" ) U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37) CVA37/22 Fleet Post Office A16-13 San Francisco, California Seri~l: 0354 '!953
DOWNGRADED AT 3 VEAR INTERVAlS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER Frcm: Commanding 12 YEARS Officer, USS PRINCETON (CVA-37) DOD DIR li200.10 To: Chief of Naval Op€rations Via: (1) Commanoer Tack Force SEVSNTY-SEVEN (2) Comma.n:ler SE'.'ENTH Fleet (3) Commander N3.va.l Forces, Far East (4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Subj: Action Report of the USS PRINCETON (CVA-37) and CARRIER AIR GROUP FIF':llEN; submission of Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4 (b) CVG-15 conf ltr ser 026 of 29 June 1953 (Air Attack Reports for ll, 12, 13, 14 June 1953) (c) CVG-15 conf ltr ser 027 of 29 June 1953 (Air Attack Reports for 15, 16, 17, 19 June 1953) (d) CVG-15 conf 1tr ser 029 of 8 July 1953 (Air Attack Reports for 24, 25, 29, 30 June 1953) (e) CVG-15 conf 1tr ser 033 of 12 August 1953 (Air Attack R~ports for 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 July 1953) (f) CVG-15 conf 1tr ser 034 of 12 August 1953 (Air Attack Reports for 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 July 1953) (g) CVG-15 conf ltr scr 035 of 12 August 1953 (Air Attack Reports for 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 July 1953) (h) CVG-15 conf ltr ser 036 of 12 August 1953 (idr Attack Reports for 20, 22, 23, 24 July 1953) (i) CVG-15 conf ltr ser 037 of 12 August 1953 (Air Attack Reports for 25, 26, 27 July 1953) Enol: (1) Action Report; 9 June 1953 through 3 August 1953
1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report of the USS PRINCETON (CVa-37) and CARRJER AIR GROUP F'IF'lllEN for the period 9 June 1953 through 3 August 1953 is submitted as enclosure (1). • • • ~ORW.TIOiJ CNO (2) Advance CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2) CINCFACFLT (2) Advance CO, CCMPOSITE SQUADRON THREB CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP CO, COMPOSITE SQUADRON ElEVEN COMNAVEE (l) Advance CO, COMPOSITE SWADRON THIRTY- CCMN~VFZ EVALUATION GROUP FIVE COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance CO, COMPOSITE SQU.DRON SIXTY CTF 77 (1) Advance OliS CTF 92 C<%J 2 _ .... ACTION REPORT • U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37) • CARRI~R AIR GROUP 15 9 June 1953 ~!~ough 3 August 1953 ~O!W Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed (lf the carriers USS BOXER (CVA-21), USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39) and USS PRINCETON (CVA-37), along with various heavy support and screening ships. The above mentioned carriers operated with the Task Force during the following dates wit~ the duration $f the period reported on: USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39.\: 13 ,Tunc to 27 June 1953; 13 July to 28 July 1953; 1 August to 3 August 1953. USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47): 9 June to 4 July 1953; 17 July to 28 July 1953. USS BOXER (CVA-21): 9 June to 19 June 1953; 4 July to 3 August 1953. Commander Carrier Jivision ONE was embarked in the USS lAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39). Cemrr.ander Carrier Division THREE was embarked in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47) from 9 June to 21 June 1953, and in the USS PRINCETON (CVA-37) from 22 JQne 1953, through the end date of this report. The mission of this task Force was set forth in Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN Operation Order No. 2-52. The period covered in this action report is an especially signifi4 cant ~ne for several reasons. It is believed to be the longest sustained combat operation conducted continuously at sea by any air craft carrier during the Korean Conflict. Furthermore, and of greater SECURITY INFORMATION 1 of 53 Enclosure (1) • • impartance, on two separate occasions, the combat sortie record for aircraft carriers iB believed to have been broken when one hundred seventy-two and one hundred eighty-four sorties were launched during two single days• operations. Lastly, this report includes the final phases of the war, down to the signing of the truce, during which period three thousand four hundred twenty-one sorties were flown; two million seventy thousand gallons of aviation gasoline, five million three hW1dred thousand gallons of fuel oil, two thousand seven hundred tons of ammunition and five hundred twenty tons of provisions were transferred at sea; and a record rate of two hundred fifty seven tons per hour, for transfer of ammunition at sea, was established. SECURITY INFOR1~TION 2 of 53 Enclosure (l) j •• • llfcl I A.:..L ~CURITY IN?ORiL\TION PART II CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS Recovered thirty-s:ix PRINCE 9 JunG - Departed Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan. TON aircraft frOO). Kn.val Air Sto.tion, Atsugi. 10 June - Enrouto ~ask FC'rce SEVENTY-SE'"JEN. RAD:M W. N. JOHNSON, Commander 11 June - Joined '.':'asl-c F,._,J.-GS .S'3\7ENTY-SEVEl·T. CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39~, Carrier Divis~>_.:n: o;:_:;, embarked on tho USS LAKE sorties. -was Co.'ll;u;:mdcr Task FC>rce SEVENTY-SEVh1'J. Flew 135 Re-arr;1ed. 12 ._Tune - Flew si.:{ty-oight sorties. Re-fueled. 13 June - Flew 138 sorties. Re-armed. 14 June - Flevo 152 sorties. Re-fueled. believed to hundrod eigl;ty-four sorties flown -- a. number ---...... 15 June - One Re-arrn.ad. be a new one day cocord for carrier aircraft sorties. 16 June • Flew 110 sorties. Re-fueled. 17 June - Flew thirty-six sorties. Re-armed. 18 June - No air operations due weather. • 19 June - Flew seventy-three sorties. 20 June -No air operations due weather. Re-armed. 21 June - No air operations due weather. were sent 22 June - No air operations due weather. Two F4U-5N aircraft for Seoul night air defense operations. Commander to K-14 embarked Carrier Division THR5E, RAm.i R. E. BLICK, USN and staff this vessel. 23 June - No air operations due weather. 24 June - Flew ninety sorties. Carrier 25 June - Flew 172 sorties. RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, Co~mander relieved RADM W. N. JOHNSON, USN, Comrr,ander Division THREE, (CVA-39) Carrier Division ONE, embarked on the USS LA.1E Cl-iiLMFLAD~ as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. 3 of 53 Enclosure (l) •,. SECURITY IHFORii.ATIOH• • 26 June - No air operations due weather. 2? June - No air operations due weather. Received freight from other vessels. 28 June - No air operations due weather. 29 June - Flew seventy-six sorties. 30 June - Re-provisioned; re-armed; re-fueled. LT BORDELON of VC-3, TAD to Seoul Defense,shot down two YAK-1$ aircraft during a night intercept flight. 1 July -Flew 108 sorties. 2 JulY - Flew forty-cne sorties, Re-armed and re-fueled, 3 July -Flew eighty sorties, Re-armed and re-fueled, VADM. J. J. CLARE, Commander ~in&NTH Fleet, visited this ship via helicopter from the USS NEW JERSBY ( BB-62) , 4 July - No air operations due weather. 5 July - Flew forty-three sorties, Re-armed and re-fueled. VADM J. J. CLARK, Commander ~~TH Fleet~ visited this ship via helicopter from the USS Nh'W JERSBY (BB-62). LT BORDELON shot down his third and fourth nBedcheck Charlies11 over Seoul. 6 July - Flew four sorties. 7 July - Flew fifty-five sorties. 8 July - Flew 162 sorties. Re-fueled. 9 July - Flew thirty-four sorties. Re-fueled; re-armed; received aviation supplies. 10 July - Flew fift~two sorties. He-provisioned. 11 July - Flew ninety-six sorties. Re-fueled; re-armed. 12 July - Flew 122 sorties. 13 July - Flew sixty sorties. Re-fueled and ro-arrned. Flew 14 July - thirty sorties. :VADM J. J. CLARK, Cor.umander SEVE.."JTH Fleet visited this ship via helicopter from the USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62). SECl!RITY INFCRMATION 4 of 53 Enclosure (1) • ',' • RADM VV. N. JOHliSON, USN, Comrnandor Carrier Division ONE, embarked on tho USS LAKE ClWJLAIN (CVA-39), relieved RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, as Commander Task Force SE'iTEI'iiTY-SEVEN. 15 July - Flew thirty-four sorties. '16 July -Flew ll9 sorties. LT BORDELON of VC-3, TAD to Seoul Night Defense Command, shot down a fifth night intruder to become the first Navy (and propeller) ace of the Korean war. 17 July - Flew twenty-six sorties. Re-armed. 18 July - Flew thirty-throe sorties. Re-fueled. 19 July - Flew eighty-seven sorties. Re-armed. 20 July - Flew twenty-nine sorties. He-provisioned. 21 July - Flew three sorties. Re-fueled. 22 July - Flew sixty-three sorties. 23 July - Flew 136 sorties. Re-fueled and re-armed. 24 July - Flew 160 sorties. Re-fueled. 25 July - Flew 147 sorties. Re-armed, 26 July - Flew 167 sorties. Re-fueled and received aviation supplies. 27 July - Flew 124 sorties. Re-armed, The Korean Truce w~s signed at lOOOI; the cease fire WRS set for 2200I. 28 July - No air operations were conducted, Re-fueled. RJilltd R. E. BLICK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, relieved RADM H. N. JOffi~SON, Commander Carrier Division ONE, as Commander Task Force SZVENTY -SEVEN. 29 July - Flew nine sorties. Special search flights for downed USAF RB-50 and gunnery were conducted. 30 July - Flew twenty sorties, Gunnery and special search and rescue missions were conducted. 31 July - Ho air operations conducted. Re-fueled and re-provisioned. SECURITY INFORMATION 5 of 53 Enclosure (l) '. ' • ~BMATION • 1 August - Departed Task Force, enroute Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan. Three aircraft from VC-35 were launched for ferry to Japan. RADM W. N.. JOHNSON, Corrunander Cnrrier Division ONE, relievGd RADM R. E. BLICK, Commander Carrier Division THREE, e.s Comm2nder Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. 2 August - Enroute Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan. 3 August - Arrived Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan. SECURITY, "II ORMATION 6 of 53 Enclosure (l) • • PART III ORDNANCE A. ohip 1. Performance a. Fire Control equipment Fire control equipment functioned Ll a satisfactory :oanner during this pen.oo. The three following equipments sustained disorders which were repaired aboard by ship's personnel (ECJ.uipmcnt failure reports~ where applicable, are being submitted through estab lished channels J: (l) Director 52 ( GFCS MK 56 MID, 2 Serial. /h50): This director oscillated and hunted in elevation when the radar optical switch was '1in radarn. When the radar-optical switch was nin caoptical 11 , however, the disorder occurred only intermittently. Upon investigation, it was discovered that the cable termin11l tubes had been packed improperly and, therefore, were not watertight. Water from the cockpit had, as a result, leaked into tho cockpit junction box. lm ·investigation of the cockpit junction-box was made through the slip-rings and it was found thc~t the 11 E2333-J11 and HE2333-5 11 leads indicated a reading of one meghom to ground. Lee.d 11E2333-3 11 was disconnected and taped with the result that approxlinately seventy per cc>.nt of the oscillation in elevation was removed. Lead 11 E2333-5"1 was then cleared at the key -- an action which removed the remaining oscillation in the elevation amplydine circuit. Finally, aftGr satisfactory ground and static tests were made, the system was energi..zed~ and operated normelly. (2) Director 54 (GFCS MK-56, MOD 2): This director would not respond in elevation to a signal from either the console controls or the optical control trE'.cking unit. A ground, caused by worn insulation on the coaxial cable leading out of the tenninal tu.be, was found to cable 11 l5GSffi.Pl2, S.N.S.N. 15-C-1220l-65ou. This cable is between tormin~l boe.rd 11 E455P and 11 E2l9611 • In order to repair the system, new packing was placed around th3 defective cable. After all the leads had been re-connected and a chGck for grounds had been made, the ~stem operated normally ~gain. (J) Director 419 (GFCS MK-63) and 40 MM mounts 416 and 419: During transmission checks it was found that 40 MM mounts 416 and 419 would not follow Director 419 (GFCS MK-63) in ele- vation. The casualty was a result of a burned out elevation synchro transmitter. Because of excessive vibration, the screw (ord dwg #146426-648) SECURITY INFORMATION 7 of 53 Enclosure (l) ... • • securing the brush cover to the elevation synchro transmitter had fallen out and allowed tho brush cover to come in contact with the rotor brushes. The rotor supply was, thereby, shorted and tho elevator synchro transmitter burned out. The synchro was replaced and normal operation restored. b. Ordnance Equipment Firing exercises were held dur:ing this period on 29 and 30 July. No casualties occurred, Tr.e maintenance and upkeep of ordnance equipment r~s been especially stressed throughout the period of this report because of the increased seasonal humidity and inclement weather. 