PERCEPTIONS OF WAR
By
CHRISTINE OLDFIELD
B.A., University of Alberta, 2003
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In
HUMAN SECURITY AND PEACEBUILDING
We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard.
______Susan Brown Academic Supervisor
______Alejandro Palacios Academic Lead, MA Human Security and Peacebuilding
______
Dr. Gregory Cran, Director School of Conflict and Peace Management
ROYAL ROADS UNIVERSITY November 2008
© Christine Oldfield, 2008
ISBN:978-0-494-50421-5
Perceptions of War 2
Abstract
The objective of this research is to examine governmental messaging during times of international conflict, specifically Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, as it relates to public perception. This paper will test the effectiveness of government messaging during a specific time of high-risk international deployment. The first section is a quantitative analysis from the various forms of public feedback. In order to measure the public’s responses to messaging, comparisons of the responses before and after the government’s release of a message have been evaluated. The second section comprises of a qualitative analysis to determine the correlation, if any, between the results from the public feedback and the government messaging. It is hoped that the findings of this research will contribute to an understanding of how messaging can be used to influence the public’s views and confidence, particularly if is related to a high risk and possibly unpopular activity.
Perceptions of War 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE: PROJECT OVERVIEW …………………………………………04 Purpose of Project...... 04 Overview………………………………………………………………………08 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………………...09 CHAPTER THREE: PROCESSES AND METHODOLOGIES……………………13 Research Methods………………………………………………………………13 Design Model……………………………………………………………………14 CHAPTER FOUR: THREE PHASES………………………………………………...15 Phase One: Operation Enduring Freedom……………………………………………15 Global Security and the War on Terror………………………………………..15 Canada’s Initial Response………………………………………………………16 Canada’s Out of Iraq……………………………………………………………22 Phase Two: International Security Assistance Force…………………………………28 Canada’s Lead in ISAF…………………………………………………………29 Canada to Kandahar: Paul Martin’s Decision…………………………………31 The 3D Approach………………………………………………………………..36 Phase Three: Kandahar………………………………………………………………...39 Task Force Afghanistan…………………………………………………………43 Move to a Conservative Government……………………………………………46 Stephen Harper’s Campaign for Support……………………………………….48 Debating Afghanistan…………………………………………………………...50 Mission Clarification……………………………………………………………54 Humanitarian Values……………………………………………………………55 Language Critics………………………..……………………………………….58 Proposed Extension……………………………………………………………...60 Message Clarification…………………………………………………………....62
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CHAPTER FIVE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES…………….66 Initial Reactions………………………………………………………………….66
Mid-Term Reaction……………………………………………………………...68
Current Reactions………………………………………………………………..69
Trend analysis of public perceptions……………………………………………70
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS ……………………………………………………72
REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………….76
APPENDICES…………………………………………………………………………..81
TIMELINE………………………………………………………………………………90 Perceptions of War 5
CHAPTER ONE
Project Overview
Purpose of Project
The purpose of this study is to contribute to an understanding of whether the messaging used during times of international conflict has the capability to influence the public’s views and confidence, particularly if is related to high risk and possibly unpopular activities. Canada made the decision on October 7, 2001 to contribute to the international forces in the campaign against terrorism. Jean Chretien made the announcement to deploy the Canadian Forces (CF) as an alliance member in support of the United States, laying the foundation for Canada’s principal theatre of operations in the wider US-led "global war on terror." Canada’s commitment would begin rather modestly in the relatively safe area of Kabul, but would be severely tested with the CF transfer to
Kandahar. Kandahar is a country that appears caught up in a complex stability operation that combines elements of counter insurgency and reconstruction in what Sean Maloney has described as a "post-Apocalyptical environment in the wake of ... a twenty-five year
'civil war'."
The move to Kandahar transformed Canada’s involvement into a long term commitment to a post-conflict reconstruction combined with counterinsurgency warfare.
Not only is the Afghanistan mission Canada’s largest troop deployment since the Korean
War, Afghanistan is Canada’s single largest recipient of aid funding, and the initiative has also spanned the terms of three Prime Ministers. Government justification for the mission varied depending on the party in power and events on the ground, however, all three Perceptions of War 6 governments stressed that Canada’s mission would secure national interests and project humanitarian values; however, the first priority for all governments in addressing this crisis has been to protect the safety and security of Canadians.
Over the course of the mission, Canada’s involvement gradually moved towards reconstruction efforts, both by providing military assistance towards stabilization and securing the country and by increasing the development funding distributed. Canada was one of 51 countries committed to the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, a comprehensive international program of aid to Afghanistan’s security, governance and development. For the years 2002-2011, Canada has authorized $1.2 billion in international assistance to
Afghanistan. That country now receives more Canadian aid than any other, about 3% of all Canadian aid during the period under review. Furthermore, events in Afghanistan, and the expected outcomes, was seen to directly affect Canada’s security, its reputation in the world, and its future ability to engage the international community in achieving objectives of peace, security and shared prosperity. Informed and fair-minded Canadians may have differed on the policy choices before them, but, none doubted that the future of
Afghanistan mattered to Canada for either security or humanitarian motives.
Various justifications for Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan have been offered to the public. “Afghanistan has been depicted as an exercise in national security, the fulfillment of multilateral obligations, a humanitarian mission, and an attempt to rebuild a failed and fragile country.” After the 2008 external panel review of Canada’s mission in
Afghanistan, Deputy Prime Minister John Manley affirmed:
“While public support for Canadian troops is strong, Canadians have been uncertain about Canada’s evolving mission in Afghanistan. To put things bluntly, Governments from the start of Canada’s Afghan involvement have Perceptions of War 7
failed to communicate with Canadians with balance and candour about the reasons for Canadian involvement, or about the risks, difficulties and expected results of that involvement. Almost the only Government accounts that Canadians have received have come from the Department of National Defence. Important issues of Canadian diplomacy and aid in Afghanistan have scarcely been acknowledged and seldom asserted in public by ministers or officials responsible.”
There was a small, although important, percentage of Canadians who oppose participation in any form of conflict because of a philosophical objection to the use of armed force however, amongst this small percentage are those who would also support participation in traditional peacekeeping. There are those who support traditional or more
"robust" peacekeeping, but only if authorized directly by the United Nations. There are those who support non-UN peacekeeping coalitions or regional bodies (including
NATO), if the objective is to address a significant humanitarian disaster, such as in
Kosovo or Sudan. These are all significant moral, legal and practical factors affecting how Canadians have approached the legitimacy of conflict participation and resolution.1
The task of managing the public’s perception and maintaining public support for government initiatives in Afghanistan has been complicated by the apparent lack of clarity about Canada’s motives, coupled with the variety of motivations and tolerance levels of Canadians for involvement in high risk, military operations undoubtedly complicated.
The Canadian military deployment to Afghanistan developed into three phases: from October 2001 to August 2003 as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), from
September 2003 to August 2005 as part of the International Security Assistance Force
1 Collins, Robin, POLLING THE AFGHANISTAN INTERVENTION QUESTION IN AID OF POLICY-MAKING. July 16,2007 Retrieved at http://www.igloo.org/shortpieces/pollingt . Perceptions of War 8
(ISAF) mission in Kabul, and from August 2005 to present in Kandahar province in an integrated approach known as the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar.
Each of these quite different stages will be assessed within the broader context of three respective overarching missions: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar.
The objective of this research is to examine governmental messaging during times of international conflict, specifically Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, as it relates to public perception. Furthermore, the study contributes to the field of Human Security and
Peacebuilding through the fundamental relationship between information, communication and conflict considering that Human Security and Peacebuilding are inherently
“information and communications intensive” activities.2 Despite this challenge, influencing public opinion remains one of the most important aspects of Canada’s modern warfare and could be a key aspect in winning (or losing) the perception war.
The hypothesis for this paper is that intended messaging is effective in maintaining public support in risky, overseas deployments as long as it appeals to the core values of the public and is actively engaged in open dialogue with civil society. The converse is also true, that intended messaging is less effective when it focuses on objectives that are not in line with the core values of the public and when dialogue and information sharing is not vigorous. This research paper will test the effectiveness of government messaging during a specific time of high-risk international deployment. It is
2 Campbell , Anthony (Tony). HSP 510 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND MARKETING. RESIDENCY 2: NOV 6 – 24, 2006 Retrieved at: http://learn.royalroads.ca/mahsp/courses/2006/Res%202/HSP%20510%20Course%20Outline%202006.doc Perceptions of War 9 hoped that the findings of this research will contribute to an understanding of how messaging can be used to influence the public’s views and confidence, particularly if is related to a high risk and possibly unpopular activity. Three research questions will guide this study. Is there apparent intent behind the messages issued by the Canadian government? What is the relationship between the public’s perceptions and the messages, or lack thereof, they receive? Has the intended messaging used during foreign operations, in managing public perceptions, been effective?
The potential gaps in information identified during the course of this project may arise from the validity and bias from the public polls, media, and news sources collected.
The researcher has made assumptions about what data to combine and the problems that can occur from the original data collected by others. Every attempt has been made to reduce any bias by gathering information from a variety of sources including sources presenting information that opposes the hypothesis.
Overview
Chapter Two presents a synopsis of the relevant literature on Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, from government statements, and the media and assessing the impact of this messaging on public perceptions. Chapter Three discusses the research design and methods used in the analysis of this project. Chapter Four reviews the Perceptions of War 10
Canadian military deployment to Afghanistan in three phases: Operation Enduring
Freedom, ISAF, and Kandahar. Chapter Five discusses the comparative analysis of public perception of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan and the government messaging. Chapter
Six provides the conclusion with an overall summary of the research findings and concludes with a discussion of the effectiveness and value of messaging to maintain public confidence as demonstrated in Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.
CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review
Based on a scan of literature for the research topic, there were several sources that discussed the public’s changing perceptions of Canada’s role in Afghanistan. In general,
Canadians have expressed concern that the mission is “seriously at odds with what many feel is the traditional role of our forces - i.e. peacekeeping.”3
Authors of The Unexpected War, Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, argued that the decisions that drew Canada deeper into a combat role in Afghanistan, owed more to the fact that Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin thought they needed to appease the Americans after refusing to join the war in Iraq and were not a party to the ballistic-missile defence program than with any broad analysis of the situation on the ground.4 Two Solitudes, One
War: Public Opinion, National Unity and Canada’s War in Afghanistan, John Kirton
3 Markland, Dave. WHITE GUYS WITH GUNS: CANADA’S MILITARY in AFGHANISTAN. October 15, 2007. ZNet | Afghanistan. Retrieved at: http://auto_sol.tao.ca/node/2791 4 Sevunts, L. CANADA’S SLIDE into a WAR. CanWest News Service. November 10, 2007. Retrieved at: http://www.canada.com/saskatoonstarphoenix/news/weekend_extra/story.html?id=54fa480b-5530-4b84-9a9a- d09a5a39c8db
Perceptions of War 11 explored the question why Canada, with its linguistically and regionally based strains of national unity, fights its longest war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2007? Amidst the external, societal and governmental determinants, this study focused on the puzzle of why a country, with no national interests directly at stake, fought in Afghanistan, despite the opposition of its public. This study hypothesizes that to go to war in Afghanistan, Canada needed to mobilize consent from a public that was substantially tolerant but had a bottom line, and do so as the initial rally turned to reluctance and the conscription constraint arose.
In The Canadian Way of War: Experience and Principles Dr. Gimblett explored the notion of a Canadian way of war, drawing meaning from the operations of Canadian
Forces (CF) in the Gulf War, concluding that it was in keeping with tradition. However, a decade later, many of the same principles are seen in the Canadian mission in
Afghanistan, but have strayed in significant ways. Dr. Gimblett indicated that there may be reasons to consider this mission detrimental to Canada and the CF, it was in part because of the politicians, bureaucrats, military planners and scholars failed to learn from history. To conclude, Dr. Gimblett proposed that a clearer understanding of the Canadian
Way of War would allow the Government to capitalize on their strengths, to conserve resources and to exact the military and political advantage for the Government to leverage its diplomatic capital.
Canadians carry a heavy burden in Afghanistan, with the toll in Canadian lives and the financial cost has been significant. The course of the conflict has caused
Canadians to question whether Canada’s involvement has been effective, and whether it will succeed. In the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan Perceptions of War 12 presented the Panel’s best answers to those hard questions. The recommendations were meant to establish a Canadian strategy to integrate military, diplomatic and development actions in a more coherent, effective engagement in Afghanistan. The Panel recommended that Canadian activities be contingent on timely actions by other governments, and on measurable progress in Afghanistan itself. Canada’s engagement in
Afghanistan earned Canada a considerable amount of influence among other countries cooperating in Afghanistan. Helping to build a more stable, better-governed Afghanistan with a growing economy is an achievable objective but success is not a certainty.
In Peacekeeping Then, Now, and Always, Dr. Dorn proposed that there exists a
“gap” in Canadian public opinion regarding peacekeeping, arguing that peacekeeping has evolved, however, there was no similar evolution in public opinion. He argued that there was no “conceptual gap” on the public’s part regarding peacekeeping and the Afghanistan missions. The concept of peacekeeping is too deeply ingrained in the public consciousness and too valuable to dismiss. The public needs to know when a UN mandate, consent for deployment, impartiality and the minimum use of force, all time- honoured standards, are exceeded to allow for proper consideration.
Support for International Involvement in Canadian Public Opinion after the Cold
War discusses the underlying issues concerning the role of public opinion in the cutback from Canada’s tradition of internationalism in the 1990s. Overall they found public opinions to be supportive of internationalism principally towards UN and NATO operations. The authors, Dr. Martin and Dr. Fortmann, suggested that when the public considered the risks of involvement, they viewed their internationalist preferences and their political leaders warily. However, when political leaders show assurance in policy Perceptions of War 13 objectives, and explain their choices, public opinion rarely poses an obstacle to foreign policy initiatives. When the public is treated as a rightful partner in the elaboration and conduct of foreign policy there is no reason to assume that public opinion will pose an obstacle.
Bring the Troops Home Now: Why a Military Mission Will Not Bring Peace to
Afghanistan the author, S. Lacombe, argued that looking for clarity about Canada’s mission in Afghanistan can be confusing. The justifications range from ousting the
Taliban, to racist attacks against an entire people, to providing reconstruction, security and women’s rights. The Government of Canada developed new phrases designed to engender support for the mission. One now hears of the need to support “failed and failing states” (the principle new work of the OECD/DAC) and of the “responsibility to protect.”5
In the paper, Afghanistan and the Polls: Change the Question -Change the
Numbers by Brian MacDonald, Senior Defence Analyst, an analysis of the word choices used during polling demonstrated changes in public opinion depended on the word choices or messages. When the question changed to include the statement of purpose of the mission, the level of support increased. When pollsters changed the question to emphasize combat,6 the support level rose. When they changed the question to emphasize
Canada’s diplomatic work in Afghanistan the average support level soared. Change the question to emphasize the development mission, to support for Canada's development and
5 Enunciated by Former Foreign Minister Axworthy, who launched the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative in 1997 along with CIDA Minister Diane Marleau, which, in turn gave rise to the peace building units in both CIDA and DFAIT and the Human Security Network of Ministers 6 Would you say that you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose Canada's military operations in Afghanistan such as helping to secure the environment for the civilian population through activities that include combat ? Perceptions of War 14 reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, such as helping to train teachers, and clear landmines and the average support level climbs further.
