Strengthening Canadian Democracy

choicesVol. 9, no. 7 August 2003 ISSN 0711-0677 www.irpp.org From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors

An Account and an Evaluation

Jerome H. Black ounded in 1972, the Institute for Research on Public Policy is an independent, national, F nonprofit organization. IRPP seeks to improve public policy in Canada by generating research, providing insight and sparking debate that will contribute to the public policy decision-making process and strengthen the quality of the public policy decisions made by Canadian governments, citizens, institutions and organizations.

IRPP's independence is assured by an endowment fund, to which federal and provincial governments and the private sector have contributed.

ondé en 1972, l’Institut de recherche en politiques publiques (IRPP) est un organisme F canadien, indépendant et sans but lucratif. Jerome H. Black teaches political science at L’IRPP cherche à améliorer les politiques publiques McGill University. Over the years, he has canadiennes en encourageant la recherche, en mettant published in the areas of women and politics, the political participation and representation de l’avant de nouvelles perspectives et en suscitant des of ethnoracial minorities, Canadian débats qui contribueront au processus décisionnel en immigration and refugee policy, strategic matière de politiques publiques et qui rehausseront la voting, and voter turnout. qualité des décisions que prennent les gouvernements, This publication was produced under the les citoyens, les institutions et les organismes direction of André Blais, Professor, Université canadiens. de Montréal; Paul Howe, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of L’indépendance de l’IRPP est assurée par un fonds de New Brunswick; and Richard Johnston, dotation, auquel ont souscrit le gouvernement fédéral, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia. Art direction les gouvernements provinciaux et le secteur privé. was by Schumacher Design, and printing was by AGL Graphiques.

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The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of IRPP or its Board of Directors. Strengthening Canadian Democracy / Renforcer la démocratie canadienne Research Directeur / Directrice de recherche Geneviève Bouchard

ince the 1960s, increased levels of education and changing social values S have prompted calls for increased democratic participation, both in Canada and internationally. Some modest reforms have been implemented in this country, but for the most part the avenues provided for public participation lag behind the demand. The Table of Contents Strengthening Canadian Democracy research program explores some of the democratic 2 Editors’ Note lacunae in Canada's political system. In pro- 3 Introduction posing reforms, the focus is on how the legit- 6 Part 1: Replacing Enumeration with a Permanent List imacy of our system of government can be 7 The Backdrop to Change: The White Paper, Two Reports, and strengthened before disengagement from pol- the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party itics and public alienation accelerate unduly. Financing 9 Putting Elections Canada into the Picture epuis les années 1960, le relèvement 13 The Politics of Change du niveau d'éducation et l'évolution D des valeurs sociales ont suscité au 15 Number of Options on the Table: One Canada comme ailleurs des appels en faveur 16 Participation and Participation Inequality: Limited Attention d'une participation démocratique élargie. Si 18 Part 2: The Impact on Participation quelques modestes réformes ont été mises en 19 Official Turnout in 1984–2000 œuvre dans notre pays, les mesures envi- sagées pour étendre cette participation restent 21 Coverage and Eligibility in 1984–2000 largement insuffisantes au regard de la 23 Turnout and Eligibility demande exprimée. Ce programme de 23 The 2000 Election recherche examine certaines des lacunes 29 The Impact on Participation démocratiques du système canadien et pro- 32 The Impact on Participation Inequality pose des réformes qui amélioreraient la participation publique, s'intéressant par le fait 33 Conclusion même aux moyens d'affermir la légitimité de 37 Notes notre système de gouvernement pour contrer le désengagement de plus en plus marqué de la population vis-à-vis de la politique.

1 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 dimension —theimpacton electoral participation. registration, Blackfocuseson onefundamental about institutionaloverhaul. nificant hurdlesthatmustbeovercomeinbringing Canada’s politicalinstitutions,highlightingthesig- for examiningthepreconditionsotherreformsto tration regimes,theanalysisprovidesaframework light onthemotivationsbehindchangeinregis- of forcesthatcarriedtheday. Inadditiontoshedding momentum forchangeandtheparticularalignment the switchfromenumerationtoapermanentvoterslist. tion, providingbothanaccountandevaluationof Choices dence. JeromeH.Black’scontributioninthisissueof its ownpermanentlist. tion. Theprovince,alongwithothers,nowmaintains generate thepreliminarylistofelectorsforitselec- paign inOntario,whichusedtheNationalRegisterto Similar concernswerevoicedduringthe1999cam- uncertain aboutthenecessaryremedialmeasures. new systemthatleftwould-bevotersunregisteredand during the2000federalelectionaboutflawsin of considerablepublicattention.Concernswereraised without muchfanfare,ithassincebecomethefocus out thecampaignperiod. further adjustmentsandupdatesundertaken through- nary listofelectorswhenanelectioniscalled,with permanent listisnowusedtogeneratetheprelimi- tion fromavarietyofgovernmentdatasources,the Register ofElectors.Regularlyupdatedwithinforma- nent voterslist,formallyknownastheNational this approachwasabandonedinfavourofaperma- meration carriedoutjustbeforeanelection.In1997 ditional approachinCanadawasdoor-to-doorenu- method usedtoregistervotersforelections.Thetra- important exception tothisinstitutionalinertiaisthe and mightbenefitfromsomecriticalappraisal.One tions havestoodlargelyunalteredsincetheircreation ing observationwasthatCanada’spoliticalinstitu- W Editors’ Note In hisevaluationofthenew approachtovoter The accountoutlinestheconditionsthatcreated These concernsarebasedlargelyonanecdotalevi- If thenewregistrationregimewasputinplace represents asystematicandrigorousinvestiga- (SCD) seriesinSeptember2000,ouropen- the StrengtheningCanadianDemocracy hen theIRPPpublishedfirstpaperin Richard Johnston,UniversityofBritishColumbia Paul Howe,UniversityofNewBrunswick André Blais,UniversitédeMontréal this country. tive forallwhohopetoseedemocracyrejuvenatedin broad-based voterparticipation,animportantobjec- the future,particularlyinfacilitatingrobustand National RegisterofElectorsfunctionseffectivelyin ing toshoreupthenewsystem,ensurethat with theeffortsthatElectionsCanadahasbeenmak- findings torecommendavarietyofmeasures,parallel tions arepersuasiveandcompelling.Hedrawsonhis inequalities? what extentdoesthisexacerbateparticipation quently facegreaterhurdlestovotinginelections.To themselves onthepermanentvoterslist,andconse- way oranother, arelesslikely thanotherstofind barriers: certaingroups,alreadydisadvantagedinone analysis againdrawsourattentiontoadministrative cy” todisparitiesinpoliticalparticipation.Black’s lighted theimportanceofinequalitiesin“civic litera- Concerned,” Comparative Context:WhyCanadiansShouldBe vantage point.HenryMilner(“CivicLiteracyin rain exploredinanearlierSCDpiece,fromadifferent and incomedifferentialsinturnout.Again,thisister- demographic groups,focusinginparticularonage gation, inequalitiesinvoterparticipationacross voters toensurethattheyareproperlyregistered. registration systemthatplacesagreaterburdenon tems, Black’sfocusesonthesignificanceofanew shortcomings ofCanada’spartyandelectoralsys- But whereasJohnston’sanalysisfocusedonthe is notwellwithCanadianpoliticsatthemillennium. turnout overthepastdecadeasanindicatorthatall September 2000),whichpointedtodecliningvoter Elections attheMillennium,” series, RichardJohnston’slead-offpiece(“Canadian Again, thistakes usbacktothebeginningofSCD The answersBlackprovidestothisandotherques- Black alsoentersanotherdistinctareaofinvesti- Policy Matters 2 , 2,noJuly2001) high- Choices , 6,no. From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors: An Account and an Evaluation

Jerome H. Black Introduction

s with most processes designed to regulate aspects of political life, the decision to estab- A lish a particular voter registration regime entails making significant choices. In one sense, the task can be portrayed as a mechanical endeavour, the need to select from among alternative methods, each of which strikes a different balance between guaran- teeing that qualified citizens have unimpeded access to the vote, on the one hand, and ensuring the integrity of the voting process by guarding against voter fraud, on the other. Registration approaches also differ in their degree of support for certain secondary, but nonetheless important, functions of the electoral system, such as allowing for the mobilization of vot-

ers by providing parties with lists of electors. From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black Registration systems also vary along other key dimensions, such as operational costs and the quality of the resulting lists. While such considerations are often regarded as establishing appropriate criteria for evaluating the performance of different registration regimes, they can also be thought of as objectives that the process might be expected to meet. The selection of a registration method, however, can also be understood within a more philosophical context where central principles and values establish a priority as to the most important purposes that the chosen approach should serve. Characterizing the decision in this way follows from the recognition that in attaching a greater weight to particular objectives, different registration regimes elevate some principles to a higher status than others.1 A key principle underlying Canada’s approach to registration for federal (and most provincial) elections for much of the twentiety century, and around which there seems to have been a strong consensus, was that the state should assume the onus of ensuring that all eligible citizens were listed as electors.2 This belief was

3 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 quite minimal. required or“costs” incurredbytheindividualwere With thestateassuminginitiative,effort the state—literallytodoorstepsofcitizenry. approach amountedtoareachingoutonthepartof become registered,thedominantthrustof thus unlisted)individualtotake someminorstepsto some pointtheonusshiftedtouncontacted(and those initiallymissedornotathome,andwhile tors. Typically, therewouldbeseveralvisitationsfor election athand,becamethepreliminarylistofelec- the writshadbeenissuedandusedsolelyfor voters. Theresultingcompilation,carriedoutonce enumerators whodeterminedandrecordedeligible of carryingoutadoor-to-doorcanvassthatused specific enumerationapproach,throughthepractice manifested inthecountry’spostwritorelection- the world. stituted, asBoyernotes,apractice thatwasuniquein come todefineCanadiantradition, andmoreovercon- emigrated orpassedawaywas kept toaminimum. also meantthatthefalselistingofthosewhohad eligible. Thetimelynatureofpostwritenumeration entering theelectoratealongwithnewlyage- rate, aswellnewcitizenswhowereconstantly tant characteristicinacountrywithhighmobility captured thosewhohadchangedresidence,animpor- inclusion (ineligiblevoterslisted).Thus,enumeration either ofexclusion (eligiblevotersnotlisted)orof lists thatcontainedaminimumnumberoferrors, their currentaddressesand,consequently, preliminary reasonably up-to-datelistofelectorsidentifiedat information compiled.Closesequencingresultedina and accuracywouldcharacterizetheregistration before anelectionalsoservedtoensurethatcurrency pation inequality and thusmitigatedanaturaltendencytoward augment voterturnoutamongallsegmentsofsociety which wastheessenceofenumeration,worked to initiative toparticipate. tion, whootherwisewouldbelesslikely totake the young, thepoorandthosewithlittleformaleduca- political processthekindsofindividuals,suchas enhance inclusion,particularlysinceitdrewintothe criticism ofthe approachisitsprolongation ofthe tion oftheeligiblepopulation. vassing effortwasabletocaptureaveryhighpropor- were usedforthe1988election),massivecan- army ofenumerators(e.g.,about110,000 enumerators This model,withstateinitiative atitscore,had The factthatregistrationwasundertaken just 6 While hegoes ontopointoutthatamajor 3 Moreover, inemployingavirtual in electoralpolitics. 5 This proactiveapproach, 4 It alsoservedto partici- approaches. The advantagesofapermanent voters ments typically offeredonbehalfofalternative atic aspects.Moreover, thereportlistsmainargu- recommendations designed to remedytheseproblem- enumerators, thesewerespelled outinthecontextof ing officerswerehavingfinding competent tion, includingtheincreasingdifficultysomereturn- white paperidentifiessomeproblemswithenumera- registration orannualenumerations. system asopposedtoeitherpermanent-listformsof Reform recently as1986,a uation againstothermethodsofregistration.As test ofofficialscrutinyandreflection,includingeval- institution. has existedaboutitsvalueasauniquelyCanadian merits iscertainlypartofabroaderconsensusthat tion astheidealmodel, ent inenumerationcanbebeneficialandofitself: all kindsofindividuals: the abilityofenumerationmethodtoreachout ative toalternativeapproaches.Theytooemphasize its advantagesnotonlyinabsolutetermsbutalsorel- structed caseforthetraditionalsystem,highlighting Smith make thestrongestandmostcarefullycon- eligible votersareregistered.” ommendation foritisthatapproximately 98%ofall meration), Boyeralsostatesthatthe“mosttellingrec- campaign (becauseofthetimerequirementenu- moreover, “at relativelylowcost.” up-to-date andaccuratelistofelectors,doesso, Qualter alsoseesvirtueinasystemthatgeneratesan voters’ listsisaproperstatefunction.” “furnished conclusiveevidencethatthemakingof approach, includinghowtheCanadianexperiencehas apparent approval,Ward’s ownpositiveverdictonthe More tothepoint,enumerationhadlongstood While notallacademicshaveembracedenumera- They alsobelievethatthepersonalcontactinher- is heraldedthroughhumancontact.(p.433) by itscitizens.Theapproachofapendingelection itive valuethatitplacesonelectoralparticipation a personalreminderbythecommunityofpos- coupled withdoor-to-doorenumerationservesas the stateratherthanoncitizenandthatis A systemthatplacestheonusforregistrationon included onthelistofelectors.(p.433) sive effectontheirwillingnessorcapacitytobe upon self-registrationmaywellhavearepres- illiterate. Forsuchpeople,asystemthatdepends abilities, andthehomeless,poor and prisons,thosewithphysicalmentaldis- ble electorate.Theseincludeelectorsinhospitals porating thosewithspecialneedsintotheeligi- Enumeration possessesthepotentialforincor- reaffirmed apreferenceforthetraditional 4 White Paper onElectionLaw 10 the greateremphasisonits 7 He alsocites,with 9 Courtney and 11 8 Though the For hispart, list, for example, are cited as being a shortened cam- provide ample opportunities for unlisted individuals to paign period and the elimination of both the “dupli- register during an official revision period and on vot- cation of effort at the three levels” of government ing day itself. These latter opportunities are vital (realizable through computerization) as well as the because no updating processes can sufficiently track confusion of voters caught up in overlapping regis- and record the enormous number of demographic and tration efforts. Overall, however, the recommendation eligibility changes that constantly occur. to maintain enumeration was forceful and strongly What happened? Why was enumeration, given its justified. Compared to a permanent-list approach, it strong official endorsement as late as 1986, replaced by was regarded as a less costly method. Moreover, it a permanent list? The question has even greater import was argued that a permanent list “would not neces- considering that the changeover occurred fairly quick- sarily be more accurate, more complete or more up- ly, indeed within a remarkably short time frame, given to-date than the present enumeration system unless that a major “representational building block,” to use strict controls or compulsory registration were Courtney’s words,18 was at stake. Moreover, the change imposed,”12 and would be unacceptable to Canadians was part of a 1990s trend that witnessed five provinces concerned about the threat to privacy entailed in the adopt their own registers, joining British Columbia, maintenance of permanent records. It seemed, then, which had (exceptionally) long relied on a permanent that support for Canada’s traditional system of enu- list.19 Accounting for the switch in registration regimes meration was solid. at the national level is one of two principal and interre- Ten years later, however, the postwrit enumeration lated tasks undertaken in this paper. The other is to system was abandoned. It was replaced by a perma- evaluate the performance of the new system in facili- nent-list approach based on the compilation and main- tating the electoral participation of Canadians. tenance of a voters register. Bill C-63,13 which received In examining these two dimensions, this paper fol- Royal Assent on December 18, 1996, mandated the lows up on an earlier project20 that provided some ini- implementation of the new system for all electoral tial exploration in both areas. That effort, in fact, events (elections, by-elections and referendums) at the identified most of the antecedent factors that appeared federal level. The National Register (formally, the relevant for a rudimentary understanding of the National Register of Electors) was subsequently estab- changeover in registration regimes. The current contri- lished following a final door-to-door enumeration that bution provides a more systematic account of what was carried out in April 1997, which, in turn, gene- happened, and in the process outlines the major devel- From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black rated the preliminary lists for the ensuing June elec- opments that unfolded over the period in question. tion.14 The legislation also reduced the minimum period Beyond this descriptive aspect, an emphasis is placed of an election campaign from 47 to 36 days.15 on the role played by Elections Canada and the chief The National Register itself was established as an electoral officer in implementing the new system. This “automated database” containing the name, gender, portrayal consists mainly in considering what motivat- date of birth and address of each Canadian citizen ed the agency to take the lead in pressing for change eligible to vote. Given that the standing expectation and, as well, the kinds of arguments it advanced in is for about 20 percent of the listed information to order to convince other major actors about both the alter each year as a result of address changes (16 per- need for, and the benefits of, such a switch. These cent), new 18-year-olds (2 percent), new citizens (1 aspects are dealt with in Part 1. Part 2 similarly follows percent) and deaths (1 percent),16 regular updating of up on the earlier study, which had identified the main the permanent list is regarded as being imperative. issues and criteria that are relevant for comparative This is done by incorporating new information from assessments of the two methods of generating voters federal departments, particularly the Canada Customs lists. In the current study, the emphasis is placed on the and Revenue Agency and Citizenship and implications for voter turnout in Canada, exploring Immigration Canada, as well as provincial motor reg- these in connection with participation levels among istration and vital statistics agencies. The system is both the general population and the poorer and less also designed to incorporate voting lists from other established segments of society (what is characterized jurisdictions. The commitment to maintain the regis- as equality of participation). The growing concern over ter in as up-to-date a fashion as possible distinguish- decline in voter turnout and nonvoting in Canada pro- es this approach as an “open” or “continuous” vides an important justification for such a focus. permanent-list form.17 So too does the commitment to Moreover, one of the key conclusions drawn in Part 1 is

5 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 would ultimately depend.Finally, Elections Canada any successfulandcost-effective permanentlist puter technologyintoitsoperations, uponwhich motivated ElectionsCanada tointegratenewcom- tionally identifiedashaving relevanceinsofarasit one. move towardaregister, albeitaprovinciallybased Party Financing(RCERPF, orLortieCommission)to the RoyalCommissiononElectoralReformand Also consequentialwasa1992recommendationby ing tolegitimizetheargumentforapermanentlist. precedent forthe“reuse”oflists Quebec atleast,inthe1993election,establishinga allowed fortheuseof1992lists,outside and the1993generalelection.Thisproximity the 1992referendumonCharlottetownAccord more immediatefactorwastheclosesequencingof savings, addedtotheappealofapermanentlist.A prospect ofsharedvoterslists,andthusevenmore effort andexpendituresinthefederation,sothat characterized byaconcerntoreduceduplicationof to gainascendancy. Thisnewenvironmentwasalso vatism andascalingbackofgovernment,continued in neoliberalprinciples,centredonfiscalconser- an especiallyattractiveprospectinaclimatewhere- shorter campaignperiod.Achieving economieswas ing theadditionaladvantageofcostsavingsanda would resolvethese,whileatthesametimedeliver- meration systemandasensethatpermanentlist increasing concernoverdifficultieswiththeenu- with aPermanent List Part 1:ReplacingEnumeration the developmentofnewregime. cations andadiscussionofissuespossibilitiesin the mainconclusions,somereflectionsontheirimpli- voter turnout.Thepapercloseswithareiterationof ation inregistrationmethodshasresultedreduced central questionexploredinPart 2:whetherthealter- electoral participationofCanadians.Thissetsupthe sible consequencesthechangeovermighthavefor that relativelylimitedattentionwasgiventothepos- to reinforceeachother’sinfluence. cated thatmanyofthemoperatedinsuchawayas ing onthechangeoverinregimesand,aswell,indi- T 23 3 identified mostofthefactorsthathadabear- vant questionsforthismoreextensivework, he preliminarystudy, designedtoframerele- The 1989auditorgeneral’sreportwasaddi- 22 and therebyhelp- 21 They included that culminatedinthechange. near-perfect alignmentofpressuresandmotivations nent list,butheismoreexplicitinidentifyingthe brief accountofthereasonsforadventaperma- the change. were characterizedasbeingstronglysupportiveof and ChiefElectoralOfficerJean-PierreKingsley descriptive narrative alsomeetsthesecond objective can bemadeonbehalfofeach. Achronologicaland and reviewthekindsofarguments andclaimsthat differences betweenthetwo registrationapproaches also affordinganopportunity tospecifytheessential chronological analysishelpstomeetthisneed,while clear needformoreextensivedocumentation.A affair. Still,asbothaccountsarequite brief,thereisa is fairlystraightforwardandhardlyamysterious Cast atthislevel,theexplanationforchangeover without muchinthewayofcounterveilingpressures. tion; moreover, these convergingfactorsoperated of forcesandeventsthatpushedinthesamedirec- quickness ofthechange)asresultingfromamatrix voter registrationregimes(andaswelltherelative served toexpeditechange. ported andwereinterestedinfutureco-operationalso single alternative.Thefactthatsomeprovincessup- switch wasfacilitatedbyaconsensussurrounding information gainedfrominterviews,hewrites: are availabletoovercomeanyobstacle.Basedon strong, theobstaclestochangeareweakandresources innovation ismostlikely tooccurwhenmotivationis innovation theory, particularlythepropositionsthat upon somefundamentalaspectsoforganizational- Independently, Courtneyhassinceprovidedhisown In short,bothstudiesunderstandthealterationin Courtney alsopointsout,andrightlyso,thatthe parliamentarians. the claimsaboutcostsavingsheldfor by thecabinetgenerally;andattractionthat sible forelectionadministration[HerbGray]and islation’s speedypassagebytheministerrespon- enumeration; thehighpriorityaccordedleg- endorsement ofamoveawayfromdoor-to-door problems; theLortieCommission’s qualified aged togetherwithaproposedsolutiontothose set ofproblemswiththeexistingsystempack- included ElectionsCanada’s identificationofa as theremighthavebeen.Thoseresources (3) ampleresourcestoovercomesuchobstacles part ofthepublicandmediatoissue; change inParliament andindifferenceonthe notable absenceofpoliticaloppositiontothe Yanover) thatchangewashighlydesirable;(2)a in theprimeminister’s office(suchasJerry tion onthepartofimportantpoliticalhandlers the primeminister(JeanChrétien)andaconvic- There wasatthetime(1)strongsupportfrom 6 25 26 24 He doessobydrawing of Part 1, namely to document the key role played by benefits associated with a permanent list and indicated Elections Canada, including the chief electoral officer, the changes that would be needed to make it a more fea- in engineering the changeover. To anticipate, it is sible and acceptable alternative. As well, the white paper maintained that the agency and Chief Electoral alluded to the chief difficulty with the enumeration sys- Officer Kingsley were pivotal in two ways. First of all, tem, one that had been slowly developing over the years they took advantage of opportunities within an — a shortage of qualified enumerators.27 evolving political context from the mid-1980s to the The chief electoral officer’s 1989 statutory report28 can early 1990s in which reform of the electoral process be similarly identified as having reinforced the general was under serious and active consideration. While the sense as to the need for reform without making any developments associated with this period can them- direct contribution to the idea of substituting the enu- selves be seen as certainly having some relevance for meration system. While it acknowledges the shortage of the eventual emergence of a permanent-list system, qualified enumerators as a problem by listing the various their impact is largely due to the mediating efforts of discretionary measures that returning officers had to Elections Canada. As the agency committed itself to take in the 1988 election, at no point does it call the the idea of a register, it gave expression and shape to enumeration approach itself into question, and it cer- these background forces and made them more perti- tainly makes no mention of replacing it. The concern nent and weighty. Elections Canada was also pivotal with the need for reform in other areas is, however, very in a second sense, as they subsequently embarked much in evidence. Chapter 2, “The Crisis in Election upon a strategy to demonstrate the technical and Administration,” succinctly lists the various issues and economic feasibility of a permanent list in order to pressures that were threatening to overwhelm the agency sell the idea to elected officials. Moreover, they did so (pp. 9–12). One of these was the challenge of adopting at an opportune time, when both government and the new computer technology, a task made more difficult by main opposition parties found the arguments for understaffing and outdated legislative arrangements. At change especially compelling and indeed self-serving. the same time, the report indicates that some steps had been taken in the use of computers and office automa- The Backdrop to Change: The White Paper, tion, including during the 1988 election. Two Reports, and the Royal Commission on The auditor general’s report, also issued in 1989, Electoral Reform and Party Financing acknowledged these developments but regarded them as From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black The idea of a change in the registration regime insufficient.29 It emphasized that far too much work was gained momentum during a period of broad reflection still being done manually, particularly with regard to and debate on Canada’s electoral law. Prompted by enumeration and revision, and that even in those areas concerns about the inappropriate and outdated nature where computers were being employed disparate soft- of current legislation and practice, especially in light ware programs were being used. The message, strongly of new Charter-based realities and lags in the use of conveyed, was that Elections Canada needed to become new technology, a consensus developed around the more efficient and to seek economies through a greater need to countenance reform in many areas, though reliance on information technology and standardized not in the electoral system itself. The 1986 white software. The report pushed the case further by noting paper and the RCERPF were both products of, and in that computerization could result in additional cost turn contributed to, this context of questioning and reductions through the development of common proce- the contemplation of change. At the same time, they dures with other jurisdictions and the sharing of both differed considerably in the conclusions they drew information and tasks. It also recognized Elections about replacing the enumeration system. Two other Canada’s difficulty in finding enumerators, though it reports, discussed in a moment, also helped define provided no further commentary in this regard. Still, in this period, and these too made reference to registra- urging the agency to embrace fully technology and tion matters. computerization and, as well, to engage in co-operative The white paper’s impact on subsequent develop- endeavours with other jurisdictions, the auditor gener- ments is probably best understood as being an indirect al’s report may have contributed to the change that one. While it did initiate debate on reform in many key eventually occurred. After all, it was generally under- areas, in the particular case of voter registration it stood that the only way that a permanent-list approach ended up, as already noted, reaffirming a commitment could be rendered sufficiently cost-effective, and thus to enumeration. Still, it did list some of the potential have a chance of being considered seriously, was

