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Home , Alexander McClure, Battle of Gettysburg, Battle of Seven Pines, Fitzhugh Lee, James Longstreet, Jubal Early

Sam Hobbs Victim of the “Lost Cause”: in the Postwar South

As a Confederate general in the , James Longstreet commanded the First in the Army of Northern , serving as E. Lee’s most trusted advisor and second-in-command. Longstreet led his men through almost every engagement of the war in the eastern , from the First of Manassas to the surrender at , earning a reputation as one of the Confederacy’s best fghters and most capable generals. Yet less than ten years afer the war, most white southerners blamed Longstreet for the South’s defeat at , and history remembered traceshim as Lee’s reliable but slow lieutenant. How did Longstreet’s reputation fall so far so fast? Longstreet’s lengthy and controversial career in the postwar South is one of the most interesting and yet overlooked parts of his life. He was the only senior Confederate ofcer to become a Republican, and he joined the party of Lincoln and abolition just three years afer the war, at the height of Reconstruction. As a result, his standing among white southerners plummeted. Longstreet’s unpopularity thus made him the target of a campaign to exonerate Lee for the loss at Gettysburg by making Longstreet the scapegoat. Te campaign was highly efective and his damaged reputation did not 35 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

begin to recover for over a century. Te controversy surrounding Longstreet was a product of larger issues in the postwar South concerning politics and historical memory. Te South was devastated from the war both physically and psychologically. Its people struggled to cope with defeat and to adjust to the profound changes that defeat efected, particularly the emancipation of one-ffh of its population from slavery. White southerners sought to protect their society from what they saw as the distortions and designs of their Northern conquerors. In their view, Reconstruction was a punishment intended to prolong their sufering and to subjugate them to the rule of the newly freed and enfranchised blacks. In response to the challenges and insecurities of defeat and to the threat posed by Reconstruction, a movement developed among former Confederates known as the “Lost Cause,” or the “Confederate tradition.” Te “Lost Cause” was a broad movement that changed over time and lacked uniformity. Historians have accordingly struggled to defne its precise boundaries. It has been described as a myth, a civil religion, and a tradition, but the best defnition for the purposes of this essay is “the dominant complex of attitudes and emotions that constituted the white South’s interpretation of the Civil War.” It was the avowed purpose of the “Lost Cause” to preserve and interpret the “true” history of the Confederacy, to consciously shape the public’s memory in “one of the most highly orchestrated grassroots partisan histories ever recorded.”1 Some of the basic “truths” that the “Lost Cause” sought to establish were the causes of the war and the South’s defeat. According to white southerners, was a constitutional response to violations of their state’s rights. Slavery was not the cause of the war, merely an incident. Te South was not defeated, but was overwhelmed by the Union’s superior numbers and resources. Tese arguments helped restore the South’s sense of honor, which was a cornerstone of this efort to glorify the Old South. In addition to promoting its version of history, the “Lost Cause” was an attack on the policies of Reconstruction. Its advocates maintained that Reconstruction was an act of oppression, and they forcefully articulated their opposition to it in terms of . Trough the “Lost Cause,” white southerners launched a war of ideas to determine the meaning of the war and the fate of

1 David Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 259. 36 Sam Hobbs

Reconstruction.2 One of the earliest organizations for the promotion of the “Lost Cause” was a coalition of Virginians under the leadership of . Te Virginians focused on celebrating the military glory of the Confederacy, and they deifed Confederate heroes Robert E. Lee and Tomas “Stonewall” Jackson. Of course, their lavish praise of the Confederacy’s military prowess naturally raised the question of defeat, for which the Virginians relentlessly promoted two explanations. Te frst was the argument that the North’s advantage in manpower simply overwhelmed the South. Te second was the “Longstreet-lost-it-at-Gettysburg” explanation, in which Longstreet’s failure to attack at the time ordered cost Lee the battle, and subsequently the war. It was a grossly exaggerated and baseless claim, but that did not prevent it from resonating in white southerners’ memory of the war. In the postwar South, white southerners-turned-Republicans, or , were held among the lowest in esteem. Tey were thought of as traitors to their race, and for that reason white southerners ofen said scalawags were inferior even to freed blacks. White southerners’ portrayal of scalawags became a central part of the myth of Reconstruction that they created. Because Longstreet was the most prominent in the South, examining his experience helps to reveal some of the falsehoods of this myth. When Longstreet declared his support for Republicans and Reconstruction afer the war, he placed himself in opposition to the “Lost Cause,” which was tantamount to a betrayal of the South. His military record subsequently became the victim of “Lost Cause” dogma, a testament to its power and endurance in Southern society. Longstreet’s postwar career therefore provides a lens through which to examine the politics of Reconstruction in the South and the role of this mythology in shaping historical memory.

Longstreet’s Early Life and Military Career Before considering how Longstreet’s enemies rewrote his history afer the Civil War, it is necessary to rehearse the trajectory of his early life and military career. Longstreet was born in Edgefeld, , on , 1821. He spent his childhood years living in the small north

2 Gaines Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South 1865-1913 (: Oxford University Press, 1987), 16; Blight, 259, 258-266. 37 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

Georgia town of Gainesville, but at the age of nine he moved to his uncle’s cotton plantation in Westover, , to attend a preparatory academy in hopes of attaining an appointment to West Point. His uncle, Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, was “one of the fnest minds of the antebellum South,” an accomplished jurist, a newspaper editor, and a Methodist minister. When Longstreet’s father died in 1833, Augustus assumed the role of parent and was a crucial infuence during Longstreet’s youth.3 Because his mother lived in northern with her relatives afer his father died, Longstreet was able to secure an appointment to West Point from Alabama in 1838. He was a mediocre student at West Point, but he met many men who became famous during the Civil War. , D.H. Hill, Lafayette McLaws, U.S. Grant and William S. Rosencrans were all close friends. He was known for being independent and exceptionally strong, and like his uncle, he enjoyed a game of cards and whiskey, and was typically well liked. He graduated third from the bottom of his class and was assigned to the as a lieutenant.4 During the Mexican-American War, Longstreet served from the Army of Observation to the occupation of City. He never commanded more than one hundred men, but his “conspicuous bravery” and proven competence earned him a promotion to brevet major by the end of the war. Serving in a variety of positions, Longstreet gained valuable experience in combat, tactics, and administrative duties. His experience was mostly on the ofensive, and he was lucky not to have been severely wounded, except for a leg wound at Chapultepec.5 Longstreet lived with his wife and children in until he accepted a position as paymaster in New Mexico. As the crisis of 1860-1861 unfolded, he opposed secession, but felt he had no choice but to join the fght if his state passed ordinances of secession. Following the capture of Fort Sumter, he resigned his commission in the US Army and reported to Richmond for orders.6 Longstreet received a commission on as a brigadier general under

