NASSER AND HIS ENEMIES: FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING IN ON THE EVE OF THE SIX-DAY WAR

By Laura James*

This article argues that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser1 neither blundered into the Six-day War, nor did he make deliberate plans to provoke conflict. Instead, in early 1967, he took actions aimed at reaping political gains, which he knew carried a high risk of precipitating military hostilities. It is suggested that Nasser's willingness to take such risks was based on his fundamental underestimation of 's capacity for independent and effective military action. This was largely founded on his image of America as an all-powerful adversary, although intelligence failures caused by domestic factors, including Nasser's lack of control over the Egyptian military, also played a role.

In early 1967, Egyptian President Gamal role played by images of the enemy in the Abdel Nasser took actions aimed at reaping decision-making process. The principal political gains, which he knew carried a sources used here include memoirs,2 high risk of precipitating military hostilities. interviews,3 public speeches and radio Nasser's willingness to take such risks was broadcasts,4 diplomatic documents,5 and a based on his fundamental underestimation broad array of secondary literature. of Israel's capacity for independent and effective military action. In turn, this THE DECISION-MAKING ELITE conception was largely founded on his The principal decision-maker in Egypt in image of America as an all-powerful 1967 was President Nasser. The cabinet met adversary, although intelligence failures only once after May 14 for a collective caused by domestic factors, including discussion of the 1967 crisis, and appears to Nasser's lack of control over the Egyptian have played no major decision-making military, also played a role. role.6 The Supreme Executive Committee To explain these conclusions, this article of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which begins by discussing the composition of consisted of Nasser, Prime Minister Sidqi Egypt's decision-making elite in order to Suleiman, and several veteran members of identify those individuals whose images of the Revolutionary Command Council the enemy are likely to have been most (RCC)--, Zakaria important. Elite images of the United Mohieddin, , Hussein Shafei States, Israel, and other perceived enemies, and Ali Sabri7-- was more important.8 as evidenced in public rhetoric and private Nasser valued the opinions and advice of speech, are then analyzed. The crucial Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad, but the decisions in the crisis preceding the 1967 Foreign Ministry was repeatedly bypassed war are analyzed in this context, in each during the crisis.9 The editor of Al-Ahram, case examining both events and Egyptian Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, Nasser's perceptions to assess the significance of the

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 23 Laura James close friend and adviser, was also very We can see that imperialism influential.10 coordinates operations with both The defense establishment played an sides--reaction on one side and Israel important independent foreign policy role. on the other…. And since In particular, Amer was able imperialism is the origin and the to question and even reverse Nasser's source of planning, the two sides foreign policy decisions. Nasser was receiving its support and arms cannot unwilling to move against Amer or by any means be two conflicting sides contradict him in public. Since 1962, the but must be two cooperating sides.17 armed forces had been substantially independent of Nasser's direct Imperialism, especially that practiced by interference.11 Amer promoted officers the United States, was seen as by far the loyal to himself, so that, for example, the most powerful enemy up to and during the Chief of Staff, General Muhammad Fawzi, early stages of the 1967 crisis, while the known to be a supporter of Nasser, was other hostile states were said to be "only largely bypassed in favor of General Abdel satellites spinning in the U.S. orbit and Mohsen Murtagi, the head of Ground following its steps."18 In Nasser's crisis Forces Command.12 Other key figures speeches of 1967, "the West" is portrayed included Air Force chief Sidqi Mahmoud, as consisting primarily of the United States the naval commander Admiral Suleiman and Britain. It is deceitful and knowingly Izzat, and most importantly Defense hypocritical, despising and ignoring the Minister General , who was Arabs, and disregarding their legitimate Amer's close friend and "leading hatchet aspirations and rights. In addition, it is the man."13 Foreign policy decision-making in staunch political ally of its creation, Israel, the area of defense was divided between supporting its propaganda, taking its side Nasser and Amer, necessitating careful and providing it with military equipment. consideration of individual decisions to identify who was actually responsible for The United States them. Nasser saw the United States as his real opponent, out to destroy him and the Images of the Enemy14 Egyptian revolution: "The battle we are From Nasser's point of view in late 1966 fighting is not an easy one; it is a battle in and early 1967, there were three main which we are fighting America, the greatest enemies: Imperialism, represented by the power in the world."19 He perceived it as United States and Britain, was linked to having strongly hostile intentions towards Zionist Israel, the "imperialist base in the the Arabs, especially in terms of its constant heart of the Arab homeland,"15 and to the support for Israel. Indeed, he went so far as "Arab reactionaries." This conception is to announce their identity: "Israel today is repeatedly expressed in Nasser's own the United States."20 Although Nasser had speeches, and was also commonplace in the also become suspicious of Kennedy's true wider political discourse.16 All three groups intentions,21 he was on especially bad terms were represented as being closely with his successor, Lyndon Johnson, who connected: Nasser saw as being strongly pro-Israeli.22 During the latter's presidency, relations deteriorated, largely due to the United

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States' perceived attempt to gain political of our challenge. But we challenge profit from Egypt's economic problems and you, America.28 to its arms sales to Israel and the conservative Arab states.23 However, despite this belief in its hostile Thus Nasser came to believe in a "wider intentions, it does not appear that Nasser conspiracy" between imperialism, Zionism, expected the United States to launch a and reaction--"only different names for the conventional military attack on Egypt. The same thing"--which explained "the situation in Vietnam was taking up so much coordinated, hostile movements against our of the United States' resources and attention nation."24 He identified a worldwide that it seemed unlikely to embroil itself in imperialist onslaught against progressive yet another regional conflict. regimes behind the replacement of Kwame With regard to the issue of relative Nkrumah in Ghana and Sukarno in capability, it was obvious to most members Indonesia by right wing, pro-Western of the Egyptian regime that the military figures, and the interventions in the strength of the United States was vastly Dominican Republic, the Congo, and greater than that of all of the Arab states Vietnam. He suggested that the United combined. Nasser stated during an States had created Israel and fostered the international press conference on May 28 Islamic Alliance25 in order to control the that he had not even taken U.S. forces into Arab world, and that the CIA was planning account, because: his own assassination for the same purpose. Although Nasser was intensely disliked in If I started considering how strong certain U.S. government circles by the mid- America is and how strong I am, even 1960s, it seems most improbable that there before I started my calculations I was an actual plot against him. However, should come to the conclusion that the idea became so fixed in his mind that America has air, land, and sea American denials were of no avail.26 superiority over us.29 The state-controlled media echoed Nasser's insistence that the United States He went on to say that Egypt would was the primary enemy and conspirator. By certainly defend itself with great February 24, 1967, Heikal, in his series of determination if the United States eleven al-Ahram editorials on the conflict intervened, even suggesting that he would between Egypt and America, was writing destroy the Suez Canal. Defense Minister that the United States had developed a Badran, on the other hand, apparently "sinister dangerous complex" consisting of replied to a colleague's query about the "economic and psychological warfare, the possibility of intervention by the U.S. Sixth hatching of plots and assassinations, and a Fleet that "we have a weapon that can deal basic and fundamental reliance on secret it a lethal blow."30 His hearers concluded he activities."27 Even at the height of the pre- had received Soviet arms or assurances of war crisis with Israel, the Voice of the support on his recent visit to Moscow, Arabs' radio station retained its priorities: although it is possible, given the incongruity of the boast, that he did not We challenge you, Israel. No, in fact, mean it seriously. There is at least no we do not address the challenge to evidence that other members of the military you, Israel, because you are unworthy establishment shared his confidence.

