Tems-In-Peace-Keeping Operations

UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 44 Date 22/05/2006 Time 4:37:30 PM

S-0865-0002-25-00001

Expanded Number S-0865-0002-25-00001

Title |tems-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East - miscellaneous correspondence, articles, reports on the Palestine liberation movements, the death of President Nasser and problems of succession within the UAR

Date Created 22/05/1967

Record Type Archival Item

Container s-0865-0002: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 22 May 1967

My dear Secretary-General; As you prepare to leave for Cairo this evening, I wish to send you these few lines to offer you my warmest good wishes for your mission. I share your concern over the situation in the Middle East at the present time, and I know your mission has an important bearing not only on reducing tension in the area but also in regard to the maintenance of world peace generally. I therefore wish you every success, as a friend and colleague, and also in the interest of world peace and the future effectiveness of the United Nations. Yours y>

The Secretary-General United Nations New York The members of the Jewish Faith Residents in the United Arab Republic receive similar treatment to the one accorded to citizens of the United Arab Republic. They suffer no discrimination, a policy which is in strict conformity with our long established principles and traditions. If a number of those residents have been temporarily detained, such precautionary measures were undertaken to ensure their personal safety during the present exceptional circumstances taking also into consideration the require- ments of public security. Their treatment conforms with all norms of humanitarian behaviour; members of their families are allowed to visit them regularly. The Red Cross was notified in due course of the aforementioned measures. It should be noted that the unfounded accusations of ill-treatment of Jews in U.A.R. constitute a weak and transparent attempt along with similar slanderous allegations, to lend an unconvincing cover to the inhuman treatment inflicted by the Israeli authorities on the Arab population in the occupied areas, i. e., the looting of their bank deposits, the unjustified and harsh restriction enforced on the consumption of the Sinai waters, the forced chasing of both Palestinians and Egyptians from Gaza and El Arish, and least but not last, the eviction of all Egyptians who are arbitrarily considered by the Israeli authorities as non-residents of the Sinai Peninsula, all of which are flagrant violations of the United Cations Charter, the Geneva Conventions and the basic tenets of human behaviour. 10 January 1969

Following is text of message sent to Bull, Oslo, from Bunche through the Norwegian Mission:

Bull from Bunche. Personally, I think your talk with General Boustany might "best take place on a visit to Beirut after repeat after your return to Jerusalem in order to avoid undue attention and significance being given to it. 15 May 1969 RdeB/ksn

An Agence France-Presse dispatch of lL.May includes some excerpts of the political platform of Mr. Georges Pompidou. The programme is presented as an answer to several questions. One of the questions reads as follows: "Question: Will Mr. Pompidou maintain the embargo on arms supplies to Israel? "Answer'. It depends less on Mr. Pompidou than on the situation in the Middle East. The main primordial purpose of France's action must be the installation in the Middle East of a just and durable peace between Israel and the Arab countries. The goal necessarily implies the end of all states of belligerency, open or smoldering, and the recognition by all States in the region of the existence of Israel within secure , recognized and guaranteed borders. The United Nations resolution of 22 November 19&7 laid the general principles of such a settlement, which can be carried out only if there is in the Middle East no imbalance of forces to the advantage of one or the other, that is to say, if the Big Powers stop supplying arms to the belligerents." (The same issue of Le Monde contains an article on Burma by special correspondent Jean Claude Pomonti. If this article does not appear in the English weekly version, I shall have it translated for you.) Rene1 de Branche October 1969 *jk \\*\ RdeB/ksRrleR/lrcn fj\W

cc: The Secretary-General Dr. Blanche Mr. Narasimhan Mr. Bolz-Bennett

Excerpts from an article in Le Monde. 12~lg October 1969, on French Foreign Minister Schumann's visit to Moscow

Priority to four-Power talks Concerning the Middle East, nothing appears to have been said which could change the relatively optimistic impression vhich Mr. Schumann had received from his previous conversations in New York with Mr. Gromyko and also at Mr. Thant's dinner for the big four Powers. This optimism is based, on the one hand, on the belief that agreement is possible among the Four (perhaps even among the parties themselves) on the modalities of a general settlement and, on the other hand, on the fact that the basic principles of the French position have not raised any objections from the Soviet side. French diplomats are convinced that the discussions among the permanent members of the Security Council are the only means of reaching an agreement which would be difficult for anyone to oppose. They believe, moreover, that a settlement in the Middle East would constitute a precedent from which other conflicts in other parts of the world could benefit. According to observers, the Soviet Union and Prance might have agreed that a solution to the Israeli-Arab war should not be dependent on the solution of other problems in which the interests of the great Powers are equally in conflict. In spite of historical references, there is a slight shift from Gaullist orthodoxy which considered that it was possible to link a settlement in the Middle East with a solution to other confrontations. Finally, France raises no objection to the essential work being done by the Soviet Union and the

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United States, the results of which will probably be examined during the four-Power meeting on 20 October. Concerning Viet-Nam, Prance is even less in a position directly to promote a peaceful solution. Mr. Schumann, it seems, has advanced various suggestions as to possible methods of bringing about a settlement. In the meantime, while wishing to remain "available", if need be, the French Government does not intend to take, openly, any initiative without being assured beforehand that it would effectively contribute to a solution to the conflict. Generally speaking, the idea of a "Vietnamization of the peace" is said to inspire these suggestions. It does not seem, however, that the discussions in the Kremlin have been expanded on this subject; the Soviet interlocutors have not given the impression of being ready to talk, on behalf of anyone, friend or ally, to Morth or South Viet-Ham. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO: The Secretary-General A: FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION Text of a debate between President Nasser and the Socialist National Congress on the Rogers plan.

FR M: D3aie:July 1970 ° Rene de Branche

CR.13(11~64> "RE. V. 27 Jul 70 G 3 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

This, brothers, is the^aiSn aiSa the way—the triumph of.,..peace, and the peace of triumph. This is t harness age of this^'liongress, and^nis is the cause of and our Arab natjjtSlf, Mayjlod g^iff you/j3uccess#4nd peace|be with

^ ~" jf t: ^ *^w#f***~ Brothers, tire ASU Nationi^>?Gongress foixrjihr ordinary session now ends. The Central Committas^will set the date for the next congress. We wish you every success. [applsiiuCe]

Question-Answer Session

c Service in Arabic 1706 GMT 24 Jul 70 M

*sldent JamalAbd an-Nasir's replies to questions by delegates to the Arab Socialist ffnion NationaT"'co;ngrres"sr^"HveJ [Text] In the name of Allah the merciful, the compassionate, the meeting is open.

Having read the questions, I can say that it will not be possible to answer all of them at a public session, because some deal with military matters. Therefore, those questions whose answers would not benefit our enemies will be answered in public session, and those dealing with military aspects will be answered at a closed session after the recess. Even then I will not speak about military matters in detail as requested, because we cannot discuss military matters in detail before a congress of 2,000 members without jeopardizing our security. However, we will be able to speak in general about military aspects at the closed session.

Also, there is no need to speak about the stands of certain states at a public session, but we will tell the truth during the closed session. The situation regarding the Arab states, Arab solidarity, and whether there is an Arab plan—all these matters need not be discussed at a public session, but we will speak about them at a closed session.

We will therefore begin with the general questions. When we have finished answering these questions, the congress will go into a 30-minute recess after which the remaining questions will be answered at a closed session.

The first question is from Muhammad Hasan Sulayman Muhammad, Shubra al-Khaymah area, Al-Qalyubiyah Province: The United States undoubtedly knows that the proposals, which it has called the U.S. initiative, contain nothing new. Are there any other matters on which agreement was reached but not disclosed, such as the Golan Height.s.^UJI observers, military zones, passage through the canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, Gaza, and other's"?'" "" ^.-~-- -=««^-~-~- •.--.—-:,

We have not agreed on anything. As I said yesterday, what the United States put forward was a set of measures [amaliyat ijraat]. People may -ask: As long as the matter is a set of measures, why did the United States not submit it a long time ago—in 1967, 1968, or 1969? I believe that the situation now, in July 1970, is very different from what it -was in 19^7, 1968, 1969, or even early 1970. Many factors have entered the situation, making the scope of the problem broader than in the past. Consequently, the United States took this initiative—this initiative I spoke about yesterday and which I said contains nothing new because every word of it is contained in the Security Council's 1967 resolution. V 27 J,ul' 70 G U UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

It-"i/s o.b'viou/ s that the United States had been making preparations to give arms to /Israel After my appeal in May to President Nixon, the United States took the aforementioned initiative in reply to the appeal. The appeal dealt with a basic matter, nafnely that the United States must order Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab •territory, and if it could not order Israel to do so, It must stop political, military, and economic aid,

Why this reply? In our opinion, this reply contains nothing more than is contained in the Security Council's November 1967 resolution.

We were therefore faced with two alternatives. We said to ourselves: If we do not answer the United States, we will be giving Israel the excuse to obtain more arms from the United States on the pretext that it wants peace while we want war. Or we could go ahead and agree to what we agreed to in 1967° r?his was what we stated yesterday.

As to the question of whether there are any other matters which were not disclosed yesterday, there are no other matters.

A question from Awatif Mahmud Kamil Faydah Kamil (Al Kahlifah): Will there also be a cease-fire between Israel and Syria, or will Israel throw Its weight against the Syrian front since Syria has not yet announced approval of the Security council resolution? What would the UAR's attitude be in this case?

The answer to this requires that the situation be clear to all of us. On 8 June 1967 the UN Security Council was in session in New York. Proposals were made calling for a cease-fire and for withdrawal of the aggressor forces to their positions of 4 June. The United States was determined that the resolution be confined to a cease-fire, and thus the part which should naturally have completed the resolution — the part calling for withdrawal of the aggressor forces to their positions of 4- June — was deleted.

We approved this resolution, Syria approved it, and so did Jordan. Matters proceeded on this basis until May 1969 when we in Egypt announced, through me personally, that the cease-fire could not go on forever and that as long as there was a UN Security Council resolution calling for withdrawal of the aggressive forces and stipulating that acquisition of territory by force is not permissible, we here in Egypt considered the cease-fire resolution to have expired.

What did this mean? It meant that we canceled the cease-fire resolution between us and Israel. However, the June 19&7 resolution providing for a cease-fire between Jordan and Israel and between Syria and Israel was not canceled.

Nevertheless, should Israel throw its weight against the Syrian front, since it is clear that we and Syria have a Joint defense, Israel's violation of the cease-fire on the Syrian front would accordingly be a violation of the cease-fire on the Egyptian front (applause); and a violation of the cease-fire on the Jordanian front would be a violation of the cease-fire on the Egyptian front.

Another question: Some may believe that the peaceful solution has been achieved as a result of approving the U.S. Initiative. Does not the President regard It necessary to continue mobilizing for the battle, now that Abba E'ban has described a cease-fire .for a limited time as a stage of preparation for war?

I have ..Aftvei said that the peaceful solution has been achieved. What I said yesterday l ! was that- -/e r'.o not wish 'to""ehHfer fc a"i"h""great ' hope,, that it "is possible to reach a peaceful Ko'VMon,, ard that the battle is violent and ferocious against an enemy who has ains. V. 27 Jul 70 jjF. _^ G 5 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

I have X'constantlVy said, even when we accepted the Security council resolution in 1967S that JMe peaceful solution is a 'Very remote development and may even be impossible due to the^nature of the enemy and his goal of expansion. There cannot be expansion and a peaep^Tul solution. On this basis, the U.S. initiative is not in any way a peaceful solwlfion. The U.S. initiative is tantamount to certain measures previously adopted in

It is clear that Israel—even in the Israeli comments today—blames me for what I said yesterday: Withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territory. They are saying Abd an- Hasir does not want a peaceful solution because he is demanding withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territory. Of course, this is impudence we have often heard, are hearing, and will continue to hear.

Another question is from All al-Bajri of Al-Jizah Province: What will Jae_ the attitude of the United States and England if Israel rejects the U.S. initiative?