7 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 of apermanentvoters’list.” lists, includingtheadvisabilityofestablishment its mandatetoreporton“thecompilingofvoters’ Indeed, theRCERPFwas,infact,requiredaspartof approach asaseriousalternativetoenumeration. enhanced thelegitimacyofapermanent-list general climateforchangeand,morespecifically, Its impactisevidentinthewaythatitaddedto meration anditspossiblereplacementbyaregister. the mostextensivecommentaryandanalysisonenu- Party Financing(RCERPF),withoutdoubt,provided to embracetechnologicalchange. ently servedasacatalystinmovingElectionsCanada tasks. Aswillbediscussedbelow, thereportappar- large-scale datacollectionandmanagement through theuseofautomationtohandlenecessary unannounced callers” (p.9).TheCommission acknowl- erly andthose wholivealone,unwillingto respondto “personal safetymakes somevoters,especiallytheeld- Furthermore, itwasarguedthat insomeurbanareas policies restrictdoor-to-door contactofresidences. were problemsaccessingmultiple-unit buildingswhere were athomewhenenumeratorscalled.Alsonoted more travel,allofwhichmeantthatfewerindividuals women enteringthelabourforceandjobsrequiring to occupationalandlifestylechanges,suchasmore accessing votersattheirresidences.Thiswasattributed culty involvedthepredicamentthatenumeratorsfaced regarded ashavingtwomaincomponents.Onediffi- who aremissedbyenumeration”(p.7).Theissuewas lem overthepasttwodecades,isnumberofvoters rally andprovincially, asanincreasinglyseriousprob- been acknowledgedbyelectionadministrators,fede- time andagainatourpublichearingsthathas canvassing effort:“Thecriticalissuethatwasraised gave tothescaleofdeclineinquality significance oftheformerisconcreteexpressionit list approach(chapter4,“A RegisterofVoters”). The Registration ofVoters”), theotherwithpermanent- with theenumerationsystem(chapter1,“The chapters ofvolume2itsfinalreport,onedealing conclusions onvoterregistrationarespelledoutintwo course ofthosesupportingashift. frequent pointsofdepartureandreferenceinthedis- (though attimesinaselectivefashion)andbecame ments andrecommendationswereoftenemployed was desirable,andcertainlythecommission’sargu- considerable momentumtothenotionthatchange moving towardaregister-basedsystem.Thisadded The RoyalCommissiononElectoralReformand More particularly, theRCERPF’smainanalysisand 30 In theend,itproposed the commission’s advocacyonbehalfofa register can rely onprovincially maintainedlists.Theparticulars of would beaffordableonlyiffederal authoritieswereto opted forfederalelections— althougharguingthatthis up recommendingthatapermanent registerbead- even moreinfluential,simply becauseitdidindeedend the RCERPF’sreport. mended solutions,thatstoodoutmostinthispartof was theproblemsofenumeration,nottheirrecom- from commentsbytheproponentsofaregister, it was notrequiredoutsideofQuebec).Still,judging place forthe1993election(althoughenumeration ing theproblemsidentified,andsomewereputin would nodoubthavegonealongwaytowardresolv- one enumeratorinsteadoftwo.Thesemeasures where safetywasnotaconcern,theemploymentof lowering oftheminimumageto16and,inareas associations andfromcommunityassociations,a tion ofenumeratorsfromallregisteredconstituency appointment of“supervisoryenumerators,”theselec- included theearlierappointmentofenumerators, meration processbyaddressingtheseproblems.These ommendations forimprovingthequalityofenu- residing intheconstituencies. requirements limitingappointmenttoqualifiedvoters of enumeratorswasfurtherconstrainedbystatutory increasingly unableorunwillingtodoso.Thesupply instance, tonominateenumerators,hadbecome political parties,whichhavetheright,infirst taken theirtoll”(p.9).Moreover, candidatesand Personal safetyconcernsinurbancentres“havealso were availabletotake upenumerationduties. was afactor, sinceitmeantthatfewerindividuals tors. Here,too,morewomenenteringthelabourforce the years—wasshortageofcompetentenumera- had beenthesubjectofincreasingcommentaryover decades” (p.9). both absoluteandrelativenumbersoverthepasttwo were identifiedashaving“increasedsubstantiallyin state giventheirexperiencesincountryoforigin” may behesitanttorespondcallersrepresentingthe do notspeakEnglishorFrenchandimmigrants“who such asthehearingimpaired,illiterate,thosewho Similarly, problemsaccessingspecial-needsgroups count ofvotersmoredifficultthaninthepast”(p.9). and that“taken together, they make acensus-type cerns, theywerenonethelessofincreasingimportance edged thatwhilethesewerenotnecessarilynewcon- The chapteronregistersystems(chapter4)was Importantly, chapter1alsowentontomake rec- The seconddifficulty—amoreseriousonethat 8 be thought of as involving multiple (and overlapping) ed that the high quality of the stored registration infor- types of argumentation and commitments. One mation, another long-time concern with a permanent- stressed how it would be possible to ensure that a reg- list approach, could be ensured. ister could be guided by some of the principles associ- Yet another reservation about permanent lists centred ated favourably with enumeration. This essentially on fears that citizens might have about state intrusion entailed a commitment to maintain the principle that and the loss of privacy. In response, the commission sug- “registration should primarily be a state responsibility” gested that a “high-quality voters register” could be (p. 113), along with the long-standing orientation to established and maintained without the need to access facilitate access to the voting process. Thus, the com- confidential information in government databases (p. mission saw revision and election-day registration as 124), that registration could be kept voluntary, without being integral components of the overall process, in voters having to relinquish the right to list themselves effect establishing the approach as an open-list system for a particular election, and that the current legal offering multiple opportunities for voters to become restrictions limiting the use of lists for electoral purposes registered.31 In practical terms, of course, these provi- could be extended, along with the implementation of sions would be necessary to compensate for the appropriate administrative and technical safeguards. expected gaps in the register’s coverage and lack of A final line of reasoning involved challenging the up-to-date listings of potential voters stemming from idea that what some regarded as distinctive benefits of eligibility and demographic changes. the enumeration system would not necessarily be lost in Another line of argumentation underscored the the move to a register. In response to the argument that distinctive benefits of a permanent list. Principal voter interest could decline without personal contact among these was the advantages of a shorter cam- with enumerators as representatives of the state, the paign — because canvassing would no longer be nec- commission suggested (but without any supporting evi- essary. This segment of the argument built on a brief dence) that the extensive campaign activity would itself section in another chapter (chapter 3, “Administering produce sufficient stimulation. In a somewhat similar the Vote”) that began by noting that a shortened vein, it asserted that “a shorter election period would not campaign was seen as a major advantage of a regis- diminish the time available to conduct a campaign at the ter, favoured as it was by most intervenors before the local level” (p. 123) — candidates and parties would get commission (p. 77). Proponents of a shortened cam- the preliminary lists of voters earlier since they would be From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black paign typically claimed that “Canadians are over- automatically produced from the register.32 exposed to politics and lose interest as a result” (p. 79), that it would reduce administration costs and Putting Elections Canada into the Picture that it would make it easier to recruit campaign help. While it is clear that the next focal point in the narra- Opposition came from those in large ridings and from tive is Elections Canada, there are several possible ways small parties with fewer campaign workers. of inserting the agency into the analysis relative to this The case for change also involved the reiteration, background of significant discussion and the urging of often by implication, of the problems with enumera- change. One possible interpretation would be to take its tion. One point given particular emphasis was that a subsequent role and specific advocacy of a permanent shared voters list would avoid the confusion of over- list as deriving from, and responding to, these develop- lapping enumeration by the different levels of gov- ments in the broader environment. Another vantage ernment. Maintaining that co-operation with other point, and the one adopted here, attributes more auton- jurisdictions would bring down the overall costs of omy and proactivity to the agency and, in fact, places it registration exemplified another critical line of argu- at the centre of an explanation of the changeover. In mentation, namely, addressing the concerns that had essence, it appears that Elections Canada was already in the past surrounded the adoption of a permanent- motivated to give serious consideration to the idea of a list approach (such as its greater costs relative to enu- register and, in effect, capitalized on the greater recep- meration). The claim that provincially maintained tivity to such a change that was being engendered. This lists could be employed was regarded as being even included taking advantage of the contribution that was more important for the idea that a register could be made by the RCERPF in enhancing the legitimacy of the economically feasible. In this regard, the commission idea of a new registration method. could point to its own research for backing (pp. Such a perspective finds substantiation, in part, by 125–132). Other research findings, it claimed, indicat- the demonstration that the causal nexus between the

9 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 this pointinplainlanguage: that wouldlateremergefromElectionsCanadamakes control wasquiteanother. Akey discussiondocument operating withtheprovinceswasonething,yielding tant tocededirectionoftheregistrationprocess.Co- that suggesttheagencywouldhavebeenreluc- cratic politicsandfederal-provincialconsiderations There isalso,ofcourse,theplayordinarybureau- obligation forstandardizationandanationaloutlook. requirements differtoowidelytoallowitmeetits given thatprovincialprocessesandeligibility agency wouldevertake suchasuggestionseriously, Canada, and,indeed,itisdifficulttoimaginethatthe tained lists.ThiswassimplyanonstarterforElections commission’s recommendationofprovinciallymain- might beexpected.Keytothischaracterizationisthe developments isweaker andmuchlessdirectthan RCERPF’s advocacyofaregisterandsubsequent The firstopportunity todosocameinOctober 1992 ECAPLE) toproducevoterslists onabroaderscale. Canada AutomatedProduction ofListsElectors,or that hadalreadybeendeveloped (knownasElections basis foraMarch1991 commitmenttouseprocedures the listsofelectors.” “test customizedsoftwareforthecomputerizationof the agencywithanopportunityto,initsownwords, larger goalofdevelopingalistwellinmind. cates thatthesemeasureswereputintoplacewiththe tives andcorrespondingdevelopmentsstronglyindi- technology. Still,thetightsequencing oftheseinitia- exploit newtechnology, especiallycomputer-based growing recognitionthatElectionsCanadaneededto part, thesestepssuggestadeterminedresponsetothe toward theadoptionofapermanent-listapproach.In to thepoint,theyindicateagency’spredisposition tenuously theresultofcommission’swork;more dence thatthechangeoverwasonlydiffuselyand February 1992)constituteevenmorepersuasiveevi- well beforetheRCERPFtableditsfinalreport(in a switchinregistrationregimes. permanent-list approachasacriticalsourcejustifying dwelling onthecommission’ssanctioningofa Specifically, by-electionsasearly1990provided The initiativesthatElectionsCanadaundertook Still, thisdidnotstoptheagencyfromrepeatedly the roleofleadership. Canada is,therefore,wellpositionedtoassume provincial andterritorialjurisdictions.Elections a commondenominatoramongstfederal, Federal electoraleligibilityrequirementsprovide complete, accurateandcurrentelectorslists. Elections Canadahasapan-Canadianneedfor 34 That experienceprovidedthe 33 interpretations discussedabove: justifies thatcommitment,illustratingseveralofthe mitment toaregister, butalsoforthe wayinwhichit not onlyforitssummarystatementaboutthecom- automation inachievingthatobjective. mind forthefutureandimportanceofcomputer electoral officermadeitquiteclearwhathehadin Canada. Inhisreportonthereferendum,chief intent wascertainlynotdisguisedbyElections sultation ontheCharlottetownAccord. Moreover, this list foruptooneyearfollowingthenationwidecon- 1992 regard isquiteapparent.Aspecificprovisioninthe door-to-door canvasswouldsavemoney. more concretethewaysinwhichforegoingofa the acquisitionofnecessaryexperienceandmake cal terms,itwouldallowElectionsCanadatopoint reuse isthecoreprincipleofsuchasystem.Inpracti- evant precedentinmovingtowardaregister, sincelist meration. Thiswouldallowtheagencytoclaimarel- in 1993,thuseliminatingtheneedforanotherenu- preliminary listforthenextgeneralelection,expected the finalized1992voterslistserveasbasisfor but, aswell,whatitplannedfor. Thegoalwastohave point, itwaswhatElectionsCanadanotonlybelieved step ontheroadtoapermanentlist.More this large-scaleuseofautomationwasasignificant were drawnupinconjunctionwithanenumeration, under itsownrules).Evenifthecomputerizedlists Quebec (whichhadoptedtosupervisethereferendum Accord, inthe220ridingsoutsideofprovince with thereferendumvoteonCharlottetown Electors.” priately titled“PreparingforaContinuousRegisterof objective was,andindeedincludesachapterappro- more forthcomingandelaborativeofwhatthelarger The forwardthinkingoftheorganizationinthis Kingsley’s reportonthe1993electioniseven the numberof submissions totheRoyal cially inthecompilation ofthevoterslist.From provincial/territorial, andmunicipal levels,espe- among electionadministrators atthefederal, investigate waysofreducingduplicated efforts Financing recommendedthat Elections Canada Commission onElectoralReform andParty In itsreportofFebruary1992, theRoyal and municipallevels. future electoraleventsatthefederal,provincial continued useofferspotentialforsavingsin was foreseeninthe preliminary listsforthe35thgeneralelection,as re-use oftheofficiallistsreferendumas system playedakeyroleinmakingpossiblethe referendum wasaninvestmentinthefuture.The Implementation oftheECAPLEsystemfor Referendum Act 36 The prefacetothischapterisinteresting 10 allowed forreuseofthevoters Referendum Act 35 , andits Commission and the number of letters to In the interview with the author, Kingsley corro- Elections Canada, it is clear that methods better borated the evidence on his central role, and he also than door-to-door enumeration must be found to prepare the voters lists. Some form of a con- helped to shed light on some important details that, in tinuous register, that is, a voters list that is turn, reinforce the perspective that privileges the impact maintained and updated on a regular basis, seems to be the obvious solution. (p. 130) of the agency in the overall scheme of things. Clearly, he As will be seen, Kingsley, in an interview with the had thought about the possibility of a register early on. author, confirmed an even earlier commitment to a When he first arrived at Elections Canada, the Lortie permanent-list approach on the part of Elections Canada. Commission was in full swing, but by his own admission By itself, the fact that the chief electoral officer Kingsley initially concentrated on the problems assoc- was personally strongly in favour of a change in reg- iated with the lack of automation and standardization in istration methods is no minor detail. Indeed, it drawing up voters lists for the 1988 election. Even before appears that if Elections Canada was at the centre of the RCERPF released its report, he had laid the ground- the process of bringing about a switch, Kingsley was work for the development of ECAPLE for use in the 1992 its epicentre. His public reports and pronouncements, referendum. At one point in the interview, he allowed as well as his comments during the interview,37 pro- that the notion to push for a register had come to him vide plenty of evidence of the leading role that he early on but that his staff warned him that “you can’t go played. This is not to suggest that the idea originated too far too fast.” At other times, he talked about how, with Kingsley. By his own admission, it was one that while he gave particular direction to the development of had been bandied about within Elections Canada the register, it was an idea that had been “percolating” for before he took over, and certainly it is fathomable a while in Elections Canada: “A damned good idea whose that over the years there would have been much time had come,” was how he described it. That it was his “institutional reflection” on registration matters, initiative to reuse the 1992 list is another important increasing as enumeration came under intensifying marker of Kingsley’s early conviction; indeed, he indi- scrutiny. Rather, what is a simple but nevertheless cated that he would have preferred to see amendments to vital point to understand about Kingsley is that, as the Referendum Act permitting the re-employment within the top official, he came to hold a sturdy personal two years, not one, presumably to enlarge the window of commitment to a permanent list not long after opportunity for establishing the reuse precedent. Cert- assuming the post in February 1990, and he clearly ainly, he was unambiguous in communicating the impor- From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black pushed for its implementation as soon as circum- tance of a consecutive application of the list and of its stances permitted. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the forming the basis for testing a permanent-list system. register coming into force as quickly as it did without Kingsley’s claims about the primary reasons that his enthusiastic commitment to a new approach and drew him early on to the notion of a register are also without his guidance in focusing the agency’s efforts consistent with other available information about how in that direction. the process unfolded. He spoke of being motivated by The formal record, including Kingsley’s statutory the growing problems with enumeration and, as well, reports on the 1992 referendum and the 1993 election the need, as a general matter, to develop automated (both issued in January 1994), is replete with sub- and standardized procedures; these were, of course, stantiating evidence and cannot possibly be read the kinds of arguments that were being widely made without immediately grasping the strength of the to justify a change in registration approaches. He also commitment to a register-based approach. A few identified possible future benefits in areas such as years later, in April 1996, Kingsley would appear cartography. Interestingly, he did not spontaneously before the Standing Committee on Procedure and mention cost considerations, which, as will been seen, House Affairs, welcomed by the chair to discuss “his came to figure prominently in arguments that were favourite project, the registry of elections.”38 In being marshalled on behalf of a register. Only when October, Herb Gray stood in the House to move that directly asked about their role did he give them some Bill C-63 be referred to that same committee, com- relevance, indicating that as a career civil servant he menting that “This bill stems from the report of the was always interested in saving money. Still, he did Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party maintain that “Cost is a factor; it is not a driving fac- Financing, the Lortie Commission, and from the rec- tor.” He also said he “might have had second ommendations made by the Chief Electoral Officer.”39 thoughts” had the research demonstrated that the new system would cost more.