Apart from the works cited here, there are many sources discussing Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. Resources examining the government communication and messaging and the influence it has on the publics perceptions are lacking. This research paper hopes to contribute this analysis to the field of peacebuilding.
CHAPTER THREE
Processes and Methodologies
Research Methods
This research project has been divided into two sections. The first section is a quantitative analysis from the various forms of public feedback. In order to measure the public’s responses to messaging, comparisons of the responses before and after the government’s release of a message have been evaluated. This was done by assessing public opinion responses throughout three phases: October 2001 to August 2003 as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), from September 2003 to August 2005 as part of the ISAF mission in Kabul, and from August 2005 to present in Kandahar province. The second section comprises of a qualitative analysis to determine the correlation, if any, between the results from the public feedback and the government messaging.
This methodology is appropriate for this type of research as it reveals if there is a relationship between the messaging used during international conflict and the public’s perceptions; moreover it was able to track changes throughout Canada’s involvement in Perceptions of War 15
Afghanistan. 7 New insights/perspectives were gained when dealing with the role of managing public perceptions and messaging during times of international conflict. The approach provides a means through which a researcher can judge the effectiveness of intended messaging in managing public perceptions during international conflict.
Design Model
The research design chosen for this project is the triangulation design model. “The triangulation design model is frequently used in research because of the need to reconcile numeric (quantitative) and text (qualitative) data. The intent of this model is to gather both quantitative and qualitative data at the same time, and to integrate the two forms of data to best understand a research problem.”8 As demonstrated in the further chapters, this project follows the typical triangulation model design as it gives “equal priority to quantitative and qualitative data and analysis, found in separate sections of the report, involving a concurrent collection of data, and integrating both quantitative and qualitative data in the results, interpretation, or conclusion phase.”9
CHAPTER FOUR
Three Phases
PHASE ONE: Operation Enduring Freedom October 2001- August 2003
7 Leedy, Paul D. and Jeanne Ellis Ormond. PRACTICAL RESEARCH, PLANNING AND DESIGN. New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc, 2005. Pages 134-135. 8 Tashakkori A, Teddlie C. MIXED METHODOLOGY: COMBINING QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications. 1998. 9 Creswell, John W, PH.D; Fetters, Michael D. MD, MPH, MA; Ivankova, Nataliya V. Ph D. DESIGNING A MIXED METHODS STUDY IN PRIMARY CARE. Posted 02/23/2004 Retrieved at: http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/467553_4
Perceptions of War 16
Global Security and the War on Terror
As a response to the United States (US) terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson announced that the North Atlantic Council was invoking Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington10, which states that any attack on a NATO nation launched from outside that nation shall be interpreted as an attack on all the NATO nations11. An intervention that was authorized by the United Nations after September
2001's terrorist attacks on the US and the nature of the response was given as an open- ended mandate. The United Nations sanctioned the invasion of Afghanistan as a just war and approved the United States operations in September 2001.
It was impossible, at the time, to accurately predict how the Canadian government would fare.12 Like their counterparts in Washington and London, Canada’s political leaders sought to rally public support for the war on Afghanistan by invoking the
September 11th atrocity and the anti-democratic character of the Taliban regime. In an
Ipsos poll September 21, 2001, the majority (73%) of Canadians agreed that Canada should join the United States and also declare war on international terrorism, reflecting that the general public agreed with the Government’s appeal to the threats to global security. This conditional support fell to just over half (54%) if Canada’s involvement in
10Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” see www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. 11 NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm 12 Collins, Robin,. POLLING THE AFGHANISTAN INTERVENTION QUESTION IN AID OF POLICY MAKING. July 16,2007. Retrieved at http://www.igloo.org/shortpieces/pollingt Perceptions of War 17
Afghanistan exposed Canadian civilians to terrorist attacks;13 indicating that a significant proportion of Canadians were still not comfortable with this non-traditional, war-making model for the deployment of their troops if their own national security was also at risk.
Canada’s Initial Response
On October 11, 2001, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien publicly announced that he was in close communication with President George Bush who ‘had been a symbol to the world of calm, courage, resolve and wisdom.’ Prime Minister Chrétien assured President
Bush that Canada would “stand shoulder to shoulder with him and the American people and that Canada would be part of an unprecedented coalition of nations that came together to fight the threat of terrorism.” 14 He claimed, at this time, that all Canadians understand what was being asked of the men and women of our Armed Forces and their families and as always, they were ready to serve and they would do Canada proud. In a poll taken by Leger Marketing from October 16th-21st, 2001, two weeks after Canada sent ships from Halifax to the theatre of war, 84% of Canadians supported (50.5% fully,
33.3% partly) Ottawa’s decisions to offer military support to the U.S. in the campaign against terrorism. Although he would not be able to provide the Canadian public with operational information, he intended to offer regular updates on the government’s objectives and efforts.
13 While the majority (73%) of Canadians agree that Canada should join the United States and also declare war on international terrorism it is conditional support falls to just over half (54%) if war exposes Canadian civilians to attack by terrorists. 55% of Canadians believe there are international terrorists within Canada just waiting to attack Canadian civilians — Only 39% are confident that the Government of Canada and its security services are capable of preventing terrorist attacks in Canada. September 21, 2001.Category Societal Issues, Foreign Affairs & Policy. Location Canada. Retrieved at: http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=1307&email=friend 14 CHRETIEN: CDN TROOPS ‘WILL DO CANADA PROUD’. Oct. 7, 2001. Retrieved at: http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1025062429054_20471629 Perceptions of War 18
The members of Jean Chrétien’s government struggled with what role Canada should play in Afghanistan. “Ottawa struggled for months to devise an Afghanistan policy that would satisfy the core political objectives of the government and, at the same time, be acceptable to the Canadian public.” 15 Art Eggleton, the Defence Minster at the time, summed up the governments thoughts as comparing the mission in Afghanistan to that in “Eritrea and Ethiopia where we went in on the first wave, we helped to establish the stabilization, the basis for ongoing peace support operations that would come after… but then turned it over to somebody else.”16 This was an obvious appeal to Canadians’ general inclination to be ‘good international citizens’ - their core values, and to placate their concerns about a protracted involvement in a high-risk operation which was outside their traditional comfort zone as peacekeepers not directly involve in war-making.
Not all members of Jean Chrétien’s government shared the outlook on the
Afghanistan mission. Then Finance Minister Paul Martin adjusted the budget proposal to include an increased military budget after September 11th.17 However a number of ministers “believed that the Canadian Forces were not particularly important or relevant to Canada’s response to 9-11.”18 They anticipated Canada’s involvement to consist of short term engagements. It was Foreign Affairs Minister Manley who pushed his colleagues in government to meet the United States security needs. He believed that
“prosperity depended on an open border and that, in turn, depended on Canada convincing Washington that it was serious about the war on terror.” In the book, The
15 Stein, Janice Gross and Lang, Eugene. THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR. Viking Canada, 2007.Pg 2 16 Thompson, Allan. SIX-MONTH RELIEF MISSION EYED: THE UNEXPECTED WAR. Art Eggleton. Toronto Sun. November 16,2001 p. A6 17 Stein, Janice Gross and Lang, Eugene. THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR. Viking Canada, 2007 pg 7 18 Stein, Janice Gross and Lang, Eugene. THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR. Viking Canada, 2007. pg 7 Perceptions of War 19
Unexpected War, Stein and Lang quote Manley recalling how he berated others in Jean
Chrétien's cabinet, “I was saying, `Excuse me ... have you been reading the papers lately?' while some other ministers were saying, `Let's not be sucked in by the Americans,' I thought these people were nuts and I still do.”19 Manley admitted that Canada’s participation was about retaining, if not strengthening, Canada’s geo-political influence.
Despite Foreign Affairs Minister Manley’s position, Canada’s mission was portrayed and expected to be a short term, limited addition to the United States involvement in
Afghanistan.
The Canadian Government intended to contribute to the initial stages of stabilization in Afghanistan; however they soon recognized that their commitment would involve a much greater commitment. From this time on, Canada’s role in Afghanistan escalated. Initially, Canada stood by their commitments and the operations they provided would be short-term stabilization in certain areas allowing for the entry of humanitarian assistance. These operations were thought to leave the doors open in the future for a longer-term international peacekeeping force that would help provide the tools to reestablish stability and civil society.20
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stated that the coalition of nations participating in this campaign intended to provide a safe and secure environment for the Afghan people as soon as possible. There was a slight increase in public support for the mission at this time
19 Stein, Janice Gross and Lang, Eugene. THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR. Viking Canada, 2007 20 News Release. CANADA PREPARING to DEPLOY ADDITIONAL FORCES on OPERATION APOLLO. November 14, 2001. Retrieved at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=288
Perceptions of War 20 as many Canadians viewed Canada’s involvement as a short term commitment to appease the United States and avoid entering into the mission in Iraq.
On November 19, 2001, the Minister of National Defence, Art Eggleton updated the House of Commons on the CF contribution to Afghanistan and continued to propose that an additional 1,000 ground troops be sent to work with coalition partners as a stabilization force in Afghanistan to help create conditions to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance. On November 22, 2001, in the Globe and Mail Article ‘Canada is not Pulling its Weight’, former DFAIT Minister, John Manley, commented that Canada had been trading on the reputation it earned in the two world wars…suggesting that
Canada must radically change course if it was to remain a global player. If you want to play a role in the world, there’s a cost to doing that.21By November 21–25, 2001, the
MacLean’s annual year-end poll found that a strong majority of Canadians (79%) supported Canada’s involvement in the action in Afghanistan. This level of support was
5% lower than the pervious Ledger poll from 3 weeks earlier. It was at this time that the
Canadian public began to realize that Canada’s contribution to the U.S.’s ‘war on terrorism’ was not the ‘early in-early out’ assistance as originally presented to them.
On December 20, 2001, the UN Security Council agreed to sanction the creation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, an enforcement mandate. The ISAF is completely outside the United Nations, part of the
“coalition of the willing” created by the U.S. government. This “stabilization mission”
21 Parsons, Lee. CANADA JOINS WAR ON AFGHANISTAN. October 16 2001. Retrieved at: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/oct2001/can-o16.shtml
Perceptions of War 21 was to support the UN humanitarian assistance program. Canada was to be part of the
ISAF, under British command.22
The Canadian public first glimpsed what information would or would not be revealed to them at the discretion of the Government. Art Eggleton admitted publicly that
Canada had an elite Special Forces unit, known as Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2), unbeknownst to the Canadian public, in a combat mission which included the controversial mandate of taking prisoners and prisoner exchange with the U.S.23 Defence
Minister Art Eggleton said that members of Canada's JTF2 commando unit had taken prisoners, however, up to this point the Liberal government maintained Canadian troops had not captured any Taliban or al-Qaeda fighters. When PM Jean Chrétien was questioned about how Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan would treat any captured prisoners, he dismissed the question by saying ‘You are asking me a purely hypothetical question at this time’. The question was anything but hypothetical when the photo of
Canadian troops, with their captives, appeared on the front page of the Globe & Mail and underneath the picture it said: U.S. soldiers. However, the soldiers in the picture had forest green uniforms on which Defence Minister Eggleton claimed he didn't find out the soldiers in the photo were Canadian until later yet held this information from cabinet. In question period Tory Leader Joe Clark accused Defence Minister Eggleton of misleading the public and Parliament by sitting on vital information.24 This would not be the only
22 Warnock, John W. PEACE AND DEMOCRACY FOR AFGHANISTAN. October 1st, 2008. Webmaster in War, Afghanistan. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. Retrieved at: http://paulsgraham.ca/index.php/2008/10/01/peace-and-democracy-for- afghanistan/ 23 Stein, Janice Gross and Lang, Eugene. THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR. Viking Canada, 2007.pg 11 24 EGGLETON CONFIRMS JTF2 HAS TAKEN PRISONERS IN AFGHANISTAN. Last Updated: Wednesday, January 30, 2002. Retrieved at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2002/01/29/jtf2020129.html Perceptions of War 22 instance that the government and their opposition would utilize information for their own means rather then being transparent to the public over events of the mission in
Afghanistan. Canada continued to be involved in prisoner transfers in Afghanistan and this issue remained a controversial topic throughout the House of Commons and across media headlines. As information was released concerning the different roles of Canadian
Forces, outside the expected traditional peacekeeping role, Canadian’s became increasingly uneasy.
In early 2002, it was announced came that Canada was sending approximately 800 soldiers to Afghanistan as part of Operation APOLLO, the Canadian contribution to the
United States-led coalition campaign against terrorism- Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF). It is important to note that Canada did not participate in the initial invasion, but joined OEF following the fall of the Taliban. The Canadian component of Operation
Apollo was deployed to help root out the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters remaining in
Afghanistan following the collapse of the government. In January 2002, an Ipsos-Reid poll showed two thirds (66%) of Canadians supported the combat role for Canadian troops in Afghanistan versus one-third (33%) who favoured the traditional peacekeeping role.25 Despite the initial support for a combat role, the public became increasingly aware of the new, non-peacekeeping role being assigned to Canadian troops and the higher risks involved, was not a short term combat mission resulted in the level of public support to drop 18% from their initial 84% in favour of the deployment.
25 Wright John . CATEGORY SOCIETAL ISSUES, FOREIGN AFFAIRS & POLICY. January 13, 2002. Location Canada.
Retrieved at: http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=1397 Perceptions of War 23
In March 2002, Operation Harpoon was deployed alongside the US Operation
Anaconda in what would be the largest battle against Al- Qaeda and the Taliban, signalling that Canada’s role was clearly a combat, war-fighting role in Afghanistan.
Canadians suffered combat deaths in Afghanistan, most famously in the “friendly fire” incident of April 17, 2002 when four Canadian soldiers were killed by a bomb dropped by an American F-16 pilot. The Canadian public’s negative reaction was strong and, in some cases, bore an anti-American flavour. While just under half (46%) of Canadians agreed that in war, these types of tragic incidents happen, a majority (52%) disagreed.26
Canada’s out of Iraq
In May 2002, the next round of troops returned home and soon after another request for more troops was put forth. The return of the troops was consistent with the stated initial intention, and early messages of the Liberal Government under Jean
Chretien, to deploy Canadian troops for a short term assignment. The request was taken seriously under the proviso that if Canada returned to Afghanistan with more troops it would not be able to contribute any troops to the war in Iraq. When Canadians were asked if they also felt “Canadian support for the U.S. and its war on terrorism was enough”:
62% of all Canadians responded yes. It became apparent that from the early support for deployment of 84% in 2001, public opinion began to resist as Canadian casualties began in early 2002, however, since the initial commitment the Liberal Government of John
Chretien continued to state it would stand by that commitment and engagement in
Afghanistan helping create the conditions for longer-term reconstruction.The importance
26 Wright, John. “FRIENDLY FIRE” IN AFGHANISTAN. While Just Under Half (46%) of Canadians Agree that In War, These Types of Tragic Incidents Happen, a Majority (52%) Disagree. April 21, 2002. Category Societal Issues, Foreign Affairs & Policy Location Canada. Retrieved at: http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=1486 Perceptions of War 24 of this mission gave Canada the means to show “leadership” by committing troops, resources, development and political effort to help the Afghan government secure a better future for its people.
