Bourbon, Pork Chops, and Red Peppers: Political Immorality in Florida, 1945-1968 Seth A

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2007 Bourbon, Pork Chops, and Red Peppers: Political Immorality in Florida, 1945-1968 Seth A. Weitz

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

BOURBON, PORK CHOPS, AND RED PEPPERS: POLITICAL IMMORALITY IN FLORIDA, 1945-1968

SETH A. WEITZ

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2007

The members of the Committee approve this Dissertation of Seth A. Weitz defended on March 16, 2007

______James P. Jones Professor directing Dissertation

______Patrick O‘Sullivan Outside Committee Member

______Maxine Jones Committee Member

______Edward D. Wynot Committee Member

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the process of researching and writing this dissertation I have benefited greatly from family, friends, colleagues and mentors who have encouraged me in numerous ways. Firstly I would like to thank my parents, Michael and Barbara Weitz, who supported my decision to forgo Law School and pursue my graduate degrees in history. From an early age they included me in their numerous international travels and helped to foster my love for history. Mom, I am especially indebted to you for your advice and suggestions on the literary scope of this dissertation. I have also been fortunate enough to receive departmental teaching and research assistantships at Florida State University that have helped fund graduate school. Thanks to the staff of the F.S.U. History Department, especially Debbie Perry, Chris Pigniatello, India Van Burnt, Vicky Bernal and Tiffany Graves. Without their support and aid I never would have been able to complete this project. Numerous fellow graduate students at F.S.U. supported and aided me in both my research and my studies. Chris Day helped me discover the topic which I ultimately pursued in the summer of 2005, and Jonathan Sheppard, Vincent Mikkelsen and Jon Mikolashek‘s invaluable support and help in preparation for my comprehensive exams helped me weather that storm six months later. Even Jonathon Weber deserves special mention since his antics on the intramural fields of Florida State kept me level headed during the my last semesters in Tallahassee. A further thanks also to Brian Hall for being a great friend and colleague over the past four years. I would like to extend a sincere thanks to the archivists and staffs of the various archives I used in conducting my research, especially Boyd Murphree and Dave Nelson of the Florida State Archives. Several professors and instructors helped me realize my love for historical study and research before I ever arrived at Florida State. Joseph Patrouch has been a dear friend to me and he, along with Darden Pyron and Brian Peterson, helped to convince me that pursuing a doctorate in history was the right course for me to pursue. I would also like to thank Kevin Fontenot at Tulane University who gave me some of the first positive feedback on my work as an historian.

iii At F.S.U. I have had the opportunity to work with a myriad of wonderful and accomplished professors who have both challenged and guided me towards my ultimate goal. Fritz Davis, whom I worked closely with on several of his own projects early in my graduate career, helped me learn valuable tools of research. If it was not for Olaf Steiglitz and his seminar on McCarthyism, I would never have found the topic that has kept me occupied for the better part of the last two years. I am especially indebted to the members of my committee, Ed Wynot, Maxine Jones, Gerard Clark and Pat O‘Sullivan for providing with valuable feedback and constructive criticism and who have also helped me grow as an historian. Above all I want to thank Jim Jones for being the best major professor I could have ever imagined. He has also been a wonderful friend and mentor for the past five years. I would also like to thank Jim for allowing me to borrow his glove for the 2006 intramural softball season. I am honored to have been afforded the opportunity to work with Jim Jones and to call him a friend. Finally, I thank the person who has had to live with me during my entire career as a graduate student and who put up with me during the entire process of researching and writing my dissertation. My wife Jill has shown me nothing but support and has also helped me keep a perspective on life. I guess I should also thank my other best friend, my dog Monty, who kept me company during the writing of this work.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………vi

INTRODUCTION……………………………………………1

RECONSTRUCTING THE OLD SOUTH………………….11

A HOUSE DIVIDED………………………………………...30

REVOLUTION………………………………………………51

A STATE TO BUILD, A SOUTH TO SAVE, A NATION TO CONVINVCE………………………………………………...81

NEITHER AN ACUSING NOR A TRIAL BODY…………109

INQUISITION……………………………………………….138

TO AVOID CONTAMINATION…………………………...168

CAMPUS OF EVIL………………………………………….182

IF YOU ARE HUNGRY, WHY HOLD OUT FOR A STEAK?...... 208

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………247

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH………………………………...259

v ABSTRACT

The end of Reconstruction ushered in a new era in Southern history. White supremacy returned to the region and the Republican Party was run back across the Mason-Dixon Line leaving the South with a virtual one party system. From 1877-1967 Florida was a member of the —solid south“ where the winner of the Democratic primary was victorious in the general election. While Florida was tied to the Democratic Party, it also differed from its sister states in the South. The Sunshine State experienced a population boom like no other state in the nation except possibly California, transforming the peninsula from a backwater, poor, insignificant state into one of the largest state‘s in the United States by 1965. Many of the new Floridians brought with them political beliefs alien to the Deep South, and these principles threatened to undermine the deeply entrenched system that had been in place since the end of Reconstruction. At mid-century, Florida politics was dominated by the Pork Chop Gang, a group of conservative, states‘ rights, segregationist Democrats from rural Northern and Central Florida. The Pork Choppers held a stranglehold over the state Legislature due to the archaic apportioning of legislative districts which had been mandated by the Constitution of 1885. The Pork Choppers espoused —Old South“ values and looked to maintain their power and control of the state in any way possible despite Florida‘s ever changing demographic and political landscape. Under the 1885 document, power in the state resided in the Legislature and the cabinet which was directly elected by the people. Because of the malapportioned political districts, 12.3% of the population could elect a majority in the state senate and 14.7% could do the same in the lower house. Florida‘s government in the first half of the twentieth century was highly suspicious of outsiders and most of the Pork Choppers viewed the state‘s political apparatus as a means of protecting their friends and advancing the interests of the Northern section of the state at the expense of the rapidly expanding population of South Florida. The Pork Chop Gang not only defended the Old South against the New South, but it also viewed itself as the last bastion of protection for the agrarian lifestyle of rural Florida which was being challenged by growing industry and big business from Orlando, and Tampa south. The Pork Choppers knew that in order to preserve their power over the

vi state they would have to retain their control of the Legislature and to ensure this they needed to protect the 1885 Constitution which was coming under more scrutiny by South Floridians. The first assault on the —Old South“ values of the Pork Chop Gang was the Supreme Court‘s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education which in 1954 directly challenged segregated educational systems throughout the nation. Florida, like its Southern neighbors largely resisted this perceived affront to white supremacy and the Pork Choppers soon saw the court‘s decision as a means to rally support to their cause and hopefully maintain their power within the state. On the national level the Pork Choppers took their cue from Wisconsin Senator Joe McCarthy who, confronted by the perceived notion of the —Red Menace“ infiltrating American society, emerged to lead systematic attacks against anyone and everyone deemed a threat. McCarthyism in Florida, commencing at the end of the junior senator‘s national reign of terror, proved a methodical and orderly assault on all opponents of the region, whether they be Communists, African-Americans, homosexuals or liberals. The perceived threats against morality, white supremacy and the concocted communist hazard were used as an excuse and disguise to purge Florida of its enemies and more importantly maintain the power of the Pork Chop Gang in the face of its growing political enemies. It was in the attacks on the Universities of Florida, South Florida and Florida State University where the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee (FLIC) employed ignominious tactics in assaulting homosexuals and others labeled immoral within the student body as well as the faculty. The FLIC demonized homosexuality in order to convince Floridians that an overhaul of the state universities was needed. The offensive against the state‘s flagship university was billed as a moral crucible aimed at protecting the state against unwanted intrusion by liberal academics and homosexuals. The FLIC, aptly called the Johns Committee, outlasted Senator Joe McCarthy on the national level, wreaking havoc in Florida until 1965. Despite the efforts of Johns, the Pork Chop Gang was unable to curtail the changing political and social atmosphere in Florida. The Pork Choppers aimed to resist change by employing reprehensible tactics but their strategy backfired helping to accelerate the disintegration of the one party political system in the state. Governor

vii LeRoy Collins tried to drag Florida into the twentieth century in the 1950‘s but was blocked by the Pork Choppers. In the 1960‘s the election of Republican Claude Kirk to the Governor‘s mansion highlighted a glaring chink in their armor. As the population of South Florida grew in the 1960‘s so did the opposition to the Pork Chop Gang and their stranglehold on Legislature. Kirk backed a change to the constitution, eventually resulting in the Constitution of 1968 which realigned the voting districts to represent the profound shift in population and draw power away from the rural counties. No longer would Liberty County (population 2,889 in 1960) and Lafayette County (3,138) hold as much political clout as Dade County (900,000). Ironically the final demise of the Pork Chop Gang can be attributed to the combined efforts of liberal Democrats who were recent immigrants to Florida from the North and the reemergence of the Republican Party under Kirk.

viii INTRODUCTION

Florida has long remained a paradox harboring various contradictory lifestyles within its borders. South Florida is the home to numerous retirees, snowbirds, and Latin American immigrants and refugees, while the northern region of the state, often referred to as the —Other Florida“ by South Floridians or the —Real Florida“ by its inhabitants, shares more in common with neighboring Georgia and Alabama. The I-4 corridor running from Daytona Beach to Tampa Bay essentially divides the state into these two distinctly different regions. Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century it became apparent that the diverging politics in these two areas had set the state on a collision course which finally came to a head in the middle of the twentieth century. As South Florida grew, much of North Florida remained backwards, lagging behind the south in its modernization and more contemporary ways of thinking. As early as the 1870‘s the alluring image of a winter playground, promoted around the world in the new age of leisure and travel, would become one of the state‘s leading industries, tourism. This was countered, however, by the stoicism and traditionalism of North Florida, defenders of the Old South who were often suspicious of outsiders and resistant to change. The end of Reconstruction ushered in a new era in Southern history. White supremacy returned to the region and the Republican Party was run back across the Mason-Dixon Line leaving the South with a virtual one party system. Nevertheless, as early as the late 1860‘s, it was clear that Florida‘s post-bellum existence would not mirror its sister states in the South. Thus it is wrong to lump Florida in the same category as South Carolina or Mississippi when dealing with post-bellum politics. While it is true that Florida was a member of the —Solid South“, and did not have a Republican reside in the Governor‘s Mansion from 1877-1967, the state did not blindly adhere to the Democratic Party as did the remainder of the South. Florida did vote overwhelmingly Democratic , but it never gained the loyalty attained by other Deep South states. This is clearly evidenced by the 1904 presidential campaign of Democrat Alton Parker who won

1 an overwhelming 95.4% of the vote in South Carolina while polling only 68% in Florida.1 Over a decade after Reconstruction ended, Frank Pope running on the Republican ticket for Governor of Florida polled close to 40% of the vote in the state. Only in 1944 did the Republicans fail to offer a candidate in the gubernatorial election, something commonplace in Deep South states. While it is true that the winner of the Democratic primary was virtually assured the Governorship, the Republicans provided more than token opposition.2 Peter Klingman, in his 1984 study, Neither Dies Nor Surrenders: A History of the Republican Party in Florida, 1867-1970, dispelled the myth that the —Party of Lincoln“ disintegrated in the Sunshine State following the removal of Federal troops from the state in 1877. He suggested that the party played a nominal role in Florida politics, but the presence of even minor opposition forced the Democrats to remain vigilant by working towards their goal of promoting white supremacy and unity only through their party.3 In the early twentieth century the Republicans fared relatively well in Florida in national elections compared to the rest of the Deep South. The only Deep South state carried by Herbert Hoover in 1928 was Florida where he received a staggering 56.8% of the vote. Former General Dwight D. Eisenhower twice won Florida in landslide victories while the rest of the region awarded their electoral votes to Adlai Stevenson. When the Republicans were unable to muster enough support among the voting population, third parties emerged such as the Populists and the Alliance Party around the turn of the century. These alternatives to the Democrats often outpolled the Republicans and the presence of all forced the Democrats to work harder in Florida than in other Deep South states to maintain their stranglehold on the peninsula. They felt if they could convince the populace that a vote for their party was a vote for white unity and white supremacy, they could preserve their power. If they could not count on the support of 95% of white voters in the state as could South Carolina‘s Democratic Party, they had to create justification for Floridians to support them. Initially this was done through the fear of the freedman ravaging white womanhood which would ultimately lead to the overall

1 Tallahassee Democrat, December 14, 1904 2 Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the State of Florida, January 14, 1889, Pp. 14; Charlton W. Tebeau. A History of Florida. (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1973). 3 Peter Klingman. Neither Dies Nor Surrenders: A History of the Republican Party of in Florida, 1867- 1970. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1984). Pp. xii

2 decay of Southern society. Later, others such as Northerners, liberals and alleged communists were labeled as —outsiders“, potential menaces to society bent on disrupting the —perfection“ of the Old South lifestyle. Florida also differed from its sister states in the South in this past century in that it experienced a population boom like no other state in the nation except possibly California, transforming the peninsula from a backwater, poor, insignificant state which ranked twenty-seventh in population in 1940 (2 million) into the ninth largest state (5.8 million) by 1965.4 Many of the new Floridians brought with them political beliefs alien to the Deep South, and these principles threatened to undermine the deeply entrenched system that had been in place since the end of Reconstruction. As the population centers moved southward, North Floridians saw their cherished way of life, in tune with the values of the —Old South“, come under attack by the —New Florida“. In response to this attack, politicians in North Florida, who had dominated state politics dating back to the antebellum period, rallied behind the —stars and bars“ in an attempt to maintain their hammerlock on the state. These politicians would ultimately fill the ranks of the Pork Chop Gang. The name Pork Choppers became synonymous with the group of conservative, states‘ rights, segregationist Democrats from rural Northern and Central Florida. While the name did not enter mainstream Florida politics until the middle of the twentieth century, the predecessors of the —Gang“ were already present in the 1870‘s. Allen Morris claimed the name originated in 1955 when a group of North Florida Senators took a —blood oath“ at a fishing camp called Nutall Rise on the Aucilla River.5 Gloria Jahoda maintained that the name predated this mid-century fishing trip, claiming it referred to the food preferred by the inhabitants of the Northern region of Florida and possibly emerged as a label during the depression, derived to differentiate Northern Floridians from Southern Floridians, especially —Yankees“ who had taken up residence in Florida‘s southernmost counties. Jahoda went on to conclude that during the Depression, the —northern and southern sections of the peninsula were eventually given the nicknames of

4 Edmund E. Kallina. Claude Kirk and the Politics of Confrontation. (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1993). Pp. 7 5 Allen Morris. Reconsideration: Second Glances at Florida Legislative Events. (Tallahassee: Office of the Clerk, Florida House of Representatives, 1982), Pp. 172.

3 the prevailing cuisine, probably by a Tampa newspaper…A pork-chopper hailed from the north, a lamb-chopper from the south“.6 The newspaper referred to by Jahoda was the Tampa Tribune and the invention of the term has been credited to editorial writer James Clendenin according to historian Michael Gannon.7 It is not clear whether or not the origin of the phrase could be traced as far back as the 1930‘s but an editorial writer for the Tampa Tribune, James Clendenin, first used the terminology in July 1955 to describe the specific group of North Florida legislators who controlled the state‘s governing body.8 In an editorial later in his life printed in the St. Petersburg Times, the former editor of Tampa Bay‘s rival newspaper revealed:

I charged the opponents of reapportionment-specifically the Senate group-with fighting for pork, rather than principle. In an editorial three days later I labeled them the Pork Chop Gang. Since the group was dominated by rural legislators, the pork chop struck me as being an appropriate symbol for their self interest in this battle.9

The truth behind the origins of the name and the exact dates when it was first used is not important. What is significant is that the ideology employed by the Pork Chop Gang in the 1950‘s and 1960‘s had its roots in Reconstruction Florida and was utilized by conservative Democrats immediately following the Civil War in order to maintain power.10 The Pork Choppers held tightfisted control over the state Legislature because of the archaic apportioning of legislative districts which had been mandated by the Constitution of 1885. They espoused —Old South“ values and looked to maintain their command of the state in any way possible despite Florida‘s ever changing demographic and political landscape. Under this document, power in the state resided in the state legislature and the cabinet which was directly elected by the people. Because of the

6 Gloria Jahoda. Florida, a History. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1976). Pp. 129 7 Michael Gannon. Florida, a Short History. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993) Pp. 135 8 Tampa Tribune, July 13, 1955 9 St. Petersburg Times, September 2, 1985 10 For an in-depth study of the Pork Chop Gang see Kevin N. Klein, —Guarding the Baggage: Florida's Pork Chop Gang and its defense of the Old South“ (Unpublished Dissertation, Florida State University, 1995)

4 malapportioned political districts, 12.3% of the population could elect a majority in the state senate and 14.7% could do the same in the lower house. As Florida‘s population exploded, many of the new inhabitants were from the North and carried with them more liberal views which brought them into direct conflict with the nineteenth century —Lost Cause“ belief system valued by the Pork Chop Gang. Those holding power were inflexible and unwilling to adjust to the demands of the —new“ Florida and, as the insistence for rapid acceleration of change became apparent, the Pork Choppers increased their opposition to change. V.O. Key, Jr., in his groundbreaking 1949 work Southern Politics in the State and Nation, commented that, while still being a relatively solid Democratic state, Florida was no longer a monolithic voting bloc like the rest of the Deep South. He attributed these characteristics to a diversified economy, geographical factors, population distribution and, most importantly, immigration from the northern United States. Florida‘s government in the first half of the twentieth century was highly suspicious of —outsiders“ and most of the Pork Choppers viewed the state‘s political apparatus as a means of protecting their friends and advancing the interests of the Northern section of the state at the expense of the rapidly expanding population of South Florida. The Pork Chop Gang not only defended the Old South against the New South, but it also viewed itself as the last bastion of protection for the agrarian lifestyle of rural Florida which was being challenged by growing industry and big business from Miami, Tampa and the south. The Pork Choppers knew that in order to preserve their power over the state they would have to retain their control of the Legislature and to ensure this they needed to protect the 1885 Constitution which was coming under increased scrutiny by South Floridians. They saw the preservation of the —Old South“ and the safeguarding of their own personal power as interchangeable. To meet this end, as has often been the case in history, they had to convince Floridians that they were in danger of attacks by outsiders whether they be African-Americans, Communists or liberals who sought to impose —alien“ values on Florida. The first major assault on the —Old South“ values of the Pork Chop Gang was the United States Supreme Court‘s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education which in 1954 directly challenged segregated educational systems throughout the nation. Florida, like its Southern neighbors, largely resisted this attack on white supremacy. The

5 Pork Choppers soon saw the court‘s decision as a means to rally support to their cause and hopefully maintain their authority over the state. In spite of the fact that the majority of Floridians did not fully accept all aspects of the Pork Choppers‘ agenda, many were still not —champions“ of integration. Following the lead of Alabama and other Southern states who had managed to virtually ban the NAACP from legally functioning within their borders, Charley Johns, President of the state senate and leader of the Pork Chop Gang helped to create the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee (FLIC) in 1956. In 1953 Charley Johns had aimed to create a special investigating committee within the Florida Legislature to curb gambling, crime and other vices. He proclaimed —I plan now to introduce and fight for legislation to create a state FBI…a state investigative force is an absolute must.“11 Johns was defeated on the floor of the legislature by a narrow 19- 17 margin but he viewed the result as a minor setback and continued to pursue the issue.12 The Pork Choppers took their cue from Republican Wisconsin Senator Joe McCarthy who, confronted by the perceived notion of the —Red Menace“ infiltrating American society after Josef Stalin‘s Red Army attained control over Eastern Europe in the post World War II era, emerged to lead systematic attacks against anyone and everyone deemed a threat to the —American way of life“. McCarthyism in Florida did not end with the junior senator‘s fall from grace in the early 1950‘s and proved a methodical and orderly assault on all opponents of the region, whether they be communists, African- Americans, homosexuals or liberals. The perceived threats against morality, white supremacy and the concocted communist infiltration were used as an excuse and a guise to purge Florida of its enemies and, more importantly, maintain the power of the Pork Chop Gang in the face of its growing political enemies. The addition of the campaign waged against homosexuals differentiated Florida from most of its neighbors in the South as this twist added a so called defense of morality into the equation. It was in the attacks on the University of Florida, University of South Florida and Florida State University where the FLIC employed ignominious tactics in assaulting homosexuals and others labeled —immoral“ within the student body as well as the faculty.

11 Tallahassee Democrat, May 24, 1953 12 Ibid, December 19, 1954

6 The FLIC demonized homosexuality, calling for an overhaul of the state universities. The offensive against the state‘s flagship university, the University of Florida, was billed as a moral crucible aimed at protecting the state against unwanted intrusion by liberal academics and homosexuals. As was the case with all aspects of the Johns Committee‘s actions, the banner of anti-communism was used to justify the witch hunt while disguising its other motivations. Johns knew that in order to obtain support to continue his undertaking, he would need to play on people‘s fear of the unknown and convince them that the Committee would —investigate all organizations whose principles include a course of conduct…which would constitute violence or a violation of the laws of the state.“13 By framing his endeavor as a moral fight to save the state from any threat and linking it directly to the greater struggle of the Cold War, Johns made it an arduous task for anyone to oppose him. After his fruitless efforts to expose the NAACP as a communist front, and therefore a threat to the stability of Florida, Charley Johns was convinced to aim his assaults elsewhere. Since the FLIC was forced to biannually justify its existence before the legislature, Johns shifted the focus of the committee to an investigation into the state‘s higher education system. Initially Johns claimed the FLIC would hunt communists in the system but it quickly became apparent that this was a daunting task, likely to produce results similar to the war waged on the NAACP. Johns and the committee, thus, focused their full attention on a more pliable, unsuspecting and vulnerable target, the sexual preferences of the students and faculty of Florida‘s universities. According to former United States Congressman Sam Gibbons, who represented Tampa and was often a thorn in the side of the Pork Chop Gang, after failing to link the NAACP to a vast communist conspiracy in Florida, Charley Johns —discovered homosexuals“. The Starke, Florida native, whom Gibbons also referred to as —the Christopher Columbus of homosexuality“, used this supposed un-American behavior to breathe new life into the floundering Florida Legislative Investigation Committee.14

13 Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the State of Florida, 1957 14 Sam Gibbons, interview by Nancy Hewitt, USF Silver Anniversary Oral History Project, 1985, Box 522, University of South Florida Archives, Tampa

7 Consequently, the FLIC, aptly called the Johns Committee, outlasted Senator Joe McCarthy‘s national career, wreaking havoc in Florida until 1965. To lead the assault on homosexuality and the state‘s higher education system Johns employed former Tallahassee vice squad Chief R.J. Strickland. Strickland, who would become the backbone of the FLIC, pressured and coerced numerous faculty members and students into admissions of guilt in order to help purge the universities of what he perceived to be threats to morality. Despite all the efforts of Johns, and his committee, the Pork Chop Gang was, ultimately, unable to curtail the changing political and social atmosphere in Florida. The Pork Choppers attempted to resist change by employing reprehensible tactics but their strategy backfired, helping to accelerate the disintegration of the one party political system in the state. Governor LeRoy Collins actively tried to drag Florida into the twentieth century in the 1950‘s but was blocked by the Pork Choppers. In the 1960‘s the election of Republican Claude Kirk to the Governor‘s mansion in 1966 highlighted a glaring chink in their armor. As the population of South Florida grew in the 1960‘s so did the opposition to the Pork Chop Gang and their stranglehold on the Legislature. Kirk backed a change to the constitution, eventually resulting in the Constitution of 1968, which realigned the voting districts to represent the profound shift in population and draw power away from the rural counties. No longer would Liberty County (population 2,889 in 1960) and Lafayette County (3,138) hold as much political clout as Dade County (900,000).15 Ironically the final demise of the Pork Chop Gang can be attributed to the combined efforts of liberal Democrats many from northern states and the reemergence of the Republican Party under Kirk and backed by emigrants from the Midwest. The study of Florida politics is not a new field but most works have focused on specific people (Governors, Senators, and Congressmen) rather than looking at the overarching themes which bound these men and women together. Biographies of Governors LeRoy Collins by Thomas Wagy, Claude Kirk by Edmund Kallina, and Ferris Bryant by John Evans as well as Senators Claude Pepper by Ric Kabat and George Smathers by Patricia Wickman and Brian Crispell tend to focus on a narrow scope of

15 Manning J. Dauer, ed. Florida Politics and Government, (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1962), Pp. 119

8 topics centering on the lives of these individuals. Kevin Klein‘s study of the Pork Chop Gang did not look at the FLIC and how it was used by the Pork Chop Gang to halt integration and defend the Old South from perceived enemies both within the state and in Washington even though his work is valuable in studying the prevailing attitudes of the Pork Choppers as well as a look into the newspaper battles that occurred within the state. The Florida Legislative Investigation Committee is a relatively new topic in Florida history since the majority of the files have only recently been released to the public after being kept in legal custody by the Florida State Legislature from the disbanding of the Johns Committee in 1965 to the 1990‘s. Bonnie Stark‘s work on the Johns Committee was completed without access to these files and relied heavily on newspaper accounts as well as interviews with some of the major players in the ordeal (Johns himself declined Stark‘s numerous requests for an interview). Stark‘s study also centered largely on the University of South Florida and the systematic attack on liberalism perceived as infesting the Tampa campus. Stacey Lorraine Braukman‘s unpublished dissertation was one of the first to utilize the newly opened Johns Committee files. Her study is an invaluable examination into how Johns and his allies used the FLIC and police state tactics in an attempt to purge Florida‘s higher education system of homosexuals, liberals and any others perceived to be exhibiting and practicing —un- American“ behavior. These works, however, fail to connect McCarthyism to the larger century-long attempt by conservatives to maintain their power while halting unwanted advances from —outsiders“. This brand of conservativism was created in Florida in order to protect what was believed to be proper American and more importantly, —Old South“ values. The Pork Choppers were delimiting what George Lewis called —Americanness“ on the state level and by defining the —other“, were able to define themselves. Kevin Klein, in his 1995 dissertation, —Guarding the baggage : Florida's Pork Chop Gang and its defense of the Old South“, maintained —with Florida in the vanguard of Southern states advancing toward the vision of a —New South“, the pork choppers comprised the rear guard of the —Old“.‘16 In 1955, The Atlanta Constitution took a jab at its neighbors to the South when

16 Kevin N. Klein. Guarding the baggage : Florida's Pork Chop Gang and its defense of the Old South (unpublished dissertation, Florida State University, 1995) Pp. 19

9 it labeled the Pork Choppers as —selfish and greedy“ but there was more to this —gang of willful men“ than a lust for power.17 There was a reason they fiercely clung to power; a way of life was at stake. While names and labels changed over the one hundred years, from the 1860‘s through the 1960‘s, these conservative, states‘ rights, anti-integration rural Democrats employed various tactics and strategies in order to conserve their influence and control within the state while preserving the Southern way of life. Whether they were rallying beneath the banner of states‘ rights, white supremacy or McCarthyism, the chivalry and morality of the —Old South“ was to be preserved by all means. These Florida Democrats implemented institutional barriers which virtually left Florida‘s political system disconnected from the profound changes engulfing the state and the Johns Committee of the 1950‘s and 1960‘s so clearly symbolized the immeasurable effect of the attitudes existing in the politics of Florida during these times.

17 Atlanta Constitution, September 11, 1955

10 RECONSTRUCTING THE OLD SOUTH

On the eve of the Civil War in 1861 the Philadelphia Inquirer dubbed Florida —the smallest tadpole in the dirty pool of secession.“1 The newspaper‘s indictment of the third state to secede from the Union was an accurate characterization of the peninsula which in 1860 was home to a mere 140, 424 inhabitants of whom only 77,746 were white.2 One hundred years later, Florida had undergone a profound transformation from a backwater, insignificant state, to a bustling tourist destination for people from around the world. The population explosion in Florida was remarkable and helped fuel this change. Along with the increase in population, Florida saw a dramatic shift in its population center from the rural northern part of the state to the southern region. Not all in Florida favored this change, however; as those in the north vehemently opposed the shift in the center of gravity southwards since this clearly spelled the end of their century- long reign over the state. While this transformation took more than one hundred years to occur, and is, still occurring today, the opposition has become much less vehement. Because the tactics employed by white conservatives over the course of the past century changed little, it is essential to analyze the roots of this conversion as well as to look at the vigorous opposition to change that has been a constant throughout. Antebellum Florida strove to create an —Old South“ on the frontier, a state that mirrored South Carolina and Mississippi in demographics, politics and economics. While this was largely accomplished by 1860, by 1865 this system was in peril as Union soldiers occupied the state‘s major cities and the former planter elite recognized their dreams were in jeopardy. In an attempt to remedy this situation, they searched for new methods to assure their continued dominance over the state in the wake of Appomattox. First and foremost was the necessity to maintain control over the newly freed African-

1 Philadelphia Inquirer, February 12, 1861. 2 Eighth Census of the United States---1860---Florida (available online at: www.census.gov)

11 American population which required the cooperation of the lower classes, those who had never owned slaves. The fact that African-Americans accounted for close to fifty-percent of the state‘s population after the Civil War was not only worrisome to the former planter class but a problem for all white Floridians as well, according to the elite. Even though the former planter class was relatively small and numbered only 5,152 at the outbreak of the Civil War, they had controlled the state‘s governmental apparatus and power in Florida since the peninsula was transferred to the United States in 1819. To maintain white supremacy, they employed a number of ignominious tactics aimed at striking fear in the hearts of the remainder of the white population. Using fear as the means to achieve and maintain white unity was nothing new in Florida and in the South as a whole as the —Slave Rebellion“, especially Saint Domingue, had been constantly evoked during the antebellum period in order to rally the lower classes behind the slaveocracy and maintain white unity. During Reconstruction and beyond, similar strategies were devised to protect and preserve the power of the former elite. These methods were employed by those in power into the 1960‘s when their authority was effectively threatened by the southern portion of the state which, for the most part, did not share the same —Old South“ values as their North Florida brethren. Florida‘s antebellum —Cottonocracy“ was centered in the —black belt“ region of Middle Florida, with the capital city of Tallahassee at its core, and this is where the majority of the state‘s population resided. The middle region of the state, therefore, controlled Florida‘s government in the antebellum period and planned to continue this domination in the post-bellum era but new trends and changes were to hamper this prospect. After the Civil War in Florida, the white conservative Democrats, led by the former planter elite, unabashed adherents to the Lost Cause of the Confederacy, knew that the most productive way to define themselves was by identifying and marking their opponents. In this case, their opposition came from northern carpetbaggers in addition to the former slaves whom they felt threatened their cherished way of life. The goal of the Democrats was to paint anyone who did not support their white supremacist agenda as being on the fringes of Florida‘s society. They effectively created the —other“, portraying their newly-labeled group as enemies of the average Floridian.

12 To maintain white solidarity in the face of a new threat, the influx of carpetbaggers and perceived encroachment by newly freed slaves into Southern society, the conservatives founded the Constitutional League of Florida on November 30, 1867. The organization, created by Charles Fenwick, was nothing more than a local Florida branch of the newly established Ku Klux Klan.3 The by-laws of the league, which was eventually officially absorbed into the Klan, outlined goals for the organization, one of which called for members to oppose —Negro Supremacy“ which in veiled terms meant upholding white supremacy.4 After the 1868 Constitution sanctioned what the conservatives felt was —outside“ or Northern rule, the Klan and its allies declared war on the freedmen and the Republicans in Florida, killing over twenty in the summer of 1868 alone5. Practicing a form of guerilla warfare led by former Confederate officers, a state of virtual civil war persisted in Alachua, Jackson, Madison and Columbia Counties which were dominated by plantation society.6 Jackson County saw the worst of these conflicts erupt into a race war which lasted from 1869-1871, and is remembered as the Jackson County War. The local Klan leader, James Coker, referred to as the —generalissimo of the Klan“ promised that in order to redeem the county from —outside“ rule, the conservatives would —kill the last damned Republican in the place.“7 Time proved that Coker was true to his words. The Klan did not solely target African-Americans but, rather, they were more intent on clearing out white Republicans whom they deemed a greater threat. The belief was that, without the evil influences from the North, African-Americans would return to their docile —Sambo“ and —Mammy“ roles which many whites felt they had actually enjoyed under slavery. Thus, it was Republicans who were threatened and told to leave the county. If they did not comply, the conservatives employed contemptible tactics to rid themselves of their enemies. The stated goal was to —kill out the leading men of the Republican Party“, which they did by murdering Dr. John Finlayson, county clerk, as well as Jewish

3 Michael Newton. The Invisible Empire: The Ku Klux Klan in Florida. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001). Pp. 10 4 Ibid, Pp. 11 5 —Testimony Taken by the Joint Select Committee to Enquire into the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States“ (cited hereafter as Klan Testimony), Vol. 13, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1872. Pp. 186-187 6 Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, November 10, 1868 7 Klan Testimony, Vol. 13, Pp. 150

13 merchant Samuel Fleishman who had made the mistake of extending credit to African- Americans at a time when such action was severely frowned upon.8 In all, the Jackson County War claimed the lives of more than 1509. In fact, hundreds of African-Americans and white Republicans were murdered throughout North Florida during Reconstruction as part of the conservatives‘ plan to regain power which ultimately meant white supremacy. In an effort to return Florida to the status-quo antebellum, violence was one powerful method the conservatives could employ. In addition to violence, these former Confederates knew that more had to be done to keep power in the hands of the antebellum planter class.10 Conservatives had virtually eliminated African-Americans as a viable political threat by the end of Reconstruction, passing the state‘s first Jim Crow Law in 1882 but, emigration to the state from regions outside the South by those who held more progressive views threatened this white conservative hegemony.11 While violence was replaced by political maneuvering in the twentieth century, it never completely dissipated. The first two decades of the new century saw Florida receive the dubious honor of having the nation‘s highest lynching rate, twice as high as Mississippi, Louisiana and Georgia, three times higher than Alabama and six times higher than South Carolina.12 African-American power was checked and partially nullified by the fact that Florida saw 4.5 lynchings for every 10,000 African-Americans residing in the state.13 The amazing growth patterns that characterized Florida in the early twentieth century actually began in the 1860‘s. Florida was home to 33.7% more people in 1870 than 1860 and by 1880 the population of the state reached 269,493, an increase of 43.5% from the preceding decade.14 According to Charlton W. Tebeau, these numbers alone do not tell the entire story. To grasp the fundamental changes occurring in Florida, one has to closely examine the economic structure of the state. Tebeau maintained —cotton

8 Ibid, Vol. Pp. 89-90; 290-291 9 Newton. Invisible Empire, Pp. 18 10 For an in-depth study of Reconstruction in Florida see, Joe M. Richardson. The Negro in Reconstruction in Florida (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1965) 11 Jerrell Shofner. —Florida: A Failure of Moderate Republicanism“ In, Reconstruction and Redemption in the South, edited by Otto Olsen. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980). Pp. 37-38 12 David Colburn and Richard Scher. —Florida Politics in the Twentieth Century“. In, Florida Politics and Government. Edited by Manning J. Dauer. (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1980) Pp. 37 13 Ibid 14 Ninth and Tenth Census of the United States–1870 and 1880---Florida

14 growers had had their day, and Floridians moved in new economic directions that set them apart from the people of the other states of the lower South.“15 Tebeau further asserted that while —Florida was on the way to becoming a typical southern cotton state in 1860…[it] changed that course before it was fully realized.“16 Cotton production in Florida, in fact, dropped dramatically from 1860 to 1900 and the decline in the percentage of farm property value in Florida was greater than in Virginia whose land had been ravaged by four years of fighting during the Civil War.17 Conservative Democrats were alarmed at the potential for loss of money and power and, while they knew slavery could never be restored, they needed new ways to maintain white supremacy. As early as the first years of Reconstruction the state was already being targeted by Northerners as a winter Eden, a place where they could escape the harsh winters and more importantly recuperate from various illnesses. Floridians, native as well as recent immigrants, knew change was in the air and they looked to exploit their natural resources to benefit the financial growth of the state. The Constitution of 1868 echoed this sentiment by providing for a Commissioner of Immigration charged with establishing a specific program to entice immigration into the state.18 Because many of the Republicans in power at the time hailed from the North, the publication of pamphlets and periodicals which touted the state‘s attractions were widely distributed throughout the North. The bureau also hired agents to travel throughout the region to promote Florida. These measures directly contributed to the start of the rapid population increase in the 1860‘s and 1870‘s but once the Bourbons, conservative Democrats who stole their name from the deposed reactionary French dynasty as well as their preferred drink, redeemed the state government in 1877, they cut back on the selling of the state to potential tourists and investors. They chose this path not only because their governmental practices were deeply rooted in a fiscal conservatism at odds with the practices of the Bureau of Immigration but, as stated previously, the conservatives suffered from a severe distrust of outsiders, especially Northerners whom were all labeled carpetbaggers or —scalawags‘.

15 Tebeau. A History of the Florida. Pp. 257 16 Ibid. Pp. 274 17 Ibid. Pp. 258 18 Martin M. LaGodna. Agriculture and Advertising: Florida State Bureau of Immigration, 1923-1960. —Florida Historical Quarterly“, Vol. 46 Issue 3, Pp. 197

15 During four years of Bourbon rule under Governor George F. Drew, a New Hampshire native who had made his fortune after moving to Georgia in 1847 and eventually opening a sawmill in Ellaville, Florida in 1865, taxes were lowered as was the state‘s debt but, the economy remained stagnant. His successor, William D. Bloxham was therefore faced with a dilemma as were the conservative Democrats as a whole. Bloxham, who hailed from Leon County, was a planter in the antebellum period and organized and commanded an infantry regiment from 1863 through the end of the war, knew Florida‘s financial problems could be solved if the state followed a path similar to the one set by the Republican Reconstruction government in the Constitution of 1868.19 However, this method of attracting visitors and therefore capital from the North countered the conservative view of insulation, exacerbated their fear of outsiders, and placed him in an unenviable position. Bloxham had won the governorship by only 5,000 votes, a margin of 55%-45% but had won 33 of 39 counties.20 The Bourbons had gained the upper hand and, over the course of the next decade, they successfully diminished the Republican threat by defining their party as the only one capable of successfully leading the state while maintaining white supremacy. This effort effectively discredited the Republicans who were linked with the African-American population. Despite the fact that Bloxham and the conservatives were intent on keeping power in the hands of like-minded individuals, the Leon County planter and politician —abandoned the entrenchment…and stressed the need for immigrants, transportation and education to achieve growth and prosperity for the state.“21 The Bourbons sacrificed some of their ideals regarding the luring of Northerners to Florida but countered by rallying the state; natives and immigrants alike, to the banner of white supremacy. These overtures to the people of the North, put into motion by the Bureau of Immigration at the behest of their new chief executive, along with the corresponding railroad boom, laid the groundwork for the undeniable population explosion which further transformed Florida in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The two —booms“ forced the conservatives to double their efforts in order to

19 P.C. Headley. Public Men of Today. (Hartford: S.S. Scranton and Company, 1882). Pp. 695-698 20 Tebeau. A History of Florida. Pp. 277 21 Ibid

16 remain in power in the face of an ever changing state. To accomplish this goal they looked to the past and employed the same tactics they had used during Reconstruction. Following the Civil War, the former planter elite linked the Republican Party to the former slaves in order to make the two interchangeable in the minds of white society. Therefore, the struggle to wrest power from the Republicans, who were painted as Northern transplants, outsiders, African-Americans and enemies of the Southern way of life, united a large majority of white Florida behind the conservatives. Following Florida‘s —redemption“ from the grasp of the —bloodsucking, land-grabbing, black Republican Yankees“ in 1877, the Bourbons set about to create certain impediments to change and progress.22 Florida, like the rest of the South, still embraced the past and it was the design of the Bourbon government to help foster the myth of the —Lost Cause“, a term which dates back to Edward Pollard‘s 1866 work, The Lost Cause: A New Southern History of the War of the Confederates. The label was solidified by subsequent articles composed by former Confederate General Jubal Early written for the Southern Historical Society in the 1870‘s.23 Historian Gaines Foster defined the —Lost Cause“ as —the postwar writings and activities that perpetuated the memory of the Confederacy“ through organizations such as the Southern Historical Society, United Confederate Veterans (UCV), United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC), Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) and others.24 Foster maintained that Southerners shaped their perception of defeat through ceremonial activities and other rituals honoring the gallant efforts of Confederate veterans, dead and surviving.25 Senator E.W. Carmack of Tennessee further reflected the concept of the —Lost Cause“ when in 1903 he noted:

The Confederate Soldiers were our kinfolk and our heroes. We testify to the country our enduring fidelity to their memory. We commemorate their valor and devotion. There were some things that were not surrendered at Appomattox. We did not surrender our rights and history, nor was it one of the conditions of

22 Richmond Daily Dispatch, December 9, 1876 23 David Ulrich, —Lost Cause“. In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, Edited by David S. Heidler, and Jeanne T. Heidler. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000). 24 Gaines Foster. Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause and the Emergence of the New South. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). Pp. 4 25 Ibid, Pp. 5

17 surrender that unfriendly lips should be suffered to tell the story of that war or that unfriendly hands should write the epitaphs of the Confederate dead. We have a right to teach our children the true history of that war, the causes that led up to it and the principles involved26.

The United Confederate Veterans can trace its roots back to Florida when as early as 1885, a former Confederate army unit proposed and published plans to organize the growing number of Confederate organizations into a national or at least regional association. While the plans were ignored by other Southern states, in 1888 consolidation of various —camps“ began to take place, culminating in the creation of the UVC which would dominate the Lost Cause movement in the 1890‘s.27 Texas was home to 18.9% of the camps in the former Confederacy in 1890, followed by South Carolina (10.3%) and Georgia (10%).28 Florida only accounted for 2.9% of the camps but the state was still the least populous in the region. The telling sign is that Florida only contained 1.9% of all Confederate veterans but yet 2.9% of —camps“.29 The Sons of Confederate Veterans, which succeeded the UCV and is still active today, was chartered in Florida in 1898 with two camps in Ocala and Jacksonville and soon expanded to include more than thirty chapters throughout the state by 1915.30 General Stephen Dill Lee, distant relative of Robert E. Lee, exemplified the aims of the SCV and UCV in a 1906 speech in New Orleans in which he commented:

To you, Sons of Confederate Veterans, we will commit the vindication of the cause for which we fought. To your strength will be given the defense of the Confederate soldier's good name, the guardianship of his history, the emulation of his virtues, the perpetuation of those principles which he loved and which you love also, and those ideals which made him glorious and which you also cherish31

These organizations and activities turned into sacred rites but proved more than merely a mental catharsis for the grieving South. Southerners needed a way to justify

26 Speech by Senator E.W. Carmack, 1903, MS 2318, Folder 1, The Nineteenth Century U.S. Senators Collection 1817-1894, University of Tennessee Special Collections. 27 By-Laws and Rules of Order of Florida Camp No. 1 of Confederate Veterans, adopted June 10, 1885 (Jacksonville: Chas. W. Da Costa, 1885). 28 Minutes of the Annual Me tings and Reunions of the United Confederate Veterans, 1900, Pp. 84 29 Compendium of the Eleventh Census: 1890, part 3, population (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897), Pp. 575 30 http://www.florida-scv.org/Camp1950/fldivision.html 31 http://www.florida-scv.org/Camp1699/charge.htm

18 their failure, portraying themselves as the aggrieved party and labeling the conflict the —War of Northern Aggression“. They helped to keep the ideals and values of the Confederacy alive in the face of a changing nation. Among other things, they helped to create —Confederate Memorial Day“ in 1866 which is still observed in Florida, one of six former Confederate states to do so.32 Southern apologists went largely unchallenged in the former Confederacy for close to one hundred years after the conclusion of the Civil War, but Florida was different. Even though the true population boom would not come until the twentieth century, Florida was already home to more —Non-natives“ than most other Southern states and each year more and more of these new Floridians came from the North. To combat this, the Bourbons and later Pork Choppers needed to close ranks and indoctrinate the newly arrived immigrants with their version of the events of the 1860‘s. This was one of the first attempts to vilify a group of people (in this case the Republican Party) in order to maintain white unity and white supremacy which would ultimately leave the conservative Democrats in power. This attitude was exemplified by Scott Dilworth Clarke‘s speech before the Memorial Association of Jefferson County in 1902. While this occurred a quarter of a century after the redeemers wrested control of the state away from the Grand Old Party, Clarke, who was the son of a Confederate veteran, and would later earn the title —Dean of the Pork Chop Gang“, used the speech to vindicate the South and give credence to the Lost Cause. Clarke claimed —rebellion it never was“ as he recounted his experiences studying under the tutelage of former Confederate General E. M. Law.33 Clarke characterized the Civil War as an aggressive, unwarranted action taken by the North and the South merely responding in —revolution“ against what he deemed a —drastic political experiment inaugurated by Northern Statesmen.“34 This drastic experiment was the election in 1860 of Abraham Lincoln which many Southerners wrongly conceived as the opening salvo in a war bent on stripping the South of its cherished way of life. Clarke went on to condemn the North and the Party of Lincoln by stating:

32 http://www.scvcamp2041.org/amd04.html 33 —Memorial Address“ April 26, 1902, Scott Dilworth Clarke Papers, P.K. Younge Memorial Library of Florida History, University of Florida, Box 70 34 Ibid

I would direct my strongest denunciations at the ”Carper Bagger“…he is a bird of prey…his shibboleth is the ”The Republican Party‘, from that party he sprang as naturally as a maggot from putrefacation...how profoundly grateful should we feel today in knowing that these onerous oppressions have place to our present stable form of government35

Clarke‘s virulent tone placed anyone who supported the Republican Party as more than merely an enemy of the South. They were now an enemy of human nature. He also lauded the centerpiece of Bourbon rule and what was to be the key element of the Pork Chop Gang‘s hold over the state, the Constitution of 1885. He urged the crowd who had gathered at the Monticello Courthouse, for the rededication of a Confederate memorial to —protect in peace what we preserved in war...it is for us to bear in mind the higher allegiance we have sworn and to remember that he who has once been a soldier of the Motherland degrades himself when he becomes a slave of faction.“36 Southerners, according to Clarke, had to maintain their independence from Northern aggression while also sustaining their allegiance to the Democratic Party, which in the South, again according to Clarke, meant an allegiance to the proponents of white supremacy. Clarke played on the fears of the crowd and it worked as he was elected Mayor of Monticello in 1905 and later served Jefferson County in the state legislature, becoming one of the leaders of the Pork Chop Gang until he retired from public life in 1966.37 The most poignant exemplar of the ardent support of the myth of the Lost Cause in Florida was illustrated by the case of Enoch Marvin Banks. This ghastly episode in the University of Florida‘s history served to foreshadow what was to come half a century later when McCarthyism swept over the state. Banks, who had been born twelve years after the end of the Civil War, was a professor of history in Gainesville in 1911, and according to Southern apologists, had the audacity to question the sanctity of the Southern cause. Banks‘ offense came in the form of an article he published entitled —A Semi-Centennial View on Secession“ in which he affirmed that the dawn of a new era was before the South and these —New Southerners“ should admit that —slavery was . . . an

35 Ibid 36 Ibid 37 Jerrell Shoffner, History of Jefferson County (Monticello, Florida: Jefferson County Historical Society, 1981) Pp. 345.

20 anachronism in the nineteenth century“ and that —…a confederacy with the recognized right of secession was not the best form of union…the North was relatively in the right, while the South was relatively in the wrong.“38 Not only had Banks penned these blasphemous phrases, he had done so in a periodical published in New York. The article unleashed the fury of proponents of the Lost Cause led by the UCV, UDC and SCV. These organizations were quick to point out that, after completing his undergraduate work at Emory, Banks had studied north of the Mason-Dixon Line, receiving his doctorate from Columbia University and even teaching for a brief period at the University of Pennsylvania. Banks had obviously been brainwashed by Yankees. In reality, Banks was shocked at how his views were received in Florida, but he should not have been. Sister Ester Carlatta, speaking in Richmond before a meeting of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, charged Banks with being —a man whose published writings proved him so unjust to the South's attitude in 1861 as to unfit him for that position“ of professor of History at an institution of higher learning in the South.39 It should also be mentioned the ironic and bad timing of the publication of the article in the minds of Southerners. The Independent published Banks‘ work on February 11, 1911, fifty years to the day that the Confederacy was formed in Montgomery, Alabama. In previous articles, Banks had blamed the South‘s economic inferiority to the North on the fact that the region had a one-party political system and was dependent on agriculture.40 This struck a nerve with not only fervent supporters of the —Lost Cause“ but also with the conservative Democrats who would later furnish the membership of the Pork Chop Gang. Somewhat ironically, Banks was a progressive but not a liberal, and he definitely agreed with most Floridians and Southerners in regards to race. Banks made it clear that he favored measures to eliminate the black voter stating that without —an ignorant negro electorate“, the South would no longer depend on the Democratic Party alone. It was his contention that the Democrats posited themselves as the safeguard

38 Enoch Marvin Banks, —A Semi-Centennial View of Secession“ Independent , Vol. 70 (February 9, 1911), Pp. 302-03. 39 —Minutes of the Eighteenth Annual Convention of the United Daughters of the Confederacy“ (Paducah, KY, 1911), Pp. 323-24. 40 Enoch Marvin Banks, "Tendencies Among Georgia Farmers," The South Atlantic Quarterly 3 (April 1903), Pp. 109-16.

21 against black society and possible domination by Northern Republicans.41 Once again Banks was correct in his summation. The conservative Democrats wanted nothing more than for the populace of Florida to believe that they were the last barricade, protecting white society from the murderous hordes of African-Americans who wanted to rape their women. Much the same image was portrayed in D.W. Griffith‘s 1915 groundbreaking film, The Birth of a Nation. In arguing against slavery, however, Banks maintained that the reasoning employed by states‘ rights Democrats in the decades and years preceding the Civil War were not compatible with the twentieth century. He contended that Abraham Lincoln, mortal enemy to Southern apologists, had favored —a principle of political organization in harmony with the age in which he lived“, differing him from Jefferson Davis who advocated —a principle out of harmony with his age.“42 The reaction was swift and drastic. John Shepard Beard, a former Florida legislator from Pensacola berated Banks for his remarks. He labeled them as an —insult to every Confederate veteran, every son of a veteran and every daughter of the Confederacy.“43 The Tampa Morning Tribune echoed Beard‘s statements and sentiments in editorials and printed his remarks in their entirety:

Thank God, the Southern statesmen of ‘61 to ‘65 had a higher concept of their moral and constitutional obligations [than Professor Banks]…will our people submit to this insult and outrage from a salaried officer of the State? Will our people endanger the intellectual and moral integrity of the youth who attend the University of Florida, by consenting to the retention of one who promulgates such mental and moral virus?44

This scathing condemnation of Banks was echoed by the editor of Jacksonville‘s Florida Times-Union who also questioned the wisdom of allowing the professor to mold the minds of Florida‘s youth. He did not want these words reaching —a generation of men and women . . . in our country“… which would —grow anarchists by wholesale and to

41 Banks, "The Passing of the Solid South," The South Atlantic Quarterly 8 (April 1909), Pp. 101-09 42 Banks, "Semi-Centennial View of Secession," Pp. 300-303. 43 Jacksonville Times-Union, February 12, 1911 44 Tampa Morning Tribune, February 26, 1911

22 give moral consent to the subversion of government.“45 These words are eerily similar to those expressed forty years later when McCarthyists questioned the prudence of allowing homosexuals and liberals to teach at the University of Florida, South Florida and Florida State University. The attacks on Banks draw similar parallels to the infamous witch hunts sponsored by the Johns Committee. The Florida Times-Union employed the same tactics the FLIC would make famous in the 1950‘s and 1960‘s by attacking the institution, the University of Florida, and not just Banks in an effort to convince University President Albert A. Murphree who had initially defended his colleague, to take action against him. The paper ran an editorial at the end of March which remarked:

Not only do we object to books which instill…heresies, [but furthermore] to say that one teacher in a college or university is responsible is not enough. The whole body is guilty when it permits or condones it. Shall we see ourselves denied the benefit of our institutions because some man or men in charge choose to prostitute them to evil?46

President Murphree tried to distance Banks from the University of Florida and the general views of the institution as a whole. In a letter to a member of the Board of Control, which oversaw the higher education system in the state, Murphree stated —I am sure he would not undertake to prejudice . . . boys who were brought up to believe in the righteousness of the Southern cause.“47 Despite the lukewarm defense from Murphree, the onslaught continued until Banks proffered his resignation which was initially refused by Murphee. Ultimately the Board of Control forced him to accept the resignation. Fred Arthur Bailey, who wrote a 1992 article on the incident published in the Florida Historical Quarterly, maintained that —This tragic incident was but a small part of a large, successful campaign for mind control. Self-serving, pro-Confederate historical interpretations accomplished their purposes.“48 Bailey was correct in his assertion that Enoch Marvin Banks belonged to the larger war being waged by the conservative

45 Jacksonville Times-Union, February 16, 1911 46 Ibid, March 31, 1911 47 —Albert A. Murphree to Francis P. Fleming“, February 27, 1911, box 15 Albert A. Murphree Administrative Policy Records, 1909-1927, University of Florida Archives, George C. Smathers Libraries, Gainesville. 48 Fred Arthur Bailey. —Free Speech at the University of Florida: The Enoch Banks Case“ Florida Historical Quarterly, LXXII (July, 1992), Pp. 18.

23 Democrats to maintain white supremacy. Ultimately, they asserted their power by designating for Floridians who their enemies were and what consequences would occur if they were afforded opportunities to state their case. The myth of the —Lost Cause“ was codified in Florida by the Constitution of 1885 and it was through this document that the Bourbons left their imprint, allowing the Pork Choppers who followed them to maintain a monopoly on power in Florida. William C. Harvard noted that state constitutions were initially meant to define and maintain the separation of power between the legislature and the —state“. The document would therefore, ideally serve as a check on the legislature, assuring that the body would not attain undue power.49 Unfortunately, in practice, state constitutions were not always effective in achieving these ends. Nowhere was this more evident than in Florida. Harvard further emphasized this point by stating that written constitutions suffer from the inherent problem of affording the population with effective techniques they can employ to —hold the government so created to the terms of the constitution.50 According to James Quayle Dealy, in state constitutions the —really fundamental trend of change has been from a dominant legislature to a dominant electorate.“51 This was the exact result conservative Floridians looked to avoid when they set out to construct a new constitution in 1885. Conservative Panhandle Floridians and their Bourbon representatives entered the 1885 constitutional convention with a mission to maintain their power while at the same time limiting the influence of the newly arrived immigrants from —alien“ regions whose beliefs and values ran counter to those of the conservatives. The —Lost Cause“ must be upheld as scripture and power must remain, for as long as possible, in the hands of the natives and their conservative allies. Native Floridians whether first or fifth generation referred to themselves as —nativists“, borrowing a term from the anti-Catholic and anti- immigration movements of the 1840‘s and 1850‘s. Conservatives who relocated to Florida from neighboring states also referred to themselves in this vein. One such —native“ was James Wood Davidson. Born in South Carolina, Davidson emigrated to

49 William C. Harvard. —Notes on a Theory of State Constitutional Change: The Florida Experience“. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Feb., 1959). Pp 80 50 Ibid, Pp. 82 51 James Quayle Dealey. Growth of American State Constitutions. (Boston: 1915). Pp. 256

24 Florida early in his life and became a self professed —Florida Cracker“. He also was an ardent supporter of the Lost Cause and in maintaining power in the hands of the conservative Democrats. Davidson was a delegate to the 1885 Convention and illustrated the mindset of his allies by stating:

What they doubtless do often resent, is the visionary spirit that seeks change, asking them to discard the old and adopt the new, a tone of infinite superiority…that offends the inherent conservatism that marks the people.52

The 1885 Constitution was the fifth such document in Florida‘s short history and the document mirrored the conservative mindset. Politics in the Sunshine State, according to V.O. Key, were deeply rooted in what he called localism which favored the more rural, —down home“ lifestyle of North Florida. He noted, in Florida —it‘s every man for himself.“53 The political atmosphere which Key described was created by the 1885 Constitution which also, according to William C. Harvard, meant that —the structure of political institutions and the sociological characteristics of the state impose rather severe limits on the non-conservative; and the social and/or economic liberal is a rarity among contemporary Florida officeholders.“54 The framing of the Constitution of 1885 was the nail in the coffin for opposition to the Bourbons and the other conservatives who succeeded them in the twentieth century. The Constitution severely limited the power of the governor in deference to the Legislature which was to be determined by the vote of the populace. In the 1880‘s this allowed Northern Florida to dictate the course the state would take, fulfilling the goals of the conservatives. More importantly the provisions agreed to at the convention allowed for the prolongation of conservative power in spite of anticipated future population shifts. While the population had grown since the end of the Civil War and immigration into the state from regions outside the South had already commenced, the Panhandle still dominated the state demographically. South Florida, which would grow into an urban region to challenge the supremacy of the conservative North in the twentieth century was still largely uninhabited at the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1885. South

52 James Wood Davidson. Florida of Today. (New York: D. Appelton and Company, 1889) Pp. 110 53 V.O. Key. Southern Politics in the State and Nation. (New York: Vintage Books, 1949) Pp. 82 54 Harvard, —A Theory of State Constitutional Change“, Pp. 85.

25 Florida accounted for a mere 15% of the state‘s population but the potential growth of the region was seen as early as the 1880‘s and it was the aim of the Bourbons to write a constitution which would allow them to retain a stranglehold on the legislature, especially the Senate. The Democratic Party, which dominated the convention under the leadership of Samuel Pasco looked to the future and imposed limitations on the number of representatives any county could have. Pasco had a peculiar background, being born in England and emigrating to Canada and eventually Massachusetts. He was a Harvard educated abolitionist who moved to Florida in 1859 and ultimately decided his allegiance lay with his adopted state of Florida when it seceded from the Union in January 1861. Pasco was wounded at Missionary Ridge and spent close to two years in a Union prison before returning to Florida where he began his career as a conservative Democrat politician.55 An analysis of the makeup of the delegates provides insight into the document which dictated political life in Florida for close to a century. Thirty-seven of the one hundred and eight delegates who gathered in the capital were Confederate veterans and many others were direct descendants of veterans. The ratification vote at the Convention, according to the Tallahassee Weekly Floridian acted as —the final effacement of the last remnant of Radical rule, ring and robbery.“56 The Constitution of 1885 —redeemed“ Florida from —outside“ rule. The initial proposal for apportionment in the House called for the most populous counties to be assigned three representatives each, the next eighteen two each and the remainder were each guaranteed one representative apiece. When the 1887 Legislature enacted the 1885 Constitution, they modified it so the largest twenty-three counties would be allotted two representatives and the next twenty-two were allotted one each.57 The Bourbons knew they would face potential problems in maintaining power in the House due to population increases in other regions and the shifting of the population center southwards but, the Constitution safeguarded that body for the time being and

55 Julianne Hare. Tallahassee, a Capital City History. (Charleston: Arcadia Publishing, 2002) Pp. 78 56 Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, October 28, 1886 57 Laws of Florida, 1887, chapter 3703, Pp. 49-52; Florida 1885 Constitution, article vii, Journal of Constitutional Convention. (1885), 609-610

26 enabled the Senate to surpass the House in terms of influence and authority within the legislature. Election to the Senate also protected the North against a growing Southern portion of the state by including a provision which limited the number of senators elected by each county to one.58 In this regard the Bourbons looked into history and devised a scheme similar to one employed by the antebellum South. Before the Civil War the South understood that their only chance of protecting slavery was to preserve a balance in the Senate. The northern states grew at a more rapid pace than the Southern, thus, the opportunity to control the House of Representatives diminished with each passing year. To combat this, the South needed to rely on the Senate and therefore needed equal representation in that body by maintaining an equal number of Slave and Free states. Florida took its cue from the antebellum South and constructed the Constitution to limit the number of Senators any one county could send to Tallahassee, meaning that small rural counties in northern Florida would have equal representation to the rapidly expanding southern region. Northern Florida could count on the Senate to block any legislation proposed and passed by the House which attempted to strip North Florida of its power over the state government. This created an era of stagnation where it was hard to implement measures and the day to day business of the state remained at a virtual standstill unless both regions favored an act. This suited the North which was virtually assured of perpetuating their hold over the apparatus of state government. The possibility for change was removed from the equation crippling South Florida‘s influence in 1885 and, more importantly, foreshadowing the decades that followed. In addition to this system of checks and balances within the Legislature, both houses were limited in total membership, a further safeguard against population increases in regions other than the rural north. There was a provision added to the constitution which called for the legislative districts to be reapportioned every ten years according to population changes but key phrases such as —whenever possible“ were added into the document. This allowed the conservative Bourbons to ignore this stipulation since they

58Florida 1885 Constitution, article vii. Journal of Constitutional Convention (1885), 609-610

27 were to control the Senate and therefore could block any such proposals passed by the House.59 By limiting the power of the Executive Branch, the conservative Democrats attempted to insure that the governor did not have the opportunity to transform the office into a tyrannical dictatorship which they closely associated with President Lincoln‘s administration and, more importantly the former Republican governments which presided over the state during Reconstruction. To counter a powerful executive, real power was given to the President of the Senate and the governor‘s cabinet in order to counter executive power. Furthermore, the governor was not afforded the option of running for consecutive terms. The Senate President was charged with creating the rules of the body, appointing not only committee chairmen but all the members as well. He was selected by a caucus of Senate members at the beginning of each biennial session which assured a conservative leader for the state‘s upper chamber.60 As further assurance, the calendar was to be set by the President which favored the northern Florida representatives since it was not uncommon for the legislature to be called into session only to be adjourned for a short period of time and then called back into session. These methods wreaked havoc on the representatives from South Florida who had to travel hundreds of miles to reach Tallahassee61. The President was also charged with the power of referral of bills to committees and was granted the ability to delegate responsibility for bills to two or more committees simultaneously. This power severely limited the prospects of them being passed if they were too progressive or too liberal in character, thus threatening the supremacy of North Florida. Numerous bills and motions that set out to benefit the growing population of Central and South Florida were killed in this manner and the threat to Bourbon supremacy was nullified.62 Further restrictions were placed on the governor since the cabinet was elected not appointed and was afforded the opportunity to seek reelection. Since the cabinet was elected directly by the populace, V.O. Key‘s characterization of Florida‘s political system was validated. Localism and political patronage were essential in this structure and these

59 Ibid 60 Malcolm B. Parsons. —Quasi-Partisan Conflict in a One-Party Legislative System: The Florida Senate, 1947-1961“, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 3, September 1962, Pp. 607 61 Florida 1885 Constitution, (1885), 609-610 62 Parsons. —Quasi-Partisan Conflict in a One-Party Legislative System“, Pp. 607

28 techniques were mastered by the conservatives. The power of the executive was diminished even further since the governor had no more influence than other cabinet members in voting on various issues. The department heads that made up the governor‘s cabinet were rarely defeated in their reelection bids and often acted as agents of local county officials looking out for the best interests of the businesses and citizens of their county. From the turn of the twentieth century until 1959, Tallahassee was home to only six comptrollers, five Superintendents of Public Instruction, four Treasurers, three secretaries of state. As prime example, Nathan Mayo served as Commissioner of Agriculture for thirty-seven years.63 By assuring that power in Florida remained in the hands of a legislature that would be dominated by North Florida for the foreseeable future, the conservative framers of the 1885 Constitution reaffirmed their grip over the state. Noting that the state‘s financial woes could be solved by increased tourism and investment from —outside“ regions, especially the North, the conservatives needed to implement measures to secure their power and authority. Along with legal and political instruments set in place, the myth of the —Lost Cause“ was evoked to rally white support for the Democratic Party whenever possible in order for the conservatives to maintain a semblance of white unity and white supremacy in the face of an ever-changing state. The 1887 Legislature, which came on the heels of the 1885 Constitutional Convention, enacted further measures to eliminate African-Americans from the voting rolls through poll-taxes which remained legal in Florida until 1937.64 The conservatives kept the African-Americans as second class citizens through these laws, helping to foster this image of white domination. Conservative rule was to be challenged immediately by the railroad boom and subsequent population explosion of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but, as intended by the framers of the 1885 Constitution, this document served as a bulwark against these changes and helped preserve the Old South in Florida.