11 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 norm. Thisoutlook representedaconscious breakwith tion technology becameanoperatingandself-evident Elections Canadaandthatthe exploitationofinforma- ably fairtosaythata“culture oftechnology”gripped indeed facilitatetheseinnovations. Inshort,itisprob- A computerizedvoterslistwould fitwellwithand (including touch-screenequipment)inballotbooths. tronic voting(or“smartcards”)andmachines included digitalmapping,votingbytelephone,elec- most sophisticatedtechnologyavailable;otherareas itself intheforefrontwithregardtouseof only onewaythatElectionsCanadacouldposition servedly. Thedevelopmentof acomputerizedlistwas embrace technologicalchangeandinnovationunre- others inElectionsCanada,thattheagencyneededto a broadervision,nodoubtsharedbyKingsleyand argument thattheeagernessforprojectwaspartof actions, togomuchfurtherthanthat. indeed, judgingfromKingsley’sdemeanourand dered acommitmenttocatchuptechnologicallyand logy. Thisjolttotheagencyappearshaveengen- the agency’ssluggishnessinembracingnewtechno- auditor general’sreport,whichhadsharplycriticized developments withinElectionsCanada,itwasthe be singledoutforhavinginfluencedhisthinkingand interview providedasensethatanyreportdeservesto some sawitasbeingintheirhands.”Infact,ifthe bodies aformoftacitrecognitiontheircentrality; Canada becauseitcreatedforsomeprovincialelectoral toward aregister:“IthinderedtheworkofElections approach hadanegativeimpactonthemovement that theRCERPF’ssupportforaprovinciallybased even wentsofarastoassert,inratherbluntlanguage, rect impactontheemergenceofregister. Kingsley argument madeaboveaboutitslesserormoreindi- period tounder47days. only aregister, Kingsleymaintained,canreducethe day campaignispossibleevenwithenumeration; Commission wasmistaken inconcludingthata40- was tosuggest,interestinglyenough,thattheLortie His onlyelaborationwithregardtocampaignlength edged, butitwasuptotheprovincesusedata. does savethetaxpayermoney, hereadilyacknowl- were “importantsecondary”considerations.Sharing cally probedabouteachdidheindicatethatthey having primaryrelevance.Again,onlywhenspecifi- campaign period,werealsonotofferedupfrontas the provincesand“benefit”ofhavingashortened This pointmeritsemphasisandhelpsmake alarger His broadercommentsontheRCERPFreinforce Two otherfactors,theideaofsharingdatawith 40 cept oftheRegister.” intended toprovidea“ Continuous RegisterofElectors”wasproduced, 1994, thein-house“DiscussionPaper ona ties of be establishedbutratherthetimingandmodali- what wasatissuenotwhetheraregisterwould treatment anditsoveralltonemake itquiteclearthat experiences ofothercountries,butthebulk ground commentaryaboutregisters,includingthe Continuous RegisterofElectors.” municating andencouragingthedevelopmentofA body, withinElectionsCanada,withrespecttocom- 20, 1993,withamandateto“act asacoordinating register. AsteeringcommitteewasstruckonOctober eagerness tomoveexpeditiouslytowardinstitutinga agency tookotherconcretestepsthatrevealan endeavoured topromotetheswitchover. ize,” awordthatKingsleyrepeatedlyusedashe agency wouldbeheedingtheimperativeto“modern- very latestinautomationandothertechnology, the cized intheauditorgeneral’sreport;byadopting the pastandwithanorientationthathadbeencriti- 1995, ting upaspecial projectteam,inlate1994 orearly Register ofElectors”(p.33). process thatwillleadtothe creation ofashared dently, that“key argumentssupporttheinitiation ofa spective” (p.28).Thedocumentconcluded,confi- and potentialsolutionsinacross-jurisdictionalper- cians needtobeeducatedaboutthecurrentproblems tion, headed“Political Will,”pointed outthat“politi- political ones,thatneededtobeaddressed.Onesec- which dealtwiththeissuesandobstacles,including tant ofallwasthechapter“StrategicAvenues,” lity considerationsandthelike). Perhaps mostimpor- (e.g., howtheregistermightbestructured,dataqua- to betaken intoaccountinestablishingaregister administrative andtechnicalmattersthatwouldneed instance, dealtwithdesignconsiderationsandsome oriented natureofthedocument.Onechapter, for opportunities thataregistercouldconfer. surrounding enumerationandtheadvantages there wasthebynowfamiliarlitanyofcomplaints was squarelyontheneedforchange.To thisend, through remedialmeasures;instead,theemphasis retaining enumerationandhandlingitsshortcomings sideration whatsoeverwasgiventothepossibilityof Beyond establishingECAPLE,Kingsleyandthe The nextstepinvolvedthesteering committeeset- Other importantthemesfurtherrevealthegoal- 45 how charged withexamining “thecostsandbene- it mightbebroughttofruition. 12 43 The documentprovidesback- high leveloverview 42 By thespringof 41 44 of thecon- No con- fits of a register, extensive work on new processes and time and not in the tight time frames currently required procedures, evaluation of sources for updating data, during an electoral event” (p. 17). consultation with potential partners, and feasibility The report also addressed the long-standing concern assessment.”46 One year later, in December 1995, suffi- over invasion of privacy and confidentiality of the cient work had been done to allow the chief electoral information that electors provided, and in several ways. officer to present the team’s main findings to the First of all, it proclaimed privacy and confidentiality as House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure core standards that had helped guide the research; this and House Affairs at an in camera meeting. was part of the commitment to ensure that the register The project team’s report, The Register of Electors would preserve “certain principles and characteristics of Project: A Report on Research and Feasibility, began the Canadian electoral system.” There were also indica- circulating in the spring of 1996. It declared unequiv- tions that the project team had reviewed the treatment ocally that study and analysis had shown that a of privacy concerns in other jurisdictions, and there national register was “both feasible and cost effective” were references to how there had been continuous con- (p. 5). Other assertions were set forth as additional sultations with the federal Privacy Commissioner’s “main conclusions.” A few of these reiterated familiar Office (p. 21); indeed, there was an acknowledgement themes such as how the register would allow a reduc- that a “privacy advisor” from the office had participat- tion in the election period from 47 to 36 days. ed in many of the workshops (p. 7). Another identified the most appropriate existing sources for keeping the register up-to-date and argued The Politics of Change48 that a “targeted reliability level of 80%” for the regis- However one might characterize Elections Canada’s ter could be maintained, meaning that the derived packaging of arguments and background research to preliminary list would have the correct addresses for make a case for a register, it is abundantly clear that an estimated 80 percent of eligible voters. This figure the government bought the package. Its support of an was judged as “the level necessary to conduct an elec- altered registration process and abbreviated campaign toral event” (p. 5). The report also confirmed current period is indicated most obviously by the legislative support and future interest by other electoral agencies priority it attached to the changeover. On October 21, for a shared national register and as well dealt with 1996, a little over half a year after the release of The the kinds of legislative changes that would be required Register of Electors Project, Bill C-63 was given first for its creation. Finally, a key conclusion highlighted reading. The legislation moved fairly quickly through From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black fiscal savings. While the implementation of a register the House, receiving a third reading on November 26. at the next election would cost about the same as car- The government’s firm support of the initiative is fur- rying out an election under enumeration (in large ther evident in the selection of Herb Gray, who was measure because a final enumeration would be neces- House leader and solicitor general, to shepherd the bill sary), each subsequent contest would allow for sav- through the chamber. Courtney similarly notes (in pass- ings (a “cost avoidance”) of $40 million, and even ing) this turn of events as being reflective of the gov- more as other jurisdictions joined in (p. 6).47 ernment’s determined backing and, importantly, adds Beyond these specifics, the report’s general tone that his interviews suggested firm specific support from reflected what had by then developed into the set Jean Chrétien and the Prime Minister’s Office. Political strategy for selling the register, and one rooted in the support was apparent not only from within the execu- logic employed by the Lortie Commission, namely, tive, however. It was also forthcoming from legislators taking the problems and limitations of the enumera- as a whole. Indeed, the Standing Committee on tion approach as a point of departure, demonstrating Procedure and House Affairs had signalled its approval how a permanent-list system would both ameliorate even before the formal release of the The Register of those difficulties and provide further benefits, and Electors Project report, when members were briefed by finally, pointing out how traditional concerns atten- Kingsley in December 1995. While that session, it will dant with a permanent-list method could be sur- be recalled, was held behind closed doors, the minutes mounted. The latter included the argument that the of subsequent meetings dealing with the draft legisla- voters list could indeed be effectively maintained and tion make it clear that there had been widespread kept up-to-date. It was even pointed out that “elec- endorsement for the register at that earlier gathering. toral information would be of higher quality, because Moreover, in the report itself the committee was char- preliminary lists of electors would be produced over acterized as having “concurred in the value of moving

13 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 tems neededtousearegisterinthefallof1997.” to developtheadministrativemechanismsandsys- pare areportintheformofdraftlegislationtobegin agreed thatElectionsCanadashouldimmediatelypre- approach proposedforitsimplementation,and to aregistersystem,enthusiasticallysupportedthe the register. as significant explanatory factorsdriving support for federal-provincial co-operation meshedwithsavings part ofthedifferentgovernments, taken toendoverlapandduplicationofeffortonthe served toillustratethatconcretestepswerebeing federal-provincial co-operationandsuccess.Italso mon thannot,provideditwithafocalpointfor era whencross-jurisdictionalconflictwasmorecom- provincial interestandpossibleinvolvement,inan cal level,however, Ottawa’sabilityto pointto by agrowingnumberofprovinces.Onmorepoliti- lier, wastheadoptionatthattimeofpermanentlists lists. Anotheramenabledevelopment,alludedtoear- register andcutoverallcoststhroughsharedvoters government usingprovincialsourcestoupdatethe with Ottawaenhancedtheprospectoffederal provinces hadsignalledtheirinterestinco-operating consideration. Atonelevel,thefactthatsome response inmanyquarters. payers moneywouldhavegeneratedapositive manent voterslistcouldsavegovernmentsandtax- climate ofeconomicrestraint,thenotionthataper- the registrationsystemcametobeevaluatedwithina the state’sfinancialburden.Inshort,ascostsof government becameconvincedoftheneedtoreduce and entrenchedduringthisperiodastheChrétien role asneoliberalprinciplesbecamemorewidespread registration economicscametoplayanevenlarger ing therelativemeritsofdifferentapproaches, tem hadalwaysbeenoneofthecriteriaforevaluat- the costsassociatedwithrunningregistrationsys- expenditures wouldhavehadspecialappeal.While new benefits—amongwhichtheprospectofcurbing permanent listwouldresolveoldproblemsandbring ably theyacceptedthelong-standingargumentthata political adviserstoembracethechange,butpresum- may havemotivatedChrétien,hisministersand Courtney doesnotelaborateonwhat,specifically, was thechangeovergivensuchaneasypoliticalride? ations moreefficientandcost-effective. “rethinking government”designed torenderitsoper- had beenintensifyingaspart ofageneralprocess Federal-provincial politicswerenodoubtalsoa What isthebasisofthispoliticalsupport?Why 52 50 a fixationthat 51 Thus 49 alluded toitintheHouse. aware ofthisLiberaladvantage,thoughtheymerely incumbency success, dence foradirectlinkbetweencampaignlengthand divided opposition.Evenintheabsenceofhardevi- in publicopinionpollsandthatfacedasharply — especiallyonethatcommandedasubstantiallead the re-electioninterestsofanincumbentgovernment understood thatacondensedcampaignwouldserve long contest,behindthescenesitmaywellhavebeen Canadians wouldbesparedthetediumofanoverly curbed orbyofferingthemorediffusenotionthat specific argumentthatadministrativecostswouldbe shorter campaigntouteditsvirtuesbymakingthe and theiradvisers.Whilemostproponentsofa have alsobeenpoliticallyattractivetokey politicians shorter campaign. principles ofestablishing apermanentlist anda ued tosignaltheirfundamental agreementwiththe proceedings thetwomainopposition partiescontin- from theveryoutset,andthroughout thelegislative as awholehadbeensupportive oftheideachange Standing CommitteeonProcedureandHouseAffairs approach. Ashasalreadybeenpointedout,the hurried implementationofthenewregistration driven mostlybythetimingofprocessandits approach. Thatsaid,theoppositionprotestwas cally onethatmimicked Quebec’smoreregulated pushed forastricterelectionfinanceregime,specifi- give thegoverningpartyanadvantage. worry wasthathastyimplementationwouldindeed leading inthepollsandanelectionimminent, a compressedcampaignperiod. that anyleaditheldwouldbehardertoovercomein sions topoliticalparties. debate onremovingthesubsidiesandtaxconces- the establishmentofrecallprocedures,andalsourged eration onthesubjectofhavingfixed electionsand sideration. TheReformParty wantedadditionaldelib- of whatwereregardedasotherareasinneedcon- as thatthebilldidnotgofarenoughincontext obligatory andpredictableadd-oncomplaints,such reason” torushtheprocess.Therewerealso insufficient consultationandthattherewasno“real sage, ignoringoppositionproteststhattherehadbeen used timeallocationtoenddebateandexpeditepas- voted againstthelegislation.Indeed,government chief reasonwhytheoppositionpartiesultimately The mainoppositionpartieswerenodoubtalso The appealofareducedcampaignperiodmust From theotherdirection,BlocQuébécois 14 58 Reform MPson thecommittee 53 the governmentlikely realized 57 55 With theLiberalsstill 54 56 This isthe and in the House were openly enthusiastic about the which set out campaign pledges in numerous areas.59 possible cost reductions that would be realized from Another timing-sensitive point is apparent when one the changeover (and, to a lesser extent, content that a recalls that the agency established its all-important source of minor patronage would be removed for the steering committee with the mandate, again, “to act as dominant Liberals), while, for its part, the Bloc con- a coordinating body, within Elections Canada, with tinued to take its lead from developments in Quebec, respect to communicating and encouraging the devel- where the provincial government was in the process opment of A Continuous Register of Electors” on of establishing its own voters register. Mention might October 20, 1993, that is, even before the 1993 election be made as well that opposition members, as incum- campaign had drawn to a close. bent politicians contemplating their own personal re- In sum, the argument here is that both government election campaigns, likely also regarded a shorter and opposition responded positively to Elections campaign as an attractive feature. Canada’s initiative because the change was politically In short, the fact that Reform and the Bloc ulti- and economically favourable and because it was in the mately voted against Bill C-63 does not contradict the interests, both partisan and otherwise, of the main par- essential portrayal that the major political forces were ties to go along. No doubt, much of what was pitched lined up on the same side. Moreover, in retrospect, to the elected officials and their advisers by Elections given their political outlooks, it is not at all surprising Canada reflected its appreciation of which arguments, that there was support for the permanent list on the explicitly made or perhaps merely implied, would be benches opposite the government. This is, of course, most effective. In this sense, the organization not only one of the implications of what was the most promi- capitalized on amenable circumstances as it took up the nent feature of the political era, the collapse of the tra- cause of a register, but actively championed it as well. ditional party system, characterized by devastating losses by the New Democratic Party and, especially, the Number of Options on the Table: One Progressive Conservative Party, and their replacement John Courtney makes the simple, though important, by Reform and the Bloc. The two older parties were point that the process of change became easier in the virtually invisible in the debate, as they were in absence of debate on what might replace enumeration. Parliament generally, and, of course, lacking status as Consensus among those seeking change that the only “recognized parties,” had no representation on the acceptable alternative was some form of “open” perma- Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. nent list no doubt helped concentrate opposition to From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black The executive, the Liberal Party and the two main enumeration in favour of a register. A broader take on opposition parties were clearly neither invisible nor Courtney’s observation might be that this consensus irrelevant as part of the defining political environ- effectively ended up precluding the option of reforming ment that ultimately produced the National Register. enumeration. As it was, the reflection and discussion Obviously, their support, and particularly the backing that surrounded registration reform tended to be nar- by the government, were essential ingredients, and it rowly focused. A more encompassing consideration is significant that these forces were all arrayed on the might have done more to stress the relative strengths of same side as the process unfolded. However, their enumeration and to include an analysis of the possibil- impact, even if convergent in nature, was subsequent ity of reforming the canvassing-based process to meet to the initiative demonstrated by Elections Canada what were regarded as its limitations. Such a stance and the engineering efforts that agency made to would not have been completely at odds with the con- develop and sell the case for change. The early steps clusions of the Lortie Commission, which did, of that Elections Canada took, already documented, are course, offer important recommendations for improving especially relevant for appreciating its prior impact the enumeration system, even as it favoured the move with reference to these political forces. Reinforcing to a (provincially based) register. this interpretation of causal sequencing is the virtual However, the weight of the recommendations was absence of any evidence suggesting that these politi- undermined not only by the RCERPF’s advocacy of a cal actors, all of whom fared well in the 1993 elec- permanent list, but also by the limited analysis that it tion, had signalled any pre-existing preferences for a had conducted as it drew critical conclusions about the change in the registration system. Especially impor- functioning of the enumeration method. This is the tant in this regard is the lack of any mention of reg- case that Courtney and Smith make in their RCERPF- istration reform in the Liberals’ famous “Red Book,” sponsored background publication.60 While admitting

15 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 and ElectionsCanada’spublication reviewing statutoryreports,newspapercommentaries it continuedtobeafairlyminorpreoccupation.After from 60to50days),theirsenseofthematteristhat (and thatpresumablythisiswhatledtothereduction concern aboutcampaignlengthintherecentpast authors admitthatalthoughtherehadbeensome beyond thecontextofitsproceedings.Thetwo list, itisunclearwhetherthissentimentspreadmuch shorter campaignasoneadvantageofapermanent by thelargenumberofintervenerswhoidentifieda paign. Whilethecommissionwasnodoubtimpressed evidence justifyingamovetowardshortercam- fall inqualifiedenumerators. such asinadequatepay, asexplanationsfortheshort- of personnel”(p.363).Theyalsolistotherfactors, on efficiencythatisquiteseparatefromthequality campaign quicklywas“another practicalconstraint addition, theyobservethatthepressuretobegin resulted intheinadequatetrainingofenumerators.In in 1988andthattheirinexperiencecouldeasilyhave out that85percentofthereturningofficerswerenew ciently qualifiedenumerators.Importantly, theypoint could indeedallbelinked tothefailurefindsuffi- meration problems,especiallyoverlooked voters, urban polls.CourtneyandSmithalsowonderifenu- circumscribed matterinvolvingsome,buthardlyall, increased inmagnitudeandthatitwasanyeventa difficulty, thattherewasnohardevidenceithad problem, theystatethatitwasnotaparticularlynew that theshortageofqualifiedenumeratorshadbeena include anyanalysis ofarevampedenumeration fact thattheagency’s researchagendadid notitself nent listwouldresolvethose problems.Ofcourse,the only todemonstratethatthe substitutionofaperma- shorter campaign)asitslaunching point.Itthenhad those difficulties(andthesupposed benefitsofa enumeration, madeiteasierfortheagencytotake included research-basedsolutionstotheproblemsof absence ofacomprehensiveassessment,onethat sponsor afederallycontrolledpermanentlist.The which ElectionsCanadabenefitedfromasitbeganto tributed totheascendancyofpermanent-listidea, the specificwaysinwhichcommissioncon- research intotheproblemsofenumerationisone ranked low”(p.371). campaign towhichenumerationcontributes,mustbe Canada’s voterregistrationsystem,thelengthof clude: “Inalistofproblemsandshortcomings Courtney andSmithalsoraisequestionsaboutthe It wouldappear, then,thattheRCERPF’s limited Contact , theycon- ty andtherightnottoparticipateinprocess. lines centredonconcernsaboutprivacy, confidentiali- achieved throughenumeration.Theremainingguide- erage andaccuracywouldbeequivalenttothose the enumerationsystem—meaningthatlevelsofcov- that thenewsystemwouldfunctionaseffectively would begivenpostwritopportunitiestoregisterand responsibility forregistration,thatpotentialvoters that thestatewouldcontinuetoassumeprimary ciples. Thefirstthreecentredontheneedtoensure own deliberationshadbeenframedinthesesameprin- nance oftheregister, pointingoutthattheRCERPF’s guided thinkingaboutthedevelopmentandmainte- Bill C-63,Kingsleyarticulatedsixprinciplesthathad Indeed, appearingbeforetheSenateasitconsidered new systemwouldneedtoworkfacilitatethevote. there wasaformalcommitmenttotheideathatany tion, includingequalityofparticipation.To besure, of apermanent-listapproachonelectoralparticipa- ly littleconcreteconsiderationwasgiventotheimpact also circumscribedinanotherimportantway:relative- Elections Canada’sresearchagendawas,unfortunately, Limited Attention Participation andParticipation Inequality: other optionsoffthetable. of aregisterservedthesamepurpose—tokeep all Elections Canada’sgeneralstrategyofsellingtheidea ence foracompleteoverhaul.Noteaswellthat process isevenmoreindicativeofaveryearlyprefer- in tical, totheorientingstandardsthatwerespelledout standably so), the permanent-listmethodas envisaged neither ofwhich wasseriouslyconsidered (and under- a votersregisterorsystem of mandatoryregistration, a populationregisterthatwould serveasthebasisfor from theimplementationof a permanentlist.Shortof ative effectsonvoterparticipation thatmightensue was thereanynoteofconcernaboutthepossibleneg- register’s datawithotherjurisdictions. commitment toinvestigatethematterofsharing gathering personalinformation.”Finally, therewasa and toavoid“any furtherimposition onCanadiansin the costsofdevelopingandmaintainingregister locate reliabledatasources,inorderbothtominimize their personalinformation.Afifthpositedtheneedto respect electors’privacyandtheconfidentialityof access asguidingprinciples.Thefourthpledgedto these similarlyidentifiedstateinitiativeandvoter The RegisterofElectorsProject These principlesarecomparable,thoughnotiden- The mainpointisthatnowhereinkey report 16 . 62 The firstthreeof 61 could never match the effectiveness of the state- respond to criticism that participation was not a pri- initiated enumeration approach in facilitating registis- ority? One obvious problem with such a rebuttal is that tration. It is true, of course, that once they are a larger array of revision opportunities is just that — inscribed in the National Register, voting would be a opportunities — and individuals would still need to take relatively easy matter for the overwhelming majority advantage of them. In other words, it is precisely the of Canadians who do not move between electoral rebalancing of the registration exercise toward a heav- events. Nevertheless, for the many who do change ier emphasis on revision that is at the heart of the new addresses, particularly if they move out of their origi- system. Therefore, to demonstrate that compensating nal constituency (see below), some action would be opportunities could be put in place, without, at the required to correct their registration information. The same time, an analysis of how easy or difficult it would newly eligible, especially those turning 18, would need be for citizens, particularly specific categories of them, to do even more to register in the first instance. to avail themselves of the opportunities constitutes a Without denying that with the new regime in place very incomplete form of analysis. Elections Canada has made it as easy as possible for The notion that the research into data quality might individuals to become properly registered, and as well be taken as evidence of a concern about participation is granting that, from an objective perspective, the also weakened by the low threshold that Elections amount of effort required to do so is quite minimal, Canada set for itself as it defined what the agency need- the reality nevertheless remains that individuals still ed to achieve in order to meet the pledge of matching need to exercise some initiative. And, again, every- enumeration’s coverage and accuracy. This point merits thing that is known about the facilitation and inhibi- some unpacking. The Register of Electors Project claims tion of participation would anticipate a drop in that the research showed that “a register could be main- participation as these demands, modest as they may tained between electoral events at a targeted reliability be, are placed on the prospective voter. Given the cir- level of 80%, the level necessary to begin conducting an cumstances and the demographics involved, the nega- electoral event, by importing electronic data from exist- tive effect is likely to be accentuated among those who ing sources” (p. 5). This percentage represents all eligible frequently move, such as renters and poorer persons, voters expected to be listed at their correct address as the as well as among those entering the electorate. Many register generates the preliminary lists. Importantly, it is such individuals are already less prone to vote, which “based on the 1993 experience of successfully conduct- is why there have long been disparities in turnout ing an election using an unmaintained one-year-old list From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black across social categories. A registration regime that that had declined to an average of 80% level of reliabili- demands some action on the part of such individuals ty” (pp. 25–26). This benchmark, then, has its origins in may very well run the risk of creating even larger the reuse of the 1992 list one year later, without modifi- gaps. Unfortunately, such concerns about diminished cation — that is, without additions or purgings — and in participation and participation equality, arguably the the knowledge that 20 percent of the electorate is affect- main disadvantages associated with the new system, ed by demographic changes over the course of a given were largely ignored in the extensive research and dis- year (16 percent address changes, 2 percent new 18- cussion that framed the understanding and arguments year-olds, 1 percent new citizens, and 1 percent deaths). about the impact of a regime change.63 The intent, of course, was to have revision and election But what of the fact that matching the “effective- day registration provide the opportunities for the needed ness” of enumeration was set out as one of the crite- corrections and additions. ria that the new system had to meet in order to be There are two points to make regarding the 80-per- considered acceptable? In particular, The Register of cent reliability figure. First, it was perhaps given more Electors Project claimed that its background studies credence than might be warranted simply because the had shown that a new permanent-list approach, 1993 election with which it was associated was deemed drawing upon a variety of sources to establish the by Elections Canada to have been “successfully cond- register and keep it reasonably up to date, and, fur- ucted.” Without challenging that summary characteriza- thermore, incorporating an enhanced revision tion — establishing the overall success of an election, process, could in the final analysis equal the coverage from an administrative perspective, is surely a complex and accuracy levels realized through enumeration. undertaking — the attribution still required detailed sub- Does this not, then, constitute relevant research about stantiation. It would be insufficient to merely state that matching the data quality of the old system, and thus an unprecedented number of people registered during