3 William Garrett Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1987), 2-3. 4 Ibid., 4-5. 5 Ibid., 5-7. 6 James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America (Bloomington, : Indiana University Press, 1896), 29-30. 38 Sam Hobbs

General P.G.T Beauregard, who gave him command of the Fourth , which was ordered to defend Blackburn’s Ford, a key position in the line behind Bull Run Creek from which to protect Manassas Junction. On July 18, three days before the Battle of Manassas, a Union brigade attacked Longstreet’s position. Although outnumbered, his men repelled several assaults and even attempted, briefy, to counterattack. At one point, when his raw troops faltered and broke the line, Longstreet “rode with saber in hand for the leading fles, determined to stop the break.” He was not involved in the Battle of Manassas, but his performance at Blackburn’s Ford earned him the praise of General Beauregard.7 Longstreet was promoted to major general, but both Beauregard and Joseph Johnston, the commanding general, tried to have him promoted further to be their second-in-command. When the landed in the east in the spring of 1862, General Johnston ordered Longstreet to the rear of the army to protect its retreat. At Williamsburg, he fought a forward unit of the Union army and skillfully delayed their advance. Johnston said of the engagement: “Longstreet’s clear head and brave heart lef me no apology for interference.” In the subsequent outside of Richmond, Longstreet misunderstood his verbal orders and placed his troops too far to the right, exposing a gap in the Confederate lines and disrupting their attack plan. According to one of his biographers, this marked “the lowest point in his military career,” but Johnston praised him in the battle reports and Longstreet never admitted any fault, instead laying the blame with Generals Smith and Wilcox.8 When Johnston fell with severe injury, President Davis replaced him with General Robert E. Lee. Longstreet felt then and afer the war that Johnston was the best ofcer in the Confederacy. Of the replacement he commented, “Te assignment of General Lee to command the army of Northern Virginia was far from reconciling the troops to the loss of our beloved chief.” At that point Lee had a shaky reputation, but he quickly initiated an aggressive campaign to dislodge the Union army from the peninsula. Te campaign succeeded in forcing the Union to retreat, but at a very high cost. Longstreet criticized Lee for issuing conficting orders and General Jackson for his sluggish execution, but Longstreet won high praise

7 Piston, 12-14; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 39. 8 Piston, 15-16; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 80; Piston, 19. 39 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

from all quarters for his “quick movements” and “hard fghting.” When Lee reorganized his army in the summer of 1862, he took care to make Longstreet his second-in-command, giving Jackson a subordinate position, and Lee and Longstreet soon became close friends.9 Te Union and Confederate armies next faced each other at the Second Battle of Manassas. Lee was eager to attack, but Longstreet cautioned that he was “urging nothing less than a piecemeal attack on an unknown force over unknown ground” and requested permission to do a thorough reconnaissance. Lee assented, but the Federals acted frst, sending their columns against Jackson on the lef. When Jackson requested reinforcements, Longstreet supported him instead with fre. Years later, he wrote: “When they were fairly in range every gun was opened upon them, and before they had recovered from the stunning efect, I sprung every man that I had to the , and swept down upon them like an avalanche.” He concluded, “Te efect was simply magical. Te enemy broke all to pieces.” Tis engagement represented Longstreet’s ideal battle formula, a resolute defense followed by a timely counterattack.10 Following his decisive victory at Second Manassas, Lee decided to invade . Longstreet supported the plan, but he objected to dividing their forces in order to capture Harper’s Ferry, calling it “a venture not worth the game.” Lee was adamant, however, and the army split, with Jackson’s command marching to Harper’s Ferry and Longstreet advancing towards Sharpsburg. Te Union army had the beneft of discovering the Confederate battle plans by a “lost dispatch,” and they arrived at Sharpsburg sooner than Lee expected. Fortunately, Jackson rejoined the Army of Northern Virginia in time for the , the single bloodiest day of fghting of the war. Lee was badly outnumbered and likely would have been crushed if not for the Federals’ uncoordinated and piecemeal assault. Te fghting was desperate, and afer committing his reserve, Longstreet “used his own presence at the front to bolster his weakening fring line in a display of courage, tenacity and resolution” that earned him his of-cited sobriquet as Lee’s “old war-horse.” Despite the tremendous energy and eforts of

9 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 112; Piston, 20-22. 10 Ibid., 23; Longstreet, “The Mistakes of Gettysburg,” in The Annals of the War: Written by Leading Participants North and South, ed. Alexander McClure (: Da Capo Press, 1994), 630-631. 40 Sam Hobbs

Longstreet and others, the Confederates would have been overwhelmed had General A.P. Hill not arrived with the remaining troops from Harper’s Ferry.11 Lee’s trust and confdence in Longstreet was well established by the end of 1862. He reorganized his army into two corps, the frst under Longstreet and the second under Jackson, and promoted them both to lieutenant general. However, Lee dated the appointments to give Longstreet the higher rank as his chief lieutenant, while he expressed reservations about Jackson being “by no means so rapid a marcher as Longstreet” and having “an unfortunate habit of never being on time.” In contrast to postwar impressions, Longstreet clearly enjoyed an intimate relationship with Lee, who he said “always invited the views of [Longstreet] in moves of strategy and general policy, not so much for the purpose of having his own views approved and confrmed as to get new light, or channels for new thought.” In spite of their relationship, Longstreet was not without doubts about Lee’s tactics and strategy. He still thought Johnston was the superior ofcer and considered Lee to be a “master of the science but not of the art of war.” Tese doubts, however, do not suggest he did not respect Lee’s character or command.12 Lee and Longstreet achieved a great victory at the , considered to be “the neatest and cheapest” victory of the war. Longstreet formed his line in a sunken road behind a stone wall that formed a natural trench at the base of some hills. To improve further the advantages of this terrain, he instructed his men to build extensive feld fortifcations. Although facing the mass of the Union army, the enemy never came close to breaching his position. Lee’s casualties were barely forty percent of Union losses, and Jackson’s un-entrenched men sufered almost twice the casualties of Longstreet. Fredericksburg was a powerful lesson in the advantages of the defensive.13 Around this time, Longstreet introduced a new feature to warfare. Te “traverse trench” was a system of short walls built perpendicular to the main trench wall at regular intervals that separated men into a series of compartments that were covered on each fank, greatly diminishing

