Education, Outreach and the OPCW: Growing Partnerships for a Global Ban

Pure Appl. Chem. 2017; 89(2): 189–195

Conference paper

Joseph Ballard and Jonathan E. Forman* Education, outreach and the OPCW: growing partnerships for a global ban

DOI 10.1515/pac-2016-0903

Abstract: The Chemical Weapons Convention remains a landmark international treaty. It was the first multilateral agreement to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction and include a strict verification regime to monitor compliance. Scientists were not only deeply engaged in the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, but have been central to the life of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) ever since it came into existence almost 20 years ago. Over that time, during which the OPCW focused primarily on its mission to oversee the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, the organization has relied on a very committed core of scientific expertise – from within and outside – to help guide it. As that core task comes to a close, the Organization faces a new challenge: ensuring that chemical weapons do not return. Meeting that challenge will require new approaches to the OPCW’s mission.

Keywords: chemical weapons; chemical weapons convention; disarmament; education; international treaty; Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; outreach; 2016 Spring ConfChem.

Introduction

The collection of papers in this issue of Pure and Applied Chemistry were featured in the Spring 2016 Con- fchem [1], an online colloquium that went live just as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) opened the celebration of its founding at the inaugural OPCW Day event in The Hague.1 This event reflected on the organizations 19 year journey to 2016, the transition of the organization into the future and the evolving nature of chemical disarmament. OPCW Day brought together diplomats, experts in disarmament and security, leaders in science and industry and more. It was a public facing event that engaged those working both within and beyond disarmament. Why does an organization focused on security issues seek to engage broader audiences and in particular, scientific audiences? The answer lies within the broad range of issues and activities required for the implementation and effectiveness of a science based disarmament treaty. Issues that have infirmed the OPCW’s objectives of engaging with those who practice and study science [2], as well as the organizations broader outreach goals, which we describe in this paper.

1 International Day for the Foundation of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (https://www.opcw.org/ news/article/opcw-founding-celebrated-with-first-opcw-day-conference-chemical-safety-and-security-in-a-technologically- evolving-world/).

Article note: A collection of invited papers based on presentations at the Open Access Online Conference “Science, Disarma- ment, and Diplomacy in Chemical Education: The Example of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons”, which was held from 2nd May till 20th June 2016.

*Corresponding author: Jonathan E. Forman, Office of Strategy and Policy, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands, e-mail: [email protected] Joseph Ballard: Office of Strategy and Policy, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands

© 2016 IUPAC & De Gruyter. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. For more information, please visit: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 190 J. Ballard and J.E. Forman: Education, outreach and the OPCW

The OPCW – where science and diplomacy meet

The OPCW is one of a handful of international organizations that exist at the intersection of science and diplomacy [3]. Its success underpinned through partnership between the scientific and diplomatic commu- nities that serve the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) [4] – which the OPCW was set up to oversee – since its entry into force in 1997. Today, as the OPCW is nearing its twentieth anniversary, the CWC has 192 States Parties (The nations supporting the treaty), leaving the treaty only four States short of universality and making the CWC the most widely subscribed disarmament and non-proliferation treaty in history (see Fig. 1); more than 66 000 metric tons of chemical weapon stockpiles declared by States Parties, representing more than 90 % of the total declared stockpiles, have been verified by the OPCW as destroyed, and progress continues toward 100 % destruction; and for “its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons” the OPCW was awarded the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize.2 The CWC is a unique international instrument: it is the first – and remains the only – multilateral disarmament treaty that prohibits a whole category of weapons of mass destruction in a verifiable way. The CWC was a huge step forward for international peace and security – the then-UN Secretary-General described the CWC in 1997 as “a momentous act of peace”.3 And it only came together through the efforts of scientists and diplomats working toward a commonly-held goal.4 Treaty implementation has four key areas of focus, as illustrated in Fig. 2: destruction of chemical weapons; non-proliferation and the prevention of re-emergence of chemical weapons (this includes verification activities such as declarations, inspections and investigations); capacity building and training in assistance and protection; and promoting international cooperation in the peaceful use of chemistry for eco- nomic and technological development. Across these areas, verification has been key to the CWC’s success. Verification goes right to the heart of the trust and confidence that multilateral treaties, particularly those

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Fig. 1: States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. As of 16 October 2015, four states remain not party to the CWC: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Israel (signed, but not ratified) and South Sudan.

