Air University Quarterly Review: Fall 1947 Vol.I, No. 2
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A ir University Q uarterl y Review .................................................................................................................... | AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW | H iiiiiiiiM iiM u iiiiiin iiiiiiiiM iiiiM iiiM H iiiu iiM iin iiiiiiiiM iiiiiiitiiliM iiiiiiiim iiiM iM iiia iiim iiiiH iiiu iiiim iiiiiiiiiiiiiin iiiiiiiiiiiiM iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiu iu iiM iiiiiiiiin iiiiiiiiiii MUIR S. FAIRCHILD, Major General, USA Commanding General, Air University DAVID M. SCHLATTER, Major General, USA Deputy Commanding General {Education} EDITORIAL BOARD | 1 DELMAR T. SPIVEY, Colonel, AC, President | I RALPH E. KOON, C olonel, AC 1 | MATTHEW K. DEICHELMANN, Colonel, AC | LEWIS E. LYLE, Colonel, AC I { WILLIAM P. NUCKOLS, Colonel, AC 1 1 WAYNE S. YENAWINE, Director of Libraries 1 1 ALDER M. JENKINS, Educational Advisory Staff I HARRY T. MOORE, Captain, AC .............................. Editor j f CHAUNCEY W. MEACHAM, 1 st Lt., A C ....... Asst. Editor \ POLLY HARRIS, Staff Secretary Printed at Maxwell Field, Alabama, September, 1947, under autbority contained io par. 5c, AR 350-130, 12 June 1945 | fT liiiiiitittiM tittiitiiiiiiH iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiitM iiiiiiu iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiitiiH iiiu iiM iiiiiiiiiin iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiM iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiin iin iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiin iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiitiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiin iiiiiiliii THE U nited States Air Force AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW % Vol. I, No. 2 _________________________ ________ FALL 1947 One-Way Combat________________________ Col. D ale O. Smith, AC 3 An Air Officer’s Education______________ Capt. Robert 0 ’Brien, AC 9 A Lecture on Air Power Maj. Alexander P. de Seversky, AC Res 25 High Sub-sonic Speeds for Air Warfare Col. Bruce K. Holloway, AC 42 Geopolitics versus Geologistics Lt. Col. Harry A. Sachaklian, AC 5 3 Mobility in the Next W ar___________ Col. Clifford J. Hejlin, AC 64 Editorial_________________________ 77 Air Anthology____________________________________ 79 Foreign Horizons__________ 1 ___________________________________ 83 Airman’s Reading: The Right to Fly, Fletcher Pratt, 91; No Peace jo r Asia and The Future oj Freedom in the Orient, Albert Parry, 92; Revolution and War- jare, Col. Charles G. Kirk, AC, 94; Yank: The GI Story oj the War, William Frye, 95; Notes on Helicopter Design Theory and The Story oj the Helicopter, Maj. Donald M. Alexander, AC, 97; Report jrom Spain and American Mili- tary Gov’t. in Germany, Raymond Estep, 98; Democracy’s Air Arsenal, W. 0 ’Dell Pierce, 100; You Can Learn To Fly, Col. Noel F. Parrish, AC, 101; Briefer Comment, 102. The Contributors_______________ 10 6 AIR LNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW is printed by Reproduction Unit, AU. % ! N\Ç- ü N IV £ « S / ^ j , Published by Air University Maxwell Field, Alabama AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW sells for fifty cents a copy and subscriptions may be ordered, rwo dollars a year, through the Book Department, Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama. Students and faculty of the Air War College and the Air Command and Staff School are provided free copies as textual material. i One-way Combat Colonel Dale 0. Smith N FIRST consideration. the average air veteran takes a O pessimistic view of one-way combat. The idea of flying into enemy territory beyond the point of safe return, con- tinuing the penetration until almost all his fuel is consumed before attacking, and then,after bombing, going a relatively short distance further before bailing out or crash landing, strikes him as being a rather grim way to conduct a war. But a tactic of this sort is the only way targets that are beyond the aircraft radius of action can be bombed. Shuttle bombing was conducted during the past war when friendly bases were available beyond the target. One-way combat should not be confused with shuttle bombing, for in one-way combat a landing must be made in enemy t e r r i t o r y or, when conditions are favorable, in neutral territory. The airplane and crew are expended as the cost of placing an atom bomb on a target which is within range, but beyond the radius of action.