EDITOR'S NOTE the view from south lawn ast year marked the twenty-ffh anniversary of the and political and economic engagement amongst states. Journal of Politics & Society. I am proud that while Gottesdiener contests a large portion of the literature by the Journal has seen tremendous change over this arguing that increasing energy independence makes states Lperiod of time, it has maintained its position as the most less, not more, active in the international arena. Finally, Jas- acclaimed undergraduate publication in the social sciences. per Peet-Martel provides a critical evaluation of sport ‘mega Unlike prior editions that ofen focused on domes- events’ that are seen by developing countries as avenues to tic issues, every essay in the Spring 2014 Journal examines prosperity. Looking at the 2010 World Cup in South Africa an issue that is international in scope. Contemporary dis- and the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, Peet-Martel emphasizes cussions refect the increasingly globalized nature of the that these events ofen sacrifce democratic governance and world. However, these discussions require an in-depth, local development. rigorous understanding of the issues at hand, rather than Te past year of the Helvidius Group has been a glance at the daily headlines. I, along with the rest of the marked by a multitude of changes. During the last year, we Board, strongly believe in this mission. transitioned to a new design that makes the Journal more In line with this theme, the Journal begins with a accessible. Our twenty-ffh year anniversary invites refec- timely guest essay from Professor Kimberly Marten of Bar- tion, and pushes us to innovate in order to maintain our nard College. While the media focuses on the Russian inva- premier reputation. Our distribution model has changed to sion of Ukraine, Professor Marten directs attention to the refect the increasing emphasis on digital viewership. While role of local warlords in the current confict. For the frst print subscriptions remain our focus, the Journal can now time, our guest essay includes a Q&A, in which our Execu- be read on our iOS Newsstand and Android applications, tive Editor asks Professor Marten about the events unfold- in addition to a number of digital platforms such as Google ing in Ukraine. Scholar and EBSCO. Te writer of this year’s Peter and Katherine To- Finally, the Executive Board has focused on ofer- massi Essay, Daniel Sellers, challenges a widely accepted ing new online content. We believe it is important to keep tenet in development literature. A consensus has formed up with the new trend of expanding open-access research supporting Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen’s thesis that demo- oferings. Our website now features book reviews, conver- cratic governments create a level of accountability that pre- sations with professors, and summaries of interesting sub- vents mass famine. By complicating the narrative painted missions. While the Board is proud of our three percent by Sen, Daniel Sellers poses important questions for inter- acceptance rate for submissions, many papers that were not national development eforts going forward. selected for the Journal are incredibly innovative and worth In the Weatherhead East Asian Institute Essay, reading. Consequently, going forward, a few exceptional Edmund Downie challenges the widely accepted theory submissions not chosen for the Journal will be uploaded to that female participation in Chinese politics experienced a the website along with a summary written by a member of monotonic decline afer the Cultural Revolution. By point- the Board. ing to a modern trend towards gender equality, Downie Tese changes are only possible because of the en- complicates the old ‘declinist’ thesis of female participation. ergy and commitment showcased by the Board. We actively In the next paper, Steven Server examines the tech- try to strike a balance between bringing the Journal forward niques used to cultivate national pride afer the Mexican with the world around us, while grounding the Journal in Revolution. Server combines political theory with empiri- its mission—an unparalleled commitment to undergradu- cal research to examine the outlets through which Mexi- ate research in the social sciences—that has and will contin- can nationalism was engendered in its population. Going ue to distinguish it from its peers. I hope you enjoy reading across the Atlantic Ocean, Nadia Hajji evaluates Spain’s this edition, as it showcases the insight that undergraduate attempt to move beyond its troublesome past during the research can bring to the pressing issues of our time. Spanish Civil War. In particular, Hajji critically refects on the motivations for the main piece of legislation the state adopted to address the past atrocities. Te next three pieces refect the globalized nature Robert C. Baldwin of our current world. Maria Balgova evaluates an increas- Editor in Chief ingly popular belief that income equality and life expectan- cy go hand in hand. Using a statistical approach, she con- New York City cludes that such a relationship cannot be substantiated. Ben May 2014 Gottesdiener also uses an econometric method, but is inter- ested in the relationship between energy interdependence, GUEST ESSAY ukraine and the problem of local warlords kimberly marteni

midst all the talk of whether the Russian or that feed of tacit collusion by corrupt state ofcials. Ukrainian government bears greater respon- At the moment, we do not know much about sibility for the violence in eastern Ukraine and the individuals who have seized power in eastern and AOdessa, we may be losing sight of a crucial dynamic southern Ukraine. Tere is good evidence, though, that is happening on the ground. Local armed men in that at least some of them truly are locals and that they Donetsk, Luhansk, Odessa and elsewhere have started do not really constitute rebel forces. For example, C. down the slippery slope to warlordism — and Mos- J. Chivers and Noah Sneider of the New York Times cow may be encouraging this trend. have profled a commander named Yuri, who is able to Warlords, as I discuss in my 2012 book of that control a militia of 119 fghters in Slovyansk because same name, are individuals who control small slices of of his past work as a Soviet Army unit commander in territory using a combination of force and patronage. Afghanistan. Yuri and his men do not seem to have Tey are distinct from rebels, because their goal is not any clear goals — not of leaving Ukraine, joining Rus- really to overthrow a government. Instead they ofen sia, or declaring their own independence. Tey are cooperate and collude with weak, corrupt, or fright- not united by ideology, just by their military train- ened state employees (including bureaucrats and se- ing and by anger at Ukrainian leaders they consider curity forces) to maintain their local control. While illegitimate. It appears that at least some of the local they may have ideologies and passions, warlords are population values the protection they provide, but it is fundamentally self-interested: What they want more not clear exactly from whom they are protecting that than anything else is to stay in a position of power, so population. Ukrainian-appointed local police ofcers they can coerce and blackmail their opponents while apparently cooperate with Yuri’s unofcial militia controlling payouts to their allies and clients. even as they go about their paid duties, and Yuri’s men Warlords are not just machine-boss politicians, claim to have bought at least one anti-tank grenade- because they are backed by private militias that are launcher from corrupt Ukrainian soldiers. willing to go to war to keep them in control. And Kiev has been announcing ever since April 13 while they are sometimes popular, and good at distrib- that it is launching a major military operation to take uting the wealth to their communities, warlords rely back “rebel” held territory in Slovyansk and elsewhere, on illegal activities like smuggling and informal fnan- and Russian President Vladimir Putin has rumbled cial links with outside players—not local taxes—for ominously about his right to intervene to protect the their resources. Tis latter point is crucial, because as population in what he calls “Novorossiya.” But the Margaret Levi points out in her classic book, “Of Rule longer that Kiev and Moscow practice what amounts and Revenue,” taxation over the long-term works only to a military stalemate, the more opportunity local when it is matched by accountability to the people. armed actors have to change the actual power balance Otherwise tax collectors face constant rebellion (as we on the ground. Tey can ensure that either the Rus- know from the history of the American Revolution). sian or the Ukrainian state that eventually triumphs A warlord doesn’t have to worry about accountability will have to bargain with them in the future. — just about keeping down local challengers. Once ensconced in positions of local power, war- Warlords rise up any time states become too lords and their threats of violence are hard to dislodge. weak to control their own territories. All nations and States that want to regain control over their territories all cultures produce people who are willing and able have to overcome the corruption that encourages their to use force for their own purposes; strong states pros- own employees to collude with the warlords. Tey also ecute those people and put them in prison. Organized need fne-grained local intelligence to successfully co- criminals all over the world run “protection” rackets erce or buy of warlord support networks. i Kimberly Marten is the Ann Whitney Olin Professor of Political Science at Barnard College. Tis piece originally appeared in the Washington Post's "Monkey Cage" blog. guest essay: ukraine and the problem of local warlords Buying of a network becomes much harder in that power structure, and knew everyone and knew when it extends to a neighboring capital, and indeed who had to be paid of and how much they had to be that might be just what Moscow has in mind in this paid, and how to make a deal with them to join the case. Putin has used local warlords in the past to gain state. In Upper Khadori, what happened is that he had political infuence in neighboring Georgia, and con- a personal representative who went back and forth by tinues to cooperate with the warlord Ramzan Kadyrov helicopter, and they tricked the guy who was the war- and his militia to control insurgents in the Russian re- lord into going in to Tbilisi for various things. When public of Chechnya. (I detail both of these cases in my he was out of town they would fy in and have consul- Warlords book.) Getting local warlords to do his bid- tations with those who were lef. ding would be a relatively cheap way for Putin to ex- What you need to have is a personal connection, ercise indirect rule over eastern and southern Ukraine and it’s not just enough to do electronic eavesdrop- without bearing the costs of military invasion. ping. Te problem is that Ukraine is so fragmented Yuri may not be a warlord (at least not yet). and without having any real trust in anyone, how are But conditions are ripe for Putin to fnd willing local you going to fnd someone with the political power in strongmen to entice into his own informal patronage Kiev to have infuence in a place like Donetsk? Te network. one sign of hope we’ve seen is the regional oligarchs coming out and supporting Kiev. But that gets back to A Q&A With Professor Kimberly Marten and Execu- the problem of patronage, and who would pay more, tive Editor Christopher Meyer the oligarchs or Moscow.

CM: What do you see as the best way to wrest CM: What is Russia’s long-term interest in fos- eastern Ukraine from warlord control? tering warlordism in eastern Ukraine?

KM: Te frst question is that of order in east- KM: It’s a matter of having infuence over the ter- ern Ukraine. I think it was never there and people ritory. So it’s not sowing instability, it’s actually the op- just didn’t realize it was never there. What tools does posite. It’s ensuring stability for their interests…Tis is Ukraine actually have? something that empires have done throughout history I don’t know how anybody can pull this of, and I when they are practicing indirect rule. It is a way of think the best-case scenario at this point might be a lot having infuence over a certain territory without put- of autonomy for the various regions so that Moscow ting your own men in place, and thereby maintain- can essentially infuence what happens there. It’s such ing plausible deniability. So Moscow has done that in a mess, and I don’t see a good outcome at the moment. Chechnya and Georgia, and it’s arguably what they are I don’t know whether there is anyone in Ukraine with doing in Transnistria, the Russian-speaking area in enough power to control Donetsk and Luhansk. Moldova.

CM: How do you predict Kiev will negotiate with CM: In terms of the Crimean annexation as a warlords in the future, assuming they remain impor- whole, you were on the Daily Show with Jon Stewart tant political actors in eastern Ukraine? in March explaining how it could actually be seen as a loss for Putin. What did you mean? KM: Te thing that you need more than anything else is good intelligence. You need to know the people KM: I guess it’s a matter of what you mean by with whom the warlords are connected. winning and losing. Putin has gained a reputation as Actually, the one good example we have of taking someone that the West can’t stop, but where he has lost down local warlords happened under [former Presi- is in the incredible expense he has taken on. He has dent of Georgia] Mikhail Saakashvili. In [the autono- increased the salaries of state employees, for example, mous Georgian region of] Adjara, Saakashvili’s uni- in Crimea in order to gain the trust of the population. versity classmate was actually the son of the former But meanwhile what we are hearing is that things prime minister of Adjara, and so he had a very per- in Crimea are a mess… [Russia] is still going to have sonal connection. He was good friends with someone to negotiate with Ukraine to get water and electricity,

3 columbia university journal of politics & society and we do not know what is happening there because supported joining Russia. they have kicked out all the Western reporters. Putin So now you go to eastern Ukraine, and the pro- has really created a mess and he did not take a war- portion of the population that is ethnically Russian lordism approach in Crimea. He just took direct con- according to the 2001 census – which is the best in- trol. formation we have – is less than 40 percent. Te fur- Putin has also lost the ability to have much of an ther you get away from Crimea, you are going to have infuence on global events because he has lost a lot of a lot less genuine support for joining Russia among international trust. We did not initially see where the the population. Te other thing is that it varies by Chinese were going to go, but now it looks like they age, and people who started school in the post-Soviet are unhappy about this, because what they value is sta- Ukrainian school system tend to have more support bility and Putin has disrupted that. And if he can set for Ukraine as an independent country than the older a precedent for saying, “It is acceptable to take a little generation because they never knew the Soviet Union. piece of the land on the border of another country A lot of the unhappiness in Ukraine is about where people are not the same culture as those in the economics. It is not about culture, it is not about lan- capital,” that does not set a good precedent for Chi- guage, it is about people being out of work and gener- nese interests in places like Xinjiang or Tibet. China ally hopeless and getting angry with the government might get cheaper gas and oil out of this, though. in Kiev. Tat’s why the IMF loan might not solve the problem. IMF loans come with conditionality, and in CM: How do you see this afecting even larger Ukraine that means skyrocketing prices for fuel, and international negotiations, such as the P5 + 1 talks everything that consumers buy, as subsidies are taken with Iran or the future of the G8? of. Te reason not to hold autonomy referendums is KM: My understanding is that on the Iran talks, that they would be happening in a very violent situa- Russia has a very strong interest in not having Iran de- tion where you do not have any information and a lot velop nuclear weapons. However, there were threats of people are very frightened about what is happen- being made by Moscow that they would pull out of the ing. So what you want is for the Russian infuence to talks, and there has been an expansion of Russian en- withdraw as well as the warlords, some of whom are ergy contracts with Iran over the last few weeks, so we local but are very violent and do not refect what the have to see what that means. It’s possible that the Rus- population thinks. It’s like saying a gang in a local area sian regime would try to strengthen the economy of who controls a block and is dealing drugs refects what Iran to the point where international sanctions would the population thinks. Tey don’t. no longer have the desired efect. It’s the banking sanctions that matter—we’re see- ing that in both Iran and Russia. I do not think the Iran talks are going to be all that afected because there is mutual interest in Iran not becoming a nuclear power.

CM: Is there any argument to be made for the rest of eastern Ukraine holding a referendum on se- cession?

KM: Te real problem with holding a referen- dum on secession is that it is not the provinces as a whole that want to secede, but the atmosphere is be- ing poisoned by armed confict. Recently, someone accidentally released from Moscow the actual results of the Crimean referendum, and it turns out between a third and a half of the people voted – so it wasn’t a 98% vote – and only a little over half of those people

4 THE PETER AND KATHERINE TOMASSI ESSAY accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s daniel sellers, reed college (2013)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my parents and family, who have provided support in all my en- deavors. Tanks go to all my friends as well for helping make life more exciting. I also thank my professors, especially Mariela Szwarcberg and Chris Koski, for their guidance, as well as Xin Zhang, for introducing me to Amartya Sen and the realities of international development. I will miss all of you, and value greatly our interactions and your teachings.

ABSTRACT Development economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen argues that democracies, by virtue of mechanisms of accountability, are better able to avert famines than non-dem- ocratic regimes. Using empirical evidence from colonial and independent India, Sen argues for the existence of an anti-famine political contract, between the government and its supporters, predicated on the prevention of famine. Building on this theory, Sen later tested his argument using cases in Africa. While Sen’s theory accurately pre- dicts the outcomes, the causal mechanism he uses to explain each variation is falsifable. In studying the experiences of each African country that succumbed to famine in the 1980s, I fnd that a free press and competitive elections are neither necessary nor suf- cient conditions for a country to avert famine. Te results presented in this paper ques- tion the presence and role of other causes contributory to famine prevention eforts, as well as the possibility of anti-famine commitments within less-than-democratic polities.

INTRODUCTION opposition parties, no government can escape severe espite modern advances in the production penalty if it delays preventive measures and permits a and distribution of food, episodes of hunger real famine to occur. Tat threat keeps governments 1 and food insecurity still occur in many of the on their toes.” Democracies, Sen argues, are better Dworld’s least developed countries. Tough “hunger equipped to prevent famines than non-democratic is not a modern malady,” as Jean Drèze and Amartya governments, which may be less responsive to the Sen (1989:3) remind us, it is recurrent in parts of the demands of the people. However, this argument is world, and no civilization is totally immune. During problematic for several reasons. the twentieth century, endemic famine was all but First, while Sen’s argument does accurately eliminated from regions outside Africa, and even predict the outcome of various African countries’ within the continent, there has been considerable famine prevention eforts, in each case, the infuence variation. While certain countries have managed to of their free press and competitive elections was less avoid famine, others have succumbed repeatedly. than clear. Additionally, in each case, the country’s Although many theories attempt to answer this political, economic, and other circumstances were question, perhaps the best-known explanation comes diferent than those in India, on whose experience from Amartya Sen, who argues that “with a relatively Sen’s argument was originally based. Sen’s theory free press, with periodic elections, and with active stems from China and colonial India, both of which columbia university journal of politics & society succumbed to famine, in comparison with post- On the other hand, Amartya Sen and Jean independence India, which has avoided famine. Drèze herald Botswana and Zimbabwe as “‘positive’ Second, despite the predictive accuracy of Sen’s examples of famine prevention, claiming that theory, in each African case, the reality is slightly democratic accountability [was] instrumental diferent from what Sen claims. For example, while in averting famine despite severe food crises.”2 Sen uses Ethiopia and Sudan as examples of countries Although Zimbabwe did manage to avoid famine that experienced famine, and had neither competitive following drought in 1982, around this time the elections nor a free press, this does not tell the province of Matabeleland was subject to government whole story. In the early stages of Ethiopia’s 1983-85 suppression of dissidents, which included the famine, the dictatorial government did not suppress strategic withholding of relief. Additionally, even information about the impending crisis, with a though Zimbabwe was fairly democratic in 1982, brief exception coming during a time of national the next year marked the start of a downward trend, celebration—the tenth anniversary of the fall of Haile and by the end of the decade, the country was Selassie.i Rather, clear predictions were published strongly autocratic. Troughout this time, the press about the food shortage, but were ignored by Western was decidedly not free. Sen’s fourth case, Botswana, governments and the UN, due to the country’s has maintained an extended period of electoral domestic politics. Sudan also descended into famine democracy and has managed to avoid famine, though under an authoritarian government, and though the causality is diferent than in the Indian case. between 1986 and 1989 the country experienced a Since independence, Botswana has been run by a free press and competitive elections, these were not single party, which has maintained its power through enough to diminish or eliminate famine conditions. patronage networks, including relief programs. In truth, the democratic government was to blame Troughout the decade, the country’s press was not only for failing to respond to the famine, but also largely free from government intervention. for encouraging its continuation. Finally, Sen considers Kenya, which managed Table 1: Selected Cases to avert famine following a drought in 1983. Drèze and Sen attribute the government’s responsiveness Table 1a: Sen’s Cases to elected members of parliament in the face of a Country Famine Democracy Press de jure one-party state, limited but signifcant press Freedom freedoms, and the threat of political instability. Botswana No Yes Free De Waal, in contrast, argues that “Kenya’s success Ethiopia Yes No Not Free in escaping famine was largely attributable to the political astuteness of President Daniel arap Moi, Kenya No No Not Free who recognized a rudimentary and implicit political Sudan (pre- Yes No Not Free contract: feed the central highlands and the cities, 1985) and the government will survive.”3 However, despite Sudan (post- Yes Yes Free arap Moi’s apparent recognition of this political 1985) pressure, his regime “avoided tackling the structural causes of poverty and vulnerability,” and committed Zimbabwe Yes No Partly Free innumerable human rights violations during and afer this time. Tere are also reports of interference Table 1b: Additional Cases in the afairs of the press by arap Moi’s regime, which Country Famine Democracy Press further complicate the picture. 4,5,6 Freedom In an attempt to further clarify Sen’s thesis, I Mozambique Yes No Not Free will also consider the experiences of Mozambique and Uganda, both examples of African countries Uganda (pre- Yes Yes Partly Free that succumbed to famine. Mozambique, once 1984) a Portuguese colony, was ravaged by civil war i September 12, 1984 marked the tenth anniversary of the Dergue revolution, from 1977 to 1992, and experienced famine twice a celebration that cost the Dergue between $100 million and $200 million. By this point in the country’s famine, an estimated 700,000 people had already throughout the 1980s: in 1983-84, from natural perished (Clay, 1984). 6 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s causes, and again in 1987 from the confict. the populace—whether on the people’s conditions or Troughout the civil war, the country did not hold the leader’s. elections, and throughout the decade, the press was According to de Waal (2000), though, while not free. Uganda also experienced famine in 1980, eforts to this efect taken by autocratic or otherwise resulting from environmental, economic, and post- less-than-democratic governments may constitute an confict issues following the deposition of Idi Amin anti-famine program or commitment, these are mere the previous year. In 1980, the country’s frst elections privileges granted to the population by the grace of in eighteen years were held, though they resulted in the ruler. Only in the context of “‘real’ democratic the reelection of Milton Obote, who was previously institutions,” it is argued, can an anti-famine contract deposed by Amin in 1971. Under Obote II, as his emerge—a lasting and, crucially, enforceable solution second term was known, the country’s elections were to famine.8 However, while the diference between not completely free or fair, though they were rated a repressive and a democratic government may as among the most legitimate in this report and on be relatively easy to identify, the diference, both the continent. While Uganda’s press was deemed theoretical and practical, between a commitment partly free in 1980, these freedoms were tenuous and and a contract is less than clear and raises further fuctuated throughout the decade. questions regarding the nature of political incentives A third complication with Sen’s argument and government responses to them. stems from a much more fundamental question: As a result, we may extrapolate Sen’s thesis to a for what reasons—if any—should democracy be universal form: mechanisms of accountability, such supposed to have an advantage in fghting famine? as a free press and competitive elections, promote A basic assumption of Sen’s claim is that “civil and responsive governments. Yet, the mechanisms Sen political rights—to free speech, to free association, describes may be distinct from the institutional form to elect representatives of one’s choice—contribute of government or even any pre-existing institutional to the protection of social and economic rights— measures of accountability, which may exist without [such as] the right to food and livelihood.”7 Indeed, necessarily promoting any specifc interest. It is throughout history, one of the most important apparent that neither the form of government nor aspects of civil and political rights has been their use the openness of the press signifcantly account for in promoting social and economic rights. However, a government’s responsiveness to famine among its though it seems logical that citizens of a democracy citizens. Instead, preventive action to famine seems would exploit their civil and political liberties to more heavily infuenced by the desire of those in ensure their protection against famine, the reality power to preserve and perpetuate the regime, a is not so simple. Certainly, abuses of social and motive more widely shared across regimes of all economic rights can and do occur in democracies, forms. and ofen stem from a failure of related civil and Having established that the presence and political rights. How, then—if at all—is famine application of factors instrumental to anti-famine diferent? measures is independent of the form and structure of Despite variation in each country’s response government, this thesis will attempt to reconcile Sen’s to the threat of famine, there is a common pattern hypothesis with the experiences of African countries across all countries. In each case, the dominant during the 1980s. In countries that experienced motivation underlying governmental attempts famine, what were the signifcant causal mechanisms? to prevent or ignore famine is that its primary And in countries that avoided famine, how—if at interests—maintaining power—depend upon it. all—did governmental action contribute to the efort? Tus, in some cases, there exists a political incentive More importantly, why did the government choose to to prevent famine. However, this incentive is by act? no means unique to democratic polities. Indeed, Beyond Sen’s initial cases—Botswana, in all democratic states there exist interests and Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Zimbabwe—I have interest groups whose demands are not met, and an also included Mozambique and Uganda, both of authoritarian government may just as easily derive which also experienced famine in the 1980s. By some legitimacy from meeting certain demands of reevaluating each case, I argue that a free press and

7 columbia university journal of politics & society competitive elections—supposed preconditions to level of food produced or available. Tough this averting famine—are, in reality, neither necessary approach does not seek to provide a complete nor sufcient in achieving this objective. While explanation of famine, Sen notes that “famine refects these mechanisms of accountability are undeniably widespread failure of entitlements on the part of important to improving the quality of governance, substantial sections of the population.”10 Starvation they must be considered distinct from other specifc may be thought of as any commodity bundle that issues and from the political will to act. does not include sufcient food. Tus, a person’s Te structure of the thesis is as follows. I frst entitlements may reduce them to starvation due to review Sen’s thesis over time, followed by a review of changes in their endowment (e.g. loss of land or labor literature on the topics of famine, elections, and press, power), or their ‘exchange entitlement mapping’ (e.g. and ultimately, an elaboration of my argument. In the fall in wages, rise in commodity prices, or changes in second section, I provide further background on each employment). case, focusing on the countries’ political regime and A few years later, Sen dramatically expanded elections, operational freedom of the press, and food the concept of entitlements by removing its security eforts. Finally, in the conclusion, I provide tangible boundaries. In Individual Freedom as a implications and recommendations for future action. Social Commitment (1990), Sen argues that famine constitutes not only a breakdown of vulnerable groups’ entitlements, but also violations of LITERATURE REVIEW individuals’ positive freedom to survive. Entitlements, Acquirement, and Freedom Sen argues that poverty is not necessarily a Tough Sen’s theory appears most explicitly violation of negative freedom: “A person in extreme in his 1990 speech, “Individual Freedom as a Social poverty is not free to do many things (e.g., feeding Commitment,” the notion that a free press and his family well, staying home when riots threaten competitive elections could hold a government his life), but the poverty and consequent failure of accountable stems from an earlier development by positive freedom may not be due to interference Sen: entitlements. Described as “the set of diferent by others.”11 Rather, poverty and famine represent alternative commodity bundles that [a] person can serious violations of a person’s positive freedom to acquire through the use of various legal channels of survive. Despite the change in language, though, Sen’s acquirement open to someone in [their] position,” policy solution remains the same: focus on vulnerable a person’s entitlements not only refect the goods groups’ entitlements and changes thereof. Within available to them, but also the conditions under this framework, explanations of famine would take which such exchanges are carried out.9 Tus, the form of economic and political changes that alter a person who owns and lives of their land, for various groups’ relative economic power. example, will establish command over food in a very By way of these considerations, Sen argues that diferent way than a wage laborer who is paid in cash. the diference between India prior to independence— While the former conducts an exchange with ‘nature’ which experienced the Bengal famine of 1943—and (own-labor entitlement), the latter transacts with India post-independence—the push for which was other members of society (trade-based entitlement).ii provoked by that particular famine—was not the It is of great importance, Sen argues, that these formation of a famine response policy, but rather a diferences in exchange conditions are considered in willingness to invoke the policy when necessary.12 matters of hunger and food policy—without them, Since independence, India’s famine prevention it is impossible to understand how people can or measures have been used judiciously. Tus, Sen cannot acquire enough food. concludes that the government’s accountability to its As a result, Sen advocates considering people, made paramount by the country’s democratic entitlements—the means by which people acquire revolution and its resulting political contract, is the commodities, including food—in addition to the causal factor in the country’s newfound ability to avert famine. Tis case, then, illustrates that “one set ii Sen (1981) also identifes production-based and inheritance and transfer- of freedoms—to criticize, to publish, to vote—are based entitlement relations. While the latter is generally of limited relevance to famine theory, the former is relevant insofar as it interacts with others’ causally linked with other types of freedoms, such trade-based entitlement prospects. 8 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s as the freedom to escape starvation and famine power. In the early twentieth century, for example, mortality.”13 famine was brought about in British Tanganyika In colonial India, it was the reluctance of the (later Tanzania) and German Ruanda-Urundi British government to take responsibility for famine by colonial troops, in an attempt to suppress the relief that helped discredit it and foment nationalist populations. 20 movements. Eventually, “sustained political agitation Elsewhere in Africa, though, colonial forced the government to take serious anti-famine administrations had begun to acknowledge famine as measures, implicitly accepting a social contract.”14 a detriment to the local population. Following famine Te Bengal famine of 1943 represented a signifcant and food insecurity in Sudan during the 1910s, the breach of this contract, and independence came colonial government attempted to transplant the four years later. Post-colonial governments have Indian Famine Code in the country, resulting in the continued to honor this anti-famine contract, and 1920 Sudan Famine Regulations. However, Sudan continue to be held accountable by the press and was very diferent than Madras, the Indian state on competitive elections.15 whose policies Sudan’s were based. First, there was On the other hand, Sen considers China, not enough administrative capacity in Sudan to a country that experienced no such popular organize a system necessary to predict and prevent democratic uprising. As a result of the country’s famine, let alone undertake the prescribed relief Great Leap Forward and the resulting social and eforts. Second, the populations most afected by economic reforms—which attempted to rapidly the famines were diferent. Refective of “the generic modernize the country’s economy through diference between (most) South Asian famines and processes of industrialization and collectivization—a (most) African ones,” those most at risk of famine in tremendous famine befell them. From 1958-61, India were agricultural laborers and rural artisans, between sixteen and thirty million people are while in Sudan, those most at risk were largely estimated to have died, though other estimates place pastoralist farmers and herders.21 Crucially, while the toll even higher. 16 At this time, “the government the fortunes of the former depended on market faced no pressure from newspapers, which were conditions (i.e. food prices and employment), the controlled, or from opposition parties, which were wealth of the latter was held primarily in assets absent.”17 Indeed, the Chinese government itself such as livestock, meaning that famine in Sudan was misled by the lack of free reporting, with its own would be harder to predict but slower to arrive, propaganda and party ofcials all competing for reducing the advantage of responding quickly.iii credit in Beijing, distorting or fabricating statistics Te area’s lack of transport infrastructure and the from around the country.18 absence of any food markets also meant that “the Afer the fall of the Soviet Union, Sen deference of the regulations to classical economics reformulated his theory to focus on fve African was inappropriate.”22 In reality, de Waal argues, cases: democratic Botswana and Zimbabwe and the Sudanese Famine Regulations were constructed the questionably-democratic Kenya, which averted primarily to deter political threats by prioritizing famine in the early 1980s, and authoritarian regimes subsidized food government employees and in Sudan and Ethiopia, which succumbed to famine. townspeople, followed by those in food-prone Tough Sen undoubtedly considers his theory robust riverine areas, while dwellers of more remote regions enough to be applicable to the individual cases, there would be lucky to receive any assistance. are important diferences among the countries to Tough Sudan’s famine codes of the early consider that present a challenge to Sen’s hypothesis. twentieth century are notable for being somewhat As in India, under colonialism, African inappropriate given their context, other African governments faced little pressure to introduce colonies also experienced ‘relief’ policies that anti-famine measures. Rather, it was only towards provided a bare minimum of assistance. While the end of the era that there arose any “sense of in certain instances, the legacies of colonial administrative responsibility towards colonial subjects.”19 However, before then, colonialism in the iii In terms of entitlements, while the wealth of agricultural laborers and rural artisans is primarily trade-based (or possibly production-based), that area was primarily exploitative and relied on military of pastoralist farmers and herders is more along the lines of own-labor entitlements. 9 columbia university journal of politics & society administrations did help to instill an expectation colony until 1956, the country descended into of emergency relief provision (e.g. Tanzania), this civil war almost immediately afer gaining its was not the norm. Tere is thus a clear diference independence. At this time, however, scholars note between the approaches of famine-prevention that the country exhibited structures that served to regimes in India and in Africa: in the former, famine guard against localized food shortages degenerating relief had become a right, while in the latter it was into famine, but that their efectiveness was still seen as little more than an administrative duty. undermined by political instability. In 1969, Jaafar However, the situation was diferent in African cities Nimeiri seized power and embraced political Islam, due to the growth of trade unions and nationalist exacerbating the confict between the country’s sentiment, where keeping the people fed became a Northern (Muslim) and Southern (Christian) political imperative and consequently was popularly halves. Nimeiri’s corrupt regime destroyed its recognized as a responsibility of the government. domestic accountability during this time, exploiting Politics of famine prevention in colonial Africa its strategic position in the West’s anti-communist was further complicated by disputes regarding land strategy, and the state began to decay domestically. use and soil conservation, with colonial governors In 1983, the specter of famine loomed in a seeing traditional techniques as backwards and few provinces, and, though drought struck again in damaging to the environment. As one might expect, 1984, the government took no action. In an attempt the policies that resulted from this view generated to persuade international fnanciers of his country’s resentment and resistance that signifcantly stability, Nimeiri stated publicly at that time that the strengthened nationalist sentiments. Policies dealing situation in the South—civil war, by all accounts— with epidemic disease control were met with similar was “reassuring.”23 Tough Nimeiri did ultimately hostility, owing both to their rudimentary nature acknowledge the gravity of the conditions, the famine and the authoritarian manner in which they were helped solidify a coalition against him, resulting in a implemented.iv popular democratic uprising in 1985. However, the Even as African countries achieved use was largely tactical, the consequence of which independence, there were no nationalist movements was that the movement failed to achieve any real that utilized the prevention of famine as a party political change. platform. Instead, other issues like racial identity Following the regime change, Sudan’s famine and economic development tended to prove more response efort was delegated to international relief salient, refecting both a relative lack of rural civic agencies and became a depoliticized, technical issue. mobilization and the problematic legacy of colonial Tis shif was refected in the creation of a technical anti-famine land-use policies. early warning system that monitored economic, In promising macroeconomic and social welfare climatic, and agricultural data, in the spirit of the development, these regimes pursued technocratic “neo-liberal agenda for eviscerating government policies that in some instances succeeded in averting responsibilities.”24 Under the democratically-elected famine. Ultimately, though, the authoritarian Umma Party (1986-9), the country did possess liberal nature of the governments undermined their relief democratic institutions, but in practice they did not programs, leaving those most vulnerable unable extend beyond Khartoum and other (Northern) to protect themselves. Tus, while systemic anti- urban centers. War in the South continued to famine policies were implemented in colonial rage, as did the famine. At this time, the press was Africa, they were markedly simpler than their Indian unrestrained, though there was little interest in counterparts. covering either situation. Around this time, Ethiopia also failed to Famine Prevention in Post-Colonial Africa prevent famine, though the country’s prospects Perhaps the clearest example of a minimal were not nearly so bright as Sudan’s afer Nimeiri. commitment to famine relief is Sudan. A British Tough Ethiopia was never colonized by a European power, Haile Selassie’s Solomonic empire came to iv It was not unheard of for entire communities to be forcibly relocated in an end in 1974 when he was deposed by a Soviet- the name of preventing the spread of disease, though in reality these programs would have done little more than expose relocated populations to new disease backed Marxist-Leninist military junta—the vectors and undermine existing social institutions. 10 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s Dergue (“council” in Ge’ez). Led by Mengistu Haile the failed response to the 1973 famine was elitist and Mariam, the country immediately became a one- institutionalized (and resulted in the fall of Haile party communist state. Afer the country’s 1973-4 Selassie), the response to the 1983-85 famine was, for food crisis, the imperial government established a short time, thought of as a major policy success for a Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) to the government of Ethiopia. Because discourse about help prevent future crises; following the revolution, fghting famine is disconnected from discourse of the Commission quickly became a tool of the internal confict, though, the TPLF has largely been Dergue. Land reforms enacted around this time were unable to take credit for its actions. designed by a small number of intellectuals without Parts of Mozambique also experienced famine the involvement of the peasant base, and were due to domestic confict. Even before Mozambique’s imposed from above. Te Dergue also established a 1975 independence from Portugal, the territory was central grain-marketing corporation that extracted subject to a decade of sporadic warfare. Additionally, food from rural populations to sustain a few cities following the formation of the new government—a and the ever-expanding army: “precisely the same one-party state based on Marxist principles—most of pattern of distribution which prevailed before the the country’s roughly 250,000 Portuguese returned revolution.”25 During the 1980s, the RRC became to Europe, leaving the economy in shambles. Civil a political tool to implement radical social reforms, war broke out in 1977, and lasted until 1992. During and later the military used it to relocate people. Te times of peace, Mozambique is a fertile country RRC was also tasked with procuring foreign aid— that has little trouble feeding its population and most of which went to fuel militias—and spreading producing exports. Between 1983 and 1984, though, propaganda, identifying the country’s 1983-5 famine the south-central region descended into famine, with as the result of overpopulation and drought, as most commonly cited statistics placing the death toll opposed to war. at around 100,000. A second major famine occurred However, though drought and harvest failure in 1987, centered on the eastern Zambézia province, did contribute to the famine, they cannot be which was the result of confict. Te civil war was considered direct causes. Even the government’s characterized by extensive human rights violations economic and agricultural policies were not as on both sides, and only ended afer the accidental integral to the famine’s sustainment as the counter- death of the president and the end of the Cold War. insurgency campaigns in Tigray and Wollo: “Te Tough political instability in Uganda arguably zone of severe famine coincided with the war did not directly contribute to the country’s famine zone, and the phases of the developing famine in 1980, the situation was indeed exacerbated by corresponded with major military actions.”26 Afer confusion and fragility following the fall of Idi Amin. the famine was uncovered by international media Afer being deposed in 1979, Amin and his forces fed in the fall of 1984, the Dergue began to use “aid as the country, and around the same time, crisis struck a strategic alibi,” with a newly-formed UN Ofce Karamoja, a region periodically aficted by drought. for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia acting as an Amin’s soldiers’ abandonment of a barracks within international ofcial mouthpiece.27 On the other Karamoja further contributed to the instability, as side of the frontline, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation traditional power relations were upset, and a power Front (TPLF) was much more cognizant of their struggle following (possibly rigged) elections resulted reliance on the rural population, and as a result, in Karamoja—already a marginalized region—being aligned their interests. By “[linking] the political caught in the crossfre. In the end, an estimated fortunes of the Tigrayan peasantry in the face of 50,000 Karimojong perished. Tough the human famine to the political fortunes of the TPLF,” the rights record of Milton Obote’s regime was below TPLF was also able to frame the government as par, the country did manage to avoid famine in having genocidal intentions.28 Karamoja following drought in 1984, just before a Ultimately, de Waal explains, Ethiopia’s famines coup removed Obote from the presidency. Dodge of the 1970s and 1980s are “replete with ironies, and Alnwick (1986), though, attribute this success which are explicable only by attention to the existence entirely to eforts by international aid organizations. or not of an anti-famine political contract.”29 While At the other end of the spectrum lies Botswana,

11 columbia university journal of politics & society whose government is noted for exhibiting an inherent democracy,” in practice, Mugabe has held power sense of obligation and a keen sense of its electoral throughout.32 interests. Having gained independence from Britain Last, but not least, Drèze and Sen consider the in 1964, Botswana has consistently maintained what case of Kenya. Afer peacefully gaining independence Freedom House judges as free and fair elections. from the British in 1963, Kenya became a republic, In reality, though, the Botswana Democratic Party with Jomo Kenyatta as its president. Political pressure (BDP) has “benefted from an uneven playing feld,” prompted Kenyatta to consolidate power in 1966 winning every contest since independence by a afer winning re-election, and established a de facto considerable margin.v,30 When drought struck in one-party state. Upon his death in 1978, then-Vice 1982 (and continued for six years), the government President Daniel arap Moi took his place, and though enacted various programs in an attempt to prop up he enjoyed support from around the country, he was rural incomes. Tough the country’s use of plow and too weak to consolidate power. However, in 1982, tractor subsidies was socially regressive, the country some ofcers of the air force attempted and failed did manage to avoid famine conditions. Tere are to overthrow him, and arap Moi dismissed political some, however, who argue that the country’s success opposition, establishing a de jure one-party state. was in no small part bolstered by its economic In 1984, the country experienced a severe drought, growth throughout the decade, rather than by in response to which an ‘inter-ministry drought any political commitment to relief. Te country’s response coordinating committee’ was established constitution does not contain explicit guarantees for and given top priority. Ultimately, the country freedom of the press, and though the government managed to avert famine, though there is evidence of occasionally interferes in media afairs, abuse by the widespread hunger leading to malnutrition. BDP is “neither as frequent nor as severe as other While Drèze and Sen attribute the government’s countries in the region.”31 responsiveness to political pressure from elected Tough Drèze and Sen similarly laud MPs, the (somewhat free) press, and the threat of Zimbabwe’s government for enacting efective political instability, de Waal argues that Kenya’s entitlement protection programs and preventing “success in escaping famine was largely attributable the country’s 1982-84 drought from precipitating to the political astuteness of President Daniel arap a major famine, this is far from a complete picture. Moi, who recognized a rudimentary and implicit Afer gaining independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe political contract: feed the central highlands and and his ZANU party were elected to power. Less (most importantly) the cities, and the government publicized than the country’s aversion to famine, will survive.”33 However, despite recognizing this however, was the ZANU military campaign pressure, action taken by arap Moi’s regime seemed conducted within the province of Matabeleland, oriented primarily towards the placation of his home to supporters of the rival ZAPU party.vi Tis opponents, failing to address the country’s more campaign—Gukurahundi—resulted in widespread fundamental causes of poverty. Additionally, there famine conditions and the deaths of between 10,000 are reports of numerous human rights violations and 20,000 people.vii Tough this was obscured during and afer this time, as well as of governmental partly by Zimbabwe exploiting its strategic position interference in press afairs that further complicate between East and West, the Gukurahundi was also Drèze and Sen’s argument.34 kept secret by restrictions on the content of news To summarize, then: while Botswana and Kenya reports. It was not until 1987 that the campaign managed to avert famine conditions, neither were ended, following an agreement to unify ZANU fully democratic. On the other hand, Sudan, Ethiopia, and ZAPU (forming ZANU-PF). However, this Mozambique, and Uganda were all autocratic, and relationship broke down some years later, and though all failed to avert famine conditions (in most cases the country has experienced “limited multi-party due to war-time politics). Finally, on frst glance, Zimbabwe also managed to avert famine, though in v XRCOMP in Polity IV (see page 28). reality, the government indirectly created hunger to vi While ZANU was Western-aligned, ZAPU supported the USSR. suppress political opposition. vii Gukurahundi, meaning “the early rain which washes away the chaf before the spring rains,” in the Chi-Shona language, was also known as the However, while anecdotal evidence is largely Matabeleland Massacres. 12 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s sufcient to reconcile Sen’s theory with reality, it Improvement of Society, Malthus identifed famine cannot provide general (or generalizable) defnitions as “a shortfall in the supply of food in a given of famine, competitive elections, or a free press— area and, simultaneously, the death by starvation all of which may be used to further examine the of a substantial proportion of the inhabitants.”36 hypothesis’ validity. While for each variable, a simple However, de Waal notes, the picture painted by this binary measure (e.g., free press vs. restricted press) description—of society constantly existing on the would seem to sufce, in reality, it is the gradations in verge of famine—is fallacious. between which provide information pertinent to this Tough classical theories of famine have endeavor, as they ofen refect decisions and actions fallen out of favor, the question of whether famines of a wide political variety. stem from ‘natural’ or ‘artifcial’ causes is still pertinent. Sen claims that the distinction can be Conceptualizing Famine misleading: famine, he argues, is fundamentally a While most popular defnitions of famine social phenomenon, involving “the inability of large include scenes of malnutrition and starvation groups of people to establish command over food” resulting from a general lack of food, this is in the face of adverse meteorological conditions.37 somewhat of an oversimplifcation. Tough famine Furthermore, though a natural catastrophe may conditions may obviously result in starvation and cause (or exacerbate) food insecurity, a disaster’s destitution, these symptoms are generally indicative impact will nonetheless depend upon how a of breakdowns of other social systems as well. Exactly society is organized. For example, a country with which systems are afected and how they are afected, an extensive irrigation network could theoretically though, is a matter of debate. While some scholars weather a drought much better than one without argue that famine is the result of a decrease in relative such redistributive infrastructure. Tat said, even the exchange power of (vulnerable) populations, others existence of droughts, foods, and other calamities is emphasize nutrition, disease, social disruption, excess not independent of social and economic policies. In mortality, or other indicators as both refecting and Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, problems of famine stemming from ‘famine conditions.’35 Clearly, then, and hunger are ofen seen as related to climate we are faced with a complex phenomenon, with change, overlooking the infuence of societal factors debates ranging from umbrella defnitions to the on how people produce and consume food. relevance of component factors. To those in power, the identifcation of famine Early ‘modern’ scholars of famine were as primarily resulting from drought or other infuenced by Tomas Malthus, who focused on natural causes can dramatically reframe lines of the gap between food supply and demand given accountability, and may signifcantly alter the policy a level of technological advancement and a fxed or international response. Even the identifcation of amount of land. In his 1798 work An Essay on the famine as such “represents a choice and is therefore Principle of Population as it Afects the Further more political than technical: rather than being ‘found,’ a defnition of Table 2: Estimated Mortality in Select Twentieth Century Famines famine must be ‘agreed Years Location (epicenter) Excess Mortality Causal Triggers [upon].’”38 Tus, when 1943 India (Bengal) 2.1m–3m Conflict famine is blamed on 1958-62 China 30m–33m Government natural causes, as with the 1969-74 West Africa (Sahel) 101k Drought Sahelian famines of the 1972-75 Ethiopia (Wollo & Tigray) 200k–500k Drought 1970s—supposed products of cyclical “changes in heat 1980-81 Uganda (Karamoja) 30k Conflict & Drought coming from the sun”— 1982-85 Mozambique 100k Conflict & Drought drought and famine (and 1982-85 Zimbabwe (Matabeleland) 10k–20k Conflict the prevention or alleviation 1983-85 Ethiopia 590k–1m Conflict & Drought thereof) are removed 1984-85 Sudan (Darfur, Kordofan) 250k Drought from the scope of agentive 1988 Sudan (South) 250k Drought action.39 (Devereux, 2000) 13 columbia university journal of politics & society