I really cannot say what will be the attitude of the United States or England. Yesterday I said I have no confidence in the United States. Today I say also I have no confidence in England. But what will be their attitude—as the world will see it? Will they continue to supply arms to Israel? JEf they do, there will have to be a major confrontation between the entire Arab world and the United States and England, Or they will pursue another course, the reasonable course. Supplying arms to Israel—and we have declared to the entire world that we seek peace and that it is Israel which seeks expansion- -will mean that the United States and England are encouraging Israel to keep the occupied Arab territory.

Husayn Abd al-Ghani of Al-Jizah Province: Could we ask Jarring, to obtain from the United States an answer stating what it will 'be ' able t odo to insure implementation of its proposals if Israel rejects them, and whether it will at least stop supplying Israel with arms? a* In fact. Jarring is not active now. He carried out his mission for a certain period "and then said he had finished everything he had to do, and left. askJagring. We can ask the United States what it will do if Is rafSre jectsth i s initiative and whether the United States will at least stop supplying Israel with arms. However, if Israel does not approve this U.S. initiative, there will be no mission for Jarring, because what would there be for him to do, since basically there would not be multiple parties for Jarring to contact and hold talks with?

Another question is from Adil Adam of Al-Jizah Province: HOW will it be possible to implement the U.S. initiative since it begins by discussing implementation of the Security Council resolution and then mentions Israeli withdrawal, while the Security Council resolution starts with withdrawal?

In fact these are very formal points because [to answer the question] we would have to examine in detail the Security council resolution so that everything in it would be implemented. However, whether this was written first or that was written first does not mean that this will start before that.

From Muhammad Muhammad Hasan of Aswan: Is there a difference in form and essence between the U.S. initiative and the Security Council resolution? As I told you yesterday — I read the Security Council resolution to you yesterday. We also read the U.S. initiative, There is no difference either in form or in essence except that the Security Council resolution contains more details and the U.S. initiative discusses, in general, implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its details. I do not regard this as a difference in form or essence, V. 27 .tfUl ?0 G 6 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

next question is: What will be the attitude of those Arab states which have •/relations with and commitments to the United States toward the United States if J1 perael rejects the initiative and the United States eontin-ies its policy of supporting /Israel?

In fact, at the beginning of May we spoke about this subject and turned to the heads of the Arab states and then to the Arab people everywhere and said that this is the last opportunity we can possibly give the United States, and that the United States must know that if it continues and persists In helping Israel its interests •^.n the Arab world will be in danger. All I can say today is that the coining days Vill make clear to us what the Arab states' attitude is to be In this regard. Question from Muhammad Muhammad Arafah of Bani Suwayf; The first armistice decision of 19^8 was one of the factors which enabled the Zionist gangs to prepare for the next battle. Will a 5-month cease-fire provide a period for Israel to catch its breath free from the war of attrition, a chance to complete preparations and to return to the part it retreated from in Sinai west of the.Canal, and to build a new Bar-Lev S-inet

The truth is that we cannot in any way draw a. similiarity between what is happening now and what happened in 19^8. In 1948 we were noj; in a position to obtain arms pr ammunition. While Israel was in such a position, especially after Britain's withdrawal and the end of. the mandate, when arms began to arrive in Israel. Therefore, in those days Israel needed time to catch its breath, mobilize its forces, and pile up arms. The situation now is quite different because Israel is getting all the arms it wants from the United States and Britain. It has obtained tanks and is getting planes. It has everything, even the most complicated and sophisticated electronic equipment. Three months would not change much in this regard, because when they request things they receive them by air from the United States within 24 houi*s. It has been announced .that they received 130 electronic devices within 24 hours of the time their planes became the target of Egyptian rockets.

As for the sec'ond part of the question regarding preparations, a return to the area Israel retreated from west of the canal, an,d construction of a new Bar-Lev Line; When they built the Bar-Lev Line east of the canal and we shelled and destroyed much of it, the Israeli losses were then indeed high. Israel wanted to minimize its losses and accordingly decided to pull back 20 kilometers east and to maintain on the canal strong positions 10 kilometers apart. On the east bank of the canal they have 17 positions, 'The previous Bar-Lev Line which they spoke about is no more» There would be no advantage for Israel in returning and rebuilding the line, because if we managed once previously to destroy this line in a short time and inflict heavy losses on Israel, forcing it to abandon the line and positions and pull back, we can do it again.

I Question from Sad Ali Said, Aswan: What we fear most is that during the cease-fire •: period Israel might build fortifications and settlements in Sinai and rebuild the ' Bar-Lev Line, Are there guarantees against this? , The Israelis say they have built three settlements in Sinai=-two close to the Mediterranean near Al-Bardawil Lake and the other near Sharm ash-Shaykh for tourist purposes. They could have built more settlements if they had wanted to in the 3 years since 1967. Even if they did build settlements in Sinai, it would not interest us or affect our military plans if it came about that we had to use military force. V. 27 Jul G 7 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

er-tKe BaEp'Eev Line, I spoke about that in my previous answer« * I will A^SO read: repeated questions. This may seem repetitious, but the reason I am doirjg^so IS that they may indicate the nature of the>people«s anxiety and thinking.

Question from Muhammad Mahdi Shuman, Ismailia: What guarantees have been made to prevent Israel from building defense fortifications in the territories occupied after 5 June--especially east .of f\he Suez Canal — -during the cease-fire period?

The pravious answer applies .here too.

Question from Abid Abid Uthman, Al-Fayyum: Have any measures been taken to fix a definite time for the negotiations procedure so it will not be dragged out? How much time has Israel been given to present its views on the initiative? Can- Israel be allowed to make new reservations?

Actually, when we received the U.S. letter we studied it and realized that we had two alternatives: To reject or approve, A rejection would have been exploited throughout -— 1-'"»« H^» n» rnni>l-i^"">J"'n W™*'1* 'r ' ' ' "" **'-'"^***cffll^FT>V1*iTn'P^**M'" ••* i ** ' •fiTrfTT:tT'i1'-inT«Mi>^i-ttT:T ' — ' TV-'t -'-"- -" • the world and would, have been taken to mean that we want war and do not want peace in aSyMfl>rm7'*even if Israel is willing to give us back all the territories occupied on 5 June 1967 and that it is Israel who wants peace. Thus Israel would be the threatened and the martyr state and so on, which we mentioned yesterday and which you know. There- fore in our reply we gave our views but did not make any reservations about this U.S. initiative. On this basis we did not talk about filing time limits or setting a bime for Israel.

Can. Israel express new reservations? It is said that Israel's reply to the U.S. initiative is not yet ready. However, if Israel expresses any reservations this will create a new situation* The U.S. initiative calls for the implementation of Security Council Resolution No 2AZ of November 1967. If Israel expresses the reservations that it will retain a part of the territory and Jerusalem, this will mean that the U.S. initiative has failed, for the whole discussion is about implementation of the Security Council rasplution, which deals with withdrawal and peace arrangements a

We are awaiting the Israeli reply to the U.S- initiative. We say there cannot be expansion and peace. If Israel insists on expansion, then we will not have peace.

Question by Abd al-Aziz Yusuf from Al-Minya: Will the cease-fire agreement provide an excuse for the eruemy to make preparations for aggression and to rebuild the frontline fortifications which were destroyed by our armed forces?

I have answered this question.

Question by Hani Sayyid Abu Zayd from Al-Qalyubiyah: Why has the United States chosen this particular moment to put forward its peace proposals, while in the past it has declined to force Israel to implement the withdrawal resolution and has continued to supply Israel with modern weapons? Is this a deception and a trick to strengthen Israel's military position, or what?

The United States has been giving Israel political support since 1967. The United States first supported Israel in the Security Council on 8 June 1967 when the Soviet Union introduced a. draft resolutipn calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of the aggressive forces to the 5 June borders. The United States rejected this draft resolution and insisted that the resolution deal only with the cease-fire, 27 Ju-1770 G 8 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC '

"o ajJ this time the United States helped Israel militarily and by every means to enable to.'impose its wish on the Arab world, to expand, and to dictate its strategy of ing peace on us.

jfsrael has always spoken about secure and recognized borders but it has only been deceiving 'the world, because by secure and recognized borders it means new borders, not the 5 June 1967 borders=new borders as Israel and the Israeli leaders want them. Despite this, the United States has not exerted any pressure on Israel; on the contrary, it has helped Israel by supplying it with Phantoms, Skyhawlcs, electronic equipment, self-propelled guns.-'' tanks, and various other weapons.

Why has the United States chosen this particular moment? I say that new circumstances have arisen which did not exist in 1968 or 1969. It is possible that the United States has now come to feel that the Arabs will not surrender, or it is possible the initiative was made so we would give "no" for an answer, in which ease they would have had complete freedom to supply Israel. Some Western papers had said that, if our answer was negative, we would be responsible .for the supply of arms to Israel. Now that our answer has been positive, Israel's position vrill be difficult.

At any rate, the situation now is different from what it was in the past. We must always appreciate Soviet support. We must remember that the USSR has always stood by us politically, economically, and militarily. The USSR also has Its own opinions on this subject. It also nas its own proposals which provide for complete withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. The future alone will show if the purpose of the U.S., initiative was a peaceful settlement or if the whole thing was a deception and a trick.

Question by Hamid Yahya from Alexandria: Could this plan, which is called the U,S. initiative,, have the following bad intentions: Oar acceptance of a temporary cease-fire would be tantamount to a temporary armistice during which the two sides would prepare to resume the fighting and. Israel would be able to devise a strategy for paralyzing the missiles on the front?

Before coming here today I was reading news agency dispatches. Israel's Prime Minister Go Ida Melr has said Israel cannot possibly accept a temporary cease-fire. Israel wants a permament cease-fire, .#he said. I cannot see how in 3 months they could paralyze the missiles, because the missiles are installed in a particular way and according to particular plan. Bar-Lev has admitted it is a new plan. The commander of the Israeli Air Force has also said that so far, they have not been able to find a method of attacking these missiles and that they will continue to search for new methods.

They will, of course, continue to search for- a. method whether there is fighting or not-- everyone studies ways to strengthen himself militarily. If the U.S. initiative fails the two sides will have no choice but to fight. Indeed, it will be a battle of life or death, a fierce and savage battle. '

Another question by Hamid Yahya from Alexandria: In view of the fact that the President announced his rejection of the cease-fire a few months ago, the Arab peoples rallying around their leader may suffer a strong psychological' shock.' Moreover, confusion and rumors may spread within Arab ranks leading to reactivation of a counterrevolution which would imperil the safety and cohesion of the Arab front,,

I have already told .you that we were under constant threats and pressure last year to accept an unconditional cease-fire—-that Is, we were to return to the 8 June 1967 resolution while Isya'^'Continued to reject the Security Council's November resolution calling for withdrawal. G 9 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

fiis was what Israel, the United States, and Britain wanted-=that we return to the cease-fire without limits and conditions. Of course, a cease-fire without limits and conditions would serve Israelis interests, for there would be no war of attrition and no Israeli losses and efforts. Israel would be in a strong position because it would be occupying Arab territories without being exposed to any military operations. Thus, Israel would not accept withdrawal for many years—no one would know how long. This was why I said we would never accept a cease-fire. I also told you that we received a U.S. threat on 2 February. They said that if we did not accept the cease~fire--meaning a permanent cease-fire—the deep Israeli raids would continue and expose our country to many dangers. Despite that, we did not accept the cease-fire even when Cairo and its suburbs, Asyut, and other areas—as we know—were being attacked,

I said we accept the cease-fire on one condition: Israel must declare it accepts the withdrawal provided for in the 1967 Security Council resolution. The U.S. initiative calls for a cease=fire for a limited period of 3 months; at the same time it says that Israel should declare its agreement to withdraw from the occupied territory in accordance with the 1967 Security Council resolution. Therefore, the two are linked.

Now Israeli Prime Minister GoIda Meir, in an interview with an Israeli newspaper, was asked: Why do you not utter the word "withdrawal" and why do you completely refuse to say this word? Her reply was that she will never utter the word withdrawal because it is withdrawal the Arabs want. As I told you, Israel always refuses to say the word withdrawal and instead talks about a redistribution of its forces. When Jarring was here, he used to come and ask us: What is your attitude regarding withdrawal? We used to answer him. Then he would go to Israel and ask the question: What is your attitude regarding withdrawal? They used to tell him: We will discuss our attitude regarding the redistribution of our forces when the Arabs agree to sit with us around the negotiation table. Therefore, I do not believe that I was wrong in what I said earlier. In fact, I am confident that the Arab masses completely understood what I said yesterday. They understand that it is not a retreat and that a cease-fire is bound to the withdrawal operation. Will Israel say it approves of withdrawal--the word used in t-he U.S. initiativ Will Golda Meir, who today said that Israel does not approve of a conditional cease-fire and does not agree to utter the word withdrawal, come back and say that she approves of a cease-fire for 3 months and that she agrees to withdrawal?