63 David R. Colburn and Richard K. Scher, Florida‘s Gubernatorial Politics in the Twentieth Century. (Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1980) Pp.106. 64 Tebeau, A History of Florida Pp. 293

29 A HOUSE DIVIDED

Despite the inherent and obvious inequities in the 1885 Constitution, agitation to radically alter the document produced by the Bourbons did not surface until the 1920‘s at which time South Florida had emerged as a viable threat to the north. The region had seen one of the most profound transformations in the state‘s history. From a backwater swamp, the region had transformed into a winter playground for the entire nation. While the precedent had been set to invest in tourism in the 1860‘s and 1870‘s and urged on by conservative governors such as Henry D. Bloxham and George F. Drew, the population boom was largely made possible by the efforts of two individuals, Henry Plant and Henry Flagler. The subsequent boom and inevitable bust a few years later furthered the growing rift between North and South Florida. A bitter rivalry emerged which would characterize Florida‘s political scene over the first half of the twentieth century and has never been completely rectified. According to the 1870 census, native-born Floridians outnumbered transplants for the first time in its history. The —natives“ accounted for 57% of the population with Georgians, South and North Carolinians and Alabamans making up the majority of the rest of the population.1 A small number of migrants had come to Florida from outside the South, with the most hailing from New York and Massachusetts but these new Floridians in total accounted for a mere 1,500 inhabitants. Unfortunately for the —natives“, who were largely conservative in their political outlook, Florida was a fertile land ripe for development, investment, tourism, and settlement. Seventy years later these numbers shifted drastically as migrants from outside the South accounted for 41% of Floridians in 1940.2 The key factor in this analysis are the locations in which the —outsiders“ choose to settle. The Northerners who emigrated to the Sunshine State tended to come from urban centers and preferred to settle in established cities such as Jacksonville in the late

1 Ninth Census of the United States–1870---Florida (available online at: www.census.gov) 2 Sixteenth Census of the United States---1940---Florida (available online at: www.census.gov)

30 nineteenth century or burgeoning municipalities such as Tampa and Miami in the early twentieth century.3 Northerners rarely moved to the former —black belt“ which included Tallahassee and other cities, towns and counties which had thrived in the antebellum period under the peculiar institution of slavery and had been tied to —King Cotton“. Leon County, home to the capital city of Tallahassee and 17,168 residents in 1880, included only 137 Northerners according to the 1880 census.4 These Northerners were often viewed with scorn and contempt by North Florida conservatives who saw them as carpetbaggers bent on pillaging the state rather than settlers seeking to improve the economic structure of Florida. The —carpetbagger“ holds a precarious position in Southern society, someone whose ideas and influence, if left unchecked would corrupt the morality of Florida and its sister states. The Bourbons knew that there were more Northerners in Florida during the 1870‘s and 1880‘s than in any other former Confederate state and this alarmed them. Florida‘s Northern born population was an insignificant 2,010 in 1860, with most residing in Key West or other port cities. By 1880 this segment of the population had swelled to over 20,000.5 Two northern entrepreneurs were among these early transplants. Henry Plant is credited with opening up the West Coast of Florida while his counterpart, Henry Flagler shares the same distinction on the East Coast. Before the two Henry‘s began their Florida ventures, —Mr. Railroad of West Florida“, William D. Chipley, a Southerner, provided the state with the first substantial piece of railroad development since the antebellum period.6 Chipley‘s work was concentrated in the Panhandle and did little to alter the face of Florida, which helps to explain why the Georgia native is largely overshadowed by Plant and Flagler. Although initially Plant came to Florida from Connecticut in 1853 in an effort to improve his wife‘s health, he soon realized that the South, with Florida in particular, was

3 Donald R. Dyer. —The Place of Origin of Florida‘s Population“. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 42, No. 4. (Dec., 1952). Pp. 286 4 Tenth Census of the United States–1880–Florida (available online at:www.census.gov) 5 Tenth Census of the United States–1880–Florida; Eighth Census of the United States–1860–Florida (available online at:www.census.gov) 6 Tebeau. A History of Florida. Pp. 282

31 wide open to railroad investment and development.7 Based out of Augusta, Georgia, Plant‘s first foray into Florida was in the northern section of the state but he quickly set up two other lines which penetrated further south establishing what became known as the —Plant System“.8 Plant‘s impact on Florida was felt as early as the 1880‘s when he constructed the —South Florida Railroad“ with its terminus aptly named Plant City, outside of the small village of Tampa.9 Prior to the completion of the railroad, Tampa, which grew out of a military outpost named Fort Brooke in the 1830‘s, had a miniscule population barely topping 700.10 It only took seven years for the fruits of Plant‘s labor to be felt in the Tampa Bay area as the population of the once tiny outpost had increased 1,000%.11 Plant‘s commitment to the Tampa area did not end with the completion of the South Florida Railroad Line. His Plant Investment Company also helped to develop the region by aiding in the enlargement of Port Tampa and establishing a steamship line from the port to Key West and Havana, Cuba.12 Plant‘s South Florida Railroad Line was made accessible to the northern United States when the gauge was converted allowing for non- stop travel between New York and Tampa. The line immediately increased tourism in Florida and additional branches opened up Central Florida, allowing Orlando to gain recognition nationally as a health spa and resort towards the end of the nineteenth century.13 To accommodate the sharp increase in tourism, Plant constructed the Tampa Bay Hotel which opened its doors in 1891 and was quickly nicknamed the —Palace in the Wilderness“.14 Less than a decade after opening its doors, the hotel hosted future President Teddy Roosevelt and his Rough Riders as well as other soldiers on their way to fight the Spanish during the Spanish-American War in 1898.15 While the Plant System only lasted until 1901, it was the most successful and largest railroad endeavor in Florida up to that point, adding over 1,100 miles of track to

7 Dudley S. Johnson, —Henry Bradley Plant and Florida“ Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 45, Iss. 2, Pp. 119. 8 Ibid, Pp. 122 9 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, January 30, 1884 10 Tampa Tribune, October 22, 1961 11 Ibid 12 Johnson. —Henry Bradley Plant“. Pp. 125 13 Ibid 14 Tampa Tribune, October 22, 1961 15 Ibid

32 the state. Yet, more importantly, it opened a new region to development and settlement.16 The growing city on the bay attracted not only tourists but businessmen and such as V. Martinez Ybor who established a cigar manufacturing city outside of Tampa, Ybor City which attracted immigrants from Cuba.17 The most significant aspect of Tampa‘s growth was the large number of foreigners and northerners who changed the composition of the region‘s population. These —new“ Floridians did not share much in common with the conservative Democrats in the Panhandle. While the United States experienced a spike in population during the 1880‘s, Florida doubled that growth, but Tampa increased dramatically more. Florida grew by 45% while Tampa saw a staggering growth rate of 668%.18 This did not taper off much during the next two decades. Tampa and Hillsborough County were home to more African-American and foreign born males than —natives“ by 1910. Since the —native“ population had fallen to close to 40% in the first decade of the twentieth century, they undertook a reactionary stance in response to the perceived influx of —outsiders“.19 Through archaic and racist voting laws, the —natives or —locals were able to maintain their power and by labeling the foreign born population as radicals and linking them to Marxism in their native countries the conservatives were able to sustain some semblance of Anglo-white unity. These accusations did have some merit as Florida had the highest socialist vote in the South in the three presidential elections of 1904, 1908, and 1912 and, a large portion of those votes came from Tampa, accounting for 20% of those voting in 1904 and 15% in 1912.20 The growth of Tampa served as a reminder to the conservative North Floridians that they could not rest on their laurels if they wanted to preserve their power in the state. Further, the Cubans and darker skinned Southern Europeans were often lumped into the same category as the city‘s African-American population due to their dark complexion, thus solidifying their status as —outsiders“.21

16 Report of the Comptroller of the State of Florida, 1901. (Tallahassee, 1901). Pp. 65 17 Durward Long. —Making of Modern Tampa: A City of the New South, 1885-1911“. Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 49, Iss. 4 18 Tenth and Eleventh Census of the United States–1880 and 1890–Florida (available online at: www.census.gov) 19 Thirteenth Census of the United States–1910–Florida (available online at: www.census.gov) 20 Biennial Reports of the Secretary of State of the State of Florida, 1904, 1908, 1912. 21 Long, —Making of Modern Tampa“ Pp. 341-342

33 Miami experienced similar growth largely due to the exploits of Henry Flagler at the behest of Julia Tuttle. Flagler first visited Florida in 1883 at the age of 53 and, it was not South Florida but, rather, St. Augustine that caught the Hopewell, New York native‘s eye. Flagler, like Plant, had envisioned monumental change for Florida and he looked to the railroad to accomplish his goals. When inviting Plant to the opening of his Ponce de Leon Hotel in St. Augustine in 1888, Flagler was rumored to have told his friend and competitor —just follow the crowds,“ alerting Plant that he was confident of success.22 Flagler wanted to open up the East Coast to travelers and settlers from the Northeast and by connecting St. Augustine to Jacksonville with a 36-mile track, he took the first step in meeting this end. This was the beginning of his Florida East Coast Railroad which would radically transform a largely uninhabited region of the state. Jacksonville boasted a population of 7,000 according to the 1880 census and the entire coast was home to a mere 53,000 residents or less than 20% of Florida‘s entire population.23 Each subsequent year saw Flagler extend his venture south until he reached West Palm Beach in 1894 where he constructed his largest hotel to date, the Palm Beach Inn which eventually became the world renowned Breakers.24 It was two years after the extension of the railroad to Palm Beach that Flagler was contacted by Julia Tuttle who owned hundreds of acres of jungle and pine forests some sixty miles south of Palm Beach. Tuttle hoped to lure Flagler and civilization down to the banks of the Miami River, where the only sign of life was Fort Dallas, a small outpost that dated back half a century earlier to the Second Seminole War. In 1894, a handbook of Florida lamented that —Dade County is in the main inaccessible to ordinary tourists and unopened to the average settler.“25 The description only got worse as the handbook continued: —inhabited only by the remnants of the Seminole Indians, and is visited only by the more enterprising and adventurous of hunters and cowboys.“26 This is what Tuttle set out to change and along with the Biscayne Bay Company promoted the area not as a lawless

22 Carlton J. Corliss, —Henry M. Flagler: Railroad Builder“ Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 23 Tenth Census of the United States–1880–Florida (available online at: www.census.gov) 24 Corliss. —Henry W. Flagler“. Pp. 200 25 Miami Herald, July 21, 1946 26 Ibid

34 frontier but, rather as a haven for invalids seeking a warm climate to aid in their recovery.27 Ironically it took a freeze to convince Flagler that the Sunshine State‘s southernmost mainland county was an ideal location for expansion of his empire. He proclaimed, —if there is a place in Florida where the freeze did not reach, there we will build a city“, visiting Miami in 1895 and, by 1896 the first railroad car pulled into Miami. Later that summer the former Seminole Indian trading post became an incorporated city with a population of nearly 3,000.28 In addition to extending his railroad line to Miami, Flagler agreed to build a hotel, the Royal Palm on the shores of Biscayne Bay.29 As Miami expanded Florida still remained the smallest state in the former Confederacy with 528,000 residents in 1900.30 The city‘s growth, like Tampa, was buoyed by the Spanish-American War as not only troops but, journalists and other government personnel temporarily called the city home, helping to publicize Miami‘s attributes to the rest of the nation. This publicity earned Miami the nickname the —Magic City“ and locals began to tout the never ending summers and tropical climate in circulars and pamphlets distributed around the country, most notably in the Northeast and Midwest.31 This ingenuity was copied by the Immigration Bureau and implemented for other regions of the state in the early twentieth century. The Bureau, which operated under the Division of Agriculture, distributed more than 40,000 —packets“ a year containing various statistics concerning the state, bolstered in the 1920‘s by a magazine advertising in the North.32 Equally as important to Miami‘s growth was Everest G. Sewell who had been lured to Miami the same year that Flagler‘s railroad arrived in the city. In 1913 he became the first chairman of the newly founded Chamber of Commerce.33 Sewell‘s goal was to promote Miami and —make Miami the foremost tourist resort in the country.“34

27 Ibid, January 18, 1980 28 Ibid, July 21, 1946 29 Paul S. George. —Passage to the New Eden: Tourism in Miami from Flagler Through Everest G. Sewell“. Florida Historical Quarterly. Vol. 59, Iss. 4 30 Twelfth Census of the United States–1900--Florida 31 Miami Metropolis, February 17, 1899 32 LaGonda. —Agriculture and Advertising: Florida State Bureau of Immigration, 1923-1960“. Pp. 199 33 Isidor Cohen. Historical Sketches and Sidelights of Miami. (Miami: Private Printing, 1925), Pp.82 34 Ibid, Pp. 115

35 The Miami Chamber of Commerce took out advertisements in fifty newspapers in the North and Midwest as well as in numerous widely read journals, magazines and other periodicals. In addition, they published The Miamian, edited by Sewell, equipped with alluring and enticing images of Miami, and distributed nationally in the 1920‘s.35 While these ventures would ultimately bring money into the state, conservative North Florida quickly became resentful of the flourishing tourist industry of the south. The center of gravity within the state had begun to shift as early as the first decades of the twentieth century as Miami‘s tourist business increased by over 1,000% from 1915- 1925.36 Of more concern to North Florida was the increase in population in Miami which reached more than 30,000 by 1920, making the city one of the largest in the state.37 The growth was far from complete as Miami‘s population expanded by a remarkable 55% over the next three years according to an article in the Miami Herald which reflected the events of the year and listed the city‘s residents at 47,000.38 Due to the unprecedented expansion, the state ordered a special census to be taken in 1925 which recorded Miami‘s population at 70,000.39 Florida‘s population had increased from 968,470 to 1,468,211 during the decade but, most of this expansion had occurred in South Florida.40 However it was not until 1950 that Florida passed Arkansas and was no longer the smallest state in the former Confederacy.41 North Florida could not match this growth and while South Florida boomed, North Florida remained deeply rooted in the past. The region remained rural and overly dependent on agriculture which tied North Florida to the nineteenth century. Florida, as a state, was changing as the number of agricultural workers in the state decreased from 29% of the population in 1920 to a mere 2% forty years later. North Florida refused to acknowledge these changes and was easily surpassed by South Florida in wealth and production.42

35 The Miamian, Vol. 4, April 1924 36 George. —Passage to the New Eden“. Pp. 451 37 Fourteenth Census of the United States–Florida–1920 (available online at: www.census.gov) 38 Miami Herald, December 30, 1923 39 Fifth State Census, 1925, State of Florida, Department of Agriculture 40 Fifteenth Census of the United States–Florida-1930 (available online at: www.census.gov) 41 Sixteenth and Seventeenth Census of the United States–Florida–1940 and 1950 (available online at: www.census.gov) 42 Dauer. Florida Politics and Government. Pp. 42

36 By 1930, Miami with 110,637 inhabitants was second behind only Jacksonville (129,549) in population. Tampa, another of the —New South“ cities, saw its population increase to 101,161 but, combined with St. Petersburg, the Tampa Bay Area claimed more than 150,000 residents. The 1920‘s also saw the emergence of thirteen new counties with only four, Dixie, Union, Gilchrist and Gulf in the North.43 Not only was Miami growing faster as well as out building any other city in Florida, it surpassed every city in the nation in per capita housing construction.44 Flagler‘s railroad was supplemented by the completion of Dixie Highway in 1911 which linked Miami and the East Coast of Florida to the northern United States in addition to the construction of the Tamiami Trail, a former Native American footpath, across the Everglades in 1928.45 The emergence of Central and South Florida, Tampa and Miami in particular, created a regional tension that had not been seen in Florida since the territorial days when Florida was rigidly divided into three distinct regions, East, West and Middle Florida. The regions often quarreled and hindered the overall growth of the territory before statehood was granted in 1845. Before Tallahassee was —created“ as the capital, the territory had two centers of government in Pensacola and St. Augustine. They both held sessions of the Territorial Legislature in their cities which left delegates scurrying back and forth between the two which were situated 400 miles apart. When the first session met in July of 1822 in Pensacola, —the members from St. Augustine had traveled fifty- nine days by water to attend“ with one delegate, Thomas Lytle, losing his life in a storm.46 When the second session of the Florida Legislative Council met in St. Augustine in 1823, the delegates from Pensacola were shipwrecked and barely escaped death.47 The solution, in the form of a compromise, benefited the new settlers of Middle Florida as commissioners John Lee Williams and William H. Simmons selected —the present day site of Tallahassee as the location for the new capital of Florida.“48 Not only was Tallahassee the midpoint between St. Augustine and Pensacola but —Middle Florida also

43 Tebeau, A History of Florida Pp. 377 44 The Miamian, Vol. 5, February 1925 45 George. —Passage to the New Eden“. Pp. 452 46 Journal of the Proceedings of a Convention of Delegates to Form a Constitution for the People of Florida 47 Michael Gannon. Florida, A Short History. Pp. 28-29 48 Edward E. Baptist. Creating an Old South. Middle Florida‘s Plantation Frontier Before the Civil War. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). Pp. 13

37 contained hundreds of thousands of acres of rich land suitable for plantations.“49 Richard Keith Call, one of Florida‘s early political figures had —looked with favor upon the location and believed that it might allay the extreme east-west sectionalism in Florida.“50 While the jealousy, resentment and, antagonism which existed during Florida‘s territorial and antebellum period eventually receded under the banner of fire-eating radicalism in 1861, the newly created rift between the North and South Florida expanded as rapidly as the state‘s newest region. The gulf between the sections was more than geographic, becoming increasingly evident as Miami and Tampa became the state‘s largest metropolitan areas. The new hostility took form as an urban-rural contest as South Florida‘s urbanism prodded its politicians into challenging the integrity of the 1885 Constitution, in particular the apportionment of legislative districts which, forty years after its compilation, was already outdated. This contention, coupled with the boom and bust of the mid-1920‘s, provided the context for conflict between the New South and the remnants of the Old South which was hiding behind the myth of the —Lost Cause“, unresolvable until the late 1960‘s and from which remnants still exist today. As early as 1900 South Floridians clamored for change in the state‘s structure and called for the relocation of the capital from Tallahassee to a more central location, possibly Tampa or the emerging town of Orlando in Central Florida. Almost every legislative session from the turn of the century through 1967 saw calls for relocation. This intensified in the 1920‘s and climaxed in 1967 when State Senator Lee Wissenbaum introduced legislation to move the capital to Orlando. The lobby of the new Capitol building in Tallahassee mockingly honors the Senator with a plaque which claims that Wissenbaum‘s —valiant“ efforts to move the Capital to Orlando was the prime motivation for construction of a new modern building in the 1970‘s.51 In the early twentieth century South Florida was emerging as a proactive region which questioned the continued dominance of North Florida. In 1880 Leon County had the largest population in the state (19,662) but, the region, as previously mentioned, did not see the same expansion which characterized South Florida in the first decades of the

49 Ibid. Pp. 14 50 Herbert Doherty. Richard Keith Call, Southern Unionist. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1961). Pp. 41 51 Hare. Tallahassee, A Capital City History. (Charleston: Arcadia Publishing, 2002) Pp. 136-37

38 twentieth century. Tallahassee‘s population grew to 26,000 in 1950 and 38,000 by 1960 but this paled in comparison to the development of cities such as Miami and Tampa in South Florida.52 This proposal to move the capital south in the first decades of the twentieth century was put before the people and a statewide referendum was held on the matter in 1923. Although the issue was defeated, the vote was closer than most North Floridians would like to have imagined as a mere 52% of the state voted to keep the capital in Tallahassee which according to the city‘s newspaper embraced the ante-bellum, magnolia and honeysuckle atmosphere“ of the Old South and was —a place rich with the tradition of the Old South.“53 In addition, the population explosion led to cries for a re-evaluation of Florida‘s forty year old constitution. The southern portion of the peninsula had surpassed the North in population and economic growth but, this was not represented in the state legislature where the rural North remained the dominant region. The South, wary of the North‘s ability to block legislation and appropriations which would benefit their region began to stir in the early 1920‘s. South Florida, in spite of Dixie Highway and the Tamiami Trail was in dire need of funds for a road construction program. However, the allocation of funds was controlled by the legislature which, because of the 1885 Constitution lay in the hands of the conservatives from the Panhandle. The rural-urban debate sprang from South Florida‘s newly aggressive approach to state politics. The region was no longer content sitting back and allowing its progress to be stifled by North Florida. Legislative representation and malapportionment became the focal point of the rivalry between the regions, first rearing its head politically in the 1923 legislative session. This session acknowledged the profound development and growth of South Florida and recognized that this trend would continue as the state was currently in the middle of an economic boom drawing interest in Florida from around the nation. While the deficiencies of the 1885 Constitution were accepted and an amendment was submitted to the people to be voted on in the 1924 general election, the legislature followed their

52 Ibid, Pp. 86, 112, 125 53 Dauer. Florida‘s Politics and Government. Pp. 34; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, November 23, 1923; Ibid, April 30, 1923

39 tradition of ignoring the mandate once it was passed by the populace.54 The 1935 legislature further mandated change in the apportionment of districts but, this too was largely ignored and never implemented by the body which still lay in the hands of the conservative North55. Senate Presidents never called for these changes to be executed and South Florida did not have enough power to force them to comply. Furthermore, the amendments passed were filled with loopholes and were laced with ambiguous language which did not oblige the Legislature to enact any modifications. The amendments served more as suggestions which were disregarded by those in power. The schism between North and South focused on the apportionment question but, manifested itself in other ways. The South Florida boom, which characterized the first years of the decade, was destined to burst due to over-speculation and over-development. Property assessment values had grown by an astounding 560% in South Florida but people did not heed the warning signs as more and more strain was placed on the speculative bubble.56 Despite calls for restraint from national papers such as the New York Times, greed took precedent over prudence until 1926 when banks in the state began to fail.57 Over the next three years a total of one hundred and seventy-two banks crashed in Florida putting an end to the twentieth century —Gold Rush“. North Florida began to resent their neighbors to the South for ushering in economic maladies in the mid-1920‘s. There were numerous factors which created the bust including but, not limited to a housing shortage, labor shortage, price increases in addition to the aforementioned over-speculation and over-development.58 Furthering the problems was the national press which published editorials and articles portraying South Florida in a negative light which only confounded the problems of the region. North Floridians offered a different view. Banks in the region tended to be locally owned and run and were able to withstand the worst of the economic downturn which had summarily decimated South Florida. When South Florida, desperate for aid, turned to Tallahassee, the legislature turned a blind eye, refusing to allocate state funds. In this regard North Florida acted as if the

54 William C. Harvard and Loren P. Beth. The Politics of Mis-Representation: Rural-Urban Conflict in the Florida State Legislature. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962). Pp. 48 55 Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union, May 22, 1935 56 Tebeau. A History of Florida. Pp. 384 57 New York Times, October 14, 1925; Raymond Vickers. Panic in Paradise (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994). Pp. 1-2 58 Miami Herald, September 3, 1925

40 state was in fact two autonomous entities rather than one state divided along ideological lines. Many conservative Democrats from North Florida resented the South and felt they needed to entrench and solidify their hold over the state to assure that South Florida was not afforded the opportunity to control the allocation of state funds. To this end, conservatives vowed to fight any efforts at reapportionment which would leave South Florida in control of the Legislature. The bust which followed the boom hardened the resolve of North Florida and convinced them of the recklessness of the south. At this time, South Florida, which was in the midst of an economic catastrophe was dealt another lethal blow on September 18, 1926 when a violent hurricane struck Miami. The day before landfall, the Miami Herald reassured readers that the storm would miss Florida. The story covered a few lines on the front page and no other mention was given to the hurricane which at last report was slamming into the Bahamas.59 The Miami News, which was printed later in the day and was distributed in the afternoon, issued warnings to South Florida claiming impact was imminent and people should prepare for a large storm to hit the area that evening.60 The Miami News‘ report proved prophetic but, also, too little too late. Between 300 and 625 people perished in the storm, over one hundred of those within the Miami city limits.61 The storm also left over 25,000 homeless and inflicted close to $100,000,000 worth of property damage in the state, 75% of that in Miami alone.62 While this natural disaster was the final nail in the coffin of South Florida‘s boom, the growing rift between North and South Florida swelled in the aftermath of the storm. As they had at the beginning of the bust, South Florida turned to Tallahassee for aid, this time for hurricane relief. After the storm South Floridians had called for state funds to be allocated to construct levees and other building projects aimed at protecting the region from future storms. They also inquired about the possibility of constructing more roads which could serve as evacuation routes in case of another disaster. The Legislature again balked at providing the adequate funds necessary for South Florida‘s full recovery as North Florida again rebuked and

59 Miami Herald, September 17, 1925 60 Miami News, September 17, 1925 61 Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, September 19, 1993 62 Donald C. Bunting. —A Comparison of Six Great Florida Hurricanes“. Weatherwise, Vol. VII, No. 3, June 1955, Pp. 115

41 rebuffed repeated calls for aid maintaining that supporting the south violated fiscal conservatism. South Florida did not have to wait long for another natural disaster as a more powerful hurricane roared ashore in 1928. The —Great Okeechobee Hurricane“ as it was dubbed claimed the lives of between 2,500 and 3,000 while inflicting over $16 billion of damage in modern day monetary value.63 The storm is remembered today as the —Forgotten Storm“ but it took center stage in the growing divide between North and South Florida. Florida‘s Attorney General, despite being a native of Leon County, was committed to helping South Florida in its time of need. He looked to circumvent the state legislature by taking his case to Capital Hill in Washington where he testified in front of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Flood Control. Fred Henry Davis, the Attorney General, shocked the committee by proclaiming, —it is mighty hard to get people (North Floridians) in other parts of the state interested in these people (South Floridians), as to whether they perish or not.“64 He later commented on the malevolence felt by many North Floridians towards the South whom they viewed as Yankee transplants and —outsiders“. Davis maintained that it had been promoted —in certain districts of Florida (North Florida) that what the people ought to do is build a wall down there and keep the military there to keep the people (Northerners) from coming in there.65 The malice and indifference shown by North Florida only furthered the notion that Florida was not operating as a unified state.66 By 1929 Florida suffered from the highest per capita debt in the nation with much of the blame being placed squarely on the shoulders of South Florida.67 Tallahassee‘s Daily Democrat, spoke for the conservatives who wished to cut back on state spending in the face of this economic crisis. They downplayed the severity of the economic downturn claiming that the depression was nothing more than propaganda spewed by —anarchists, communists and political dissenters.“68 When Governor Doyle Carlton tried

63 Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, September 14, 2003 64 Klein. —Guarding the Baggage“. Pp. 85 65 Ibid 66 For more information on the —Great Okeechobee Hurricane see, Eric L. Gross, —Somebody Got Drowned Lord: Florida and the Great Okeechobee Hurricane disaster of 1928“ (Unpublished Ph D Dissertation, Florida State University, 1995) 67 Florida Senate Journal, 22nd Session, 1929, Pp.3 68 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, February 18, 1932

42 to propose legislation to aid South Florida‘s economy he was met with resistance from the more powerful Legislature. Carlton was from rural Wauchula, Florida which while technically in South Florida, had more in common with the rural northern region. He was sympathetic to South Florida as he had practiced law in Tampa before entering into politics and was familiar with the region‘s larger urban centers. Despite his ties to South Florida, he vehemently opposed the region‘s plan to legalize gambling in order to change the economic fortunes of the state. North Floridians opposed the gambling proposal as well as other plans designed by the region. The rupture between the two regions came to blows, literally, when two members of the house became engaged in a fist fight on the House floor during the debate over economic reform.69 North Florida only consented to legalized gambling under the preconditions that the practice be limited to South Florida while each county in the state would receive equal revenue from the taxation imposed on the gaming venues.70 This —compromise“ only acted to further the split and antipathy between the regions. As the divide came to consume Florida politics, the reaction to the New Deal only further splintered the state as well as the Democratic Party. A record fourteen candidates filed for the Democratic nomination to fill David Sholtz‘ shoes in 1936 as chief executive with Fred Cone emerging as the victor. V.O. Key characterized the election as —political pulverization“.71 Cone‘s nomination and subsequent victory in the general election over Republican E.E. Callaway saw the Democrat garner over 80% of the statewide vote.72 That Cone would win the general election was a foregone conclusion but a more in depth analysis of the primary illustrated that Cone was not the favorite of a majority of Floridians. The former Columbia County lawyer received a paltry 15.7% of the vote in the large primary field.73 Cone was not a New Dealer but, rather, a staunch conservative who was overly critical of President Franklin Roosevelt and David Sholtz, the New Dealer Governor who had preceded Cone in office. Cone was the antithesis of the New South politicians from South Florida. He practiced an exaggerated form of fiscal conservatism which looked to roll back many of the state funded aid programs

69 Tallahassee Democrat, May 28, 1965 70 Klein. —Guarding the Baggage“. Pp. 89 71 Key. Southern Politics. Pp. 88 72 Tebeau. A History of Florida. Pp. 407-8 73 Key. Southern Politics. Pp. 88

43 implemented by Governor Sholtz. This shift to the right did not characterize the overall view of the state but, rather, emphasized the confused political atmosphere in Florida which stemmed from the changing demographics in the state. This perplexity was further illuminated by Claude Pepper‘s nomination and subsequent election to the Senate in 1938. Pepper was the exact opposite of Cone, a liberal New Dealer whose very presence in Washington, D.C. representing Florida irked conservatives in North Florida throughout his terms which lasted until 1950.74 The advent of the Second World War eased sectional tensions and the voters chose World War I veteran Spessard Holland to lead the state through the conflict. World War II, like the Spanish-American War and the Great War before it, accelerated the state‘s rate of growth. By 1940 Florida had not yet recovered from the Depression, largely because Governor Cone had cut numerous New Deal programs but, the outbreak of World War II and the United States‘ entrance into the war two years later helped Florida right its economic ship. The state implemented many building projects with road construction taking center stage. The road building was viewed as a military necessity because of the defense installations which sprang up around the state. A modern transportation system was essential to connect the bases and airfields. During Holland‘s term over 1,500 miles of highway was constructed in Florida with one third of the cost covered by the Federal Government.75 The war also ushered in a new mode of transportation as military contracts brought Delta, National, United and Eastern Airlines to Florida. The airlines remained in the state following the end of the war furnishing another boost to the tourist industry.76 While the tourist industry was interrupted, the influx into the state of soldiers and their families helped to ease financial setbacks. The military accounted for over 40% of the occupancy of hotel rooms in resort areas throughout Florida and state and national newspapers, especially the New York Times, did their part to curb rumors circulating throughout the nation that Florida would be —dead this winter.77 Commissioner of Agriculture, Nathan Mayo, who occupied the post from 1923 to 1960, doubled the efforts of his department which was charged with coordinating

74 Tebeau. A History of Florida. Pp. 409 75 Ibid, Pp. 145 76 Ibid, Pp. 421 77 New York Times, November 15, 1942

44 Florida‘s tourist industry. Florida adapted to the unique circumstances forced on the state by the war. An immediate result was that many of the servicemen and their families liked what they saw in the Sunshine State and either stayed or returned shortly after the cessation of hostilities in 1945. According to Charlton Tebeau, the war opened up the state to —many people to whom it might otherwise have been totally unknown“ leading to an astounding population explosion during the 1940‘s. Florida‘s population increased forty-six percent from 1,897,414 to 2,271,305 during this time and an astounding 81.5% of these —new“ Floridians settled in the peninsula as opposed to the Panhandle and most in South Florida.78 During the war Millard Fillmore Caldwell was elected to succeed Spessard Holland. On paper, Caldwell looked to be a return to the conservatism of Fred Cone. Caldwell, a Tennessee native and World War I veteran was a former United States Congressman from Santa Rosa County in the Panhandle but he had resigned his seat in 1941 to protest Roosevelt‘s liberal New Deal policies. Intra-state rivalry, which had been virtually silenced during the war, resurfaced in the form of Ernest R. Graham who had challenged Caldwell for the Democratic nomination. Graham represented the interests of South Florida and felt the region was underrepresented in every aspect of the state‘s government. Graham was a proponent of the creation of a new state university in Florida to meet the growing need for an institute of higher learning in this rapidly expanding section of the state. He went further during his campaign and urged South Floridians, especially those in his home county of Dade, to —stop playing Santa Claus“ to North Florida by giving in to their wishes and sitting back and allowing the continued domination of the state through the malapportioned state Senate. Graham placed third in the primary garnering 91,000 votes, 25,000 behind Caldwell who also won the runoff and the general election by defeating Republican Bert L. Acker 79%-21%.79 The Second World War had furthered Florida‘s transformation into a modern dynamic state breaking away from its Old South roots even though North Florida still clung to power in the legislature because of the apportionment in the Senate. North Florida no longer spoke for a majority of the state‘s residents but, no one expected the

78 Sixteenth Census and Seventeenth Census of the United States–Florida–1940 and 1950 (available online at: www.census.gov) 79 Tebeau. A History of Florida. Pp. 421; Miami Herald, July 28, 1944

45 1945 legislative session, which was scheduled to commence as the Red Army encircled Berlin, to challenge the 1885 Constitution. For most of the session it seemed that the harmony between the regions which had blossomed during the war would continue. However, Governor Caldwell startled the north by claiming that he felt the body should consider the question of reapportionment to meet the guidelines established by the 1885 Constitution. He called for an extraordinary or emergency session to deal with apportionment. North Florida was shocked. This —duty“ of the legislature had largely been ignored by the governors as well as the House and Senate. Now Governor Caldwell called for action and the state‘s newspapers quickly realized the ramifications of the Governor‘s plea. Tampa Bay‘s two newspapers rightly foreshadowed what was to come when the Tampa Tribune proclaimed, —Civil War in Florida“ and the St. Petersburg Times noted —North and South Florida fight renewed.“ The Times went on to illustrate the frustration of many in the southern region by astutely describing the forthcoming debate as a —fight to the death between the Florida of yesterday and the Florida of tomorrow.“80 North Florida was led by Senator Amos Lewis of Marianna who exclaimed that his allies were prepared to suppress any effort by South Florida to reapportion the Senate. At the beginning of the debate, North Florida felt relatively safe despite their anger at the gall shown by South Florida in challenging the —dominant“ region. According to the wording of the 1885 Constitution, the Legislature was charged with doing nothing more than reapportioning Senate districts based on population only so far as practicable.81 The document made no mention of what exactly —practicable“ meant and previous legislatures had ignored this stipulation. Lewis and the North Florida conservatives were challenged by Henry S. Baynard who represented South Florida from his St. Petersburg district. Baynard proposed a bill which would have moved two North Florida districts south weakening the North‘s control over the Senate. At the time North Florida held a 23-15 advantage. Baynard‘s plan would alter this slightly but, North Florida would remain in power with a 21-17 advantage.82 Lewis, however, rejected this plan as conceding too

80Tallahassee Daily Democrat, May 27, 1945; Tampa Tribune, June 6, 1945; St. Petersburg Times, June 2 and 6, 1945 81 Florida 1885 Constitution. Article VII, section 3 82 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, June 6, 1945

46 much to South Florida but he did realize some compromise had to be reached and he proposed to add five more districts and seats to the Senate with three being awarded to South Florida and two to North Florida. With this scenario, North would maintain a 25- 18 edge in the Senate.83 Furthermore, no North Florida senators would lose their seats. This proposal reaffirmed the resolve of North Floridians not to relinquish power through reapportionment further angering Baynard and his colleagues. The position of the conservative bloc was clarified when Senator Newman C. Brackin of Okaloosa County asserted, —I don‘t care what the constitution says…I‘m fighting for power and control.“84 North Florida was in fact fighting for just that, something they had fought for since the end of Reconstruction. The Southern bloc responded by saying it would consider a plan which added three seats to South Florida but, only one to North Florida. Nevertheless, Amos Lawrence did not waiver in his convictions, adding that —our bloc does not want to lose its balance of power in the senate…We have the majority…We will not recede“. Lawrence‘s emphatic renunciation of the compromise was met with praise in the papers in North Florida and ridicule and scorn from the state‘s southern periodicals. The North Floridians, who were now being referred to as —Cockroaches“ favored a constitutional amendment to settle the issue once and for all so as to curb any future thoughts of reapportionment.85 According to this plan, the Senate would be permanently locked at 67 seats, one for each county and North Florida would maintain a majority of 37-30.86 South Florida dismissed this plan as illogical since according to the 1940 census, Dade County in South Florida was home to 315,00 people while Florida‘s northernmost county, Nassau, north of Jacksonville only had 11,000 residents.87 Further frustrating South Florida was the fact that reapportionment measures passed by the House of Representatives were doomed in the Senate based on the current district lines. Newspapers played an active role in this debate, which some deemed a crisis but, in reality, their significance should not be exaggerated as they rarely did more than preach to the choir. Tallahassee‘s paper, the Daily Democrat tried to paint the South

83 Ibid 84 St. Petersburg Times, July 25, 1945 85 Ibid, September 21, 1945 86 Florida Senate Journal. 30th Session, 1945, Pp. 1005-1006 87 Tebeau, A History of Florida. Pp. 424

47 Floridians, also known as —Termites“, in a negative light. According to the paper, North Florida merely wanted to do what was fair and best for Florida. The southern region of the state was tearing Florida apart by clamoring for reapportionment and thus fanning the flames of sectionalism. They attacked South Florida by stating that they would —do well to consider the wisdom and desirability of an adequate system of checks and balances.“88 The —checks and balances“ referred to North Florida retaining control over the Senate while conceding the House to the —Termites“. South Florida papers, such as the Tampa Tribune, St. Petersburg Times and Miami Herald responded to the virulent tone professed by the Daily Democrat. The Times stated the —real disaster is the imposing of yesterday‘s political philosophy…and pre-Civil War ideas…upon a progressive and forward looking people.“89 Other justifications were espoused by the conservatives, speaking for North Florida, who asserted that the purpose of a bicameral legislature was to protect the minority population, in this case the —Cockroaches“. According to them, —never in the history of this state has the Senate been based on population…the representation has always been on geographical basis…historical and traditional ties should be considered and proper balances should be maintained.“90 This statement was in fact true. The Senate had never been based on population but, that was because the conservatives had framed the 1885 Constitution to protect their region against future population growth in other sections of Florida. Whenever challenged, the conservatives pointed to the United States Senate and equal representation afforded every state by the Constitution as justification for Florida‘s malapportioned Legislature. As the debate entered its third month and the legislators grew more impatient under the sweltering Tallahassee sun, the South Florida newspapers began a new campaign to oust —Cockroaches“ from office through the ballot box. They organized various organizations such as the APENFC, Association for the Prevention of the Election of North Florida Candidates and the Anti-North Florida Candidates Club.91 North Florida scoffed at these —clubs“, rightly noting that South Floridians did not vote

88 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, June 3, 1945 89 St. Petersburg Times, June 6, 1945 90 Florida Senate Journal, 1945, Pp. 998 91 Tampa Tribune, June 17, 1945

48 for candidates running in North Florida districts and also reiterating the fact that South Floridians could elect the governor but, the state‘s Chief Executive‘s powers had been curtailed by the 1885 Constitution. Since the formation of these organizations did nothing to alter the malapportioned Florida Senate, the Miami Herald called for the permanent separation of the regions into two states. According to the paper‘s editor, —the thinking, the living, the geography…the habits of the two sections are decidedly different.“92 The region‘s other leading papers quickly backed the Herald, maintaining that North Florida was holding back the modern progressive southern region with its entrenchment in Old South values. The Daily Democrat in Tallahassee referred to South Florida‘s —secession speak“ as ludicrous and absurd, maintaining that all of the state‘s residents were Floridians.93 Florida‘s neighbors were keen on adding their opinions to the debate and Georgia‘s Governor, Ellis Arnall, noted that his state would be glad to oblige South Florida and swallow up the Panhandle. On July 10, George Okell, a Representative from Dade County called for a vote on secession. An affirmative vote would send the matter to Congress in Washington, asking for the forty-ninth state, the state of South Florida.94 These persistent calls for secession did not faze the —Cockroaches“ as witnessed by Amos Lawrence‘s comments to Senator Baynard in which he reiterated his position and reaffirmed that North Florida would never retreat.95 The —Termites“ of South Florida next threatened legal action to force reapportionment of the Senate but, this too fell by the wayside. Worried that the debate and subsequent impasse was —tearing Florida to pieces“, Senator Walter B. Fraser, from St. Augustine and representing St. John‘s County, proposed a plan which would have moved one seat from North Florida to South Florida.96 Fraser‘s call for reconciliation and compromise was joined by Alachua County‘s Senator William A. Shands who sought to redraw Florida‘s Senate districts to include 42 seats, an addition of four seats.97 Most —Cockroaches“ opposed these proposals but in the end a

92 Miami Herald, June 9, 1945 93 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, July 10, 1945 94 St. Petersburg Times, July 11, 1945 95 Ibid, July 27, 1945 96 Panama City News-Herald, July 13, 1945 97 Miami Daily News, July 28, 1945

49 modified version of Fraser‘s bill, more conciliatory to South Florida, passed by a 23-12 margin in the Senate.98 The victory was nothing more than a symbolic one for South Florida but, nonetheless, the St. Petersburg Times, announced that the passage of the bill signified the —end of an era and philosophy of life imposed on a great and growing state by a cluster of rural counties in north and west Florida.“99 An editorial in Martin County‘s Stuart News echoed this sentiment by proclaiming the battle was far from over and that the 1945 legislative session was the beginning, not the end, of what was a war. It continued by mocking North Florida, prophesizing that in due time the —Cockroaches“ would exclaim —oh yes, we remember when North Florida used to run things here.“100 Two Senate districts were shifted to the South Florida counties of Broward and Palm Beach but, North Florida still retained a comfortable advantage in the upper house. Despite the confidence shown by the Times and the Stuart News, most in Florida realized this compromise did nothing more than place the onus on future legislative sessions to re-visit the apportionment question. South Florida was going to continue to expand and North Florida‘s values were destined to be continually attacked not only by the —Termites“ but by African-Americans, liberals and so called Northern —agitators“ and outsiders in the late 1940‘s and early 1950‘s.

98 Florida Senate Journal, 1945, Pp. 1049 99 St. Petersburg Times, July 25, 1945 100 Tampa Tribune, June 23, 1945

50 REVOLUTION

In 1945 Florida was a state with feet straddling the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The state had seen more growth than any other state in the South during the first half of the twentieth century but conservative, rural North Floridians were content with living in a long gone era, swearing their allegiance to the —Lost Cause of the Confederacy“ and the tenets of white supremacy which accompanied it. As Florida expanded and modernized, the Pork Choppers dragged their feet in an attempt to impede progress, which was synonymous with preserving their own power. The conservatives also aimed to halt any impetus for social change, especially in terms of affording civil rights to African-Americans whom they considered to be second class citizens. Race relations took center stage following the Second World War, not only in Florida but, throughout the nation as well. This turned the South into a battleground and provided ammunition for a war that was to rage for the next quarter of a century. The conservatives in Florida felt pressure from all sides in the late 1940‘s and looked to solidify their control over the state government and society by defending themselves from all they considered —outsiders“ whether they be African-Americans, Liberals or alleged communists. For the most part, they strove to maintain their power through elections and policies but the postwar era also saw a resurgence in Ku Klux Klan action in the state. The Klan acted as a virtual arm of the Pork Choppers, providing a backlash against political and social changes in Florida which threatened the supremacy of the conservatives. Two battles highlighted post-bellum Florida life and led to a charged political atmosphere throughout the peninsula. The latter would prove to be the more vicious battle and also one in which the Pork Choppers were able to flex their muscles. This clash was the crusade in 1950 to oust the liberal two term U.S. Senator Claude Pepper from his seat in Washington. Pepper embodied the best and worst of Floridians, being a liberal progressive New Dealer yet raised with ingrained racist tendencies, and who would not abandon this belief system despite his penchant for liberalism. Pepper also

51 symbolized the transition Florida was undergoing during and after the Second World War. The senator knew that to save his political career he would have to straddle a fine line which, if crossed, would mean betrayal to the South. In the end, Pepper was defeated when his liberalism was linked to the growing fear of the —Red Menace“. Pepper was, in essence, labeled and categorized as being an —outsider“ which led to his demise and a resurgence of conservatism in Florida at a time when the Pork Choppers had seemed to be losing a grip on the state. The first conflict, which contributed to the conservative slip in power, also illustrated V.O. Key‘s contention that Florida was in fact a different state where politics was characterized as being —every man for himself.“1 This penchant for localism, according to Key, meant that Florida was ripe for political battles, the first of which came in 1948 and later, more vehemently in 1950. In 1948 conservatives were faced with the dilemma of potentially abandoning the Democratic Party in favor of the upstart —Dixiecrats“ or State‘s Rights Democrats initially led by Mississippi Governor Fielding Wright but adopted and —saved“ by South Carolina‘s chief executive J. Strom Thurmond. The results of the 1948 election, which centered on state‘s rights and white supremacy, demonstrated that Florida was not as deeply rooted in the nineteenth century‘s —Lost Cause“ mythology as the Pork Choppers would have liked. They remained in power within the state‘s power structure because the 1945 legislature approved only minor changes to the archaic legislative districts but they could not control the votes of Florida‘s electorate which underscored not only a reluctance to abandon the Democratic Party but, also the attitudes and ideologies brought into the state by the newest Floridians. Historians in the past have made the mistake of attributing the failure of the Dixiecrat Revolt in the Sunshine State solely to the allegiance of Floridians to the national Democratic Party while, in reality they have failed to recognize the contributions of recent immigrants to the Sunshine State. This is best illustrated in the support of Truman but, also, possibly more telling, in the support of Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican candidate for President who garnered 33.3% of Florida‘s vote. He more than doubled the returns given to third party candidate Thurmond raising a red flag for the Pork Choppers. Only in Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee did Dewey receive more support among

1 Key, Southern Politics in the State and Nation Pp. 82.

52 Southern states than in Florida. In the 1948 election, 84.5% of Floridians voted against Thurmond, the Dixiecrats and, thus, the Pork Chop Gang.2 The November 3 headline of the Chicago Tribune, —Dewey Defeats Truman“, lives in infamy as one of the most notorious editorial blunders in American history.3 To Southerners, the fact that Truman had defeated Dewey, fulfilling the cries of his supporters during the campaign who urged him to —Give ”em Hell, Harry“, marked the beginning of the end of their blind allegiance to the Democratic Party. The 1948 election, one of the most famous and most studied in American history, highlighted a breach within the party that had once dominated the South. Battle lines were drawn between conservatives and liberals within the party which would not be healed until the conservative element ultimately switched allegiance and joined the ranks of the Republican Party in the 1960‘s. The first seeds of discontent within the southern wing of the Democratic Party were planted in the early 1930‘s. As the nation reeled during the Great Depression, Franklin Delano Roosevelt entered the political maelstrom with a liberal agenda bent on saving the nation from the throes of economic failure. Roosevelt‘s New Deal was initially questioned by conservatives in the South and attacked for being —quasi-socialist“ but, as the realities of the depression set in, most Southerners realized Roosevelt‘s plans to expand government would only help the South‘s recovery. Furthermore, southern Democrats soon discovered that they were able to manipulate the system, finding loopholes which allowed them to keep blacks in a subservient role and channel most of the federal aid to whites, especially the larger planters, farmers and factory owners. Conversely, African-Americans welcomed the New Deal but recognized its limitations. They derided several of Roosevelt‘s programs, referring to the National Recovery Administration or N.R.A as —Negroes Ruined Again“. When it became clear that the President was not willing to risk losing the —Solid South“ by pushing for equal treatment for blacks under his programs, a majority of Southerners again threw their support behind Roosevelt in his reelection bid in 1936. They also believed that the terms of the New Deal were not binding and the —big government“ programs and policies

2 R.A. Gray, Secretary of State, Tabulation of the Official Vote, 1948, Pp. 3-5 3 Chicago Tribune, November 3, 1948

53 implemented were temporary and not permanent. Lastly, and most importantly, they knew that the New Deal would not threaten white supremacy. At the first sign of appeasement shown to a more assertive and aggressive African-American population, many Southern whites abandoned their support of the New Deal. While they continued to support Roosevelt in national elections, this was more out of loyalty to the Democratic Party and an ingrown systematic hatred and fear of the —Party of Lincoln“. Although by the 1940‘s, they had become the nation‘s true conservative party. One of the catalysts for Roosevelt‘s concessions to African-Americans was World War II which served as a watershed in American history. The war transformed the nation and nowhere was this change more evident than in Florida. The population boom and development of military bases and industry directly challenged the supremacy of the conservative North Florida Democrats as the state saw an increase in those who the future Pork Choppers viewed as —outsiders“. Ironically, these —aliens“ were largely a combination of liberals from the northeastern United States and Republicans from the Midwest, both of whom presented a challenge to the North Floridians. According to former Alabama congressman Carl Elliott, the World War II Era was a crossroads for the nation and, the South in particular, when it came to civil rights. Elliott asserted that —few of even the most liberal southern politicians took a stand on the issue of race in the first half of this century, because there was no issue on which to stand.“4 As industry boomed, even before the United States entered the Second World War, conservative whites in the South made an effort to stem the rising tide of black activism. An Arkansas man noted that black workers needed training only in —those areas in which he is traditionally accepted: domestic, custodial, and agricultural work.“5 These sentiments were echoed in Florida and other Deep South states as evidenced by Florida employers who lured white workers from Mississippi through incentives such as salary increases rather than succumb to hiring qualified local African-Americans.6

4 Carl Elliott and Michael D‘Orso. The Cost of Courage: The Journey of an American Congressman. (New York: Doubleday, 1992), Pp. 114 5 Calvin C. Smith. War and Wartime Changes: The Transformation of Arkansas, 1940-1945. (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1986), Pp. 77 6 Kari Frederickson. The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), Pp.31

54 Without support from Congress or the majority of white Southerners, African- Americans took it upon themselves to organize their fight for equality. Union organizer, avowed socialist, civil rights leader and Floridian, Asa Philip Randolph, helped to lead a campaign aimed at achieving racial equality in the military and defense industries which he hoped would mushroom to a widespread civil rights movement. Ironically, Randolph had been briefly incarcerated during the Great War under the Espionage Act for protesting African-American involvement in the war. Randolph, along with Bayard Rustin organized a mass protest, called the March on Washington Movement in 1941 in order to hopefully pressure President Roosevelt into recognizing the inequalities faced by African-Americans. Roosevelt pleaded with Randolph to call off the march since he felt dissension would provide propaganda to potential enemies of the United States, especially Nazi Germany and, more importantly as America drifted towards war, the President did not want to face the prospect of a divided population. When Randolph refused, Roosevelt caved in to some of his demands by issuing Executive Order 8802 or the Fair Employment Act which was meant to prohibit discrimination based on race in national defense industries. Nothing was said of integrating the armed forces and to the dismay of many African-Americans, Randolph called off the movement.7 This action by Roosevelt was enough to set off the always volatile South who protested the creation of the Committee on Fair Employment Practice or FEPC which they maintained impeded state‘s rights. They claimed that —Congress has no power under the Constitution to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several states.“8 These arguments which echoed throughout the South were eerily similar to those heard in the late 1850‘s and 1860 as the region drifted towards secession and the nation towards Civil War. Despite the fact that the FEPC was severely limited in its actual power and the scope of activities which fell within its jurisdiction, conservatives in the South felt their power was threatened; they felt white supremacy was threatened. The federal government, as had been the case in the past, did not actively enforce the legislation it passed and close to a year after the FEPC was created, blacks accounted for

7 For more information on A. Philip Randolph and the FEPC see, Daniel S. Davis, Mr. Black Labor, the Story of A. Philip Randolph, (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1972); Herbert Garfinkel, When Negroes March: The March on Washington Movement in the Organizational Politics of the FEPC, (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959) 8 New York Times, February 24, 1948

55 a mere 3% of workers in wartime industry and Washington refused to challenge private contractors in the South who refused to employ African-Americans.9 Southerners immediately framed the FEPC and other measures as direct attacks on the —Southern way of life“ and many employed ignominious and virulent language in an attempt to strike fear in the hearts of the South. The leading Southern opponent of the FEPC, the —Prince of the Peckerwoods“, Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi stated that —every Negro in America who is behind movements of this kind…dream of social equality and inter-marriage between whites and blacks.“10 The not so subtle undertones mirror the language employed by McCarthyists some years later on the national level as well as in the halls of Florida‘s Legislature. If Roosevelt‘s concessions to African-Americans put the South on the defensive, it was his successor‘s ultimate —betrayal“ of his —Confederate roots“ which pushed them towards open revolt. Southerners had originally hailed Harry S. Truman as one of their own and supported his addition to the Democratic ticket in 1944 as a means to not only place an ally within a breath of the White House (which was becoming immensely important due to Roosevelt‘s declining health) but, also to replace Henry Wallace who many in the South considered too liberal. Truman‘s —betrayal“ of the South can be traced to his reaction to the blinding of Isaac Woodard, an African-American World War II veteran, while still in uniform, who, after a verbal altercation with a bus driver, was beaten in jail by a South Carolina police chief. Truman‘s alleged response was recorded by NAACP chief executive Walter White in his autobiography. White claimed Truman was so shocked by the heinous nature of the Woodard incident that he exclaimed, —My God! I had no idea it was as terrible as that! We‘ve got to do something.“11 The —something“ Truman referred to turned out to be the creation of a Committee on Civil Rights, which in 1947, issued a famous report entitled —To Secure These Rights.“12 The report called for an end to the poll tax throughout the South (the poll tax had been eliminated in Florida in 1937), basic minority

9 Frederickson. The Dixiecrat Revolt. Pp. 33 10 Louis Ruchames. Race, Jobs and Politics: The Story of the FEPC. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), Pp. 94 11 Walter White. A Man Called White. The Autobiography of Walter White. (New York: Arno, 1967) Pp. 330 12 Steven F. Lawson. To Secure These Rights: The Report of President Harry S Truman's Committee on Civil Rights. (New York: Bedford / St. Martin‘s, 2004)

56 voting and civil rights as well as an end to segregation. The South was quick to respond and, in most cases, spoke as a unified front, urging the President not to put the full weight of the White House behind the proposals. Jacksonville Reverend A.C. Schuler wrote to Truman warning him that —if that report is carried out you won‘t be elected dogcatcher.“13 The New Orleans Times-Picayune, asserted that by issuing the report, the committee —proposed to extinguish a smoldering and slowly dying fire by drenching it with gasoline.“14 Much to the chagrin and disgust of conservatives throughout the South, Truman gave a historic address before Congress on February 2, 1948 in which he called for the implementation of the committee‘s outlined plans as well as a permanent FEPC and anti- lynching legislation that the South had been able to defeat through filibustering in the Senate. Rabid segregationist James O. Eastland, senator from Mississippi stated, —this proves that organized mongrel minorities control the government.“15 Mississippi‘s main newspaper, the Clarion-Ledger exclaimed that the initiatives, if enacted by Truman, would constitute a —vicious and unconstitutional program.“16 A Floridian, who signed his letter —An ex-supporter and voter“, told Truman:

If you think you are going to cram niggers down the throats of Southerners, you are badly mistaken…Southern families know how to handle niggers better than any others…but when it comes to making them our social equals…well, that just don‘t go17

Georgia Congressman Gene Cox maintained that the program —sounds like the program of the Communist Party.“18 The linking of civil rights and communism foreshadowed the path the South and Florida, in particular, would take less than a decade later when trying to halt integration under the guise of fulfilling their patriotic duty as part of Senator McCarthy‘s crusade against the —Red Menace“.