NATO and the rest of the international community worked very closely in
Afghanistan towards common objectives. For five years they worked under the Bonn
Agreement27 towards generating new constitution, a new government and ultimately the holding of elections in Afghanistan. Now in the post-Bonn era, there was a shared vision for the future of Afghanistan called the Afghanistan Compact28. The United Nations had a central and impartial role in co-ordinating the work of the international community under the compact and being their primary mandate; to work with NATO to achieve the objectives in the fields of security, governance and development embodied in the
Compact.29 NATO invoked the obligation of all members of its alliance, for the first time in history, to assist a member state that came under attack. “In a rare moment of global convergence, international law and international institutions sanctioned military actions.”30 The renewed call to arms justified by the broadly-accepted NATO mandate brought the international and Canadian communities back to foundations of a common alliance for mutual protection that had come out of World War II, and provided a platform for new messaging that would appeal to large number of people.
27 See http://www.bonnagreement.org/eng/html/welcome.html for full information on Bonn Agreement 28 The Afghanistan Compact. BUILDING on SUCESS. London January 31- February 1, 2006. 29 UN in Afghanistan. Interview with the Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, Ambassador Chris Alexander. Retrieved at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061102a.htm 30 Stein, Janice Gross and Lang, Eugene. THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR. Viking Canada, 2007.Pg 285 Perceptions of War 25
The calls made for ISAF’s expansion in 2002 had been actively supported by the
UN, some international NGOs and academics, as further reconstruction depended on sufficient levels of security being established. As DND background material made clear, the ISAF and Operation Athena were not UN operations. ISAF, although authorized by a
UN resolution in December 2001, was led by the United Kingdom, Turkey, and a shared
German-Dutch Corps before it came under NATO command in August 2002 and became the first official NATO operation outside Europe. This was a significant shift in operations in Afghanistan from a country-led operation to a UN presence. NATO took over command and control of ISAF in August 2003 under a United Nations mandate.
Initially restricted to providing security in and around Kabul, NATO's mission would cover approximately 50% of the country's territory by 2005.
Prime Minister Jean Chretien stated that Canada would not join a military campaign against Iraq without the support of the United Nations Security Council.
"We believe that Iraq must fully abide by the resolution of the United Nations Security
Council. We have always made clear that Canada would require the approval of the
Security Council if we were to participate in a military campaign. Over the last few weeks, the Security Council has been unable to agree on a new resolution authorizing military action. "If there is a war, of course Canada will be there to help the victims of a war," Chretien said staying within the traditional support role Canadians have been accustomed to. He added that the CF currently participating in the war against terrorism would continue and would likely be involved in a peacekeeping or reconstruction role after any military action against Iraq. Opposition Leader Stephen Harper said the Perceptions of War 26 government's decision to send troops to Afghanistan while failing to support the U.S. position on Iraq was sending mixed signals to Canada's allies.31
Opposition MPs seized on the U.S. ambassador's recent rebuke over Iraq in the
Commons, saying Ottawa deserted its traditional allies and put Canada's U.S.-dependent economy at risk. "Why does the Prime Minister fail to grasp that his stand is deeply injurious to our national interests?" Canadian Alliance Leader Stephen Harper asked in
Question Period. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien said Canada remained a partner with the
U.S. in the fight against terrorism, despite the disagreement over Iraq. “The people of the
United States and the government know very well that when they asked us to fight terrorism that we were the first ones to go there and send troops to Afghanistan," Mr.
Chrétien said, reiterating that Canada has the right to disagree with its friends.32
On September 12, 2003, The Honourable John McCallum, Minister of National
Defence stated, as part of his speech at the Calgary Chamber of Commerce:
“Indeed, the Canadian Government would contribute more in combined military, diplomatic and development assistance to Afghanistan in the next year than to any other country in the world. If a country of Canada's size was to make a difference on the world stage, we must focus and specialize. Fewer countries of operation and fewer military capabilities are better than more countries and capabilities if we are to find the critical mass necessary to make a difference.”33
31 CTV.ca News Staff. CHRETIEN SAYS CANADA WILL NOT JOIN WAR ON IRAQ. Updated Tue. Mar. 18 2003. 32 Gray, Jeff. OPPOSITION SEIZES on U.S. REBUKE. Globe and Mail. March 26, 2003. Retrieved at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20030326.ucellf0326/BNStory/National/ 33 Minister's Speeches Archive. WHY AFGHANISTAN? WHY CANADA? Calgary (Alberta). September 12, 2003. Speaking notes for The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence at the Calgary Chamber of Commerce http://www.dnd.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1189 Perceptions of War 27
Minister of National Defence John McCallum also announced to the Canadian troops that he was deeply impressed by their contribution but was vividly conscious of the dangers they faced. By establishing peace and security, Canada is also providing the groundwork for humanitarian assistance and development programs that will help
Afghanistan rebuild its economic, political and judicial institutions. With the installation of the interim administration, Afghanistan rejoined the world community, and Canada had an opportunity to put its new policies into action. An administration committed to peaceful coexistence, national reconstruction and democratic elections clearly deserved support, and Canada re-established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in January
2002. In short, the mission spoke to both Canadians' altruism, desire to help others its desire to put down terrorism and enhance domestic security.34 Canadian messages were clearly moving toward more altruistic appeals and self-interest more embedded in
Canadian core values and became less associated with being a good neighbour to the
USA and counterterrorism.
Still under the Liberal Government of Jean Chrétien, Canada made its second major military deployment to Afghanistan as part of the 35-nation NATO/ISAF force based in Kabul under the command of Lt. General Richard Hillier. Canada also had a large human rights team in UNAMA in Afghanistan and development experts, governance experts, and UNAMA co-ordinated both development humanitarian affairs through the establishment of a master plan to which donors were asked to subscribe.
UNAMA acted as the conduit of information, both in the field and at central level
34 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. CANADA in AFGHANISTAN, BUILDING BRIDGES IN AFGHANISTAN.
Autumn 2003.Retrieved at: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/issue20/01-title-en.asp Perceptions of War 28 between the Provincial Reconstruction Team and the international assistance community, and continued to monitor the process and advise the military. UNAMA recommended that the PRT’s concentrate on promoting regional security through it presence and exercise of Coalition military influence; assisting in security sector reform efforts, for example with the Afghanistan National Army, the police and the Disarmament,
Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) process; and rebuilding government administrative buildings and national infrastructure projects. There were many vulnerable groups in Afghanistan that depended on food, basic medical services, and so forth. There was also a broader UN community in Afghanistan with dozens of agencies, funds and programs, all of whom had been represented in Afghanistan or many of which had been present for decades. UNAMA brought the work of the military and development together in an integrated mission.35
Throughout the course of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, a strong message of establishing Afghanistan’s security and maintaining Canada’s national security was stressed; however, very little was mentioned to the Canadian public about the full nature of Canada’s involvement in the U.S.’s campaign against terrorism. At this time, public support was relatively strong, partially due to the Canadian public’s willingness to support actions against terrorism but also due to the messages that Canada’s mission would only be short term with a lesser degree of involvement in combat. Canadian’s were quit willing at this time to back Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan with the mind set
35 Interview with the Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, Ambassador Chris Alexander. November 2, 2006. Retrieved at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061102a.htm
Perceptions of War 29 of securing Canada’s own national security in addition to fulfilling the active role of bringing peace and stability to other countries.
PHASE TWO: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - September 2003- August 2005
ISAF
Initially ISAF’s most important goal was to support the Afghan interim government, established in Kabul on December 22, 2001, in maintaining security. At first
ISAF operated only in Kabul and its immediate vicinity. OEF was not a massive force and was not structured for occupation missions in the wake of the rout of the Taliban.
OEF’s mission was to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The collapse of the Taliban regime occurred earlier then expected ahead of schedule and the follow-on OEF stabilization plan was still under development. With an accelerated timetable and a futile (non-NATO)
ISAF, the greatest concern was that the Afghan militias would start to fight among themselves, with a subsequent return to the destructive civil war of 1993 to 1996, the period that led to the rise of the Taliban in the first place. The Afghan central government was developing and subject to coercion by the warlords and their militias, since, at this time, there was no national army. Something had to be deployed in the early days of the conflict by OEF to allow time for the establishment of a stronger central government. The
United Nations (UN) would not operate under US military control and the US would not allow Special Forces to operate under UN command, eventually resulting in the emergence of ISAF. Perceptions of War 30
Initially ISAF was UN sanctioned, but not yet NATO controlled. ISAF was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference36, in December 2001, after the ousting of the Taliban regime. Afghan opposition leaders attending the conference began the process of reconstructing their country by setting up a new government structure, namely the
Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA). The concept of an UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established ATA was also launched to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan. These agreements paved the way for the creation of a three-way partnership between the ATA, the UNAMA37 and ISAF.
ISAF was not a UN force, but was a coalition of the willing deployed under the authority of the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council gave the ISAF in
Afghanistan the most robust mandate possible, authorizing it to take any measures necessary to carry out its tasks. This means that it could use force if necessary to maintain security in Kabul. A detailed Military Technical Agreement (Appendix 1) between the
ISAF Commander and the ATA provided additional guidance for ISAF operations.38
Canada’s Lead in ISAF
John McCallum, Minister of National Defence at the time, addressed the Calgary
Chamber of commerce, reinforced Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan was
“fundamental to Canada's security; even though it was not immediately evident, when our soldiers patrolled the streets of Kabul, they were also helping keep the streets of Canada
36 Lakhdar Brahimi. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE of the SECRETARY-GENERAL for AFGHANISTAN. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions. Retrieved at: http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm 37 For further information on the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan see http://www.unama-afg.org/ 38 For additional information on ISAF see: http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/history/index.html Perceptions of War 31 safe.” Additionally, Canada participated in the ISAF mission as part of our longstanding
'Pearsonian' peacekeeping tradition and “the Canadian Forces would be helping to secure and rebuild a war-torn country. They would, quite literally, be saving lives. In short, the mission speaks both to Canadians' altruism - our desire to help others - and to our self- interest - our desire to put down terrorism and enhanced our own domestic security.”39
The messages at this time varied from promoting the ‘traditional role’ of Canada’s military to reinforcing Canada’s need to secure our nation.
In December of 2003, soon after Paul Martin became Prime Minister, ISAF was absorbed into NATO. NATO confirmed publicly it was taking on new operations which met the common security interests of the Allies. “We commend the participants of Allies in the International Security Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan, and the present role of
Germany and the Netherlands as lead nations in the mission.” 40 From August 2003,
NATO took the lead role by assuming the strategic coordination, command and control of
ISAF. NATO’s absorption of ISAF allowed for ISAF to continue its support towards to
Afghan government and a much more sustainable presence in Kabul, without the rotation of lead nations every six months.
In late 2003, Canada played a major role in the NATO’s absorption of ISAF, leading the force and planned its expansion outside of Kabul. Canadian military leaders and diplomats conceptualized plans to disarm Afghan militia factions and incorporate them into the new army or demobilize them. This contributed significantly to averting
39 Minister's Speeches Archive. WHY AFGHANISTAN? WHY CANADA? Calgary (Alberta). September 12, 2003. Speaking notes for The Honourable John McCallum, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence at the Calgary Chamber of Commerce. Retrieved at: http://www.dnd.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1189 40 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Communiqué, Madrid NATO meeting, June 3, 2003. Perceptions of War 32 civil war between some of the more heavily armed factions. Canada also established a small advisory team to assist the Karzai government in developing a plan to convince the
IMF and World Bank to invest in Afghanistan: no money, no development.
Tim Murphy, Prime Minster Martin’s Chief of Staff, had been quoted as saying that Afghanistan was perceived to be Jean Chrétien's project and that Paul Martin viewed
Afghanistan as something he had to do more than something he wanted to do41 in order to keep the Canadian Government and the Liberal Party’s commitment.42 It is important to remember that Canada’s role in ISAF was only part of the larger NATO Mission. At this point Canada had not been asked to assume the full mantle of the mission but work in concert with the other 25 members of NATO.
The Honourable John McCallum, Minister of National Defence announced in a news release that Major-General Andrew Leslie assumed the responsibilities of Deputy
Commander of ISAF:
“I have complete confidence that Maj.-Gen. Leslie is the right officer for this very important position, Operation ATHENA demonstrates the high level of importance Canada is planning on fulfilling its commitment to Afghanistan and the international community as well…This mission will be challenging, I am confident that our troops have the leadership, along with the training and equipment, to meet and overcome these challenges.”43
Canada to Kandahar: Paul Martin’s Decision
41 Stein, Janice Gross and Lang, Eugene. THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR. Viking Canada, 2007. 42 John Turley-Ewart. MANLEY’S REPORT TAKES A DIG AT PAUL MARTIN. Posted: January 22, 2008. Retrieved at: http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2008/01/22/john-turley-ewart-manley-s-report-takes-a-dig-at-paul- martin.aspx 43 CANADIAN MAJOR-GENERAL to TAKE SENIRO COMMAND POSITION in ISAF. August 11, 2003. Retrieved at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1159
Perceptions of War 33
Discussions continued on the evolving concept of PRT’s, but no decision was made at this time as to where Canada’s PRT would be located and it was this decision that officials in the departments of Foreign Affairs, CIDA and Defence continued to discuss for more than a year. The plan was that ISAF would incrementally take control of the PRT’s. Gen. Hillier stated that the PRT should be reinforced by a strong combat deployment in Kandahar as well as strategic advisory teams attached to most Afghan ministries, the "three-block war" approach.
There were a number of reasons being debated concerning the location of
Canada’s PRT. Issues such as where the other foreign troops were already located, coupled with where CIDA, dealing with the development section of the PRT, would be operating after signing on with UNAMA, and whether participating Non Governmental
Organizations (NGO’s) would participate with the PRT’s. At the same time, several
NATO allies gave Canada conflicting signals on where their PRT should be located.
UNAMA (the UN Mission in Afghanistan) was a political mission, so the bulk of their focus was in political work; good offices to prevent or resolve conflict; to help support the Afghan government as it continued its transition towards full authority and extending its capability across the country.
Canada’s placement of their PRT in Kandahar came under high criticism, with the cynical view that in effect, Paul Martin’s Government decided “to risk Canadian lives in
Kandahar to keep trucks rolling across the Detroit River.”44 Professor Stein stated in The
Unexpected War that the issue of committing combat troops and their location was not on
44 Walkom, Thomas. OUR ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN REALLY ABOUT TIES WITH U.S. Oct 14, 2007. Retrieved at: http://www.thestar.com/News/article/266634 Perceptions of War 34 the agenda during the year that officials in the departments of Foreign Affairs, CIDA, and
Defence debated- neither was it for officials dealing with the Afghanistan file or for the
Prime Minister's team preoccupied with the Quebec sponsorship scandal.