2 See http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2013/opcw-facts.html. 3 Opening remarks of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the first CWC Conference of States Parties, 6 May 1997. 4 For an overview of the historical development of the CWC, see: www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/genesis-and- historical-development/. J. Ballard and J.E. Forman: Education, outreach and the OPCW 191

Fig. 2: Areas of focus for the OPCW in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

that touch on peace and security, need to work. These allow all parties to the treaty to verify each other’s compliance. The verification system applies not only to chemical weapons stockpiles and related facilities (which are required to be destroyed), but also to commercial chemical sites and production of relevance to the CWC. This requires that international chemical weapons inspectors verify the destruction of military stockpiles and inspect chemical production facilities (including commercial facilities) meeting criteria within the territories of the States that have joined the treaty [5]. These inspectors, who have deep technical knowledge of chemical production processes, chemical weapons destruction techniques, and chemical analysis [6], have carried out over 6000 inspections around the world since 1997. At the same time, OPCW inspectors and supporting staff are ready to deploy at short notice in case of compliance concerns, when the use of chemical weapons has been alleged and/or if a State Party requires assistance in response to a chemical incident [7]. Their work, which is reported back to the States Parties that meet regularly in The Hague to review the operation of the CWC, has been critical to ensuring the treaty’s integrity. An example of how the CWC can draw scientific and diplomatic worlds together. This connection was created through the CWC’s negotiation, during which scientific principles were used to help define the kinds of weapons and chemicals the treaty should be concerned with and to construct a viable verification regime. And we see the science and diplomacy connection throughout the work of the OPCW today. The Scientific Advisory Board, an independent body of 25 scientific experts nominated by States Parties and appointed by the Director-General, renders specialized advice on science and technology that could affect the operation of the treaty.5 The OPCW works closely with the chemical industry on matters of mutual concern. And the CWC fosters international cooperation in the peaceful use of chemistry through its capacity building programs.6

5 See www.opcw.org/about-opcw/subsidiary-bodies/scientific-advisory-board/. 6 In this regard, OPCW offers a number of capacity building programs for science in developing countries; more information is available at https://www.opcw.org/our-work/international-cooperation/capacity-building-programs/. 192 J. Ballard and J.E. Forman: Education, outreach and the OPCW

There are other international treaties that ban categories of weapons of mass destruction, most notably the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) [8]. But that treaty – which entered into force much earlier than the CWC, in 1975 – contains no formal verification provisions.

A changing organization in a changing world

While the CWC provides a strong example of science serving the cause of global peace and security, the OPCW’s work has focused primarily on ensuring the destruction of declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, leaving OPCW’s existence and achievements little known beyond those directly involved in CWC implementation. This all changed with events in 2013 in the Syrian Arab Republic [9] and the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize, pushing the OPCW onto the world stage. The OPCW and its accomplishments have raised an important question: in an era when the declared global stockpiles of chemical weapons have been all but destroyed, what is the role of an organization dedicated to their abolition? The answer to that question lies in the CWC itself, in which the treaty’s States Parties state clearly their determination “for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons”. What does this mean today, in a world where we are constantly reminded of the threat of chemical weapons in ways that were certainly unantici- pated in 1997 [10]? The first part of answering this question lies in the word “declared” – while those chemical weapons that have been declared to the organization by its current States Parties will soon be destroyed, there remain States outside the CWC. The possibility of new States joining with stockpiles of chemical weapons is one that the OPCW must continue to plan and prepare for. The OPCW must also continue to work on the important issue of the recovery and destruction of old and abandoned chemical weapons – one of the most pernicious ongoing legacies of past conflicts [11]. Likewise, to keep the treaty relevant, requires ensuring that States Parties to the CWC continue to live up to their obligations. As has recently become all too apparent, working to ensure that chemical weapons do not re-emerge goes beyond looking at the actions of governments. Non-State actors have recently shown themselves to be all too willing to use chemical weapons. The confirmed use of chemical weapons in the conflict in Syria and in Iraq poses new challenges for the CWC regime and the norm it enshrines. And the evocation of the possible use by terrorists of chemical weapons in attacks in Europe [12] and elsewhere [13] has heightened public awareness of the continuing threat of chemical weapons. Above all, ensuring chemical weapons do not return is a task that the OPCW cannot do on its own. And while science (and its practitioners) will remain central to OPCW’s mission, it is just one part of a much broader undertaking in which education and outreach will play a growing role. Confronting these challenges will require the OPCW to adjust its priorities, to look beyond its traditional networks, and to enlist a new generation in the service of its mission. OPCW’s science engagement must go beyond a small circle of committed scientific experts – both from within and outside the organization – that have helped to guide the work of the organization for the past 20 years. OPCW’s industry outreach will need to engage not only those who are directly involved in implementing the treaty’s complex verification regime, but also those who regularly use, transport, trade in or store toxic chemicals. OPCW’s work with educators and young people will need to focus on building better global citizens as well as responsible future scientists. This is why education and outreach is a priority, for it is an essential part of achieving universal acceptance of the norms embedded in the CWC.

