Conference on Disarmament Statement by Ambassador

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ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

STATEMENT

AMBASSADOR AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ DIRECTOR-GENERAL

ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

GENEVA

5 September 2017

Mr. President, Mr Secretary General,

Please accept my felicitations on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference is assured of able leadership as you bring to this position a wealth of knowledge, experience and diplomatic skills. I wish you every success.

I am delighted and indeed honoured to address the CD. This forum embodies the spirit of an era of resolve to banish war in favour of peace – peace based on a durable foundation of international cooperation, development and the rejection of the tools of war that are regarded as illegitimate.

The twentieth century witnessed the trauma of two world wars within a span of a few decades that brought ruin on a scale never seen before in human history. Technology magnified the destructive power of weapons in ways not thought possible.

These harrowing experiences united the entire world community in an aspiration to live together in harmony. A community of nations traumatised by extreme and pervasive violence found it possible to reignite the lost glow and warmth of shared values and norms as a basis for inter-state relations.

Ironically, just as people were constructing a new beginning, the nuclear age was dawning.

The destruction seen as a result of years of warfare could now happen in a matter of minutes.

A well-thought out and systematic pursuit of disarmament eventually took shape of which the CD is a salient manifestation. It is rightly recognised as the "sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" of the international community.

My association with this body before I took up my responsibilities as the Director- General of the OPCW in 2010 brings back fond memories. Despite the difficulties and the somewhat adverse light in which the CD currently finds itself, this is a forum unique in its character, collegial in its atmosphere and indispensable in its purpose.

It has an immense potential and unique expertise as the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) testifies. That example alone can inspire the Conference to seek out the common ground necessary for disarmament initiatives to fructify.

This product of the CD is an extraordinary treaty in more than one respect.

In its essentials, it is an international legal instrument that comprehensively prohibits chemical weapons. Yet such familiar descriptions do not fully account for the ground- breaking advance the Convention has made not only in the field of disarmament but also in the promotion of humanitarian values.

A prohibition on the use of excessive or indiscriminate force and stipulations to protect civilians in times of armed conflict are of longstanding validity and importance. These are fundamental ethical and moral principles of universal appeal.

These also inform every effort expended against weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation. Once codified in international treaties, the observance of these norms is no longer a mere moral necessity but a binding legal obligation.

In the CWC, the Conference on Disarmament has the distinction of having codified the customary rules against the use of poison as a method of warfare into a comprehensive and verifiable legal prohibition – a regime that has developed and adapted with time and effort and is now accepted by nearly every country in the world.

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This year we are commemorating two decades of successful operation of this treaty and the work of its implementing body the OPCW. The nature of global developments makes it necessary that our deserved sense of fulfilment be accompanied by a renewal of resolve, for there remains business that is unfinished and challenges that are serious.

In these twenty years, our goal of completely eliminating an entire category of weapons of mass destruction has been pursued steadily. Not many around the world were aware of the existence of the OPCW until the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Organisation.

This honour constitutes a recognition that the norm against chemical weapons and their use has been strengthened and the goals of peace and security well served. Today, any allegation of use of chemical weapons evokes prompt concern and any confirmation brings about immediate condemnation.

OPCW’s work has involved a multiplicity of tasks. The results are historically unprecedented in the context of international efforts to verifiably eliminate weapons of mass destruction.

The Organisation has conducted extensive verification of destruction of chemical weapons as well as thousands of inspections in the chemical industry. Importantly, it has also established good practices in several areas relevant to preventing the re- emergence of chemical weapons. These include the monitoring of transfers,

3 encouraging and facilitating the joining of the Convention by states, assistance and protection against chemical weapons, engaging the global public, undertaking tasks in international cooperation, capacity building, and knowledge sharing, and promoting the peaceful uses of chemistry.

96% of all declared stockpiles of chemical weapons have been successfully destroyed. China and Japan continue to make good progress in eradicating the legacy of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of China.