On the eve of Parliament's re-opening, former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien drove a wedge into the Liberal Party with his indictment of Paul Martin as having blood on his hands over the deployment of Canadian troops to Kandahar. One senior Defence
Department official, who took part in the discussions leading to the Kandahar deployment, said the delay in the issue reaching Mr. Martin had nothing to do with the then Prime Minister but resulted from a year-long debate over the nature and the role of the CF’s deployment between the departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs and from conflicting pressures from Canada's allies. The senior Defence official also claimed that, in reality, Paul Martin made the decision on mobilising the Canadian PRT in Kandahar within weeks of the issue being put before him.45
National Defence Minister Bill Graham also denied that indecisiveness by former
Prime Minister Paul Martin led to Canada deploying troops in Afghanistan's Kandahar province, but conceded that lengthy discussions within the government meant other
NATO partners succeeded in being posted to less dangerous parts of the country. Graham stated that he would not describe Prime Minster Paul Martins decision on Canada’s PRT as dithering. Mr Graham further stated that numerous discussions went on at the lower levels about where Canada should commit a PRT and, a case could be made by saying that because it took so long other people took other places that were more attractive from
45 Valpy, Michael. CHRETIEN: MARTIN DITHERING LED TO SOLDIERS DEATHS IN AFGHANISTAN. Globe and Mail, October 15, 2007. Retrieved at: http://taylor.typepad.com/blog/2007/10/chrtien-canada-.html Perceptions of War 35 a security perspective and therefore there were fewer choices available when it came time for Canada to say yes.46
Foreign Affairs Minister Graham and later Defence Minister, refused to take sides in the dispute touched off by former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and pointed out that it was Mr. Chrétien who committed Canadian troops to Kabul and committed soldiers through NATO to the support and rebuilding of Afghanistan, but Minister Graham also believed Mr. Chrétien would not have agreed to send troops to Kandahar if he had remained Prime Minister. In the book The Unexpected War, Professor Stein stated that
Mr Chrétien committed Canada to ISAF for one year ending in the summer of 2004, and at no time was a significant extension of Canada's commitment to ISAF under consideration. The examples cited above coupled with Prime Minister Chrétien’s criticism of his successor, Paul Martin, and critical commentary on the decision-making processes regarding the various Afghanistan deployments, contributed significantly to confusing messages, and did little to bolster the confidence of the public in the
Afghanistan mission.
From the times directly after September 11, 2001, when the Canadian public’s sympathy for Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan was at is all time high, Jean Chrétien remained reluctant to appear to too close to the Americans.47 Relations between Canada and the United States had been compromised through past debates over tariffs on soft wood lumber and wheat but continued to deteriorate. Paul Martin may have agreed with
46 Freeman, Alan and Valpy, Michael. EX MINISTER DENIES MARTIN TO BLAME FOR KANDAHAR MISSION. Globe and Mail. October 16, 2007. Retrieved at: http://paropamisus.wordpress.com/2007/10/16/globe-and-mail-some-canadians-wish-they-had-chosen-herat-instead-of- kandahar-for-prt/ 47 Stein, Janice Gross and Lang, Eugene. THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR. 2007. Viking Canada. Pg 11 Perceptions of War 36
Jean Chrétien’s decision not to get involved in Iraq; however Paul Martin thought Jean
Chrétien mishandled its execution and communication resulting in further damage to the
Canada-US relationship. Paul Martin attempted to establish distance from his predecessor, demonstrating that he was more concerned about the Canada-US relationship, signalling to Canadians and the world, Canada was prepared to be a major contributor to global affairs. The move from Kabul to Kandahar for Paul Martin was the opportunity to earn the respect from the United States. In addition, Canada’s involvement in this mission was hoped to make Canadians proud of the government and the military.
Despite the pride Canadians felt for their military, their support for the mission would continue to waver as a result of the limited messages from Paul Martin’s Government in addition to the open debate from the previous liberal leader, Jean Chrétien.
Nonetheless, the various accounts of what lay behind the Kandahar deployment posed major questions.48 Mr. Graham wrote to Paul Martin recommending that Canada implement a PRT operation in Kandahar. The issue of combat troops in Kandahar went to
Prime Minister Martin after General Hillier became Chief of the Defence Staff who recommended a Canadian commitment to Afghanistan much broader than a PRT. He also said that Afghan President Hamid Karzai had been pressing for a broader NATO presence in the south that was not simply American. An elaborate review of Canadian foreign policy, entitled Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World was put forth in 2005. In a Foreword to the Statement, Prime Minister Paul
Martin invoked the expansion of the CF as a measure to enhance Canada’s abilities by
48 Freeman, Alan and Valpy Michael.. EX MINISTER DENIES MARTIN TO BLAME FOR KANDAHAR MISSION. October 16, 2005 Perceptions of War 37 allowing Canada to play a leading and lasting role in peace support operations. He presented the direction of a PRT in Kandahar as a sign of Canadian leadership but failed to acknowledge the mission as a combat mission making reference to ‘peace support operations’ contributing to the public’s confusion over the Canada’s role.
Bill Graham, then Minister of National Defence, in his introduction the defence section of Canada’s International Policy Statement, confirmed Canadian vulnerability to the threat of terrorism and, to the ‘spill over effects’ from failed and failing states such as
Afghanistan. In the first instance, the sufferings that these situations created were unsettling to Canadian values. Beyond this, they planted the seeds of threats to regional and global security resulting in Canadian’s feeling insecure over their national security in addition to the mission in Afghanistan.
On April 16, 2003, at the urging of Canada, Germany and Netherlands, NATO took responsibility for the ISAF mission. NATO confirmed publicly:
“We commend the participants of Allies in the International Security Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan, and the present role of Germany and the Netherlands as lead nations in the mission. From August, NATO will take the lead role by assuming the strategic coordination, command and control of ISAF. ISAF will continue to operate under the United Nations mandate.” 49
The 3-D Approach
The focus of Canada's military deployment in Afghanistan was centered on the capital, Kabul, where Canadian Forces (CF), based at Camp Julien, had focused their efforts on a 'charm offensive', winning the hearts and minds of the local population with
49 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Communiqué, Madrid NATO meeting, June 3, 2003. Perceptions of War 38 highly visible light patrols, which had resulted in light casualties.50 Canada shifted the direction of their mission that brought defence into closer contact with diplomatic and development activities. Canada's role in Afghanistan had all the hallmarks of the new type of operation the Canadian Forces would be expected to lead: it was a multilateral mission authorized by the United Nations and led by NATO; undertaken at the invitation of the Afghan government, and aimed at reviving a failing state, for humanitarian reasons and at the same time ensuring that it cannot be used as a base of operations for terrorists.
Messages such as this were what the Canadian public wanted and needed to hear as the mission became further involved into a heavier combat mission.
Contributions by Canada and the international community to Afghanistan were significant, a total Canadian investment expected to top $1 billion over a 2 year period.
With increased defence, diplomatic and development efforts, came the need for a more comprehensive strategy resulting in what Canada called its "3-D Approach," involving unprecedented levels of coordination among government departments and agencies. The
Canadian government used the 3-D approach as a way to address the situation in
Afghanistan. The 3-D approach involved the co-ordination of the DFAIT (diplomacy),
DND (defence), and the CIDA (development). This approach was put to the test in
Afghanistan.51
By 2004, there were nine such OEF led teams and they had been renamed
Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The plan was that ISAF would incrementally take control of the PRT’s. General Hillier stated that the PRT should be reinforced by a strong
50 Evan L. CANADA TO KANDAHAR. Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd. May 14, 2005. Retrieved at http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/archive/index.php/t-47876.html 51 DFAIT. ‘REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN’. October 15, 2005. Retrieved at: http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/menu-en.asp . Perceptions of War 39 combat deployment in Kandahar as well as strategic advisory teams attached to most
Afghan ministries, the "three-block war" (3D) approach. Paul Martin outlined his thoughts on the Defence policy for the new century, the 3-D approach, would serve as the model for Canada's involvement in international crises in the future; crises that would take many forms. International terror was the major threat to Canadian security, compared to the Cold War of decades past, he said. "There is no home front. The conflict is not
'over there.' Our approach to Canada's security and defence must reflect this reality."
Since Martin became prime minister, defence policy has been undergoing a major review that will be complete by year's end.52
Within the defence aspect of the 3-D approach, the CF’s adopted the concept of three-block warfare. “On the first block, the CF would deliver humanitarian aid or assist others in doing that. On the second, the CF would conduct stabilization or peace support operations. On the third, the CF would be engaged in a high-intensity fight. Canada’s missions had to be ready to conduct these operations simultaneously and very close to one
53 another and were prepared to conduct them in large urban centers and complex terrain.”
The Canadian Forces worked alongside all three blocks: assisting CIDA in the distribution of millions of dollars in humanitarian assistance; provided training for the
Afghan National Army and Police; and engaged in fierce fire fights against elements of the Taliban.
52CTV.ca News Staff. TROOPS TO REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN UNTIL MIS-2005. Apr. 14 2004 Retrieved at: http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1081960939231_77370139 53 Department of National Defence. “THREE BLOCK WAR” . A Soldier’s Guide to Transformation. Retrieved at: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca . Perceptions of War 40
In an interview with Vanguard magazine, David Mulroney, head of the
Afghanistan Task Force, talked about the Canadian government’s efforts to integrate various government departments’ work in Afghanistan. Using the “great insight of
Afghanistan” of 3-D he illustrated the efforts to development a “single, Government of
Canada policy perspective that is sufficiently coherent and compelling to shape program activity on the ground.” While noting the policy, operational and organizational challenges involved in such a process, he advocated an expansion of this approach.
The Chief of Defence Staff General Hillier, and former Liberal Defence Minister Bill
Graham warned Canadians to expect an increase in casualties as a result of this new mandate in an attempt to prepare Canadians for the increased intensity of Canada’s mission in Kandahar. The reality of the new mandate did set in until the body bags returned home with alarming regularity. With opinion polls showing just 30% support for the new mission in Afghanistan, Harper mounted his public relations counterattack.54
PHASE THREE: Operation Archer in Kandahar August 2005-Present
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
Provincial Reconstruction Team's (PRT) were introduced by the U.S.-led coalition as a means to ‘win hearts and minds’ for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). PRT’s were a response to the growing resentment among the majority Pashtun community in the south and east Afghanistan concerning their belief, and to international criticism of the apparent divide between OEF military stabilization activities and the reconstruction and development process. Pashtun discontent was fueled by Pashtu feelings of
54 Taylor, Scott. CANADA’S MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN: BEYOND THE RHETORIC. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Fall 2006, Vol. 9, Issue 1. Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2006. Retrieved at: http://www.jmss.org/2006/2006fall/articles/taylor_afghanistan.pdf Perceptions of War 41 underrepresentation, even disenfranchised. Although the president of the ATA, Hamid
Karzai, is a Pashtun, it was believed that the Panjshiri Tajik faction led by Defense
Minister Fahim, controlled the government.55 The inability of the ATA to protect Pashtu’s from a wave of human rights abuses perpetrated against them since the fall of the Taliban has heightened Pashtun suspicions and mistrust of the government. Another source of discontent concerns U.S. military operations. By their heavy-handed tactics in Pashtun areas of the country, U.S. troops have alienated much of the populace.56
The concept of PRT’s evolved considerably since the first PRT was established in
2002, in the eastern city of Gardez, gradually becoming rooted in the Afghan security landscape. PRT’s represented a significant development in the nature of military engagements in non-military activities in Afghanistan. PRT’s had been tasked with participating in reconstruction activities and promoting Afghanistan’s central government authority at the provincial level. PRT’s represented a significant development in the nature of military engagements in non-military activities in Afghanistan. PRT’s had been tasked with participating in reconstruction activities and promoting Afghanistan’s central government authority at the provincial level.
The initial concept brought forth concerns from the international assistance community. At the political level it was feared that the engagement in reconstruction
55 Two of the three power ministries, defence and foreign affairs, remain in the hands of the Panjshiris, and the bulk of the military and intelligence service is loyal to Fahim. Fahim's decision in February 2003 to replace 16 ethnic Tajik generals with individuals from other ethnic groups was heralded as a political breakthrough, yet the Pashtun populace remains sceptical. 56 Sedra, Mark. THE FORGOTTEN WAR: SHOWS NO SIGN OF ABATING. Retrieved at: http://www.fpif.org/papers/afghan2003.html
Perceptions of War 42 activities would distract the Coalition from its role in establishing security throughout the country; humanitarian organisations were concerned that the Coalition forces involvement in the provision of humanitarian aid would blur the lines between military and humanitarian actors and make humanitarian workers more vulnerable make the relations with the local communities vulnerable; and the government expressed the view that if not properly directed the Coalition’s attempt to expand the authority of
Afghanistan’s central government to the outlying regions could undermine the
Government’s authority.
The international community and PRT coalition forces had constructive interactions over the potential role that the PRT’s would play in the reconstruction of the
Afghan state. It was felt that the PRT’s should concentrate on the rehabilitation of basic administrative infrastructure at the district level. Concentration at this level would effectively support the extension of Afghanistan’s central government’s influence in addition to aiding the reconstruction process. Against this background, the announcement of the PRT was welcomed by the ATA and UNAMA as a sign of a continuing engagement by the international community as Afghanistan’s problems increased.
The expansion of a civil-military approach was presented to the Canadian public as a means to help facilitate the delivery of reconstruction and development, which in turn would bring about stability. This new mission changed the role of the Canadian Forces from war-making to a more humanitarian role which was more in line with Canadian core values. Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Chamberlain explained that the Canadian model became recognized as one that worked, despite the challenging conditions. Canada clearly had interdepartmental coordination, the ability to deploy and execute in a way that resulted in Perceptions of War 43
Afghan ministries wanting to deliver more programs, and projects in Kandahar because they knew that the government structure was in place, mentored and supported by
Canada, was solid. Canada’s success was its willingness to learn, adapt and evolve, a process that could eventually remove the military from the team.57
In November 2005, then Minister of Defence Bill Graham, elucidated to an audience the intent of the PRT was to assist the Afghan authorities in providing governance and security, in addition to delivering basic services to citizens. It was a concept that was highly consistent with Canadian values and expertise. It also corresponded with the thrust of Canada’s defence and international policy statements as a practical exercise in Canada’s 3-D approach. Defense Minster Graham used Canadian values as a means to evoke public support and understanding of Canada’s mission in
Afghanistan. Messages such as these were an attempt to establish stronger public support and understanding of the mission, however, these messages continued to vary and change as Canada got more involved in Afghanistan.
PRT’s were recognized by many governments, including the Canadian
Government, as an innovative, new strategy for expanding the reach of humanitarian and development activities into less secure regions, with the overall goal of establishing stability and security in Afghanistan. NGOs recommended that they and the Canadian
Government put pressure on other governments to ensure that these resources would be forthcoming. The humanitarian community was concerned that using military or political
57 Thatcher, Chris. PREPARING A PRT: A CEREBRAL APPRAOCH FOR COLLABORATIVE TRAINING. Retrieved at: http://www.vanguardcanada.com/PreparingPRTThatcher Perceptions of War 44 criteria to determine the recipients, the quantity or the quality of assistance response would compromise the long-term positive impact of assistance.
Specifically, concern was expressed that long term impact would be sacrificed for short term political and military dividends, communities that opposed the current government would get different levels of aid than those who supported the government, the military would be tempted to use NGOs as “force multipliers” to achieve political or security-related ends. These concerns were compounded by the fact that without active government involvement and capacity to establish standards and accountability structures it would be impossible to assess the long-term impact of military led assistance. Given that the PRT concept was evolving, and there existed various PRT models in terms of focus and size, clarification was used to establish the Canadian PRT initiative, which was designed to work closely with the Afghanistan government to enhance its capacity to deliver quality security services to the outer regions of the country where they had previously not been able to operate, and to provide space for NGOs to engage in longer- term reconstruction and development work.58
Task Force Afghanistan
On August 16, 2005, the Liberal Government of Canada sent approximately 2,500 soldiers, with no set end date, as part of Task Force Afghanistan to Kandahar. The deployment was set to establish a base in what remained one of the most heavily Taliban- dominated areas in the country. Part of the mission, labelled as Operation Archer, was the deployment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) comprised of CF members as
58 NGO/GOVERNMENT DIALOGUE on PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRTs) in AFGHANISTAN and the MILITARIZATION of HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. December 4 2003. Key Civil Society Recommendations Perceptions of War 45 well as officials from CIDA, the RCMP and Foreign Affairs resulting in Canada’s largest mission since the Korean War. Operation Archer shifted from operating under the command of OEF to the NATO-led ISAF and was eventually viewed by Canadian officials as the embodiment of 3D’s- Defence, Diplomacy, and Development.