A similar argument that has existed since famine of 1943 was the result of acute starvation colonial times is the tendency to place blame on escalating into large-scale mortality. On the other pastoral society, the idea being that these societies are hand, countries may become adept at dealing with ‘backwards’ and conservative, and emphasize “stock persistent hunger, but fall prey to considerable accumulation as opposed to quality control, pastoral transient hunger, as in China during 1958-61. mobility and cattle raiding.”40 Indeed, it is not However, de Waal (2000) argues that the uncommon to see Africa’s endemic twentieth century distinction between transient ‘famine’ and ‘chronic famines attributed directly and solely to the victims hunger’ is fallacious; as with most social scientifc themselves.viii terms, the linkage between real-world phenomena However, these arguments are misleading and social scientifc concepts can be unclear. In because they are based on generalities and present response, de Waal (2000) identifes fve main pastoralism as ignorance, without considering components of theoretical famine, with real-world external factors such as the weather and ofen- instances combining some, if not all, to varying exploitative economic conditions. While Sen’s degrees: hunger, impoverishment, social breakdown, argument for considering entitlements follows, mortality, and coping strategies undertaken in Okudi argues that such an approach is as “narrow response. However, it is also possible, he notes, for in scope as it is limited to the immediate causes of a famine to occur without any number of these famine and its consequences,”41 failing to expose the factors. Tough uncommon, famine striking asset- relationship between long- and short-term causes of rich societies is not unheard of, while others have famine. occurred without social breakdown or even excess mortality.ix Identifcation Rather than simply conceptualizing hunger Beyond identifying the cause(s) of a famine, and famine as occurring on the same linear scale, there is still the question of what ‘famine conditions’ famines may assume qualitatively diferent forms entail, what distinguishes famine from mere ‘episodes as they escalate. While this does help clarify famine of food insecurity’ or ‘chronic hunger,’ and, of conceptually, it does not make the identifcation of course, how best to avert such afictions. While such an occurrence any less imprecise. ‘pop’ conceptions of famine do tend to oversimplify matters, they can provide a helpful starting point for Quantifcation exploring what constitutes this complex occurrence. A second measure for distinguishing famines To some, famine is identifed primarily as a from one another is severity—the degree to which health crisis, manifested by signifcant changes in each factor is present. One problem arises, however, nutrition levels or starvation. In this vein, Drèze in that it is ofen difcult to know the true scale of and Sen (1989) distinguish famine, “involving acute the excess mortality caused by a famine. Estimates starvation and a sharp increase in mortality,” from are always approximate, and refect the incentives chronic hunger, “sustained nutritional deprivation of the published. For methodological reasons, then, on a persistent basis,” as distinct yet related demographers and nutritionists prefer to release phenomena.42 While the former, they note, requires ‘crude mortality rates’ expressed in deaths per speed in intervention, ofen resulting in the use of thousand, though the media and public tend to desire existing distributional mechanisms, the nature of the aggregate totals, which are not completely accurate latter is such that slower but more impactful policies measures. may be enacted. Tis distinction is also important in De Waal identifes three qualitative degrees of considering the experiences of diferent countries. famine severity: famines involving primarily hunger India, for example, experiences regular hunger and impoverishment, those with elevated mortality and endemic undernutrition, though the Bengal rates, and those seeing spectacularly high death rates alongside severe social dislocation and collapse.43 viii In the case of Uganda, for example, Akol (1985) argues that the development of agricultural productivity in afected areas was impeded Tese measures also allow for consideration of by a ‘persistent’ rustling of livestock, leading to distress migration, as well as detrimental traditional rituals and practices. Similarly, Alnwick (1985) ix For example, though the Dutch Hunger Winter of 1944 was notable for attributes the country’s 1980 famine to the ‘alarming’ amount of plundering occurring in a more developed and asset-rich country, it occurred during and and raids afer the fall of Idi Amin the previous year. was generated in no small part by the Nazi occupation. 14 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s auxiliary factors such as changes in exchange reason that famines in Africa ofen fail to achieve entitlement mappings (e.g., the ability to buy food) or political signifcance. coping strategies. Walker (1989), on the other hand, focuses on De Waal then proposes fve general types of behavioral responses to food insecurity, with four famine, based on the sector of society most afected distinct ‘stages’ of coping strategies. Te frst includes and the primary causal elements. Te frst, pastoral strategies for overcoming ‘normal seasonal stress.’ famines, primarily afect herders, and are caused by Te second includes increasingly irreversible coping drought, leading to a lack of pasture and water for strategies as scarcity persists (e.g., selling livestock animals and an abandonment or reduction of the or mortgaging land). Te third is “characterized pastoral lifestyle. Due to their slow onset, they are by dependence on external support,”46 such as quite dispersed and may be extremely protracted. international aid, and if all else fails, the fourth stage, Agrarian/smallholder famines afect scattered starvation and death, will follow.47 While the frst farming populations, and result from drought- stage is at least indicative of food insecurity, the related production failures that ofen betray deeper second embodies a weakening of future security in social problems, such as exploitative economic the name of present survival. relationships. Tese famines are usually slow-onset, Tus, both Walker and Howe remind us that and may manifest themselves as multiple localized “famines threaten livelihoods as well as lives, and famines surrounding an ‘epicenter’ from which that efective famine prevention requires early waves of grain prices rise and cause migration. intervention to protect livelihoods, rather than Tese famines may remain invisible outside the mandating relief just to ‘save lives.’”48 Because coping afected areas. Class-based/occupational famines strategies are highly context-dependent, though, negatively afect wage laborers and can result from their usefulness as generalizable famine indicators rapid and drastic changes in exchange entitlements is diminished. Some authors distinguish ‘coping’ (e.g. collapse of labor, changes in grain price). from ‘adaptive’ strategies, while some argue that Tese famines may become highly visible as people such strategies may be adopted concurrently, while migrate, which in turn strains the resources of still others dismiss the idea of dividing famine into neighboring locales. Finally, wartime famines stem ‘stages’ at all. Ultimately, then, theories promoting from conditions imposed on civilians during war, coping strategies as a viable dimension of classifying including destruction or confscation of goods and famine do not efectively justify their (exclusive) use. restrictions on movement. Tese famines are highly Whereas coping strategies are context-specifc, dependent on the nature of the war.44 Howe and Devereux argue that nutrition-based Of course, many famines are combinations indicators may be compared universally. However, of the above types. Agrarian famines, for example, this metric also possesses defnitional problems, such are commonly associated with pastoral famines, as what specifc rate of malnutrition or mortality and changes in grain prices caused by agrarian or indicates the beginning of a famine. Additionally, wartime famines may cause class-based famines in nutritional indicators generally refer to children adjacent areas. In Ethiopia in 1983-5, for example, under fve years of age, though children over fve “some of the highest mortality was recorded in areas and adults are demonstrated to be more afected which did not themselves sufer a major production by emergencies than are younger children, in part failure, but which were suddenly (and to their because adults will ofen reduce their intake to residents, inexplicably) struck by high food prices ensure that their children have enough food. Child and immigration of destitute laborers.”45 malnutrition, then, may serve as a ‘trailing indicator,’ Generally, de Waal notes, ‘characteristic Asian failing to manifest until well afer adult malnutrition famines’ have been class-based, rapid-onset, and has set in. high visibility, making coping strategies less helpful A third complication of nutrition-related and state action more necessary. In contrast, African metrics is the ambiguous relationship between famines are generally more localized, slow-onset, aggregate nutrition and food crises, as “malnutrition and low in visibility, placing greater importance on outcomes can be the result of [factors]... such as coping strategies than public action. It is for this disease, an unsanitary public health environment or

15 columbia university journal of politics & society poor child-care practices.”49 In particular, the point proxied by excess mortality.”51 Te authors also note is raised that nutrition should not be considered an that mortality of the ‘magnitude’ scale starts at zero, indication of famine independent of wider food- rather than one because, as has been established, security information, as low rates of malnutrition malnutrition need not imply deaths. As the authors may obscure advancing famine conditions such as clarify, this points to one resolution to the long- severe degradation of livelihoods or the use of drastic standing debate as to whether famines must be coping strategies. characterized by excess mortality. To provide greater operational clarity and One the one hand, quantifying the impact of accountability for famine prevention eforts, Howe famine by excess mortality makes sense, because proposes a bipartite scale to estimating famine death is “the most tragic human consequence of severity. In addition to the ‘magnitude’ of a famine, famine.”52 Still acknowledging that ‘famine’ can which refers to the aggregate impact, the authors occur without excess mortality enables a better establish ‘intensity’ as a separate metric, refecting the characterization of famine as a complex set of severity of the crisis at a given time and place. processes (marked chiefy by hunger and destitution). As mentioned earlier, the intensity and Intensity magnitude scales are designed to work in tandem, To estimate a measure of ‘intensity,’ the and thus interact in specifc ways: “Any intensity authors combine anthropometric and mortality level of 3 or above will register as a famine on the indicators, as well as ‘food-security descriptors.’ magnitude scale, even if it occurs in a very localized Te “anthropometric/mortality indicators provide area, and even if no deaths are recorded (this could cut-ofs for each level that can be compared across be a ‘Category A’ famine).”53 However, the opposite situations. Te food-security descriptors capture the is not necessarily true: every incident which involves dynamic, self-reinforcing changes in the livelihood death is not necessarily a famine. Additionally, deaths system associated with increasing degrees of food can result from a food crisis condition, but the crisis insecurity and famine, and can be adapted to specifc may not be considered a ‘famine’ unless the intensity circumstances (for example, drought or confict) of the conditions in any given area matches or and diverse contexts.”50,x Additionally, the authors exceeds ‘level 3.’ establish a system of weighting anthropometric/ Ultimately, Howe and Devereux argue that mortality versus food-security indicators depending while their metric is not perfect, the establishment on which is estimated to occupy a more causal role. of a universal famine scale has great implications for One issue with this scale, however, which has accountability. During a crisis, such a scale ofers yet to be resolved, is the appropriate unit of analysis a basis to pressure intervention by responsible, or for determining the intensity level. Te authors accountable, actors, and afer the fact, it may be ofer no solution, except to note that the intensity invoked to assign ‘proportionate accountability.’ (localized) and magnitude (aggregate) measures Proportionality, it is argued, is important to are designed to be complementary. By creating establishing accountability both in terms of the an ordinal scale of localized food insecurity, the number of deaths caused, as well as intent situation may be observed over time, and allows However, while attempting to determine intent external stakeholders to make more informed can increase accountability and bring perpetrators decisions regarding aid. to justice, the authors warn against the realization of perverse incentives, “such that governments and Magnitude humanitarian agencies devote disproportionate A complete assessment of a crisis’ full impact, resources and energy to ensuring simply that Howe and Devereux argue, can only be made in threshold malnutrition and mortality rates on the retrospect. Tus, ‘magnitude’ refers to “the scale famine scales are not crossed.”54 Additionally, on of human sufering caused by the entire crisis, as the part of a perpetrator—if such a role exists—these perverse incentives may result in eforts to mitigate x “Te anthropometric/mortality indicators and food-security (or exacerbate) famine conditions to the extent that descriptors can be thought of as registering the efects of a crisis on the ‘lives’ and ‘livelihoods,’ respectively, of the afected population.” (Howe and the crisis crosses one threshold or another. Instead, Devereux, 2004) 16 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s

Table 3: Famine Intensity Scale Level Phrase Malnutrition & Food-security Descriptors Designation Mortality Indicators 0 Food- CMR < 0.2/10k/day & Social system is cohesive; prices are security Wasting < 2.5% stable; negligible adoption of coping strategies. 1 Food- CMR ≥ 0.2 by < Social system remains cohesive; price insecurity 0.5/10/day and/or instability, and seasonal shortage of key Wasting ≥ 2.3 but < items; reversible ‘adoptive strategies’ are 10% employed. 2 Food crisis CMR ≥ .5 but < Social system significantly stressed but 1/10k/day and/or remains largely cohesive; dramatic rise in Wasting ≥ 10 but < price of food and other basic items; 20% and/or prevalence adaptive mechanisms start to fail; of œdema increase in irreversible coping strategies. 3 Famine CMR ≥ 1 but < Clear signs of social breakdowns appear; 5/10k/day and/or markets begin to close or collapse; Wasting ≥ 20% but < coping strategies are exhausted and 40% and/or prevalence survival strategies are adopted; affected of œdema population identify food as the dominant problem in the onset of the crisis. 4 Severe CMR ≥ 5 but < Widespread social breakdown; markets famine 15/10k/day and/or are closed or inaccessible to affected Wasting ≥ 40% and/or population; survival strategies are prevalence of œdema widespread; affected population identify food as the dominant problem in the onset of the crisis. 5 Extreme CMR ≥ 15/10k/day Complete social breakdown; widespread famine mortality; affected population identify food as the dominant problem in the onset of the crisis. CMR: crude mortality rate Wasting: proportion of child population (six months to five years) who are below eighty percent of the median weight-for-height or below –2 Z-score weight-for-height. (Howe, 2004) the authors advocate formulating policy solutions the identifcation of more discrete levels. that address the underlying causes of famine, though the efort to do so may be prompted or catalyzed by THEORETICAL ARGUMENT Democracy and Elections Table 4: Famine Magnitude Scale While there certainly is no dearth of scholarship Category Phrase Designation Mortality Range regarding identifying the presence, scope, and causes A Minor famine 0–999 of famine, we turn now to the relationship between B Moderate famine 1,000–9,999 famine and politics. Te events that catalyze famine C Major famine 10,000–99,999 may be of a natural or meteorological character; D Great famine 100,000–999,999 however, another line of thought identifes famine E Catastrophic famine 1,000,000 & over as resulting from a lack of action. Te intuition (Howe, 2004) for this perspective begins from the assumption 17 columbia university journal of politics & society that any society, with concerted efort, can prevent and ‘vertical’—the “proximity of the state—as a drought or other natural causes from escalating into structure of political power—to the society.”55 famine. What circumstances, then, would alter a According to this conception of political famine government’s response, or provoke a government to response, institutions that promote (vertical) respond? accountability, such as a free press and competitive From Malthus (1798) comes a ‘demographic elections, are made distinct from the political will explanation’ of famine: it is the result of food supply necessary to utilize those mechanisms efectively.xi restricting unsustainable increases in population. Another explanation, known as selectorate By this reasoning, famine is a natural phenomenon theory, comes from Bueno de Mesquita et al. that cannot be averted. Tough in retrospect we may (2002). Tey argue that governments possess a fnite call neglectful the government that allows famine amount of response capacity: “both democracies and to ‘run its course’ (e.g. Britain prior to 1880), the autocracies face a trade-of between the cost of action logic behind this argument only allows structural and the cost of inaction. Te government is assumed conditions to cause famine. to maximize its political support to stay in power.” As Sen (1981) gives an economic explanation of a result, famine mortality may occur if governments famine. He argues that famine is the result of the “fnd that inaction is the support-maximizing failure of some people’s entitlement relations to strategy.”56 Key to this decision is evaluating the size provide them access to enough food to survive. In of the selectorate (S)—“the set of people who have other words, famines are allowed to occur when an institutional say in choosing leaders”—relative a government is insufciently concerned with to the winning coalition (W)—“the minimal set of protecting the entitlements of its citizens (i.e., people whose support the incumbent needs in order preventing a relative degradation or decline of to remain in power.”57 When W is small, leaders people’s exchange entitlement mapping). A policy may focus on the particularistic transfer of goods solution under this paradigm would take the form of and services, at the expense of the provision of public entitlement protection, seeking to prevent changes in goods, while a large winning coalition encourages exchange conditions or in endowments. bandwagoning. Finally, Drèze and Sen (1989) and Sen (1999) In all cases, legitimacy accompanies political ofer reformulations of the entitlement argument, authority and trust, which forms the “basis of a namely that competitive elections and freedom of the better ability of institutions to protect citizens,” press are essential to preventing famine. Te logic and increases the state’s power to act.58 A second behind this argument is that competitive elections aspect of legitimacy is the “respect of social contract, encourage politicians to appease voters and thereby refecting how close the state is to society,” and third, protect their entitlements, while a free press acts as state legitimacy “decreases the risk of shocks leading an additional tool for compelling governments to act. to famine, especially the likelihood of civil wars: De Waal (1990, 2000) responds to Sen, and trust in institutions build peace.” While Mesquita though he believes in entitlement theory, he identifes et al. do not discuss the legitimacy of the state per entitlements as part of a larger picture. Famines are se, the same responsiveness may be thought of as a composed of fve elements in varying proportions: successful broadening of the winning coalition—the hunger, impoverishment, social breakdown, set of people whose support the incumbent needs mortality, and coping strategies in response to the to remain in power. Sutter proposes a few measures frst four. Tus, while famine prevention eforts of state legitimacy, including public opinion, a should include entitlement protection measures, the ‘behavioral’ approach rooted in votes for and against presence and severity of each other factor should be the incumbent, and changes in politicians’ defnitions considered as well. of legitimacy.59 Sutter (2011), on the other hand, explores ‘statehood’ as a mediator between political Polity IV institutions and famine. To disaggregate state quality, the author measures two forms of legitimacy: xi Her examination of thirty-six countries over 1980-2005 reveals two fndings: as institutional quality improves, the likelihood of famine decreases; ‘horizontal’—the ethnic fragmentation of a country— and even accounting for climatological and political shocks, a higher aggregate state legitimacy corresponds to a lower probability of famine. 18 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s In an attempt to more rigorously examine democratic and autocratic components. Tus, while each country’s political situation over time, I have POLITY is included in Table 5, this is mostly for included the use of the Polity IV dataset in my the sake of readability. More detailed statistics are analysis. Begun as an attempt to “[code] the authority available in Appendix A.xii characteristics of states in the world system” the As concerns this study are three statistics from dataset’s level of analysis is a country’s ‘polity’: a the Polity dataset related to executive recruitment: “political or governmental organization; a society “(1) the extent of institutionalization of executive or institution with an organized government; state; transfers, XRREG; (2) the competitiveness of body politic.”60 Among other reasons, the dataset is executive selection, XRCOMP; and (3) the openness particularly useful for its placement of ‘democracy’ of executive recruitment, XROPEN.”63 and ‘autocracy’ as collinear—captured as a country’s ‘Polity Score’—as well as its disaggregation of XRREG Te regulation of executive ‘executive recruitment.’ recruitment refers to the extent to which a polity Table 5 contains Polity scores of relevant possesses institutionalized mechanisms for the countries. For the scores of all African countries, transferal of executive power. Tis has three see Appendix A. For each case, the score listed is possible values: (1) Unregulated, (2) Designational/ the country’s average from 1980 to 1989, with the Transitional, and (3) Regulated. ‘Unregulated’ exceptions of Sudan, whose 1985 regime change implies “forceful seizures of power,” such as coups;xiii warrants a distinction, and Uganda, whose score is ‘Designational/Transitional’ entails selection by only that under Obote II (1980-85). political elites without formal competition;xiv and Te frst score (POLITY) is simply the ‘Regulated’ recruitment involves either hereditary diference between a country’s democracy (DEMOC) succession or competitive elections.xv and autocracy (AUTOC) scores on a scale of +10 (full democracy) to –10 (full autocracy). Democracy XRCOMP Te competitiveness of executive is a complex measure comprised of three elements: recruitment seems rather self-explanatory, with institutions of accountability, constraints on executive competition achieved when no contending party or power, and the guarantee of civil liberties. According candidate possesses a handicap (though incumbency to these elements, the authors identify a ‘mature and xii Also of note (in Appendix A) are periods during which countries’ internally coherent democracy’ as “one in which scores are rated -77 or -88. Tough Table 5 does not show these scores, they represent “standardized authority scores,” indicating years during which no (a) political participation is unrestricted, open, assessed polity score could be awarded. A score of -77 represents a year of and fully competitive; (b) executive recruitment is “interregnum,” or anarchy between successive regimes, and a score of -88 notes periods of “transition.” elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are Of countries in Africa, only three were awarded a standardized substantial.”61 authority score during the 1980s: Chad, Sudan, and Uganda. Briefy: Afer the death of Chad’s president in the late 1970s, central authority collapsed until On the other hand, though ‘autocracy’ has 1985, when a strongly autocratic government (with a POLITY score of -7) become a pejorative term in Western political was established. In 1985, Sudan’s autocratic president, Jaafari Nimeiri (-7) was overthrown, and in 1986, the democratic Umma Party (7) was elected. For this discourse, the authors operationalize the concept not transition the country was awarded -88 in 1985. as simply a lack (or negative value) of democratic Uganda during the 1980s experienced a similar but opposite shif. Following the fall of Idi Amin in 1979, Milton Obote reassumed power components. Rather, autocracies are polities with (having previously been deposed by Amin in 1971). Obote’s second term (3) was marred by widespread human rights abuses, and he was deposed in 1985, restricted political participation, executives chosen though his immediate successor only held power for six months. January 1986 by political elites, and few constraints on executive saw another new president, Yoweri Museveni (-7), whose administration was also marked by internal confict and human rights abuses. He has held power power. since, though during that time the country has signifcantly improved its Tough the authors construct a combined Polity scores. polity score (POLITY), they note that regimes may xiii Such transfers may be legitimized afer the fact through (noncompetitive) elections or the enactment of legislation, though a polity will remain classifed simultaneously exhibit elements of both autocratic as unregulated until the coup leader has been replaced via “designative or and democratic authority. Rather, this variable is competitive modes of executive selection.” (ibid.) xiv Also considered here are polities with arrangements made following an included as “a convenient avenue for examining initial unregulated seizure of power that seek to regularize future transitions general regime efects in analyses.”62 As with famine, of power, as well as polities in transition from selective to elective modes or though, scores near the middle of the spectrum are vice versa. xv Te fundamental distinction between regulated and unregulated muddled somewhat, obscuring the combination of recruitment is the level of institutionalization, and, in competitive cases, impartiality. 19 columbia university journal of politics & society is obviously signifcant). Tis measure also has three as much of the literature and multiple cases show, possible values: (1) Selection, (2) Dual/Transitional, the presence of democratic institutions does not and (3) Election. ‘Selection’ refers to determination of necessarily warrant their application towards the executives by “hereditary succession, designation, or prevention of famine. Tough institutionalized by a combination of both;”64,xvi ‘Dual/Transitional’ mechanisms of vertical or horizontal accountability implies a polity with dual executives chosen by may exist, the government may still possess a diferent means, or transitions between selection and monopoly on the regulation of civilian activity, including the dissemination of Table 5: Polity IV Scores of Examined Countries information. Country POLITY XRREG XRCOMP XROPEN Tus, an equally important Botswana 6.3 2 2 4 mechanism for generating government Ethiopia -7.6 2 1 4 accountability is one that is in practice distinct from the government itself Kenya -6.8 2 1 4 (bottom-up, so to speak). Just as a Mozambique -7.6 2 1 4 governmental separation of powers Sudan (Nimeiri) -7 2 1 4 can promote a system of checks and Sudan (Mahdi) 3.5 2.5 2.25 3 balances, a free press can provide an important check on government action Uganda (Obote II) 3 2 2 4 (or inaction). As Drèze and Sen note, Zimbabwe 3 2 2 4 it is important to remember that state (Marshall et al., 2011) action is by no means independent of “political ideology, public pressure, and election; and ‘Election,’ of course, refers to executive popular protest.”65 However, as with governmental selection by competitive election between two or mechanisms of accountability, the efcacy of the more parties. press is by no means guaranteed. Indeed, though a free press can help spread XROPEN Te ‘openness’ of executive information within and between countries—in the recruitment is the extent to which all members of latter case attempting to evoke embarrassment or the politically active population have an opportunity, shame—a free press may only help prevent famine in principle, to attain the position of chief executive if “those vulnerable to famine are considered fully through an institutionalized process. If transfers citizens of the country.”66 It is not enough for the of power are coded as Unregulated in XRREG, or press to simply possess the freedom to report, but a involve a transition to/from Unregulated, XROPEN ‘political trigger’ must be present as well. To return is coded 0. Four degrees of openness are used: (1) to Mesquita et al. and selectorate theory: in serving Closed, (2) Dual Executive–Designation, (3) Dual to help fght famine, the press must make clear who Executive–Election, and (4) Open. exactly the winning coalition includes, both to the For a translation of Polity IV executive government and to the voters. recruitment concepts and component variables, as Devereux (2000) argues that a combination of well as component variable scores for all African ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ mobilization is essential countries by year (1980-1989), see Appendix A. to catalyzing positive action in pursuit of rights. While primary mobilization is undertaken in pursuit Press of one’s own interests (e.g., mass movements), Tough literature reviewed thus far has pointed secondary mobilization (a.k.a. activism) entails the to various political mechanisms of accountability that participation of interest groups. Tough primary mediate the relationship between the government mobilization is important, it cannot overcome famine and its citizens, this is only half the picture. Indeed, alone, as those who mobilize could be satisfed with food handouts. Secondary mobilization, then, xvi Tis also includes rigged or single-candidate elections, replacement of is necessary to identify issues and frame them presidents before the end of their term, military selection of civilian executives, selection from within an institutionalized major party, incumbent selection of politically. It is print, visual, and other forms of successors, boycotts of elections by major opposition parties, et cetera. 20 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s broadcast media that must, in times of dearth, aid then, I have provided averages, with Not Free equal those afected in their fght against famine.xvii to 0, Partially Free, 1, and Free, 2. For a table of To paint a more complete picture of each Freedom House Press scores for all of Sub-Saharan country’s civil and political freedoms, I have Africa, see Appendix A. also considered Freedom House’s Freedom of the Countries with half-scores include Botswana, Press survey data. Unfortunately, though, in some Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Troughout instances there seem to be discrepancies between the the decade, Botswana fared the best of any country numerical scores reported by Freedom House and (among those examined), exhibiting a print freedom more detailed historical accounts. Tough in part score of 2 and a broadcast score of 1. Kenya, Sudan, this stems from an ironic lack of transparency on the Uganda, and Zimbabwe, on the other hand, all had periods with print scores of Table 6: Freedom House Scores of Examined Countries 1 and broadcast scores of 0 Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 -4 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 (when both were not 0). No Botswana 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 2 country on the continent Ethiopia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 exhibited more broadcast Kenya 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 freedom than print freedom.xx Mozambique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sudan 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 1 0 Theory Uganda 1 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 Since the publication of Zimbabwe 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 Poverty and Famines in 1981, 0: Not Free; 1: Partly Free; 2: Free. (Freedom House, 2012) Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze have argued that democracy— part of Freedom House, it is also indicative of the minimally, a regime with a free press and competitive complex, variable, and occasionally subjective nature elections—prevents famine. To support the of such a rating scheme.xviii Tese discrepancies argument, Sen frst considers India and China, are interesting in their own right, and when they do noting that where one experienced a democratic arise, I have attempted to reconcile them with my revolution whose leaders successfully used famine own fndings. to mobilize support, the other, in its pursuit of social Conducted by Freedom House since 1980, the and economic reforms, caused the greatest famine Freedom of the Press survey measures the degree of the twentieth century without even realizing it.68 to which a country permits the free fow of news Tis diference of outcomes Sen attributes to the and information.xix To assess this, Freedom House formation of a political contract, predicated on the undertakes a “multilayered process of analysis prevention of famine, between the revolutionary and evaluation by a team of regional experts and government and its supporters. Tis compact— scholars” who examine legal, political, and economic an explicit acknowledgement of a persistent and indicators.67 fundamentally important political issue—was also From 1980 to 1988, Freedom House catalyzed by the country’s free press, which allowed disaggregates countries’ scores into Print and the citizens to hold the government accountable, Broadcast freedom (which I have combined to form and was lent signifcant weight when independence half scores in Table 5), while from 1989 to 1992, they followed its breach by the colonial government published consolidated statistics. For 1980-1988, In later texts, the argument is reformulated to ft countries in Africa. While the frst, Botswana, xvii Tough the internet has largely upended the traditional media position supposedly maintained free and fair elections, in as the sole means of distributing or broadcasting information, this principle applies equal well to so-called ‘new’ or ‘social’ media. reality, a single party has won every contest handily. xviii Tough they do publish an outline of their methodology, for older cases And though the second positive case, Zimbabwe, especially the data is less extensive, and their conclusions less self-evident. experienced political confict and famine in xix According to the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights, information freedom is a universal and basic human right. Article 19, Matabeleland, this was not exposed until afer the specifcally, states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and end of the Cold War, in part due to restrictions on expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.” xx For discussion of each, see Page 35. 21 columbia university journal of politics & society the press. However, the country’s elections were, Tough Kenya’s successful response to drought by most accounts, free and fair. Tus, while in was prompted by a recognition of the people’s needs, Botswana the case could be made for the existence it was not necessarily the result of any action by the of an anti-famine political contract, it is imperfect. press, and certainly was not motivated by the threat In Zimbabwe, the government may have been of being voted out of ofce—afer 1982, arap Moi responsive to the needs of certain regions, though its dismissed political opposition and established a de actions in others indicate the lack of any signifcant jure single-party state. While on the surface this anti-famine contract. seems to follow Sen’s causal theory, any argument for However, I argue that the history of Kenya a political contract in Kenya under arap Moi would is crucial to determining whether the causation is be dubious at best. For both Botswana and Kenya, valid. As presented by Drèze and Sen, Kenya was a then, famine prevention eforts and political stability single-party state which, despite its lack of primary were aided by their governments’ direct provision elections or political opposition, was responsive to of goods and services, as opposed to any more the demands of the people due to elected members programmatic eforts—refecting a sizable disparity of parliament and a press which enjoyed limited between the selectorate and the winning coalition. but signifcant press freedoms. De Waal, though, In summary, while under certain circumstances diminishes the signifcance of the MPs and attributes famine may become an issue salient enough to government responsiveness to the astuteness of warrant continual prevention eforts (i.e. the the President, who recognized the need for famine formation of an anti-famine contract), this is relief. However, in this case, the contract seems not always the case. Further, it seems that in a quite limited, painting a picture of the government country’s mission to avert famine, a free press and response as mere political opportunism—though competitive elections are neither sufcient nor aid was distributed throughout afected areas (which necessary conditions to spur government action. were also politically signifcant), the government also Tough such action may not, according to de Waal, committed various human rights violations during constitute a strict ‘anti-famine political contract,’ and afer this time.69 the distinction between such a contract and its Further, while Drèze and Sen consider the diminished analogs—a program or commitment—is country’s limited but signifcant press freedoms to be far from clear, and, more importantly, of questionable causal in the formation of this political contract, the relevance. reality seems more complex. While Freedom House rates the country’s press as ‘Partly Free’ throughout EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE the decade, Wanyande (1995) presents a more Tis section includes specifc details on the detailed analysis, describing the relationship between elections and press of each case, as well as their the state and mass media in independent Kenya ‘outcomes’ (e.g. whether they experienced famine as “uneasy and confictual.” Just as the state “has or not). While I have attempted to include details continually accused the press of being unpatriotic regarding each case throughout the article where and bent on serving the interest of Western nations appropriate, this section includes consolidated at the expense of the interest of Kenya,” the media summaries of each country’s relevant historical accuses the government of “undermining its freedom episodes. and right to inform and educate the public on matters of public importance.” Wanyande also notes that Case Selection while each side’s perception of the other intensifed For this project, I have chosen to consider following the advent of multi-party politics in the all African countries that experienced a famine early 1990s, whereas “under one party rule, the during the 1980s. Tis includes Sudan, Ethiopia, state could, with relative ease, suppress attempts by Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Uganda. Additionally, the media to expose its shortcomings.”70 De Waal I have included Botswana and Kenya, both of which corroborates, noting that neither parliament nor the experienced drought and a reduction of marketed press had signifcant sway on the president’s decision food, but managed to avert the onset of famine to respond to calls for relief. conditions. 22 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s Tough Drèze and Sen also consider the island was conceived primarily in response to its program nation of Cape Verde as a positive example of an anti- employed in 1979-80, which was conventional famine political contract, I have not included this and moderately successful. During this time, child country in my analysis because it did not experience malnutrition and mortality rates rose slightly, and famine or the threat of food insecurity during the much food aid was distributed poorly. In response, 1980s. With that said, the country’s experience does the government commissioned an independent accord with my reformulation of Sen’s theory. evaluation that recommended the establishment of a famine prevention system modeled on India’s Scarcity Analytical Narratives Manuals. Tis solution, however, did not consider an BOTSWANA important diference between the two countries: “in Political Regime and Elections Botswana there was no mass popular agitation, but Botswana, Zimbabwe’s neighbor to the west, was instead a government with a sense of obligation and a a British colony until 1964, when the UK accepted shrewd sense of where its electoral interests lay.”75 proposals for a democratic self-government. In 1965, In the interest of bureaucratic integrity, the country ratifed its constitution, and the next the government commissioned, considered, and year, formally declared independence. Te country discussed publicly eleven more reports, and in has held regular elections since independence, which January 1982, Botswana formally adopted a set international observers have judged free and fair. of guidelines for a Drought Relief Programme Tough the country’s press has been rated (DRP). Modeled on Indian policy, the program was “Free” by Freedom House since 1973, Botswana eventually reorganized and renamed the Department does exhibit specifc authoritarian tendencies. of Food Resources (DFR). Tough the ‘right’ to Since independence, for example, the Botswana relief was granted and not fought for (as it had Democratic Party (BDP) has won every single been in India), the DFR was “an example of the election by a considerable margin. Tough the characteristically Botswanan process of consultation elections have been observed as free and fair, the BDP and consensus-making, not of adversarial vigilance,” has “benefted from an uneven playing feld, in which which helped ensure its continued success.76 extreme resource and media disparities undermined Afer 1984, though (when Quett Masire was the opposition’s ability to compete.”71,xxi elected), the DRP shifed its focus from ‘human relief programs’ to agricultural programs, which were more Institutions of Famine Prevention expensive and economically regressive, and favored Scholars note the country for having “the most commercial and bureaucratic elites. enduring [anti-famine] system on the continent.”72 Troughout the 1980s, though, the country’s harvests Press were insufcient to meet its needs. Te country’s constitution does not contain Tough Botswana’s electoral system— explicit guarantees of press freedom, though it does characterized by high levels of professionalism and protect freedoms of speech, assembly, and expression, accountability—is undeniably important to the which are generally respected by the government. country’s improvement and self-preservation, it is Freedom House consistently rated the country’s press arguably not the cause of the country’s ‘implicit anti- as ‘Free’ during the 1980s. famine political contract.’73 Instead, de Waal argues, Although the Botswana Democratic Party this contract comes from “political commitment, a occasionally breached civil liberties by shutting down sense of administrative obligation, and accountability independent radio networks, placing pressure on through participatory structures and electoral private media by adjusting allocated state advertising politics.”74, xxii funds, and occasionally prosecuted (or deported) Botswana’s anti-famine system of the 1980s critics under the 1986 National Security Act, “such xxi As a result, Levitsky and Way categorize Botswana as a “competitive abuse was neither as frequent nor as severe as other authoritarian” state (Levitsky & Way, 2010). countries in the region.”77 xxii Historically, the country’s ability to protect its food security has also been aided by its (relative) wealth, though at the same time, an absence of popular (i.e. secondary) mobilization for civil rights has helped to undermine Episodes of Food Scarcity government responsiveness. 23 columbia university journal of politics & society

Drought struck the country in 1982, and solutions to the economic vulnerability of the continued for six years. By 1984, relief-related poorest. expenditures had grown to 15 percent of total During this time, though the Drought Relief government expenditures, and around 20 percent Programme’s shortcomings were overshadowed of the rural working population was employed in a by the economic efects of the country’s diamond labor-based relief program. As a result, even though mining industy, Botswana’s GDP grew at 18 percent the drought was longer and more severe than that of per year between 1985 and 1990, up from 3 percent 1979, malnutrition rose only slightly before falling per year earlier in the decade. to levels lower than before the drought. No excess Ultimately, the strengths of the Drought mortality was reported, and between 1980 and 1984, Relief Programme lay not in any explicit anti- death rates among children and infants fell by over 30 famine contract, but in the “integrity of the public percent. administration and the BDP’s astute use of patronage During this time, though, the DRP began and local institutions to ensure popular legitimacy to spend considerable amounts of money on an while still pursuing policies aimed at enhancing the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Production Programme power and wealth of a commercial-governmental (ARAP). Designed as yet another relief program, in elite.”79 Despite admirable levels of accountability, practice, it amounted to little more than a subsidy though, the program faced weakness in its inability to rural elites. Te program was also notable for to catalyze mass political mobilization for the having been designed in secret and announced over enforcement of the government’s commitment to the radio, to the surprise of both civilians and the relief. Instead, the poor still relied on structures of Ministry of Agriculture. representation in which they had little power to set Begun as a one-year program, the Accelerated the agenda, such as Village Development Councils Rainfed Arable Production Programme was and general elections. ultimately extended to four years and consumed While the Accelerated Rainfed Arable over half of the Drought Relief Programme’s annual Production Programme exacerbated economic expenditures. Seventy-fve percent of this was taken inequality, the Drought Relief Programme up by a 100 percent plowing subsidy to tractor augmented state power with respect to the rural owners—commercial contractors who plowed more poor by recasting patronage networks as focused land than was ever cultivated. Te expansion of on state structures, rather than customary exchange commercial tractor ownership proved to be socially networks. Tus, drought and famine relief in regressive, as well: by awarding subsidies to the Botswana remained “hostage to a patrimonial style individual in whose name the land was registered, of government, albeit a relatively benevolent one.”80 customary land tenure institutions (communal/ Tough Botswana’s relief program is ofen invoked mutual ownership among many relatives) were as a notable example of African anti-famine systems, destroyed, as were the equally complex customs it is important to remember that this ability was regarding oxen ownership and lending. Tis led bolstered in no small part by the country’s economic to greater income inequality, as well as increased growth. plot sizes and agricultural output of larger farmers and a reduction or elimination of the agricultural ZIMBABWE productivity of smallholders. Tere was also a high Political Regime and Elections misappropriation of funds, in contrast to most other Prior to the country’s birth in 1980, Zimbabwe Botswanan entitlement programs. was engaged in a protracted war of independence, Once again, an independent evaluation was during which the Rhodesian counter-insurgency commissioned. Tough the resulting report was used food as a weapon. Teir techniques involved highly critical of ARAP, its existence alone refects an the forcible relocation of rural populations and the “enduring sense of government obligation for rural restriction of rural food supplies, creating widespread welfare.”78 Te evaluation ultimately recommended hunger just before independence. Te plight of the the government’s delinking famine prevention from guerrilla struggle was, therefore, based in part on an agricultural programs, and focusing on lasting intimate symbiotic relationship between the front

24 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s and the people, paving the way for a strong political drought from precipitating a major famine. Tough contract. the country’s food supplies grew around this time, However, two complicating factors exist “a close examination of the facts reveals that the when analyzing the Zimbabwean case. First, the prevention of famine in 1982-4 must be attributed as revolutionaries invoked traditional spirit mediums much to far-reaching measures of public support in to gain legitimacy, and second, the front constantly favor of afected populations as to the growth of food infated claims of popular mobilization.81 Even supplies.”83 before independence, then, there were few signifcant Despite the government’s “socialist aims,” channels for popular representation, with dissent the country has maintained private ownership subdued by party politics. and market incentives, and since independence February 1980 saw the creation of a liberated the country’s social services—particularly those Zimbabwe, with Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe related to health and nutrition—have experienced African National Union (ZANU) party winning considerable improvement.84 the frst election by a considerable margin. Polity reports this election as regulated, competitive, and Press open (ideal conditions). Elections were held again in Prior to independence, restrictive laws March 1990, though independent observers reported consistently stifed the media. For instance, during this election as neither free nor fair.82 the fght for independence, the government proscribed reports about casualties, and instructed Institutions of Famine Prevention the media only to report rebel casualties and their As a leader, Mugabe was committed to retreats to Zambia and Mozambique.85 As a result several radical agendas, though in the end, a lack of this and other instances of restraints on the of executive ability betrayed him. Health and media, the fght for a free press became central to the education services were improved almost as much struggle for independence. as was promised before independence, and some However, afer independence in 1980, Mugabe’s structural inequalities of agricultural marketing government did not follow through with its pre- were removed. Additionally, following drought in independence promises regarding media reforms. 1980, the government introduced temporary taxes In fact, the only colonial act that was immediately to fnance future relief measures without resorting to repealed following independence was one that foreign aid. Tis levy was relatively successful, and its prohibited reporting on debates in parliament. In funds were used for relief programs afer the (milder) January 1981, though, the government established drought of 1987. the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust to expedite the Compared to other African countries, transition of media control from the white minority Zimbabwe’s economy is vigorous and diversifed, to all of Zimbabwean society. At this time, the though some social and economic inequalities persist Ministry of Information also imposed restrictions on as colonial residues. Tus, the agricultural sector the content of news reports, despite its emphasis on a is starkly divided, with the majority of fertile land free, non-partisan, and mass-oriented media.8 cultivated by a group of commercial farmers, while Tis restriction on reporting was one of the peasant production is largely limited to ‘communal primary reasons Gukurahundi was met with such areas.’ Even within these communal areas, there little international outcry. In addition to limiting exists regional variation in both agricultural potential the scope of information contained in reports, the and access to infrastructural support, with further government imposed curfews and denied press divisions between ethnic and class groups. As a access to afected areas. A state of emergency was result, despite the economy’s relative prosperity, large declared, which allowed the government to “detain sections of the population do live in acute poverty and arrest ZAPU leaders, and deport international Although they receive almost no attention, journalists for their reporting of human rights Drèze and Sen highlight the direct entitlement abuses.”87 On a systemic level, Zimbabwe was a protection programs undertaken by Zimbabwe as a ‘Frontline State’ during the Cold War, which allowed signifcant factor in preventing the country’s 1982-84 Mugabe to couch Gukurahundi as a campaign to