2, Expenditures Quantity Description 161 D1 5 11 /38 Projectile, AAC 2,317 Hl 40 MM HEIT-SD B. Aviation For ordnance performance 8nd expenditures by the Air Group (CVG--15) see PART VI, Section ~. 8 of 53 Enclosure (1) • . ' . . • ' . • PART IV BATTLE D~GE A. Own The ship sustained no battle damage, See references (b) through (i) for battle damage sustained by PRINCETON aircraft. B. Enemy See references (b) through (i) for damage inflicted upon the enemy. ~TION 9 of 53 Enclosure (l) • • SECUaiTY INFORM'cTION PART V PEBSONNEL FE A. Ferformance 1. The performance of ShiP's Com_vany and ~lir Group personnel was outstanding. B~ Complement 1. The average on-board count during the ""eriod was as follows: (}ff1cer Eg;I.isted !91!!1 Ship's Comptmy 118 2,088 2,206 Marine Detach_1jjent 2 62 64 Air Group 122 624 746 Flag 29 79 _...ill! Total 3,124 2. During the ~eriod the following promotions ~nd advance ments took place: One to Commander Three to Lieutenant Commander due to Lieutenant Four to Lieutenant (junior grade) Four to Warrant Officer (pay grade W_3) Two to Chief Petty Officer (aoting arnointments) 3. During the period there were no criticcl shortages in nny rating thnt nrevented this vessel from accomplishing its mission. c. Rerlonishment 1. The irregular sch~duling of replenishm8nt nnd the con sequent mustering of working parties on short notices required depart ments to keep their working party muster lists curr(:mt at all times. Alternates were listed to provide for the contingency of a watch of a pc.rticulc.r man on tho working party coinciding with th" tine of re plenishment. Despite tho fnct that nll n.vJ.il.()_ble personnel from offices and suDply divisions wore placed on working parti,3s, tho demBnds made on the Ehginoering, Dec!c, and Air Divisions h 10 of 53 Enclosure (1) • ·.. • to of these depart.'ncnts. This Ar1ditional load is nora difficuJ.t d "-YS. nl)e:orb ,.men replcnish.t"Ttont is coniuctcd Pt night botweon Ot<3rHting 2. The results of night replenishments on tho Engineering Dcp-'lrtmcnt ~Jro SUTJlffi!'_rized bolow: o. Ammunition '1nd provision rcn1cnishmont r'x;uirod the striking service of n:prroXimo.tely two hundred man. Innsmuch Qs the ovolution, below of Cl.r.1I'luni tion rmd provi.sions is goncr'llly an 9-ll-night dr.y the sorvic·..:s of these nen arc lost to tho deprrtfo:l ..:mt the followin-~ c;.r9 the as well. Tho divisions h,:;rdest hit during these .::volutions Division. Boiler Division ::md, to a lossor doL;reo, tho Main Engines on a four The porsonnEJl o.llowanco of those divisions affords "~- watch in p~.rson hours-on ')Ud eight-hours-off b2sis. -\ny m-~tcrial r:::orluction requires nol, such ns is required during nnsche3_ul b. It is a:rp.rcnt thn.t the adverse worldng conditions n IJU1jor olet11ent in Cr:lUSGd by unschc,dulcd roplonisl]mcnt opc·-~ations are loworing the lo'..JOring of efficiency. It is fiHt th~1t the resultant f'1ctor to two -mar of w~'.tch standing efficiency >vr.s a contributing In order serious C'tsualti:Js suffered ,..;ithin this rerm·ting period. to mc\intc.in satisfactory safety st'.mdards, non-scheduled replenish:t-Jent -md night rE:JplcnishT:J.ent should be kept to a minirrur'l. D. StRtistics of Pu1Jlic Inforn-c;tion find b~end ::.ctivities: 1. Pu'vlic Info~-~-tion Rnloasos : 124 HoMetown ne1..re stories (to F"dTNC) 146 Hometown nsws nhotos (to FHTl-JC) 56 News dispetches (by rncio) 16 News fe~turus /+1 Fhotoe 18 Hometown r-::-.dio intdrviows 52 Daily newspaper published 53 Daily r·_'dio DGWSC!lStS the 2. At t.~c request of Conrn•nd8r N!J.VFtl Forces, Far E"-:lst sent out followine disv~tchos and public inform,-:>ction mossases wore ll of 53 Enclosure (1) • • SECU!liTY INFQ;U1 .TION l':nd his subsequent nade by }C;~s ·:;,.. '11. TUtUJ~-, the emergency w,:1tcr l:1ndinb on (DDE-.445~: recovery by the USS F'.:.,l!.'TCW:Ea 2\i¢:L26Z July 19 53 23~214Z July 1953 241'f436Z July 1953 250532Z July 1953 2~0646Z July 1953 on loan to tha Fifth B01.DElON, who h:.d been 3. LTG. P, He hc.d b E. Morale nnd Welfare Rboard including the morale of Qll personnel 1. In ~3neral in spite of the prolongod pilots wos excellOJ.lt to the.t of the Air Group flight opcrSttions cl.ue ncture of short tour v.t sen. Tho unpr8dicta~)lc nffect morsle for did, hclWevcr, adversely poor wo-'.l.thor con~litions schndulc wLich al:towed T:le fourth-d:'.y r·::JplonishB.:mt It periods of time. missed by the .\ir Group. •,r-:s sorely pori:t."Lt. pilots to rclCcX periodic.'·lly whonGver opcrntions schedule s~ould be used E). is folt thr.t this UetJort, FAHT VI, Section see Modic.-·1 D(rpo-rtment (For further co~i·lont F. C,.:suol tiGs 1. Ship's CoF!pony f·.BJ, S\Jrir:~l nu;.1.bcr July, ·wATSON, T.B., ~"·· On 1 on p portable Vlh8n the flywhonl USN' Wf.lS f~.tally injured Po.rticU 297-:::.4-21, servicing c1isinto;-;r·,tod. test stnnd w'!l.ich ho \-J,'ls hydr:J.ulic imncdi.:tto do."-th. docnpit:1.tion oausod nlnost Enclosure (l) 12 of 53 • '· • SECURITY INfORMATION 2, Air Group a, On l July, LT W.A, JENSEN, h29203/l315, USNR, of VF-152, ditched after his aircraft was hit by enemy anti-air- craft fire. He suffered possible compression fracture of a lumbe.r vertebra and was admitted to the u.. s. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan, on 8 July 1953, without being returned to this COITJnand. b. On 2 July, LTJG G. BE!,AS, 521247/1310, USN, of VF-153, rcc~ivcd lacerations about the face and neck when his aircraft was hit by an enemy AA fire. LTJG BENAS flew his damaged plane back to the PRDJCETON and received treatment aboard. c. On 14 July, LTJG J.L. PAWER ,, h528B3/1310, USN, Flag Lieutenant of ComCarDiv THREE, was killed when the AD4N which he was flying on a routine ASP escort flight failed to pull out of a practice rocket run. d, On 19 July, ENS R.W. TUR!J"ER, 554759/1325, US~"R, of VF-152, crashed into the water on taku off. He received cQffildnuted fractures of the left humerus, radius, and ulna. Because of the fractures, he was unable to be hoisted by tbe helicopter and •~as taken fran water by the crew of a whaleboat from the USS F10~CHER (DDE-445). He remained aboard the FlETCHER overnight and -was trans ferred back to the PRINCETON on the following morning for further treatment. It is a.nticipatGd that he vdll b'- transferred shortly to the U.S. Naval Hospital at Yokosuka for physio-therapy and other convalescent wre. e, On 20 July, LCDR Charles Uoye JOt~S, 99776/1310, USN, Operations Officer of CVG-15 Staff, was killed when his F9F crashed into a hillside apparently after having been hit by flak. f, On 26 July, LT li,C, BLACKFORD, 453727/1315, USNR, of VF-152, was shot down and presumed killed in action· while on a reconnaissance mission over enemy territory. (For Medical D8partmcnt Statistical swnrna.ries see PART VI, Section E). SECURITY INFORMATION 13 of 53 Enclosure (1) • '' • SECURITY INr'ORI!ATION PART VI SPECIAL COMMEN~S A. Air Group 1. Composition of Air Group FIF'T~N: Aircraft on Board ll June 1 July 15 July 28 July Carrier Air Group FIFTEEN CDR John E. P.ARXS, USN Fighter Squadron 152 F4U-4 16 l4 15 LCDR Rotert STANEK, USN Fighter Squadron 153 FaF-5 16 13 11 11 LCDR Gerr1..ld E. i.ULLI!.R, USN Fighter Squadron 154 !'9F-5 16 16 15 13 LCDR Bruce A. BELL, USlffi. At tack Squadron 155 AD-4 16 16 15 15 LCDR Ray S. OSncRHCUDT, USN 11 1 Composite SG.uadron 3 Det. D l F4U-5N 4 2 2 2 LT Guy BORDELON, USH, ()....in-G Composite Sy_uadron ll Det, 11 Dn iJJ-4W 3 3 3 3 LT Joseph :FIERCE, USI-.!R, 0-in-C Composite SY.uadron 35 Det. nnn AD-4N 4 4 4 4 LT J.C. HOLLOWAY, USN, 0-in-c Composite Squadron 61 D0t. 11 Dn F9FP 3 3 3 3 LCDR G.A. \JUTE, USN, 0-in.C 2. Swnmary of Fli:.cbts: .June 11 - 3 August 1953 VF 153. VF 154. VF 152.VC 3 .VA 155.VC 35.VC ll.VC 61. M,l;;," s;;,s;;'i;;:o"'n=....;,F.<.9F:.;-:;,5'-'_F,_·9'-'Fc:-:<5_,_. J4U.:4 .F4U-5N .IJJ-4A .iJJ-4N .IJJ-4W .F9F -5P. Total DEFEI~SIVE: CAP 140 147 287 ASP 56 56 ASP-Esc ___..__To-~--~-~---72~_._-_,;,l~--,.,-'----'-_,;5~4 Total 140 147 23 -31 56~---'--~3:.<.9.1..7 l4 of 53 Enclosure (1) • . ' • SECURITY INFORMATION (su..nmary of Flights Continued) VC 35. VC 11. VC 61 • VF 152. VG 3 • V~ 155, • Total VF 153.VF 154. • ,W..4N •.'.D-4W. F9F -5P ,F4U-4 .F4U-5N . xD-4 Mission F9F-2 .F9F-5 • OFF1illSW6: 8 • l,ll6 518 23 • 1 34 520 Strike 532 4 17 • 255 • 14 .1,048 Recco 230 • • 526 522 103 191 CAS 30 38 • 50 22 Photo 1 3 4 2 1 1 ECM 32 VOC Rec 2 5 1 4 NGF • 52 1 103 .2,939 82;) 568 23 562 • Total 800 • • 17 KISC: 2 6 9 • 37 Si>R 10 6 10 ll • • 3 19 Training 5 11 12 Ferry 8 :l ' . 85 "----.:!- " 17 12. Slowtime _ _).0 3 18 ' Total 6 l.L. 103 .3,421 TOT1L 26 610 • 98 69 SORT US 946 • 974 587 • 2 4? 10 2 • 8 h.BOR.TS 15 10 98 69 105 .3 ,468 597 28 618. TOTi..L 961 984 J..verar;e • Flights • 20.4 • 12.6. 26.2 • 31.4 • 5.6 • 26.8 Per Pilot 51.8 • 50 3. Operations period consisted operations during the a. Offensive aircraft and strikes air sup .. art for propeller close almost wholly of close in the Cherokee areas supplies and troop concentrations priority, how against Close air sup._ort took lines for the jets. primary targets beh:',.nd the diverted from. their several tirrt0S jots were against air ever, and effort was also expended t:rpe of missior". Some coordinating to that in North Kor·~'a. No missions fields, roads, and bridges heckler sorties WGre flown this period. Night jets ·with props ·ware of inclement weather. very limited because Enclosure (1) 15 of 53 SECURITY n:FuRMJ..TIOl,i • ' ' • b. Shortly before the USS FRINCETON 1 s return to the li.rw this p.:;riod, the poace talks at Panmunjom took a very favorable turn and there arose tho possibility of an oarly truce. The change in offensive strategy of Task Force SE"lE.NTY-S2.VEN was occasioned by the United Nations maximum effort to stabiliSe the main line of resistance in the face of strong enemy efforts to pu.sh the lines farther south before the signing of the truce. (1) Two results of the maximum effort were: (a) .h.n increase in the average nt11<1ber of schGduled sorti~s per day from 110 to 165. (b) Full flight schedules Fnrrol"v day, with replenishing being done in the ope.'ating area at night or during incle ment weather. c. kir Group FIFTEEN and attached VC detachments flew 3,439 combat sorties during this combat tour. It is believed that an all t:irne record ~~as sot on 15 June 1953, when the .H.ir Group flew 184 combat sorties. On this same day VF-154 flew fifty-four jet coHbat sorties--also believed to be a record for a squadron in one day. Those records were made possible only because of high aircraft availability and highly efficient, hard working, flightJ hangar deck, and ordne.r.cc crews. d. Ditchings: (1) During this period two jets on different oc casions ditched off shore from K-18 because uf inclemunt weather, The circumstances in each case, how.::ver, were similar. The flights were diverted to K-18-in one case due to a broken hook point and in the other due to adverse weather in the operating area. .r.t the tiJne of the diversions the K-18 weather, as roport~d by the K-18 tower, was within acceptable limits. However, upon arrival t!w pilots folllld conditions considerably