- of the most advanced base. The simple fin a lity of the term "one-way combat" makes the air veteran immediately skeptical. His whole effort in past air war, other than to perform his mission, has been to avoid one-way f li g h t s . But, when he devotes some lo g ic a l thought to the tactic, it is likely that he will be willing to conduct such operations should they become necessary in future war. The fir s t questions to be answered in considering one- way combat are; <i) Why are one-way f l i g h t s necessary, and (2) why is it necessary to extend the bombing range of our existing airplanes? The B-36 has all the range we need, it is argued. But the cold fact remains that should we go to war soon we shall not have enough B-36S to conduct offensive operations in great force. We shall mainly have to use our B-sos and our B-29S with about 3,000 miles range. General Kenney has said that "if we get into trouble again, the attack will probably come over the shortest air routes from 3 4 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW the European-Asiatic land mass across the North Polar Basin." Naturally we will counterattack. But from existing bases available to us, the B-29S and B-50S w ill not be able to strike vital Eurasian targets and return to their points of take-off. Reference to a polar-projection map will demon- strate that our radius of action is far short of that neces- sary to make conventional round-trip sorties. Therefore, if we are to hit the targets we must buy one-way tickets. The next question that comes to mind is: Why not seize advance bases by surface action? As we did in World War II, why don't we plan to take bases within our radius of action? Why rush? In the last war practically all our operational bases were secured and built after we entered the war. But it was a time-consuming process. It took over a year to put our English bases in shape to conduct offensive operations in force, and those bases were given to us without requiring surface action. Most African, Italian, and Pacific bases had to be seized and it took considerably longer to develop them. It may be said that the Marianas bases which had to be seized and then built upon were not effectively operational until three years after we entered the war. Can we wait three years before employing the atomic bomb in force? In this day of atomic warfare, will our enemy wait? Or will he, if he has the bomb, conduct one-way opera- tions? The answer is evident. We won't have time to seize advance bases and develop them. We must strike in force as quickly as we can, e l s e our enemy w i l l beat us to the punch. And an atomic-bomb punch might well be the knockout blow. We would be guilty of gross negligence if we planned on the assumption that the enemy doesn't have the bomb. There is every indication, with all the data on atomic energy which we have openly supplied the world, that any determined nation with resources could manufacture the atomic bomb within three to five years, starting from scratch. This estimate has been made by the scientist who helped develop the bomb. And there is much evidence that none of the great powers started from scratch. Potential enemies have been working on the atomic project since 194-2» which would give them bombs on hand right now. To assume that potential enemies have no bomb carriers ONE-WAY COMBAT 5 with adequate range to place the bombs on our ci t i e s would be equally shortsighted. There is no trick to building a long-range bomb carrier, and any powerful nation not doing just that would be guilty of stupidity beyond all reason. For example, at l e a s t four B-29S were f u l l y compromised by being in the hands of Rússia as far back as July 1944- Many more were compromised in Japan. The only safe assumption we can make is that potential enemies have developed or will develop atomic bombs and that, with one-way flig h t, they have aircraft today with range enough to drop atomic bombs on our c i t i e s . Defense against such attacks presents a gloomy picture. Certainly we have no defensive system now that would be even remotely successful and it is unlikely that we ever w ill have such a system before war is upon us. Without question we cannot rely on defensive measures during the immediate future. The complexion of atomic war reemphasizes the old clichê that the best defense is a good offense, and alters it somewhat: the best defense is the first offense m force. IT TOOK about 600,000 tons of bombs to knock out Germany. Probably less than ten percent of those bombs struck the intended targets. Consequentlv, the factor of error is well represented within the 6oo,ooo-ton figure. Germany did not capitulate as a d ir e c t r e s u lt of bombing but many experts assert that she would have done so with slightly more bomb- ing. Let us assume that it would have taken almost twice that tonnage, or one m i l l i o n tons, to defeat her. This shower of bombs would have been rained over Germany for a period of from five to seven years, during which time she could have rebuilt much of the damage and strengthened her moral resistance to the terror and tragedy.