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 25 Laura James

Israel our forces, reach Beersheba."36 Amer's In Nasser's public speeches and private subordinates seem to have shared his conversations of 1967, Israel's intentions opinion. British Field Marshal Montgomery are consistently portrayed as hostile, visiting the on May threatening, deceitful, and aggressive. In his 12 gave a blunt warning that they would Unity Day broadcast, for example, he lose a war with Israel, to which General referred to Israel as "the original enemy Murtagi replied that they had the latest which is a manifestation of perpetual Russian equipment.37 Murtagi expressed a aggression."31 As such, its nature was seen similar opinion to a domestic audience, as fundamentally expansionist.32 Israel was reporting from Sinai that "Our forces are also usually portrayed as subordinate to fully prepared to take the battle outside the external forces: in particular, the UAR borders."38 Internal propaganda international Zionist movement, Western convinced most military officers that their imperialism, and the United States. Heikal capabilities were superior to those of the questioned the extent of this subordination Israelis.39 in al-Ahram on January 14, 1963, writing This appears to have been a major that "Israel is an instrument but not an misperception. Due to economic problems, instrument without a will of its own."33 Egypt had been rapidly falling behind in the However, such an opinion was uncommon. arms race since 1965. 40 Israeli and foreign The operational image of Israel's relative intelligence agencies thought that no military capability held by the Egyptian confrontation would be possible for Egypt ruling elite is more ambiguous. The defense before at least 1970, 41 and Johnson was establishment thought that they could defeat advised by U.S. intelligence officials that Israel in May 1967, and said so in private Israel could quickly defeat Egypt or any and in public. At his trial for conspiracy combination of Arab states.42 However, it after losing the war, on February 24, 1968, appears that the Egyptian intelligence Badran testified: service, focusing on the quantity of arms and troops rather than quality, training, We were confident that our army was leadership, and morale, seriously ready and that Israel could not attack underestimated relative Israeli strength. because intelligence estimates pointed Arab tacticians in general agreed that Israel to the fact that we were superior in would be unable to fight a long war, and armored weapons, artillery and air that there would be "a crushing military power. It was calculated that Israel advantage once Arab military operations would not walk into an open grave.34 against Israel are conducted according to a single, co-ordinated plan."43 Consequently, When the decision was being taken to public opinion inside Egypt was entirely close the Strait, Amer, asked by Nasser if convinced that Israel was weak, divided, the armed forces were ready for war, and afraid to fight without outside support. apparently pointed to his neck and said, This was the belief that had long been "On my own head be it, boss! Everything's promulgated by Heikal in al-Ahram: in tiptop shape."35 Furthermore, in early June, he told the foreign minister, "If Israel Imperialism has built up an image of actually carried out any military action Israel as a ferocious power which no against us I could, with only one-third of Arab could challenge. But this is a

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myth, because the UAR can eliminate long."50 Heikal reported him as telling King Israel single-handed. The problem is Faisal in August 1965, "I believe that the the forces protecting Israel and their conflict between us and Israel is a matter of military presence.44 a hundred years."51 The key to this apparent contradiction It was also a theme emphasized in Nasser's between Nasser's statements and behavior crisis speeches, which portrayed Israel as seems to be that Nasser's belief in Israeli militarily boastful, deluded by false past strength was predicated upon two successes, and ripe for destruction by the assumptions: that the Arabs were divided, Arab nation. and that Israel was supported by powerful However, it is difficult to tell whether external forces. He told the Beirut Nasser really believed this to be the case. It publication al-Hawadis on March 26, 1967, is possible, as Heikal suggests that since "We could annihilate Israel in twelve days Nasser had limited access to the armed were the Arabs to form a united front." forces, Amer was able to deceive him with Israel, when isolated from the aid of global regard to Egypt's relative strength. At their imperialism, was consistently portrayed as May 24 meeting, Nasser told U Thant that weak. For example, it was generally his military chiefs had assured him that they believed that Israel had only survived the were ready,45 and Mahmoud Riad reports Suez conflict with the help of Britain and Nasser as saying, after the war, that Amer France. The United States had taken the had told him he could hold off Israel with place of the European powers as Israel's one-third of his strength.46 Other members protector. Thus Nasser's operational image of the regime also seem to have been of Israeli capability should be described less convinced. When Sadat, then speaker of the in terms of objective strength or weakness, National Assembly, heard of the Israeli and more in terms of dependency. On attack, his reaction was, "Well, they'll be Palestine Day in 1967, he explained, "Israel taught a lesson they won't forget."47 could not live for one day without U.S. Likewise, Salah Bassiouny of the Foreign economic and military aid."52 This belief Ministry, hearing a military friend predict was expressed during the shocked early disaster, was deeply shocked and did not hours of June 5 in the widespread believe him. 48 conviction that the United States was The alternative possibility is that Nasser fighting on the Israeli side.53 knew Israel to be stronger than Egypt, but was bluffing and did not really expect to Key Decisions fight. Mohieddin, for example, said that In order to use a decision-by-decision Nasser had ways of knowing what really approach to explaining the importance of was going on in the armed forces and knew images of the enemy prior to the Six-day that they were inferior in quality.49 This War, it is first necessary to establish that the should have been reinforced by the March whole course of events was not planned in 1967 report of the Unified Arab Command, advance by the Egyptian regime.54 U.S. and which emphasized the poor defensive other foreign representatives believed at the capability of Arab states. Moreover, Nasser time that the had a plan, due to had often expressed his awareness that the small indications of forethought and time was not yet ripe to fight Israel, and that organization such as the speed of the "the way back to Palestine is hard and