25 columbia university journal of politics & society quash Communist-allied ZAPU dissidents. At the prevention measures were taken early and given same time, Drèze and Sen argue that the press was high political and fnancial priority. Te main “relatively unconstrained,” and that they played a entitlement protection measures included large- great part in keeping the government focused on the scale food distribution to the adult population and drought.88 supplementary rations for children under fve. In the face of government pressure, though, the Weiner (1988) estimates the number of people for media did succeed in making advances in its ability whom the government drought relief program to criticize the government. Later in the 1980s, one supplied the primary means of survival during newspaper published an article about the country’s 1982-4 at about 2.5 million—roughly 30 percent AIDS problem, the government was criticized for of the population. However, that said, estimates being a one-party state, and a widespread corruption of how many households actually beneftted from scandal was exposed. government food distribution are complex and varied.89 Despite variation in estimates of the Episodes of Food Scarcity number of benefciaries, though, the program is to Soon afer independence, the country began be commended for its size and logistical complexity, to experience a drought. Tis lasted three years, though there were reports of delays, uncertainties, and peaked during the second year (1983). Tough and frauds in the distribution of food. Zimbabwe generally produces a grain surplus, in Te programmatic distribution of food faced the worst afected areas of the country, harvests its own difculties, with some accounts describing of Zimbabwe’s principal staple, maize, completely the eligible population as limited only to households failed during the drought. To combat this, Zimbabwe without any member in regular employment. Tere imported food in an attempt to reduce variability have also been disputes over how judicious the in the food supply. Botswana, in contrast, was less distribution actually was; though some suggest the predisposed to produce a surplus, Table 7: Zimbabwe: Official Maize Sales, 1979–85 and consequently Percentage sales by type of farmer resorted to Season Total Sales (tons) Δ% Large-scale commercial Communal lands propping up rural incomes during 1979-80 825,563 n.a. 87.9% 8.1% the same drought 1980-81 2,013,759 +143% 82% 14.4% period. Zimbabwe’s 1981-82 1,451,827 –27% 70.4% 21.8% strategy worked 1982-83 639,747 –55% 72.6% 21.4% well in most areas, with local party 1983-84 941,591 +47% 58.6% 35.5% chairmen doling 1984-85 2,000,000 +112% 50.0% 45.0% out relief to those (Bratton, 1987) earning less than the legal minimum wage. distribution was fair, others argue that the pattern Following two consecutive years of was indiscriminate and blind to people’s actual needs. massive reductions in maize sales to the Grain Such variation may have stemmed in part from the Marketing Board (see Table 6), remittances from politicization of the program, given that at times relatives became a crucial line of support for party members became involved in the provision many households, and, as in Kenya, many of the of relief, leading to favoritism along party lines. households whose members resorted to wage labor Additionally, the distribution of food was limited to in the wider economy were found to be the least rural areas, an unusual focus for relief programs that susceptible to the drought. For others, though, tend to have an urban bias. government relief became the main or even the only source of food. Matabeleland Begun in 1982, the country’s famine While these successes were well publicized,

26 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s the confict and famine in Matabeleland managed even entirely prevented.”95 Bratton (1987) boldly to avoid popular consciousness. Following argues that “no person in Zimbabwe died as a direct infammatory remarks by a high-ranking ZANU result of starvation,” though most are not quite so ofcial, the region, home to many ZAPU supporters, confdent. was brutally suppressed by the government. Tis Beyond this, the government’s health and suppression came to be known as Gukurahundi.xxiii education eforts since independence have caused Also known as the Matabeleland Massacres, “a noticeable improvement in the health status of the campaign lasted from 1982 to 1985, with an the population of rural Zimbabwe in spite of the estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Matabele murdered and severe drought,” most notably manifesting as an tens of thousands more tortured in internment camps apparent decline in infant mortality throughout the by Mugabe’s infamous North Korean-trained Fifh drought period.96 A decline in child morbidity (in Brigade.90 relation to immunizable diseases, at least) was also On the other hand, Drèze and Sen describe this reported around this time, caused primarily by the confict as a product of the program’s politicization, government’s widespread immunization campaigns noting that “the coverage of the drought relief Overall, evidence regarding the nutritional programme in Matabeleland, the stronghold status of the population during the drought is of political dissidents, has been described as mixed. Many informal reports stressed rising ‘exceedingly patchy.’”91 Leys (1986) adds that the levels of undernutrition in the early stages of the government blamed the dissidents for disrupting drought, although there is some evidence that this relief eforts, even holding them responsible for the statistic declined following an expansion of the drought at one point. Tese accounts, however, seem relief program in 1983. Nonetheless, over the whole more concerned with the ‘ofcial’ provision of aid drought period, there is a lack of any marked change and the mechanisms thereof, rather than considering in the nutritional status of the total Zimbabwean the situation as a whole. population, a remarkable accomplishment given the Te year 1984 also saw the third consecutive initial severity of the drought. harvest failure, causing drought relief to become a major source of food for people in Matabeleland. KENYA In addition to killing civilians outright, the Fifh Political Regime and Elections Brigade exploited Matabeleland’s food dependence, A British colony until 1964, Kenya gained its with later reports noting the use of “food as a weapon independence through peaceful elections. Following of coercion.”92 Curfews and blockades were set up the 1978 death of the country’s frst president, Jomo across the region, and soldiers began to control or Kenyatta, Vice President Daniel arap Moi assumed block all food supply channels. When relief was power and was met with support throughout the distributed, “recipients were not allowed to take country. Tough he followed in the footsteps of his any rations away, but had to eat their meals under popular predecessor, Moi was too weak to consolidate army supervision,” amounting to “a sentence of power until 1982, following a failed coup by Air starvation.”93 Only afer a unity agreement between Force ofcers. Political opposition was dismissed, ZANU and ZAPU in 1987 that merged their parties and the constitution was altered to establish a de jure did the confict come to an end, though this was single-party state. However, Drèze and Sen note that at the expense of competitive politics. Tough the the country retained an elected parliament, arguably Matabeleland famine has not been systematically allowing for some degree of responsiveness. investigated, there is strong evidence pointing to its place as the result of a power struggle between the Institutions of Famine Prevention two parties.94 Kenya has experienced remarkable economic Despite this, Sen argues that the overall growth and stability since independence. Te efectiveness of the country’s entitlement protection economy features a strong private sector and programs at this time is “beyond question,” with a substantial public sector based on parastatal starvation deaths having been “largely and perhaps corporations. However, the country has limited xxiii “Te early rain which washes away the chaf before the spring rains,” in natural resources and no petroleum production. the Chi-Shona language. 27 columbia university journal of politics & society

Approximately 80 percent of the population lives strong analytical capabilities, as well as an emphasis in rural areas, mostly on the 20 percent of land that placed on ability rather than bureaucratic formality: receives enough rainfall to support agriculture. Trade “Junior clerks who operated microprocessors found of food grain is managed by the National Cereals themselves with immediate access to the Director and Produce Board (NCPB), a government-owned of Planning,” resulting in unprecedented levels of corporation that sets prices by buying and reselling productivity.98 grain (mostly maize). Early on, the government chose to frame the drought as a serious problem, though “it would not Press be considered a crisis.”99 Normal administrative At the time of independence, Kenya’s media systems would be employed, with additional labor was mostly foreign-owned but friendly to the new sourced from the private sector as needed; the state. Kenyatta’s administration generally had a policy response would be handled by Kenyans alone. of nonintervention, and Kenyatta himself argued Te low profle adopted by the government that the media should be free but responsible, with helped keep public concern in check, and the country the administration having “frequently made calls managed to avoid hoarding and public security issues to newsrooms, ostensibly to have some sensitive typically associated with crisis droughts. Te use of stories killed.”97 However, afer 1978, when arap Moi normal administrative systems also helped keep costs assumed power, the press became subject to near- low. Most importantly, however, their use “provided a constant attacks by the government, including the conceptual frame of reference within which everyone arrest and detention of some journalists and editors. could work. Tere would be no crises-motivated ad hoc programs.”100 Episodes of Food Scarcity However, despite the best eforts of the National Early in 1984, the country experienced a Cereals and Produce Board, the inevitability of food hundred-year drought that cut production of maize imports soon became clear. Once the international by half. Wheat and potato harvests were down 70 community learned of the country’s need for food, percent, and pastoralists reported similar rates of the response was “dramatic. Te government found livestock mortality. However, disaster never struck, itself in the peculiar position of welcoming aid while thanks to the government’s entitlement protection discouraging the general public and the donors from eforts. characterizing the situation as a crisis.”101 Arap Moi’s Kenya generally experiences two rainy seasons uncompromising stance on Communism may have per year (once in spring and once in winter). As a infuenced the international community’s response as result, the onset of drought in April 1984, continuous well. sunshine during the normal ‘long rain’ season, was To determine how much food would be evident without any technical early warning system. needed and when it would be needed required Around this time, the government launched an an estimation of aggregate need. Te Ministry of active response to the drought, beginning with the Finance and Planning approached this problem from importation of food. Te government’s ability to two perspectives: Te frst focused on aggregate respond in this way was greatly aided by high market nutritional requirements, while the second focused prices of cofee and tea, the country’s largest exports. on national production shortfall as a proxy for At the onset of the drought, the National imports needed. Ultimately, the second approached Cereals and Produce Board possessed a stock that was used, “because its relative simplicity facilitated could last only four to six months. At the behest of operationalization, and because it would reproduce the President, an ‘inter-ministry drought response market conditions experienced in a normal year.”102 coordinating committee’ that was tasked with In the end, more than 850,000 metric tons of grain assessment and response was established. Tey were imported. initiated commercial imports of food, negotiated with Developing a schedule for the imports, international donors for assistance, and established a however, proved to be particularly difcult. From task force to manage imports and distribution. negotiations with donors and initial assessments Tis efort was aided greatly by the government’s of the NCPB’s stocks, it became clear that even

28 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s with the most efcient efort of all parties involved, (which had been successful in India). Additionally, foreign assistance could not arrive until well afer early in the drought response, the government the depletion of domestic stocks. It also became realized that despite its employment generation evident that almost all aid would arrive in the form eforts, some households would need direct relief. of food, rather than money, forcing Kenya to import As a result, District Commissioners were authorized grain commercially to endure the span between the to freely distribute food wherever it was needed, exhaustion of domestic stocks and the arrival of aid mainly through local chiefs who knew the needs of Another important question was the variety their community. By most accounts, the chiefs did an of maize to import. As Glantz (1987) notes, “[a] efective and equitable job, though in the end, most lthough there is little nutritional diference, Kenyans households receiving rations were given very little strongly prefer to eat white maize as opposed to the food (just some 5 to 10 percent of individual daily yellow varieties.” Unfortunately, Kenyans are unique requirements). in this preference, and there is very little white maize A number of NGOs also became involved in grown for human consumption outside East Africa, the response efort, with some groups establishing such that the variety cost about 30 percent more. their own import schemes. To ease this process, Ultimately, the decision was made to import cheaper the government allowed organizations to draw yellow maize, as “it was felt that this premium for grain from existing stocks, which would later be aesthetic preferences could not be justifed.”103 replenished by the NCPB. While most NGOs Beyond saving money, importing ‘inferior’ focused on food-for-work programs, some also yellow maize had a secondary efect of encouraging provided seeds for future harvests. Tough deserving informal rationing by those who could aford of commendation, NGOs’ eforts proved almost alternative food supplies. Some scholars note that this impossible to coordinate—because these programs ultimately contributed to a progressive distribution were established before the drought and were of grain. Because the yellow maize was less desirable expected to continue aferwards, there was great than its white counterpart, the demand could be reluctance to surrender autonomy for the sake of expected to drop substantially as soon as the rains the larger coordination efort. As a result, people resumed and white maize became available again. and organizations struggled to obtain adequate However, this meant that the government had to be information for planning and management during careful not to import too much, as it could end up the drought.104 To combat this, the Ministry of with stocks of valuable but unmarketable grain. Finance and Planning moved quickly to assemble To further emphasize that the drought was a pertinent information and began disseminating ‘serious problem’ rather than a crisis, the government weekly reports on the drought response efort. chose to distribute food primarily via established While Drèze and Sen attribute the government’s commercial channels in an attempt to reduce responsiveness to the actions of elected members variability in food prices and availability. Tis would of parliament, de Waal argues that the country’s help decrease the likelihood of any informal food ultimate “success in escaping famine was largely economies, as well as maintain an air of stability and attributable to the political astuteness of President confdence. Keeping food prices at normal levels, Daniel arap Moi, who recognized a rudimentary however, required a substantial subsidy of grain and and implicit political contract: feed the central its transport. highlands and (most importantly) the cities, and the Tus, entitlement protection eforts took two government will survive.”105 However, despite the forms. First, the imported food was directed to help successes of arap Moi’s regime in averting famine reduce variability in the food supply, and second, during this time, action taken ultimately amounted to direct relief was provided to the neediest households. little more than securing their own base of power and Initially, the government attempted to represented only a slight policy change from colonial accomplish the former through employment times. Tus, though hunger was averted, the Kenyan generation, developing a food-for-work system, government “avoided tackling the structural causes of though that scheme was eventually phased out in poverty and vulnerability in both the highlands and favor of rural development projects with cash wages the lowlands.”106

29 columbia university journal of politics & society

Ultimately, Glantz argues, the success of success reinforcing this as a viable linkage. Kenya’s drought response efort was a product both of ofcial institutional action and cooperation by UGANDA laborers in the name of national unity and pride. Political Regime and Elections Cohen and Lewis (1987) stress the role ‘political Uganda gained independence from Britain in commitment’ played in the government’s response, 1962, with the country’s frst elections held the year while Drèze and Sen emphasize the threat of political prior. Tough initially a republic, many debates instability following the government’s failure to avert occurred within the country over how centralized famine afer the drought in 1979.107 Te instability the government should be, with deep divides along argument, however, seems especially appropriate, national, religious, and ethnic lines. In 1966, Prime as the afected Central and Eastern Provinces were Minister Milton Obote suspended the constitution, both politically important and meteorologically and in 1967, a new one was ratifed that expanded and economically unstable, and also because the president’s authority and abolished the division of drought conditions reached the outskirts of Nairobi. traditional kingdoms. Regardless, the Kenyan case provides insights that In 1971, Obote was deposed by a military coup challenge and improve conventional prescriptions for led by Idi Amin, who declared himself president, responding to food insecurity. dissolved the parliament, and amended the constitution to give himself absolute power. Under Implications for Famine Response Efforts Amin’s rule, the country experienced signifcant Most prescriptions for famine response economic decline, social degeneration, and eforts are based on analyses of the worst famines widespread human rights violations, resulting in the during which, by defnition, existing structures deaths of between one and fve hundred thousand and systems are unable to cope with the demands Ugandans. Following a border altercation with placed upon them. Conventional wisdom dictates Tanzania, the Tanzanian army, with Ugandan exiles, the creation of institutional structures designed fought for the liberation of Uganda, and in 1979, specifcally to respond to food shortages. Focusing on Amin and his armies fed to Libya. these types of responses, though, tends to overlook In December 1980, the country’s frst elections the efective action a government can undertake in eighteen years were held, which resulted in Milton independent of purpose-specifc institutions. By Obote and his Uganda People’s Congress party virtue of their non-crisis nature, the rare cases when returning to power. Tough the Commonwealth government is successful in averting famine ofen go Observer Group (a collection of groups formed to unrecognized, their signifcance unappreciated. Teir monitor elections throughout the Commonwealth importance, however, “lies in the fact that potential of Nations) declared itself satisfed with the outcome famines are prevented from growing to the point of of this election, there is considerable debate as to attracting international attention.”108 whether they were rigged. Te Kenyan case, on the other hand, Polity lists the country’s elections as having suggests that there may be two major approaches to ‘Transitional or Restricted Elections,’ one category addressing food insecurity: the “permanent structural below competitive elections. Te country has some of strategy typically recommended by the international the highest scores on the continent at this time. community,” and a “functional standby strategy.”109 Following a military campaign against the Without establishing any purpose-specifc structural Uganda National Liberation Army—comprised of apparatus, Kenya’s government was able to draw exiled Ugandans against Amin (as well as Obote)— upon the managerial and operational resources of Obote was deposed in 1985, by military coup. existing administrative structures. While the country Amnesty International estimates the Obote II regime did undertake some steps deemed essential for food as responsible for the deaths of more than 300,000 security, these were not integral to the creation of a civilians across the country. crisis-response capacity. Rather, strategies that helped mitigate drought and famine conditions were part of Institutions of Famine Prevention a broader national development strategy, with their In July 1978, when crop failures signaled a 30 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s dearth of food, Amin’s government took no action. In agricultural. But though these areas experienced 1980, the situation escalated, and eventually gained extreme food shortages between February and July international attention following appeals by elders 1980, the intensity of the shortage and the disparity and an exposé in London’s Observer newspaper. between the majority impoverishment and minority However, by the time relief supplies began to arrive enrichment were both most notable in Karamoja. in June 1980, a large number of people had already Immediate causal factors included shocks to the died, and the situation was quite severe. In summary, rural economy in 1979 and 1980, including unusually during the 1979-80 food crisis, the government did low rainfall in 1979 and the war that ousted Idi not take action to avert famine conditions. Amin, both of which led to low agricultural production. Te country’s infation led to the sale of Press agricultural produce to meet peasant demands, but Tough the state and local press were silent these stocks were bought primarily by speculative on the 1980 famine until its exposure by Western traders, who later resold them at prices unattainable media, the government had been alerted about by the poor. Tis led to further impoverishment the situation from 1978 onwards by way of food as many households “resorted to sale of what they monitoring in Karamoja, crop acreage and harvest never would have considered objects of commercial assessments by agricultural ofcers, and estimates transactions in normal times, i.e., land, cows, etc.”113 of afected populations. By October 1978, there was Episodic shocks also occurred in the early correspondence at various levels of government months of 1980, with neighboring districts receiving regarding the food situation in Karamoja. Between unusually heavy rains that washed away most planted September and October 1978, the District crops. Te rampant thef of cassava from the felds Agricultural Ofcers for South, Central, and also exacerbated normal seasonal hunger, and was North Karamoja had sent reports to the Provincial largely attributed to people displaced from Karamoja. Commissioner for Agriculture, which described the Within Karamoja, drought and raids were loss of crops to disease and drought, as well as cases prevalent. 1978 and 1979 were years of minimal of starvation and migration by pastoralists. harvest, due to natural conditions as well as political However, almost all indications of the drought instability. Afer the war of liberation, Idi Amin’s and impending famine occurred under the reign soldiers abandoned a stocked barracks in Moroto, a of Idi Amin. Shortly afer assuming power in 1978, district within Karamoja. Te guns were picked up Amin “tortured and killed journalists... [and] shut and traded by locals, for many of whom this marked down all newspapers except the one he used as his a considerable advance in defense technology. own propaganda vehicle.”110 Tough Obote was Tis in turn led to increased violence among perhaps only slightly less dictatorial than Amin, he tribes, primarily in the form of raids. Conditions did allow some independent newspapers to exist, worsened, and many lost their herds. By the fall of “but their editors and journalists sufered constant 1979, food was scarce, leaving to elevated starvation harassment and prolonged imprisonment.”111 and mortality rates. Te situation deteriorated further in early 1980, with the arrival of cholera from Sudan Episodes of Food Scarcity and restrictions on road travel in and out of the Since pre-colonial times, the Karamoja region Karamoja. of Uganda has been plagued by drought and famine. Because the Karimojong people face a harsh Since the 1970s, though, natural, social, and political environment and limited technology, pastoralism events have lef the area “disaster-prone,” with forms the basis of their society, with livestock herds the majority of the population impoverished and comprising their principal source of food. Tus, extremely vulnerable to food shortages. Karimojong cows are rarely slaughtered, with food During the 1980 famine, between 20,000 and instead coming from animal products like milk 50,000 people were believed to have perished.112 supplemented by crops like sorghum and millet. Tough the famine was centered in the Karamoja Te irregular rainfall of the area makes rain-fed region, it also afected a number of other districts agriculture unreliable, and it is not uncommon for whose economies were agro-pastoral and seeds to be sowed up to four times per season. In

31 columbia university journal of politics & society addition, the low level of productive development Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), means that even afer good harvests, “what is lasting from 1977 to 1992. produced is consumed before the beginning of a From the time of independence to the new season.”114 Te pastoralist Karimojong are, resolution of the country’s civil war, FRELIMO therefore, extremely vulnerable to environmental was the only legal political party; the country’s frst irregularities, raids, or epidemics. elections were not held until 1994.117 To avoid the loss of animals and alleviate sufering during times of disaster, traditional Institutions of Famine Prevention measures such as “avoiding environmental Tough droughts and famines have occurred degradation, close community solidarity through the throughout Mozambique’s history, in the past, people exchange of gifs and ceremonies, keeping part of were generally able to carry out various coping one’s herds with relatives or friends, raids approved strategies. Prior to colonial rule, people grew and ate by elders and assistance to those who are victims drought-resistant crops such as millet, sorghum, and of a crisis” are employed.115 However, during the cassava. Te arrival of European colonizers heralded 1980 famine, these traditional means of assistance the introduction of maize to the region, which soon collapsed across the region. became the national staple. However, maize is much Overall, three factors were signifcant during more dependent upon rainfall, portending an era of the 1980 famine: livestock, security, and the limited precarious food security for the area. role of rain-fed agriculture in the local economy. In addition, the Portuguese forced African Areas that were hit hardest were also those with little men to “grow industrial crops like cotton, and livestock, due to raids, whereas those hit least were also forced them to provide labor in the mines of those with military superiority and animals. South Africa.”118 Beyond further exacerbating the In the end, the 1980 famine in Karamoja area’s food security, this placed additional burdens seems to have ended not through any concerted on women to grow food crops in addition to their government action, but simply with the passage preexisting domestic and reproductive duties. As of time. Since then, the region has continued to a result of these policies, labor migration became experience recurring food shortages, including signifcant, yielding dependency on food imports as following drought in 1984. However, during this people failed to use remittances from South Africa time, the country’s relative political stability allowed to develop agriculture. In the 1940s and 50s, famine for a more efective response. Dodge and Alnwick became increasingly common, and in 1965, Portugal note that the response of the UN, UNICEF, and other enacted a ‘scorched earth’ policy along the Tanzanian international relief agencies helped keep starvation border in its fght against FRELIMO supporters deaths to a minimum, though “drought, armed which ofen led to starvation. confict and the displacement of large numbers of At independence, FRELIMO assumed power people” still occurred.116 and stifed all local trading, imposing a uniform policy of villagization and collective production that MOZAMBIQUE severely afected crop yields. It was through these Political Regime and Elections policies, though, that FRELIMO hoped to invigorate Prior to its independence, Mozambique was industrial agriculture at the expense of peasant managed by Portugal. Ten years of sporadic warfare farming. Tis disruption was costly and inefective, and a lefist military coup in Portugal in 1974 allowed and made the urban population reliant on food the Marxist-Leninist Front for the Liberation of produced through a centralized and mechanized Mozambique (FRELIMO) to take control of the system of production. territory. Within a year of Portugal’s Carnation Te time afer independence also saw an Revolution, almost the entire Portuguese population unusual number of natural disasters. In 1977, the had lef Mozambique, and in June 1975, the country Limpopo and Incomati rivers fooded, damaging formally declared independence. Te rapid exodus crops and livestock; in 1978, the Zambezi river also lef the country’s economy in shambles. Soon afer, fooded, driving 220,000 people from their homes, civil war broke out against the western-aligned and in 1979, Cyclone Justine damaged agriculture in 32 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s the north of the country. Prior to 1980, however, the attacks began in earnest, 100,000 Mozambicans government was largely able to curtail damage via sought refuge in neighboring Zimbabwe. a Department for the Prevention of Calamities and International aid was slow to arrive, delayed Natural Disasters. Trough this organization, the until the crisis had already struck. In 1983, government was able to mobilize resources to deal Zimbabwe (itself combatting famine) was the major with the crises, including foreign aid. food donor to Mozambique, and it was not until early 1984 that more food aid was sent. Afer 1984, Episodes of Food Scarcity though, Mozambique became massively dependent In 1980, three factors contributed to the sharp on foreign aid: “Food shortages became chronic decline in food production and marketing. First and food became almost unobtainable on the were military tactics used by RENAMO fghters, ofcial market.”121 Where food surpluses did exist, which were directed towards infrastructure, and they were sold on the black market or bartered, the population displacement that resulted. Second and in provinces such as Gaza, the black market were ofcial policies that restricted rural trade, accounted for as much as half of food surpluses. By established communal villages, and forcibly recruited 1986, harvests were down to roughly ten percent urban jobless to rural labor programs in the north. of 1981 levels. At the same time, Mozambique’s Te third factor was the weather, which in 1983- urban population increased as rural food insecurity 84 “turned the economic disaster into widespread deepened. human tragedy.”119 1985 and 1986 saw no reprieve from confict During times of peace, Mozambique is a fertile and hunger, with a major RENAMO ofensive in country which has little trouble feeding its population Zambézia Province in late 1986 coinciding with the and producing exports, agricultural and otherwise. planting season. Afer attacks began on roads, over Between 1983 and 1984, though, the south-central 500,000 were reported as ‘at risk’ from famine, and region of the country descended into famine, with over 270,000 were displaced. most commonly cited statistics placing the death toll At the same time, there was a severe food at around 100,000. A second major famine occurred shortage in the northern Niassa Province due to in 1987, centered on the eastern Zambézia province, foods, poor harvests, and RENAMO activity, placing which was the result of confict. 400,000 people at risk of famine. Additionally, 1986 According to UNICEF, over 600,000 people foods in the Zambezi Valley washed away a portion perished during Mozambique’s decade-long period of Tete Province’s frst harvests following three years of intermittent famine—a toll that compares to of drought, placing around 500,000 at risk of a food Ethiopia’s famine of 1983-85. However, except for shortage. 1983-84, there were not scenes of mass starvation. Around this time, famine spread to the south of Instead, famine meant “chronic shortages of food the country, even reaching the outskirts of the capital, and all consumer goods, constant insecurity and Maputo. In Maputo Province, 60 percent of the frequently homelessness, loss of assets such as population faced serious food shortages in 1986, with livestock, and being forced to survive on a reduced another 22,000 displaced by RENAMO activity along diet of leaves and roots, and perhaps wild game, until the South African border. In Inhambane Province, it [became] possible to reach a food distribution about 38 percent of the population was described center or plant and harvest a crop.”120 as at risk, and in Sofala Province, almost 1 million In the early 1980s, an unusually severe drought individuals were placed in danger by the war. Serious afected most of central and southern Mozambique, malnutrition was also reported in the Chibabwa area, with the poorest families starting to sufer extreme where RENAMO burned maize. hunger. In Tete Province, many died of complications Marginal recovery occurred in 1987, when related to the lack of available food, though the agricultural production grew by seven percent, famine received no publicity. In Gaza and Inhambane though around this time, famine struck in Zambézia, provinces, where RENAMO was the most active, an previously the country’s wealthiest and least famine- estimated twenty-fve percent of normally marketed prone province. While it is undeniable that many in crops were lost. In the following year, as RENAMO Zambézia sufered hunger and destitution due to the

33 columbia university journal of politics & society

RENAMO occupation, the Mozambican Air Force’s 1982-3, they destroyed 900 rural shops. In addition to counter-insurgency strategy, which included large- its tangible efects, the destruction of infrastructure scale population displacement, was also to blame. was also symbolic, “cleansing the area of government Despite this, there is little evidence pointing presence, providing an outlet for accumulated to RENAMO or FAM creating famine as an end. grievances of the populace, and returning the Instead, “the basic military strategy of aiming to countryside to a subsistence condition.”126 control the civilian population leads to famine as However, one of the most devastating aspects a direct and foreseeable consequence... Te logic of RENAMO’s campaign was the obstruction of war-created famine has not been one in which and diversion of relief. Between 1984 and 1987, starvation is used to kill people, but one in which the RENAMO destroyed and damaged relief trucks, threat of starvation is used to control people.”122 killed drivers, and stole or destroyed over 400 tons Te abuse of food aid was also instrumental in of food and relief supplies. Over half of these attacks maintaining famine conditions, with both RENAMO occurred in 1987—a year which also saw some and FAM responsible for attacks on relief convoys 4,500,000 people face famine and the displacement of and storehouses, as well as corrupt government 1,600,000 more. Te destruction continued through ofcials and merchants systematically diverting large 1988, and in 1989, RENAMO launched attacks on amounts of relief food. a railway line, destroying over 2,000 tons of relief Tough famine was not a deliberate strategy, food.xxiv as one FAM ofcer explained, people were relocated Beyond this, however, it is difcult to generalize “for their safety. Otherwise the bandits (RENAMO) about RENAMO’s operations, with the treatment of would make them feed them. In remote areas we populations under their control varying considerably. then destroy their felds—so the bandits will not According to accounts of Mozambicans who become fat.”123 Between 1986 and 1988, 466 such experienced it, RENAMO’s administration can be ‘accommodation camps’ were established, though categorized by geographical, logistical, and local many were more signifcant as “nodes of government political factors, with areas subject to ‘taxation,’ control in a sea of insurgency”124 which could not ‘control,’ or ‘destruction’ modes of control. Given be maintained without international aid. As a result, the fuidity of the insurgency, though, these the government’s access to relief became one of its categorizations are tenuous at best. greatest assets in the war. ‘Taxation’ areas constituted much of RENAMO’s Te only tangible evidence of government forces domain, and were used “to produce and services systematically destroying crops as a tactic of war for the organization, with RENAMO frequently comes from their 1987 counter-insurgency campaign only imposing on the local population light tribute in Zambézia. Assisted by units from Tanzania demands.”127 In ‘control’ areas, on the other hand, and special forces from Zimbabwe, the operation RENAMO attempted to establish health clinics, entailed large-scale population displacement from schools, and government institutions.xxv districts that had come under RENAMO control. When Zimbabwe fully entered the war in 1985, Te government’s scorched earth policy during these RENAMO was faced with the threat of air-based attacks directly contributed to the 1987 famine. attacks. In response, larger bases were fragmented All of this is not to say that RENAMO did not and moved to inaccessible locations. As areas came commit similarly grave atrocities. An early South under military pressure, civilian food supplies African training manual for RENAMO, which dwindled considerably. By 1985-86, this had helped taught readers how to ambush, retreat, and spread undermine RENAMO’s support among the local propaganda, also “advised units to ‘live of the land’ population. by capturing supplies and destroying everything Finally, Maputo and Gaza provinces were remaining so as to deny the enemies access to ‘destruction’ zones, subject to “the seemingly wanton it.”125 RENAMO also targeted infrastructure in destruction of health, educational and economic its campaigns, including railroads, bridges, trucks, xxiv In 1991, a senior RENAMO ofcial confrmed the role of food in their strategy: “Food is a tool of war, we use it to make strategic gains, but so do the shops, FRELIMO ofces, clinics, and schools. In 1982 FRELIMO Marxists!” (Karl Maier, 1992). alone, 140 villages were torched by RENAMO, and in xxv In most cases, though, these were nothing more than poor replicas of the system RENAMO had previously destroyed. 34 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s infrastructure, and food stores and food convoys.”128 Mengistu Haile Mariam, the junta established a one- From these areas, for example, came four reports one party communist state afer assuming power. year of aid vehicles being destroyed, rather than frst removing the cargo. Empty trucks were also targeted Institutions of Famine Prevention on occasion, further hampering the government’s Prior to 1974, there had been little successful relief eforts. protest action, and no urban food riots. Indeed, the Tese displays of dominance, then, were early stages of the revolution were relatively non- dramatic indicators of RENAMO’s destructive violent. De Waal notes that at this time, Ethiopia was capacity, signifying a “deliberate and efective weapon (on paper, at least) better equipped to prevent famine of war. [Tis conspicuous destruction] sends a very than ever in its history. Rather, “the shortcoming vivid message to the thousands of hungry deslocados was that while the famine played a role in the (displaced people) waiting for food relief to arrive in revolution, the famine-vulnerable people did not.”131 their accommodation centers and is very efective in Afer the revolution, reforms were imposed from eroding morale.”129 In some instances, these displays above, making tenuous the gains of the revolution, of power signaled to the population a choice between and causing the government to struggle with its RENAMO and starvation. Tus, in the end, food legitimacy. security all but dictated military strategy. During the power struggle that followed the Afer the death of Samora Machel, revolution—the ‘Red Terror’—extractive policies Mozambique’s President, in a 1986 plane crash, were implemented to sustain the ever-increasing Joaquim Chissano, his successor, implemented army. Around this time, a central food extraction sweeping economic and political changes. In addition institution was also established, though in practice to transforming the country from Marxism to the corporation simply supplied food to a few select capitalism, Chissano successfully carried out peace cities—the same pattern of distribution as under the talks with RENAMO, bringing the civil war to an end Emperor. in 1992. Around this time, a new constitution was Overall, the Dergue’s economic policies rated that created a multi-party political system, a had disastrous consequences that caused mass market-based economy, and free elections. By 1993, impoverishment and were partly to blame for the more than 1,500,000 Mozambican refugees returned scope of the country’s 1983-85 famine. While the from neighboring countries in one of Africa’s largest Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), an repatriation eforts.130 anti-famine bureau established in the fnal years of the Empire, once produced comprehensive analyses Press of poverty and famine in Ethiopia, by the 1980s, Troughout Mozambique’s civil war, there the RRC had become compromised as a tool of the were many human rights violations. Even since Dergue. the cessation of hostilities, there have there been Tasked with collectivizing Ethiopia’s workforce many concerns regarding infringements of the press and procuring foreign assistance, the RRC was and other civil liberties, although the country has very successful in securing aid, though much of improved in recent years. Consequently, during the the food was used to supply militias (especially in 1980s, Mozambique’s press was rated as ‘Not Free’ by Eritrea and Tigray). Elsewhere, the RRC “pushed Freedom House. international agencies to set up relief programmes in surplus-producing regions, where the [government] ETHIOPIA continued to collect substantial quotas.”132 Te Political Regime and Elections RRC was also instrumental in spreading propaganda Unlike other countries in this study, Ethiopia which framed the 1980s famine as resulting from was never colonized by a European power. In overpopulation and drought, downplayed the role of 1974, though, the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie war, and claimed that all victims were being reached I was brought to an end when he was deposed by by it and other aid organizations. However, despite a Marxist-Leninist military junta known as the these distorted claims, the RRC never interrupted the ‘Dergue’ (“committee” or “council” in Ge’ez). Led by fow of early warning information, which could have 35 columbia university journal of politics & society inhibited its ability to procure aid. migrants [turned] up at feeding centers,” that signs of famine began to arise.134 International NGOs Press began appeals for aid, and the RRC quickly revised its During the country’s 1973-75 famine, Emperor assessment and claimed a major production shortfall, Selassie suppressed information about the situation, retroactively identifying drought to cover destruction and it was not until a newsreel aired on Canadian wrought by government forces. television that the international community began Tough the country’s 1983 harvest was far from to respond.133 Afer the explosion of international disastrous, famine occurred in the northern province attention, Ethiopia’s government sought to restrict of Tigray. In 1984, the short rains failed, and the foreign media and relief agencies, though this only RRC played up the incident as causing catastrophic drew more attention. Te revolutionary Dergue famine, though it was not until the main harvest of used this attention to their advantage, culminating 1984 that severe drought spread to the eastern and with the creation of a UN Ofce for Emergency southern parts of the country.xxvi Tough not nearly Operations in Ethiopia (UNEOE). Tough intended as prolonged or severe as the famine in the north, the to be an authoritative source of information, the fgures were confated in government statistics, giving ofce deliberately obscured information, including the impression that the entire country was sufering their own reports. from a unitary crisis. During the Eighth Ofensive, a domestic While drought and harvest failure contributed military operation launched in February 1985, the to the famine, neither they nor the government’s UNEOE did not mention any ofenses, even those economic and agricultural policies can be considered that involved direct attacks on relief operations. direct causes of the famine. Rather, the country’s Tey consistently downplayed reports of forcible famine was principally caused by the government’s resettlement, rebutted independent research, and counter-insurgency campaign in Tigray and Wollo: even appealed for aid at resettlement sites. “Te zone of severe famine coincided with the Tus, not only did the government’s control war zone, and the phases of the developing famine over media serve to veil its repressive military corresponded with major military actions.”135 Five actions, but it was also able to infuence the elements of Ethiopia’s counter-insurgency strategy in content of news that was released. Tis allowed the particular helped catalyze famine: military ofensives government of Ethiopia to exploit the international aimed at rebel strongholds in surplus-producing humanitarian community for aid through its own regions, the bombing of markets in rebel-held areas, channels as well as through the UNEOE, while severe restrictions on trade and movement, forced simultaneously engaging in continued domestic population resettlements, and the manipulation of confict. relief programs. Until early 1984, international donors were Episodes of Food Scarcity (justifably) skeptical of the Ethiopian government’s While many speak of ‘the Ethiopian famine’ appeals for relief amidst mounting evidence that as a homogeneous national phenomenon, this is diversion and abuse of aid were employed as tactics misleading. Tis image, though, allowed the RRC to in counter-insurgency eforts. In October 1984, claim that it had been predicting the 1983-85 famine however, the famine was thrust into the international as early as 1981. In reality, many of those afected media spotlight. Tough this mobilized some, were in one section of the country, aficted by a others felt the exposure resulted from collusion wholly diferent crisis that was precipitated by the between private relief agencies and television Dergue’s war with various ethnic groups. Further broadcasters.xxvii Western governments’ priorities at doubt is cast on the RRC’s claims when one considers the time were simply to avoid embarrassment, such the unreliability of local statistics at that time. As late xxvi A less partial indicator of famine is the price of grain, which was as early 1984, no one could truly have predicted the consistently high in eastern and central Tigray, with elevated prices rippling famine, with food production estimated as above outwards following the 1984 harvest failure (see Table 8). Rainfall data from the time corroborates this theory, with localized droughts occurring in 1983 average for 1981 and 1982 (see Table 7). alongside above-average rainfall in other areas. It was not until February 1983, when “destitute xxvii In addition, the broadcast aired during prime fundraising season for relief agencies, causing NGOs to compete for media exposure. 36 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s 136 that “aid became a strategic alibi.” Table 8: Relative Food Production in Ethiopia, 1977-84 In response, the Ethiopian Government sought Production to restrict media and relief agencies, drawing further attention to the situation. However, the Dergue soon Year Total Per Capita began to use the relief presence to their advantage 1977 99 95 with the creation of a UN Ofce for Emergency 1978 110 104 Operations in Ethiopia (UNOEOE). Te ofce’s 1979 122 113 purported mission was to coordinate relief eforts 1980 117 106 with the Ethiopian Government and to centralize 1981 115 102 the fow of information, though these functions 1982 127 110 were already served by other organizations. Tis lef the UNOEOE, de Waal notes, to help maintain the 1983 118 99 appearance of competent action towards the famine 1984 110 90 without antagonizing the Dergue. NOTE: 1974-6 = 100 (de Waal, 1991) Nonetheless, the ofcial UN view was that the ultimately argued that the Dergue’s policies “have no agency enabled a broader and more efective response doubt caused vast unnecessary sufering including force. Te Ethiopian Government intensifed its starvation,” there was no evidence of deliberative actions (the creation of famine and manipulation of use of starvation at that time (a qualifer that aid), and the UNOEOE acted as its mouthpiece, with allowed Mengistu’s administration to escape further journalists frequently turning to it as an authority scrutiny).138 on the topic. Rather than investigating abuses, Te US also felt pressure domestically to though, the UNOEOE “consistently concealed continue providing humanitarian assistance: disturbing evidence, including evidence produced following popular aid concert events in England and by its own monitors.”137 In the same month as the America, it became a priority to be seen as giving establishment of the UNOEOE, for example, the generously. Because media and politicians were Dergue launched a ‘silent ofensive’ in Eritrea, so prohibited from visiting rebel-held areas, “it was named for its lack of publicity. necessary for US assistance to have a high media Te one international agency to withdraw from profle in government-held areas,” depoliticizing the the country in protest was Doctors Without Borders famine and allowing the Dergue to exploit the media (MSF), who departed soon before the government presence.xxix, 139 ordered their expulsion. MSF later published a Among areas of Tigray held by the Tigrayan damning report of the situation, though this only People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the greatest caused other organizations to discredit them on the force against famine was the political relationship basis of incompetency.xxviii Tus, the relationship between civilians and the TPLF, who believed that between international humanitarian actors, the the peasantry was crucial to succeed in revolution. media, and the Ethiopian government greatly As the TPLF began to undertake more quasi- impeded any systematic evaluation of the famine. governmental programs, it continued to involve the Following a UNOEOE report on Tigrayan rural population. Te TPLF had drawn support from garrison towns that dramatically overstated the peasants since its inception, so their political contract proportion of people receiving satisfactory rations, had become enforceable. Had the TPLF lacked the the US government was forced to become an support of the locals, it would have been crushed accomplice in the cover-up. Days earlier, the US militarily.xxx Congress requested that President Reagan determine As the war and food crises intensifed, the TPLF whether Ethiopia had used starvation as a weapon of war, a tactic that would have provoked the US to xxix A convenient scapegoat for the famine was found in the natural environment, the tropes of which are familiar: drought, overpopulation, and take action. While the Presidential Determination unsustainable land-use practices. ‘Saving’ the environment became a popular xxviii Tough its ineptitude was not the cause of its expulsion, it is not nonpolitical way for Western (particularly American) donors to send aid to inconceivable that MSF was politically naïve: “its feld staf were unaware of communist Ethiopia. the implications of reporting on what they had seen, and had they been more xxx Te TPLF also established a relief administration with the face of an experienced they would have followed their colleagues in other agencies and independent NGO, though in practice it was “virtually indistinguishable from remained silent” (de Waal, 1997). the civil administration of the front” (de Waal, 1997). 37 columbia university journal of politics & society also shifed its focus to economic and social policies 1969. As a result, Sudan defaulted on its foreign over military action. Tese policies, including wage debts, causing Nimeiri to appeal to international employment, money lending, and trading, helped to lending and aid organizations, and to invoke a greatly reduce variability in individual purchasing spirit of ‘national reconciliation.’ In practice, this meant abandoning political alliances with secular Table 9: Average Grain Prices in Northern Ethiopia, 1981-85 professionals as well as the South, and Nimeiri’s rule Province “became characterized by an embrace of political Season E. Tigray N. Wollo N. Gondar Islam and deepening economic dependence.”143 Nov/Dec 1981 100 50 40 At this time, the country’s legal system began a Nov/Dec 1982 165 65 55 process of ‘Islamization,’ with the appointment of a Nov/Dec 1983 225 90 45 prominent Sudanese Muslim Brothers member to the Nov/Dec 1984 300 160 70 post of Attorney General. Jun/Jul 1985 380 235 165 Over time, prominent secularists and religious (de Waal, 1997) leaders lef the regime, and the situation in the South degenerated into civil war. In an attempt to legitimize power, and further promoted the idea of the TPLF as his government’s use of political Islam, Nimeiri a governing force. declared Islamic law in 1983 and proclaimed himself Ultimately, de Waal concludes, Ethiopia’s Imam. In so doing, however, he made the claim that famines of the 1970s and 80s are “replete with he was accountable only to Allah, eliminating any ironies, which are explicable only by attention to remaining shred of commitment to popular welfare. the existence or not of an anti-famine political By this point, Sudan was experiencing a massive contract.”140 While the failed response to the infux of remittances; the country was also deeply 1973 famine was “highly intellectual, elitist and indebted to foreign governments. As a result, the institutionalized,”141 the response to the 1983-85 government became signifcantly less accountable famine was, for a time, thought of as a major policy to its internal tax base, and “instead [relied] success for the government of Ethiopia. At the same on the apparently magical liquidity of Islamist time, the TPLF largely did not receive recognition for fnanciers.”144 Meanwhile, capitalist investors began its productive eforts. to withdraw, and Islamic banks and merchants began to invest, “exploiting their tax privileges, political SUDAN connections and access to hard currency.”145 Political Regime and Elections Prior to its independence in 1956, Sudan was Institutions of Famine Prevention under the purview of the British, who allowed In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Sudan’s the establishment of a democratic parliament renowned system of local government began to following a series of polls. At independence, de decay. Infation devalued government salaries, Waal notes, Sudan exhibited two structures that and many civil servants joined the migration of “stood as guarantees against localized food shortages professionals to the Gulf States. Corruption was degenerating into famine (in the North at least).”142 widespread, and experiments in regional governance Te frst was a civil service with a reputation for fostered factionalism, further lowering morale. professionalism, which tasked itself with safeguarding During the 1980s, Sudan became a strategic local food supplies, and the second was the system of player in the Cold War, and was seen as key to the ‘native administration’ of villages and sub-districts. anti-communist strategy afer it changed alliances However, the situation was undermined by from East to West. Despite the country’s massive political instability in the form of multiple coup ofshore debt, Nimeiri exploited this position attempts, the migration of many of the country’s to receive more foreign aid, making Sudan the professionals, and the failure of Sudan’s ‘open recipient of the most US foreign assistance in sub- door’ strategy for attracting foreign investment. Saharan Africa (over $1.4 billion throughout the Additionally, there was rampant corruption under decade). However, this foreign assistance, combined the rule of Jaafar Nimeiri, who seized power in with multiple debt reschedulings, served only to 38 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s prolong the country’s impending economic crisis. Te management of Sudan’s debt was such that “by Episodes of Food Scarcity 1984, Nimeiri’s treasury was living from hand to In 1983, the specter of famine loomed as mouth.”146 Eventually, the country defaulted on drought reduced food production by seventy-fve its debt to the IMF, making Nimeiri accountable percent in north Kordofan, north Darfur, and the primarily to fnanciers in Washington. Red Sea Hills. Local governments attempted to Around this time, reforms demanded by the US distribute relief, but were restrained by tight budgets and IMF included the “widespread privatization of and meager stores.xxxi nationalized corporations and the radical slimming Rains failed again during the summer of 1984, down of the state budget.”147 Tese were welcomed and conditions became increasingly desperate. Apart by Islamist merchants, to whom it provided greater from a (largely symbolic) declaration of emergency leeway for investment. At the same time, more in Darfur, however, no action was taken by the non-state actors began to become involved in the government. Tere were mass migrations to towns reconstruction of southern Sudan, following the 1972 and cities, including Khartoum, but around this time peace agreement. Unlike before, though, foreign children in rural areas began to die. aid was now being channeled to foreign NGOs over Tough Nimeiri felt himself accountable whom the Sudanese Government had no control. only to Allah, in reality he had actual or potential fnanciers as well, to whom “the drought and famine Press were an embarrassment and a distraction.”151 In an Te Library of Congress reports that since the attempt to persuade international donors that Sudan country’s independence, Sudan’s mass media has was stable and a good recipient of aid, Sudan was largely served to disseminate information supporting forced to deny classifying the troubles in the South various political parties or ofcial government as war. Because the confict was not ‘war,’ militias views (depending on the power structure at the were mobilized instead of the army. Similarly, the time). Radio has “remained virtually a government government did not admit to famine, which would monopoly, and television broadcasting [has] have shaken investors’ confdence. been a complete monopoly.”148 Freedom House In the end, Nimeiri’s strategy for averting corroborates, awarding Sudan scores of zero (‘Not famine was simply to deny that any problem Free’) for print and broadcast freedom until 1987, existed. In November 1984 he said publicly, “Te when print media gained some freedom. situation with respect to food security and health In the end, the famine in the South failed to is reassuring;” it was not until January 1985 that he become a political scandal in Sudan. In addition to admitted to the reality of the situation.152 By this a lack of interest by political groups in the North, point, though, it had been a full year since drought northern journalists rarely covered the crisis, which became apparent, and an estimated 250,000 had would have meant traveling to an active war zone and perished. challenging security restrictions. Equally important, Te famine did help solidify a broad coalition though, was the lack of signifcant interest among against Nimeiri, led by professionals, including readers: “Apart from the English language Sudan doctors, lawyers, and civil servants. In November Times (edited by a Southerner), only the Communist 1984, the Ministry of Health broke ranks and al Meidan showed an interest, and that was largely published an honest report of the famine conditions. connected to the political implications of the Shortly thereafer, the Ministry of Agriculture militias.”149 released estimates of relief needed that contradicted Tough press freedom plainly “did not exist” those released by Nimeiri. Te famine also divided under Nimeiri, the Library of Congress notes the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), the single that under Mahdi, Sudan had numerous political political party at the time. With the defection of newsletters, as well as independent newspapers Sudan’s largest city, there began the formation of and magazines.150 Following the coup by the an urban-rural alliance that would overthrow the Revolutionary Command Council for National xxxi By early 1984, the FAO estimated the relief needed in Darfur at 39,000 Salvation, all newspapers were banned. metric tons. Khartoum cut the fgure to 7,000 metric tons, and even less was delivered. Nothing was sent to Kordofan. 39 columbia university journal of politics & society government.xxxii much a refection of the weakness of government as In April 1985, there was a popular uprising of a true spirit of tolerance; but the freedoms were by democratic forces. While the fall of Nimeiri genuine and were used by, among others, human was a “triumph of the politicization of famine,” the rights activists.”157 coalition which formed to overthrow him was fragile, At the same time, this period saw the most and its use of famine largely tactical, such that in the severe famine in Sudan’s modern history. In the end, no robust anti-famine political contract would South, famine was caused by the ongoing civil emerge.153 war. Te government endorsed proxy militias to Perhaps the most blatant example of political conduct raids, which were frequent, widespread, opportunism during the famine, though, was “the and devastating. Livestock were stolen, villages were rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which destroyed, wells were poisoned, and people were used its radio broadcasts to chastise the government killed indiscriminately. Militias were also implicated for inaction over the famine, while the SPLA itself in the capture and enslavement of civilians. Tose was helping to create famine in the south.”154 Afer who managed to escape fed to garrison towns, where the fall of Nimeiri, many who once mobilized against they were forced to sell their labor and assets cheaply, the famine lost interest, and the political agenda and were ofen prohibited from moving farther shifed. By this point, interest in overcoming the north, where there was the possibility of work or drought came only from those still afected by it. charity. Immediately afer the fall of Nimeiri, Dr. Al- Local government ofcials and army Jazuli Daf’allah, became interim prime minister commanders also prevented relief assistance from and promptly delegated responsibility for relief reaching displaced people, and an estimated 30,000 to international agencies (in light of Sudan’s people died in Western Sudanese displacement now-bankrupt economy). In addition to helping camps that year. Localized famines were also created depoliticize famine, this solidifed the crisis as by the military, whose tactics included raiding and within the domain of relief organizations, rather scorched earth. than being owned by the democratic forces behind Due to the militias’ connections to Sadiq’s the uprising—famine prevention became an Umma Party, a war economy eventually developed, internationalized technical issue, rather than a with a vested interest in the confict’s continuation. (domestic) political one. Tis shif was refected in Additionally, for some politicians, merchants, and the establishment of an early warning system that ofcers, the violence, famine, and failure of relief monitored economic, climatic, and agricultural data, represented a policy success. refecting “the neo-liberal agenda for eviscerating Despite this, though, there is little evidence government responsibilities.”155 that points to a strategic plan to use the famine as a In 1986, democratic elections returned to weapon of genocide. Instead, the “moral, political Sudan, though they were spread over a twelve-day and economic logic of the war as interpreted in period and delayed in thirty-seven constituencies due Khartoum created a space where such near-genocidal to the civil war. Afer the elections, Sadiq al-Mahdi motives and practices could fourish”158 and the Umma Party assumed power. During this Te South was not only a war zone, but also time: an area with no legitimate political authority, which Sudan enjoyed all the institutions of liberal allowed state agents to act with impunity. Tis democracy, at least in Khartoum and other urban ‘abolition of restraint’ did not develop automatically, centers. Te press was uncensored and vigorous, of course, but was the result of state and local politics: and ofen highly critical of the government. “Khartoum still had clients and allies in the South, Political parties, trade unions and professional whom it had to mollify, and who had power bases associations were free to mobilize. Tere was no in their own right. But in Khartoum, the famine suspicion of fraud in the elections. Te judiciary 159 was independent and on several occasions was virtually invisible.” At the same time, the overruled government decisions.156 Sadiq government was exceptionally sensitive to the demands of Northern constituents, especially It is arguable, though, that this liberalism was “as those from urban areas, and established a subsidy on xxxii Omdurman, population 526,284 in 1983. 40 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s wheat that was prohibitively expensive (equivalent Additionally, the government was only sensitive to its to roughly 7 percent of government revenue). Te urban constituents, and there was no urban-rural or insistence by the IMF to remove this subsidy in North-South coalition that could promote broader March 1985 helped contribute to the downfall of accountability. Nimeiri, and while Sudan’s donors insisted it should be further cut or abolished, Sadiq refused to touch CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE AFRICAN it, despite other agreed-upon austerity measures. CASES Even the mention of cutting the wheat subsidy drew I have argued that while Amartya Sen’s theory crowds in the streets, such that “all government that a free press and competitive elections would fnance was hostage to this single issue,” as well as allow a country to avert famine is not entirely reducing the government’s accountability to a single, accurate, its underlying causal mechanism is limited constituency.160 valid. However, press freedom and competitive In the end, Sudan’s famine failed to become a elections are by no means the only mechanisms of political scandal as interest waned among journalists accountability that could prompt a government to and the general public. Te SPLA also proved an take action to avert famine. obstacle to the peace process, placing military By examining Sen’s cases—Botswana, victory over political mobilization. At best, the Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan—as well as SPLA represented ‘benevolent paternalism,’ while Mozambique and Uganda (thus completing the set of at worst, it was violent and extractive. Tactics used all African countries that experienced famine during by the force created food shortages in many areas the 1980s, I argue that although the causality is valid, by requisitioning food, labor, and livestock, and in most cases, countries’ famine prevention eforts exacerbating shortages in others. Garrison towns were not motivated solely by freedom of the press were reduced to starvation, and relief supplies were or competitive elections. Moreover, the presence of consistently blocked, inhibiting eforts by Northern either institution in a country does not guarantee the politicians to build anti-famine alliances with afected prevention or aversion of famine conditions. In some populations. cases, the domestic press prompted a government’s A glimmer of hope for relief came following response to famine, while in other instances it was widespread foods in August 1988, when “there the international media that exposed a crisis. Yet, was criticism from all quarters over corruption and in other cases, action was not taken despite a free favoritism in the distribution of relief,” but as the press, refecting either a lack of incentive to report issue was gaining attention, the ruling coalition food shortages or a lack of political imperative to collapsed following a dispute regarding Sharia act on the information. Tus, while a free press is, if law.161 Te 1988 peace accords between the SPLA anything, likely to expedite famine response eforts, it and the Democratic Union Party (DUP), the second is by no means necessary or sufcient. Additionally, largest political party, made no mention of famine while representative politics are generally considered or famine relief, and it was only later in the year necessary to align the interests of politicians with the that Western donors took up the cause. By the voting population, they are by no means sufcient. end of 1988, pressure from Danish and American Beyond raising questions of what factors are governments yielded Operation Lifeline Sudan sufcient to prompt a response to famine, this fnding (OLS), a plan proposed, designed, and implemented challenges the necessity of a representative form of almost exclusively by international relief agencies. government for such an efort: in all institutional Ultimately, political liberalism was unable forms of government, the key political incentive— to substantially alter the lines of accountability maintaining power—remains the same. established in the fnal years of Nimeiri’s regime. De Waal answers this by noting that despite Te exclusivism of the government combined with the existence of other accountability-promoting a lack of signifcant opposition and an emphasis institutions, the press and elections may be used by on international assistance contributed to an people to sanction elected politicians for past actions, environment hostile to any democratic institutions while simultaneously projecting a (vague) image that would provide protection from famine. of desired political action. In this way, a contract