worse than report~d (the tmver continued to rc:port the origi:1al weather conditions). The actual state of tho w.::ather encountered during tho.; approach was very poor. Thoro was a f:Lfty to scventy-fivG foot ceiling, and visibility was only one-eightP, of a Since tho aircraft had doscendcd from altitude, low fuel stRtes mile. -... precluded their proceeding to another field. __ (2) The r~sult was that, after several Qnsuccess .ful passes at the field, one pilot in each flight W[l.S forced to d.itch while the remaining twelve pilots landed safuly. h further handicap during low ceiling and visibility approaching is the thirty-fiva foot hi£h snnd dunes at the approach end of the E-18 runway. The pilots SECWITY 1.:-J:FORM.:-:~.TION 16 of 53 Enclosure (1) • .' • SECURITY INFORJE •• TION flying low to muintain cont!?.ct with the water arc Ul12.ble to see over the sand dunes in titllo to boc•Jme orient:::.tod for a safe landing. stops have been taken to get the -JXtensj_on of tho runway mc-~rkod 0ut to tho bench. This arranremont would en1.bl8 the pilot to line up with tho runway without actually seeing it. The fact still remains, though, th-:.t the pri.rrl:'.ry cause of these accidents was the erroneous wee.thor reports rocoivod from Korea. Had the true weather condition boon known in ti.nc both flights could have been diverted to 8.11 c.ll weather field. (3) The second ditching was done a~tcr an air- craft experienced a fuel exhaustion flameout. One interesting note on this ditching: while the fuel gauge indice.ted two hundred pour.ds of fuol rer11aining after flameout, the pilot had to lut down to fifty fGet before s0eing tha -water because visibility was lowered to lGss thar, fift:~ yards. Upor, seeing tho water he leveled off high for touch down and began to settle. By utilizing his nshot Gt.m 11 ignit.ion he lighted off ._ ... nd Rdvanced his throttle. There was enough residu"'ll fuel left in the system to give him approximately fifty per cent RFM which definitely checked C:is rate of decent and possibly saved him from m:).king E1. f (h) It was noted that in the ditchings described tr.e nose fe.irin.gs ce.mc loose from the locked position. In the first case it :noved forward two or three inches and in the second case about a foot. It seems the downward force of a water landing had o. ter1dency to break off the nose section of ti~c; F9F. (It he.s been observed that nose sections coming off on arrestt:Jd landings have, in most cases, hcen accompanied by a hard landing). On a prt;vious ditching the nose section wr,s observed to come off com.ph;tel:' resulting in nearly com.IJle disinter gration of the pl9.ne and loss of the pilot. e. There is a tendency on the part of pilots doing close air support to break at the sarae point and follow the flight path of the preceeding plane to the target. The dangers of affording enen;y • On ~ gunners this advance inforrr,ation on o~el s position are obvious. I several occasions heavy flak concentrations were seen at the leader's break point at about the time the next plane would have been there had be used t~•e same break point. f. When the USS Ul\E CHAJJI-'LJN (CVA-39) joir1ed the task for('.e, four division leaders were exchanged with VA-45 from that ship for three days. This exchange system is believed to be the best so f3.r used to familiarize new groups with the Eorean operating pro cedures. It is better than hewing a flight from the 11 new 11 group rendezvous in the air with a flight from the rtold11 group and be led to the t-'l.rget. The briefing and debriefing is nuch more valuable when S~iJIUTY U;}'ORL<,•. il.TION 17 of 53 Enclosure (1) . ' ' . -llli»WI'& • • SllCURITY I!iFGR1i.>Tl0il all pilots of the striJ.;-e are present. Informal pre-briefing and having strike leaders join the now group the day prior to scheduled combined c-:ir operations proved very valuable. g. During this period only one case of aileron snatch 1 in the was encow1tered in F4U-4 s. It is believed that this decrease incidence of aileron snatch is the result of several corrective m8a yet sur h. It has been found that little fuel can be savBd in feet when the F9F-5 by climbing to altitude in excess of ten thousand more fuel operating -whithin a SlltRll radious of action. lJiost likely Only when will be burned in the climb than will be saved e.t e~titude. to go to higher alti long range fli~hts are scheduled is it necessary tudes, i. Th3 force was hampered by low overcasts in the target being exert 2.rea throughout the entire tour. Since a maximum effort was low clouds, Gd at this time, and since targets were often obscured by ovor the fli[hts would climb through the weather at the force, report radar control approximate to.rgot area, be dir.;,cted to their drop point by 'IJhilc stations, :tnd would drop on aignal from the ground controller. tactics the results ohtainod cannot be accur~tely assessed, such bombir:g on the andoubtodly hcwe at least a psychological and harrassing effect enemy. j. On nwn"erous occasions squadrons have found it nece duo to condi ssary to make IFR lGt-downs upon their return to tho force of a study tions or· l:lXtrernely low visibility and ceilings. The restllts subject of of carrier controll"d let-down procedures is being made the sopare.tc coDrespondeace. 1 k. Bambs were preferred over HViRis and ATAR s as squadrons weapvns against most rocco targets cncountored by both jet not found during this pc2iod. MiXed loads of bombs and rockets voerc special targets such satisfactor~l· Rockets were preferred only for gun has been as t~nks, tunnels, or caves. The twenty millimeter found to bo the most effective weapon against truc%s and oxcarts. l. On 23 June, two pilots <>.nd aircraft of VC-3 vv0re de period ployed to K-6 to intercept enemy night hecklers. Durir~ the {l) SECURITY OR!i.ATION 18 of 53 Enclosure • ·.: • SECURITY INFORMATION 1 to 20 July 1953, LT BORDELGN of VC-3, was credited with destroying five enemy night hecklers. LT BORDEL0N stated that when he reported conta.ct with the enemy night hecklers they began to take violent evasive .:;.ctian- an indicntion th!l.t either they or their ground controllors .s.re monitoring our radio frequencies. m. The AD-4W aircraft with n.APS-2011 r<'tdar has proved to be a very effective plane for Search 8.nd Rescue work. The utiliz0.tion of the radar opurator for navigation purposes insures ~ full and thorough coverage of the search area in a miniinum of time. 1he nAPs-2011 vms used by PRII;CETON planes in the effective rescue of a OOwned BOJGR pilot on 19 June 1953, during inclement weath8r. n. Photography (1) Photographic missions for this period consisted primarily of the mapping of :~rcas of the Cherokee sector and of the air fields of North Kor0a. Very little bomb damage assessment photography assigrm1cnts woru received. (2) Low overcasts placed restrictions on approxi mately forty per cent of the photo missions. Tiith the procurement of the K-2~ e.nd/or the X-l7-611 B c:lJneras, low a.l:titude oblique photography might be obtained when cloud cover made vertical photograph~r impossible. It is known that the development and procurement program for these CE'cJneras is well underway r-.nd no further comment will be 1nade here. (3) In contrast to the first period, C9Ji:Leras cmd related equipment stood up remarkably well. ::.iagazine failures of the l-\-38 c~era (after home-made modifications cmd adjustments) wore prFLcticall;.r non-existent. The light, flimsy coEstruction of the nr.gazine wes Jnadc the sub~c:ct of a RUDM.. (4) Because of the type of mapping assignments rec~ivcd, the large 395 foot film roll was used a~~ost exclusively. The winding mcchP..nism of the magazine does not seem designed well er,ouch to overcl)~!le tt.c inertia of this mass without adjustment of the clutch system. No further troubles, however, were experienced. (5) The Image 1Iotion Compensator Cts origin<>.ted by Detachment Mike of the USS PHILIPFINE SEA (CVA-4?) Has •ilo-"..nufc.ctured and installed in each of the three photo planes. The Dog Dctachtr.ont vers1on of the c.'Jmpensator differs slightly from the original in the electric drive mechanism. It has operated continuously and success fully since its installation. 19 of 53 Enclosur<:J (1) .. • '' • 4. Ordnance was considered a, The twenty millimeter cun performance of arn~ent parts was during this tour, Structural failure outstanding vhere applicable, are bc.::ing only problem encountered, Reports, the Due to tho heavy operational submitted through established channels. during the day and allllost all lJlain schedu.ie, maintenauce was difficult ordnance crews, tena,nce was accomplished by night appears to 11 14A11 bomb rack situation now b.. The Aero per and lubrication has improved their be good, F"::'iodic inspection Aero not anticipated. Alti1ough some forr,mnce, Further shortages arc is believed that present spare parts 14A parts are not available, it racks in stock will suffice. Fighter and a smaLl number of Aero l4A per cent increase in reliability Squadron 152 reported a twenty-five r·e by the use of the canvas covers of thwse racks on F4U-4 aircraft port·8d in the previous Action Report. limited maintenance c. One squadron reports that only tour. Parts usage 11 11 has been necessary this of the MK6 Model 0 AFCS only m.i.nor on the manual part of tho system; has b~en almost negligible flight. Pilots check the systeo on every adjustments have been required. in the form of rockets with broken d. Hung ordnance and In spite of all the precautions pigtails Li.aS been a big headache. seems to persist. Some rockets devices that were used, this problem When the Aero 14A and l4B rack have dropp0d off on arrested landil1gs. is subjected to an arrested Unding with hung rocLat (HVAR or ATAR) in thw bomb rack is always changud r-.nd drops ordna.YJ.ce, tho shzar pin to prevent future malfunctioning. e. Twenty Millimeter Guns yoke has con (l) The use of a safety block or as an 4cellent safety device for t.inuod to be a time saver as well the safety block is insurted botweon the twGnty millin.eter guns. 'rhe push rods. Tt.us, the breech gas cylinder yoke and the ratraction to battery in event of tho inadvertent block is prevented from going sot has appreciable permarlGnt driving spring reloa.se of the scar. No the feed safety block. Howev0r, lwaving resu.:ted from thu use of the of 11 may result i..'1 the eventual loss mechanisms continually nwound in the feed mouth. tcndion anci thus cause jams at due to the (2) Considerable trouble has r0sulted guns on the ...:04NA aircr3.ft. The rust:l.r~ rusting of twenty millimeter Use to the water based Hydrolube. of 11 Acro 13An gun ch:lrgers is due (1) 20 of 53 Enclosure • ' ' • ' ' PiiQB'TJ' f· S3CURITY INFORMATION of this Hydrolubc makes it necessary to fnquently replace the charger seals. This is a constant problem. A report via established channels is being made. f. In two instances jettisoned unarmed ordnance has exploded on contact. Both cas~s occurred over water. One 250 pound GP was fused Inst/ND. One 500 pound GP was fused Inst/.01. The cause has not boen deter;uincd. g. Total Ammunition Expended 11 June through 27 July 1953: Description 5C6 Kl 2000# GP 1,6J.8 K2 1000# GP 1?2' K3 5000# GP 5,431 K4 250# GP 3,590 K5 100# GP 2 K8 350# DEPTH BUi>lB, AN-MK 54 387 K9 220/260# FRAG 6,014 K20 FUZE, NOSH:, hN-Ml 39Al 5,175 K;dl FUZE, NOSE, AN-Ml40Al 2 K23 FUZE, NOSE, AN-WW.46 9 K26 FUZE, NOSE, VT, T20E1 K27 FUZE, NOSE:, VT, T50E4 ·2t?' ~ K30 FUZE, NOSE, A."J-MK 219 $,917 K35 AN-MlOOA2 (ND) 1'17 K36 AN-MlQ!.A2 (. 025) 2,096 K37 AN-Ml02A2 ( ,025) 4 K42C FUZE, T,,IL k124/.U ( 6 hr) 199 K45T ,J,TI PERSONI;EL P-OMB FUZE EXTEl~BION 11 K48 FUZE, FotlB, TJ>IL, (HYDROST,.TIC) .Ji-MK 230 2,102 K49i. PR:ThER DETONhTCR Ml4 I'~ON DEUY 2,214 K49D PRll>lER DETON;,TUR >U4 (0.01) 7,213 K49E PR.Ili&:R DETONATOR Ml4 ( 0, 025) 24 Ll 3. 