13 Monroe Billington. —Civil Rights, President Truman and the South“, The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 58, No. 2, Pp. 131 14 New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 31, 1947 15 Time, February 16, 1948 16 Jackson Clarion-Ledger, February 5, 1948 17 Billington. —Civil Rights, President Truman and the South“, Pp.134 18 Jackson Clarion-Ledger, February 4, 1948

57 Self avowed moderates were drawn into the fray by Truman‘s —actions“ as Virginia Senator Harry Byrd declared that Truman had fired a —devastating broadside at the dignity of Southern traditions and institutions“ while Robert H. Stephens of Palatka wrote the president claiming, —I am for Civil Rights, but not at this time.“19 Others took a different route and called for aggressive action and more than mere words from the South. Kissimmee native J. W. Cantrell wrote to South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond urging him to lead the South in a revolt against Truman and the national Democratic Party.20 He implored the governor to call a —Dixie“ presidential convention with the specific goal of not abandoning the values of the South. He also called for a referendum to produce a viable candidate for President who would not, in Cantrell‘s words, —sell us out to the NAACP.“21 A cadre of Southern governors, Millard Caldwell of Florida included, backed a statement issued by the South which told the nation that the region was —determined to restore the Democratic Party to the principles of Jefferson and Jackson and will resort to whatever means are necessary to accomplish this end.“22 While the South was largely united in defiance of Truman‘s program, conservative Floridians knew work had to be done if the state would support a full fledged revolt against Truman and the party they had supported for close to one hundred years. Throughout the South, the most extreme voices came from politicians and citizens in what constituted the —black belt“. Almost every state in the Deep South had a region where during the antebellum period, slaves outnumbered whites in astounding numbers and where in 1948, the African-American population was still high and concentrated. In Florida this was the Panhandle, especially the counties which surrounded Tallahassee. This was also the region of the state dominated by the conservative Democrats, who thanks to the 1885 Constitution, still controlled the state legislature. Kari Frederickson referred to these conservatives as —Black Belt Coalitions“ and it was her assertion that in order for the —revolt“ to be successful, these Democrats would need to not only dominate the state parties but, also, convince their electorates. In states such as Mississippi this

19 Washington Post, March 8, 1948; Billington. —Civil Rights, President Truman and the South“, Pp. 136 20 —J. W. Cantrell to Strom Thurmond“, February 4, 1948, J. Strom Thurmond Papers, folder 3191, campaign series, gubernatorial papers, Special Collections, Clemson University Libraries, Clemson, South Carolina (cited hereafter as Thurmond Papers). 21 Ibid 22 New York Times, May 9, 1948

58 was a feasible goal as the Delta Planters, the Mississippi version of the Pork Chop Gang, rallied behind their governor, Fielding Wright who took the lead in the attacks on Truman in the winter of 1948.23 In Florida, this would prove a more difficult task. It soon became evident that while many Floridians disagreed with Truman‘s stance on civil rights, they were not radical enough to follow Mississippi and other Deep South states out of the Democratic Party. Floridians, along with their neighbors in the Deep South not only faced a president whom they believed was bent on tearing down the last vestiges of their way of life but, also, a new militant African-American society not content with its position in Southern society. A split from the national Democratic Party served the best interests of the conservatives in Florida as well as throughout the South because, in their minds Washington, D.C. had once again infringed upon state‘s rights and struck a vital blow at their cherished way of life when the Supreme Court handed down its 1944 ruling in Smith v. Allwright. This landmark decision, which allowed an African-American in Texas to vote in the previously all-white Democratic Primary, was viewed as a cause for concern. The winner of the Democratic Primary was basically assured of victory in the general election and this challenge to white supremacy threatened the stability of conservative political dominance. Coupled with the inroads made in civil rights activism in Washington and at home, Florida‘s conservatives looked to unify the state behind their goals. Even Florida‘s liberal and progressive senator, Claude Pepper, when asked to choose between white supremacy and supporting civil rights and the Supreme Court‘s decision, stood steadfastly by his Southern white brethren. Conservatives and Southern —liberals“ alike were soon placed on the defensive with the emergence of Harry T. Moore, a teacher and insurance salesman turned civil rights activist and NAACP Chapter President from Brevard County in Central Florida, who sought to challenge the notion that African-Americans were not afforded the right to vote which they had been granted in 1869 under the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Moore‘s activism began in the 1930‘s, when as head of the Brevard County branch of the NAACP he drew national attention with his efforts to equalize the pay inequities between black and white teachers in the state. His work led to African-

23 Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt Pp. 68-70.

59 American educators closing the gap to the point that, by 1950, they made 86% of white teachers‘ salaries, a sharp increase from the previous decades.24 Moore‘s leadership within his county chapter of the NAACP catapulted him into the role of president of the state‘s first unified NAACP Conference in 1941.25 Moore‘s ascendancy in the NAACP and the reorganization and expansion of the state NAACP coincided with a post-World War II spike in Ku Klux Klan membership in the Sunshine State. In spite of the fact that conservative politicians publicly distanced themselves from the Klan, they now had other means with which to combat the rising tide of dissent in Florida. James Colescott had helped to keep the KKK alive in Miami during the war at a time when it was viewed as an unpatriotic organization and he was confident that it would prosper in the postwar period.26 As early as October, 1945, the fruits of his labor were being reaped as no less than five crosses burned on the lawns of black families in Miami, an act coinciding with the —rebirth“ of the national Klan atop Stone Mountain outside of Atlanta.27 Moore, having worked to raise the salaries of Florida‘s black teachers turned his focus to African-American voter registration after the Supreme Court handed down its historic decision in Smith v. Allwright. Moore and the NAACP met in Lake Wales in Central Florida to discuss how to implement the court‘s ruling in Florida. They organized the Progressive Voters‘ League (PVL) and launched a statewide drive aimed at registering black voters. Moore outlined plans and goals of the PVL while also stressing the importance of the black vote in the primaries. He penned an open letter to Florida‘s black population, aptly titled —Open Letter to Florida Negro Citizens“ in which the NAACP leader implored African-Americans not to be —misled…The Democratic primary is THE ELECTION IN FLORIDA.“28 In the eyes of white conservatives, he went too far when he specifically blamed county and state politicians as well as local police

24 Robert A. Margo. Race and Schooling in the South: An Economic History. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) Pp. 54 25 The Crisis, Vol. 59, February 1952, Pp. 75; For more information on Harry T. Moore and the NAACP in Florida see, Caroline Emmons, —Flame of Resistance, the NAACP in Florida, 1910-1960“, (Unpublished MA Thesis, Florida State University, 1998) 26 Stetson Kennedy. Southern Exposure. (New York: Doubleday, 1946) Pp. 211-212 27 Newton. Invisible Empire. Pp. 107 28 Harry T. Moore. —An Open Letter to Florida Negro Citizens“. January 10, 1948, Papers of the NAACP, group 2, box 35, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. (cited hereafter as NAACP Papers)

60 departments for their complicity in violence aimed at African-Americans, especially the impeding of black voter registration.29 Moore and the NAACP were met with immediate and stiff resistance from conservatives such as Brevard County registrar W. J. Bailey who exclaimed, —before I register any niggers as Democrats, I will get out of politics altogether.“30 Progress was slow at first, especially in counties Panhandle dominated by rural conservatives deeply entrenched in the ideology of the nineteenth century. A year after the forming of the PVL, eight counties in rural North Florida had failed to register a single African- American voter and two would not register their first until 1960.31 The PVL did register 20,000 voters in 1944 alone but this still accounted for a mere 5.5% of those eligible to vote.32 By 1946 this number had risen to 48,000 of which more than 30,000 voted in the 1946 Democratic primaries.33 Four years later over 116,000 African-Americans or 31.7% of the voting age population were registered to vote.34 Moore‘s efforts surpassed other NAACP chapters in the Deep South and by 1950 Florida had 50% more African- American voters than its sister states in the region.35 As a true statement of irony Moore was barred from registering to vote by Brevard County officials.36 As Moore, the PVL and NAACP organized, white resistance stiffened. Lynchings, cross burnings and white protest rose throughout Florida causing Moore to appeal directly to Governor Caldwell for action. One of his aides was quoted as saying —lynching of Negroes is really beginning to give the governor a headache“ but, despite the statement, Caldwell responded meekly, never fully throwing the weight of the Governor‘s Mansion behind civil rights.37 Caldwell was more interested in preserving law and order and he soon ordered an FBI investigation of Moore and other PVL members and NAACP activists which ultimately cost Moore and his wife their teaching

29 —Harry T. Moore to PVL members“, November 15, 1945, NAACP Papers, part 4, roll 6, Pp. 992-993 30 Newton. Invisible Empire. Pp. 108 31 Ibid 32 Miami Herald, October 8, 1989 33 Ben Green. Before His Time: The Untold Story of Harry T. Moore, America‘s First Civil Rights Martyr. (New York: Free Press, 1999), Pp. 37 34 H.D. Price. The Negro and Southern Politics: A Chapter of Florida History. (New York: New York University Press, 1957). Pp. 53 35 Ibid, Pp. 45 36 Moore to M.W. Perry, January 21, 1947, NAACP Papers, part 4, roll 6, Pp. 925-926 37 Green. Before His Time. Pp. 70

61 positions in March 1951.38 The prompt and coordinated counterattack launched by the conservatives was effective in slowing down the progress made by Moore, the PVL and NAACP. The latter organization actually saw a drastic decrease in membership from 1948-1950 of over 6,500 members which mirrored a decline throughout the South as the Klan and other groups sought retribution.39 In 1947, conservatives also attacked the efforts and strides made by the PVL when state Senator John Mathews of Jacksonville sponsored legislation which would have made the Democratic Primary a —private club“, allowing conservatives to sidestep the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Smith v. Allwright and exclude African-Americans from participation.40 While this proposal fell by the wayside and was defeated, violence and resistance to African-American advancement rose and Governor Caldwell reentered the fray by charging the state‘s sheriffs with the task of eliminating —idleness“ an undertaking squarely aimed at the state‘s black population.41 On Christmas Day, 1951, Harry T. Moore became the first modern day African- American civil rights leader to be assassinated when a bomb exploded under his home in Mims. Moore‘s wife, Harriette, was also killed in the explosion.42 Earlier in the day a well attended KKK barbecue had taken place in nearby Lake Jessup, a mere fifteen miles from Moore‘s Central Florida residence.43 The case was ultimately closed by the FBI in 1992 despite credible evidence suggesting Klan involvement only to be reopened in December, 2005 by Florida Attorney General and future Governor Charlie Crist. In August, 2006 Crist announced his findings which centered on four former Klansmen who were indicated as being responsible for the crime. Moore‘s assassination turned the local civil rights leader into a national martyr but his accomplishments and efforts to improve African-American life in Florida only provided the conservatives with a stronger resolve to rally their base and solidify their control over the state‘s political mechanisms. The conservatives were clearly on the defensive in the 1940‘s and were striking back in every way imaginable.

38 Ibid, Pp. 61 39 —Lucille Black to Daniel E. Byrd“, November 21, 1950, NAACP Papers, group 2, box 35 40 Green. Before His Time. Pp. 71 41 Ibid, Pp. 51 42 Newton. Invisible Empire. Pp. 130 43 Green. Before His Time. Pp. 8

62 Florida did take center stage in what was now becoming a concerted movement in the South against President Truman as Wakulla Springs a small town south of Tallahassee, hosted the 1948 annual Southern Governor‘s Convention. Feeling the need to unite the region, Fielding Wright looked for the conference to serve as a forum to rally support to block Truman‘s civil rights program by denying him the nomination in 1948. The added threat of African-American voters increased the urgency in Wright‘s mind. At Wakulla, Wright proposed that the Southern wing of the party, which he labeled —true Democrats“ meet at a later date to discuss the possibility of creating a new party independent of Washington which would serve regional interests.44 According to Wright, unless the South acted and did so as a homogeneous body, Harry T. Moore‘s endeavors would have the backing of the Presidency, possibly leaving the conservatives without power in a region they had dominated for more than a century. They looked for support from three different groups or classes in the South. The first were those who still, after more than eighty years, advocated the —Lost Cause of the Confederacy“ and according to the New York Times, had an inferiority complex. Secondly were those who were strict adherents to the doctrine of state‘s rights and did not feel the South needed anyone, especially the —dreaded Yankee“ meddling in their internal affairs. Lastly Wright and Thurmond hoped to gain allies and support from Southerners who merely wanted to maintain the status quo, which meant preserving white supremacy.45 Not all the governors were ready to abandon the only political party they had ever known and Florida‘s Millard Caldwell led the —moderates“ who stood united against civil rights and in favor of white supremacy but, were not ready for what they believed to be drastic and desperate measures. Caldwell felt that any dissension would result in the election of a Republican president in November.46 Caldwell was joined by the Governor of Tennessee, James N. McCord in opposition to Wright‘s proposal. The rupture was bridged by Strom Thurmond who advocated a —cooling off“ period of sixty days before any further action would be considered. In the meantime, the governors made it clear that they believed that Truman needed to halt what they called —attacks“ on white

44 Jackson Clarion-Ledger, February 6, 1948 45 New York Times, February 28, 1948 46 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, February 7, 1948

63 supremacy.47 Thurmond‘s plan was adopted but modified to reduce the period to forty days and the South Carolina chief executive issued a stern warning to the national party that the loss of the South‘s 127 electoral votes would be enough to deny Truman the presidency and possibly assure the election of a Southerner after the election was thrown into the House of Representatives.48 Unfortunately for Thurmond and Wright, the South was in no way united and those who advocated bolting from Truman and the national party could not count on all 127 votes. Mississippi wasted no time and, almost immediately after returning from Florida, Governor Wright presided over a meeting of more than 4,000 state Democrats in Jackson. According to the Clarion-Ledger the city was overrun with —white Mississippians, blood of the Confederacy and of true Jeffersonian Democracy“ who met to resist Truman‘s —anti-Southern legislation.“49 Ten days later Thurmond and other Southern leaders met with the chairman of the Democratic National Committee and vowed that the —South was no longer in the bag.“50 While Governor Caldwell sat on the fence debating the best options for Florida, some of the state‘s citizens took the initiative and bombarded Thurmond with letters of support. C.H. Pennell wrote to Thurmond to tell him that he could count on the support of Northern Florida while Frank Upchurch called for a statewide meeting like the one that had taken place in Mississippi to discuss what he felt was Florida‘s inevitable departure from the Democratic Party.51 When the Southerners, now referring to themselves as the —State‘s Rights Democrats“ met in Washington in March, they devised a plan trying to deny Truman the nomination rather than agree to an outright break from the party. They did hint at drastic action by saying they would never accept the nomination of anyone who supported civil rights in what they felt was a violation of state‘s rights and sovereignty.52 Caldwell decided against attending the meeting since he was still concerned over the ramifications

47 Ibid, February 12, 1948 48 Nadine Cohodas. Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), Pp. 133 49 Jackson Clarion-Ledger, February 13, 1948 50 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, February 24, 1948 51 —C.H. Pennell to Strom Thurmond“, February 27, 1948, Thurmond Papers, folder 3191; Tallahassee Daily Democrat, February 24, 1948 52 Cohodas. Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change. Pp. 137

64 in the general election.53 It was also at this time that the movement‘s followers were christened as —Dixiecrats“ by the Charlotte News.54 Following a plan similar to one employed by fire-eating Democrats in 1860, the Dixiecrats agreed to reconvene in Birmingham after the national convention met in Philadelphia if the Democrats nominated Truman.55 Governor Caldwell stayed on the fringes of the Dixiecrat camp but, nonetheless, favored a Florida delegation to the national convention which promised to abide by and support only a platform which did not assault states‘ rights and white supremacy. Aside from that, Caldwell did not advocate bolting from the convention as the Mississippi and Alabama delegations had decided.56 Caldwell did reaffirm his support for the South in a radio address in April where he referred to the national party and Truman‘s supporters as the —Gestapo“.57 Thus, Caldwell echoed the sentiments of the Dixiecrats without ever pledging his support for a splinter party. Prior to the national convention, the Florida Democratic Party held a strategic meeting at which rabid segregationist and Dixiecrat Frank Upchurch was elected chairman of the delegation but Caldwell and other —moderates“ or Democratic —loyalists“ were able to persuade Upchurch to abandon his extremism and promise not to bolt from the party in the City of Brotherly Love.58 As the national convention neared, Floridians looked forward to the Democratic gubernatorial primary which would decide the state‘s next chief executive. The three main candidates were all conservative and Fuller Warren, from rural Blountstown in North Florida, edged out Dan McCarty from Ft. Pierce in South Florida, garnering 51.9% of the vote.59 Despite hailing from the southern portion of the state, McCarty was an avowed conservative, possibly more so than Warren who some billed as a —moderate“ or even —liberal“ despite the fact that he had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan. This was revealed during the campaign but, the candidate professed his present day hatred for the

53 Julian M. Pleasants. —Claude Pepper, Strom Thurmond, and the 1948 Presidential Election in Florida“, Florida Historical Quarterly, vol. 76, issue 4, Pp.446 54 Cohodas. Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change. Pp. 142 55 Pleasants. —Claude Pepper, Strom Thurmond, and the 1948 Presidential Election in Florida“, Pp. 447 56 Ibid, Pp. 448 57 —Millard Caldwell, radio address“, April 6, 1948, Millard Caldwell Papers, box 10, P.K. Younge Library, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. 58 Tampa Tribune, June 8, 1948 59 Colburn and Scher. Florida‘s Gubernatorial Politics in the 20th Century

65 Klan and tried to distance himself from his past participation in the organization by stating that he had joined the Klan —as a favor to a friend…never wore a hood…never took part in any of the Klan‘s branding, beating whippings, torturings or lynchings.“60 However, almost all of Warren‘s —political war chest“ came from known Klansmen. He did openly support the Dixiecrats more enthusiastically than Caldwell but, in the end, not enough to please Thurmond or Wright, despite his previous associations. Warren would not take office until 1949 and it was up to Caldwell to lead Florida through the election of 1948. Caldwell‘s lack of support for a separate southern party irked many conservatives in Northern Florida but other Democrats, such as Claude Pepper, just added to the confusion by trying to —draft“ former General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the party‘s potential nominee. After —Ike“ squelched the movement, Pepper would eventually put his own name forward before withdrawing after receiving barely any support even from the Florida delegation. The delegation, led by Upchurch, was dominated by conservatives many of whom abhorred Pepper. Florida was far from unified and therefore not a reliable ally for South Carolina, Alabama and Mississippi who now had taken the lead in the Dixiecrat movement. At the Democratic convention, the debate over the wording of the platform took center stage with the Southern anti-civil rights motion voted down in favor of a progressive platform issued by Minneapolis Mayor Hubert Humphrey who would win the Democratic nomination for President at the equally controversial 1968 Democratic Convention.61 With the platform vote —settled“, Handy Ellis, chairman of the Alabama delegation proclaimed, —we bid you good-bye“ and led half of his state‘s and the entire Mississippi delegations out of the building. Florida‘s delegation, while staunchly opposed to the platform, remained in their seats.62 The delegation had unanimously voted against Humphrey‘s platform but stayed loyal to their governor and also former governor and now U.S. Senator Spessard Holland who had urged them not to bolt.63 In protest of the platform, the Florida delegation refused to support Truman and pooled its votes together with other disgruntled Southerners who had remained at the convention

60 Newton. Invisible Empire. Pp. 117 61 Cohodas. Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change. Pp. 164 62 New York Times, July 15, 1948 63 Ibid

66 and pledged their support for Georgia Senator Richard Russell64. Truman was nominated by a landslide vote of 947 ² - 263.65 Of the twenty members of the Florida delegation, seven, including Upchurch, attended the states‘ rights convention in Birmingham two days later.66 Governor Caldwell and Senator Pepper did not attend and the St. Petersburg Times reluctantly endorsed Truman.67 Florida‘s other Senator, Spessard Holland also refused to endorse the Dixiecrats despite his firm opposition to Truman.68 On July 17 in Birmingham the Dixiecrats named Strom Thurmond as their presidential candidate with fiery Mississippian Fielding Wright as his running mate.69 They knew they would have a tough road ahead of them, especially in Florida where in spite of the fact that many disagreed with Truman‘s civil rights policies, they did not agree with the main principles of the Dixiecrat movement, which would mean a split with the Democratic Party. In an attempt to clarify their position but, more importantly unify the South, Thurmond and Wright reiterated their claim that they were the true Democratic Party. In an article in Time Magazine, Wright hammered home his point by exclaiming —this is not a bolt. This is not a fourth party. I say to you that we are the true Democrats of the Southland and these United States.“70 Strom Thurmond and Fielding Wright officially became candidates for the State‘s Rights Democratic Party on August 11 in front of close to 10,000 supporters who filled the coliseum in Houston with rebel yells, Confederate battle flags, and portraits of Thurmond and Wright alongside Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson.71 Delegations from the eleven former Confederate states plus Oklahoma and Kentucky were present but support of key politicians from these a majority of these states was severely lacking. Florida‘s biggest Dixiecrats were Upchurch, who ultimately served on the party‘s executive committee along with Charles Sheppard and state Attorney General J. Tom Watson who had run against Fuller Warren in the 1948 primary.72 Watson later left

64 St. Petersburg Times, July 15, 1948 65 Cohodas. Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change. Pp. 169 66 Miami Herald, July 15, 1948 67 St. Petersburg Times, July 16, 1948 68 Ibid, July 18, 1948 69 New York Times, July 18, 1948 70 Time, LII, July 26, 1948, Pp. 16 71 Houston Post, August 12, 1948 72 Pleasants. —Claude Pepper, Strom Thurmond, and the 1948 Presidential Election in Florida“, Pp. 457

67 joining the Republicans and ran for Governor of Florida in 1954. Upchurch immediately went on the offensive in Florida maintaining that Truman could not win the state‘s electoral votes. He maintained that Floridians would never surrender to Truman and his allies made up of —Northern Communists and radicals, and left-wingers“. He made further references to Washington as a —Gestapo“ police state run by the NAACP.73 He protested the President‘s actions claiming he deliberately brought the race issue into the picture to —create hatred“ and that Thurmond and Wright were the only individuals who could and would safeguard the South‘s traditions.74 The next step for the Dixiecrats was to get their candidates on the ballot in Florida which would prove to be a tough task after they were denied outright in attempts to be included in Maryland and Missouri75. Upchurch led the charge and demanded a change in Florida‘s election laws so that Floridians would be afforded the opportunity to vote for the Dixiecrat candidates in November.76 The Dixiecrats received a boost when four of Florida‘s Electoral College voters pledged to vote for Thurmond in defiance of the electorate in Florida.77 This was met with swift resistance from more liberal South Florida as the publisher of the Miami Herald filed a suit in court against the four electors whom he maintained planned on abusing their power and breaching the trust of the entire state by casting their votes for Thurmond even if Truman carried the state.78 The suit was struck down by a circuit judge who stated the electors were not bound to vote for any specific candidate.79 This ruling solved one problem but, the Dixiecrats still desperately strove to get their candidates officially on the ballot and keep up their pressure on Tallahassee. After a committee, which was established for the express purpose of determining which candidates would be listed on the ballot, failed to come to a consensus and merely offered a recommendation, Governor Caldwell called a special session of the state legislature to decide the issue.80 Throwing the decision into the hands of the legislature was a victory for the Dixiecrats since conservative North Floridians still

73 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, August 6, 1948 74 Ibid, August 12, 1948 75 Frederickson. The Dixiecrat Revolt. Pp. 152 76 Gainesville Sun, September 5, 1948 77 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, September 8, 1948 78 Ibid, September 7, 1948 79 New York Times, September 8, 1948 80 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, September 10, 1948

68 dominated the body in Tallahassee. The vote in the legislature, as expected, put Thurmond on the ballot. The House passed the measure 72-14 and the Senate 33-1. In an effort to stave off criticism and future potential legal battles, they also added Progressive Party candidate and former Vice President, Henry Wallace‘s name despite the fact that Frank Upchurch and other conservatives maintained he was a pawn of the Soviet Union and a front for the American Communist Party.81 The decision turned out to be a pyrrhic victory for the Dixiecrats. Now that all four candidates were on the ballot, the electoral votes could no longer be split and whoever carried Florida in November would receive eight electoral votes in their column. In mid-October, a poll conducted throughout the Sunshine State, gave the Dixiecrats a ray of hope as Thurmond received a little over 30%.82 As the state‘s top political leaders took sides, Governor Caldwell tried to stay above the fray. He agreed with the Dixiecrat platform and abhorred Truman‘s stance on civil rights but, in the end, he pledged to vote for Truman. He vowed to never actively campaign for the incumbent but, nonetheless, his decision was a crushing blow to Thurmond‘s chances in the state. As it turned out Caldwell did reluctantly campaign for Truman in a roundabout fashion by attacking the Republicans instead of heaping praise on Truman. Fuller Warren, the Democratic gubernatorial nominee and thus a virtual lock to win the general election, could not endorse Truman and ignored the Presidential race completely during his campaign.83 Thurmond‘s campaign in Florida picked up steam when J.L. Lee, former member of the state‘s Democratic Executive Committee, endorsed him along with the Gainesville Sun who charged the national party with trampling on the rights of the South.84 Thurmond, who had previously doubted his chances in Florida, soon arrived to actively campaign in the Sunshine State. His stops came mostly in North and Central Florida including a stop in Wildwood, located between Orlando and Gainesville, where he blasted the president‘s civil rights program.85 Thurmond‘s virulent tone was an attempt

81 Ibid, September 16, 1948 82 Gainesville Sun, October 19, 1948 83 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, September 21, 1948 84 —J.L. Lee to James Peters“, September 23, 1948, Thurmond Papers, civil rights file; Gainesville Sun, September 26, 1948 85 Gainesville Sun, September 6, 1948

69 to scare Florida‘s voters into his camp. He returned to Florida a month after his speech in Wildwood, attending rallies and delivering speeches in Gainesville and Jacksonville before heading into —enemy“ territory in South Florida.86 His stops in Palm Beach and Miami, two areas which had been virtually created by the boom of the 1920‘s and were filled with immigrants from the northeastern United States, were not as successful as his rallies in North Florida. A speech in Miami was attended by a meager 500 supporters while Truman‘s visit to Miami drew an estimated 250,000 spectators, one of whom was Governor Caldwell.87 Thurmond‘s tone during the campaign stops in Florida was strong but subdued. He left the vehement attacks to Wright who in Marianna, labeled Truman and Wallace as pawns of the Communist Party.88 The weeks leading up the election saw Thurmond and the Dixiecrats losing all hope of a victory in Florida and most newspapers in the state actually predicted a Dewey triumph despite an end of October poll which showed Truman in the lead. The night before the election the Klan paraded through Central Florida in an attempt to swing the voters back to the conservative camp but to no avail.89 Truman won 281,988 votes in Florida, easily defeating Dewey (194,780) and Thurmond (89,750). The state‘s eight electoral votes were safe in Truman‘s camp as the Dixiecrat revolt was thoroughly crushed in the Sunshine State. Thurmond carried only three counties in Florida; Alachua, St. Johns and Flagler. None in the —Black Belt“ although Alachua shared many characteristics with the Panhandle, save for the University of Florida.90 Thurmond did receive more than 20% of the vote in 36 counties in Florida, mostly in the north and mostly dominated by the same conservatives who controlled the legislature. In the counties where the South Carolina Governor tallied more than 30% of the vote, the black populations were the highest in the state.91 Despite not carrying the state, Florida‘s Dixiecrats, the descendants of the Bourbons and forerunners of the Pork Choppers learned invaluable lessons which they carried with them into the 1950‘s. Fear was a

86 Ibid, October 17, 1948 87 Miami Herald, October 19, 1948 88 New York Times, October 14, 1948 89 Miami Herald, November 2, 1948 90 R.A. Gray, Secretary of State, Tabulation of the Official Vote, 1948, Pp. 3-5 91 Pleasants. —Claude Pepper, Strom Thurmond, and the 1948 Presidential Election in Florida“, Pp. 471

70 tactic which could potentially influence voting patterns and help the conservatives stave off future attacks from the more liberal elements of society. The Dixiecrats failed in the Sunshine State because they could not hide behind the 1885 Constitution to impose their will and values on a majority of Florida voters. However, an in-depth analysis of their campaign validates the fears they held regarding the retention of power in the future in the face of an ever-changing state. It also provides an explanation for why they hardened their methods in the 1950‘s in order to preserve their precarious chokehold on the state. Dewey‘s showing in the election was cause for concern for the conservatives, especially those who supported Thurmond. A growing Republican base, made up mostly of émigrés from the Midwest, added to the already large and continually growing and significantly more —left leaning“ South Florida posed a grave threat to North Florida. Battles such as legislative fights over reapportionment loomed in the future and the demand for change would only continue to escalate as the Republicans and liberal Democrats grew in size and support in South and Central Florida. The conservatives knew they had to pick and choose their battles carefully and despite a setback at the polls in 1948, they soon set their sights on an easier target, Florida‘s liberal Senator, Claude Pepper. The election of 1948 served as a wakeup call for the conservatives and they quickly rallied to defend their values and beliefs by assaulting their new enemy. They needed to redeem themselves for their failures in 1948 and Claude Pepper proved the perfect antidote for their ailments. Claude Pepper was a controversial political figure from the outset of his first term in the Senate. Pepper had first angered many Floridians by supporting a ban of the poll tax in 1937. This measure which was created during Reconstruction, effectively enabled the state to bar African-Americans from voting, maintaining white supremacy. His enemies claimed he was attacking state‘s rights by his position on this issue.92 Pepper was quick to defend himself when charges were levied against him, bringing into question his allegiance to the South. Pepper maintained he was a Southerner at heart, Alabama born and bred, who was —passionately fond of our old south and zealous to

92 Ric Kabat. —From New Deal to Red Scare: The Political Odyssey of Senator Claude D. Pepper“. (Unpublished Dissertation, Florida State University, 1995), Pp. 10

71 preserve the best that the great noble past has left us.“93 His allusions to the —Lost Cause“ are obvious but, Pepper‘s view on race differed from others in the South, especially the conservatives who would soon vehemently oppose him. While at Harvard he defended his position against attacks from northern classmates when he declared —I have no hatred of the negro.“94 Later in life his position on race would be used against him but, in reality, Pepper‘s views were, and still are to this day, hazy. He changed his position whenever it fit his political aims and the more he came under fire from the right, the less progressive his views on race became. An example of this can be seen in his time at Harvard when he opposed a Federal anti-lynching bill on the grounds that a decision of this magnitude should be left to the individual states to decide.95 After being elected to the Senate his stance on an anti-lynching bill did not change and he initially participated in filibusters aimed at stopping a vote on the proposed legislation. However, Pepper later backed off this stance and tried unsuccessfully to end the filibuster.96 His zigzag policies and stances on issues would only come back to haunt him later in his political career. The inconsistencies were often ignored but, the fact that Pepper at times seemed to support aspects of civil rights helped rally the opposition to oust him in 1938, 1944 and again in 1950. People quickly forgot speeches and statements in which Pepper‘s words echoed the staunchest segregationist and adherent to the doctrine of white supremacy, such as his remarks in Marianna in 1931 when he claimed, —the Yankee freed the Negroes but God almighty made a white man to be free.“97 A decade later he reassured his white constituents that the —South will allow nothing to impair white supremacy“ and furthered that statement by asserting that he had mentioned —nothing indicating that I believe in social equality because, of course, I do not.“98 Pepper was seen as a loose cannon by the conservative Democrats. They tried and failed to oust him from power in 1944 but, an opportunity arose in 1950 which afforded them the chance to replace the senator in Washington with someone more in tune with their values. The break they were looking for was actually brought on by

93 —Claude Pepper, Harvard Law School Diary“, s404, December 8, 1921, Claude Pepper Papers, Claude Pepper Center, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida (cited hereafter as Pepper Papers). 94 Ibid, March 17, 1922 95 Ibid, May 25, 1922 96 Kabat. —From New Deal to Red Scare“, Pp. 36 97 Pepper, —Speech at Marianna“, November 28, 1931, Pepper Papers, s402, box 3, folder 5, Pepper Papers. 98 Tampa Morning Tribune, April 29, 1944

72 Pepper himself. Not able to defeat the incumbent based on his views on race relations alone, Pepper‘s soft stance towards communism and Soviet Russia following the Second World War effectively alienated him from a majority of Floridians. Pepper‘s problems can be traced back to his split with President Truman in 1945 but, unlike the Dixiecrats, the Senator opposed Truman‘s foreign policy first and foremost. Immediately after being sworn in as President following the death of Pepper‘s protégé, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the new chief executive became the subject of notes jotted down by the Florida Senator in his diary. Pepper was concerned about the new President‘s political leanings and was worried that the last vestiges of New Deal —liberalism“ would be stamped out by the new administration. In his diary he noted, —I wish he were more liberal“, foreshadowing his break with the President soon thereafter.99 The social and political climate following the Second World War was not conducive to the brand of liberalism practiced by Pepper or Henry Wallace for that matter and both men soon saw first hand how their careers could be affected by the new —Red Scare“ that was gripping the country. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill‘s famous speech in early spring 1946 at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri chastising Soviet Premier and former ally, Joseph Stalin with hanging an —Iron Curtain“ over Eastern Europe helped to create a charged atmosphere in which the Cold War dominated political, social and cultural aspects of American and western society. In this regard, anyone could be deemed a potential threat or enemy to society and politicians‘ allegiances were routinely questioned and scrutinized by those claiming to be true patriots. A second wave of the —Red Scare“ appeared throughout the United States in the late 1940‘s and early 1950‘s. In the South, this was used for political gain, to rid the region of liberalism and preserve conservative white power. Florida was to be a battleground for this new conflict as the state had a larger liberal element than its sister Deep South states and conservatives in North Florida were still defending their way of life against unwanted encroachments from South Florida. Jacksonville‘s Florida Times- Union summed up the feelings of the South when it maintained —the stories of the Communists making the infiltration of government circles one of the primary objectives

99 Pepper, Personal Diary 1945, April 13, 1945, box 2, folder 2, Pepper Papers

73 of world revolution are not figments of somebody‘s imagination.“100 These words and the tactics employed by the conservatives served as a precursor to the battles waged in the 1950‘s by Charley Johns, the FLIC and the Pork Chop Gang operating under the cover of McCarthyism. To say that Claude Pepper walked into a buzz saw is an understatement. Conservatives had been targeting Pepper for more than a decade and his stance on the Cold War and President Truman only added fuel to the fire and weapons to their arsenal. The attack on Pepper must also be viewed in the larger battle for survival waged by the conservative Democrats; a war in which they had just suffered a major setback in 1948. As World War II drew to a close in the summer of 1945, Claude Pepper embarked on a tour of Europe which was to include a stop in the Soviet Union. With the cessation of hostilities many in the United States were no longer looking forward to a positive future relationship with the Kremlin. Pepper was not one of these people. In 1943 he had penned an article for an English language periodical published by Russians in which he envisioned a post war peace determined by the continued friendship between the United States and the Soviet Union.101 Once in Moscow Pepper met face to face with Marshal Stalin and commented afterwards:

I have had the honor to meet and talk to Generalissimo Stalin, one of the great men of history and of the world…the people of America and good men and women everywhere owe a great debt to Generalissimo Stalin, to the Red Army and to the people of the Soviet Union for their magnificent part in turning back and destroying the evil Nazis102

Pepper did not return to the United States for four months but an angry state and nation awaited him upon his arrival. His words were not met with the same praise in Florida as they were in the Soviet Union and the Fort Lauderdale News fired the opening salvo by stating, —Claude Pepper believes in Communism. WE DO NOT…he is NOT a part of OUR AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE.“103 The die had clearly been cast and, what

100 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, June 17, 1950 101 James C. Clark, —Claude Pepper and the Seeds of his 1950 defeat, 1944-1948“, Florida Historical Quarterly, vol. 74, issue 1, Pp. 4 102 Pepper, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Information Bulletin, October 2, 1945, Pepper Papers, box 6, folder 9 103 Fort Lauderdale News, September 21, 1945

74 was most disconcerting to Pepper was the fact that this attack was levied by a newspaper in the more progressive region of the state, South Florida. This was not rhetoric from the rural north. The fear of communism transcended boundaries in the late 1940‘s and 1950‘s Florida and Pepper realized this too late to save his Senatorial career. The reaction from the rest of the state was predictable and a friend of Pepper‘s warned one of his aides about the reaction he might expect from North Florida. The letter noted —the Florida crackers are not interested in statesmanship, and they are not interested in Europe or world affairs. They are principally selfish…“104 This sentiment was justified by the Palatka Daily News which stated that Pepper‘s statements and positions were so asinine and out of touch with reality that they effectively free any —Florida Democrat from any obligation to support him henceforth or even to consider him as a party member.“105 The attacks did not deter Pepper who pleaded with President Truman to cut the American nuclear weapons program and charged the United States with being a —guarantor of British Imperialism.“106 Florida‘s other U.S. Senator, Charles O. Andrews (1936-1946) of rural Holmes County in North Florida, did not come to the aid of his colleague. On the contrary, he openly attacked Pepper while maintaining Florida‘s allegiance to the South and reasserting its stance on communism. He reiterated that Pepper did not —represent the feeling and sentiment of the great mass of people of Florida.“107 The Washington Post was one of the first newspapers to use language which subtly alluded to Pepper‘s supposed political leanings by printing an editorial entitled —Red Herring“.108 Other papers soon joined the Post in labeling Pepper as —Red“ or —Pink“ in an effort to brand him as a communist and bring his loyalty into question, as had been done to a large number of other Americans during this time. An editorial in the Saturday Evening Post referred to Pepper as —Pink Pepper“ and Newsweek soon followed with an article labeling the Senator as —Red Pepper“, a nickname he was never able to shake and which followed him to his Senatorial collapse in 1950.109

104 —Moorman M. Parish to James C. Clements“, November 20, 1945, Pepper Papers, box 80a, folder 1 105 Palatka Daily News, September 18, 1946 106 Clark. —Claude Pepper and the Seeds of his 1950 defeat, 1944-1948“, Pp. 8 107 New York Times, April 6, 1946 108 Washington Post, April 18, 1946 109 Saturday Evening Post, August 31, 1946; Newsweek, April 7, 1947

75 The movement to oust Pepper from his Senate seat began soon after the failed Dixiecrat revolt of 1948. With public opinion squarely on their side, the conservatives knew 1950 was a crucial year. Pepper was up for reelection and, in 1949, reports, memos and plans arrived on the desk of Florida‘s other Senator, former Governor Spessard Holland (1946-1971).110 Holland, a staunch conservative, began to weigh his options in looking for a viable candidate to challenge Pepper. One soon emerged in Congressman George Smathers who, ironically, was from South Florida. He began his political career under Pepper‘s patronage yet had a rather close relationship with President Truman. Holland and his allies approved of the candidate since he abandoned Pepper and renounced his liberalism. Ironically, in the now famous 1950 Democratic Primary, the candidate from Miami was conservative and the one from Perry in North Florida was liberal. Robert Sherrill in his 1968 work, Gothic Politics in the Deep South, charged Smathers with standing for the —business industrialist axe, weighted with bigotry and with fanatically misleading patriotism, which was used to hack the Deep South away from the rest of the nation after World War II“. He continued by chastising Smathers for instigating —the public orgy of witch-burning“ which followed in the state in the 1950‘s under Charley Johns.111 According to Sherrill, Smathers was nothing more than the —Deep South‘s golden hatchet man“, drudged up for the sole purpose of defeating —Red Pepper“ and restoring conservatism to Florida‘s other Senate seat.112 Even before announcing his candidacy in January 1950, Smathers came out swinging and he would only turn up the heat in the first months of his campaign. Every speech linked Pepper not only to Communism but, also to civil rights. James G. Horrell, who had filed to run for Pepper‘s seat but dropped out of the race soon after Smathers had entered, maintained that in —rural areas, particularly in West Florida, use of State‘s Rights, Civil Rights, Communism create[d] a winning psychology“ for Smathers.113 Not surprisingly, Smathers noted that it was the duty of all Americans to remain vigilant and

110— William A. McRae to Ralph Davis“, September 7, 1949, box 812, file 76, Spessard Holland Papers, Florida State University Special Collections, Tallahassee, Florida (cited hereafter as Holland Papers). 111 Robert Sherrill. Gothic Politics in the Deep South. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968). Pp. 147 112 Ibid, Pp. 148 113 —Horrell Report“, George Smathers Papers, box 110, Horrell Report Folder, P.K. Younge Library, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida (cited hereafter as Smathers Papers).

76 fight communism —wherever we find it“, a subtle reminder to Floridians that their senior Senator had supposed ties to the Soviet Union.114 Smathers positioned himself as an —all-state“ candidate, trying to lure support from North Floridians who, despite his conservatism, were leery of his background as a South Floridian born in New Jersey. Smathers began his campaign in Orlando and ran it out of Jacksonville.115 The opening of his campaign in Orlando was a spectacle that mirrored the Dixiecrat conventions held in Birmingham and Houston two years before. Rebel yells resonated through the Orlando Coliseum and spectators draped themselves in Confederate battle flags while clinging to portraits of Robert E. Lee and other Southern icons.116 The —Lost Cause“ was alive and well in Orlando on January 12 and the conservatives rejoiced in having found a new leader. Smathers charged Pepper with being a leader of extremists and radicals and framed his own candidacy as a crusade to save American democracy from the ravenous hordes of Godless communism supported by Pepper.117 After working the crowd into a frenzy Smathers said —you will not find in me an apologist for Stalin“ before declaring that from that day forward, Pepper was —on trial“.118 The Congressman ended his vitriolic attack by insinuating that Pepper had committed treason while warning that the election of 1950 was the last attempt for Florida to preserve its freedom. He evoked images of George Washington and God himself as he hammered away at the two term Senator whom he once counted as a close friend.119 Pepper was hurt by Smathers‘ speech and vowed never to talk to him again to which Smathers dryly retorted, —now Joe Stalin, Henry Wallace, nor Paul Robeson will never speak to me either.“120 Smathers also picked up the unwanted endorsement of the Klan which increased its activities during the election campaign, burning crosses in cities and towns where Pepper spoke as well as on the lawns of potential black voters. Smathers tried to distance himself from the Klan yet was eager to paint himself as the

114 Miami Herald, January 5, 1950 115 Ibid, January 8, 1950 116 Ibid, January 13, 1950 117 Ibid 118 Ibid 119 Ibid 120 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, January 18, 1950

77 defender of white society while linking Pepper to civil rights.121 The attacks and influence of the Klan worked in his favor and by the end of February, Smathers had raced ahead to an eight point lead in the polls.122 Pepper was slow to respond to these assaults on his character and political views and, when he did reply, he often left supporters and potential voters scratching their heads in confusion. In a speech in front of the University of Florida‘s Young Democrats shortly after the election of 1948, Pepper had made the bold statement that he would support President Truman‘s civil rights program even if that spelled defeat for him in 1950.123 Less than two years later, during a fierce campaign, Pepper backtracked on his previous statement, maintaining in a campaign circular that he was opposed to any government action which would infringe upon the rights of the South. Included in this blanket statement were civil rights programs touted in Washington and the North.124 The most controversial and ludicrous attack may or may not have really taken place. Smathers, at campaign speeches in North Florida, was alleged to have asked rural Floridians:

Are you aware that Claude Pepper is known all over Washington as a shameless extrovert. Not only that, but this man is reliably reported to practice nepotism with his sister-in-law and he has a sister who was once a thespian in wicked New York. Worst of all, it is an established fact that Mr. Pepper, before his marriage, habitually practiced celibacy125

Smathers denied having ever uttered those words and maintained his innocence for the rest of his life. He tried to squelch the rumors but it soon became national news. However, the controversy did nothing to slow Smathers‘ well-oiled machine and as the two campaigns slugged it out ahead of the May 2 primary date, various polls showed startling figures. The question seemed to be not who would win but, rather by how much. The Jacksonville Journal showed Smathers ahead by as much as 30% while the Florida Political Survey and Poll found Smathers with a 9% lead in late March and 14%

121 Miami Herald, February 12, 1950 122 Joe Abram, —Florida Political Survey and Poll“, February 23, 1950, box 1, folder 1, Pepper Papers 123 Gainesville Florida Alligator, December 17, 1948 124 —Claude Pepper and the Compulsory FEPC“, Campaign Memorandum, Political Campaign 1950, box 42, folder 3, Pepper Papers. 125Time, April 17, 1950

78 lead a month later126. In a last ditch attempt to turn the tables on Smathers by labeling him as an outsider, Pepper waved a copy of the Congressman‘s birth certificate in the air while stating —for two hundred years I haven‘t had an ancestor who lived north of Virginia“. He went on to ask the crowd who they would trust more on the issue of race relations, a true southerner or someone born in New Jersey.127 Pepper‘s desperation was further seen in the fact that he publicly supported Otto von Habsburg‘s bid to restore his family‘s dynasty to the throne of Austria. The —uncrowned Emperor“ as he was referred to by his supporters was an ultra-conservative politician who vociferously opposed Communism in Central Europe and felt he was the last bastion of hope for Austria against the —Red Menace“.128 In an effort to bolster his image in Florida, Pepper joined a coalition of conservative politicians who threw support behind the son of Austria- Hungary‘s last Kaiser. The results of the primary were not shocking to anyone who had paid close attention to the race. Pepper, the incumbent had been swamped by a relatively unknown Congressman from Miami. Smathers polled 54.7% of the vote, winning in a landslide, despite losing his home county of Dade by 917 votes.129 Even before the official returns were counted, Pepper knew his Senate career had been cut short. He conceded the election after a mere 19% of precincts had reported their results to Secretary of State R.A. Gray in Tallahassee.130 Conservatives accomplished in 1950 what they could not in 1948. At the onset of the decade, they once again dictated the political landscape in Florida and, more importantly, they had an ally in Washington whom they could trust in the upcoming civil rights battles looming on the horizon. Furthermore, Smathers‘ triumph was a victory for conservatism at a time when many in North Florida feared that liberalism was on the rise in the state. As the decade of the 1950‘s began, politically speaking, Florida was still

126 New York Times, March 18, 1950; Miami Herald, March 28, 1950; Abram, —Florida Political Survey and Poll, April 24, 1950, box 1, folder 1, Pepper Papers 127 Miami Herald, April 1, 1950 128 Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Uncrowned Emperor: The Life and Times of Otto von Habsburg (London: Hambledon and London, 2003), Pp. 157 129 R.A. Gray, Secretary of State. —Tabulation of the Official Vote, Florida Democratic Primary Election, 1950“, Pp. 3 130 Miami Herald, May 3, 1950

79 firmly entrenched in the conservative camp but, new challenges would soon arise that would shake the foundation of conservatism within the state.

80 A STATE TO BUILD A SOUTH TO SAVE, A NATION TO CONVINCE

Politically, Florida entered the 1950‘s in a nebulous position. The state had flatly rejected the extremism of the Dixiecrats in 1948 but, had also momentarily sidetracked the promising career of its most liberal politician, Claude Pepper two years later. Florida was seen by some northerners as a —bright spot in the South“, the most progressive, urbanized and diversified state, however, it was ruled politically by adherents of the —Lost Cause“, conservative North Florida Democrats who blocked change and progress every step of the way. Heading into the 1950‘s, they saw civil rights as the next threat to their power. The African-American population of Florida was relatively small compared to its Deep South neighbors but, the possibility of having to counter the black vote as well as the growing progressive base in South Florida gravely concerned these conservatives. The black community, making up only 21.8% of the state‘s population in 1950, had seen a rise in activism in the late 1940‘s and early 1950‘s. Many were clamoring for the right to vote in the state‘s Democratic Primary, not only to fulfill their civil rights as Americans but, more importantly in the eyes of the conservatives, to challenge white supremacy.1 Race relations were tenuous in Florida as was the case throughout the South and many conservatives looked to this arena as the major battleground for the decade ahead. Florida‘s political and social diversity differentiated the state from its Deep South neighbors and nowhere was this more evident than in sphere of race relations. The continued influx of northerners to South Florida saw the rise of wider views concerning such ideas as race relations which threatened conservative values and power within the state. These progressives made up one distinct group in Florida which challenged the Old South and —Lost Cause“ mentality of North Florida. The conservatives were stung in the 1950‘s by those whom they had previously considered allies. These —New South“

1 Seventeenth Census of the United States–1950, —Characteristics of the Population, Part 10, Florida (available online at: www.census.gov)

81 North Florida Democrats, led by future Governor LeRoy Collins, defended segregation and white supremacy but, were not willing to defy the federal government in order to protect the Old South. Collins was an advocate of the —New South“, and a self described —racial moderate“. It was this faction which vexed the conservative element the most and which threatened their hegemony since they shared the same constituents in North Florida‘s panhandle and rural counties. A third opposition group to the North Florida conservatives were the South Florida Democrats, who were moderate to liberal on the race issue but, more importantly still resented the malapportioned Senate which favored the rural and sparsely populated north. The —Termites“ left over from the 1945 —civil war“ in the Legislature, saw an ally in LeRoy Collins, a Tallahassean, who aimed to be his own man free of conservative control. During his campaign for governor in 1954, Collins had pledged to lead the fight to amend and if necessary, replace the archaic 1885 Constitution that the conservatives clung to as their saving grace2. The very basis with which the conservatives maintained their power was slipping from under their feet and they looked to rally the state‘s white population behind their banner. Unfortunately for the conservatives, they received systematic rebuffs from the growing opposition at the national, state and local levels from the growing opposition. Despite advances made towards civil rights even those who professed moderation in race relations by no means possessed progressive outlooks towards racism, civil rights or African-Americans in general. Malcolm Johnson, longtime editor of the Tallahassee Democrat, used his weekly Sunday editorial to preach his views to his readers. Johnson considered himself to be rather progressive in regards to race and a moderate on the issue of civil rights. Writing in 1956, his words illustrated the obstacles that African- Americans still faced. Johnson, when discussing African-Americans and whites maintained, —we are two races“. Johnson, believing he was mediating, further remarked —we [whites] helped to create this new Negro“, a more militant and socially and politically active African-American who many thought threatened white society. Johnson also asked white readers to treat African-Americans with more respect than they had in the past and recognize that progress in the fields of civil rights was inevitable and

2 —Governor LeRoy Collins: Inaugural Address, January 4, 1955“. Florida Governor‘s Papers, Box 1 (speeches), folder 38, Thomas LeRoy Collins Papers, Florida State University Special Collections, Tallahassee, Florida (cited hereafter as Governor‘s Papers)

82 unavoidable, hinting at his underlying prejudices. Later he cautioned his African- American readers, warning them that any advance made within society brings with it new responsibilities. Johnson‘s patronizing tone aimed at the African-American community implies subtle racism which he misinterpreted and advertised as progressive views on race relations. Johnson chastised the black community for its continued agitation, telling them that

Like the child grown up, he must learn that he can‘t have everything he sees when he sees it and he can‘t get it merely by stamping his feet and making a commotion. As a mature racial personality, he has an obligation to fix his eyes on the greater goals, the food of living, not just the candy3

Johnson concluded his editorial by exclaiming:

The Negro is a minority. This is a democratic republic of sovereign states and local governments, ruled by majority votes. A minority should not and must not have its rights disregarded, but there is some indication that a school of thought has developed on the theme that the desire of a minority has been made paramount to the power of the majority. That can‘t be4

Writing two years later, Johnson remained adamant that the rights of white society, the majority in Florida, should be placed firmly above those of the African- American segment of the population. He wrote —What rights? Whose rights? In avoiding discrimination against one, does it discriminate against another?.“5 Johnson and Collins were both —moderates“ on the race issue, harbored inherent racist tendencies and viewpoints but, Collins especially frustrated the conservatives by calling for calm rational and realistic responses from both sides of the equation, the African-Americans and whites in Florida. As the NAACP and other civil rights groups pushed for equality on the national level, South Florida‘s large and constantly growing Jewish population, most of which had recently migrated south from New York and Massachusetts, helped Miami‘s black population fight for equality and justice. These Jews, as Raymond Mohl contended in his

3 Tallahassee Democrat, August 16, 1956 4 Ibid 5 Ibid, December 21, 1958

83 2004 work South of the South: Jewish Activists and the Civil Rights Movement in Miami, 1945-1960, for the most part —brought with them important elements of their communal and religious culture…a culture that valued human dignity and supported social justice, a culture that found segregation and racial discrimination deeply troubling.“6 Jews found themselves in a precarious position in a Florida split between two distinct regions and two social and political mindsets rooted in different centuries. Mohl maintained that —many Southern Jews believed that supporting racial integration would disturb Jewish-Gentile relations…and stimulate anti-Semitism“7. There is truth to that statement as the account of Samuel Fleishman illustrates and, while Jews did participate in the movement in a larger proportion than their Southern white, Protestant neighbors, it is a mistaken belief to label all of Florida‘s Jews as civil rights activists. In spite of this fact, the Klan along with conservatives and segregationists conveniently placed them in that category which was an easy task since Jews were often viewed as already being on the margin of Southern society. Miami remained a strictly segregated city both for African-Americans and for Jews well into the 1950‘s and 1960‘s. While the more than 50,000 African-Americans living in Dade County in the 1940‘s bore the brunt of this repression by being confined to a fifty block area referred to as —Colored Town“, Jews were not free from discrimination as they were routinely banned from various gentile establishments such as hotels and country clubs.8 After the Second World War several Jewish activists in Miami began to speak out against the injustices suffered by the city‘s African-American population, especially Miami‘s racial zoning policy.9 This bold action resulted in a backlash against the Jewish community as a whole and matters were only worsened in the early 1950‘s when several Jewish owned hotels on Miami Beach were integrated. Although many Jewish owned hotels in the city remained segregated, the Klan‘s national newspaper, The Fiery Cross, called for a boycott of all Jewish owned hotels and businesses in Dade County and also

6 Raymond Mohl, South of the South: Jewish Activists and the Civil Rights Movement in Miami, 1945- 1960 (Gainesville: University Presses Florida, 2004). Pp. 3 7 Ibid, Pp. 33 8 Miami, Herald, January 16, 1951 9 Ibid, June 9, 1947

84 published a list of gentile-owned hotels that catered to neither Jews nor African- Americans.10 Further links between anti-Semitism and Jewish involvement or perceived involvement in the Civil Rights movement can be seen in the violent incidents which occurred simultaneously in both the black and Jewish communities in the 1950‘s. In late 1951, dynamite blasts shook Carver Village in Miami‘s Liberty City, a predominantly African-American inner-city community, in addition to several Dade County synagogues and Hebrew schools.11 Graffiti found at the Hebrew schools echoed the connection as it praised both Adolf Hitler and the Ku Klux Klan, making derogatory comments aimed at both African-Americans and Jews and the link between the two groups which comprised close to a combined 30% of Miami‘s population.12 In May 1958, more bombings rocked the Jewish community as Miami‘s Temple Beth-El was ravaged by explosives. While no arrests were ever made, a rabbi received an anonymous call claiming that his synagogue would also be targeted, along with his congregants and any other Jew unless he ceased participation in the Civil Rights movement by omitting any references to integration in future sermons.13 Local Klan leaders in Florida proclaimed that Jews and African- Americans were both agents of the —left“ whose mission was bent on destroying morality and Southern society through a systematic campaign with the ultimate goal of imposing a fully integrated society on the South.14 These challenges and new challengers to white supremacy and conservative power alarmed the North Floridians but, events in Washington, D.C. would soon throw their world into utter chaos. Like their neighbors in the South, Florida‘s conservative Democrats lived behind the veil of Jim Crow society. Their values and way of life had been legally protected and codified by the United States Supreme Court‘s 1896 landmark ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson. This case paved the way for legal white supremacy and the relegation of African-Americans to a second class citizenship. In 1899 the Supreme Court had

10 Ibid, May 3, 1949 11 Miami Times, December 1, 1951 12 Mohl. South of the South. Pp. 25 13 —Report on the Miami and Jacksonville Bombings“, May 3, 1958, box 1, file 20, Papers of the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida (cited hereafter as FLIC Papers) 14 Edward S Shapiro. —Anti-Semitism, Mississippi Style“. In Anti-Semitism in American History, ed. David E. Gerber. (Champagne-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986) Pp. 132

85 specifically ruled on education in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, sanctioning de jure segregation of races in American schools. The NAACP had fought Plessy and Cumming with limited success in the first half of the twentieth century and although cases had been won, it was not until the 1940‘s when African-Americans began to see the conceivable light at the end of the tunnel. Florida was representative of the rest of the South in the inequities of African- American education. By keeping the black community at such a disadvantage, conservatives were able to eliminate one element of possible resistance and opposition to their power. At the beginning of the 1940‘s Florida spent $62.78 on each white student but a mere $27.63 on African-American students.15 The inequities were blatantly obvious. African-American teachers were also subjected to discrimination in pay as white teachers received more than double the yearly salary of African-Americans working the same capacity in 1940.16 Those figures say nothing of the unequal facilities provided for African-Americans as well as the fact that the school year was longer for white students in the 1940‘s. In response to growing activism on the part of the NAACP and a push for equality in education, many Southern states, Florida included, looked for new avenues to preserve the status quo. One such plan called for the improvement of public education for both races in the state. An increase in spending on education, especially in regards to African-Americans, the conservatives hoped would buy them time. If they could produce even the allusion that Florida‘s dual school system was in fact —equal“ as well as —separate“, they would possibly be left alone by Washington, D.C. Thomas Wagy, in his study on LeRoy Collins‘ political career lauded the future governor, who in 1947 as a member of the state Legislature, was the driving force behind the Minimum Foundation Bill. Wagy claimed that the bill was aimed at modernizing the state‘s education system.17 While this was true, the fact remains that many looked at the program as a way to preserve segregation by creating truly equal schools. Joseph A. Tomberlin, writing in the 1950‘s, noted that Florida was not alone in the region in

15 Harry S. Ashmore, editor. The Negro and the Schools. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954) Pp. 153-156 16 Jesse P. Guzman, editor. Negro Yearbook: A Review of Events Affecting Negro Life, 1941-1946. (Tuskegee: Tuskegee Press, 1947), Pp. 59 17 ThomasWagy, LeRoy Collins: Spokesman of the New South. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985)

86 launching programs aimed at equalizing facilities and educational opportunities for both races. Tomberlin, unlike Wagy, did not believe the initiative was undertaken with the welfare of the state‘s students in mind but, rather, that the goal was to keep the races separate and placated. The 1885 Constitution, which had provided legal sanctioning for conservative control of the state, had provisions set in place that called for the segregation of the races. Article XII, Section 12 maintained simply stated that, —white and colored children shall not be taught in the same school, but impartial provision shall be made for both.“18 The document had dealt with other aspects of segregation and separation of the races and further codified the distinctions by implementing an anti- miscegenation clause; —all marriages between a white person and a negro, or between a white person and a person of negro descent to the fourth generation, inclusive, are hereby forever prohibited“19. These were the only two instances in the Constitution, where race was mentioned. The words —colored“, —negro“ and —white“ were only mentioned in these two articles but the intention of the document to maintain white supremacy and keep power in the hands of the conservative North Floridians was evident.20 Florida did raise the standard of education in the 1940‘s and early 1950‘s and African-Americans benefited greatly from this program. By 1952 the state was spending comparable money on African-American and white students, although whites still benefited more.21 Other inequities were partially rectified as well but, in the end, the NAACP and other black and white civil rights organizations and activists were not satisfied and, in the first years of the new decade they strove to tear down the Jim Crow wall in education. As was the case throughout most of their early existence, the NAACP looked to the courts to challenge Jim Crow and after combining four separate court cases together in the early 1950‘s, the Supreme Court finally reached a decision on the legal foundation of —separate but equal“ which had dominated Southern society for more than half of a century. On May 17, 1954 the Earl Warren led court unanimously (9-0) overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, maintaining that —in the field of public education, the doctrine of separate but equal has no place“. Warren further asserted that separation of

18 Florida Constitution 1885, Article XII, Sec. 12 19 Ibid, Article XVI, Sec. 24 20 For more information on LeRoy Collins see, Martin A. Dyckman. Floridian of his Century: The Courage of Governor LeRoy Collins. (University Presses of Florida, 2006) 21 Ashmore. The Negro and the Schools. Pp. 153-156

87 the races, as prescribed by the late 19th century Supreme Court and clung to by the Jim Crow South, —solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority…that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.“22 This statement challenged the 1896 court which had determined that segregation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Not only was the Supreme Court‘s ruling a blow to the ideology of the conservatives in Florida and throughout the region, the Warren court directly challenged the 1885 Constitution in the Sunshine State. The dreaded —outsider“ was infringing on Florida‘s moral and social values and, more importantly, the Brown v. Board decision, attacked conservative power, which was synonymous with white supremacy. The black community welcomed the news as a step in the right direction but, was wary and divided in its outlook on how much their situation would actually change. Cal Adams, a black journalist writing for one of the State‘s most liberal and progressive news organs, the St. Petersburg Times, advised his readers to be patient and not overly exuberant until concrete changes were set in place. A call for change had been handed down by Chief Justice Warren but it was hardly a blueprint.23 Ironically enough, Adams‘ employer, the Times, was a segregated newspaper which confined specific news about the African-American community in Tampa Bay to a —colored“ section of the paper. Some African-Americans set aside the fact that the Brown decision was in fact not the sweeping mandate they hoped would immediately squash the last vestiges of Jim Crown in the South and rejoiced in the victory which they knew would eventually dismantle the system that for so long had dictated their second class existence. William A. Fordham, Florida‘s NAACP chapter president‘s outlook was positive and even went as far as to issue a stern warning to the State‘s white citizens. Fordham exclaimed that Florida‘s black population fully expected the State‘s white citizens to abide by the ruling and take the necessary steps to end segregation.24 Reaction from the South‘s white leaders and citizens alike was swift but not unified. Extremists and staunch segregationists such as Georgia Governor Herman Talmadge attacked the Supreme Court and Washington for usurping power from the

22 Washington Post, May 18, 1954 23 St. Petersburg Times, May 20, 1954 24 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 18, 1954

