Traceshim As Lee’S Reliable but Slow Lieutenant
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Sam Hobbs Victim of the “Lost Cause”: James Longstreet in the Postwar South As a Confederate general in the Civil War, James Longstreet commanded the First Corps in the Army of Northern Virginia, serving as Robert E. Lee’s most trusted advisor and second-in-command. Longstreet led his men through almost every major engagement of the war in the eastern theater, from the First Battle of Manassas to the surrender at Appomattox, earning a reputation as one of the Confederacy’s best fghters and most capable generals. Yet less than ten years afer the war, most white southerners blamed Longstreet for the South’s defeat at Gettysburg, and history remembered traceshim as Lee’s reliable but slow lieutenant. How did Longstreet’s reputation fall so far so fast? Longstreet’s lengthy and controversial career in the postwar South is one of the most interesting and yet overlooked parts of his life. He was the only senior Confederate ofcer to become a Republican, and he joined the party of Lincoln and abolition just three years afer the war, at the height of Reconstruction. As a result, his standing among white southerners plummeted. Longstreet’s unpopularity thus made him the target of a campaign to exonerate Lee for the loss at Gettysburg by making Longstreet the scapegoat. Te campaign was highly efective and his damaged reputation did not 35 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History begin to recover for over a century. Te controversy surrounding Longstreet was a product of larger issues in the postwar South concerning politics and historical memory. Te South was devastated from the war both physically and psychologically. Its people struggled to cope with defeat and to adjust to the profound changes that defeat efected, particularly the emancipation of one-ffh of its population from slavery. White southerners sought to protect their society from what they saw as the distortions and designs of their Northern conquerors. In their view, Reconstruction was a punishment intended to prolong their sufering and to subjugate them to the rule of the newly freed and enfranchised blacks. In response to the challenges and insecurities of defeat and to the threat posed by Reconstruction, a movement developed among former Confederates known as the “Lost Cause,” or the “Confederate tradition.” Te “Lost Cause” was a broad movement that changed over time and lacked uniformity. Historians have accordingly struggled to defne its precise boundaries. It has been described as a myth, a civil religion, and a tradition, but the best defnition for the purposes of this essay is “the dominant complex of attitudes and emotions that constituted the white South’s interpretation of the Civil War.” It was the avowed purpose of the “Lost Cause” to preserve and interpret the “true” history of the Confederacy, to consciously shape the public’s memory in “one of the most highly orchestrated grassroots partisan histories ever recorded.”1 Some of the basic “truths” that the “Lost Cause” sought to establish were the causes of the war and the South’s defeat. According to white southerners, secession was a constitutional response to violations of their state’s rights. Slavery was not the cause of the war, merely an incident. Te South was not defeated, but was overwhelmed by the Union’s superior numbers and resources. Tese arguments helped restore the South’s sense of honor, which was a cornerstone of this efort to glorify the Old South. In addition to promoting its version of history, the “Lost Cause” was an attack on the policies of Reconstruction. Its advocates maintained that Reconstruction was an act of oppression, and they forcefully articulated their opposition to it in terms of white supremacy. Trough the “Lost Cause,” white southerners launched a war of ideas to determine the meaning of the war and the fate of 1 David Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 259. 36 Sam Hobbs Reconstruction.2 One of the earliest organizations for the promotion of the “Lost Cause” was a coalition of Virginians under the leadership of Jubal Early. Te Virginians focused on celebrating the military glory of the Confederacy, and they deifed Confederate heroes Robert E. Lee and Tomas “Stonewall” Jackson. Of course, their lavish praise of the Confederacy’s military prowess naturally raised the question of defeat, for which the Virginians relentlessly promoted two explanations. Te frst was the argument that the North’s advantage in manpower simply overwhelmed the South. Te second was the “Longstreet-lost-it-at-Gettysburg” explanation, in which Longstreet’s failure to attack at the time ordered cost Lee the battle, and subsequently the war. It was a grossly exaggerated and baseless claim, but