5" ROC::ET COi,:PW."'TE ROUND 447 15 511 P....:.. Vh.R COA·IT'LETE ROUND 499 17 AT.Jl COliF!ETE ROUND 97,753 llil 20MM HEI M97 81,106 1<2 20li!ll INC M96 81,106 MJ 20MM iJ'-T M96 259,966 1:14 LIKK, 20MM !1.8/MBEl 11,592 !vi6 Ci.L. , 50;,PI MB 11,592 M7 CAL., 50 INC Ml 5,798 1(8 C"L·, 50 API-T li20 28,982 1<9 LINK, c,u,,, 50 M2 183,794 MlO CAL., 50 BELTEI (2-2-1) '• wt.>L SEGUi'iiTY TIWORt~;~·roN 21 of 53 Enclosure (1) ' . . • • ' ' (Total .:Wr1unition Expended 11 June through 27 July 1953 Continued) 'iuantity Description 1,470 N1 THICKEI'>'ER M2 (1bs) 64 N5 XYLENOL (gallons) 37 N6 IGNITER, JU5, EXTilRNhL WP 38 NS IGNITER, hll6, ThTJlR!I,,L WP 39 N14 FIRE, BOI.JB, MK 78.5 16 P2 FLhRE, P;&CHUTE, MK .5 52 P3 FLoRE MK 6 pi;.RJ;CHUTE 16 Pl5 LIGHT, FW;,T, niRCR.n.FI', .iJ>J 1iK 6 521 PP1 CORTRIDGE, BOWl EJECTOR l:K 1 150 PP7 C;J!TRIDGE II J48 JET ENGINE h. Ordnance Expended per Squadron: VF-153 VF-154 VF-152 VC-3 VC-35 2rx:o# 506 1000# 492 1,112 500# 4 40 1 54 14 40 350/1 2 260/1 104 48 ;!10 60 120 25()// 93 1,954 1,972 1,095 128 7 160 100# 1,761 1,8ll N• ...F .·.n.i 36 5u .t.T •.,R 215 206 11 71 6 12 3. 5 i.E ll 6 201iM 145,295 138,124 39,290 13,7W 7,070 5o c;.r, 219,208 11 5 HV.".R 242 208 12 LE.hFLGTS 8 7 2 SZCtEIT:: .IXFORli·::.-.TIO!J 22 of 53 Enclosure (1) . . • ' . • i. Hung Ordnance: Releases Drop Offs Remaining Type Type by on on Type Me Ordnance Jerking Landing Racks Rack F9F-5 100,1 $ Aero 14A " 250/i 1 10 " " 260/i 6 " F4U-4 250/i 1 3 " J\D-4N 250/i 2 " " 260# 1 " AD-hN'< 250/i 1 " F9F-5 ATAR 30 " " HVAR 4 33 " F4U-l.._ ATAR 8 " F4'.i· _5N AT.Jt 1 MK9 AD-·4N 3. 5 ARS 1 Aero l4J:.. AD-41'J ATAR 1 Aero 14A (l)Aero 14A rack malfunctions in most cases were due to fa~lures within the aircraft's electrical system. Structural failur€s cf Aero 14A racks resulted in only .06 per cent of all bombs carried heirlg returned aboard. (2) Of all rockets carried five per cent were re turned aOoard due to broken pigtails, two per cent due to dud rocket rr.otors and, .007 per cent to pigtail plugs vibrating loose from their recepticles. Four rockets fell off as the shear pins of the Aero~l4A broke on arrested landings. (3) Fifty caliber guns averaged one stoppage per each s:ix thousand rounds fired. (4) Twenty mill~neter guns averaged one stoppage each seventeen hundred rounds fired. 5. Uaintenance and Material a. Routine checks and corrective ili.C-intenance comprised the ma,jn':' work-load during this tour on the line. Maximum effort and nifht rep~_enishment by the Task Force made maintenance difficult and rc~ired sound planning and excellent night maintenance crews to obtain the required availability. ~OR1iATION 23 of 53 Enclosure (1) • • • b. Comr:Lander Air Force, Pacific Fleet dispatch l71950Z of ,July, which requires inspection of all F9F fuel cells, and Bureau of Aeronautics dispatch 032124Z of July, requiring inspection of the installation of tho main accessory drive gear assembly bearing, contri buted to the maintenance workload. These inspections have not as yet been completed on all aircraft. ... c. Six 11 J48 11 a.nd two 11 R-2800 11 engine changes w.sre per formed during the puriod; si.xteon Holley fuel controls also were changed. A major factor contributing to the large nwnbor of fuel control changes is belicvod to have been the prior use of the alcohol additive by one of the squadrons. d. A !!J4SP6A 11 engine had to be changed because of large nicks found in the compressor. This engine had only ana hundred hours of operation and had no noticeable nicks on previous inspections. Dis assembly revealed that pieces of metal such as screws, arming wire, o.nd pieces of whnt appear0d to be blast shield metal h~d entered the engine. It is therefore recomrn.endcd that: 1''.{7 ~' ~It- (1) Blast shields be rigidly insp0ctcd for signs of i~ ~ .P~ ~etcrior~tion to reduce the poSliibility of pieces coming loose Md enter- .;-\'' C J.ng the J.ntake ducts. ,, .(} I ~ ~f / / t ~ (2) That flight deck personnel conduct continuous I1 0( t~ policing of the flight deck, particularly in the drain scuppers. ,!l'Ui- rr {V I" ' . l C ;\ l ------>,- 1 '11'- -1 At£ . . (3~ The.t ordnance.persor_mel should police the aron J -_, ( elf'" for pJ.OCCS of arm1ng WJ.rC before le.".Vl.l1g a JOb. ~\ 1-; t e ~ ~ (4) That squadron personnel of the flight docrc e~so ..-\ ,1/ ,/' ~'continually police the area for pieces of met?..l the.t could be blown Jr 1~ 7 Jt(. sucked into engine intake ducts. ;{\·G. Tho Pratt cmd Vfuitncy ropr.;semtative concurs in the above roc om- \ ' mcndo.tions :-md b-2liovos that prCillB.ture engine changes due to inducer nicks co.n be reduced i'ii'ty to scvc:1ty-i'ive per cent abo2...rd aircrnft cc.rriers b;~r a program of' increased flight dock cleanliness. c. Spark plug troubles iD nR335011 cngj_ncs have beon materially rwduced since some now ttRB-19 11 and 11 RB-2? 11 plugs have be come avRil?.ble. f. The F4U-5N 1 s were plauged with nurnorous hydre.ulic leaks during this period. Periods of inactivity seom to increase the number of such insta.•1ces while a decrease is evident when the n.ircra.ft 24 of 53 Enclosure (1) . • •• • ' ~ORJ.!ATION nrc operated drtily. Regular exorcise of the hydraulic units seems to keep seals in better condition a..J.d reduces the number of lee.ks exper- ienced. g. Wingfold cylinders on two ..ill (~ircraft h,:-,d to be re pl::ced as a result of failure during the folding operation while the wings were carrying an excessive ordnecnce load. h. One F9F, ~hile being tuwed with the wings folded, was blown over by the blast from another F9F and required a wing chAnge. The F9F-5 is not very stA.blc when subjected to a large side airlo?.d when the wings :?.re in the folded position, P..nd extreme care shoulC: be exercised to prevent such situations arising. i. Aircraft handling accidonts were materially reduced over the preceding tour. This fact is especially noteworthy in view of the increased night h~1dling brought about by night rcplcnish~ent. Continued vigilance on thu part of flight and hi.".ngc>.r d0ck crews is necess.~.ry if such accid.;;nts are to be kept to a miniJnwn. j. No hook point foilures occurred. One F9F squadron has complotcd w0ll over 1,900 nrrcsted l"-ndings without a single failure. This scNadron continues the practice of g1·easing the hook point before each flight und follows up with e. close inspection for chipping .a.nd cracking following e .ch landing. The crossdcck pvndants arc gr'..Oascd daily. A total of seventy-three hook points <.tnd sixteen shanks wore issued for F9F aircraft. These were changed largely because the units had reached their maximum permissible number of cngc.gc ,.wnts. k. Other major parts issued for F9F aircraft included: seven starters, 150 low pres:mre fuel filters, eight tip tanks, fui..U' tecn aileron boost sol~noids, two rudders, and five elevators. 1. There were two cr.rbureters, sovo.Q hook sh:mks, eighteen hook points, two l1k"'-gnatos, thr'-'G wings, four elevc.tors, end two propellers issued for AD eircr2ft. Two propellers, four carbu rote:rs, one wing, two elevators, and. five t.:.ilhooks W<;;lrC issued for the F4U' s. A total of 139 :nain landing geiU" tires wore issued for F9F e.ircrnft, six i"or the F4Us, a.nd four for the ;.Ds. One aircraft bnttery was issued during the period. m. Some difficulty is still being ocperienccd in obtain ing spots for full power turn-ups of prop planes and for such opere.tions ,"'.s drop checks, wing cha.r.1ges, 1.nd engine che.nges. Coop~ration between ship and air group personnel, however, is excellent. 25 of 53 Enclosure (1) • • n. The substitution of night replenishm.ant for fourth day rcplcnishr.1ont somcwh2.t hf'.rrlpcred mRintene.nce work because of the time during which lights were off on the ha.ngJ.r dock.. In spite of this fr'.ct, all squadrons and VC detachments maintained their usue.l high standards of availability. ~s computed in accordance with the Naval .idr Warfare Reporting ~aanual, .s.vailability was as follows: YF-152 V%-~3 VF-1~4 v;-155 VC-3. VC-11 VC-3{ VC-61 95.5% 9 • 95.2)6 91.6% 90.3% i:1iCi,r 98.0% 91).'3% The ratio of missions rogulo.rly scheduled to those .:(lawn by their own aircraft is shown below, expressed on e.. percentage basis; VF-152 VF-~3 'lF-154 Vk-155 V~~ VC-11 :&ill. VC-61 97. "if, 90. ' 102. "if, 97. "if, ICi(5% 100)\ 1~6%. 100% o. M.'J.terial sup~~ort and cooperation from the ship's supply depr.rtt!l.cnt continues to· be excellent both in tho spare parts available and the procuroment of ACOG items. The following is a break- down of tho ACOG 1 s experienced dur:ing this period: Plane Allcwance Days ~~ NoiD.cnOlature Stock Nwnber Non-idlow ACOG iill-4W Tube .H.ssembly R$2-DQ-5265548 Non-i..llow 49 F4U-4 Control Assembly RB2-CV-V5-48660 Non-Allow 26 F4U-4 Stabilizer Asaembly RB3-CV-V5-40103 Non-Allow 2 F9F-5 Valve Assembly R83-AP-25400-20 Allowcmce 5 F9F-5 Valve Assembly R83-AP-25400-20 Allowance 5 F9F-5F Inverter Rl7-I-7476-l Non-Allow 4 F4U-4 Cylinder Asserubly R85-FW-13691S Allowance 2 F9F-5 Therinostat R17-VCH-49B92 Non-Allow 2 AD-4NA Cylinder Assembly RBZ-DG-5255155-17 Allowance 2 AD-4N Indicator R88-I-1325-15 Allowance 6 AD-4N Indicator RBS-I-1651-100 Allowance 1 F9F-5 Cover Assembly RG5-PW-151979 Non-Allow 1 AD-4 Wing Assembly R$2-DG-5256004-534 J\.llowa..'1ce 16 F4U-5N Rod Assembly R32-GV-V5-l0938 Non-Allow 4 AD-4N Indicator RBB-I-1651-100 Allowance 1 F9F-5 Cover Assembly R85-DW-151979 Non-Allow 4 F9F-5 Valve R33-AF-13701-20 Allowance 1 F9F-5 Valve R83-AP-1370l-20 Allowance 1 F9F-5 Valve R83-i 26 of 53 Enclosure (1) • . • ~RMATION p. The 'FASRON Detachnent at K-18 has rendered invaluable assi~tance to the Air Group pilots and aircraft on numerous occasions and is performing a.n exeellent j?b with the limited facilities it r.as at hand. On one occasion, the Marine detachment from K-13 also did an excellent job of replacing both wings on an F9F (BuNr. 126170) after it had been severely damaged by enemy fire. This job was done overnight. 6. Aircraft Damage: a. Combat Loss of Aircraft: ~ 1!!!ll Type A/C Ii!ili2. Cause Code 7/1/53 '/F-152 F4U-4 80822 Enemy Anti-Aircraft Fire L 7/16/53 VA-155 AD4 126904 A/A Fire. Pilot Bailed Out L 7/20/53 VF-153 F9F-5 125557 Enemy Anti-Aircraft Fire L 7/26/53 VF-152 F4U-4 81834 Enemy Anti-Aircraft Fire L b. Damage Inflicted by Enemy to Own Aircraft: ~ Unit T;zQe ALe BuNo ~ Code 6/14/53 VF-152 F4U-4 97086 Small Arms Fire D3 6/14/53 VF-153 F9F-5 126207 Automatic Weapons D3 6/15/53 VC-3 F4U-5N 124452 Small Arms D3 6/15/53 VF-154 F9F-5 126229 Small hrms D3 6/16/53 VF-154 F9F-5 126241 Small Arms D3 6/16/53 VF-153 F9F-5 125557 Automatic Weapons D3 6/17/53 VF-153 F9F-5 126230 Small Arms D3 6/~53 VC-3 F4U-5N 124452 Automatic ~iVeapons D3 7/ 53 VC-3 F4U-5N 122038 Small Arms D3 7/1/53 VF-152 F4U-4 82117 Automatic Weapons D3 7/2/53 VF-153 F'iF-5 125557 Automatic Weapons D3 7/2/53 VF-153 F9F-5 125961 Sma.ll Arms D3 7/3/53 VF-153 F9F-5 125596 Automatic Weapons D2 7/3/53 VF-154 F9F-5 126251 Boob Blast D3 7/6/53 VF-154 F9F-5 125543 Bomb Blast D2 7/9/53 VC-3 F4U-5N 122038 &nall Arms DJ 7/11/53 VF-154 F9F-5 126235 Automatic 1Veapons D3 7/11/53 VF-154 F9F-5 126238 Small Arms DJ 7/18/53 VF-153 F9F-5 126230 Small Arms D3 7/19/53 VF-153 F9F-5 126170 Auto.m.atic Weapons D3 7/24/53 VF-154 F9F-5 125952 Small Arms D3 7/24/53 VF-153 F9F-5 215591 Automatic Weapons D3 7/25/53 VF-153 F9F-5 126243 Automatic Weapons D3 27 of 53 Enclosure (1) • • ...... ,RMATION c. Operational Loss of Aircraft: Date Unit Type A{.C BuNo Cause 6/13/53 VF-153 F9F-5 125573 Ditched, Low Fuel L 7/9/53 VF-153 F9F-5 125462 Ditched, Flame Out L 7/12/53 VA-155 AD4 125757 Crashed L 7/19/53 VF-152 F4U-4 B1331 Crashed on take-off L 7/25/53 VA-155 AD4 126922 Ditched due to engine trouble L 7. Air Intelligence a. General (1) During this tour tfle Air Intelligence team continued to operate effectively and s:IDotbly, and its relations with the ship1 s intelligence personnel were excellent. Despite the rather heavy briefing schedule brought about by the continuous all out effort of the Task Force, the lessons learned during the first two tours were put to effective use. b. Maps (1) The preponderant scheduling of propeller Close .Ol.ir support and jet Cherokee missions during this period presented some what of a map problem. To provide a suitable target chart of each corps area and annotated with the current bcmbline and prominent terrain features used by CAS controllers. These were carried by many CAS flight leaders. (2) An additional briefing aid was a strip :r,ap of the bomblino area constrncted of 1:50,000 nrmy Map Survice charts. The chart covered all areas of CAS operations and was annotated with the current bomblino, anti-aircraft positions, terrain features, ttK 11 and n.ri.n fields, corps and division level headquarters, Tactical Air Di rection Center, 11MFQ 11 (GrOtmd Radar Control1ed Drop) controllers, et cetera. This chart has proved invaluable in briefing as well as de briefing during current operations. (3) The majority of pilots began their original tour using the A:ti.S 111552!! series map. The disadvantage of having ele vations in meters and light grid lines in this map is overcome by the ease of readability due to north lighting. This map is still preferred by most pilots. 