Former Liberal MP Carolyn Parrish spoke out against Canada's upcoming deployment to Afghanistan. Her chief complaint was that this action commits Canadian soldiers to a dangerous task, where they may not only have to kill, but may be killed themselves. In fact, she went as far as to say that "If this thing gets any deeper in
(Afghanistan) and we get a couple of dead Canadians back, I'll vote to bring the government down the first opportunity I got." 59 While this may seem to be in the best interests of protecting our soldiers, the fact of the matter was that the deployments to
Kandahar were an extension of on-going government policy. Canada has never undertaken a "peacekeeping" role in Afghanistan, despite a common public perception to the contrary.60 Ms. Parrish's comments indicated that many Canadians, even senior politicians, failed to understand the complexity and intensity of the Afghan situation.
General Rick Hillier, Chief of Defence Staff, made public comments on this area, indicating that the situation was serious and that the mission may require the use of lethal force. Ms. Parrish ironically, did not see these comments as trying to shed light on the situation. Instead she took an aggressive stance against General Hillier’s comments and
59 Carolyn Parrish on Afghanistan, Thursday, July 28. 2005. The Ruxted Group. Retrieved at: http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/1-Carolyn-Parrish-on-Afghanistan.html
60 Topics: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO IN AFGHANISTAN. October 3, 2008. Retrieved at: http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html Perceptions of War 46 asked the Prime Minister to "muzzle the beast, assume command of Canada's agenda in your usual articulate, dignified and intelligent way. Let the Canadian public know Gen.
Hillier does not speak for our government." Although Gen. Hillier may not speak for the
Government, he spoke bluntly for our military, and did not gloss over the unsavoury aspects of the job at hand. The Canadian public needed to be aware that the Government committed the CF into a dangerous, hostile mission, a mission with little resemblance to the Peacekeeping missions of the 1990's. It was straight talk, not politically motivated
"muzzling" that would ensure the Canadian mindset was ready for what may come.61
The decision for the Canadian Forces to move into Kandahar was complex and multi-faceted. It was taken by politicians, generals and civil servants trying to craft rules for a new kind of international military -defence-development engagement they did not fully understand in a country in which they had no substantial previous experience. In support expanding ISAF, the Canadian government decided to re-deploy the Canadian
Forces personnel from Kabul to Kandahar, to take over a US Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT) in 2005.
As the Canadian Forces new PRT mission began to take shape and there was an increase in Canadian casualties the messages also took a new direction causing further public scrutiny. On October 12, 2005, when Minister Graham visited Afghanistan he noted in a press conference:
…there’s no question but that the mission in Kandahar is a much more dangerous mission …We’ve always said that …we were under no allusions that this would be an easy PRT … So our troops were ready and
61 Parish, Carolyn. CAROLYN PARRISH ON AFGHANISTAN. July 28. 2005. Retrieved at: http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/1-Carolyn-Parrish-on-Afghanistan.html
Perceptions of War 47
prepared to face the fact that they may have to face attacks … it will be more in the nature of a combat mission…That’s going to be their job is to go out and meet them in the field and destroy them and destroy their capacity to attack our troops and to attack innocent Afghan people. 62
Earlier in a 2004 address at the International Conference on Afghanistan, then-
Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham said the military deployment “has deep political support in Canada because of the importance that Canadians attach to seeing Afghanistan established as a free, open and democratic society.” He painted a picture of a community police action aimed at promoting human rights and discouraging drug traffic. Not once did he utter the word ‘Taliban’ or hint at exchanges of live ammunition. In a speech made shortly before the January 23, 2006 federal election, Stephen Harper promised to increase
Canadian military spending to the point that the other major powers would take notice, and, made defence and national security the priority for the Conservative campaign in
2005 and 2006. Stephen Harper criticized that the previous Liberal government for needlessly angering Washington by failing to sufficiently support the Bush administration in its ‘war on terrorism’. The messaging from Defence Minister Graham soon shifted from a mission directed towards Canadian values to that of a Canadian combat mission before the Conservative Government came into power.
In his address to the UN General Assembly Prime Minister Harper insisted on
Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan in the same terms as the Liberals when they described Canada’s role in that country. He maintained the 3D Approach as a rational and deliberate means for an integrated foreign and defence policy: “Canadian defence
62 National Defence and The Canadian Forces. THE HONOURABLE BILL GRAHAM, TELECONFERNCE TRANSCRPIT. October 12, 2005. Retrieved at: http://www.dnd.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1778 Perceptions of War 48 personnel, diplomats, and development officers are on the front lines of the fight for the future of Afghanistan. Canadians feel tremendous pride in the leadership role they have assumed and we share equal grief for the casualties they have taken.”63 In his UN speech
Stephen Harper was categorical. He believes there was only one option in Afghanistan:
“(…) if we fail the Afghan people, we will be failing ourselves. This is the United
Nations' strongest mission and, therefore, our greatest test. Our collective will and credibility are being judged. We cannot afford to fail. We will succeed.”64
Move to a Conservative Government
On February 2, 2006 Stephen Harper was elected as the new Prime Minster of
Canada resulting in the inheritance of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan and all the controversy and confusion that went along with it. It became Prime Minister Harper's responsibility, as the new Prime Minister, to persuade the public that the sacrifice would be worthwhile, that stability could be won in Afghanistan and at the same time reassuring
Canada’s national security. The Conservative Governments intent, behind their messaging, was to stress the status and prestige of Canada’s participation in the global community and, present the mission to be a step beyond the Liberals traditional peacekeeping messages.
Stephen Harper connected the dots between global terror networks and the
Taliban and Canada’s national security and made references to the Taliban's ruthless
63 Harper, Stephen. Address by the Prime Minister to the 61st Opening Session of the United Nations General Assembly. September 21 2006. New York. Retrieved at: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1329 64 Harper, Stephen. Address by the Prime Minister to the 61st Opening Session of the United Nations General Assembly. September 21 2006. New York. Retrieved at: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1329
Perceptions of War 49 oppression of the Afghan people. On the other hand, Stephen Harper consistently minimized the possibility of combat and refused to acknowledge that Canada was in a combat mission when discussing the Afghanistan mission to the public. He did not build a case for Canada’s involvement so much as argue that it was all the Liberals' idea to go there in the first place, wasting an opportunity to bolster the nation's confidence and resolve. Just as the Conservatives had done, the Liberal Governments avoided exposing the more risky nature of the Afghanistan deployment and presented the impression that
Canada was in a combat mission but placed the CF deployment within the context of traditional Canadian humanitarian activity, closer to Canadian tradition and values. The lack of decisive Government messaging contributed to the continued public confusion over Canada’s role in Afghanistan. In the Ottawa Citizen, on March 14, 2006, Stephan
Dion then Liberal Foreign Affairs critic opposed any rethinking of the mission. "But we don't want to second guess. It's a very important mission, and we want to be there." This was made apparent again in a March 2006 poll which revealed that 70% of Canadians polled believed that the main purpose of the Canadian troops in Afghanistan was related more towards peacekeeping than combat, whereas only 26% think that its primary role was combat. “This suggested that there remains some confusion about the primary purpose of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. It also implied that the Canadian government has some work to do in better educating the public about the true role and mandate of Canadian troops in Southern Afghanistan.”65
Stephen Harper’s Campaign for Support
65 Gregg, Kelly, Sullivan & Woolstencroft: The Strategic Counsel is pleased to present findings of The Globe and Mail/CTV Polling Program for March 2006. Interviews were conducted between March 9th and March 12th, 2006. The following table outlines the sample distribution and associated margin of error. Perceptions of War 50
Prime Minister Harper made a public three-day visit to Afghanistan to show support for the Canadian troops, met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and rallied public support at home behind Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. The new Conservative government aimed to use the current Canadian mission in Afghanistan to effect a fundamental change in Canada’s military and geo-political posture. Stephen Harper repeatedly said that Canada must play a larger role in world affairs and, that Canadian troops were deployed to fight international terrorism, and that their mission was “about demonstrating an international leadership role for Canada. You can’t lead from the bleachers. I want Canada to be a leader...A country that really leads. Not a country that just follows, but one that provides “leadership on global issues.” 66 Stephen Harper stated quite sternly that “it was never easy for the men and women on the front lines. And there may be some who want to cut and run. But cutting and running was not Canada’s way.
We don’t make a commitment and then run away at the first sign of trouble. We don’t and
67 we won’t.” Stephen Harper directed his messaging more towards Canada’s national security and global presence in international affairs. Stephen Harper’s continued expression of statements such as these, stressed the importance of Canada’s presence in
Afghanistan, took a much stronger stand on Canada’s mission then the former Liberal government had. During the May 2006 debate on expanding Canada’s operation in
Afghanistan to February 2009, Harper warned that:
“Canada was not immune to such [terror] attacks. And we will never be immune as long as we are a society that defends freedom, democracy and
66 Jones, Keith. CANADIAN PRIME MINSTER PROCLAIMS MAJOR SHIFT WITH AFGHANISTAN VISIT. March 16 2006. Retrieved at: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/mar2006/cana-m16.shtml 67 Harper, Stephen. ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN. March 13, 2006. Accessed online at http://www.pm.gc.ca . Perceptions of War 51
human rights. Not surprisingly, Al-Qaeda has singled out Canada along with a number of other nations for attack. The same Al-Qaeda that, together with the Taliban, took an undemocratic Afghanistan and made it a safe haven from which to plan terrorist attacks worldwide… we just cannot let the Taliban, backed by Al-Qaeda, or similar extremist elements return to power in Afghanistan.”68
Despite Stephen Harpers strong stance on Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, the public continued to question the mission and support continued to decline. It was becoming apparent that the public were not comfortable with the combat portions of the mission and would continue to reject the idea of an extension. In a EurasiaNet commentary, M. Ashraf Haidari suggested that one of the most significant reasons for
Canada’s involvement is the country’s own national security. One cannot deny the real security imperative Canadians will face if Afghanistan’s stabilization efforts fail…It is imprudent to think that Canada is exempt from increasing transnational security threats and that Canadian national security is not at stake with its mission in Afghanistan.
Stephen Harper responded by stating he understood the public’s frustrations but argued that the previous government should have voted on the deployment, but it was the
Liberals choice not to. The decision was taken and Canada couldn’t change its opinion when the troops were in danger. In a Strategic Counsel poll done from February 16-19,
2006, the Canadian public responded with a 73% approval when asked: Should a decision to send troops to Afghanistan require parliamentary approval?69
Debating Afghanistan
68 Harper, Stephen. PRIME MINISTER STANDS BY CANADA’S COMMITMENT TO AFGHANISTAN. May 17 2006. Retrieved at: http://www.pm.gc.ca 69 Strategic Counsel poll of 1,000 Canadians was taken Feb. 16-19 and is accurate to within 3.1 percentage points, 95 per cent of the time. Retrieved at: http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php?topic=40238.0;wap2 Perceptions of War 52
In an October 2001 “take note” debate, Chrétien’s government outlined Canada’s contribution to Operation Apollo, Canada’s contribution to the war on terrorism in the wake of September 11, 2001. Parliament was similarly excluded from voting during a
“take note” debate on Canada’s deployment to Afghanistan in 2002. The charade continued after then-Prime Minister Paul Martin’s government extended and increased
Canada’s contribution of combat troops to Kandahar in May, but only held “take note” debates in November, months after the fact and again with the Conservatives. In each and every case, the Opposition lament over the lack of a meaningful parliamentary role. As a result, the Harper government’s decision to overturn decades of abuse and to restore a meaningful role for Parliament allowed for a vote on the extension of Canada’s mission in
Afghanistan. What was hypocritical during the debate was some Opposition members’ criticism of the process, stating they wanted to know why there was a rush to hold a vote.
PM Harper announced that he was putting forward a motion asking for Parliament’s support for the mission’s extension, giving Opposition MPs 48-hours’ notice. That was the most notice Opposition MPs were given prior to a “take note” debate. Most of the time, they were given a lot less and little or no notification of the subject to be debated.
Steven Harper repeatedly rejected the idea of a debate and said his government would not make decisions based on opinion polls. Despite dropping numbers in public support and the continual lack of satisfaction the Canadian public had surrounding Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, Stephen Harper rejected the idea of a debate and said his government would not make decisions based on opinion polls. He appeared to retain the moral high ground, and acted consistently with his stand on Canada taking a leadership role. Despite polling results, Stephen Harper reinforced his claim that Canadians did not Perceptions of War 53 cut and run at the first sign of trouble, and that was the nature of this country, and when we send troops into the field, he expected Canadians to support those troops.
The rise in the number of Canadian fatalities in Afghanistan created disillusionment among federal politicians. In debates at the House of Commons in
November 2005 and May 2006, opposition parties objected to the significant change in the role and the extension of the Canadian military in Afghanistan. The situation was fuzzier in the Liberal party, where the Opposition Leader and former Defence Minister,
Bill Graham, said his party supported the troops and the mission in Afghanistan, but the
MPs would be voting by conscience. The confusion in Parliament had its echo in society.
A June 9, 2006 poll by the Strategic Counsel found total support for sending troops to be at 48% while 44% opposed the idea. Another poll by the same Counsel, published on July
19, 2006 found an increase in popular opposition (56%) to the decision to send Canadian troops to Afghanistan as well as objecting to the extension. (Appendix 2)
At first glance, these results appeared to conflict with previous polling during the
Liberal Government on the level of support for the decision to send troops to
Afghanistan. The results reflected a different context in which the questions were posed resulting from the different objectives the government had for the mission at that time.
The decline in public support may be more indicative of the public’s unwillingness to support mission in hostile, combative areas. Given these circumstances, the majority of
Canadians (62%) said they would have voted against sending troops into Afghanistan.
Canadians have yet to be conditioned to the new active combat role that the CF’s were being asked to undertake. Polling results demonstrated that the public’s support could continue to change as Canada’s mission becomes increasingly combative and casualties Perceptions of War 54 mounted up. As the polling suggests modest support could become open opposition. The uncertainty Canadians had regarding Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan could potentially result in a major hurdle for the Conservative government as public opinions were still being formed and could continue to shift with time and as events unfolded.
These results stressed the need for the Canadian government to be more transparent in educating the public concerning the challenges and benefits of the mission.