11 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 201; Piston, 25-26. 12 Piston, 30; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 158, 288. 13 Piston, 32–34. 41 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

their exposure to artillery. It was an important innovation, providing another example, on top of his tactical prowess at Second Manassas and Fredericksburg, of Longstreet’s understanding of the power of defense. Afer the war, he was falsely characterized as excessively cautious, but in reality he had a better understanding than most of his contemporaries of modern warfare.14 In the spring of 1863, the Confederate War Department assigned Longstreet to the Virginia and coastal region to gather supplies and provisions and to check the growing Federal presence in that area. Tis was his frst quasi-independent command, and though he secured sufcient provisions, his eforts to dislodge the Union army from New Bern, North Carolina, and Sufolk, Virginia, failed. Te Secretary of War praised Longstreet, however, for his “restraint” in not sacrifcing many casualties for a peripheral objective, and declared the campaign a success.15 Because of this assignment Longstreet was not present for the Battle of Chancellorsville, but aferwards he came up with an interesting plan designed for the relief of Vicksburg, under siege by , proposing to reinforce General Bragg’s army in with Johnston’s army in Mississippi and his own two divisions from Sufolk. Tat “combination once made should strike immediately in overwhelming force upon [Union General] Rosencrans, and march for the and Cincinnati.” In theory, Grant would be forced to abandon Vicksburg to meet this threat in the North. Longstreet’s plan demonstrated his appreciation of the importance of the western theater, a common criticism of Lee, and his knowledge “that the only way to equalize the contest was by skillful use of our interior lines.” In the end, Lee rejected the plan in favor of his own plan to invade .16 Lee sought to relieve pressure on Virginia and perhaps to draw Union troops from the West to counter the threat to Washington, DC. Longstreet supported the proposal but stressed that the campaign should be ofensive in strategy, defensive in tactics, suggesting “that we should work so as to force the enemy to attack us, in such good position … which might assure us of a grand triumph.” Lee agreed with this approach, but when the two

14 Ibid., 35. 15 Ibid., 37. 16 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 331, 327. 42 Sam Hobbs armies met unexpectedly in Gettysburg on July 1, he resolved to attack. As the initial fghting broke out in mid-afernoon, Longstreet’s men were still a day’s march away, and they had to wait for General Ewell’s fourteen-mile- long wagon to pass before starting at 4:00 p.m. Tey camped late that night for about two hours, three miles from Gettysburg. Meanwhile, their commander deliberated with Lee on the course of action for the next day. Longstreet proposed fanking the enemy’s lef and occupying a position between the Union army and Washington, from which they would threaten Federal communications and force the enemy to attack. Lee rejected this proposal, believing a fanking movement would expose the Confederate train, and announced his intention to strike the Union army where it stood.17 Longstreet’s two divisions began to arrive at general headquarters early on the morning of the second, while Pickett’s was not expected until later that day. At 11:00 a.m., Lee ordered Longstreet’s men to attack by a concealed route on the right “as soon as practicable,” granting permission to wait for one last brigade expected within the hour. Te concealed route doubled the distance to their appointed position, and an oversight in reconnaissance—the Confederate was missing- in-action—compelled the columns to make a countermarch at one point. When they fnally reached their position, the Union line on their front was much changed and strengthened since the information collected in the morning. Longstreet’s subordinates requested permission to delay and even suggested a fanking movement similar to his earlier proposal, but the attack proceeded as planned. Te fghting began around 4:00 p.m. and Longstreet’s divisions made considerable progress against a superior enemy in strong position, but they received no help from the other corps, who did not coordinate their assaults with Longstreet’s as instructed to prevent the Union from concentrating against him.18 On the third and fnal day of the , Longstreet once again pressed for a fanking maneuver, but Lee refused. Instead, Lee ordered Pickett’s division, supported by several from the Tird Corps, to make a on , while the remainder of Longstreet’s corps defended the right fank. Longstreet expressed his objections to the plan in strong terms, at one point saying to Lee: “Te

17 Ibid., 331; Piston, 49-52. 18 Ibid., 53–58. 43 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

ffeen thousand men who could make successful assault over that feld have never been arrayed for battle.” Lee insisted, and the infamous charge was made following an epic but inefective artillery barrage. It was the worst defeat of the war for the Army of Northern Virginia, and although Lee assumed complete blame for the disaster, Longstreet was ultimately held responsible.19 Afer Gettysburg, the government in Richmond was more amenable to suggestions of a concentration of forces in the West. When Longstreet asked to be transferred to General Bragg’s army in “to arrest the march of Rosencrans,” Lee and President Davis assented. By the time he reached the , Rosencrans had pushed it into Georgia, and Bragg immediately gave him command of a wing of the army during the middle of the Battle of Chickamauga. His wing was in chaos, but “no other ofcer in the South could have taken control as quickly and smoothly or with such self-confdence as Longstreet at Chickamauga.” Within hours he launched a powerful assault, and when a gap emerged in the enemy lines, he “drove Rosencrans and half his army from the feld in one of the greatest routs of the war.” Bragg’s army was unable to pursue their defeated adversary, but Longstreet earned a new nickname, the “Bull of the Woods.”20 Te remainder of his time in the Army of Tennessee was plagued by squabbling, dissent, and failure. Bragg had been quarreling with his subordinates long before Longstreet’s arrival, but Longstreet did nothing to calm the waters. In fact, he later became the leader of the anti-Bragg faction. Te feud between them continued to escalate until it literally split the army, with Bragg maintaining the siege of Chattanooga and Longstreet moving against Federal forces at Knoxville. Longstreet had ignored intelligence at Chattanooga, which gave the enemy an opportunity to reopen their supply lines, and his performance at Knoxville was no more successful, ultimately settling in for a siege during the winter of 1863-64. At this time, he began to have problems within his own command. He relieved McLaws, a lifelong friend who had served under Longstreet since Seven Pines, for his apathy and loss of nerve since Gettysburg, but McLaws responded with accusations of his own and soon had his dismissal overturned. Another dispute emerged between Longstreet, several of his

19 Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 386, 391-394. 20 Ibid, 433; Piston, 70-71. 44 Sam Hobbs subordinates, and the War Department over promotions, and he eventually arrested one of his ofcers. Tese problems did not originate with Longstreet, but his management was poor, as “he was too partisan towards protégés … and downright petty and vindictive toward those who opposed him.” Nevertheless, he was never in danger of losing his command, and an investigation by the War Department found that “General Longstreet possesses the confdence and afection of his ofcers and men.”21 In April 1864, Richmond ordered Longstreet to return to Lee’s army in Virginia, but he did not remain for long. In an incident strikingly similar to Jackson’s tragic death, Longstreet’s own men accidently shot him during the , sending a minie ball into his throat and out his right shoulder, an injury that afected his voice and troubled his right arm for the rest of his life. It might have killed a man of lesser size, but Longstreet recovered and returned to Lee’s army before the end of 1864. In the waning days of the war, Lee depended more and more on Longstreet. Once Grant captured Petersburg, Lee had to abandon Richmond, and for the last ten days of the war Longstreet’s men never lost their order and discipline as they protected the army’s retreat to Appomattox against almost continuous assaults by the enemy.22