28 of 53 Enclo suro ( 1) ...... • • .._..R&TION 11 (4) The AMS nL552 terrain r,1ap has been used for many briefings. Fle..k, furthermore, is plotted in the ready room on the AMS n1552 11 series. In addition a single sheet of the terrain map series has been used to brief each pilot individually. E:'l.ch pilot is, therefore, able to see a closeup, in three dimensions, where his of exactly target is located in relation to tho surrounding terrain. This method actually lessens the briefing time required the and enables pilots in the back row to get a 11 front rown briefing. (5) The U.S. Navy flight chart 11 NC Miscellaneous 156 A2-l 'Texoprintr; 11 , has been used somewhat by squadrons during this tour for evaluation purposes. The results obtained cPnrt with this durable have been excellent. The map folds compactly without cracking surfnce and grease pencil marks may bo Wiped off with a map provides cloth. The excellent coverage on one sheet. The shading on is also good. this map c. In preparing map folders for the pilots, scotch was used at the tape beginning of the cruise. It was found, however, that it tended to crack and discolor. Since then it 1 11 has been replaced by 'Mystick type ordnance tape and this tape has factory. proved highly satis d. The use of 1:30,000 target photographs inaugurated during this tour on the line has proved to be of tremendous scale photography value. This is of value to the squadron intelligence officer to the pilot because: and (1) It provides an accurate, easily read .tn3.p. quality is especially This important in the low rice paddy areas where rivers and roads may have changed positions. (2) It shows the target location in relation to pre dominent terrain features which may not be shown on 1:50,000 photographJ~ due to the size of the area covered. (3) The 1:50,000 photograph, however, necessary is still a part of the briefing and flight. It is used to locate ings, roads, build and terre.in features not readily visible in the smaller scale photography. e. Availability of more bomb damage assessment graphs would photo be a great boost for the pilotst morale. In addition WOLl.ld be a ba.sis it for an analysis of present attack procedures and tactics based on target damage. 29 of 53 Enclosure (1) ...... • • .._..R&TION 11 (4) The AMS nL552 terrain r,1ap has been used for many briefings. Fle..k, furthermore, is plotted in the ready room on the AMS n1552 11 series. In addition a single sheet of the terrain map series has been used to brief each pilot individually. E:'l.ch pilot is, therefore, able to see a closeup, in three dimensions, where his of exactly target is located in relation to tho surrounding terrain. This method actually lessens the briefing time required the and enables pilots in the back row to get a 11 front rown briefing. (5) The U.S. Navy flight chart 11 NC Miscellaneous 156 A2-l 'Texoprintr; 11 , has been used somewhat by squadrons during this tour for evaluation purposes. The results obtained cPnrt with this durable have been excellent. The map folds compactly without cracking surfnce and grease pencil marks may bo Wiped off with a map provides cloth. The excellent coverage on one sheet. The shading on is also good. this map c. In preparing map folders for the pilots, scotch was used at the tape beginning of the cruise. It was found, however, that it tended to crack and discolor. Since then it 1 11 has been replaced by 'Mystick type ordnance tape and this tape has factory. proved highly satis d. The use of 1:30,000 target photographs inaugurated during this tour on the line has proved to be of tremendous scale photography value. This is of value to the squadron intelligence officer to the pilot because: and (1) It provides an accurate, easily read .tn3.p. quality is especially This important in the low rice paddy areas where rivers and roads may have changed positions. (2) It shows the target location in relation to pre dominent terrain features which may not be shown on 1:50,000 photographJ~ due to the size of the area covered. (3) The 1:50,000 photograph, however, necessary is still a part of the briefing and flight. It is used to locate ings, roads, build and terre.in features not readily visible in the smaller scale photography. e. Availability of more bomb damage assessment graphs would photo be a great boost for the pilotst morale. In addition WOLl.ld be a ba.sis it for an analysis of present attack procedures and tactics based on target damage. 29 of 53 Enclosure (1) \ • 8. Electronics a. In general .. overall performance of electronics equip ment hs.s been good to exceller.t for the entire operating period. b. The procurement of ruggedized 11 6il.D 51' tubes has im proved the operational availability of the ttil.N/ARC-1 11 considerably and discrepancies have been reduced a great deal. c. !t is impossible to over-ouphasize the necessity for properly functioning ~DF equipment when working jets close to their maximwn endurance and tmder varying weather conditions. The PRINCETON is equipped with only a fifty watt horner beacon. This beacon has caused undue headaches on many occasions due to short range and being blanked out by other Stronger stations close to tho same frequency. The in ability of incoming aircraft to receive the beam causes many avoidable radio transmissions in :requests and answers to 11 stecrsn. Under IFR conditions the situation gets very critical when each division of jets must be very carefully tracked on radar until visual contact is made with the force. To a fast moving jet at high altitude._,. uzsu is of use only in bringing flights close to the force, anQ other means of navigation are necessary when these flights get inside the radar screen in low visibility. The USS LARK CHAMPLAIN (CVl-..-3'/) is equipped with a five hundred watt homer beacon and the pilots who l1avo been in the air wheii-- this ship ha-S thEi ll\F glla!-d report that this makes tho difference between wandering around en 11 2B" and calling for 11 steers11 , or being able to home on the force and being certain of navigation when over an overcast. It is, therefore, recommended that the type homer gaar installed on the USS UK& CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39) be installed in other CV!.' s. d, The 11l!.N/APG 3011 has withstood an average of slightly over ten catapult shots and arrested landings between bench adjustments. ApproXimately two and one-half man hours of maintenance is required per ten catapult shots and arrested landings. Predominant failures have been due to: (l) Tubes: Three or four particular tubes, for which rugged versions are manufactured but .":lot ec.sily available, have caused the most trouble. (2) Lock-On sensitivity adjustr.lent: As an experi ment, this unit wired one plane so that the lock-on sensitivity could be adjusted in the cockpit during flight. The pilot would then get a lock-on at a range fifty per cent greater than with the gear installed in any other plane. The gear in this plane has not required re-align ment since the 11fix.11 was installed although it has taken more than 30 of 53 Enclosure (l) • ' . .' • thirty catapult shots and landings. A comprehensive report on all operational aspects of the APC 30 is nearly complete and will be given full distribution by separate correspondence. e. The perfor!nance e.nd availability of the 11 ii.RN-6n, IIAPR-211 and nJtPX-611 Th"\s been excellent. 9. Survival a. Ditchings (1) There ware four cases of water ditchings dur jng this tour on the line: Two were made by F9F-5 pilots due fuel exhaustion, one b;l an F4U pilot due to battle da.;rk'!.ge, and or1e by rn ;.n pilot due to engine failure. In all except one case the emergency survival gear used functioned successfully. In the one instance the fRC-17 radio failed to operate due to a large amount of water and mold ii1Side the ce.se. From all indications the seePJLge.,occurred sor2.etime prior to the ditching and steps are now being taJcen to check all trans receivers for the possible cause 4 (2) The F4U pilot mentioned aLove, received a back iijjury during his ditching. The pilot apparently leveled off too high due to slick sea conditions and an oil obscured windshield and r+Jceived a badly wrenched back. (3) In the case of the .[J) pilot, the ditching w;:s made after an attempted emergency landing on Yodo Island. ;..ftor over shooting on his first approach the engine failed corJ1f->letely and the ditching was made without incident. b. Bailouts (l) During this tour one successful bailout oc curred. .n.n AD, after being hit by flak on a C.~S r.rl.ssion, suffered such severe elevator d2! c. Surviv (1) The 11 PSK-P survival kits which were received were placed in the life re.fts in place of certain geer the.t was con sidered unnecessary in tho Korean .-:Tea. The plastic conte.iners in these 31 of 53 Enclosure (1) . . ~.TION• • kits have frayed and torn with norr.tA...l wear. It is rcconu,;endcd that a stronger JG.:>.terial be used fur J0h·2se containers ar:..d that one FSK-1 be issued et;.ch pilot for person2.l c:1ro. d. Ex:rosure suits (1) It is felt that exposure suits should be re turned to tho Uuitcd St3.tos for renovation as soon as possible after the completion of tho winter phase of the tour. They are serving no useful purp,)se in the forwa.rd e.rea and a:;.~e deteriorating in stowage. 10. .... ir Group p. rsonne. a. 1iorale (1) Despite a fifty--hw day tour on the line (during whi('L n.n :'..:..i.-out effort was ~,~ado 2nd frecl:J.cnt replenishr,tents worc conducted during both c:ay wG. n:i_p.{:t) the r.1oroJ..e of the officers and r.wn of the Air Group re!X-L'1cd at n h:4h lc·.oL ,'U.l pcrsCJ:n,nel yroved equ!i.l to the requirc ;-.lcnts of the suste>.incd eff01~t.~ Nevertheless, a tremendous strain w~s im posed upon the pilots during these op0rations. (2) Th', _9Uot fntigm. resultant from r. continued six hour per L:-<-y per pilot rout::..~1o we.s SUPl-Di38d to havo been relieved by tho frequent canocll~tions of evQnts due to bad weather. This situ~tion, however, was deceiving. •.. ctnally, 1Nhether or :clot the pilots flew the mission: for which they wer._; schodulor!, the:r underwent the .w:ajor part of the strc.in n.nd the entire portion of thl pre;:oare.tions necCss"l!'y to each flight, since for every J:dssion scho.::.ulcd, pilots reported for briefings e-..nd suited up in r-tnticipation of the flight. If, hDwevcr, the event had been post poned they wore placed on one hour notice. This last condition only in creased the strain for each individual in who"'l.t is a 1nost difiicult part of e-··ch mission -.the waitiu;; to r,m.n aircraft. Fatigue, consequently, was not relieved at all, but increased instead by the nervous tension of being uon call11 • For thest: reasons, it is reconu~ ..;;lnded that for tours of over twenty days on tho line thD.t definite breaks in operations be scheduled for carriers. These breaks could be clltcrnated between various CV .... ' s. It is flillt that scheduling of defi,cite rest periods would prove greatly beneficial to pilots and i. _prove both their morale and flying efficiency; it is, furthernore, the opinion of this CQmtaand that it is fallacious reasoning to look upon events cancelled or set on stand-b;>r basis as restful or beneficial to the pilots. (3) It has been found that morale is higher among all personnel when they are kept inforr.1ed of what 11 theirn planes and 11 theiru pilots are ao1.'1g to th::;; ener.1y. This inforr,mtion has been dis seminated by information sheets, nGWspapsrs, lectures, and radio news programs .. 