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 27 Laura James movement into Sinai, and the atmosphere of confirmed by the fact that Egyptian troops overwhelming confidence in .55 passed through Cairo in ostentatious However, subsequent Egyptian accounts procession, rather than secretly, and were emphasize that in fact there was a high deployed in the Sinai according to the degree of confusion, and decision-making defensive "Conqueror" plan-- although was frequently improvisational. The offensive operations were not ruled out.63 evidence of Nasser's own speeches is Nasser himself later said he estimated the mixed. On May 22 he asserted, "We had no likelihood of war at only 20% at this time.64 plan prior to May 13,"56 though four days It was generally stated that the key later he implied the opposite: trigger for this decision was the receipt, on May 13, of a report that Israeli troops were Recently we felt we are strong massing in force on the Syrian border. Such enough, that if we were to enter a reports had been received before, but this battle with Israel, with God's help, we one was more convincing. First, could triumph. On this basis, we circumstantial detail on the nature and decided to take actual steps.57 location of the thirteen brigades was provided. Second, there were fewer troops However, it seems likely that, in front of than usual in the Israeli Independence Day an Arab audience, Nasser was merely trying parade in Jerusalem on May 15, which was to take credit for the inevitable.58 intended as a gesture to reduce provocation, Although the Egyptian military certainly but interpreted, due to the rigidity of the had contingency plans for this sort of Arab image of an aggressive Israel, as situation, the specific occasion seems to evidence they were busy elsewhere.65 have come as a surprise. Third, and most importantly, the information was received through several THE MOBILIZATION IN THE SINAI channels, given particular emphasis by the The first important decision made by the USSR. The Soviet ambassador provided a Egyptian regime in the crisis preceding the detailed report to the Egyptian Foreign 1967 War was the mobilization of the Ministry; Vladimir Semenov, the Soviet Egyptian armed forces and concentration of deputy foreign minister, gave similarly troops in the Sinai desert. At the same time, specific information to Sadat at the Moscow Chief of Staff General Fawzi, was sent to airport, and the story may also have been investigate the apparent threat to and passed directly from the oviet to the assure the Damascus regime of Egyptian Egyptian intelligence service.66 support.59 The decision seems to have been Nevertheless, this report alone seems made late on May 13 at Nasser's house, by insufficient to explain the Egyptian Nasser, Amer, and Sadat, who had just decision, especially since it was soon returned from Moscow.60 The following contradicted. Fawzi was sent to Syria to morning, Amer also met with Badran, investigate on May 14, but he found no Fawzi, and the heads of the various sections evidence of abnormal troop concentrations, of the armed forces in order to decide and was told by the Syrian air force chief military questions. The aim appears to have that the report was merely based on threats been to deter Israel from aggression, and past raids. He reported fully to Amer on following the pattern of the mobilization of his return to Cairo on May 15. 67 In addition, 1960, 61 rather than to start a war.62 This is the Israelis repeatedly denied--through the

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U.S, the USSR, and a secret channel press briefing on May 11 that was previously used by Mossad—that unusual apparently misquoted and misinterpreted as numbers of troops were present on the a threat to occupy Damascus and overthrow border.68 The United States confirmed this. the Syrian regime.73 Prime Minister Levi However, due to the fixed Egyptian belief Eshkol also threatened the Arab rulers with in Israeli and American hostility, neither drastic measures: was believed, as the foreign minister later said to UN Secretary-General U Thant: We do not recognize the limitations they endeavor to impose on our acts [The] U.S. Chargé told us that there of response… If they try to sow were no concentrations but would not unrest on our border--unrest will give us any guarantees. We were back come to theirs.74 in a similar situation as existed in 1956 when the U.S. ambassador gave When even international observers us similar information, and yet we thought that an Israeli attack might be were attacked.69 forthcoming,75 Nasser and the Egyptian media naturally took such words as Naturally, such denials were not received evidence of aggressive intentions toward until the Egyptian troops had begun to Syria. However, even an Israeli threat to move into Sinai, when to withdraw them Syria was not necessarily a sufficient reason would have meant a loss of face. As Badran for action. Syria was no longer part of the put it, "Everything had got escalated and we UAR, as it had been when Nasser mobilized can't just turn the key and get all the troops in 1960, and the Egypt-Syria defense back as if nothing happened."70 However, agreement did not mandate a response to this does not explain the continuation of the normal raids, just as none had been made military build-up, which was perceived as the previous month when six Syrian planes increasingly threatening by Israel, in late were shot down. The statements of Israeli May.71 leaders and reported troop movements It is therefore suggested that the real seemed more threatening because they were reason for the mobilization was less the perceived in the context of a U.S. presence or otherwise of troop conspiracy against Egypt, attacking concentrations, and more the image of Nasser's prestige by showing that he was Israel as having aggressive intentions, unable to protect Syria. Bassiouny claims which caused contrary evidence to be that the Foreign Ministry saw the reports as discounted or ignored. Burdett even credible, because Israel had reached the suggests the Soviet report was never taken level at which it could find strategic literally, but seen to represent a political alliance with the United States.76 Similarly, rather than a military reality.72 It is certainly on May 12, Heikal had written the last true that, since Israel could mobilize within article in his series about the clash between hours, the lack of troop concentrations was Egypt and America, in which he depicted not in itself significant. The perception that the United States as finally prepared to deal Israel intended to attack Syria may the coup de grace to Egypt's government. In therefore have been more closely related to this atmosphere of danger, the heavy threats uttered by Israeli decision-makers. emphasis laid by the USSR on the warning For example, General Yitzhak Rabin gave a of troop movements seemed like an

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 29 Laura James opportunity not to be missed. It implied an what they intended. Nasser certainly invitation for Egypt to confront her enemies ordered both letters to be written. He with Soviet support, without which the planned the first on the morning of May 14 United States was utterly unassailable.77 in consultation with his advisor for foreign affairs, delegating the task to Amer, who The Expulsion of UNEF gave instructions to General Fawzi. The next decision made by the Egyptian However, when Nasser saw the English regime was to expel UNEF from the Sinai. version, he displayed concern about the On May 16, General Fawzi wrote to the wording, since he wanted to make it quite UNEF commander: clear that UNEF could remain in Gaza and Sharm al-Shaykh. He apparently asked For the sake of complete security of Amer to change "withdraw" to "redeploy" all UN troops which install and cross out "all" before "these troops." Observation Posts along our borders, Amer reported that this was not possible, as I request that you issue your orders to the letter was already being delivered.84 withdraw all these troops Therefore it seems likely that, two days immediately.78 later, Nasser ordered Riad to request the full withdrawal reluctantly, with no alternative The UN's commander had no authority to that would avoid a loss of face. In the long agree, and referred the matter to the term, he had wanted to get rid of UNEF, but secretary-general, who made it clear that at this juncture it led to confused changes of UNEF could be expelled but would not plan and raised new political issues for stand aside to allow the resumption of which the regime was not prepared.85 hostilities. Therefore, Foreign Minister Riad However, once the lines had been drawn, he sent him a formal request "to terminate the rejoiced with the Egyptian people at the existence of UNEF on the soil of the UAR expulsion, and he never had any intention and in the Gaza Strip."79 Again, although of seeking a graceful way to back down, Nasser does not seem to have intended war, advising U Thant not to send an appeal that he acknowledged that this action raised its would certainly be refused.86 probability--to anything from 20 to 80 On the other hand, it seems possible that percent, depending on the source.80 Fawzi Amer intended the complete termination of himself apparently failed to realize the UNEF from the beginning. He had significance at the time,81 but Riad claims suggested it twice previously,87 and the to have become aware of the possibility of a , which he controlled, military confrontation immediately upon preempted the withdrawal, demanding reading Fawzi's letter.82 The UN access not only to the border posts but also commander thought it would make war to Sharm al-Shaykh.88 The occupation or inevitable, and was cheerfully told by his otherwise of Sharm al-Shaykh was the Egyptian liaison, Brigadier General crucial difference between the withdrawal Sharkawy, "We have arrived at this and the redeployment of UNEF, since the decision after much deliberation and are military seems never to have considered the prepared for anything. If there is war, we option of leaving it empty and vulnerable to shall next meet at Tel Aviv."83 Israeli attack. Amer apparently decided to There is some ambiguity regarding occupy Sharm al-Shaykh on the evening of precisely who took these decisions and May 16, having changed his mind twice.