41 columbia university journal of politics & society is formed which indicates to those in Table 10: Relief and Political Representation by Region, 1986-87 power the importance of a particular Number of Seats cause, such as preventing famine. 1986 1987 Region in Sudanese In a liberal political system, various Relief (mt) Relief (mt) mechanisms can aford this ability, Constituent Assembly while under an authoritarian regime, Upper Nile 1,000 3,000 7 the people’s only recourse is protest, Bahr el Ghazal 2,000 4,000 9 peaceful or armed. Darfur 51,000 — 43 However, as with famine versus chronic hunger, the threshold of an Kordofan 107,000 20,000 43 anti-famine political contract versus a Eastern 35,000 35,000 31 commitment is less than clear, and, more Northern 2,400 1,000 20 importantly, of questionable relevance. First, in reality, there is no perfect Central 18,000 6,000 55 means of enforcement in representative Khartoum 2,000 1,000 34 politics, and so there can be no ‘pure’ manifestation of a political contract. Total 223,400 82,000 262 Second, while the preconditions (Keen, 1994) for a contract are the same as for a delinked both from specifc issues and from the commitment, the latter seems little more than an political will to take action. impermanent version of the former; the two can only be distinguished in retrospect. More signifcantly, though, is the scope of a contract, both in terms of the parties involved and the content of the agreement. While an anti- famine political contract includes the government, the people, and famine, in theory, variation in each may lead to ‘impure’ contracts and possibly famine conditions. In Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Kenya, for example, an anti-famine contract may be claimed to have existed, though only for a specifc portion of the population (i.e. a greater disparity between the selectorate and the winning coalition).xxxiii,162 Additionally, while an agreement (be it a contract or some other pact) between a state and the people may entail the prevention of famine conditions, the government may be free from addressing more fundamental causes, such as structural poverty or vulnerability to food insecurity, a pattern observed in Kenya in 1984. Ultimately, freedom of the press and the regulation, competitiveness, and openness of elections cannot be considered panaceas for the prevention of famine. While these mechanisms of accountability are undeniably important to improving the quality of governance, they must be xxxiii In terms of selectorate theory, this scenario would result from a disparity between the selectorate, “the set of people who have an institutional say in choosing leaders,” and the winning coalition, “the minimal set of people whose support the incumbent needs in order to remain in power.” (Mesquita et al., 2002) 42 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s APPENDIX A: TABLES

Table 11: Polity IV Executive Recruitment Concepts and Component Variables Polity IV Polity IV Component Variables Brief Description Concept XRREG XRCOMP XROPEN Succession by (1) Ascription Regulated (3) Selection (1) Closed (1) birthright (2) Dual Executive: Ascriptive and designated rulers Ascription Regulated (3) Selection (1) Dual-Des. (2) coexist & Designation Informal competition from (3) Designation Transition (2) Selection (1) Open (4) within an elite Self-selection by (4) Self-Selection Unregulated (1) N/A (0) N/A (0) seizure of power (5) Gradual Transition from Self-Selection Transition (2) N/A (0) N/A (0) (6) Dual Executive: Ascriptive and elective rulers Ascription Regulated (3) Transition (2) Dual-Elec. (3) coexist & Election (7) Transitional or Restricted Election Transition (2) Transition (2) Open (4) (8) Competitive Formal competition among Regulated (3) Election (3) Open (4) Election publicly supported candidates

43 columbia university journal of politics & society

Table 12: POLITY Scores for All African Countries Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Algeria -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -2 Angola -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Benin -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Botswana 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 Burkina Faso -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Burundi -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Cameroon -8 -8 -7 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 Cape Verde -4 -4 -4 -4 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 CAR -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Chad -77 -77 -77 -77 -88 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Comoros -5 -5 -6 -6 -6 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Congo B -8 -8 -7 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 Congo K -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 Côte d’Ivoire -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 Djibouti -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 Egypt -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 Eq. Guinea -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Ethiopia -7 -7 -7 -7 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 Gabon -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 Gambia 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Ghana 6 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Guinea-Bissau -7 -7 -7 -7 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 Guinea -9 -9 -9 -9 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Kenya -6 -6 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Lesotho -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Liberia -7 -7 -7 -7 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 Libya -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Madagascar -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 Malawi -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 Mali -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Mauritania -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Mauritius 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Morocco -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 Mozambique -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -7 -7 -7 -7 Niger -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Nigeria 7 7 7 7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -5 Rwanda -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Senegal -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 Sierra Leone -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Somalia -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 South Africa 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Sudan -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -88 7 7 7 -7 Swaziland -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 Tanzania -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 Togo -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 Tunisia -9 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -5 -5 -5 Uganda 3 3 3 3 3 -77 -7 -7 -7 -7 Zambia -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 Zimbabwe 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 -6 -6 -6

44 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s Table 13: XRREG Scores for All African Countries Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Algeria 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Angola 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Benin 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Botswana 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Burkina Faso 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Burundi 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 Cameroon 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Cape Verde 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 CAR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Chad -77 -77 -77 -77 -88 1 1 1 1 1 Comoros 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Congo B 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Congo K 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Côte d’Ivoire 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Djibouti 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Egypt 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Eq. Guinea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Ethiopia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Gabon 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Gambia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Ghana 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Guinea- Bissau 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Guinea 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 Kenya 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Lesotho 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 Liberia 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 Libya 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Madagascar 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Malawi 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Mali 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Mauritania 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Mauritius 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Morocco 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Mozambique 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Niger 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Nigeria 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 Rwanda 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Senegal 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Sierra Leone 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Somalia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 South Africa 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Sudan 2 2 2 2 2 -88 3 3 3 1 Swaziland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Tanzania 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Togo 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Tunisia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Uganda 2 2 2 2 2 -77 1 1 1 1 Zambia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Zimbabwe 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 45 columbia university journal of politics & society

Table 14: XRCOMP Scores for All African Countries Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Algeria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Angola 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Benin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Botswana 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Burundi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Cameroon 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Cape Verde 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chad -77 -77 -77 -77 -88 0 0 0 0 0 Comoros 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Congo B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Congo K 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Côte d’Ivoire 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Djibouti 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Egypt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Eq. Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ethiopia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Gabon 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Gambia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Ghana 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Guinea- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Bissau 1 Guinea 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Kenya 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Lesotho 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Liberia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Madagascar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Malawi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Mali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Mauritania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Mauritius 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Morocco 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Mozambique 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Niger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 Nigeria 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 Rwanda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Senegal 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Sierra Leone 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Somalia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 South Africa 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Sudan 1 1 1 1 1 -88 3 3 3 0 Swaziland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Tanzania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Togo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tunisia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Uganda 2 2 2 2 2 -77 0 0 0 0 Zambia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Zimbabwe 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2

46 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s Table 15: XROPEN Scores for All African Countries Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Algeria 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Angola 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Benin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Botswana 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Burundi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Cameroon 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Cape Verde 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 CAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chad -77 -77 -77 -77 -88 0 0 0 0 0 Comoros 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Congo B 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Congo K 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Côte d’Ivoire 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Djibouti 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Egypt 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Eq. Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ethiopia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Gabon 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Gambia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Ghana 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Guinea- 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Bissau 4 Guinea 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 Kenya 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Lesotho 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 Liberia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Madagascar 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Malawi 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Mali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Mauritania 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Mauritius 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Morocco 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Mozambique 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Niger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 Nigeria 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 Rwanda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Senegal 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Sierra Leone 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Somalia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 South Africa 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Sudan 4 4 4 4 4 -88 4 4 4 0 Swaziland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Tanzania 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Togo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tunisia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Uganda 4 4 4 4 4 -77 0 0 0 0 Zambia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Zimbabwe 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

47 columbia university journal of politics & society

Table 16: Press Freedom Scores for All African Countries (Press/Broadcast) Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Algeria 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 1 Angola 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Benin 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Botswana 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 2/1 1 2/1 2 Burkina 1/1 1/1 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 1/1 Faso 0 Burundi 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Cameroon 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Cape Verde 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0 0/0 0 CAR 1/1 1/1 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 1/1 0 Chad 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Comoros 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Congo B 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Congo K 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0 1/0 0 Côte 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/1 1/1 1/1 1 1/0 d’Ivoire 1 Egypt 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Eq. Guinea 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Ethiopia 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Gabon 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 1 2/2 2 Gambia 1/1 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 1/1 0 Ghana 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Guinea- 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 Bissau 0 Guinea 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0/0 0 1/0 0 Kenya 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 0/0 0 1/1 0 Lesotho 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0 0/0 0 Liberia 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Libya 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Madagascar 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Malawi 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Mali 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Mauritania 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/1 2/1 2 2/2 2 Mauritius 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0 1/0 0 Morocco 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Mozambique 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Niger 2/1 2/1 2/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 2 2/1 1 Nigeria 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1 1/1 1 Senegal 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Sierra Leone 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0 0/0 0 Somalia 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 South Africa 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0 1/0 1 Sudan 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 1 0/0 0 Swaziland 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Tanzania 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Togo 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 0/0 0 Tunisia 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0 1/0 1 Uganda 1/1 0/0 0/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0 1/1 0 Zambia 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1/0 0 1/0 0 Zimbabwe 1/0 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0 1/0 0

48 accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s Works Cited and Stephen Devereux, “Famine Intensity and Magnitude Scales: A Proposal for an Instrumental Defnition of Famine,” Disasters 28, no. 4 (2004): 353-372. 1. Amartya Sen. Individual Freedom as a Social Commitment. 1990. 36. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1990/jun/14/individual- Africa. freedom-as-a-social-commitment/. 37. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. Hunger and Public Action. 2. Alex de Waal. “Social Contract and Deterring Famine: First 38. Paul Howe and Stephen Devereux. “Famine Intensity and Magnitude Toughts.” Disasters 20 (1996): 194-205. Scales: A Proposal for an Instrumental Defnition of Famine.” 3. —. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa. 39. Ben Okudi. Causes and Efects of the 1980 Famine in Karamoja. Kam- Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. pala: Centre for Basic Research, 1992. 4. ibid. 40. ibid. 5. Korwa G. Adar and Isaac M. Munyae. “Human Rights Abuse in 41. ibid. Kenya Under Daniel arap Moi.” African Studies Quarterly 5, no. 1 42. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. Hunger and Public Action. (2001). 43. Alex de Waal. Democratic Political Process and the Fight Against Fam- 6. Zachary Ochieng “Kenya: Long, lonely road to press freedom,” Free ine. African Media, 2011. Wanyande, 1995); Peter Wanyande, “Mass 44. ibid. Media-State Relations in Post-Colonial Africa,” Africa Media Review 45. Alex de Waal. Democratic Political Process and the Fight Against Fam- 9, no. 3 (1995): 54-75. ine. 7. Alex de Waal. Democratic Political Process and the Fight Against Fam- 46. Paul Howe and Stephen Devereux. “Famine Intensity and Magnitude ine. IDS, 2000, 28. Scales: A Proposal for an Instrumental Defnition of Famine.” 8. ibid. 47. Peter Walker, Famine early warning systems: victims and destitution. 9. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, ed. Te Poltical Economy of Hunger Vol- 48. Paul Howe and Stephen Devereux. “Famine Intensity and Magnitude ume I: Entitlement and Well-Being. Oxford University Press, 1990. Scales: A Proposal for an Instrumental Defnition of Famine.” 10. ibid. 49. ibid. 11. Sen, Individual Freedom as a Social Commitment. 50. ibid. 12. Amartya Sen. “Wrongs and Rights in Development.” Prospect Maga- 51. ibid. zine, 1995. 52. ibid. 13. Sen, Individual Freedom as a Social Commitment. 53. ibid. 14. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in 54. ibid. Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. 55. Camille Sutter. State legitimacy and famines in Sub-Saharan Africa. 15. (Drèze and Sen, 1989) 2011. http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37621/. 16. ibid. 56. ibid. 17. Amartya Sen. “Wrongs and Rights in Development.” 57. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Silverson, 18. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. Hunger and Public Action. Oxford Uni- and Alastair Smith. “Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Sur- versity Press, 1989. vival of Leaders.” British Journal of Political Science 32, no. 4 (2002): 19. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in 559-590. Africa. 58. Camille Sutter. State legitimacy and famines in Sub-Saharan Africa. 20. Marilyn Little, “Colonial Policy and Subsistence in Tanganyika 1925- 59. ibid. 1945,” Geographical Review 81, no. 4 (October 1991): 375-388; Alex 60. Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr. Polity IV de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Project. Center for Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems Research Africa. Inc., 2011. 21. ibid. 61. ibid. 22. ibid. 62. ibid. 23. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in 63. ibid. Africa. 64. ibid. 24. ibid. 65. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. Hunger and Public Action. 25. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in 66. de Waal, “Social Contract and Deterring Famine: First Toughts.” Africa. 67. Freedom House. Freedom of the Press: Global. Detailed Data and Sub- 26. ibid. scores 1980-2012. (Press Freedom Edition). Freedom House, 2012. 27. ibid. 68. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. Hunger and Public Action. 28. ibid. 69. Adar and Munyae, “Human Rights Abuse in Kenya Under Daniel 29. ibid. arap Moi.” 30. Stephen Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: 70. Wanyande, “Mass Media-State Relations in Post-Colonial Africa.” Hybrid Regimes Afer the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- 71. Stephen Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: sity Press, 2010. Hybrid Regimes Afer the Cold War. 31. ibid. 72. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in 32. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. Hunger and Public Action. Africa. 33. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in 73. ibid. Africa. 74. ibid. 34. Adar and Munyae, “Human Rights Abuse in Kenya Under Daniel 75. ibid. arap Moi”; Zachary Ochieng “Kenya: Long, lonely road to press free- 76. ibid. dom”; Peter Wanyande, “Mass Media-State Relations in Post-Colonial 77. Stephen Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Africa.” Hybrid Regimes Afer the Cold War. 35. John Ilife, Te African Poor: A History, Cambridge: Cambridge 78. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in University Press, 1989.; Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Es- Africa. say on Entitlement and Deprivation, New York: Oxford University 79. ibid. Press, 1981; Peter Walker, Famine early warning systems: victims and 80. ibid. destitution, London: Earthscan, 1989; Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, 81. ibid. Hunger and Public Action; Ò Gràda, 1989; Alex de Waal, “A Re- 82. “Zimbabwe.” In Compendium of Elections in Southern Af- assessment of Entitlement Teory in the Light of the Recent Famines rica (2002), edited by Tom Lodge, Denis Kadima and David in Africa,” Development and Change 21 (1990): 469-490; Paul Howe Pottie, 442-443. EISA publication. http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/ 49 columbia university journal of politics & society

zim1990election.htm 133. Alerting the world to Ethiopia famine. CBC Digital Archives. http:// 83. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. Hunger and Public Action. www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/arts-entertainment/music/banding- 84. ibid. together-singing-out-for-disaster-relief/alerting-the-world-to-ethio- 85. Mark G Chavunduka. “Te Role of the Media in Zimbabwe.” In Te pia-famine.html Right to Tell: Te Role of Mass Media in Economic Development, edited 134. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in by R. Islam, 281-290. Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications, Africa. 2002. 135. Alerting the world to Ethiopia famine. CBC Digital Archives. http:// 86. Myung-Jin Park and James Curran. De-Westernizing Media Studies. www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/arts-entertainment/music/banding- Routledge, 2000. together-singing-out-for-disaster-relief/alerting-the-world-to-ethio- 87. Timothy Scarnecchia. “Rationalizing Gukurahundi: Cold War and pia-famine.html South African Foreign Relations with Zimbabwe, 1981-1983.” Kronos 136. ibid. 37, no. 1 (January 2011): 87-103. 137. ibid. 88. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. Hunger and Public Action. 138 Presidential Determination No.85-20, “Determination with Respect 89. ibid. to Ethiopia,” September 7, 1985. 90. Timothy Scarnecchia. “Rationalizing Gukurahundi: Cold War and 139. Alex de Waal. Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia. Hu- South African Foreign Relations with Zimbabwe, 1981-1983.” man Rights Watch, 1991. 91. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. Hunger and Public Action. 140. ibid. 92. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in 141. ibid. Africa. 142. ibid. 93. ibid. 143. ibid. 94. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. Breaking the Silence—A 144. ibid. Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands. Legal 145. ibid. Resources Foundation, 1999. 146. ibid. 95. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. Hunger and Public Action. 147. ibid. 96. ibid., emphasis original. 148. Helen Chapin Metz. Sudan: A Country Study. Federal Research Divi- 97. Zachary Ochieng “Kenya: Long, lonely road to press freedom.” sion, Washington: Library of Congress, 1992. 98. Michael H. Glantz. Drought and Hunger in Africa: Denying Famine a 149. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Future. Cambridge University Press, 1987. Africa. 99. ibid. 150. Associated Press. Journalists Accuse Military of Violating Press Free- 100. ibid. dom. 1989. http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Journalists-Accuse- 101. ibid. Military-of-Violating-Press-Freedom/id-95a2346b9e3fe426e8f8d- 102. ibid. 2b7a1bd6888. 103. ibid. 151. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in 104. ibid. Africa. 105. Alex de Waal. Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in 152. ibid. Africa. 153. ibid. 106. ibid. 154. ibid. 107. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. Hunger and Public Action. 155. ibid. 108. Michael H. Glantz. Drought and Hunger in Africa: Denying Famine a 156. ibid. Future. 157. ibid. 109. ibid. 158. ibid. 110. Melinda B. Robins. “Press Freedom in Uganda.” In Press Freedom and 159. ibid. Communication in Africa, by Festus Eribo and William Jong-Ebot, 160. ibid. 121-135. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1997. 161. ibid. 111. ibid. 162. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. “Political Institutions, Policy Choice 112. Cole P. Dodge and David Alnwick. “Karamoja - A catastrophe con- and the Survival of Leaders.” tained.” Disasters 10, no. 1 (1986): 15-16. 113. Ben Okudi. Causes and Efects of the 1980 Famine in Karamoja. 114. ibid. Bibliography 115. ibid. 116. Cole P. Dodge and David Alnwick. “Karamoja - A catastrophe con- Ò Gràda, Cormac. Famine: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University tained.” Press, 2009. 117. http://africanelections.tripod.com/mz.html Abuoga, John B, and Absalom A Mutere. “Te History of the Press in Kenya.” 118. Karl Maier. Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Te African Council on Communication & Education, Nairobi, Process in Mozambique. Human Rights Watch, 1992. Kenya, 1988. 119. ibid. Adar, Korwa G., and Isaac M. Munyae. “Human Rights Abuse in Kenya Under 120. ibid. Daniel arap Moi.” African Studies Quarterly 5, no. 1 (2001). 121. ibid. Associated Press. Journalists Accuse Military of Violating Press Freedom. 1989. 122. ibid. http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Journalists-Accuse-Military-of- 123. ibid. Violating-Press-Freedom/id-95a2346b9e3fe426e8f8d2b7a1bd6888. 124. ibid. Biti, Tendai, and Feltoe, Geofrey. “Media Law and Practice in Southern 125. ibid. Africa: Zimbabwe.” Media Institute of Southern Africa, 1997. 126. ibid. 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52 THE WEATHERHEAD EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE ESSAY continuity and change: women's representation in reform-era chinese politics edmund downie, yale university (2014)

ABSTRACT Tis essay uses a mix of secondary literature, primary sources, and quantitative analysis to ofer a comprehensive account of the ebbs and fows in women’s representation in Chi- nese politics during the reform (post-1978) era. Te literature to date ofers two confict- ing accounts of women’s representation during this era. Some scholars present the peri- od as a time of consistent decline; others present gains in representation levels from the 1990s onwards. Tis essay reconciles these two narratives for a unifed account. It does so by updating Jude Howell’s concept of “state feminism” in reform-era China to show how state interests and civil society demands together determined women's participation lev- els during this period. Te concept of "state feminism" treats women's representation in Chinese politics from 1949 to today as a refection of state needs. Such a state-centric view has fueled many of the "declinist" depictions of female representation in the reform era. Tis essay afrms state feminism's dominant role in suppressing women's representation through the mid-1990s. But it also shows how the state, by promoting economic develop- ment and closing gender gaps in educational attainment, has had a moderately positive impact on women's representation over the past two decades. During the same period, civil society pressures have also emerged as a signifcant factor behind rising representa- tion levels. For this reason, accounts of women’s representation in Chinese politics today must incorporate both state and non-state actors in their analyses as substantive infuences.

n October 1, 1949, the day of the founding women’s political participation at levels well above of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), what was featured in the Party at the time was fun- the People’s Daily ran an announcement damental to that agenda. Mao himself spoke in 1934 Ofrom the newly established All China Democratic of a future in which women were liberated from the Women’s Foundation, calling on the women of China institution of marriage. But “frst,” he said, “comes the to welcome the newly established government. i “Un- possession of political freedom.”2 der the leadership of this government,” it said, “we Contemporary China has not realized the women will achieve liberation and enjoy the right of lofy goals of early Party rhetoric on women’s equal- male-female equality, and we will able to efectively ity in politics. Its failure is by no means unusual. contribute our energies to participate in the building Data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union indicate of a new China.”1 Te statement represented the of- that women make up just 21.3 percent of parliaments fcial continuation of the Chinese Communist Party’s worldwide at the beginning of 2014.3 Higher posi- longstanding commitment to the political platform tions of power are even more elusive. In 2010, just 11 of gender equality. Although the Party’s internal of 192 heads of government worldwide were female.4 structure was thoroughly patriarchal, Party lead- Chinese views on the role of women in politics are ers advanced a comprehensive and radical agenda fairly typical internationally, roughly at the median of women’s liberation in their writings, which drew of Inglehart and Norris’s data set of sixty-two coun- widespread support from women in China, espe- tries that measures popular views of women’s place in cially in the upper middle classes. A commitment to politics.5 Many of the prejudices they identifed that i Te All China Democratic Women’s Foundation would later become bear on Chinese women seeking careers in politics known as the All China Women’s Foundation. echo those experienced around the world. Chinese columbia university journal of politics & society men, like men of most other countries, ofen perceive and some scholars today still subscribe to this view.8 women with political ambitions to be passive, lacking More contemporary scholars, however, present a in leadership ability, and dangerously seductive.6 more positive narrative of reform based upon trends London School of Economics professor Jude from the past two decades, but they have yet to have Howell centers her brief survey of the history of yet to engage with the struggles of the early reform women’s political participation in post-1949 China period documented by earlier scholars.9 around her concept of “state-derived feminism”: Tis essay attempts to reconcile the “declin- not just the ofcial gender ideology in post-1949 ist” thesis with the successes of the past two decades China but also the set of practical strategies used that have come into focus in the works of more re- to enhance women’s status and the particular cent scholars. In doing so, it seeks to show how the institutional arrangements made to that end. … “monopoly” state-derived feminism held in deter- It has a monopoly on the explanation of women’s mining female representation in Chinese politics has oppression, on the management of social change, weakened during the reform period to bring about a and on the imagination of the alternative.7 more nuanced relationship between state feminism Howell sees state-derived feminism as the driv- and civil society pressures. Te declines of the early ing force behind “the cycles of advance and retreat reform period—from the late 1970s through much of that have characterized women’s numerical repre- the 1990s—refect the dominance of state feminism. sentation in politics and government since 1949.” Te progress of the next two decades, or late reform, She analyzes these ebbs and fows throughout four in part refects state feminism’s increasingly positive historical periods. Participation surged in the early infuence, manifested in the edifying efects of eco- 1950s, during the frst years of the Mao period. A nomic development and in policies promoting wom- brief decline followed in the early 1960s, but partici- en for cadre selection. However, that progress also pation picked up again from the late 1960s through owes to the growing women’s movement in Chinese the 1970s during the most infamous movement in civil society, whose infuence on policy in the past post-1949 Chinese politics, the Cultural Revolution. two decades has challenged the place of the state as Mao’s death and the subsequent “reform era” of state the sole driver of changes in women’s role in Chinese overhaul under Deng Xiaoping precipitated a more politics. ii extended fall in the 1980s and 1990s. Under How- Te paper will unfold as follows. Te frst sec- ell’s framework, participation rises when the Party tion will examine the decline in representation levels needs to mobilize women “for the purpose of socio- in the early reform period from their highs during economic transformation, raising economic output, the early 1970s. Many general overviews speak of this or for ideological and political ends”; it slumps when decline as a single, temporally consistent process,10 “the heat of political campaigns cools, and/or when but I divide it into early and late reform. Te former economic restructuring requires adjustments in the features a rapid drop during the early 1980s, followed labor force.” Te strength of state-derived feminism by a subsequent period of stagnation through much is largely dependent upon its juxtaposition with the of the 1990s. Early reform represented the state’s de- larger political, economic, and social needs of the termination to leave the tumultuous politics of the state. early 1970s behind; late reform refected institutional Howell’s essay stands out in the literature developments in the Chinese bureaucracy that pro- on Chinese women in politics since 1949, because duced a very difcult environment for female politi- it combines a broad historical sweep with an un- cal hopefuls. In both cases, state feminism suppressed usual level of theoretical sophistication through its female representation, because doing otherwise conception of state-derived feminism. Nevertheless, would not have been compatible with state ends. Te more than ten years afer the essay’s publication, the second section will focus upon the interplay between reform period deserves a new narrative. Howell and state feminism and civil society feminism in lifing other earlier scholars of women’s place in reform-era women’s representation levels during late reform. politics present a picture of uninterrupted decline, I will focus primarily on women’s positions within relatively prestigious organs in the party-state ii She presents her analysis in terms of three periods: the 1950s, the Cultural Revolution, and the reform era. I speak of four to include her analysis of the bureaucracy: the National People’s Congress (NPC), 1960s, which she uses to set up her discussion of the Cultural Revolution. 54 continuity and change: women's representation in reform-era chinese politics Central Party Committee (CPC), and Politburo at the Te Cultural Revolution ofered an unusu- national level, as well as assorted leadership positions ally favorable environment for prospective female at subnational levels. I will supplement this data with cadres. Te decade featured a succession of nation- statistics on membership in the neighborhood and wide factional struggles as Mao sought to purge his village committees. My choices here follow the gen- opponents under the guise of a campaign against eral approach in the literature, though it is restricted Chinese society’s anti-communist elements. He com- by lack of complete access to data in other parts of plemented these purges by seizing control of cadre the bureaucracy. selection to introduce a wave of proletarians into the party-state bureaucracy.11 Maoist analysis had FROM REVOLUTION TO MODERNIZATION: DE- always viewed female oppression primarily through CLINE AND STAGNATION THROUGH THE 1990S the lens of class struggle, and so women with politi- Te declinist thesis of women’s representa- cal aspirations—especially proletarian women—were tion in reform-era Chinese politics draws much of its appropriated as a class free of bourgeois leanings.12 salience from the struggles that women faced from Ofcial policy required that each leadership group 1978 through much of the 1990s (what I call “early (lingdao banzi) had to have at least one female cadre reform”). Representation had peaked during the in order to be approved.13 Female prospective cadres political tumult of a decade 18 in Chinese politics known Table 1: Female Representation in the National People’s Congress (NPC) as the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Te bulk of the NPC (Year Elected) Number of Number of Share of Female reform-era decline occurred in Female Delegates Male Delegates Delegates (%) the early 1980s, as the Chinese 1st (1954) 147 1079 12.0 state sought to distance itself 2nd (1959) 150 1076 12.2 from the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. Subsequent chang- 3rd (1964) 542 2492 17.8 es in the Chinese bureaucracy 4th (1975) 653 2232 22.6 further ensured that female representation remained low 5th (1978) 742 2755 21.2 through much of the 1990s. 6th (1983) 632 2346 21.2

7th (1988) 634 2344 21.3 The Early 1980s Backlash 8th (1993) 626 2329 21.0 Against the Cultural Revolu- tion 9th (1998) 650 2329 21.8 Te early 1980s was a 10th (2003) 604 2381 20.2 time of rapid retreat for Chi- th nese women in politics. From 11 (2008) 637 2350 21.3 the Politburo to the bottom 12th (2013) 699 2288 23.4 rungs of the cadre hierarchy, female representation had also beneftted here from the ascent to the Politburo reached unprecedented levels during the Cultural of Mao’s controversial wife Jiang Qing in 1969, who Revolution due to exceptionally strong central sup- used her political and personal status to become a port. However, this level of support fell with the powerful proponent for greater female representa- Cultural Revolution, as the Chinese state under Deng tion.14 Xiaoping shed its focus on social equality to concen- As a result, female representation in elite trate on economic modernization. As a result, by the politics (Tables 1-3) is widely considered by scholars mid-1980s, the gains of the Cultural Revolution had to have reached levels unprecedented in the his- almost completely disappeared. Tis disappearance tory of the PRC during the Cultural Revolution.15 revealed just how superfcial and state-dependent Women reached the Politburo during this period these gains really were. 55 columbia university journal of politics & society

heroine” by Mao himself, and Chen 19 Table 2: Female Representation in the Standing Committee of the NPC (Full Members) Muhua, a longtime revolutionary who had risen through the ranks since NPC (Year Elected) Number of Number of Share of Female joining the party in 1938.17 Repre- Female Members Male Members Members (%) sentation in the National People’s 1st (1954) 3 73 4.0 Congress rose sharply as well, peaking 2nd (1959) 4 58 6.5 in 1975 at 22.6 percent in the general