88 individual states. He added a forewarning to the nation by promising that —there will never be mixed schools while I am governor“. Talmadge went further by asserting states‘ rights over the federal government and announcing that the Constitution of the United States was nothing more than a —mere scrap of paper“.25 While a Gallup Poll showed that close to 80% of white Floridians opposed integration, the state‘s politicians were divided on the issue and what course of action to take.26 Many who favored segregation and white supremacy, were not ready to fight a second civil war to preserve the separation of the races. This did not illustrate a reversal of policy and views within the state as Florida‘s Attorney General Richard W. Ervin and the State Superintendent for Public Instruction, Thomas D. Bailey, vowed to delay integration for as long as legally possible. They also reassured Florida‘s disconcerted white population that they would be successful in manipulating the law and even the ambiguous and vague Supreme Court ruling to their favor.27 In this regard, the Court‘s ruling had not decimated their hopes, just as the Brown ruling did not result in the immediate desegregation of public schools, nor did it mandate desegregation of public accommodations, such as restaurants or bathrooms, owned by private entities. The Supreme Court asked attorneys general and other legal counsels from around the nation, especially the South, to file briefs with the court concerning implementation of the May 1954 decision. Florida‘s Attorney General Ervin was adamant that the Court should introduce for consideration local problems in the South and also the attitudes of the population, an allusion to the Gallup Poll which illustrated that a large majority of white Floridians opposed integration. Ervin also warned the justices against setting a specific timetable for implementing the ruling so as to provide Florida and its sister states with ample time to prepare for the monumental change.28 A month after Ervin had appeared before the Supreme Court and almost exactly one year after the initial ruling struck at Jim Crow education, the Court ruled once again in what has become known as Brown II. This second decision was also ambiguous as it called for district courts to take action consistent with the Supreme Court‘s original

25 Atlanta Constitution, May 18, 1954 26 Wagy, LeRoy Collins: Spokesman of the New South, Pp. 61 27 Southern School News, September 3, 1954 28 Ibid, June 8, 1955

89 findings and to implement the changes —with all deliberate speed“.29 This was, in a sense, a partial and minor victory for the South as it did not specify what exactly —deliberate speed“ entailed. For Florida‘s politicians who urged calm and rational response, Brown II, justified and vindicated their thought processes. The Brown decision and subsequent debate as well as further court rulings, came at a crossroads in Florida‘s political history. The year 1954 marked an important election which could determine the route the state would take in the future. In 1952 Dan McCarty of Fort Pierce in South Florida was elected as Florida‘s thirty-first governor. McCarty was a former citrus grower and cattle rancher who began his career as a staunch conservative but, who by 1952 was not an ally of the conservative rural bloc in the Panhandle. Florida looked to be heading down a more moderate road as McCarty succeeded former Klansman Fuller Warren in 1952 but soon after assuming power McCarty suffered a heart attack which took his life eight months later. One of the infamous quirks surrounding the 1885 Constitution came into play upon McCarty‘s debilitation and death as the document did not provide for succession through an office of Lieutenant Governor. Article IV of the 1885 Constitution clearly outlined the succession process:

In case of the impeachment of the Governor, his removal from office, death, resignation or inability to discharge his official duties, the powers and duties of Governor shall devolve upon the President of the Senate for the residue of the term, or until the disability shall cease; and in case of the impeachment, removal from office, death, resignation or inability of the President of the Senate, the power and duties of the office shall devolve upon the Speaker of the House of Representatives. But should there be a general election foe members of the Legislature during such vacancy, an election for Governor to fill the same shall be had at the same time30

This measure was another aimed at preserving the power of the conservative North Florida Democrats as they held a virtual hammerlock and monopoly on the office of President of the Senate, who, as previously outlined, held the real power in the state. The acting Governor, following McCarty‘s death was future ringleader of the Pork Chop Gang and Florida‘s designated Joseph McCarthy, Charley Johns of rural Starke. Johns,

29 Time, June 13, 1955 30 Florida Constitution 1885, Art. IV, Sec. 19

90 who had a nineteen year career in the state Senate both before and after his stint as governor, was a rabid racist, segregationist and adherent to the doctrine of states‘ rights and the myth of the —Lost Cause“. Johns‘ family also constituted most of the original settlers of Bradford County which he represented in the state senate and he was considered a political legacy in Florida. He had family members in the Legislature in the 1880‘s and 1890‘s and his older brother Everett was first elected to the state house in 1921 and became Senate president twelve years later. Everett suffered an untimely death before he could begin his tenure as president and Charley entered the political arena in his brother‘s stead in 1934 and continued to hold a seat in the body until being elected president of the Senate himself in 1953.31 Johns had originally supported McCarty‘s progressive agenda despite inherent differences in their political philosophies. Their working relationship soon soured after McCarty attacked the very platform that Johns and other North Florida conservatives relied on to help maintain their power; senatorial power and patronage. After assuming the governorship, Johns attempted to clean house and replace McCarty‘s appointees with those whom Johns could trust to carry out his agenda and, more importantly, to create an infrastructure for his 1954 campaign. Johns was merely the acting governor and was thus denied the right to finish McCarty‘s four year term. Therefore, a special election was to be held in 1954 to meet this pressing need. When McCarty‘s appointees refused to resign, Johns suspended them creating a backlash throughout the state and unifying a solid opposition to the Starke native as a gubernatorial candidate the following year.32 One such member of the growing opposition was LeRoy Collins, then a member of the state legislature. Collins had worked closely with McCarty during his short time in office and was appalled at Johns‘ actions and arrogance and decided to challenge him in the 1954 election. The Democratic primary, which was set for May 4, was a three way contest with Seminole County‘s Brailey Oldham throwing his hat into the ring as well. Prognosticators looked for Oldham, from Central Florida and, a former state senator, to divide Collins‘ progressive base and swing the election to Johns who was backed by a

31 Klein. —Guarding the Baggage“, Pp. 103-104 32 Tampa Tribune, December 12, 1953

91 unified North Florida. The split awarded Johns a victory but, not the landslide he had hoped for. Although he had achieved the division of votes which afford him a plurality, it did not eliminate the need for a runoff. Johns polled 38% of the vote while Collins finished second with 34% and Oldham brought up the rear at 28%.33 Publicly Johns was confident that he would secure Oldham‘s votes but, this was a daunting task since his —values“ and politics ran counter to those of many of the Oldham voters. A closer analysis of the votes shows some staggering voter turnout numbers in the rural North and Central Florida counties in which Johns desperately needed to win. Baker County had a turnout of 72% with 74% voting for Johns. Dixie County, which gave 60% of its vote to Johns saw over 87% of the county‘s registered voters submit ballots. Other rural counties saw similar patterns which easily eclipsed the statewide averages. South Florida counties such as Dade and Pinellas had turnout recorded at or below 50% and these counties threw their support largely behind Oldham and Collins. Overall only 55.6% of registered Floridians cast their ballots in the election.34 When one takes into account the fact that Florida‘s black population still resided in large numbers in North Florida, the old —black belt“ counties, and add that to the disenfranchisement of African-Americans, these numbers become somewhat suspicious. Compiling statistics for his dissertation on the Pork Chop Gang, Kevin Klein found that several of the North Florida counties had more registered voters in the 1950‘s and 1960‘s than citizens of voting age. In particular, Lafayette County had 1,688 citizens above the legal voting age but the county registrar listed the names of over 1,900 on its voting list. Lafayette County, home to 152 voting age African-Americans did not have single African-American registered to vote until the 1960‘s making these voter turnout numbers virtually impossible. These —Pork Chop“ counties would continue this trend into the 1960‘s as the conservatives desperately clung to their power by employing new, innovative, and ignominious tactics.35 Johns wasted no time in mounting an assault on Collins. One day after the primary, he labeled Collins a —Big Corporation Lawyer…who lives in a $200,000

33 Annie Mary Hartsfield and Elston E. Roady. Florida Votes, 1920-1962: Selected Election Statistics. (Tallahassee: Institute of Governmental Research. Florida State University, 1963), Pp. 63 34 Ibid 35 Klein, —Guarding the Baggage“, Pp. 189

92 colonial mansion“ in an attempt to distinguish himself from the Tallahassee native and portray himself as the man of the people, or at least of North Florida.36 Collins fired back, accusing the acting governor of shady business and political practices, subtly insinuating that Johns‘ administration was corrupt, both morally and literally.37 Collins continued his onslaught reminding voters that as a state legislator Johns had refused to support a measure designed at —unmasking“ the Ku Klux Klan, to which Johns could only mutter a feeble response; —I made a mistake.“38 As the candidates moved towards the second primary, the Supreme Court in Washington moved towards a decision on the Brown case. Johns distanced himself from the segregation issue as much as possible since most Floridians knew his stance and his only chance at victory was to pick up the moderates who had voted for Oldham. Collins, on the other hand, felt he had to reassure North Floridians that he was not another Claude Pepper. Thus, during the campaign, he declared his commitment to maintaining a dual education system in Florida, which was a vote for segregation. In the end, despite those seemingly anti-progressive remarks, Collins‘ support in progressive South Florida proved to be the difference. Collins won 54.8% of the vote but an in-depth analysis of the returns illuminates the deepening divide between North and South Florida. Collins won 58% of his home county of Leon but was trounced in many of the neighboring counties who threw their support behind the Pork Chopper, Johns. Madison County, 30 miles east of Tallahassee awarded Johns 63% of the vote and Wakulla, due south of the capital cast 66% of its votes for Johns.39 Conversely, Collins won 70% of Dade county‘s 101,709 votes and won similar victories in Florida‘s southern region. The election of Collins was a blow to the conservative North Floridians who now would look to other means to preserve their power in the 1950‘s. Collins did not have to prepare much for the general election since a Republican had not been elected in Florida since Reconstruction (There were only 136,376 registered Republicans in Florida, accounting for a mere 11% of the state‘s registered voters) but, his task became considerably easier when his challenger, former state Attorney General

36 Miami Herald, May 5, 1954 37 Tampa Tribune, May 14, 1954 38 Wagy. Governor LeRoy Collins. Pp. 39 39 Hartsfield and Roady. Florida Votes, 1920-1962. Pp. 63

93 and former Democrat, now running as a Republican, J. Tom Watson died in late October, just weeks before the election. Collins won over 80% of the votes as Watson‘s name remained on the ballot. Bill Hendrix who had announced his candidacy in late May was a write-in and also included on many ballots throughout the state. Hendrix, retired head of Florida‘s Ku Klux Klan, felt someone needed to look out for the interests of North Florida‘s conservative population but he received negligible support throughout the campaign as well as on election night.40 Florida, like the rest of the South, was ablaze with concern and debate following the Supreme Court‘s ruling in the Brown case. Initially Collins threw his support behind State Superintendent Thomas Bailey who had called for calm, sober, and rational responses to the ruling. Bailey actually maintained that black teachers and students would not press for integration because they preferred the separation of the races. Collins maintained his campaign pledge to do everything within the law and within his power to combat integration but, it soon became clear that he was virtually powerless. He further antagonized the conservative bloc by asking Floridians not to take the drastic steps being discussed and implemented throughout the Deep South. Unfortunately for those professing a need for radical action, the future governor, although committed to segregation, refused to support extremism. Florida‘s leading newspapers seemed to urge the same restraint while at the same time condemning the ruling. The Tampa Tribune called the Brown decision —deplorable“ but, also, —inevitable“.41 The Orlando Sentinel acknowledged the Court‘s supremacy in the matter but reassured its readers that implementation would he a long time coming and might not even effect the current generation of students.42 It concluded that —after fifty- eight years of educational progress in the South under the ”separate but equal‘ doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court has written some new law“ which it plans to impose on the South and in the process breakup the racial harmony and progress of the region.43 The St. Augustine Record remarked —No surprise“ but, went on to chide Washington for striking a match to a powder keg and leaving the South in a predicament with a more volatile

40 New York Times, May 30, 1954 41 Tampa Morning Tribune, May 19, 1954 42 Orlando Sentinel, May 18, 1954 43 Ibid

94 situation than before.44 Fort Lauderdale‘s Daily News, a leading voice in the more liberal South Florida, maintained that segregation would remain in Broward County‘s schools while the Florida Alligator, published by the University of Florida, claimed that the decision would backfire as large numbers of white teachers would refuse to instruct black students.45 Other papers, especially those in North Florida, lamented the intrusion from —outsiders“. The Florida Times-Union labeled the decision as a —Body blow to the South‘s blueprint for progress“ and that —the South still knows the problem best and should be left to solve it.“46 The Jacksonville paper went further by asserting that —the transition from segregation to integration will be forced upon unwilling Southerners suddenly“ and warned Washington that Southerners would not quietly accept the ruling.47 The Pork Chop Gang and other conservatives did not accept moderation on the race question and they soon organized in the legislature to combat integration, even if their new governor would not support their extreme measures. Identifying a direct challenge to white supremacy, the Pork Choppers sprung into action. They received the support of the Association of Florida Ku Klux Klan (which they publicly distanced themselves from) which collected over 50,000 signatures on a petition condemning the Brown decision and tried to present it to LeRoy Collins who had angered the conservatives by not committing to attend a Southern Governors Conference in Richmond to discuss mass resistance policies.48 The Klan had grown in number in Florida and created a wide base in Central Florida, a region with a growing non-—native“ population but, an area because of its agricultural and rural background, traditionally linked socially and economically to North Florida. While not embracing the support of the Klan, Pork Choppers agreed in principle with their outlook and goals for the state. Collins was deemed a traitor to North Florida, not only through his stance on integration but, also because of his plans for the 1885 Constitution. These designs and subsequent battles with the Legislature will be examined later, however, it is essential to note them as a large contributor to the mindset of the Pork Choppers. The conservatives saw in Collins a wolf in sheep‘s clothing and, more

44 St. Augustine Record, May 18, 1954 45 Fort Lauderdale Daily News, May 18, 1954; Florida Alligator, May 21, 1954 46 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 19, 1954 47 Ibid 48 New York Times, September 29, 1954

95 significantly, someone in a position of power and influence who aimed at gaining even more power by chipping away at their dominance of the Legislature, especially the Senate. In his inaugural address Collins claimed the South needed to revise its doctrine of state‘s rights to become compatible with the changing face of the nation. According to Collins, massive resistance to federal law and mandates, would not serve in the state‘s best interests. He saw agriculture, industry, and tourism as the basis for Florida‘s prosperity and the state could ill-afford to remove one or two of these vital cogs by alienating itself from the rest of the nation. Further, Collins asserted, all three elements worked together and could only grow and prosper as a combined entity.49 Wanting to strike the first blow, the Legislature took the initiative hoping a proactive approach would convert Collins to their side. The charge was led by Senator John Rawls of Marianna in Jackson County and, Prentice P. Pruitt of Monticello in Jefferson County. Both Pruitt and Rawls were from —black belt“ counties that neighbored Tallahassee and both were staunch segregationists. Rawls, like Johns, could trace his political lineage back to the 1800‘s as his great-grandfather Junius Rawls had orchestrated a minor coup in 1897 that led to the election of the son of former Confederate Secretary of the Navy, Stephen R. Mallory who went by the same name.50 Pruitt claimed that segregation might be —feasible in the next 50 or 100 years“ but“ no one would say it‘s feasible now.“51 He was supported by Rawls who maintained:

Integration of the white and Negro races in the public schools of the state of Florida would tend to encourage the reprehensible, unnatural, abominable, abhorrent, execrable and revolting practice of miscegenation which is recognized, both in conscience and by the law of the state of Florida as a criminal offense52

Here, once again, conservatives employed tactics of fear to frighten Floridians. The vision of white womanhood being ravaged by rampaging hordes of African- Americans was evoked in order to rally support not for segregation but, rather, for bold and immediate action to resist the Federal Government. F.W. Bedenbaugh, a Representative from Lake City had called on acting governor Charley Johns to call a

49 Florida House Journal, 35th Regular Session, 1955, Pp. 12 50 Tebeau. A Short History of Florida. Pp. 300-303 51 Southern School News, June 8, 1955 52 Florida Senate Journal, 1955, Pp. 182

96 special session to address the issue of resistance and he urged the same action to be taken by the new governor, LeRoy Collins.53 He was backed by Gainesville‘s J. Emory Cross who reassured his constituents that he would do everything in his power to use the Legislature to block integration. Other North Florida conservatives weighed in on the debate with similar responses such as Bonifay‘s H.B. Douglas‘ claim that —whites and negroes will never mix in our schools“ and J. Graham Black of Jasper promising that —they‘re not going to school together in my county.“54 Inverness‘ James Connor called for a different approach by proposing a three school system to replace the dual system. The third component would be for those students who, as eloquently described by Connor, —want to mix it up.“55 Collins tried to mollify the extremists by restating his stance on the issue of integration, vowing to do everything within the law and within his powers as governor to keep the dual school system intact. His approach was labeled —legal opposition“ and he was proclaimed as leader of the so-called —moderate segregationists.“56 Collins‘ political future was uncertain as he took a moderate stance on integration since governors, according to the 1885 Constitution were not afforded the opportunity to succeed themselves in office. Pork Choppers were dealt a crushing blow when the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Collins was allowed to seek reelection since he had been elected to finish Governor McCarty‘s term. In the words of historian Helen L. Jacobstein, the Democratic primary of 1956 was not only important for Florida‘s future political path but, more importantly it —represented a crucial decision in Florida‘s racial history.“57 Floridians had the chance to vote for moderation and retain Collins, or replace the governor with someone willing to employ a more radical and proactive approach to the integration issue. Never before had a Florida election focused solely on one issue, race. In spite of efforts by Collins to change the subject and highlight other issues of importance to Floridians, race was all that mattered. Five candidates threw their names into the race

53 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 18, 1954; St. Petersburg Times, July 11, 1954 54 Southern School News, June 8, 1955 55 Ibid 56 Wagy. Governor LeRoy Collins. Pp. 61 57 Helen L. Jacobstein. The Segregation Factor in the Florida Democratic Gubernatorial Primary of 1956. (Gainesville: University of Florida Social Sciences Series, no. 47, 1972) Pp. 3

97 along with Collins including former Governor and Klansman Fuller Warren of Blountstown, who had relocated to Miami and former Speaker of the House in Florida Farris Bryant, a staunch segregationist in his own right who would serve as governor of the Sunshine State from 1961-1965. The introduction to the campaign of a political novice, retired Florida National Guard General Sumter Lowry of Tampa, assured that race would remain the only issue of importance in the contest for governor. Lowry reintroduced the element of fear and scare tactics to the campaign, foreshadowing the McCarthyist ploys to link communism to civil rights. Lowry exclaimed that integration was nothing more than a part of the:

International Communist conspiracy…part and parcel of their three pronged attack to destroy our national independence through world government; to destroy our Christian Church through infiltration; and to destroy our race by mixing it with the blood of the negro race58

Lowry advocated and pushed for an interposition bill, act or resolution in the state legislature which would duly nullify the Brown decision in Florida. Lowry signaled out Collins stating that —he (Collins) would sell out the children of the state for the dollar bill.“59 His most famous quote mocked Collins by claiming that Floridians were —tired of governors who pussyfoot and evade the issue while the NAACP program of integration marches on.“60 Not one to mince words, Lowry issued a stern warning to Collins and also the people of Florida by advising them that they would have —violence if integration is attempted“ and that he was willing to lead a —march on Washington“ with the purpose of overthrowing the Supreme Court to preserve the separation of the races.61 While Lowry was leveling damning assaults on Collins, the South acted in a unified effort to challenge integration. On March 12, 1956 Southerners in Congress condemned the Supreme Court‘s ruling and intrusion on state‘s rights by issuing the —Southern Manifesto“. They focused on what they perceived to be the unconstitutionality of the ruling by adhering to the principles of the unwritten doctrine of state‘s rights. They further maintained that the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment had never

58 Southern School News, February 1956 59 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, March 10, 1956 60 Ibid 61 Jacobstein. Segregation Factor. Pp. 19

98 intended to include education in their measure and therefore the Warren Court‘s decision was baseless. Florida‘s two United State Senators, George Smathers and Spessard Holland signed the document along with six of the state‘s eight Congressmen. The only two who refused to sign were progressive Dante Fascell of Dade County and Republican William Cramer, the state‘s only non-Democrat in Congress. Overall 102 out of 139 Southern Congressmen signed the bill with only Tennessee‘s Senators, Estes Kefauver and Albert Gore, Sr. refusing to sign. Texas‘ Lyndon Johnson did not sign but, claimed he was never asked.62 Gore depicted the Manifesto as —dangerous, deceptive propaganda“ which pushed the South to openly defy the federal government and commit acts bordering on treason63 Wayne Morse, a progressive Senator from Oregon mocked the Southern faction by stating, —You would think today Calhoun was walking and speaking on the floor of the Senate“, a reference to nineteenth century demagogue and fire-eater John C. Calhoun who pushed South Carolina to the brink of secession in 1832 and 1850.64 Collins tried in vain to steer clear of Lowry but, inevitably he knew he would have to confront his assailant. He said that Lowry‘s policy proposals and virulent rhetoric would tear Florida apart by inciting racial warfare.65 The timing of the Southern Manifesto played into the extremists‘ hands in Florida since on the same day the District Court struck another blow against segregation by ruling that Virgil Hawkins, an African- American, must be admitted to the University of Florida Law School.66 This ruling not only horrified whites throughout Florida, it swept the rug from under Collins who had maintained that he could protect segregation without resorting to violence or mass resistance. This put Collins on the defensive and he called on southern governors to convene and discuss possible responses. The race question was certainly pushing Collins to take a more aggressive approach, although he still refused to back extremism or any measure he felt was detrimental to the state‘s well being.67 Lowry continued the assault and Collins knew more action was needed and so the governor appointed retired Judge

62 Klein. —Guarding the Baggage“. Pp. 296 63 Ibid 64 Ibid 65 —Statement by LeRoy Collins“ February 2, 1956, Correspondence of Governor LeRoy Collins, box 328, file —Race Relations-1956“, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida 66 Tampa Morning Tribune, March 13, 1956 67 Panama City News, March 18, 1956

99 L.L. Fabinski of Pensacola to chair a committee to study the issue and formulate a legal response to the Brown decision. While the committee would not meet until after the primary, Collins hoped the announcement and creation of the body would be enough to stem the rising tide of radicalism in Florida. When the votes were counted, Collins‘ gamble seemingly paid off. Collins received 51.7% of the vote and won the election in a landslide that did not require a second primary as was the case in 1952. Lowry, the political novice, finished second, showing Collins and the state that many in Florida were still willing to openly defy Washington. The retired general received 21.3% of the votes placing him well ahead of Bryant who garnered 110,000 (13%) and Warren who polled 108,000 (12%). Looking at the overall results, Collins was faced with the fact that close to 49% of the state‘s Democrats preferred a more radical approach to the race question. Collins received most of his support from South Florida, where Broward County gave the incumbent 78% of the more than 50,000 votes filed. Likewise, Dade (72%), Brevard (60%), Monroe (66%), Martin (70%), Pinellas (68%), Sarasota (68%) and Palm Beach (64%) all afforded Collins landslide results. Lowry fared best in the Panhandle and other rural counties. He received over 40% of the vote in and carried the counties of: Lafayette (55%), Suwannee (55%), Holmes (54%), Liberty (54%), Dixie (53%), Gilchrist (51%), Taylor (50%), Levy (46%), Hamilton (45%), Santa Rosa (45%), Sumter (45%), Walton (44%), Washington (43%), De Soto (43%), Madison (43%), Okaloosa (43%), Jefferson (42%), Hardee (40%) and, Okeechobee (40%). Overall Collins won 33 counties with Lowry winning 26, Warren 6 and Bryant 1. Clay County outside of Jacksonville cast the same number of votes for both Lowry and Collins.68 The 1956 election also saw 32% of Florida‘s African-American population register and most voted for the —moderate segregationist“.69 The general election in the fall was a foregone conclusion as Collins won in landslide, amassing 74% of the vote against the Republican challenger and receiving more than 61% of the vote in every county. These numbers, while high, do illustrate growing support for the Republican

68 Hartsfield and Roady. Florida Votes. Pp. 61 69 Wagy. Governor LeRoy Collins. Pp. 73

100 Party in Florida, especially in the Orlando and Tampa Bay areas as these regions continued to see an influx of immigrants from the Midwest. Collins‘s efforts aimed at postponing integration had been joined by Attorney General Ervin who tried to circumvent the high court‘s ruling not only in Brown v. Board but, also in the Virgil Hawkins case. When his endeavors were stymied, he looked to stall the inevitable for as long as possible. Providing legal counsel for the state‘s Board of Control, which oversaw maintenance of Florida‘s university system, Ervin formulated a plan which called for a questionnaire to be devised and sent out to Floridians from all walks of life. This survey would hopefully, in Ervin‘s mind, validate the segregationist cause by showing the Supreme Court that Florida was not ready for integration. Ervin hoped that once Florida had spoken, Washington would have no choice but to listen and act accordingly.70 This was no small undertaking as the Attorney General sent out 56,294 questionnaires throughout the state. They were distributed to faculty, students, employees, family and alumni at Florida State University, the University of Florida and, also Florida A&M University.71 In including the state‘s leading historically black university, Ervin looked to display the fact that neither African-Americans nor Florida‘s white citizens favored integration or, more compellingly an inter-mixing of the races. Questions asked ranged anywhere from when African-Americans should be admitted to the white universities, if at all, to how whites would react to integration of other public facilities such as swimming pools, cafeterias, dances and social events72. The framing of the questions cleverly pushed the fear of race-mixing and interracial dating and relationships to the forefront of the minds of the parents and the alumni. White students showed a higher propensity to accept integration than their parents and the alumni of the white universities. Forty-one percent of white male students responded by claiming they would treat African-American students as if they were any other student, while the number was higher for females at 46%. Further, 29% of white males responded that they would accept a black roommate as did 21% of the female

70 —Study on Desegregation“, May 2, 1956, LeRoy Collins Papers (hereafter cited as Collins Papers), box 140, folder 1, Special Collections, University of South Florida Library, Tampa 71 Tallahassee Democrat, January 1, 1956 72 —Study on Desegregation“, May 2, 1956, Collins Papers, box 140, folder 1

101 students. These figures, especially the 46% of female students who responded, seemed to dispel the myths purported by the staunch segregationists that southern white womanhood was threatened by integration. The parents, as mentioned above, were vehemently opposed to integration and only 8% of those asked maintained that they would favor immediately admitting African- Americans to Florida‘s universities. Forty-six percent favored a delay for either preparation or as a stall tactic and 44% would not have them admitted under any circumstances. The Board of Control maintained that according to the parents the —main fear expressed was that of intermarriage between the white and Negro races.“73 Ervin was especially pleased with the responses from the parents and forwarded the Board of Control‘s report to the state Supreme Court which, in 1957, ruled that states rights, in this case the Florida Supreme Court‘s ruling, superseded the United States Supreme Court and, therefore, continued to deny Hawkins admission to the University of Florida‘s School of Law. The summer of 1956 saw Collins‘ attempt at forestalling not only integration but also, more importantly, the growing tide of extremism highlighted by the election results and the recommendations handed down by the Fabinski Committee. The report was issued on July 16 and Collins called a special session of the legislature to deal with the recommendations put forth by the committee.74 The Committee called for two main actions from the governor; the first was the implementation of a pupil placement law which would effectively allow local school districts to place students in various schools. This action was supposed to be based on merit but, in fact, would create a de facto loophole for the state to circumvent the Brown decision. Secondly, the Committee looked to give the governor unprecedented emergency powers to in fact mandate the rules governing public institutions such as parks, buildings and, of course schools. This would allow Collins, or any future governor to close schools that were forced to integrate.75

73 Ibid 74 —Governor‘s Message“. Florida House Journal, Special Session, July 23, 1956, Pp. 7 75 —Report of the Special Committee“, July 16, 1956, Correspondence of Governor LeRoy Collins, box 328, file —Race Relations, May-December, 1956

102 Collins gave the report high praise, claiming, —this is a program I can and will support“, while at the same time striking at radicals who wanted more action. Collins maintained that he would do nothing to destroy Florida‘s public schools and would not take action above and beyond that called for by the Fabinski Committee.76 Florida‘s conservatives, especially the Pork Chop Gang wanted more action and further safeguards implemented which would reassure them that the state‘s schools would absolutely not be integrated in the near future. Prentice Pruitt, who had led the extreme vocal opposition to the Supreme Court‘s initial ruling in 1954 returned to attack the Committee‘s moderation. He was joined by Tallahassee‘s J. Kenneth Ballinger in calling for an interposition resolution, the action sought by Lowry and Bryant during the primary campaign months before. While this was being debated, the Senate quickly and unanimously passed and adopted the Fabinski plan verbatim. The House voted to pass the plan 91-3 but also wanted to debate interposition, something the Senate had ignored.77 Sumter Lowry, still in the minds of Floridians, appeared before the Legislature to plead for interposition telling the United States Supreme Court —we openly defy you.“78 He was urged on by Pruitt and other conservatives and on July 26, Farris Bryant, who campaigned on a platform of strict segregation, introduced a resolution to the House.79 It was during this debate that Charley Johns and three other Pork Choppers first flirted with the idea of a special committee in the legislature aimed at discrediting the NAACP in an attempt to halt integration. The fruits of their labor, the Florida Legislative Investigative Committee (FLIC) or Johns Committee will be examined in detail in later chapters. The Pork Choppers were clearly not satisfied with what they viewed as moderation on the part of Collins. The House had not heeded Collins‘ warning and to combat this affront, Collins took drastic action. On August 1, Speaker of the House Ted David, an ally of Collins, announced that the governor had adjourned the legislature under little known and little used special powers granted him by the 1885 Constitution. The constitution had stipulated that the chief executive could adjourn the legislature if the two houses could

76 Tallahassee Democrat, July 16, 1956 77 Tallahassee Democrat, July 24, 1956 78 Jacksonville Journal, July 31, 1956 79 Miami Herald, July 26, 1956

103 not work together and mutually agree on a set time for adjournment.80 Since the House continued to debate after the Senate had ceased its work, Collins implemented the little known provision and shocked the conservatives. One newspaper account maintained that Bryant was in mid-sentence when the speaker‘s gavel crashed down cutting him off and sweeping the rug, if only momentarily, out from beneath the Pork Choppers‘ feet. Six months were now set to pass before the resumption of the session and any progress towards interposition. Collins had bought time but, in the process had incensed the conservatives who were growing more and more radical by the day. Prentice Pruitt led the charge against Collins by stating —I think it was a low blow“ while Key West Representative William Neblett sarcastically remarked to Bryant, —Well, I guess that‘s interposition. The governor interposed“. Bryant was not amused and many conservatives felt betrayed once again by their governor.81 While the conservatives waited for another opportunity to defy Collins and the Supreme Court, the state‘s focus remained on Tallahassee but for other reasons. In May 1956, two female Florida A&M students refused to give up their seats to whites on a city bus, heightening racial tensions throughout the city and leading to the Tallahassee Bus Boycott led by C.K. Steele. Steele, a reverend and colleague of Martin Luther King, Jr. helped to form the Inter-Civic Council, based on the Montgomery Improvement Association which had been formed after Rosa Parks‘ actions in that city in December 1955. Steele‘s efforts and the violent backlash and retaliation by the Klan and other white supremacist groups pushed Collins to the brink over the summer and into the fall as he was dealing with the conservatives in the Legislature.82 At his inaugural address in January 1957, Collins urged Floridians to remain calm in the face of the violence which had rocked Tallahassee and also the growing racial crises elsewhere in the state. He still looked for Florida to be a beacon of light in the Deep South, an example to its neighbors and also to the nation of a more progressive —New South“ state. He concluded the speech by stating, —This is the call of history, a

80 Florida Constitution 1885, Art. IV, Section 10 81 Fort Lauderdale News, August 2, 1956; Miami Herald, August 6, 1956 82 For more information on the Tallahassee Bus Boycott and C.K. Steele see, Mike Pope —Denial of Justice: Malcolm Johnson and the Tallahassee Bus Boycott“ (unpublished MA Thesis, Florida State University, 2002); Gregory Padgett —C.K. Steele and the Tallahassee Bus Boycott“ (unpublished MA Thesis, Florida State University, 1977) and Gregory Padgett. C.K. Steele a Biography (unpublished Dissertation, Florida State University, 1995)

104 history which grows impatient. Ours is the generation in which great decisions can no longer be passed to the next. We have a state to build, a South to save, a nation to convince, a God to serve.“83 Florida‘s newspapers were overly supportive and the speech even gained national attention and recognition when Newsweek commented favorably on his message84. However, his address received mixed reviews from Legislators with James E. Conner, who had let flow fiery rhetoric in May 1954, exclaimed that the Supreme Court was not the law of Florida as Collins had stated but, instead, that role was reserved for the Constitution of Florida which upheld and mandated segregation. State Senator Henry Stratton of Nassau County north of Jacksonville lamented —now that Collins has yielded to the philosophy of the U.S. Supreme Court, I guess we are officially integrated.“85 To many Pork Choppers, Collins was no longer even striving to maintain his initial campaign pledges which had called for opposing integration. The battleground once again became the Florida State Legislature and when the state‘s elected officials met in April to resume the session halted by Collins in August, interposition was the first item on the ledger. On April 5, the House passed the interposition measure with the resolution declaring the Brown decision, effectively, null and void within the state.86 The House had also flirted with a —last resort bill“ allowing for the closure of public schools. Despite approving the extraordinary powers granted him by the Fabinski Committee, Collins did not approve of these measures which aimed directly at the schools. He remarked, —I will never approve any plan to abolish any public school, anywhere.“87 The debate moved to the Senate where the conservatives employed the aid of Virginian William Old, the —father of interposition“, who lectured the body on the values of mass resistance on April 15.88 Old‘s speech helped the conservatives override the opposition led by Senator Doyle Carlton, Jr. (son of former Governor Doyle Carlton) of Wauchula in Highland County and Verle Pope of St. Augustine. Collins refused to sign

83 —Governor LeRoy Collins: Inaugural Address, January 8, 1957“, Governor‘s Papers, box 1, folder 38 84 Newsweek, January 21, 1957, Pp. 31 85 Tallahassee Democrat, January 8, 1957 86 Tampa Tribune, April 6, 1957; House Bill 671, Florida House Journal, 1957, Special Session, Pp. 1045- 47 87 Tampa Tribune, April 21, 1957 88 Ocala Star Banner, April 15, 1957

105 the bill but, it became law without his signature on April 23.89 Collins attached a note to the document stating that he was opposed but, was, nonetheless, mandated by law to forward it to the President of the United States. Collins underscored his opposition to —massive resistance“ without legal means and highlighted the fact that the resolution had become a law without his signature. Seeing that they had circumvented Collins‘ moderate position, Attorney General Ervin looked to pass a —local“ last resort bill allowing districts the authority to close schools in the case of forced integration. This would again literally usurp Collins‘ power and authority. At the end of the May, the bill passed the House 57-36 and the Senate 26- 11.90 Collins, as expected, vetoed the bill in early June yet this maneuver held as conservatives could not muster enough support in the House to override the veto.91 For Collins, this minor victory brought him neither rest nor respite. Events in the Ozarks assured Florida‘s governor that the rift that existed between himself and the conservatives in the state concerning the race issue would not be healed in the near future. Little Rock, Arkansas was the next battleground for the war on segregation and Collins was drawn into the fray in an attempt to pacify the entire region. Collins, seen as a voice of moderation, looked to quell Governor Orval Faubus‘ attempts at defying the federal government, while at the same time warning President Dwight D. Eisenhower that the South was not fond of Washington overstepping its bounds and meddling in Southern affairs.92 Collins, in the eyes of many in the region as well as the Pork Choppers at home, once again betrayed Florida and the South by calling for the region to be more flexible in adapting to inevitable change. Collins was condemned by everyone from the Pork Chop Gang to Jacksonville‘s Martha Reid Chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy who passed a resolution admonishing the governor for what they deemed meek submission to the NAACP.93 What is often overlooked regarding Collins‘ stance is the fact that he harbored national political ambitions and, thus, never wanted to portray

89 Florida House Journal, 36th Regular Session, April 23, 1957, Pp. 339-341 90 Florida House Journal, 1957, Special Session, Pp. 1047 91 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, June 9, 1957 92 For more information on the Little Rock Crisis see, I. Wilmer Counts, A Life is more than a Moment, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999) 93 Wagy. Governor LeRoy Collins. Pp. 95-96

106 himself as a candidate for the South only as Strom Thurmond had been in 1948. To this end national newspapers and periodicals lauded his efforts in trying to curb the Little Rock crisis with Newsweek asking, —wouldn‘t LeRoy Collins make a good national candidate?“94 Collins‘ name was often mentioned in national circles as a possible vice presidential candidate in 1960 and John F. Kennedy considered Collins before deciding on another Southerner, Lyndon Baines Johnson of Texas. Despite the national accolades, Collins was met with the stark reality that he could not propose any measures or introduce any legislation that did not deal with segregation and this was reinforced by the special session he had called in hopes of revising the archaic constitution of 1885, another one of his campaign pledges. Conservatives had other ideas and Cedar Key‘s Senator W. Randolph Hodges and H.H. Hair, Jr. of Live Oak, backed by Charley Johns, introduced another —last resort“ proposal similar to the one vetoed by Collins earlier. This time the conservatives employed fiery rhetoric evoking images of guns and bayonets with allusions to the Little Rock crisis. The bill passed the Senate 35-1 but failed to pass the House.95 The House failed to pass the bill on a second vote but Collins saw that this issue would not fade into oblivion and agreed to a compromise bill which called for the closure of schools if Eisenhower or a future president sent troops to Florida as had been the case in Arkansas.96 While most Floridians disapproved of integration, the intensity of this opposition varied as evidenced by the fight between Collins and the Pork Choppers. The special session called by Collins in September 1957 reached new emotional levels as Senator Harvie Belser of Bonifay impulsively and angrily announced his resignation after the —last resort“ bill had failed to pass the House. He charged Collins and his allies with bringing about the general —decline of the South“ and further accused Collins of lacking the —guts to fight for the traditions and customs of our land.“97 Marianna‘s Tony Peacock would later claim to speak for Floridians when in 1959 he proclaimed, —I think he

94 Newsweek, September 30, 1957, Pp. 40 95 Tallahassee Democrat, October 2, 1957 96 Ibid, October 4, 1957 97 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, October 10, 1957

107 (Collins) is completely out of touch with a majority in both houses and a majority of the people of Florida at this time.“98 Violence, for the most part had been averted, and this was Collins‘ main goal throughout the racial crisis of the 1950‘s. However, the governor‘s moderation illustrated to the Pork Chop Gang that more had to be done if they were to preserve their stranglehold on Florida. LeRoy Collins had not forgotten his campaign pledge to reapportion the legislature and this threat, coupled with his moderation on integration, forced the conservatives into a corner from which they emerged fighting in the mid- 1950‘s led by staunch segregationist and virulently racist Charley Johns.

98 Tallahassee Democrat, April 8, 1959

108 NEITHER AN ACUSING NOR A TRIAL BODY

The term McCarthyism has entered the American lexicon and is generally an accepted term describing the early years in the Cold War that saw Wisconsin‘s junior Republican Senator, Joseph R. McCarthy vigorously pursue the alleged communist threat to American society. Ellen Schrecker, one of the leading scholars on —McCarthyism“ argues that this term is merely a generalization. According to Schrecker, —most victims of what has come to be called McCarthyism…never had any contact with Joe McCarthy.“1 Despite the inherent labeling of his name, Schrecker does use the term throughout her numerous works on the topic. She defines McCarthyism as:

The most widespread and longest lasting wave of political repression in American history. In order to eliminate the alleged threat of domestic communism, a broad coalition of politicians, bureaucrats, and other anticommunist activists hounded an entire generation of radicals and their associates, destroying lives, careers, and all institutions that offered a left-wing alternative to mainstream politics and culture…It used all the power of the state to turn dissent into disloyalty and, in the process, drastically narrowed the spectrum of acceptable political debate2

McCarthyism in Florida encompassed all of this and more, beginning with an all out assault on African-American society led by the Pork Chop Gang in an effort to curtail integration. Schrecker maintains that anti-communism preceded and succeeded McCarthy‘s short-lived reign of terror on the national level, lasting from the late 1930‘s through the 1960‘s.3 In Florida, as well as throughout the South, the —Red Menace“ and the threat communism posed, was used as a guise to root out civil rights organizations and discredit the NAACP and others. In Florida, more was at stake. The Pork Chop Gang used —McCarthyism“ as a way not only to attack the NAACP and halt integration

1 Ellen Schrecker. The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents. (New York: Bedford/St. Martin‘s, 2002), Pp. 1 2 Ellen Schrecker. Many Are The Crimes, McCarthyism in America. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), Pp. xii 3 Schrecker. The Age of McCarthyism. Pp. 1

109 but also as a means of preserving their loosening grip over the state. South Florida continued to grow in population and power and this proved to be a more concrete threat to the North Florida conservative bloc than Moscow ever was. Therefore, McCarthyism in Florida, which grew from attacks on the NAACP to include an assault on homosexuality and liberalism at Florida‘s public universities, was a continuation of the century old effort by the conservatives to retain their power. Joseph McCarthy‘s actions in Washington merely placed Florida‘s —crusade against morality“ into a broader context. According to Ellen Schrecker, —it is hard to have a witch-hunt without witches“ and the Supreme Court‘s ruling on —Black Monday“, May 17, 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, provided Florida with the —witches4. After identifying an enemy, the Ku Klux Klan usually issues a —death warrant“ or sentence, in which the organization instructs its members to carry out an execution, whether by armed attack, flogging, lynching, or arson, on someone deemed a threat to white supremacy. In Florida, after the Brown decision, the Klan had first tried to fight the high court‘s ruling by rallying the state‘s white citizens in a non-violent manner. Retired Klansmen Bill Hendrix‘s highly unsuccessful —write-in“ campaign in the 1954 Democratic Gubernatorial Primary was joined in futility and failure by the William Griffin‘s Association of Florida Ku Klux Klans who circulated a petition against the Brown decision.5 Others, such as Lake County Sheriff Willis McCall, elected in 1944 on a virulently racist platform, took matters into their own hands to ensure that the Supreme Court‘s ruling was never enforced and implemented in Florida. McCall ran Lake County with the backing of the Klan and, within a year on the job had already been accused of brutality by the Socialist Worker‘s Defense League‘s who attempted to bring McCall to justice for his treatment of black prisoners whom the sheriff had basically reduced to the status of slaves6. McCall was known to brag that if any sort of riot, racially or class motivated, broke out in Lake County, that he would —be in the middle of it.“7 It was under these auspices that in the summer of 1954 the sheriff became the director of the National Association for the

4 Ibid, Pp. 5 5 New York Times, May 30, 1954; Ibid, September 29, 1954 6 Ben Green. Before His Time. Pp. 52 7 Ibid, Pp. 79-80

110 Advancement of White People, which had been revived after the Brown decision to combat the NAACP.8 McCall, not waiting for Governor Collins or even the more sympathetic Pork Chop Gang to take action and in defiance of the United States Supreme Court in Lake County, had forcibly removed five non-white children from an all-white school in Mount Dora. The Platt family, the victims involved in this action were not African-American but, rather, Croatan Indian. McCall‘s overzealousness and determined racism blinded him to this fact. When this was brought to the sheriff‘s attention, he responded by saying —I don‘t like the shape of that one‘s nose“ before removing them from the school9. In spite of the fact that the Platt family successfully challenged McCall and the Lake County School Board in court, the sheriff and the local Klan continued their assault by firebombing their house and destroying their family car.10 In October, McCall had proclaimed, —I, for one, am going to do all I can to forestall such a movement [integration]. I am one who, instead of sitting around grumbling about these agitators, goes into action. We need more action and not so much wishie-washie grumbling“ and, his actions proved that he was a man of his word.11 McCall and Hendrix were not alone in their sentiments and shortly after the Brown decision, North Florida‘s conservative Democrats, led by the Pork Chop Gang, looked to issue their own death warrants against the NAACP and those who favored integration. They did so by pushing for the creation of a special investigative committee to be run through the state legislature, with powers to effectively kill the NAACP and, therefore, bring desegregation to a grinding halt in Florida. The Pork Choppers claimed to be working with the support of the populace. Segregation was a hot issue in Florida and, as public opinion polls showed, the majority of Floridians, even the bastion of progressivism, South Florida, agreed that it should remain intact. Some of this alleged support was seen in the state‘s newspapers where a political analyst from South Florida claimed that close to, if not more than 90%

8 Daytona Beach News Journal, June 4, 1972; For more information on Sheriff McCall see, Timothy Brandt Robinson. Law and Order, By Any Means Necessary: The Life and Times of Willis V. McCall, Sheriff of Lake County“ (unpublished MA Thesis, Florida State University, 1977) 9 Life, November 17, 1972, Pp. 90 10 Ibid 11 Tampa Morning Tribune, October 9, 1954

111 of Floridians favored segregation.12 Other, more striking evidence was the fact that anti- segregationist state legislator John Orr of Dade County was defeated in the 1958 Democratic Primary by a pro-segregationist challenger by close to 25,000 votes. This was a seat Orr had won in 1956 by more than a two to one margin.13 Orr had fallen victim to negative propaganda not just in Dade County, the district he represented but, throughout the entire state as well. Both the Miami Herald and Lakeland Ledger questioned his competence as a representative of his constituents and accused him of voting and acting on behalf of his own interests, not those of his constituents.14 A Northerner, who had moved to Florida, wrote a letter to the Orlando Sentinel, which was published in May 1956 and which voiced his support for segregation while blaming the NAACP for the racial strife in Florida. The author also went on to chastise the federal government and the North for interfering in Southern life by exclaiming, —We Southerners don‘t tell Nevada to give up gambling or New York its backbreaking state income tax. Why should other states force us to do things their way?“15 Another reader informed the Sentinel that most Northerners agreed with segregation and urged Florida to not —make the same mistake as we did in the North“ in integrating society.16 Charley Johns and his allies misinterpreted this information as full fledged support to their radical cause and undertook extreme measures beyond what most Floridians favored. Florida and the South, had a long tradition of viewing African- Americans as not trustworthy, dating back to the antebellum period, if not the colonial era where in many areas the fear of the slave revolt pervaded the white psyche. This —fear“ continued through Reconstruction and into the Jim Crow Era when African-Americans were —put in their place“ in order to protect white womanhood, the symbol for virtuous white society. African-Americans were portrayed and framed as the —outsider“ and in Florida, the fear of outside interference ran deeper than in other Southern states simply due to the influx of immigrants from other regions of the country who did not share the same moral and political values and goals as the conservative bloc from North Florida.

12 Orlando Sentinel, May 17, 1956 13 Miami Herald, October 1, 1958 14 Lakeland Ledger, July 31, 1956 15 Orlando Sentinel, March 30, 1956 16 Ibid, May 5, 1956

112 This charge of treason was especially common during the Second World War. The fear was promulgated by rumors and accusations that spread throughout the South and were especially prevalent in Florida since the Sunshine State was home to a large number of military bases and war generated industry. In 1943, sociologist Howard W. Odum‘s book Race and Rumors of Race exposed these rumors as myth and analyzed their origins in order to explain them. He maintained they began as blacks migrated to cities in search of jobs during the buildup to war from 1939-1941. He believed that the rumors took on a life of their own, so much that, by the middle of the war it was rumored that African-Americans were boasting that they would —take care of white women“ while their husbands, fathers and brothers were fighting the Nazis, Italians and Japanese. They also accused African-Americans of stockpiling weapons for a revolt whose main aim was to —marry all the white girls and run the country.17 The absurdity in this fiction was also exposed by supposed comments made by African-Americans in which they discussed how much better life would be for them once Hitler and the Germans took over the United States.18 Aside from the fear of the —uppity Negro“ turning their world upside down, white Floridians, especially the conservatives in North Florida, did not trust the loyalty of the African-American community when it came to prosecuting the war. In the summer of 1941 as the United States drifted towards an inevitable war with the Axis Powers, many states, including Florida created defense organizations to protect their citizens. Florida‘s State Defense Council was created in 1940 by outgoing conservative Governor Fred P. Cone of Lake City. The State Defense Council listed the scope of its powers as directing —local, county, and regional defense councils“ while being comprised of twelve divisions, —Industry and Material Resources, Labor and Personnel, Civil Protection, Fire Protection and Water Supply, Agriculture, Food, Health and Housing, Communications and Transportation, Power and Fuel, Finance and Budget, Home Community Service, and Information, Education and Morale.“19 Frank Holland, a representative for the Council wrote an urgent memo to his brother, Governor Spessard Holland in June 1941

17 Howard W. Odum. Race and Rumors of Race: The American South in the Early Forties. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943), Pp. 55-57 18 Ibid 19 State Defense Council of Florida Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida

113 relaying his concerns to the chief executive, who also served as head of the State Defense Council, that the black population of Florida was ripe for subversive activity. He contended that Florida‘s African-American community —may present a terrific problem in morale if we are actually subjected to a severe attack, and as a class [they] are the most fertile field for subversive propaganda by enemies of our nation.“20 In an effort to combat any —subversive“ activity, Holland pushed for the creation of the Negro Defense Council led by Florida A&M President John Robert Edward Lee.21 Lee was charged with making regular reports to the State Defense Council which he used as an opportunity to reassure white society that —Negroes in Florida have gone all out for defense.“22 This sentiment was proven by the actions of Florida‘s African-Americans like L.W. Patrick who organized a motorcycle troop in Dade County in the black community. In a letter, Patrick explained that —it seems that when there is a job to be done the colored people are almost always the first to complete the job that has been assigned to them…you must give them credit for being patriotic…No white people have even thought to do such a thing here as yet.“23 Despite seemingly being able to prove critics wrong, African-Americans remained, after the war, —outsiders“ in Florida as well as throughout the South. With the defeat of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and Fascist Italy, Americans were faced with a new enemy and a new war. The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ushered in a new age, one which would be dominated by ideological splits among the world‘s major powers. The Cold War brought new challenges to the United States but, more importantly, brought African-Americans into the unwanted spotlight once again. One such —outside“ group which struck fear into the hearts of Southerners as well as most Americans in the Cold War were the communists. Most Americans were certain

20 —Memo to Spessard L. Holland from Frank Holland“, June 20, 1941. Governor Spessard L. Holland: Administrative Correspondence (cited hereafter as Holland Correspondence), box 24: 1941-1944. Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida 21 —Florida Civilian Defense News“. No. 13, November 1, 1941. Holland Correspondence, box 24, folder 10 22 Biennial Report: State Defense Council of Florida, 1941-1942. (Tallahassee, March 25, 1943), Pp. 77 23 —L.W. Patrick to Guy H. Allen“, February 2, 1942. State Defense Council, Florida Motorized Civil Unit Records, 1940-1943, box 1, folder titled: Advisory Board M.P.T., Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida

114 that the American Communist Party, receiving its marching orders from the Kremlin, was consistently plotting the overthrow of American society and they often looked suspiciously at African-Americans as a possible group Moscow would target to aid in their revolution. The American Communist Party did have ties to the African-American community as their lawyers had defended the —Scottsboro Boys“ in the 1930‘s, organized sharecroppers and tenant farmers unions during the Great Depression, as well as leading other strikes and protests against unequal employment opportunities. Fearing negative responses from white society, in many cases, African-Americans tried to distance themselves from the communists despite the fact that they were often one of, if not the, only white group supporting them at any given time. The NAACP realized the problem posed by communist support and amended its platform to further distance the organization from the communists.24 At the 41st Convention of the NAACP, held in 1949, the organization resolved to form an investigative committee to look into possible infiltration of the group by the communists. The Board of Directors was further charged with taking —necessary action to eradicate such infiltration, and if necessary suspend and reorganize, or lift the charter and expel any unit which comes under Communist or other political control and domination.“25 This and other efforts by the NAACP and African- Americans did nothing to convince the South of their loyalty and the feeble link between the entire African-American community and communism was not eradicated for decades. Communism provided the Pork Choppers with the ammunition they needed to —patriotically“ attack integration and moreover to unite the state behind their ignominious agenda. Johns had called for a special committee dating back to 1953 to investigate gambling and other vices that the Pork Choppers associated with the decadence of South Florida. Johns‘ efforts were stymied by his fellow legislators who felt such a body would cause more harm and bring to Florida a black eye nationally, hurting tourism.26 To Johns this argument was another example of South Florida placing its own interests ahead of

24 For more information on the Scottsboro Boys and the NAACP‘s —link“ with Communism see, Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro, a Tragedy of the American South, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979) 25 —Mark Hawes, Confidential Progress Report“, January 17, 1957 FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 21, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida 26 Tallahassee Democrat, May 24, 1953

115 the entire state. Tourism was one of the state‘s leading industries but the discrepancy in revenue from tourism between North Florida and South Florida was wide. After failing in his bid to be elected governor, Johns once again turned his attention to a special committee but, this time he framed his endeavor as a crusade to save white society from the newly aggressive African-American recently emboldened by the Brown decision. In April 1955 Johns sponsored Senate Bill 227 which called for the creation of what was originally named the Legislative and Investigation Committee. This committee would be made up of eight members from both houses of the legislature and require all officials in the state to cooperate with the body. Johns was again defeated as the bill died in the Senate in early June.27 A year later Johns‘ dreams became a reality when he was backed by Senators Dewey Johnson and John Rawls, fellow Pork Choppers, in proposing Senate Bill 38 which, if passed, would create the Florida Legislative Investigative Committee (FLIC).28 They made little effort to mask the intentions of the Committee. The bill did not mention the NAACP by name but Senator Johnson himself admitted that he saw no other group in Florida that the FLIC would investigate.29 The FLIC‘s role in Florida would be to:

Make as complete an investigation as time permits, of all organizations whose principles or activities include course of conduct on the part of any person or group which would constitute violence or a violation of the laws of the State, or would be inimical to the well-being and orderly pursuits of their personal and business activities by majority of the citizens of this state30

The bill was passed by the Senate by a 28-7 vote and the following day six of the seven dissenters changed their vote to provide a final and resounding 34-1 margin of victory for Johns.31 The House proved a more difficult road for the Pork Choppers, which Johns expected since he had less influence in the lower chamber of the Legislature. The House Rules Committee refused to recommend passage which meant that two-thirds of the entire House would need to vote —yea“ for Johns‘ bill to become a reality. Luckily

27 Florida Senate Journal, Regular Session, April 1955, Pp. 2 28 Ibid, Special Session, July 25, 1956, Pp. 7 29 Tallahassee Democrat, July 25, 1956 30 —Transcript of Testimony“, February 4, 1957, FLIC Papers, box 3, folder 18 31 Tallahassee Democrat, July 25, 1956

116 for Johns, the mood of the state at this time was favorable. On August 1, 83% of the House passed the bill (72-15) and the FLIC was given validation.32 Immediately after the House passed the bill, Governor Collins refused to sign it but it became a law without his signature. As early as June, Collins was alerted to the true intentions of the committee when Johns‘ ally, A.J. Musselman, a conservative from Pompano Beach in South Florida‘s Broward County, penned a letter to the governor. Musselman was a state Representative and outlined for Collins of the magnitude of creating a committee to safeguard white society against communist plots and especially infiltration of the NAACP. He stated that the Committee would investigate the —extent of activities in the NAACP and other pro-integration groups of Communist paid employees, sympathizers or agitators.“33 He tried to reassure the governor that the Committee would not engage in witch hunts but, rather, would be composed of —moderates, ones who would not become hysterical or who are not easily susceptible to mob or emotional influence.“34 Unfortunately for the NAACP, for African-Americans and, later for anyone with liberal leanings, the Committee grew to embody the opposite of everything Musselman had assured it would not become. The legislator from Broward County further alleged:

Our entire concern was not directed against [colored people], but rather against ideas alien to our nature and custom. We were not fighting them and them alone or degrading and debasing them, but fighting for the ideals of our country in an attempt to combat international militant Communism that we so greatly fear35

Collins, no fan of integration, maintained, —I regard the matter as one for the legislature‘s determination“, while later affirming his assurance that the members of the Committee would act responsibly and not allow this to become a witch hunt.36 Collins knew his popularity would suffer from opposing a bill which, on paper, looked to have the best interests of the majority of white Floridians in mind. Johns and other Pork Choppers were flooded with letters from around Florida which offered their

32 Ibid, August 1, 1956 33 —A.J. Musselman to Governor LeRoy Collins“, June 14, 1956, Correspondence of Governor LeRoy Collins, box 33, folder 4, Florida State Archives 34 Ibid 35 Ibid 36 Ibid, August 24, 1956

117 congratulations and support. A Palatka resident addressed his views to Johns, reminding him that integration was a communist plot designed to disrupt not only the state of Florida but, more crucially, constitutional government and capitalism.37 The FLIC was not an anomaly in the United States during the 1950‘s. Various other states, including most of the South had or was in the process of creating similar committees or organizations with the sole aim of halting integration. The FLIC immediately set out to gather as much information and materials as possible from its sister states in order to create a well oiled machine.38 Time was of the essence as the Supreme Court had ruled in Brown II that the nation‘s schools must be integrated with all deliberate speed. The Committee framed its agenda through a —Rules and Regulations“ section in their guidelines. The first item listed bluntly stated, —Intelligence is knowledge“. The remainder of this list covered everything from demanding the FLIC members to abide by a policy of —neat dress“ to reminding them that —Rumor, hearsay, talking or side remarks regarding person can be destructive to all concerned“. The FLIC was to run a tight ship as rule #2 clearly illustrated, —Talking prohibited-not impressive.“39 The Committee hammered out not only its agenda, which was to stifle the NAACP and, in the process, delay and possibly halt integration altogether, but, also its plan of battle. The FLIC‘s main aim was to gather information in order to paint the NAACP with a treasonous brush and to achieve this end, they proclaimed that all witnesses who appeared before the Committee would be coerced into answering the questions put before them with the threat of contempt charges hanging over their heads.40 Charley Johns and his cohorts were soon to find out that this method would backfire. In spite of the fact that everyone knew the true intentions of the FLIC, they tried to soften their image by claiming —this committee is neither an accusing nor a trial body, but rather is an investigative arm of the state legislature.“41 These words advanced the FLIC as an agent of the people of Florida, working for the citizens‘ best interests. The Chief

37 —Anonymous Letter (name redacted) to Charley Johns“, April 10, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 3, folder 9 38 —FLIC Minutes“, September 11, 1956, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 16 39 —Rules and Regulations: Florida Legislative Investigation Committee“, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 23 40 —FLIC Minutes“, October 10, 1956, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 16 41 —“Rules and Regulations: Florida Legislative Investigation Committee“, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 23

118 Investigator of the FLIC was Remus J. Strickland, former head of the Tallahassee Vice Squad and the Chief Counsel was Attorney Mark Hawes of Tampa. The FLIC focused on other areas as well as on creating the foundation for the Committee itself. In order to convince the Legislature that the NAACP was in fact working as an agent of the Communist Party, the FLIC needed to conduct research on the —Red Menace“ itself. They obtained publications such as the Daily Worker, and scoured back issues in an effort to link the NAACP to the communists. They were able to find various minor connections including a 1937 publication entitled The Road to Liberation for the Negro People.42 With limited success, the FLIC ferreted out and collected the mailing list of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) as well as speeches and pamphlets published by various African-American Muslim organizations, including a speech given at the Temple of Islam with the seemingly incriminating title, —White Man‘s Heaven is a Black Man‘s Hell“.43 These endeavors produced scant connection between the NAACP and the African-American community in general and the communists but, the work of the FLIC was just beginning. Reverend C.K. Steele, president of Tallahassee‘s NAACP chapter, vice-president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and one of the founders and president of the Inter-Civic Council (Tallahassee‘s local SCLC affiliate), exclaimed, —we are not afraid of this legislative investigation [FLIC]“ upon hearing the news that Florida‘s state legislature had passed the bill creating the FLIC.44 In all reality, despite Steele‘s words of defiance, the African-American community took precautions to protect itself from the anticipated onslaught. The NAACP‘s national leadership requested that Florida‘s local chapters collect all of their records and ship them to the national office in New York which was completed shortly after the creation of the FLIC45. These protective actions would aid the NAACP later as the FLIC moved in for the kill in the courtroom. The FLIC relied heavily on cooperation from local police departments and governments to trace the actions of the NAACP. With the overall goal of halting

42 FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 19 43 —Publications“ FLIC Papers, box 17 44 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, February 3, 1957 45 Mark Hawes, Confidential Progress Report, January 17, 1957, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 21

119 integration, the Committee focused on bank accounts opened and maintained by the NAACP in an effort to trace their transactions and prove that the organization was bankrolling desegregation cases.46 Results varied as some banks were forthcoming with their information, while others were less compliant.47 A report given by the FLIC to the Legislature in December 1956 highlighted their findings. The report listed specific banks such as the Florida National Bank of Orlando and the Citizens National Bank of Orlando as ones where the NAACP had opened accounts. The report also listed the names of the individuals who had opened the accounts (although the information was later blacked out) along with the phone number they listed for contact information.48 A similar report from the same month indicated that the NAACP Legal Defense Fund primarily used the International Bank in Tampa for what the FLIC labeled —integration funds“.49 The reports further tried to establish links between the cities where the NAACP got their funds and integration movements. They noted that various —civil rights“ activities or —integration movements“ often occurred in cities soon after money was transferred into a local bank by the NAACP or a related group. The FLIC also contacted local law enforcement in order to locate areas in the state in which to target their efforts. They found that both St. Petersburg and Sarasota had incidents involving NAACP attempts at integrating swimming pools and local beaches. In the case of St. Petersburg, the NAACP filed a desegregation suit in local court while Sarasota was the site of a —wade-in“ to integrate the Gulf of Mexico. Both attempts at integration failed with Sarasota Police closing the beach in order to keep African- Americans from patronizing the segregated area.50 These disturbances bothered the Pork Choppers but, other areas were soon identified as hotbeds of —subversive“ activity. Gainesville had long been a site of NAACP activity and the case of Virgil Hawkins, prospective African-American law school student had yet to be resolved. The

46 —Letter from R.J. Strickland, Chief Investigator to All Chiefs of Police“, December 31, 1956, FLIC Papers, box 3 47 —Letter from Robert W. Milburn, Chief of Police, West Palm Beach and William M. Barnes, Chief of Detectives to R.J. Strickland, Chief Investigator“, January 8, 1957, FLIC Papers, box 3 48 —Report“, December 19, 1956, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 14 49 —Report“, December 13, 1956, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 14 50 —Letter from J.R. Reichert, Chief of Police, St. Petersburg to John Cye Cheasty, Chief Investigator, FLIC“, October 31, 1956, FLIC Papers, box 3: —Letter from R.N. Wilson, Chief of Police, Sarasota, to John Cye Cheasty, Chief Investigator“, FLIC Papers, box 3

120 FLIC‘s first witness was Hawkins, who was called into the Capitol Building in Tallahassee on February 4, 1957 to commence the Johns Committee‘s witch hunt.51 Hawes grilled Hawkins and his lawyer Horace E. Hill in an attempt to uncover whether or not the NAACP had funded his integration crusade at the University of Florida. Hawkins argued that the NAACP had not provided him with financial aid to the dismay of Hawes who had hoped for a clear cut admission. Hawes and the FLIC, however, were not going to take no for an answer. He continued the barrage in the hope that Hawkins would crack. Hawkins remained steadfast in his defiance, although the incessant questioning did wear on his psyche. His frustration is seen in the following response to Hawes‘ constant badgering:

Q: Have you ever received any monies from the… A: NAACP? Q: the NAACP Legal Defense Fund? A: For the 4th time, no sir.52

Hawes did have an ace up his sleeve and with a flare for drama, produced a check from the NAACP to Hawkins in the amount of $150 issued and signed by Edward D. Davis, co-chair of the NAACP‘s steering committee.53 Hawes and the FLIC rejoiced at seemingly trapping Hawkins in a lie but, in reality, this tie to the NAACP, ultimately, did nothing for their cause of halting integration or tying the civil rights movement to the —Red Menace“. Hawes tried to seal Hawkins‘ fate as a cog in the NAACP‘s wheel by proving that Horace Hill, his counsel, had been working on direct orders from Thurgood Marshall, Roy Wilkins and the national NAACP. When directly confronted with these —charges“, Hill was evasive and ultimately proclaimed, —No I wasn‘t representing the NAACP. I didn‘t consider myself as representing the NAACP.“54 When questioned further and presented with evidence that there were ties to Hill‘s work and the NAACP, the lawyer simply evaded the answer Hawes was searching for. These tactics frustrated

51 —Virgil Hawkins Testimony“, February 4, 1957, —Papers of the Florida Bar“, FLIC Papers, box 2, folder 5 52 —Virgil Hawkins Testimony“, February 4, 1957, FLIC Papers, box 3, folder 18 53 —Edward D. Davis Testimony“, February 4, 1957, FLIC Papers, box 2, folder 5 54 —Horace E. Hill Testimony“, February 4, 1957, FLIC Papers, box 2, folder 5

121 the FLIC and led committee member Cliff Herrell to lose his cool when questioning Edward D. Davis.