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Troops were to be sent as soon as possible, war with Israel."94 arriving by May 18. 89 Since Amer seems to have been aware that the occupation of The Closure of the Straits of Tiran Sharm al-Shaykh would force the closure of The decision to control passage through the Tiran Straits, provoking Israel,90 this the Tiran Straits, closing the Gulf of Aqaba suggests that he may already have planned to Israel, was made on the morning of May war in mid-May. 22 by a meeting of the Supreme Executive Nasser, by contrast, was looking Committee, consisting of Nasser, Amer, the primarily to increase the political gains prime minister, and the remaining members from his previous move. While Amer and of the Revolutionary Command Council his military supporters perceived Israel as (RCC). A vote was taken, but only the the primary enemy, and its military prime minister voted against closure, citing inferiority as the key factor determining economic concerns.95 On the evening of action, Nasser's calculations were more May 22, therefore, Nasser made a speech complex, since his emphasis on the hostility affirming: of the United States caused him to pay Our rights and our sovereignty over greater attention to the global situation. the Gulf of Aqaba, which constitutes Unlike Amer, who apparently never Egyptian territorial waters. Under no seriously considered the option of partial circumstances will we allow the UNEF withdrawal, Nasser was probably not Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of committed to the occupation of Sharm al- Aqaba.96 Shaykh until at least May 17, when U Thant refused merely to evacuate the border On the following day, Cairo Radio posts.91 However, after that date, he must added that the president had also banned have approved it. The main negotiator with "the passage of strategic materials through the UN military forces was General Fawzi, the Gulf to Israel even on non-Israeli who was avowedly Nasser's man. On May ships." 17, Fawzi definitely confirmed that UNEF There is some controversy over whether had to withdraw from Sharm al-Shaykh, but Egyptian decision-makers believed this gave them 48 hours. When the UN constituted a decision in favor of war. commander, hoping to delay the removal Israeli leaders had long reiterated that they until Thant arrived in Cairo, then asked for would view the closure of the Gulf of three extra days, Fawzi refused, but granted Aqaba as a casus belli. Although only five him until May 22 as an act of cooperation.92 Israeli vessels had passed through over the This particular date was almost certainly previous ten years,97 Cairo Radio's chosen because it was the day on which explanation of Nasser's announcement Nasser intended to announce the closure of threatened Israeli oil imports, access to the Gulf of Aqaba, which depended on an Africa and Asia and, most importantly, Egyptian military presence in Sharm al- deterrent capacity. There was the obvious Shaykh. It was therefore probably Nasser precedent of 1956, when the Aqaba who gave the order.93 He was aware of the blockade was a key cause of the Israeli implications, as he made clear in his speech attack.98 Officers in the Egyptian armed of May 26: "Taking over Sharm al-Shaykh forces learned during training that Israel meant confrontation with Israel. It also had laid down certain "red lines," including meant that we were ready to enter a general closure of the Tiran Straits.99 Crossing these

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 31 Laura James lines would be a declaration of war. Some observers believed that Nasser As late as May 19, Israeli Foreign never wanted to close the Gulf of Aqaba, Minister Abba Eban had told the Soviet but was forced to it by the occupation of Ambassador, "There will be no war if the Sharm al-Shaykh, which was in turn Egyptians do not attack and do not interfere necessitated by the termination of UNEF.107 with Israel's right of navigation."100 The regime's credibility was involved. At Therefore, it seems certain that Nasser and the meeting on May 22, Amer apparently Riad were being disingenuous when they protested that his troops could not simply expressed to U Thant on May 24 the belief sit in Sharm al-Shaykh and watch the Israeli that the Gulf of Aqaba was not really flag go past.108 However, Safran denies that important to Israel.101 According to two of the closure followed inevitably from the those present at the May 22 meeting, Sadat occupation.109 Even after UNEF had been and Shafei, Nasser said then that the asked to leave, the possibility of a blockade blockade would make war 100% certain, was hardly mentioned in the Egyptian press although in his speech of July 23, Nasser until it became reality. Rabin reported the claimed his actual estimate at that time was testimony of Egyptian prisoners of war that 50% or 80%.102 It is, however, interesting Amer told a group of officers in Sinai on that the pilots who were the original May 20 that the Straits would not be closed, audience for Nasser's May 22 speech were which, even if he was lying, must have apparently disappointed, because they seemed plausible to his audience. thought he meant that considerations related Moreover, to the extent that it was a to the U.S. would prevent war, and Amer significant factor, the link between had to reassure them, "don't worry children, occupying Sharm al-Shaykh and closing the we're going to fight."103 Tiran Straits seems to have been The main reason for the Tiran blockade acknowledged earlier in the policy-making seems to have been the criticism directed at process, as outlined above--implying that the Egyptian regime by the other Arab the decision was taken then, rather than states, especially the Jordanians. Amman arrived at by accident. Nasser did not Radio asked on May 19: appear to feel trapped by the course of events. Indeed, U Thant, when he visited Will Egypt restore its batteries and Cairo, was puzzled by Nasser's air of guns to close its territorial waters in blissful confidence. Badran has even the Tiran Strait to the enemy? Logic, claimed, "Closing the Gulf was the main wisdom, and nationalism make it aim."110 incumbent on Egypt to do so….104 It therefore appears that Nasser made a deliberate decision to blockade the Tiran Extravagant domestic propaganda had also Straits and run a high risk of war, and that gathered momentum and raised high decision must be explained. An important expectations.105 The loss of the Suez war factor was the weak and apparently eleven years earlier had long rankled, and irresolute Israeli response to his previous there was a deep desire to wipe this defeat provocations. In private, Eshkol had sent out. This opinion was expressed in Riad's Nasser secret messages urging de- words to Thant, "Israel will not profit from escalation. In public, he continued to assert that aggression any more."106 Israel's peaceful intentions, call for international mediation, and avoid criticism