Longstreet’s Postwar “Apostasy” Longstreet’s immediate postwar reputation is instructive, especially when compared to his reputation only a decade later. During the war, he did not receive the public attention his experiences merited, as most coverage was provincial and the papers in Virginia, where he spent the bulk of the war, heavily favored their native sons. For this reason, and because he did not ft the image of the puritanical Jackson, the cavalier Stuart, or the aristocratic Lee, he never became a public hero like these men. However, “as the Confederacy’s senior lieutenant general and veteran of both of the major theaters of war,” he was “well-known” and “greatly respected, especially by the common soldiers.” Longstreet was typically described as a “bulldog,” “a commander of great skill and energy,” and “the best fghter in the whole army.” Given later charges of slowness, lethargy, and excessive caution, his

21 Ibid., 74–81. 22 Ibid., 88–91. 45 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

portrayal as “a rapid marcher whose troops were never late, a soldier hard hitting in the attack and resolute in the defense” is revealing. He was best remembered as “Lee’s intimate friend” and “most trusted lieutenant.” In short, Longstreet was rightfully known as one of the Confederacy’s best and most valuable commanders.23 Longstreet’s plan was to follow his longtime aide and close friend, T.J. Goree, to Texas, where he could settle with his family and begin a new life as a civilian. On the way to Texas, however, they stopped in , where he remained. New Orleans was a popular destination for many Confederate leaders, including two former members of Longstreet’s command, Edward and William Owen, who ofered him a partnership in their cotton brokerage business. Te frm of “Longstreet, Owen and ” opened on January 1, 1866, his name lending distinction and prestige to the frm. Tree months later, he was elected president of a New Orleans insurance company, and the combination of these two business positions aforded Longstreet a comfortable salary and lifestyle.24 During a public address in the summer of 1866, Longstreet avoided political questions and was modest about his own infuence, calling himself a “humble citizen—in fact, only a on parole.” Referring to the debate over Reconstruction, he remarked: “If I approach Mr. Johnson I am called a traitor; if toward the Radicals, I am called a rebel; therefore, I must be content to remain on the fence.”25 At that point the struggle between President Johnson and Congress over Reconstruction policy was reaching its climax. Johnson’s plan was decidedly lenient, providing for the broad application of amnesty and pardon and requiring of the former Confederate states only that they renounce secession and accept the Tirteenth Amendment. Republicans in Congress believed this policy abandoned the fruits of the war the Union had just won at so much expense and sacrifce. In their view, it “put enormous authority back in the hands of white southerners, but without any provisions for black civil or political rights.” From late 1865 to 1868, the in Congress took control of Reconstruction and acted to address the

23 Ibid., 96–99. 24 Thomas Robinson Hay and Donald Bridgeman Sanger, James Longstreet: Politician, Officeholder, and Writer (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1952), 321-323. 25 New York Times, June 20, 1866. 46 Sam Hobbs shortcomings in President Johnson’s plan. To Johnson’s requirements for readmission to the Union, they added the Fourteenth Amendment, which established equality before the law and extended citizenship to the native- born regardless of race. When the southern states rejected the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress divided the former Confederacy into fve military districts and made black sufrage a condition of readmission to the Union. White southerners balked at these conditions, especially on the issue of black rights. One Virginian wrote to a leader of the Radical Republicans, asking him: “Which feeling is strongest in your Abrahamic bosom—love of the negro, or hatred of the white man of the South?”26 Following the passage of the Military in March 1867, which put the South under military occupation, the editor of the New Orleans Times sent out a request to prominent men in the area for their opinions on Reconstruction. Longstreet was the frst to respond, beginning a series of public statements on politics that sealed his postwar fate. He acknowledged that he was inexperienced in politics and could “only speak the plain, honest convictions of a soldier.” Indeed, soldierly conceptions of duty and the terms of war largely defned his approach to the issue. From his perspective, it was a simple question of accepting defeat and submitting to the terms of the victors. Longstreet reminded his audience, “We are a conquered people.… Tere can be no discredit to a conquered people for accepting the conditions ofered by their conquerors.” If the goal of the South was readmission to the Union with its full and equal rights restored, then “the only means to accomplish this is to comply with the requirements of the recent Congressional legislation.” Some skeptics responded that Congress would not honor its commitments once the South had met its conditions, to which Longstreet counseled, “Let us accept the terms as we are in duty bound to do, and if there is a lack of faith, let it be upon others.” His was a pragmatic approach to Reconstruction. Without suggesting that he approved of Republican policy, Longstreet simply recommended following the law. Te newspaper praised his advice and declared his views “in full unison” with its own. At that point, his opinions were in concert with a number of other former Confederate leaders.27 Not three weeks afer he published his frst letter, and perhaps

26 Blight, 44–48. 27 New Orleans Times, March 19, 1867; Hay and Sanger, 331. 47 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

encouraged by its positive reception, Longstreet published another. In it he argued that “the political questions of the war should have been buried upon the felds that marked their end.” Te South had surrendered, forfeiting its claim to secession and ending “the former political relations of the negro.” Southerners needed to accept the fullness of defeat and apply themselves to Reconstruction with “the sincerity of purpose which will command success,” instead of the present strategy of “masterly inactivity.” Tey had no other choice: recourse through the law was not available, as “the only available law is martial law, and the only right, power,” and resistance was not only hopeless, but there was no just cause for it beyond the one already settled. Longstreet proposed to bury the hatchet and to “relieve ourselves from our present embarrassments by returning to our allegiance, in good faith, to the General Government under the process laid down by Congress.” Tis letter used stronger language than his frst and was more critical of intransigent diehards, but he still did not express support for the Republican Party. Tis letter drew the attention of local Republican politicians, however.28 When one of these Republicans, John M. G. Parker, wrote Longstreet to compliment his letter and ask for his further views on public afairs, Longstreet responded, afer several weeks of consideration, with another letter he allowed Parker to publish in the New Orleans Times. Before releasing it to the public he showed it to his uncle Augustus, who advised his nephew to keep it private. “It will ruin you, son, if you publish it,” his uncle warned. “We are not ready yet to hear such hard counseling.” Longstreet began his letter to Parker by asserting a maxim he thought was self-evident: “Te highest of human laws is the law that is established by appeal to arms.” In very direct terms, Longstreet reiterated his opinion that the issues under debate then were the same as “the great principles that divided the political parties prior to the war,” that “the sword has decided in favor of the North, and what they claimed as principles cease to be principles, and are become law.” Up to this point, the letter was a reafrmation of his previous statements.29 In the passage following, however, Longstreet made a critical departure: “Like other Southern men, I naturally sought alliance with the Democratic party, merely because it was opposed to the Republican party,”