that did not prevent it from resonating in white southerners’ memory of the war. In the postwar South, white southerners-turned-Republicans, or scalawags, were held among the lowest in esteem. Tey were thought of as traitors to their race, and for that reason white southerners ofen said scalawags were inferior even to freed blacks. White southerners’ portrayal of scalawags became a central part of the myth of Reconstruction that they created. Because Longstreet was the most prominent scalawag in the South, examining his experience helps to reveal some of the falsehoods of this myth. When Longstreet declared his support for Republicans and Reconstruction afer the war, he placed himself in opposition to the “Lost Cause,” which was tantamount to a betrayal of the South. His military record subsequently became the victim of “Lost Cause” dogma, a testament to its power and endurance in Southern society. Longstreet’s postwar career therefore provides a lens through which to examine the politics of Reconstruction in the South and the role of this mythology in shaping historical memory. Longstreet’s Early Life and Military Career Before considering how Longstreet’s enemies rewrote his history afer the Civil War, it is necessary to rehearse the trajectory of his early life and military career. Longstreet was born in Edgefeld, South Carolina, on January 8, 1821. He spent his childhood years living in the small north 2 Gaines Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South 1865-1913 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 16; Blight, 259, 258-266. 37 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History Georgia town of Gainesville, but at the age of nine he moved to his uncle’s cotton plantation in Westover, Georgia, to attend a preparatory academy in hopes of attaining an appointment to West Point. His uncle, Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, was “one of the fnest minds of the antebellum South,” an accomplished jurist, a newspaper editor, and a Methodist minister. When Longstreet’s father died in 1833, Augustus assumed the role of parent and was a crucial infuence during Longstreet’s youth.3 Because his mother lived in northern Alabama with her relatives afer his father died, Longstreet was able to secure an appointment to West Point from Alabama in 1838. He was a mediocre student at West Point, but he met many men who became famous during the Civil War. George Pickett, D.H. Hill, Lafayette McLaws, U.S. Grant and William S. Rosencrans were all close friends. He was known for being independent and exceptionally strong, and like his uncle, he enjoyed a game of cards and whiskey, and was typically well liked. He graduated third from the bottom of his class and was assigned to the infantry as a brevet lieutenant.4 During the Mexican-American War, Longstreet served from the Army of Observation to the occupation of Mexico City. He never commanded more than one hundred men, but his “conspicuous bravery” and proven competence earned him a promotion to brevet major by the end of the war. Serving in a variety of positions, Longstreet gained valuable experience in combat, tactics, and administrative duties. His experience was mostly on the ofensive, and he was lucky not to have been severely wounded, except for a leg wound at Chapultepec.5 Longstreet lived with his wife and children in Texas until he accepted a position as paymaster in New Mexico. As the crisis of 1860-1861 unfolded, he opposed secession, but felt he had no choice but to join the fght if his state passed ordinances of secession. Following the capture of Fort Sumter, he resigned his commission in the US Army and reported to Richmond for orders.6 Longstreet received a commission on July 1 as a brigadier general under 3 William Garrett Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1987), 2-3. 4 Ibid., 4-5. 5 Ibid., 5-7. 6 James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1896), 29-30. 38 Sam Hobbs General P.G.T Beauregard, who gave him command of the Fourth Brigade, which was ordered to defend Blackburn’s Ford, a key position in the line behind Bull Run Creek from which to protect Manassas Junction. On July 18, three days before the Battle of Manassas, a Union brigade attacked Longstreet’s position. Although outnumbered, his men repelled several assaults and even attempted, briefy, to counterattack. At one point, when his raw troops faltered and broke the line, Longstreet “rode with saber in hand for the leading fles, determined to stop the break.” He was not involved in the Battle of Manassas, but his performance at Blackburn’s Ford earned him the praise of General Beauregard.7 Longstreet was promoted to major general, but both Beauregard and Joseph Johnston, the commanding general, tried to have him promoted further to be their second-in-command.