Q: you have stated in your opinion, and I believe you, that you feel that you have absolutely nothing to hide and, personally, your testimony has borne that out. Would you be at liberty to tell this Committee why, apparently, the rest of them are trying to cover and evade and ”I don‘t know‘ for two days here? A: No I am not, because I really have no knowledge that they are doing that; but I think, gentlemen, that it is very unfortunate that we succumb to hysteria. I think, basically, that the setting up of this Committee was done in a kind of hysterical situation setting, and I think it is very unfortunate that any NAACP people would succumb to that hysteria.55

This testimony proves that the true intentions and tactics employed by the FLIC were known to those being persecuted. It also illustrates the resolve of the NAACP and others to strike back at the FLIC and its witch hunt. The FLIC next moved where the iron was hottest to uncover —subversive“ activity in both Tallahassee and Miami, sites of recent bus boycotts. The boycott in the capital had started in May, 1956 when two female Florida A&M students had been arrested for refusing to abide by the city‘s Jim Crow transportation policies. In support, C.K. Steele helped to found and lead the Inter-Civic Council (ICC) based on the Montgomery Improvement Association and Baton Rouge‘s United Defense League which had both been successful in challenging white society in their respective communities. R. J. Strickland was familiar with bus boycotts having led the Tallahassee Police Department‘s response to C.K. Steele and the ICC. Strickland even went as far as to travel to Montgomery to establish ties between Steele and Martin Luther King, Jr., which were fairly obvious and did not need undercover work.56 The FLIC had support for its efforts from a wide range of sources within Florida and, especially, in Tallahassee. The capital city‘s newspaper stated that the bus boycott, which led to outbreaks of violence

55 —Edward D. Davis Testimony“, February 5, 1957, FLIC Papers, box 2, folder 6 56 —R.J. Strickland, Tallahassee Police Department Confidential Report“, no date, Collins Papers, box 139

122 aimed at African-Americans and, largely traced back to the Ku Klux Klan, was —a put-up job of un-American activity.“57 The fear of the —outsider“ was being manipulated by the FLIC and its allies as they framed the NAACP, ICC and, African-American society as being the enemy of white Florida and, more significantly, the United States. Hawes and the FLIC tried to intimidate FAMU and white Florida State University students who had participated in the boycott into making statements which would cast a shadow of guilt over the ICC and possibly the NAACP. Whether the two organizations were guilty of anything which violated state law was irrelevant in many cases and the FLIC merely aimed to cast the civil rights movement as evil. The students interrogated by the FLIC remained as evasive, if not more so than the previous witnesses who had been called to testify before the committee. Seeing their window of opportunity closing, Hawes changed tactics and called on —fear“ to help his cause. In the questioning of a white northern graduate student at Florida State, Hawes brought the subject of interracial dating into the arena. In what was supposed to be an investigation of the ICC and the Tallahassee Bus Boycott, Hawes asked John Boardman, who had been one of four white students arrested during the boycott, what the goals of the NAACP were. Boardman responded that he understood that they included the —elimination of any legal distinction between the races“. This was the break Hawes needed and he seized the opportunity:

Q: That applies to every phase of American life, does it? A: Yes Q: Including the prohibition against intermarriage between the races? A: To the best of my knowledge, the NAACP has not specifically interested itself in such cases58

In the end, however, the hearings in Tallahassee failed to halt the methodical breaking down of the walls of segregation and failed to tie the NAACP, ICC or any other African-American organization to the Communist Party. The Committee was able to uncover evidence which linked Robert Manning Strozier, President of Florida State

57 Tallahassee Democrat, June 30, 1956 58 —Testimony“, February 6, 1957, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 1

123 University, to the NAACP, but, this did nothing to halt integration or besmirch the president‘s reputation. The information was confirmed in a memo written by R.J. Strickland relating to a telephone conversation the chief investigator had with United States Congressman Robert Fulton Sikes, who represented a North Florida district in Washington. Congressman Sikes reported that although he did not have concrete evidence, he had the —privilege of reviewing the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington and had seen material contained therein showing that [Strozier] had been a member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People during his tenure at the University of Chicago.“59 Strickland went on to conjecture:

This within itself might explain the position that is being taken by [Strozier] in regards to the affiliation of various faculty and students at Florida State University in the local sit-down demonstrations by the negro people of Leon County, Tallahassee, Florida60

Despite this seemingly damaging evidence against Florida State University‘s president, in the end, the only positive to come out of the disclosure as far as the FLIC was concerned was the negative press which this created for the NAACP. The FLIC highlighted several instances in which they had caught witnesses in either an outright lie or stretching the truth. While these cases did not prove their guilt, they did raise questions about the moral integrity of the African-American community. At the end of February, Henry Land, Chairman of the FLIC, told the media that the Committee was shifting its focus to South Florida, a region that was always a thorn in the Pork Choppers‘ side. Land commented on the relocation of efforts to Miami by stating —we are particularly interested in suits to desegregate the schools that have been filed in Dade County.“61 There was no doubt in Miami that the NAACP had not only supported but, in addition, had led the African-American community‘s efforts to desegregate Dade County‘s schools. Theodore Gibson, an Episcopal minister and president of the local NAACP, led the charge in Miami demanding the integration of the

59 —Memorandum“, April 12, 1960, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 13 60 Ibid 61 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, February 25, 1957

124 city‘s buses along with schools.62 The initial assault launched against the Miami NAACP lasted only three days because the FLIC, once again, ran into a determined opposition. The NAACP‘s attorney, Gratton E. Graves, Jr. failed to produce membership records for the Miami and Liberty City branches of the civil rights organizations, claiming that Thurgood Marshall had requested that he send them to the national office in New York.63 The Committee returned to Miami in March, but not before they played the propaganda game through the media. State Senator Dewey Johnson, one of the founding members of the FLIC and one of Johns‘ closest allies issued a statement to the press in which he affirmed the obvious, —the NAACP is the mastermind behind integration suits.“64 Johnson went further and announced that the hearings in Tallahassee had proven without a shadow of a doubt that the NAACP was guilty of barratry, or bringing repeated legal actions solely to harass.65 Johnson called for legal action against the NAACP, ICC and, for good measure but, more importantly to keep up the appearance of a non-racially biased front, the KKK. The 1957 session of the legislature opened with FLIC being reissued a lease on life for two more years and Charley Johns being selected to replace Henry Land as Chairman of the Committee beginning in 1958. The second version of the FLIC included more stringent segregationists and Pork Choppers including Ben Hill Griffin, Jr. representing Frostproof in Polk County. FLIC members proposed five bills to the Florida Legislature in 1957 which, if passed, would make it easier for the committee to track the NAACP and other organizations in the future by forcing them to turn over their membership lists and other pertinent information when requested to do so. The bills did not specifically name the NAACP but, the wording made it apparent what organizations were being targeted.66 Another section of the bill prohibited an attorney working for an —association“ to represent the association‘s members. This was clearly aimed at the NAACP and the legal and financial aid it gave to those involved in civil rights litigation. The bills, which became known as the FLIC Bill or FLIC Package Bill, also introduced

62 Marvin Dunn. Black Miami in the Twentieth Century. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), Pp. 191 63 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, February 25, 1957 64 Ibid, February 8, 1957 65 Ibid, February 20, 1957 66 Ibid, April 5, 1997

125 communism into the picture by maintaining that the Committee had uncovered evidence —disclosing that Communist Party and other subversive organizations are seeking to agitate and engender ill-will between the races.“67 The campaign against the African- American community was now being billed as one of good versus evil, right versus wrong. Charley Johns and the FLIC had skillfully employed McCarthyist tactics in order to frame their struggle as a noble crusade and garner the undying support of Florida‘s citizens. They would use this —evidence“ when they returned to Miami to continue their molestation of the NAACP. The initial bills were not voted out of committee in the House but, this proved only a minor setback for the FLIC. L.B. Vocelle, a member of the House Judiciary Committee had commented that —we‘re not to hurt the NAACP…we‘re only going to hurt ourselves“ when defending the decision to squash the bill.68 Ralph J. Blank, Jr. of Palm Beach County addressed the concerns of many in the legislature when he stated —the question is whether we want to destroy certain liberties in order to preserve others.“69 Eventually a watered-down version of the bill which was now being called the —Race Act“ and was now vaguely worded passed 72-1.70 The final version of the bill afforded the FLIC with little if no power with which it could coerce the NAACP nor curtail its the actions. With these minor setbacks, Charley Johns looked towards the threat of the —Red Menace“ as his salvation. Before returning to Miami, the FLIC sought the testimony of former Communist Party member, turned —professional“ anti-Communist J.B. Matthews. His revelations provided the FLIC with motivation but no evidence of an actual link between the NAACP and the Communist Party.71 A week before making its first appearance in Miami since the abortive hearings a year earlier, Mark Hawes announced that the FLIC had a list of over 150 Communist Party members who had lived in Miami.

67 Florida Senate Bill 347, April 15, 1957 68 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 16, 1957 69 Ibid, May 7, 1957 70 Ibid, May 17, 1957 71 Ibid, February 11, 1958

126 Hawes never linked them directly to the NAACP but, he did set the stage for later accusations.72 The NAACP tried a new tactic to delay or cancel the scheduled hearings by taking the FLIC to court to question the committee‘s authority to subpoena witnesses, in addition to the constitutionality of the FLIC itself. Unfortunately for the NAACP, the courts ruled in favor of the FLIC, ordering the witnesses to appear and testify.73 Johns praised the ruling while finding time to also reassure Floridians that —this is not a prosecution committee but a committee of inquiry.“74 We plan to find out what is going on and to let the people know what the solution is“. Furthermore, according to the Starke native, —the committee wants to be fair.“75 The FLIC wasted no time in calling witnesses to the stand and immediately their efforts were met with varying results. Mrs. Crouch, called to the stand in late February, alleged that the NAACP in Miami had been infiltrated by communists. She, along with her husband, Paul Crouch, admitted that they themselves were both communists and former members of the NAACP. She divulged what the FLIC maintained was damaging and incriminating information. When asked about the infiltration, she responded:

A: Well, the Communist Party members were instructed to infiltrate the existing trade unions, the NAACP… Q: Right there: Is that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People that you are referring to? A: Yes Sir76

Not everyone was as forthcoming. Bertha Teplow, who had been a member of the Miami chapter of the NAACP only responded to the questions inquiring about her name and address77 Witness after witness followed Teplow‘s lead until the FLIC called

72 Bonnie Stark. —McCarthyism in Florida: Charley Johns and the Florida Legislative Investigative Committee, July 1956 to July 1965“. (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of South Florida, 1985), Pp. 34-35 73 Miami News, February 26, 1958 74 Ibid, February 26, 1958 75 Miami Herald, February 26, 1958 76 —Testimony“, February 25, 1958, Miami, FLIC Papers, box 4, folder 15 77 —Bertha Teplow Testimony“, February 26, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 4, folder 16

127 Reverend Edward T. Graham to the stand. Instead of maintaining his silence, Graham used the time to read a prepared statement which lambasted the FLIC and the hearings in general. Graham concluded his statement by proclaiming, —I am not a man of violence; rather, I am a man of peace.“78 Graham was not the only witness to lash out at the FLIC. Ruth Perry, a white ten year veteran of the Miami NAACP and columnist for the city‘s black newspaper, the Miami Times, exclaimed, —I consider the committee‘s demand for such records…invalid, and an invasion of my rights to due process of law and freedom of speech and association.“79 Committee member from Miami Springs Cliff Herrell was infuriated at Perry‘s defiance. He shot back that she was —not fit to be a citizen of the state of Florida…I think this is a disgrace.“80 Once again the FLIC used the fear of infiltration by —outsiders“ in order to further their cause. She was attacked further by J.B. Hopkins of Escambia County, who chided Perry by demanding:

How can you draw but one conclusion from the refusal of NAACP witnesses to testify that the organization that claims to be a shining and noble group dedicated to the betterment of race relations is not so noble and shining and that it is allowing communists to hide behind the skirts of the NAACP81

Reverend Theodore Gibson, who had helped to foil the plans of the FLIC in 1957, returned to the witness stand a year later and this time he saved his condemnation for Cliff Herrell who had just tried to bully and blacken the reputation of Ruth Perry. His scathing attack also derided the FLIC and anyone who dared to question the patriotism of the witnesses called before the Committee. He stated:

There can be no question in anybody‘s mind in Dade County as to my citizenship, I am an American citizen. I believe in the heritage of America. I believe in the Constitution of the United States. I would not permit this Committee or any other Committee to intimidate me nor to deny me my lawful Constitutional rights, and for such a reason, and none other, I want to state that I have not been a Communist; I am not a Communist; I am not a Communist sympathizer. I refuse,

78 —Edward T. Graham Testimony“, February 26, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 4, folder 16 79 —Ruth W. Perry Testimony“, February 27, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 4, folder 18 80 Ibid 81 Ibid

128 as of now, to answer any questions and I, therefore, consider myself no longer obligated to the Committee82

Hawes, who had been questioning Gibson, or who at least had thought he was going to interrogate the Reverend, stood in silence as Gibson left the stand and proceeded to walk towards the exit amidst a thunderous eruption of applause from the gallery. Hawes tried to stop Gibson by asking him, —you are now leaving the hearing room“, to which Gibson insolently replied, —I am sir.“83 At this point the FLIC members voted to hold Gibson and all others who had refused to cooperate in contempt of the Committee. By February 28 that number had grown to ten.84 The NAACP appealed the contempt charges, although, the state‘s high court did not side with the civil rights organization, it did delay the hearings. This delay was a minor victory for the NAACP. As a result the FLIC‘s investigations were all but shut down until May when a further hearing was set on the matter.85 The momentary triumph secured by the NAACP was shattered in June when the Florida Supreme Court ruled in favor of the FLIC, maintaining that they had not violated the witnesses‘ constitutional rights and, further, it called for the NAACP to turn over their membership lists when subpoenaed.86 This prompted Charley Johns to utter menacingly, —that‘s what we‘ve been waiting for“ and moved to re-open the hearings. The NAACP, however, much to Johns‘ chagrin, did not submit. New life was injected into their cause in late June when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NAACP in the case of NAACP v. State of Alabama, overturning a contempt charge levied by the Alabama high court.87 The ruling put the FLIC on the defensive as they tried to spin the decision in their favor. Mark Hawes maintained that it had no bearings on Florida because the FLIC dealt with possible —subversive“ activity and, therefore, the state‘s security was being protected by the Committee‘s actions.88 Once again, Hawes framed the battle as a conflict between good and evil by evoking McCarthyist images of the Cold War. Hawes was soon backed by the Miami Circuit Court judge ruling on the

82 —Theodore Gibson Testimony“, February 27, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 4, folder 18 83 Ibid 84 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, February 28, 1958 85 Ibid, March 18, 1958 86 Ibid, June 19, 1958 87 Ibid, July 1, 1958 88 Ibid

129 NAACP‘s latest appeal who ordered the NAACP witnesses to appear before the court and to answer the questions posed by the FLIC. In a controversial move, the judge evoked images of the Strom Thurmond‘s abortive 1948 campaign by rallying behind the states‘ rights banner. He acknowledged the supremacy of the Florida Supreme Court over the high court in Washington, asserting that he was bound to accept Tallahassee‘s ruling.89 The NAACP fired back immediately, appealing again to the Florida Supreme Court. The case, Theodore Gibson v. FLIC was again framed as a regional Cold War front by Hawes. Communism must be halted in its tracks and the NAACP was harboring enemies of Florida and the United States and the FLIC was merely looking out for the best interests of the state. The Florida Supreme Court heard all arguments and finally ruled on December 19, 1958. The high court, as expected, sided with the FLIC, ruling that the committee was constitutional, had the right to conduct —fact-finding“ investigations and, that state in general did have the authority to investigate subversive activity. There was no mention of what —subversion“ was, or more importantly, who defined these so called —un-American“ activities.90 There was, nonetheless, a positive in all of this for the NAACP. The long, drawn out appeals process basically postponed the FLIC‘s witch hunt for the rest of 1958. This not only frustrated the Committee but, also, allowed the NAACP valuable time to circle the wagons and prepare for new battles in 1959. In the interim, the FLIC was granted another two year extension but, Johns, privately was beginning to consider a shift of focus for the FLIC‘s investigations which would bear out in the following years. The NAACP was seemingly out of legal options in the summer of 1959 when the United States Supreme Court refused to hear the Florida Supreme Court case (Gibson v. FLIC). Johns was exuberant in spite of the fact that he had already decided the NAACP hearings were now to take a backseat as he shifted courses to an all out assault on what the Pork Choppers deemed immorality (homosexuality and liberalism) at Florida‘s universities. Johns publicly stated his approval of Washington‘s ruling by affirming, —our job now is to determine the extent of

89 Miami Herald, July 4, 1958 90 Stark. —McCarthyism in Florida“, Pp. 53-60

130 communist infiltration of the NAACP“. Johns continued by lambasting the NAACP by asserting, —the way those people [NAACP] defied the committee was ridiculous. I think we should go down there, bring them back and make them testify or put them in jail.“91 The frustration was also seen in the report filed by the FLIC to the Legislature in 1959. The report noted that, —Since February, 1958, the Committee has been subjected to numerous sustained legal assaults designed to destroy the Committee or to obstruct and frustrate the Committee‘s investigations until it expired.“92 The findings also included a list entitled —Report of Organizations, Publications and Findings Pertaining to Communists and Racial Agitation in the State of Florida“. This list included such organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), American Friends Service Committee, American Soviet Friendship Committee, American Association for the United Nations, American Jewish Congress, Black Muslims, The Communist Party, Congress for Racial Equality (CORE), NAACP, Progressive People‘s Party, Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. (SCEF), Southern Regional Council, State Chapter on Human Relations, United States National Student Association, Women‘s International League for Peace and Freedom, The Movement of the 20th of July Club, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and the Sobell Committee. These organizations were charged with being —active at this time throughout the South and are deemed to be the leaders, selected to promote dissension, agitation and turmoil of the public and the citizenry.“93 The report went on to list the publications each aforementioned organization issued including NAACP‘s The Crisis and SCEF‘s Southern Patriot before listing periodicals which countered the supposed communist threat. Publications such as Newsweek were mentioned as being —very informative and are constantly fighting the Red movement.“94 The hearing did resume in the capital city in November but by this point Johns and his allies were also confronted with a national and statewide civil rights movement growing more aggressive and militant by the day. Daytona Beach, Deland, St. Petersburg, Sarasota, Tallahassee and Tampa were rocked with lunch counter sit-ins led

91 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, June 23, 1959 92 —Report of the Florida Legislative Investigative Committee to the 1959 Session of the Legislature“, April 13, 1959, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 21 93 —Report of the Florida Legislative Investigative Committee to the 1959 Session of the Legislature“, April 13, 1959, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 21 94 —Report of the Florida Legislative Investigative Committee to the 1959 Session of the Legislature“, April 13, 1959, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 21

131 by students, many aligned with SNCC. In February 1960, Florida A&M students protested throughout the month, often bringing —normal“ life in Tallahassee to a grinding halt95. This newly found aggression shocked Floridians but the FLIC was now facing the stark reality that they had made little if no progress against the NAACP. They had been able to shape public opinion in their favor but they realized this would not help them halt integration. Governor Collins, shortly before leaving office, commented that —racial discord in America is following a Communist script, whether or not is written from the Kremlin.“96 Cliff Herrell, committee member from Miami, exclaimed that the new hearings in November would virtually decide the fate of the NAACP and the FLIC‘s investigation of the group. Reverends Gibson and Graham were called to testify along with Reverend Leon Lowry of the Tampa NAACP. It soon became apparent that nothing had changed in spite of the FLIC‘s court —victories“. The witnesses refused to answer questions, contempt charges were filed and the FLIC was seemingly thwarted. Reverend Lowry was even more defiant as the Tampa NAACP leader refused to return for the second day of hearings. This prompted the FLIC to issue a statement revealing that it was now impossible to —clean up the infiltration of Communist Party members into the NAACP.“97 In February 1960, the NAACP struck back at the FLIC by asking the courts in Tallahassee to allow them to question FLIC members including Hawes, Johns and Herrell. The NAACP issued a statement defending this course of action by claiming they were —entitled to know if the committee is raising ghosts and hobgoblins to scare the people or if we in South Florida are really in danger of communist infiltration.“98 The court demurred on the NAACP‘s request, conversely, ordering the NAACP to answer any further questions posed by the FLIC. This new hearing was set to take place in April since Hawes had fallen ill and again, the NAACP witnesses refused to answer the FLIC‘s probes. On May 26 the courts ruled once more that the NAACP did not have the right to question the FLIC members and further ordered NAACP members to appear before the

95 —Chronology of Demonstrations“, Collins Papers, box 48, folder 11 96 Tampa Tribune, March 16, 1960 97 Jacksonville Florida-Times Union, November 6, 1959 98 Ibid

132 FLIC in July and answer all questions asked.99 When they refused to do this, they were fined $1,200 each and sentenced to six months in jail. The ruling judge chastised the NAACP:

You may have been overly enthused over the activities of your organization, but in the view of this court to disobey a legislative committee is a serious matter. When the time comes, that a member of the NAACP or any other voluntary association can disobey a committee of the legislature of Florida and disobey a mandate of the state judiciary, democracy will crumble and freedom will be destroyed100

The Cold War had now seeped into the courtroom and McCarthyism was present in all aspects of the debate. The NAACP, again, appealed the case. The battle between the NAACP and the FLIC was turning into a war of attrition and the NAACP was now attempting to —outlast“ its adversary. Johns was growing impatient and the Committee was not showing the same zeal in their pursuit of the NAACP. The court‘s ruling proved a partial victory for the NAACP as Reverend Graham‘s rights were deemed to have been violated while Gibson‘s had not been infringed upon. The Florida Supreme Court maintained that the FLIC had not proven that Graham needed to answer when he was asked if he was a member of the NAACP. This decision opened the door for the NAACP who appealed the ruling on Gibson to the United States Supreme Court which finally ruled in favor of the civil rights organization in 1963, overturning the state‘s high court.101 The court in Washington further maintained that the FLIC had failed to link the NAACP to the Communist Party. This was a crushing blow to the FLIC who as early as 1958, in a report made to the Legislature, had maintained that through extensive research they had uncovered evidence that showed that 61% of the state NAACP leaders had —affiliations“ with Communist organizations.“102 The report further maintained that one third of these —offenders“ belonged to at least fifteen Communist groups. By 1963, the FLIC had lost most interest in the NAACP‘s alleged ties to the —Red Menace“ and the

99 Ibid, May 26, 1960 100 Ibid, August 30, 1960 101 Stark. —McCarthyism in Florida“, Pp. 83 102 —Communist Penetration and Influence on Organizations Operating in the South and the State of Florida“, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 21

133 Pork Choppers were embroiled in a life or death battle to save North Florida from reapportionment. The main victory for the FLIC during its decade long crusade against the NAACP was winning the publicity battle. This was no surprise as a majority of Floridians opposed integration in the 1950‘s and 1960‘s. They had linked individuals to the Communist Party including several Floridians who were members of the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF), an organization previously deemed to be a communist front by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC).103 Hawes and the FLIC had gone after the SCEF because C.K. Steele and other prominent Florida civil rights activists and NAACP members were on their mailing lists but they had no more luck in halting integration by discrediting civil rights leaders and the movement. As late as 1964 the FLIC kept tabs on SCEF and its actions and were especially concerned with the Florida Information Exchange and the Tallahassee Legislative Project, described as organizations formed by —friends of the civil rights and civil liberties“ in Orlando in March 1963. The purpose of these organizations, according to a letter obtained by the FLIC which originated in SCEF‘s headquarters in New Orleans, was to —keep information flowing among friends of integration, civil rights, civil liberties in all parts of Florida.“104 SCEF‘s actions and those of the confederation of organizations known as —Friends in Florida“ were of particular interest to the FLIC because they listed among their goals, efforts to directly challenge Pork Chop power in the Legislature. According to the —memo“ sent by SCEF, the Florida Legislative Project worked with the Tallahassee Educational Committee to create a list of —tasks“. They labeled one as an —immediate task“ and urged the importance of this endeavor. The —memo“ stated:

An immediate task is to elect to the Florida House and Senate people favorable to integration, civil rights and civil liberties. You are urged to contact candidates for these offices at once and get commitments from them on these issues. And, above all, get your friends in the organizations to do the same105

103 —Memo to Florida Friends of Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. from Jim Dombrowski“, November 19, 1959, FLIC Papers, box 3, folder 9 104 —Memo to Friends in Florida“, October 20, 1964, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 13 105 Ibid

134 The FLIC‘s investigation into the civil rights movement in Florida was more than an attempt to halt integration and discredit movement organizations such as the NAACP. The Pork Choppers viewed their efforts as part of their crusade to maintain power in the Legislature and, therefore, their dominance in Florida. Even though they eventually shifted focus to homosexuality and what they labeled —sexual perversion“, they did not abandon all efforts to attack and attempt to hinder integration and civil rights. In the early 1960‘s the Committee sent informants and undercover agents into meetings of local chapters of the NAACP and other civil rights organizations in last ditch efforts to gain ammunition for their losing battle. A report to the FLIC filed in 1964 highlights some of these efforts which took place in the early years of the decade. The report cited a Miami Herald article entitled, —Secret Agents Disclose Racial Plot in Florida“ from February 9, 1961 which also alerted the city and state to the presence and activities of the FLIC agents investigating the civil rights movement. The Herald listed a —Deland housewife and a Road Department employe (sic) who masqueraded as integrationists to get evidence for a Legislative Committee Thursday linked (name redacted) to an organized drive to end racial segregation in Florida.“106 The report also noted that a —grandmother and wife of a Deland dentist“ was the central witness at a —daylong hearing before the Committee investigating alleged Communist infiltration of the NAACP in Florida.“107 The Committee also employed some if its own members as well as locals to infiltrate civil rights meetings and organizations. One such undercover agent was a former FLIC secretary who attended integration meetings in Orlando and reported her findings to the FLIC. At the meeting she noted the presence of a —Miami Beach banker and member of the Dade County School Board“ as well as the —Director of the Florida Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union.“108 She commented that they gave speeches on different methods which could be used to motivate —church people behind the drive for desegregation“ and that the —church people will have to be made to feel that segregation is immoral.“109 This last segment directly countered everything the FLIC and, more importantly, the conservative Pork Choppers had preached for close to one

106 —Report“, July 14, 1964, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 6 107 Ibid 108 Ibid 109 Ibid

135 hundred years. They had used morality and immorality in order to frame their arguments in favor of racial segregation and discrimination and, now, the civil rights movement was co-opting the same arguments to meet their needs. While these investigations did not ultimately curtail integration or the civil rights movement, the report and the subsequent articles it alludes to, give valuable insight into some of the tactics employed by the FLIC. These experiences and procedures would prove beneficial and indispensable in the Committee‘s future endeavors in Gainesville. In 1961, the United States Civil Rights Commission issued a report listing states —doing the most to maintain racial segregation at public schools and colleges.“110 Florida was listed alongside Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina. The FLIC was the strongest bulwark in this opposition but, even they could do nothing more than publicly besmirch the reputation of the NAACP. While Floridians did not always agree with the lengths to which the FLIC went to disrupt the civil rights movement, many did agree with the ultimate goal and this was evidenced by the countless letters received by Charley Johns and other FLIC members. By linking the NAACP to the —Red Menace“, Johns and the FLIC were able to rally more support to their cause. The FLIC was transformed from a legislative committee instigating a witch hunt to a patriotic organization safeguarding the state‘s vital interests from encroachments from —outsiders“. Clinton Collins from Jacksonville wrote to Charley Johns in the late 1950‘s pleading with him to maintain the pressure on the NAACP. He wrote, —Will you please continue your investigation of the Communist NAACP until every one of the agitators are made known and brought into the open with their schemes to overthrow the American Government.“111 As they shifted focus elsewhere at the end of the decade, they still maintained an eye on the Civil Rights Movement and in February 1965, published a report on Martin Luther King, Jr.‘s campaign against segregation in St. Augustine that he had undertaken with the help of a local dentist, Dr. Robert B. Hayling and the local NAACP. It was in St. Augustine that King received aid from various Florida rabbis, providing the state‘s conservatives ammunition with which to again negatively portray Florida‘s Jewish

110 Miami Times, January 21, 1961 111 —Letter from Clinton Collins to Charley E. Johns“, April 19, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 3, folder 19

136 population as being —un-American“, —outsiders“, and too liberal. The report, aptly titled Racial and Civil Disorders in St. Augustine, labeled African-American males involved in the movement as —sexual predators“ working on advice from —outsiders“. The most notorious —outsider“ was Dr. King and, the pamphlet provided copies of letters sent from local NAACP members to King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as well as to President Lyndon B. Johnson asking for aid. They also linked King to communism in further attempts to soil his reputation and link the movement to the common enemy of the United States. The report re-iterated a historical theme that the implicit goal of the entire movement was to gain access sexually to St. Augustine‘s white women.112 Convincing the citizens of the merits of segregation and that the NAACP was an agent of the Communist Party did nothing to halt integration and the FLIC knew this by the 1960‘s. Furthermore, they were not even able to make many substantial links between the NAACP and Moscow. Facing these realities, Charley Johns and the FLIC moved away from their assault on what Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland referred to as —racial perverts“, replacing their African-American adversaries with a new target, homosexuals and Florida‘s liberal higher education system.

112 FLIC, Racial and Civil Disorders in St. Augustine. (Tallahassee, February 1965), Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida

137 INQUISITION

The desperate yet fruitless efforts of the Johns Committee from 1956-1960 to expose the NAACP as a communist front, and therefore a threat to the stability of Florida, convinced Charley Johns to aim his assaults elsewhere. Since the FLIC was forced to biannually justify its existence before the Legislature, Johns shifted the focus of the Committee to an investigation into the state‘s higher education system. Initially Johns claimed the FLIC would hunt communists in the system but it quickly became apparent that this was a daunting task likely to produce results similar to the war waged on the NAACP. Thus, Johns and the Committee focused their full attention on a more pliable, unsuspecting and vulnerable target, the —sexual preferences“ of the students but more crucially the faculty of Florida‘s universities. Johns once again turned to the former Tallahassee vice squad Chief R.J. Strickland, who had aided the Committee in its investigation into the NAACP, to lead this undertaking. Strickland would become the backbone of the FLIC and would pressure and coerce faculty members and students into admissions of guilt in order to help to purge the universities of what he perceived dire threats to the morality of Florida‘s citizens.1 The shift of the Committee‘s focus came at a time when the nation was also scrutinizing the private lives of teachers. Joseph McCarthy himself had initiated the correlation between homosexuality and communism as early as 1950 and the House Committee on Un-American Activities linked homosexuality as a blight on the field of education around the same time that Johns commenced his attack.2 While some claim that the shift in the FLIC was merely an offshoot of national affairs intended to contain communism, Florida‘s onslaught against homosexuals was part of a larger battle, one waged by Charley Johns and the Pork Choppers to preserve their way of life and, more importantly, their grip on the state Legislature. While the FLIC‘s investigation regarding homosexuality initially focused on the University of Florida, it soon branched out to

1 Stark. —McCarthyism in Florida“. Pp. 89 2 Richard Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959). Pp. 153

138 include Florida State University, the University of South Florida and, in the early 1960‘s the state‘s elementary and secondary education system. Charley Johns became obsessed with the horror of homosexuality after he shifted the focus to Gainesville and —sexual perversion“ and the Committee eventually aimed to root out all vestiges of what they believed was a disease within the state. The University of Florida proved an intriguing target for the campaign since chief counsel Mark Hawes had graduated from the Law School and even Charley Johns had attended classes at the Gainesville university without ever graduating. Furthermore, the school boasted other famous alumni within the state and many Pork Choppers and state legislators were alumni. Ben Hill Griffin, a member of the FLIC, legislator and self proclaimed —cracker millionaire“ from rural Frostproof in Polk County, had attended the University of Florida for three years in the 1930‘s and the school‘s football stadium bears his name today. George Smathers, conservative U.S. Senator who had ousted —Red Pepper“ and was a staunch anti-Communist, was a Florida alum who had used his ties to the university to aid in his election in 1950. Smathers would enter towns throughout the state in his campaign vehicles painted orange and blue to represent the University of Florida‘s school colors. Along with campaign speeches and slogans, speakers attached to the top of the vehicle blasted the school‘s fight song. Smathers also used the extensive Florida alumni organization in the state to establish ties in even the smallest Florida communities.3 Now, it was these conservatives who looked to attack the very school they held close to their hearts. Their goal was, however, not to discredit the University, but, rather, to —save“ Florida from sexual perversion and its link to communism. The FLIC was substantially more productive and successful in attacking the university system, especially the University of Florida than it had been with the NAACP. Professors and students at the University of Florida felt betrayed by their president J. Wayne Reitz who did little to impede the investigations and subsequent purge. Former Florida graduate Art Coletson, a closet homosexual —outed“ during the investigations, exclaimed that the FLIC —had all the power to destroy your life“. He claimed that he was surprised and appalled that —professors never seemed to challenge the police when they stomped into the classroom to interrogate us…they were silent because they were

3 —Smathers Campaign Materials“, campaign file, 1950, Smathers Papers, box 110

139 afraid“.4 Phyllis Meek, Associate Dean of Students at Florida in 1966, maintained that President Reitz was cooperative with the Johns Committee for the same reason professors and students did not combat the offensive; they were fearful of losing more than just their jobs. Reitz, according to Meek, feared that Tallahassee would withhold funding from the University if he did not comply with their demands and accommodate their needs.5 Before Johns and his cohorts could begin their assault, they had to insure that their actions were legal. If they found that aspects of their work did not meet the guidelines and criteria set forth by the Legislature and the state‘s statutes and laws, they would have to conceal and mask their efforts under the guise of containing the spread of communism. Before the initial meeting of the FLIC, a law office in Tallahassee was contacted to iron out details and to contact other states to inquire into similar practices within their borders. The firm of Parker, Foster and Madigan was charged with communicating with state legislators and lawyers in Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas and Illinois.6 The Chairman of the FLIC, State Representative Henry W. Land, wrote to the Attorneys General of ten fellow southern states in a further effort to obtain as much information about similar committees and investigations and reported to the FLIC that only one such body existed, the State Sovereignty Commission of Mississippi.7 Despite his audacity, Charley Johns was in a continual state of paranoia over the existence and actions of his committee. The fact that the FLIC had to justify its existence and fight for appropriations every two years only heightened his anxiety which motivated Johns to rationalize the need for the Committee by producing concrete results. As the FLIC altered their approach to initiate their assault against homosexuals, outside voices and opinions were sought to help validate their actions. Aside from famous conservative Pork Choppers such as Johns and Ben Hill Griffin, the Committee requested assistance from a wide array of professionals to aid their cause. The Advisory Committee to the FLIC was created and among its members were prominent doctors, academics, judges and state bureaucrats. Believing homosexuality to be a mental disorder, they enlisted the help of Dr. Julian A. Davis, Chief Psychologist at the Florida

4 Florida Alligator, April 14, 2005 5 Ibid 6 —Letter from Law Office of Parker, Foster and Madigan to Henry W. Land“, July 7, 1956, FLIC Papers 7 —Minutes of the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee“, October 10, 1956, FLIC Papers

140 State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Dr. Jack A. Kapchan, Professor at the University Of Miami School Of Medicine and Dr. Walter R. Stokes, who also doubled as a lawyer. Additionally the advisory board contained prominent individuals in the education field.8 Johns had at his disposal allies in almost every field that concerned the agenda of the Committee and used this advisory board to strengthen the position of the FLIC and to help validate its legitimacy. To complete the transition from investigating the NAACP and their futile attempt to halt the integration of Florida‘s schools, to protecting the morality of the state‘s institutions of higher learning, the FLIC required additions to their platform, one of which was a list of definitions of the new enemy, homosexuals. The Johns Committee utilized their newly created advisory board to produce new terminology for what they perceived to be —deviant behavior“ that was detrimental to their valued way of life. In spite of the fact that the FLIC was an extremist association, they were overly cautious as to the wording of the homosexuality and sexual behavior provisions of the Committee and solicited an outside group of psychologists and psychiatrists to amend the language of the report. The preliminary phrasing was harsh and judgmental making the board of doctors feel it went beyond the scope of previous definitions and rationality and would alienate moderates and hurt the validity of the FLIC. Almost all of their suggestions were taken into consideration as a new report was issued with numerous alterations known as —Fundamental Changes“. The group urged the dropping of the term —crime against nature“ to be replaced with the phrase —deviant sex conduct“ which they adopted from a similar Illinois Code. In fact, the FLIC also went as far as to adopt the entire —Illinois section on Public Indecency“.9 It should be noted that while Illinois and other states had these provisions within their state statutes, they did not act on the measures to actively and viciously assault their own citizens. The second approved proposal was to strike from public record, any mention of —animal-human sex relations“ to soften the tone of the

8 —Present and Past Members of the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee“, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 4 9 —Proposals of the Group of Psychologists and Psychiatrists to the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee“ FLIC Papers, box 1 folder 16

141 report.10 The proposal further called for the FLIC to not —penalize the sex conduct of mutually consenting adults, carried out in private, including those defined as —deviant sexual behavior“.11 This proposal was a key element in the FLIC mindset which noted that there were degrees of homosexuality. After listing their proposals, the group of mental health experts offered advice on other possible future steps the Committee could employ to aid their investigation. One of the most important advised steps which was adopted by the FLIC and put to use in later attacks on the universities of Florida and South Florida as well as Florida State University, was a stipulation that called for mandatory psychiatric examinations of all condemned so called sexual deviants in accordance with provisions 801.4 and 917.12 of the Florida Statutes. Further, the group called for a provision which would create a system of —outpatient psychiatric centers to which offenders on probation or parole may be assigned“.12 This proposal was approved by the FLIC as were two other suggestions on how to deal with those arrested. Provision #3 called for the —confidentiality of information relating to the first arrest for deviant sexual conduct…with provision that the confidentiality shall be waived upon conviction or a plea of guilty“.13 They also advised that the —second offense of deviant sexual conduct“ shall be placed in the jurisdiction of a —felony court…providing appropriate penalties upon conviction“.14 Johns, initially, was concerned with stopping the —recruitment“ of college students by older influential people such as professors and administrators. In Johns‘ mind, those who were sought out by people in power could be saved, cured and changed and ultimately returned to a normal heterosexual life.15 Fundamental change #4 proposed by the mental health expert stated that the FLIC should —penalize as public indecency any deviant sex conduct occurring in public“ as prescribed by the Illinois section on public indecency.16

10 Ibid 11 Ibid 12 Ibid 13 Ibid 14 Ibid 15 Charley E. Johns. —Homosexuality in Public Education“, Report of the FLIC, 1959, Collins Correspondence, box 101, folder 16 16 —Proposals of the Group of Psychologists and Psychiatrists to the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee“ FLIC Papers, box 1 folder 16

142 Mark Hawes and R. J. Strickland in particular consistently utilized the proposals but Strickland often interjected his own views and beliefs which countered the language adopted by the board of doctors in his investigations and interrogations. On one occasion these theories were buoyed and seemingly justified by the testimony of an admitted homosexual who, when describing the difference between what he referred to as —giving and receiving“, he used the phrase —animal lust“ to describe homosexual encounters.17 One of the final proposals offered to and accepted by the FLIC called for the utmost secrecy when charges of immoral sexual behavior were brought against members of the academic community.18 This last qualification confirmed Johns‘ obsession, allowing him to continue his campaign without outside interference by anyone who might bring into question the legality of the committee‘s actions. A letter from Strickland to Cliff Herrell, the original chairman of the FLIC, highlighted this practice and provided insight to other reasons for the maintenance of secrecy. In the letter, Strickland noted that the decision had been made, along with Superintendent of Public Instruction, J.B. Culpepper, to not:

Expose or revoke the certificate of these people [homosexual teachers] until the investigation is completed in the area that we are in now, as it might have a tendency to completely stop this investigation or to run them underground to the extent that it would be impossible to obtain such information as is necessary on the others19

The former Tallahassee Vice Squad Chief also noted that bringing the case into the public eye would alert other closet homosexuals in the teaching profession of possible action that would be taken against them, stating, —when a member of the Committee appeared (during the questioning in Gainesville), then these people began to bring in their attorneys and upon advice therefrom, ceased to give information which was vitally needed in that investigation“.20 In this regard, the work of the Johns Committee differed from the battle waged by Senator McCarthy and his allies on the national level less than a

17 —Testimony“, October 20, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 6, folder 146 18 —Proposals of the Group of Psychologists and Psychiatrists to the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee“ FLIC Papers, box 1 folder 4 19 —R.J. Strickland to Cliff Herrell“, December 15, 1959, FLIC Papers, box 3, folder 9 20 Ibid

143 decade before. McCarthy brought his struggle into the national spotlight in an attempt to discredit his opponents while Johns kept his actions under a veil of secrecy in order to combat against resistance and questions of the legality of his labor. The report made to the 1959 Legislature shed more light onto the motives that drove the FLIC members when they created their committee and, possibly of more consequence, shifted its focus to so called —sexual deviants“ in the late 1950‘s. —Part I“ of the report was broken down into sections with the second of these units illuminating the prevailing belief of the FLIC that homosexuality was a disease. The section was entitled —Medical Aspect“ and described in detail different forms of and treatments for homosexuality. The report maintained that the information was compiled with the aid of —highly qualified men“ and —from the statements of admitted homosexuals“. Based on the information they gathered, the FLIC surmised that homosexuality could be fought if —detected“ at an early stage and that it —varies greatly in degrees and in individuals“. This —immoral“ behavior was allegedly —cultivated by environment, association and habit“; they were —made by training, not born“. 21 While the FLIC claimed it could combat the spread of the disease, it also noted that:

There is no useful means of treatment for this problem save and except psychotherapy…all physical treatments, including drugs and shock treatments, have proven to be absolutely worthless…with respect to medical prognosis for cure, (stopping homosexual conduct), homosexuals fall into several classes, depending on such factors as age of the individual, the degree and extent of his homosexual conduct, the period of time over which he has engaged in same, and his individual desire to correct his sexual deviation…for the young person who can be brought to treatment at an early age and an early stage of his homosexual activities, and who had proper desire to help himself, the prognosis for cure appears to be good…after the age of 25, when the individual has been practicing for 3 or 4 years, the prognosis drops sharply and becomes practically nil by 3522

It was, therefore, essential for the FLIC to identify the root of the problem and eliminate the chance that the —disease“ could spread and affect teenagers and college age individuals. Johns and the FLIC worried that the state‘s universities were ripe breeding

21 —Report of the Florida Legislative Investigative Committee to the 1959 Session of the Legislature“, April 13, 1959, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 21 22 Ibid

144 ground for homosexuality and they, thus, looked to attack the perceived problem at its source, corrupting faculty members who had access to the young minds of Florida. The report noted that homosexuality on college campuses was on the rise but, they also claimed to have information that linked this unwelcome phenomenon to an earlier stage of education. In May, 1957, Ed Blackburn, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, requested an official investigation into possible cases of —homosexuality“ at the Southwest Florida Tuberculosis Hospital. He discovered that the Florida Sheriff‘s Bureau was eager to assist him as well as the FLIC who, under state Senator Fletcher Morgan of Duval County, was also investigating the state‘s tuberculosis hospitals for other reasons ranging from inefficiency to mismanagement.23 The investigation lasted only three days before the cover of one of the investigators was blown but, in that short span of time, the Florida Sheriff‘s Bureau was delivered the sworn statements of seven current and former employees of the Southwest Florida Tuberculosis Hospital who admitted to engaging in homosexual relations and —activities“ with other staff members.24 This investigation of the hospital was highly valuable to the future endeavors of the FLIC. Not only did it lay the structural groundwork for the witch hunt the Committee would pursue at the University of South Florida in the 1960‘s, it provided priceless lessons and experience that Strickland and others would employ in the coming years in Gainesville. Most importantly, and relevant to meeting the Committee‘s ultimate goal of solving the homosexual —problem“ in higher education was that the inquiry and investigation uncovered the names of supposed homosexuals working in the area‘s public school system. This was made possible by a phenomenon described by Victor S. Navasky in his 1980 work, Naming Names. While Navasky‘s study dealt with HUAC‘s investigation into the —Hollywood Ten“, the same situation occurred in Florida. This was McCarthyism at its worst. Navasky contended that human nature, for the most part, compelled individuals to look out for their own interests, even when this came into conflict with what was —right“. He noted that the accused or the defendant —waived the right to refuse to talk about others“ by talking himself. It was understood and expected

23 —Memo“, FLIC Papers, box 1 folder 14 24 —Don McLeod to Fletcher Morgan, May 23, 1957, FLIC Papers, box 3, folder 7

145 that witnesses would also serve as informants and informers and deals were often offered and created to lure the accused into implicating as many people as possible. Navasky further noted that HUAC was —in essence serving as a kind of national parole board, whose job was to determine whether the —criminals“ had truly repented of their evil ways…only by a witness‘s naming names and giving details…could the Committee be certain that this break with the past was genuine.“25 The same rules applied in Florida and the Sheriff‘s Bureau and ultimately the FLIC was able to ascertain the magnitude of the homosexual —problem“. The naming of names led to an accusation levied at the Dean of Boys at Tampa‘s Plant High School, who, in the process of being interrogated, supplied his interviewer with the names of sixteen males that he had —some sort of sexual contact with“. At the conclusion of the inquiry the number had grown to at least twenty five alleged —homosexual“ teachers in the Tampa area.26 Fortunately, the FLIC did not take any action on the findings as they were still embroiled in a heated battle with the NAACP but the information was a valuable asset for future investigations. Fletcher Morgan, who had collected the reports, and, more potently Charley Johns and the rest of the FLIC, came to the appropriate conclusion that many if not most of the state‘s public school teachers received their training at the state‘s universities, many at the University of Florida in Gainesville. Therefore, the FLIC, with their biased sensibility, surmised that the root of the problem could be traced back to Florida‘s college campuses. Johns noted that homosexual activity increased and became more prevalent as a student progresses up the educational scale and, therefore, the FLIC‘s shift in focus to rampant homosexuality was justified.27 More importantly, and disconcerting to Johns and the FLIC was the belief that —a surprisingly large percentage of young people are subject to be influenced into homosexual practices if thrown into contact with homosexuals who desire to recruit them.“28 As noted earlier, the FLIC had determined that homosexuality could be treated before the age of 25, thus concluding that if they attacked homosexuality at the university

25 Victor S. Navasky. Naming Names. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980), Pp. ix 26 —Testimony“, February 6, 1959, FLIC Papers, box 7, folder 15 27 —Report of the Florida Legislative Investigative Committee to the 1959 Session of the Legislature“, April 13, 1959, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 21 28 Ibid

146 level they were not only —curing“ those students afflicted with the —immoral“ ailment, they were also protecting the next generation of Florida‘s youth from being infected. The process was cyclical. Stop the homosexual professors at the state‘s universities from transmitting their disease to their students and this, in turn halts the spreading of the disease to Florida‘s youths once the college students become educators themselves. With the particulars mapped out, R. J. Strickland set out to conduct an in depth investigation of sexual behavior at the University of Florida. Rumors and speculations circulated as to why Johns had targeted the state‘s most prestigious university. Some claimed that the senator initiated the investigation at the behest of his son, Jerome Johns, a student in Gainesville, who in 1958 had allegedly alerted his father to the presence of homosexual teachers at the university.29 Others maintained that race relations brought the FLIC to Gainesville as it had to Miami and Tallahassee in the preceding years and that homosexuals were an afterthought that were soon transformed into the main target and objective of what now could truly be called the Johns Committee. The Florida Alligator, the University of Florida‘s student run newspaper ran a story in October 1958, which claimed that FLIC member Bart Knight stated they had shifted focus to Gainesville to probe liberal professors who were encouraging race-mixing and integration.30 Charley Johns, new Committee chair at the time, in a report issued to Governor LeRoy Collins and the state Legislature assured that the FLIC‘s interest in Gainesville was due to —numerous complaints“ issued to the body from a wide range of unnamed sources throughout the state.31 A conversation between R.J. Strickland and R.H. Gore, founder, publisher, chairmen, and editor of the Fort Lauderdale News (now the Sun-Sentinel) and also former Treasurer of the Democratic Party and Governor of Puerto Rico under President Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s administration, also shed some light onto Johns‘ motives for targeting Gainesville. Strickland, who reported on his conversation with Gore in a —Statement of Facts“ presented to the FLIC in 1958, noted that the discussion centered

29 Stark. —McCarthyism in Florida“. Pp. 92 30 Gainesville Florida Alligator, October 31, 1958 31 Johns. —Homosexuality in Public Education“, Collins Correspondence, box 101, folder 16

147 around —certain activities at the University of Florida.“32 Gore had also been a member of the Board of Control and that he had been alerted by a student and the student‘s father that:

Certain activities existed in the University and that this student in particular had been approached by members of the faculty in regards to homosexual activity on his part, to the extent that they wanted him to participate in such activity33

Gore told Strickland that he had authored a letter to the President of the University of Florida, Dr. J. Wayne Reitz, calling to his attention to the —situation“. In addition, Gore had met with Reitz on two other occasions to discuss the potential problems at his school. Gore mentioned that Reitz had met with the student and his father but that the newspaper mogul could not recall the names of the faculty members implicated by the student. Gore, according to Strickland, was —deeply concerned“ with the situation and —offered, with permission of the Committee, to place a man in the University of Florida, at his own expense, as an undercover agent to help clean out such activities that might exist in the homosexual field.“34 Strickland was, indeed, thankful that Gore had alerted him to the severity of the situation and of his willingness to aid in any future investigations but, he was leery of a separate investigation which might jeopardize any future undertakings of the FLIC. Whatever brought the FLIC to Gainesville, likely a combination of events and charges, their focus was now clearly on homosexuality, more importantly, how to halt the growing —cases“ of the disease and —cure“ the patients while they were under the age of 25. As early as 1954, before the FLIC was created, the University of Florida had grappled with the possible presence of homosexuals on the Gainesville campus. According to testimony taken by the FLIC in 1959, five years earlier a UF student had been forced to dropout of the University because of, what a psychiatrist labeled insanity. During the testimony, the psychiatrist alluded to the fact that the student had been —involved in some homosexual relations at a chicken ranch“ outside of Gainesville, thus

32 —Statement of Facts by R.J. Strickland, Chief Investigator, FLIC, re Conversation with R.H. Gore“, August 18, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 28 33 Ibid 34 Ibid

148 the cause for his insanity and forced resignation from the school.35 In spite of the fact that University of Florida President Reitz‘ was concerned over a perceived homosexual —problem“ at the school, the University took no action, nor did the Alachua County Sheriff‘s Department a year later when a student informed the sheriff of plans for a —homosexual party“ at the chicken ranch. Evidence of interest in the matter did not surface until 1957 at a time when the FLIC was beginning to show frustration over their lack of progress in halting integration by attacking the NAACP. Then, the Committee seemingly concerned itself with the rumors about the —situation“ in Gainesville. In October, 1957 Charley Johns read a statement in which he told the Legislature that the Committee had employed R. J. Strickland to travel to Gainesville for a short period of time to lay the groundwork for future investigations. Johns noted that Strickland was to —investigate a matter…and report his findings to the Committee.“36 Johns was still being vague and obtrusive but the focus of the FLIC had clearly shifted and this was revealed in September of the following year when the FLIC sketched the degree to which the University of Florida had a —problem“ with homosexual professors and students. This revelation was made to the Board of Control which, at the time, oversaw the state‘s university system.37 Johns realized that Pork Chop power was waning in the 1950‘s as onslaughts coming as a result of the Brown decision, coupled with the increasing liberalization of South Florida due to the constant influx of —outsiders“ increased. As Johns understood, this threatened to culminate in South Florida‘s wresting power from the conservative rural northern region. McCarthy had tied homosexuals to Communism as early as 1950 in an effort to weed out those he viewed as —deviants“ out of American government. Ironically, through the aid of his top counsel, and closet homosexual Roy Cohn, McCarthy maintained that the secrecy and —closet“ lifestyle of homosexuals exposed them as easy targets for communists. Charley Johns was deeply concerned with the —spread“ of homosexuality because Johns was terrified of the connection between the —disease“ and communism.

35 —Testimony“, January 22, 1959, FLIC Papers, box 7, folder 13 36 —Minutes of the FLIC Meeting“, October 2, 1957, Papers of the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, 1955-1965, box 9 37 —Minutes of the FLIC Meeting“, September 27, 1958, Papers of the Office of the Clerk of the House, box 9

149 The Pork Choppers and their conservative allies were caught up in the Cold War hysteria even after Joe McCarthy‘s death in 1957 and Johns was a strong proponent of containing communism at all costs. It was McCarthy‘s belief that communists could use the threat of public exposure, or —outing“ of the homosexual to bribe them into divulging national security or classified government information.38 This theory which labeled homosexuals as being ripe for subversion was not discovered or even introduced by McCarthy. In fact, it was not an American phenomenon. Almost half a century earlier, a case involving alleged espionage and homosexuality shook the Imperial and Royal Army of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The —Blackmail of Colonel Redl“ as David K. Johnson labeled the incident in his 2004 work, The Lavender Scare, was cited in 1950 during the Hoey Investigation into homosexuality in the United States Government. Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) relayed the story of Alfred Redl, the head of Austrian Intelligence in the years leading up to World War I. According to Hillenkoetter, Tsarist Russia became aware of Redl‘s homosexuality and used this information to blackmail him into becoming a double agent and subsequently selling Vienna‘s most highly guarded secrets to St. Petersburg in return for complete silence concerning the colonel‘s sexual orientation which would have had him dishonorably dismissed from the ultra-conservative Austro-Hungarian Army.39 Hillenkoetter, in an effort to emphasize his fear of subversion and aid Senator Clyde Hoey‘s (D-North Carolina) investigation into homosexuality in Washington‘s political circles, exaggerated the role homosexuality and blackmail played in what has become known in history as the —Redl Affair“. Redl, according to David K. Johnson, was a homosexual and a double agent working for the Russians, but it was Redl, and not St. Petersburg that was issuing the demands and calling the shots. Redl was involved in espionage against his country for monetary and egotistical reasons. Redl was part Ukrainian and part Hungarian and felt he had never been truly accepted by the officer corps in the Austro-Hungarian Army.40 Both of the these reasons led him to betray Kaiser Franz Josef‘s Army but, the —Redl Affair“ as

38 Rovere. Senator Joe McCarthy. Pp. 153 39 David K. Johnson. Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), Pp. 108 40 Ibid, Pp. 109

150 introduced by Hillenkoetter seemingly illustrated the threat homosexuals posed to national security and, therefore, Johns felt his fears and subsequent actions were justified due to this threat. Professor James Congleton of the University of Florida‘s English Department, one of the casualties of McCarthyism in Florida, became a key informant for Strickland and the Committee. Congleton‘s testimony also lent credence to Johns‘ beliefs that homosexuality was a disease which was spreading throughout the University of Florida and one, that if not checked, would spread to all corners of the Sunshine State. Furthermore, Congleton, in his testimony, in Johns‘ eyes, linked homosexuality to a larger threat. For Johns, homosexuality was an affront to the lifestyle Americans, Southerners and, most importantly, Northern Floridians had become accustomed to. Any assault on this cherished way of life was an attack on the Pork Chop Gang and their power. It also opened Florida up to infiltration by any and all —outsiders“, the enemy of the conservatives. In being interrogated by Mark Hawes, Congleton brought Johns‘ fears and beliefs to the forefront:

Q: Doctor [Congleton], is there any doubt in your mind that the time has come for someone to break up this thing [homosexuality] out here at this University? Don‘t you think that the welfare of the state and the students that go through this school dictate that some brake be put on this thing out there? A: Mr. Hawes, I would like to see the most powerful brake that could be put on it, without, of course, causing too much suffering and too much tragedy41

Later in his testimony, Hawes‘ leading questions resulted in Congleton seeming approval of the FLIC and the work it was doing in Gainesville and throughout the state. Congleton also tied homosexuality to the larger interests of the state as Hawes had previously done and, furthermore, appeared to substantiate Charley Johns‘ consternation.

Q: Doctor [Congleton], you have said it was kind of like a cancer? A: Yes sir. Q: Don‘t you think that it had gotten bad enough that the government ought to attempt to do something about it? I mean it is beyond my imagination. I mean I just didn‘t realize that that kind of thing went on like it does.