Nearly 3500 industry inspections have been conducted globally and thousands of beneficiaries of international cooperation programmes from across the world are contributing to the implementation of the Convention in their countries as well as for the betterment of their societies.

The Convention was negotiated as a permanent ban on chemical weapons. Eliminating declared stockpiles and verification activities in the chemical industry are key tasks. So is international cooperation for peaceful activities. But these programmes do not define the Convention. The CWC is a prohibition of enduring validity. The tasks undergo change over time. But the global ban remains integral.

At this juncture, our single most important preoccupation is crafting a unified vision that will ensure lasting value of the norm and its protection well into the future.

With the complete elimination of declared arsenals within sight, a part of our work that has all these years taken up the major share of our attention and resources will conclude. The prohibition on chemical weapons will however remain as valid as ever. And an effective, well-resourced Organisation will continue to be essential.

First, its defining mission will become the prevention of re-emergence of chemical weapons. And second, a robust and efficient Organisation will ensure that effective mechanisms to promote the norm and to enforce the prohibition remain available to the international community.

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The objective of prevention is made more complex by the continuing advances in science and technology as well as new security challenges. Instead of sequential thinking, we need to work simultaneously on multiple fronts.

While developments in science and technology herald a better future they will also inevitably impact the Convention’s verification regime. Advances in chemistry, chemical technology and engineering are rapidly transforming the global chemical industry.

This makes it necessary for us to have the ability to detect new chemicals and to determine if they are relevant to the Convention. The growing interaction between biology and chemistry is also creating the potential for the production of dangerous chemicals through new techniques and methods. We need to acquire a better understanding of such developments and to follow them closely.

This is a function that is admirably performed by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board. Comprising eminent experts from 25 States Parties, the Board deliberates on all relevant scientific and technological developments and regularly issues its reports and recommendations advising in particular on monitoring progress on science, evaluating its impact for the Convention and how the Secretariat can prepare itself for future verification tasks.

At the same time, progress in science also offers opportunities for improving verification and protection measures.

The effective use of new scientific methods and procedures promises the ability to detect the presence of chemical warfare agents through improved sample collection and analysis. Sampling and analysis have been crucial in our recent missions to determine the validity of allegations of use of chemical weapons.

One of our recent initiatives pertains to upgrading the OPCW Chemical Laboratory to a Center for Chemistry and Technology. We therefore hope to augment OPCW’s Science and Technology capabilities to fully address the threat of chemical weapons, as well as to support capacity building in our States Parties. Under this initiative, the OPCW Laboratory will be expanded and bolstered with additional capabilities. It is my hope that States Parties and other partners will fully support this venture as it is part of a package of measures that I consider important for consolidating the role of the Organisation in international security.

In a related move, this year, I established a Temporary Working Group of the Scientific Advisory Board to conduct an in-depth review of the methods and technologies used in our investigative work. This Group will identify the capabilities, skill sets and equipment needed to augment and strengthen the Secretariat’s capacities to conduct contingency operations.

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Mr President,

It is not possible to consider measures for promoting international security without addressing the pervasive threat of terrorism. Hardly any international organisation has remained insulated from its impact. Recent incidents include the use of toxic chemicals as weapons of terror.

As the global system evolves, international organisations have to adapt to meet this threat and thus remain true to the expectations of the international community.

When the OPCW was established, chemical terrorism did not loom as the danger it currently is. So while an anti-terrorism role is not explicitly mentioned in the Convention, both the prohibition as well as the prevention and response aspects of the Convention offer it as an effective bulwark against terrorism. The fact of the matter is that the international community has at its disposal an asset with expertise and capacity to promote its counter-terrorism objectives in so far as they relate to the chemical domain.

The CWC already has a sound legal framework. Effective enforcement of this framework would serve to criminalise the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons or their use by all natural or legal persons under the jurisdiction of individual States Parties.

In other words, the full and effective implementation of the Convention under the domestic laws of all 192 of our Member States and greater controls over substances of concern is the best prescription to prevent acts of chemical terrorism.