32 of 53 Enclosure (1) • .. • b. Tra.ini.ng (1) DurilLf the last rating exawination a totnl of 337 no;Jn took tests. Of this nw:-tLcr 204 or 60.$ per cent passed. However, due to lack of quotas 0nly 118 or 35.1 per c;;;nt of those having passed W·...:re fi.nn.lly ro..ted. ~TION 33 of 53 Enclosure (1) \ ·~ORM~TION• • B. Air Department 1. Aircraft Uandling a. No new or unusu~l problems were encountered in the handling of aircr~t. Equipment failure reports, where applicable, are being submitted through established channels. b~ In spite of the handling and spotting problems present during the period of 11;naximwn effortn, the fact that plane directors and plane handling crews have become very experienced minimized delays. c. Another contributing factor to the success of deck handling crews in meet~g th~ heavy damands during this period was the ideal schedule. I·~ required a minimwn nwnber of re-spots and enabled the plane har~lers to develop a set routine. d. It is understood that a test project is underway to evaluate the necessity of greasing cross deck pendants daily. This daily application of sreasc causes the Fly III landing area to become extremely slippery aqd creates a hazardous condition for the chock men during deck launches Jf propeller aircraft. The condition was aggravated during tr.s tour on the line since the 11 maximum effort 11 type of operations being tonductcd offered no opportunity to scrub down the Fly III area. e. The effect of jet blast on the flight deck continues to create a serio~ problem. Tho heat from these blasts melts the pitch between the dock ~lanking and causes the caulking to loosen. When possible, jots are parked outboard for turn up; but with large launches some planes must be parked fore-and-aft. 'The melted pitch not rmly causes the flight deck to deteriorate, but results in a slippery· deck which is hazardQUs to personnel and moving planes. 2. Aviation Ordnance a. The bomb elevators installed on this ship were not designed to carry heavy loads for such prolonged periods as are required by !light operations in Task Force 77. The track guide-shoes have become ~ern beyond the adjustment tolerances of the electric stop switch~s, ?~d the car tilts toward the side with too heavy loads. This situation causes the car to stop eithGr two inches too high Gr two inches too low. Temporary repairs by the ship's force have been accomplished and new track shoes will be installed during navy yard availability. SECURITY INFORMATION 34 of 53 Enclosure (1) • Y' .. • SECURIT'Y !NFORLIATION b. Pl;:o;nes being towGd over bomb elevator hatches htJ.ve sprung the hatches to tho point where they are no longer water tight. During heavy rains elevator switches and relays r~vc short circuited. Water dr~ins on the bomb elevator coaming are of throe-quarter inch pipe and become clogged with debris adrift on the flight deck. Larger drains of one and one half to two inch pipe would facilitate water run-off during r~iny periods and increase the effectiveness of the bomb elevntors. c. The lug channel of the ~~k 1 Bomb Skid has a tendency to fail duG to b:r3akag.s or bending after 1-',ard usage; it thereby allows five hund~~d pound and one thousand pound bombs to slide forward on the skid while being novod on the flight deck. It is rtJcornmcndad that the lug channels bo strengthened with angle irons, or that they be manufactured of heavier gauge metal. d. Rock2t pictails continue to break at high speeds, causing dud rocket moto:,~n. J, satisfactory method of preventing the pigtails from breakinc h1.s r'ct, been devised. e. When J.SS'J:rr-'ling bombs for high speed aircraft r1. modified tail-fin locking-nut must be USE-Oc:, This nut employs four Allen Head set-screws t,hat r·: '-l'-lire exoes.sive time to tighten; however, the use of the extondod-reac_· A.llen Wrench (approximately fifteen inches long with a 11 T!I Mnd.l_,,) ho.s solved this problGm. J, Aircraft Maintenance a. Due to thB long stretches of bad weather encountered during this tour, aircraft shop loe.ds were less than normal. Free periods were devoted to the painting of spaces and the overhauling of equipnent. b. a fatal accident marred an otherwise perfect safety record whGn the engine flywheel on a portable hydraulic test stand (Modal 8278 139, Serial #N288S-2117'2, manufactured by Wisconsin Motor Corporation) disintegrated whilo the machine was being serviced. A report of unsatisfactory or defective mate~iPJL (USS PRINCETON (CV~37) RUDM, Serial 1-53) has been submitted. c. One R-.2800-18 engine and one Hamilton Standard 24E6o propeller v.>ere built u~ during the period to replace engines issued by the Supply Department. 35 of 53 Enclosure (l) • , SECURITY INF0!1J!i.TION• • 4. ~utomotivo Maint:.m2..nce a, Routine servicing and upkeep wore sufficient to kGep oight tractors in S6fViCe throughout the tour, Two tractors with crackGd rear axle housings ar::: being retlU'n 5. hvi~tion ~~saline a. The pJ.ug-v'.llvcs of the aviation gasoline. system hn.vc rec;_q~ rod co.nd.ar:~· .~<'-1 2 ,-~:1d regular lubric0.tion, It h-:\s been neccs3'"'r;:t to dr?:!.tl thr, 3tc.tj_on filters daily to remove grease and particleu that h:wc bce11 pich:Gd up internally froa plug valves. b. Refueling at sen has boon uneventful, A six-inch flaneo-typc hose has bcY,~-·1 u:;;ed to take gasoline aboard, The rate of recoi·.·:'..ng gasoline h:.1s '0c~cn ~-pproxiJ;,atel:;r forty thousand gallons per hour. .kG specified in •_;,),:~-:t'1r;.ler Air Force, Pacific Fle0t Instruction 09150.1 of 12 February 1'153_, maximum head pressures during refueling are 10.9 pounds per squa~e inch forward ~nd 8.9 pounds per square inch aft. The r.-1to of flow rual:\.!3\0d during the fueling of inner tanks has been the determining fc>:-{,or jn fucling the outer tant.:s so that the sy-stc:n will not be fil]_od tu greater than ninety-fivo per--cent of capr..city. c. Through the efforts of the gasoline officer, a mechanicA-l cam device for a.ttachmont to the Robb Quick Release Coupling has been evaluated, This device provides for autonatic actuation of the quiclc-rolease coupling in an emergency. To effect a breakaway only the ho.sen:.es~enger pelican hook is released. As the ships separate the coupling clears the side and then breaks automatice.lly clear of the ship. This procedure prevents gasoline spi1lage on the deck. k report of the device, with pictures and detailed descriptior... , is being forwarded S(lparat\::lly (Commanding Officer, U,S,S, PRINCETON (CVn-37)·1tr CVA37/30, 19-2 scr 2567 of 3 . d. To strike below aviation lube oil during re plenisUnent, a rectangular funnel is fitted in the deck filler. A portable ramp is placed alongside. The filler plugs of the drums are removed and replaced by a pipe nipplo, globe valve, and ninety degree elbow. The drums are then rolled up tho ramps and the vent plug removed. The valve at th~ bottom is opened and air pressure is applied through the vent plug opening thereby permitting four drwns to be emptied simultaneously. ~ORMkTION 36 of 53 Enclosure (1) • • • • • --SDCURITY INFORMATION (4) NU~!h..>r of above shots o.t ma.ximum pressure (4,000 lbs. psi) Port 739 Stbd ...2?1 Total 1,662 b. Due to oritioel wind conditions, throe-fourths of all launches ''-'Gt'8 lJ::d,,) at a maximum firing pressuttc of four thousand pou"lr1s pe:::' scur'.::.'.: --lr,c to "Ih' s procedure greatly incrensad oil leaks :md ct· l~~r ronti·10 -.·,u: ··1·,~-~w;1 ·:o problems. However, the only rw.jor ropflir nGC\;e'3 :;.·~-T ·iu::in.;o'; ·i;_'li.,; r·:: ..•i-xl wo.s the installr:tion of n now oil gear pumf) :)_n +.~ln f:lt::J.rOo~rd ~r<~--.pu.lt which wo.s acoot1plishod e.t seo. by the ship~s :·o.~_'co. Tl:-b cnt~:.r·J ch".ngo of pumps was completed within ten hour~. The use of -':l. h~Tf":·~ll.lic type track-oiler, manufactured by the eatnpJ.l_t ~rm,r f:o:'>ora n.n u.::_:~.·raft hydraulic f'.ccumulator, proved highly effic:LCl::.tC ~11ck lub:-). .:--r.::.:n wa.s improved with the result that shuttle slipp!S):' wero.r dcc:rcased t.c"J.i '. L"Bsulted in less frequent changing of slip~ors. c. Tho LcwcbJ.ng cap d. In generr:.l, tho availability of both catapults was excellent during this operating PGriod. 7. Holicopt,'Jr 0p a. An ;;; nr .., SECTll.ITY INFORMATIOO 3S of 53 Enclosure (1) .' .-. •• ~'*ORMATION • C, Engineering Dop.'~rtr1cnt 1. Engineering plrmt n~intcultmco and repair, particUll"l.rly in regards to boilG!'s$ h,"J.s boon 2. continuin~ problem duo to tho lack of equi~er.t availability. 2. Two policios were establishor1 in -:m effort to alleviate the situation: a.,_ T1H Jffir.ors-of-the-Dook were trained to be alert for chnnf{ing op '· ~-~- :.:-.· tl ~~1 wenthor conditions (in relation to r.mg:inoering pl::>.''-~, :'·f~- :.rome:"'lts). :J, At, t_'l. ""-'ginning of each bridge WC>~tch the situ::o.tion was o.nalyz.cd, dt;d.si.0n': w-~'o mD.de 1 tho Offic0r-of--tho-Wo.tch was called, nnd tho prcblsn;; t~vr:'is(':" ;.r:Jro discusser!. :-:, Tt ,,.,- ·.. 1 :Lcios not only have nw.intcdned good liaison b-:..twccn t.h:. b:._·_!__: "'' ·ttd main control, P.llowing the Officor of'-tho-Wat"h to "t':'.lcc f1'l L r!r~v.:mtagc of opcrs.tinG conditions, but also h."V0 brought nbou~; ·Gh3 ti>'!loly securing of boilers, und availability for ropnir and !'la.intont.r::""!O for ns much as four hours por d'ly. 3. Boilc.:r 'l~G-bo Co.suD.. l ty a. At nbout 0209 on 23 Juno 1953, while steaming at 110 R.P.M., the number throe ship's boil,lr suffered .-:: tube failure. At the tine of the o~sualty, boilers nQ~bors one, three, five ~nd eight uere on tho line in c split pLmt nrrangcrn3!lt. Investigation revealed that the last tube (-:~ ono inch generatin~ tube in the out bo~d {AA) row, tho one roost removed frOM tho boilor burners) h~d sheared off flush with the exterior surf:".ce of tho nmd dl"Ul'l. Further investigation disclosed th:\t ci;;ht ar:'l_ditionc..l tubes were in various stn :os of dotorioration nppnrontly rtue t~_. external corrosion. Tho questionable condition of those tubes led to the decision to plug and mochnnically rupture four tubes. Tho rGrn.aining four 'lro also being scheduled. for replaoeuont as soon a.s possible, b. Upon the conclusion of the teMporary repairs outlined above, tho boiler vm.s given a hyt'l.rostatic test of 750 pounds. This tost reveale0. nn additional leak in nurn'\:ler twelve economizer element npproxim.~toly two inches from the header in a "no flM0 11 area.. No externr:tl tube corrosion was appnrent. The defective clement was pluggo~ ~nd, after ~ satisf~ctory hydrostatic test, was placed back in service. It did appear, however, that this element had boen lenking for sene tine prior to tho rupture of the ?ne inch generating tubo. Frequent subsequent daily inspections have !'ailed to indicate any unusu"'l condition. 