41 —James Congleton Testimony“, January 5, 1959, FLIC Papers, box 6, folder 160

151 A: Well, I think maybe the government should do the kind of work that the Police Department here has done. Q: I mean it could spread over the whole country. That is what I‘m talking about…42

Johns was shocked at the high level of homosexuality at the University, a condition he proclaimed was —absolutely appalling“ and thus, he sent R.J. Strickland to Alachua County to begin the FLIC‘s investigation into the —corruption“ of Florida‘s future.43 To the outsider it seemed as if the FLIC had fallen off of the face of the earth and this was the exact reaction Johns wished to promote. Strickland had spent the summer of 1958 creating a secretive ring of informers among students at the university, many of whom were friends or acquaintances of Jerome Johns. The University of Florida and the Gainesville community were in the dark about Strickland‘s project for months and many were shocked when it was discovered since the school was the oldest and most respected institution within the state and many, if not the majority of Florida‘s lawmakers were alumni.44 This latter fact is one reason why Strickland strove to keep the investigations out of the public arena. The primary objective in Strickland‘s work, similar to the investigation of the Southwest Florida Tuberculosis Hospital, was to collect names and encourage those questioned to provide lists of more people involved in homosexual activity. Strickland was using the same McCarthyist tactics Navasky described in Naming Names and his efforts were soon to bear fruit. Strickland‘s work, the FLIC hoped, would provide the Committee with more than a mere list of names. It would also assess the —level“ of homosexuality of those under scrutiny and, therefore, highlight which, if any were capable of being saved, cured and changed.45 Strickland also elicited aid from local law enforcement and state law enforcement agencies who felt an allegiance to the former vice squad chief. Some of the campus police and highway patrol even posed as students to help swell Strickland‘s ranks of informers. Not everyone who was approached to aid in his homegrown McCarthyism answered the request favorably. Several homosexual students at Florida who were

42 Ibid 43 Johns. —Homosexuality in Public Education“, Collins Correspondence, box 101, folder 16 44 Stark, —McCarthyism in Florida“, Pp. 91 45 Johns. —Homosexuality in Public Education“, Collins Correspondence, box 101, folder 16

152 approached by police wanting to turn them into informers declined the offer.46 Strickland set up a headquarters at a local Gainesville hotel, the Thomas Hotel, and his —interrogation suite“, room 202, quickly became a symbol of the movement. Strickland moved to establish the locations in Gainesville that were frequented by the city‘s homosexual population and his efforts reaped immediate benefits. The chief investigator also bullied alleged homosexuals, known as —witnesses“, to take Strickland to various establishments in and around Gainesville which were often frequented by homosexuals. In a progress report presented to the FLIC in October, 1958, Strickland stated that —questioning of several subjects, mainly students at the University of Florida has revealed a considerable homosexual operation being in existence at the above stated university.“47 The report listed the names of informers and the information they provided for the committee. The first informer afforded Strickland with valuable insight into a homosexual —hot spot“. The report read:

[Name redacted] Although not very cooperative at beginning of deposition, later admitted his Participation in homosexual activity at the University of Florida.

[Name redacted] Although not a homosexual is very helpful and is now continuing to work in close cooperation with the investigator of this committee.48

From these two anonymous sources, Strickland learned that —three subjects who formerly worked at the Burger House as part-time bartenders and were also students at the University of Florida might have considerable information in re of above stated investigation“49. Strickland went on to list the three former Burger House employees, whose names were also subsequently redacted. These subjects were contacted by Strickland and asked to help in the investigation. They replied that they needed time to ponder the request and ultimately denied the FLIC‘s call for aid. Despite their refusal, they were not forgotten by Strickland. The FLIC had already constructed an in-depth informant structure and, through this network they were able to locate a one time

46 Gainesville, Independent Alligator, October 2, 2000 47 —Progress Report of Chief Investigator, R.J. Strickland in RE University of Florida Investigation, for the Week of September 29, 1958 thru October 16, 1958“, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 28 48 Ibid 49 Ibid

153 roommate of one of the former Burger House employees who was also an alumnus of the University of Florida whose address was currently listed in Miami. Strickland‘s report noted that a deposition was taken from this individual who provided the investigator with more names and leads. Working with this information at hand, Strickland located another informer and after interviewing him stated that —deposition was taken from one [Name redacted] who was very cooperative although not being a homosexual furnished this Investigator with several names who were possible homosexuals at the University of Florida.“50 With this information gathered, Strickland set out to act on the knowledge he had plied from the —witnesses“. He convinced one of the alleged homosexuals to accompany him to the Burger House in order to identify other homosexuals. In return for his assistance, Strickland basically gave the informer immunity by not ordering him to undergo psychiatric evaluation and treatment for his —disease“. He proclaimed that even though he had admitted to participation in homosexual activity, he had never —committed the act“ himself so he did not need treatment. Strickland warned and advised the informer to deal with the problem, since it was a problem, on his own. The relieved witness replied, —I mean, fact is, there never has been a time in my life when I didn‘t like women. I mean, I am a queer for women. Let‘s put it that way!“51 This small interchange illuminates the true motives of Strickland and the FLIC as well as the context in which he was working. They were not interested in the individual homosexual but, rather, in getting to the root of the problem and attacking the —disease“ as a whole before it could do any more damage. The investigation into the Burger House employees revealed the depth of the —problem“ in Gainesville and also illustrated the success of the tactics utilized by Strickland, mainly the creation of the informer ring in addition to the phenomenon which Victor Navasky wrote about in Naming Names. It is human nature to be self-protective, even if that means sullying the reputations of others, even friends and associates. This scenario, fostered by fear, would play itself out over and over again throughout the Committee‘s stay in Gainesville.

50 Ibid 51 —Testimony“, January 6, 1959, FLIC Papers, box 7, folder 2

154 There were, exceptions to the rule, however, as noted earlier. The progress report filed by Strickland in the fall of 1958 mentioned a student who was not as forthcoming with information. He was contacted and interviewed and admitted that he was aware of homosexual students at the University as well as faculty members. Unfortunately for Strickland, he refused to name names, maintaining —it was against his code of ethics to meddle into other peoples business“. Moreover, he also denied subsequent attempts by Strickland who was insistent that he divulge the seemingly valuable information he possessed.52 Strickland was also able to infiltrate several fraternities at the University of Florida and question members who were willing to disclose information on homosexual activity. An anonymous member of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon (SAE) fraternity approached the investigator and stated that while he was not a homosexual and that he could not presently name any homosexuals, he had been —approached“ on several occasions and propositioned by homosexuals and would try to obtain the names of those students who had made passes at him in the past.53 Other fraternity members alerted Strickland of a house in nearby Cross Creek which was known to be a meeting place for homosexuals. Strickland acted quickly on this tip and set up surveillance of the house and was able to compile a list of suspects for his investigation. As an example, the list included the name (which was redacted) along with the license plate number (also redacted) and that the car was registered to the student‘s father in Hollywood, Florida. Strickland noted that the student in question lived on N.W. 7th Avenue in Gainesville and had been observed attending —meetings“ at the Cross Creek house. Other students who attended various functions at the house included one from Utah who was viewed in the company of three other students attending a dinner party at the house, all duly noted by Strickland.54 Strickland acted on the information and interviewed several of the students who had been seen entering the Cross Creek house and even followed some of them to other locations in the area including the Thirsty Gator Bar in Gainesville. Through contacts

52 —Progress Report of Chief Investigator, R.J. Strickland in RE University of Florida Investigation, for the Week of September 29, 1958 thru October 16, 1958“, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 28 53 Ibid 54 Ibid

155 made at the aforementioned bar, Strickland was able to learn that a subject who frequented the establishment was a homosexual and also employed by the University of Florida as a pharmacist in the University‘s infirmary. Once interviewed, he was forthcoming with Strickland and alerted him to the fact that he suspected that a professor (Name redacted) at the school was a homosexual. The report noted that other students who Strickland questioned provided similar information regarding the faculty member. Along with the professor, the pharmacist fingered his boss, who ran the University Pharmacy as being a homosexual —for the reason that he on numerous occasions surrounds himself with boys, individually and in groups both throughout the University and his home.“55 Strickland also discovered his property was the same one in Cross Creek that the FLIC had under surveillance. Strickland must have been ecstatic. This was seen as true breakthrough because, while homosexuality among the student body was a concern, locating faculty members and others in position of authority was essential and a key to the investigation. The Johns Committee had previously established that homosexuality was a learned trait and that the students were in the most vulnerable position and were the easiest target for exploitation by those in power, in this case teachers. Attacking the —problem“ in its infancy and not allowing for the proliferation of homosexuality would ultimately aid the overall goals of the Pork Choppers; preserving their power. The spread of homosexuality, which they and others linked with communism and liberalism and other dreaded —isms“, ran counter to the —morality“ cherished by the conservative North Florida politicians. Further investigation also uncovered various other houses which were identified by informants as meeting places for homosexuals. One such house, owned by John Reynolds was noted in a —Confidential Report“ presented to the FLIC in the summer, 1958. The account included a list of visitors to the house, most of whom were tied to the academic community in Gainesville on some level. One of those identified was recognized as a former professor at the University of Florida who had been fired by the Gainesville university for his refusal to testify in 1955 in front of HUAC. He continued to reside in Gainesville and allegedly kept close ties to the University faculty and

55 Ibid

156 entertained various members at his residence on numerous occasions.56 Surveillance of the ex-professor‘s home provided the FLIC with a list of possible homosexuals. Apparently, these men were guilty by association. The visitors were identified as an instructor at P.K. Yonge Laboratory, a school connected with the University of Florida, a member of the Association of Psychological Clinic at the University of Florida, a University professor of Education, along with instructors of Social Sciences and Speech. All of these visitors were identified by their cars whose license plates were recorded by the surveillance team. The FLIC investigation of the Reynolds family continued until it was discovered that another guest at the house played an active role in the Gainesville Little Theatre which was affiliated with the University. They also noted a professor of Botany who used to live next door to John Reynolds. More importantly for Strickland and the Committee, this professor was known to take —trips“ with Reynolds and also had been —very active in the local PTA Association and is considered one of the worst ”Pinks‘ of that area“57. It is not clear whether or not the report‘s allusion to —Pinks“ was in reference to alleged homosexuality or ties to Communism, both of which are tied to the color pink. The investigation also uncovered an Associate Professor of Music who upon being interrogated and interviewed by another informant, named names of other homosexuals in the community, including one who headed the Summer Operetta at the University of Florida.58 The opening Strickland was looking for came when his informants ascertained that the men‘s restroom at the Alachua County Courthouse was a common meeting place for the city‘s homosexual population. Strickland acted swiftly by installing secret cameras inside the bathroom along with planting his informants as part of elaborate stake-outs in an attempt to defile the reputation of the faculty.59 Strickland was alerted to what he referred to as the —situation at the courthouse“ by several homosexuals he questioned who were delivered to him in Room 202 by his watchdogs or local law enforcement. One such informant, Bill Tilletson a part-time member of the University of

56 —Confidential Report of Informant–Gainesville, area“ June 1-June 8, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 14 57 Ibid 58 Ibid 59 Stark. —McCarthyism in Florida“. Pp. 94

157 Florida Police Department, brought an unidentified man to room 202 and proceeded to attempt to entrap the unsuspecting man into soliciting, what Strickland referred to as —homosexual relations“. After a couple of minutes, Strickland entered the room and confronted the anonymous man with accusations of homosexuality and indecency. Caught completely off guard, the man confessed to being a homosexual and claimed to have engaged in homosexual activities for the past two years while being a student at the University of Florida. He refused to identify any of his former sexual partners but did state that he was aware of numerous homosexuals among the student body and faculty. The break for Strickland came when the man identified the restroom at the courthouse as being a meeting place for homosexuals and also revealed the late afternoon and early evening as the time when many of these incidents occurred.60 With this information in hand, Strickland initiated his operations targeted at University faculty and his endeavors were met with immediate successes. A report from Strickland to the FLIC in December 1958 contained the story of an English professor at Florida who solicited sex from an undercover officer at the county courthouse. The officer asked the professor to accompany him to the county jail where he proceeded to interrogate him. The professor admitted to being a homosexual and claimed that the first time he noticed a —tendency for homosexuality was at the age of five, when he was observing a bunch of boys swimming“. He asserted that he —had a great desire for them“61. When threatened with the loss of his job, he pleaded that he had been in the process of —trying to correct his trouble for the past three years“ by seeing a psychiatrist in Jacksonville. This was the opportunity Strickland and Johns had been waiting for. In fear of losing his job, the professor cooperated fully with the investigators and named a colleague in his own department as being a homosexual along with the Assistant Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, an instructor of Music and two professors in the Humanities Department. The professor went further by naming a student he knew to be homosexual and promised to aid the investigation in the future in any way possible.62

60 —Statement of facts gathered by R.J. Strickland in Room 202, Thomas Hotel“, August 19, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 28 61 —Statement of Facts“, December 5, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 28 62 Ibid

158 Three days after the interrogation, the English professor called the University Police Department and submitted an additional list of homosexuals which included a lecturer in the English Department as well as another professor in the same department, the Head of the Geography Department and a Management and Business Law professor. In return for the list of known homosexual faculty members, the professor requested immunity and asked if his admission of homosexuality would jeopardize his standing with the University. The interrogating officer notified him that the case was no longer under his jurisdiction and all future recommendations and decisions would be made by the Gainesville Police Department and ultimately any higher authorities which one can surmise was an allusion to the FLIC.63 Concluding his report on the incident, Strickland noted that this informer seemed a potentially valuable asset to the FLIC and should be kept in his position, at least until his information was no longer deemed beneficial to the committee.64 The Geography professor, Sigismund Diettrich was called before the FLIC in January, 1959 to testify to the allegations of homosexuality against him. Later that year he described the hearings in a letter to Raymond Crist, one of his colleagues in the Geography Department. Diettrich‘s recollection of the interrogation underscored the earth shattering and life altering power of the FLIC. He noted that —after about an hour and a half they were through with me and my life work was in shambles.“65 Diettrich was subsequently fired after a brief meeting with President Reitz and attempted suicide by ingesting 85 aspirin tablets and climbing onto the windowsill of the Geography Building. Diettrich described what happened next to Crist: —I climbed up and looked down onto the cold wet concrete sidewalk. I turned yellow. I could not jump.“66 Diettrich‘s letter to Crist also highlighted the remorse he felt for his actions. His words illuminated the feelings of the time towards homosexuality. Rather than admit to being a homosexual, Diettrich lamented the choices he made which led to homosexual activity. According to him, he was a participant, not a practicing homosexual. He had been

63 Ibid 64 Ibid

65 —Sigismund Diettrich to Raymond Crist“, March 24, 1959, Florida Legislative Investigation Committee Folder, University of Florida Archives, George Smathers Libraries, Gainesville, Florida 66 Ibid

159 temporarily afflicted with a disease which rendered his better judgment useless and allowed him to make poor decisions in his life. In his own words, Diettrich exclaimed, —Oh Lord, how I have hurt the only woman I ever loved and cared to love. Our happy marriage was not a mirage but it was a true reality. That other phase was merely a dark, frightful animal instinct that every now and then unleashed itself…It was like being possessed.“67 Not only did Diettrich refer to it as a phase, he tied homosexuality again to —animal instincts“, common language used to describe homosexuality in the 1950‘s and 1960‘s. Further investigation into the —situation at the Courthouse“ uncovered more of the homosexual —ring“ in Gainesville. A forty-seven year old resident of Hawthorne, a town just outside Gainesville, admitted to Strickland and Tilletson that he traveled to Gainesville on occasion for the specific purpose of engaging in homosexual activity in the Alachua County Courthouse restroom. In a —Statement of Facts“, Strickland noted that the subject had been admitted to the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee and another institution in Augusta, Georgia for his homosexuality. Strickland, furthermore, referred to him as a —mental case“ and despite the fact that he provided the Committee with valuable information concerning the alleged homosexuality of two University of Florida professors, the investigator concluded that —testimony from this witness would not be acceptable due to his incompetency“ and that they did not —seek further information or cooperation from this subject.“68 On other occasions, Tilletson went undercover, posing as a homosexual and frequenting the men‘s restroom at the Courthouse to gain information and identify suspects. He also participated in stakeouts in which he hid in the bathroom and observed homosexual activity. Tilletson‘s work led to the questioning of a University of Florida professor of Music. Tilletson remarked that the professor was observed in the Alachua County Courthouse —playing with himself and also observing Officer Tilletson through a hole in the partition between the two toilets.“69 Tilletson then identified himself to the suspect and asked him to accompany him for further questioning and he was subsequently interrogated by Tilletson and R.J. Strickland at the Alachua County

67 Ibid 68 —Statement of Facts“, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 28 69 —“Statement of Facts“, December 12, 1958, box 1, folder 28

160 Sheriff‘s Department. The professor, when interviewed, admitted to being a homosexual for over sixteen years, committing his first —act“ in 1942 while in the armed forces during World War II. He was only a —mild case“ whom Strickland and Tilletson did not feel needed to undergo psychiatric treatment. He did provide the FLIC with valuable information such as other homosexual meeting places in Gainesville. The professor named the restroom in the library as well as one in the Florida Union Building. He then proceeded to name names, including another professor whom he had observed in the restroom on the second floor of the library —in such positions as there is no doubt that the man is a homosexual.“70 The report also noted that homosexuals used signals upon entering the restrooms such as —a foot wiggling signal“ to alert their presence to other homosexuals. The Music professor also claimed to have observed another professor (Name redacted) —on several occasions at fraternity parties or at fraternity houses going around hugging boys“. He also charged the professor with harassing students in his class and that male students told of class discussions which they characterized as —very disgusting“ and that he was —always talking about sex while teaching mixed classes of boys and girls“. He later maintained that he —is one of the worst homosexuals in that University.“71 As was clear, Tilletson‘s investigation also focused on homosexuals outside of the University and in turn tried to persuade them to divulge information concerning students and professors. One such subject was a Presbyterian Minister in McIntosh, outside of Gainesville. Tilletson noted that the subject entered the bathroom in the Alachua County Courthouse and remained there for forty-five minutes after which time the police officer determined he had displayed homosexual tendencies and confronted him, asking him to accompany him to his car where he proceeded to interview the minister. He was unable to provide Tilletson with the names of any other homosexuals, even though Tilletson tried to link the minister to faculty and students at the University. The interrogation did, however, lead to the names of other homosexuals in the community including an Air Force veteran and employee at Cook‘s Shoe Store in Gainesville. He claimed that he could recognize students and professors who had participated in homosexual activity by

70 Ibid 71 Ibid

161 sight but could not supply the FLIC with any names. Tilletson and Strickland agreed to use this subject later in identifying homosexuals.72 In almost every report filed by Strickland or Tilletson and presented to the Committee, the investigators made note that most of the subjects, especially the professors were married. They stated how long they had been married and that most of the witnesses claimed that they were still in love with their wives and that this was merely a phase or a mistake. This was noted by the FLIC and often used to ascertain the —severity“ of their homosexuality. The presence of the Committee in Gainesville ushered in a culture of fear throughout the community. The investigation, which had commenced through the actions of Strickland and Tilletson soon took on a life of its own as others took it upon themselves to carry out their own crusades, riding the coattails of the FLIC. The library director at the University of Florida, Stanley West took matters into his own hands by ordering the library staff to screen books and magazines for what he called —suggestiveness“ and eroticism“ When questioned about his controversial action, West later maintained he was acting on information gathered by the FLIC in Gainesville. He explained that —some of these people get satisfaction by looking at and cutting out art work from books and magazines“ and it was his job as a —morally aware“ citizen of Florida to limit, if not deny their access to such materials.73 His acts were scrutinized and criticized by the student newspaper, the Florida Alligator, as much for his assaults on personal liberty and approval of censorship as for the implications that his undertakings had for the University population. In reality, the paper was afraid that a negative image would soon circulate the state and possibly the nation which linked the school with homosexuality74. The FLIC‘s investigation had the power to besmirch the overall reputation of the school and further illuminations of the University‘s homosexual —problem“ would only heighten negative perceptions about the school. The progress report of the FLIC filed by R.J. Strickland pertaining to autumn 1958 commented on the development of a successful informant structure in Gainesville. Strickland remarked that the —questioning of several subjects, mainly students at the

72 —Statement of Facts“, December 6, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 28 73 Gainesville, Florida Alligator, March 15, 1960 74 Ibid

162 University of Florida, has revealed a considerable homosexual operation being in existence.“75 The work of the Committee in Gainesville was, at that time, still largely unknown to the community and the state as a whole but as word began to leak out, several people came forward with their own stories to tell which charged former colleagues and classmates as being homosexuals. A judge who worked in the Alachua County Courthouse took matters into his own hands returning to the building after hours in an attempt to trap a colleague engaging in homosexual relations in the building. The judge, according to his own declaration, entered the courthouse with a flashlight and crept up the stairs until he cornered two men in a hallway and was able to identify one of them before they separated and fled the building. The judge immediately contacted Strickland and divulged this information to the investigator.76 This cooperation even exceeded Strickland and Johns‘ expectations and allowed them to cast a net over the homosexual community in Gainesville and at the University of Florida. Since the reasons for Johns‘ probe into the University were still largely secret, people began to speculate about the strange occurrences around campus. Reports of students and faculty members being whisked away from their classes by uniformed law enforcement officials reached the press who came to their own conclusions. The Florida Alligator surmised that Strickland was in Gainesville to investigate and possibly attempt to halt the entrance of George Starke to Florida‘s Law School. Stark, from Ocala, was an African-American who had been admitted to the Law School despite protests and outcry from a good portion of the university as well as the state.77 The Gainesville Sun determined that Strickland was in the city to examine charges brought against faculty members who were purportedly inciting racial agitation by advocating full integration.78 The student newspaper printed a follow up article a week later in which it questioned the University‘s administration for refusing to deny or confirm the various stories being hypothesized by the local news organs.79

75 —Progress Report of R.J. Strickland, University of Florida Investigation“, September-October 1958, FLIC Papers 76 —Statement of Facts of Conversation between R.J. Strickland and an anonymous Circuit Court Judge“, August 12, 1958, FLIC Papers 77 Gainesville, Florida Alligator, October 31, 1958 78 Gainesville Sun, October 28, 1958 79 Gainesville, Florida Alligator, November 7, 1958

163 The press was not privy to the factual information concerning the investigations because the only people who knew the truth beyond the investigators themselves were the accused and the informants. The Johns Committee‘s victims remained silent on the issue because if they agreed to resign and keep quiet, no revelations concerning their private lives would be made public, which in turn would hinder any future job searches. Florida law did provide for a public hearing for those in the teaching profession who were charged with being —guilty of immorality“, but publicity would so disparage the reputation of the accused, even if their innocence was proven at a later date.80 This placed the professors in a precarious predicament and only a solitary professor stepped forward to challenge Strickland, Johns or the Committee. In the late 1950‘s, in a society that largely believed that homosexuality was a disease or psychological disorder, the victims of the Johns Committee had to face their futures which explains why most remained silent on the issue and accepted their fate. At the conclusion of the fall semester in 1958, Strickland furnished President Reitz with a list of professors, students and employees of the University of Florida who were labeled as —sexual deviants“ by the FLIC. The Committee reported the termination of the contracts of fifteen professors when they delivered their report to the Legislature in 1959. This number has been disputed by former University of Florida faculty members who place the number between twenty and twenty-five. Whatever the actual number may be, only one faculty member protested the findings, even though to no avail. The remainder of the professors on Strickland‘s list were called to meet with President Reitz in alphabetical order and they quietly resigned.81 Whenever the committee was challenged, Johns threatened to take the proceedings public and President Reitz was quick to quiet disconcerted faculty members as he did not want damage done to the University‘s reputation. Johns held the upper hand and knew that by publicizing inquiries into the morality of the state‘s most prestigious institution of higher learning, he would tarnish the school‘s status within the state. Reitz also worried that if they did not act on the findings and recommendations of the FLIC, the school would be accused of —harboring“ homosexuals. As the real reasons

80 Florida Statutes (1959), chapter 231.28 81 Bonnie Stark. —McCarthyism in Florida“. Pp. 99

164 for the FLIC‘s presence in Gainesville slowly surfaced, Reitz was bombarded with letters from concerned citizens across the state voicing their displeasure with the situation at the University. One letter, from Harrison L. Friese in Fort Lauderdale chastised Reitz for what the author deemed as inaction or too little action, writing —you close your eyes to extensive homosexuality, not only among the undergraduates, but in your own faculty.“82 Reitz quickly responded, defending his actions as well as his University. The president wrote that he had readily acted on the Committee‘s suggestions and recommendations and had implemented what he supposed to be:

Prompt and effective action…you might be interested in knowing of the 14 staff members dismissed, 12 of them had been on the staff prior to my presidency…Finally I believe you would be interested to know that in only two cases involving staff did we find that there was any relation with students83

The only concerted effort to protest the investigation was taken by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) but this undertaking backfired as Johns held a press conference in Jacksonville in February 1959 to announce that the FLIC was investigating homosexuality, deviant behavior, immorality and subversive activities at the University of Florida. This last charge played on the fears of the —Red Menace“, and painted the Committee as a patriotic organization investigating possible actions that were detrimental to society.84 The University‘s problems escalated when the Miami Herald and Gainesville Sun grossly overestimated the number of students being investigated at Florida, so these stories prompted a frantic but futile attempt by Reitz to silence the press.85 After his unsuccessful attempt at halting what he referred to as a —misinformation campaign“, Reitz changed tactics and publicly announced that following a review of the findings of the FLIC, the University of Florida had voluntarily dismissed or asked for the resignation of fourteen faculty and staff members.86 These actions by Reitz ended one of the darkest

82 —Harrison L. Friese to J. Wayne Reitz“, May 16, 1959, J. Wayne Reitz Administrative Policy Records (cited hereafter as Reitz Papers), University Archives, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 83 —J. Wayne Reitz to Harrison L. Friese“, May 26, 1959, Reitz Papers 84 Miami Herald, February 19, 1959 85 Gainesville, Florida Alligator, February 19, 1959 86 Ibid

165 periods in the University of Florida‘s history. The chaotic and terrifying days of 1958 were over and while the situation in Gainesville did not immediately return to the status quo, the worst of the witch hunts ended. It was also discovered that, during the late 1950‘s Strickland and the FLIC occasionally took time off from their investigations in Gainesville to pursue leads in other areas in the state. In October, 1959, Strickland traveled to Miami to interview a teacher at Norland Senior High School. The teacher, interrogated by Strickland in his car in the school parking lot, was a graduate of Florida State University and, the reason the investigator traveled to South Florida for the interview was to hunt possible homosexuals in Tallahassee. The teacher maintained that he himself was not a homosexual despite the fact that Strickland had sworn testimony claiming that he had been engaged in homosexual acts at Florida State as well as junior college in Palm Beach.87 In spite of his proclamations of innocence, the teacher was able to furnish Strickland with the information he had traveled across the state to obtain. He told Strickland that there were practicing homosexuals at Florida State University and that he knew of two and suspected many others. He also named an employee at a florist located on College Avenue and Adams Street, less than a mile from the campus, who was a homosexual and, possibly involved with students at Florida State. He further implicated other students suspected of being homosexuals based on their —language, mannerisms, walk and actions.“88 As they had in Gainesville, Strickland and the Committee were told of a house in northern Leon County where —homosexual parties“ were commonplace, often involving at least thirty to forty people, largely students. The house was subsequently put under surveillance but the measures employed in Gainesville to fight against —sexual perversion“ were never carried out to the same extent in Tallahassee. Florida State University was an afterthought compared to the University of Florida Johns and the FLIC emerged victorious from their assault upon the state‘s higher education system and, buoyed by their successes, looked for a renewal of their committee by the new Legislature which was easily granted an appropriation of $67,500 during the

87 —Statement“, October 29, 1958, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 28 88 Ibid

166 1959 Legislative session.89 Overconfident after their victories in 1958, Mark Hawes and R.J. Strickland looked to expand the power of the FLIC further by implementing fundamental changes to the state‘s school system. The Committee wanted to centralize records of teachers to make it easier to keep —undesirables“ out of the profession and make it nearly impossible for a teacher fired from one county or school district to receive employment in another region of the state. They even went as far as to ask that teachers or instructors —convicted of moral turpitude“ be stripped of their retirement benefits. These changes to the school system were slow to be implemented and it would take another —crisis“ to propel the FLIC into the limelight once again and to afford its allies with reasons to push for further changes.90 The FLIC‘s next foray onto a college campus a few years after leaving Gainesville took place in Tampa where the state‘s newest institution of higher learning, the University of South Florida was located. Rumors of —rampant“ and unchecked communism, homosexuality and liberalism on the Tampa campus drew the Johns Committee to the Gulf Coast. Their subsequent investigation into the University of South Florida did not shift focus away from homosexuality among all Floridians. While the Johns Committee withdrew most of their resources from Gainesville for the move to Tampa, they also shifted their focus to the state‘s public school system as the witch hunt appeared on high school, junior high school and, even elementary school campuses in the early 1960‘s. The threat of communism was revisited, especially at the University of South Florida but it continued in Tallahassee at Florida State University as well. The homosexual threat had breathed new life into the FLIC and Charley Johns and R.J. Strickland looked to capitalize on the momentum in an attempt to preserve the power of the Pork Chop Gang and protect their cherished way of life and their —Old South“ values.

89 Bonnie Stark. —McCarthyism in Florida“. Pp. 110 90 Ibid, Pp. 111

167 TO AVOID CONTAMINATION

Following its departure from Gainesville, the FLIC obstinately continued its investigation into —sexual perversion“ in Florida. The tactics remained the same but, the focus shifted from the campus of the University of Florida to the state‘s public schools and finally, the Committee concentrated on a concerted effort aimed at publicizing and systematically destroying what they referred to as the —institution of homosexuality“ in the Sunshine State. This final assault was an attempt to break down another affront to the Old South conservative lifestyle and belief system the Pork Choppers followed. The —situation“ in Gainesville had shocked the FLIC and led them to believe that a real problem existed in Florida. Ed Blackburn, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, when discussing the problem of the increase and spread of homosexuality, echoed these sentiments. He noted, —like sin and taxes…it‘s always with you.“1 The expansion of the investigation into the homosexual —ring“ in existence in Florida was justified by the FLIC due to the commonly held view of homosexuality held by many within the state and the nation in the early 1960‘s, a misconception that homosexuals were a threat to —moral“ society. The FLIC framed their attack on homosexuality in much the same way it had justified its assault on the NAACP. The Committee was protecting the vulnerable and helpless segments of society from intrusion by —perverts“, whether racial or sexual. Regarding the NAACP and the civil rights movement, white womanhood was threatened, while homosexuals were predators bent on exploiting children. One proponent of the FLIC‘s investigation noted, —there are many homosexuals who are not dangerous but there are also some homosexuals who are actually criminals in that they solicit children and sometimes will attack children“, immediately drawing the link between sexual predation and homosexuality.2 Others were not as cautious and —moderate“ in their condemnation of homosexuality.

1 Tampa Tribune, January 6, 1962 2 —Report, Florida Children‘s Commission, advisory committee meeting“, Tallahassee, January 22, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 11

168 The state‘s newspapers, for the most part, initially supported the FLIC and their shift in focus, with some offering outspoken praise: —It [homosexuality] cannot be allowed to go on in open, rampant, fashion, most especially because so many adult sex deviates victimize teen-agers and younger boys and girls, thereby making them misfits in normal society.“3 Another paper offered hope that the Governor and Legislature would be able find the —best answer to curbing homosexual practices before they corrode innocent person‘s characters“.4 As was the case in Gainesville, the Committee looked to —cure“ homosexuals who had not passed the point of no return in an attempt to restrain the growing —problem“. Johns and his allies also received praise and words of encouragement from around the state. Harold S. Dalton a resident of Key West, wrote to the FLIC, exalting the Committee‘s work and thanking them for —enlightening both the public and officials on this subject which has been too hush-hush for many years, and which is now internationally recognized and dealt with in a much more sane fashion than in days past.“5 Another letter told the Committee that the author was exuberant that they were tackling the problem noting, —it is about time some of our Legislators were shocked about the growing HOMOSEXUALS in our community“ and that she hoped they would create —some new and stiff laws to control these SEX DEVIATES.“6 An anonymous letter showed the desperate state some in Florida felt the problem created and pleaded with the FLIC to take action. The author lamented the dire need for corrective action and was appalled and horrified with the condition of the state. The letter stated, —Lets do something about it before many of our young people are ruined and little children are killed as a result of these perverts being loose in our society.“7 The investigations at the University of Florida had planted a malignant seed and the movement gained steady momentum from the findings in Gainesville until it soon encompassed a concerted effort to uncover all vestiges of homosexuality in the state. The 1960‘s also saw the birth of an anti-pornography movement in Florida and this —indecent“ material, added to charges of pedophilia, were linked to homosexuality in an attempt to discredit a segment of the state‘s population, one that, for the most part, did

3 Lakeland Ledger, October 16, 1961 4 Tampa Tribune, January 7, 1962 5 —Harold S. Dalton to the FLIC“, March 18, 1964, FLIC Papers, box 2, folder 10 6 —Mrs. A.B. Sawyer to the FLIC“, March 18, 1964, FLIC Papers, box 2, folder 10 7 —Anonymous to John Evans“, May 13, 1964, FLIC Papers, box 2, folder 5

169 not share the belief system of the conservative bloc in North Florida. While public opinion was largely against homosexuals in Florida as well as the nation in the 1960‘s, the Pork Choppers demonized homosexuality in an attempt to shape them as the enemy of normalcy and morality. The FLIC was buoyed by the fact that —moderate“ LeRoy Collins‘ term was set to expire in January 1961. Collins, who had been a thorn in the Pork Choppers‘ side since his special election victory over Charley Johns in 1954, never openly supported the Johns Committee. While the Tallahassee native did not stand in its way, Collins was an opponent of the conservative North Florida bloc and had led the fight to reapportion the state Legislature throughout the 1950‘s. With Collins‘ tenure in office coming to a close, Pork Choppers looked for someone to fill his shoes and provide the support the FLIC needed to continue its investigations. Initially the frontrunner appeared to be state Legislator Farris Bryant, a Pork Chopper from Ocala who had come into conflict with Governor Collins during the reapportionment debate. Bryant was a graduate of both the University of Florida and Harvard University. He was a staunch segregationist who condemned the —sit-in“ campaign which had swept Florida and the South in 1960 and became a focal point of the election. He was opposed by Haydon Burns, Mayor of Jacksonville and also a rabid segregationist as well as Doyle Carlton, Jr., son of former Florida Governor Doyle E. Carlton (1929-1933) and, finally Ku Klux Klan leader Bill Hendrix. Carlton was the only candidate in the Democratic primary who did not condemn the —sit-ins“. In the initial primary, Bryant garnered 193,507 votes but finished only slightly ahead of Carlton who received 186,228 votes. Burns, who would be elected governor himself in 1965 finished third with 166,352 votes. In the runoff Bryant was nominated by the Democratic Party after receiving 55% of the vote and was elected Governor of Florida in November defeating Republican George C. Peterson of Fort Lauderdale.8 On paper, Bryant‘s election was a coup for the Pork Choppers since the Marion County resident aggressively supported their agenda and, unlike LeRoy Collins, acted on the information he was furnished by the Committee and encouraged Johns and his allies to continue and expand their investigations into all aspects of Florida‘s society that

8 Tebeau. A History of Florida, Pp. 444

170 countered conservatism. In reality, an analysis of the numbers shows not only the divide between North and South Florida in voting patterns but, also the growth of the Republican Party. In the general election, Peterson received 38.5% of the vote.9 This all indicated the fact that Pork Chop power was waning in Florida, even though, for the time being they were afforded the aid and support of the Governor‘s Mansion. As was the case at the University of Florida, Dade County uncovered a homosexual —problem“ years before the FLIC was invited down to investigate the situation. In 1956, at the same time Johns and the FLIC was in the midst of their war against the NAACP, a woman in Coral Gables (a suburb of Miami and home to the University of Miami) stumbled across what she deemed to be offensive and morally inappropriate magazines being sold at a local news store which happened to be located across the street from Coral Gables Elementary School. The woman was shocked, appalled and terrified and the material eventually found its way to the hands of the Coral Gables Police Department. The police, along with the Coral Gables Woman‘s Club and the city‘s Chamber of Commerce, drafted a letter to the mayor, local religious leaders, parent groups and other local civic organizations urging the formation of some sort of regulating body which would be responsible for the screening and censorship of materials sold at newsstands throughout Dade County which included the city‘s of Miami and Miami Beach, along with Coral Gables and other municipalities.10 The grassroots efforts culminated in the formation of the Decent Literature Council of Dade County (DLCDC) in 1957 which pledged to root out and halt the spread of —suggestive books“ in addition to the entire —perversion for profit“ industry which they claimed targeted and corrupted America‘s youth through the —portrayal of abnormal sexual behavior as being normal.“11 The report issued by the DLCDC upon its founding called for state agencies and public officials to acknowledge, investigate and, most importantly, combat the threat that pornography and, through alleged connections, homosexuality, posed to society. They delineated three areas within society that

9 Ibid 10 —Manual“ Decent Literature Council of Dade County, 1963, Farris Bryant Administrative Correspondence (cited hereafter as Bryant Correspondence), Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida 11 Ibid

171 pornography affected, crime, mental health and lastly, as a breeding ground for subversive activities which ran counter to basic American values.12 The DLCDC operated in an around Miami for several years before the FLIC became involved in the investigation of —sexual perversion“ in Dade County in 1961. R.J. Strickland was summoned to Miami to aid and expand the investigation which had started as an attempt to ban pornography but, had since blossomed into an all-out assault on homosexuality. Strickland would join Dade County‘s Director of Public Safety, Thomas J. Kelley and local detectives led by James Duane Baker. Before Strickland‘s arrival, the local team had uncovered information regarding homosexual teachers at Dade County schools as well as others who had contact with the area‘s youth including Boy Scout and Sea Scout leaders. The investigation focused on the photographing of the youths and their possible prostitution.13 The FLIC employed similar tactics to those they used in Gainesville and quickly created a large and highly effective informer ring made up of teenage boys who had admitted to participating in —immoral“ acts with adult males in Dade County. These informants provided names, addresses and descriptions of the —acts“, which included posing for photographs and having sexual relations with the men. Detective Barker and Florida State Trooper H.R. Blair convinced one of the teenagers, a nineteen year old, to direct them to local homosexual hangouts and residences. Strickland and Tilletson had successfully employed the same tactic in Gainesville and reaped immense benefits and now it was being used in Dade County to yield similar results. The teenager showed the law enforcement agents private homes, bars, clubs, hotels and motels where homosexual adults allegedly lured teenage boys to engage in sexual activities in return for money, food, or other —rewards“. The informant alerted police to what he referred to as —hustling“, which he had participated in six years prior when he was thirteen. He had exchanged sexual favors with what he described an —older man“ in exchange for money, beer and, the use of a car among other things.14 From other witnesses, the investigators also ascertained that the Apache Motel in Miami was a common hangout for the city‘s homosexual population. It was at this motel and others in and around Dade County that

12 Ibid 13 —Report“, December 10, 1960, FLIC Papers, box 13, folder 33 14 —Testimony“, 1961, FLIC Papers, box 8, folder 72

172 —questionable“ parties were held and it was these parties, as described by the teenagers which justified the witch hunt. According to the testimony, these parties were the breeding ground for immoral, decadent behavior. The investigators were fed stories of pedophilia, pornography, prostitution, orgies and rampant drug and alcohol use.15 The information provided to the investigators only fueled their suspicion of and disdain for homosexuals. The teenagers‘ descriptions led the investigators to believe they were dealing with animals who led double lives. This was one of the reasons the FLIC and others felt they needed to undercover what they deemed the homosexual —underworld“. The youth were at risk because it was becoming apparent to the FLIC that it was not so simple to merely spot a homosexual on the street. The teenagers related stories of soldiers and sailors participating in these —gay parties“, including a naval reservist who was —dressed in a dress–a red sweater with falsies and a skirt.“16 The discovery of military and formal servicemen who were homosexuals was especially distressing for the Committee and one such case unnerved them completely. The subject had been arrested in Marion County in early 1962 but, he had ties to Miami and the military. He had been stopped while driving for a traffic violation and ended up at the Marion County jail where he was interrogated by the County Judge, among others. After an hour, according to the report filed by the county and sent to the FLIC, the subject admitted he was a homosexual. He then proceeded to shock the interrogator, Deputy Sheriff Gene Andrews of Marion County, by recalling his —conversion“ to homosexuality. He noted that he had joined the U.S. Air Corps in 1940 as a medic and was sent to the Philippines where he was captured by the Japanese after the fall of Manila. He was forced to participate in the Bataan Death March where over 75,000 American and Filipino soldiers were forced to march close to one hundred miles. The march claimed the lives of over 10,000 allied soldiers before they reached their destination. He spent the duration of the war in a prisoner of war camp in Japan where he —learned to be gay“. He claimed —this was the first time that he had anything to do with other men.“17

15 —Testimony“, April 1961, FLIC Papers, box 8, folder 108 16 —Testimony“, January 6, 1961, FLIC Papers, box 9, folder 2 17 —Report of Interrogation of [Name redacted]“, January 14, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 11

173 After the war he was married for the second time. He had been divorced by 1940 and had three children from his first marriage. According to the report, he was still married even though he was openly gay and his wife lived in Miami. He met his current boyfriend in Tampa where he worked in a restaurant as a cook. His boyfriend was a teacher, further evidence of the infiltration of the school system by homosexuals in the minds of the FLIC. After living in Tampa, the couple moved to Miami where he was hired as a teacher by the Miami Military Academy but was fired for undisclosed reasons shortly thereafter. He was soon hired by the Florida Central Academy in Sorrento, northwest of Orlando, as a nurse and later he became the Dean of Boys.18 This story motivated the FLIC in the following years to push for a central database of known homosexuals to stop the possibility of people like the subject in the report being hired by schools after they had been fired by other ones. In spite of the fact that the subject admitted he was a homosexual and lived with his lover, he tried to minimize the severity of his admission by maintaining that they slept in separate beds. He did note that he was the husband and his lover was the wife in the relationship. He went on to explain that they split up when he found his partner having an affair with the president of an unnamed university and, after this incident he moved back to Miami and was hired as a teacher at Oxford, a Jewish school on Miami Beach and later proceeded to —name names“, including that of the Assistant Dean of Students at a Chicago university (name redacted) among others in the Miami area. Some of the most valuable information he provided for the investigation was in relaying the fact that —if I was to find myself a partner in Miami I woould [sic] go to Vic‘s Bar, N.E. 2nd Ave., Miami or to Charles Hotel, this place has a bar.“19 These findings only intensified the resolve of the FLIC to strike at the heart of the problem in their eyes, which, they continually were reminded and discovered, was larger than they had ever imagined. Strickland had joined the investigation in early 1961 and concluded his stay in Miami by the spring. In the short period he was in Miami, the FLIC had uncovered a large homosexual network in the area and local police had arrested numerous men on charges varying from pornography to selling alcohol to minors and finally, committing

18 Ibid 19 Ibid

174 —crimes against nature“. Strickland noted that he was horrified at the —pathetic conditions of some of the youth“ and appalled and sickened by the adults who controlled them.20 After Strickland‘s return to Tallahassee, Governor Bryant and the FLIC worked together to organize a conference to tackle the growing —problems“ they had encountered in Miami and were sure existed throughout the state. Bryant drafted a letter acting as an invitation to the meeting in which he wrote:

Recent crime investigations in our state clearly indicate that homosexual activity is widespread. The true impact of this menace to our society is not fully felt until we realize that our youngsters, the youth of our state, are prime targets for homosexuals who continually seek to proselyte21

The invitation was sent to the Sheriff‘s Bureau, Division of Corrections, Juvenile Court System, Parole Commission and, the State Mental Hospital among others, furnishing evidence of how homosexuality was viewed in the 1960‘s. Bryant soon appointed an Advisory Committee on Decent Literature with members including segments of Florida‘s notable population.22 The makeup of the Committee illustrates how important this cause was to the FLIC and the Pork Choppers as well as, seemingly, all aspects of society were covered; medical, mental health, education, law enforcement, and social clubs and organizations. The creation of the Committee was soon followed by the Decent Literature Act, signed by Governor Bryant in the summer, 1961. The Advisory Committee worked closely with the Florida Children‘s Commission (FCC) at the behest of Bryant to launch

20 —Memo, R.J. Strickland to William G. O‘Neill“, May 30, 1961, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 12 21 —Letter“, April 9, 1961, Bryant Correspondence, box 57, folder 9 22 —Members of the Advisory Committee to the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee“, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 5; Members of the Advisory Committee included: G. Holmes Braddock, who served for 38 years on the Dade County School Board, State Representative Richard O. Mitchell from Leon County, a member of the FLIC, John E. Evans, staff director of the FLIC, Dr. Julian A. Davis, Chief Psychologist of the Florida State Hospital, Dr. J.T. Kelley, Director of the Teacher Certification Division of the State Department of Education, Dr. Jack A. Kapchan, Professor at the University of Miami School of Medicine, Charlotte Blee, President of the Florida Congress of Parents and Teachers, Judge Lamar Winegeart from the Duval County Juvenile Court System, Katie Pratt, Recording Secretary of the Florida Federation of Women‘s Clubs, Dr. Walter Stokes, Psychiatrist and a member of the Society for the Scientific Study of Sex, as well as the Superintendent of Public Schools in Hillsborough County and the Police Chief of Lakeland.

175 an assault on pornography and homosexuality which was linked to —obscene“ and —offensive“ published material.23 Many of the charges levied by the Advisory Committee and the FCC were unfounded at best and fabricated at worst. They maintained that advertisements in magazines and newspapers enticed youths to —send for literature and pictures with simulated homosexual practices“ as a way of seducing them into further acts of homosexuality which inevitably led to the spread of the —disease“.24 The report filed by the Advisory Committee contained no statistics to back up this claim nor the announcement that a —great majority of this type of literature has sprung up in the past few years“ which was directly linked to an increase in homosexuality.25 It was for this reason the FCC held sixteen conferences around Florida in which they warned people about the problems facing society with the increase in homosexuality and, also, how the state‘s youths could —avoid contamination“26. One of the sixteen meetings was held in Tallahassee on January 22, 1962, and according to a report on the conference, it was —opened by the group deciding to determine if a problem in area of homosexuality existed in Florida.“27 As the meeting progressed, various officials and citizens from around the state offered their own experiences in dealing with the homosexual —problem“ in Florida, including a police officer from Winter Haven in Central Florida who claimed to have found and arrested three men —parading around in women‘s clothing“ through the streets of Winter Haven.28 He went on to claim that Polk County had somewhere between 150-180 homosexuals, some of whom were school teachers, ministers, state workers and —people from all works of life.“29 He alerted the participants of the meeting to a motel —operating a house of male prostitution.“30 He also noted that all of the homosexuals he came into contact with were —exceptionally intelligent people, except three who were morons“ and that they

23 Florida‘s Children, No. 12, November 1961, Pp. 2 24 Jacksonville, Florida Times-Union, March 6, 1962 25 —Report of the Governor‘s Advisory Committee on Decent Literature“, March 15, 1961, Bryant Correspondence, box 80, folder14 26 Ibid 27 —Report on Discussion at Meeting on Problems of Homosexuality in Florida, Florida Children‘s Commission“, January 22, 1962, Pp. 1 FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 11 28 Ibid 29 Ibid 30 Ibid

176 were also extremely sensitive. Unfortunately, according to the police officer, few wanted treatment when offered and that the —majority wanted to move somewhere and continue their practice.“31 This worried the FLIC and others in Florida who again called for a system to be implemented which would track known homosexuals so they were not afforded the opportunity to introduce their —disease“ to other parts of the state and —prey“ on the innocent fourteen to sixteen year olds the officer claimed they —infected“ with homosexuality. A representative from the State Health Department was questioned on all aspects of homosexuality, ranging from the spread of venereal disease to the successful —spread“ of homosexuality to different economic classes. According to the representative, the —recruitment“ of homosexuals appeared to be more —effective among youth of a high intelligence level. The less literate were the least effected“, further justifying what had taken place at the University of Florida.32 Yet, he also stated that a magazine titled One, claimed there were over 45,000 homosexuals in Florida of which more than 400 are in Florida State Prisons and between 60 and 70 in the woman‘s prison. The known homosexual prisoners at Raiford‘s Florida State Prison were under constant surveillance and treatment from psychiatrists, one of whom spoke at the meeting in Tallahassee, commenting on the —physical characteristics“ of homosexuals such as withdrawal, fear, shyness and the lack of self expression. He also shed light onto the fact that the investigations rarely focused on lesbians.33 When questioned on why the problem was so grave for Floridians when California was known to have a —notorious“ homosexual —problem“, the psychiatrist reasoned that Florida was fertile land for immigrants from around the world, including America‘s homosexual population. The conservatives in the 1960‘s were faced with the same problems their predecessors had dealt with for the past one hundred years, the influx of —outsiders“ into the state, bringing their contaminated ideas and values with them and poisoning their cherished —Old South“ lifestyle. He noted, —They move to

31 Ibid 32 Ibid, Pp. 2 33 Ibid, Pp. 3

177 Florida to get away from the smog, snow etc. Also, Florida is a booming country…[it] will provide a fertile ground for them [homosexuals].“34 A representative from Florida State University (name redacted) introduced controversy into the meeting by exclaiming that —we should get the problem [homosexuality] out into the open“ and, confront the menace to society by teaching and warning students about the —disease“ in schools, both at the collegiate and high school levels.35 Some countered his view and maintained that —danger…existed in every community when a program of this sort starts.“36 Despite apprehension, and because the need was so dire, the group agreed that an educational program should be implemented and aimed at children throughout the state aged nine to eighteen.37 The final segment of the meeting dealt with police and their investigative techniques with the group agreeing that tactics previously employed by the FLIC and other law enforcement agencies throughout Florida were not only effective but, more importantly, necessary. One member stated that —homosexuals dreaded exposure“ and that an increase in the number of arrests would lead to more publicity which, in turn would lead to a decrease in homosexual activity in areas that were targeted.38 Further it was suggested that a database of all fingerprints of homosexuals should be created and shared with all counties and municipalities in Florida to stop homosexuals from moving to other communities where they were unknown as homosexuals. Some more cautionary members questioned the effectiveness of this approach since it would only alert communities to criminally indicted homosexuals but that many did not commit crimes. This was quickly countered by the assurance that there were numerous offenses for which homosexuals were arrested in an effort to protect the communities from their presence. When asked what crimes homosexuals were arrested for, a law enforcement representative listed —crime against nature“, indecent exposure and child molestation.39 Before concluding the meeting, the group decided that in order to effectively combat the spread of homosexuality, other organizations had to act in an auxiliary role to

34 Ibid 35 Ibid, Pp. 5 36 Ibid, Pp. 6 37 Ibid, Pp. 5 38 Ibid, Pp. 7 39 Ibid, Pp. 8

178 supplement the efforts put forth by the FLIC. They called for the cooperation of all major organizations in Florida, in particular county medical societies, health departments and mental health clinics, along with chambers of commerce, ministerial groups and —community and civic groups of all kinds“.40 The state‘s newspapers lauded the work of the FCC, the Advisory Committee and Governor Bryant, whose cabinet awarded the Children‘s Commission an additional fourteen thousand dollars for the upcoming fiscal year.41 With the backing of the Governor, many in the FCC looked to heighten the pressure on Floridians in an attempt to prod them into action against the alleged threat to society. Working with some of the suggested measures floated at the various meetings throughout the winter, 1961-1962, the Advisory Committee reported in the summer, 1962 that a —public education effort employing the so-called ”shock‘ technique may be needed immediately…if the public is to be stimulated to want to do something“ in regards to the spread of homosexuality in Florida.42 The FCC followed up the statewide meetings by creating a Research Committee on Sexual Deviation chaired by a psychiatrist for the State Bureau of Mental Health, Wayne Yeager. The committee was composed mainly of mental health officials but, had little real influence or power and existed mainly as a corroborating body for the FLIC when they wanted to consult —experts“ on the mental aspects of homosexuality. They did issue a statement in which they proclaimed that they —endorsed and supported [the] present activities of the Governor, Johns Committee, and the law enforcement agencies.“43 The measures taken by the FCC and FLIC reaped immediate benefits for the conservatives in their efforts to oppose the spread of homosexuality. The Florida Sheriff‘s Bureau deduced that the meetings not only —successfully created a strong desire“ to —do something about sex deviates, particularly where our youths are involved“

40 Ibid, Pp. 10 41 Tampa Tribune, March 22, 1962 42 —Wayne Yeager memo to the Florida Children‘s Commission‘s Advisory Committee on Homosexuality“, June 4, 1962, Bryant Correspondence, box 57, folder 9 43 FCC Annual Report, June 1962, Bryant Correspondence, box 18, folder 6

179 but, also created the infrastructure for such action.44 By early 1962 the FLIC and FCC, with the help of local law enforcement throughout the state had —started a drive of rounding up homosexuals“ which had led to the arrest of forty men in the Capitol city, twenty in Panama City and well over one hundred in the Tampa Bay area.45 FLIC members were less shocked by the numbers of homosexuals in Tampa Bay than they were with those arrested in Tallahassee and Panama City. The latter cities were in the Panhandle, the more conservative part of the state which the Pork Choppers counted on for support. The FLIC kept track of homosexual arrests made throughout the state, with special interest in those connected to schools. Countless —memos“ filed in 1962 recalled arrests and provided updates on individuals charged with homosexuality. One such —memo“ noted that the subject had resigned from the Chipola Junior College in Marianna, fifty miles west of Tallahassee. The report stated that the subject‘s mother-in- law traveled to Florida from Minnesota to alert the President of Chipola that her son-in- law was a homosexual. Further investigation of Chipola found that the Dean of the Junior College had been fired in 1955 or 1956 because he had taken —teen-age boys to the movies and home with him on week-ends in a town proved to be Pansey, Alabama.“46 The memo further stated that the Dean had told one of the boys that due to a —shortage of beds“, he would have to sleep in bed with him, where he allegedly tried to make sexual advances towards the teenager. The report further informed that the Dean had recently been fired from Donaldsonville High School in Georgia after being charged with rape.47 Homosexuality in the Panhandle deeply concerned Charley Johns and the FLIC who doubled its efforts and soon uncovered more —sexual deviants“ in the area. They reported on a high school music teacher, fired from Cottondale High School near the Alabama border who, then, simply moved to Graceville a town fifteen miles away and taught music at the high school there until he was again fired for homosexual activity. This

44 —Wayne Yeager memo to the Florida Children‘s Commission‘s Advisory Committee on Homosexuality“, June 4, 1962, Bryant Correspondence, box 57, folder 9 45 Tampa Tribune, January 6, 1962 46 —Memorandum“, March 8, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 11 47 Ibid

180 incensed Johns who again called for a statewide database in order to track teachers fired for homosexuality.48 The FCC and the Advisory Committee continued their work in the first half of the 1960‘s with the Committee meeting several times in 1964, including a conference at the Holiday Inn in Tallahassee in May in which they drafted several proposals which they asked their Pork Chop allies to introduce in the 1965 Legislative Session. Several of the proposals included a revision of the Florida Statutes —in all cases involving sex offenses, drawing up specific statutes to cover uniformity“ in an attempt to further combat the growing problem. They noted the necessity for all law enforcement and other agencies in the state to take the same action in regards to homosexuals and also to share information to lessen the likelihood that a homosexual fired from a job in one section of the state could gain employment in another. They additionally called for the creation of what they referred to as an —educational approach“ to homosexuality, a process by which the local schools, universities and law enforcement agencies would work together to educate the public.49 What had started as an inquest into possible homosexual activity at the University of Florida in the mid-1950‘s blossomed into a statewide witch hunt by the FLIC, FCC and endorsed by sympathetic Pork Chop Governor Farris Bryant who all looked to protect —normal“ society from the contamination by decadent homosexuality which had been further demonized by linking it to pedophilia and pornography. This campaign waged by the FLIC looked to cleanse the state and uphold the waning power of the Pork Choppers by rallying the citizens behind a banner they could and would support; morality.