3rd (1964) 17 79 17.4 body and 27.1 percent among full members of the standing committee.iv th 4 (1975) 39 105 27.1 More importantly, the proportion of 5th (1978) 35 148 19.1 women among full members of the 6th (1983) 13 125 9.4 Party Central Committee—the actual seat of decision-making power— th 7 (1988) 16 121 11.7 reached its apex of 10.3 percent in 8th (1993) 17 121 12.3 1973. 9th (1998) 16 118 12.0 Te Cultural Revolution also brought gains to female representa- 10th (2003) 21 138 13.0 tion at lower levels of politics. Nation- 11th (2008) 26 161 16.1 wide statistics are hard to come by for 12th (2013) 25 161 15.5 this period, but the proportion of fe- male cadres reached 16-20 percent of Table 3: Female Representation in the Party Central Committee (Full Members)20 cadres at district, county, and bureau levels in Beijing by 1972. Women also Central Committee Number of Number of Share of Female (Year Selected) Female Members Male Members Members (%) constituted 17-22 percent of cadres in Shanghai’s Party Committee and 8th (1956) 4 93 4.1 its Revolutionary Committee, which 9th (1969) 13 157 7.6 was the Cultural Revolution-era proxy 10th (1973) 20 175 10.3 for municipal government.21 Female representation at lower levels of the 11th (1977) 14 201 7.0 Party and the state was also strong, th 12 (1982) 11 210 5.2 as women’s share among lower-level 13th (1987) 10 175 5.7 cadres in Shanghai was almost 50 22 14th (1992) 12 189 6.4 percent. As for the Party itself, 13.5 percent of new recruits into rural Par- th 15 (1997) 8 193 4.1 ty branches were female between 1966 16th (2002) 5 198 2.5 and 1975. More impressively, however, 17th (2007) 13 204 6.4 11 percent of rural Party branches in 1973 had female secretaries or deputy 18th (2012) 10 205 4.9 secretaries, a sign that the traditional

view that women can only handle for the frst time in the country’s history, though the 23 three who reached full member status were wives women’s work was perhaps starting to erode. of top leaders Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, and Zhou En- In 1978, two years afer Mao’s death, the Chi- lai.16, iii However, two women were named alternate iv Ostensibly the highest state legislative body of the PRC, though true legal authority lies with the Politburo, and especially the Politburo Standing members who did not have such status: Wu Guxian, Committee. Te NPC historically served as a rubber stamp for laws ratifed an uneducated textile worker anointed as a “labor by the Politburo, but it has started to assert some degree of independence since the 1990s. It rarely rejects Politburo legislation today, but debates in the NPC have become an important forum for resolving disputes between iii Te executive body of the Communist Party, and, as such, the second- the Party and other parts of government. Te NPC also has its own Standing most powerful political institution in the PRC behind the Politburo Standing Committee, with around 5–7 percent of the members of the overall body. As Committee, a subset of Politburo members that works as a sort of inner cabinet with the Politburo, the NPC Standing Committee meets more regularly than and is responsible for the state’s major legislative decisions. Te Politburo has the full NPC—several times a year, as opposed to just once—and is more both full and alternate members; alternates are nonvoting. powerful than the larger body. 56 continuity and change: women's representation in reform-era chinese politics nese leadership launched the Reform and Opening was only in its infancy. Deng and his supporters had Up (gaige kaifang) program. Te initiative sought to a positive program for overhauling the state, but they center state policy around a pragmatic approach to frst had to excise the legacy of Cultural Revolution, economic development instead of the ideologically a decade of turmoil so extreme that, in their eyes, it charged dogmatism that had defned Chinese politics demanded a wholesale rejection. Women were easy throughout the Mao era. Five years later, the Cultural targets for this because of traditional social prejudices Revolution-era gains in women’s representation had and because they were one of the favored classes of disappeared. Women’s share in the frst reform-era Mao and his deposed supporters.29 Party Central Committee in 1982 dropped below Comparing China in the early 1980s and post- 1969 levels to 5.2 percent, and no women were pro- Soviet states in the early 1990s provides a useful il- moted to the new Politburo. v Female representation lustration of the role of the state in China’s transition- only shrank marginally in the following year’s Na- era decline. Women experienced a drastic decline in tional People’s Congress as a whole, but saw a precipi- political representation afer the collapse of the Soviet tous drop in the NPC Standing Committee, falling to Union; the female share in the national parliaments just 9.4 percent in 1983. of post-Communist Europe, for instance, fell from a Lower levels seem to have experienced a similar regional average of 30 percent to less than 10 percent clear-out. Wang Qi cites evidence from leading Chi- in the new states.30 Admittedly, the post-Soviet de- nese women’s studies scholar Li Xiaojing that one to cline was a product of elections as opposed to chang- two-thirds of the cadres removed from ofce were ing top-down selection mechanisms, and the Soviet female during the dismantling of the revolutionary bureaucracy did not seek out uneducated cadres as committees in 1982-83.24 Wang Yinpeng presents Mao did in the 1970s. Nonetheless, the U.S.S.R. and ofcial data on the share of female leaders in what Cultural Revolution China both featured states that Wang Qi calls “State organs and their working bod- that (1) had appropriated formal female representa- ies” in 1982, and found only 9 percent at the provin- tion for their own political ends and (2) were politi- cial level and just 5 percent in the country’s prefec- cally abhorrent to their successors.31 As a result, tures, cities, and counties.25 , vi Te female share when those states collapsed, female political partici- of new cadres in rural Party branches fell from 13.5 pation sank as well. percent in 1966-1975 to 8.6 percent in 1977-1982.26 Wang Qi writes that the Cultural Revolution “went down in history as a golden age for women’s Stagnation Through the 1990s representation in China and is still remembered as Te low levels of female participation that such.”27 But the rapid reversal of the 1980s exposed emerged in the early 1980s remained in place well just how limited that golden age really was. Tis into the following decade. Tis was especially true at reversal can in part be explained by the transforma- the lowest levels of government. In 1993, the female tions in the Chinese party-state bureaucracy in the share of chief and deputy chief positions was 3.8 post-Mao era. Te push to recruit more technically percent in townships and small towns, 5.9 percent in and professionally accomplished cadres—that is, cad- counties, 5.1 percent in cities, and 4.1 percent in pre- 32 res with educational backgrounds far more abundant fectures. Te average recruitment share of female among men than women—was inseparable from cadres in rural Party branches dropped to 5.9 percent 33 the program of economic modernization that lay at in 1983-1990. As late as the early 2000s, one survey the heart of Deng’s vision for China.28 Still, such a of 218 villages in Zhejiang found that half of local 34 drastic decline in women’s representation cannot be Party branches did not have female members. Te attributed solely to a modernization program that provinces showed almost no improvement in the fe- male share of leadership positions between 1982 and v Te body of the Party charged with selecting members for the Party’s 35 most important positions, including the General Secretary, the Politburo, the 1990. Politburo Standing Committee, and the Central Military Commission. Te Te national level showed some small gains. Te Central Committee has more power within the broader party-state apparatus than the NPC, but its pseudo-democratic structure still belies a top-down number of women in the Central Committee held approach to Party leadership selection. more or less steady between 1982 and 1992, even vi Unfortunately, Wang does not specify what she means by “State organs and as the size of the body overall shrank by 10 percent, their working bodies,” and I did not have access to the almanac from which she drew her fgures. and representation in the NPC Standing Commit- 57 columbia university journal of politics & society tee climbed 3 percent to 12.3 percent. Overall NPC policy in early reform lef the ACWF gutted. Stafng representation was unchanged versus the early 1980s reductions meant that some townships had just one but still quite high, as the NPC continued to serve or two ACWF stafers, while many counties in the as the body of choice for the state’s attempts to keep early 1990s had just 500 RMB for ACWF activities up appearances on its commitment to gender equal- annually afer payroll expenses.43 ity.36 , vii However, women’s share in the Central In the absence of explicit state support mecha- People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), nisms, women were expected to compete with men an important central advisory body, hit its nadir of for cadre positions solely on the basis of suzhi, or 9.4 percent in 1994, and only four of ninety-nine “quality.” Te concept of suzhi is a uniquely post- ministries and commissions that year were headed by Mao Chinese concoction: an amalgam of ideas about women.37 , viii Confucian malleability, Maoist self-cultivation, and Te lack of progress refected the dearth of state the reform bureaucracy’s predilection for technical support during this period for women’s participation and professional competence, all coalescing into a in government. Te Organization Department did mainstay of ofcial discourse.44 Today, educational not issue its frst regulation specifcally on selecting background tends to serve as a proxy measure, and as female cadres in the reform-era period until April such, its infuence on cadre selection is profound.45 of 1988, and the frst with actual numerical targets More than half of Party members in the early 2000s came only in 1990.38 State rhetoric no longer sought had at least completed high school, and almost 90 to eface gender diferences as it had during the Cul- percent of local ofcials had college educations.46 tural Revolution, leading to renewed acceptance in Tis emphasis on education itself disadvantages public discourse of traditional views of women as women, given the persistent educational achievement passive and domestic.39 Meanwhile, the All-China gap in contemporary China. Moreover, gender preju- Women’s Federation (ACWF)—which cooperates dices seep into perceptions of female suzhi. In the with the Organizational Department to provide input context of cadre positions, suzhi entails excellence in on short-term and long-term plans for female re- felds such as logic and abstract thinking, which tra- cruitment—found its funding and stafng resources ditional conceptions of gender treat as women’s weak increasingly constricted.40 To be sure, the ACWF’s spots.47 Te concept of suzhi also blames inequalities potential as a champion has always been limited. Te in women’s access to political power on female inad- organization succeeded the All China Democratic equacy rather than structural injustice, discouraging Women’s Foundation in the 1950s as a state-afliated governing bodies from adopting afrmative action “mass organization,” tasked with transmitting Party policies.48 Women’s groups in China have not re- policy and ideology on gender to the masses. Party belled against this turn per se. Te ACWF’s eforts to ideology since the founding of the PRC has included bring more women into politics since the late 1980s the doctrine that women’s liberation is merely a sub- have consisted in large part of eforts to improve set of economic liberation, rather than a separate women’s suzhi, taking up programs ofering technical problem in need of a tailored approach.41 Moreover, training and instilling in women four qualities associ- the ACWF is a sub-ministerial organ, which limits ated with suzhi: self-respect (zizun), self-confdence its access to top Party decision-makers.42 Nonethe- (zixin), self-reliance (zili), and self-strength (ziq- less, the organization could still provide politically- iang).49 inclined women with a level of state access that no Te early reform changes detailed above af- other women’s group could match. However, state fected women’s representation through the traditional methods of cadre recruitment via state appointment. vii Te most frequently cited ranking of women in politics internationally comes from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, who measure the share of women But the late 1980s saw the introduction of a new in national parliaments. Te NPC is toothless compared to most democratic parliaments, but by preserving a relatively high level of female representation means of a cadre selection for village-level admin- here, the Chinese government can buttress its place in these rankings for istration: elections. Te NPC Standing Committee international and domestic audiences alike—as late as 1994, China ranked 12th. See Edwards, “Strategizing for politics.” adopted elections for village government in 1987, and viii Te CPPCC serves as a central advisory body structured to represent a a nationwide survey in 1990 showed that 75 percent wider range of voices than most other party-state organs. It is comprised of of villages had held their frst elections, with half of delegates from China’s various political parties as well as appointed individuals 50 not afliated with any particular party. (China does have parties other than these featuring more candidates that seats. Tey the CCP, but they are functionally powerless.) 58 continuity and change: women's representation in reform-era chinese politics were not show elections—voters in Shandong alone more difcult to accumulate the needed social capital ousted 10,000-20,000 cadres in 1995. In practical to mount a run for ofce.59 From the same Zhejiang terms, elected village committees are not as powerful study cited earlier, a sample of female cadres from as village Party branches, and, in particular, local Par- twenty-three villages found that just 13 percent had ty secretaries.51 Nonetheless, they have taken over a married into their villages, compared to 63 percent of broad array of economic management functions that women in the villages as a whole.60 were handled by people’s communes in the 1960s and One might view the negative impacts of elec- 1970s. Tey also serve as an important channel for tions cited above as collateral damage from a progres- villagers to enter the Party, as successful candidates sive state policy. But as with cadre selection at higher from outside the Party are usually recruited for mem- levels, the state’s treatment of women in politics has bership.52 In this sense, their establishment served also actively harmed female villagers’ chances as as the village-level equivalent to the post-Mao trans- candidates. Te 1987 Organic Law of Village Com- formation in cadre selection methods at higher levels mittees that established elections contained the detailed above. stipulation that village committees should include Many scholars claim that the introduction of “an appropriate number of women” (funü yingdang competitive elections has brought about a decline in you shidang de ming’e), but no explicit quotas were women’s political participation at the village level.53 introduced until 2010.61, ix In the absence of stricter While these scholars give plenty of evidence that elec- dictates, the clause became functionally interpreted tions are gendered, they cite almost no data to show as “no more than one” female member, out of each that elections make for a more gendered cadre cohort village committee’s three to seven slots.62 Meanwhile, than what was experienced under the people’s com- an early 1990s survey of twenty unsuccessful female mune system, and it is difcult to fnd data on gender candidates in Liaoning cited in Rosen highlighted diferentials among village-level cadres to assess their how the consistent shunting of women into women’s claims. But it should be noted that even early Mao- work hurt the chances of female candidates.63 Tose era village governance seems to have made plenty of who did have government experience had accumu- room for women: according to Wang Fenghua, 70 lated it primarily in “sof” jobs in felds like culture percent of villages during the 1950s had female heads and education, and as a result, voters doubted their or deputy heads.54 In the early 2000s, however, just 1 leadership and management abilities. Others came percent of village committee chairs and 16 percent of from backgrounds in “woman’s work,” a term for jobs members were female, for an average of two female related to family planning; the unpopularity of these committee members per three villages.55 policies undercut their eforts to mobilize support. Regardless, the disadvantages that women face Beyond this, the funding and stafng reductions at in Chinese village elections are indisputable—they the ACWF mentioned above weakened a resource are less likely to be named as candidates, and less that sought to link women with mobilization aids like likely to win when they run.56 Tese disadvantages lineages and higher-level ofcials, which are more in part refect traditional views on gender among the easily available to male candidates.64 rural Chinese. Te end of the Mao-era suppression Afer the sharp declines of the early 1980s, Chi- of gender and the introduction of elections has given nese women’s representation in politics showed little these views full public expression. An early 2000s improvement through much of the 1990s. Te intro- survey in rural Zhejiang found that 73 percent of duction of elections in the villages and the modern- respondents considered political participation to be ization of cadre selection at higher levels, combined “men’s business.”57 In contrast, results from the 2005 with the weakening of the state’s active mechanisms World Values Survey (WVS) indicate that 53 percent to promote women in politics, fostered a very dif- of Chinese citizens nationwide consider men more fcult institutional environment for women with po- capable political leaders than women.58 Moreover, litical aspirations. Many of the challenges that such the introduction of elections has disadvantaged the women faced in this period—the suzhi discourse, large proportion of rural women who marry men toothless state dictates, and, of course, traditional no- from other villages; such women are expected to tions of women’s unsuitability in politics—continue move to their husband’s village, and so they fnd it ix Note that the elections were initially established as a trial; they were adopted in full in 1998, and the new law preserved the language. 59 columbia university journal of politics & society to work against female political participation today. seems to be a positive sign as well. Te existence of Still, other developments over the past twenty years a female skew in gender ratios in 2000 suggests that have brought about real, although very much incom- the neighborhood committees have been gendered as plete, improvements. I turn to these below. women’s work. Such gendering is certainly consistent with their lowly standing; neighborhood committees are the lowest administrative unit in urban China A FITFUL ADVANCE: REFORM-ERA PROGRESS IN and lack the level of self-governance aforded to their WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION counterparts in the villages. Te data on women’s representation in Chi- Progress at higher levels has been less consis- nese politics suggests substantive improvements in tent, though recent years suggest a possible uptick. women’s position over the past twenty years, most Te proportion of women among provincial-level strikingly at lower levels of government. Tese im- elites sat at 10 percent in 2004, no diferent from sim- provements in part follow from measures that, as ilar fgures from Yinpeng Wang calculated for women with Mao-era feminism, realized gender equality for among leaders of what Wang calls “state organs and ulterior state purposes—improving China’s image in leading bodies” in 1990.69, xii Te share of women international eyes, or more indirectly, strengthening in the CPPCC increased from 9.2 percent in 1993 to the educational qualifcations of the Chinese labor 16.8 percent in 2003, but female representation in the force. But credit also goes to the growing women’s NPC and CPC reached their low points post-Mao movement in Chinese civil society, which, through in 2003 at 20.2 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively. its infuence on the AWCF, has contributed to a More recently, however, representation in the NPC succession of progressive initiatives regarding the rebounded to its highest level in history in 2013, and composition of the bureaucracy: afrmative action, the female share of full and alternate PCC members policy plans, and even a change in cadre promotion reached its reform-era peak of 10 percent.70 More criteria. In this sense, the developments of late reform importantly, the Politburo admitted its frst woman suggest that the concept of state-derived feminism is in the post-Mao era in 2002. Today, it has two female no longer sufcient on its own to explain changes in members for the frst time since 1969, Vice-Premier women’s representation in Chinese politics; civil soci- Liu Yandong and Tianjin Party Secretary Sun Chun- ety feminism matters as well. lan.71 Neither of them are wives of high-level cadres Women’s formal representation in Chinese or “labor heroines,” as were the three Mao-era female politics has grown on a number of fronts over the full Politburo members. Rather, Liu Yandong and past several decades. Te share of female cadres over Sun Chunlan’s posts such as Vice-Chairwoman of the the entire bureaucracy has increased steadily since CPPCC and Party Secretary of China’s trade unions, the start of the 1990s, from 31.2 percent in 1991 to respectively, have given them experience leading a 65, x nearly 40 percent in 2007. Women’s presence in host of diferent elements of the party-state bureau- the Party also expanded, from 15.1 percent in 1993 to cracy.72 19.2 percent in 2005. Once again, improvements have Some of these reform-era improvements in been concentrated in lower levels of government and women’s representation in Chinese politics refect at the grassroots level. Te share of women among the force state feminism has championed most vigi- village committee members nationwide reached 21.7 lantly since the launch of Reform and Opening Up: percent in 2008, and the proportion of female heads economic development. As Louise Edwards points 66 inched up from 1 percent in 2000 to 2.7 percent. out, this view is in certain ways consistent with tradi- Women made up 13 percent of mayors nationwide in tional Party theory on women’s liberation, by which 2006, up from 5 percent in 1989 and 10.9 percent in “it would be assumed that women’s status would be 67 2001. One metric that fell was women’s representa- broadly improved with each increase in GDP—in- tion in the urban neighborhood committees, from 59 cluding in the sphere of political participation.”73 68, xi percent in 2000 to 50 percent in 2011. But this But if Mao-era state feminism promised liberation x If these fgures seem high, note that most statistics cited to this point in through development, it also mobilized women in the text refer to women in national positions or in leadership roles at sub- provincial levels, as opposed to more mundane assignments. xii As with the instance cited above in fn. 8, Wang does not specify what she xi Urban neighborhood communities are the urban equivalent of the village means by “State organs and their working bodies,” and I did not have access to committee, whose members have also been elected since 1990. the almanac from which she drew her fgures. 60 continuity and change: women's representation in reform-era chinese politics the political and production processes to accelerate connection between economic development and development itself. Te reform-era vision of libera- women’s share: Slovenia excels economically but has tion through development is more passive, with more seen no change in women’s representation, whereas of an emphasis on raising GDP levels and less on the Bulgaria’s economic weakness does not prevent it targeted mobilization of women to realize that pur- from having one of the strongest female presences.77 pose. Inglehart and Norris’s analysis of IPU tables against Edwards is skeptical of this strategy, and, in GDP per capita demonstrates a strong correlation be- some ways, she is right to be so. Speaking broadly, tween economic development and female representa- development’s impact on female representation in tion, but consideration of individual cases as above politics is tricky to assess. It is true that villagers tend indicate that economic development here is likely to have a more conservative outlook on gender roles disguising other factors.78 than urbanites, but using the urban-rural divide as a Nonetheless, economic development has bol- proxy for development assumes too tight a connec- stered women’s place in reform-era Chinese politics tion between urbanization and development. More in one very specifc way: by shrinking gender dispari- targeted analyses of development give more am- ties in educational achievement, a key prerequisite biguous results. As noted above, for instance, WVS for cadre selection under the discourse of suzhi. Te data on Chinese attitudes towards women’s place in gap in male and female gross enrollment ratios at politics shows no signifcant change between 1995 secondary schools shrunk from 13 percent in 1983 and 2004, despite annual GDP growth consistently to 8 percent in 1997.79 Te post-1999 expansion hovering around 10 percent during the period. One in college enrollment has also made major dents in might object that such changes would not appear post-secondary education gender gaps. A study by over such a small time period, but a geographical Wei-Jun Jean Yeung calculated that the male-female comparison between locations at diferent GDP levels odds ratio for progression from senior high school in China is likewise ambiguous about the signifcance to college fell from 1.84 to 0.99.80 Te Party has of development. A gender equality index constructed aged moderately for much of the reform period, but by Fubing Su in his 1999–2004 survey of provincial- recruits still skew heavily young: 75 percent of Party level elites suggests that levels of development, as recruits 1997–2002 were under 35.81 In this sense, measured by per capita GDP, have only a small im- the Party is drawing from a pool of potential cadres pact upon women’s representation in politics.74 Te in which men and women are increasingly similar in impact for development is much smaller, for instance, terms of their educational qualifcations. than whether the unit in question is an autonomous Tese shrinking gender gaps emerge directly region, a centrally administered city, or a province, or from the state’s eforts to accelerate development whether the region has a high sex ratio. Meanwhile, through expanded access to education. Decades of at the grassroots level, Guo, Zheng, and Yang’s study growth have increased demand for skilled labor in of Zhejiang villages found that the villages with the the Chinese economy, a challenge that the state has highest share of women’s representation on their addressed through massive investments in education. village committees tended to be ones of moderate Due to the post-1999 expansion in higher educa- wealth.75 Poorer villages lacked the consciousness to tion mentioned above, annual college enrollment push against traditional gender norms, while wealth- increased from 1 million in 1998 to 6.3 million in ier villages were solely focused on economic develop- 2009.82 At the lower levels, the number of elemen- ment, the perceived province of men. tary schools in China rose consistently between 1980 International comparisons are also useful in and 2000, and slots in secondary schools have like- pushing back against explanations centering around wise seen steady increases.83 Tese initiatives have economic development. Japan’s per capita GDP not been specifcally targeted at gender disparities, exceeds $45,000, and yet it ranks 122nd out of 142 but they have nonetheless allowed schools to accom- countries in the latest Inter-Parliamentary Union modate a wider array of students—an important (IPU) tables on women in national parliaments.76 development, given traditional preferences for edu- Montgomery also observes that national parliaments cating males.84 Te state’s fxation on bolstering the in Post-Communist Europe demonstrate no clear Chinese economy has pressed it into this expansion.

61 columbia university journal of politics & society

It has also funded the expansion by improving tax lage committee seats be reserved for women.93 More revenues.85 intriguingly, “an index of women’s participation” has Te heightened demand for skilled labor in been added as a criterion in ofcials’ performance China has also raised payofs for education.86 Urban evaluations.94 Subnational state organs have also China saw the marginal return of a year of education taken steps of their own. In particular, several prov- almost triple between 1992 and 2003 alone, from 4.0 inces have issued regulations requiring at least one percent to 11.4 percent. Education has become the woman in village committees and other governing primary factor determining whether rural workers bodies.95 Hunan, in particular, is widely acclaimed as can fnd more lucrative of-campus jobs.87 Returns a progressive province.96 Representation in Hunan for women in urban China are even higher than village committees is more than 30 percent female, those for men.88 As such, parents during the reform and 17 percent of mayors in 2003 were women, well era have an increasingly powerful incentive to obtain above the 2004 national average of 10.9 percent. To good schooling for girls. be sure, most state regulations on women’s participa- Shrinking gender gaps in educational achieve- tion in the reform era have no enforcement provi- ment constitute a “supply-side” explanation for the sions.97 Still, the state’s success in meeting many of increases in female representation over the past twen- its targets—such as those set by the National People’s ty years—more women have attained the educational Congress, or the Hunan mayoral and village commit- qualifcations needed to become cadres. To be sure, tee level—suggests that these regulations have had it is not a comprehensive explanation. Analysis of more than a nominal impact. 2000 Census data in Hannum and Yang suggests that State-derived feminism can explain in part the Hunan is a middling province in terms of educational impetus for this raf of reforms. Afer the events at outcomes, but its village committee representation Tiananmen Square, the Chinese leadership hoped to rates are exceptional.89 Shanxi’s educational out- improve its image worldwide by hosting the United comes for pre-1980 birth cohorts are equal or better Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, to Hunan’s, but its village committee representation awarded to China by the UN in March of 1992.98 rate is among the lowest in the country: just 7.7 per- Te event needed to be accompanied by a demon- cent.90 Tese inconsistencies indicate the shortcom- strated commitment to women’s rights domestically ings of any analysis that links women’s progress en- in order to have the desired impact on international tirely with educational attainment. audiences.99 Te 1992 law on women’s rights and the At the same time, women’s place in politics 1995 gender-equality program, in particular, refect during the reform era has also benefted from “de- these pressures. mand-side” initiatives by the state: a bevy of dictates Still, the concept of state-derived feminism can- on women’s participation in politics, following the not account for the role of the burgeoning Chinese Organizational Department’s frst reform-era regula- women’s movement in bringing about the sorts of tion in 1988 mentioned above. Te frst PRC law on changes. In the early years of the reform period, the women’s rights was passed in 1992, followed by the collapse of the communes closed important chan- frst national reform-era gender equality program in nels for women’s engagement in public life. As a 1995, which explicitly set forward the goal of rais- result, production became an individual rather than ing women’s participation in politics.91 In 2001, the a collective efort, and so women were once again Organizational Department expanded on the quotas relegated to domestic afairs (Rosen, 1995). Since it suggested for sub-county bodies in 1990 to propose then, however, the growth of civil society has cre- fgures for participation at higher levels: at least one ated a new space for public expression. Tat space woman in every government leadership group (ling- has manifested itself most prominently in the late dao banzi) and Party standing committee, along with reform explosion in social organizations focused on specifc targets for participation in these at the prov- women’s issues, especially in the cities.100 Women’s ince (10 percent), city (15 percent), and county (20 studies was unknown as a discipline in China until percent) levels.92 Te 10th NPC in 2007 mandated the ACWF held the frst conference on the subject in that its successors be at least 22 percent female and 1983.101 Ten years later, with the Beijing Conference followed up in 2010 to demand that one-third of vil- approaching, sixteen research centers had been set up

62 continuity and change: women's representation in reform-era chinese politics around the country.102 Te energy around women’s committee directors for women’s afairs.112 issues persisted well beyond the Beijing Conference; I have glossed over intra-bureaucracy gender in 2000, there were 50,000 women’s associations afli- diferentials in most of the paper because the extent ated with the ACWF alone.103 to which they have been alleviated during the reform Te growth in civil society women’s groups has era is hard to assess. Time-series data on the ratios of had little efect on citizen attitudes towards women in deputies and heads, for instance, is difcult to come politics; calculations based on WVS data suggest that by. Many of the statistics on formal representation the proportion of Chinese who considered men more that I have cited in this paper concern positions in able in politics than women was consistently a slight the party-state bureaucracy that are relatively presti- majority from 1995 to 2004.104 Still, this proportion gious at their administrative levels—mayor, Politburo has been able to infuence ofcial policy in at least member, village committee head, NPC delegate. some capacity through the eforts of the ACWF, the Some of these increases in women’s representation in only organization with the status to push for any seri- these positions have outstripped the rate of increase ous policy change. In the late 1980s, under the infu- of female cadres’ total share, which rose by one-third; ence of civil society feminism, the organization be- the share of female mayors, for instance, more than came increasingly disenchanted with its mandate to doubled. It seems also that more female mayors, champion the Party line.105 It has since grown more at least, have been allowed to leave the traditional willing to represent women’s interests when they strongholds of culture, education and health (CEH). clash with Party interests.106 Tat shif has manifest- Rosen says that 70 percent of female mayors in 1989 ed itself in its eforts to improve women’s representa- were assigned to one of these felds or to sports, while tion at a host of levels: putting forward candidates for Wang reports that the 2001 share in CEH was down local People’s Congress elections, ofering training for to 50.2 percent.113 prospective cadres, and lobbying for stronger quota But to the “three manys, three fews” listed provisions.107 Organizational Department regula- above, we might add another one: “many cadres, few tions on female cadre participation are formulated in in the Party.” And for all the gains in state organs, conjunction with the ACWF. Te existence of con- it may be most signifcant that this phenomenon crete targets in 1990 and 2001, as well as many of the has changed little in the reform era. Women’s share subnational circulars noted above, were a direct result among cadres overall was twice their share among of ACWF input. At the grassroots level, Judd’s eth- Party members in 1991; in 2004, the ratio was the nography of a county in Shandong Province shows same.114 Given the still-dominant role of the Party how pressure from the local ACWF branch brought in Chinese politics, and the signifcance of Party about a surge in women’s participation in local village membership for career advancement in the bureau- committees.108 cracy, the stagnation on this front should temper At this point, I should briefy discuss women’s enthusiasm over other indications of the improving political representation in China from another angle: status of women within the cadre system. intra-bureaucratic gender gaps. Scholars are unani- mous in observing that women in the party-state CONCLUDING REMARKS bureaucracy consistently receive less prestigious My essay has sought to ofer a new vision of assignments than men.109 One common saying women’s political representation in the People’s Re- among Chinese female cadres, “the three manys public of China that reconciles existing narratives of and the three fews,” sums up this problem nicely: early-reform decline and late-reform progress. Te “many in trivial positions, few in powerful positions; post-Mao era began with a rapid decline in women’s many deputies, few heads; many in culture, science, representation, with female cadres treated as sym- education, and health bureaus, few in economy and bols of the Cultural Revolution’s infuence on the fnance.”110 Su’s survey of provincial-level leaders party-state bureaucracy. Deng’s modernization push fnds that female elites are four times more likely than brought about a decade of stagnation, but the state’s male elites to be given deputy assignments.111 170 of tentative reconciliation with policies aimed at gen- the 183 female village committee members in Wang der equality starting in the 1990s has brought about and Dai’s survey of Zhejiang villages served as their modest advances since. We should no longer speak

63 columbia university journal of politics & society of the monotonic decline in the reform era as Howell 8. See, for instance, Stanley Rosen, “Women and political participation in China,” Pacifc Afairs, vol. 68, no. 3 (1995), pp. 315–41; Edwards, did in 2002, nor should we speak of its ebbs and fows “Strategizing for politics”; Qi Wang, “Gender quotas in China,” paper as defned solely by the concept of state feminism. It presented at the 3rd European Conference on Politics and Gender, Barcelona, March 21-23, 2013. remained dominant during the early reform period, 9. Yongnian Zheng, Xiajuan Guo, and Litao Zhao, “Women’s Political Participation in China.” East Asian Institute Background Brief no. but the growing women’s movement in Chinese civil 453, 2009; Jie Du, “Funü canzheng—lao yiti, xin tiaozhan” (“Women’s society, has proved a signifcant factor in its own right participation in politics—old issues, new challenges”), China Wom- en’s Studies Online, 2012, accessed December 15, 2013, at http:// over the past twenty years by persuading the AWCF www.wisc.ac.cn/academicnews/79791.htm. to drif from its rigid adherence to Party theory. 10. See, for instance, Howell, “Women’s Political Participation in China: Struggling to Hold Up Half the Sky”; Rosen, “Women and Political It must be stressed that these advances over the Participation in China”; Edwards, “Strategizing for politics.” past two decades are very modest—a few percent- 11. Melanie Manion, “Te Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: Te Appointment, Promotion, Transfer, and Removal of Party and State age points here, a few percentage points there. Tey Leaders,” China Quarterly 102, 1985, p. 205; Q. Wang, “Gender quo- certainly do not anoint China as an international tas in China,” p. 16. 12. Yuan, Reconceiving Women’s Equality, p. 60. standard bearer for female representation in govern- 13. Ellen R. Judd, Te Chinese Women’s Movement Between State and ment. Women make up 23 percent of Chinese NPC Market (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 175–6.; th Rosen, “Women and Political Participation in China,” 330. delegates, the 55 largest share among parliaments 14. Howell, “Women’s Political Participation in China: Struggling to Hold worldwide.115 Tirteen percent of Chinese mayors Up Half the Sky,” p. 45. 15. Q. Wang, ”Gender quotas in China,” p. 12; Howell, ” Women’s Politi- are female, well above the regional average, but fe- cal Participation in China: Struggling to Hold Up Half the Sky,” p. 45. male mayors’ shares in Serbia and New Zealand are 16. Rosen, “Women and Political Participation in China,” pp. 317-18. 17. Roxanne Witke, “Wu Kuei-hsien: Labour Heroine to Vice-Premier,” 26 percent.116 2.7 percent of Chinese village com- China Quarterly, vol. 64, 1975, p. 730; All China Women’s Federation, “Chen Muhua,” November 21, 2008, accessed December 21, 2013, at mittee heads are female; women in Cambodia, with- http://www.womenofchina.cn/html/womenofchina/report/95488-1. out the help of quotas, make up 7.0 percent of the htm. 117 18. Y. Wang, “Report on the State of Women in Urban Local Govern- chairs of equivalent rural councils. And just as the ment: People’s Republic of China,” United Nations Economic and early CCP relegated its female members to second- Social Commission for Asia and the Pacifc, 2001, p. 6, accessed at http://www.unescap.org/huset/women/reports/china.pdf; Edwards, class status by concentrating them in the Women’s “Strategizing for politics,” 383; Inter-Parliamentary Union, last up- Bureau, today’s party-state bureaucracy keeps women dated November 1, 2013, accessed December 20, 2013, at http://www. ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2065_A.htm. out of high politics through disproportionately low 19. Y. Wang, “Report on the State of Women in Urban Local Govern- levels of Party membership.118 It will require a unit- ment,” p. 6; Edwards, “Strategizing for politics,” p. 383; Te Central Government of the People’s Republic of China Standing Committee ed front between state and civil society—and not one of the 11th NPC, accessed December 20, 2013, at http://www.gov.cn/ that kowtows to the state’s needs, but one that takes test/2008-03/15/content_920964_2.htm; Te Central Government of the People’s Republic of China Standing Committee of the 12th NPC, the criticisms of civil society feminists as a guiding accessed December 20, 2013, at http://www.gov.cn/test/2013-03/14/ star—for China to establish a reputation as a leader in content_2353702_2.htm. 20. Rosen, “Women and Political Participation in China,” p. 319; Ed- women’s participation in government. wards, “Strategizing for politics,” 383; Xinhua, “Member Name List of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” ac- cessed December 20, 2013 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2007- Works Cited 10/21/content_6917382.htm; Xinhua, “Member Name List of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” accessed 1. People’s Daily, “All-China Democratic Women’s Federation Calls on December 20, 2013 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/18cpcnc/2012- Women Nationwide: Warmly Celebrate the Establishment of the 11/14/c_113690703.htm. Central People’s Government,” October 1, 1949, p. 4. 21. Q. Wang, “State-Society Relations and Women’s Political Participa- 2. Mao Zedong, Selections of Historical Materials from the Central Revo- tion,” in West et al., ed., Women in China: Social and Economic Trans- lutionary Bases, vol. 2 (Jiangxi People’s Press: 1982), quoted in Chu formation (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, 1999), p. 25. Tan, “Mao Zedong funü quanli guan chu tan” (A Preliminary Explo- 22. Ibid; Howell, “Women’s Political Participation in China: Struggling to ration of Mao Zedong’s Toughts on Women’s Rights), Funü yanjiu Hold Up Half the Sky,” p. 45. luncong, vol. 1, 1994, pp. 11–13, 50. 23. Rosen, “Women and Political Participation in China,” p. 331. 3. Inter-Parliamentary Union, last updated November 1, 2013, accessed 24. Q. Wang, “State-Society Relations and Women’s Political Participa- December 20, 2013, at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm. tion,” p. 30. 4. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Afairs, “Te 25. Y. Wang, “Report on the State of Women in Urban Local Govern- World’s Women 2010: Trends and Statistics” (New York: 2010), p. x. ment,” p. 7. 5. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, Rising Tide: Gender Equality and 26. Rosen, “Women and Political Participation in China.” Cultural Change Around the World (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- 27. Q. Wang, “Gender quotas in China,” p. 12. sity Press, 2003), p. 137. 28. Manion, “Te Cadre Management System, Post-Mao,” p. 206. 6. Louise Edwards, “Strategizing for politics: Chinese women participa- 29. Q. Wang, “Gender quotas in China,” p. 20. tion in the one-party state,” Women’s Studies International Forum, vol. 30. Kathleen A. Montgomery, “Introduction,” in Richard E. Matland and 30, 2007, pp. 380–90; Qi Wang, “Renegotiating Gender and Power: Kathleen A. Montgomery, ed., Women’s Access to Political Power in Women’s Organizations and Networks in Politics,” Lund University Post-Communist Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), Centre for East and South-east Asian Studies, Working Paper No. 2, p. 2. 2004, pp. 9–10. 31. Ibid; K. B. Usha, “Political Empowerment of Women in Soviet Union 7. Jude Howell, “Women’s Political Participation in China: Struggling to and Russia: Ideology and Implementation,” International Studies, vol. Hold Up Half the Sky,” Parliamentary Afairs, vol. 55, 2002, pp. 43–44. 42, no. 2, 2005, pp. 141–165. 64 continuity and change: women's representation in reform-era chinese politics

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Ibid, p. 604; Q. Wang, “Gender quotas in China,” p. 19; Chiew-Sang Women’s Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe, p. 15. Bryan Ho and Qin Li, “Rural Chinese Women’s Political Participa- 78. Inglehart and Norris, Rising Tide, pp. 34–35. tion: Problems and Prospects,” in Zhidong Hao and Sheying Chen, 79. Emily Hannum, Jere Behrmann, Meiyan Wang, and Jihong Liu, ed., Social Issues in China: Gender, Ethnicity, Labor, and the Envi- “Education in the Reform Era,” 2007, p. 18, accessed from a draf of ronment (New York: Springer, 2014); Xiajun Guo and Litao Zhao, chapter in China’s Great Transformation, ed. Loren Brandt and Tom- “Women’s Political Participation in China,” East Asian Policy, 2009, p. as Rawski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), http:// 155. works.bepress.com/emily_hannum/10/. 54. Fenghua Wang, “Shilun dang de lingdao dui funü canzheng de zuoy- 80. Wei-Jun Jean Yeung, “Higher Education Expansion and Social Strati- ong” (“Some comments on the efect of Party leaders on women’s fcation in China,” Chinese Sociological Review, vol. 45, no. 4, 2013, p. participation in politics”), Zhonghua nüzi xueyuan xuebao (shehui 72. kexue ban), vol. 13, no. 3, 2001, p. 6-9. 81. Dickson, “Cooptation and Corporatism in China,” in Dittmer and 55. Howell, “Women’s Political Participation in China: in whose interests Liu, ed., China’s Deep Reform, p. 125. elections?”, p. 607; Wang and Dai, “Women’s Participation in Rural 82. Yeung, “Higher Education Expansion and Social Stratifcation in China’s Self-Governance,” p. 93. China,” p. 55. 56. Howell, ”Women’s Political Participation in China: in whose interests 83. Junxia Zeng, Xiaopeng Pang, Linxiu Zhang, Alexis Medina, and Scott elections?”, p. 606. Rozelle, “Gender Inequality in Education: a Meta-Analysis,” Contem- 65 columbia university journal of politics & society

porary Economic Policy, vol. 32, no. 2, 2012, p. 476. 114. Calculated from Zheng et al., “Women’s Political Participation in 84. Ibid; Hannum et al., “Education in the Reform Era,” p. 18. China,” p. 6–7. 85. Zeng et al., “Gender Inequality in Education,” p. 476. 115. Inter-Parliamentary Union, last updated November 1, 2013. Accessed 86. Ibid. December 22, 2013, at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm. 87. Emily Hannum and Jennifer Adams, “Beyond Cost: Rural Perspec- 116. UNDESA, “Te World’s Women 2010,” p. 120. tives on Barriers to Education,” in Deborah Davis and Wang Feng, 117. Ibid, p. 20. ed., Creating Wealth and Poverty in Modern China, (Stanford, CA: 118. Gilmartin, “Gender in the Formation of the Chinese Body Politic,” p. Stanford University Press, 2008), http://works.bepress.com/em- 315. ily_hannum/2/. 88. Emily Hannum, Yuping Zhang and Meiyan Wang, “Why Are Returns to Education Higher for Women than for Men in Urban China?” China Quarterly, vol. 215, 2013. 89. Emily Hannum and Meiyan Wang, “Geography and educational inequality in China,” China Economic Review, vol. 17, 2006, p. 260. 90. Wang and Dai, “Women’s Participation in Rural China’s Self-Gover- nance,” p. 93. 91. Zheng et al., “Women’s Political Participation in China,” p. 5; “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women,” adopted April 3, 1992, and amended August 28, 2005, accessed December 22, 2013, at http://www.china.org.cn/eng- lish/government/207405.htm. 92. Du, “Funü canzheng—lao yiti, xin tiaozhan”; Q. Wang, “Gender quo- tas in China,” p. 8. 93. Du, “Funü canzheng—lao yiti, xin tiaozhan”; Min Dongchao, “From Men-Women Equality to Gender Equality: the Zigzag Road of Women’s Political Participation in China,” Asian Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 17, no. 3, 2011, accessed in HTML format via ProQuest, no. 900320414. 94. Guo and Zhao, “Women’s Political Participation in China,” p. 55. 95. Jiang’ai Dong and Hongli Li, ”Gonggong zhengce, xingbie yishi yu nongcun funü canzheng” (”Public policy, gender consciousness, and rural women’s political participation”), Shanxi daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban), 2010, no. 1; Guo, Zheng, Yang, “Women’s Participation in Village Autonomy in China,” p. 154; Howell, “Women’s Political Participation in China: in whose interests elections?”, p. 612; Edwards, “Strategizing for politics,” p. 386. 96. Wang and Dai, “Women’s Participation in Rural China’s Self-Gover- nance,” p. 93; Howell, “Women’s Political Participation in China: in whose interests elections?”, p. 612. 97. Zheng et al., “Women’s Political Participation in China,” p. 14; Du, ”Funü canzheng—lao yiti, xin tiaozhan.” 98. South China Morning Post, September 28, 1993, accessed December 22, 2013, via LexisNexis Academic. 99. Rosen, “Women and Political Participation in China,” p. 340. 100. Judd, Te Chinese Women’s Movement Between State and Market, p. 18; Q. Wang, “Renegotiating Gender and Power,” p. 1; Min, “From Men-Women Equality to Gender Equality.” 101. Dongchao Min, “Te Development of Women’s Studies: From the 1980s to the Present,” in West et al., Women in China, p. 211, 214. 102. Jude Howell, “Women’s Organizations and Civil Society in China: Making a Diference,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, vol. 5, no. 2, 2003, p. 197. 103. Ibid, p. 195. 104. World Values Survey Association, “World Values Survey 1981-2008 Ofcial Aggregate v. 20090901.” 105. Rosen, “Women and Political Participation in China,” p. 335; Judd, Te Chinese Women’s Movement Between State and Market, p. 16n. 106. Edwards, ”Strategizing for politics,” p. 382; Min, “Te Development of Women’s Studies,” p. 217. 107. Howell, “Women’s Organizations and Civil Society in China,” pp. 199–200; Q. Wang, “Renegotiating Gender and Power,” p. 34; Ed- wards, “Strategizing for politics,” p. 382; Howell, “Women’s Political Participation in China: Struggling to Hold Up Half the Sky,” p. 50. 108. Judd, Te Chinese Women’s Movement Between State and Market, p. 92. 109. Rosen, ”Women and Political Participation in China,” p. 325; Ed- wards, “Strategizing for politics,” p. 386; Howell, “Women’s Political Participation in China: Struggling to Hold Up Half the Sky,” p. 47. 110. Xinhua News, “Women’s Political Rights Attracts Serious Attention of the Most Powerful Organs,” published June 28, 2010, accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-06/28/c_12270643.htm. 111. Su, “Gender Inequality in Chinese Politics,” p. 155. 112. Wang and Dai, “Women’s Participation in Rural China’s Self-Gover- nance,” p. 102. 113. Rosen, “Women and Political Participation in China,” p. 326; Q. Wang, “Renegotiating Gender and Power,” p. 22. 66 desempeñando el papel revolucionario: nationalism and culture in mexico, 1920-1940

steven server, princeton university (2014)

ABSTRACT Some scholars suggest that Mexican culture in the wake of its bloody Mexican Revolu- tion was completely manufactured by the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and scholar José Vasconcelos for the sole purpose of creating a Gramscian political hege- mony and a cultural “common sense.” Tis article ofers a diferent, more pluralistic, un- derstanding of the creation of Mexican national identity in the afermath of the Mexican Revolution. Indeed, average Mexicans created a cultural milieu that existed outside the bounds set by the state. State-employed muralists disputed politics and the appropri- ate role of state power in the new Mexican culture, while flms of the Mexican Golden Age, beginning in the 1930s, refected conservative ideologies inconsistent with more progressive, state-favored philosophies. Tourist materials and cookbooks, created for American audiences, also tempered the cultural norms favored the PRI by casting them as quaint or as kitsch, rather than as the full-fedged expression of an organizing ideology.