32 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) Nasser And His Enemies of Egypt. For example, in his May 22 some evidence that an order was given for statement to the Knesset, he stopped short an offensive on May 27, which was then of condemning the Sinai build-up.111 This cancelled, due to the insistence of the reinforced the existing image of Egyptian United States and USSR that neither side military superiority--if Israel wanted to should strike the first blow.115 Thereafter, avoid war, it was presumably because she according to Badran, The situation was thought she would lose, and if she relied on turned from attacking to defense," which the international community, she must be was the cause of all the confusion.116 too weak to stand alone. Nasser was Oren has attempted to reconstruct therefore encouraged to believe Israel might Amer's changing intentions, based on not fight, especially if the United States Egyptian military memoirs.117 Replacing urged a peaceful solution. At the same time, the established, defensive 'Conqueror' plan, Amer was assuring him that his armed Amer apparently introduced Operation forces were more than ready to confront 'Lion', which involved the elimination of Israel,112 and the other Arab states were Eilat and the acquisition of a Negev seeking his leadership. If it did come to landbridge connecting Egypt to Jordan. war, his prospects were looking better all After the closure of the Tiran Straits, he the time. seems to have broadened objectives to include the entire Negev, with Operation The Question of Escalation 'Dawn,' the orders for which were to be Over the following fortnight, from May issued directly from Amer's own house. 23 until the outbreak of war on June 5, the Despite doubts expressed by Murtagi, Egyptian leadership had three options. It Fawzi, and Sidqi Mahmoud, by May 25 could launch a first strike on Israel, everything was ready for an attack at continue to escalate the situation (forcing daybreak on May 27. Fawzi implies that Israel either to attack first or to back down), Amer made his plans independently and or attempt to deescalate by making Nasser quashed them when he found out concessions to Israel. In the end, the about them, which seems plausible given Egyptian leaders seem to have chosen the the evidence that Nasser and Amer were not second alternative. However, there are on good terms in late May.118 On the other indications that the first option was under hand, Oren claims that Nasser was fully consideration and was rejected. The aware from the beginning but preferred to military command apparently urged a first overlook the operation, canceling it a few strike, but later changed its mind, according hours before it was due only because he to both Badran at his trial and Nasser in his came to believe that Israel was forewarned. meeting with U Thant.113 However, although Nasser gave Amer In the Sinai, there was deep confusion much latitude, it seems unlikely that he was since, as late as June 5, officers were still prepared to allow him to start a war without not sure whether their purpose was taking at least a passing interest, and other offensive or defensive. While Nasser evidence suggests that he never had any reiterated that Egypt would not strike first, intention of striking first. tanks and planes were fully fuelled and not Indeed, all of Nasser's plans depended concealed, as if they were going to attack, on the assumption that the Israelis would implying that "the political decision did not strike the first blow. Heikal claims that match with the military one."114 There is Nasser rejected the first-strike option,

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 33 Laura James because he thought it would give the United President Mohieddin. This seems to have States and Israel the pretext they were revived the hope in Egypt that the looking for. International opinion would be superpowers might compel Israel to accept alienated, the Soviets might withdraw their the situation, and lead to a military support, and the United States could enter relaxation. General Noufal reports that on the war on Israel's side. When Nasser met that day, "We were ordered to deescalate with the military commanders on June 2, he and to get back to our offices."122 told the air force commander that Egypt had Nevertheless, Nasser's small concessions do to wait for Israel to attack: not suggest that he was making a concerted effort to avoid war. The appearance of Sidqi just said 'Sir,' he said it in reasonableness kept the international English, 'it will be crippling to me'…. community from turning against him, while Abdel Hakim Amer looked at Sidqi every delay was to his advantage, since it and said, 'Sidqi, do you accept the gave Egypt time to complete its military first attack or do you want to fight the preparations and coordinate with the other United States?'119 Arabs. Israel, by contrast, could not afford to sustain total mobilization for long. It seems, therefore, that Amer had by In fact, certain actions taken by Nasser this time accepted the political parameters seemed designed to escalate the situation within which Nasser was working, still further. On May 29, he gave King especially as regards his image of the Hussein of Jordan permission to come to United States. Badran also says that he tried Cairo, and the Jordanian-Egyptian Joint to persuade Amer to allow a small first Defense Agreement signed the following strike in order to provoke a war, but Amer day certainly increased the risk of war. The unwillingly refused because of Nasser's Arabs had crossed another of Israel's "red wishes. 120 lines" by explicitly encircling the Jewish However, if the Egyptian regime had no state and giving Egypt control of its most intention of attacking first, neither did it vulnerable border. Indeed, Shimon Peres make any great effort to defuse tensions said that the key factor in Israel's decision with Israel. There were some minor to fight was: concessions. In addition to the reiterated promise not to fire the first shot, Nasser [Seeing the behavior of] Nasser and agreed with U Thant to accept a two-week Hussein at Cairo Airport. This was an moratorium on action in the Strait if Israel historic and crucial kiss…. We were did the same, and to refer the issue of now surrounded by a sort of banana passage to the International Court of [shaped front] filled with Russian Justice-- neither of which was acceptable to weapons.123 Israel. A British Foreign Office Telegram sent on June 2 optimistically noted "signs In addition, Nasser used increasingly that the Egyptians were already tending to belligerent rhetoric, which worsened the modify the application of their crisis by making the issue one of the rights blockade."121 More significantly, on June 3, of Palestine–and thus, implicitly, the the U.S. envoy Charles Yost and Foreign existence of Israel. On May 22 he suggested Minister Riad set a date for the U.S. that peace could not mean ignoring "the government to receive a visit from Vice-

34 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) Nasser And His Enemies rights of the Palestinian people" and There is general agreement that on June announced to Israel, "You are welcome [to 2, following the Israeli cabinet reshuffle, attack], we are ready for war."124 On May Nasser concluded war was certain, telling a 28 he declared, "The rights of the people of meeting of the Supreme Command that he Palestine must be restored. We accept no expected an attack on the air force on basis for coexistence with Israel."125 By Monday, June 5. 133 By the following day, June 4, his tone had become even more however, new doubts seemed to have triumphant: arisen, since in two interviews Nasser gave to the British press on June 3, he claimed in We are, with God's help, advancing one interview that war was imminent, and along the road towards our rights and in the other that the crisis had already the rights of the people of Palestine, passed.134 It is difficult to draw a general and God willing, we shall be conclusion from so many contradictions, victorious.126 but the central point appears to be that Nasser was not actually sure whether a war Although all of these threats were explicitly would occur. He changed his mind conditional on Israeli aggression,127 this frequently, but not his policies, because, in could have provided small comfort when one sense, the question was unimportant. Nasser was also stating that "the mere He expected military victory if war did existence of Israel is an aggression."128 break out, political victory if it did not. This raises the controversial question of Nasser's confidence was therefore whether Nasser actually expected war. He founded not only on his belief, acquired seems, throughout, to have been in two from Amer, that the Arabs were militarily minds on this issue, making contradictory capable of defeating Israel, but also on his statements. The UN commander, meeting perceptions of the international situation. In him on May 24, says Nasser clearly particular, his beliefs about the stance the understood "that a continued blockade of USSR would take are crucial to explaining the Gulf of Aqaba would eventually force his image of the degree of threat from the Israel to take aggressive action," but he also United States. However, his actual views on claims Nasser believed Israel would not this point are often misinterpreted. Badran fight without U.S. help, which would not be returned from his mission to Moscow in forthcoming.129 Nasser's confidant Heikal late May and is said to have given Nasser proclaimed the inevitability of an armed the false impression that the USSR would clash with Israel in al-Ahram on May 26, provide Egypt with military support if Israel recommending that Egypt should wait to attacked first.135 Nasser's speech of May 26 receive the first blow. However, he also certainly might be interpreted as expressing said in July 1969 that this was not then this opinion, which seems to have been Nasser's own opinion.130 At his May 28 prevalent in Cairo.136 press conference, Nasser said that he On the other hand, it is unlikely that expected an Israeli attack "daily."131 Yet, Nasser himself believed it for long. As he two days later, King Hussein received the implied at his May 28 press conference, he impression that Nasser did not want war, knew that in such a case the United States did not believe it would happen and thought would also intervene, perhaps resulting in there was a way out, perhaps through world nuclear war. Therefore he suggested international intervention.132 that "if war breaks out between Israel alone