28 New Orleans Times, April 7, 1867. 29 Hay and Sanger, 334; New Orleans Times, June 8, 1867. 48 Sam Hobbs

he wrote. “But as far as I can judge, there is nothing tangible about it except the issues that were staked upon the war and there lost.” In other words, he could not support the Democrats because they refused to acknowledge the military bill and amendments, and thus based their platform on ignoring the law and rejecting the results of the war. In his view, the military bill and amendments were “peace oferings.” Tese were simply the terms of the settlement.30 Equally important were his comments on black rights. Democrats opposed black enfranchisement and denied the federal government’s right to legislate on sufrage. Longstreet countered that blacks were already enfranchised, and to oppose that fact accomplished nothing except to concede any chance of their support. Furthermore, “the exclusive right of the States to legislate upon sufrage will make the enfranchisement of the blacks a fxture amongst us,” for at the time most white southerners were disenfranchised and “black voters were the core constituency of Southern Republicanism and the means to power in 1867-68.” Instead, Longstreet proposed to extend black sufrage to all the states, including the North, and in so doing retain the option to “remove it by the remedy under republican principles of uniform laws upon sufrage.”31 Nuances aside, Longstreet had announced his opposition to the Democrats and his support of black sufrage. Te editorial accompanying his letter observed that he had joined “a party whose whole policy seems to be one of vindictive persecution and abuse of his late Confederates in arms.” Longstreet responded the next day, complaining that the article was “calculated to mislead” and failed to explain how his entire purpose was to suggest the best means of relieving the South from its present condition. His statement that “the war was made upon Republican issues, and it seems to me fair and just that the settlement should be made accordingly” was widely censured and ridiculed. Even Longstreet’s old friend D.H. Hill wrote in his magazine that “either our gallant friend’s theology or his loyalty is at fault.” Northerners and Republicans, in contrast, lauded his views.32 His apparent embrace of black sufrage did some of the greatest damage

30 New Orleans Times, June 8, 1867; Blight, 47. 31 Ibid. 32 New Orleans Times, June 8, 1867; , “Editorial,” The Land We Love, August 1867, 355-356. 49 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

to Longstreet’s reputation. Tis position opened him to the charge of being a “Black Republican,” or someone who supported black equality, one of the most pejorative insults possible of a white southerner at the time. Of course, the charge was a mischaracterization of his views. In a private letter to a friend, Longstreet clarifed his stance. “Since the negro has been given the privilege of voting, it is all important that we should exercise such infuence over that vote, as to prevent its being injurious to us, and we can only do that as Republicans,” he wrote. He saw black sufrage as a fait accompli, and for that reason directed his eforts towards managing this new reality instead of uselessly opposing it. Moreover, it was a matter of necessity. “Congress requires reconstruction upon the Republican basis,” he wrote. “If the whites won’t do this, the thing will be done by the blacks, and we shall be set aside, if not expatriated.” Longstreet made the point that the only way forward was through Republican Reconstruction, the alternative being to cede control of the Republican Party and thus Reconstruction to the blacks. In the latter case, blacks would not only have sufrage but would hold political ofce. Te argument epitomized his pragmatism, but Longstreet failed to communicate his commitment to white supremacy as convincingly in his public statements. As a result, white southerners “saw only that he had dared to suggest collaboration with the party of abolition.”33 Te issues of politics and race were virtually indistinguishable in the postwar South. For the Democrats, “white supremacy was the cornerstone” of their opposition to Republicans and Reconstruction. Tey reserved some of their deepest wrath for scalawags, or native southerners who aligned with the Republicans, among whom Longstreet was easily the most prominent. A popular defnition ran: “A scalawag is a white man who thinks he is no better than a Negro and in so thinking makes a correct appraisal of himself.” For white southerners, it was far more than a political disagreement. As the “Lost Cause” ideology began to emerge, with its claim that the South was never really beaten, they started to view “Reconstruction as a continuation of the same struggle in a diferent manner.” For this reason, Longstreet’s embrace of Reconstruction seemed like a betrayal of the cause, calling into question his loyalty and motives.34 Longstreet was not ostracized when he counseled submission to

33 James Longstreet to R. H. Taliaferro, , 1867, reprinted in Piston, 106; Piston, 107. 34 Blight, 101; Piston, 110, 109. 50 Sam Hobbs

Reconstruction, but only afer he announced his intention to join the Republican Party. Te prevailing view of scalawags was that their support of Republicans was a naked attempt to curry favor with the party in power so as to advance their own interests at the expense of the South. Longstreet was viewed no diferently. As one modern historian has noted, “Scalawags supposedly sold out the South for personal gain just as Judas had betrayed Christ for silver.” Religion was a major element of the “Lost Cause.” Southerners ofen compared their defeat to Christ’s sacrifce and their sufering under Reconstruction to early Christian persecution. As a part of this narrative, “the Lost Cause was transforming the Southern soldier, living and dead, into a veritable saint.” Longstreet’s heresy put him at odds with this redemptive narrative, exposing not only his motives but his Confederate past to attack.35 It did not help his defense when less than two weeks afer his controversial letter appeared in the newspapers, Longstreet received a pardon. Te timing was coincidental, but it reinforced the perception that his decision was a political tradeof. Ironically, although accused of switching parties for personal gain, Longstreet’s political afliation caused such a backlash that it afected his business, and he felt compelled to resign from his frm with the Owen brothers and to transfer his insurance interests to his friend General Hood. He never sought political ofce until afer his business interests collapsed in late 1867.36 During the presidential campaign of 1868, Longstreet endorsed his old friend General Grant. Tey had been cadets at West Point together, were stationed at the same post outside St. Louis in the mid-1840s, and had served in the Mexican-American War. Teir only encounter in the Civil War was at Appomattox, where they had a cordial reunion despite the somber occasion. Longstreet even introduced Grant to his cousin, Julia Dent, who later became Grant’s wife, making them kinsmen. Of their relationship, Longstreet said, “Ever since 1839, I have been on terms of the closest intimacy with Grant.” Tus, it is not surprising that Grant nominated Longstreet for surveyor of the port of New Orleans shortly afer his inauguration. His confrmation elicited nine hours of debate in the Senate, but he received the post with an annual salary of six thousand dollars. So began Longstreet’s lengthy career