n 1934, the Mexican thinker Samuel Ramos the decades immediately following the Revolution, published a text entitled El perfl del hombre from about 1920 to the end of the Cárdenas y la cultura en México. Ramos, like many of administration in 1940. In those twenty years, the Ihis contemporary intellectuals, had dedicated the state was hard at work composing a new national last decade to exploring, probing, and challenging drama. Tis drama was for the beneft of Mexican “Mexicanity.” In his new text, Ramos aimed to citizens, who had been through a decade of hell, as explore the rationale for the recent embrace of a new well as for the world, which looked with expectation quintessentially Mexican self-concept at a time when and trepidation at the new regime. there was much for Mexicans to be insecure about. Tere exists much scholarship on the topic Te nation had plunged in and out of a decade- of post-revolutionary nationalism in Mexico that long revolution that wracked the country with describes this process in depth. By contrast, this study violence and instability. It was from the ruins of this aims to synthesize these voices into a resonant, more confagration that had consumed the ancién regime complete, whole. Tose who ascribe to traditional that the new Mexican state would have to rise. Te views of cultural hegemony describe the process 1920s and 1930s whirred with the work of national of “playing the Revolutionary role” as decidedly rebuilding and reconstruction; a new constitution monolithic or elite-spurred and sculpted. In fact, as needed to be implemented, infrastructure had to be will be shown by explorations of murals and prints, rebuilt, and commerce needed to fow once again. flms, postcards, and cookbooks, that reading of the Yet the work of the state was not limited to physical post-Revolutionary project is decidedly simplistic. changes. A new political culture would also be In casting the post-Revolutionary drama, the state needed to reify the victorious ideology with a rich inherently lost monopoly over the national narrative. system of myths, murals, ideologies, and, above all, Rather than being the one-note work of elites, as performances. For it would be through performance, is sometimes argued, the new Mexican political a great national pageant, that the “truth” could be culture was in fact a polyphonic, diverse patchwork formed in the midst of so much uncertainty. of individual conceptions of the state project, some Tis post-Revolutionary performance lies directly opposed to “orthodox” Mexicanity. at the heart of this study. Specifcally, the goal is to Te same processes of state formation explore where culture and politics intersected during persist today in Mexico. Certainly, given the 2012 columbia university journal of politics & society reelection of the traditionally dominant political a close reading of a major flm of the period, Allá en party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), el rancho grande.5 Te fnal section will turn to both the concept of “institutional revolution” fgures food and tourist materials; supported by texts from prominently in the minds of many. Te PRI obviously Pilcher and Berger, we will analyze cultural materials has its roots in this period. Its political messaging produced for U.S. audiences.6 was inherited from the Sonoran dynasty as the PNR “Desempeñando el papel revolucionario,” or (National Revolutionary Party), and it was more “Playing the Revolutionary Role,” the title of this formally coalesced by Lázaro Cárdenas as the PRM study was carefully chosen to best convey the (Party of the Mexican Revolution). As such, an type of cultural exploration as detailed above. Te exploration of the ways in which the Mexican state great political drama being performed in Mexico was created out of the chorus of diferent conceptions beginning in 1920 relied on many actors, for the of state will clarify the overall arc of the past century, process of national reconstruction was not one as well as the political fortunes and failures of the that could be undertaken alone. It is the portrayal PRI. of national ideologies that remains today, for the But the present study also has a more general interpretations that average citizens made of state relevance. Politics and culture have an intimate ideology formed modern Mexico. Every Mexican had connection, one that ought to be understood to play his or her role in the revolutionary drama, by citizens from around the world. It is through in order to fulfll the ideological underpinnings of a everyday experiences, such as reading a newspaper, movement for which so many had perished. watching a flm, or even planning a vacation, that citizens are steeped in, and inculcated with, FORGING A NATION: CULTURAL HEGEMONY certain civil and political values. Te object of this AND MEXICANIST IDEOLOGY study is to awaken a critical eye that can discern To engage with the cultural materials of the propagandizing, but that can also see that individual post-Revolutionary years, we must frst understand creativity can have power beyond pure aesthetic or classical cultural history theory. Antonio Gramsci, commercial appeal an Italian Marxist, wrote extensively on the use Tere is a great deal of scholarship that must of culture as a tool for political domination and be synthesized to satisfy these goals. It will be useful hegemony creation. Trough cultural hegemony, to ofer the arc of the argument before embarking, a polity’s hegemonic bloc is able to create a new which is shown by exploring the central theory “common sense” for the population at large. Te of cultural hegemony as conceived of by Antonio hegemonic bloc is the group that at any given time Gramsci.1 Ten, we will explore the erection of the wields power and is able to exercise that power Revolutionary Pantheon as a Gramscian exemplar. to afect political change: the elite, ruling class. It Tomas Benjamin’s recent book will support this does not consist of all citizens, for many remain exploration and demonstrate the extent to which subaltern, subject to the will of the political bloc. it was a concerted efort by those in power.2 Te Tis hegemonic bloc that holds power attempts to second theoretical section, however, will challenge create cultural hegemony, which ideally encompasses Gramscian cultural hegemony. Resting on classic all members of the polity. Te broadness of texts, this section will problematize Gramsci’s the “common sense” of the cultural hegemony theory and ofer an alternative model.3 With this ensures the continued dominance of the elite, for alternative reading, I endeavor to tear down the it discourages challenges to the existing political most staged of cultural projects. An analysis of the culture. mural work of the “Big Tree” (Diego Rivera, David Cultural hegemony is not widely integrated Alfaro Siquieros, and José Clemente Orozco) will simply because the hegemonic bloc orchestrates show the diversity of these contractors of Mexican it. Te elite origin of ideology is not sufcient to nationalism, with assistance from the model text on create hegemony. As Stuart Hall writes, “Rather, the cultural nationalism in Mexico in this period, Te efective coupling of dominant ideas to the historical Eagle and the Virgin.4 Te Revolutionary message bloc which has acquired hegemonic power in a will be shown to be decidedly contentious by doing particular period is what the process of ideological

68 desempeñando el papel revolucionario: nationalism and culture in mexico, 1920-1940 struggle is intended to secure. It is the object of the ruling class motivations, despite intellectuals’ exercise—not the playing out of an already written supposedly inviolate impartiality. Subaltern and concluded script.”7 As such, the goal of the intellectuals do not exist to advance an alternative ruling class is not simply to conceive of a new “truth” ideology to “traditional” elite intellectuals. Te ruling for the state; it is not a fait accompli merely by virtue class dominates the ideological struggle, and through of its etiology. Rather, the ruling class must invest in cultural media, is able to reify the Revolution. the process of tying its brand of truth to the supposed Utilizing the above theoretical discussion of cultural contemporary hegemonic bloc. Once these ideas are hegemony, we may now employ it in the specifc case strongly tied to the hegemonic bloc, the suggestion study at hand. Te post-Revolutionary milieu we now is that the ideological struggle fades away. Tese new explore is that of Mexico beginning in 1920, with its ideas become an inextricable part of the “common ambitious projects of nationalism. sense” that the ruling class advances, and subaltern Gramsci’s theory on intellectual participation groups accept them as integral to political culture. A emerges vividly in this specifc case. Perhaps the cultural hegemony is thus generated and sustained.8 intellectual fgure that best captured the role of the Te process of formulating new truths, then, state in creating and advancing Mexican national falls to those members of the ruling class best suited ideology is José Vasconcelos. Appointed as the head for the fxation of ideologies to the hegemonic bloc: of the Secretariat of Public Education (SEP) in 1921, intellectuals. Trough their formulations of new Vasconcelos was an important voice in the casting of national ideologies, particularly ones that support the a new, state-sponsored ideological project. In 1925, work of the existing hegemonic bloc and are followed he published La raza cósmica, arguably his most by propagandizing to ensure the lasting linkage of infuential essay. In it, Vasconcelos embraced an these ideologies to the dominant political culture, Americanist ideology, highlighting the conception intellectuals are critical to hegemony formation. of mestizaje, or ethnic mixing, as the critical element Many see themselves as independent of the state that would redeem the Mexican nation: “We in project, however, “Since these various categories of America shall arrive, before any other part of the traditional intellectuals experience through an esprit world, at the creation of a new race fashioned out de corps their uninterrupted historical continuity, of the treasures of all the previous ones: Te fnal and their special qualifcations, they thus put race, the cosmic race.”11 In general, Mexicanist themselves forward as autonomous and independent ideology rested on an appropriation of old-style of the dominant social group.”9 Tey are critical in racial stereotypes that had been pervasive in the 19th creating a new national ideology on behalf of elites. century. While the Porfriato, the late 19th century At the same time, due to their historical status, they regime of President Porfrio Diaz, had been oriented frequently represent their ideological formulations toward “whitening,” or the Europeanization of the to be free of the taint of mere partisanship. With Mexican national culture, La raza cósmica explicitly this veneer of impartiality, it is made all the more rejected whitening in favor of mestizaje. It would likely that ideology may be associated with the be through the amalgamation of all of the races of contemporary hegemonic bloc. Te elite-domination the Old World that Mexico would emerge as the of the ideological struggle becomes ever stronger transcendent leader of the New World. Tere was a given that subaltern groups do not create or value to the indigenous element of Mexican culture; integrate intellectuals into their social group. When it was essential to creating Mexicanity. an intellectual does arise from the peasantry, he is But that is not to say that the new ideological immediately assimilated into the dominant social regime was devoted to the edifcation of traditional class. As such, elites may monopolize the ideological indigenous values per se. Certainly, Vasconcelos struggle and impose political culture.10 underscored the importance of Mexican self- Gramscian cultural hegemony theory, then, awareness of the indigenous contributions for suggests a powerful and near-monolithic sense contemporary Mexican sensibilities. Tat said, there of nationalism. Tis stems from the fact that were many elements of indigenous culture that intellectuals, the key agents in the creation of needed to be redeemed, for native culture was still hegemonic ideologies, are always associated with seen as backward, weak, and uncivilized. It was for

69 columbia university journal of politics & society these reasons that subaltern Mexicans had sufered doing this simply because that is what intellectuals under the Porfriato, (exploitation by hacienda do. Te stakes were very high. Te Revolution owners, priests, and capitalists). Old-World European had been flled with instances where leaders elements had corrupted the Mexican spirit. As lacked support from the people, and it had cost such, it was the role of the post-Revolutionary state them and their supporters their lives. Based on to “transform a ‘backward, degenerate, diseased’ Mexicanist ideology and ideas regarding La raza people into healthy, scientifc patriots mobilized cósmica, intellectuals such as Vasconcelos and his for development” without the manipulations of peers were attempting to win that revolutionary Europeans or Americans.12 struggle to which Gramsci refers. As intellectuals How would this project materialize? of the Revolution, of the emergent hegemonic Vasconcelos’s ideas were indeed rather contradictory. bloc, these Mexicanists were tying a platform to He embraced both the inherent value of the the ruling class, to prevent further instability and indigenous elements of the Mexican national heritage bloodshed. In formulating a new national discourse as spiritually redemptive, and at the same time, that upheld both the value of indigenism and that believed that indigenous culture was inherently of modernization of backward populations, these uncivilized and needed to be redeemed. Te key was men were ofering politicians the chance to tie the embracing that inherent contradiction and using it nation more closely together to create a hegemonic to the state’s advantage. Te new ideology of La raza coalition. Vasconcelos was a self-described “child cósmica would appropriate the cultural lexicon of the of the people,” urging fellow intellectuals to leave nation’s indigenous history to preach the gospel of their ivory towers and join La Revolución.15 Just progress and development. as Gramsci suggested, the adaptation of subaltern As the head of the SEP, Vasconcelos devoted intellectual currents, such as the notion of “the himself to this goal through a variety of projects. At people” and agitation for land redistribution, gave the forefront lay his socialist educational program, the ruling class greater ballast, a wider scope, and devoted to educating schoolchildren about the appeal. Tereby, they hoped that the bloody tide of moral rightness of the new Revolutionary regime. Revolution could subside afer ten years of cataclysm. To better educate the populace, Vasconcelos devoted Vasconcelos and his fellow Mexicanists wrote himself to a variety of cultural projects, engaging a myth to support the post-Revolutionary state. Te in the processes of co-optation of the folkloric cosmic spirit would pervade all elements of the new elements of Mexican culture in order to form a new nation, as the harbinger for a Mexican renaissance. national narrative. Tis was accomplished by the Te state would tie every Mexican to the necessary development of Missiones Culturales, a program agenda, calling on the fulfllment of the national launched in 1923 in which teachers assigned to rural, political project, because it was inherent to Mexican heavily indigenous communities would appropriate, blood and spirit. Te Revolutionary state could be collate, and redeploy cultural material for mass trusted, for through the redemption of the indio dissemination.13 Tis process of cultural mestizaje without European intervention, the road would was also exemplifed by the SEP’s approaches to be paved for a “Mexican rebirth into innocence hygiene projects, family education, and combat and utopia” from the misery of the previous 500 against social diseases, which presented campaigns years.16 Tough directed by the spirit of the great advocating Western-style social systems expressed Revolutionary heroes who had died to divine the in visual and verbal terms that the people could path to Mexico’s cosmic destiny, all were to perform understand, such as prints depicting animate in this Revolutionary drama by virtue of their ethnic skeletons and appeals to the rural familial unit. heritage. In terms of forging cultural hegemony, Tis reveals a desire to modernize the populace by blood is thicker than water. utilizing a lexicon infuenced by indigenism.14 Obviously, Vasconcelos and his cohort were BLOCK-PRINTING THE REVOLUTIONARY drafing a new national identity. Tey were forjando FAMILY la patria, forging and formulating the nation and Consequently, Gramscians have a fairly creating a new culture. Tat is not to say they were persuasive case for their theoretical model.

70 desempeñando el papel revolucionario: nationalism and culture in mexico, 1920-1940 Mythologizing of the nation by intellectuals not need to lean on a myth of the Revolution to promised progress and stability, La raza could efectively tie ideology to his rule; as Benjamin leave the bloodshed of the previous decade behind states, “Obregón represented the unity of history and and turn its eyes toward the shining future. Te biography: the legitimacy of his authority and his new ruling clique had cemented its power; its new government, therefore, was self evident.”18 In other quest was translating raw power into hegemony. words, Obregón had no need for a great ideological Politically, one can see its goals clearly. Te most superstructure to make his regime hegemonic. prominent articles of the Constitution of 1917 are Instead, he established a cult of personality, the fairly explicit in their rejection of Porfrian principles modus operandi of most caudillos. Obregon’s and an embrace of Revolutionary future. Article 27 departure from a revolutionary justifcation for supports the redistribution of lands by the state for power was, however, an aberration. public utility. Article 123 supports broad radical As time wore on, according to a Gramscian workers’ rights. Article 3 ofers a more explicit sense analysis, there was a marked shif toward seeing the of Gramscian strategizing at work: “Te education power of crafing an external history to give ballast imparted by the Federal State shall be designed to to future “Revolutionary” agendas. Tere was thus develop harmoniously all the faculties of the human a marked push to unify disparate Revolutionary being and shall foster in him at the same time a love groups in order to heal divisions within the nation.19 of country and a consciousness of international To unify these subaltern groups, the Taller de solidarity, in independence and justice.”17 Tese gráfca popular (TGP) was established in 1937 as a political goals were explicitly expressed by Obregón propaganda arm of the Mexican state. In one of its and then by Calles, and formed the planks of the introductory prints, its aims are made explicit. Te new Partido Nacional Revolucionario in 1929. From group announced that it was formed from a group of Vasconcelos’ appointment in 1921, however, it had painters “like you,” been clear that intellectuals were critical in tying In the country and in the city and they know policies to the ruling class through cultural projects, your problems. Tey ofer you their asístanse in as an extension of mandatory Federal education the form of illustrated education sheets, fiers Defenders of Gramscian analysis certainly that we will publish monthly, and they will deal have several prominent cultural examples to support with themes of immediate interest for you and their theoretical framework. Te best illustration for your community. Tis will help you form a conscientious community, and it will improve the of nationalist culture being utilized to support the morale in your school.20 political aims of the Mexican state is the trope of the Revolutionary Family. Tis theme manifested itself Te TGP seemingly aimed for a horizontal in prints of the era, a critical tool in Vasconcelos’s integration of the post-Revolutionary state, fusing project of civic education. Trough a simple image together of the various out-groups and social classes and slogan, the aims of the state could be readily that did not wield power, to create a consciousness of difused and digested by the people. Te central aim national issues. of many prints of the era was ostensibly to integrate TGP prints underscored this organized society. the new post-Revolutionary cultural hegemony, both A print entitled “Unidad en tus flas” (“Unity in horizontally and vertically. Tey sought to tie various Your Columns”) shows horizontal integration of 21 subaltern groups together as Mexicans, and to tie distinct interest groups. A peasant and his wife, them closer to the post-Revolutionary hegemonic a student, a soldier, and a worker are clustered bloc. In his book La Revolución, Tomas Benjamin together, hands supportively on shoulders. Under shows how the new hegemonic bloc used mythology this scene of mutual regard, the reader is exhorted and ofcial history to create this integrated political to conserve and increase the power of their Gran culture. Following the end of explicit hostilities Central Sindical, their individual labor group. In by 1920, the new political apparatus returned to concept, then, the collective membership of these governance, under the watchful eye of the new various labor groups would constitute a larger, President Obregón. As General Obregón was unifed social body under the state. Te TGP urged “Caudillo of the Revolution,” however, he did readers to guard the Revolution by vigilance within their groups: “Don’t allow enemies to infltrate. 71 columbia university journal of politics & society

Choose the most conscientious revolutionary As time went on, and fewer leaders had the elements for posts of responsibility. And help create Revolutionary résumés that leaders like Calles the great communal unity against individual passions and Obregón did, it was important to lean on this and betrayals. WE CAN HELP YOU WITH OUR Pantheon for credibility. Most important, however, GRAPHIC SUPPORT.”22 Tus, the printmakers, was the sense that the current president had assumed and their handlers in the government, ensured that a political mandate from those glorifed heroes. the Revolutionary family, “the people,” remained President Lázaro Cárdenas attempted to demonstrate intact against counterrevolutionary forces, namely that he had lived up to the spirit of his predecessors, anyone who threatened the hegemonic bloc’s ability continuing their consecrated project. A 1938 print to wield power. Granted, this poster emerged during celebrates Cárdenas’s nationalization of the oil the late 1930s, when fears of fascism were rampant. industry. 25 Cárdenas sits signing documents, Correcting for some of the alarm, the poster surrounded by ragged peasants. Te improbability nevertheless captures the mechanism by which the of the cartoon is emblematic of the aim of the print: state aimed to join disparate social groups together to demonstrate that President Cárdenas had not as “the people” to protect the Revolution from its shut himself up in the Palacio Naciónal, but that he enemies. went throughout the “countryside, workshops, and In addition to creating “the people,” a all the places where the workers, peasants, women, Gramscian state needed to tie these out-groups and children call him.” Further, Cárdenas’s policy to the state. Building subaltern unity could be successes are enumerated; namely his defeat of the dangerous if this subaltern coalition was not loyal Maximato, his ejidal project, his support for labor, to the ruling class. Te Cristero revolt, the primary his support for education, and most importantly, opposition to Revolutionary anticlericalism, showed the nationalization of oil companies. Trough this that challenges to the hegemonic bloc were costly act, Cárdenas had challenged the exploitation of the in terms of blood, treasure, and political capital.i nation by foreign capitalists. He had protected the Tus, vertical integration was vital. Within the fully Revolutionary family from the foreign intriguing integrated regime, “virile leaders joined forces to lead that had fourished during the Porfriato. Cárdenas a glorifed peasantry and working class to victory fostered a paternalist public image as a leader against a common enemy (that is, the old regime and who would protect subaltern groups from the imperialism).”23 enemies of “the people.” As Eric Zolov writes, “Te Tis is best represented by depictions of Mexican case achieved… the institutionalization the Revolutionary Pantheon in prints. A 1935 of the president as patriarch… and the ofcial cartoon shows Carranza, Zapata, Angeles, Calles, party as domestic council.”26 A 1942 print is more Obregón, and Cárdenas, astride horses, as guardians explicit in its intent to tie the presidential father protecting an embracing peasant and worker in the to the glory of the Pantheon. Under portraits of foreground.24 No longer would Carranza and Villa Madero, Zapata, Cárdenas, and the new president be intractable ideological enemies, but rather allies Manuel Ávila Camacho, a Mexican fag serves as in the larger struggle of national liberation; Madero a background for an illustrative Camacho quote: and Zapata could peacefully coexist in prints and on “Here are we all. Tose of today and yesterday; the Revolutionary calendars, as they could not in 1911. absent and the present, those that are and those that With this mythology of the Revolution, a hegemonic were, constituting a sacred union that no enemy coalition could be coalesced. A cultural hegemony attack will divide.” 27 Te quote explicitly speaks could embrace various Revolutionary cliques, like the to the continuing spirit of Mexican resiliency and followers of Pancho Villa or Emiliano Zapata, even if nationalism thirty-two years afer the Revolution. these cliques did not hold the central political power. Implicitly, however, the print speaks to the goal of By erasing the inherent “dissensus” of the Revolution using the President as the intermediary between and mythologizing its consensus, the ruling elite was the Revolutionary Pantheon and “the people,” who better positioned to suggest that its political vision were expected to unite behind the regime. What was best coincided with larger Revolutionary aims. at stake was the creation of an indivisible political i For more on the Cristero revolt, see Jean Meyer, “An Idea of Mexico: culture, and thus, a hegemonic bloc that could rule Catholics in the Revolution” in Te Eagle and the Virgin. 72 desempeñando el papel revolucionario: nationalism and culture in mexico, 1920-1940 without dissent. so-called “revisionist” studies of the Mexican Reading with Gramscian lenses, we see the Revolution. Revisionists are those who take a arc of Mexican political and cultural institutions quasi-Marxist line, seeing the Revolution as the inherently tied to an intellectual elite. With the cementation of a bourgeois authority over subalterns. creation of a Revolutionary “people,” consisting In their challenge to this revisionist current, Joseph of various subaltern interest groups, as well as and Nugent aim to “bring the state back in without the creation of the Revolutionary Pantheon, the leaving the people out.” In other words, the goal is to politicians and intellectuals of the new hegemonic understand the elite-spurred political culture, that bloc were able to fx new ideas about Mexicanity popular culture is not “a thoroughly autonomous and the role of the state. In this exploration of prints domain,” but also to recognize that “popular culture and propaganda, it is clear that Gramsci’s theoretical is contradictory since it embodies and elaborates model of elite-mediated political culture is supported dominant symbols and meanings, but also contests, by the eforts of the state. Trough its language, its challenges, rejects, revalues… and presents policies, and above all, by its cultural patronage of alternatives to them.”28 Te authors in Joseph and indigenism and Revolutionary mythology, the state Nugent’s volume support this analysis by exploring did all it could to ensure that the country would projects at the state level. From ejidal politics in neither revert to the ancien régime nor spin out of Chihuahua to the local politics of Mayan villages in control and plunge back into chaos. Chiapas, these historians show that the centralizing tendencies of Mexicanist ideologies were challenged EVERYDAY FORMS OF POLITICAL CULTURE by the demographic and geographic diversity of To simply accept, however, that Mexican Mexico itself. national self-concept was orchestrated, executed, Kevin Middlebrook’s book ofers a reading and dominated entirely by the state is simplistic and of the post-Revolutionary project that shows how misguided. Gramsci’s theory suggests that subaltern the Mexican state’s corporatism created a diverse groups, the peasantry or proletariat, and non- ideological patchwork. Middlebrook underscores intellectuals, are incapable of utilizing intellectualism the high stakes associated with the project of the to graf values onto a hegemonic coalition. In other new Mexican state: state policies, through which words, without intellectuals, it is impossible to the elite-dominated bloc preserves its power, must create a political common sense. Tis interpretation respond to, harness, and co-opt the “political and is problematic in its portrayal of the majority of programmatic imperatives posed by revolutionary the population as powerless victims lacking any mass mobilization.”29 Unlike the purely Gramscian political agency. Te remainder of this study will reading of post-Revolutionary cultural nationalism, be devoted to showing that this victimhood is Middlebrook sees the post-Revolutionary hegemonic certainly not the entire picture. State “contractors,” bloc as constrained by a variety of features of namely those responsible for creating this cultural the Mexican nation. As in Joseph and Nugent, material, and non-state actors, those who consumed geography and local caciques feature prominently cultural materials, were both instrumental in in Middlebrook’s presentation of the formation of creating national culture. To that end, there are this diverse national identity. Middlebrook sees the two prominent texts that have staked out positions primary limitation to the erection of a monolithic against traditional Gramscian historiography: Te Gramscian hegemony as stemming from the Paradox of Revolution and Everyday Forms of State corporatist nature of the new regime. Leaning on Formation. Using both of these studies, a third labor unions and peasant groups, the state, by its very position will be staked out. With this alternative nature, had to sample and stitch together an ideology theoretical model, we may then explore three to please the entire Revolutionary Family. primary forms of cultural expression (murals, flms, Tis reading is consistent with Vasconcelos’s and folkloric/tourist materials) and read them from vision of indigenism as a tool for political this alternative historiographical perspective. modernization, as well as the edifcation of the Joseph and Nugent criticize the inconsequential Revolutionary family. Te state would interact with role assigned to popular participation by the its citizens as discrete groups: campesinos, obreros, 73 columbia university journal of politics & society indígenos, and others. As Middlebrook suggests, “Te to be directly communicating with “the people,”ii very heterogeneity of this governing ‘revolutionary this one addressed those operators in the localities coalition’ symbolized the established regime’s who understood the value of using propaganda commitment to the political representation of diverse to tie communities closer to the state. While elements.”30 Tis is perhaps an overstatement of this grammatical diference could certainly be the regime’s desire to integrate separate interests. coincidental, it does ofer an interesting insight Certainly, the SEP was committed to the eradication into the expected audiences of these two posters. of certain “backward” aspects of indigenous life. As It also speaks to the state’s acknowledgement that seen by Cárdenas’s nationalization of oil, capitalists, it was unable to create cultural hegemony without particularly those who held sway during the elements that existed outside of the hegemonic bloc Porfriato, were also not, in concept, meant to be per se. Tat SEP teachers were hundreds of miles represented. Middlebrook’s point is nonetheless well from Mexico City meant they had autonomy in what taken: the state’s sampling from diverse sociopolitical they taught and how they taught it. Vasconcelos’s groups allowed it to fx post-Revolutionary hegemony could not be everywhere. hegemony more easily. Tis use of Revolutionary “contractors” Tese two studies support the notion that ultimately led to a diversity of messaging about the post-Revolutionary state was unable to fully what truly constituted lo mexicano. Even the most dominate the ideological struggle, simply due to the centralized of cultural projects, the creation of fact that it relied on too many disparate elements in murals, was subject to a diferential interpretation order to fully control the messaging. For Joseph and of the state project. Murals are frequently held as Nugent, the geographic diversity of the nation meant the best example of Gramscian cultural hegemony Mexico City was unable to exert continuous control; at work, and strongly support the traditional vision for Middlebrook, the state’s corporate patronage of of post-revolutionary nationalism as dictated by labor groups required modifcation of Revolutionary elite political actors. Te “Big Tree” muralists elite preferences. Both studies place importance on (Diego Rivera, David Alfaro Siquieros, and José those with an explicit political agenda and political Clemente Orozco) are supposed to have played mobilization that exists outside of the watchful eyes their roles loyally in the reifcation of La Revolución. and silver tongues of the governing bloc. But their An examination of three of their famous murals, readings neglect the sheer political power of the however, shows they had diferent conceptions of cultural. Te remainder of this study will show that what truly constituted a Mexican utopia. those who operated in the aesthetic and cultural Te murals of Diego Rivera are perhaps the realm were as responsible for ideological diversity most instantly recognizable of the Big Tree, and as those involved in post-Revolutionary political the most explicit in the defense of indigenism and mobilization per se. the Revolutionary family. To cement the connection between the muralist project and the new nationalist CONTESTED UTOPIAS: THE MEXICOS OF THE education, Rivera painted 235 individual frescoes BIG THREE throughout the Ministry of Education, covering Even given their best eforts to difuse over 15,000 square feet.32 Troughout the murals Revolutionary propaganda, the TGP needed of the SEP, Rivera’s murals evidently support a assistance from prominent citizens throughout the Mexicanity based on post-Revolutionary indigenism. country. One early poster exhorts “teachers that In Mechanization of the Countryside, a goddess work in the country” to use their services: “Help wrapped in Revolutionary red shoots a lightning yourself with our propaganda and help us make bolt at a hacienda owner and his foremen.33 Freed it better. Revolutionary propaganda should rain from their exploitation, an Indian woman sits with over our whole country. Our sheets are weapons. legs crossed, her lap overfowing with maize, and Te weapon is forged, wield it!” 31 It is interesting wheat surrounding her. Behind her is the evidence to note the use of the formal usted being used in of modernization: a peasant rides a tractor and an this print. While other prints that used tú seem airplane fies over a hydroelectric dam, which gives

ii See endnote 21, “Unidad en tus flas,” for one example. 74 desempeñando el papel revolucionario: nationalism and culture in mexico, 1920-1940 electricity to “the people.” Guarding this new agrarian Siquieros was evidently a great supporter of prosperity are three familiar armed Revolutionary Revolutionary mobilization against fascism and fgures: a worker, a peasant, and a soldier. Te capitalism. Nevertheless, he had a contentious message is plain: the Revolution has allowed for the relationship with Diego Rivera, the great indigenist liberation of the indigenous people from exploitation, muralist. In 1935, El Universal ran a front page and as such, abundance and technological progress story about their ideological confict at a meeting have created a civilized and prosperous nation. Tis at the Palacio de Bellas Artes: “Tere was almost a is but one of many examples of Rivera’s advocacy real fst-fght between the followers of Rivera and for post-Revolutionary nationalism on the basis of Siquieros.”38 Siquieros accused Rivera of advancing indigenism. an art of the petite bourgeois, as his work depicted Unlike Rivera, however, José Clemente Orozco a reductionist nationalism based on indigenism. was critical of the course that the Revolution had Rivera was a counterrevolutionary, a shill for the taken. In Political and Ideological Exploitation, state. Essentially, Rivera’s support for Trotsky was Orozco depicts emaciated creatures against a a betrayal for the global revolutionary cause. For backdrop of fames. 34 Te creatures rage at the Rivera, Siquieros was a political opportunist. Having “ideologues of modern social revolution” for their been expelled from the Mexican Communist Party, false leadership, demagoguery, and failed ideals. Siquieros had to prove his own unfinching Stalinist Desmond Rochfort suggests the fgures resemble credentials. Tus, despite the ideological congruence prominent Communists Karl Marx, Leon Trotsky, of their work at frst glance, the two artists had and David Alfaro Siquieros.35 To the lef, three distinct political visions regarding the appropriate beastly caudillos wielding sledgehammers, rifes, role of the state.39 and polemical pamphlets demonstrate how the Te “Big Tree,” then, are not a monolithic false prophet’s ideologies get translated into group. Te moniker is applied to three very diferent Revolution. Ultimately, the caudillos expose their men who all happened to paint political murals. ability to oppress, as seen in the wretched, miserable In style, in content, in political orientation, and in fgures to the right. States Rochfort, “For Orozco, utopian vision, the artists held diferent ideas about the struggle for ideals and their betrayal by the the appropriate role of art in the post-Revolutionary fallibility of human beings that leads to greed, power, era, and indeed about the scope of the Revolution exploitation, and superstition dichotomized the itself. Far from being an art form that advanced human character, dooming it to tragic repetitions of cultural hegemony, murals, due to their artist’s failure.”36 Tus, the mural, rather than supporting personal political and artistic diferences, served as a utopian vision of post-Revolutionary Mexico as lightning rods for debate and dissent regarding the Rivera did, warns against the demagoguery of false post-Revolutionary project. prophets speaking the words of national liberation, for Mexico and for all nations. CELLULOID IDEOLOGIES: HISPANICISM VERSUS Clearly, there was no ideological love lost INDIGENISM IN FILM between David Alfaro Siquieros and Orozco, if Te incongruity of the utopian visions of the Rochfort’s assertion is to be believed. Siquieros’s various muralists was also manifested on the Silver reputation as an ardent supporter of revolutionary Screen. By the mid-1930s, the Cárdenas regime radicalism was too much for Orozco. In Portrait had taken to sponsoring flm production. Cárdenas of the Bourgeoisie, Siquieros attacked both fascists ofered tax exemptions to domestic flmmakers and and capitalists alike. In the central panel, a machine formed the Financiadora de Películas, which felded spits out coins, ostensibly to support the gas-masked grant proposals for private investment in flm. As a drones that surround it. To the lef, a giant parrot result of these innovations, production grew from six creature addresses faceless Nazi legions, and has flms in 1932 to 57 flms in 1938, greatly increasing set fre to a revolutionary temple emblazoned with Mexicans’ share of the domestic flm market.40 Given “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité.” Te armed worker, these fnancial and organizational modifcations, whose rife is poised at the reactionary forces, is the the Mexican flm industry was poised to embark only one who can stop the dystopian future. 37 upon a Golden Age. Within this new flm industry,

75 columbia university journal of politics & society three prominent strands emerged: state-sponsored sponsored its frst “talkie” in 1935, Redes, which told “educational” flm, which was supported by state- the story of indigenous fshermen who opposed intellectuals; experimental flm; and commercial exploitation by a local monopolist.44 Joanne flm, which looked to Hollywood for inspiration. Hershfeld describes the flm as an epic of class With experimental flm’s small audience, state- struggle, meant to teach Mexicanity to Mexicans and sponsored flms and commercial flms competed for to challenge commercial flm’s aesthetics. She states, largest market share. Tose with control over the “the cinematography… romanticizes their lives by largest share of the flm industry could also exercise emphasizing the beauty of the landscape and the a large degree of infuence over the dissemination of people and promoting an ‘intimate’ and mythical Revolutionary ideas.41 connection between people and nature.”45 With Cárdenas’s government was clearly committed this transcendent cinematography, the raza cósmica to fulflling the remaining goals of the Revolution, message could be understood; the indigenous had a and that goal manifested itself in politics as well spiritual connection to the land, and once freed from as state-sponsored flm. Unequivocally breaking oppressors they would be able to create a utopia. Life the dominance of the Maximato, a cabal becoming would hopefully imitate art. perilously addicted to power, Cárdenas returned Despite the SEP’s hopes to make these flms to a distilled set of Revolutionary principles. popular, the flms were unable to compete with Oil companies were nationalized and ejidal commercial releases. For example, following redistribution, as guaranteed under Article 27 of the his limited success with Vámonos con Pancho 1917 Constitution, was undertaken to a greater extent Villa, which aimed to glorify post-Revolutionary than previously. indigenism, Fernando de Fuentes scored a major Te ensuing political confict over the redoubled hit with his 1936 flm, Allá en el rancho grande. Revolutionary eforts, was, as is consistent with Tis flm best represents commercial releases at cultural history theory, also manifested in flm. the time, as well as the conservative nationalism Aurelio de los Reyes spoke to the two nationalistic described by de los Reyes. It supported an alternative, tendencies, one conservative, the other liberal: competing vision of horizontal integration. Rather “Both tendencies must have polarized with the than favoring the coalescence of a Revolutionary arrival of Lazaro Cárdenas to the government, with family that consisted of the various subaltern groups his agrarian policies, which appear in the comedia (like workers and peasants) tied together by their ranchera, which leads to the Porfrian nostalgia.”42 commitment to the Revolutionary project, the flm In general, state-sponsored cinema defended advocated a paternalistic vision of social relations, Revolutionary indigenism, while commercial flm where peasants were united by their loyalty to their advocated a return to Porfrian “order and progress” hacienda owner. Te flm was thus ideologically at through the genre of the comedia ranchera, or rural odds with everything the Revolution, and the post- comedy. Revolutionary state, stood for. Te great heroes of Te SEP, now under Narciso Bassols, was the Revolutionary pantheon had mobilized against intimately involved in the new national indigenist the Porfrian elites and desired to topple the hacienda cinema. For members of the governmental system in favor of communal plots. Glorifcation of hegemonic bloc, cinema ofered an important this archaic system was anathema. opportunity to use Revolutionary ideology to Life on the Rancho Grande does not look integrate society horizontally: “educational flm is as bleak as Zapata and Villa may have suggested, the only plan possible to publicize the awareness however. Despite the trite plot and simplistic of our proletariat that our economic situation resolution, the flm’s depictions of life on the ranch allows, as its cost is lower than any other scheme are entertaining and convey a folkloric utopia: guitar of proletarian university that may be implemented, playing, cock fghting, and hat dancing. Frequent which also has the disadvantage of being slower songs and physical humor give the sense that on and with worse results.”43 Film, with its ease and the ranch, the boss is less of a taskmaster than the efcacy, would be the best medium to create a benevolent facilitator of the good life. Te flm is post-Revolutionary consensus. To this end, the SEP a melodramatic romance. As a consequence of a

76 desempeñando el papel revolucionario: nationalism and culture in mexico, 1920-1940 misunderstanding, José Francisco must defend his has nothing to do with exploitation. Te confict in fancée, Cruz against the advances of the hacienda the story is emphatically not due to malfeasance, owner, or hacendado, Felipe. Despite the confict, intrigue, or exploitation on the part of the hacendado; the fgure of the hacendado is consistently shown to rather than exploiting his peasants, Felipe is one of be a good man. Rather than isolating himself from the victims of intrigue. Te central villain of the flm his peasants, the old hacendado greets them as they is Ángela, the woman who had taken José Francisco come in from the felds. It is due to his care that José in at the beginning of the story. As a result of her lack Francisco is able to live at Rancho Grande, and he of morality, her greed, and her machinations, she made a companion to Felipe, the future inheritor of nearly topples the entire rancho. Ángela’s desire for the hacienda. Felipe, like his father before him, is a money and to rid herself of Cruz led her to instigate dutiful patriarch. He is taught that a hacendado must the fght between the two men. Early in the flm, the be the father, mother, doctor, judge, and sometime old patrón chastises Ángela for not being married to sexton for his peasants. As a result of his kindness, Florentino. By the flm’s end, Florentino understands his peasants pray that the Virgin of Guadalupe bless that he must become Ángela’s husband and he beats him. Te hacienda is a place of generosity, ease, and her aggressively. Without a husband to beat her into bucolic pleasure, not abjectness or exploitation.46 submission, Ángela was capable of intrigue. Te flm A diferent philosophical paradigm undergirds then cuts to Florentino and Ángela emerging from and explains this fundamentally diferent vision the Church on their wedding day, with Felipe and his of the social state in Mexico. As noted above, the new wife, and José Francisco and Cruz. Florentino ofcial state ideology was indigenism, which held now is the rightful head of the household; the rancho the racial mixture of the nation in high esteem and is redeemed, and the flm ends against a Mexican saw the state as the necessary agent of liberation and sunset.49 redemption for a people oppressed and exploited by Commercial flms were successful because Europeans and Americans. Clearly, from this point people enjoyed these happy endings, colorful of view, any hacienda had to be a horrible legacy of cinematography, and compelling characters. colonial cruelty: how could it ever serve as the setting Unlike the austere didacticism of Soviet-inspired for a romantic comedy? Allá en el rancho grande, revolutionary cinema, the ambiance, sounds, and however, supports a competing ideology, hispanicism. customs of the comedia ranchera were familiar, and According to hispanicism, Spanish blood, culture, the simple depictions of social life were comfortable and Catholicism had redeemed the Indians from for the flm’s audience. Tis flm was so popular that barbarity and backwardness. Employed by an alliance de Fuentes remade the flm in 1948. De los Reyes between conservative Catholic peasants and wealthy suggests that audience’s enthusiasm stemmed from landowners in the states of Michoacán, Guanajuato, the “public’s identifcation with the characters… by and Jalisco, hispanicism ofered a powerful alternative the idealization that they made of the [characters] vision to Revolutionary indigenism in the 1930s.47 In (they were all ‘good’ and they knew how to dress the flm, the hacendados are clearly Spanish—the old and wear with dignity national costumes).”50 Te boss’s lisp and use of “vosotros” indicate his European charro was an idealized, honorable man, protecting origin. José Francisco is the heroic, Hispanic charro, the social state from decay. Tis conservative which, as Joanne Hershfeld describes, “was a symbol sensibility, rather than appearing merely reactionary, of Hispanic masculinity—light-skinned, handsome, is consistent with modernity and progress. Rather, and respectful of the ‘inherent’ divisions within commercial flms such as Allá en el rancho grande Mexican society… the charro’s role was to maintain may have been popular partly because they gestured the patriarchal system that kept classes, races, and to a non-statist version of progress and modernity. genders in their places.”48 Te hero, therefore, is Te charro can be seen as a redeemer of the past, heroic not because he opposes the current status creating modernity based on the salvation of an older quo, but because he defends its historically Hispanic model. customs and cultural traditions. Further, the medium itself aforded audiences Indeed, there is a confict in the flm between a chance to take part in the modern world. Eric José Francisco and Felipe. But the disagreement Zolov attributes the success of rock ‘n’ roll flms of

77 columbia university journal of politics & society the 1950s to their embodiment of “a modern lifestyle gringo doesn’t understand the culture in the least. that appealed to many adults’ sense of progress and He shouts “Whoopee!” when his cock wins, another prosperity, especially the desire to be viewed by the cringe-worthy moment.53 outside world as advanced.”51 Likewise, the fact Te flm speaks to the contemporary that Allá en el rancho grande was a Hollywood-style relationship between Mexico and the United States. commercial flm led many to feel that they were Mexico and the United States had a contentious taking part in American-style progress. In other relationship since the Mexican-American War, words, the medium of Hollywood flm signifed in which the United States was perceived as an modernity, especially when the characters were imperialistic power. Tis idea certainly had not proud leaders that created stability. In content and vanished by the time of the Revolution, as the presentation, Allá en el rancho grande was a chance Porfriato had seen a massive increase in the for Mexicans to look with anticipation toward a size and scope of U.S. investment and business brighter future. development in the nation. Terefore, a key element Tus, the success of this comedia ranchera of Revolutionary rhetoric was that the United States suggests that a conservative, Porfrian vision of was the new Spain, exploiting the indigenous peoples society had not been totally erased by the Revolution. of Mexico. Relations, at least in terms of commercial Trough a reworking of the underlying principles, interactions, were at an all-time low with Cárdenas’s “order and progress” were realized. Tis vision nationalization of oil, which included several U.S. opposed the wholesale alteration of social relations, interests. As the TGP prints above demonstrated, which the Revolutionary state promoted. Modernity there was great national chest beating following that was not the exclusive property of the Revolutionary event, for Mexico had fnally overpowered the United hegemonic bloc. Te flm industry, and indeed States. the state project, was subject to the whims of the At the same time, however, the Mexican elites market and its consumers; the very people the state sensed that the United States needed to be pacifed desperately targeted with its Revolutionary “common in some regard, so that they would support the sense” had an alternative vision of Mexican identity Mexican state economically. In 1929, President Portes and the way toward modernity. Gil, undoubtedly at the behest of the jefe maximo Calles, announced the nation’s commitment to the SERAPE CANAPÉS: A MEXICO FOR FOREIGN expansion of the tourism industry in Mexico. To that CONSUMPTION end, he created the Mixed Pro-Tourism Commission Allá en el rancho grande was popular not and declared that Mexico would be made safe and only among Mexican audiences; Americans comfortable for travelers from the United States. focked to enjoy the folkloric comedia ranchera. States Berger: “Amid broader eforts to defne lo An advertisement from Billboard magazine noted mexicano during the 1920s through education, art, Guízar’s visit to the (ironically named) Cervantes archaeology, and music, tourism emerged as another Teatre in New York, where he met a crowd of 50,000 opportunity for revolutionary leaders to defne, people. Quotes from reviewers from local papers negotiate, and preserve national identity.”54 Tourism spoke to the quality of Guízar’s singing voice and his was another area where the state could preach “looks and sure-fre stage personality.”52 Americans indigenism.55 even had a role in the flm itself. During a cockfght, Tis project was not entirely in Mexican hands, an obvious gringo places a bet on the “gallo colorado” however. Sociologists have indicated that tourists because he is from Denver, Colorado, which causes aim to experience something “distinct from everyday everyone in the club to cringe. Te gringo emerges life—a process mediated through an artifcial, again to defend the hacendado against a charge of protected environment developed for and demanded exploitation of the peasants, and he is promptly by the tourist. Ironically, tourists nevertheless set knocked unconscious. In other words, the gringo out in search of ‘the authentic.’”56 Tus, when the is a joke; while he is obviously interested in quasi- Mexican government facilitated tourism projects imperialistic economic enrichment, he does not based on indigenism, they were actively catering to represent an imminent threat. Additionally, the the desires of their American visitors to see Mexican