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 35 Laura James and us alone, I think that it will be restricted expressing friendliness and condemning to this area."137 The truth appears to be that aggression, he expressed doubt as to its although Badran mistook an empty sincerity.142 This suspicion was reinforced compliment by the Soviet defense minister by indications from the American side, such and passed it on to Nasser in time to as U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Richard influence his May 26 speech, the Foreign Nolte's estimate that the chances of Israeli Ministry gave Nasser the true picture that attack were about fifty-fifty and the report very evening.138 Nasser was not, thereafter, that Johnson had told his aides, "Israel will relying on the USSR to do more than deter hit them."143 However, so deeply ingrained American intervention, which it did--for were the images of American hostility and example, by moving additional naval units Israeli dependency that these were seen as to the eastern Mediterranean as a "trip- indications of U.S. duplicity rather than wire." Since Nasser knew that the two genuine inability to dictate to the Jewish superpowers had been in touch at the state. highest levels since May 22, to avoid Other factors were also interpreted misunderstanding, this action may also have within the Egyptian regime as further affected his calculations insofar as it indications of Israeli weakness. For seemed indicative of a lowered Soviet example, Amer sent two MiG-21s to make estimate of the probability of U.S. a reconnaissance flight over Beersheba, intervention.139 "laughingly" announcing the panicked Nasser's judgment that the USSR would Israeli response to Nasser over lunch on deter American intervention made it seem May 28.144 Similarly, on May 30, Sidqi less likely that Israel, viewed primarily as Mahmoud told the Jordanian delegation that an instrument of the United States, would Egyptian squadrons had been flying into act independently. This was partly because Israeli air space, unchallenged for the last it was not perceived to be strong enough; to few days, and that "this indicated that a certain extent due to the fact that Nasser Israel's fear of the Egyptian air force was assumed it would follow U.S. orders. The sufficient to prevent them from challenging United States was clearly emphasizing a it."145 King Hussein, with rather different diplomatic approach, attempting to organize preconceptions, interpreted such an international flotilla, dubbed the "Red forbearance as Israeli intelligence- Sea Regatta," to break the blockade, and gathering.146 agreeing on June 3 that the Egyptian and At the same time, Israeli rhetoric American vice-presidents should exchange condemning the Tiran blockade and visits.140 Indications of the American search subsequent developments was relatively for a peaceful solution, if they could be mild. Eshkol, in his Knesset statements and taken at face value, must also be indications May 28 broadcast, expressed his readiness of the fact that Israel would not strike to participate in a peace effort and first.141 However, Nasser had an established repeatedly called for international support image of the United States as deeply hostile and action. Although he also emphasized towards him personally. Therefore, he did the strength of the IDF and, in coded terms, not take these signs at face value, and did Israel's willingness eventually to use force, not rule out the possibility of war, his poor delivery of the speech--the hesitant according to his July 23 speech. When he tone of voice which many interpreted as received Johnson's letter of May 23, showing weakness--confirmed the

36 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) Nasser And His Enemies impression of irresolution, among his own united and the United States held back from people as well as the Arabs.147 Even the fact fighting on Israel's side by the Soviet that the United States counseled restraint counterweight. was interpreted as an attempt to protect During the crisis of 1967, events were Israel from Arab wrath--and therefore as neither planned in advance nor developing further evidence of her need for outside the control of the Egyptian leaders. protection.148 Nasser chose at each stage not to draw The Egyptian attitude was back, motivated by the prospect of high fundamentally based on the Arab belief in political gains, and knowingly risking war, Israeli military inferiority. Nolte sent a U.S. based on a persistent underestimation of an Embassy telegram on May 27, explaining Israel seen as isolated from effective that Nasser: international support. The mobilization of …appears sincerely to believe Egyptian forces in Sinai was less a result of Egyptians can beat Israelis if we do the reports of Israeli troop concentrations-- not intervene and his estimate is which were soon contradicted--than of the shared by every official Egyptian we fact that Israel was seen as having have talked to.149 aggressive intentions, causing Egypt to focus on the rhetoric of Israeli leaders Most other foreign observers similarly suggesting the possibility of an attack on noted the confidence of the ruling elite.150 Damascus. This was enhanced by the fact This exemplifies the ability of a group to that the tensions in U.S.-Egyptian relations preserve a deeply ingrained image, seemed to be coming to a head, suggesting especially one to which there is a strong that the United States might dictate an emotional commitment, by ignoring or Israeli strike in order to embarrass Nasser. reinterpreting all evidence to the contrary. The expulsion of UNEF was Only a sufficiently dramatic and originally part of the same decision: a discontinuous event, such as the Six-Day partial withdrawal was requested so that the War itself, is able to invalidate such a Egyptian forces would present a credible perception. deterrent. Marshal Amer may have instigated the demand for full withdrawal, CONCLUSIONS perhaps even out of desire to provoke a In summary, the Egyptian elite viewed war, but Nasser confirmed it, apparently the United States as its primary enemy: willingly. On balance, however, the closure Strongly hostile, much more powerful than of the Straits of Tiran was not an inevitable Egypt, and the head of a conspiracy consequence of the expulsion of UNEF, nor involving Israel and the "reactionary" Arab did the Egyptian elite fail to realize that this states. Israel was also perceived as move carried a high risk of war. Prime extremely hostile and aggressive. However, Minister Eshkol's messages seeking to avert it was seen as subordinate to the United war, and emphasizing the role of the States in terms of both military capability international community, had been and political capacity for independent interpreted as further evidence of Israeli action. This image encouraged Nasser to military inferiority and unwillingness to believe that Egypt could hold her own take independent action. At the same time, against Israel if the international conditions Nasser saw his own position as constantly were suitable, i.e. with the Arab states