Will Israel—-all of (its) comments I have seen--(?attempt to show that we are laughing at the Americans). UPI reports from Jerusalem that the Israeli radio and television commentators view with suspicion tinged with enmity what seems to be a conditional acceptance by President Abd an-Nasir of the U.S. initiative since these commentators have said that An-Wasir's speech contains nothing new. Vfhat they would regard as new would be our agreement to their taking any Arab land. We said this yesterday, and we have said it hundreds of times before: We will not, under any circumstances, agree to part with any Arab land, and this does not mean just Egyptian land, Abd an-Nasir's speech, they say, contains nothing new in connection with possibilities for peace in the Middle East. They add that Abd an-Nasir used Rogers' proposals as a means to repeat the previous Egyptian position calling for complete withdrawal from all the occupied territory without the Arabs committing themselves to establishment of peace. The commentators say Abd an-Nasir's conditional acceptance of the Rogers plan might place Israel in a difficult diplomatic position. The commentators demand a wise Israeli policy to avoid ruining Israel's international relations. G 10 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

leli radio commentator says Abd an-Nasir's words conceal his real aim — to drive F wedge between Israel and the United States so that the flow of arms, which Israel eeds* badly,, will stop. A television commentator says? we are really anxious to see to t wh<=& extent the Americans will fall into this Egyptian trap. These are Israeli statements, not ours. --

In our reply to the U.S. initiative, what we really wanted to say was that we do not want war for the sake of war and that anyone who does cannot really be a responsible person. However, we do want our rights. If we are able to achieve our rights by diplomatic and peaceful means, we will work through every possible means and in all fields to achieve our rights through peaceful means. When we exhaust all peaceful means, then fighting will be our only alternative, because we cannot give up our land. Fighting to liberate our territory is our right and our duty. These are self-evident and known facts,

What I want to say is that the Arab masses are highly vigilant and throughly understand and follow up matters, and that the Arab masses have been following the details of this case for years. On this basis, there cannot be any confusion as far as the masses are concerned. There are persons who are opposing-=there are persons against us. There are persons who are objecting, there are persons who are opportunists, there are persons who want political gains. Whatever we say, these persons will be useless, whether here or throughout the Arab front. You cannot convince these persons no matter what you tell them because basically their aims are bad as far as we are concerned; or their objectives are opportunists as far as -they are concerned j or they are not interested in the consequences~=whether Israel obtains hundreds of aircraft from the United States or not,, In f act , we must not take this group of people into account. It is the masses of the vigilant people in our country here and in all parts of the Arab world that we must take into consideration* I am confident that the vigilant masses of the people in our country and throughout the Arab nation understand the motives which prompted us to reply positively to the U.S. Rogers initiative.

Question from Salah Ismail, Mina Province: The domestic front is undoubtedly mobilized for a military solution. What will the masses reaction be if the political organization and the information media explain the attitude toward the U.S. initiative and the masses are convinced by it, then-~for one reason or another-=it proves impossible to implement the provisions of this initiative? We cannot treat political action like someone whose arm has been broken and put in a plaster cast and thens whenever we say a word, we must break the plaster and cast it again. Our masses are very aware and understand this matter. I have always said, and I said yesterday, that we will move on the road of a peaceful solution and political action. Still I believe that what was taken by force can only be regained by force. All the people understand this. They understand that we must move freely and that we are dealing with the whole world because the world has very great influence. Israel is very skillful in dealing with the world. It poses as the victim and as the one who wants peace, claiming that the Arabs seek to slaughter the Jews, that they seek war, that they will never accept peace. Our people and our domestic front are, in my opinion, very. aware and mobilized for the military solution. We have always talked about a peaceful solution and at the 'same time mobilized for a military solution. I think there is really no reason at all to fear that if we talk about the U.S. initiative and then go back to military action this would shock the masses. G 11 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Achieving a peaceful solution is not guaranteed. Achieving a political solution is fa-ri"etched. I have been saying this since 1967 when we agreed to accept the Security -Council resolution. I say it again today on 24 July 1970. It is difficult to achieve a peaceful solution. There are many powers and many conflicts. There is also Israel, which wants to expand, occupy Arab land, and impose surrender on the Arabs. There is a difference between peace and surrender. I think that in this respect the masses are very clever and aware.

The same questioner asks: The Rogers message did not mention the Palestinian people's rights. We have always announced that solving the problem requires two things: Complete Withdrawal and the Palestinian people's rights. How will this initiative make possible restoration of the Palestinian people's rights?

I say the U.S. initiative covers both these things because it speaks of implementation of all the provisions of the 1967 Security Council resolution. This resolution provides for the achievement of a solution to the problem of the Palestinians or the Palestinian ref.ugees-=a just solution in accordance with the UN resolutions„ This means that the question of the Palestinian people's rights to their homeland is covered. Accordingly, I say that what we accepted yesterday is what we accepted in November 1967 because the U. S. = Rogers initiative speaks of implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council resolution.

Question from Ibrahim Ali al-Qadi, Oina: The UAR accepted the Security Council resolution before Israel. Israel was against accepting it despite all efforts. Would it not have been better for the 'United States to get Israel's approval of its recent proposals-- called the U.S. initiative=-before asking Egypt to accept them? Can we be sure that the United States has good intentions despite its apparent complete partiality to Israel and overall aid to it?

Actually, this is a question of procedure. This initiative was made to us and Israel at the same time. In my opinion, the Israelis did not answer because they were waiting for us to reject it so they could blame us and go shedding tears in every country, saying Egypt has turned down the U.S. peace initiative and Egypt wants war=-=give us arms and funds. This is why vie had to give a positive reply to forestall Israel in the eyes of the whole world.

No one knows what Israel's reply will be. They say they will hold a conference next week, that Abba Eban has a new plan which he announced yesterday, and that when I spoke yesterday I did not answer Eban's plan. When I spoke yesterday I was not at all interested in answering a plan by Abba Eban. Before I came in I knew and I had read Abba Eban's statement, but this was not the subject I was going to speak about, because Abba Eban always tries to deceive the world public, Every day he makes 10 conflicting statements. Yesterday, I was not answering Abba Eban's statement and was not assuming that the United States adopts Israel's attitude. We have accepted the U.S. initiative. After this we will see how good the U.S. intentions are, what the reaction will be, and what the United States will do.

We are also waiting for the Israeli reply. Our reply yesterday was unconditional. We approved all the points made by the United States but explained our interpretation of the Security Council resolution. If Israel makes a conditional reply then it will be Israel which has rejected the U.S. initiative and which wants not peace but expansion and seizure of Arab land. . V S7 J,ul 70 G 32 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC '

by AW al-Hayy Harafil Abd al-Fattah from Al-Jifsah: The foreign minister's '' a^pi'wal 'of the proposals of U.S. Secretary of State Hogcrs followed You.? Excellency's ../return from your trip to Mossew, .although the U.S. proposals or initiative were submitted early in the second half of June. This could give the impression that the recent Moscow talks were not as successful as the previous talks, particularly these during Jrtiur trip in January 1970. We would like you to explain why the approval of the U.S. initiative took place 1 month later.

We will first speak about our relations with Moscow. Our relations with Moscow are 100 percent strong. We speak to one another with complete clarity and frankness. The Soviet leaders in Moscow affirmed to us during our recent visit that they fully support us, with every means, in our endeavor to regain our legitimate rights. I tell you that I left Moscow completely satisfied with my latest visit. I agreed with them, that in order for us to be kept informed, Ali Sabri will go to Moscow once every 2 months to discuss the political and military situation. Therefore any rumors about failure of the talks are false.

We are in full agreement on a political plan. We are also in full agreement on a military plan. All we agreed on is being implemented. The Soviet Union is completely convinced for the sole reason, as they told us, that we are defending ourselves, our country, the Arab nation, and our occupied territories.

You have asked me to explain why the approval took so long to announce. The fact is when we made our appeal in early May they answered us on 20 June. It took them more than one and one-half months. When they sent us their initiative and asked us to answer immediately, vie d®cided not to answer them until a month later. This was a national attitude we adopted. [applause] ' It had no significnace. What helped us in this case was that I was in Libya when the proposals were madft, Then I spent barely 48 hours here before leaving for the USSR. In fact there were no real reasons for the delay«

Question by Hasan Ismail Yasin from [wrd indistinct]: Concerning the U.S. plan,, some people are confused about the cease-fire versus a peaceful settlement and have asked us: Why did ye approve the plan even through the Golan Heights was not mentioned? Could the President clarify this point?

We have already spoken about the cease-fire in detail. Regarding the political or peaceful settlement, neither has anything been said about Sinai, We have not said a word about Sinai, Jerusalem, the West Bank, or Golan. What has been said is that Israel must announce its acceptance•of withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November 1967. This, 4ti my opinion, covers all the territories occupied in 1967, because the Security Council resolution states the inadmissibility of acquiring territories by force.

The U.S. initiative is a general jine. As I told you yesterday it does not contain details about a peaceful settlement—it is a set of measures.. The new thing in it is that Israel must announce that it accepts withdrawal. Israel has refused since 1967 to announce even once that it accepts withdrawal.

A question by Abd al-Ghani Qandil of Al-Qalyubiyah: On what basis have we accepted the U.S. initiative despite the fact that it contains nothing new and is similar to the Security Council resolution issued on ?.Z November 1967? a 13 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Whiztfue accepted the Security Council resolution we were in an unenviable position— ~fn a state of military collapse,. Now we have accepted this initiative at a time when our military position has changed from one of weakness to one of strength in all political, military, and economic fields,

I belieye that in my previous statements .1 have explained why we have accepted the U.S. initiative,. I say that this is really thefinal opportunity for discussion about a political solution. We must not give Israel any chance to cry out to the world and obtain arms to strike at the Arabs. Israel takes Phantoms. Who does it strike with them? It strikes us. It strikes Egypt with the Phantoms. It takes the Skyhawks and strikes Egypt with the Skyhawks. They go and tell the Americans, and the result is that President Nixon declared at his press conference,' in his statements on Egypt and Syria, that Arabs want to throw Israel into the sea and destroy the Israelis, while Israel does not want to throw Arabs into the sea. I commented'on Nixon's statement yesterday and said that he should know the truth: That it was Israel which threw the Arabs out of their homes—threw them into a sea of sand, a sea of desert, and expelled them. It expelled 1 million, pore than a million,

Nixon has presented Jbhis initiative and says he is suspending the supply of arms to Israel until he receive^ an answer. . We must work in the. stoblime interest'Of the homeland and not calculate the operation on the basis of what existed in 196? and what exists now.

We say there is a final opportunity for a political solution. The United States may have reconsidered its position and may want to adopt a sound stand that will contribute to a political solution. Therefore, we must not let this opportunity and our reply must be positive to see what the result will be.

Abd al-Fattah Muhammad ParaJ of Al-Minufiyah: It is understood that Syria did not accept the Security Council resolution in November 1967. Subsequently, the U.S. initiative did not include it, particularly in connection with the 5-month cease-fire. If aggression is committed against Syria during this period, what will our positI6n be?

I have answered this question. I'.said that we were the only ones who abolished -the -cease-fire and that any aggression against Syria or Jordan will be a violation of the cease fire.

Mahmud Halawah asks: The initiative requires that the1 diplomatic, official, and popular departments and the political organization have a clear, definite role. Is there a plan for these departments in this situation?