In May 2006, Stephen Harper’s Government held an emergency debate70 on extending the mission reaffirming that Canada resolved not to "cut and run" from
Afghanistan, lashing out at opposition calls for a debate on the situation when the House resumed sitting the following month. The Liberals accused Stephen Harper of
"irresponsible ambiguity" regarding the mission's future, hinting at a hidden agenda on the Prime Minister's part. "The Prime Minister was wasting time, shilly-shallying, and I know why - because he wants to stay longer than February, 2009." Stephen Harper offered no details on how long Canadian Forces might remain in Afghanistan, or what signs of progress would mean our job there is done.71 "The Prime Minister wants this confusion. He's not clear at all; because he wants the extension....What he would like to do was to have an open-war mission with no deadlines. But he has to cope with the public opinion of Canada, and they are a minority government."72
70 Harper, Stephen. SPEECH of The RIGHT HONOURABLE STEPHEN HARPER PRIME MINISTER of CANADA DURING the
PARLIAMENTRY DEBATE on AFGHANISTAN. May 17, 2006. Retrieved at: http://www.afghanemb- canada.net/en/speeches/speech_harper.php 71 Geddes, John. Campbell, Colin. Savage, Luiza. CANADIANS IN AFGHANSTAN FOR THE LONG HAUL. MacLean’s Magazine. March 20,2006 Retrieved at: http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0012929 72 Campbell, Clark. ED TORIES GET WIRES CROSSED, DION SAYS. September 4, 2007 Perceptions of War 55
Stephan Dion, the new Liberal leader, accused Prime Minister Steven Harper of sending signals that they did not expect an extension of the Kandahar mission past 2009, but refused to make unequivocal official statements to its allies and Canadians. It was not just Stephen Harper whose messages varied over time. In early May 2006, Stephan Dion stated “I have always been a strong supporter of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan and
Kandahar, and of those who have gone there to fulfill it, Canada’s Armed Forces.” On the other hand on May 17, 2006 Stephan Dion voted to end the mission in eight months but enough Liberals vote with Harper to help him extend the mission into 2009. The mixed messages coming from both the current Conservative government and the opposing
Liberal government carried on the mixed messages concerning Canada’s mission in
Afghanistan. On May 20, 2006 an Ipsos poll revealed Canadians supported the
Afghanistan mission (57%) but were not keen on a two-year mission extension (44%)73.
The continued decrease in public support was evident in the Strategic Council polling as demonstrated in their polling results. (Appendix 3)
Mission Clarification
To the dismay of the Conservative government, polls consistently showed that more Canadians oppose than support the CF counterinsurgency mission. While there was a modest increase in public support in the weeks immediately following Harper’s visit to
Afghanistan in March, the most recent poll showed 54 % of Canadians disapprove of the
CF deployment. The government provided virtually no information as to what the CF mission would entail, and much of what it did say, with its repeated claims that the
73 Wright John. Ipsos Reid/Global/National Post , Politics & Elections (National). Canada. May 20, 2006. Retrieved at: http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=3088 Perceptions of War 56 mission “was the same as before,” was disingenuous. The Oppositions reservation as to what would constitute success, what the government would do if the mission went badly, and how much it will cost, queries that echoed those that the current Conservative
Defence Minister asked of the then Liberal government were met with smears, non sequiturs, and nationalist bluster patterned on the speeches of George W. Bush.
Repeatedly, the Conservatives accused the opposition of undermining our troops in the field and wanting to shuck off Canada’s responsibilities in the fight for freedom.
It became evident, by the decreased public support for Canada’s mission, that the public needed the Prime Minister to clarify the necessity of extending the mission to
Canadians. In addition, when the public were polled as to if they believed the Afghanistan mission was going better or worse then they expected 48% of those polled believed the
Afghanistan mission was worse then they expected. Results such as these continue to indicate that the Canadian public are still lacking the understanding of what Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan is. The poll findings unsettled politicians and the military alike with further pressure on Stephen Harper’s government to deal not only with a recent string of attacks and accidents suffered by Canada's contingent in Afghanistan, but also with some hard numbers of declining public support.
Just hours after Canada suffered its first female combat death, MPs voted to extend the mission to February 2009. CTV's Janis Mackey Frayer, reported from
Kandahar, said although there had not been any official reaction to the vote, soldiers showed "a degree of inevitability" about the mission being extended. When foreign minister Peter MacKay visited Afghanistan, there was talk that Canadian troops would stay longer, the fact that the mission was being extended came as no surprise because Perceptions of War 57 very few believe that the task would be done by February, 2007, Mackey Frayer told
CTV's Canada AM. Warrant Officer Bruno Wissell likened the Afghan mission to Bosnia suggesting they could be there for 10 years and doing two or three tours. "Once you get into a mission, you always want to finish what you started." Sergeant Scott O'Neill also approved the mission's extension, calling it "a no-brainer." He told The Canadian Press that the coalition is only starting to make headway and needs to keep at it until the job is done.74
Humanitarian Values
The humanitarian role of the Kandahar PRT was also problematic given that social development programs were planned to be delivered within military security protective forces. In order to comply with the Good Humanitarian Donor Ship principles, the official Canadian government position was that the PRT was not providing humanitarian assistance, however, there were several CIDA officials embedded as part of the PRT and, the Canadian public was often told that the PRT was representative of our
'Whole-of Government Approach'.
The Whole of Government Approach originated in the OECD/DAC75, and was championed by the United Kingdom with a consolidated fund from many departments working on one master plan. Canada tested it in Afghanistan but to begin to achieve this dual objective, new Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives had to be instituted to complement Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) already underway.
74 CTV.ca News Staff. AFGHAN MISSION EXTENSION ‘NO SURPRISE’ TO SOLDIERS. May. 18 2006. Retrieved at: http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060517/nato_afghan_060518/20060518?hub=Canada 75 The OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance agreed by ministers in 2004 define the security system as including: core security actors; security management and oversight bodies; justice and law enforcement institutions; and non-statutory security forces. Perceptions of War 58
Afghanistan highlighted the importance of understanding local political realities and analyzing the likely impact of reform initiatives. It demonstrated the need for ensuring that reforms were sensitive to key issues such as ethnicity and was targeted to help address the root causes of tension.
Canadians were confused about the role the PRT would play when it came to security services and their role in terms of reconstruction. To help clarify the role of the
PRT and their potential mandate it was recommended that Canada come up with an innovative name. This was suggested to help clarify to civil society, and emphasize its role in the providing security yet have the capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies, in the event of natural or man-made disasters. It was intended to work closely with the Afghanistan government to enhance its capacity to deliver quality security services to the outer regions and provide space for NGOs to engage in longer-
76 term reconstruction and development work. The humanitarian role of the Kandahar PRT was also problematic given that social development programs were planned to be delivered within military security protective forces. In order to comply with the Good
Humanitarian Donorship principles, the official Canadian government position was that the PRT was not providing humanitarian assistance,74 there were several CIDA officials embedded as part of the PRT, and the Canadian public were often told that the PRT was representative of our 'whole-of government approach'. The messaging towards the ‘Whole of Government Approach’ gave the government an opportunity to link Canada’s mission
76 NGO/GOVERNMENT DIALOGUE on PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRTs) in AFGHANISTAN and the MILITARIZATION of HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. December 4 2003. Key Civil Society Recommendations
Perceptions of War 59 to Canadians core values in addition to the concept of security for both Afghanistan and
Canada’s national security.
It was not until July 31, 2006 that the Canadian Forces moved into the area of heaviest fighting, taking control of the Regional South Command from the OEF and responsibility for all but a few specific counter-terrorism operations which remained under US control. Up to this point, there had been a total of 20 Canadian casualties in
Afghanistan. The Strategic Council revealed polling results from August 10-13, 2006 indicated that 58% of polled individuals believed that this price was too high to pay for
Canada. In an opinion piece for La Presse, Yves Boisvert77, a columnist in judicial affairs and political affair, took issue with those who believed that Canada’s soldiers in
Afghanistan were fighting and dying for nothing. He highlighted the fallacy of the popular call for a more “humanitarian” rather than “military” mission for Canada in
Afghanistan, noting that it was a good program but an unrealistic one. He argued that
Canada needed to remain in the war to prevent a resurgence of the Taliban and al Qaeda, and noted the progress being made in establishing a functioning government and social progress.
77 Yves Boisvert. “A journalist and radio host in Quebec. He is a columnist in judicial affairs and political affairs for the newspaper La Presse. Boisvert was educated in law at the University of Montreal, where he earned a bachelor's degree. He also studied theatre, having received a certificate of study and who has been critical theatre for the student newspaper Continuum. Boisvert had never intending to enter the Bar of Quebec. He joined La Presse in 1988, where he wrote his own section since 2000.” Wikipedia: http://translate.google.ca/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yves_Boisvert_(journaliste) &ei=HhCmSYS_HZWksAP69eDdDw&sa=X&oi=translate&resnum=1&ct=result&prev=/search%3Fq%3 Dwho%2Bis%2BYves%2BBoisvert%26hl%3Den%26rls%3DSKPB,SKPB:2006- 45,SKPB:en%26pwst%3D1
Perceptions of War 60
In September 2006, during an address to the UN General Assembly, Harper reinforced the message on the importance of maintaining a presence in Afghanistan stating that “if we fail the Afghan people, we will be failing ourselves. This was the
United Nations strongest mission and, therefore, our greatest test. Our collective will and credibility are being judged. We cannot afford to fail. We will succeed.”78
As of September 2006, there were 18,500 troops operating under ISAF and 18,000 under OEF. It was expected that once the transition to ISAF control completed, the balance would be 26,000 ISAF troops and 10,500 Americans conducting counterterrorist operation. ISAF started off as a European-led attempt to replace OEF after the war- fighting phase in Afghanistan was over. At this point, ISAF was non-NATO, limited to operating in Kabul, and proved to be unable to significantly assist in the stabilization of the country because of its limited mandate and capabilities, particularly when those were compared to the high level of coercive firepower that could be brought to bear by the
'warlords' and their militias in the Kabul area.79
Language Critics
There have been many critics of Harper’s language and in response. The
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade evaluated the communication strategy, including Harper’s use of words, about Afghanistan in November 2006. A series of cross-country focus groups reported that many Canadians, in fact, believed that Harper was “echoing” US President George W. Bush’s description of the war in Iraq. The report
78 Harper, Stephen. ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE 61ST OPENING SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. September 21,2006. Retrieved at http://www.pm.gc.ca 79 Maloney. Sean M. CANADA TO KANDAHAR- PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM OR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN. Royal Military College. Retrieved at: http://www.casr.ca/ft-maloney1.htm Perceptions of War 61 recommended that the Conservative government avoid emphasizing values like freedom, democracy, liberty, because it “comes across as sounding too American.” Instead, they should emphasize phrases like “rebuilding, restoring, reconstruction, hope, opportunity, and enhancing the lives of women and children.”80 In a sense, Harper was not echoing
Bush, but the previous Liberal government. In the week after 9/11, Chrétien defended war as an instrument to “destroy the evil of terrorism.”
Critics of Stephen Harper focused on his more forceful language, but they neglected to distinguish the clear linkages made between the Afghanistan operation and
Canadian values. While in Afghanistan, Harper made it clear that “serving an UN- mandated, Canadian-led security operation…was in the very best of the Canadian tradition.” Harper went on to assert that “reconstruction was reducing poverty; millions of people were now able to vote; women were enjoying greater rights and economic opportunities that could not have been imagined under the Taliban regime; and of Afghan children who were now in school studying the same things Canadian kids were learning back home.” Harper concluded that these tasks demonstrated that this involved “standing up for…core Canadian values.” The Conservative government reemphasized statements associating Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan with the messages of Canadian values as the Liberals had done. The promotion of Canadian values was not the Conservative governments’ idea to try to gain more support, but was initiated by the Liberals. Jean
Chrétien’s 1995 Foreign Policy review and Paul Martin’s 2005 International Policy
80 Toronto Star. This internal report was described in Allan Woods, “TO SELL CANADA ON WAR, TRY ‘HOPE’ BUT NOT LIBERTY’. February 17, 2007. Retrieved at: http://www.thestar.com/News/article/182857
Perceptions of War 62
Statement both stated that Canadian foreign policy was based on three pillars: physical security, economic prosperity, and the promotion of Canadian values.
Faced with such strong and growing opposition to Canada’s presence in
Afghanistan, Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared that Canada's military role in
Afghanistan would continue past February 2009 only if there were a consensus among political leaders and Canadians. This was a dramatic shift in Steven Harper’s messages which had affirmed until recently that Canada would not "cut and run" from Afghanistan, a message he stressed during a visit to Kandahar on May 23, 2007. Messages such as these add to the public’s lack of confidence in the government and perhaps more distressing to the Conservative government was the continued hardening of Canadians’ positions on the mission in Afghanistan. Public polling showed Canadians had, indeed, been consistently cool to the mission especially as the casualty count increased, and the public’s reaction to the two-year extension was no less chilly. As demonstrated in the opinion polling data (Appendix 4) continued to drop as the casualty increased and Canada got further involved into combat missions.
Proposed Extension
Prime Minister Stephen Harper proposed an extension of Canada's military mission in Afghanistan until 2011, with an emphasis on training Afghan security forces, but would not say whether the mission would continue to include a combat component.
“Our government did not believe that Canada should simply abandon the people of
Afghanistan after February, 2009,” Stephen Harper said in an October 2007, Speech from Perceptions of War 63 the Throne, referring to the current deadline for the Kandahar-based NATO mission.81
Stephen Harper's change of mind received a cool reception from the Liberal opposition.
Liberal Leader Stéphane Dion accused the Prime Minister of ‘creating ambiguity,’ suggesting that if Stephen Harper was responsible, he would advise NATO and
Afghanistan that Canada would be pulling out in 2009. He should be very clear and should say that the combat mission in Kandahar ends in February 2009."82 The
Conservative government had been known to favour extending the Afghan mission, but this was the first time a specific time limit had been given.83 The fickleness shown by the
Liberal government over the mission in Afghanistan appeared to be a response against the
Conservative Government to gain popularity amongst the public whom have continued to voice their uncertainty over Canada’s mission in Afghanistan.
While Canadians held to their core values of peacekeeping, it was apparent that they were uncomfortable with the loss of life that occurred in a combat mission, and that no amount of government messaging was shifting the majority to accept these losses. In an opinion piece for the National Post, Father Raymond J. De Souza notes that “what
Canadians principally know about what is happening in Afghanistan is the casualty figures,” and wonders how the populace can support a war in which there are only casualties. He argues the need for presenting to the Canadian public a “clearer picture of
81 Freeman, Alan. TORIES LOOK TO EXTEND AFGHAN MISSION UNTIL 2011.The Globe and Mail. October 17 2007. Retrieved at: http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2007/10/canada-proposes.html 82 Elmasry, Mohamed. SCARIFYING CANADIANS IS NO HELP TO AFGHANISTAN. June 30, 2007. Retrieved at: http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/44611 83 Freeman, Alan. TORIES LOOK TO EXTEND AFGHAN MISSION UNTIL 2011.The Globe and Mail. October 17 2007. Retrieved at: http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2007/10/canada-proposes.html
Perceptions of War 64 what our troops are accomplishing,” in the interest of permitting a ‘mature public judgment on the policy itself.’
In February 2008, Prime Minister Stephen Harper unveiled a new motion with an end date of 2011 for Canada's militaries combat mission in Afghanistan, a move aimed at bridging the gap between the Conservatives and Liberals. The original Conservative motion would have extended the Afghan mission until at least 2011, but only if NATO provided 1,000 extra troops to reinforce Canada’s efforts. The new motion still had those two conditions, based on recommendations by the panel led by former Liberal Cabinet
Minister John Manley. In its amendment, the Liberal party conceded by stating the mission could be extended with a new focus on reconstruction and training followed by the full withdrawal of Canadian troops by July 2011. Having an end date in the new
Conservative motion was significant.84 A motion such as this would be in accordance with Canadian traditions and values. The militaries role after the extension to 2011 was what was initially perceived, under the Liberal government of Jean Chretien, when
Canada first offered support. Despite John Chretien expectations for Canada’s involvement to be short term and limited, the extension opened the door for humanitarian work, something that was closer to Canada’s traditions in international operations.