78 desempeñando el papel revolucionario: nationalism and culture in mexico, 1920-1940 identity. Tey could not take this ideology to its quasi-racist stereotypes, including a Mexican sleeping extreme portrayal, however. Claiming that Europeans under his sombrero and a palm tree, Mexicans had oppressed Mexicans for centuries would not fshing, and a Mexican getting into trouble at his be appealing to Americans, so the more extreme work. Te internal confict in the booklet is best aspects of post-Revolutionary indigenism had to be captured by one spread in particular. Next to an ad toned down when presenting to foreign audiences. In for Native Arts and Antiques, there is an ad for the this manner, the ofcial Revolutionary line became Hotel Reforma stating, “250 rooms and bathrooms; distorted. charmingly appointed; air conditioned; purifying In order to make Americans comfortable by water plant; all modern conveniences.” Te ad for creating that “artifcial, protected environment,” the hotel lacks any indigenous adornment. Clearly, Mexico had to demonstrate its cosmopolitan, indigenism should not factor into conversations about European character. In a tourist guide for Americans, lodgings or the comfort of their foreign visitors. Touring Mexico, the traces of this conficted Tourists need not be overwhelmed or challenged too ideology are fully evident. One advertisement for greatly.61 beer reads, “Cerveceria Moctezuma: Te beer that Evidently, many feared that for the tourists, made Milwaukee jealous.” Tis text is set against indigenism would transition from a folkloric whimsy the lithographed backdrop of a hacienda and other to a bald indication of backwardness. Indigenism was European-style buildings. In the foreground are a “fun” element that could be experienced during simple peasant cottages—a coexistence of the two the day, but it would not follow tourists into their ideals at the same time.57 Milwaukee evoked home, hotel rooms or their restaurants beyond their own as well as European methods of beer making, but the comfort level. Te food of the era also captured this exotic setting of the factory allowed the tourist to feel ambivalent attitude, particularly when presented for just far enough away from home. Te advertisement foreign audiences. Jefery Pilcher notes, “Foreign demonstrates the authentic and the comfortable recipes continued to dominate Mexican culinary Indigenism does make an appearance in the literature throughout the 1920s and 1930s, an booklet, for the only informational section of the ironic continuation of Porfrian tastes through the brochure is about indigenous groups. Te author revolutionary period.” 62 One English-language writes, “It is recognized that much of the charm, cookbook contains Pilcher’s assessment, as well as individuality and strength of the present Mexican Berger’s. In Mexico Trough My Kitchen Window, nation lies in the fact that her roots are buried deep María de Carbia dedicated her recipes to the “nice in ancient and glorious Mexican civilizations.”58 English-speaking people that have visited and liked Here one sees a line explicitly expressing Mexico,” and the recipes she selects capture this Revolutionary state indigenism. Te tourist pamphlet ambivalence toward indigenous cooking.63 She thus also expresses the goal of modernizing the Indians; describes tortillas: “Just as in Africa, [where] the the Tarahumaras [of Northwestern Mexico] are ‘tom-tom’ greets the ear of the wandering stranger, said to have lived in misery for centuries, but “the in Mexico the sound of the clapping hands of the present Mexican government is making strong Indian woman greets the ear of the wandering eforts to aid them economically, and to educate their tourist, especially through the country roads and children.”59 Tere is even a subtle jab at the United small villages.” 64 De Carbia invokes Africa to give States, consistent with the view that the United States her readers a sense that Mexican food is indeed was the new imperial oppressor. Elsewhere in the exotic, perpetuating the folkloric mystique. Mexico is guide, a lithographed cartoon road map of the border indelibly infuenced by its indigenous past. crossing shows an angry Uncle Sam, his arms crossed De Carbia does not wish to suggest that in irritation.60 Various cartoons that depict Mexican all Mexicans constantly eat these Indian pancakes industriousness appear throughout the lithographed cooked on a piece of sheet metal, lest they be thought pages: glass blowing, factories, and agricultural work. of as uncouth. Te reader can rest assured that, “Te Tese images underscore the idea that Mexico was a middle and high class people eat tortillas instead land of modernity and progress. of bread once in a while ‘for a change’ specially At the same time, however, there are several accompanying some chili dishes, but they use them

79 columbia university journal of politics & society mainly for the confection of some fancy dishes as immoderate eagerness to excel, to be the frst in ev- ‘enchiladas.’” 65 Just as in Touring Mexico, there erything.”68 is the explicit indication that the folkloric exists Tis reading is seemingly consistent with the for those who want to immerse themselves in it ways in which the post-Revolutionary state desper- “for a change,” but that it by no means is pervasive ately desired to create a cultural hegemony based or anything more than whimsy. Based upon de upon indigenist nationalism. Vasconcelos’s concep- Carbia’s recipe selection, it seems that Mexican food tion of the raza cósmica, one which valued Indian is unequivocally Spanish in character: the author roots over Hispanic customs, can be read as a “psy- includes recipes for gazpacho, veal Valencia style, and chological” attempt to appropriate that which had Spanish menestra. Here, there is an attempt to depict historically made Mexicans insecure, to turn a per- Mexico as truly Spanish, with some indigenous ceived roadblock to modernity into an existential fourishes. Ideologically speaking, the text is much beneft. Tis ideology would create a Revolutionary more hispanicist than indigenist, much more Porfrian Family, an indelible ethnic bond between all Mexi- than Revolutionary. cans. Te current ruling bloc, then, could begin the Te Mexican state’s experience with the work of modernizing and civilizing the people who creation of a Mexico for international consumption had sufered hardship and exploitation for so long; can best be described by one recipe in de Carbia’s the Revolution, and the path toward the ascendancy text, “Serape Canapé,” a dish consisting of toast, of la raza, could begin in earnest. Education would cream cheese, pimento, green pepper, or “any be the key, for culture needed to change in order to other food that can give color and taste to the create a new common sense for the Mexican people canapé.”66 Te dish, invented for this text, captures that could bring them out of the bloody terrors of the challenges associated with the creation of lo Revolution and 500 years of exploitation. mexicano for foreigners. While the canapé looks To assume an inferiority complex does not give like a serape, an indigenista icon, in fact it is made sufcient credit to the Mexicans who desperately from white bread and cream cheese, ingredients that believed that the Revolution, and its accompanying gringos could feel comfortable cooking with and indigenism, was the true path to peace and security. serving to their friends. As in the flms, the market Tat is, rather than attempting to conceal their own dictated the appropriate ideological line to take. inferiority, Mexican cultural projects between 1920 Clearly, some elements of indigenism made it through and 1940 were a clear admission that power was in- the censorship. But as the primary motivation for deed tenuous. Armchair psychology is not the prima- producing these materials was to get Americans to ry goal of this paper, despite the invocation of Samuel pay a visit, indigenism needed to be toned down and Ramos. However, I would venture to ofer the fol- stripped of its Revolutionary radicalism.67 Once lowing diagnosis, based upon the evidence presented ideology, it was transformed into kitsch. above: existential anxiety. Tose involved in the creation of the new state INFERIORITY COMPLEX OR EXISTENTIAL ANXI- were extremely concerned with power for the mere ETY? reason that it was contested. Te experience of the To conclude, we return to Samuel Ramos’ text, previous decade indicated that power was ephem- El perfl del hombre y la cultura en Mexico. Ramos eral; when it evaporated, a violent end came quickly. views Mexican culture as emanating from an infe- Personal self-interest, and anxiety about the lack of riority complex on the part of the Mexican people. control over one’s world and future, was only part Oppressed for so long, told to modernize and Eu- of it. Tese fgures were indeed concerned about the ropeanize for centuries, the Mexican people have future of Mexico. In establishing these cultural proj- a deep-seated insecurity about the value of la raza. ects, they hoped to integrate society and tie it to their Writes Ramos, “One should suppose the existence of particular vision of ascendancy. Tat these cultural an inferiority complex in all individuals that demon- projects were rife with dissensus merely reinforced strate an exaggerated concern with the afrmation of these anxieties: Siquieros and Rivera took pot-shots their personality, that have vital interest in all things at each other over who was the better revolutionary. and situations that signify power, and that have an Te people disdained Revolutionary flm in favor of a

80 desempeñando el papel revolucionario: nationalism and culture in mexico, 1920-1940 glorifcation of the ancien régime. A tourism industry www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/mex/en_mex-int-text-const.pdf. 18. Benjamin, La Revolución, p. 73. had to appeal to the supposed exploiters by declaring 19. Ibid., p. 73-75. Mexico’s ultimately European character. 20. Xavier Guerrero, “El Táller de Gráfca Popular.” Poster. Mexico City: Taller de Gráfca Popular, 1938. From Princeton University Indeed, indigenism was a cultural trapping, Library, Latin American Prints Collection. http://arks.princeton.edu/ ark:/88435/dj52w478k. Author’s translation. rather than the way of the future. Mexico was no lon- 21. José Chavez Morado. “Unidad en tus flas.” Poster. Mexico City: ger in the midst of a military upheaval, but instead, Taller de Gráfca Popular, 1938. From Princeton University Library, Latin American Prints Collection. http://arks.princeton.edu/ an ideological struggle. As during the Revolution, ark:/88435/7s75dc467. with its many factions and massive mobilization, the 22. Ibid. Author’s translation. 23 Eric Zolov, Refried Elvis: Te Rise of the Mexican Counterculture period of post-Revolutionary nation building saw a (Berkeley: University of California, 1999), p. 4. broad polyphony of voices emerge that represented 24. “Revolution Day”. Cartoon. Candelario Nacionalista y Enciclopedia Popular (Mexico, D.F.: Partido Nacional Revolucionario, 1934) Re- those previously disenfranchised from developing a printed in Benjamin, La Revolución, p. 88. concept of the nation. To claim that there existed a 25. Alfredo Zalce, “Expropriación de la industria del petroleo.” Poster. Mexico City: Taller de Gráfca Popular, ca. 1938. From Princeton great National Culture revealed from on high is the University Library, Latin American Prints Collection. Author’s same type of mythmaking done by men like Vascon- Translation. http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/p2676v64d. 26. Zolov, Refried Elvis, p. 4. celos. “How much of the truth can one man endure?” 27. “Aquí estamos todos.” Poster. Mexico City: Taller de Gráfca Popular, enquired Nietzsche. Sometimes, the very lack of 1942. From Princeton University Library, Latin American Prints Col- lection. http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/5138jd955. Author’s control, and the great amount of individual free will, Translation. creates the most powerful myths about the universe’s 28. Joseph and Nugent, Everyday Forms of State Formation, p. 21-22. 29. Middlebrook, Te Paradox of Revolution, p. 9. divine destiny. 30. Ibid., p. 27. 31. Alfredo Zalce, “Compañero.” Poster. Mexico City: Taller de Gráfca Popular, 1938. From Princeton University Library, Latin American Works Cited Prints Collection. http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/rv042t15n. Author’s Translation. 1. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio 32. Desmond Rochfort, “Te Sickle, the Serpent, and the Soil: History, Gramsci. Comp. Quintin Hoare and Geofrey Nowell-Smith (London: Revolution, Nationhood, and Modernity in the Murals of Diego Ri- Electric Book, 2001). vera, José Clemente Orozco, and David Alfaro Siquieros” in Te Eagle 2. Tomas Benjamin, La Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Mem- and the Virigin. ory, Myth & History (Austin: University of Texas, 2000). 33. Diego Rivera, Mechanization of the Countryside, 1926. For the most 3. G. M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds, Everyday Forms of State Forma- comprehensive example of Rivera’s vision of Mexicanity see Te His- tion: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico (Dur- tory of Mexico, 1935, also at the SEP. ham: Duke UP, 1994); Kevin J. Middlebrook, Te Paradox of Revolu- 34. José Clemente Orozco, Political and Ideological Exploitation, 1936. tion: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexicso (Baltimore: 35. Desmond Rochfort. Mexican Muralists: Orozco, Rivera, Siqueiros (San Johns Hopkins UP, 1995). Francisco: Chronicle, 1998), p. 140. 4. Mary K. Vaughan and Stephen Lewis, eds. Te Eagle and the Virgin: 36. Rochfort, “Te Sickle, the Serpent, and the Soil.” National Identity, Memory and Utopia in Mexico, 1920-1940 (Dur- 37. David Alfaro Siquieros, Portrait of the Bourgeoisie, 1940. ham: Duke UP, 2006). 38. “Gran escandalo en el palacio de Bellas Artes,” El Universal, August 5. Aurelio de los Reyes. Medio Siglo De Cine Mexicano (1896-1947) 30, 1935, p. 1. Quoted in Marciela Gónzalez Cruz Manjarrez, La Po- (México, D.F.: Editorial Trillas, 1987); Allá en el rancho grande, di- lemica Siquieros-Rivera: Planteamientos Estético-políticos 1934-1935 , rected by Fernando de Fuentes, 1936. (México, D.F.: Museo Dolores Olmedo Patiño, 1996), p. 26. 6. Jefrey M. Pilcher, ¡Qué Vivan Los Tamales!: Food and the Making of 39. González Cruz Manjarrez, La Polémica Siqueiros-Rivera: p. 33-43. Mexican Identity (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1998); 40. Joanne Hershfeld, “Screening the Nation” in Te Eagle and the Vir- Dina Berger, Te Development of Mexico’s Tourism Industry: Pyramids gin, p. 265. by Day, Martinis by Night (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); 41. Ibid. Dina Berger and Andrew Grant Wood, eds, Holiday in Mexico: Criti- 42. De los Reyes, Medio Siglo, p. 186. Author’s Translation. cal Refections on Tourism and Tourist Encounters (Durham, NC: 43. Agustín Aragón Leiva, “Divulgación cientifca por la cinematografa,” Duke UP, 2010). El Nacional, October 9, 1932, p. 3. Quoted in de los Reyes, Medio Si- 7. Stuart Hall, “Te Problem of Ideology-Marxism without Guarantees,” glo, p. 187. Author’s Translation. Journal of Communication Inquiry 10.2 (1986): p. 43-44. 44. Redes, directed by Fred Zinneman, 1935. 8. Ibid. 45. Hershfeld, “Screening the Nation,” p. 267. 9. Gramsci, Selections, p. 138. 46. De Fuentes, Allá en el rancho grande. 10. Ibid., p. 136. 47. Hershfeld, “Screening the Nation,” p. 272-273. 11. José Vasconselos, “La Raza Cósmica,” p. 21, http://www.flosofa.org/ 48. Ibid. aut/001/razacos.htm. 49. De Fuentes, Allá en el rancho grande. 12. Mary K. Vaughn and Stephen E. Lewis, introduction to Te Eagle and 50. De los Reyes, Medio Siglo, p. 152. Author’s Translation. the Virgin, p. 10-11. 51. Zolov, Refried Elvis, p. 29. 13. Ruth Hellier-Tinoco, Embodying Mexico: Tourism, Nationalism & 52. “Advertisment,” Te Billboard, December 12, 1936, p. 22. Performance (New York: Oxford UP, 2011), p. 60. 53. De Fuentes, Allá en el rancho grande. 14. Vaughn and Lewis, Te Eagle and Virgin, p. 11. See Section II, “Uto- 54. Berger, Te Development of Mexico’s Tourist Industry, p. 11-12. pian Projects of the State,” of Te Eagle and the Virgin for further 55. Ibid. examples of specifc programs undertaken by the SEP, particularly vis 56. Berger and Wood, Holiday in Mexico, p. 4. a vis “the Indian Problem” and modernization. 57. Ruth Poyo, Touring Mexico, (Mexico, D.F.: Fischgrund, 1939), p. 18. 15. Henry C. Schmidt, “Antecedents to Samuel Ramos: Mexicanist 58. Ibid., p. 20. Tought in the 1920s,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Af- 59. Ibid., p. 23. fairs, 18.2 (1976), p. 184. 60. Ibid., p. 6. 16. Ibid., p. 185. 61. Ibid. 17. Constitution of Mexico, Organization of American States, http:// 62. Pilcher, ¡Qué vivan los tamales!, p. 130. 81 columbia university journal of politics & society

63. María Aguilar de Carbia, Mexico Trough my Kitchen Window (Mexi- Tomas Benjamin, fgure 5. Austin: University of Texas, 2000. co City: A. Mijares, 1938). Rivera, Diego, “Mechanization of the Countryside,” frescoe, 1926 (Secretaría 64. Ibid., p. 137. de Educacion Publica, Mexico City). In Te Eagle and the Virgin, 65. Ibid., p. 138. edited by Mary K. Vaughn and Steven E. Lewis, plate 4. Durham, NC: 66. Ibid. p. 9. Duke UP, 2006. 67. Pilcher, “¡Qué vivan los tamales!” p. 130. Rochfort, Desmond. Mexican Muralists: Orozco, Rivera, Siqueiros. San 68. Ramos, El perfl del hombre, p. 73. Francisco: Chronicle, 1998. ---. “Te Sickle, the Serpent, and the Soil: History, Revolution, Nationhood, and Modernity in the Murals of Diego Rivera, José Clemente Orozco, Bibliography and David Alfaro Siquieros.” In Te Eagle and the Virgin, edited by Mary K. Vaughan and Stephen Lewis, 43-57. Durham: Duke UP, “Advertisement.” Te Billboard 48, no. 50 (Dec 12, 1936): 22-22. (http:// 2006. search.proquest.com/docview/1032114787?accountid=13314). Roji, Joaquin and Augstín Palacios. Mexico: Guia ilustrado de turismo. Mexi- Alfaro Siquieros, David. Portrait of the Bourgeoisie, fresco, 1940 (Sindicato co, D.F.: Guia Roji, c. 1935. de Electricistas, Mexico City). In Te Eagle and the Virgin, edited by Schmidt, Henry C. “Antecedents to Samuel Ramos: Mexicanist Tought in Mary K. Vaughn and Steven E. Lewis, plate 10. Durham, NC: Duke the 1920s,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Afairs, 18.2 UP, 2006. (1976). “Aquí estamos todos.” Poster. Mexico City: Taller de Gráfca Popular, 1942. Vasconselos, José, “La Raza Cósmica,” Proyecto flosofía en español. http:// From Princeton University Library, Latin American Prints Collection. www.flosofa.org/aut/001/razacos.htm. http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/5138jd955. Vaughan, Mary K. and Stephen Lewis, eds. Te Eagle and the Virgin: National Aragón Leiva, Agustín. “Divulgación cientifca por la cinematografa.” El Identity, Memory and Utopia in Mexico, 1920-1940. Durham: Duke Nacional, October 9, 1932, p. 3. UP, 2006. Benjamin, Tomas. La Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Zalce, Alfredo. “Compañero.” Poster. Mexico City: Taller de Gráfca Popular, Myth & History. Austin: University of Texas, 2000. 1938. From Princeton University Library, Latin American Prints Berger, Dina. Te Development of Mexico’s Tourism Industry: Pyramids by Collection. http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/rv042t15n. Day, Martinis by Night. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ---. “Expropriación de la industria del petroleo.” Poster. Mexico City: Taller de --- and Andrew Grant Wood, eds. Holiday in Mexico: Critical Refections on Gráfca Popular, ca. 1938. From Princeton University Library, Latin Tourism and Tourist Encounters. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010. American Prints Collection. http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/ Chavez Morado, José. “Unidad en tus flas.” Poster. Mexico City: Taller p2676v64d. de Gráfca Popular, 1938. From Princeton University Library, Zinneman, Fred. Redes. Mexico, 1935. Latin American Prints Collection. http://arks.princeton.edu/ Zolov, Eric. Refried Elvis: Te Rise of the Mexican Counterculture. Berkeley: ark:/88435/7s75dc467. University of California, 1999. Clemente Orozco, José. Political and Ideological Exploitation, fresco, 1936 (Universidad de Guadalajara). In Te Eagle and the Virgin, edited by Mary K. Vaughn and Steven E. Lewis, plate 7. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2006. “Constitution of Mexico.” Organization of American States. http://www.oas. org/juridico/mla/en/mex/en_mex-int-text-const.pdf De Carbia, María Aguilar. Mexico Trough my Kitchen Window. Mexico City: A. Mijares, 1938. De Fuentes, Fernando. Allá en el rancho grande. Mexico, 1936. De los Reyes, Aurelio. Medio Siglo De Cine Mexicano (1896-1947). México, D.F.: Editorial Trillas, 1987. Gónzalez Cruz Manjarrez, Marciela. La Polemica Siquieros-Rivera: Plantea- mientos Estético-políticos 1934-1935 . México, D.F.: Museo Dolores Olmedo Patiño, 1996. Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Comp. Quintin Hoare and Geofrey Nowell-Smith. London: Electric Book, 2001. “Gran escandalo en el palacio de Bellas Artes.” El Universal, August 30, 1935, p. 1. Guerrero, Xavier. “El Táller de Gráfca Popular.” Poster. Mexico City: Taller de Gráfca Popular, 1938. From Princeton University Library, Latin American Prints Collection. http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/ dj52w478k. Hall, Stuart. “Te Problem of Ideology-Marxism without Guarantees,” Jour- nal of Communication Inquiry 10.2 (1986). Hellier-Tinoco, Ruth. Embodying Mexico: Tourism, Nationalism & Perfor- mance. New York: Oxford UP, 2011. Hershfeld, Joanne. “Screening the Nation.” In Te Eagle and the Virgin: Na- tional Identity, Memory and Utopia in Mexico, 1920-1940, edited by Mary K. Vaughan and Stephen Lewis, 259-278. Durham: Duke UP, 2006. Joseph, G. M. and Daniel Nugent. Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revo- lution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico. Durham: Duke UP, 1994. Middlebrook, Kevin J. Te Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Au- thoritarianism in Mexico. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1995. Pilcher, Jefrey M. ¡Qué Vivan Los Tamales!: Food and the Making of Mexican Identity. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1998. Poyo, Ruth. Touring Mexico. Mexico, D.F.: Fischgrund, 1939. Ramos, Samuel. El perfl del hombre y la cultura en México. Mexico, D.F.: Edi- torial Pedro Robredo, 1938. “Revolution Day”. Cartoon. Candelario Nacionalista y Enciclopedia Popular. Mexico, D.F.: Partido Nacional Revolucionario, 1934. In La Revo- lución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Myth & History, by 82 post-transitional justice in spain: passing the historic memory law nadia hajji, duke university (2014)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my advisors, Professor Sarah Bermeo, Professor Judith Kel- ley and Professor Ken Rogerson, for their continual availability and support through- out my research and writing process. Many thanks also to the generous support of the Sanford School of Public Policy that enabled me to conduct research and interviews in Madrid and to the Duke University librarians for their kind assistance. I am in- debted to all those who participated in my interviews for donating their time and of- fering invaluable insights into my topic. Finally, I would like to wish special thanks to my mother and family for accompanying me through the process and being such a strong support system throughout my work on this project and all other endeavors.

ABSTRACT Tis paper traces the origins of the post-transitional justice eforts by the Spanish gov- ernment to recognize and ofer reparations for the human rights crimes committed dur- ing the Spanish Civil War and subsequent Franco dictatorship. Afer a delay of at least thirty years, reparation legislation was enacted in 2007 with the passage of the Historical Memory Law, which is regarded as one of Spain’s most ambitious measures to address its past human rights violations. Tis thesis argues that three main factors encouraged the Law’s passage. First, Spanish involvement in foreign social justice shined a spotlight on Spain’s own unsettled past. Second, the maturation of a younger generation that did not experience the worst years of the dictatorship turned public opinion in favor of repara- tion. Finally, the Law was introduced under opportune political circumstances and en- compassed minimal reparations in order to receive the necessary congressional vote.

INTRODUCTION 1980s that occurred from southern Europe to Latin hen Spanish leader Francisco Franco America. Most countries engaged in transitions from died in 1975 afer a rule of over three authoritarian systems of government to democracy, decades marked by human rights abuses, such as Portugal and Chile, immediately pursue WSpain underwent a radical change in governance accountability and reparation measures for crimes from dictatorship to democracy. During this committed by their fallen authoritarian regimes. transition, the country did not respond to the Spain, however, is distinctive in its decision to ignore human rights abuses of the Franco regime, or, in its past human rights violations, amid the fear that other words, it failed to pursue transitional justice. doing so would destabilize the new democracy.2 Transitional justice is defned as “the array of legal Nevertheless, Spain eventually faced both foreign and political mechanisms devised to hold departing and domestic demands to pursue what can be authoritarian regimes accountable for their political referred to as “post-transitional justice.”3 With transgressions.”1 Tis feld of study began with the pressure mounting in October 2007, the country Nuremburg trials in the 1940s and was popularized achieved a monumental piece of justice legislation, by a worldwide wave of democratization in the the Historical Memory Law, which addressed the columbia university journal of politics & society human rights violations that took place under the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco.4 Scholars Forgetting the Past have speculated on the motivations behind this Despite this horrifying past, or perhaps surge of renewed concern for Francoist crimes, because of it, Spain chose to forego any system of yet the analysis of Spain’s recent accountability accountability afer Franco’s death in 1975 and during and reparation measures has been limited and the subsequent transition to democracy. Tere was explanations are incomplete. Tis article strives to an attempted coup d’état in 1981, in which the Civil contribute to this sparsely researched area of Spanish Guard tried to reinstate the military government of social justice. Understanding the context in which the past thirty-fve years. Although the coup failed, the Historical Memory Law was passed could help to it demonstrated the precariousness of the new illustrate why accountability for Franco-era crimes democracy. In response, victims chose to protect the became an issue on the political agenda so many country’s democratic achievements at the expense years afer the collapse of the Franco regime and not of reparation. Rather than speak openly about earlier. the Franco regime’s crimes, Spain adhered to an unspoken Pacto del Silencio or Pacto de Olvido (Pact BACKGROUND of Silence).8 Te frst democratic Parliament afer The Crimes of the Franco Regime the dictatorship passed an Amnesty Law in October Francisco Franco’s dictatorship in Spain, which 1977 that pardoned all political crimes, regardless lasted from 1939 to 1975, began afer a gruesome of nature or outcome, including those committed 9 three-year Civil War between the Republicans, who by the Franco regime against its enemies. Many were loyal to the established Spanish Republic, and scholars have argued that this path allowed for a the Nationalists, a rebel group led by General Franco. peaceful governmental transition and helped stabilize 10 Te crimes of the Franco regime can be divided into the new democracy. In fact, despite its neglect of two phases: the years immediately following the war justice processes, Spain’s transition is regarded as (1939–1947) and a more stable period that lasted a model for securing strong democratic outcomes until the regime fell in 1975. Te most serious crimes afer a dictatorship. Conversely, according to some occurred during the former period, but political academics, Portugal’s proactive investigations into crimes continued throughout the latter.5 past crimes during its transition compromised As part of a deliberate system of revenge, democratic stability. Per this view, these pursuits 11 Francoist troops targeted civilians in locales of distracted the country from political reconciliation. Republican support in the immediate post-war Following this reasoning, the UN has historically years.6 Around 440,000 Republicans were exiled supported laws granting amnesty and preventing immediately afer the war, 10,000 of whom died in prosecution as a means of restoring peace and 12 Nazi concentration camps. Mass trials and executions solidifying democratic governments. Nevertheless, occurred regularly, with Franco showing little in choosing this method of transition, Spain did not restraint in signing death warrants. Some 400,000 fully conclude its tragic past. Moreover, a general people were subjected to forced labor, torture, consensus exists that this law is unconstitutional and 13 prison time, or internment camps. Te number of incompatible with international human rights law. these “ofcial” victims who sufered directly from Several obstacles perpetuated Spain’s pact repression policies is unclear and the number of of silence and hindered judicial inquiry into the those who were terrorized, kidnapped, and murdered Franco government’s violations. Te frst obstacle in secret is almost impossible to determine. concerns statutes of limitations embedded in most Children were separated from their Republican legal systems, including Spain’s. Tese statutes ensure parents and ofen adopted into families of Franco that prosecution for a crime may occur only within loyalists without ever knowing their true origin. a reasonable period afer the crime is committed. Although many of these crimes continued well into However, counterarguments hold that such statutes the later years of the dictatorship, later violations do not apply to Franco-era government violations, by the Franco regime consisted mostly of political for the disappearances have not been solved, making sentencing and torturing of government opponents.7 them ongoing crimes. Another obstacle pertains 84 post-transitional justice in spain: passing the historic memory law to basic due process rights for the accused; these prohibited political acts at the Valley of the Fallen, cannot be upheld, as the deceased are unable to Franco’s burial site.21 defend themselves.14 Retroactive justice scholar While the Socialist Worker’s Party (Partido Angela Guarino argues that fghting to bring justice Socialista Obrero Español, or PSOE) introduced the to crimes whose perpetrators are likely deceased is Historical Memory Law expecting quick, unanimous unproductive and others assert that attaining justice passage, the political process for the Law proved for the crimes of past regimes is unnecessary and unexpectedly contentious. Te country’s two main simply unrealistic.15 However, to other scholars political parties, the center-lef PSOE and the center- investigating Franco-era crimes, such as Mónica right Popular Party (Partido Popular, or PP), had Zapico Barbeito, the purpose of retroactive justice both been active in the debate for retroactive justice is not only to ensure justice, but also to establish in Spain. Te PP objected to the proposal for the the truth about the crimes committed and to grant Law in its entirety, accusing the PSOE of attempting reparations to those afected.16 to destroy Spain’s democratic transition.22 Some attribute the PP’s position to the public ties party The Historical Memory Law members and their families had to Franco’s While Spain evaded a transitional justice institutions.23 Despite these opposing views and the process in the early stages of the new government, resulting political drama, Congress eventually agreed the country faced increasing pressure at the turn of upon a revised version of the legislation, which this century to reveal the past transgressions of the passed with 127 votes for and 119 against (115 of Franco regime. Te Franco regime’s human rights which were from the PP).24 violations were neglected for decades until around 2000 when a nongovernmental organization, the Breaking the Silence Association for the Recuperation of Historical Te question remains as to what propelled Memory (ARMH), was created to assist private the new push for Spanish transitional justice initiatives in exhuming mass graves and investigating that materialized in the Historical Memory Law. the fate of disappeared persons.17 Subsequently, in Furthermore, there is no agreement on why the new 2006, a “fever for remembering” occurred, when law was passed when it was. Transitional justice the Spanish public pressed the government to literature suggests that ethical principles do not acknowledge the truth behind Franco-era crimes.18 drive pursuits for accountability and reparations, but In October 2007, Spain ofcially acknowledged rather a combination of other elements condition the the actions of Franco’s dictatorship as “unjust” for process.25 Tus, to discover why the frst reparations the frst time by passing the Historical Memory Law. law in Spain passed in 2007 and not earlier, I conduct 19 Te Law received international and domestic a situational examination rather than an ethical attention for its eforts to fnally address the country’s one. Furthermore, by examining trends at both silenced past. However, in an attempt to achieve the domestic and international levels, I provide an broad appeal, the Law intentionally did not refer account thorough enough to explain why reparations to any historical or collective memory, nor did it legislation was fnally passed in 2007. establish an account of what human rights violations It is important to recognize that the took place, nor did it condemn the Franco regime conversation for justice is not exclusively a domestic for its actions. It simply recognized each citizen’s matter, as foreign governments and organizations right to “personal and family memory,” or the right also play a role. Carmen González Enríquez claims to investigate crimes pertaining directly to one’s that active advocacy, including international family.20 Te bill created a process for victims to advocacy, is central to guaranteeing prosecution of seek a “Declaration of Reparations and Personal human rights crimes. 26 In her opinion, lobbying and Recognition,” enhanced the pensions of Republican political strategizing by the international community survivors and Franco-era political prisoners, and is consequential.27 Additionally, the desire and instructed local administrative units to help locate perceived need to enter the “European family” may and exhume mass graves. Further, it required favor transitional justice.28 Whether and how these removal of partisan commemorative symbols and international factors played a role in the Spanish

85 columbia university journal of politics & society pursuit of justice is discussed in Section 1 of this the international, generational, and political contexts thesis. provides a comprehensive understanding of the While the international factor may be factors that led to the Historical Memory Law. important, the local community and public opinion cannot be ignored.29 In transitioning countries, METHODS retroactive justice is not intended to deter further Parliamentary dialogues retrieved from the crime, but rather to validate the rights of citizens online journal of the Spanish Congress of Deputies and legitimize young democratic governments. were examined to assess the political debate on Some believe that new state authorities must address the Historical Memory Law. Tese journals were these violations; otherwise they may be construed obtained from the website of the Congress of as retroactively supporting the perpetrators.30 Deputies, http://www.congreso.es, which organized Eijkman explains that public opinion on the priority the journals by parliament session. Te particular of justice determines whether the prosecutions are journals analyzed were retrieved by searching appropriate.31 Internal pressure is examined in speeches in the eighth legislative session (2004–2008) Section 2, which compares the Spanish populace under the keywords Guerra civil y la dictadura, of 2006, when the Historical Memory Law was which were contained in the title of the original bill. introduced, to that of previous periods. Te search yielded three journals, from October 31, Finally, difering ideas on retribution and 2007, December 14, 2006, and November 11, 2006. reparations ofen become attached to political parties, On these dates the debate of the Law was recorded, making politics a crucial element in transitional with members of each parliamentary party speaking justice. Te agendas of these parties can mobilize on particulars of the bill, ofering amendments, demands for justice, and other political factors, such and expressing overall support or concerns. Te as institutions, can shape the way a country confronts political parties that spoke on the bill included its difcult past.32 For example, the PSOE and the the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE), the PP have been strategic in advocating for and against Democratic Popular Party (PP), the Vasco Party, the reparations, with the latter even defning justice Parliamentary Coalition of the Canaries and New attempts as an attack on the foundation of Spanish Canaries, the Catalán parliamentary group known democracy.33 Such political factors behind the as Convergence and Union, the United Lef, the passage of the Historical Memory Law are explored Republican Lef of Catalonia, and the Mixed Group in Section 3. comprised of nine members belonging to parties Although modest compared to the desires of the not large enough to create their own parliamentary political lef, the Historical Memory Law attempted group. to break the country’s silence and amnesia regarding In each session, members of all parties past human rights violations. In this article, political contributed to the debate over the Historical Memory debate, media reporting, and interviews surrounding Law. Generally, in each session, only one speaker the passage of the Historical Memory Law are used for each party spoke on behalf of the entire party, as evidence for the proposed motivations behind the expressing all the positions, concerns, and opinions justice concerns in Spain. In the subsequent sections, of that group. Te three congressional sessions I argue that the bill came at a time of renewed interest were screened for speeches, culminating in thirty- in Francoism and the Civil War. Developments in six speeches that in total comprised the various international criminal law and victims’ rights norms party stances in Congress at the time. Te debate encouraged initial self-refection in the country. was analyzed for several factors. First, to evaluate Further, a new generation of social and political politicians’ receptiveness to the Law, complaints participants that were willing to discuss past justice about the bill were monitored. Tese complaints were problems was replacing those who had lived and recorded in areas where justice was still considered to sufered through the Civil War and the Franco be incomplete afer the Law was passed, according to dictatorship. Finally, the politicians found reparation fndings from the literature review. Any complaints electorally favorable in 2006 and engaged in strategic outside this time condition were documented as negotiations to ensure the Law’s passage. Looking at “other complaints.” Te recorded areas included:

86 post-transitional justice in spain: passing the historic memory law – complaints about the Valley of the Fallen; generational tracking. Finally, the congressional – proper documentation of the dictatorship and debate entries were tagged with the political party Civil War; with which each respective speaker is afliated. Tis – sufcient apology or recognition of victims; – condemnation of the Franco regime or allowed me to better see how party politics afected establishment of a truth commission; the shaping and passage of the Law. – concrete policy on the exhumation of mass Congressional debate data was supplemented graves; with an analysis of arguments for the Historical – annulment of summary judgments during the Memory Law found in the two most circulated Franco regime; and newspapers in Spain, El País and El Mundo. El País – prosecution of perpetrators of human rights has a loosely liberal afliation, while El Mundo violations. skews slightly conservative. Using both of these Any comment that was disapproving toward, sources ensured inclusion of the most relevant critical of, or opposed to the bill was considered articles and a representative sample of arguments a “complaint.” A “complaint” was not necessarily associated with both ideologies. Furthermore, it negative in tone, but also included any constructive was possible to compare the coverage of both of comment that suggested changes, ways to improve these newspapers to reveal any partisan diferences. the bill, or personal desires for the bill that had not Articles and opinion pieces from 1990 to 2013 were yet been addressed. Additionally, to assess overall gathered in the LexisNexis database using search satisfaction with the bill, a parliamentary member’s terms corresponding to the Historical Memory Law, overall judgment of the bill as either “sufcient,” human rights, and the Franco dictatorship. Duplicate “insufcient,” or “neutral” was recorded. Judgments articles and editorials were eliminated, as well as recorded as “insufcient” were readily apparent false positives that did not refer directly to the above in speeches that referred to the bill as “lacking,” search criteria. Te extent of news coverage was “not enough,” “disappointing,” or “insufcient.” If quantifed as the number of articles within certain explicit language was not used, then speeches that time frames that referenced the Historical Memory contained arguments for further reparation were Law, Franco, international human rights, and marked as “insufcient” interpretations, while indications of generational changes, such as appeals those that lacked such arguments and expressed to justice for grandparents. optimism or satisfaction with the bill were marked Te fnal data source consisted of interviews “sufcient.” When an argument did not clearly fall that were conducted in person in Madrid, Spain into these categories or when there were conficting in the summer of 2013. Tese interviews were interpretations in the same argument, it was marked designed to obtain opinions of those familiar with as neutral. the Historical Memory Law in order to elucidate References to the international community, what some people view as its benefts and drawbacks. such as international human rights law, Spanish Furthermore, these interviews were used to gain involvement with the Pinochet case, or international insight into the reason the bill was on the political interest groups such as Amnesty International, were agenda, public opinion on the Law, and general documented within the congressional debate entries. perspectives on the debate that may not have been Tese references were important in assessing what acquired through analyses of journal and newspaper role the international community played in passing documents. Lastly, information gathered from the Law and gauging how ofen debate referenced the these interviews was used to enhance the historical international stage. Furthermore, the congressional background behind the transitional justice process in debate was tracked for any evidence of a generational Spain. change occurring within Spain and among the Te most useful interview was with Carlos congressional representatives. For example, if a Castresana-Fernandez, a renowned Spanish member stressed a need to do justice for his or her prosecutor, criminal law professor, and head of the grandparents or alluded to an inability to pass such International Commission against Organized Crime a law previously because of the instability of Spain’s in Guatemala (CICIG). He has particular expertise democracy, his or her comment was included in in Spanish justice, as a consequence of having

87 columbia university journal of politics & society worked with Superior Courts of Justice of Madrid similarly occurred without any precondition relating and Catalonia, as well as in the Special Prosecutor’s to Spain’s pursuit of accountability.36 Terefore, in Ofces against Corruption. Castresana-Fernandez the 1980s, the international community still did not is an expert in international human rights and has require Spain to acknowledge Franco-era crimes or won many honors for his work in the subject area, bring justice to Franco-regime victims. including the National Award for Human Rights in More recently, the European Union has strictly Spain in 1997 and the Human Rights Award from the imposed reparation conditions on countries before Argentina Association of Human Rights in 1999. Te granting membership. Entry requirements for interview took place on August 29, 2013. Serbia included the surrender of all war criminals Additional interviews were conducted with to the former Yugoslavian tribunal.37 Conditions Patricia Esteban, a resident of Madrid and professor were also imposed on the Czech Republic and all of Spanish literature at the Universidad San Pablo; former members of the Warsaw Pact. Spain and Juan Pulgar, a lawyer in Madrid; and Pilar Pulgar, Portugal, however, were both accepted without a worker residing in Madrid who lived through the such demands.38 Tus, a direct request by the Franco dictatorship. international community never drove the Spanish pursuit of justice through the Historical Memory RESULTS Law. Te Law also had no direct repercussions for Section 1: International Context Spain in the international community, so Spain Te renewed interest in justice and should have felt no pressure via the international accountability that occurred in Spain in the 2000s stage to address its transitional justice concerns.39 afer years of observance of the pacto de olvido was Although there were initially no specifc situated in a unique moment on the international international demands for Spain to address victims stage and in the evolution of international law. of the Franco regime, later requests by non- Post-transitional justice in Spain resulted from a governmental international organizations resonated variety of international factors including elevated with the country, which could help explain why international pressure, the establishment of post-transitional justice occurred in 2007 and not international human rights laws, Spain’s involvement earlier. Amnesty International implored Spain to in foreign transitional justice, and the progression do justice for the thousands of victims up until and of transitional justice in other countries in the late even afer the Historical Memory Law was passed.40 1990s. Tese appeals were publicized to the Spanish population through El País in articles from May Active International Pressure and November of 2003. In the May 2003 article, the Spain was not required to address its past newspaper covered Amnesty International’s support human rights violations by the international of new initiatives honoring Civil War victims and communities it joined following the democratic exhumations of mass graves.41 Likewise, in 2002, the transition; however, the international community United Nations Human Rights Ofce recommended did actively contribute to Spain’s “fever for that Spain “investigate the disappearance at the remembering.”34 When Spain joined the Council of hands of the Franco regime [of] at least two cases Europe in 1977, the Council did not impose entry of Republicans shot afer the Civil War.”42 El País requirements pertaining to Franco-era crimes. featured this recommendation on November 16, Although in 1950 this Council forged the European 2002, which consequently sparked an immediate and Convention of Human Rights, an international treaty unprecedented motion in Parliament on November to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms 20 condemning Franco’s uprising in 1936 as an illegal in Europe, it did not attempt to apply this doctrine rebellion against a legitimate government.43 Tis retroactively to Spain and force the country to ofer earlier reaction by the Spanish Parliament to the reparations to victims of the Franco government.35 request of international organizations suggests that As a result, Spain did not face pressure to pursue the pressure from such organizations contributed to transitional justice in the 1970s. Te country’s the milieu in which the Historical Memory Law was subsequent entry into the European Union in 1986 passed. In sum, international pressure grew in the