17 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 to 67.0percent forthe1997contestandthen plum- cent forthe1993election,underwent anotherdecline percentage ofregisteredvoters), droppedto69.6per- Participation, asofficiallyrecorded(votescasta established overthecourseof thelastthreeelections. generally rangedfrom80to83percent. quality oftheNationalRegistersinceJune1998have modest goalbyalargemargin.Estimatesofthedata Elections Canadahasnotexceeded thatcomparatively 80 percentamountedtoalesserchallenge.Still, given 12-monthinterval.Thusmeetingthetargetof updated regularly, certainlymultipletimeswithinany mitted itselftoastrategywherebythelistwouldbe However, ElectionsCanadahadfromtheoutsetcom- for alistunmaintainedoverone-yearperiod. Second, andmoreimportantly, 80percentisthetarget basis foramoreconvincingclaimaboutsuccess. tration problemsandthelike, wouldhaveprovidedthe to register, howmanydidnotdosobecauseofregis- that exploredhoweasyordifficultindividualsfoundit day registrationwasanewarrangement.Ananalysis ed listwasusedinmostofthecountryandelection- be strangehadthisnotoccurredgiventhatanoutdat- the revisionperiodandonvotingday;indeed,itwould od. drift noticeablyupwardsordownwardsovertheperi- established democracies,Canadianturnoutdidnot ure islowrelativetoturnoutinmostotherlong- period averagedaround75percentandwhilethisfig- until the1988contest,voterturnoutoverpostwar son whyanemphasisonparticipationiswarranted.Up so precipitouslyinthelastfewelectionsisanotherrea- pation hasresultedinanynegativeoutcomes. question ofwhetherornotitslimitedfocusonpartici- the caseforadoptionofaregister. Thisraisesthe concerns thanitoughttohavedoneasdeveloped Canada endeduppayinglessattentiontoparticipation regime. Aswasnotedabove,however, Elections participation astheprimaryobjectiveofaregistration tion inCanadaofconsideringthefacilitationvoter Canadians. Suchafocusisinkeeping withthetradi- I Participation Part 2:TheImpacton The factthatvoterturnoutinCanadahasdropped 65 sis isplacedhereontheelectoralinvolvementof change inregistrationmethod,thegreatestempha- n evaluatingtheconsequencesassociatedwith A dramaticallynewpattern,however, hasbeen 64 2000 election. before thenewsystemcamefullyintoeffectwith three elections,simplybecausethedeclinebeganwell explanation forthedropinturnoutobservedlast made thatthemovetoaregistercanberuledoutasan voter turnout?Thesuggestionhas,infact,alreadybeen even ofasecondarykind,onthepost-1988declinein observed inrecentelections?Hasithadsomeimpact, regimes havehadonthelowerlevelsofparticipation have increasedacrossagecategories. participation inequality, insofarasturnoutdisparities more Canadiansarevotinglessandless. scholarship vestedinunderstandingwhymoreand nature andlegitimacyofCanadiandemocracy. amount ofsoul-searchingastoitsmeaningforthe been regardedasbeingseriousenoughtopromptafair Not surprisingly, thedropinelectoralparticipationhas tion, eclipsingtherecordlowof63percentsetin1896. the worstturnouteverdocumentedinafederalelec- 1988, butalsobecauseitestablishedanewrecordfor because ithelpedconfirmthenegativetrendsince figure wasthesubjectofmuchcommentary, notonly meted to61.2 percentforthe2000election.Thelast manent listis relevant forunderstandingsome ofthe 2000 pairingofelections. in electoralparticipationat least acrossthe1997and regimes contributed,however modestly, tothedecline it isconceivablethatthechange inregistration new registrationprocess.Moreover, if thisistruethen have beenhigherwereitnotfortheoperationof in the2000election;itcouldbethatturnoutwould Register ofElectorsplayedaroleinloweringturnout itself foreclosethepossibilitythatNational lier generations. ticipate thantheirsimilarlyagedcounterpartsofear- their predecessors,andnoticeablylessinclinedtopar- ested inandlessknowledgeableaboutpoliticsthan into theelectorateofyoungvoterswhoarelessinter- focused ongenerationaleffects,particularlytheinflux to lowerturnoutlevels,muchoftheanalysishas variety offactorshavebeenidentifiedascontributing rience issimplypartofabroadertrend. other countriesaswell,soperhapstheCanadianexpe- observation thatvoterturnouthasdeclinedinmany of institutingcompulsoryvotinginCanada. mind whenhemusedaloudaboutthepossiblewisdom Electoral OfficerKingsleyappearstohavehadthisin What bearingmightthechangeoverinregistration There hasalsobeenaconsiderableamountof A casecouldeven bemadethatthemove toaper- Still, suchalineofargumentationdoesnotby 18 70 This ideafindsadditionalsupportinthe 69 This phenomenonisalsoasourceof 71 68 While a 67 66 Chief broader post-1988 decline. After all, the 1993 elec- that a smaller proportion of those registered under a tion was conducted, outside of Quebec, on the basis permanent-list method will vote compared to the tradi- of a registration process that had some of the hall- tional postwrit enumeration system. This follows sim- marks of a permanent-list approach.72 The reuse of ply because the compilation of the voters list afresh the year-old 1992 list meant a correspondingly heavy and in close proximity to the election translates into reliance on revision and polling-day registration to situations where individuals are more likely to be listed handle subsequent changes and additions, which at their current address and to have received the subse- might have resulted in lower participation because of quent information they require in order to cast their the greater effort involved in registering. As for the ballot; put differently, the timeliness of the postwrit 1997 election, it was, of course, preceded by the last enumeration process implies fewer listing errors and enumeration held before the formal adoption of the other problems requiring action. In contrast, permanent National Register. However, as discussed below, that lists (at least those based on a volunteer system) cannot particular canvassing effort did not conform exactly match this level of currency, because they cannot track to standard or ideal practices, which leaves some and instantaneously record Canada’s high level of pop- room for doubt about its interpretation vis-à-vis the ulation mobility; consequently, the register’s prelimi- facilitation of voting. nary list will contain a large number of individuals As will be seen, the extent to which the implica- listed at outdated addresses. tions of the change in registration regimes can be The need for remedial action, or lack thereof, on the linked to broader patterns of turnout decline (in addi- part of electors is not the only way of understanding tion to whatever impact it may have had in the spe- how registration effects may influence participation. cific 2000 election) depends, in part, on the approach Under the traditional system, personal contact with enu- taken to characterize the dependent variable. Two merators on the doorstep may very well have acted as a sorts of measures are available to gauge the registra- stimulus enhancing the probability that individuals vote tion-participation relationship: the standard turnout beyond their existing predispositions to do so. Under measure defined by votes cast as a percentage of reg- the new regime, it seems unlikely that receipt of a card, istered voters, and eligibility measures. The latter even one that contains the correct information, will in allow for investigation of the variability in the “cov- itself make much of a difference. A more certain case erage” of the registration process as it has a bearing can be made for contacting in connection with the can- on the overall turnout rate. With registration as a vassing efforts of parties and candidates. In their study From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black necessary condition for voting, turnout is naturally of the 2000 election, Blais et al. determined that, all decreased as large numbers of adult citizens are things being equal, “the likelihood of voting increased excluded from the lists. Put differently, eligibility by five percentage points when someone had been con- measures, by benchmarking the number of votes cast tacted by a political party.”73 However, electors who are relative to the number of eligible citizens, index voter improperly recorded on the register are unlikely to be turnout while taking into account the operation of mobilized by the parties; they risk being missed during the registration regime. the course of the campaign because the parties rely heavily on the preliminary lists.74 Official Turnout in 1984–2000 That said, it is somewhat problematic to draw infer- The utility of the turnout measure defined by votes ences about registration effects for the entire period in cast as a percentage of registered voters stems from its question on the basis of the official voter turnout meas- status as the official measure, as published by Elections ure. (As will be seen, the specific 2000 election lends Canada, for documenting voter turnout in the country itself to a more certain investigation of the link between and, of course, from its long-time use by students of registration circumstances and turnout.) The fluctuations Canadian elections. Its pertinence here, however, arises in voter participation across the elections in question are from its value as an index of participation when the influenced by so many factors, including generational focus is on how easy or difficult it is for those already replacement, that it is nearly impossible to attribute spe- registered to follow through and cast their vote. cific effects to the registration circumstances in which In this regard, it is pertinent to recall the near- individuals found themselves. The challenge of drawing truism that the level of participation is inversely inferences is compounded, ironically enough, by the related to the amount of effort required to carry out errors of inclusion that attend the permanent-list the activity in question. This leads to the expectation approach, mainly because of the delay in purging names

19 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 carried outbyBlais (73.1 percent)taken fromanindependentanalysis cates anddeceasedonthefinalvoterslist, Elections Canada’sreckoning ofthenumberdupli- similar magnitude,one(72.7percent)derivedfrom which istheaverageoftwonear-equalestimates 69.6 percentandthecorrectedfigureis72.9percent, transpired inconnectionwithlist-basedelections. errors wouldhavebeenfarlesscomparedtowhat their homeconstituency. Thatsaid,thenumberof dents beingredundantlyregisteredbytheirparentsin were nodoubtsomeerrorsofinclusion—suchasstu- scratch andincloseproximity totheelection,there those electionstheregistrationprocesswasdonefrom 1988. Thisisunfortunatebecause,eventhoughin the twopostwritenumerationelectionsin1984and modify theofficialturnoutfigureof75.3percentfor Information isnotavailable,itshouldbenoted,to ures dotransformthepatternofdeclineovertime. and listings.Itisquiteapparentthattheadjustedfig- basis forestimating(andthussubtracting)extranames existing informationandresearchthatprovidethe as officiallyreportedandadjusted,drawingupon by showingtheturnoutratesforlastfiveelections turnout rateshardlyneedtobeexaggerated. average of thepermanent-listmethod,asCanada’slower-than- that resultarenotaparticularlyattractiveby-product ally prevailed.Theartificiallydeflatedturnoutfigures appearance ofalowerlevelparticipationthanactu- surplus namesandredundantlistingshavecreatedthe cerned inconnectionwiththestandardmeasure: earnest withthe 1997election.Theadjusted figurefor norm. Thedrop inparticipationreallybegan in and iswellwithintherange ofvariationaroundthat new figureisnotfarfromthe 75percentbenchmark of turnoutdeclinebetween1988 and1993;indeedthe suggests amoremodestimpression ofthemagnitude turnout measure. sible voters”picked upinthedenominatorof pate andhowmuchisduetotheexistenceof“impos- faced byregisteredelectorsastheysoughttopartici- much thedecliningturnoutfiguresreflectproblems These inaccuraciesmake itdifficulttosortouthow at theirformeraddressaswellcurrentone). who havereregisteredfollowingamovebutarelisted and incorrectingduplicatelistings(thoseindividuals torate becausetheyhaveemigratedorpassedaway) (those individualswhoarenolongerpartoftheelec- For the1993election,officialturnoutrateis This inflationaryeffectisdemonstratedinFigure1 However, oneregistration-basedeffectcanbedis- 75 et al . 77 The reworked percentage 76 the other surpluses, that contest,usingElectionsCanada’sestimatesof Elections Canadainformation) figure of63.6percent(againcalculatedusing almost sixpoints(5.8percent),whiletheadjusted turnout rateplungedto61.2 percent,adeclineof election wouldalsoappeartobe“real.”Theofficial months ofvotingday, hadfewererrorsofinclusion. tion, basedlargelyonacanvassingeffortwithintwo one (67.0percent)reflectsthefactthat1997elec- ure lieswithinapercentagepointoftheunadjusted cial, unadjustedtallies.Thefactthatthecorrectedfig- with adeclineofonly2.6percentbasedontheoffi- substantial five-pointdropfrom1993.Thiscompares inscribed onthe NationalRegister. individuals whohadpassed awaysincebeing duplicates onthefinallistof votersand177,000 figure itselftakes into accountanestimated614,000 ment madeforthe1993election. Therecalculated far fromtrivialandrivalsin magnitudetheadjust- reworked figures—abouttwoandahalfpointsis Nonetheless, thedifferencebetweenofficialand substantial four-pointdrop(4.2percent). Canada, IDEAandothersources. Other figurestakeneitherdirectlyorcalculatedfromElectionsCanada,Statistics Source: Officialturnoutfigurestakenfromreportsofthechiefelectoralofficer. als registered(1993,1997and2000electionsonly). 1 Notes Elections, 1984-2000 Turnout andRegistrationCoverageinFederal Figure 1 Surplus namesandduplicatelistingsremovedfromthetotalnumberofindividu- Percent The dropinturnoutassociatedwiththe2000 100 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 ● ■ 78 9418 9319 2000 1997 1993 1988 1984 ■■ ❑ is 67.8percent,whichrepresentsaquite Official turnout Adjusted turnout 20 ❑ Election year 1 ● ■ ❑ ❑ 79 still representsa Registration coverage Voters as%eligible ● ■ ❑ ● ■ ❑ The other comment to make about the adjusted fig- one another rather than as precise point estimates. Of ure for 2000 is that its acceptance would remove that course, the fact that elections in the 1984–2000 period election from the record books as having the lowest were carried out based on either enumeration or per- turnout ever, allowing the 1896 contest to once again manent-list principles allows for the comparison of claim that dubious honour. Still, no amount of adjust- coverage rates using the two methods. The enumeration ment can alter the fundamental fact that voter decline elections of 1984 and 1988 were followed by reuse of in recent elections is real and deserves the attention it the 1992 referendum voters list for the 1993 election has received as a prominent feature of contemporary (again, outside Quebec), by an enumeration process for political behaviour in Canada. the 1997 election and finally by a full application of the National Register in 2000. Coverage and Eligibility in 1984–2000 The top graph line in Figure 1 indicates that cover- Typically, the number of individuals who meet the age did decrease over the last three elections but not in statutory age requirement is taken to denote the pool of a pattern that suggests that the decline is strictly asso- eligible voters. In traditional immigrant-receiving soci- ciated with list-based methods.82 Coverage dropped eties, however, it is advisable to use citizenship as well nearly three percentage points after the 1988 election as age to circumscribe the eligible population. Two ver- and, importantly, did not rise with the enumeration- sions of such measures are relevant here, a more impor- based contest in 1997. For 1984 and 1988, the registra- tant one that allows for direct measurement of the tion effort is estimated to have reached 94.9 percent coverage achieved by the registration method by divid- and 96 percent, respectively, of the eligible population. ing the number inscribed by the number eligible, and a Inclusion decreased to 93.3 percent for the 1993 elec- second, derivative measure that relates votes cast to the tion, dropped further to 92.2 percent in 1997 and then potential number of eligible voters. rose slightly to 93.1 percent in 2000. In both cases, the same orthodoxy specifying an Taking these statistics at face value, the interpreta- inverse relationship between the requirement of indi- tion must be that coverage declined noticeably in the vidual initiative and participation also anticipates less last three elections and that neither registration method coverage (and less voting) in the new system relative was able to match previous levels. There is, moreover, a to the traditional one. The state’s more decidedly plausible basis for such a conclusion, and it involves proactive approach in the past meant that eligible two characterizations. One would be that the permanent voters had to do little to get their names on the vot- lists performed as expected and ended up capturing From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black ers list. Moreover, the fact that the compilation of fewer individuals than the enumeration method had names was carried out in close proximity to election been able to do in 1984 and 1988. The second would day meant that new 18-year-olds and new citizens involve acknowledging that the employment of enumer- were more likely to be included. By contrast, those ation in the more contemporary period can no longer not already on the permanent list would need to take equal its past achievements. This latter conclusion, of some action, however minimal, to be included on the course, would square with the argument of diminishing electoral rolls. Furthermore, being unregistered, these quality and coverage that had been put forward as a individuals are also more likely to be overlooked in reason for abandoning enumeration. Indeed, in his offi- the campaigning efforts of parties and candidates. cial report on the 1997 election,83 the chief electoral The adjusted registration data can be retained as officer pointed out that there were challenges in getting the analysis shifts to consider what conclusions the political parties to supply a sufficient number of might be reached about coverage (and thus participa- names for enumerators and that returning officers had, tion) differences over the same 1984–2000 period.80 as a consequence, to turn to other sources. No exact fig- Of prime interest is the comparative performance of ures are cited, though the report does go on to specify the enumeration and list systems in capturing the that there were problems finding enough enumerators in optimal number of eligible voters. The information the west end of Toronto and in Newfoundland (p. 45). needed to estimate the eligible population in terms of Without wishing to dispute the reality of this shortage and citizenship comes mainly from Elections age as a factor, it remains unclear whether enumeration Canada and Statistics Canada. Because these popula- problems, per se, were solely or even largely responsi- tion figures are estimates,81 as are the adjusted regis- ble for the relatively lower coverage level recorded in tration statistics for the last three elections, coverage the 1997 election. Other factors — not necessarily asso- rates are best considered in broad juxtaposition with ciated with the application of the enumeration method

21 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 ble population that itmanagedtoreach great success.Indeed,initsreporttheagencyboasts conformed tostandardenumerationpractices—asa out inQuebec—aneffortthatarguablymoreclosely regarded theenumerationdrivethathadbeencarried the 1993election.Inthatyear, ElectionsCanada piece ofevidence,interestinglyenough,comesfrom capacity onthepartofenumerationmethod.One taken asavalidindicatorofgenerallydiminished whether thecoveragerateinthatelectioncanbe straightforward matter. merator-elector contactproblems)isnotsucha 1997 toashortageofenumerators(andotherenu- some level—thenattributingthelowcoveragein common sensesuggeststhattheymusthavehad,at bearing onthequalityofregistrationeffort—and tion hadbeenaslowprocess: were newappointeesand,moreover, thattheirselec- officers whoweretooverseethefinalenumeration of redistribution,three-quartersthe271 returning importantly, thereportgoesontonotethat,because preparation forthelastenumeration”(p.42).More training forreturningofficersandtheirkey staffin to theAct, wealsohadtoprovidethenecessary manuals andformstoreflectthelatestamendments lowing thepassageofBillC-63:“Whilerevising entered intowithinthetighttimeframetheyhadfol- attention tothe“intenseactivity”thatagency Kingsley’s reportonthe1997generalelectioncalls regard, itissignificanttonotethatelsewhere, — couldhavebeenequallyormoreimportant.Inthis was achieved, figure wasderivedorhowthishighlevelofcoverage were noenumerations; instead,ElectionsCanada pur- provinces —PrinceEdwardIsland andAlberta—there contributed tothedecreased coverage. First,intwo tions fromnormalenumeration practicemayhave officers; atleasttwootherelements involvingdevia- redistribution andtheslowappointment ofreturning meration featurednotonlytighttimeframes,riding 1990s, becarriedoutquiteeffectively. suggests thatenumerationcouldstill,intheearly There areadditionalgroundsforquestioning Insofar asthesetimepressuresmighthavehada The registrationprocessboundupwiththelastenu- an enumerationandelection.(p.42) guidelines fortheirtasksbeforetheyplungedinto assimilate themanymanualsandprocedural many returningofficersdidnothavetimeto despite thetrainingeffortsofElectionsCanada, Because ofthedelaysinappointmentprocess, 85 . 84 but suchafigurebyitselfmorethan It givesnoinformationonhowthat 98 percentofQuebec’seligi- 2000 election. of high-mobilityareas,”concluded thereporton targeted revisionexercise providedeffectivecoverage tional addressesweretargetedinthismanner. “The with maintainedlists.Altogether, about515,000 addi- the limitationsincoverageandcurrencyassociated enumeration, is,ofcourse,intendedtocompensatefor addresses called uponfailedtoproducearesponse at Canada could have emphasizedthat29percent ofthe problems withenumeration, however, Elections tals.” tions suchasnursinghomesandchroniccarehospi- apartment buildingsandstudentresidents,institu- areas knownforhighmobility, includingclustersof recently developedareassuchasnewsubdivisions, the electionperiod.“Ingeneral,theyconcentratedon specifically designatedareasduringthesecondweekof process bywhichapairofagentscallonresidentsin “targeted revision”efforts.Targeted revisionisa problems withthe2000electionincontextofits rebuttal, pointtotheevidenceofenumeration-like possible withenumeration,ElectionsCanadamight,in tional factorswereatplay. impact couldbesignificantinacontextwhereaddi- lower overallcoverage,buttogethertheircumulative expected toplayonlyaminorroleinexplainingthe sure, eachofthesedeviationsbyitselfwouldbe have resultedinsomeindividualsbeingmissed.To be lag timebyameretwoandone-halfweeks,itwould ahead ofvotingday. Whilethischangeextendedthe meration wascarriedoutbetween53and47days in Quebecforthe1993election),finalAprilenu- and 29daysbeforetheelection(ashadbeencase further slippage.Insteadoftakingplacebetween35 took placeslightlyearlierthanusual,leavingroomfor meration processcarriedoutintherestofcountry been asourceofthelowercoverage.Second,enu- Alberta’s rapidpopulationgrowth),thiscouldhave errors ofexclusion (presumably, asafunctionof the extentthattherewasasubstantialnumberof Thus, thepurchasedlistwassusceptibletoerror, andto been basedonaNovember1996generalenumeration. province’s register-basedsystem,which,inturn,had took place(inJune),butitwasaproductofthe that listseveralmonthsoldbythetimeelection Alberta’s listisparticularlytroubling.Notonlywas numbers ofeligiblevotersinvolved,theuse in April1996andMarch1997,respectively. Giventhe generated fortheprecedingprovincialelections,held chased thefinallistsofregisteredvotersthathadbeen If thesefactssuggestthatadequatecoverageisstill 86 This process,whichisverymuchakinto 22 87 In makingthepointaboutcoverage the doorstep, even after two visits (at which time a cess on voter turnout in the 2000 election. That contest mail-in package was left). Later, when asked about the is of prime importance, of course, because it was the possibility of a return to the traditional system, first one to be held with the new regime well in place. Kingsley did use this statistic to illustrate the problem- The National Register had been functioning for nearly atic nature of enumeration.88 In rebuttal, it could be three and a half years when it was used to generate the pointed out that, given the areas that were designated, preliminary voters lists. Now, therefore, its performance a 71-percent rate of contact is actually quite impres- as an open-list system, based on the incorporation of a sive and, moreover, a subset of those who were not at continuous flow of updated elector information, can be home or did not answer their door ended up register- meaningfully assessed. A focus on that contest does ing by taking advantage of the mail-in package that require, however, stepping back somewhat from mak- had been left. Indeed, the statistic might even be taken ing strong distinctions in the analysis of participation to suggest the value of a three-visit canvass (at appro- effects according to whether or not an individual was priately altered times) for certain special areas, with registered. This is because a large number of people the routine two-visit mode used elsewhere. Clearly, the were in “in between” situations, such as having their other point to make is that coverage in the 2000 elec- name listed, but at an old or incorrect address. Apart tion would have been lower without targeted revision. from these “incorrect” registrations, factors such as In short, there is reason to believe that the use of receipt of a voter information card and manner of list-based approaches contributed, however modestly, receipt would have made a difference. Nevertheless, it to the recent decline in electoral coverage (and partici- is possible to demonstrate that the less than ideal regis- pation). Key to this interpretation is seeing the 1997 tration circumstances in which many individuals found election as constituting only a weak test of the cover- themselves — including, most fundamentally, not being age achieved with enumeration. Still, a more prudent registered at all when the preliminary voters lists were perspective at this juncture would be to see this only as generated — had an inhibiting effect on participation. a plausible inference. A more certain one is that cover- A variety of information sources allow for this conclu- age under the new regime has been inferior to what sion. To begin with, there was ample media coverage of enumeration was able to achieve in the past. Therefore, the campaign that focused heavily on the administrative the commitment on the part of the advocates of a per- aspects of the election, including various concerns about manent-list approach to maintain the high levels of the nature and functioning of the new registration system. inclusion that had long characterized Canadian regis- There were also reactions by MPs, particularly members of From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black tration practice has not yet been fulfilled. the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, as they had an opportunity to conduct a post-mortem on Turnout and Eligibility the election by questioning Kingsley directly. As well, Finally, and for the sake of completeness, Figure 1 Elections Canada carried out its own “post-event” analysis shows the overall participation rate by relating the of the voter registration process in addition to other number of votes cast to the number of eligible voters. aspects of the election.89 Its summary report, in turn, Since this measure captures both registration cover- draws upon survey-based information taken from, among age and voting behaviour, it is to be expected that it other individuals and organizations, 60 randomly selected records the lowest percentages across all elections. candidates who ran for registered parties, 20 selected “rep- And, of course, it also picks up both the declining resentatives of registered political parties,”90 259 returning coverage that has occurred as well as the fact that officers and 49 academics who had signalled their interest fewer Canadians have been voting. In the 1984 and in electoral matters. The report also cites some (summary) 1988 elections, 71.5 and 72.2 percent of the eligible results of national surveys, including one conducted by population voted, while in 1993 only 68 percent did Ipsos-Reid on behalf of Elections Canada. As will be seen, so; the figure falls off sharply to 62.5 percent for the that data set is used extensively as a basis for an inde- 1997 contest and drops again, to 59.2 percent, in pendent analysis of the registration process and its impact. 2000. However it is measured, participation in While the statistical work provides the most convincing, Canadian federal elections has clearly been declining. and certainly the most generalizable, evidence on registration effects, the disparate sources of information essential- The 2000 Election ly converge in producing a characterization of the new The evidence is much clearer on the impact — a nega- system as having operated in such a way as to have tive one, to be exact — of the new registration pro- inhibited voter turnout.