Certainly, there is a general plan, but we do not know the positions of the others so as to be able to .work out a1 detailed plan. It is difficult for us to do this. If there are comments from Israel today, our detailed plan will be on the basis of these comments.. If there are comments from the United States—what is the official U.S. stand? They have not yet said. What is the official Israeli position? Despite statements from Golda Meir and Abba Eban, this position is not yet known. There is a plan for the diplomats. The impact of this plan has perhaps appeared throughout the world. The world press says the Arabs want peace, that the talk that the Arabs want war and not peace is untrue, and that Egypt's positive reply calls for optimism. When the real reactions appear, we will be able to work out a detailed plan. V. 27 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

& ,'• Question/by Muhammad Abd al-Ka'mil from Aswan: 'What will be the fate of the U.S. pjjfsone'r pilot?

*''! Vjr-ill send him over to you in Aswan. [laughter] _/' ""What will be fate of the U.S. prisoner pilot? Will he be tried as a prisoner of war or will be be handed 9ver.to Israel?

I want to say that we will not hand over pilots to Israel. In the past we returned two pilots to them in exchange for one Egyptian'and two Syrian pilots. We decided to give them the two pilots in exchange for our Egyptian pilot who was their prisoner and for the two Syrian pilots who had landed by mistake at an Israeli airfield.

In my opinion the destruction of Phantoms is not as valuable as the capture of Israeli pilots. Therefore, we will not return- the Israeli pilots or prisoners to Israel. However we will treat them in accordance with the Geneva convention. The Red Cross will be allowed to see them. It was announced in the United States that the American pilot left the United States several years ago,' and therefore even if he insists on his U.S. citigenship they will not allow him to regain his U.S. citizenship. As far as I know he has U.S. as well as Israeli citizenship, like many other American Israelis who have emigrated to Israel.

Question by Ammar Banati from Jfisyut: What would be our position if we accepted the cease-fire for a specific period and then Israel refused to withdraw, as happened with the Security Council's 19^7 resolution?

This is very simple. If we accept the cease-fire and Israel (?does not) the cease- fire is not implemented. Will Israel reply that it agrees to withdraw in accordance with the UN 1967 resolution? If Israel says this, then the cease-fire will be effective for 3 months. If at the end of the 3 months Israel has refused to withdraw, naturally we will have the right to continue the battle to liberate our lands,

I have here a question by several people from Al-Mahattah al-Gharbiyah: The people fear that the 3-month cease-fire contained in the U.S. initiative is a new American and Israeli trick against the Arab peoples to give the enemy the chance to carry out a surprise attack. Shis fear stems from the crisis of confidence and the Arab peoples* bitter experiences in their dealings with Israel and the United States.

We have taken surprise military actions into consideration and assessed Israel's positipn.. If Israel could carry out a surprise military action, it would not have [words indistinct]. We can say that Israel cannot possibly carry out a surprise military action against our armed forces. A single helicopter may carry out an opsaation at a spot in the desert; we cannot disperse our army everywhere in the desert. As for an attack operation, however, I can assure you that our armed forces are capable of routing attacking Israeli-forces, i Question: Were the Rogers proposals, called the U.S. initiative, submitted -to the bi«-four representatives before being submitted to the UAR? What will be the stand of the big four—especially the United States—if Israel rejects these proposals?

No,, these proposals were not Submitted to the- big four, before being submitted to the UAR.:- ^However after they were submitted—or on the same day they were submitted to the U1F.—they were also submitted to the big $ owe «:•••• the Soviet Union, Prance, and Britair... G 15 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

'will be the attitude of the big four, especially the United States, if Israel sjects these proposals? As I said before, I cannot say what this attitude will be. We have accepted these proposals and accepted this U.S. initiative. Is Israel rejects them, we will see the attitude of each state, and we will determine our attitude accordingly.

Second question; The cease-fire decision includes all the Arab fronts, such as Syria and Lebanon. What will be the UAR stand if Israel violated the cease-fire during the 3-months period?

Naturally if Israel violated the cease-fire on any front this will be a violation of the cease-fire on all fronts.

Was the U.S. initiative the result of our forces escalation, the result of Soviet support and consequent fear of a confrontation with the Soviet Union in a v/orld war, or a response to Your Excellency's appeal?

We waited one and one-half months. We spoke on 1 May and then waited one and one-half months. They should have replied to our appeal because it was a subject of interest not only to us but the whole Arab nation.

The building of our forces, our steadfastness, our standing firm for the last 3 years, and the Soviet Union's determination to support us and help us defend our land, the Soviet Union's determination to help us liberate the occupied territory-=-all these are factors which cannot be forgotten or ignored. Also, a lot has been written in the past few months,, and Nixon has said there is a danger in the Middle East and this danger might produce a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. All I wish to say is that our position today is much stronger than in 1967., 1968, and 1969. The more our position is strengthened, the stronger become our relations with our friends in the Soviet Union--there is complete understanding between us and the more attainable a political solution becomes. I have told you before that no one will give us a political solution while we have no strength. We must be strong, and they must feel vie are capable of restoring our rights by force. This is the only way Israel will accept a political solution,, As long as they are convinced that we cannot cross the canal and cannot fight, why should they leave the eastern bank? Therefore there are many factors.

U.S. President Nixon delivered hysterical statements on (?1 July). What is the gist of these statements, and what is the Arab reply to them?

Truly in this period there have been many contradictory statements; The U.S. President said something, the U.S. secretary of state said something, the U.S. President's assistant said something else. The assistant secretary of state said something, and congressmen said something. I regarded all this talk as directed at Moscow, At that time we were in Moscow discussing political and military subjects, discussing special subjects regarding the Soviet Unionss support for us. At that time I regarded all the statements, the statements you have referred to, as hysterical. Their purpose was to apply pressure so our Moscow talks would not achieve the desired result. Our friends in the Soviet Union also understood this, and we discussed these statements. They had no effect on our strong relations with Moscow, relations based on supporting us in the defense of our country and on strengthening and suppprting us in the liberation of our occupied lands.

Why was the cease-fire proposal not coupled to the necessity for Israel to declare its agreement to begin withdrawal from territory occupied after 5 June 1967? V/' 27/Jul 70 G 16 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

e cease-fire proposal [Abd an-Naslr begins sentence again] According to the initia- there is also a proposal that Israel declare! it agrees to withdraw from occupied territory in accordance with the 1967 Security Council resolution,

Question from Abd al-Munim Ash-Shair, Port Said Province; What are the chances of Israel accepting the U.S. initiative?

The chances? I--no one knows, of course,

Question from Mustafi Bultaji al-Janayni, Al-Qalyubiyah province: Will the acceptance of the Rogers proposals bring stability to Israel and consolidate its military position, since it may build fortifications and bunkers during the cease-fire period and use them in aggression against our forces, as happened in the case of the Bar-Lev line?

If they wanted to build fortifications and bunkers they could have done so. They have been there for 3 years, and months will not make any difference,,

Will the cease-fire enable us to install a network [An-Nasir does not complete the question] This we will answer in the closed session,

Question from Uways Muhammad Uways, Ad-Daqahllyah Province; When will the UAR commitment to this approval of the U.S. initiative become effective, and when will we have the right to revoke it?

If Israel announces approval and pledges to withdraw from the occupied Arab territory in accordance with the Security Council resolution, and accepts everything in the U.S. initiative without reservation, and if Jarring comes here as a result and notifies the UN Secretary General of the undertakings of the parties concerned regarding the Rogers plan, it is then that implementation of this initiative will begin. Of course it is our right to revoke it if our enemy revokes it, or If we discover that we will be sit- ting for years or months without result. Of course Israel, in its talks with Jarring, may talk and not answer because Jarring spent a year and a half before talking to Israel in vain.

What will the U.S. attitude be if Israel rejects this initiative?

We shall see,

Question from [name indistinct]; Would our acceptance of a 90-day cease-fire not give Israel the chance to strengthen itself on the three fronts?

(?This again) shows — perhaps I will not read all the questions --it shows what Is occupying everyone's mind. How can Israel strengthen itself more? Will it call up its re- serves? If it does— our aim is in fact to compel Israel to call up more of its reser- vists, because if it does its economic situation will get worse. Israel knows this. This is why it decided that the war should not be a land war but basically an' air war. Hence its rush to get planes, for if Israel was not superior to us in the air and we crossed the canal then a land war would ensue. A land war would compel Israel to mobilize the army completely. If the battles continued for long Israelis economic situation would deteriorate and it would suffer a great deal. Therefore I think we should not fear this matter of strengthening, G 17 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

from Zalcariya Udbu, Al-Buhayrah Province; Can we rest assured that the ,_;ed States and its President will not seize the opportunity of the cease-fire to 'Strengthen Israel, and will not our acceptance of the U.S. initiative revive the sympathetic attitude toward the United States at a time when hostility toward the United States should be intensified?

I told you yesterday that on the basis of my past experience I have no confidence in this matter, but we have replied and we shall see. Will they strengthen Israel? If they do it will be nothing new, because they have been strengthening Israel since 1967 and before 1967. As for reviving the sympathetic view toward the United States in the Arab nation, some will say: We said before that it is the United States which can solve the problem; everything is in U.S. hands. These people are the same U.S. agents who used to say that the case was hopeless politically, militarily, and economically. However..this initiative is not only the result of efforts by the United States but also efforts by the Soviet Union, which has given us arms and helped us to resist the deep raids and which has resolved to help us with every possible means to defend our homeland and liberate our usurped land. It is not (?accurate) to say that U.S. sympathizers might convince the Arab masses or the Arab public, because the masses and public know what has been done by all sides. However this will not stop any American here in any club from saying: We said it before but no one listened to us. We said before — why antagonize the United States, and why do this and that?

Why did we antagonize the United States? Because it gave Israel electronic equipment. Why did we antagonize the United States? Because it supported Israel politically and stood up in the Security Council, from the first day, to refuse to approve the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire and for the withdrawal of the aggressing forces. Indeed we were quite justified in antagonizing the United States. Our relations with the United States have been severed. In 1968 the Americans spoke to us about resumption of relations. Subsequently they spoke again and again, but my answer has been that we cannot resume relations with the United States because whenever any incident or issue is raised in the Security Council the United States sides unconditionally with Israel, Even when Israel attacked Beirut international airport and all other states took a stand against Israel the United States said that if a resolution is to be adopted denouncing the act then it should denounce not only Israel but also the Arab states.

Thus I believe that U.S. sympathizers are not selling much in the Arab world. Further- more, intensifying the hostility toward the United States would not, in my opinion, require much effort. However, any such intensification will be a result of what happens after our reply. We shall see what the United States does and what its attitude is.

Muhammad Ahmad Hamrush of Al-Minufiyah; Now that we have .accepted Rogers peace proposals, what will our position be if Israel rejects them as it previously rejected the Security Council resolution of November 1967, which we approved? What is the position of the Arab states'ingeneral in regard to such a situation?

I will answer the first part of the question. Fighting is continuing. We are building our armed forces. We will recover by force what Israel took in June 1967. As for the .position of the Arab states in general regarding this situation, I will tell you about it at the secret session frankly and in detail. G 18 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

/' Muhaimmad Lutfi Ahmad Hasan of Al-Minya Province: Does the approval of the U.S. initiative give the aggressive Israeli forces an opportunity to completely prepare themselves, or could the purpose of the initiative be to deprive the Arabs of the opportunity and waste time so the Israelis can produce things that will prevent us from becoming superior?

By producing things that wilX prevent us from becoming superior, do you mean an atomic bomb, for example? I do not think the situation in the Middle East will come to atomic war. We have signed an agreement called the agreement aanning proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this agreement the Soviet Union pledges to give immediate aid to any state exposed to a nuclear threat. The United States could stand on Israel's side, but we would appeal to the Soviet Union in regard to this pledge.

Hahmud Sulayman Sulayman of Ismalias We fear that Israel, during the cease-fire period, will rebuild the military fortifications which have been destroyed in Sinai. We are particularly frightened by the Bar-lev line.

Everyone is afraid they would build the Bar-Lev Line. My opinion is that if they built the Bar-lev line, we would probably have an opportunity to inflict heavier losses on them,

Izzat Mahrus of Asyut Provincei What will be the UAH's attitude if Israel concentrates militarily, especially on the Syrian front, since Syria did not approve the Security Council resolution and therefore the cease-fire?

I say that Syria has approved the cease-fire resolution since July 1967. If Israel committed aggression against Syria, this would end the cease-fire with Egypt.