39 of 53 Enclosure (1) • ,. '. • 4. On 14 July 1°53, the distillate from the number two set of evaporators indicated excessive salinity. By 19 July 1953, the salinity reached such a proportion that further distillation to ship's tanks was no longer acceotable. The unit was secured and investigation revealed that one section of the tube sheet surface on the after part of the distiller-condenser was considerably pitted, This same .erosion had, in addition, eroded the inner surface of the tube where it entered the tube sheet causing the tube's failure. Removal of tho tube and plugging of the holes was necessary in order to effect a positive seal. Although zincs are checked every thirty days, this experience points up to the desirability of more frequent and closer inspections of zincs throughout tho plant. This point is especially true when operating undJr the severe operation condi tions imposed by long periods on the line with minimum maintenance time availablu. D. Gunnery 1. Replenishment at sea a. Daylight replenishments (1) Daylight replenishments wore carried out in a routine manner. b. Night replenishments (1) Night replenishments were carried out on numerous occasions. Fueling and gasolinG transfers were conducted by the 11 span wire", ''modified span wire", and "oiler inhaul" methods. Of these, the "span wir<,l 11 method is undoub.;tedly the roo.at satisf.actory for night operetions. - (2) An occasi9nal night of low visibility created some difficulties when either the 'imodified span 0.re11 or 11 inhaul11 methods were used. Tn.e oilers, furthermore, cncounter~d special difficulty in ooordina~ing the handling of the inhSul. line with the hook-up crews in the darkness. A further encumbermcnt has been-tho small working space at the aftor fueling station on this vessel. This small area made a safp hook~up of the oiler inhaul. virtually'·~ impossible at nigpt •. c. Night re-arming (1) No serious problems were encountered in night re-arming. A progrrun of "safety first" was emphasized and the rate SECURITY INFORMATION 40 of 53 Enclosure (l) .. .' ~ORMATION• • of transfer of ammunition was, oonscquently, slightly lower than the normal dnylight rate. (2) Standard signals and markings as prescribed in NWP-38 wore used. d. The PRINCETON replenished on all but fifteen of the fifty-six days covered by this report. e. Rceord replenishment (1) On 13 July 1953, the PRINCZTON replenished from the USS FIREDRAKE (AE-14). Amrnuni tion and other supplies were transferred to this vessel at a rate of 257.4 tons per hour-- a rate believed to be a record one for this sort of operation. 2. Ordnnnce and Fire Control a. Firing ox~rcisos werJ hold on 29 and 30 August. See Part III, ORDNANCE, E. Medical Department 1. Supplies and Equipnent a. No shortage of Medical Department supplies occurred and there was no significant breakdown of equipment. 2. Medical Department Evaluation or Ship's Compruzy- nnd Air Group: n. The morale of tho ship's comprmy and nir group pilots has been excellent in spite of the extended period on the line. This period has bc:cn deprc:osing not only bocr.:mee of its length, but because normnl replenishment duy periods of relaxation have been missed, and weather has beon of such a poor caliber that at times lethargy has been noted. b. It is still felt that r>. three-week assign."llcnt on the line is the optimum period of Qcployment. Also day replenishment periods off<:!r fl corto.in longec'l. for rc.:lax£~tion t.h. 41 of 53 Enclosure (1) • : • F. Operations Dep~tJ.nont and indic3.ting systems wind direction '!he o.. Thoro arc two in this vessel. systzms installed tho port intensity indicating when connoctod to three wind wind indic~tors have obtained from the located on the yardru:-rns, readings vnnes and anemometers with the other or starboard wind one system is oomparGd dissimilar when ccrtnin temper""turo been found to be addition, under roo.d• conditions. In the wind intensity under identical found bet"Heon havo been relative wind condi oonditions, varinti0ns .'lnd the actunl it from the indic'Jtors flight dock. Furthermore, ings obtained ..."orWard end of the taneous wind existing at the differences in sirrrul various tions th:::t considerable been reported nt has been observed more carriers have from two or warrant it. readings obtnined do not appear to weo.thar conditions times 11hcn true and relative need f~r accurate wind With tho critical bog.~n tnking b. this command using nnd intensity indicators, we,::tthcr conditions lJind direction under v;'rious them and in.toos:i.ty- re""dings comparing direction systems nnd simultaneously at the lead regular wind indientor anemometer positioned the from a portable were found to exist with those obtained differences which the flight deck. The relative wind over ing edge of the ,md actual wind indic:J.tor readings of tho following: between tho as being a result deck wore determined flight apparently were direction differences (}) Wind structure. oi"foct of th8 isl?.nd caused by the turbulence were differences apparently (z) Wind intensity existing neer tempcrnturo inversion tor ~nd strong r the sea we. caused by a shallow exists whenev- ThiB typo of inversion resulting in lighter the surface. ~ir tenpcr':'ture, anemo is loss thEm the of the yardarm temporn.turo ~t the height flight dock than ~nds over tho meters. above readings the analysis of the As a reeul t of an of the various a. enable thrJ observer fnctors which for tho actual followil'1g correction corrected reading boon to determine the flight deck have wind in..=:icr:tors vy over the di:o:-ection t.l1ld intonsi reln.+,iVQ w:~_nd usod on this chip: obta:i.r.(:d a':;.t'l nrc (1) Wind Direction factors ~hould be Tho following o~ection indicators to relr-.tivo 'Wind direction readings of the the flight deck: applied to tho W.n<1 d:froaUon over obtetin "_h.cJ t'.IJIT<;ct .rc.~fl-t._i:vu Enclosure (1) ~•!'J!'LA~ION 43 of 53 • • - ::~t SECURITY INFORMATION• • Indicator ReadiQg Port System Starboard System 000-019 - 06 I o6 020-034 - 10 I 04 035-049 - 13 104 050-129 unreliable ,L 00 130-159 unreliable - 05 16o-199 11o - 10 200-229 I 05 unreliable 230-309 00 unreliable 310-325 - 04 I 13 325-339 - 04 110 340-359 - 06 ,L 06 (2) Wind Intensity Except for calm wind conditions, the following correction factors should be applied to ~~e readings of the wind intensity indicators to obtain the correct relative wind intensity over the flight deck, whenever the temperature differences (in degrees fahrenheit) indi cated below exist between the air and water: Temperature Difference *Correction Factor (-) - 0 -1 1 - 2 -2 3 - 7 -3 8- 11 -4 12 - 15 -5 *Note - An additional co:rrection .factor of plus two (12) knots should be applied to the windward anemometer when the relative wind is between 10 and 25 degrees on the bow. d. In view of tho above information, it is recommended that all aircraft carriers ascertain whether simil8r correction factors are required for their wind indicating systems and that after each periodic overhaul a recheck of the correction factors be made. It is further recommended thet corrected relative wind direction and intensity indicator readings always be reported by aircraft carriers whenever eomparisons arc made. 2. Combat Information Center a. The notable feature of this period was the large amount of flying conducted in weather unfavorable to air oporations. To cope with this difficulty a foul weather let-down procedure was 44 •f 53 Enclosure (1~ ,. .' • • • • aircraft. Flights were developed to ncc0111plish tho saf (1) SECURITY INFORMATION 45 of 53 Enclosure • •' ~ SECURITY • INFOftMATION • of high humidity from a oompat'atively dry area. The only solution to such a condition was to re~ove the antennas singly and completely dismantle and olean the interT:l.l sp~oers and surfaces. This can be, and was accomplished under conditio:J.s of continuous operation; although, from the point of view of pe~sonnel safety, such procedure is not recommended as routine maintenance. A higher degree of sealing for VHF antennas, however, is recommended. The UHF antennas, are com pletelY inaccessible during operations at sea, and at the completion of forty-five days operation, nine of the thirteen UHF a.ntezmas install-etl·---- were either open or shorted internallY. It is recommended that UHF extension arms be hinged at the mast in order that they may be lowered for maintenance work. c. 1be excessive vibration to whieh Radio III is sub jected resulted in a casualty to the power supply chassis of a TCK transmittE.>.r. Investigation of the breakdown revealed that the aluminum chassis was oraekcd and shattered in several places as though crystallization had occurred. A new chassis was constructed on board. d. Two identical easualtios occurred in the one thousand volt winding of the low voltage armatur~ of the motor generator associated with the TBM transmitter in Radio III. The actual cause is not known. The most logical assumption, however, is that it was an insulation breakdown resulting from aga and storage. The lack of a spare necossi tate.t rewinding the armaturs on board. e. Daily leoturos wore given to tochnioians ~~d familiarization tours and oxplc.natory talks were givon to new SA ratings in the division.• 4, Photog:'nphie Laboratory a. Fhotographic reconnaissance planes from unit liDog" of VC-61 flew a total of thirty-nine sorties and obtained a total of 4,417 exposures during the period. The ehief dif.ficulty e:xporicnccd in processing the fi~ arose from tho fact that the laboratory is not equipped to process four hundred foot rolls. Those rolls have to be eut in half and only one roll can bo processed o.t a tin:.o. b, Anothor dif£ioulty encountered is due to the fact that the laboratory possesses only one "AlOA'' dryer. This dryer broke down on two occasions during the period and is a source of constant maintenance troubles. The cut-back in distribution requiroments (from six to two) allowed the photographic section to get all its work out on time, however, in spi to of the breakdowns. SEC!lRTTY INFOllMATTON 46 of 53 l!helosure (1) ' .' ~ilMATION• • c. During th~ d3ys in which no ~hotogr~phic reconnais S9.IlCo missions W'1re fl'..J'm, nil'l.cty-f'ive par cent of tho 240 pages of photographs for ·G:r.i~> yeo.:r ;f' .src:.ise book, "Attack CnrriE.Jr 11 , were produced. 5. Rc~nrks on _D,oplcnishrr..;r..t Procedures a.. 'I'h'J +.imo rnquired to prepare o. carrier for re-arming, provisioning, nnd ro~-f,Kling 'lnd to make it rea.Cty agt>in for f1ight operations after the completion of' thasc evolutions is o. ljajm• pl'1nning consideration. The personnel required for working parties in many instances nre the seJne men who may have just completed work with air oper~tions and who will again be roquirod at their stations for tho opor~tions which follow renlanishm~nt. Preparations required for re fueling on the other hqnd,-involve little time ~d few personnel. b. An analysis of the replenishments conducted during the :::.cried of this !'aport resulted in the f'ollowi.Ylg conclusions b0ing drawn with respect to tho timG and work load fnctors involved: (1) Ro-nrming (a) PrGparntion 1,. Involves removal of about thirty aircraft from hnngar b·-ws ono and two to the flight deck with attendant interruption of ~~inton>nco. Tho time required to complete the evolution is 3bout one and one-fourth hours. g. Tho assembly of' a two hundred mon work ing party requires ~tbout forty-fivo minutes. (b) After Prop hauled down 1. The assenbly -~d sto~w.go o:' miscel lmloous fliiUllUl1ition requires abOi.lt two hours for each hour nlongsido the m·1munition ship Uo.sE"Jd on rm nve:r.age arming rate. g. Aircraft respotting for tho next launch can commence at about one-half th:J mnmuni tion stowage tL11e and be completed simultaneously thc:r.owith. 2· Re-arming for tho next launch nornally cannot be commenced until after ammunition stowage is completed inasmuch as tho same personnel arc required for both evolutions. An average time interval b~twccn leaving the ammunition ship until aircraft can be ready for the next launch is three and one-half hours. I 47 of 53 Enclosure (1) •• IN70fu'IATION• • (2) Provisioning (~) Preper~tion 1. Involves clearing of the starboard half of bays nunber one nnd twO nnd nearly all of bay number three. The time required to accomplish this is about on0 -1.nd one-fourth hours. (b) After Prep hauled down !