35 Piston, 111, 112. 36 New York Times, Sept. 25, 1893; Hay and Sanger, 340-341. 51 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

in the Republican Party.37 Once he became a recipient of political patronage, his reputation as an opportunistic scalawag was sealed, leading to his subsequent ostracism. Over the next several years, Longstreet served in a variety of positions during one of the most turbulent periods in Louisiana’s history. In 1870, he became president of the New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad and was appointed the adjutant general of the state of Louisiana. Taken together with his post as surveyor, his salary was between ten and ffeen thousand dollars. His time was well paid, but not well spent, as he became identifed with one of the most notorious and controversial Reconstruction governments in the South.38 When a bitter clash between factions of the Republican Party consumed Louisiana politics in the early 1870s, Longstreet did his best to avoid the dispute. His disgust reached a boiling point in 1872, and to illustrate his discontent he resigned his post as surveyor of customs and as adjutant general. He was still far from unemployed, retaining his commission as major general in the state and receiving another lucrative position in 1873. As commander of the state militia, it fell upon Longstreet to quell an insurrection of forces who sought to depose the Republican administration by force of arms. On September 14, 1874, he led the state’s largely black troops against the insurgents, many of whom were Confederate veterans. Te militia put up a pitiful fght, and the White League took control of New Orleans until federal troops arrived. For his part, Longstreet was shot and captured. It was a humiliating experience, which he had wanted no part in, and the lasting impression of Longstreet leading black troops against white veterans was devastating to his reputation.39 His frustration with the Republican Party was so great in 1872 that he temporarily gave his support to the Liberal Republican movement. Liberal Republicans represented that portion of the party for whom “the wartime idealism and the egalitarian vision of the radical Republicans survived without passion.” Tey wanted to be done with Reconstruction and to focus on reconciliation. In the end, they proposed to “restore southerners

37 New York Times, , 1885. 38 Hay and Sanger, 336, 349. 39 New York Times, March 13, 1872; New York Times, January 9, 1872; Hay and Sanger, 365, 370-371. 52 Sam Hobbs to equality and return blacks to their proper place.” Longstreet’s attraction to their platform was natural, considering that he never subscribed to Republican ideology in the frst place. He retracted his support for the movement, however, once he felt it had lost sight of its original purpose, noting, “We have been drawn on, step by step, until we fnd ourselves not only out of the Republican Party, but about to enter the Democratic ranks.” On this point he was frm, however: he would not become a Democrat.40 Following the disastrous White League riot in 1874, Longstreet moved to Georgia, returning to the same area in northern Georgia where he grew up as a boy. Tere he received a mixed reception. One man wrote to the local newspaper in Gainesville to warn his neighbors: “paint your skin black…. A white man who would even speak to him is not worthy [of] the name of a Georgian.” When he arrived, Longstreet built a house outside of town for his family and bought another in town for use as a hotel. Meanwhile, he served a stint as postmaster before being appointed as ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1880, where he spent a brief and uneventful year. Longstreet’s main foray into Georgian politics occurred afer he returned.41 In 1881 he fnally received the appointment he had been lobbying for, US Marshall of Georgia. It was a lucrative post, paying ten thousand dollars a year, and it gave its occupant considerable infuence. Reconstruction had ended and Republicans were no longer in power in any of the Southern states, but Longstreet received his position by federal appointment. During his time as Marshall, Longstreet also became a leader of the White Republican Party, whose purpose was to lay the foundation for a durable Republican Party in Georgia composed of respectable white men. Te competing faction of the party sought to maintain the old coalition of and black voters, which Longstreet viewed as shortsighted. He thought that the best strategy was to emphasize issues of “commerce” rather than dwell on “the prejudices which have operated in withholding equality of political rights.” As a result of their diferences, the other side maneuvered to remove Longstreet as Marshall. Teir plots received a boost when Longstreet’s ofce came under investigation for corruption. Longstreet was never implicated in any wrongdoing, as his only mistake was to retain his predecessor’s deputies.

40 Blight, 123-126; New York Times, October 20, 1872. 41 New York Times, June 28, 1875; New York Times, July 28, 1884. 53 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

Ultimately, the investigation forced the resignation of his Chief Deputy, Longstreet’s son, and resulted in the conviction and sentencing of another deputy for fraud and perjury. While the scandal provided credible cover, many suspected that Longstreet’s removal from ofce in 1884 was politically motivated. He did not hold ofce again until 1898, when he was appointed US Commissioner of Railroads, which he held until his death in 1904.42

Te “Lost Cause” Collects a Scalp Longstreet had been a loyal and active Republican for over thirty years, but he received no credit for his consistency from white southerners. Rather than view his commitment as proof of the sincerity of his motives, they faulted him for never admitting his error in judgment and returning to the fold of the Democratic Party. In the eyes of many he had betrayed the South, and his name was associated forever afer with Radical Reconstruction. Te most lasting consequence of Longstreet’s apostasy was the smear campaign of his war record. Te efect of this campaign was not immediate, however. Even afer his infamous letter of 1867, the South generally acknowledged Longstreet as one of its best generals, even though he never became a public hero. His backwoods origins, no-nonsense practicality, and fondness for cards and whiskey simply did not ft with the nostalgic version of the Old South propagated by the “Lost Cause.” In addition, no state laid claim to Longstreet. He was born in South Carolina, grew up in Georgia, received his appointment to West Point from Alabama, and lived in Texas for over a decade before the war. His politics and lack of popular heroism did not directly impugn his military reputation, but merely made it susceptible to attack. Te event that triggered these attacks was the death of Robert E. Lee on October 12, 1870. White southerners always revered Lee, but his reputation ascended to new heights afer his death. Shortly aferwards, two principal memorial associations formed in Virginia to raise funds for a monument to Lee, one based in Richmond and the other in Lexington. Beginning with these two associations, a key group of Virginians formed a coalition of Confederate organizations under their leadership, including the Association

42 New York Times, December 19, 1882; New York Times, June 1, 1880; New York Times, January 17, 1884; New York Times, July 21, 1884; New York Times, July 22, 1884; New York Times, October 23, 1897. 54 Sam Hobbs of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Southern Historical Society. Te Virginia coalition was instrumental in the development of the “Lost Cause” myth, functioning as “the frst sustained movement to defne and exploit the Confederate tradition.” As its origins would suggest, one of the central tenets of the coalition was to preserve the memory of Lee. In reality, it was a campaign to deify him. Te coalition “proclaimed his character fawless” and praised “his unsurpassed abilities as a military commander.” Tey elevated him to such a degree that Lee became “virtually incapable of error.” Te Virginia coalition treated similarly the memory of . Te main leaders of what has been called the “cult of Lee” consisted of Jubal Early, William Nelson Pendleton, J. William Jones, and , R. E. Lee’s nephew. It is no coincidence that these were the same men who sabotaged Longstreet’s record.43 In order to create an image of Lee as infallible, the Virginians needed to shif his mistakes onto someone else’s shoulders. His major blunder, and the one for which he was most criticized during the war, was the defeat at Gettysburg. Longstreet’s unpopularity made him the ideal candidate for scapegoat, as it “increased the inclinations of southerners to believe the worst about him.” While the Virginians publicly denied that politics had anything to do with their attacks, their correspondence tells a diferent story. In addition, Longstreet had dared to criticize Lee, allowing the Virginians to frame the debate as a choice between Lee and Longstreet.44 Te assault began with a speech by Jubal Early in January 1872, in which he claimed that during a night conference with Ewell, Rodes, and Early afer the frst day at Gettysburg, Lee had expressed his intention to attack at dawn the next day with Longstreet’s corps. Longstreet’s failure to attack until 4:00 p.m. had supposedly cost Lee the battle and the war. Te following year, Pendleton went on a lecture tour of the South to deliver eulogies of Lee, which he used as an opportunity to bolster Early’s case against Longstreet. His main contribution was to reveal that Lee had asked him to do a reconnaissance early on the morning of July 2 because Lee expected Longstreet to attack at dawn. Pendleton continued, “Lee’s acceptance of responsibility for the disaster amounted to a magnanimous cover-up unparalleled in history.” With these speeches, Early and Pendleton laid the