Mahmud Hamid of Asyut Provinces What are the points of difference between Rogers proposals and the UN 22 November 196? resolution?

Yesterday, I read to you the UN resolution and Rogers proposals. The difference is that the UN resolution contains many details and deals with definite details and subjects, where-ae Rogers calls in general for implementation of the Security Council resolution.

Abd al-Pattah al-Jibali of SuhaJ Provincei Do you think the prospect of a peaceful solution is now greater ~than a military solution?

No. I have no hope at all, despi;e all this, that there will be a peaceful solution. Why? Because I know—I have read all the Israeli statements,, all the statements of the Israeli leaders, All of them (?seek) expansion. They want the land. They want greater Israel. They aven want to expand more in the future. I have also read the statements of the Americans who support Israel. All the statements have been in support of Israel. A large number of U.S. congressmen support Israel. A large number of the governors of American states have visited Israel and support it. They say Israel must change its borders so these borders will be secure and recognized. What does this mean? Th:.s means expansion. As I said we will not accept expansion in any form. On this basis I would like to tell Abd al-Fattah al-Jibali that chances for a peaceful solution are the same as before our statements yesterday and before our reply.

Abd al-Aziz Abd as-Silam at-Tabbakh of Alexandria? What would happen if Israel honored the U.S. initiative on the canal front but not on the other fronts^' Would we stand with hands folded, bound by our approval, while Israel struck .it Syria and Jordan even though we regard the war as a national Arab war? Or would we open fire on Israel in solidarity with the fraternal Arab states and in our belief in the national character of the battle? G 19 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

I am re-aSing the question to the people to learn the mood of the Egyptian people. f The^Egyptian people are prepared to sacrifice themselves and their sons for the &a~ke of solidarity with other Arab peoples. - If anything the question indicates just .-f that» I had replied to:thecquestion earlier, saying that the battle is a national battle and the entire Arab front is one front.

Salamah Abd al-Azi2 Ukashah of al-guhayrah: Do the U.S. proposals include some concession giving up part of the territory? What is the meaning of the words "secure borders"?

I have already said: We will never give up any land in any form. I am unable, have no right, and cannot give up any piece of Arab land, whether it is in Egypt, Jordan, or Syria.

Questions by Tutab Murad from Asyut: What is Syria's position on the cease-fire?

I have answered this question.

What will the UAH's position be if Syria is attacked?

I have also answered this question.

Question by Paruq Ghallab from Cairo:. First, I have noted following our acceptance of the (Security Council's 19&7 revolution that there have been attempts by some Arab spates to defame our position, yet these states have not made a single sacrifice for the battle. I fear that:,these states may exploit our acceptance of the U.S. initiativi to start bragging to the Arab peoples.

Following our acceptance of the Security Council resqlttion, I met with a senior official--the man who was then Syrian Prime Minister, Brother Yusuf Zuayyin» He told me; You have accepted the Security Council resolution. People will talk about you and try to cast doubt on you, and this may affect your prestige Iji' the Arab world. My reply was; The question is not one of prestige but of our interest, our land's interest. This is why we accepted the resolution. In my opinion the Arab masses are extremely alert* They know about those who are U.OOO kilometers away yet bra^ daily about armed struggle without making a single sacrifice. Those who want armed struggle should bring their armed forces to fight at our side. Those who want armed straggle should mobilize all their resources so the battle will definitely become a national battle.

Certainly there will be bragging, but those who understand will say. The Egyptians now have the right to lead the Arab nation. We have never claimed leadership of the Arab nation, but our country has a role to play. Our geographical position also creates a role. There are only 200 meters--the Suez Canal--separating us from the Israelis. There will be bagging, suspicion, a great deal of talk, and counter- propaganda. However, in my opinion the Arab people are extremely alert.

When we accepted the Security Council resolution in 1967, thgyttried to belittle our position* Mfc.ny newspapers in a number of Arab states wrote defamatory articles about us. However no one paid attention to these papers. Every mature Arab knojes who is trustworthy and who brags and deceives the Arab nation. In our long history during the past 18 years we have been faithful not only to our Egyptian issues but also to the issues of the whole Arab nation. We have sacrificed blood and taken the initiative in support of every Arab state exppsed to aggression. In 1956 we sent Egyptian troops to Syria when it was threatened with an invasion by the Baghdad pact. We also s._-nt troops to Algeria* It was a dispute between two Arab states, but when Algeria r^uested our aid we sent it. We also sent our troops to Yemen. £7 Jul 70 G 20 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

ready to fulfill our national obligations. The Egyptian people have sacrificed 'ajfreat deal for the sake of their Arab nation. The Arab masses know this. They also now that when we make a decision we do so as- trustees of our Arab nation's interest.

It is clear from your questions that no one speaks about Egypt. Everyone asks: What will happen to Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon? No one asks what will happen to Egypt. You only ask about the Bar-Lev line. This shows the extent of the Egyptian people's sacrifice and Arab national pride.

Second, the President stressed in his speech yesterday that our acceptance of the initiative will not delay for one moment our preparation for the battle, our armament or training. I ask that this be stressed in all fields and by all our information media.

I agree with brother Faruq Ghallab on this, and I say that I personally will see to this with regard to the armed forces, together with brother General Fawzi. [applause]

Question from Ahmad tfahammad Alyan Fuad: Why is the cease-fire period in the U.S. initiative fixed at 3 months? Does the U.S. initiative mean that the United States can bring pressure to bear on Israel to implement this initiative, or is this a U.S. political maneuver?

I really do not know why J5 months. Can the United States exert pressure on Israel? Of course. The whole world knows the United States can exert pressure on Israel. Israel receives 500 million dollars a year from the United States. If it did not, how would they eat? They eat with the money they get from the United States. Where would they buy arms if the United States did not supply them, and if the United States did not help them politically? Of course they have to listen to the United States. The whold world knows that without U.S. aid Israel could not stand fast politically, militarily, or economically, and also knows that Israel is a U.S. protege.

Question from Ahmad Abd al-Halim Yahya, Al-Qalyubiyah; Do you consider that our acceptance of the U.S. initiative will be a test of the U.S. attitude and expose its real intentions?

If you wish to put it that way, I agree with you. The coming days will indeed show us where everyone stands.

Question: Does Your Excellency believe there has been a change in the U.S. attitude toward the crisis, and is this change the result of the success of our political activity or of U.S. fear of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, or of losing its interests in the Arab countries?

I think we have answered this question.

A repetitious question from Dr Lutfi Sulayman^ Al-Payyum: What would the situation be if Israel consolidated its fortifications on the eastern bank during the 3 months?

A question from Sayyid Zaki, Gatro : Egypt, experienced a precedent in dealing with the West when we accepted a temporary truce in 19^8. The result was that the imperialist states supplied the Zionist gang at the time with arms and equipment and gave it military superiority. What are the expected possibilities after the UAR acceptance of the recent U.S. initiative, whether Israel accepts or not?

I think there was an earlier question about this and I answered it. There is nothing to prevent supplying Israel. Israel is receiving arms. V. 27 JMI 70 G 21 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

•^ *••'''" -X •fi told you*"yesterday that Israel will get eight Phantoms to replace the eight shot '"'down. .It will get electronic equipment, and it has received 100 Skyhawk planes and 50 gfeaVtom planes. So the situation is different from 19^8. In 19U8 Israel obtained arasfs while we did not- Now we both obtain them. The possibilities—well, we shall the possibilities, whether Israel accepts or not.

Question from Amin Ali Abd al-Karim, Al-Gharbiyahs We fear the U.S. initiative may be another trick. There is a clear crisis of confidence..

That will not harm us. If the United States is deceiving us it will not harm us at all* It might benefit us internationally, on a world level, and in various other fields. Everyone will feel that we do not want peace while Israel wants war and expansion and the United States supports it.

Question from Ash-Sharqiyah Province congress: Sincere Arabs have some suspicion that acceptance of the U.S. initiative may be exploited by some who have a grudge against you personally. How will this affect the situation?

We answered this before- There will be people who will exploit it. The spiteful are known. We know them individually. I also believe the Arab peoples and masses know them because these individuals have been active for years. When we take a decision we must take one thing into consideration: the interest of our nation, of our country. What is our interest and what are our circumstances? As for the spiteful and the antagonists, this is an endless matter.

Question by Ali al-Jabiri, Al-Jizahs What will the U.S. and British attitude be toward Israel if it rejects the U.S. proposals?

I have answered this.

Question by Abd ash-Shafi Kamil(Shal>n}s Is the latest U.S. initiative considered as t: the official reply to the President's 1 May appeal to the United States?

I have also answered this.

Is the President's acceptance of the U.S. initiative [question unfinished] Many inquiries and questions".

What is the organization]s immediate role in relation to the masses at this stage and what arrangements have been made for this role?

In the central committee meeting we spoke about this matter 'and-isaid we would discuss the people's questions and put these questions to the commands so they could answer them through the organization, and thus the answers would not be inconsistent and casual, This is why I suggested yesterday that we put forward questions and answers because in this way you will have asked ill the questions that anybody will ask jnd I will have ^answered them. In this way there will be common, thinking by all .of us when we meet with the masses,,and we will have complete Information on the situation, its developments circumstances, and methods. We will be able to face the people without causing confusion through individual effort.

Questions from the Red Sea Province, A question almost the same as one asked before-- .about guarantees that Israel will not benefit.

'Someone asks: Cannot the U.S. initiative be regarded as.a kind of self-restraint such as the United States advised us to follow before the June 1967 aggression? It';is his view that the Americans are .bluffing us. V. 2;f Jul 70 G 22 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

/ / /" / ./It is/' very possible the Americans are bluffing us in this respect. *' /' Is-'there any contradiction between continued mobilization for the battle and the cease-fire?

'Never, there is no contradiction.

Husayn All as-Sayyid Husayn, Kafr Ash-Shaykh Province: Also a question on whether the U.S. initiative is a political maneuver to give the enemy the opportunity to strengthen his forces, now that the enemy and those behind him have become convinced of the capability of the Egyptian air defenses, especially in the recent period during which the air defenses have proved their ability to destroy the myth of the U.S.-made Phantoms and Israel's air supremacy.

As I said yesterday, we received the U.S. initiative before the battles. It came on 20 June and on I July our missiles on the front began to intercept the Phantoms.

Muhammad Kamal Uinran, Cairo Province; Since issuance of the Security Council resolution on 22 NovEraber 1967 there has been difference in interpretation of this resolution by the UAR and friendly states on the one hand and by Israel, the United States, and those on their bandwagon on the other. Have we clarified the means for implementing the plan we have accepted, and clarified the various viewpoints, including our adherence to our original viewpoint?

We sent a letter to the U.S. secretary of state in which we expressed our opinicn on the Security Council resolution. The Security Council resolution is clear; it stresses that territory must not be acquired by war, by force. This means Israel has no right to acquire Arab land in Egypt, the Gaza strip, the West Bank, Jerusalem, or the Golan Heights. This is clear. The Israelis ignore all this and say: We want secure and recognized borders, They mean they want to expand their borders. The resolution did not say secure and recognized borders for Israel alone; it spoke of secure and recognized borders also for us.. If the Israelis mean by secured borders expansion of their borders, we could say that by secure borders we mean changes of our borders into areas inside Israel. They deceive the world public by these terms. The words secure and recognized are not interpreted anyone as expansion. I want to say: We do not want expansion,, but Israel wants expansion. Those who help Israel in publicising such interpretations are supporting Israel in its expansion. I repeat: Either peace or expansion--there can never be both peace and expansion.

Question from Shawqi Hashish, on Israel's position toward Syria and Lebanon. I have spoken about this.

Question from Muhammad Hishmat ash-Shanawani, Al-Munifiyah: Is there a formula to reconcile the U.S. initiative and Syria's rejection of the Security Council resolution?

I spoke with chief of state Al^Atasi about these matters while we were in Tripoli and Benghazi. There is agreement between us and Syria on all issues.

Fathi Muhammad Yusuf, Alexandria: Does the cease-fire apply to all confrontation states,, including Syria despite Syria's disapproval of the Security Council resolution? And what will be the position if Israel violates the cease-fire?