Message Clarifications
In his government-commissioned report on Afghanistan, former Liberal Minister
John Manley argued one of the Conservative government’s chief failures with respect to the mission occurred far from the battlefields of Kandahar. If Stephen Harper was
84 CBC News. HARPER UNVEILS NEW AFGHAN MOTION WITH 2011 END DATE: LIBERALS SEEM TO BE PLEASED WITH THE PROPOSED MOTION. February 21, 2008. Retrieved at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/02/21/harper-speech.html
Perceptions of War 65 struggling to get his message about Afghanistan across to Canadians, the message itself may have been the problem. What’s needed now, Manley wrote, was for the government to “engage Canadians in a continuous, frank and constructive dialogue about conditions in Afghanistan and the extent to which Canadian objectives are being achieved.”
Furthermore, the new messaging should above all emphasize “providing more information and analysis on the diplomatic and reconstruction-development dimensions” if the government hoped to get more Canadians on side with the mission.
Peter Donolo, who served as communications director for former Prime Minister
Jean Chrétien, commented that Stephen Harper’s “information deficit needed to be redressed immediately in a comprehensive and balanced communication of open and continuous engagement with Canadians.” He was among many in the bureaucracy who complained that while soldiers were allowed to speak out, officials from CIDA and
Foreign Affairs are barred from talking about their work in Kandahar.
Communication efforts were marred by opposition criticisms of cover-ups on sensitive files, such as detainees, and accusations that the Prime Minister's Office took an active hand in ‘muzzling bureaucrats and cabinet ministers’. All issues related to the
Afghan mission were vetted through the Privy Council Office, the bureaucratic wing of the Prime Minister's Office. That often meant delays when reacting to fast-developing stories, like the detainee issue. “I think the Prime Minister's Office has probably made things worse unnecessarily throughout this whole piece,” said Peter Donolo. The government was paying a price for their top-down, tightly-scripted approach to communications. Perceptions of War 66
The government prepared a media briefing on its Afghan efforts in a bid to show its openness after the criticisms of the Manley report. But the rules forbade the identification of the bureaucrats who spoke at previous briefings. To turn around the flagging communications efforts, experts urged the government to be honest and forthright and let diplomats and development workers tell their stories. “Raise the volume on the developmental side,” said EKOS Research president Frank Graves, urging the government to tap into public interest to hear more about reconstruction efforts in
Kandahar.
Prime Minister Harper said that he accepted the panel's critique of his government's communications work and pledged to do better. He also offered a blunt assessment of the challenges facing the Conservatives, “Let's be truthful...a robust military mission where there are casualties is never going to be easy to communicate and it's never going to be all that popular to communicate.”85 Despite Stephen Harper’s acknowledgement to improve his communication strategy, on March 11, 2008 Stephen
Harper’s Government was confronted with the detainee issue. When the military stopped handing over prisoners on Nov. 6, 2007 because of suspected prisoner abuse, “the government sat on the news. Was this a top-secret security matter? Of course not. The government ultimately released the news itself in a public court document.” 86Sandra
Buckler, Stephen Harper’s spokeswoman, made the claim that the government had not known about the suspension of prisoner transfers; yet later said she "misspoke." The
85 Campion-Smith, Bruce. AFGHAN MISSION TOUGH PR SELL: INSIDER, CRITICS, MANLEY ALL SAY TIGHT-LIPPED STYLE IS FAILING CANADIANS. Feb 04, 2008. Retrieved at: http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/300128 86 DO NOT MISSPEAK TO THE PUBLIC. Globe and Mail Update. March 11, 2008.Retrieved at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080311.wwedetainees11/BNStory/National/ Perceptions of War 67 government's credibility in selling an important mission to Canadians suffered87 mirroring
Paul Martin’s government in also dealing with the issue of prisoner transfers.
The Conservatives and Liberals recognized the imperative of acting in a way that did not undo the work achieved, while imposing a condition of greater help from their allies in the NATO. The question of whether soldiers should engage in "combat" seemed a matter more of semantics than substance; the word was barely mentioned in the
Liberal’s proposed amendment to the Conservative motion.88 The significant disagreement was over the deadline. The Liberal amendment called for the CF to leave
Kandahar by July, 2011. Although Conservative House Leader Peter Van Loan said the
"objective" was to withdraw troops by the end of 2011, the Conservative motion said only that the mission would be reviewed in 2011. It was recommended that the Liberals adjust their position, even given that they had already adjusted to embrace the Manley recommendations. It made no tactical sense to declare what would happen 3 years in the future. Circumstances in Afghanistan might change markedly; Canadian soldiers in
Kandahar might feel on excellent grounds in 2011 that they were part of an operation that should not be cut short. The Conservative motion offered essential flexibility. The argument was put forth that the Liberals should not balk at this.
After a long-overdue domestic debate, Stephen Harper announced that the
Canadian Parliament would vote on March 13, 2008 to keep its soldiers in Afghanistan until 2011 with less concentration on combat and more on training Afghan security
87 DO NOT MISSPEAK TO THE PUBLIC. Globe and Mail Update. March 11, 2008.Retrieved at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080311.wwedetainees11/BNStory/National/ 88 For Full details’ on the conservative Motion on Afghanistan see: http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/revised-motion-afghanistan.html
Perceptions of War 68 forces. Retired Major-General Lewis Mackenzie suggested that publicly setting a date for pulling troops out of a war zone could embolden the enemy. Defence Minister MacKay rejected this idea by emphasizing that Canadians would continue to be engaged in rebuilding Afghanistan after the combat mission ended. “We will…be there, and the role will change,” he said, “We'll emphasize the humanitarian aspect, continue with training, continue with our people there that are both with the domestic police and maybe on the military side to build…capacity."89
CHAPTER FIVE
A Comparative Analysis of Responses
Initial Reactions ‘Early in-early out’ was the phrase that surrounded the mindset of Canada’s military and Liberal Government in late 2001 as arrangements were made for Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. Defence Minister Art Eggleton stated that the idea would be to go in “on the first wave, help establish the stabilization, the basis for ongoing peace support operations that would come after…but then turned it over to somebody else.” The
Canadian Government stated that it went to Afghanistan to help the country establish lasting peace and prosperity, to thereby avoid any future extremism and instability both in, and stemming from, Afghanistan. Peace and stability in Canada and the rest of the world was clearly linked to bringing lasting peace and prosperity to Afghanistan.
89 CBC NEWS.CA. ENDING AFGHAN MISSION IN 2011 IS NO ‘CUT AND RUN’, MacKay says. September 14, 2008. Retrieved at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/09/14/afghan-mission-end.html
Perceptions of War 69
The book The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar, suggested that “Canada slipped into war in Afghanistan step by step, incrementally, without fully understanding that it was going to war.” There was never a medium- or long-term Afghanistan policy, the authors concluded. The book also asserted that the Department of Foreign Affairs has been gutted since the 1990s and rarely coordinated with the Canadian International
Development Agency. The members of Jean Chrétien’s Liberal Government were initially uncertain as to what role the Canadian military would, should or could play in
Afghanistan. Prime Minister Chrétien stated that Canada would contribute a range of air, land and sea forces to the international force being formed to conduct a campaign against terrorism. This was thought to be the extent of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan as a response to September 11th to show Canada’s support towards the United States and remain out of Iraq. To the public’s knowledge Canada’s participation would indirectly support the mission in Afghanistan, at low risk, allowing for little political controversy at home or abroad. At this time public support was high, appealing to the aftershock of
September 11th and towards the need to feel secure within their borders.
It was stressed to the public that Canada’s mission was “not an offensive mission, not a front-line mission. This was a stabilization mission to assist in opening corridors for humanitarian assistance.”90 Statements were made to secure public support in the more traditional way to which the Canadian public was accustomed to. Words and ideals, known to the Canadian public from past international operations, were used to elicit public support. The high percentage of public support initially reflected that the Canadian public agreed with the Liberal Governments appeal to the threats to global security;
90 Stein, Janice Gross and Lang, Eugene. THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR. Viking Canada, 2007. Pg15 Perceptions of War 70 however, the strong public support was based on the public’s personal and national security and an appeal to traditional Canadian humanitarian inclinations. Messages were directed at protecting Canada’s own national security while at the same time providing a safe and secure environment for the Afghan people. Positive public support was conditional based on Canada’s involvement being short term and with little combative involvement. When presented with the potential for Canada to move further into a combative role, public support would drop dramatically, especially with Canadian’s under the impression that Canada would be further exposed Canada to terrorist attacks.91
Selective information was presented to the Canadian public concerning Canada’s full involvement overseas. Mixed messaging, over the roles of the Canadian Forces, the
JTF2 and prisoner transferring came from within the Liberal Government soon caused the public to start questioning Canada’s role and mission in Afghanistan. Canadians began to realize that the mission in Afghanistan could be more than the ‘early in- early out’ commitment as stated only a few months earlier.
Mid-term Reactions
From August 2003, the CF served as part of the NATO-led ISAF in Kabul, protecting the new Afghanistan government. In December of 2003, there was not only a transition in government from Jean Chrétien’s to the new Liberal Leader, Paul Martin, but also a significant transition within the Afghanistan mission when ISAF was absorbed into
NATO. The absorption of ISAF into NATO resulted in Canada expanding its presence
91 While the majority (73%) agree that Canada should join the United States and also declare war on international terrorism it is conditional as support falls to just over half (54%) if war exposes Canadian civilians to attack by terrorists 55% believe there are international terrorists within Canada just waiting to attack Canadian civilians — only 39% are confident that the Government of Canada and its Security Services are capable of preventing terrorist attacks in Canada. September 21, 2001 category societal issues, Foreign Affairs & Policy .Location Canada Retrieved at: http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=1307&email=friend Perceptions of War 71 and its role in Afghanistan. It was perceived by Paul Martin that Afghanistan was Jean
Chrétien’s project and was now something he had to do more then something he wanted to do. Initially, Paul Martin focused on rebuilding the relationship with the US that had faltered, in his opinion, through the previous Liberal Government.
The relatively safe mission attracted little attention in Canada until 2004 when
Canada volunteered to take over responsibility for the far more dangerous province of
Kandahar. Paul Martin’s Government was widely criticized, with speculations that his tardy decision making resulted in Canada’s PRT move to Kandahar, to staying too close to the Americans and wanting to please them. Paul Martin’s decision to extend Canada’s mission into Kandahar was the first indication to the public on the different priorities the new Liberal Government would have. As the Canadian Forces got more involved and were committed further into the high combat areas, the public began to question if this mission was the right one for Canada. A drop in public support would soon start to appear as the public became increasingly aware that Canadian’s were not just in for the short run, nor in a low-risk, traditional peacekeeping role. In addition, Canada’s involvement in this mission was hoped to make Canadians proud of the government and the military. Despite the pride Canadians felt for their military, their support for the mission would continue to waver as a result of the limited messages from Paul Martin’s Government in addition to the open debate from the previous liberal leader, Jean Chrétien.
Current Reactions
Stephen Harper made the mission in Afghanistan his own, making more attempts at letting the public know more about the progress of the mission. The Conservative Perceptions of War 72
Governments intent, behind their messaging, stressed the status and prestige of Canada’s participation in the global community and, presented the mission to be a step beyond the
Liberals traditional peacekeeping messages. Canada’s mission left the Harper
Government with the challenge of putting together a simple message about an intricate situation.92 It was suggested that the Conservatives choose a more effective approach to persuade Canadians to look at the long-term view as compared to committing their support to short-term missions and let the results speak for themselves. According to
Littlewood, the Conservative Government needed to convince Canadians what they “had to look at was not the week-to-week, or even month-to-month issues but where Canada was in, 2002 or 2005, compared to where Canada is in 2008 and where Canada might be in 2010 or 2011.” Despite the fact that there was an increase in public messaging by the
Conservative Government and a noticeable increase in public polling, the public continued to be uncertain over the mission in Afghanistan especially with the increased casualty rates. This humanitarian aspect of the mission was often forgotten when discussing Canada's participation in Afghanistan, yet it could be the most important part of the mission.
Trend Analysis of Public Perceptions
Despite recognising that Afghanistan represents one of Canada's most important foreign policy endeavours thus far, Canada entered Afghanistan in it’s comfort zone, and slowly but surely got enveloped into an escalated situation. The obstacles that the
92 Gohier, Philippe. 2008. THE ART OF (SELLING) WAR. Apr 10, 2008. Retrieved at: http://www.macleans.ca/canada/national/article.jsp?content=20080410_110848_5424
Perceptions of War 73
Government of the day had to deal with in constructing a positive shift in public opinion included: the belief that Canadian troops were there due to pressure from the US; difficulties in understanding the link between the military presence and the humanitarian and reconstruction aspects of the mission; and the imbalance in the distribution and burden sharing among allies in Afghanistan. The decline of the public opinion was indicative of a lack of understanding of the operational environment in which Canadian troops were engaged.
It became apparent that even the Government of the day did not intend for
Canada’s mission to be anything other than what they communicated initially resulting in the appearance of a lack of clarity in the messaging. Initially, the strong level of support for the CF deployment was primarily based on the emotional support for the CF overseas in addition to the perception that the mission would be short-term rather than a clear understanding of the mission. The shifting of Canada’s public opinion suggested an initial lack of understanding by the public of the operational environment in which Canadian troops were engaged. Public polling also demonstrated that opinions shifted as public acknowledgement of the actual, evolving nature of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.
There is a correlation between the public’s support and the extent to which the CF got further involved into combat missions. Having dealt with only a few military casualties over the past half-century, Canadians soon recognized the reality of Canada’s high risk, and emerging combat mission as the flag-draped coffins returned home. A public that had long seen its military as Peacekeeping Forces had trouble adjusting to its forces engaging in high risk, unconventional missions. (Appendix 5)
Perceptions of War 74
View Mission as a War 80 Support For Mission in Afghanistan 70 Soldier Causulties
60
50 Causulties Number of
40
30
20
10 10
5
0% 0 March March June June Sept Sept April April April May May May Nov Nov July Aug Nov Dec July Aug Nov Dec Feb Jan Oct Oct Oct Oct
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Relating the Decline in Public Support, the Increase in Canadian Casualties and
Canadians Perceiving Canada’s Mission as War93
93 Gregg, Kelly, Sullivan & Woolstencroft: The Strategic Counsel. A Report To The Globe and Mail and CTV. The State of Canadian Public. Opinion on Afghanistan, Conrad. Black July 16,2006. Retrieved at http://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls/2007- 07-16%20GMCTV%20July%2012-15.pdf Gregg, Kelly, Sullivan & Woolstencroft: The Strategic Counsel. A Report To The Globe and Mail and CTV. North Korea, Afghanistan & Liberal Leadership. Oct 16,2006. Retrieved at http://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls/2006-10- 16%20GMCTV%20Oct%2012-15%20(Oct%2016).pdf Perceptions of War 75
CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion
There were three major decisions that Canada made in regards to its commitments in Afghanistan. The first decision was in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when Jean
Chrétien’s Liberal government, deployed its Special Forces (JTF-2), and ground troops to assist US efforts. For the first time since the Korean War, Canadian troops were deployed into an explicit ground combat mission. The second decision occurred in February 2003 when the Jean Chrétien’s Liberal Government sent additional ground troops to Kabul as
Gregg, Kelly, Sullivan & Woolstencroft: The Strategic Counsel. A Report To The Globe and Mail and CTV. Post Liberal Convention. Dec 3, 2006. Retrieved at http://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls/2006-12- 3%20GMCTV%20Dec%203%20(Dec3)3%20r.pdf Gregg, Kelly, Sullivan & Woolstencroft: The Strategic Counsel. A Report To The Globe and Mail and CTV. Economy, Leader Positive/Negatives, Afghanistan, Carbon Tax. Jan 14, 2008. Retrieved at http://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls/2008- 01-14%20GMCTV%20Jan%2010-131.pdf Ipsos Reid. Category Societal Issues, Foreign Affairs & Policy. Location Canada. Retrieved at: http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=1307&email=friend Wright John . CATEGORY SOCIETAL ISSUES, FOREIGN AFFAIRS & POLICY. January 13, 2002. Location Canada. Retrieved at: http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=1397 Wright, John. “FRIENDLY FIRE” IN AFGHANISTAN. While Just Under Half (46%) of Canadians Agree that In War, These Types of Tragic Incidents Happen, a Majority (52%) Disagree. April 21, 2002. Category Societal Issues, Foreign Affairs & Policy Location Canada. Retrieved at: http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=1486
Perceptions of War 76 part of NATO’s ISAF. Their mandate was to provide security assistance to the interim
Afghan government and prepare for Presidential and Parliamentary elections. The third decision occurred in May 2005 when Paul Martin’s Liberal Government announced the withdrawal of its forces from Kabul and their re-deployment in Kandahar in February
2006. The CF would form one of the PRTs that would be assigned to different NATO countries and would be spread out across Afghanistan.