48 Ibid 49 —Minutes of the Advisory Committee to the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee“, Tallahassee, May 15, 1964, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 16

181 CAMPUS OF EVIL

The opening of the state‘s fifth public university in 1960, the University of South Florida (USF) raised eyebrows within the small Tampa community of Temple Terrace where the school was located. It was not soon after the opening of the institution that disgruntled parents and clergy called upon the FLIC to come and investigate the University for —questionable“ teaching practices. The assault on the University of South Florida was aided by the fact that staunch segregationist and ultra-conservative Farris Bryant had replaced moderate LeRoy Collins as Florida‘s Governor in 1961. One of the first pieces of legislation that passed with Bryant‘s blessing was the Stallings-Eldredge Bill which called for the creation of a new mandatory course for Florida‘s high schools entitled —Americanism versus Communism“. Although this was meant for the high school level, it foreshadowed the battles that took place over the next couple of years in Tampa.1 President John S. Allen had been selected by the Board of Control in 1957 to be the first president of the University of South Florida. Allen had been the Vice President of Administration at the University of Florida and resided in Gainesville when the FLIC witch hunts had rocked the North-Central Florida community. When Allen opened the new University to students in 1960 the initial enrollment was 1,997. The school was located in Tampa and the Tampa Bay area had a population of close to 200,000 in 1960 and many of the students came from Tampa and St. Petersburg but, others enrolled from the outlying areas which included many rural communities which shared their values with the Pork Choppers. Debate over why the FLIC came to Tampa ran rampant during the investigation and it is likely that they were drawn to Tampa for a variety of reasons. The Tampa Tribune reported that the FLIC was invited to —investigate Communist activities as well

1 Tampa Tribune, April 3, 1961

182 as morals, deviations and homosexuality.“2 Mark Hawes, counsel for the FLIC stated that he was concerned with the teaching practices of South Florida‘s faculty in general since the students, as a result of the improper education they were receiving, —might be softened to where they might be susceptible to Communistic doctrines or some other doctrines.“3 Aside from homosexuality and communism, some claimed the Committee was drawn to Tampa because of the racially liberal teaching of some of the faculty. A student claimed that her —Introduction to Teaching professor…talked quite a lot about integration and segregation and everything, and he is in favor of us having it here…I had quite an argument with him…about intermarriage.“4 Another student commented on a film she had been shown in one her classes that —showed Negro men and white women together, holding hands, and I remember in one scene she, I believe, took a cigarette from his mouth and started smoking.“5 Charley Johns, in a letter to Allen, warned the president that his university would soon be under investigation —in regard to the infiltration into state agencies by practicing homosexuals“ and in doing so would try to ascertain the —extent of this problem“ while performing the undertaking with —a very high level of dignity.“6 Homosexuality, communism and integration were all concerns of the FLIC and the rationale behind their investigations over the past five years. However, the Johns Committee, despite Charley Johns‘ letter to Allen as well as indications of homosexual activity on the Tampa campus, was drawn to Tampa largely because of University of South Florida Professor Thomas Wenner. Wenner, according to FLIC member and state Representative George B. Stallings of Jacksonville, was —blowing off about how the university has accepted Negro students and should announce it to the nation.“7 Stallings was appalled and leveled his abhorrence at the comments and his concerns to Johns by stating, —if this guy wants to make such an

2 Ibid, May 18, 1962 3 —Testimony“, May 30, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 5, folder 10 4 —Testimony“, May 10, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 10, folder 12 5 —Testimony“, May 15, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 10, folder 15 6 —Charley Johns to Dr. John S. Allen“, November 9, 1961, Papers of John S. Allen (cited hereafter as Allen Papers), Special Collections Department, University of South Florida Library, Tampa, Florida, box 4, folder 13 7 —George B. Stallings to Charley Johns“, November 28, 1961, FLIC Papers, box 2 folder 17

183 announcement he should not be salaried in a tax supported institution of the State of Florida…I hope that our committee will be able to do something about this bird and his big mouth.“8 Johns agreed with his colleague and alerted Strickland of the possible danger in Tampa by proclaiming, —the next time you are down that way, see what you can find out about this Professor.“9 Even though President Allen defended his employee, claiming his words were distorted and taken out of context, Wenner was chastised by citizens and politicians alike throughout the state.10 In the midst of allegations of improprieties, Wenner switched tactics in an effort to shift the focus off of himself, and contacted state Representative Joe McClain of Pasco County, just north of Tampa, and informed him of homosexuality on the University of South Florida campus, referring to the school as a —campus of evil“.11 This time, President Allen defended his institution and not his seemingly renegade faculty member, stating that Wenner‘s comments stemmed from a —prejudiced mind.“12 The previously embattled professor remained on the offensive, indicating that there were faculty members who were sympathetic towards America‘s Cold War enemy and soft on communism and that McClain should ask the FLIC to come to Tampa to investigate these harsh realities. Wenner, in turn, would be more than happy to supply the Committee with a list of professors who harbored both homosexual and communist tendencies.13 At the same time Wenner issued his plea to McClain, a grassroots effort was underway in rural Hillsborough County to ensure that the University of South Florida was not, indeed, a —campus of evil“. The movement was led by Jane Stockton Smith, whose son, Stockton, Jr. or Skipper (his nickname), had enrolled at USF. The Smiths lived in the small rural community of Plant City, the Winter Strawberry Capital of the World, thirty miles outside of Tampa. Speaking to the FLIC later during the investigation, Jane Smith told the Committee that her son felt that higher education,

8 Ibid 9 —Charley Johns to R.J. Strickland“, December 4, 1961, FLIC Papers, box 3, folder 17 10 —John Allen to J.B. Culpepper“, December 2, 1961, Bryant Correspondence, box 26, folder 4 11 Allen Papers, box 4, folder 15 12 Miami Herald, May 27, 1962 13 —Thomas Wenner Testimony“, June 7, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 5, folder 20

184 especially the university system, should encourage not only morality but, faith and patriotism as well.14 Johns and the Committee felt the same way in regards to the new school. The University of Florida was their school, most of the FLIC and many state legislators were alumni and, in their minds, they had just completed an arduous battle to save their school. Now they were faced with a new school, in a growing region of the state. They also knew that USF would not be the last state university built and opened in South Florida. Johns and his allies were aware of the effort to bring a state university to Miami as state Senator Ernest Graham, father of future U.S. Senator and Florida Governor Bob Graham had presented the idea to the Legislature as early as 1943. By the time Senate Bill 711 was introduced to the legislature in 1965 by Senator Robert M. Haverfield and, signed into law later that year by moderate Governor Haydon Burns, Miami was not the only —New“ Florida location to have a University.15 The University of Central Florida had been established in 1963 in Orlando and Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton, 60 miles north of Miami, had opened its doors in 1964. These developments were a clear indicator to Johns and the Pork Choppers of the inevitable swing in power and influence from North to Central and South Florida. Therefore, the FLIC, acting as the savior of the Pork Chop Gang, made a point to attempt molding the University of South Florida into a conservative haven and shield it from liberal and —deviant“ infiltration. Jane Smith, along with three other parents, requested a meeting with Sidney French, the Dean of Academic Affairs at USF, after being pushed into action by Stockton, Jr.‘s condemnations of the Tampa university‘s —vile approach to sex, destruction of faith in God, and extolling of ideas that are of socialist and communistic origin.“16 The meeting, however, did not unfold as Smith had hoped and she claimed that French dismissed the group as —crackpots“ perpetrating a witch hunt.17 French also referred to the group as a —pressure group“ and refused to listen to their grievances.18 The group objected to what they felt were —immoral teachings“ in the University, mainly

14 —Testimony, Jane Smith“, June 4, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 5, folder 16 15 http://www.fiu.edu/docs/brief_history2.htm 16 —Report by Jane Stockton Smith“, John Egerton Papers, box 1, folder 1, University Archives, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida (cited hereafter as Egerton Papers) 17 —Sidney French, Review of Meeting Between a Group of Tampa Citizens and Representatives of USF, September 22, 1962“, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 13 18 —Testimony, Sidney French“, May 30, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 5, folder 10

185 in the English Department where faculty were accused of using profanity, other objectionable language and espousing anti-Christian ideals. Furthermore, Stockton, Jr. and other students had been offended by the selection of Brave New World, Grapes of Wrath and The Immense Journey in their Functional English course. Jane Smith and the other parents involved told Dean French that these works were not suitable for young impressionable minds.19 Smith, now irate by the lack of concern for the well being of her son and his fellow like minded students, took matters into her own hands and penned a letter that she mailed to fifty families in Tampa who she chose because of their reputation as being —responsible citizens, interested in the affairs of our community.“20 At the conclusion of the letter, she invited them to a meeting at her house in April. Twenty-five people attended, including the Mayor of Tampa, Julian Lane and, they listened to Smith rail against USF for harboring extremist professors, bent on passing their radical liberal views on to a vulnerable generation of America‘s youths. The meeting concluded with the group voting to formally invite the Johns Committee to Tampa to aid their cause.21 They determined that they were —up against many weighty problems serious enough to warrant investigation by those with knowledge and ability to achieve results, namely, the investigating committee.“22 Based on this conclusion, though it may appear ironic, the Smith‘s abstained from the vote, the final tally of which was 22-1 in favor of extending an invitation to the FLIC. As for the Smiths, they felt that they —were not acquainted with the committee and did not feel qualified to do so.“23 Mayor Lane did agree to contact Charley Johns who was an old acquaintance and Baya Harrison, Chairman of the Board of Control. Neither Lane nor the group of parents, led by the Smith‘s, were aware that the FLIC had already decided to undertake an investigation at the University of South Florida. Both Strickland and Mark Hawes arrived in Tampa on April 10, the day after the meeting. The question of censorship and academic freedom were not foreign ideas to the state‘s universities, as the University of Florida had waged a war against the FLIC and the Pork Chop Gang in 1959 over their controversial efforts to ban books they deemed to

19 —French, Review of Meeting“, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 13 20 —Report by Jane Stockton Smith“, Egerton Papers, box 1, folder 1 21 Ibid 22 —French, Review of Meeting“, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 13 23 Ibid

186 be subversive and —un-American“. Pork Chopper, state Representative, and future FLIC member George Stallings of Duval County, a University of Florida alumnus, together with state Senator Randolph Hodges authored and introduced bills in their respective houses which called for the banning of books in the state‘s universities that were written by communists. They went even further calling for a ban on books whose authors had been brought before HUAC and had not cooperated with McCarthy‘s allies, pleading the Fifth Amendment, or had impeded the interview process in some other manner. They also attacked books that were used in the public school system and noted evidence provided by —two Miami housewives“ who claimed that only 2 of 43 books used in the system were —Pro-American“. The other forty-one were subversive and Stallings and Hodges felt they should be banned.24 The bills, coupled with simultaneous proposed legislation from Charley Johns and Dewey Johnson, President of the Senate in 1959, which advocated the firing of any teacher, faculty or staff member at a public school, junior college or university who championed integration, brought a swift response from the University of Florida‘s student body, which in the Pork Choppers mind, was a puzzling and disconcerting backlash. The students organized protests and circulated a petition which accumulated over 2,000 signatures while the school‘s newspaper voiced its displeasure with Johns and his fellow Pork Choppers by exclaiming, —the state is trying everything within its power to take away your liberty, while a lopsided legislature is attempting to remove what little freedom you have left after McCarthy“. It also commented, —Think how much more of a show [Johns] could have put on if he could have used stacks of burning library books to smoke out Communists and homosexuals which are supposedly undermining morals and manners of our society.“25 The Pork Choppers were perplexed as well as alarmed by the negative response they received from a school that many considered their own and, more significantly a university that the conservatives hoped would continue to be a breeding ground for future conservatives. In response to the reaction of Florida‘s student body, Stallings traveled to Gainesville to meet with the livid students and try to reassure them that the FLIC, Pork

24 Gainesville Florida Alligator, May 5, 1959 25 Ibid, May 12, 1959; May 5, 1959

187 Choppers and other conservatives did not favor censorship and book burning as was alleged by the Florida Alligator. He tried to assuage the students by claiming the Pork Choppers introduced the legislation to calm the fears of the —helpless parent who is forced to see his child studying a slanted, subversive textbook.“26 Unfortunately for the Pork Choppers, the House Committee on Public Education ultimately sided with the students, killing the Bill 16-1, in spite of the fact that many did agree it might be a viable option in the future.27 Close to 1,000 students at Florida, not content with the meeting with Stallings, still stinging from the witch hunt carried out against the University‘s homosexual faculty and apprehensive that the situation would continue and possibly escalate to cover all aspects of the institution, protested the FLIC and the censorship bills on May 5, 1959. The next night, after an electrical outage forced students from their dorms, male students charged an all female dorm, Broward Hall chanting —we want panties“. What began as a harmless —panty raid“ soon turned political. The chants of, —we want panties“ were soon altered, after the Dean of Men tried to lead the students in an impromptu singing of —We are the Boys of Old Florida“, the school‘s fight song. Thus, the chant that now reverberated throughout the campus was —We want Johns“. After changing the focus of the protest, they channeled their anger towards campus police who tried to calm the incident. The students hurled rocks at the campus police and set dumpsters and other pieces of property on fire. Two students were arrested for the fracas and expelled from the school. Numerous others were hospitalized after the incident but it demonstrated the growing resistance to the Committee‘s actions.28 Meanwhile in Tampa, Jane Smith‘s group was especially appalled at a proposed speech to set to take place on the University‘s campus. Dr. Jerome Davis, a political scientist who had been blacklisted by HUAC for his strong left-wing leanings which Representative McClain told the FBI bordered on —communistic“, had been invited to the University to give a speech concerning different forms of government .29 After it was announced, Allen was bombarded with letters, phone calls and complaints from around

26 Ibid, May 12, 1959 27 Ibid, May 15, 1959 28 Ibid, May 8, 1959 29 —Joe McClain Testimony“, June 5, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 5, folder 17

188 the state, including one letter from Sydney Lenfesty who told the president , —communists were infiltrating the American universities and having a forum to expose college students to communism.“30 Allen, after a telephone call from and visit with Governor Farris Bryant, capitulated and rescinded the invitation, referring to Davis as being too controversial and inappropriate.31 But, the debate had just begun. University of South Florida professors were outraged at Smith and her —pressure group“ as were the students not of the same mindset as Skipper and his friends. At the center of the disagreement was the question of academic freedom. The Pork Choppers and their allies maintained that they supported academic freedom, as long as this did not include ideas that countered their belief system which would threaten the supremacy of their values in the state. While Skipper wrote a letter to President Allen trying to persuade him from allowing Davis to speak at USF, another group of students did the exact opposite.32 In the second letter, the six students who signed the document, made their feelings clear. They maintained that the —principal[sic] of intellectual freedom must not be compromised at USF“ and they implored Allen to allow Davis to speak at the Tampa campus, but Allen was not swayed. He had, what he felt, was the best interest of the University in mind. He was present in Gainesville when the Johns Committee had assaulted homosexuality there and, did not want to draw the ire and wrath of the FLIC. If Allen would not stand up to the University‘s accusers, the USF chapter of the American Association of University Professors decided that academic freedom was at stake. Thus, the President of the branch in Tampa, Donald Harkness noted their concern and publicly protested Allen‘s actions. They issued a statement which read, —If in the judgment of an instructor a person not on the university staff can make a unique contribution to the course, we feel that the instructor should be free to invite this person to speak to his class.“33 Harkness and the local branch also lashed out at Jane Stockton Smith and the movement started by the parents claiming that the —integrity of education demands that it be free from tendentious criticism and pressure from outside“ while

30 —Sydney Lenfesty to President John Allen“, March 17, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 13 31 Tampa Tribune, March 4, 1962 32 —Stockton Smith, Jr. to President John Allen“, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 13 33 —Donald Harkness, Memorandum on AAUP-USF Chapter Position on FLIC Investigation“, March 2, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 13

189 asserting the school‘s administration and not the parents‘ right to determine —his intellectual fitness“ while refraining from commenting on —his political fitness.“34 The parents, feeling betrayed by the AAUP, retaliated, maintaining that politics was the key ingredient to judge a faculty member‘s —fitness“. They applauded Allen‘s decision to rescind Jerome Davis‘ invitation to speak at the University. Margaret Jefferson wrote to Allen and stated:

Because there will be so many organized efforts on the part of outright communists to attack you for refusing to allow a person of such obvious disloyalty as Jerome Davis on the campus, I offer you my gratitude for your honest good sense. Believe me, thousands of parents feel as I do; and we aren‘t organized so you won‘t hear from us35

The University had barely recovered from the Davis incident when word spread that another controversial academic, Dr. Harold Taylor, had been invited to speak at USF. The Sarasota News summed up the feelings of some in the Tampa Bay area when it proclaimed, —Same Song, 2nd Verse“, as the announcement of the speaker was met with resistance from the parents group as well as the Tampa Ministers Association and the Chairmen of their Civic Affairs Committee, Jiles E. Kirkland.36 The minister wrote a letter to President Allen weighing in on the situation and voicing his concern over the latest speaker invited to the USF.37 This incident never reached the level of the Jerome Davis affair but, it added to the growing consternation felt by the parents group. While the FLIC was setting up their operation in Tampa, word quickly spread of their presence in the community. They had not officially announced their investigation but, they made no attempts to hide their presence. As expected, the University of South Florida branch of the AAUP did not warmly welcome the FLIC to Tampa but, instead of protesting their presence, they tried to reach a compromise and soften the inevitable blow to the academic community. They secured a list of requests and compromises and asked for five concessions from the FLIC.

34 Ibid 35 —Margaret Jefferson to President Allen“, March, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 13 36 Sarasota News, April 12, 1962 37 —Minister Jiles E. Kirkland to President Allen“, March 7, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 13

190 First, with the investigation of the University of Florida fresh in their minds, the AAUP insisted that professors be interviewed on subjects and matters that were considered legitimate by those concerned. Secondly they challenged the tactics Johns had employed in Gainesville in keeping the investigation secretive. They requested that the hearings at USF be brought out into the open and conducted on the University‘s campus as a further safeguard for those interrogated. They also asked that the proceedings be tape recorded and that the witnesses would be furnished with a copy of the recordings. The AAUP, trying to cover as many bases as possible, also demanded that legal counsel be provided for those interviewed if they so desired and, lastly, that the information gathered in the investigation was not to be published without —mutual agreement between faculty and University.38 Only if these conditions were met, would the organization cooperate with the FLIC. President Allen agreed with the stance taken by the AAUP and decided to meet with FLIC members before they officially started their investigation. He personally took the AAUP‘s demands to the hotel where Committee members were staying and chose to invite the FLIC to USF, assuming they met the conditions set forth by the AAUP. In being proactive, Allen hoped to limit the publicity surrounding the event. Unfortunately for Allen, Professor Wenner had already given an interview with the St. Petersburg Times in which he divulged that the FLIC was in Tampa to investigate homosexuality at the University of South Florida.39 His statements to the press angered both Allen and the Committee. As a consequence, Hawes agreed to hold the hearings on campus while Allen‘s hopes for a swift and limited investigation had been dashed. Public knowledge of the investigation put Johns on the defensive and he now felt the need to explain the presence of the FLIC in Tampa. Johns, for his part, refuted Wenner‘s claim that the professor had been instrumental in bringing the Committee to the Bay area. At the same time he admonished Wenner for publicizing the FLIC‘s investigation, stating: —It is a policy of this committee to carry on our activities quietly and with as little publicity as possible.“40 Baya Harrison, Chairman of the Board of

38 —American Association of University Professors, University of South Florida Chapter, Position Paper on FLIC Investigation“, May 25, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 13 39 St. Petersburg Times, May 18, 1962 40 Tampa Tribune, May 20, 1962

191 Control entered the fray by straddling the fence, neither approving nor disapproving of the Committee‘s pending investigation. He noted that he had knowledge of the FLIC‘s plans for an investigation at USF but, also, that the BOC would not —voluntarily permit any unwarranted interference with the proper conduct and administration of the university president and faculty.“41 Subsequently the press next concerned itself with how the FLIC found its way to Tampa in the first place as a plethora of rumors circulated. These included the introduction of rabid segregationist and 1956 Democratic gubernatorial primary candidate Sumter Lowry, who hailed from Tampa, and was conveniently embroiled in a heated Democratic Congressional primary with state Senator Sam Gibbons. The St. Petersburg Times charged that Mark Hawes had announced that the FLIC hearings would commence on May 28 because that date fell one day before the primary between Lowry and Gibbons. Gibbons had been instrumental in bringing a public university to Tampa while a member of the Florida House of Representatives (1953-1958) and Lowry, a Pork Chopper at heart, was opposed to the creation of a new university. Lowry was also a member of the Florida Coalition of Patriotic Societies, an extremist right-wing organization which had derided USF over the invitation it had extended to Jerome Davis to speak on the campus. Davis, who had been blacklisted by HUAC in the 1950‘s for —socialist leanings“ and helped to found the pacifist organization —Promoting Enduring Peace“ was often targeted by conservatives throughout the Cold War. The Times accused Lowry of using them to taint Gibbons‘ reputation since he was a proponent of the Tampa school.42 In denying the charges, Lowry claimed, —I had nothing whatsoever to do with the investigation and knew absolutely nothing about the charges until I read them in the paper.“43 The candidate stopped short of suing the newspaper for libel and eventually received an apology from the Times. Johns put out the fire by announcing that Hawes had provided the wrong date and that it would be May 30 not May 28 when the hearings would commence. As they had done in Gainesville, the FLIC mapped out their strategies before the Committee initiated the investigation. They hoped to create an informant ring as they

41 St. Petersburg Times, May 20, 1962 42 Tampa Tribune, May 23, 1962 43 Ibid, May 29, 1962

192 had been able to do in Gainesville and, with luck, students and faculty members would —name names“ once they were faced with the possibility of being condemned in some manner by the FLIC. Unfortunately for the Committee, since Wenner had brought publicity to the investigations, witnesses knew they could claim some rights and would not face the same dire situations faced by the accused in Gainesville. Before opening the inquest the FLIC planned the creation of what they referred to as an —Inner Group“ comprised of Johns, Hawes, McClain, Wenner, the Smiths and Edward Whittlessey who had worked under President Allen at the University of Florida. Each of the members was given a code name with Hawes designated as the —Quarterback“ because he was to lead the interrogations. This group would be bolstered by community members sympathetic to their cause as the FLIC stressed —THIS TAMPA STUDENT AND CITIZENS ELEMENT MUST BE PICKED WITH THE GREATEST CARE for reliability, knowledability, ability to be good witnesses and courage.“44 This inner group would also meet with R.J. Strickland, who, once again, was tapped to lead the investigation, on a regular basis. The first meeting was scheduled for ten days after the beginning of the inquiry. As they had in Gainesville, when Strickland had based his operations out of the Thomas Hotel, the lead investigator in Tampa, aided by Panama City investigator John H. Sullivan set up their headquarters in room 170 of the Hawaiian Village Motel.45 The investigators quickly ascertained from their informants a list of names of students and professors who were alleged communists, left-wing liberals or homosexuals. Based on this list, which was provided by local high school principals, current and former USF students, —concerned“ parents and, faculty members, the FLIC compiled specific questions to ask each —witness“ who was to be questioned when the hearings commenced on May 10.46 The initial investigations, as they had in Gainesville, focused on homosexuality. The two investigators were aided by J. Duane Baker who had led the pornography investigation in Miami in the 1950‘s. They soon focused their inquest on four professors and staff members: James Teske, an educational resources staff member; Professor John

44 —FLIC Memo“, April 18, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 17 45 —Testimony“, May 8, 1962, FLIC Papers, box folder 8 46 Ibid

193 MacKenzie; Theater Professor John Caldwell and Music Professor R. Wayne Hugoboom.47 Teske‘s name had been brought to the attention of the Committee by a former South Florida student. He disclosed that two years earlier, he and his girlfriend had been invited to Teske‘s house with other students where they were offered alcohol, provided with pornographic photographs and, also that he had allegedly sexually propositioned one of the students.48 MacKenzie was also charged and accused of —performing homosexual acts on students.“49 Both Teske and MacKenzie had their contracts terminated and they left USF while Caldwell and Hugoboom were suspended. Both chose to appeal their suspensions and Hugoboom did so successfully and returned to his teaching duties. Caldwell‘s case would prove to be more complex and controversial.50 Caldwell‘s case centered on a student named Charles Hadley who, himself, was identified as being a homosexual by other students who talked with the FLIC. Hadley had complained to Dr. Margaret Fisher, Director of Student Personnel, that students around campus had labeled him homosexual. With controversy swirling around him, he married another USF student Judy Graves and, Hadley himself, chose to speak to the Committee, possibly in an effort to deflect suspicion away from himself.51 He told the FLIC that the problems stemmed from a theater trip to Tallahassee. Supposedly Caldwell had informed Hadley to —stay away“ from the theater program because Caldwell —did not want any fairies“ involved in his program. Soon after this exchange, Hadley did travel to Tallahassee with the group and shared a hotel room with Caldwell. It was in the room, according to Hadley, that Caldwell made an unwanted sexual advance, telling the student, —If a homosexual friend of mine came to me for homosexual action, I couldn‘t turn him down.“52

47 —H.P. Stallworth to John Allen“, June 4, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 14 48 —Testimony“, May 8, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 10, folder 6 49 Charley Johns, —Report from Florida Legislative Investigation Committee to State Board of Education“, August 24, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 14 50 Ibid 51 Margaret B. Fisher, —Interview with Charles Hadley“, September 14, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 14 52 Committee for Evaluating Mr. John Caldwell‘s Suspension, —Report to President John S. Allen“, August 9, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 12

194 Caldwell vigorously denied the accusation and insinuated that he shared a room with Hadley in order to keep an eye on a student whom he considered to be a homosexual and also to protect the other students on the trip from any unwanted homosexual advances. The Committee also noted that Caldwell consistently made comments and remarks in which he referred to his theatre program as being —free from homosexuals“ and —the cleanest theatre in the United States in this regard [homosexuality].“53 Caldwell‘s defense was bolstered by the testimony of several of his other students who accused Hadley of being a homosexual, one of whom was accosted by the student in question on one occasion. According to Paul Morton, the student who defended Caldwell, the only reason Caldwell shared a room with Hadley was that they were the only two left without a roommate and did so out of necessity.54 Caldwell‘s defense was also bolstered by testimony on his behalf given by a priest and another USF faculty member in addition to Dr. Fisher, who provided a character analysis of Hadley and described him as —irresponsible“, —inconsistent“ and —unsavory“ and that Hadley‘s only character witness, a fellow student was in jeopardy of failing out school himself, had stolen and destroyed school property and, therefore was an —unreliable witness“.55 When Hadley was finally questioned by the Committee, with odds now greatly stacked against him, he seemingly changed his story and claimed he was not privy to any information concerning —homosexual activities…on campus.“56 In August, 1962, the University reversed its original position and recommended Caldwell be re-instated. Johns was not pleased with the findings and publicly lambasted the University for not taking action against Caldwell, despite the defamation of Hadley. Johns was also miffed at the fact that power had been taken out of his hands. Professor Wenner‘s comments to the press had indeed come back to hurt Johns and his investigation. Caldwell, while vindicated, was not satisfied. Thus, in spite of the overturning of his suspension, he tendered his resignation to President Allen due to —extended and

53 Ibid 54 —Report on Investigation Conducted by President Allen on the John W. Caldwell Case“, September 11, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 12 55 Ibid 56 —Confidential Report to President Allen from James A. Parrish on the John W. Caldwell Hearing“, August 28, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 14

195 continuing harassment“ from the Committee.57 In his public comments he pleaded, —I can‘t take any more…I won‘t subject myself to further indignities from that man [Johns] and what he‘s doing to destroy teacher morale at the university“ and that he would —never give up, but keep on hurting people to save face politically“ despite the FLIC‘s failure in uncovering a communist plot in Florida.58 It must also be known that, in spite of the reinstatement, Allen had privately decided not to extend tenure to Caldwell because he was deemed too controversial and he was only expected to continue teaching at USF for six more months.59 In fact, the only irregularity in Caldwell‘s behavior uncovered by the FLIC was his prior arrest and ticketing for a drunken driving incident according to James Parrish, chairman of the faculty committee established to follow the proceedings of the FLIC‘s investigation.60 Despite his previous public defense of his University, Allen showed signs of cracking under pressure from the FLIC and exemplified the fear the Committee struck in the hearts of those it attacked. The Committee continued its investigation into homosexuality on the campus and the initial week of interviews and interrogations focusing on supposed inappropriate classroom discussion and assigned readings. The testimony obtained revealed that many of the female students were uncomfortable with comments made by their male professors as well as the fact that reading material was deemed —trashy“, laced with profanity and —a great deal of sex brought into the book.“61 Another student relayed to the investigators stories of a professor who used words such as —penis“, —testicles“, —whores“ and —bitches“ in class. The student refused to utter aloud what she felt were inappropriate words; so she wrote them down for the FLIC.62 With the conclusion of the interviews at the Hawaiian Village Motel, the hearings moved to the University campus. President Allen had been instrumental in bringing the FLIC to the campus to steer the investigation away from a motel and bringing it out into the open. To prepare the students and faculty for the expected onslaught from the FLIC, Allen addressed the University on May 21, urging them to cooperate with the Committee

57 Tampa Tribune, September 21, 1962 58 Ibid 59 —Report on Investigation Conducted by President Allen on the John W. Caldwell Case“, September 11, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 12 60 —Report on Caldwell Investigation“, August 29, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 12 61 —Cheryl Beckner Testimony“, May 15, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 10, folder 24 62 —Testimony“, May 10, 1962, FLIC Papers, Box 10, folder 27

196 and to remain calm, attempting to assure them that they did not have to answer questions which they felt were unjust and that, from that day forward, all interrogations were to take place on campus during —normal“ hours.63 Despite Allen‘s reassurances, the students‘ fears were not allayed and they took matters into their own hands led by the Executive Council of the Student Association. They obtained the signatures of more than half of the University‘s 2,500 students, objecting the presence of the FLIC on campus and the onset of the interviews during finals week.64 The hearings began on May 23 in the Conference Room of the Administration Building, chosen as the venue by President Allen. Charley Johns, Mark Hawes and R.J. Strickland were present along with Committee members George Stallings, Richard O. Mitchell and William G. O‘Neill and Dr. Herbert Stallworth a representative from and assistant director of the Board of Control. The first day focused on appropriate reading selections from a specific course entitled the —American Idea“ and they called its professor John Warner, as the first —witness“ of the hearings. The readings in question brought into the equation were The Razor‘s Edge by Somerset Maugham and J.D. Salinger‘s Nine Stories. Johns soon lost his patience with Warner and attacked the professor, assailing him for his choice of reading assignments. Johns‘ tirade centered on Salinger‘s book as he exclaimed, —Doctor, I want to ask you if the literary field has got to such a low ebb that you all couldn‘t find anything to put in your library but this trash…will you advise me what is literary and a genius about writing such crap as he just read?“65 Warner responded to Johns‘ diatribe by maintaining, —I don‘t rate this trash myself, sir, and I think that, with more time and studying it and analyzing it with one of our good teachers, you wouldn‘t either.“66 Senator Mitchell continued the harangue, informing Warner that he had attended the University of Florida in 1950 along with Stallworth and Hawes and he sarcastically asked the USF professor, —will you tell me how, from 1950 to 1962, this world had changed so much that it is necessary to have such kind of books as we are talking about as recommended reading, or suggested reading, or as a reading list

63 Tampa Tribune, May 21, 1962 64 Ibid, May 20, 1962 65 —John Warner, Testimony“, May 23, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 5, folder 6 66 Ibid

197 delivered to the young people of this University? Tell me how in twelve years that has changed.“67 Later in the day Hawes inserted the question of morality into the equation. The chief counsel asked if it was appropriate for faculty to influence their students by shoving their own morals down their throats. Warner responded by stating —Surely we want them [students] to be sound and sane“ to which Hawes countered, —When did the University and the educational systems take this over from the homes?“ Warner‘s exact words indicated the alleged problem according to the FLIC. By noting —I think we have always shared it with the homes“, Warner underscored the greatest fears of the conservatives. The faculty admitted they were trying to shape the minds of the students and fill them with views that ran counter to the conservative values taught in many Florida households.68 After the first day of hearings, Johns spoke to the media, affirming that the FLIC was —trying to be as fair as humanly possible“ with the hearings and concluded his remarks by maintaining that once finished, the Committee would turn over their findings to the BOC for a further study and that he would not make a final statement on the findings until then.69 Warner saw things differently. The professor penned a —memo“ to President Allen in which he voiced his concern and alerted Allen to what he felt the Committee‘s true intentions were. Warner stated, —The purpose appears to be either the usurpation of control of the university from its heads and the Board of Control, or its harassment, demoralization and possible destruction.“70 Further, Warner strongly urged Allen to create an investigating committee comprised of faculty members to study the FLIC‘s accusations and findings and Allen complied and a committee was formed71. However, as the week progressed, the FLIC continued to harass faculty members including Human Behavior Professor Henry Winthrop for his usage of the words —Christ“, —hell“ and —damn“ in his lectures. The hearings concluded in early June with Johns issuing a final statement to the University. According to Johns, in spite of the Caldwell case:

67 Ibid 68 Ibid 69 Tampa Tribune, May 24, 1962 70 —Robert Warner, Memorandum on FLIC Hearings“, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 12 71 Ibid

198 Your [USF] homosexuality is at a minimum. You practically don‘t have any at this institution at this time, but let me give you some fatherly advice. You can take a hard boiled attitude against it, and keep it out of here, and build an institution that this state can be proud of, but…you can‘t take the attitude you have got72

By this point Johns had had enough of the homosexual problem. During the hearings the previous weeks, the state Senator commented:

Would you believe me when I tell you that six years ago, when I was appointed on this Committee, and when we got into this homosexual situation, that I was naïve and didn‘t know that existed? Further, would you believe me when I tell you God knows I would have been better off if I never found it out, as far as being a citizen. I would have been happier73

Nevertheless, the Johns Committee was extremely critical of the —other“ problems at USF, mainly the —immoral“ teachings and materials presented in the classroom by the faculty coupled with allegations of —communistic“ leanings on the campus. The report of findings issued by Johns placed the onus on the Board of Control, pushing them into immediate action in August. During the summer break, with many of the University of South Florida‘s faculty and staff on vacation, including President Allen, Charley Johns released the entire text of the investigations, without censoring the names of the professors questioned, to the Tampa Tribune, even though he had previously promised to keep them private until after the BOC had met and acted on the findings.74 In the release, Johns condemned the University for being —soft on Communism“, denounced the faculty for —using anti-religious and pro-communist literature in their classes“ and finally announced that the FLIC had —uncovered four professors who were accused of homosexual behavior.“75 In addition to these findings, Johns brought to light another controversy which had plagued President Allen and his school, the debate over Professor D.F. Fleming and his consideration for a position at USF. Fleming had taught at Vanderbilt University but was accused of assigning readings labeled as —communist propaganda“ by HUAC and the professor had been

72 Ibid 73 —Testimony“, May 23, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 5, folder 6 74 Tampa Tribune, August 25, 1962 75 Ibid

199 blacklisted. Allen had approved Fleming‘s hire and was, then, publicly chastised by Johns for not conducting a thorough background check. Allen subsequently rescinded the offer to Fleming despite the fact that Hawes and the FLIC admitted to Allen that they had been —mistaken“ and Fleming had, in fact, not been blacklisted by HUAC76. In spite of the fact that Hawes had recanted the charge against Fleming, the incident highlighted a problem in the hiring practices of the University and other Florida institutions. Johns felt that the state‘s youths and conservative values could only be protected by enforcing background checks as part of the process. The majority of the larger state newspapers responded to the investigation of the University of South Florida by defending the young institution. The local Bay area periodicals were adamant in their defense of the school with the St. Petersburg Times maintaining, —Florida higher education has suffered a severe blow by this irresponsible action. No professor of stature would risk accepting a post with our university system while the Johns Committee is in existence.“77 The Tampa Times surmised that USF had no more problems than any other university in the nation while the Daytona Beach Evening News charged the FLIC with —acting as a prosecutor condemning a man without a hearing.“78 The editor of the Gainesville Sun, whose community had still not recovered from the Johns led witch hunts less than five years before, sent a letter to President Allen, extending his support, as well as that of his newspaper to the embattled president.79 The University of South Florida was also backed by the AAUP and Allen received letters from the presidents of the University of Florida, Florida State University, Jacksonville University, and Florida Southern College in support of the school.80 Floridians from all walks of life sent letters of support to Allen while also voicing their displeasure with the Johns Committee, sending letters to Johns and other FLIC members. Ovra Lee Ice, a minister from the Tampa suburb of Temple Terrace took his case directly to Governor Farris Bryant, a Pork Chop ally of Johns in late August. He beseeched the Governor, —How shall we be able to secure able professors to join this new faculty if they read this scurillous [sic] attack? How shall we enlist students to enter

76 Ibid 77 St. Petersburg Times, August 27, 1962 78 Tampa Times, August 27, 1962; Daytona Beach Evening News, August 27, 1962 79 —William M. Pepper, III to John Allen“, September 7, 1962, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 13 80 All letters found in Allen Papers, box 4, folder 14

200 classes here?...We must not abet the already growing opinion that Florida is after all a state of crackers.“81 Bryant immediately responded to Ice, defending his conservative allies by noting, —I have neither the authority to hamper activity because…the overall result of legislative investigations is good“. Bryant finished his remarks by stating, that he himself was a —cracker“ and that he was —not offended by that opinion, but I don‘t think anything will be done that will destroy the wonderful image that Florida has.“82 The perception of Florida was also on the minds of others in the state including the anonymous author of a letter to the editor of the Tampa Tribune. The letter lambasted Johns and called on the Board of Control to be the final arbiter in matters concerning the universities by intimating that, if they did not assume control, —the asinine, stone age pronouncements of Charley Johns and his barbarian pork choppers on such matters as philosophy, literature, and good taste, will make a laughing stock of higher education“ in the state.83 Allen, buoyed by support he had received from around the state, lashed out at the Johns Committee by proclaiming that it had:

Generated an endless flow of unfair and harmful publicity. It has probed beyond its legislative mandate into the university‘s curriculum, its choice of assigned reading material, the religious and political beliefs of the faculty, the professional judgment of its administrators, and even into the private lives of its staff, seeking to build the most one-sided and damaging case it could against the institution84

The BOC met in July to discuss the issues raised by the Johns Committee after receiving twelve volumes and over 2,500 pages of testimony from the University of South Florida and met again in September to recommend action to be implemented for the future.85 The Board dealt with four major issues: homosexuality; communist teaching; obscenity in books; and a challenge to students‘ religious beliefs. Dealing with the question of homosexuality, the Board noted that Johns had presumed the —problem not to be of great magnitude…at the present time“ and highlighted that the Board had

81 —Ovra Lee Ice to Farris Bryant, August 28, 1962, Bryant Papers, box 148, folder 10 82 —Farris Bryant to Ovra Lee Ice, September 4, 1962, Bryant Papers, box 148, folder 10 83 Tampa Tribune, August 31, 1962 84 Tampa Tribune, August 28, 1962 85 —Report of the Special Committee of the Board of Control“, September 14, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 2

201 previously adopted a policy on December 9, 1961 titled —Policy on Morals and Influences.“86 Studying the section entitled —Attitude toward identified Communist teaching and/or lecturing on campus“, the Board reveled that the —testimony did not reveal any Communists or any Communist sympathizers among the permanent employees of South Florida.“87 They did acknowledge that the campus was not free from —outside“ political views and added that they had been —cognizant for some time that its employment procedures throughout the System could be improved“ and in this regard, the Board called for the fingerprinting of personnel to be —implemented in the near future.“88 This policy was something that Charley Johns and the Pork Choppers had been calling for during the entire investigations as they felt it would help protect the youth of Florida. The Board did not agree with the FLIC‘s crusade to ban books from college campuses noting that for them to —establish themselves as a censorship group would strike at the very heart of academic freedom“. In addition, they felt the selection of books should remain in the hands of faculty as long as they displayed good judgment by insuring that reading materials would be —Pertinent to the subject being taught; The best available and obtainable; and Within the purview of good taste and common decency.“89 At the meeting, the Board of Control deemed the religious questions raised by the Committee to be the most difficult to address but also found that the testimony provided to the group by the FLIC did not point to any evidence that students had their religious beliefs compromised by any faculty members at USF.90 In concluding their report, the Board maintained that they were the —proper body to receive, investigate, and take action upon any and all complaints directed toward or against the institutions under its authority.“91 They aimed this section at —all branches of State Government“ and all Floridians firing an apparent salvo at the Johns Committee and the Pork Chop-dominated Legislature whom they felt had overstepped their bounds. The Board of Control‘s executive director, J.B. Culpepper, further addressed the problems when he wrote that the

86 Ibid 87 Ibid 88 Ibid 89 Ibid 90 Ibid 91 Ibid

202 Board needed to create —plans for protecting the Universities against homosexuality, moral turpitude, drunkenness, profanity in the classroom, personality instability, and other behavior deemed to be detrimental to the institutions.“92 In compliance with Culpepper‘s statement and the Board‘s wishes, university presidents throughout the state became proactive in suggesting and implementing policies to deal with the findings and recommendations. President Allen composed a proposal dealing with the selection of speakers and guest lecturers on university campuses. Allen‘s final document seemed to defy Johns as he proposed that —controversial“ speakers should be invited and allowed to speak on campus on the condition that time was allotted at the end of the talk for questions from faculty and students. He also took a shot at the Johns Committee by claiming that further study of communism, fascism and other —ideologies“ should be undertaken to fully understand them before passing judgment and, more importantly, jumping to conclusions.93 The Board of Control issued its initial recommendations from their July meeting on September 14, 1962. The first section dealt with the selection of faculty and students and broke each down further. The sub-section on faculty charged the president of each state university with maintaining a file on each candidate considered for a job, containing information required by the Board of Control. The universities would be forced to attach recommendations from the dean, department or institute head along with the names of at least two individuals —who have vouched for the candidate and have a personal knowledge of or concrete information as to the qualifications of the candidate; including academic background, loyalty, attitudes toward communism, moral conduct, and general teaching ability (emphasis in original).“94 It was also decided that guest speakers and lecturers, the root of one of the controversies at USF, were to be approved beforehand by the president of the respective university. The sub-section on faculty concluded with the

92 —Board of Control Memo“, July 17, 1962, J.B. Culpepper Papers (cited hereafter as Culpepper Papers), box 1, folder 1, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida 93 —Statements of position submitted by the Presidents of the State Universities, September 1962, Culpepper Papers, box 1, folder 1 94 —Implementations of the Recommendations Approved by the Board of Control on September 14, 1962“, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 2

203 most contentious policies calling for the fingerprinting of all university personnel by the beginning of February, 1963.95 Following the guidelines set down for the screening and policing of faculty, the sub-section on students called for their applications to be bolstered by a letter from a —responsible“ official vouching for their moral fitness and character. Each individual university was further ordered to maintain files on students who applied even those denied admission, for future use by other schools. Section #3 empowered the school to conduct an investigation into students from whom they detected even the slightest indications of —antisocial or immoral behavior, such as communistic activities or sex deviation“. Upon uncovering any such impropriety, the official was obligated to report the incident or evidence to the president who was charged with conducting a more thorough investigation.96 The information would also then be passed on to presidents of the other state universities, by way of a confidential memorandum. Any applicant who applied to more than one state institution would not be granted admission until the investigation ran its course.97 In regards to homosexuality on the campuses of Florida‘s universities, the Board adopted a policy in which the president of each school was forced to file confidential quarterly reports on any incidents and action taken to correct them in —regard to the elimination of sexual deviates.“98 All of the other recommendations made by the Board in September were basically followed verbatim. As expected, the new policies and procedure adopted by the Board were welcomed in the more conservative circles of the state, although some Pork Choppers did not feel they went far enough. At the same time, many liberals lamented the further losses to academic freedoms they now represented. Baya Harrison, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Control, issued a statement on December 7, 1962 in which he stated that the Board was —gratified“ with the policy adaptations as the —actual concepts of freedom and of responsibility have been brought into proper focus and balance.“99 He assured Floridians that the actions taken by the Board and that the trust they placed in the

95 Ibid 96 Ibid 97 Ibid 98 Ibid 99 —Statement by Hon. Baya Harrison, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Control“, December 7, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 2

204 Universities would be protected, meaning, more correctly, that the students would be safeguarded against —immorality“. The new policies were also approved and lauded by representatives from the state‘s four public universities; Dr. Fred H. Hartman from the University of Florida, Dr. Michael Kasha from Florida State University, Dr. Thomas Stovall from the University of South Florida and Dr. Charles Smith from Florida A&M University, the state‘s historically black university.100 In conclusion, the Board of Control presented its new —Statement on Policy on Academic Freedom and Responsibilities“ to the state. They noted that Florida could only achieve its —full potential for greatness“ with an exemplary public university system and that the faculty and students must be free from outside constraints in their efforts to —cultivate a spirit of inquiry and scholarly criticism and to examine ideas in an atmosphere of freedom and confidence.“101 These words directly challenged the premise of the Johns Committee‘s witch hunts around the state‘s respective college campuses. While seemingly defying the FLIC, the rest of the —Statement“ read like a blueprint for conservatism calling on university employees to —exercise appropriate restraint and good judgment“ while also defining their roles as a —citizen“ and how they should conduct themselves in a professional academic environment.102 In one breath, the Board declared their independence from Pork Chop and conservative control, only to subvert the declaration in the next statement, paragraph or even sentence by limiting the true —academic freedoms“ of university personnel all the while maintaining that is exactly what they were protecting. While the Board was drafting its report, the University of South Florida became embroiled in controversy once again. The Board was concerned that all of its work would be undone as a storm brewed around English professor Sheldon Grebstein‘s suspension for assigning the essay The Know-Nothing Bohemian in his class. The reasons for the assignment were lost in the maelstrom which ensued over the questionable sexually explicit quotes in the article. Charley Johns and Mark Hawes received a copy of the article from the daughter of Jane Smith, who led the parent

100 —Statement by Faculty Committee which Participated in Drafting the Statement on Academic Freedom and Responsibilities“, December 7, 1962, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 2 101 —Statement of Policy on Academic Freedom and Responsibilities“, FLIC Papers, December 7, 1962, box 1, folder 2 102 Ibid

205 movement at the University of South Florida. In an attempt to stave off future conflict, President Allen, after being summoned to Gainesville to meet with the Board, suspended Grebstein.103 The USF Chapter of the AAUP swiftly responded by supporting Grebstein as well as raising questions and concerns over the recommended policies the Board was planning to implement. They suspected that the new policies meant that —faculties need to be under constant surveillance for basest intentions and violations of morality and patriotism.“104 They also called on their sister chapters around the state to study and analyze the Grebstein case as an example of the —encroachment on their own future responsibility as teachers, scholars and disseminators of the truth.“105 The AAUP concluded that —Dr. Grebstein‘s suspension destroys the responsibility of the faculty to select materials appropriate to the subject taught and to the context of the level and maturity of the course which it is used.“106 The Tampa Chapter of the American Association of University Women (AAUW) took their complaints a step further by attacking the Johns Committee itself, maintaining it had neither the power nor legal authority to investigate ethics and morality in Florida‘s universities. They also admonished Johns for his publicizing of the findings in August which violated the FLIC‘s policy of first reporting to the Legislature.107 The most damming dissent, however, came from Florida State University where the Faculty Senate called an emergency meeting which was attended by University President Gordon W. Blackwell (1960-65) among other top officials and faculty members. The Senate adopted a resolution which declared the Board‘s new policies to be a grave threat to academic freedom and that the Board should work with the universities not the FLIC to act as a safeguard against the Johns Committee.108 The findings of the Faculty Senate, coupled with a show of support from the print and television media throughout Florida influenced the Board of Control which issued a sixty-two page report in which it found no wrongdoing on Grebstein‘s part and recommended reinstatement.

103 Tampa Tribune, October 23, 1962 104 —Executive Committee of the USF Chapter of the AAUP to the Board of Control“, November 7, 1962, Allen Papers, box 3, folder 15 105 Tampa Tribune, October 23, 1962 106 Ibid 107 —AAUW Report“, Allen Papers, box 3, folder 16 108 St. Petersburg Times, November 5, 1962

206 On November 18, Allen reinstated the English professor with a —censure for bad judgment“. However, as with Caldwell, Grebstein had seen enough. The beleaguered academic accepted a position at Harpur College in Binghamton, New York, now the Arts and Colleges Division of Binghamton University. While the Grebstein debacle was the last publicized foray into the University of South Florida‘s world by the FLIC, it did have lasting effects on the Tampa school. USF soon found that the lingering doubts over academic freedom raised by the Johns Committee‘s investigations hurt recruiting of potential faculty members. Candidates openly admitted that they were concerned over the perceived negative treatment of faculty in the state of Florida and the level of control which the government seemingly held over the state‘s universities. The Director of Educational Resources, Dr. G.C. Eicolz notified Allen that a potential candidate informed him of the reservations he had in accepting a job in Florida. The job would be replacing a professor dismissed during the FLIC‘s crusade in Tampa and Eicolz recalled that the:

Candidates I interviewed received advice from faculty members not to accept positions at our institution. The reason given was that the Johns Committee investigation was an infringement on academic freedom and the state Board of Control refused to intervene and protect the university109

The Johns Committee‘s investigation at USF was a partial victory for the conservative attack group, however, the negative responses from around the state coupled with opposition from organizations and faculty members alike illustrated chinks in the conservative armor and spelled the beginning of the end for not only the FLIC but, more importantly the Pork Chop Gang and their historically powerful grip on the state of Florida. The early 1960‘s saw the continuation of this shift in power to the southern portion of the state and their less conservative values as the Pork Chop Gang came under increased scrutiny and attacks from opponents, especially in the Legislature which would ultimately end in the new Constitution of 1968 and the death of the mal-apportioned state government, the saving grace of the Pork Chopper agenda.

109 —Dr. G.C. Eicolz, Memorandum on Recruitment“, Allen Papers, box 4, folder 13

207 IF YOU ARE HUNGRY, WHY HOLD OUT FOR A STEAK?

The Pork Chop Gang approached the 1960‘s as they and their forerunners had every decade since Reconstruction, with one foot planted squarely in the nineteenth century. The conservatives knew that time was not on their side and the growing opposition to the witch hunts carried out by watch dog of the Pork Choppers, the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee illustrated the fact that more and more Floridians embraced progress and change. The FLIC and their conservative allies in North Florida had one pillar of support, the Constitution of 1885 was still the law of the land, thus allowing them to maintain a firm hold over power in the state through the Legislature which, by the 1960‘s, had become the most mal-apportioned in the nation. The late 1950‘s saw an increase in opposition to this imbalance and every legislative session opened with cries for reapportionment. As the 1960‘s progressed, these calls got louder and support for the —lambchoppers“ or South Floridians in the Legislature grew. As their power slipped away and the United States Supreme Court weighed in on behalf of South Florida, the Pork Choppers made one last ditch effort to shape public opinion and convince Floridians that they shared their values with the majority of citizens in the state. This endeavor, the publication of the Purple Pamphlet in 1964, which was meant to highlight the homosexual threat to Florida, backfired badly hastening not only the demise of the FLIC but, the Pork Chop hold over Sunshine State politics. In the 1950‘s, Governor LeRoy Collins‘s moderate stance on segregation and unwillingness to follow the path of Arkansas‘s obstructionist Governor Orval Faubus or Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland gnawed at the last nerve of every Pork Chopper. However, the greatest danger he posed to the conservatives, certainly in their opinion, was his obsession with reapportionment. From the outset of his term in 1955, the Pork Choppers eyed Collins with concern since three of his top advisors were considered overly liberal. Robert Fokes had previously served as an executive assistant to the conservatives‘ arch-nemesis, former U.S. Senator Claude Pepper. He was joined in Collins‘ inner circle by Florida State University Political Science professor James W.

208 Prothro and St. Petersburg Times reporter John Perry. Both were considered extremely liberal and Perry served as Collins‘ Press Secretary and speech writer and that capacity he was partially responsible for crafting Collins‘ message and helping the governor relay it to the state.1 Early in his tenure at the Tampa Tribune, as one of the leading voices of the —New“ Florida, he called on the Governor —to pick up his whip and beat a couple of obstructionist senators into line“ and —blister senatorial pants with the fire of public opinion“ which was swaying away from the Pork Choppers in the 1950‘s.2 Such action, according to the paper, would break the Pork Chop Gang and —aid Florida‘s progress by wrecking the stranglehold which a clique of backward-looking senators from little counties now has on the legislation.“3 Collins seemingly agreed, confirming the worst fears of the Pork Choppers. Unlike Governor Millard Caldwell, who had been sympathetic but, unwilling to risk his political future backing South Florida, Collins advocated change. When the state was embroiled in the segregation debate and the FLIC was nothing more than an unformulated idea in Charley Johns‘ brain, Collins decided to test the power of the Pork Chop Gang, challenging the conservative establishment in an effort to drag Florida kicking and screaming into the twentieth century. In April, 1955, Collins sent a stern warning to the Pork Choppers and anyone who might oppose reapportionment:

We will continue to fight on the floor of the Senate and in the House committees and on the floor of the House. We will fight everywhere honorable men and women can fight for law and reform and a better state. We are not willing to assume that eight senators can continue to defeat the will of a majority of the Senate and a majority of the People of Florida4

Collins‘ —Winston Churchill-esqe“ call to arms emboldened South Florida but, in reality, became an impediment for future progress. Collins, as expected, supported the southern region of the state on this issue but because he felt they were in the right, not because he would prove to be an ally of South Florida in every regard. The tone of the

1 Wagy. Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida. Pp. 47 2 Tampa Tribune, August 20, 1955 3 Ibid 4 Tallahassee Democrat, April 21, 1955

209 speech, however, was enough to rally the Pork Choppers in defense of their way of life and gave them yet another reason to label Collins a heretic and a Judas to North Florida. In his inaugural address, Collins called for the writing of a new constitution to replace the archaic 1885 relic. This new document, according to Collins would reapportion the Legislature along with tackling other critical issues in an effort to modernize the state.5 Collins had not been involved in the 1945 legislative battle over reapportionment as he had been serving in the Navy during World War II and had not experienced the animosity which had reached a boiling point in 1945. In spite of this, Collins, in a letter to the editor of the Fort Myers News-Press foreshadowed his future position by asserting that opposition in the Senate was a concerted effort on the part of —23 men to oppress nearly 2,000,000 citizens.“6 The North Florida senators responded first with what they felt was a compromise, issuing reapportionment plans which would not change the balance of power in the Legislature in an effort to appease the South by at least introducing legislation on the matter. In one case, a senator even introduced a plan which would have added to the mal-apportionment and given North Florida an even larger edge in the assembly. South Floridians, with Governor Collins‘ backing, did not fold. Palm Beach Senator Russell Morrow resigned in protest from the Constitutional Amendments Committee which was comprised of mainly Pork Choppers: —In this resignation, I hand this bone back, this token [emphasis in original] of representation, this pittance of popular voice, and I pray to God that somehow…that the right…will break through the restrictions now binding them.“7 The Tampa Tribune, in an editorial, backed Morrow‘s symbolic gesture noting the inequities in the Senate and also on the committee, while lashing out at the Pork Choppers for placing the blame on the South Florida Senator:

The Committee is stacked against general constitutional revision…It is loaded with men from North Florida; in the entire South Florida area which holds more than half of the state‘s population and pays about two-thirds of the taxes Mr. Morrow is the only member–out of eleven…It is not Mr. Morrow who is guilty of sectionalism8

5 —Governor‘s Message“, Florida House Journal, Thirty-Fifth Regular Session, 1955, Pp. 9 6 Ft. Myers News-Press, July 20, 1945 7 Ibid, April 23, 1955 8 Tampa Tribune, April 25, 1955

210

They concluded by calling for a fair and equally apportioned committee to write a new constitution which would solve the problem and submit their results to the people for ratification. South Floridians knew once the Legislature drafted a document and turned the process over to the populace, their region would be vindicated since the majority of the state‘s population now resided in South Florida and the more urban regions of Central Florida. Of the largest counties in the state, according to the 1960 census, Dade (935,047), Duval (455,411), Hillsborough (397, 788), Pinellas (374,665), Broward (333,946), Orange (263,540), Palm Beach (228,106), all but one were in South and urban Central Florida.9 Duval County, the one North Florida County with a large population, also had a tradition of not blindly following the Pork Choppers as its home Jacksonville was more progressive than other North Florida cities. The more telling statistic was the difference in growth between the counties in South Florida and those in the North from 1950-1970. While the entire state saw an increase in population, counties such as Dade and Hillsborough nearly doubled in size while North Florida‘s growth was more stagnant if it grew at all. Some counties in the Panhandle, such as Taylor and Gadsden even decreased in population. To further illustrate this point, a closer analysis of the population shifts and districting reveals that there was a district in North Florida where a lone representative had a mere 2,199 constituents while, the other end of the spectrum saw a South Florida elected official who represented 165,028 by himself. In the Senate the smallest district contained 10,413 constituents while the largest, located in South Florida, had 495,084.10 In the late 1930‘s, 26.1% of the population elected a majority in the Senate and, amazingly, in 1955 that number had shrunk to 17.7%. Even though the population of South Florida boomed, the Legislature‘s districting remained stagnant.11 Since the 1920‘s Florida‘s population had drastically changed. No longer was the state two-thirds rural as it had been before the boom. By the 1950‘s it was two-thirds urban. The shift in population was echoed by a transformation in popular support from the media. The state‘s largest and most influential newspapers now hailed from South

9 Tebeau. A History of Florida. Pp. 471-472 10 Colburn and Scher. Florida‘s Gubernatorial Politics. Pp. 172-174 11 Ibid

211 Florida and for the most part opposed Pork Chop obstruction. The largest newspaper in North Florida, Jacksonville‘s Florida Times-Union remained neutral on the debate while the Tallahassee Democrat gave only luke-warm support to the Pork Choppers with their conservative editor (who fashioned himself as a moderate) dubbing the Pork Chop Senators as a —wrecking crew“.12 Their only real means of support from the press came from small outlets such as the Pensacola Journal and other weekly and papers in the panhandle. The Tampa Tribune, St. Petersburg Times and Miami Herald unequivocally supported Collins and reapportionment. The Pork Choppers did fire back, defending their position by referring to the 1885 Constitution as a lawful and just document which had brought Florida seventy years of prosperity and progress. Their major complaint and point of contention was that Collins had overstepped his authority by meddling in legislative affairs which violated the principles of the archaic constitution and, therefore the laws of the state. They mocked Collins with Senate President W. Turner Davis whose father Charles was Senate President in 1917, leading the charge by stating, —The oracle [Collins] has spoken words of wisdom…I still believe there are three branches of government.“13 Woodrow Melvin, Pork Chop Senator from Santa Rosa County outside of Pensacola, announced the position of the conservatives on legislative power in the apportionment debate by challenging such beliefs:

When our forefathers prepared themselves for the task of drafting the document they did not gather around the table as a group of jabbering idiots, but with an eye to the future they provided a framework of government that was designed to endure…The framers provided the three branches and I think it would be just as wrong for the chief executive…to attempt to blackjack the Legislature14

As they had in the 1940‘s when tensions rose and the sectional debate threatened to tear the state apart, several South Florida Legislators advocated the passage of a secession resolution to split the state in half. This desperate measure signified the seriousness of the impasse. Some South Floridians did not feel they could win the battle

12 Tallahassee Democrat, April 21, 1955 13 Ibid, July 22, 1955 14 Ibid, April 22, 1955

212 with North Florida and some did not care to try, acknowledging that Florida had, in fact, become two different states in reality if not legality. Fred C. Peterson, a representative from Pinellas County was the backbone behind proposed secession:

That state senators and representatives of Florida‘s contiguous urbanized counties who desire just and proper representation do hereby join and commend to their citizenry the holding of an area convention upon the adjournment of this session to consider seceding from that area of Florida whose legislators seek to deny them a just representation15

While not many took Peterson seriously, some Pork Choppers did acknowledge the need for change. However, they just disagreed with their South Florida colleagues on how far to go. They agreed to compromise, as long as they retained control of the Senate. Senators Ed Fraser and Harry Stratton, representing Baker and Nassau Counties, outside of Jacksonville, publicly stated that they, for the sake of compromise and conciliation, would consolidate their districts into one unit. Stratton clearly saw the writing on the wall with the continued growth of South Florida and subsequent power shift and felt that this compromise would allow the Pork Choppers to at least retain a seat in the area without possibly losing more seats to redistricting. He noted that reapportionment was imminent and that it could involve as many as fifteen or sixteen seats.16 By compromising on certain seats, the Pork Choppers hoped they could maintain a majority. Thus, they quickly formulated a plan which would have shifted two seats in the Senate from North Florida to South Florida.17 South Florida did not even have time to react as Governor Collins displayed his disdain towards the Pork Choppers and their proposal by stating that it met none of the requirements as prescribed by the Constitution for reapportionment based on population shifts.18 Collins knew he could not count on the Senate since it was dominated by North Floridians, and therefore looked to the more fairly apportioned House. The main point of contention for Collins was the Ninth Senate District which was comprised of Citrus and Hernando Counties, rural counties north of Tampa whose citizens shared Pork Chop

15 Ibid, April 25, 1955 16 Ibid, May 24, 1955 17 Ibid 18 Ibid, May 28, 1955

213 values. The total population of the district was 12,804 per the 1950 census. Collins was appalled that the Ninth District was given as much representation as Sarasota and Manatee Counties, south of Tampa, whose population was 63,531.19 Unfortunately for Collins, his hopes for the House were soon dashed as many in the chamber were put off by the threatening tone of Collins‘ calls for reapportionment. Even some South Floridians in the House felt Collins had, once again, overstepped his constitutional duties, even though his proposal would benefit them, and sided with the Pork Choppers to oppose the abolition of the Ninth District.20 The situation seemed bleak as Collins called for an extra session which still did not result in a negotiation and a resolution on the matter. In June the Senate worked out what they felt was a fair compromise but the House, led by Sam Gibbons, the progressive representative from Tampa who would ridicule Charley Johns‘ obsession with homosexuality in the years to come, was not overly receptive. Gibbons threw down the gauntlet when he stated that any plan must come from the House since it was the more fairly apportioned chamber. He further maintained that the House would not be willing to compromise and concluded by labeling his chamber, —the fighting House“.21 Gibbons‘ statement angered the Pork Choppers and J. Emory Cross of Alachua County immediately went on the offensive, chiding Gibbons and South Floridians in the House for previously failing to provide a suitable apportionment bill. Gibbons responded by claiming they had not had any bills rejected and that, —It takes nothing but the record to make you a liar“, to which Cross retorted, —It won‘t take the record to make you one.“22 The inevitable imminent deadlock led to the rehashing of old ideas and plans such as the —67 plan“ in which every county would have one senator and was usually coupled with the —135 plan“ which would give each county 2 representatives in the House. These plans favored the Pork Choppers as numerically, North Florida and rural counties outnumbered urban South and Central Florida counties. The plan had been floated previously in 1945 by Senator J. Graham Black of Jasper (in Hamilton County on the

19 Florida House Journal, 1955, Pp. 1748 20 Tallahassee Democrat, June 1, 1955 21 Ibid, June 19, 1955 22 Ibid, June 26, 1955

214 Florida/Georgia border in between Jacksonville and Tallahassee). Black was one of the few victims of the limited reapportionment that had taken place in 1945 but had later been reelected to represent a larger district. He introduced a proposal for a constitutional amendment that would be placed in front of the voters in the 1956 election to create 67 seats in the Senate.23 This plan, as it had in 1945, did not receive much support and ultimately was scrapped before ever getting off the ground as Collins threatened a veto. Senator Dilworth Clarke, one of the longest serving members of the Senate and among the leaders of the Pork Chop Gang had already accepted the addition of Wakulla County (south of Tallahassee) to his district which encompassed his home county of Jefferson in Florida‘s historical —black belt“, when Sam Gibbons issued a plan which would have further enlarged his district while stripping seats away from other Pork Choppers. If passed, the new proposal would take away Liberty County‘s Senate seat and add the rural area to Clarke‘s district, making the Pork Chopper responsible for 16,000 constituents. Clarke did not take the news lightly and warned the Legislature, —Gentlemen, when you give me Liberty [County] you give me death.“24 Clarke‘s Pork Chop allies in the Senate sympathized with the Senator with one adding, that they did not want Clarke —to have to walk in the woods of Liberty County.“25 W. Turner Davis also brought into question the merit of assigning Senate seats based on population when Dade County accounted for close to one third of the population of the state. In Davis‘ mind this did not mean that Dade County deserved the right to control a third of the Senate and at least thirteen senators.26 South Floridians as well as Collins felt otherwise and various plans appeared which were all unacceptable to one side or the other. Collins proved to be as uncompromising as the conservatives and threatened to call extra special sessions until a plan was approved and even claimed he would veto any legislation he did not favor. Collins also highlighted what issues he refused to compromise on, including the need for the abolition of Nassau County as a single seat Senate district along with the aforementioned changes carried out to the Ninth District and adding single seat status to Bay, Monroe, Manatee and Sarasota Counties. This final

23 Florida Senate Journal, 1955, Pp. 159 24 Tampa Tribune, June 5, 1955 25 Ibid, June 18, 1955 26 Tallahassee Democrat, June 26, 1955