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 37 Laura James improving, with more Arab states pledging support the pre-existing and self- support. perpetuating belief in the hostility of both Finally, the decision not to strike first, the United States and Israel, and in the but nevertheless to continue to escalate the military inferiority of Israel. crisis, is explicable in similar terms. The military establishment seems originally to have supported a first strike, but later *Laura James is a College Lecturer at St bowed to the demands of the president. Edmund Hall, Oxford University. She is Nasser thought that the United States would currently completing her doctoral thesis in not support Israel militarily in case of an International Relations, entitled, "Images of Israeli first strike, not least because he felt the Enemy: Conflict Decision Making in assured that the Soviets would intervene if Nasser's Egypt." She also worked as a the United States became directly involved. consultant at the International Fund for Fighting Israel by itself, allied with Jordan Agricultural Development. and Syria under a united command, he An earlier version of this article was thought that he could win, or at least hold presented at the U.S. Department of State's out for a satisfactory UN-imposed solution. conference "The United States, the Middle Finally, Nasser also assumed that Israel East, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," held would follow the orders of the United on January 12 and 13, 2004. States, which appeared to be seeking to avoid war. Indications that Israel might not follow suit were perceived as evidence of NOTES U.S. duplicity rather than inability to dictate to Israel. 1 In this paper, common Arabic proper Throughout the crisis, incoming nouns are spelled according to the generally information was distorted to fit the accepted Western media usage, without preconceived enemy images of the reference to a specific system of Egyptian elite. This was related to well- transliteration. For nouns in less common attested cognitive mechanisms,151 as well as usage, the paper follows the existing to the general emotional commitment to the scholarly literature. belief that Israel was inferior to the Arab 2 In particular, Abdel Magid Farid, Nasser: states, and to the authoritarian structure of The Final Years (Reading, England: Ithaca, the regime. For example, it seems likely 1994); Mohamed Heikal, Nasser: The that regime propaganda in Egypt influenced Cairo Documents (London: New English those whose duty it was to collect military Library, 1972); , The information on Israel, causing them to Philosophy of the Revolution (Buffalo: underestimate its potential, and the elite to Smith, Keynes and Marshall, 1959); believe that error. Regime dynamics also Mahmoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in apparently limited Nasser's access to the Middle East (London: Quartet Books, reliable information on the relative 1981); Indar Jit Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: strengths of his own armed forces and those Withdrawal of the United Nations of the Israelis. However, the decision Emergency Force leading to the Six-Day makers themselves also over-emphasized War of June 1967 (London: Cass, 1980); confirmatory evidence and ignored or Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity (New distorted contrary information so as to York: Harper and Row, 1978).

38 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) Nasser And His Enemies

3 Extensive use is made of the transcripts of 10 A.I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World: the background interviews of surviving The Elements of Foreign Policy (New participants performed in BBC, Fifty Years York: Wiley, 1976). Although Heikal had War: Israel and the Arabs: Interviews, no independent power base (Robert Private Papers Collection, The Middle East Stephens, Nasser: A Political Biography Centre, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1997. (London: The Penguin Press, 1971)), Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Nasser relied on him for the most current Miscalculation in the Middle East information, and according to the former (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana US Ambassador, Lucius Battle, Heikal University Press, 1993); Avi Shlaim, "His wrote important foreign policy speeches for Royal Shyness: King Hussein and Israel," Nasser in the early 1960s (Raymond Cohen, The New York Review of Books, July 15, Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli 1999; and Hussein of Jordan, My "War" Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf with Israel: As told to and with additional (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, material by Vick Vance and Pierre Lauer 1990)). (London: Peter Owen, 1969), also 11 Stephens, Nasser: A Political Biography; reproduce relevant interviews, in full or in Sadat, In Search of Identity. part. 12 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the 4 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts. Part Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview. 4: The Middle East and Africa (Caversham 13 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in Park, England: British Broadcasting the Middle East. Corporation Monitoring Service, 1967), 14 This section draws on an intensive supplemented by Fuad A. Jabber, qualitative analysis of all Nasser's speeches International Documents on Palestine, during the pre-war crisis, on May 22, May 1967 (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 26, May 28, May 29, and June 4, 1967 1970), is the major source for political (BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts. Part speeches and radio transcripts. 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967)). 5 Useful files in the UK Public Record Such rhetorical images are not necessarily Office include FCO 17/290, FCO 17/489, identical to operational images, but there is FCO 17/490, FCO 39/250 and PREM sufficient accuracy to delineate the most 13/1826. Parker, The Politics of salient enemies, Israel and the United Miscalculation in the Middle East States, which are later analyzed more reproduces relevant US foreign policy specifically in terms of operational documents in an Appendix. perceptions within the Egyptian regime of 6 A.I. Dawisha, "The Middle East," in their intentions and capabilities. Christopher Clapham (ed.) Foreign Policy 15 "Unity Day" speech, February 22. BBC, Making in Developing States: A Summary of World Broadcasts. Part 4: The Comparative Approach (Westmead: Saxon Middle East and Africa (1967). House, 1977). 16 Yehoshofat Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to 7 Farid, Nasser: The Final Years. Israel (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 8 Sadat, In Search of Identity. 1972). 9 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the 17 February 22. BBC, Summary of World Arabs: Interviews. Bassiouny interview. Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967).

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 39 Laura James

18 Cairo Radio: Nasser's "Palestine Day" 32 Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel. Message to Arabs in UK, May 15. BBC, 33 Ibid. Summary of World Broadcasts. Part 4: The 34 Winston Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East and Africa (1967). Middle East: An Intimate Report on What 19"Labour Day" speech, May 2. Jabber, Lies Behind the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New International Documents on Palestine, York: Atheneum, 1969). 1967. 35 Sadat, In Search of Identity. 20 May 26. BBC, Summary of World 36 Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and Middle East. Africa (1967). 37 PRO, PREM 13/1826. 21 Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents. 38 May 18. BBC, Summary of World 22 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and the Middle East: Regional and Africa (1967). International Politics, 1955-1967 (Boulder: 39 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the Westview Press, 1994). Parker, The Politics Arabs: Interviews. Fakhr interview. of Miscalculation in the Middle East, 40 Nadav Safran, From War to War: The recalls that within 24 hours Kennedy's Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967 assassination was said in Cairo to have been (New York: Pegasus, 1969). the result of a Jewish plot. 41 Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East: 23 Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents. An Intimate Report on What Lies Behind 24 May 15. BBC, Summary of World the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and 42 Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Africa (1967). Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973 25 The fact that a major arms deal with (Berkeley: University of California Press, Saudi Arabia coincided with the 1980). announcement of the Islamic Alliance lent 43 Ahmad Samih Khalidi, "An Appraisal of credence to this suspicion (Dawisha, Egypt the Arab-Israel Military Balance," Middle in the Arab World: The Elements of East Forum, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1966). Foreign Policy). 44 November 4. BBC, Summary of World 26 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and the Middle East. Africa (Caversham Park, England: British 27 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts. Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967). Service, 1966). 28 May 23. BBC, Summary of World 45 Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and of the United Nations Emergency Force Africa (1967). leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967. 29 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts. 46 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967). the Middle East. 30 Sadat, In Search of Identity. Riad, The 47 Sadat, In Search of Identity. Struggle for Peace in the Middle East, 48 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the reports a similar statement. Arabs: Interviews. Bassiouny interview. 31 February 22. BBC, Summary of World 49 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and the Middle East. Africa (1967).