23 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 be possibleto register. Theexactwordingofthemes- to avoidlogjamsonpolling day, whenitwouldstill possible toregisterduringthe revisionperiodinorder vote. Clearly, theagencywantedasmanypeople had tobelistedintheNational Registerinorderto vision advertisementsinforming thepublicthatthey was theconfusingnatureofElectionsCanada’stele- media, butpicked upaswellbythebroadcastmedia, right acrossthecountry: representative ofthetonenewspapercoverage from asamplingofdifferentnewspapersarefairly 2000 electionisquitestriking.Thefollowingexcerpts scrutiny ofthedifficultiesandirregularitiesin polling stations.Still,theheavyandpersistentmedia where tovoteorconfrontinglongqueuesinthe ing effort,beinggiventhewronginformationabout that emphasizedvotersbeingmissedinthecanvass- meration methodwerenotimmunetocriticalreports well. Certainly, pastelectionsgovernedbytheenu- did notdwellsomuchonthoseaspectsthatworked surrounding theregistrationandvotingprocesses the mediachosetofocusheavilyonproblems There isnothingsurprisingornewaboutthefactthat Media Commentary One ofthespecificthemestaken upintheprint National Post names werenotontheofficialvoterslist. ready tocasttheirballotsonlyfind four hourslateandonein10 Canadians arrived es yesterdayaspollingstationsopenedupto Voting acrossthecountrywasmarredbyglitch- still onthelist. and evenincidentswheredeceasedcitizenswere as wellreportsofwrongaddressesforvoters by voterstoregisteronthelistforfirsttime, There werewidespreadreportsoffutileattempts Journal cards orthattheygotmorethanone. wrong information,thattheyhaven’treceived they havereceivedElectionsCanadacardswith stituencies, withangryvotersobjectingthat The newsystemhascreatedchaosinsomecon- addresses. still othershaveseentheircardsgoastraytoold all, othershavereceivedfaultyvotercardsand new housingdevelopments,arenotonthelistat al election.Somevoters,particularlythosein Register ofElectorsmakesitsdebutinthisfeder- lar problemsacrossthecountryasNational parts ofthecity. Andtheirsituationsmirrorsimi- federal electorsareangeringvotersinvarious Glitches inthecountry’s computerized listof Daily Gleaner lived inthesameplacefordecades. wrong riding,despitethefacttheymayhave noticing theircardslistthemasvotersinthe heap ofunreadmail.Manylocalresidentsare should avoidthetemptationtotossthemintoa Electors receivingtheirvoterregistrationcards (November 21) Hamilton Spectator (November 28) (November 9) Vancouver Sun (November 15) (November 24) Fredericton Edmonton then wentontosay: developments withregardtotheNationalRegister, but performance reportfor1999–2000,includingpositive on abroadernotebyquotingfromElectionsCanada’s Alliance, whowasalsothelead-offquestioner, began tarian. ThatMP, JohnReynoldsoftheCanadian ad.” yielded —“Okay, whatwe’regoingtodoisrevisethe approved theadvertisement,atfirstdefendedit,but 2001. Kingsley, whoindicatedthathehadpersonally electoral officerandhisstaffformallyonMarch1, their firstpostelectionopportunitytoquizthechief Committee onProcedureandHouseAffairs,whohad criticism frommembersofParliament ontheStanding The advertisingcampaignreceivedevenmoreintense Parliamentary Scrutiny reached thesamedetermination. son (e.g.,thepreviousoccupantoftheirdwelling) who receivedacardbearingthenameofanotherper- would beunabletovote.Similarly, someofthose information cardconcluded(wrongly)thatthey that manyindividualswhodidnotreceiveavoter vote. No,youcan’t.”Whattranspired,ofcourse,was sage was,“Ifyou’renotonthevoters’list,youcan’t demnation: MP tospeak,andshewasunequivocalinhercon- most part.’ Ibegtodifferslightly.” ed that,‘Theregistermetourexpectationsforthe “On page9ofyourdocument,Mr. Kingsley, youstat- the needtomake ageneralcommentontheregister: updating arrangementswithQuebec.Still,hedidfeel meeting andwentontoaskaboutElectionsCanada’s been conducted,promisedmorequeriesatasecond problems withthewayinwhichelectionhad signalling hissensethatthereweresomegeneral left offthelist. by thefactthathisownnamehadbeenerroneously Libby DavisoftheNDPwasnextopposition Michel GuimondoftheBlocQuébécoisbeganby No doubtReynolds’annoyancewascompounded 91 stituents, inthattheyjustweren’tonthelist. problems…I hadlotsofcomplaints…fromcon- bunch ofnotesfrommemberswhohavereal a problem.Asthewhipofparty, Ihavea about everymemberonthiscommitteehashad ing beforeyougothere,weheardthatjust Now, itallsoundsgreat,butatoneothermeet- we actuallyhad ontheground.Iconsiderall of lems —isvastly differentfromtheexperience success story, eventhoughtherearesomeprob- so onthatmakethenationalregistry looklikea presented today—thesegraphs andslides I finditironicthattheinformation we’vehad — afterpersistentchallengesbyoneparliamen- 24 93 92 us, as MPs, as the real experts in this information” form and mail it back to the agency.98 To matter…Within our own caucus, I know the first summarize, there is no disagreement that the perma- thing we talked about when we got back here was what happened on election day. Everybody nent list came up short with regard to registering newly had incredible stories of concerns and situations age-eligible voters.99 that took place.94 She went on to cite the specific problem of “dis- Elections Canada’s Post-Mortem crimination against poor people and aboriginal peo- The agency’s own assessment, drawn from the elite ple,” making it clear that, to her way of thinking, not sources already mentioned, does not hide the difficulties only did the permanent-list method depress turnout experienced with the new registration regime. Its 2000 in general but it had an especially debilitating effect General Election Post-event Overview notes that “a major- on less favoured groups. ity of candidates and political party representatives indi- The theme of participation inequality was sounded cated a low degree of satisfaction” with the preliminary even earlier in the hearings by a Liberal MP, Carolyn lists of voters generated by the National Register (p. 7) Parrish, who first of all wondered if she needed to and that for their part returning officers reported having change her position as a supporter of the register: “to deal with widespread or major complaints about the As a great advocate of a national registry, I have lived to eat my words. We had a rough time in preliminary lists of electors, indicating that the accuracy this election. We also had a rough time with the of the lists did not meet their expectations” (p. 7). national registry in the 1999 [Ontario] provincial Academics were described as seeing no difficulty with the election. I don’t expect perfection, and I think it’ll probably take several elections to get this registration procedures, though some “indicated that the thing ironed out and cleaned up, so I’m not process unduly put the onus on electors and required too going to throw the baby out with bathwater quite yet.95 much initiative from them, especially those who were less Her worry that the new registration method had a involved or interested in the first place” (p. 7). Candidates negative effect on turnout and equality were practi- and political parties apparently were “neutral about most cally the next words out of her mouth: aspects of voter registration,” but when opinions were I’m more concerned about the voter turnout than given “they generally reported low satisfaction rates, par- I am about anything else. I think the voter ticularly with registration at advance polls and on polling turnout was poor. A low voter turnout disenfran- day, with the targeted revision process and with the accu- chises the poorest and most disenfranchised people in society to start with. I think it was really racy of revised lists of electors” (p. 8). good for the blue-haired ladies who have lived in From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black my riding for 60 years, because they were on the 100 voters list, they had property, nobody hassled The Ipsos-Reid Survey them, and they were fine. The teenagers didn’t Central to the use of survey data for deriving insights get to vote, nor did new immigrants, people who into the link between registration and participation is the had moved recently, or the poor. Generally, society doesn’t give a damn about those people, but I do single item that was employed to categorize the registra- — even if they vote NDP.96 tion status and circumstances of respondents. The ques- While it is unclear how much of this criticism tion, structured around people’s experiences with the Kingsley expected to hear, he cannot have been sur- voter information card, merits quoting in full: prised by the concerns voiced about the particular Prior to the November 27th, 2000 Election you situation of young people. In preliminary remarks to should have received a “voter information card.” This card is approximately 5 inches by 9 inches the committee, his top official responsible for the and would have provided you with information National Register, Rennie Molnar, readily identified about the election, including where and when to this gap in coverage as an area in need of significant vote. It also would have had your name and address and told you that you were on the voters improvement. Molnar allowed that only an estimated list. Which of the following most closely describes 30 percent of eligible youths had been registered your situation?” [READ, ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE]. when the lists were first generated (with a final regis- The response possibilities were as follows (followed tered level of 55 to 60 percent).97 Kingsley himself by the percentage distribution):101 had been quoted several times during the campaign Your voter information card came in the mail and was correctly addressed to you personally (75.3) as lamenting the fact that a huge majority of the esti- Your voter information card came in the mail, but mated 400,000 Canadians who had turned 18 during there was some personal information that was the year had not registered in spite of Elections incorrect (4.5) Canada’s outreach program; after all, all they had to You got a voter information card with someone do, he emphasized, was to sign a “confirmation of else’s name (2.2)

25 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 have totake themoststepstoget onthelist. effort andthosewhohadreceived nocardatallwould else’s cardwouldneedtomake somewhat moreofan least action,whilethosewho hadreceivedsomeone incorrect personalinformation wouldneedtotake the and effort.Theanticipationis thatthosewithonly situations wouldrequiredifferentlevelsofengagement expectation isthatremedyingthesevariousregistration inhabited byapersonwhowasregistered.Theordinary als whohadmovedintoadwellingunitpreviously someone else’scard;likely theseweremostlyindividu- further 2.2percentindicatedthattheyhadreceived were simplynotrecordedontheNationalRegister. A at all;presumablythesewereprimarilyindividualswho prised peoplewhoreportednothavingreceivedacard Among these,thelargestcategory(14.5percent)com- ed toundertake someremedialactioninordertovote. ideal registrationsituationsandwhowouldhaveneed- significant numberofCanadianswhowereinlessthan ed inthesample. tered andtovote)beingdisproportionatelyrepresent- and motivatedindividuals(thoselikely toberegis- but itcouldbepartlytheresultofpoliticallyengaged product ofnonvotersfalselyreportinghavingvoted, of participation.Nodoubtthisinflationispartlythe dents, afigurethatisfarcryfromtheactuallevel level of81 percentreportedbythesurveyrespon- This isstronglysuggestedbytheveryhighturnout ested andinformedindividualsamongthecitizenry. the sampleprobablyoverrepresentedmoreinter- data qualityestimates.Aswithmostelectionsurveys, too generoustobetaken ascorroborationforthose als listedatthecorrectaddress. generating asestimatesofthepercentageindividu- from thesortoffiguresthatagencyhadbeen resulting totalof79.8percentisnottoofarremoved curacies abouttheelector’spersonalinformation.The receive it)eventhoughthecardcontainedsomeinac- ly addressedcard(oratleastcorrectenoughto this figurethe4.5percentwhohadreceivedaproper- correct information.Presumably, onecouldaddto percent indicatedthattheyhadreceivedthecardwith quality” oftheregister. Amongtherespondents,75.3 support ElectionsCanada’sestimatesofthe“data Nonetheless, thesurveystillmanagedtocapturea At thesametime,surveyfiguresareprobably Taken atfacevalue,theresponseswouldappearto voter informationcard(3.0) example, aphonecallore-mail)togetyourown You hadtomakesomesortofenquiry(for You nevergotavoterinformationcard(14.5) 102 rience. Thepercentage continuestorisefor thenext of three(66percent) hadthisidealregistration expe- among thosebetween25and 34yearsold,onlytwo rectly addressedcardwithaccurate information,and every twoindividuals(48.9 percent) receivedacor- those betweentheagesof18 and24,onlyonein sharpest patternwithregistrationstatus.Among dences frequently. Asanticipated, ageexhibitsthe they aremorelikely toberentersorchangeresi- suboptimal registrationexperiences,largelybecause and poorerCanadiansaremorelikely tohavehad and incomecategories.Onepremiseisthatyounger expected, morelikely tobeboundupwithcertainage displaying howsomeregistrationsituationsare,as mentary way. Table 1helps todemonstratethisby in whichpeoplefoundthemselves,atleastarudi- statuses, ifnotideal,doestapthevarioussituations information aboutwheretovote. rect personalinformationmayhavebeengivenwrong small subsetofthosewhoreceivedacardwithincor- 14.5 percent.Finally, judgingfrommediareports,a gests thatthenonrecipientlevelmightbehigherthan these individualsdidnotreceiveacardthenthissug- stand apartsomewhat.)Incidentally, insofarassomeof sis willshowthatthisdoesindeedmake thecategory captured the tinctive becausenoneoftheothershaspurposefully ing ofsubsequentaction.Thismakes thecategorydis- presumably, nothavingreceivedacard—withthetak- ticular, itconflatesnotbeingregistered—including, problem fromamethodologicalpointofview. Inpar- obtain theirvoterinformationcardposesanother category comprisingthosewhotooktheinitiativeto card simplybecauseitwasincorrectlyaddressed.The uals didnotmoveatallbutreceivedanotherperson’s Furthermore, itisnotinconceivablethatsomeindivid- already registeredattheiroldaddress,othersnot. to someoneelsecouldhavevaried,somehavingbeen circumstances ofthosewhoreceivedacardaddressed previous occupanthadnotbeenlisted.Similarly, the registered mighthavemovedintoadwellingwhose card becauseofaddresserrors.Aswell,somethose those listedmighthavesimplyfailedtoreceivetheir a cardwereindeednotregistered,butsmallsubsetof precision. Nodoubtmostofthosewhodidnotreceive natives couldhavebeenconstructedwithgreater fectly homogeneous;itseemsthattheresponsealter- is alsoclearthattheresponsecategoriesarenotper- terizing theseregistrationsituationsinthisway, butit Still, itappearsthatthisorderingofregistration As willbeseenbelow, thereissupportforcharac- motivation 26 to register. (Subsequentanaly- two age brackets, reaching 82.7 percent for those situation, while 31.2 percent received no card (specific between 35 and 64 and 91.5 percent for those 65 and data not shown).104 over. Most of these differences are mirrored in the The survey offers additional perspectives on the vari- corresponding percentages associated with the most ous registration experiences of Canadians in the last unfavourable situation, not having received a card. election. An important insight is available from a line of Over one-third (34.5 percent) of the youngest adults questioning that asked individuals who did not receive a and almost one-fifth (19.7 percent) of those in the card with the correct information and address whether or next age bracket claimed that this was their experi- not they took any action to rectify their registration sta- ence. By contrast, only 10.2 and 3.3 percent of those tus. Those who responded in the affirmative were between the ages of 35 and 64 and those 65 and over, queried about whether they thought the process was respectively, did not receive a card.103 Apart from this, easy or difficult. The data indicate that a substantial pro- younger Canadians were also modestly more likely to portion of people either failed to act or regarded the take the initiative to register, capturing, it would process as difficult when they did try to do so. appear, that comparatively small and exceptional Altogether, nearly one-third (30.9 percent) of those who segment of young people with the motivation and received a card with incorrect personal information, interest to participate. someone else’s card or no card at all did nothing to The pattern for income is also as expected, again adjust the irregularity. A further 15.7 percent of these suggesting that the registration status categories are individuals took action but reported that they found the

Table 1 Voter Registration Status by Age, Income (percent)

Age Income

Less than $20,000- $40,000- Registration status 18–24 25–34 35–64 65+ $20,000 39,999 59,999 $60,000+

Correctly registered 48.9 66.0 82.7 91.5 66.7 73.0 79.0 79.5 Personal information 5.8 5.8 3.8 3.6 3.5 5.9 5.4 3.3 incorrect Received another’s card 2.2 5.2 1.3 1.2 3.8 2.8 1.3 1.8 Received no card 34.5 19.7 10.2 3.3 22.6 15.4 11.6 12.7 From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black Took initiative to get card 8.6 3.3 2.0 0.3 3.5 2.8 2.8 2.7 (N) (362) (483) (1,280) (329) (372) (597) (542) (738)

Source: Based on data provided by Elections Canada from a random telephone survey of 2,500 Canadians conducted by Ipsos-Reid between November 28 and December 11. While the survey oversampled individuals between the ages of 18 and 34, the weighted version is used here. According to Ipsos Reid, it is ”representative of Canada’s age and gender composition in accordance with 1996 Census data.“ measuring at least basic differences. Those with an process difficult or very difficult. In other words, nearly income of less than $20,000 had the least favourable one-half of the individuals (46.6 percent) in less than experiences. Among these individuals — the poorest optimal registration circumstances either failed to follow Canadians — 66.7 percent found themselves correctly through as hoped for or, if they did, found the process registered, while 22.6 percent responded that they had wanting.105 Table 2 breaks down this figure for the vari- failed to receive a card. Registration circumstances are ous registration categories: 41.4 percent for those who slightly better for those with incomes between $20,000 had only personal information to amend, 44.4 percent and $39,999, at 73 and 15.4 percent, respectively. for those who received another person’s card and 51.8 Those in the two higher income brackets were also percent for those who received no card. Roughly, then, better off with regard to registration, with the corre- inaction and perception of difficulty increased according sponding percentages hovering around 80 percent for to the amount of remedial action required. This helps being correctly registered and 12 percent for failing to substantiate the value of distinguishing among the cate- receive a card. Finally, and in part overlapping with gories, imperfect as they are. The data also reveal that the above data, part-time and full-time students were there were undesirable registration results even when also prone to be in registration situations where some relatively little remedial action was required. remedial measures were necessary. Only 50.0 percent Table 2 presents results for three other variables that of students found themselves in the ideal registration illuminate further aspects of Canadians’ reaction to the