• The striking below of prov:i.sions from accumulation points in hangar bay numh:;r three-. requires abou~ two hours. Re-spotting for next launch cannot OOl'llBcnoc bofore one hour r,ftor leaving the provisioning ship. 2. The time required to be roacly for the next lnuneh nftor provisioning will nor:mnlly be two hours. (3) Re-fueling ('l) Prepo.rntion !• Involves respotting of about five aircraft to clear tho st~rboard side of buy one. The time required is negligible,;, g. The superheat in the boiler'3 must be lowered from 850~, full power conditi,n, to 6ooor. in order to ~llow for stopping engines if required during the appros.ch to the replenish·· mont vessel. Ti~e required to accomplish this is a minimum of thirty five minutes. One bour notice is desirnble to comply with s,'1f'e engi neering practice. (b) Aftor Prep hculed down 1,. Aircr"lft can bG read:r for ~.aunch on completion of re-fueling. g. Superheat must .:-gain be raisod to 800°F, and addition3l boilers cut in to have full power available, TLqe required is thirty-five minutes to one hour. c. It is recommended th:.c.t due consideration be given to appropriate title and worklocd factors in planning replenishment operations, particularly for aircraft carriers whon opcratin:~ with a task force. SECURITY ORMATION 48 of 53 Enclosure (l) ,• .. . ·. •• • -~ • ~~-N_,OP.!i~TION • G. Navigation Dcpo.rtncnt 1. Standard To.ctic,-\1 Diameter for Fast Carrier Operations a. The operations of this ship with Task Force SEVENTY- ~ SEVEN have demonstrated that turns ~~de with n standard tactical diameter of one thousand five hundred yards are undesirable and that turns made with an increased diameter nre essential to the efficient conduct of present day fast carrier opern.ti.')ns. The heavioc:- t:rl.!'C?",J.ft no~r in use and the increased bO!:'l.b loads have increased currier t:m side ·wi:l',ht to such an extent th.:.:~t the degree of heel in a stanr:o.rd tn"':'n is !~O ,·:xcossive thnt all aircraft maintenance and respottin.a; mus~ br; stoppec'l. w.til a turn is completed. Some or the unacceptable conG.ition3 whic1. result there frOI!l and which seriously interfere with the meet:!.ng of schGdulod operations nre as follows: (1) Aircrnft nust bo secured wi_ th addi tianal tie down lines over nnd above tho throe tic dOwn reels no·.:mnlly used during air operations. (The high canter of gravity o:f the jet t:y·pe aircraft with folded wings renders them unstable. In one instance three tic down reels failed and an F9F-5 airplane would have gone ovor the side if it had not been stopped by fallinr, against nnother plrmE::.) (2) All movements of Qutomativo equipment must be stopped and all portnble Maintenance equipr.tent secured. (3) RG-a.rming and re-fueling operations ".re either stopped or retarded. (I+) Aircraft which hav>? been placed on hydraulic wing jacks for rm.r:..i.1,~ mnintenanco are endangered. (5) Personnel arc exposed to additional hazards when the deck is wet. b. The limited endur3llCO of jot aircr0!'t rGq~1ircs froqmmt launch rmd racovery operations and a proporti.Jnate increasa in the mullber of :formation turns into end out of tho wind. The loss of ef.ficlcncy which results from the frequent stoppage of t.rork as outlined above is unacceptable. Turns of increased dimn;~tcr :r.!.UJ?t be Gmployed in the interest of personnel and material safety anj in order to obtain un interrupted flight .o:md hangnr dock operations. c. Experience with the use of a 2000 ycrd tactical di~etor, which was rccom.tnondcd by this comnc.nd an::-: directed to be used for standard turns by Golllm~dor Tusk Force 77 on 27 Juno 1953, proved it to be highly satisfactory. It is recomnondod that a tactical diameter of 2000 yards be .adopted as standard for all fast carrier operations • .. I a:. SBCURITY INFORMATION 49 of 53 &>closure (l) .. • ;i Ul I a SECURITY INFORMATION• • 2. Lighting for NiGht Replenishment Operations. a. The opm:··a t.J.ons during this period afforded the most concentrated and varied experience with night replenishment of the Korean War. The procedures involved became commonplace with practice and were refined and modified by the lessons learned by experience. In general, the special lighting prescribed by NWP-38 for tackle and gear at transfer stations was found to be satisfactory. However, no provision was made for the lighting of the delivering ships which would serve as aids to th~ reeeiving ships in making approaches and in keeping station along side. In an attempt to develop a suitable lighting system for these purposes, this command recommended to Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN the evaluation of the following lighting arrangem0nts on replenishment and receiving vessels: (1) One dim red light loeated on the main deck of the delivering ship, at a point opposite the desired position of the bridge of the rece~v~ng ship, so as to reflect outward and downward at the deck edge at an angle of approximately 45°. (This light not only indicates the best posit.ion f0r the receiving ship, but serves to elimi nate the tendency toward vertigo which results from observing a single light, for protracted lengths of time.) (2) Another dim red light, similarly rigged, located as far forward as practicable, to indieate the fore and aft axis as well as the side of tho roplonishment ship. (3) Two dimmed lights, of the same intensity as those described in paragrgph 36o of NWP-38, rigged on top of each of the after king posts of the delivering ship to form a1tthwartship range of lights. (These two lights provide a means for detecting the relative fore and aft movement of the two ships.} (.L) Ti.m dim. rr.d- ltlr,'hts located foT'Ward on the replenish"lngt..side of the receiving ship to form a rang0 of lights along the .fore and aft axis. (These lights, nnd the o:ae des~ri"P:>ed in sub paragraph (b) above, provide an indication of the movement o:': the bows of tho two-ships, toward or away from each other. On this ship, the forward deck edge lights on the flight deck serve this purpose.) (5) For approaches to the replcnishm2nt ship; the screened wake light and the rod truck lights of the replenishment vessel. (These lights, in conjunction with the station keeping lights prescribed above, provide the orientation and depth perception necessary to make night approaches with confidenee. On the contrary, particularly on dark or foggy nights, the stern light and/or unscreened dock flood lights are too bright in contrast to the other lights on tho replenishment ship which arc essential to proper orientation.) oaw 1.nu r. SECURITY INFORMATION 50-53 Enclosure (1) ' .. • ... ' • • • b. In view of the unprecedented opportunity which was afforrtod tho units of Task Force SEV1NTY-SEVEN to replenish at night ann to develop those improvements in the lightinJ systems fol" approach and station keeping, it is recommended th:J.t the above lighting measures be adopted for stondard use. H. Supply Department L The dep'lrtment functioned normally throughout this extended period although the len;-:,th of ti:me on tho line pro-.cd to be the most severe test of "staying power" sustained by it to date. Only two items rnn critically low: tires nnd tubes for the F9F ai"tcrnft .. 2- One hundred fifty-one F9F main landing genr tires were expended in tho forty-three operating days covered b~ this report. It is considered that the principal factor in the unexpoetcdly high usage of those items was the use of K-18 as n ''Weather alto:!'llnte 11 landing field at times when the Task Force was fogged in. ·Tho K-18 runways are composed of worn Marston Matting which rips tires ~ shreds. The acute shortage was relieved by pro~pt action on the pn2~ of the USS BOXER (CVA-21), A re-supply from tho USS JUPITER (AVS-~) has eub sequently been received. 3. Bacauso of tho need for optimum coordinatioo and cooper ... Btion between T3Sk Force ships during tho period of mnximu• effort, n conference to~ns requested by the FRlllCEI'ON nnd convoncd by Connnander Carrier Division ONE. Attending wore tho Supply Officers t>f all four CV As on the line and the Stnff Supply Officers of Commando:! Carrier Division ONE and THREE. An agenda was drawn up and agrecmltlts wore reached upon the following subjects: a. D0r.1and chllllncls. b. Logistic communication procedures. c. Responsibility for action. The minutos of tho meeting arc in tho possession of Commander Carrier Division ONE and the USS LAKE CH..fU.iPU;.IN (CVA-39), and an enrl;:1 anpli ficntion of thG Logistic Annex to tho Task Force Operation QrC.er is .1.nticipated. It is rocOI'lillcndad that a progro.m to insure muxiJJ'I.D:J. continuity of effort end information on irnrlediato logistic pt"Ogr!lr.ls between tho relieving Task Force CO!l1J_""'1.8.nd Staffs nnd maj0r units within the Force be pursued. 51 of 53 Enclosuro (l) P.\RT VII RECOMMENDATIONS: l. Po~c 24 (VI, A, 5, d) ~. It is rocammonded that: (1) Blast shields be rigidly inspected for signs of deterioration to roduco th~ possibility of pieces coming loose and entering tho intake ducts. (2) The.t flight dock personnel conduct continuous palic ing of tho flight deck, particularly in the drain scuppers. (3) ThQt ordnance personnel pOliOG the area for pieces of o.rl:l.in3 wire bE:Jfore leaving a job. (4) Thnt squadron personm::l of the flight dock 9-lso continually police tho area for pieces of metal that could be blown or sucked into engine intake ducts. 2. P~gc 30 (VI, A, 8, c) a. It is roconnended that the type homer gear installed in the USS L!Ult£: CW\MPL,\lli (CVA-39) be instc.llod in all other CV:i's. 3~ Pn;:re 32 (VI, A, 9, c) a. It is reconnnondcd th:::t a stronger mat.orio.l be used for FSK-1 survivc.l kit containers o.nd th"!.t 0ne R3K-l be issued each pil0t for personal c.1.rc. .Af RUDM is being subrr..i tted. 4. Page 32 (VI, lf,J.O,a[2)) a. It is rccamm8ndod that, for 5. tour of over twenty days on the line, nnr1 when opor~tio~s pernit, 'J.!l occnsionr,l break in oparations b0 scheduled. 5. Pngo 35 (VI, B, 2, c) a. It is recommended th._,t the lue ch:tnnols (of' the M:irk 1 Bomb Skid) be strengthened with n.ngl•J irnns, or that they be t1c.nufacturcd of heavier gauge metal. An RUDAOE is being subnittGcl.. 6. Pa.;o 38 (VI, B, 7, a) a. It is recommended that nll helicopter units :flying HOJS-1 holicoptor3 nnd bnsed o.boaiod ship in tho Korean area reduce their gaso line loads Cilld strip the helicopters in no-wind or light-wind conditions. 52 of 53 Enclosure (1) • ,· • rSWwF? \L SECURITY INFORillhTION 7. Page 44 (VI, F, 1, d) a. It is recomuended that all aircraft carriers ascertain whether sirr.ilar correction factors are required for their wind indicating systems and that after each periodic overhaul a re-check of the cocrectiol\ factors be made. It is further recOJ.t.r:tended that corrected relative wind direction and intensity indicator readings always be reported by air craft carriers whenever compa.ris~ns are made. A letter is being sub Jdtted to Coamander Air Force~ Paclific Fleet on this subject. 8. Page 46 (VI, F, 3, b) a. It is recomw.ended that UHF extension arms be ~nged at the r.ctast in order that they may be lowered for maintenance. 9. rage 48 (VI, E, 5, c) a. It is recommended that due consideration be given to ..vlffie and workload factors in planning all replenishment operations. 10. Page 49 (VI, G, 1, c) a. It is recomrr a. It is recot:~Uiended th.:?..t a standard lighting syst0ro. for the purpose of assisting receiving ships in making approaches ar;d in station keeping during night replenishment be incorporat0d in N'NF-38 for use by all naval vess~ls. 12. Face 51 (VI, H; 3) a. It is r.:oco,'.Jaended th:::.t a program to insure ii:ta.XimunL continuity of effort and information on immediate logistic progras,,s between the relieving 'fask Force Cm~itand Staffs <::lid J:tajor units within the task force be pursued. 53 of 53 Enclosure (1) ' 2$ llliL SECURITY INFO!U'1ATION CAG-2 CAG-5 CAG-7 CAG-9 CAG-11 C.!G-15 CAG-19 CAG-14 CAG-12 C!.'IG-1 CATG-2 CO, VC-3 CO, VC-11 00, VC-35 co, VC-61 Pf:pn;:NTICA~: I I . /, /)?_#~{~~-->~ ./ J .\liES GAGNON j 4 LCDR, USNR -"" Flag Secretary i I /