215 action would greatly favor South Florida as three of the counties mentioned were in that region (Manatee, Sarasota, Monroe). In addition, Bay County, with Panama City as the county seat, was more moderate than most its neighbors and would soon elect moderate Dempsey Barron to the House in 1956 and Senate in 1960.27 After hearing the Governor‘s demands, the Pork Choppers summarily ignored them and introduced their own plan in the House which passed by the narrow margin of 39-37. As expected, Collins vetoed the bill which created more discord between the two branches of government and widened the gulf between the Pork Choppers and the rest of the state. He also vetoed another version of the —67/135 plan“.28 Collins obstinacy backfired as Senator Stratton, who previously was willing to risk losing his seat by merging his district, recoiled from that sentiment and vociferously denounced Collins and renounced his plan for reapportionment. Stratton avowed to stand his ground and defend the Pork Chop agenda by stating, —I am going to take care of Harry Stratton.“29 Collins, now faced with the prospect of losing the precious few allies he had in North Florida, called for a recess and the Senate remained adjourned until late September. His explanation to the Legislature placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Pork Choppers. He spoke directly to his opposition noting, —If you are to violate the Constitution, it is far better that you do it on your own time.“30 In the interim, Collins was invited to speak at a Labor Day picnic in Dunnellon, in Marion County, one of the Pork Choppers‘ strongholds in Central Florida. Collins, never one to shy away from confrontation saw the event as an opportunity to carry the fight to the Pork Chop Gang on their turf. In scathing remarks that shocked those in attendance, Collins derided those who —spit on the State Constitution“. His virulent remarks continued as he condemned the actions of the Pork Choppers who represented the very people he was addressing. Collins blatantly told the audience that —the most effective effort being made in Florida to stimulate anti-small county sentiment…is being made by small county senators and representatives.“31 Collins could have stopped there, already

27 Ibid, June 30, 1955 28 Ibid, July 9, 1955; —Proposed Constitutional Amendments to be Voted on“, November 6, 1956, Collins Correspondence, box 314, folder —Constitution Advisory Committee“ 29 Tallahassee Democrat, July 14, 1955 30 Florida House Journal, Extraordinary Session, 1955, Pp. 114 31 Tallahassee Democrat, September 5, 1955

216 offending the crowd but he continued on the offensive as his next barrage included a direct threat to small counties and their elected officials. Collins informed the audience that, as governor, it was well within the scope of his powers to cut funds to various local programs and institutions and proceeded to name several in Marion County. His point clearly conveyed, Collins assured the stunned spectators that he would not carry out the threats but, merely wanted to remind their senators and representatives who held the highest office in the state.32 The Pork Chop press echoed the sentiments of the Gang by denouncing Collins‘ speech and branding him as a dictator. The press also called on the Pork Chop legislators to do everything in their power to halt reapportionment as a means of principle and that they could not sell their integrity and moral values to Collins and his heretical allies.33 Walton County Representative Tom Beasley directly confronted Collins, stating, —I‘m for the status quo and I challenge the governor to come to Walton County and speak against me in the next campaign.“34 Farris Bryant, a Representative in 1955 and Collins‘ successor in the governor‘s mansion in 1961 initially took a less vitriolic approach to the problem, urging simply for restraint and moderation, claiming, —Sometimes we must crawl before we can walk.“35 Bryant changed his tone as he entered the 1956 gubernatorial race, blaming the impasse and stagnation on Collins. The Marion County representative asserted that the —battle for reapportionment was lost…by the deliberate and calculated refusal of the Governor to use that influence and prestige entrusted to him by the sovereign people of this state to assist him in upholding the Constitution of the State of Florida.“36 Collins quickly retorted by rhetorically asking Bryant, —Is [Bryant] suggesting that I should stop the State‘s road construction program in his own county of Marion because its Senator will not vote for fair reapportionment?37 Bryant‘s sentiments were echoed by lambchoppers who also felt Collins had not put the full weight of his office behind reapportionment. They reminded him that —The only language which many legislators understand is the rough talk of

32 Ibid 33 Ibid, September 10, 1955 34 Ibid, September 27, 1955 35 Ibid, May, 27, 1955 36 —Farris Bryant News Release“, Collins Correspondence, box 319, folder —Reapportionment“ 37 —LeRoy Collins News Release“, Collins Correspondence, box 319, folder —Reapportionment“

217 support denied and patronage withheld“, while the Miami Daily News asserted, —the real question is not whether the Florida Legislature is ready to deal with the problem but whether the Governor is.“38 J.B. Underhill, a reporter for the St. Petersburg Times, a paper that had been critical of Collins‘ decision to not do more to force reapportionment on the Pork Choppers, now defended Collins by claming that his methods allowed for the passage of numerous other essential bills and laws which would have been otherwise challenged and likely killed by the Pork Chop Gang if they felt the governor had overstepped his powers.39 In his second inaugural address and subsequent speech opening the 1957 legislative session, LeRoy Collins notified Floridians, —First and foremost among governmental reforms, we need a new constitution“ and to reach this goal, according to Collins, the Legislature would need to comply with the recommendations issued by the Constitutional Advisory Committee.40 Collins noted, —I have only one sole and single motivation…and that is to help Florida grow.“41 Collins‘ larger goals for Florida placed him in contention with Pork Choppers who looked inward and were more interested in protecting their own political power and future. The Pork Choppers quickly organized an opposition front under the guise of a committee to study reapportionment. Senate President William A. Shands of Alachua County appointed the committee to study the matter but, the committee consisted of thirteen members, of which eleven were Pork Choppers or allies of the Gang and opposed reapportionment. Shands appointed Marianna‘s John Rawls to serve as vice-chairman working under Chairman Dewey Johnson of Quincy in Gadsden County.42 The Pork Choppers were also able to —stack“ the Constitutional Revision Committee which did not bode well for the lambchoppers and Governor Collins. Because of Pork Chop domination of the committee, no Constitutional Convention was called by the Legislature in 1957. In its place, the Legislature approved plans for revising the Constitution article by article and submitting each to the people for

38 Tampa Morning Tribune, June 3, 1957; Miami Daily News, May 26, 1957 39 St. Petersburg Times, June 1, 1957 40 —Governor LeRoy Collins: Inaugural Address“, January 8, 1957, Collins Papers, box 1, folder 38; Florida House Journal, Thirty-Sixth Regular Session, —Governor‘s Message“, April 2, 1957, Pp. 8-16 41 —Governor‘s News Conference: 51st Annual Meeting“, August 2-5, 1959, Collins Correspondence, box 350, folder —Governor‘s Conference–National, 1959“ 42 Tampa Morning Tribune, May 26, 1957

218 ratification. However, they tied all of the articles together and stipulated that in order for one to pass, all would need to be approved. The Pork Choppers wanted to keep House and Senate membership at a status quo while stripping the governor of the right to veto reapportionment legislation. These proposals were met with stiff resistance in the House and the Pork Choppers eventually agreed to a compromise which would expand the Senate from thirty-eight to forty-two seats but this minor revision would not change the balance of power.43 Collins was not amused. The Governor had favored a twelve member committee which he would appoint to study the matter and called the Senate‘s recommendations —the most unsound, unacceptable, and abominable suggestion I have seen advanced in the field of constitutional revision.“44 He issued a counter proposal which would have increased House membership by twenty members and the Senate by five officials. This plan was defeated in the House by a mere three votes but, even if it had passed, the Senate, which was more malapportioned than the House, would have killed the bill.45 Another deadlock was inevitable and the Legislature recessed until the fall but continued to work to try and break this standstill. In the interim, Pork Chop Gang members met outside the Legislature on the Aucilla River and agreed to compromise by pushing for a plan to increase Senate membership by seven seats with four of those earmarked for South Florida. While this —compromise“ would still not alleviate the malapportioned legislature, a weary Collins vowed to support the proposal to the dismay of many South Floridians. He tried to allay the fears of the lambchoppers by promising to push for a drastic increase in the House to offset minimal gains in the Senate. Two weeks later a house caucus agreed to add nineteen seats in the House and on September 30, 1957, Collins called a special session of the Legislature to finalize plans.46 The original proposal to submit the fourteen changes to the Constitution to the voters was reissued and approved and, in spite of Collins‘ support, the lambchoppers were not mollified. South Florida‘s newspapers labeled the plan as a continuation of —rural rule“ while attacking Collins for

43 Ibid, June 3, 1957 44 Ibid 45 Miami Herald, June 6, 1957 46 Tampa Morning Tribune, September 8, 9 and 30, 1957

219 —capitulation“.47 The Daytona Beach Morning Journal even referred to the governor as a liar.48 The Orlando Sentinel continued the barrage by proclaiming, —To say we are disappointed in our alert and ebullient young governor is to put it mildly.“49 Pork Chop adversary Sam Gibbons of Tampa along with fellow Representatives John Mathews of Jacksonville and Roy Surles of Lakeland warned the Pork Choppers that their constituents would not vote for the proposed bill unless it was amended to provide actual change. They were even joined by FLIC member Cliff Herrell of Miami who usually sided with the Pork Choppers but, on this occasion saw the needs of his constituents in greater demand. He referred to the Pork Chop proposal as lame and even noted that in some cases, the changes would strengthen Pork Chop control of the Legislature.50 Collins defended the plan by following Farris Bryant‘s advice from 1955 when he had called for small steps and moderation. Collins campaigned throughout September, promoting the plan and claiming, —We can‘t get adequate reapportionment until we get better apportionment than we have now…The new apportionment plan gives us vastly improved representation for our most underrepresented areas and new legislative strength and leadership for improvement.“51 While Collins and even the Pork Choppers lauded the proposal, the Florida Supreme Court took the matter under consideration. The point of contention was the stipulation that all amendments had to be approved in order for any to be passed. This method, referred to as a —daisy-chain“, was ruled unconstitutional by the state‘s high court and the issue was dead before the state‘s citizens had an opportunity to voice their opinions.52 Collins conceded defeat for the time being but appointed a new committee to continue to study reapportionment and charged them with formulating a plan to present to the Legislature at the opening of the 1959 session. In 1959 Governor Collins again acted as spokesperson for the southern region of the state, claiming —The People of South Florida–the people in the population center– feel that they are not being treated fairly, in the matter of legislative representation, and

47 Ibid, September 23, 1957; Tampa Daily Times, October 9, 1957 48 Daytona Beach Morning News, October 2, 1957 49 Orlando Sentinel, September 29, 1957 50 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, October 10, 1957 51 —Statement by Governor Collins“, February 26, 1958, Collins Correspondence, box 340, folder —Constitutional Revision“ 52 Harvard and Beth. Politics of Mis-Representation. Pp. 62

220 they are right.“53 When the governor opened the 1959 Legislature, he reminded the state of the importance of reapportionment while warning those present that defending the status quo would lead to an —era of sectionalism in our state that will be devastating.“54 With the Pork Choppers claiming the issue was dead, Collins began to tout his own plan for reapportionment. Unfortunately for Collins, Pork Chop opposition remained and Malcolm Johnson, editor of the Tallahassee Democrat noted, —Governor Collins might as well have been talking into a dead mike.“55 Collins promoted a plan which would have added 9 seats in the Senate, raising the total to 47 while House membership would increase from 95 to 104.56 The Pork Choppers remained adamant and rejected the Governor‘s plan, ultimately settling on one that finally passed in the Senate 24-14 and received similar backing in the House. This plan called for an increase in the Senate of only 4 seats bringing the total to 42.57 Collins was in no mood to compromise and fought the proposal until another compromise was reached. Membership in the House would increase to 103 seats, an addition of 8 members, while the Senate would expand from 38 to 44 seats.58 Collins was able to live with this compromise and immediately began campaigning for the plan which would be put before the voters in November. He unveiled the slogan —half a loaf is better than none“ and underscored that sentiment by stating —This is progress. This can only help the state get out of the pork chop strait jacket. This will provide new men, new troops to take up the battle in the years ahead…Let‘s get these reinforcements and with them push forward to still better representation for all Florida.“59 The reality of Senate Joint Resolution Number 660 signified a small victory for urban South Florida but did not address or aim to correct the serious imbalances in the Senate. Of the thirty-eight current Senate districts, only seven would be affected by the amendment. Jefferson County, represented by Pork Chop ringleader Scott Dilworth

53 —Press Conference, Governor LeRoy Collins“, August 15, 1958, Collins Correspondence, box 340, folder —Constitutional Advisory Committee“ 54 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, April 10, 1959 55 Tallahassee Democrat, April 9, 1959 56 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, April 9, 1959 57 St. Augustine Record, April 15, 1959 58 Tallahassee Democrat, April 19, 1959 59 —Reapportionment Article for United Press International, By Governor LeRoy Collins“, October 28, 1959, Collins Correspondence, box 357, folder —News Releases, 1959“

221 Clarke, saw its population decrease from 10,400 in 1960 to 9,500 by the end of the decade but, under the proposed reapportionment, the county would not lose its status as a single district county. Neither would any other single district county. North Florida would seemingly be spared the brunt of reapportionment and the Pork Choppers would remain in power in the Senate. This was too much for many South Floridians to handle. According to 1958 census estimates, the forty-six smallest counties in Florida contained 16.3% of the population, down from 18.7% in 1955. Under the new plan the smallest forty-eight counties would still elect a majority in the House despite being home to a mere 17.2% of Florida‘s citizens. More shocking figures revealed that by 1961, the date the reapportionment would go into effect at the opening of the next legislative session, the six largest counties in Florida, five of which were located in South Florida, would contain 54.8% of the state‘s population but only elect 21.4% of the House. The situation in the Senate was eerily similar as the twenty-three smallest districts would still elect a majority of Florida‘s Senators.60 It is not surprising that despite Collins‘ efforts, Florida remained divided along sectional lines. Seventeen newspapers in the state supported the plan while ten opposed it, most in South Florida.61 The Miami Herald was the only South Florida paper to support Collins and the amendment.62 Representative Dempsey Barron of Bay County equated the compromise to a —legislative miracle“, touting the merits of the plan and predicting voter approval in the November referendum.63 Much to the chagrin of Collins, opposition came from unlikely sources as well. Mayors Haydon Burns and John Russel of Jacksonville and Fort Lauderdale respectively, fought the proposal as did Earl Faircloth, an attorney who led the Florida Committee for Fair Representation claiming —The people of the populous areas have seen through this scheme to retain pork chop control of the legislature.“64 Faircloth would later serve as Florida‘s Attorney General and run against Collins in the 1968 Democratic Senatorial primary.65 Once again they

60 Harvard and Beth. Politics of Mis-Representation. Pp. 63-65 61 Miami Herald, November 1, 1959 62 Harvard and Beth. Politics of Mis-Representation. Pp. 66-67 63 Panama City News Herald, May 24, 1959 64 Miami Herald, November 1, 1959 65 —News Clippings“, Collins Papers, box 1, folder 1

222 charged Collins with capitulating to the Pork Choppers. The St. Petersburg Times offered their summation by writing:

The truth is, the Pork Chop Gang and their allies fervently want the people of Florida to accept this gold-brick amendment for fear that they might lose some of their unjustified power in the equitable reapportionment forced on them by overwhelming public demand–or by the courts66

Representative William H. Boyd of Manatee County, one of the growing South Florida counties that Collins had tried to protect, defended the Governor‘s support of the amendment by stating, —I think the boys of the majority bloc have made us a little better deal. They are at least trying to work out something…it is hard to admit, but these boys are going to give us whatever they want. If you are hungry, why hold out for a steak? Go ahead and eat a humberger[sic].“67 Floridians went to the polls on November 3 and voiced their displeasure over the reapportionment amendment, defeating the plan by a wide margin, 177,955 to 146,601. Out of the 55% of Floridians who opposed the amendment, most of the votes came from South Florida. Voting almost in a homogenous bloc with Duval, St. John‘s and Volusia Counties in Northeast Florida, every county from Indian River south to Dade in Southeast Florida opposed the amendment. On the West Coast, Pinellas County was the only county to vote against the proposal following the lead of its major newspaper the St. Petersburg Times which had condemned the plan. A good number of North Florida, Pork Chop dominated counties voted against the measure but, for different reasons. The Panhandle counties which opposed the amendment did not favor a plan which would give any power to South Florida. Seven of these counties, it should be noted, decreased in population between 1950 and 1960 while South Florida experience yet another population explosion.68 While Collins lamented the defeat, Fort Lauderdale Mayor John Russel reveled in the outcome. He applauded the voters‘ decision while speculating on what the results meant for the future of Florida by directing his comments at the North Florida

66 St. Petersburg Times, November 2, 1959 67 St. Petersburg Times, May 5, 1959 68 Harvard and Beth. Politics of Mis-Representation. Pp. 67

223 conservatives, proclaiming —Mr. Porkchopper, we say that your days are numbered.“69 A Miami woman who had opposed the amendment also took a shot at Collins: —I didn‘t think half a loaf was better than none.“70 Collins was left in a state of disbelief. While he acknowledged the shortcomings of the proposal, he still felt passage of the amendment was in the best interests of Florida and he rationalized the rebuff, uttering —I just don‘t think the people understood“. He later commented —somewhere along the line, in some way, some remedy is going to have to come. And if the Legislature does not provide the remedy itself, I think it will be just a matter of time before the courts are going to step in and find a way to furnish relief.“71 While Collins‘ words would prove prophetic in the near future, for the moment, Florida‘s Legislature remained the most malapportioned state house in the nation. Farris Bryant‘s election pleased the FLIC and conservatives, however, the new governor, like LeRoy Collins before him pushed for constitutional revision. His first address opening the Legislature on April 4, 1961 asked for a reapportionment plan which differed only slightly from the 1959 version which the voters of Florida had categorically rejected.72 After only three weeks, the House approved Bryant‘s proposal and the Senate claimed it was not far behind. Under the plan, the Senate would be enlarged to 45 seats and the House to 105. There were some important differences between this plan and the 1959 model which were initiated to placate South Florida. Jefferson County with less than 10,000 residents would finally lose its single senator status and become part of a multi-county district and the twenty-three largest counties would be given single senator status. It also included a provision that would automatically increase the representation for any county whose population reached 50,000.73 This was not seen as enough in South Florida and the more urban centers in Central Florida and many newspapers continued to oppose what they referred to as —token“ reapportionment. In the House, Broward County which was projected to have one million residents by 1970, was set to double its members from 2 to 4 but the Pork Choppers balked and

69 Miami Herald, November 4, 1959 70 Ibid 71 —Press Conference, Governor LeRoy Collins“, March 10, 1960, Collins Papers, box 3, folder 2 72 —Governor‘s Message“, Florida House Journal, Volume I, Thirty-Eighth Regular Session, April 4, 1961, Pp. 11-14 73 Tallahassee Democrat, April 19, 1961

224 reduced the total number of seats in the House from 105 to 104, thus, stripping Broward County of a potential seat. Overall, neither the House nor the Senate would fall under lambchop control. Under this unreasonable plan, 13.5% of Floridians would elect a majority in the Senate and 17.7% in the House. While these numbers were improvements over the current districting, the change was negligible.74 Despite the shortcomings of this plan and the fact that voters had rejected a similar plan by a 55%-45% margin just two years before, Bryant was confident that Floridians would approve the measure when they went to the polls in November, 1962. Before the issue could even be presented to the public, the United States Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision on reapportionment in Baker v. Carr. The lawyers for the defendant, the Secretary of State of Tennessee, unsuccessfully argued that reapportionment of legislative districts was a political question, not a question that may be resolved by federal courts. The ruling enabled federal courts to intervene in and, ultimately, prove to be the deciding voice in reapportionment cases. Baker v. Carr paved the way for future cases including the 1964 case, Reynolds v. Simms which affirmed that state legislative districts had to be roughly equal in population and had to adhere as closely as possible to the doctrine of —one man, one vote“.75 The implications were clear and Collins had foretold of the courts decision in 1959 when he lamented over the failed vote that past November. Florida was not alone on the issue as Los Angeles County had one lone senator for over one million residents while a rural California county had 14,000 residents and a single senatorial seat. Even though, overall, Florida remained the gravest case and the most malapportioned Legislature in the nation. The bombshell dropped on the Pork Choppers and also the reapportionment proposal rushed the Legislature back into session as Bryant called a special session in the summer of 1962 solely to answer the reapportionment question.76 The governor introduced yet another plan to the Legislature which would have increased House membership to 144 but, more importantly, it would have given the ten largest counties 80 seats. The Senate, according to Bryant‘s proposal would increase to 45 seats but, power

74 Harvard and Beth. Politics of Mis-Representation. Pp. 68-69 75 St. Augustine Record, July 30, 1962 76 Ibid

225 would remain in the Pork Chopper‘s hands.77 They would control at least 21 senate seats but they had numerous other allies, who were not technically considered Pork Choppers, who would vote with them on most measures. Many in the Legislature approved of the proposal and also felt it met the criteria set down by the Supreme Court.78 In spite of the supposed soundness of the plan, some Pork Choppers opposed the measure claiming their hands were being forced by outsiders in Washington and the Supreme Court. This they had done in 1954 in the Brown decision, which they felt had infringed upon the sacred doctrine of state‘s rights. Lakeland Senator Scott Kelly tried to assuage the fears of Pork Choppers by attempting to reason with the conservative rural North Florida bloc. He scolded, —This is not a time to condemn the courts. For whether we like it or not, the courts have assumed jurisdiction in this matter and their ultimate decision will be binding on us. States‘ Rights will prevail if the Florida legislature passes a fair and equitable reapportionment plan.“79 The Pork Chop Gang did not take Kelly‘s plea to heart as eleven senators introduced a resolution asking the Legislature to ignore the Supreme Court ruling in Baker v. Carr. They equated their defiance to the —Massive Resistance“ campaign launched in 1954 which culminated in the —Southern Manifesto“. They charged the federal courts with blatantly assaulting state‘s rights while ignoring the wishes of the people. The resolution, in part, stated that the courts:

With less than one hour consideration of argument has usurped the entire sovereignty of Florida with one small stroke of a pen, scorching and obliterating a whole section of the Florida Constitution which we are sworn to uphold…We deplore the high-handed arbitrary and unreasonable attempted seizure of our sovereign state Legislature, by any court made up of men who have never been elected and are not responsible directly to the people80

Bryant, a conservative in his own right, empathized with the Pork Choppers but maintained his support for reapportionment and refused to support the states‘ rights resolution. He noted that the resolution would not change the outcome of the court‘s

77 —Governor‘s Message“, Florida House Journal, Extraordinary Session on Reapportionment, August 1, 1962, Pp. 4-5 78 St. Petersburg Times, August 2, 1962 79 Orlando Sentinel, August 2, 1962 80 Florida Senate Journal, Extraordinary Session, August 2, 1962, Pp. 7

226 decision and the only consequence it would have would be to —make them [Pork Choppers] feel better“.81 Bryant was supported by former Governor Fuller Warren and James Bomar, the Speaker of the Tennessee House of Representatives both of whom urged the Florida Legislature to accept a compromise before a federal court imposed their own version of redistricting on Florida.82 In response to the advice given by Warren and Bomar, both the Senate and the House quickly proposed numerous plans. The Pork Chop dominated Senate continued to propose plans which neither the voters nor the courts would approve while disregarding a 46 seat plan introduced by former Senate President W. Turner Davis as well as the reintroduction of the 67 member Senate proposed by James E. Conner of Brooksville and G.T. Melton of Lake City.83 Seemingly out of nowhere, the House shocked the Senate by passing a 40 Senator/130 Representative plan whose makeup was previously alien to the Legislature. The Senate refused to pass the bill as it was and changed the proposal to 46 Senate seats and 135 Representatives, passing it by a 29-5 vote.84 With both houses approving the Senate‘s changes, the special session concluded. The legislators felt they had done their job but, now the courts would have the final say as to the legality of the bill. Three weeks after passing the bill, a three judge panel upheld the proposal, claiming:

The way of the state of Florida in providing for the government of its counties and municipalities may not be the best of possible methods, but we are not willing, and doubt that we are able, to provide that it be changed. We do not think it would be reasonable to render unworkable the system by which a very large part of the state‘s legislative function is exercised85

With the court‘s stamp of approval, the plan to add forty seats in the House and eight in the Senate went before the voters in Florida. In the weeks and months leading up to the November vote, opposition emerged to challenge the legality of the proposal, including a lawsuit filed by two Miami lawyers, Richard Swann and Peter Sobel. They

81 Orlando Sentinel, August 3, 1962 82 St. Petersburg Times, August 7, 1962 83 Orlando Sentinel, August 9, 1962 84 Ibid 85 Miami Herald, September 5, 1962

227 dismissed the bill, claiming that the redistricting in the House was negligible and that the Pork Chop Gang‘s grip over the Senate would actually strengthen. As they had on two previous occasions, the voters rejected the plan.86 As the tenuous grip the Pork Choppers held on power slipped even further, the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, which still existed, limped into the 1963 legislative session on life support, hoping for another two year extension to continue their assault on civil liberties. By this time, most of the state‘s newspapers had begun to question the need for the Johns Committee with John Williams of the Florida Times- Union, writing —the legislature should close the [FLIC‘s] office, lock up the records and save the taxpayers of Florida the remainder of the $155,000 appropriation.“87 The Tampa Tribune, commenting on the FLIC‘s witch hunt at the University of South Florida, agreed with the Florida Times-Union claiming they had —disrupted the academic program and morale of a major state university, overstepped legal authority by inquiring into religious and political beliefs.“88 The newspapers were not alone in their criticisms as legislators joined in the attacks on the FLIC as Representative Fred Karl of Hillsborough County noted that —some of its activities have had all of the characteristics of witch hunts; the state‘s academic reputation has been damaged seriously, and many people have been unnecessarily harassed and hurt.“89 Karl wanted assurances from the Committee that they would change their focus and conduct if they were to have their funds appropriated for two more years. Karl‘s colleague from Hillsborough County Terrell Sessums called for an internal investigation of the FLIC to be conducted by a special committee formed in the Legislature probing the Johns Committee‘s methods. State Senator Tom Whitaker questioned the purpose of the Committee, maintaining that their final report lacked recommended legislation and that Johns and his allies had strayed from their original intent, the betterment of Florida through new —corrective legislation“. The real blow came when Duval County‘s Senator John E. Mathews condemned the FLIC. Mathews

86 Ibid, August 14, 1962; November 7, 1962 87 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, October 1, 1964 88 Tampa Tribune, November 19, 1962 89 Ibid, March 21, 1963

228 had served as a member of the Johns Committee but now he questioned the need for the body.90 For the first time Johns was forced to actively defend the FLIC and, more significantly, his chief investigator, R.J. Strickland, who had become involved in a controversial sting operation in which he had allegedly framed Orlando Sentinel reporter Bob Delaney who had penned damming articles about Strickland and the Committee during the USF investigations. Strickland had enlisted the aid of local Orlando police officers and entrapped Delaney in solicitation of a prostitute.91 Johns‘ enemies in the Legislature used this incident against the FLIC. The early 1960‘s also saw several Pork Choppers, who were staunch supporters of the FLIC, lose their seats to more moderate opponents. Former Senate President W. Turner Davis who had served five terms in the Senate, was defeated in a Democratic primary as were Senators Wayne Ripley, Travis Graham and Phillip Beal. Beal was defeated by future moderate Governor Reuben O. Askew.92 The FLIC received more disconcerting news when Haydon Burns, Mayor of Jacksonville emerged as the front runner for the Democratic nomination for governor in 1964. Burns had opposed reapportionment plans in the early 1960‘s because he felt the redistricting did not provide South Florida with adequate representation. Further, and even more distressing for the Pork Choppers, Burns had publicly stated that he did not favor a continuation of the FLIC and that he would oppose the Committee‘s right to exist if elected governor.93 Their fears were realized when Burns eventually emerged victorious after a protracted struggle. Ironically, in the primary, Burns was considered the conservative as his main opposition came from liberal leaning Robert King High, Mayor of Miami. That the conservative was a moderate alarmed the Pork Choppers. Burns and High were not alone in the primary as four other Democrats joined the fracas, of which two hailed from South Florida. The lone North Florida candidate was John E. Mathews who had previously

90 Ibid, April 19, 1963 91 James A. Schnur, —Closet Crusaders: The Johns Committee and Homophobia, 1956-1965“, John Howard, ed., Carryin‘ On in the Lesbian and Gay South. (New York: New York University Press, 1997), Pp. 146 92 Tampa Tribune, May 9, 1962 93 Ibid, May 13, 1963

229 called for an end to the FLIC. Two of the other candidates, Scott Kelly and Fred Karl had previously either opposed the committee or Pork Chop reapportionment plans. Burns received 27.5% of the 1,135,839 votes cast followed by High (18.2%), Kelly (18%), Fred O. Dickinson of West Palm Beach (16.7%), Mathews 12.3% and Karl (7.6%). Burns was forced to face High in a runoff with the Jacksonville mayor winning the Democratic nomination after he easily defeated Robert King High 58%-42% and was subsequently elected Governor of Florida in November in a landslide victory over Republican Charles R. Holley.94 Burns‘ election was even more troubling for the Pork Choppers since Florida had altered its election pattern so, in the future, the gubernatorial election would not coincide with the national presidential election. The winner of the 1964 election would be up for reelection in 1966 and the election of Burns meant that the Pork Choppers would have to find a legitimate candidate to oppose the incumbent in 1966 or they would be faced with an enemy potentially serving a six year term. Burns‘ election was still a year away when Charley Johns and Mark Hawes went before the legislature in an effort to defend their embattled Committee, however, Burns‘ popularity, even in 1963, coupled with the mounting opposition from newspapers and legislators from around the state meant the Pork Choppers had a tough challenge ahead of them if the FLIC was to continue its existence. It was in this chaotic political atmosphere that Johns pleaded with the Legislature. He told his audience that —the work of this committee has got to go on…It‘s larger than any of us.“95 FLIC chief counsel Mark Hawes followed Johns and chastised University of South Florida, President John Allen in addition to the Bay area‘s leading newspapers and others who had criticized the Committee‘s actions. His remarks were virulent, volatile and vindictive and stopped just short of actually threatening his enemies. Johns, not to be outdone by his compatriot, took the floor once again and continued the tirade while also offering a defense for Strickland‘s actions by stressing his accomplishments in Gainesville and other investigations. He concluded his remarks by saying —If Strick never does another thing, he‘s earned every dime this committee has paid him.“96

94 Tebeau. A History of Florida. Pp. 446 95 Tampa Tribune, April 19, 1963 96 Ibid

230 On April 22, three days after Johns and Hawes pleaded their case to the legislature, an assortment of bills were introduced which called for a continuation of the Committee with different stipulations. On May 6 the House State Government Committee approved an extension by an 11-5 margin with an appropriation of $155,000, close to twice as much as the 1961 Legislature had afforded the Committee. The Senate passed the measure on May 9 by a 30-14 margin and the Appropriations Committee in the Senate approved the $155,000 earmarked for the FLIC.97 A closer examination of the vote does illustrate the growing opposition to the FLIC and the Pork Choppers. The victory was pyrrhic as the 14 opposition votes in the Senate were the most to oppose the Committee since its inception in the mid-1950‘s. Two of the fourteen votes came from former Committee members, Cliff Herrell and John E. Mathews. Herrell, from Miami, represented a constituency which was adamantly anti- Johns Committee and his political future possibly hinged on this vote. Five of the opposition votes, Reuben Askew, Dempsey Barron, John E. Mathews, J. Emory Cross and Verle Pope hailed from North Florida and Cross had been a Pork Chop ally in the past. Pope, despite representing St. Augustine, had long been an opponent of the Gang. The others who constituted the fourteen —nay“ votes included George Hollahan of Miami, Scott Kelly of Lakeland, Beth Johnson of Orlando, former Governor Dan McCarty‘s brother John from Ft. Pierce, Bernard Parrish of Titusville, Ed Price representing Bradenton and Tom Whitaker, Jr. from Tampa.98 After passing the Senate, the bill was turned over to the House for a full vote amidst a swell of protests and condemnations from the state‘s newspapers. Johns responded to the mounting resistance and hostility by trying to frame the Committee‘s importance into the vernacular of the Cold War. Johns asserted that —Whenever you try to preserve America for Americans, this is the type of obstruction you run into…they [Russia] won‘t have to fire an atom bomb at this nation. They are going to take us over from within…We had better wake up and try to do something.“ The House voted on May 24 and passed the bill by a 94-31 margin.99 In the debate that preceded the vote,

97 Ibid, April 23, May 7 and 10, 1963 98 Ibid, May 10, 1963 99 St. Petersburg Times, May 24, 1963; Tampa Tribune, May 25, 1963

231 former FLIC Chairman Henry Land opposed the Committee‘s extension, to no avail, citing the excessive appropriation of $155,000. Fred Karl who had been a longtime opponent of the FLIC introduced legislation co-sponsored by Woodie Liles which, if passed, would curtail the powers of the Johns Committee and provide legal safeguards for those persecuted by the Committee. In the end the amendment was not passed but the strong support highlighted the shaky foundation on which Johns and his allies rested. The tenancy of the FLIC‘s existence was illustrated by other amendments which did pass, including one that forced the Johns Committee to file reports to the Legislature every three months while also ensuring the rights of witnesses and those interrogated by the FLIC.100 With the Committee slated to commence work at the end of the summer in 1963, Johns and his colleagues tried to map out a future plan of action. If Johns thought that the reprieve afforded to the FLIC by the Legislature was the end of his troubles, he was sorely mistaken. Earl Faircloth, who had opposed Pork Chop attempts at reapportionment, and who had just been appointed to the FLIC, announced his resignation. Faircloth claimed he had only accepted a position on the Committee under the condition that changes in leadership were carried out.101 When the FLIC met for the first time on August 8, Charley Johns was replaced as chairman by Richard Mitchell of Leon County. Unlike Johns, Mitchell was concerned with the Committee‘s image throughout the state and displayed little of the arrogance which had tarnished Johns‘ image. He pledged to lead the FLIC in a new direction and to focus on corrective legislation rather than —police state tactics“ which had characterized Johns‘ tenure as chairman.102 Much to the chagrin of Johns and other Pork Choppers, one of Mitchell‘s first acts as chairman was to force the resignation of both Hawes and Strickland in an attempt to reverse the negative connotation the two gave the Committee.103 Pork Chop power was clearly waning as Mitchell solidified his control over the FLIC. Hawes was replaced by Tallahassee lawyer Leo Foster who accepted a part-time role as chief counsel, accepting a salary only when actively working for the

100 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, May 31, 1963 101 Miami Herald, July 30, 1963 102 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, August 9, 1963 103 Ibid

232 Committee. Former FBI agent Lawrence Rice succeeded Strickland as chief investigator.104 After being stripped of power, support and members, the final nail in the coffin for the FLIC was brought on by Charley Johns‘ obsession with homosexuality. Following on the success of the Florida Children‘s Commission and the crusade against pornography, homosexuality and sexual deviance, the Committee authorized the publication of Homosexuality and Citizenship in Florida, later named the Purple Pamphlet because of its purple cover. In the preface of the report the Committee outlined the purpose of the publication, stating their aim was to explain —the extent of infiltration into agencies supported by state funds by practicing homosexuals, the effect thereof on said agencies and the public, and the policies of various state agencies in dealing therewith.“105 John E. Evans, newly appointed staff director of the FLIC highlighted the intent of the report: —Since the homosexual has seen fit to come out into the open and try to get himself accepted by society . . . it is about time the thinking members of society . . . get off their duffs and realize that if we don‘t stand up and start fighting that we are going to lose these battles in a very real war of morality.“106 State Senator Robert Williams from Graceville wanted the pamphlet, which contained forty pages of illustrations and text, to be distributed to a limited audience which would consist of —members of the Legislature, law enforcement officials, members of the press, and to such groups as parent-teacher associations, city police departments, and others properly concerned.“107 The Orlando Police Department received fifty to use in their training classes while the Dade County Sheriff‘s Training School used fifty-five copies of the report in its training classes.108 The Purple Pamphlet defined a homosexual as —anyone willing to have sex with someone of the same sex“ which, according to the FLIC, was an affront to American

104 Ibid, November 19, 1963 105 Florida Legislative Investigation Committee. Homosexuality and Citizenship in Florida: A Report of the Florida Legislative Committee (Tallahassee, January 1964). 106 —Remarks of John E. Evans, Staff Director, Florida Legislative Investigation Committee to the Annual Convention of the Florida Federation of Women‘s Clubs“, April 15, 1964, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 25 107 —FLIC Minutes“, Bryant Correspondence, January 29, 1964, box 82, folder 4 108 —Memo to C. Lawrence Rice, Chief Investigator, FLIC, Subject Homosexual Report“, May 30, 1964., FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 7; —FLIC Staff Report #15“, April 3, 1964, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 27

233 ideals and it was the responsibility of the FLIC to stop this behavior.109 The tone of the pamphlet illustrated how homosexuality was a choice referring to homosexuals as —active“ or —practicing“. —Active“ homosexuals were subsequently likened to subversives and linked to the Communist Party.110 The report did not offer any substantial scientific or psychological evidence supporting this assertion but it was a commonly held myth supported by pseudo scientific evidence which the pamphlet cited in its bibliography. Homosexual relationships and sexual encounters were analyzed in the pamphlet and the report quoted a magazine article which had defended homosexuality, calling the love of the same sex as beautiful and that it needed to be celebrated. The article concluded that sex without love is empty. The report refuted this claim by stating that the conclusion was flawed because homosexual relationships based on love were few and far between; fleeting relationships centered on —animal lust“ were the norm.111 Thus, the Committee sought to bolster their argument by stating that homosexuals had a strong appetite for sex.112 They believed that this —appetite“ created a sex starved fiend who would take sex from wherever they could get it. The taboo nature of sexual conduct and public conversations about it made this idea more repulsive, furthering the distinction of homosexuals as the —outsider“ in American society. Possibly the most shocking section of the Purple Pamphlet, aside from the graphic photographs, was the descriptions of homosexuality which labeled it as a disease and mentioned homosexuals and child molesters in the same paragraph. According to the FLIC, —The child molester attacks, but seldom kills or physically cripples his victim“ while —the homosexual…prefers to reach out for the child at the time of normal sexual awakening and to conduct a psychological preliminary to the physical contact“. Despite separating the homosexual from the child molester, by mentioning them in the same paragraph, the link was firmly planted in the minds of the readers. The section concluded with a scathing condemnation of homosexuals when it maintained that —homosexuality is unique among the sexual assaults considered by our laws in that the person affected by

109 Homosexuality and Citizenship in Florida: A Report of the Florida Legislative Committee 110 Ibid, Pp. 6-7 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid., p. 10.

234 the practicing homosexual is a first victim, then an accomplice, and finally by himself a perpetrator of homosexual acts.“113 One can surmise from this passage that the authors of the report attempted to portray homosexuality as a crime as bad as or worse than molestation. Rather than rally support to their side, the publication of the Purple Pamphlet backfired and ushered in a new wave of denunciation aimed at the FLIC. The opposition stemmed from the shock value of the report which was meant to prod the populace into action but, in reality, disgusted the average Floridian. In the introductory section, the pamphlet issued a stern warning to —every parent and individual concerned with the moral climate of this state“. It further cautioned them to —be aware of the rise of homosexual activity noted here.“ Inside the lavender cover was a photograph of two shirtless men in an embrace and kissing. Other photos in the pamphlet showed a teenage boy in a —G-string“ bound in ropes. The caption accompanying the photograph read, —use of bindings is frequent in artwork of this nature…an apparently strong stimulant to the deviate.“ A glossary of —Homosexual terms and Deviate acts“ complemented the collection of photographs which also included a man in the stall of a public restroom receiving oral sex through a hole in the stall. The last straw for those who were appalled by the pamphlet was the inclusion of photographs of young boys in various erotic poses.114 While the distribution was supposed to be limited, a notation on the back of the pamphlet advertised the sale of the report for twenty five cents, which further shocked and angered the public. The astonishment was magnified after Robert Williams wrote an article entitled —Sex, Tallahassee“ which appeared in the The New Republic in May, 1964. In the article, Williams claimed that —Two thousand books were printed at a cost of $720. The first thousand were sent off to legislators, newspapers, and other ”key‘ people, but anyone who sends the committee 25 cents can get one.“115 The negative response was swift and came from all regions of Florida. In an editorial Ralph Renick stated, —This booklet is offensively indecent. It is not possible to

113 Ibid 114 Ibid 115 Robert H. Williams. —Sex, Tallahassee“, The New Republic, May 23, 1964

235 give . . . a description of its contents without violating . . . sensibilities.“116 Miami Attorney Richard Gerstein labeled the pamphlet —obscene and pornographic“ and threatened legal action against the FLIC if publication did not immediately cease.117 He was backed by Florida‘s Attorney General James Kynes who referred to the pamphlet, especially the pictures as being —repulsive and shocking“, while Wilson Carraway, the President of the Senate discarded the copy given to him in the trashcan on the Senate floor.118 While some newspapers defended the motivation for publication, the Tallahassee Democrat denounced the pamphlet as being —shocking“ and —obscene“. Floridians also voiced their disapproval of the pamphlet by sending strongly worded letters to FLIC members. One anonymous writer told Senator Mitchell that —as one of these ”degenerates‘, I cannot but be somewhat concerned as to the fate of these now-existing 60,000 [homosexuals], once public sentiment is aroused…for I am not the ”queer‘ the general public has in mind.“119 Another letter to Mitchell from —A Voter and a Good Citizen“ informed the Committee member:

I personally hope that you and every member of your infamous legislative investigating committee, and your staff henchmen, John Evans, get just what you deserve–to rot in hell…Your present ill-fame only serves to prove that you and your crowd have the dirtiest minds in the state120

John E. Evans defended the pamphlet by claming —our report is somewhat less ”sexy‘ than any number of textbooks and marriage guides readily available at the local library; and finally, that any young person who wanted a good guide to either homosexuality or promiscuous sex as presently practiced would find the current issues of Playboy . . . more edifying than our report and their illustrations of greater erotic value.“121 An editorial in the Tallahassee Democrat commended the Committee for

116 —Editorial # 1414 by Ralph Renick“, March 8, 1964, FLIC Papers, box 16, folder 13 117 Miami Herald, March 18, 1964 118 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, March 20, 1964 119 —Anonymous Letter to Richard Mitchell“, March 19, 1964, FLIC Papers, box 2, folder 10 120 —A Voter and a Good Citizen to Richard Mitchell“, FLIC papers, box 2, folder 9 121 —Remarks of John E. Evans, Staff Director, Florida Legislative Investigation Committee to the Annual Convention of the Florida Federation of Women‘s Clubs“, April 15, 1964, FLIC Papers, box 1, folder 25

236 issuing the report maintaining —it is a real subject that we have discussed too long behind the backs of our hands without recognizing the scope and implications of the pernicious problem it presents“.122 However, the general public was not entirely convinced and the Johns Committee had finally gone too far in the minds of a majority of Floridians. Governor Farris Bryant publicly claimed that he refused to open the Purple Pamphlet and while he agreed with the necessity of educating Floridians on the dangers that homosexuality presented, he questioned the public distribution of what the Florida Times-Union labeled the —Pervert Report“.123 A noncommittal governor, who had previously supported the FLIC and the Pork Chop Gang, did not bode well for Charley Johns. The opposition to the Purple Pamphlet continued and intensified when the Florida Civil Liberties Union called for the abolition of the FLIC.124 After the Purple Pamphlet debacle, the FLIC felt the best course of action was to stay out of the public eye and regroup to fight another day. The Committee suffered a further blow when Chairman Mitchell was diagnosed with terminal cancer and was replaced with Senator Robert Williams. In the interim another controversy rocked the Johns Committee and threatened to end their nine year reign in Florida. Without warning, on September 8, John Evans tendered his resignation. This was immediately followed by the resignation of the remaining FLIC staff members due to —deep divisions within the committee membership on its direction“ and finally, because —the membership was unprepared to follow through with Chairman Mitchell‘s leadership, and the steps [he] had initiated to make it serve a useful legislative purpose.“125 Evans did issue a statement in which he listed the accomplishments of the FLIC during his tenure while also reiterating the fact that he felt the Committee was still valuable and, even possibly, a necessity in the current political and social climate. He concluded that in comparison to other states, because of the Johns Committee, Florida remained virtually free of —subversive influences“.126 Without a concrete statement regarding the reasons for the resignations, newspapers began to conjecture and rumors circulated throughout the state.

122 Tallahassee Democrat, April 17, 1964 123 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, March 19, 1964 124 Ibid, March 20, 1964 125 Ibid, September 13, 1964 126 Ibid

237 Jacksonville‘s Florida Times-Union claimed the resignations were due to a disagreement with Governor Bryant over the FLIC‘s investigation into and subsequent published report concerning the racial strife in the nation‘s oldest city, St. Augustine. The papers contended that Bryant, who had created a bi-racial committee to settle the standoff between the local NCAAP, Martin Luther King, Jr.‘s‘ SCLC and St. Augustine‘s all- white city council and local government had, allegedly, according to the papers, become upset that the FLIC‘s investigation and published report, would reflect negatively on his actions.127 Evans denied this was the reason for the mass resignations but, the rumors persisted nonetheless. The slow death of the FLIC was accelerated by the shocking resignation of the Committee‘s namesake Charley Johns at the end of September. Senator Williams, the acting Chairman due to Mitchell‘s failing health, followed Johns in announcing his resignation. Johns cited personal reasons and in his resignation letter addressed to Senate President Wilson Carraway, Johns stated —close the office, lock up the records and save the taxpayers of Florida of the $155,000 appropriation.“128 In spite of his illness and the mass resignations, Mitchell vowed to carry the work of the FLIC into the next legislative session and along with Representative Stallings, issue the Committee‘s findings as well as introduce a large and comprehensive legislation package since he had claimed all along that was the real mission and aim of the FLIC. The legislation would include a Sexual Behavior Act to combat sexual deviancy, an Academic Freedom Act, Teacher Certification Revocation, and a Fingerprinting Act all aimed at strengthening the public schools and protecting Florida‘s youth. The package also included a Communist Party Act as the FLIC continued their brand of McCarthyism to the very end. All of the proposed legislation was an attempt to counter challenges and affronts to the Pork Choppers‘ cherished Southern way of life.129 Initially, in presenting his legislation to the legislature, Mitchell did not ask for an extension for the Committee. He quickly reversed his decision but the opposition of the newly elected Governor Haydon Burns, coupled with the tarnished name and reputation of the Committee, did not allow for the FLIC to be granted a continuation and the Florida

127 Ibid, October 1, 1964 128 Ibid, October 3, 1964 129 Ibid

238 Legislative Investigation Committee was finally laid to rest on July 1, 1965. The death of the Committee, along with the failed passage of Mitchell‘s legislation was a hammer blow to the Pork Chop Gang. In challenging the Johns Committee, Burns had issued a scathing statement in which he stated, —The sooner it [FLIC] is eliminated, the better off the state will be. The committee as presently identified does not enjoy the support or the respect of the public and is devoid of any usefulness.“130 The FLIC‘s existence, however, was not the only pressing issue that the Pork Choppers faced entering the 1965 legislative session. The Federal District Court in Miami instructed the Legislature to pass a legitimate reapportionment plan which abided by the Reynolds v. Simms ruling and to compose an amendment which finally provided Florida with —one man, one vote“ districting. If they did not comply, the court would be forced to issue its own plan which they claimed would likely be ”harsher“ than the bare minimum the state needed to produce an acceptable plan.131 Upon receiving that information from the court, seven reapportionment plans were introduced with one of the most popular being a 40 senator, 100 representative option introduced by Senators Robert Haverfield and George Hollahan, both from Dade County. Ralph Turlington, a Representative from Gainesville favored a 50 senator, 100 representative plan while another plan calling for 36 seats in the Senate and 108 in the House and which received the support of the Mayor‘s Council on Fair Reapportionment and various Women‘s clubs and groups was introduced by Orlando representative Robert Elrod. Sam Campbell from DeFuniak Springs, one of the state‘s few Republican legislators even entered the fray with three different plans. Two of the more outlandish plans were a 90 senator, 220 representative legislature and also a 100 seat unicameral legislature.132 In the end, the House and Senate passed a plan which called for a 58 seat senate and a 109 seat House. The proposal met immediate and swift opposition from Governor Burns, and while he maintained that he would not veto the bill, he would not sign it either.133 Burns pessimistically predicted that the federal court would not approve the

130 Ibid, May 22, 1965 131 Tallahassee Democrat, June 1, 1965 132 Ibid, June 30, 1965; Ibid, June 9, 1965 133 Ibid, June 30, 1965

239 measure.134 The court proved Burns‘ statement prophetic when it rejected the plan forcing the governor to call a special session beginning on March 2, 1966. Burns entered the arena himself by presenting a 48 senator, 108 representative plan which he maintained was more equitable and closely abided by the —one man, one vote“ doctrine.135 Burns knew he would face a stiff challenge in the 1966 Democratic primary, especially from South Florida liberal Robert King High whom Burns had defeated in 1964. Burns tried to play the role of an intermediary standing above the chaos which consistently wreaked havoc on the Florida State Legislature by stating —I should like to believe the terms ”pork choppers and ”lamb choppers‘ have been buried forever. I urge one, and only one coalition-a coalition of dedicated Floridians placing statesmanship above all else.“136 Newly installed Senate President James Conner called for an —all- Florida plan“ a phrase which entered into the legislative lexicon and was used constantly throughout the 1966 debates on reapportionment.137 The legislature considered the governor‘s proposal, modified it slightly, raising membership in the House to 117 while keeping the Senate at 48 seats. Burns signed the bill into law and the federal court in Miami approved the plan seemingly ending the ordeal.138 This victory afforded Burns with momentum heading into the Democratic primary but the incumbent still faced a determined opposition from two candidates representing the more liberal wing of the party, Miami‘s Robert King High and Lakeland‘s Scott Kelly. In the primary, Kelly and King split the more liberal vote but their returns denied Burns a first ballot victory. Burns garnered the most support, receiving 35.7% of the vote followed by High with 32.5% and Kelly with 31.8%. In the runoff, High defeated the more conservative Burns by a comfortable margin (54%-46%). Most of High‘s support came from South Florida and the growth of the region was substantial enough to propel the Miami Mayor into the nomination.139 Burns was not the only Democratic incumbent defeated in the May primary as Charley Johns lost a May 24 runoff to Hal Davis in a hotly contested election 50.1%-

134 Ibid, July 1, 1965 135 —Governor‘s Message“, Florida House Journal, Extraordinary Session, March 2, 1966 136 Ibid 137 Tallahassee Democrat, March 3, 1966 138 Ibid, March 10, 1966 139 Tebeau. A History of Florida. Pp. 447

240 49.9% despite the fact that Johns carried 15 of the 23 counties in his district which had been enlarged to include the more populous regions of North-Central Florida, including Alachua County, where the Johns Committee‘s witch hunts had terrorized the University of Florida community a decade earlier.140 High‘s triumph was a victory at a high cost since it had badly divided the Democratic Party. Many conservative Democrats, especially those in North Florida, found it impossible to support High who was a —John F. Kennedy Democrat“, had favored integration, civil rights and his proposed plans for Florida included a spending program which mirrored that of President Lyndon B. Johnson.141 Heading into the general election, the Chairman of the Republican Party in Florida proclaimed —If we fail to win this year we can blame no one but ourselves.“142 In spite of the optimism emanating from the Republican camp, Democrats were shocked when Republican Claude Kirk did become the first member of his party to be elected governor of Florida since Ossian B. Hart in 1872 and the first Republican to serve as governor since former Union Army veteran Marcellus Lovejoy Stearns left office in 1877. Kirk had been a Democratic until 1960 when he headed the —Floridians for Nixon“ campaign and now the California native had risen to the highest office in Florida state politics by defeating Robert King High fairly easily 55%-45%, carrying 55 of Florida‘s 67 counties in the process.143 One of the first issues Governor Kirk had to deal with upon assuming office was the startling decision by the U.S. Supreme Court which reversed the federal court‘s previous ruling rejecting the legality of the legislature‘s 48 senator, 117 representative plan.144 Not only had the court reversed the decision but it had also declared the Legislature unconstitutional and, thus, did not recognize the 1966 elections.145 Kirk followed his Democratic predecessors by voicing his displeasure at the high Court‘s ruling. He was aided in his protest by Attorney General Earl Faircloth as well as Democrats in the both the House and Senate along with Florida‘s national Congressional

140 —Returns from General and Primary Elections“, May 24, 1966, Department of Elections, State of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida 141 Klingman. Neither Dies nor Surrenders. Pp. 165 142 Tallahassee Democrat, June 19, 1966 143 Ibid, November 7, 1966 144 Tallahassee Democrat, January 10, 1967 145 U.S. Supreme Court, Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967)

241 delegation and Conservative Democratic U.S. Senator George A. Smathers who castigated the court for —succeeding only in plunging our state into chaos and confusion.“146 Kirk initially was able to count on bipartisan support to attempt to counter an outside threat. He would later be chastised by Democrats and even members of his own party for what Verle Pope called —Kirkumcizing“ the Legislature by his liberal use of his veto powers, especially on fiscal measures.147 Kirk also responded proactively, urging the Legislature, which was still dominated by Democrats, to put aside partisan and sectional differences to construct a plan which would forestall a mandated reapportionment from Washington.148 The plans issued would be turned over to the Federal District Court in Miami for consideration before being signed into law by the governor. The Legislature continued their efforts to construct an acceptable plan while, at the same time, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to permit the legislators to remain in their seats until the next set of elections in 1968. While the court was mulling over Florida‘s request, the Legislature proposed another plan which heavily favored South Florida which constituted a marked shift of power to more urban areas. The proposal called for 48 seats in the Senate and 120 in the House with most of the gains in South and Central Florida.149 This plan would also mean 43 members in both houses would be up for reelection in 1968. Opponents quickly emerged who maintained that the plan still did not rectify the profound population shift, leaving too much power in the hands of North Florida despite the large changes proposed. Unfortunately for the legislators who supported the plan, the district court in Miami called a recess.150 It was not until early February that the judges William A. McRae, David W. Dyer and Warren O. Jones finally rendered their decision. As many expected they approved a plan issued by University of Florida political science professor Dr. Manning J. Dauer who had proposed a 48 senator, 119 representative Legislature.151 In issuing their decision, Judge Warren O. Jones stated, —The judges of this court have reluctantly concluded that a judicial apportionment of the legislature is

146 Ibid 147 Florida House Journal, Forty-Second Regular Session, 1969, Pp. 256 148 Orlando Sentinel, January 12, 1967 149 Ibid, January 17, 1967 150 Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, January 27, 1967 151 Tebeau. A History of Florida. Pp. 449

242 required. The state has failed to present, and the court has carefully considered but has rejected, as impractical and of doubtful validity, a proposal for at large factional voting.“152 The new plan also called for all members of the Legislature who had been elected under the old method to run for reelection before the opening of the new session, less than two months later in early April.153 The primaries would be held on February 28, making campaigning almost impossible. An example of the new districting was best illustrated by Dempsey Barron, a Senator from Panama City whose district exploded after reapportionment to encompass nine counties and over 300,000 constituents.154 In opening the Forty-first Legislative Session in April, 1967, Governor Claude Kirk asked the Legislature to focus all of its efforts on a revision of the state constitution, the archaic document which had cemented conservative North Florida Democratic control in 1885, leading to the construction of the Constitution of 1968. Articles III and IV of the new constitution dealt with the legislative and executive branches of Florida‘s government. Article III Section 15 was entitled Terms and Qualifications of Legislators dictating that House members would be up for reelection every two years while Senators would serve four year terms. Section 16 was the much anticipated inclusion dealing with apportionment and legislative districting. It followed the plan issued by Dr. Dauer which was accepted by the federal district court.155 Article IV dealt with the executive branch and strengthened the office which had its power diminished in 1885 by the Bourbons who wrote the old constitution. The new document afforded governors with the opportunity to succeed themselves as the state‘s chief executive. It also created the office of Lieutenant Governor which had been abolished by the 1885 Constitution and further stipulated that the new position would be filled through an election with the prospective candidate running on the same ticket with the potential governor. According to Article IV, Section 3, the Lieutenant Governor would succeed the Governor upon the latter‘s death or resignation, seemingly solving the problem which arose in 1954 when Charley Johns, as Senate President, became acting governor when Governor Dan McCarty died. One major criticism of the 1968 document

152 Tallahassee Democrat, February 9, 1967 153 Ibid 154 Ibid, March 15, 1967 155 Florida Constitution (1968), Article III, Sections 15-16

243 according to modern day political scientists was Article IV, Section 4 which related to the cabinet system. Florida retained its unique structure in which the cabinet remained elected offices independent of the governor. The legislators approved the document in July, 1968 and the voters ratified the new constitution in the November elections that same year.156 In 1968 conservative Democrat George A. Smathers, whom the Pork Chop Gang had used to eliminate one of their chief enemies, liberal Claude Pepper in 1950, decided not to seek reelection for his fourth term and instead announced his candidacy for the Democratic Presidential Nomination, eventually won by the more liberal Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota. The race to fill Smathers‘ seat placed the conservatives in a dilemma. The Democratic nominee was former Governor LeRoy Collins who had waged a war against the Pork Chop Gang during his six year tenure as governor. Collins had won the nomination by defeating Attorney General Earl Faircloth of Miami. Many conservative Democrats could not bring themselves to support a self avowed racial moderate who had not thrown the full weight of his office behind —Massive Resistance“ and other attempts to halt integration. Furthermore he had opposed Pork Chop domination of the Legislature. By 1968, while many of these conservative North Florida Democrats remained registered Democrats, their allegiances had switched with some beginning to abandon their party in the voting booth. The —George Wallace Revolution“ in the 1968 presidential race created a chaotic and confusing political atmosphere in Florida as the former Alabama Governor received 28.5% of the state‘s votes, winning every county in North Florida, save for Alachua which was one of three counties to support the Democrat, Hubert Humphrey. A significant number of Wallace‘s supporters in North Florida also voted for Republican Senatorial nominee and former Mayor of Maitland Edward J. Gurney in the 1968 election against LeRoy Collins. He was elected in a landslide victory over Collins, receiving 56% of the vote to Collins‘ 44%.157 Gurney subsequently resigned in 1974 due to his implication in a scandal and was replaced in office by Miami Democrat Richard Stone.

156 Ibid, Article IV, Sections 2-3; Ibid, Article IV, Section 4; Colburn and deHaven Smith. Government in the Sunshine State. Pp. 46; David R. Colburn and Lance deHaven Smith. Government in the Sunshine State. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999) Pp. 45 157 Tebeau. A History of Florida. Pp. 447

244 Gurney‘s return to politics was thwarted in 1978 when current Democratic U.S. Senator, Bill Nelson, defeated Gurney in an election to the U.S. House of Representatives. Following the end of Reconstruction and the removal of Federal Troops from Florida, conservative Democrats re-established their power base through a systematic assault on their enemies, both African-Americans and Republicans. After reclaiming the various branches of government, the Bourbon Democrats consolidated their power in the Constitution of 1885 which provided for a weak executive while creating a strong legislative branch. The Constitution was also composed to ensure that the Panhandle districts, from which the conservatives drew the majority of their support, would continually elect a majority of legislators to the state Senate. As Florida moved into the twentieth century the state began to experience a profound transformation in its demographic makeup. The railroad, real estate and subsequent population boom which occurred in the first decades of the twentieth century converted South Florida from a swamp infested wasteland into a tourist haven and winter playground for Northerners. This conversion directly challenged the conservatives whose values and belief system instantly came into conflict with the —new“ Floridians. Whenever a challenge arose, the conservatives hid behind the Constitution of 1885 in order to maintain their power and stranglehold over the instruments of state government. They also played on the fears of the populace, creating the —other“, whether it was African-Americans or liberals and later communists and homosexuals, in an attempt to rally support behind their cause. The battles waged by the conservatives took place not only within the halls of Florida‘s Capitol building, but, also in the classrooms of the state‘s universities as academic freedom was assaulted in the mid-nineteenth century in a last gasp effort to stave off what the conservatives viewed as the rising tide of liberalism. The Pork Chop Gang and its predecessors the Bourbons, who had dominated the Florida State Legislature and Florida politics in general for close to a century had weathered various storms and challenges to their supremacy, but by 1968 their power had lessened to a point where they could no longer stave off challenges from more liberal Democrats from South and urban Florida as well as the growing Republican Party in South and Central Florida. The cruel and reckless activities of the Johns Committee in the late 1950‘s and early 1960‘s coupled with stubborn opposition to equitable

245 reapportionment aided in the Pork Choppers demise at the end of the 1960‘s and ushered in a new era of Florida politics. For the first time in over a century Florida had a two- party political system. The continued shift in population to the more urban areas of South and Central Florida, coupled with a constant influx of immigrants from the Northern United States as well as Latin America also helped to strip away any remaining stranglehold the remnants of the Pork Chop Gang held over the state.

246 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Manuscript Collections

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258 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Seth A. Weitz was born February 20, 1979 in Baltimore, Maryland. In 1980 he moved with his family to Miami, Florida where he was raised. He graduated from Ransom-Everglades High School in 1997. Weitz received a Bachelor of Arts in history from Tulane University in New Orleans, Louisiana in 2001 and a Master of Arts in history from Florida State University in 2004. He earned a Ph D. from Florida State in 2007. Weitz and his wife Jill currently reside in Chicago, Illinois with their dog Monty.

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