43 Foster, 63–71. 44 Piston, 117–120, 129. 55 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

foundation for the argument that Longstreet lost the war at Gettysburg.45 Te argument reached its fruition with the Gettysburg series published in the Southern Historical Society Papers (SHSP). Te pretext for the series was a request by an anonymous foreigner for the views of leading Confederates on why the South lost the battle at Gettysburg. Te frst response listed a number of fatal errors, including the delay of Longstreet’s attack on both the second and third day of the battle. However, the author, William Allan, also held Ewell and A.P. Hill responsible for defeat for neglecting to take on the frst day and for failing to provide support to both of Longstreet’s attacks. In the following article, Fitz Lee absolved Ewell and Hill for the lack of coordination, arguing, “Te failure of cooperative efort was the result of the diferent degrees of promptness with which General Lee’s orders for attack were carried out.” In his view, it was “difcult to conceive” why the assault of the second day “should have been delayed until 4PM.” On the third day, Fitz Lee noted that Longstreet did not begin until two hours afer Ewell’s attack. Walter Taylor, a former aide to General Lee, also contributed a response, repeating the charges of delay and adding the assertion that the attack of the third “was not made as designed.” According to Taylor, Longstreet was supposed to use all of his divisions, but only ordered Pickett’s forward.46 Early followed these articles with one of his own, presented as a crystallization of the responses to the foreigner’s inquiry. Early reiterated his claim that Lee had ordered Longstreet to attack “at a very early hour on the morning of the 2nd,” and that the failure to do so was the fatal error of the battle. If not for Longstreet’s sluggishness, “we would have achieved the anticipated victory, for Meade’s whole army had not then arrived until about 3PM.” Furthermore, “cooperation would have taken place had the attack been promptly made at the time expected.” Te narrative for the failure of the assault on the third was similar: Longstreet delayed, precluding cooperation with the other corps, and he did not observe his orders to employ all of his divisions for the charge. Noting Longstreet’s opposition to Lee’s plan, Early speculated, “He did not enter into those attacks with the spirit of confdence so necessary to success.” Early boldly asserted that

45 Ibid., 118, 121–122. 46 William Allan, Southern Historical Society Papers (hereafter, SHSP), August 1877; Fitz Lee, SHSP, August 1877; Walter Taylor, SHSP, August 1877. 56 Sam Hobbs if Lee had won Gettysburg, the Confederacy would have won the war. By this logic, Longstreet was the only obstacle between the South and its independence.47 In addition to exonerating Lee, Early’s account of Gettysburg served another purpose. One of the preoccupations of the Virginia coalition was explaining defeat. Articles in the Southern Historical Society Papers repeatedly made the case for the “overwhelmed-by-superior-numbers” excuse, but “Longstreet-lost-it-at-Gettysburg” presented another possible explanation. Tis explanation had the beneft of identifying a scalawag as the source of the South’s present predicament. Longstreet did not immediately respond to the accusations against him, evidently content to let his record stand for itself. Around the time that the controversy spilled into the pages of the SHSP, he decided to end his silence and accepted a request by the Weekly Times to provide a full account of the battle. He wrote, “I have been so repeatedly and so rancorously assailed that I feel impelled by a sense of duty” to respond. Longstreet felt the attacks were politically motivated, and his old friend, Tomas Goree, agreed. “Pendleton has presumed upon your present unpopularity to make charges which he otherwise would not have dared to utter,” Goree wrote. Two other former subordinates, Alexander and McLaws, wrote to their old commander to express their dismay at the false charges against him, providing their own accounts of the battle in support of Longstreet.48 In response to the alleged sunrise attack order, Longstreet collected statements from Lee’s former aides to discredit the notion that the order ever existed. W.H. Taylor responded: “I never before heard of the ‘sunrise attack’ you were to have made. If such an order was given you I never knew of it, or it has strangely escaped my memory.” Charles Marshall similarly had no “personal recollection” of the order, and he noted that there was nothing in Lee’s ofcial report to suggest “he expected the attack to begin earlier.” Not only did Charles Venable have no knowledge of the order, he could not

47 Jubal Early, SHSP, August 1877. 48 James Longstreet, “Lee in Pennsylvania,” in Annals of the War, 415; T. J. Goree to James Longstreet, May 17, 1875, Longstreet Papers, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, UNC-Chapel Hill (hereafter, SHC); James Longstreet to , , 1869, Alexander Papers, SHC; Lafayette McLaws to James Longstreet, June 12, 1873, McLaws Papers, SHC. 57 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

“believe any such order would have been given,” for on the morning of the second, Lee was still trying to decide whether to attack on the right or the lef. Finally, A.L. Long did not recall an order to attack at sunrise “or at any other designated hour,” but rather as early as practicable. When Longstreet quoted these statements at length in his account, it should have put the question of a sunrise attack order beyond dispute.49 However, the Virginians were unrelenting. Early responded that the aides’ statements only showed that they did not know of the order, not that it did not exist. In any event, the more important question was whether Longstreet was slow in executing his orders, not the exact hour he was supposed to attack. Even if Lee did not give the order until 11:00 a.m., as Longstreet claimed, Early maintained that there was no excuse for the delay until 4:00 p.m. To this end, Longstreet provided a detailed account of his troops’ movements on the second day. He explained that the distance from headquarters to their position on the right was actually a three-mile march, a length that the concealed route doubled. Additionally, he had to order a countermarch at one point because of faulty reconnaissance. In spite of the countermarch, when compared to a similar movement by Jackson at Chancellorsville, Longstreet’s troops actually made good time.50 According to Longstreet, “Te only amendment that would have ensured, or even promised victory, was for Ewell to have marched in upon the enemy’s right.” He cited the failure of Ewell to support his attack, as Lee ordered, with an advance along that part of the line as the most important blunder of the day, allowing the Union army to concentrate its considerable resources against Longstreet alone. Early blamed Longstreet for the lack of coordination, saying that if the attack had begun on time, Ewell would have been prepared to advance in support. To this charge, Longstreet was indignant: “His orders were to remain in line of battle, ready to cooperate with my attack whenever it should be made. If he was not ready in the afernoon, it is folly to say that he would have been ready at sunrise.”51 Regarding Pickett’s charge, Longstreet denied that Lee’s orders were