27 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 information, while30.4percentdisagreed( 62.9 percentagreedthattheyhadreceivedsufficient ly toagreethattherewas“enough information.”Only tions. Ontheseconditem,respondentswerelesslike- were differencesacrossthevariousregistrationsitua- not consciouslyso).However, asnotedbelow, there did not,infact,findittobeconfusing(or, atleast campaign, thisperhapssuggeststhatmanyCanadians fusing natureofthe“Are youonthelist”advertising 8.0). Givenwhatwaswidelyreportedaboutthecon- cent) agreeingthatthiswasindeedthecase( favourable, withmorethan8in10 people(82.9per- For thesampleasawhole,responsewasquite tering andvotingwas“clear andeasytounderstand.” item shownasked whethertheinformationonregis- disagree (collapsed)portionsofthescale.Thefirst measure andpercentagesfortheagree,neutral ways, withmeanscoresfortheoriginal11-point and whentovote.”Theresultsarepresentedintwo on “howtogetthevoterslistandaboutwhere 0-to-10 agree-disagreescale,theflowofinformation new regime.Allrespondentswereasked torate,ona Source: Seetable1. Encouraged vote Enough information Clear andeasytounderstand Registrationandvoting (b) Took noactionorfound (a) (percent) Correction ProcessandAttitudesTowards RegistrationandVoting Information,byRegistrationStatus Table 2 1 Notes: Sample numbersvary becausethenumberofrespondentsforthese questionsvaried. iare3. 353. 265. 34.2 15.1 50.7 9.5 57.7 13.5 28.7 31.1 59.5 11.4 42.6 25.9 4.0 31.5 44.2 13.3 44.4 82.7 7.4 32.4 20.7 46.8 11.1 29.6 35.3 63.0 53.6 33.5 9.9 17.7 -- 48.8 9.3 26.1 13.0 64.0 77.8 37.3 17.3 45.4 51.8 5.5 28.0 9.9 4.5 66.4 85.6 30.4 6.7 44.4 62.9 6.4 (N) 5.1 Mean 88.5 Disagree Neutral 41.4 Agree 11.1 6.0 82.9 Mean Disagree -- Neutral Agree 46.6 Mean Disagree Neutral Agree information (N) difficult correction processdifficult/very 1 (2,456-76) 58 11 5)(363) (54) (111) (528) l eitrdif.icretaohrscr ocr togetcard nocard another’s card info.incorrect registered All . . . . . 5.2 3.6 6.3 4.6 5.0 7.7 5.2 6.2 5.6 5.5 6.8 7.6 5.2 6.9 8.2 6.6 8.5 8.0 Mean 1896)(1)(4 316)(73-75) (351-60) (54) (111) (1,849-68) orcl esnlRcie eevdTook initiative Received Received Personal Correctly Mean = = an entirelyaccuratecardand85.6percentofthose vote. Thus,while88.5percentofthosewhoreceived sufficient quantityandashavingencouragedthemto of rating theinformationasclearandunderstandable, from theideal,lowerlikelihood ofrespondents eral, themoreregistrationcircumstancesdeviated individuals’ assessmentoftheinformationflow. Ingen- registration statusmadeaconsiderabledifferencein election overwhichtheagencyhadsomecontrol. to administrativeratherthanpoliticalaspectsofthe of theelectionitself,questiondoesafterallrefer reflects thelow-stimulus(e.g.,noncompetitive)nature might bearguedthatsomepartofthisresponse indicated disagreement( in theaffirmative,whileasubstantial37.3percent vote.” Lessthanhalfthesample(45.4percent)replied registration andvoterinformation“encouraged meto ment aboutmotivation,inparticular, whetherthe connection withthethirditem,whichrecordedsenti- done moreinthisarea.Thelowestratingsoccur 6.6), suggestingthatElectionsCanadamighthave The breakdowns shownsuggest,notsurprisingly, that Registration status 28 Mean = 5.2).Althoughit who received a card with incorrect personal data matically raised the stakes and demanded that the agreed that the information was clear and understand- greatest priority be given to facilitating the registration able, the figure diminishes somewhat (to 77.8 percent) of the millions of unlisted or incorrectly listed for those who received someone else’s card and tum- Canadians. Without effective communication with this bles dramatically to 53.6 percent for those who population, it is hard to fathom how their participation received no card at all (Mean = 8.5, 8.2, 7.6 and 5.6, could be facilitated. respectively). Clearly, the positive assessment of the quality of the information, seen in connection with the The Impact on Participation entire sample, does not hold across the board, espec- The most important aspect of the new registry system ially for those who did not get a card. These same indi- to explore is, of course, its direct impact on voting in viduals were also less likely to respond that they had the November 2000 election, and not only in connec- received “enough information” — only 44.4 percent tion with turnout in general but as well the implica- provided positive replies compared to 63 to 66 percent tions that it had for participation inequality across for individuals in other registration circumstances. social categories. With regard to the broader dimension, Assessments of whether the information encouraged the pertinent question is not so much whether higher participation also form a pattern, with both receiving registration thresholds led to less voting, since the someone else’s card and not receiving a card appar- expectation of some sort of a negative effect is well ently making a difference. Of those who received a grounded in the literature. Additionally, there is the completely correct card, 48.8 percent indicated that plain but important fact that a substantial number of they were encouraged to vote as a result; this is true of survey respondents reported that they did not regular- only 31.5 percent for those who received another’s ize their registration circumstances, and thus many of card and only 28.7 percent for those who received no them would not have been able to vote. What is really card at all (Mean = 5.5, 4.6 and 3.6, respectively). at issue, then, is the magnitude of the impact on voter In short, these figures reveal that the flow of regis- turnout associated with less than optimal registration tration and voter information was regarded as partic- experiences. ularly inadequate by those who were most in need of It would appear that registration status indeed more and clearer guidance, and perhaps stimulation. exerted a strong influence on voter turnout. Table 3 No doubt, some of the responses could be the result provides an initial sense of this by setting out the voter of rationalizing by individuals who were predisposed participation rates for individuals in the different regis- From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black not to vote and therefore downplayed or did not tration circumstances. Putting aside the category of recall the information they had come across; still, those who took the initiative to get registered (90.7 there is no reason to assume that such a phenomenon percent of whom voted), the effects are conspicuously overwhelms all other interpretations. And, of course, monotonic. For respondents in the most favourable at a basic level it makes sense that individuals who registration situation — those who received a card with did not receive a card would, naturally, be those most correct information — 88.3 percent ended up voting. likely to indicate limited informational effects. Turnout fell, but only modestly, to 82.9 percent, for What of the counterclaim that these results speak those who received a card with some incorrect personal not so much to the principles of the new regime as to information. However, the decline is noticeably greater, the particulars of how the information campaign was down to 72.2 percent, for those who received a card conceived and put into place? No doubt, this is true to addressed to someone else. Finally, the lowest partici- some extent and future campaigns will likely be pation level and the biggest drop across categories designed, recalling Kingsley’s pledge, to reflect some occur in connection with those who received no card at progress on the learning curve. Still, it is not entirely all, with barely half, or 51.2 percent, indicating that inappropriate to view the inadequacies as being inher- they had cast a ballot. This represents a huge gap ent elements of the new regime. From the very begin- between the two extreme registration situations. ning, after all, the plan to develop and implement a Closer inspection of the data, involving a multivari- permanent-list system called for a huge effort to be ate orientation, strengthens the inference that registra- made during the election period to pick up the slack, tion status had a direct and substantial bearing on to capture the very large numbers expected who lower levels of voter turnout in 2000. A follow-up on would not be listed or would be listed incorrectly. In the bivariate perspective is necessary to ensure that the other words, the decision to develop a register auto- results reported above are not masking other effects,

29 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 the sameeffects. for confirmationpurposes,andrevealedessentially That said,parallellogisticanalyseswerecarriedout able inquestion,netoftheothervariablesincluded). variable foraunitchangeintheindependentvari- gauge theincrementordecrementindependent ables haveamoreconventionalinterpretation(they the coefficientsgeneratedforindependentvari- shown basedonOLS regressiontechniquesbecause dependent variable(voted/notvoted),resultsare tivariate techniquetoemployinlightofthenominal that logisticregressionisthemoreappropriatemul- registered oratall).Whileitcanbeargued were, tobeginwith,alsolesslikely tobeproperly groups, particularlytheyoungandpoor(who up thetypicalnonvotinghabitsofcertainsocial including thepossibilitythattheyaremerelypicking ables. Asthevariablesexaminedinfirsttwo the thirdaddingpotentiallyrelevantattitudinalvari- influence oftheregistrationexperiencemeasuresand ic variablesalone,thesecondassessingadditional a baselinebycapturingtheeffectsofdemograph- Table 4inthreeformsormodels,thefirstservingas results ofthisparsimoniousapproachareshownin retained forsubsequent,pareddown,treatment.The gin provedtobestatisticallysignificantandwere effects ofage,education,incomeandAboriginalori- ence category. card,” leavingthosecorrectlyregisteredastherefer- card,” “receivednocard”and“tookinitiativetoget sonal informationincorrect,”“receivedanother’s primary itemsmeasuringregistrationstatus:“per- incorporated as(0/1)dummyvariables,werethe foreign-born). Thesebackgroundcharacteristicswere Aboriginal originandnativity(whetherCanadian-or gender, province/regionofresidence,mothertongue, age, income,education,employment/studentstatus, some influenceonvoterturnout.Thelistincluded available inthesurveythatcouldpotentiallyexert assembled virtuallyallofthedemographicvariables eevdn ad5. (363) (75) (54) 51.2 (1,883) 90.7 (111) 72.2 (N) 88.3 Took initiativetogetcard 82.9 %voting Received nocard Received another’s card Personal information incorrect Correctly registered Registration status Voter Turnout byRegistrationStatus Table 3 Source: Seetable1. Only thedemographicvariablesrepresenting 106 The firstcutthroughthedata to -.23(from-.31), implying thatunfavourableregistra- that thecoefficient forthelowestagecategory decreases the effectsofcertainothervariables. Noteinparticular viduals aredistinguishedby their motivation. to getregistered,reinforcing theviewthattheseindi- a smallpositiveeffectforthosewhotooktheinitiative incorrect personalinformation(-.02).Finally, therewas dently noeffectforthosewhoreceivedcardswithonly points, alsoafairlysizeableimpact.Therewasevi- another persontranslatedintoaturnoutdeclineof13 turnout. Foritspart,receivingacardaddressedto tion amountstoasubstantial28-pointdeficitin who werecorrectlyregistered,thisregistrationcondi- nificant) regressioncoefficientof-.28;relativetothose card, whichisclearlyindicatedbythe(statisticallysig- largest sucheffectisassociatedwithnotreceivinga most importantoneshavenegativeconsequences.The and income(andAboriginalorigin),and,moreover, the ing onparticipationindependentlyofage,education Clearly, someregistrationexperiencesdohaveabear- sustained inthisphaseofthemultivariateanalysis. ence attributinganinhibitingeffecttoregistrationis does andnotvote.Moretothepoint,infer- make anadditionalcontributioninaccountingforwho incorporated forthesecondstep,signifyingthatthey when thevariablestappingregistrationstatusare (adjusted) tion inturnoutthesampleasindicatedby of variablesexplainsabout11 percent ofthevaria- status intoaccount.Altogether, thissmallcollection Canadians, evenaftertakingageandsocioeconomic participation ontheirpartrelativetoother coefficient of-.17forAboriginalpeopleindicatesless than theeffectassociatedwithage.Theregression privileged counterparts),thoughtheimpactisless less educatedvoteatlowerlevelsthantheirmore a bearingonturnout(thosewhoarelesswelloffand results confirmbothincomeandeducationashaving ing deficitasageincreases.Aswell,theseinitial set ofagevariables,whichrevealsanarrowingvot- levels. Alsoasexpectedistheoverallpatternfor adults (i.e.,newer“generations”)voteatmuchlower the widelydocumentedfactthatCanada’syoungest to those65andover. Byitself,thatresultreiterates age recordsaparticipationgapof31 pointscompared Thus, thecoefficient-.31 forthose18to24yearsof question relativetothelevelofomittedcategory. cients recordtheturnoutlevelofcategoryin regression runsareallbinary, theregressioncoeffi- Factoring inregistrationalsoleads toanadjustmentof The levelofexplanationrisessomewhat,to.169, R 2 30 statistic of.106. Table 4 Regression Models of Voter Turnout1

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Baseline: demographic Including registration Including attitudinal effects status variables

Age 18–24 -.31 (.030/.000) -.23 (.030/.000) -.10 (.027/.000) 25–34 -.23 (.029/.000) -.18 (.028/.000) -.06 (.025/.011) 35–64 -.09 (.025/.002) -.06 (.025/.017) -.01 (.022/.779)

Income < $20,000 -.07 (.026/.005) -.05 (.025/.035) -.01 (.022/.684) $20,000–39,999 -.06 (.021/.006) -.05 (.021/.009) -.01 (.018/.758) $40,000–59,999 .01 (.021/.535) .01 (.020/.674) .02 (.018/.185)

Education < High school -.11 (.029/.000) -.10 (.028/.000) -.03 (.025/.279) High school -.11 (.023/.000) -.11 (.022/.000) -.06 (.020/.003) Some college/university -.06 (.020/.005) -.06 (.019/.003) -.04 (.017/.014)

Aboriginal -.17 (.041/.000) -.14 (.039/.000) -.13 (.035/.000)

Registration status Personal information incorrect -.02 (.036/.534) -.03 (.032/.333) Received another’s card -.13 (.050/.012) -.07 (.044/.101) Received no card -.28 (.022/.000) -.18 (.020/.000) Took initiative to get card .08 (.045/.078) .04 (.040/.306)

Attitudes Election interest .07 (.008/.000) Knowledge: parties .04 (.010/.000) Knowledge: voting process .08 (.010/.000) Vote matters .01 (.002/.000) Important to vote .05 (.004/.000)

Constant 1.05 1.05 -.06

Adj. R .106 .169 .357 From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black N = 2,218

Notes 1 Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Figures in parentheses are standard errors and statistical significance levels. Source: See table 1. tion circumstances were partly responsible for the group’s politically engaged, including making the effort to lesser participation, though, of course, a substantial effect register and vote. Indeed, insofar as they are conceptu- associated with that age group persists. Interestingly, the alized as antecedent variables, then one might wonder consequences stemming from not receiving a card would whether the primary registration-vote relationships appear to be just as detrimental for turnout, if not more seen so far merely reflect underlying differences in so, as being between 18 and 24 years of age.107 The infer- political predisposition.109 ence, then, is not only that registration matters, but that it Not surprisingly, each of these variables has a statis- matters a great deal. tically significant impact on turnout and collectively This conclusion holds in the face of a third regres- they ratchet up the level of explanation by a noticeable sion model, also shown in Table 4, which adds some amount, more than doubling the R2 to .357. Moreover, available attitudinal variables that are typically con- most of the coefficients for the previous sets of vari- sidered in more comprehensive treatments of ables are attenuated with the incorporation of these turnout. These include a measure of election interest, attitudinal items, implying that they play a part in two knowledge items (one on party platforms and explaining how the demographic and registration vari- policies, the other on the voting process), one indic- ables have an effect. The biggest drops actually occur ator of citizen duty and one tapping vote efficacy.108 for age, with the coefficients for the youngest and next One rationale for including these items is to consider youngest categories weakening from -.23 to -.10 and them as tapping the propensity of individuals to be from -.18 to -.06, respectively, suggesting that lesser

31 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 important. relevance. Inshort, into account,registrationstatuscontinuestohave impact onturnoutitself;andevenwhenthisistaken the administrativesideofvoting,ithasasignificant tion isconsequential.Asameasureofunderstanding also helpfulinsupportingtheinferencethatregistra- pertaining toknowledgeofthevotingprocessare ably sizeableeffectonturnout.Moreover, theresults tion statuscontinuestoexhibitadirectandreason- on theregistration-voterelationship.Still,registra- cating thattheattitudinalvariablesdohaveabearing to -.07 forthosereceivingsomeoneelse’scard),indi- a cardisdiminished,from-.28to-.18(and-.13 its part,thecoefficientassociatedwithnotreceiving rate amongindividualsinthesetwoagegroups.For vening variablesthathelpinterpretthelowervoting levels ofinterest,knowledgeandthelike areinter- parison, olderandmoreaffluentindividualstended canvassing effortsofpartiesandcandidates.Bycom- were lesslikely tobestimulatedvotethroughthe be recordedproperlyattheircurrentaddress,they less likely tobeincludedon thepreliminarylistorto Additionally, andasnotedearlier, becausetheywere degree ofeffortwasneededinordertoparticipate. were disproportionatelyincategorieswhereagreater challenging registrationcircumstances;simply, they election wasthattheyfoundthemselvesinmore people andthepoorwerelesslikely tovoteinthat participation inequality. Onereasonwhyyounger mean thatthenegativeeffectsworked toincrease impact onvoterturnout,buttheyalsonecessarily manifestation inthe2000election,hadadebilitating that thenewpermanent-listsystem,initsfirstfull Not onlydotheseresultssubstantiatetheargument The ImpactonParticipation Inequality Turnout byRegistrationStatusandAgeIncome(percent) Table 5 1 Notes orcl eitrd7. 009. 638. 398. 91.3 63.8 89.7 76.9 65.1 83.9 (57.1) 42.4 84.2 81.2 38.6 $60,000+ 96.3 64.3 59,999 (63.6) 90.5 39,999 (75.0) 69.7 $20,000 80.0 87.5 65+ 49.5 75.3 64.0 35–64 32.0 25–34 (62.5) Correctly registered Personal information incorrect 18–24 Received another’s card Received nocard Registration status Source: Seetable1. Figures inparenthesesindicatean experience N of lessthan12. 678. 586. 157. 9795.8 89.7 74.3 61.5 66.7 95.8 85.7 66.7 with registrationis g Income Age 110 tions, thejointeffectofregistrationandeach ordered fromtheleasttomostamenablesitua- income, ontheother. Withtheregistrationcategories to registrationstatus,ontheonehand,andage 2000 election.Shownareturnoutpercentagesrelated additional inhibitingeffectdidindeedoccurinthe consequences tion situations,itmayhaverisked enhancingthe poorer individualsincertainconstrainingregistra- double effect:notonlydiditputyoungpeopleand the newregistrationprocessmaywellhavehada less affluentthanforotherpotentialvoters.Inshort, sent alargeropportunitycostfortheyoungand tion; putdifferently, notbeingcontactedmayrepre- of thepartiesallmorecriticalfortheirparticipa- be engagedpoliticallymakes themobilizationefforts undertake. Perhaps, aswell,thispredispositionnotto activity easieror, asinthepresentcase,harderto operation ofcontextualeffectsthatmake political members ofsociety, theyaremoresusceptibletothe Generally lessmotivatedandinformedthanother because theyarelesslikely tovotebeginwith. to beexpectedforyoungerandpoorerindividuals cases thaninothers.Suchan“interactioneffect”is but, rather, exerted astrongerinfluenceinsome was notuniformacrosssocioeconomiccategories that thenewregime’sinhibitingimpactonturnout situational aspects.Itispossible,indeedplausible, increase theinequalitiesfurther, evenbeyondthese cies inturnout. system servedtomagnifythetraditionaldiscrepan- ferences ininterestandinformation,theregistration across thesesocialcategories,inpartdrivenbydif- uations. Sinceparticipationdisparitiesalreadyexist to beinmoreamenableregistration(andcontact)sit- Table 5setsoutsomeevidencethatsuggeststhis The registrationprocessmayalsohaveworked to 1 esta 2,0-$40,000- $20,000- Less than 32 of thatplacement. other variables can be readily seen. In the case of age, the process of change, emphasize some key points and the turnout rate is extraordinarily low, at 32 percent, establish some of the significant linkages among the for those between 18 to 24 years of age who did not various contributing causes. At another level of receive a card, but soars to 96.3 percent for those 65 analysis, this paper set out and defended a perspective and over who were correctly registered. As a whole, that privileges the role of Elections Canada and the the essentially nonadditive pattern in the data is hard chief electoral officer as key and proactive elements to miss. The disparity in turnout between being cor- that deserve most of the credit for the advent of a rectly registered and not receiving a card amounts to register. The agency not only took advantage of 43.3 percent (75.3 vs. 32 percent) among the young- opportunities within an evolving context of electoral est group. The gap drops to 30.5 percent among those reform to seize the initiative in advocating on behalf between 25 and 34 and to 20.8 percent for those of a register, but it then greatly facilitated its adoption between 35 and 64. Interestingly, it actually goes by employing an effective selling strategy that back up to 32.7 percent among those 65 and over; it stressed the technical and economic feasibility of a is unclear whether this is a function of the limited permanent list that appealed to the interests of both number of cases in some of the cells or if it indicates the government and the main opposition parties. that older individuals were also susceptible to the One point that was emphasized in the account of impact of registration constraints. Still, the main the changeover was the relatively limited attention message from the table with respect to age, and to a that had been devoted to considering the possible lesser extent income, is that the pattern accords with consequences for participation, including participa- the interpretation put forward that the negative regis- tion disparities. The exploration of these areas formed tration effects were stronger for the young and the the basis of the second objective pursued here. What poor relative to other Canadians.111 gave added weight to this focus, of course, is the anx- iety that has been building about the decline in voter turnout in the country. By and large, the evidence Conclusion indicates that the new registration approach has contributed to this decline and has accentuated participa- his investigation into the change in Canada’s tion gaps across social groups. Evidence of these voter registration regime has been structured negative effects is strongest and most certain in the From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black T by two objectives. One entailed explaining 2000 election, where the National Register had its first why the traditional postwrit enumeration approach full test. Both qualitative and quantitative information was replaced by a permanent-list system. The signif- was marshalled to demonstrate that a large number of icance of the registration method as an integral Canadians ended up in less than ideal registration cir- component of the electoral process, and the need to cumstances, which, in turn, served to decrease their document and understand new developments in its likelihood of voting. The impact was particularly character and operation, provided a rationale for heightened for those who did not receive a voter pursuing this aim; the fact that the canvassing information card, a situation that disproportionately approach in particular had been abandoned added worked to constrain the voter turnout of younger and further justification. After all, enumeration had been poorer citizens. The results also suggest that the regis- long-established in the country, had come to define tration process increased participation inequality a uniquely Canadian institution and, moreover, beyond these situational aspects. ended up being replaced fairly rapidly even though These results potentially provide the basis for some its merits and the overall desirability of keeping the rethinking about the change in registration regimes, system had been officially reaffirmed as late as even for contemplating a return to enumeration in 1986. In broad terms, the task of assembling an order to recapture its advantages in facilitating partici- explanation involved identifying the forces and cir- pation. Such a reversal, however, is clearly not in the cumstances, political and otherwise, that pushed in cards. Even if concerns have been raised by some MPs the direction of change. Since most factors worked and in the media about registration in the 2000 elec- to support replacing enumeration, in retrospect the tion, such voices have not generated anywhere near outcome was predictable; the subject was nonethe- the momentum necessary to bring about the status quo less seen as worthy of study — in order to describe ante. More to the point, the same dominant forces and amenable circumstances that converged to bring about