The issues to explore were whether the declining public support was due to the public’s lack of knowledge, lack of effectiveness of the message or the messengers, or the lack of comfort Canadians had towards their troops becoming more involved in unconventional operations involving combat, and away from the traditional role as peacekeepers. As demonstrated in the declining public support, Canadians were staunchly averse to sending their troops into a high risk mission and continued to object to the new role into which the CF were directed. Various justifications for Canada’s involvement in
Afghanistan have been offered to the public such as that Afghanistan was an exercise in national security, the fulfillment of multilateral obligations, a humanitarian mission, and an attempt to rebuild a failed and fragile country. Despite the various objective messages given, public polls made it apparent that although the government may not have been consistent with the objectives of the mission in Afghanistan, no matter what the message at the time was, the public objected to Canada’s involvement in a combat mission.
Most Canadians were not well informed about why Canada went to Afghanistan, why they are still there or why Canada should stay. Informing Canadian public opinion as to the relevance of their country’s commitment to Afghanistan has been a particular challenge and will remain so. It is not as easy as defining a strategic context in which to Perceptions of War 77 operate. Canada’s mission in Afghanistan has continually changed and evolved as the mission progresses. Despite the public’s perceptions of Canada’s mission being directed towards peacekeeping, the Conservative and Liberal Governments did not present the changing rules of engagement as anything more. Canadians clearly demonstrated that they were not prepared to move outside their traditional zones as lower risk peacekeepers.
It is important to note that despite the public’s hesitation towards the CF involvement in higher risk, combat missions, there was an increase in the level of support as the governments revealed more information on the mission.
Canada stands at an important crossroads in what was decidedly a bold demonstration of leadership on the world stage. Canada’s mission was a great opportunity to implement its long held stance on spreading democratic ideals to the world. The hypothesis for this paper was that intended messaging was effective in maintaining public support in risky, overseas deployments as long as it appealed to the core values of the public and was actively engaged in open dialogue with civil society. The opposite was also thought to be true, that intended messaging was less effective when it focuses on objectives that were not in line with the core values of the public and when dialogue and information sharing was not vigorous. As demonstrated in the polling results, public support did increase when more information was given despite the public’s uncertainty over the evolving combative role of the CF missions.
This research paper tested the effectiveness of government messaging during the specific time of the high-risk international deployment to Afghanistan. It was hoped that the findings of this research would contribute to an understanding of how messaging could be used to influence the public’s views and confidence. However, once it was Perceptions of War 78 established that the mission was not “early in-early out”, and Canada received its first casualties, the support dropped and although it did fluctuate some over time, the general public support remained the same with an overall impression of the public not supporting the new combat roles for Canadian troops. Perceptions of War 79
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Appendix 1 Military Technical Agreement94
Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’)
Preamble
Referring to the ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’, signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001, (‘Bonn Agreement’), The Interim Administration welcomes the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386.
The ISAF welcomes the Interim Administration’s commitment in the Bonn Agreement to co-operate with the international community in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime and to respect international law and maintain peaceful and friendly relations with neighboring countries and the rest of the international community.
Article I: General Obligations
1. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the Bonn Agreement requires a major contribution on its part and will make strenuous efforts to co-operate with the ISAF and with the international organizations and agencies which are assisting it.
2. Interim Administration understands and agrees the Mission of the ISAF is to assist it in the maintenance of the security in the area of responsibility as defined below at Article I paragraph 4(g).
3. The Interim Administration agrees to provide the ISAF with any information relevant to the security and safety of the ISAF mission, its personnel, equipment and locations.
4. For the purposes of this Military Technical Agreement, the following expressions shall have the meaning described below: a. ‘The Parties’ are the Interim Administration and the ISAF. b. ‘ISAF’ includes all military personnel together with their aircraft, vehicles, armored vehicles, stores, equipment, communications, ammunition, weapons and provisions as well as the civilian components of such forces, air and surface movement resources and their support services. c. The ‘Interim Administration’ is the organization as detailed in the Bonn Agreement.
94Crown Copyright/MOD 2001 For details on ISAF’s Area of Responsibility (AOR), see “Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’),” 31 December 2001. Note Article I paragraphs (2) and (4)(g) and Annex B: AOR: Kabul and its Surrounding Areas. Available online at: http://www.operations.mod.uk/isafmta.doc. Perceptions of War 85
d. ‘Military Units’ includes all Afghan factions, armed representatives or personnel with a military capability, to include all mujahidin, armed forces, and armed groups, other than the 'Police Force' defined at paragraph 4 e. The definition of ‘Military Units’ in this context does not include the ISAF, Coalition Forces or other recognized national military forces. e. The Interim Administration ‘Police Force’ means individuals who have been formally appointed as Police by the Interim Administration, are recognizable, and carry official identification. The Police Force includes the national security police, the criminal police, the uniform police, the traffic police and the border police. f. ‘Host Nation Support’ (HNS) is the civil and military assistance rendered by the Interim Administration to the ISAF within Afghanistan. g. Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the area marked out on the map attached at Annex B. h. ‘Coalition Forces’ are those national military elements of the US led international coalition prosecuting the ‘War on Terrorism’ within Afghanistan. The ISAF is not part of the ‘Coalition Forces’. i. An ‘Offensive Action’ is any use of armed military force. j. Designated Barracks to be agreed between the parties and to be detailed at Annex C. 5. It is understood and agreed that once the ISAF is established, its membership may change.
Article II: Status of the International Security Assistance Force
1. The arrangements regarding the Status of the ISAF are at Annex A.
Article III: Provision of Security and Law and Order
1. The Interim Administration recognizes that the provision of security and law and order is their responsibility. This will include maintenance and support of a recognized Police Force operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and Afghanistan law and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, and by taking other measures as appropriate.
2. The Interim Administration will ensure that all Afghan Military Units come under its command and control in accordance with the Bonn Agreement. The Interim Administration agrees it will return all Military Units based in Kabul into designated barracks detailed at Annex C as soon as possible. Such units will not leave those Barracks without the prior approval of the Interim Administration and notification to the ISAF Commander by the Chairman of the Interim Administration.
3. The Interim Administration will refrain from all Offensive Actions within the AOR.
4. A Joint coordinating Body (JCB) will meet on a regular basis. The JCB will comprise of designated Interim Administration officials and senior ISAF representatives. The Perceptions of War 86 purpose of the JCB will be to discuss current and forthcoming issues and to resolve any disputes that may arise.
Article IV: Deployment of the ISAF
1. UNSCR 1386 authorizes the establishment for six months of an international force to assist the Interim Administration in the maintenance of security in the AOR. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF is the international force authorized by UNSCR 1386 and may be composed of ground, air and maritime units from the international community.
2. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF Commander will have the authority, without interference or permission, to do all that the Commander Judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the ISAF and it’s Mission.
3. The Interim Administration understands and agrees the ISAF will have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement throughout the territory and airspace of Afghanistan. The ISAF will agree with the Interim Administration its use of any areas or facilities needed to carry out its responsibilities as required for its support, training and operations, with such advance notice as may be practicable.
4. In consultation with the Interim Administration, the ISAF Commander is authorized to promulgate appropriate rules for the control and regulation of surface military traffic throughout the AOR.
5. The ISAF will have the right to utilize such means and services as required to ensure its full ability to communicate and will have the right to the 5 unrestricted use of all of the electromagnetic spectrum, free of charge, for this purpose. In implementing this right, the ISAF will make every reasonable effort to co-ordinate with and take into account the needs and requirements of the Interim Administration.
Article V: Illustrative Tasks of the ISAF
1. The ISAF will undertake a range of tasks in Kabul and surrounding areas in support of its Mission. ISAF will make every reasonable effort to coordinate with and take into account the needs and requirements of the Interim Administration. Possible tasks, which may be undertaken jointly with Interim Administration Forces, will include protective patrolling.
2. By mutual agreement between the ISAF Commander and the Interim Administration the ISAF may: a. Assist the Interim Administration in developing future security structures. b. Assist the Interim Administration in reconstruction. Perceptions of War 87
c. Identify and arrange training and assistance tasks for future Afghan security forces.
3. The ISAF will liaise with such political, social and religious leaders as necessary to ensure that religious, ethnic and cultural sensitivities in Afghanistan are appropriately respected by the ISAF.
Article VI: Identification
1. ISAF personnel will wear uniforms and may carry arms if authorized by their orders. Police Force personnel, when on duty, will be visibly identified by uniform or other distinctive markings and may carry arms if authorized by the Interim Administration.
Article VII: Final Authority to Interpret
1. The ISAF Commander is the final authority regarding interpretation of this Military Technical Agreement.
Article VIII: Summary
1. The purposes of the obligations and responsibilities set out in this Arrangement are as follows: a. To provide the necessary support and technical arrangements for the ISAF to conduct its Mission. b. To outline the responsibilities of the Interim Administration in relation to the ISAF.
Article IX: Final Provisions
1. Certified copies of this Military Technical Agreement will be supplied in Dari and Pashto language versions. For the purposes of interpretation the English language version of this Military Technical Agreement is authoritative.
Perceptions of War 88
Appendix 2
Do Canadians Support or Oppose Sending Troops to Afghanistan, July 18, 200695
95Gregg, Kelly, Sullivan & Woolstencroft: The Strategic Counsel. A Report To The Globe and Mail and CTV. Perceptions of the Conservative Government, Troops in Afghanistan and Terrorism. July 18, 2006. Retrieved athttp://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls/2006-07-18%20GMCTV%20July%2013-16%20(Jul%2018).pdf Perceptions of War 89
Appendix 3
Do Canadians Support or Oppose Sending Troops to Afghanistan, May 5, 200696
96 Gregg, Kelly, Sullivan & Woolstencroft: The Strategic Counsel. A Report To The Globe and Mail and CTV. A Report To The Globe and Mail and CTV Federal Budget, Afghanistan. May 5, 2006. Retrieved at http://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls/2006-04-10%20GMCTV%20May3-4%20(May%205).pdf
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Appendix 4
Canadian Public Support for Afghanistan Mission, July 200797
97 Gregg, Kelly, Sullivan & Woolstencroft: The Strategic Counsel. A Report To The Globe and Mail and CTV. HSRP,The Strategic Counsel;icasualties.org. Retrieved at http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2007/07/canadian-public.html Perceptions of War 91
Appendix 5
Canadian Casualties: Is it The Price We Pay, or is The Price Too High?98
98 Gregg, Kelly, Sullivan & Woolstencroft: The Strategic Counsel. A Report To The Globe and Mail and CTV The State of Canadian Public Opinion on Afghanistan, Conrad Black. July 16, 2007.Retrieved at: http://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls/2007- 07-16%20GMCTV%20July%2012-15.pdf Perceptions of War 92
Appendix 6
Do Canadians Support or Oppose Sending Troops to Afghanistan?99
99 Gregg, Kelly, Sullivan & Woolstencroft: The Strategic Counsel. A Report To The Globe and Mail and CTV The State of Canadian Public Opinion on Afghanistan, Conrad Black. July 16, 2007. Retrieved at: http://www.thestrategiccounsel.com/our_news/polls/2007- 07-16%20GMCTV%20July%2012-15.pdf
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Timeline
Oct. 7, 2001: The U.S. starts bombing Afghanistan, following Sept. 11 and the ruling Taliban's refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden without proof that he organized the terrorist attacks.
Then-prime minister Jean Chrétien announces Canada will join the U.S.-led war on terror. Operation Apollo starts shortly after. Canada's first move is to send warships to the Persian Gulf. Initial commitments involve about 750 Canadian Forces members.
November 2001: Backed by the U.S., the Northern Alliance marches into Kabul, the country's capital. Taliban fighters retreat to the south, the east and into Pakistan. An interim authority takes over, headed by Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader from Kandahar.
April 18, 2002: Americans accidentally bomb Canadian soldiers, killing four and wounding eight, marking the first deaths for Canada.
Summer 2003: Operation Athena starts Canada's contribution to the UN-led International Security Assistance Force, which includes a commitment of 2,000 Canadian troops. The operation's goal is to build Afghan national security forces, support infrastructure and suppress insurgency and terrorism.
Oct. 9, 2004: Afghanistan holds a presidential election selecting Karzai. Parliamentary elections follow about a year later.
Feb. 13, 2005: The Liberal government announces Canada will increase the number of troops in Afghanistan from 600 to 1,200 by the summer.
Jan. 23, 2006: Conservatives form minority government following the federal election.
May 17, 2006: Conservative government extends mission by two years. The motion passes 149 to 145, with 30 Liberals supporting. New pull-out date is early 2009. Canada has spent $4.1 billion on Afghanistan operations since Sept. 11, 2001.
July 31, 2006: NATO takes over military operations in southern Afghanistan, the area where the Taliban mostly are. About 8,000 NATO soldiers are deployed, including 2,200 Canadian soldiers. Perceptions of War 94
October 2007: Prime Minster Stephen Harper calls for an independent panel, led by John Manley, to come up with recommendations on the nature and length of Canada's role in Afghanistan. The move comes after heated debates in Parliament and among Canadians.
Jan. 22, 2008: The Manley Report is released, mainly stating Canada would cause more harm than good by immediately pulling out. The Report recommends Canada stay beyond February 2009 on two conditions: That NATO sends about 1,000 more troops to Kandahar and that the government helps with helicopters and aerial surveillance. The report also recommends Canada focus more on diplomacy and reconstruction.
Jan. 17, 2008: There are three Canadian operations in Afghanistan: Operation Athena (2,500 troops), Operation Archer and Operation Argus.
March 13, 2008: Conservatives pass motion, with Liberal support and revisions, to extend the mission to 2011, with a focus on reconstruction and training Afghan troops. The vote is 198 to 77. If the Liberals had not supported the motion, it would have triggered an election.