National legislation and the means to enforce it create the domestic capacity to monitor, to report, and to guide activities involving chemicals along peaceful and productive lines.

We assist our States Parties in this important area through training programmes, information-sharing and capacity-building activities. These are designed to promote best practices in legal processes and enforcement.

The spectre of chemical terrorism demands more effective multilateral coordination.

The OPCW’s Open-ended Working Group on Terrorism explores ways and means for enhanced interaction and coordination with relevant international bodies. A Sub- Working Group focusses particular attention on the problem of non-State actors.

We also have an active partnership with the United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). Together with the IAEA, the OPCW co-chairs the working group on preventing and responding to WMD terrorist attacks with chemical or biological weapons.

Domestic implementation of the CWC has continually improved. Over the years we have created and improved upon programmes that assist our States Parties in this regard including through internships for legal drafters and reviews by the Secretariat of drafts of implementing legislation.

UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) represents an important instrument for denying weapons of mass destruction capabilities to non-state actors. At its heart lies essentially the same notion of effective national legal frameworks and enforcement ability. The OPCW, with its institutional capacity, experience and implementation support record, is uniquely placed to advance the objectives of that resolution.

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The CWC includes assurances of security for its States Parties in terms of assistance and protection against chemical weapons. We have worked extensively with our member states to ensure that an effective emergency response capacity is available at all times should the need ever arise.

As part of such preparedness, the OPCW has established a Rapid Response and Assistance Mission (RRAM), which can be deployed upon request from States Parties. The RRAM can quickly provide emergency measures of assistance in the case of use of chemical weapons. The RRAM is equipped with analytical equipment to detect toxic chemicals, secure the affected area, and provide assistance to victims.

Importantly, the team is enabled to cooperate and coordinate with UN and other relevant international organisations. In January, we tested the RRAM at a table-top exercise held in the framework of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (UNCTITF) at OPCW headquarters. The exercise clearly demonstrated that should the worst occur, we as international organisations must respond collectively, as well as individually, drawing on the strengths of each agency.

The OPCW also works with States Parties to develop national and regional capacities to manage and mitigate the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. This is achieved through a comprehensive programme of training and capacity building for first responders and other relevant agencies in States Parties.

This training programme facilitates the exchange of skills and expertise among practitioners, with an emphasis on regional cooperation. The benefit of this approach is that the same skills and capacities equip first responders to also deal with industrial accidents or other scenarios involving toxic chemicals.

Advancements, particularly in the life sciences, offer opportunities for developing better medical counter-measures for those affected by exposure to hazardous chemicals, as well as treatment for the longer-term effects of such exposure.

Developments in material sciences and nanotechnology have allowed for the production of vastly improved protective equipment, thus ensuring the health and safety of those who are exposed to chemicals, both in response to chemical attacks as well as accidents.

Through OPCW cooperation programmes, our States Parties are made aware of the benefits of such advances which they can utilise to improve upon their own national protection and response capacities.

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The objective of preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons requires greater education and outreach efforts. It will benefit from an expansion in our interaction and through deepening our relationships with key partners in science, academia and industry.

To this end, the OPCW has established an Advisory Board on Education and Outreach. This body guides the development of new activities, and teaching tools to increase awareness of the dangers posed by the possible misuse of dual-use technology.

They also help us to disseminate our message to universities and schools in order to nurture a culture of responsible science. The goal is to develop and promote professional ethics that support the aims of the CWC.

Mr President,

Over the last twenty-years, the CWC and the OPCW have made a major contribution of the international goals of peace and security.

The Organisation was able to take up one of its greatest challenges because of the resilience of the Convention and the political will of its States Parties. I am referring to our mission in Syria, certain aspects of which still remain outstanding.

We were mandated with an operation to remove and eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons in the midst of a civil war, through a joint mission with the UN. This mission relied on the commitment and dedication of the OPCW staff backed up by the coordinated support of the European Union and States Parties who provided technical, financial and political assistance for the mission.

