NASSER AND HIS ENEMIES: FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING IN EGYPT ON THE EVE OF THE SIX-DAY WAR By Laura James* This article argues that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser1 neither blundered into the Six-day War, nor did he make deliberate plans to provoke conflict. Instead, in early 1967, he took actions aimed at reaping political gains, which he knew carried a high risk of precipitating military hostilities. It is suggested that Nasser's willingness to take such risks was based on his fundamental underestimation of Israel's capacity for independent and effective military action. This was largely founded on his image of America as an all-powerful adversary, although intelligence failures caused by domestic factors, including Nasser's lack of control over the Egyptian military, also played a role. In early 1967, Egyptian President Gamal role played by images of the enemy in the Abdel Nasser took actions aimed at reaping decision-making process. The principal political gains, which he knew carried a sources used here include memoirs,2 high risk of precipitating military hostilities. interviews,3 public speeches and radio Nasser's willingness to take such risks was broadcasts,4 diplomatic documents,5 and a based on his fundamental underestimation broad array of secondary literature. of Israel's capacity for independent and effective military action. In turn, this THE DECISION-MAKING ELITE conception was largely founded on his The principal decision-maker in Egypt in image of America as an all-powerful 1967 was President Nasser. The cabinet met adversary, although intelligence failures only once after May 14 for a collective caused by domestic factors, including discussion of the 1967 crisis, and appears to Nasser's lack of control over the Egyptian have played no major decision-making military, also played a role. role.6 The Supreme Executive Committee To explain these conclusions, this article of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which begins by discussing the composition of consisted of Nasser, Prime Minister Sidqi Egypt's decision-making elite in order to Suleiman, and several veteran members of identify those individuals whose images of the Revolutionary Command Council the enemy are likely to have been most (RCC)--Abdel Hakim Amer, Zakaria important. Elite images of the United Mohieddin, Anwar Sadat, Hussein Shafei States, Israel, and other perceived enemies, and Ali Sabri7-- was more important.8 as evidenced in public rhetoric and private Nasser valued the opinions and advice of speech, are then analyzed. The crucial Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad, but the decisions in the crisis preceding the 1967 Foreign Ministry was repeatedly bypassed war are analyzed in this context, in each during the crisis.9 The editor of Al-Ahram, case examining both events and Egyptian Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, Nasser's perceptions to assess the significance of the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 23 Laura James close friend and adviser, was also very We can see that imperialism influential.10 coordinates operations with both The defense establishment played an sides--reaction on one side and Israel important independent foreign policy role. on the other…. And since In particular, Field Marshal Amer was able imperialism is the origin and the to question and even reverse Nasser's source of planning, the two sides foreign policy decisions. Nasser was receiving its support and arms cannot unwilling to move against Amer or by any means be two conflicting sides contradict him in public. Since 1962, the but must be two cooperating sides.17 armed forces had been substantially independent of Nasser's direct Imperialism, especially that practiced by interference.11 Amer promoted officers the United States, was seen as by far the loyal to himself, so that, for example, the most powerful enemy up to and during the Chief of Staff, General Muhammad Fawzi, early stages of the 1967 crisis, while the known to be a supporter of Nasser, was other hostile states were said to be "only largely bypassed in favor of General Abdel satellites spinning in the U.S. orbit and Mohsen Murtagi, the head of Ground following its steps."18 In Nasser's crisis Forces Command.12 Other key figures speeches of 1967, "the West" is portrayed included Air Force chief Sidqi Mahmoud, as consisting primarily of the United States the naval commander Admiral Suleiman and Britain. It is deceitful and knowingly Izzat, and most importantly Defense hypocritical, despising and ignoring the Minister General Shams Badran, who was Arabs, and disregarding their legitimate Amer's close friend and "leading hatchet aspirations and rights. In addition, it is the man."13 Foreign policy decision-making in staunch political ally of its creation, Israel, the area of defense was divided between supporting its propaganda, taking its side Nasser and Amer, necessitating careful and providing it with military equipment. consideration of individual decisions to identify who was actually responsible for The United States them. Nasser saw the United States as his real opponent, out to destroy him and the Images of the Enemy14 Egyptian revolution: "The battle we are From Nasser's point of view in late 1966 fighting is not an easy one; it is a battle in and early 1967, there were three main which we are fighting America, the greatest enemies: Imperialism, represented by the power in the world."19 He perceived it as United States and Britain, was linked to having strongly hostile intentions towards Zionist Israel, the "imperialist base in the the Arabs, especially in terms of its constant heart of the Arab homeland,"15 and to the support for Israel. Indeed, he went so far as "Arab reactionaries." This conception is to announce their identity: "Israel today is repeatedly expressed in Nasser's own the United States."20 Although Nasser had speeches, and was also commonplace in the also become suspicious of Kennedy's true wider political discourse.16 All three groups intentions,21 he was on especially bad terms were represented as being closely with his successor, Lyndon Johnson, who connected: Nasser saw as being strongly pro-Israeli.22 During the latter's presidency, relations deteriorated, largely due to the United 24 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) Nasser And His Enemies States' perceived attempt to gain political of our challenge. But we challenge profit from Egypt's economic problems and you, America.28 to its arms sales to Israel and the conservative Arab states.23 However, despite this belief in its hostile Thus Nasser came to believe in a "wider intentions, it does not appear that Nasser conspiracy" between imperialism, Zionism, expected the United States to launch a and reaction--"only different names for the conventional military attack on Egypt. The same thing"--which explained "the situation in Vietnam was taking up so much coordinated, hostile movements against our of the United States' resources and attention nation."24 He identified a worldwide that it seemed unlikely to embroil itself in imperialist onslaught against progressive yet another regional conflict. regimes behind the replacement of Kwame With regard to the issue of relative Nkrumah in Ghana and Sukarno in capability, it was obvious to most members Indonesia by right wing, pro-Western of the Egyptian regime that the military figures, and the interventions in the strength of the United States was vastly Dominican Republic, the Congo, and greater than that of all of the Arab states Vietnam. He suggested that the United combined. Nasser stated during an States had created Israel and fostered the international press conference on May 28 Islamic Alliance25 in order to control the that he had not even taken U.S. forces into Arab world, and that the CIA was planning account, because: his own assassination for the same purpose. Although Nasser was intensely disliked in If I started considering how strong certain U.S. government circles by the mid- America is and how strong I am, even 1960s, it seems most improbable that there before I started my calculations I was an actual plot against him. However, should come to the conclusion that the idea became so fixed in his mind that America has air, land, and sea American denials were of no avail.26 superiority over us.29 The state-controlled media echoed Nasser's insistence that the United States He went on to say that Egypt would was the primary enemy and conspirator. By certainly defend itself with great February 24, 1967, Heikal, in his series of determination if the United States eleven al-Ahram editorials on the conflict intervened, even suggesting that he would between Egypt and America, was writing destroy the Suez Canal. Defense Minister that the United States had developed a Badran, on the other hand, apparently "sinister dangerous complex" consisting of replied to a colleague's query about the "economic and psychological warfare, the possibility of intervention by the U.S. Sixth hatching of plots and assassinations, and a Fleet that "we have a weapon that can deal basic and fundamental reliance on secret it a lethal blow."30 His hearers concluded he activities."27 Even at the height of the pre- had received Soviet arms or assurances of war crisis with Israel, the Voice of the support on his recent visit to Moscow, Arabs' radio station retained its priorities: although it is possible, given the incongruity of the boast, that he did not We challenge you, Israel. No, in fact, mean it seriously. There is at least no we do not address the challenge to evidence that other members of the military you, Israel, because you are unworthy establishment shared his confidence. 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