I am reading this question so our brothers in Syria can hear and realize how much the people here in Egypt care about Syria in the same way they care about Egypt. V. 27 Jul^O G 23 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC 'X' - -7 -XT-"""" HamTd Abd al-.Miinim, Qlna Province: Again the question whether the 3 months are a maneuver. We have answered this question.

Ibrahim Asfur, Munufiyah Province: What is Syria's attitude, an^. does it accept the Security Council resolution?

We answered this question and also answered about Israel's benefiting from the cease-fire. The comparison between 19^8 and now was also answered.

After this he has a military question which we will answer during the closed session.

Question by Dr Abd al-Hamid Hasan Muhammad from Cairo: The William Rogers proposals provide for a cease-fire until 1 September. Is this not a U.S. attempt to pose before the world public as a seeker of peace, while during the cease-fire period the United States will continue secretly and openly to strengthen Israel? If this happens, then, as the President said, we will not trust the United States. We must take precautions against what the United States is preparing for us, because this so-called initiative, although it does not contain anything new, is not in our interest.

The reply to this question is that I agree with Dr Abd al-Hamid that we must be extremely cautious.

Question by Hasan Abdallah Ali from Alexandria: What will be our position if Israel rejects the U. S. plan?

We will continue as we are now.

Question by Sayyid Salam from Sinai: It is the Arab forces who will play the effective role in achieving the final victory whether by political or military methods. Would success of the Rogers proposals, which the UAH has approved, be regarded as achievement of the victory to which we aspire?

Since the setback we have raised the slogan of removal of the effects of the aggression and liberation of the occupied Arab territories. If we can achieve this without war, then well and good. However, at the same time we have proclaimed to the whole world that we cannot abandon our right, which is to liberate politically or militarily all our territories occupied by the enemy. If the enemy does not accept, then we will have to face him militarily. This calls for great preparation by us, for the next battle will be decisive and final. We cannot enter the battle if we have doubts, no matter how slight, about victory. On this basis we are working in the political field and at the same time building our armed forces. We have built our defensive armed forces and are now building our offensive armed forces. If the political action fails we will have no choice but to fight. We all know that we have done our work and duty. Duty calls on us to fight. Everyone knows that fighting is our destiny and that Israel understands only the language of force.

The remaining questions repeat previous ones except those questions which I think should be answerer in the closed session. The time is now 2155. We will adjourn the session for 30 minutes then resume in a closed session. Thank you.

= 0 - V. 27 Jul 70 ISRAEL HI

DEVELOPMENTS IN WAKE OP UAR STAND ON ROGERS PLAN

24- July Morning Press Opinion

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 24- Jul 70 M

[Prom the morning press review]

[Text] HMODIA believes the Egyptian reply to the U.S. peace initiative is a transparent political ploy intended to mislead Washington without any change being made in the stubborn Egyptian stand, Egypt, with the support of the Soviet Union, wants to play tricks with the U.S. proposal to achieve what it has not been able to achieve but without binding itself to anything in return, even for appearance's sake.

NOWINY I KURIER says that the Egyptians extracted the raisins they liked from the Rogers plan, added their own version, and were thus able to send Washington a basically favorable response. Certainly the Egyptians are interested in a cease-fire for a limited period so they can have an interval during which to position an improved antiaircraft network along the canal and prepare for a general offensive at the end of the period.

UJ KELET comments that the Egyptian Government worded its response cleverly so that Washington administration would tend to actually accept the Arab-Soviet interpretation of the peace plans, Israeli information services must work hard to show the United States that the Egyptian reply is only turning the Rogers plan into a weapon of war for Cairo.

Meir Interview

Paris AFP in French 1753 GMT 24 Jul 70 C (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

{Text] Tel Aviv--There is only one way to reach peace in the Middle East: "An unlimited cease-fire, as was decided on by the Security Council in June 1967!" Mrs Golda Meir said in an interview with the independent newspaper HAARETZ.

The Israeli Government chief added; "I can only hope that President Nasir or his successor, whoever he may be, will decide to live in peace with Israel. The Arab leaders must recognize that there is no other solution for peace. They must accept the fact that they cannot destroy us and that the only way out is through peaceful coexistence

Asteed: "Why do you refuse to use the word 'withdrawal' of Israeli troops?" Meir said: "I am not willing to use this word only because the Arabs want it. I do not believe in the mystique or miraculous power of the word 'withdrawal.1 I do not think that, if we used this word, safety would instantly be given us. The question is rather to know 'when' and ''to where'. What we ask for are 'guarateed and recognized borders in peace,, ' which means that once peace is obtained our forces will not remain beyond these recognized borders."

The objectives sought by the Israeli Government are clear, Mrs Meir added. "We will do everything possible to keep Israeli forces from being reduced, to continue the country's development, and to establish peace. Should the war continue, we will do everything possible to conserve the humanism of Israeli society, even in time of war. " Confidential ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO: S e cret ary-General As ' FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

In view of the latest events in the Middle East I am sending you a paper on the Palestine resistance organisations, prepared in the Department. I think it might "be of interest to you.

Date: FROM: j 28.9.70 DE: L. Kutakov CR. 13 (11-64) 25 September 1970

S t 2-00 \ The Palestine resistance organizations and the Middle East conflict

The Palestinian Arabs have risen and have "become one, if not the most decisive new force in the Middle East conflict since the June 1967 hostilities. The var of 196? has helped to give them prominence in the political decision-making process, the Arab states having failed to restore to them the rights they have been claiming since the establishment of the state of Israel in 19^8. The disappointment of 1967 has opened the door to a new type of militancy among the Palestinians who, refusing to consider themselves mere refugees awaiting the decision on their fate by the international community, gathered in resistance groups and began their activities on two fronts: on one hand against Israel, they carried out from Arab territories, commandos action aimed at keeping the fight going; and on the other hand in various Arab countries where, through rallying, and with public opinion behind them, they succeeded in exerting, more or less successfully and depending on the type of government or regime in the territory concerned, pressure aimed at gaining a foothold in Arab countries. Despite the fact that they number about a dozen or so organizations, they all united against the latest big-power peace initiatives in the Middle East, bringing their leadership into collision with President Ifesser, King Hussein and other Arab leaders who supported a political settlement. In August 1970, the Palestinian resistance groups consisted of the following organizations: Al Fatah (the Palestine Rational, Liberation Movement); This gtoup is the most popular and the largest of all the Palestinian resistance commando groups. Its strength is estimated at 15,000 men, and receives financial assistance mainly from private Palestinian individuals and from some Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Abu Dhabi in the Trucial Coast. - 2 - Al Eatah has no political ideology and requires no particular or specific political affiliation of its members. With the other major organizations it proclaims, as a main goal, the destruction of the present "Zionist state structure" though not of the Israeli or Jewish people, and itx replacement by a new democratic Palestinian state, where Moslems, Jews and Christians can live together on equal terms. Al Patah considers itself an integral part of the Arab revolution, thus aiming at independence, the removal of foreign hegemonies and the active participation in the revival of the Arab world. In this role, Al latah vowed not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab countries, with and for this reason, was able to enter/many of them, mainly, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic, which are directly concerned with the Middle East conflict, in agreements allowing that organization to have offices, collect funds, recruit and train Palestinians to fight Israel. However, for various reasons, the organization was not able to have a full freedom of action in Syria and Iraq. Both countries feared that the presence of Eatah in their territory would jeopardize their Baathist regimes, and while they supported the activities of the group outside their territories, they confined its operations to having a representation office; and in the case of Iraq, Eatah men were forbidden from even collecting funds. The Iraqi regime followed this ban with the formation, in early 1969, of its own group - the Arab Liberation Front - as an answer to any ctiticism that could be raised concerning Iraq's participation in the Palestine resistance movement. Syria formed in 1968 and for the same reason, As Saiqa, which took over all the activities pertaining to commando action on the border with Israel. In Lebanon following several confrontations and clashes with the authorities of that country, Al latab, with other organizations was able to have a limited freedom of action on the southern borders which led subsequently - 5 - to a cycle of border attacks from Lebanon and Israeli retaliation as it was evident from the thrie meetings of the Security Council in August 19&9, and in May and September 19TO. In that country, Al Patah enjoys the support of almost the entire Moslem population and a small proportion of the Christians there. Furthermore, there are in Lebanon, close to 300,000 Palestinian refugees who had a definite influence in making the Palestinian resistance movement an established fact in Lebanese politics. In Jordan, the fact that the majority of the population is Palestinian, imposed on the Government of that country a policy of supporting the resistance movement, not without an expensive cost in life and property resulting from clashes with the Jordanian authorities. This fact led also to the present dilemma in Jordan which had committed itself to the peaceful settlement of the Middle Bast conflict, but could not disregard the position of the Palestinians who had vowed to resist that peaceful settlement to the bitter end. Until recently Al Eatah enjoyed the full support of the United Arab Republic. However, fallowing Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers plan, the Palestinians found themselves at odds with President Hasser. The declaration of the Egyptian President that he recognized and respected the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to fight for their rights, fell short of their objective to destroy the state of Israel, and did not satisfy their plans. As a result, many of their active leaders were forced out of the United Arab Republic and their two broadcasting stations (Al Asifa) were shut down. In the remainder of the Arab countries, including those which support the United Arab Republic's acceptance of a peaceful settlement and those who opposed it, the Palestinian resistance movement still enjoyed support and assistance. These countries are not directly concerned with the conflict, and find that there is no contradiction between supporting the peaceful settlement and giving assistance to the Palestinians. - k - As-Saiqa; This organization is considered the resistance arm of the Syrian Baath party. Born in complicated Sjirian internal political circumstances, it was intended to be a substitute in Syria for other Palestinian organizations - particularly Al Satan - and operated exclusively in that country. So far, it has been used mainly for the purpose of bolstering the commando organizations in Lebanon, giving them material and logistical support in Lebanon based operations against Israel. They were rarely reported to have engaged in combat with the Israelis from Syria or even from Lebanon. The group consists of about 7,000 men, mostly Palestinians who are trained and assisted by Syrian military cadres. It has no other ideology but that of the leftist Baath party of Syria. In terms of objectives, strategy and it in tactics, it is similar to Al Fatah organization and always sided with/the decisions taken by the Palestine Liberation Organization regarding the strategies of resistance. Because its activities are concentrated in Syria, it faces no problems or complications in other Arab countries. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Although it numbers about ^,000 members, this group made sensational news when it undertook hijackings, attacks on airplanes in Europe and the Middle East. This group has always been the traditional dissenter among Palestinian organizations. In the early period of the Palestine Liberation organization, it refused to sit in the annual plenary meeting of that body and was not represented in the executive committee. Against the decisions of that committee, it continued the individual acts of hijacking or attack on international airlines on the ground that they represented the imperialist interests which supported Israel. Recently they singled out the United States as Israel's main ally, and vowed to attack its economic interests inside and outside the Middle East. In this respect they are in serious disagreement with Patah - 5 - which urged concentration On Israel alone especially in attacking Israeli military and economic targets rather than civilian ones. They argue that American as well as Israeli interests must be hit wherever they are found. Civilians must not be immune since Israeli warfare and repression in the Israeli-occupied Arab territories do not spare Arab civilians. In addition to this disagreement on strategies and tactics of resistance operations, the group has basic disagreements with most of the organizations. The Popular Front believes that its aim should be a total revolution to remake and modernize Arab society. The members profess a narxist ideology and believe'~ in a total revolution in Arab society. They charge Fatah of being a bourgeois organization unfit to carry out the revolution in the Arab world. The members and sympathizers are among the intellectuals in the Arab world. A large number of students find a fulfilment and satisfaction in belonging to this organization because it is closer to their ideal of overthrowing the established Arab regimes than are Al Fatah and other groups. By their dynamic and unpredictable actions, they keep other organizations guessing as to where they will hit next. The disagreement between the Popular Front and the other organizations led recently to the suspension of its membership in the committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, following the recent hijacking and the seizure of some fifty hostages still in its detention. Its membership was subsequently restored when fighting broke out with the Jordanian army. At a certain point, the masses were becoming wary of the Front's unorthodox method of action. The Arab masses do not condone attacks on civilians - particularly women and children. However, the recent hijacking raised a spontaneous wave of enthusiasm which subsided suddenly when the Front blew up the planes in the Jordanian desert. In the logics of resistance and fight to change the Arab society, the Front has more appeal than Al Fatah, or say, the rest of the Palestinian -6 - groups. As all the groups are fee ing a battle of survival in Jordan, cool thinking on the part of some intellectuals enables them not to forget that the Front has kept its ideology as a written word and that it has done nothing to carry out the cherished revolution against the present Arab regimes. The only regime which supports the Front is that of Iraq. It should be recalled that last year Syria incarcerated George Habash for several months before he escaped from prison in Syria. The United Arab Republic was from early 1967 a supporter of the Front. However, following the battle of Al-Karameh in Jordan in March 1968, Al Eatah gained the favour of Nasser and the respect of the Arab world. The Front and its leader, George Habash, became of secondary importance, Al Fatah having proved that it had the power and potential of carrying out the Palestinian fight against Israel. A splinter of the Front is the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, headed by Nayef Hawatmeh. This off-shoot of the Habash group adher« more closely to the tenets of the Marxist-Leninist world revolution, and opposes the hijacking carried out by the Popular Front. It has followers mainly in Jordan and Lebanon, and some in other Arab countries. Its strength is estimated at about 1,000 men who carry out operations inside Israel and against1 it from Jordanian territory. Palestine Liberation Army; This is the army formed by the Palestine Liberation Organization before the June 1967 war and was stationed in Gaza and later in the Suez Canal as a Palestinian brigade. Units of that army serve also in the ranks of the Iraqi and Syrian armies. The Palestine Liberation Organization Brigade was said to be the Syrian force that had entered Jordan with scores of tanks to support the Palestinian commando forces in Northern Jordan. Parallel to As-Saicp, Iraq had formed, as mentioned above, the Arab Liberation Front consisting of about 3,000 men and is believed to carry out the policy of Iraq's Baath party regarding the Palestinian resistance. - 7 - In addition to these major groups, the Palestinian resistance movement includes about half a dozen organizations which are listed below: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command; Headed by a veteran Palestinian resistance hero, Ahmed Jabril, this group undertakes actions of a military nature and is not known to hold a particular ideology. The membership consists of Palestinians from different valks of life and the group is concerned with the liberation of Palestine and return to the homeland. Popular Struggle Front; The group was formerly of baathist ideology. It is now devoted entirely to clandestine action inside Israel-occupied lands. Arab Palestine Organization and Action Group; These two groups are pro-Nasser. It would be recalled that when Nasser declared his acceptance of the peaceful settlement, the two groups consisting respectively of 100 and 50 men, dissented from the other Palestinian groups and announced their support of the decision of the Egyptian President. Later, following the meeting of the Palestine National Council, they rejoined the ranks of the other organizations and renounced their early decision to support Nasser. The Ansar (Partisans): This is a group formed several months ago by the Communist parties of Syria and Lebanon. It is headed by Khaied Bakdash, leader of Syria's communist party. The members are from the communist parties in Syria and Lebanon, and their attitude towards the peaceful settlement was recently made known in a statement issued by the communist party in Syria, in support of the peaceful settlement, as the only way at the present time, to recapture the territories lost in the June 1967 war. ROUTING-SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO: A: Secretary-General FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