Our work in Syria however did not end with the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons production capacity and the removal and destruction of its declared chemical weapons.

In 2014, I established a Fact-Finding Mission to investigate allegations of use of chlorine as a chemical weapon in Syria. Since that time, nineteen separate missions have been deployed. In a number of cases the results have confirmed with a high level of confidence the use of toxic chemicals and sulfur mustard as weapons.

The investigation into the widely reported incident at Khan Shaykhun, on 4 April this year confirmed that this was indeed an attack involving the use of sarin as a chemical weapon.

I have strongly condemned this atrocity that reportedly killed nearly 100 people, including children, and injured hundreds of others. It is a blatant violation of the norms of the Convention and an unacceptable mode of behaviour.

Attributing responsibility for the use of chemical weapons is not within the remit of the FFM. This function has been assigned by the UN Security Council to the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM).

The FFM mechanism, important in its own right also serves to highlight the ability of the CWC regime to deal with unexpected contingencies.

In the case of the FFM, the OPCW uses methods and methodologies rooted in the provisions of the Convention concerning investigations of alleged use. These need to be adapted to the particular circumstances and dynamics in Syria that preclude in most cases the freedom of access to areas of interest within Syria and therefore to the application of forensic approaches of investigation.

With an armed attack on the first FFM when it attempted to reach a scene intended for investigation, the choice before the international community was between no investigations at all or investigations that would apply procedures and methods that are recognised as legitimate under various international fact finding missions. Inaction was not an option. It would reinforce impunity and cause irreparable damage to the CWC regime.

The Fact Finding Mission remains the best possible means to resolve the allegations of use.

The international community has forcefully condemned any use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances. Both the Executive Council and the UN Security Council have by consensus recognised the facts about the use of chemical weapons in Syria. It is on account of such acknowledgment of the work of the OPCW Fact Finding Mission that the Security Council proceeded to establish the Joint Investigative Mechanism to identify the perpetrators of the attacks.

With the FFM confirming the use of Sarin, the work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism has become highly important in identifying the perpetrators of this horrific assault on a civilian population. Those who are responsible must be held accountable for their actions.

Another issue we are seeking to resolve in Syria is about clarifying certain elements of the Syria’s declaration of its chemical weapons programme. A team of experts called the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) has been engaged with Syria in an effort to clarify several outstanding issues.

The purpose of this exercise is to arrive at a declaration that will be regarded by our States Parties as complete and accurate. I have continued to underscore to my Syrian interlocuters the necessity of bringing this matter to a closure. This is possible through the provision of scientifically and technically plausible explanations on the unresolved questions. It is also important for us to have access to individuals with an overarching knowledge of the Syrian chemical weapons programme.

Following the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme under the most compressed of timelines, the work of the FFM and the DAT demonstrate that adaptability will be crucial to address new and unprecedented situations in order to serve the object and purpose of the Convention.

Mr President,

The human proclivity for waging war has often been regarded by thoughtful commentators as persistent. General George C. Marshall, the architect of the post Second World War European Recovery Programme had once remarked that, “If man does find the solution for world peace, it will be the most extraordinary reversal of his record we have ever known”.

We cannot say if and when such a reversal will decisively occur. What we can count are some of the positive steps taken in that direction. The success of the CWC is one such step that was initiated in this very forum.

Here I wish to mention that not every member of this Conference is a State Party to the CWC. I renew my appeal to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Egypt, Israel and South Sudan to join the Convention at the earliest and thus participate fully in strengthening the worthy international effort that commenced in this very forum.

An obvious lesson from history is that the illusion of power from weapons does not guarantee self-preservation. This is especially true in the age of weapons of mass destruction.

A defining feature of our global civilization is its technological attainment. We need to make peace, prosperity and humanity its dominant characteristic. We should never discount the possibilities and should continue to create the opportunities. Progress in disarmament is not only vital, it is achievable.

The CWC can serve as an excellent example of what can be accomplished with political will on the part of its States Parties.

I thank you for your attention.