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50 November 24. BBC, Summary of World 61 In February 1960, following a sharp Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and increase in border incidents between Israel Africa (1966). and Syria, at that time joined with Egypt as 51 Quoted in Avraham Sela, The Decline of part of the (UAR), the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Nasser concentrated his forces in the Sinai Politics and the Quest for Regional Order in order to put pressure on Israel. Despite a (Albany: State University of New York warning from Soviet intelligence sources on Press, 1998). February 15 that Israel was massing troops 52 May 15. BBC, Summary of World on the Syrian border, Nasser neither Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and objected to the presence of UNEF nor Africa (1967). attempted to close the Straits of Tiran. He 53 Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents; moved the Egyptian forces out again from Sadat, In Search of Identity; Riad, The March 1, announcing that his aim of Struggle for Peace in the Middle East; deterring Israel had been achieved. This Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the precedent figured in the minds of both sides Middle East. during the crisis of 1967 (Michael Brecher, 54 L. Carl Brown, "Nasser and the June Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (New War: Plan or Improvisation?" in S. Seikaly, Haven: Yale University Press, 1974)). R. Baalbaki, and P. Dodd (eds.), Quest for 62 Sadat, In Search of Identity; BBC, Fifty Understanding: Arabic and Islamic Studies Years War: Israel and the Arabs: in Memory of Malcolm H. Kerr (Beirut: Interviews. Fawzi and Badran interviews. American University of Beirut Press, 1991), 63 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War (New makes a good case that Nasser had no York: Oxford University Press, 2002). master plan. 64 "Revolution Anniversary" speech, July 55 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in 23. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts. the Middle East. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967). 56 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts. 65 Cohen, Culture and Conflict in Egyptian- Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967). Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf. 57 May 26. BBC, Summary of World 66 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East and the Middle East. Africa (1967). 67 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the 58 Safran, From War to War: The Arab- Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview. Israeli Confrontation. 68 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War. 59 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the 69 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview. the Middle East. Appendix, Document 5. 60 Ibid. See also Parker, The Politics of 70 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the Miscalculation in the Middle East. Rikhye, Arabs: Interviews. The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the 71 Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, United Nations Emergency Force leading "Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of to the Six-Day War of June 1967, reports 1967," Adelphi Paper, No. 41 (1967). Nasser as telling Thant the decision was 72 Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East: made on May 13, but by the Cabinet, which An Intimate Report on What Lies Behind was probably a constitutional fiction. the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 41 Laura James

73 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the testimony of Rikhye, The Sinai the Middle East. Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations 74 May 13. Jabber, International Documents Emergency Force leading to the Six-Day on Palestine, 1967. War of June 1967, and Thant's June 26 75 See The New York Times, May 13. Report on the Withdrawal of UNEF 76 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the (Jabber, International Documents on Arabs: Interviews. Bassiouny interview. Palestine, 1967). 77 Safran, From War to War: The Arab- 90 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the Israeli Confrontation. Arabs: Interviews. Noufal interview. 78 Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal 91 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the of the United Nations Emergency Force Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview. leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967. 92 Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal 79 Quoted in Safran, From War to War: The of the United Nations Emergency Force Arab-Israeli Confrontation. leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967. 80 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in 93 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the the Middle East. Arabs: Interviews. Badran interview. 81 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the 94 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts. Arabs: Interviews. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967). 82 Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the 95 Sadat, In Search of Identity. Middle East. 96 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts. 83 Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967). of the United Nations Emergency Force 97 Arthur Lall, The UN and the Middle East leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967. Crisis, 1967 (New York: Columbia 84 Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the University Press, 1970). Middle East; Michael B. Oren, Six Days of 98 Safran, From War to War: The Arab- War; BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the Israeli Confrontation. Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview. 99 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the 85 Safran, From War to War: The Arab- Arabs: Interviews. Fakhr interview. Israeli Confrontation; Michael B. Oren, Six 100 Quoted in Parker, The Politics of Days of War. Miscalculation in the Middle East. 86 Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal 101 Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967. leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967; 87 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview. Middle East. Appendix, Document 5. 88 Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal 102 Sadat, In Search of Identity; Burdett, of the United Nations Emergency Force Encounter with the Middle East: An leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967. Intimate Report on What Lies Behind the 89 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict; BBC, Summary of Arabs: Interviews. Noufal interview. World Broadcasts. Part 4: The Middle East Murtagi, as quoted in Parker, The Politics and Africa (1967). of Miscalculation in the Middle East, 103 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the suggests that the decision was made later. Arabs: Interviews. Badran interview. However, Noufal's story accords better with

42 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) Nasser And His Enemies

104 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts. 120 Ibid. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967). 121 PRO, FCO 17/489. 105 Walter Laqueur, The Road to War: The 122 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the Origin and Aftermath of the Arab-Israeli Arabs: Interviews. Noufal interview. Conflict 1967-8 (London: Weidenfeld and 123 Quoted in Randolph S. Churchill and S. Nicolson, 1968). Winston, The Six Day War (London: 106 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in Heinemann, 1967). the Middle East. Appendix, Document 5. 124 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts. 107 Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967). of the United Nations Emergency Force 125 Jabber, International Documents on leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967. Palestine, 1967. BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the 126 Ibid. Arabs: Interviews. Noufal interview. 127 Cohen, Culture and Conflict in 108 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Middle East. the Deaf. 109 Safran, From War to War: The Arab- 128 May 28. Jabber, International Israeli Confrontation. Documents on Palestine, 1967. 110 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the 129 Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal Arabs: Interviews. of the United Nations Emergency Force 111 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts. leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967. Part 4: The Middle East and Africa (1967). 130 Stephens, Nasser: A Political 112 Sadat, In Search of Identity. Biography. 113 Burdett, Encounter with the Middle 131 Jabber, International Documents on East: An Intimate Report on What Lies Palestine, 1967. Behind the Arab-Israeli Conflict; Parker, 132 Hussein of Jordan, My "War" with The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle Israel; BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and East. the Arabs: Interviews. Hussein interview. 114 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the 133 The military command did not take this Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi, Shazly and Fakhr warning seriously, or pass it on to the lower interviews. ranks, largely because it seems to have been 115 Avraham Sela, The Decline of the Arab- based either on the precedent of the Suez Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and crisis or on a conversation with an the Quest for Regional Order. However, American journalist. "Revolution Gamassy firmly denies that there was ever Anniversary" speech, July 23, BBC, an offensive plan. BBC, Fifty Years War: Summary of World Broadcasts. Part 4: The Israel and the Arabs: Interviews. Middle East and Africa (1967); Sadat, In 116 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the Search of Identity.; Farid, Nasser: The Arabs: Interviews. Badran interview. Final Years; BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel 117 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War. and the Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi, Noufal 118 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the and Badran interviews. Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi and Bassiouny 134 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War. interviews. 135 Badran insists he only reported to Nasser 119 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the that Marshal Gretchko, the Soviet Defense Arabs: Interviews. Badran interview. Minister, had promised support if the US

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 43 Laura James

interfered. BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); and the Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi and Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Badran interviews. Misperception," World Politics, Vol. 20, 136 Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the No. 3 (1968), pp. 454-479. Middle East. 137 Jabber, International Documents on Palestine, 1967. 138 Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents; BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs: Interviews. Bassiouny interview. 139 Safran, From War to War: The Arab- Israeli Confrontation. 140 The Egyptians later claimed that they had believed the United States was also endorsing Thant's moratorium and putting pressure on Israel to comply (Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents). 141 This basic belief was at the root of the many Arab conspiracy theories prevalent after the war. 142 Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East; BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs: Interviews. Fawzi interview. 143 Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East. 144 Ibid. 145 Samir A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 146 BBC, Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs: Interviews. Hussein interview. 147 Brecher and Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973. 148 Safran, From War to War: The Arab- Israeli Confrontation. 149 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East. Appendix, Document 12. 150 Ibid. Documents 1 and 9; Anthony Nutting, Nasser (London: Constable, 1972); PRO, FCO 39/250. 151 See Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia." In David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen, (eds.), Enemies in

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