33 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 out inthefirsthalfof2000. the InstituteforResearchonPublicPolicy andcarried part ofanationalpublicopinionsurveysponsoredby Two questionsonvoterregistrationwereposedas to atleastsomereservationsaboutanewregime. that awiderdebate,haditoccurred,mighthaveled permanent-list approach. public consciousnesshasalsoservedtosolidifythe confined toelitecirclesandhasnotatallpenetrated the extentthattherehasbeenadebate, cal clout.Thefactthatthedebateonregistration,to inhibiting effectsoftheregisterhaveleastpoliti- tion isthesimplefactthatthosemostaffectedby against thepossibilityofswitchingbacktoenumera- process. Theotherpoliticalrealitythatmitigates entrenched itasacentralelementintheelectoral and maintainingtheNationalRegisterhave rial andotherwise,thathavegoneintoproducing sage oftime,theinvestmentandcommitment,mate- merits ofthenewregime.Moreover, withthepas- factors, continuetocharacterizethediscourseon commitment totechnologicalchange,amongother attraction ofincumbencyadvantageandtheongoing about costsandfederal-provincialco-operation,the the registerinfirstinstancestillprevail.Claims this question been puttoasimilarsample justafter what thedistribution mighthavelooked like had suggests uncertaintyortentativeness. Onewonders respondents (23.9percent)offered noopinionalso anything else.Thefactthat nearlyaquarterofthe by thecost-savingsreference inthequestionthan have respondedunreflectively, beingmoreswayed indicating apreferenceforthenewsystemmight that muchofthisopinionwas“soft”;somepeople come untiltheelectionlaterthatyear, itislikely cal experiencewithapermanentlistwouldnot endorsement oftheregister. Consideringthatpracti- much canbereadintotheseresponsesasan to enumeration.Atthesametime,itisunclearhow the list,whileonly19.3percentsuggestedareturn percent) indicatedapreferenceforcontinuingwith one aswell;itasked: more pertinentbutitmaybeusefultonotethefirst Interestingly, thereissomeevidencesuggesting Slightly morethanoneintworespondents(56.7 not haveanopiniononthis? continue tousethegovernmentlist,ordoyou should gobacktousingthedoor-to-doorlist,or records likeincometaxforms.Doyouthinkwe list thatisupdatedregularlyusinggovernment election. Inordertosavemoney, wenowusea ing enumeratorsgodoor-to-doorbeforeevery In thepast,voterslistwaspreparedbyhav- 112 The secondquestionis be addeddirectly totheNationalRegister. Thisoption permission andconfirmtheir Canadiancitizenshipto forms inordertoallowindividuals whogivetheir the CanadaCustomsandRevenue Agencytoaltertax pointed outthatanagreement hadbeenreachedwith operation oftheregister. To beginwith,Kingsley recently taken orwascontemplatingtoimprovethe cuss thekindsofstepsthatElectionsCanadahad on May7,2002,providedhimanopportunitytodis- Standing CommitteeonProcedureandHouseAffairs nally weregivenlittleregard. attention toparticipation-linked mattersthatorigi- the agencycanperhapsnowaffordtopaymore Ironically enough,withtheregisterfirmlyinplace, includes maximizingcoverageandaccuracy. effectiveness oftheNationalRegister, andthat expected totake itsjobseriously andimprovethe ticipation. Moreimportantly, theagencycan be tions abouttheregister’sdebilitatingeffectsonpar- have spoken outandcontinue toexpressreserva- some kindofresponse,attheveryleast,toMPswho cles. Indeed,itcannotbe.Obviously, itmust provide ferent tothekindsofconcernsvoicedinsomecir- top. Atthesametime,agencyhasnotbeenindif- enthusiasm for“its”registerprobablyranksatthe registration regime,ElectionsCanada’sunwavering ty inelectoralparticipation. meet thedesireofmanyCanadiansforgreaterequali- gests thatElectionsCanadawillneedtodomore suffices tonotesimplythatthisresultatleastsug- make toomuchofthis10-point difference,perhapsit ple guidingtheregistrationprocess.Ratherthan to costs(29.7percent)shouldbethedefiningprinci- more thoughtthatinclusion(39.6percent)asopposed the principlethatshouldprevailbut,interestingly, Those whodidvoiceapreferenceweredividedabout ficulty choosingstrictlybetweenthetwoideals. though someoftheseindividualsmighthavehaddif- ion, suggestingalackofengagementwiththeissue, fact, 30.6percent,respondedthattheyhadnoopin- ticipation, shouldinformtheregistrationapproach: to probewhichoftwoprinciples,economicsorpar- rounds thesecondquestionaswell.Itwasdesigned the November2000election.Suchcuriositysur- The chiefelectoralofficer’sappearancebeforethe Among thefactorsinhibitingareturntoold Here, too,asubstantialnumberofrespondents,in not haveanopiniononthis? one, evenifitcostssignificantlymore,ordoyou ble orthateveryeffortismadetoincludeevery- voters listbepreparedasinexpensivelypossi- What doyouthinkismoreimportant,thatthe 34 was actually put in place in time for the spring 2002 using the telephone to register in a new constituency, tax period. While it applies to all eligible voters, the would be helpful to individuals with enough interest expectation is that it will register mainly young peo- and initiative to take advantage of them. It is unclear ple, especially new 18-year-olds. According to how much the easier option will serve those who lack Elections Canada, of the 275,000 people expected to that interest and initiative. And, as well, not all young be added to the voters lists through this ticking of people file an income tax return, which is also true of boxes, some 225,000 will be young people. Other many poorer Canadians. The effectiveness of identify- endeavours have entailed devising communications ing areas of undercoverage, especially in low-income strategies to make more effective contact with young locales, would be important but, of course, matters will people in order to encourage their registration. Plans depend on the thoroughness of the subsequent action were also afoot, Kingsley indicated, to research cov- taken. Presumably, the intention is to take proactive erage, and undercoverage, of key demographic measures along the lines of targeted revision, which, it groups such as low-income individuals, using the will be recalled, entails limited but focused enumera- newly available 2001 census data. tion-like actions carried out during the election period. Kingsley also indicated that a review of “address What is interesting to note in this regard is that the and geography components of the registry” had been chief electoral officer’s last recommendation quoted launched by returning officers “to ensure that street above would provide the basis for canvassing meas- and place names are spelled correctly in those few ures between election events as well as during revi- places where there are still problems and that electors sion. Presumably, it would even allow for the are in the correct electoral district and polling divi- possibility of a complete enumeration in off-election sion.”113 And testing was apparently continuing with years, which would bring the Canadian approach more regard to the tracking of address changes using in line with the Australian model, whereby biennial Canada Post information and in connection with on- door-to-door canvassing is used to update the voter line registration. register. Closer to home, British Columbia has manda- The chief electoral officer used his appearance tory enumeration during the third calendar year fol- before the Standing Committee to remind MPs of lowing an election, and the five other provinces that proposals (requiring legislative changes) that he had recently adopted their own registers officially allow for set out earlier, in the context of his recommenda- enumeration as well. In the absence of any possibility From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black tions following the 2000 general election.114 One of turning back the clock, the incorporation of enu- modification recommended in his report, Moderni- meration-like activities in order to balance the regis- zing the Electoral Process, was to make it easier for tration approach would appear to be the best way to voters who move from one constituency to another address the coverage inadequacies that seem almost to phone in their corrections, an option that is cur- inherent in the current system.115 Planned and unhur- rently limited to those who move within a con- ried periodic nationwide canvassing outside of election stituency (p. 19). (At the same time, enhanced periods, in conjunction with a substantially expanded networking among computers would allow officials use of targeted revision during the election period, to remove a listing at a person’s former address, thus would serve to add hundreds of thousands of reducing duplicate listings.) A more general recom- Canadians to the voters list. Such state-promoted ini- mendation would make it easier for individuals who tiatives would have the additional benefit of establish- take the initiative to register (outside of the election ing direct contact with eligible voters, constituting, to period) by eliminating the need for them to sign a quote Courtney and Smith again, “a personal reminder certificate of eligibility (pp. 13–15). Another propo- by the community of the positive value that it places sal, if implemented, would enhance the ability of the on electoral participation by its citizens.”116 chief electoral officer “to undertake initiatives to The supplementary use of enumeration measures verify, correct and update the Register and to author- would naturally add to the cost of registering voters. ize returning officers and others, to conduct such But this is the trade-off that must accompany any initiatives outside of the electoral events” (p. 16). kind of serious commitment to facilitating participa- No doubt, these measures have the potential to tion. For the longest time, ensuring unfettered access make some difference, though the nature and magni- to the vote was the dominant principle governing the tude of the effects are an open question at this junc- employment of the registration method in Canada. ture. Some new measures, such as the option of This commitment to access wound up receiving rela-

35 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 the participationofallcitizens. uphold thekey democraticprincipleoffacilitating registration regimesshouldprimarilyoperateto sion andthepolicychoicesreflectidealthat to revisitthematter, andtoensurethatthediscus- was warranted.Itnowappearsthatthetimeisright financial savingswereaccordedmoreweightthan to whatmightbelostintermsofparticipation,the Register. Withverylittlesystematicthoughtgiven culminated intheestablishmentofNational tively littleconsiderationduringtheprocessthat 36 Notes tate or inhibit voter turnout is well established in the liter- This paper benefited greatly from the enormous assistance ature; see, for instance, Robert W. Jackman, “Political provided by Elections Canada. Many important facets of Institutions and Voter Turnout in Industrial Democracies,” the analysis, including those that critically examine the American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (December agency’s role in the development of the National Register 1987), pp. 405-423; and Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. of Electors and the permanent list’s impact on turnout, Miller, “Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies During would not have been possible without Elections Canada’s the 1980s,” Comparative Political Studies 27, no. 4 active co-operation; this included the provision of in-house (January 1995), pp. 467-492. documents, statistical information and survey material as 4 Courtney and Smith, “Registering Voters,” for instance, well as discussions with key personnel. This paper also ben- report a coverage figure of 95.99 percent for the 1988 efited from the reflections and suggestions of André Blais, election; the estimate was generated by Elections Canada Paul Howe, Richard Johnston and an anonymous referee, for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party and from the research assistance of Chris Anderson. Financing (p. 451, footnote 4). They also reference cover- 1 For a brief discussion (with references) of the different age estimates of 97 percent and 95 percent for other objectives and principles associated with alternative periods (p. 421). registration regimes, see Jerome H. Black, “The 5 For a strong statement on how participation inequality National Register of Electors: Raising Questions About translates into unequal political representation and influ- the New Approach to Voter Registration in Canada,” ence, see Arend Lijphart, “Unequal Participation: Policy Matters 1, no. 10 (December 2000). Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma,” American Political 2 Histories of voter registration at the federal level in Science Review 91, no. 1 (March 1997), pp. 1-14. Canada are provided by Norman Ward, The Canadian 6 “No other country has a system where the lists of voters House of Commons, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of are prepared afresh, on a systematic basis, and so close Toronto Press, 1963), ch. 10; J. Patrick Boyer, Election to the time of voting, as does Canada” (Boyer, Election Law in Canada: The Law and Procedure of Federal, Law in Canada, p. 425). Provincial and Territorial Elections, Vol. 1 (Toronto: 7 Boyer, Election Law in Canada, p. 426. He does not Butterworths, 1987), pp. 416-424; and John C. explicitly indicate any source for the 98-percent figure; Courtney and David E. Smith, ”Registering Voters: it may originate in a study of 12 by-elections in 1978 Canada in a Comparative Context,” in Michael Cassidy that Courtney and Smith (“Registering Voters”) cite in (ed.), Democratic Rights and Electoral Reform in their own work, though they note that the figure (98.1 Canada (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), pp. 346-358. percent) refers to the percentage of the names on the Provincial and territorial variations are also considered voters’ list who were eligible (and thus is more a measure by Boyer, Election Law in Canada, pp. 424-425, 452- of accuracy than of coverage) (p. 364).

527; and Courtney and Smith, ”Registering Voters,” pp. 8 Norman Ward, The Canadian House of Commons: From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black 372-389. A fairly up-to-date listing of the legal provi- Representation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), sions governing voter registration at both levels of p. 204 (cited on p. 416 in Boyer, Election Law in Canada). government is set out in Elections Canada’s 9 Terrence H. Qualter, The Election Process in Canada Compendium of Election Administration in Canada: A (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 22. Comparative Overview (Ottawa: Elections Canada, 10 See, in particular, Kenneth R. Carty, “Citizens, Electors, 2002), part D. Voters and Parties in Canada or The Case of the Missing 3 One key generalization that can be made about registra- Voters List,” in Courtney, “Registering Voters” (pp. 41–48). tion systems is that their impact on accessibility for vot- 11 White Paper on Election Law Reform (Ottawa: Queen’s ers very much depends upon whether voters need to take Privy Council for Canada, 1986). For a mention of earlier the initiative in order to be registered. See, for instance, official pronouncements, see Black, “The National Valentine Herman and Françoise Mendel, Parliaments of Register of Electors,” pp. 8-9. the World: A Compendium (London: Macmillan, 1976), 12 White Paper on Election Law Reform, p. 39. p. 40; and William C. Kimberling, “A Rational Approach 13 An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act, the to Evaluating Alternative Voter Registration Systems and Parliament of Canada Act and the Referendum Act. Procedures,” in John C. Courtney (ed.), Registering 14 More exactly, the last enumeration was conducted Voters: Comparative Perspectives. Report of a Round between April 10 and 16 in all parts of Canada except Table on Voter Registration (Cambridge, MA: Center for Alberta and PEI, where agreements had been reached to International Affairs, Harvard University, 1991), pp. 3-11. use the lists produced from their most recent provincial Illustrative of this fact is the notoriously low registration elections (March 1997 and November 1996, respectively). numbers in most American states, where individuals 15 Bill C-63 also altered the hours of voting in federal elec- must assume the major responsibility for registering; see tions across the country, in order to ensure that the elec- G. Bingham Powell, Jr., “American Voter Turnout in tion results would be made public at approximately the Comparative Perspective,” American Political Science same time. Review 80, no. 1 (March 1986), pp. 17-43. The broader 16 Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the argument and demonstration of how the prevailing insti- 37th General Election (Ottawa: Chief Electoral Officer of tutional features and procedures can alternatively facili- Canada, 2001), p. 58.

37 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 23 Inasense,the1980election constitutedanearlier 22 Black,“TheNationalRegisterofElectors.” 21 Black,“TheNationalRegisterofElectors.” 20 ThoseprovinceswereAlberta,NewBrunswick, 19 Courtney, “ReformingRepresentationalBuilding 18 Onterminology, Courtneyrightlypointsoutthattheterm 17 30 RCERPF, 29 28 See,forinstance,Courtney andSmith,“Registering 27 Courtney, “ReformingRepresentationalBuildingBlocks.” 26 Courtney, “ReformingRepresentationalBuilding 25 Courtney, “ReformingRepresentationalBuilding 24 3 ElectionsCanada,“DiscussionPaper onaContinuous 33 Atthesametime,ofcourse,receivingtheselistsearlier 32 “Closedlist”approaches,suchastheoneemployedin 31 Financing Royal CommissiononElectoralReformandParty ipated crises”(“RegisteringVoters,” p.355). is capableofrespondingfairlytoinstancesunantic- included aheavyrelianceonrevision,“provedthatit argue thattheenumerationprocessattime,which idea ofapermanentlist.Infact,CourtneyandSmith different, withnothoughtatallbeinggiventothe another enumeration.Still,thecontextwasentirely to adecisionbyElectionsCanadanotcarryout precedent sinceitsproximity tothe1979electionled its ownright. federal level;thisisatopicthatmeritsinvestigationin were insomecaseslinked totheinitiativetaken atthe doubt, provincialdevelopments(notexplainedhere) Newfoundland andLabrador, OntarioandQuebec.No Blocks.” former termbecauseitsusageismorewidespread. Press, 2002),pp.115-131, esp.p.119. Thispaperusesthe Democracy inCanada (ed.), Beginning oftheTwenty-FirstCentury,” inWilliamCross Representational BuildingBlocks:Canadaatthe ly maintainedroll.”JohnC.Courtney, “Reforming (whatever itsform),whichiswhyheprefers“continuous- always changestobeincorporatedintotheregister “permanent voterslist”isinaccuratesincethereare Democracy: FinalReport reports.nsf/html/8910ce.html pp. 8–10, 20,athttp://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/ 1989 ReportoftheAuditorGeneralCanada (Ottawa: ChiefElectoralOfficerofCanada,1989). 1989 ReportoftheChiefElectoralOfficerCanada Voters,” p.358. Blocks,” p.125. Blocks.” on ElectoralReformandParty Financing,1991). 1994), p.ii. (Ottawa:ElectionsCanada, April Register ofElectors” sions andinaccuracies. would beoflesservalueifthey containedmanyomis- Process inCanada prepared. See,forexample,Qualter, ficult forindividualstoberegistereduntilanewlistis Britain, haveaclosingdatethattypicallymakes itdif- Political Parties, Representation,andElectoral Reforming ElectoralDemocracy [hereafter, RCERPF], , pp.18–22. (Don Mills,ON:OxfordUniversity (Ottawa: RoyalCommission Reforming Electoral The Election , Vol. 2,ch.4. , esp. 5 Thereportthattheprojectteamultimatelyproduced— 45 Theexecutive summary, forinstance,liststhe“com- 44 9 HouseofCommons 39 38 TheinterviewtookplaceonAugust22,2000,atElections 37 36 35 34 3 ElectionsCanada,“Discussion Paper 43 2 ElectionsCanada,“Discussion Paper 42 Itmightbearguedthatthisneworientationrepresents 41 See,forexample, 40 of Canadaonthe 36thGeneralElection referenced inthe March 1996,p.10). However, January1995isthedate submitted toJean-PierreKingsley, Elections Canada, late 1994(Ottawa:RegisterofElectors ProjectTeam, and Feasibility The RegisterofElectorsProject: AReportonResearch ing. ElectionsCanada,“DiscussionPaper” (p. i). fundamental buildingblockleadingtoelectronicvot- use ofregistersinothercountriesandtheregisterasa by Canadiansoftechnologytoprovideservices,the advantage ofreducedelectionperiods,theacceptance of savingsfromsharedlistsacrossjurisdictions,the lems withthewayenumerationworks,possibility register. Theyare(intheorderlisted): growingprob- pelling reasons”forconsideringtheestablishmentofa emphasis. 35…nce/10_96-04-30/haff10_blk101html, tunity.” Seep.1,athttp:/www.parl.gc.ca/committees Canada has“beenchampingatthebitforthisoppor- April 30,1996.HerespondedbynotingthatElections Standing CommitteeonProcedureandHouseAffairs Canada’s headquarters,andlastedabouttwohours. 35th GeneralElection Report oftheChiefElectoralOfficerCanadaon Electoral OfficerofCanada,1994),p.19. of theChiefElectoralOfficerCanada The 1992FederalReferendum:AChallengeMet of Canada,1994),p.25. 35th GeneralElection Report oftheChiefElectoralOfficerCanadaon — ContinuousRegisterofVoters. mittee wasformallyknownastheSteeringCommittee 22/088GO1E.html http://www.parl.gc.ca/english/hansard//088_96-10- 27, 2002,inOttawa. Electoral Officer’sRecommendations,”heldFebruary Disclosure andDemocracy:AssessingtheChief at anIRPP-sponsoredconference,“Transparency, offered thisinterpretationinhiscritiqueoftheregister technology —almostasanendinitself.GrahamWhite tion withinthenewenvironmentofcommitmentto Kingsley personally, reflectedapenchantforinnova- of apermanentlistforElectionsCanada,and general’s report.Onealsowondersiftheattractiveness occurred evenwithouttheinfluenceofauditor- increasing emphasisontechnologywouldhave preoccupied withoperationalimperativesandthatthe a naturalandinevitabledevelopmentinanagency Electoral OfficerofCanada,1997),p.73. of Canadaonthe36thGeneralElection 38 — indicatedtheestablishmentdate asin Report oftheChiefElectoralOfficer Report oftheChiefElectoralOfficer Debates , ch.13. (Ottawa: ChiefElectoralOfficer , October22,1996,p.2,at , ,” p.1,original ” p. 1;thecom- (Ottawa: Chief , p.11. (Ottawa: Chief : Report , 46 The Register of Electors Project, p. 10. went up to 83 percent when respondents were told (near 47 The savings estimate that Elections Canada would the end of the interview) that the list would save $30 mil- eventually use in public, as it made the “business case” lion for each election, and more should the list be shared. for changing registration regimes, was $30 million. To These numbers are likely inflated, in no small measure be clear, this is the amount that would be saved for because Elections Canada was identified as the sponsor. A each general election or referendum held subsequent slanting effect seems particularly likely given that to the recouping of costs associated with building and Canadians would have had little information about perma- maintaining the register. Of this amount, $8 million is nent lists and, in the absence of public debate, would have connected to the shortened election campaign. A criti- reflected little on registration systems. Indeed, it is telling cal analysis of the financial dimension of the that only 3 percent of respondents had no opinion on this changeover, a subject that clearly merits attention, is question, an unrealistically small percentage for such a beyond the scope of this study. low-information policy area. (In contrast, two questions on 48 The following portrayal is essentially concerned with voter registration in a 2000 survey sponsored by the elite-level politics and accords virtually no role to Institute for Research on Public Policy explicitly allowed mass opinion. Thus, it is in fundamental agreement for “don’t know” responses and found “no opinion” levels with Courtney’s characterization of “indifference on to be roughly 24 and 30 percent; these results are briefly the part of the public” (“Reforming Representational discussed in the conclusion to the current paper). Building Blocks,” p. 125). That said, during the legisla- 49 The Register of Electors Project, p. 11. tive process Elections Canada did state, on at least two 50 For instance, at one point Gray praised the legislation occasions, that its surveys indicated public support for during third reading by noting, “The register project also a register, first in front of the Standing Committee on supports the goal of improved federal-provincial co- Procedure and House Affairs, April 30, 1996 (see p. 3 operation and the reduction of overlap and duplication.” at http:/www.parl.gc.ca/committees35…nce/10_96-04- House of Commons Debates, November 26, 1996 – see p. 30/haff10_blk101html) and then during third reading 8 at http://www.parl.gc.ca/english/hansard//107_96-04- of the bill, November 26, 1996 (see p. 8 at http://www. 26/107eGO1E.html parl.gc.ca/english/hansard//107_96-04-26/ 51 In fact, in 1998 the Elections Canada project team that 107eGO1E.html). The Report of the Chief Electoral developed the register won the Award for Leadership in Officer of Canada on the 36th General Election also Service Innovation presented by the Association of makes reference to supportive public opinion surveys Professional Executives of the Public Service of Canada (p. 12). Even if the survey results were not central to and sponsored by Deloitte Consulting. A publication by the pitch for the register, it is still unclear to what the latter, Elections Canada: National Register of extent they could be construed as indicating strong Electors, states that the register “eliminates the need for

public support. This is the case with regard to the sum- time consuming and expensive door-to-door enumera- From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black maries of two national surveys that Elections Canada tion” (Ottawa: Deloitte Consulting, no date), p. 1. made available to the author. The first, carried out by 52 See also Courtney, “Reforming Representational Building Angus Reid in July 1996, was limited to opinions Blocks,” p. 125. about the sources that might be used to update a per- 53 There is some Canadian literature demonstrating that manent list, and thus contained no evaluative ques- incumbents do have an electoral advantage. See, for tions about alternative registration systems or the example, M. Krashinky and W. Milne, “The Effect of principles they should embody. Moreover, proregister Incumbency in the 1984 and 1985 Ontario Elections,” sentiment was no doubt accentuated, given the word- Canadian Journal of Political Science 19, no. 2 (June ing used in the survey’s preface: “In order to eliminate 1986), pp. 337-343, and by the same authors, “Some duplication and reduce costs, consideration is being Evidence on the Effects of Incumbency in the 1988 given to a process to replace federal enumeration.” The Canadian Federal Election,” in Leslie Seidle (ed.), Issues second survey, carried out the following month by in Party and Election Finance in Canada (Toronto: Environics, did not probe underlying principles, but Dundurn Press, 1991). See also David Docherty, Mr. did include general preference questions. One of the Smith Goes to Ottawa: Life in the House of Commons first questions was (unprefaced): (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997). Elections Canada, which is the nonpartisan agency 54 Several years later, following the 2000 election, one member responsible for organizing and conducting federal of the Standing Committee, Carolyn Parrish, was quite candid elections, has proposed that Canada develop a reg- in drawing the link: “You see, a short electoral period is really ister of electors, sometimes called a permanent great for the incumbents because it puts everybody else at a voters’ list, that would be updated regularly and disadvantage. We’ve been advertising for three and a half would replace door-to-door enumeration at each years, so we’re in good shape.” Standing Committee on election. Generally speaking, do you strongly Procedure and House Affairs, March 1, 2001, p. 13, at approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove http://www.parl.gc.ca/ InfoComDoc/37/1/HAFF/ or strongly disapprove of this idea? Meetings/Evidence/haffev06-e.htm Approval was overwhelming, with 76 percent signalling 55 The Reform Party’s Stephen Harper complained about the support, 38 percent strongly so. Furthermore, support rush to put the new system in place: “We are very con-