I am sending you. a note on the possible implications of the death of President 3?asser for the future Government structure of the UAH.

S" Date:, . FROM: _/ DE: 29.9.70 L.Kutakov

CR. 13 (11-64) 28 September 1970

The death of President Nasser is expected to create internal as well as external problems related to the issue of succession, Egypt's internal policy, its foreign policy and in particular its position of leadership in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Under the constitution, Anwar As-Sadat, the Vice-President will succeed Nasser as the new President of the United Arab Republic. However, problems are expected to loom because the Vice President assumed his post through designation by Nasser and not by popular support. It is said that Nasser selected him as Vice President because he presented the least of problems and because he did not cause the President any difficulties through the eighteen years of his rule over Egypt. Although all those involved in the problem of succession are military men, hoi^ever, they diinot necessarily represent the armed forces and therefore could not possibly work out a military takeover without complications. In addition to the Vice President two other personalities may be involved in the struggle for succeeding Nasser. They are Zakaria Muhieddine and Aly Sabry. The former was the Minister of the Interior for several years and in that capacity organized the internal security forces (police) and is said to have a great deal of influence in the armed forces. If this is true, he may yield a powerful influence in the coming government, if not becoming himself number one man in post-Nasser Egypt. Politically, he professes no ideology and sits exactly on the fence between the right and left tendencies ±n. Egypt's body-politic. He was quoted once as saying about the reforms in Egypt: "We shall not copy from this or that - 2 - particular ideological book but we shall take whatever we deem appropriate and useful and adapt it to our conditions. Such pragmatism fits more in Egypt politics today than the ideological stand of the other man, mentioned above, namely, Aly Sabry. Mr Sabry who is said to have closer relations with the Soviet Union than any other leader, was the Secretary-General of the Arab Socialist Union which is the legislative body of the United Arab Republic. Because he worked very hard in organizing the Union and in elaborating the United Arab Republic's internal socialist reforms, he rose to prominency and was given the post of Secretary-General of that Union. However, the post was taken away from him in the summer of 1969 upon his return from the Soviet Union for the apparent reason that he brought back with him two rugs. It is too well known that the real reason was his disagreements with the late President over many political issues and his attempt to stretch his hand over President Nasser. The informed sources characterize him as an "aparataki", the equivalent of a man from the cadres. These sources believe that Mr. Sabry will not be able to grab the presidency, having no support among the armed forces in the country. However, he will be kept as a liaison man who could keep the dialogue going with the Soviet Union. While the idea of one man succeeding Nasser is the dominant one now, it is not impossible that a triumvirate consisting of the Vice President and the two above mentioned men could become a convenient means of solving the porblem of succession. In Arab politics, the death of Nasser will definitely create a vacuum. His personal influence in many situations and crises solved - 3 - so many problems. He was a kind of catalyst who was able to gather the various political elements in the Arab world and while such influence did not create a. reinforcement in the Arab world it had, nevertheless, presented a brilliant facade of unity in many political crises. It is too early to assess the consequences of such an event but one can speculate that because Nasser's policies were not shrouded by mysteries and because the public discussions of these policies have created a rationale of these policies, the future President of "Egypt will have at least for the present time, no difficulties in carrying out the country's internal and external policies unless developments require the presence and the intelligence of a man like Nasser himself. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO. ** The Secretary-General

FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

I am forwarding herewith, for your information, a note on the Internal and External Problems related to the Issue of Succession in Hie UAR.

Date: DE: 1.10.70 L.Kutakov CR. 13 (11-64) Personal and Confidential Internal and External Problems related to the Issue of Succession in jthe UAR

The death of President Nasser is expected to create internal as well as external porblems related to the issue of succession, Egypt's internal policy, its foreign policy and in particular its position of leadership in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Problems of Succession; Under the constitution, Anwar As-Sadat, the Vice President has succeeded Nasser as the interim President of the United Arab Republic. The National Assembly should meet within sixty days to nominate a new President, who is to be confirmed by a popular referendum. While a military prominence is not excluded, the emergence of General Fawzi, Minister of War, or General Sadek, Chief of Staff, as new strong men, is unlikely because they are considered mainly technicians and lack the political stature required in any possible candidate. In addition to them, two other personalities may be in line of succession to Nasser. They are Zakaria Muhieddine and Aly Sabry. The former was the Minister of the Interior for several years and in that capacity organized the internal security forces (police) and is said to have a great deal of influence in the armed forces. If this is true, he may yield a powerful influence in the coming Government, if not becoming himself number one man in post-Nasser Egypt. Politically, he is said to be between the right and left tendencies in Egypt's body-politic. He is considered a pragmatist without definite ideological affiliations. Mr Sabry, who is said to have closer relations with the Soviet Union than any other United Arab Republic leader, was the Secretary- General of the Arab Socialist Union. Because he worked very hard in organizing the Union and in- elaborating the United Arab Republic1s internal socialist reforms, he rose to prominency and was given the post of Secretary-General of that Union. The post was taken away from him in the summer of 1969 because of reported disagreements with - 2 -

Nasser over many political issues. While the idea of one man succeeding Nasser is the dominant one now, it is not impossible that a triumvirate consisting of the interim President and the two above mentioned men could become a convenient means of solving the problem of succession. The Internal Problem; His death, in addition to the problem of succession, will raise questions related to the United Arab Republic's economic and social policies:; For Nasser,while devoting energy and resources to his country's external problems, nevertheless embarked on an ambitious economic and social programme in continuation of his goal to double the national income once every ten years. It is most likely that this area would be the least affected by his death. It is also certain that the socialist policies of Nasser would not be rolled back. However, their continuation will proceed more or less in the same pace depending on the role of the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt's future politics, the new President's inclinations and finally the type of relations post-Nasser Egypt might have with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. Inter-Arab Problem; The death of President Nasser will have definite repercussions in Arab politics. His personal influence and the important decision he personally made in that area would be subject to changes that may affect the policies of many Arab countries. The first consideration in this respect is the future of the progressive regimes in the Arab world and the issue of the rivalry that existed between him and between some Arab leaders like King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and President Boumedienne of Algeria. It is often said that his personal stature has been a - 3 - reinforcement of the socialist progressive governments, mainly in Syria, Iraq and more so in Libya and Sudan. It is not impossible that the shock of his death might create a disruption which would bring forth a rightist element. As for the rivalry with those advocating the rallying of Islamic countries in support of the Palestinians, it is possible that a resurgence of that idea might take place, bringing about a stronger feeling of an Islamic approach to the question of leadership in the Arab world as a result of the vacuum created by the death of President Nasser. He will be missed mostly in Libya and Sudan, where he was in the process of creating a strong bloc in the north-east corner of the African continent, probably to offset the influence of a possible North African power bloc. Peaceful Settlement; Regarding the peaceful settlement, there is no reason to believe that the new regime will depart from the policy established by President Nasser on this question. This decision to accept a peaceful settlement, although taken by him personally, and in co-operation with a few other top men in the Government, has been subject to an extensive public debate in which Nasser, answering hundreds of questions from the floor of the Arab Socialist Union meeting, succeeded in transforming this decision into a rationale which became easier to advocate and defend by any person in ISgypt. Unless a strong person or group had a different idea, but was not able to express it during those debates, the new regime will be expected to carry out the decision of a peaceful settlement especially if this decision is part of a global Egyptian and Arab strategy worked out in co-operation with the Soviet Union. Palestinian Guerillas; The Palestinian commandos, and in particular Al-Fatah, have lost in Nasser the strongest support they could, have ever had in the Arab world. For although he accepted the peaceful settlement to the apparent detriment of the Palestinians who vowed to carry out their struggle to the bitter end, he recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to pursue their fight against Israel. There was no contradiction between the continued fight against Israel and peaceful settlement. In the mind of Nasser, on the contrary he considered that the two opposing ideas complement each other, the link being his insistence on the preservation of the rights of the Palestinians, making it a condition of the peaceful settlement. Relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries: The Soviet Union and other socialist countries started to develop their relations with the United Arab Republic as soon as this country got independence after the World War II. These relations were based on the interests of the two parties. The United Arab Republic as a new, anti-colonial nation saw in its relations with the USSR the possibility to receive the necessary economic, military and policioal help for strengthening its national sovereignty and independence. A specific feature of the Soviet and other socialist countries economic aid was that it was earmarked for the industrialization of 'Egypt, the construction of vitally important economic projects such as the Asswam Dam, training local personnel and the creation of Egypt's state sector of the economy. The public sector now accounts for more than 80 per cent of the industrial output. Soviet help was also instrumental for the success of the agrarian reform in Egypt. As a result of this reform, one million acres of land were distributed to the peasants. The first landmark of the military co-operation is considered to be the agreement concluded by the United Arab Republic with socialist countries in September 1955 on deliveries of arms and military equipment. This assistance helped President Nasser to take important measures to consolidate the national independence of Egypt, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, resistance to the triple aggression of October - November 1956 and development of Egypt's military power. - 5 -