49 W.H. Taylor to James Longstreet, April 28, 1875, Longstreet Papers, SHC; Charles Marshall to James Longstreet, February 7, 1875, Longstreet Papers, SHC; Charles Venable to James Longstreet, 1875, Longstreet Papers, SHC; A.L. Long to James Longstreet, May 3, 1875, Longstreet Papers, SHC. 50 Jubal Early, SHSP, December 1877; Longstreet, “Lee in Pennsylvania,” 422-424. 51 Longstreet, “The Mistakes of Gettysburg,” 624, 626. 58 Sam Hobbs for him to send his entire corps against Cemetery Ridge. If those were his orders, Longstreet countered, Lee would have fxed the mistake himself, for “I was in the immediate presence of the commanding general when the order was given for Pickett to advance.” In addition, to use his entire corps would have been a poor decision. It would have lef the charge itself and Lee’s army as a whole vulnerable and exposed to a fank attack. Also, it is doubtful that more divisions would have made the infamous charge a success. Instead, it likely would have added to the magnitude of the slaughter. It was true that Longstreet objected strongly to Lee’s plan, but that should be a credit to his military judgment, not a reason to blame him for the plan’s failure.52 Longstreet devoted considerable space to outlining his disagreements with Lee during the Pennsylvania campaign. He felt strongly that the campaign should be ofensive in strategy, defensive in tactics. For this reason, he disagreed with Lee’s intention to attack and favored a fanking movement, which would have put their army between the Federals and Washington, placing pressure on the Union to attack. Lee rejected his proposals, but Longstreet remained convinced that his course was the wiser policy. In fact, he claimed that Lee came to the same realization and wrote Longstreet to that efect six months later: “Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg, instead of pursuing the course I did, how diferent it might all have been.” Early and the others doubted the authenticity of the alleged letter, but Erasmus Taylor wrote Longstreet to say that he had read the letter and remembered the same statement almost verbatim. Lee’s admission validated Longstreet’s strategy, but more importantly, it undermined the Lee cult’s argument that his famous assumption of guilt afer the battle—“It’s all my fault”— was a magnanimous gesture rather than a reasoned judgment.53 While Longstreet was right on the military questions, he lost the war for public opinion. Troughout his writings on the war, Longstreet was highly critical of Lee. His praise for Lee’s character and abilities as a commander is lost in the numerous errors he identifes in Lee’s decisions. Early capitalized on Longstreet’s criticism of Lee and skillfully cast the controversy as a choice between Lee and Longstreet: “Either General Lee or General

52 Longstreet, “Lee’s Right Wing at Gettysburg,” The Century War Series: and Leaders of the Civil War (Castle Books, 1990), 345; Longstreet, “Lee in Pennsylvania,” 429-431. 53 Longstreet, “Lee in Pennsylvania,” 434; Erasmus Taylor to James Longstreet, 10 September 1889, Longstreet Papers, SHC. 59 The UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History

Longstreet was responsible for the remarkable delay that took place in making the attack. I choose to believe that it was not General Lee.” By this point, Lee’s reputation had become so well established that to make a critical remark of him was tantamount to destroying one’s own reputation. In the end, Longstreet’s defense did him more harm than good. He came across as incredibly arrogant in his writings. As one historian has noted, “No plan of Lee’s was so good that Longstreet did not claim to have ofered a better one, nor did Lee’s strategy ever prove weak without Longstreet’s having predicted that it would.” He commented on battles and strategy with great accuracy, but without acknowledging the beneft of hindsight. In addition, he occasionally exaggerated the odds he faced, such as on the second day at Gettysburg, and overstated his contributions relative to others, as in his account of Second Manassas. When he wrote of his agreement with Lee to pursue an ofensive strategy with defensive tactics in Pennsylvania, he presented it as almost a contractual understanding between equals, which added to his image as ambitious and insubordinate. In his defense, Longstreet displayed none of these characteristics or tendencies during the war. Tey were the product of years of frustration of watching Lee and Jackson become idolized while he sufered constant abuse and degradation.54 Te attacks against Longstreet stuck. Te custodians of the Confederate tradition succeeded in making him the scapegoat for Gettysburg, and they shaped his reputation for over a century. Te image of Longstreet is of a reliable but overly cautious and deliberate commander. Tere was no daring or genius about him. He was a plain, determined fghter with an excessive penchant for the defense. A myth developed that Jackson was Lee’s right- hand man and closest confdant. Rather than a bulldog or commander of great energy, Longstreet was known thereafer as slow, stubborn, arrogant, and petty. In short, he was the victim of a calculated and efective character assassination. It is difcult to exaggerate the infuence of the “Lost Cause” in the second half of the nineteenth century. Not only the South’s, but the nation’s memory of the Civil War and Reconstruction is still informed by the tenets of that tradition. Longstreet’s epic fall from one of the most respected

54 Piston, 147. 60 Sam Hobbs generals of the Civil War to the culprit responsible for the South’s defeat is a testament to its power to shape historical memory. Longstreet’s tarnished reputation deserves to be remembered along with Lee’s infallibility and states’ rights doctrine as one of the great accomplishments of “Lost Cause” mythmaking. Longstreet did not become an enemy of the “Lost Cause” because he rejected his Southern heritage or criticized the Confederacy. He was a target the second he became a Republican. Politics was inseparable from the “Lost Cause.” For white southerners, Reconstruction was a continuation of the ideological battles behind the war, which is why they considered Longstreet a traitor and deserter of the cause when he joined the party of the North. Te “Lost Cause” was as much about the present as it was about the past, for its proponents understood the power of the past to shape the future. In this way, the South was able to win the peace, even afer it lost the war. Te mission of the “Lost Cause” was to establish the “true” history of the Confederacy. Yet there was very little truth in Longstreet’s reputation afer the Gettysburg series appeared in the Southern Historical Society Papers. For this reason, the “Lost Cause” challenges how we perceive history. History is not always written by the victors. Tough Longstreet may have underestimated the time span, posterity has eventually rewarded his faith: “I do not fear the verdict on Gettysburg. Time sets all things right. Error lives but a day—truth is eternal.”55

55 Longstreet, “The Mistakes of Gettysburg,” 633. 61