39 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 62 See 61 CourtneyandSmith,“RegisteringVoters.” 60 LiberalParty ofCanada, 59 Infact,someofthelengthiest discussionsinthecom- 58 TheReformParty wasalsoagainstthestaggered-hours 57 Opposition(Conservative)senatorsweremoreexplicitin 56 3 LiberalMPMarleneCaterall,amemberoftheStanding 63 e/42ev-e.htm http://www.parl.gc.ca/english/senate/com-e/lega- and ConstitutionalAffairs Proceedings oftheStandingSenateCommitteeonLegal Canada, 1993). Liberal PlanforCanada hours wasalsoatopicofdebate. ing ofthewrits.)Theimplementationstaggered is requiredbetweennotificationofavacancyandissu- ties; inthecaseofby-elections,aminimum11 days the informationmadeavailabletocandidatesorpar- and dateofbirthareincludedintheregisterbutnot tive campaign.(Inthecompromisesolution,gender would givetheminadequatetimetomountaneffec- that asnapcallfollowedbyshortelectionperiod campaign toby-elections—oppositionpartiesfeared and dateofbirth,onapplicationthe36-day ticularly whethertoincludeinformationongender mittee andintheHousecentredonprivacyissues,par- process. provision thathadbeenaddedtothebilllatein http://www.parl.gc.ca/english/senate/ deb-e/58db-e.html them.” Senate been fightingtheLiberalsforalongtime.We know cannot believethatittookthemsolong,butwehave the oppositioninotherplacetofigurethisout.I of fact,thebillwouldnotbehere.Ittookafewdaysfor polls, wewouldnotberushingthisthrough.Asamatter senators, thatiftheLiberalswereat30percentin campaign intheelection.Iguaranteeyou,honourable rush? Itisonlyforthepurposesofhavinga36-day partisan natureofthematter:“Whyistheresucha sition intheHousefornotimmediatelyrecognizing Tkachuk, evenwonderedaboutthenaïvetéofoppo- lish/senate/deb-e/56db-e.html. Hiscolleague,David December 3,1996,p.20,athttp://www.parl.gc.ca/eng- which thegovernmentenjoystoday.” Senate hurry ifIenjoyedtheleadinpublicopinionpolls reproach itforthat.IsupposethatI,too,wouldbeina Murray said,“Thegovernmentisinahurry. Idonot vocalizing theirviewsaboutanadvantage.Senator 30/haff27_blk101.html gc.ca/committees35…nce/27_96-10- Affairs as well.” don’t wanttoplayaguessinggameaboutthelength tion aboutthetimingofnextelection,andwe already playingaguessinggamehereintheopposi- cerned aboutthis.IcannotunderstateWe are of concernsabout theimpactofregisteron partici- singled outforherexceptional andconsistent voicing Committee onProcedureandHouse Affairs,canbe The RegisterofElectorsProject , October30,1996,p.8,athttp://www.parl. Standing CommitteeonProcedureandHouse Debates , December5,1996,p.12,at (Ottawa: LiberalParty of Creating Opportunity:The , December10, 1996,p.2,at , pp.11–12. Debates , 1Forinstance, AndréBlaisfoundthatturnoutdroppedby 71 SeethecommentsbyLouisMassicotte,asquotedin 70 69 Blais See,forexample,André Blais,ElisabethGidengil, 68 Jean-PierreKingsley, quotedin“LiberalsIgnoreWinds 67 See,forexample,CentreResearch andInformationon 66 SeeJeromeH.Black,“Reforming theContextofVoting 65 64 its extensiveness, itstimingacrossdemocracies andthe turnout hasbeendeclining,there issomedebateasto 2000), pp.1091–1122. While thereisaconsensusthat Comparative Political Studies in Advanced IndustrialDemocracies,1950to1997,” also MarkGrayandMikiCaul,“Declining Voter Turnout University ofPittsburghPress,2001), pp.33–36.See Merits andLimitsofRationalChoiceTheory tries heexamined.See 3 percent,onaverage,inthe1990samong91 coun- CRIC, “Voter Participation inCanada,”p.13. (October 2001). (Toronto: DundurnPress,2001), pp.293–317. Dornan (eds.), People’s Verdict,” inJonH.Pammett andChristopher Press, 2002),esp.ch.3;andJonH.Pammett, “The Canadian Election Victory: MakingSenseoftheVote inthe2000 Richard NadeauandNeilNevitte, Toronto Star of Change…WhileIt’sFamiliarShoresforChrétien,” 2001. Canadian DemocracyinCrisis?” Canada [CRIC],“Voter Participation inCanada:Is Millennium,” Richard Johnston,“CanadianElectionsatthe (Toronto: DundurnPress,1991), pp.61–176. Seealso in HermanBakvis(ed.), Process inCanada:LessonsFromOtherDemocracies,” 37th GeneralElection Report oftheChiefElectoralOfficerCanadaon 37/2/HAFF/Meetings/Evidence/HAFFEV07-E.HTM see pp.55–56,athttp://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/ ing aCommitteesessionheldonNovember, 21, 2002– fairness isevidentinherexchanges withKingsleydur- Caterall’s continuingpreoccupationwithinclusionand tees35…nce/27_96-10-30/haff27_blk101.html. 30, 1996,pp.13,15,athttp://www.parl.gc.ca/commit- Committee onProcedureandHouseAffairs,October “middle-class approachtopublicity.” Standing updating process,whichshesuggestedamountedtoa speak anotherlanguagewouldnotbepicked upinthe She alsoworriedthatthosewhoareilliterate,blindor who isputonthelistasaresultofenumeration.” ers’ list.Thismakes themdifferentfromsomebodyelse positive measuretoensureheorshegetsonthevot- version ofnegativeoptionbilling—thevotertotake a Elections Canada’sapproach“soundsalittlebitlike a pation andinequality. Atonepointshesaidthat Wheat fromtheChaff,” Opinions andBehaviourofCanadians:Separatingthe Brenda O’Neill,“GenerationalPatterns inthe Political et al. 40 , Anatomy ofaLiberalVictory , December30,2000. Choices The CanadianGeneralElectionof2000 (Peterborough, ON:Broadview , p.59. 6, no.6(September2000),p.13. To Vote orNottoVote: The Voter TurnoutinCanada Policy Matters 33, no.9(November CRIC Papers Anatomy ofaLiberal 2, no.5 , ch.3; , October (Pittsburgh: uniqueness of the Canadian case. See, for example, 84 Report of the Chief Electoral Officer on the 35th General Johnston, “Canadian Elections at the Millennium,” pp. Election, p. 96. 14–15; and the references in CRIC, “Voter Participation 85 Perhaps Elections Canada was able to take advantage of in Canada,” p. 6. the focus on Quebec and concentrate its efforts and 72 Were it not for the exceptional political developments resources there. in Quebec in 1993, particularly the rise of the Bloc 86 Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the Québécois as it mobilized the federal participation of 37th General Election, p. 62. nationalists, useful comparisons of turnout levels 87 Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the might have been made between the enumeration 37th General Election, p. 62. approach employed in the province and the (reused) 88 Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, list approach employed elsewhere. March 1, 2001, p. 21. 73 Blais et al., Anatomy of a Liberal Victory, p. 57. For 89 The report’s “main objectives were to evaluate the levels some earlier evidence of the effects of contacting on of satisfaction among electors and stakeholders and to turnout (and vote direction), see Jerome H. Black identify areas that could be improved.” Elections Canada “Revisiting the Effects of Canvassing on Voting Research Studies, “2000 General Election Post-event Behaviour,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 17 Overview” (no date), p. 1, at (1984), pp. 351–374. http://www.elections.ca/ loi/rec/overview_e.pdf 74 Candidates would, of course, still get the revised and 90 Representatives included national directors, agents and official voters lists, but their usefulness would be limit- members of Elections Canada’s Advisory Committee of ed by the fact that they are received late in the cam- Political Parties. paign, the former 10 days before election day and the 91 Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, March latter three days in advance. 1, 2001, p. 13, at http://www.parl.gc.ca/ InfoComDoc/ 75 And, of course, there are other explanatory variables 37/1/HAFF/Meetings/Evidence/haffev06-e.htm that would need to be taken into account. 92 Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, 76 Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the March 1, 2001, p. 10. 37th General Election, p. 90. 93 Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, 77 André Blais, Antoine Bilodeau and Christopher Kam, “The March 1, 2001, p. 16. Flow of the Vote Between the 1993 and 1997 Elections” 94 Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, (unpublished manuscript, no date). The slightly higher March 1, 2001, pp. 20–21. figure in this study may be due to the authors’ taking 95 Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, March emigration into account in their re-adjustments. 1, 2001, p. 13. Incidentally, Parrish’s negative allusion to 78 Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the the federal register in the Ontario context stems from the

37th General Election, p. 90. province’s decision to use it to generate the preliminary list From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black 79 Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the of voters for the June 1999 election (and as the first step in 37th General Election, p. 90. establishing its own permanent list). Critics complained that 80 For the 1988 election, the coverage figure of 95.99 the information obtained from the register was out of date percent cited by Courtney and Smith in “Registering and that the revision process was too limited and poorly Voters” is used (see footnote 4 in the current docu- organized. It was argued that all of this, in conjunction with ment). Estimates of the age-eligible population are a shortened election campaign (from 37 to 28 days), based on various Statistics Canada sources and the depressed turnout, especially among the less established IDEA Web site, at http://www.idea.int/voter_turnout/ and the poor. In turn, this had partisan implications, giving northamerica/canada.html. Citizenship estimates were the incumbent Conservatives the advantage. For comments provided by Elections Canada, which had originally and references on the Ontario case, see Black, “The National obtained them from Statistics Canada. Register of Electors,” pp. 16, 20–21 and footnote 45. 81 Citizenship estimates for election years, in particular, 96 Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, must be extrapolated from census data. March 1, 2001, p. 13. 82 Elections Canada has published its own coverage esti- 97 Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, mates for these five elections — 95.5, 95.2, 95.9, 95.1 and March 1, 2001, p. 3. 95.2 percent, respectively, indicating little temporal varia- 98 See, for instance, Andrew Duffy, “Youth Tuning Out: tion and no particular pattern. These figures are higher Election Boss,” The Gazette (Montreal), October 30, 2000. than those generated in this paper. According to one 99 The situation for new citizens appears to be better, agency official, this is because of the use of unadjusted though not perfect: Elections Canada reports that population counts, which are several percentage points between 85 to 90 percent of new Canadian citizens agree below the corrected figures that Statistics Canada empha- to be added to the Register. Standing Committee on sizes. Still, assuming that the undercounting is consistent, Procedure and House Affairs, May 7, 2002, p. 30, at it is unclear why the estimates provided by Elections http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/1/HAFF/Meetings/ Canada differ from the pattern shown in figure 1. Evidence/haffev63_e.htm 83 Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the 100 Elections Canada kindly provided the author with this 36th General Election. data set. According to its information, “Ipsos-Reid con-

41 IRPP Choices, Vol. 9, no. 7, August 2003 0 Ideally, party identificationshouldhavebeenincluded 108 Anexaminationofthebetas,standardizedregression 107 Thelogistic-basedresultsarenotshownbutavail- 106 Thesefiguresexclude thosewhotooktheinitiativeand 105 Atthesametime,studentswereamongthosemostlikely 104 103 Blais Forthosewhowerealreadyregistered,somecorrec- 102 Notshownare14“don’tknow”cases,representing.5 101 the positiveside,Blais in theanalysis,butitisnotavailablesurvey. On receiving acardand-.21 forthelowestagecategory. able assessments,revealsacoefficientof-.26fornot coefficients, whicharemoresuitableforacross-vari- pointed outbelowinfootnote111. where theOLS andlogisticresultsarenotsimilaris able fromtheauthoruponrequest.Anexception those whoreplied“don’tknow.” prised exceptionally motivatedyoungpeople. whole –reinforcingtheinferencethatcategorycom- — 9.6percent,comparedto3percentforthesampleasa to take theinitiativetoresolvetheirregistrationsituation People’s Verdict,” p.312). problems withbeingregisteredonthevoterslist”(“The lower educatedcitizens,“weremorelikely toreport reports thatyoungpeople,aswelllowerincomeand tion card(seep.60).Inyetanothersurvey, Pammett with respecttoageandnotreceivingavoterinforma- Anatomy ofaLiberalVictory istered onelectionday, tootherofficials). apply inpersontothereturningofficer(or, iftheyreg- Those whowerenotregisteredwouldhaveneededto ters ofthereturningofficerforcompletionforms. would haveentailedapersonalvisittotheheadquar- ularly thoseinvolvingamovetonewconstituency, changes withintheconstituency),whileothers,partic- tions couldhavebeenmadebytelephone(e.g.,address percent ofallrespondents. tion inaccordancewith1996Censusdata.” is “representativeofCanada’sageandgendercomposi- ages of18and34,theweightedversionisusedhere.It While thesurveyoversampledindividualsbetween 2000. Atotalof2,500Canadiansweresurveyed.” took placebetweenNovember28andDecember11, ducted arandomtelephonesurveyofCanadiansthat and aboutthevoting process(“knowingwhere and knowledgeable” abouttheparties andtheirplatforms knowledgeable, notveryknowledgeable ornotatall regarded themselvesas“veryknowledgeable, somewhat Specifically, respondentswereasked whether they tively determined,whichwould havebeenpreferable. knowledge itemsaresubjectively basedandnotobjec- closely, not verycloselyornotatallclosely.” Thetwo followed the2000election:“veryclosely, somewhat on electioninterest—thatis,howcloselyindividuals Instead ofaquestiononpoliticalinterest,thereisone only anapproximation ofthekindroutinelyemployed. Even so,themeasuresonhandmightseemtoprovide tant ascorrelates(see interest andinformationaboutpoliticsaremoreimpor- et al ., intheirsurveyofthe2000election, Anatomy ofaLiberalVictory et al. demonstrate thatpolitical , reportasimilarpattern ). 1 Amultivariateversionofthisanalysis(whichincluded 111 Theimpactofthenewregistrationsystemonparticipa- 110 Atthesametime,itmightbearguedthatregistration 109 coefficients for the incomevariablesasmaineffects income bracket ($20,000–$39,999); interestingly, the of -.08( nonrecipients withanincomeof lessthan$20,000and ables withacoefficientof-.13 ( of 18and24.Thetwootherswere fortheincomevari- nonvoting byeightpointsforthose betweentheages .012), meaning thatnotreceivingacardaccentuated age, -.07 ( coefficient of-.08( observed. Onewasforthelowestagegroup,witha tion effects,allintheexpecteddirection,were (or “maineffect”)variables.Threesignificantinterac- impact ofthese“productterms”alongsidetheoriginal education seriesofvariablesandthenexaminingthe ing thetwolowestcategoriesforage,incomeand this registrationexperiencebyeachofthoserepresent- were createdbymultiplyingthedummyvariablefor receiving avoterinformationcard,interactionterms on themostconsequentialregistrationsituation,not port forthepresenceofinteractioneffects.Focusing model shownintable4)providessomeadditionalsup- all ofthevariablesindicatedinthirdregression constituency). accuracy estimatesbroken downbyjurisdictionand analysis inthecaseofregister(i.e.,coverageand for settingupthedependentvariablessuchan Elections Canadadoesmaintaintherawdatanecessary meration vis-à-visgeographicaldisparitiesincoverage. a comparativeassessmentoftheperformanceenu- here) requireacarefulanalysisthatshouldalsoinclude provinces andterritories.Theseaspects(notexplored and updatingarrangementsestablishedwiththe also beevident,dueinparttodifferencesthesharing centre) andruralridings.Interprovincialdisparitiesmay evident indifferencesbetweenurban(especiallycity of populationmobility;presumably, thiswouldbemost from oneconstituencytoanother, inpartasafunction racy achievedbytheregistermightbeexpectedtovary may alsoberelevant.Thedegreeofcoverageandaccu- in age,incomeandthelike. Ageographicaldimension tion inequalityisnotnecessarilylimitedtodifferences during thecampaign. become moreinterestedasaresultofpoliticalcontact attitudes, includingthepossibilitythatindividualswill experiences themselveshaveabearingonpolitical agree format(appropriatelyrecoded). doesn’t matter”)arebasedona0–10-scale, agree-dis- in elections”)andtheitemonefficacy(“Myvotereally item oncitizenduty(“Itisimportantthatpeoplevote have notproducedmisleadingresults.Finally, boththe gests theirrelevanceforpresentpurposesandthatthey turnout andtheircorrelationswithothervariables)sug- Still, thewaythesevariablesbehaved(theirimpacton place ifyoucouldnotgetouttovoteonelectionday”). when tovoteandknowingwhatotheroptionswerein p p 42 = .087)forthoseinthesecond lowest = .012) and notreceivingacard,-.09( p = .096)alongsidemaineffectsfor p = .012) forthose p = were no longer statistically significant. Note that it is only in connection with this testing of interaction effects that the logistic analysis (see footnote 106) diverged from the OLS results: none of the coefficients for these six interaction terms achieved statistical significance, suggesting, as one reviewer put it, differences linked to their functional forms. 112 The survey sampled 1,278 adult Canadians during the period February 16 to April 2, 2000; the main results, though not the ones referenced here, are presented in Paul Howe and David Northrup, “Strengthening Canadian Democracy: The Views of Canadians,” Policy Matters 1, no. 5 (July 2000). 113 Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, Evidence, May 7, 2002, p. 13, at http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/1/HAFF/Meeting s/Evidence/haffev63-e.htm#Int-227341 114 Modernizing the Electoral Process: Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada Following the 37th General Election (Ottawa: Elections Canada, 2001). 115 This was also the view of several speakers, most notably Graham White and John Courtney, at the IRPP-sponsored conference, “Transparency, Disclosure and Democracy.” 116 Courtney and Smith, “Registering Voters,” p. 433. Vote- encouraging activities may be especially important to ensure that enhanced coverage does not simply lead to the listing of unlikely voters who are relatively uninter- ested and uninformed. Indeed, without measures to promote participation itself, increased registration coverage may well lead to a lower official turnout rate. From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors by Jerome H. Black

43 choices Strengthening Canadian Democracy Renforcer la démocratie canadienne

Studies Published / Études publiées

“Canada’s Democratic Malaise: Are the Media to “Changing the Canadian Electoral System” Blame?” Louis Massicotte Richard Nadeau and Thierry Giasson Choices, February 2001 Choices, February 2003 “The National Register of Electors: Raising Questions “Parliament’s Performance in the Budget Process: About the New Approach to Voter Registration in A Case Study” Canada” Peter Dobell Jerome H. Black Policy Matters, May 2002 Policy Matters, December 2000

“Generational Patterns in the Political Opinions and “Reforming Parliamentary Practice: The Views of MPs” Behaviour of Canadians: Separating the Wheat from the Peter Dobell Chaff” Policy Matters, December 2000 Brenda O’Neill Policy Matters, October 2001 “What Could Canadians Expect from a Minority Government” “Parliamentary Secretaries: The Consequences of Peter Dobell Constant Rotation” Policy Matters, November 2000 Peter Dobell Policy Matters, September 2001 “Strengthening Canadian Democracy: The Views of Canadians” “Civic Literacy in Comparative Context: Why Canadians Paul Howe and David Northrup Should Be Concerned” Policy Matters, July 2000 Henry Milner Policy Matters, July 2001 “Changing Dynamics in Election Campaign Finance: Critical Issues in Canada and the United States” “Introducing Direct Democracy in Canada” Jennifer Smith and Herman Bakvis Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin Policy Matters, July 2000 Choices, June 2001 “Canadian Elections at the Millennium” “Electoral Democracy in the Provinces” (addendum) Richard Johnston Donald E. Blake Choices, September 2000 Choices, April 2001

“Electoral Democracy in the Provinces” Donald E. Blake Choices, March 2001 From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors: An Account and an Evaluation Résumé by Jerome H. Black

’adoption, en 1996, du projet de loi C-63 a modifié de façon substantielle le mode d’inscription des L électeurs au Canada en créant un Registre national des électeurs : au lieu d’effectuer un recensement après la publication du décret de convocation des électeurs, on Dans un deuxième temps, l’auteur examine le lien utiliserait maintenant une liste permanente. Dans cette entre le nouveau système d’inscription et le taux de par- étude, le professeur Jerome Black expose en détail les ticipation au scrutin. Dans l’ensemble, son analyse forces et les circonstances qui ont mené à l’adoption de indique que l’établissement d’une liste permanente a con- cette réforme et évalue en quoi le nouveau système a tribué à diminuer la participation générale en plus d’ac- influencé le taux de participation au scrutin. centuer les écarts de participation entre les différents Dans un premier temps, l’auteur définit et examine les groupes sociaux. Ces effets négatifs sont particulièrement facteurs qui ont donné lieu au changement. Parmi ces manifestes lors de l’élection de 2000, le premier test véri- facteurs, l’auteur relève une préoccupation accrue à l’en- table du Registre national. En fait, les données qualita- droit des problèmes posés par le recensement, le désir tives et quantitatives convergent pour démontrer qu’un d’écourter les campagnes électorales, la perspective de grand nombre de Canadiens ont éprouvé des problèmes réaliser des économies, la possibilité d’éliminer le avec le processus d’inscription ce qui, en retour, a dimi- chevauchement des activités d’inscription entre différents nué la probabilité qu’ils participent au scrutin. L’impact a paliers de gouvernement, le précédent établi à l’élection été ressenti de façon plus importante du côté de ceux qui de 1993 alors que l’on avait utilisé les listes électorales n’ont pas reçu la carte personnalisée d’information de compilées pour le référendum de 1992, et l’effet des l’électeur, ce qui a réduit de façon disproportionnée le recommandations de la Commission Lortie et du vérifica- taux de participation des citoyens plus jeunes et moins teur général. Par ailleurs, l’analyse révèle le rôle clé fortunés. Les résultats suggèrent également que le d’Élections Canada, notamment celui du directeur général processus d’inscription a augmenté l’asymétrie de partici- des élections, dans l’évolution de ce dossier. Le professeur pation au-delà de ces aspects situationnels. Black soutient qu’Élections Canada a exploité des Dans sa conclusion, le professeur Black présente cer- circonstances favorables à la réforme électorale pour pré- taines des mesures qui seront mises en œuvre pour coniser l’établissement d’une liste permanente, en mettant accroître l’efficacité du Registre et recommande la tenue l’accent sur sa faisabilité technique et économique ainsi périodique d’un recensement à l’échelle du pays. que sur les avantages qui en découleraient. Qui plus est, Élections Canada a profité du fait qu’il était, à cette période, dans l’intérêt du gouvernement et dans celui des principaux partis d’opposition d’accueillir favorablement ce changement.

45 From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors: Summary An Account and an Evaluation by Jerome H. Black

n 1996, Bill C-63 — providing for the establishment of a National Register of Electors — was passed, thus I changing Canada’s method of voter registration from postwrit enumeration to a permanent-list At the time, however, limited attention was given to approach. Jerome Black’s analysis of the change in such the impact of the proposed shift on electoral participa- an integral component of the electoral process has two tion. This leads to the second objective of this paper, an objectives: to provide a detailed account of the forces examination of the link between the new registration and circumstances that led to the transformation of the regime and voter turnout. By and large, the analysis indi- regime, and to determine whether the new regime has cates that the permanent-list approach has contributed to had an effect on voter turnout. diminishing voter turnout and has accentuated existing The first objective involves identifying and discussing participation gaps across social groups. These negative the factors that led to the changeover. These included effects are particularly evident in the 2000 election, the increasing concern over problems with enumeration, the first full test of the National Register. Indeed, qualitative desire for shorter election campaigns, the promise of and quantitative data converge to demonstrate that a cost savings, the possibility of eliminating duplicate reg- large number of Canadians ended up in less than ideal istration efforts between different levels of government, registration circumstances, which, in turn, decreased the the precedent set in the 1993 election with the reuse of likelihood of their voting. The impact was greater for the voters lists compiled for the 1992 referendum and those who did not receive a voter information card, the impact of the Lortie Commission and the auditor which thus disproportionately constrained the electoral general’s recommendations. At the same time, the analy- participation of younger and poorer citizens. The results sis underscores Elections Canada’s role, including that of also suggest that the registration process increased partic- the chief electoral officer, as a key and proactive element ipation inequality beyond these situational aspects. in the process of change. Professor Black argues that the In his conclusion, Professor Black notes some steps agency capitalized on circumstances favourable to elec- that are being planned to increase the register’s effective- toral reform to advocate a permanent list, stressing its ness, but adds the recommendation that nation-wide enu- technical and economic feasibility as well as the benefits meration be conducted periodically. it could confer, at a time when it was in both the government’s and the main opposition parties’ interests to embrace change.