In the struggle between the two tendencies in Egypt - one for the development of the state sector and further political co-operation with socialist countries and the other one for the strengthening of the private sector and increased co-operation with Western countries - President Nasser took the side of the first political course. Those members of the national leadership (Z. Muhieddine and some others) who advocated the reduction of the state sector, encouragement of private capital and expansion of economic co-operation with Western powers were excluded from the (Jovernment. Now with the death of President Nasser the question arises as to what extent the policy of the late president would be continued. A change of this policy in the immediate future is not likely. Rather a continuation of the good relations established under the late President Nasser between the United Arab Republic and the socialist countries is expected because of "Egypt's important economic assistance received from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Furthermore, parallel to this pattern of relations with Socialist countries, the possibility exists for an enhancement of Egypt's relations with non-socialist countries. Relations with Western Countries: The development of Egypt*s relations with the Western countries depends on the course to be followed by the new ge'gime in the area of economic construction. It is assumed that the idea of developing the private sector may be revived and enhanced. Western powers, especially those with traditional influence in the area will try to make their influence felt in the new situation, and if so, the United Arab Republic will be more apt to receive Western credits and other economic assistance from Western Powers than it did under President Nasser. Furthermore, it should be said that if the plan for a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict will have a chance of surviving the period following the death of President Nasser, it may open the door to more economic co-operation with Western Europe, especially the United States, the United Kingdom and France. UNITED NATIONS Distr. ip- /••» ii jp| e -r- \f rf*97V'^-4-^rv\s$iv GENERAL S C V^ LJ K I I I " S/102T2

21 COUNCI\~ W U IN V. I LL W*?^±^W ? ENGLISH ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/'FRENCH

LETTER DATED 13 JULY 1971 FROM THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In accordance with Article 5^ of the United Nations Charter, I have the honour to transmit to you, for the information of the Security Council, the resolutions enclosed herewith, which were adopted "by the Eighth Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

(Signed) Mamadou Moctar THIAM Ambassador Executive Secretary of the OAU to the United Nations S/10272 English Page 2

Resolution on Namibia

(AHG/Res.65 (VIII))

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU meeting in its Eighth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 23 June 1971» Noting with approval the International Court of Justice's opinion that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory, Urges the immediate summoning of a Special Meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations to discuss ways and means of enforcing the past decisions of the United Nations in the light of the legal obligation imposed on the World Community by the decision of the World Court, Agrees that the current Chairman of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government should lead a delegation of Foreign Ministers to attend this special meeting of the Security Council, Expresses appreciation of the splendid work done by the lawyers who presented the OAU case in the World Court.

Resolution on the continued aggression against the United Arab Republic

(AHG/Res.66 (VIII))

The Assembly of the Heads, of State and Government of the OAU, meeting in "its Eighth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, from 21 to 23 June 1971, Having heard the declaration of H.E. the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Head of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, Recalling its previous resolutions AHG/Res.53 $Vl of September 1968, AHG/Res.57 (Vl) September 1969 and AHG/Res. 62 (VIl) September 1970, concerning the situation prevailing in the Middle East in general, and in the United Arab Republic in particular, calling for withdrawal of foreign troops from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967 in accordance with Security Council resolution 2U2 of 22 November 1967 and appealing to all Member States of the OAU to use their influence to ensure a strict implementation of that resolution and support the present efforts of the United Nations Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, S/102T2 English Page 3

Mindful of the constructive efforts of the United Arab Republic aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East3 especially the positive position recently taken in response to Ambassador Jarring's peace initiative of 8 February 1971, Seriously concerned that the present grave situation resulting from the continued Israeli occupation of the territories of three Arab States, one of them is a Member in this Organization, constitutes a serious threat to the regional peace of Africa and to international peace and security, Determined that the territory of a State should not be the object of occupation or acquisition by another State resulting from threat or use of force, which is a basic principle enshrined in the United Nations Charter and reiterated in Security Council resolution 2U2, as well as the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security 273^ (XXV) adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1970, 1. TAKES NOTE of the declaration of H.E. the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Head of the delegation of the UAR; 2. REAFFIRMS emphatically the contents of its resolutions AHG/Res-53 (V) September 1968, AHG/Res.57 (VI) September 1969 and AHG/Res.62 (VII) September 1970, and calls for immediate withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all Arab territories to the lines of 5 June 1967 in implementation of Security Council resolution 2^2 of 22 November 1967; 3. EXPRESSES its full support to the efforts of the Special Representative l\ of the United Nations Secretary~General to implement Security Council 11 resolution 2U2 of 22 November 1967, and to his initiative for peace of 8 February 1971, in particular; U. REAFFIRMS its solidarity with the United Arab Republic and appreciates the positive attitude reflected in its reply on 15 February 1971 to the Special Representative's initiative for peace as a practical step for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; 5. DEPLORES Israel's defiance to that initiative and calls upon it to make a similar positive reply to the Special Representative's initiative for peace of 8 February 1971; 6. REQUESTS the current Chairman of the OAU to consult with the Heads of State and Government so that they use their influence to ensure the full implementation of this resolution. S/10272 English Page U \ Resolution on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination

(CM/Res.2U2 (XVIl))

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Seventeenth Ordinary Session, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15 to 19 June 1971, Taking note of the report of the Administrative Secretary-General in documents CM/380 and CM/380 Part I/Add.I and II, Noting with grave concern that the African people of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe continue to be subjected to humiliation, exploitation and genocide under the regime of apartheid which constitutes a crime against humanity, Gravely concerned over the continued detention and torture of opponents of apartheid under the notorious "Terrorism Act", Taking note of the intensification of the deceitful propaganda and manoeuvres by the South African racist authorities concerning its so-called "outward policy", Considering that this policy is designed to overcome isolation, build a southern African bloc under its hegemony and divide African States, Noting the continued increase in the military budget of South Africa and the growing support by South Africa to minority colonial regimes in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola, Noting with grave concern that several countries, in particular Member States of NATO, continue to provide military and other assistance to the South African authority, and that foreign investment in South Africa from these countries as well as from Japan has greatly increased, Taking note with satisfaction of the growing opposition to apartheid by world public opinion and the increasing support to the liberation struggle by anti-apartheid movements and by Church, Trade, Union, Student and other groups around the world, 1. REAFFIRMS its full and unconditional support to the oppressed people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle to eliminate apartheid and achieve majority rule; 2. REJECTS and DENOUNCES the deceitful propaganda and manoeuvres of the South African authorities in promoting their so-called "outward policy"; S/10272 English Page 5

3. CONDEMNS the main investors as well as trading partners of South Africa for encouraging and assisting the South African Government in its oppression of the African people; k. STRONGLY CONDEMNS all the Powers, particularly, France and the United Kingdom, for continuing to supply the Pretoria regime with arms in violation of the resolutions of the Security Council; 5. COMMENDS the activities of all anti-apartheid movements and of all Churcha Trade Union., Student and other groups which support the legitimate struggle of the oppressed peoples of South African countries and "boycott South African racists; 6. EXPEESSES its appreciation to the United Nations, anti-apartheid movements and other groups for their activities in acquainting the world opinion with the inhumanity of apartheid and the legitimate struggle of the liberation movements, and appeals for continued efforts in this respect; 7. APPEALS to all friendly Governments, organizations, and individuals to extend greater moral, political, humanitarian and material support to the liberation struggle of the peoples of South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in co-operation with the OAU; i 8. CALLS FOR WORLD-WIDE CAMPAIGNS: (a) For the cessation of all military co-operation with South Africa; (b) For boycott of South Africa in economic, cultural, sports and other fields; (c) For the ending of torture in South African prisons and the release of all political prisoners; (d) To apply to freedom-fighters the relevant articles of Geneva Conventions of 19^-9 on the treatment of prisoners of war and to ensure participation of liberation movements in the drafting and application of international humanitarian law applicable to the so-called internal conflict; (e) For appropriate action against companies investing in South Africa; (f) For prohibiting emigration of persons, especially skilled workers to South Africa. 9. REQUESTS the African Group at the United Nations to continue to challenge the credentials of the South African delegation; 10. REQUESTS the OAU Bureau of Sanctions and Decolonization to publicize constantly all evidence of collaboration by Governments and economic and 1'inancial interest with South Africa. /••• S/10272 English Page 6

Convening a Special Session in Africa of the United Nations Security Council on Decolonization Problems

(CM/Res.2U3 (XVIl))

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Seventh Ordinary Session, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15 to 19 June 1971, Recalling the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly on decolonization, apartheid, racial discrimination in Africa, and foreign occupation of African territories, Recalling the numerous resolutions of the Organization of African Unity on problems of decolonization of African territories still subjected to foreign domination and foreign occupation of African territories, Recalling in particular the right of peoples to self-determination and independence and the responsibility of the Security Council in the event of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, Considering the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the programme of action adopted in the formal Declaration of the General Assembly at its Twenty-Fifth Session, Concerned by the explosive situation that exists in the African territories still subjected to colonial domination and foreign occupation and the consequent threat to world peace and the security of the African countries, Considering the main responsibility of the Security Council in the search for the maintenance of international peace and security, Aware that under Article 28, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Charter the Security Council can convene meetings in places other than the United Nations Headquarters, Realizing the interest for the Organization of African Unity and the African liberation movements of holding a special session of the Security Council in Africa to be held in African countries near areas of international tension devoted to discussing the whole question of decolonization in Africa, 1. REQUESTS the United Nations General Assembly to recommend to the Security Council to convene early in the year 1972, in African country Members of the Organization of African Unity, a special session devoted solely to the measures to be taken with a view to implementing the various Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on decolonization, the struggle against apartheid, racial S/10272 English Page T

discrimination in Africa9 and withdrawal of foreign occupation zones from African soil 5 2. CALLS UPON the State Members of the United Nations, and more particularly the members of the Security Council, to facilitate the holding of such a special session of the Security Council; 3. RECOMMENDS the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity to introduce through the agency of the African Group at the United Nations the request for convening such a special session of the Security Council in Africa early in the year 1972.

Declaration on the Question of Dialogue

(CM/St.5 (XVII))

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Seventeenth Ordinary Session, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15 to 19 June .,1971, discussed in an atmosphere of utmost cordiality and frankness the question of a proposal for a dialogue with the minority racist regime of South Africa. The discussions afforded all members of the Council an opportunity to fully express the views of their respective Governments on this important question. The Council reaffirmed: 1. Their total commitment to the principles and purposes contained in articles II and III of the charter of the Organization of African Unity, especially in regard to the eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa, and the absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent', 2. That the Manifesto on Southern Africa (Lusaka Manifesto) unanimously adopted by the Organization of African Unity and endorsed by the United Nations and the Conference of Non-Aligned States, but rejected by the racist regimes of southern Africa, is the only objective basis for any meaningful solution to the problems of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in Africa; 3. The legitimacy of the struggle being waged by the peoples of Africa to obtain their legitimate rights to independence, freedom, human dignity and equality, and that all Member States of the Organization of African Unity remain totally and unconditionally committed to their struggle. S/10272 English Page 8

Moreover, it was agreed that no member State of the Organization of African Unity would initiate or engage in any type of action that would undermine or abrogate the solemn obligations and undertakings to the commitments contained in the Charter. It was also agreed that any action to be taken by member States in regard to the solution of the problems of colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid in Africa, must be undertaken within the framework of the Organization of African Unity and in full consultations with the Liberation Movements of the territories concerned. The Council rejected the idea of any dialogue with the minority racist regime of South Africa which is not designed solely to obtain for the enslaved people of South Africa their legitimate and inherent rights;and the elimination of apartheid in accordance with the Lusaka Manifesto. The Council'of Ministers also considered and agreed that in any case any form of dialogue should appropriately be commenced only between the minority racist regime of South Africa and the people they are oppressing, exploiting and suppressing. The Council of Ministers also agreed that the proposal for a dialogue between the independent African States and the racist minority regime of South Africa is a manoeuvre by that regime and its allies to divide African States, confuse world public opinion, relieve South Africa from international ostracism and isolation and obtain an acceptance of the status quo in southern Africa. In view of the above considerations the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity emphatically declares that there exists no basis for a meaningful dialogue with the minority racist regime' of South Africa. Under these circumstances, the Council reaffirms its determination to continue to render and increase its assistance to the Liberation.Movement until victory is achieved.