Education and outreach for peace

While there is much work to be done, there already exists a good base to build on. The OPCW’s website (opcw. org) is generally the first port of call for anyone interested in the organization – it has special sections describ- J. Ballard and J.E. Forman: Education, outreach and the OPCW 193 ing the organizations work, with a particular emphasis on scientific engagement. A set of factsheets, available in all six OPCW official languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Spanish and Russian) [14], detail the various facets of the organization, the history of chemical weapons and efforts to control and eradicate them, and the functioning of the Convention and its verification regime. The OPCW website also hosts a set of e-learning resources, with modules focused on general information about the Organization and the Convention as well as specialist courses for training those involved in CWC verification.7 The website showcases innovative initiatives designed to connect with new audiences, such as the FIRES project, a series of short films about personal stories linked to chemical weapons.8 These films aim to engage a broad range of audiences in the story of the OPCW and international efforts to eradicate chemical weapons. Other resources on the organization’s website include links to science education projects, like the Multi- ple Uses of Chemicals project [15] developed by IUPAC with the cooperation of the OPCW. The OPCW is committed to supporting this kind of work – aimed at supporting educators – with more to follow. To round off OPCW’s engagement in digital space, the organization is active across a range of social media platforms. Activities continue to ramp up in this area, with a redesigned website forthcoming. For those interested in both scientific and educational focused materials available from the OPCW, the current website provides an interactive guide to find a variety of materials available for download (Fig. 3) [16]. Furthermore, OPCW social media regularly sends out links to new resources as they become available (the interactive guide at the previous link will guide website visitors to the various OPCW social media accounts).

Fig. 3: Examples of materials and resources with scientific and educational themes available from OPCW.org.9

7 See www.opcw.org/special-sections/education/e-learning/. 8 See https://www.thefiresproject.com/. 9 A site guide to resources can be found at https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/science-technology/science-technology- resources/. 194 J. Ballard and J.E. Forman: Education, outreach and the OPCW

OPCW continues to work closely with its States Parties on building support and engagement for it’s outreach initiatives through regional meetings to discuss and make recommendations on how the organization can support member states in this area, and vice versa. In 2016, meetings were held in Iran (May 2016, Asian Region), Lithuania (May 2016, Eastern European Region), Paraguay (June 2016, Latin American and Carib- bean Region) and South Africa (June 2016, African Region). These meetings provide opportunities for offi- cials in CWC States Parties to engage their own national stakeholders on CWC implementation, and to share ideas about how to reach them most effectively. Engagement with the global chemical industry is likewise an important component of the OPCW’s outreach activities. Industry has always been a key player in the operation of the CWC’s verification regime (and industry representatives participated in treaty negotiation), with its importance assuming a new dimension in the fight against chemical terrorism. The chemical industry, and the individuals that work in it, are a key to the success of the OPCW in tackling this troubling issue. Looking beyond the chemical industry, the OPCW has also supported work to engage chemical practitioners on the topic of responsible science. To this end, in 2015 the organization coordinated the drafting by a diverse group of scientists of The Hague Ethical Guidelines, a set of elements considered important, from a CWC perspective, in relevant professional codes [17]. These guidelines have been endorsed by IUPAC [18], referenced for their importance in regard to broader ethical issues in the practice of chemistry [19] and have and provided input into the recently drafted Global Chemists Code of Ethics [20]. Reaching out to young people is another important facet of OPCW’s education and outreach work. To that end, the OPCW has established partnerships with Leiden and Groningen Universities in the Netherlands, and runs an annual WMD Summer School, in association with the TMC Asser Institute, in The Hague.10 Finally, one of the most important new initiatives that the OPCW has taken over the last year is the deci- sion to bring in outside expertise to provide advice on how to scale up OPCW education and outreach in support of the organization’s strategic priorities. The Advisory Board on Education and Outreach [21] is a group of 15 experts [22] from around the world, appointed by the OPCW Director-General to advise both the OPCW and CWC States Parties on this important work. Its mandate covers not only high-level strategic advice but also ensuring that the OPCW’s education and outreach activities are coordinated and cost effective – to do this it will monitor global science education and disarmament and non-proliferation education initiatives, as well as propose partnerships with other stakeholders. It will also be tasked with developing a portfolio of activities and projects, so that the widest possible range of audiences can benefit from them. One of the most significant aspects of the establishment of the new Advisory Board – which met for the first time on 28 and 29 April in The Hague [23] – is that it represents a potential sea-change in the way that the OPCW interacts with the world. It represents the recognition that achieving the aims of the CWC will in the future require a whole new kind of engagement – one that is underpinned with robust strategies, with flexible and modern educational tools, and with the support of new stakeholders. Most importantly it means that education and outreach has a clear strategic role in the future of the organization. For education and outreach are necessary components in achieving a future where chemical weapons have been completely eliminated, and where the norms embodied in the CWC ensure that such weapons are unwanted.

References

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10 Summer Program on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in a Changing World (http://www. asser.nl/education-events/summer-programmes-2016/disarmament/). J. Ballard and J.E. Forman: Education, outreach and the OPCW 195

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