88 post-transitional justice in spain: passing the historic memory law early 2000s, which fostered dialogue on transitional Tis evolution of criminal law in the 2000s set justice issues. the stage for Spain’s renewed interest in Franco-era crimes.48 Almost 20 percent of debate speeches on Building International Norms the Historical Memory Law cited World War II as the In addition to the pressure directly exerted origin of the international criminal law applicable on Spain by international actors, the evolution of to Spain, referring to it as the structural basis of international human rights norms has had a great European democratic culture and the foundation infuence on the trajectory of the Historical Memory of the core European value of human rights.49 Law debate. Tese developments began with the Speeches also acknowledged the sixtieth anniversary Nuremberg trials in 1945, when the United Nations of the precedent’s existence.50 Moreover, 36 percent resolved that atrocities like those of World War II of the debate speeches explicitly accused Spain of should never recur. Te United Nations adopted violating established international human rights the Universal Declaration of Human Rights three doctrines, indicating that deputies were cognizant years later, though this declaration and the similar and respectful of the norms that the international Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from community expected to be upheld. Enforced Disappearance (1992) are not legally In the debate over the Historical Memory binding. 44 In contrast, the UN’s International Law, 71.4 percent of deputy accusations referred to Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the violation of some UN human rights doctrine. and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Most accusations cited noncompliance with UN Rights are legally binding human rights agreements, International Covenants of Human Rights, followed efective as of 1976. Te Rome Statute of the by neglect of the Rome Statute. Other UN doctrines, International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted in such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1998 and put into efect in 2002, establishing four were mentioned less ofen. Specifcally, Joan Tardà core international crimes: genocide, crimes against i Coma of the Republican Lef argued on October humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.45 31, 2007, that “[Spain] deliberately ignored UN Spain ratifed the Rome Statute in 2000, although resolution 95 on the recognition of judgments and the Court did not have retroactive power to look the principles of international law arising from into Spain’s past. Finally, in 2005, drawing on the Nuremberg.”51 He referred to the mandatory eforts of previous doctrines, the Basic Principles and subrogation requirement, whereby one person Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation takes over the rights or remedies of another against for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human a third party, implying that the current Congress Rights Law and Serious Violations of International was responsible for remedying the Franco regime’s Humanitarian Law defned and outlined thirteen violations against Spanish citizens. Similarly, Deputy necessary parameters of reparation. According Begoña Lasagabaster Olazábal complained that to this retroactive standard, full and efective the bill did not adhere to the UN doctrine on war reparation requires restitution, compensation, crimes and crimes against humanity.52 In this rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non- sense, although the United Nations did not impose repetition.46 Moreover, the parameters explicitly demands on Spain to execute post-transitional obligate prosecution of persons allegedly responsible justice, the norms the organization set came alive for human rights violations, provision of proper during the Historical Memory Law debate. Even if assistance to victims seeking access to justice, and UN human rights norms did not directly infuence the inapplicability of statutes of limitations.47 reparation, they at least pressured the Spanish With the accumulation of all such human rights Congress to answer more questions about justice for doctrines, the UN has a basis for recommendations crimes against humanity in 2006 than in any previous on handling human rights violations, including the year. 2002 recommendation to Spain discussed previously. Te Council of Europe’s human rights Finally, since Spain is part of the UN community, developments, specifcally the decisions of the all such norms that have retroactive power apply to European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) also Spain for Franco violations. played a large role in the debate, with 28.5 percent of

89 columbia university journal of politics & society the accusations and 11 percent of the entire debate shape the reparations discussion in Spain. referencing statements made by the organization. For example, Aitor Esteban Bravo of the Vasco The Justice Cascade Group insisted that the parameters for judging the Another key component of the international Historical Memory Law should not be limited to the environment facing Spain in the early 2000s was the Spanish constitution, but should also include the progression in transitional justice that had taken ECHR.53 Arguments for the existence of a general place in other countries, especially those in Latin international human rights norm appeared in 42.9 America. Transitional justice was pursued in Chile, percent of the accusations and 16.7 percent of the Argentina, and Guatemala in the late 1990s, ICC debate. Congressional deputies referred to the need cases were brought against Uganda, Congo, Sudan, to explicitly condemn the Franco regime and combat and South Africa in the early 2000s, and truth historical relativism painting Franco as a “sof” commissions were created in twenty-fve countries dictator in order to abide by this norm.54 Overall, during these two decades.56 Tese occurrences lef more than 50 percent of the bill debate referenced people wondering when Spain’s victims would have some international human rights development, their turn for justice. In an opinion piece in El País, giving voice to the international community along Javier Maravall wrote: the route to the Historical Memory Law’s passage. Argentina and Chile, in their democratic Moreover, El País consistently referred to transition processes, looked to the Spanish UN human rights doctrine and the Rome Statute transition as a model of peaceful and in articles from 2000 to 2008, thereby informing consensual change. Maybe it’s time you the Spanish public of the existence of such norms España look now to processes that have during this time. 55, i Te dominant Spanish occurred in these two brotherly countries to clarify human rights violations that occurred news source highlighting these norms for other during the dictatorship of General Francisco human rights cases created an interactive space that Franco (1939-1975).57 fostered Spanish citizens’ introspection on Spain’s compliance with these standards. Expressing interest From 1997 onward, El País featured several in this international doctrine on human rights, other opinion pieces contrasting reconciliation in Spain with that in other countries, particularly the Spanish public responded with 380 opinion 58 pieces on human rights and UN doctrine in El País Argentina and Chile. Spain not only witnessed between 2000 and 2007. Tese fndings suggest that accountability measures in other countries with international human rights norms informed both similar pasts, but also actively participated in the political debate and the Spanish media. Perhaps these cases. In 1999, Guatemalan citizen Rigoberta most importantly, they indicate the extent to which Menchú used the Spanish High Court to bring a the Spanish populace reacted to these international case against the Guatemalan military leadership norms around the introduction of the Historical for human rights violations against indigenous Memory Law in 2006. Tis, in turn, demonstrated populations during its civil war. In June 2003, the saliency of this issue in Spanish politics and Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón jailed a former naval pressured Spanish politicians to take action. ofcer of the Argentine military dictatorship afer he At the turn of the millennium, public interest was extradited from Mexico to Spain pending trial in human rights concerns peaked in response for genocide and terrorism. to media stories of crimes against humanity and In September 2005, Spain’s Constitutional Court justice around the world. Te increased attention ruled that the “principle of universal jurisdiction to such concerns primed discussions over domestic prevails over the existence of national interests,” human rights and ultimately increased attention to allowing the National Court to reach beyond Franco violations. Overall, the prevalence of human national borders in cases of torture, terrorism, or rights development and international justice norms war crimes, even when no Spanish victims were in the Congressional debates highlights that the involved. Subsequently, on January 11, 2006, the development of international human rights helped Court initiated an investigation into seven former Chinese ofcials, including former President Jiang i 380 articles between 2000 and 2008 in El País, retrieved from LexisNexis Academic. Zemin, who allegedly took part in genocide in Tibet. 90 post-transitional justice in spain: passing the historic memory law On July 7 of that year, six Guatemalan ofcials were Memory Law was shaped partially by the irony of formally charged to appear in the Spanish Court in Spain condemning foreign human rights abuses regard to the Menchú case. Tis is the environment while failing to address its own. in which the Historical Memory Law was passed in 2006. Unsurprisingly, people began to demand “Honeymoons” for Justice Spain’s own accountability for human rights crimes Spain’s lack of engagement in any international considering that Spain was playing such a central role confict also made the pursuit of reparations in many cases regarding international human rights plausible in 2006.65 Spanish lawyer, judge, and crimes. magistrate Carlos Castresana-Fernandez refers Te case of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, to periods of international calm, like this period, one of Spain’s early probes into foreign human as “honeymoons” for justice.66 For example, the rights crimes, was pivotal in fostering pressure for international tranquility just afer World War II Spanish vindications of Franco-era crimes.59 In nurtured the Nuremburg trial process; however, 1998, Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzón issued an justice eforts following this early post-World War international arrest warrant for General Pinochet II period were suspended for almost half a century for ninety-four counts of torture of Spanish citizens until the end of the Cold War. Te fall of the Berlin and for the 1975 assassination of Spanish politician Wall in 1989 ushered in an international peace that Carmelo Soria.60 Te charges fled by Spain for allowed for retroactive introspection worldwide. An infractions that were not only in another country enormous volume of justice occurred in the next but on another continent highlighted the Spanish decade that had been impossible during the ffy government’s hypocrisy. Spanish citizens and the years of the Cold War, including the aforementioned international community alike wondered why the Latin American cases.67 Still, even the late 1990s did country would provide justice for the victims of not prove politically favorable for Spanish justice, as another dictatorship but not for its own victims.61 demonstrated in Section 3. Such refections appeared in sixteen articles in Agence Te honeymoon of the 1990s ended with the News Press and a range of other international news attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001. Although the sources, including Te New York Times.62 Te bulk of Iraq War lasted until 2011, Spain pulled troops out of such international media occurred in 1998. Spanish Iraq in 2004 under Zapatero, reinstating international citizens raised the same concerns in El País opinion peace for Spain. With the onset of the 2008 economic pieces, with one professor saying, “…when we asked crisis, however, such international stability ended, [sic] that Pinochet be held accountable, we must limiting the government’s ability to carry out prove that there is no contradiction between our reparations requiring heavy state involvement.68 peculiar relation with the Franco dictatorship and the Terefore during the few crucial years between 2004 request for Pinochet’s prosecution. Or there must be and 2008, Spain was sufciently at ease to pursue very good reasons for holding diferent criteria.”63 reconciliation with its past. Te debate over the Historical Memory Law As discussed in Section 3, the international featured identical sentiments. For instance, Joan peace coincided with domestic political Tardà i Coma noted the “contradiction that Spanish developments to make reparation a possibility. Both state judges pursue crimes committed in Chile or of these conditions were necessary, but neither was Argentina a few years ago instead of in the State sufcient, to usher in reparations legislation. itself.”64 In fact, a third of the debate speeches looked Ultimately, requests made by international to the legal protection of victims in other countries organizations such as the United Nations and as precedents, with two-thirds directly referring to Amnesty International resonated with the Spain’s involvement in the Pinochet case. Although country and elicited a reaction. Te development Patricia Esteban conceded that there was a diference of international human rights norms informed in sensitivity between dealing with Spain’s issues and framed the political debate of the Historical and with those in other countries, she too felt that Memory Law. Te justice cascade at the turn of the Spain’s involvement in foreign justice issues was millennium provided the momentum needed to “paradoxical.” Clearly, the debate over the Historical ignite Spanish retrospection, and the Pinochet case

91 columbia university journal of politics & society focused attention on Spain’s particular unresolved the political opposition during the dictatorship issues. Finally, an international peace was conducive now aligns with the lefist parties (ERC and IU) or to action on the part of the Spanish government. It the PSOE. As a result, the same conservative and was the confuence of these developments, not one progressive divisions from the dictatorship still exist in particular, that accounted for the international and rotate in and out of ofce. Because of their ties contribution to the “fever for remembering” and to the Franco regime, the conservatives tend to be ultimately the passage of the Historical Memory less interested in pursuing accountability and giving Law.69 Still, generational turnover and political reparations to the victims of the Franco regime, cooperation, discussed in the next sections, are what preferring not to “reopen old wounds,” as university made reparation most plausible in the early 2000s as professor Patricia Esteban puts it.73 Likewise, opposed to earlier years. the liberals, who disproportionately represent the victims of the Franco regime, are more inclined to Section 2: Generational Turnover pursue these reparations. Te number of reparation During the Socialist PSOE rule from 1982 measures these groups have passed while in ofce to 1996, the government shied away from signifcant illustrates this diference. Although they passed a accountability and reparation measures. In the similar number of symbolic reparation measures, following terms from 1996 to 2004, the majority the PP passed only one material reparation during Popular Party showed reluctance to invoke heavy its 2000–2004 term, while the PSOE passed ffeen reparations. During a renewed PSOE term from 2004 during its 2004–2008 term.74, ii to 2012 under Prime Minister Rodriguez Zapatero, however, a new opportunity for reparations arose. Yet Reservations of the Elder Generation this new opportunity was more than just the result Te large distinction between the old and of a political changeover. With the passing time and new generation was visible in other ways as well. changing governments, a simultaneous generational In an opinion poll conducted by El Mundo in 2006, transition occurred. Te composition of the Spanish negative opinion towards Franco’s uprising that general public moved from those who were directly started the Civil War was greater amongst younger afected by the Spanish Civil War and the Franco individuals than amongst the elderly. Moreover, the dictatorship to a more removed population: their elderly were less inclined to speak on the matter at children and grandchildren. all, as a larger proportion of elderly respondents chose not to state any opinion.75 Tus in 2006, the Political Continuity elder generation was more hesitant to speak about, In many respects, the descendants of the Franco let alone confront, the terrors of the Franco regime. era represent a continuity of their predecessors. Te younger generation, according to Joan Tardà Carlos Castresana-Fernandez noted a “natural i Coma of the Republican Lef, was comprised of heritage” in the Spanish lineage originating during “people who had internalized so much pain and the Franco dictatorship.70 Te end of the Spanish terror in the years of transition [that they] only dictatorship was not achieved through a defeat of dared to undertake timidly a tough journey to the regime, as in Greece, Italy, or Portugal, but rather repair the memory of their parents.”76 Tose of through negotiation. As a result, remnants of the the previous generation who lived through the dictatorship remain, even in the form of indiference dictatorship preferred to portray the “placidity” of toward the past.71 Te social group that represented the dictatorship and the normality of life under it.77 and supported the dictatorship now comprises the Patricia Esteban, a professor of literature in Madrid, social mass that votes conservative, although it no noted that some of the elder generation, even today, longer holds the same authoritarian values. For do not regard Franco as a dictator and deny that example, Joan Tardà i Coma chastised the PP for any oppression occurred, despite all investigations allowing a member of the Franco regime, Manuel and evidence indicating otherwise. Although Juan Fraga Irabarne—who was responsible for the police’s Pulgar, a conservative who lived through ten years of killing of fve workers in Vitoria in 1976—to hold the dictatorship, conceded that atrocities occurred, a distinguished position in the party.72 Similarly, ii Five during the PP 2000-2004 term; 6 during the PSOE 2000-2008 term 92 post-transitional justice in spain: passing the historic memory law he argued that 2006 was not a proper time to deal the generation of victims’ grandchildren, whether by with such matters. He resented that the government’s directly acknowledging an old versus new generation eforts were being directed at “ghosts of the past” or by appealing to do justice for their grandparents. instead of the economy.78 Jorge Fernández Díaz, for example, mentioned “a new generation…[that] does not share the hatreds A New Pro-Justice Generation and passions of those who participated in [the Civil On the other hand, there was a growing trend War.]”83 Although several deputies, like Jordi Xuclà i in Spain in the 2000s towards a favorable opinion Costa from Convergence and Union, recognized that, of justice. While only twenty-six opinion pieces thirty years ago, the only possible path was one of relating to General Francisco Franco were published selective amnesia (to usher in the peace and harmony in El País from 1995 to 1997, there were more than necessary for democracy), this new generation 200 pieces from 2004 to 2006.79 Tis suggests a of deputies agreed that another route was now growing willingness of the public to engage in debate possible. Joan Tardà i Coma efectively embodied this over the dictatorship, which was also refected in conviction during the debate, stating: the political sphere. To begin, all political parties I’m not a person of the transition or who fought favored democracy in 2006 when the Historical against Franco. I am one of the grandchildren, Memory Law was introduced, while in the late 1970s, and my generation… has gone through school authoritarianism still pervaded the country. Deputy without studying and without knowing what was Esteban Bravo of the Vasco Party maintains that, as of the struggle against Franco. We know from our 2006, no longer was any political party fully in favor family tradition, or the explanations of friends, colleagues, but we have not studied it. It would of silence and against the pursuit of justice, “because be impossible for this to happen in France, it is not good for democracy nor for coexistence Germany, Portugal, and in so many countries and equality for all citizens.”80 In fact, only three of that have shown that they have done good.84 thirty-six speeches during the Historical Memory Such comments and attitudes suggest that the new Law debate regarded the Law as “unnecessary.”81 interest that Spanish politicians took in reparations Even these reservations were strictly directed towards and accountability for the Franco regime’s crimes particulars of the Law, rather than to the idea of cannot merely be explained in terms of international reparations in general. Te Spanish people’s increased pressure and political development, but must willingness to tackle post-transitional justice issues, also take intergenerational change into account. which strongly contrasted the reservations of the Grandchildren of Civil War victims were more Civil War generation, opening a door for debate over adamant for reparations than their predecessors reparation and accountability that was previously because the younger generation that dominated barred. during Zapatero’s term was distanced from past How do we know, however, that Spanish horrors. Not only had they evaded the worst of the politicians’ increased willingness to consider Civil War and dictatorship, but they also grew up reparations legislation is the result of a new in a world where the topic was considered taboo. generation rather than simply the consequence of a Tis generation rejected the taboo imposed on favorable political climate? To examine this question, them, instead showing openness towards justice and we may turn to both interviews and debate speeches. accountability that manifested in a renewed push for Patricia Esteban discussed how children in Spain did reparation legislation. not, and still do not, learn in full about Spain’s recent history and the extent of the Franco dictatorship and A Decline in Surviving Victims its human rights violations, as these topics have been Te willingness of the grandchildren of the considered almost taboo.82 Tus, many children victims of the Franco regime to pursue reparation and grandchildren of Franco-regime victims became measures can in part be attributed to a desire for tired of being shielded and eager to seek justice dignity and decent burial for familial victims. Such a for their relatives who were never able to procure desire led to the emergence of the Association for the it themselves. Tirty-nine percent of the debate Recuperation of Historical Memory (ARMH), which speeches on the Historical Memory Law referenced drove early attempts to break the “pacto de olvido.” 93 columbia university journal of politics & society

Te ARMH was created in 2000 afer the privately embedded. Te younger generation represented a led exhumation of a mass grave of thirteen civilians constituency that, if not actively pressuring Congress killed by Republican gunmen in 1936. Many came to to pursue retroactive justice, at least sought to hold the excavation site in Leon Priaranza del Bierzo for accountable those representatives who were averse assistance in fnding other missing persons, which to measures of reparation. In fact, in all debate motivated those working at the site to create ARMH speeches, the PP complained that the PSOE was to provide such help. Since then, the group has using the Historical Memory Law as a political worked to dignify Spain’s past, do justice for those weapon to boost its image and distort that of parties who deserved it, and deepen Spanish democracy.85 in opposition. Te PSOE was operating under the According to an El País survey, by July 2006, 64 assumption that the public would side with them in percent of those questioned wanted bodies from their pursuit of the reparation measure and against mass graves to be exhumed, identifed, and returned the PP who opposed the justice legislation, suggesting to their families. that the general constituency was supportive of Pressure to act before all the victims of the justice for the Spanish people and disapproving of Franco regime were deceased further contributed those against reparations. All this considered, it is to the new pro-justice consensus. Te years 2005 evident that the Historical Memory Law came about and 2006 marked the thirtieth anniversary of in part due to the maturation of a younger Spanish Franco’s death and the seventieth anniversary of generation in both the political arena and in Spanish the beginning of the Civil War, respectively. Tese society as a whole. anniversaries served as a reminder of both the time To conclude, since the transition from lapse since the Franco regime and the declining dictatorship to democracy was achieved through number of living victims of that regime. Descendants negotiation rather than overthrow, remnants of the wanted monetary or other tangible compensation dictatorship, including societal divisions and sources for their elder relations during their last years. Even of infuence, remain. Tese remnants contributed those without personal connections to Franco- to the indiference towards Franco and reservations regime victims acknowledged the urgency to address towards reparation among those who lived during the issue while victims and relatives of victims were the Civil War and the dictatorship. However, still alive.86 Such urgency was expressed during the sheltered children and grandchildren of this the debate over the Historical Memory Law, such as generation did not harbor the same fears and ties to when Begoña Lasagabaster Olazábal of the Mixed the past and, therefore, were more willing to confront Group said he took his ninety-seven year-old it. Te younger generation undertook the task of grandfather multiple times to request annulment dignifying the memory of familial victims through of his sentence from the Military Division of the Association for the Recuperation of Historical the Supreme Court under the Franco regime.87 Memory. Finally, the anniversaries of Franco’s death Moreover, many with deceased relatives began to and the beginning of the Civil War reminded the think, “Well, my grandfather is still buried in a country of the declining number of living victims clandestine grave. I want the body, I want the corpse, as well as the waning time in which reparation and and I want a dignifed process of re-vindication compensation would be relevant. Such generational and a decent burial, not a clandestine one,” which factors certainly created a sense of urgency that Castresana-Fernandez confrmed was absolutely was not achieved by the factors associated with the legitimate.88 international community. Clearly, the aging of the population and the desire for proper burial of victims served to foster Section 3: Political Considerations discussion on reparation among the younger Although many point to the Historical generation. Te younger Spanish were therefore Memory Law as a heroic measure of reparations, impelled to discuss reparation not only because others insist that the degree of justice achieved by of their distance from the atrocities of the Franco the Law is overstated. Supporters of the bill ofen regime and their desire for breaking taboo, but also referred to it as a “starting point,” acknowledging because of the social context in which they were the bill’s limitations as well as its potential to

94 post-transitional justice in spain: passing the historic memory law serve as a precedent for future, more substantial, and rejecting a single Law that simultaneously aimed reparations.89 Others during the debate argued to address an array of complex social justice issues.94 that the Law was trivial and would not satisfy Several PP speakers defended the party’s continuous anyone without remedying all persisting justice support of reparations, reminding Congress of concerns.90 Because the Law encompassed sensitive the past reparation measures they had enacted.95 and controversial topics, Congress struggled to Nevertheless, the PSOE loosely painted opposition to reach a consensus on many areas of reparation.91 the Law as opposition to victim reparation in order Interviews and the congressional debate suggest to tarnish the Popular Party’s public image. that the PSOE strategized to acquire sufcient votes Still, the Socialist Worker’s Party lacked an by compromising aggressive reparation in the Law. absolute majority in Congress and thus had to appeal If this is the case, then the accomplishment of this to other congressional parties to support the bill. justice law thirty years afer the dictatorship seems During the political debate of the Historical Memory like less of a feat. Law, discussions attempted to get the maximum consensus possible. Congress debated the frst draf Political Motivations Behind the Law of the bill, from September 8, 2006, on December Te introduction of the Historical Memory 14, 2006, when three amendments were also Law itself was a strategic political move. Te Law presented. Te United Lef and the Republican Lef was not, in fact, included in the Socialist Worker’s presented the frst two amendments as alternative Party manifesto for the 2004 general election, yet texts for consideration and the PP presented the it eventually became a centerpiece of the PSOE’s third amendment that simply requested withdrawal legislative agenda once the Party came to power. of the bill, yet Congress ultimately rejected all It was meant to strengthen the Party’s position three of the amendments. Following this debate, afer a fortuitous election that swung votes in its 377 more amendments to the bill were presented. favor, making the PSOE the majority party by only Tus, agreement was a strenuous process and fve percent.92 Out of a total of 394 members of intense negotiations occurred up until the bill’s Congress, 187 represented the PSOE, 170 represented passage.96 In the end, the fnal Law sacrifced the PP, and 47 were members of other parties. Tis aggressive reparations to reach an agreement and is illustrates the PSOE’s narrow margin of victory over accordingly unsatisfactory for the formal authorities, the PP, which created a dually dominated Congress. international standards, and the victims.97 Patricia Te PSOE had to look for new opportunities, such as Esteban noted that a large part of the Spanish the Historical Memory Law, to garner support and population believes the Law is useless, and she also retain their majority position in the next election. felt that the Law has not made a signifcant impact on Esteban indeed cited the Law as an opportunistic play society. Many members of Congress demanded that of the PSOE, comparing it to the issues of abortion the bill be more aggressive on certain reparations, and gay marriage used to strengthen and advertise yet to no efect, as outlined below. Ultimately, the its lefist politics as distinct from conservative PSOE was forced to reconcile with the PP, which ideologies. Additionally, in the bill’s congressional underscores the role political maneuvering played in debate, PP deputies consistently accused the PSOE of infuencing the trajectory of the Historical Memory manipulating reparation both for achieving political Law. gain and attacking the PP’s conservative ties. For instance, Jorge Fernández Díaz claimed the purpose Strategic Specifcations within the Law: Annulment of of the bill was “from day one, a deliberate attempt, Judgments make no mistake, to marginalize the [Popular] Party, Te most frequent concern in the Historical to present this as a policy in which the opponents are Memory Law debate regarded annulment of factious, pro-Franco or fascists while the progressives judgments. Out of the thirty-six entries, it was understand the pain and sufering of the people.”93 mentioned seventeen times, taking up approximately On the contrary, PP representative Manuel Atencia 47 percent of the debate. Te Historical Memory Roblado explained PP opposition to the Law as Law declared illegitimate the military tribunals that resistance to imposing an ofcial historical memory condemned individuals based on political standings.

95 columbia university journal of politics & society

Tese thousands of judgments spanning from 1933 to any governmental burden, either fnancial or 1978 include criminal sentences for political, military, temporal, that would have been borne if the religious, or ideological reasons. Congressional government annulled sentences afer the bill’s deputies insisted these judgments occurred without passage. Tis secured the PSOE the political credit due process of law, have errors of form and substance, for the reparation without incurring much expense. and should be null and void. Declaring the judgments illegitimate rather than Te main controversy was over the term annulling them was benefcial not only for the ruling “illegitimate,” which did not carry sufcient legal PSOE, but also for the Popular Party, which was value. By declaring the judgments illegitimate, notably silent on the annulment issue during the victims and their families were only allowed to debate. Te Popular Party, due to its historical link “solicit individual reparation” before a council of fve to the dictatorship, had a vested interest in Franco’s appointed senior social scientists who would examine legacy. By maintaining rhetorical limitations in the each case independently before granting annulment document, Congress did not alienate the PP nor or compensation—a process that could take decades. commit the PSOE to address or compensate for the Many congressional deputies viewed the appeal sentences for years to come. In this manner, the fnal process as an unfair burden on victims. Tey Historical Memory Law included the most passable, proposed amendments to make it the state’s duty though necessarily unsubstantial, solution to Franco’s to review these judgments, rather than to require military judgments. 50,000 people to sue for the same nullity. Tese amendments failed. Others suggested an explicit Strategic Specifcations within the Saw: the Valley of condemnation of the Franco dictatorship, whereby the Fallen the regime would be formally expelled from the legal Te Valley of the Fallen was another system and oppressive legislation and judgments prominent point of contention with the Law. Over 30 from the period would be deemed crimes against percent of the debate speeches expressed discontent humanity and repealed.iii Such a condemnation was with Law’s solution for the Catholic basilica and rejected as well. In each of her three debate speeches, memorial in the municipality of San Lorenzo de El Congress member Joan Herrera Torres of the United Escorial, Spain. Franco conceived the area as a site Lef cited this issue as the “main stumbling block to bury and honor those who died during the Civil in the negotiations with the government.”98 She War. Te Valley of the Fallen remains controversial noted that the governing PSOE party did not want for two reasons. First, it was constructed in part the annulment of judgments and in the original by a workforce of prisoners of war. Secondly, it is text did not even declare the judgments illegitimate. a common burial ground for both Franco-regime Several other congressional representatives expressed victims and war victims from both sides.101 While the same frustration, citing hundreds of interest some insisted that it would be disrespectful for the organizations, including Amnesty International, dictator to remain buried next to his victims, others which agreed that Spain should abide by UN argued that it would be dishonorable to disturb the doctrine on crimes against humanity and annul monument. Uxue Barkos Berruezo of the Mixed these judgments.99 Nevertheless, opponents cited Party fought during the debate to convert the Valley “legal difculties” in annulling the military trials and into a Civil War memorial.102 Esteban Bravo of the defected appeals for across-the-board annulment Vasco Group wanted to go even further, calling it by saying that certain victims carried their sentences “inadmissible” to have the tombs of both Franco and as medals of honor, “proud to have defended Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, a notable politician democracy.”100 and lawyer executed by the regime during the war, Tus the bill strategically addressed Franco’s occupy the same resting place. Bravo called for repressive military judgments while avoiding Franco’s remains to be relocated. On the other hand, a larger confict over government obligation to Jorge Fernández Díaz of the Popular Party argued review all military judgments of the time and that the Valley of the Fallen was “frst and foremost over Franco’s legacy. Te bill managed to sidestep a place where the remains of 60,000 people who iii Twenty-eight percent of debate speeches expressed a desire for explicit died during or as a result of the civil war are” and condemnation of the Franco regime in the bill. 96 post-transitional justice in spain: passing the historic memory law frmly held that the area should remain undisturbed. process through the example of the famous poet Te distinctly incompatible opinions on the bill’s Federico Garcia Lorca, who was executed by dictation for the Valley of the Fallen resulted in an Nationalist forces. Evidence suggested Garcia Lorca outcome that ultimately preserved the status quo. was buried along with three or four other victims In the end, the Historical Memory Law simply in a mass grave. While the families of the other prohibited demonstrations, political events, and victims all desired to exhume the bodies, Garcia exaltation of Franco at this burial place. Moreover, Lorca’s family objected, thereby hindering the ability it provided that the grounds would be governed by of other families to obtain proper burial for their the rules for establishments, places of worship, and relatives. Moreover, Castresana-Fernandez argued public cemeteries. that with, “more than 100,000 forced disappearances, Tese disagreements over the Valley of the it is obviously a process that cannot be dealt with Fallen complicated the debate of the Historical privately by the families.”103 Tis process was not Memory Law and the bill ultimately fell short only inefcient, but was also noncompliant with of transforming the site into a real symbol international human rights standards that mandate of reconciliation. In agreeing to ofer limited the state to establish truth and coordinate the legal reconciliation through the Valley of the Fallen, consequences of reparation. In accordance with Spanish politicians kept the controversy surrounding the UN “Right to a Remedy,” it is the duty of the the Valley from impeding the Law’s passage. Had state “to investigate violations efectively, promptly, the Valley measures been more explicit and drastic, thoroughly and impartially,” and conduct “the search crucial support would likely have been put in for the whereabouts of the disappeared.”104 Still, the jeopardy. Disturbing any of the tombs would have Garcia Lorca story illustrates the divide among the put the Popular Party’s support at stake, while not Spanish on whether to exhume these graves or leave addressing the Valley at all would have angered the the dead in peace. Instead of displaying a frm stance Vasco Group, the Mixed Party, and others. Tus on the issue, the Law opted for a noncommittal to appease such difering perspectives, the Law reparation, keeping the current government from only minimally addressed the Valley of the Fallen. bearing any leadership burden in the process. It Clearly, the political maneuvering needed to pass ofered the government’s neutral support of grave the bill limited the extent of reparations possible. exhumations as a facilitator rather than leader. Te dynamics of Spanish party politics made only a Ultimately, these provisions kept the status-quo in the simple de-politicization of the Valley a possibility. exhumation process, not ordering any exhumations but rather permitting individuals to deal with the Strategic Specifcations within the Law: Grave graves of their relatives as they deemed ft. Although Exhumations deputies could argue for a greater governmental role, Finally, the Law was necessarily evasive in such a compromise kept the grave exhumations from stipulating how mass grave exhumations would being a derisive issue that could potentially block the be administered. Te Law provided state fnancial bill’s passage, and the public fnancing was deemed at support and assistance for families in tracking, least “a foundation.”105 identifying, and eventually exhuming Franco victims In sum, while disagreements still remained who were subjected to extrajudicial executions and among conservatives and progressives over the extent placed in mass graves unbeknownst to their families. to which reparation should be given, a digression Representatives from the Convergence and Union, from the political sentiments of the dictatorship Vasco, United Lef, Republican Lef and Mixed Group presented a new political atmosphere where all parties all attempted to secure active governmental parties held democratic values and agreed that at responsibility for these identifcations and least some recognition and reparation was necessary. exhumations during the political debate in Congress, Furthermore, the political circumstances of the 2004 yet in the end the Law simply allowed families to election provided the stimulus for the government to request authorization for such actions, without present the Historical Memory Law. Tus, politics in dictating any state duty. Carlos Castresana-Fernandez one sense advanced the cause of Spanish social justice explained the difculty of privatizing the exhumation and yet, in another sense, hindered it. Te range

97 columbia university journal of politics & society of pending issues of reparation and accountability Taking advantage of this public opinion, the PSOE that needed to be addressed made for complicated introduced the Historical Memory Law, in part to legislation that inevitably made it politically marginalize the conservative PP. Still, because of the contentious. Because there was no consensus on issue’s complexity, the Law went through a process several sensitive matters, such as truth commissions, of negotiations and compromises that ultimately exhumations, and nullifcation of judgments, reduced the degree of justice incorporated. Tis strategic provisions in the Law intended to secure the confuence of factors accounts for why it took until most votes caused the fnal product to fall far short of 2007 to pass signifcant reparations legislation such compliance with international standards on remedy as the Historical Memory Law. However, conditions of human rights violations. did not prove favorable enough to fully rectify transitional justice concerns, as the standards of “full CONCLUSION and efcient reparation” defned by the UN were not Instead of addressing the Franco regime’s all addressed. I argue that it was largely party politics violations once Spain’s democracy stabilized, Spain that limited the scope of the Law. continued to shun its painful history for decades. All three factors (international human rights Spain’s involvement with the United Nations, the development, generational changeover, and political development of international human rights norms, circumstances) were necessary for the Historical and other international justice pursuits in the 1990s Memory Law to pass, yet none were singularly set the stage for Spanish post-transitional justice in sufcient. Without international social justice the early 2000s. With each passing year, the Spanish developments, the Spanish public may not have been population became further removed from its painful as adamant for reparations; without a public desire history. Tus, by the thirtieth anniversary of Franco’s to grant reparations, Spanish politicians would have death and the seventieth anniversary of the Civil been less likely to support reparation measures; and War in 2005 and 2006, respectively, Spain was more without political cooperation, reparation measures ready to face the Franco violations than ever before. could not have been ofcially enacted. Still, these Finally, the opportune moment for justice came considerations do not exclusively explain the Law’s afer the 2004 congressional election, when the passage. Other factors that may have played a role PSOE employed the past to strengthen its electoral include domestic organizations, the media, and advantage. Terefore, the “pacto de olvido” was institutional frameworks. Further research into fnally broken by the Historical Memory Law in 2006, the existence and roles of such factors would be when favorable international, social, and political benefcial. Moreover, which of the three factors conditions converged. discussed contributed most to Spain passing the Law Te three factors contributing to Spanish justice can be researched further. Finally, a study comparing all interplayed to foster an environment conducive the extent of reparation between countries pursuing to reparation and accountability. International justice immediately and those that pursue reparation social justice cases from Latin America to Eastern retroactively would be useful to enhance our Europe informed public opinion of international understanding of transitional justice. justice norms. Grandchildren in Spain, sheltered Furthermore, the delay in Spanish justice from the reality of Franco’s human rights violations, pursuits has made subsequent attempts to saw the country arrest Pinochet in London and secure reparations and retribution difcult.106 ultimately requested the same legal protection Because Spain failed to implement reparation and Spain provided for victims in foreign countries. accountability measures during the transition, With time ticking and a diminishing number of pessimism for the future of reparations is apparent surviving victims, Spain faced a “now-or-never” in Spain. Patricia Esteban commented that, if moment to bring justice to those afected. Te full reparation did not occur in 2008 while some domestic push penetrated the political sphere by of the direct victims and relatives of the victims encouraging politicians to pass reparation measures were still alive, then restoration of memory and and creating an atmosphere of disapproval toward justice would likely never be achieved. As time representatives who outright opposed such measures. passes, it will no longer be a priority, and “a legacy

98 post-transitional justice in spain: passing the historic memory law of neglect and manipulation of the memory of justice for Franco-era crimes against humanity.” Boston College Inter- national and Comparative Law Review, vol. 33, no. 1, p. 68. the Franco dictatorship will remain for future 13. Tamarit-Sumilla, “Transition, Historical Memory and Criminal Jus- generations.”107 Indeed, in November 2013, tice in Spain,” 734; Barbeito, M. Z. “Investigating the Crimes of the Franco Regime: Legal Possibilities, Obligations of the Spanish State Spain maintained that it would not review the and Duties Towards the Victims,” International Criminal Law Review, amnesty law for crimes committed during the war vol. 10, no. 2, 2010, p. 258; Encarnación, “Justice in Times of Transi- tion,” 186. and dictatorship to a critical U.N. Committee on 14. Guarino, “Chasing Ghosts,” p. 77. Enforced Disappearances.108 Tough the Historical 15. Ibid, p. 85. Memory Law has ofen been referred to as a “starting 16. Barbeito, “Investigating the Crimes of the Franco Regime,” p. 261. 17. Ferrándiz, Francisco. (2013). Exhuming the defeated: Civil War mass point” for bringing justice to the victims of Franco- graves in 21st‐century Spain. American Ethnologist, vol. 40, no. 1, p. era crimes, one must wonder if there will ever be an 41. 18. Erice, Francisco. (2006). Combates por el pasado y apologías de la ending point. memoria, a propósito de la represión franquista. Hispania Nova: Re- Finally, scholars must note that the trajectory of vista de historia contemporánea. 19. Urdillo, “Impunity for Enforced Disappearances,” p. 52. Spanish transitional justice has implications beyond 20. Boyd, “Politics of History,” p. 146. its own borders. Te factors that caused Spain to 21. Ibid, p. 146. acknowledge its past crimes some seventy years 22. Ibid, p. 145. 23. Urdillo, “Impunity for Enforced Disappearances,” p. 52. later can shed light on eforts in other countries to 24. Ibid, p. 56. revisit their past justice concerns. Advocates for 25. Encarnación, “Justice in Times of Transition,” p. 180; Carmen González Enríquez, Alexandra Barahona de Brito, and Paloma retroactive justice can use the Spanish precedent to Aguilar Fernández, Te Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in better understand when international, domestic, and Democratizing Societies: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 15.. political conditions in a country are favorable to its 26. Hun Joon Kim, “Structural Determinants of Human Rights execution and how to capitalize on them. Moreover, Prosecutions afer Democratic Transition,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 49, no. 2, 2012, pp. 305-320. the shortcomings of Spain’s delayed transitional 27. Aguilar, “Transitional or Post-transitional Justice?,” p. 15. justice process can inform other transitional justice 28. González Enríquez, Politics of Memory, pp. 5-27. cases—for example, teaching countries to be 29. Quirine Eijkman. “Recognising the Local Perspective: Transitional Justice and Post-Confict Reparations.” Global Jurist U6, vol. 10, no. 3, proactive in guaranteeing efcient reparation rather 2010, pp. 1-16. than delaying the process. Overall, the Spanish 30 Anja Seibert-Fohr. Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009), p. 7. situation can shed light on how past human rights 31. Eijkman, “Recongising the Local Perspective,” p. 8. violations can be handled and when, if ever, it is too 32. González Enríquez, Politics of Memory, pp. 115. 33. Aguilar, Transitional or Post-transitional Justice?, p. 15. late to right past wrongs. 34. Francisco Erice, “Combates por el Pasado y Apologías de la Memoria, a propósito de la Represión Franquista.” Hispania Nova: Revista de Works Cited historia contemporánea, no. 6, 2006. 35. Human Rights Education Associates, “European Human Rights Sys- 1. Omar G. Encarnación, “Justice in Times of Transition: Lessons from tem,” http://www.hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=365. the Iberian Experience,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 56, no.1, 36. Maria Dimitropoulou-Hassiotis, A Guide to the European Union : pp. 179-92. Institutions, policies, programmes, funds and entry tests to the EU insti- 2. Paloma Aguilar, “Transitional or Post-transitional Justice? Recent tutions, (Camberley, Surrey: Porphyrogenitus, 2006). Developments in the Spanish Case,” South European Society and 37. Tony Barber and Neil MacDonald, “Serbia glimpses ‘european FT.Com Politics, vol. 13, no. 4, 2008, pp. 417-33. dawn,’” , 2007, para. 1. 3. Ursula Urdillo. “Impunity for Enforced Disappearances in 38. Dimitropoulou-Hassiot, “A Guide to the European Union,” p. 172. Contemporary Spain: the Spanish Search for Truth,” Interdisciplinary 39. C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, August 29, Journal of Human Rights Law, vol. 6, no. 1, 2011, p. 41. 2013.

4. Carolyn P Boyd, “Te Politics of History and Memory in Democratic 40. Amnesty International, “Spain: Window of opportunity for a fresh Spain,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social start on human rights,” last modifed June 11, 2004, http://www. Science, vol. 617, no. 1, 2008, p. 144. amnesty.org/.; Amnesty International, “Spain blocks investigations of 5. Josep María Tamarit Sumalla, “Transition, Historical Memory and Franco-era crimes,” last modifed June 17, 2013, http://www.amnesty. Criminal Justice in Spain.” Journal of International Criminal Justice, org/ vol. 9, no. 3, 2011, p. 733. 41. El País, “Espana impulsa una ‘justicia especial solo para inmigrantes,’” 6. Madeleine Davis, “Is Spain Recovering its Memory? Breaking the http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic Pacto del Olvido,” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 3, 2005, pp. 42. “UN wants Spain to lif amnesty,” Te Nelson Mail, 2012, p. 6. 859-863. 43. El País, “La ONU Pide que Se Investigue Donde Estan Enterrados Re- 7. Tamarit-Sumalla, “Transition, Historical Memory and Criminal Jus- publicanos Fusilados tras la Guerra,” www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/ tice in Spain,” 733. lnacademic 8. Davis, “Is Spain Recovering its Memory?,” p. 858. 44. “United Nations: General assembly resolution and declaration on the 9. Tamarit-Sumalla, “Transition, Historical Memory and Criminal protection of all persons from enforced disappearance,” International Justice in Spain,” 734. Legal Materials, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 903-910. 10. Encarnación, “Justice in Times of Transition,” p. 183. 45. Te evolution of international criminal law. (1999). Strategic Sur- 11. Ibid, p. 79. vey, 100(1), 35-37. 12. Guarino, Angela M. (2010). “Chasing ghosts: pursuing retroactive 46. U.N. General Assembly, 64th Session. (2005). Resolution 60/147. 99 columbia university journal of politics & society

Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 73. P. Esteban, in-person communication, August 29, 2013 Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 74. Aguilar, “Transitional or Post-transitional Justice?,” p. 424. Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 75. “El Franquismo a debate 30 años despues/ Encuesta 1.” El Mundo. ac- Law. (A/Res/60/147). AccessUN Readex. (16 Dec. 2005). cessed http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 47. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Repa- 76. Diario Núm. 296, 2007, p. 14620. ration, UN General Assembly, § VII 77. P. Pulgar, in-person communication, August 29, 2013. 48. C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, August 29, 78. J. Pulgar, email communication, August 31, 2013. 2013. 79. Retrieved from LexisNexis Academic. Note: some duplicates possible. 49. Joan Tarda i Coma. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los 80. Diario Núm 296, 2007, p. 14618. Diputados, Núm. 296. Sesión del 31/10/2007, p.14621 [http:///www. 81. Eduardo Zaplana Hernández-Soro, Josep Antoni Duran i Lleid, and congreso.es].; Joan Xuclà i Costa. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de Jordi Xuclá I Costa, Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputa- los Diputados, Núm. 925. Sesión del 17/10/2007, p.31 [http:///www. dos, Núm. 296. Sesión del 31/10/2007, p.14611-14633 [http:///www. congreso.es]. congreso.es]. 50. Joan Herrera Torres. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los 82. P. Esteban, in-person communication, August 29, 2013. Diputados, Núm 222. Sesión del 14/12/2006, p. 11265 [http:///www. 83. Diario Núm. 925, 2007, p. 32. congreso.es]. 84. Diario Núm. 222, 2006, p. 11262. 51. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm. 296. Sesión 85. ¿Quienes Somos?. (2013). Association for the Recovery of del 31/10/2007, pp.14611-14633 [http:///www.congreso.es], p. 14620. Historical Memory. Retrieved November 10, 2013, from http:// 52. Diario Núm. 296, pp. 14611-14633. memoriahistorica.org.es/ 53. Diario Núm. 296, p. 14619. 86. P. Esteban, in-person communication, August 29, 2013. 54. Joan Herrara Torres. Diario Núm 296, p. 14615. 87. Diario Núm. 925, 2007, p. 17. 55. V. Fisas, “Naciones Unidas acusa a Bagdad de ocultar la lista de los 88. C. Castresana, in-person communication, August 29, 2013. civiles muertos,” El País, April 26, 2007, www.lexisnexis.com/hottop- 89. Francisco Rodríguez Sánchez and Joan Herrera Torres. Diario ics/lnacademic; “Construir la paz despues de la guerra,” El País, www. de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm. 296. Sesión del lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic; Ruperez, J. “El 11-M nos cogio 31/10/2007, pp. 14614-14615; Fernández de la Vega Sanz, M. Diario absolutamente desprevenidos.” El País, April 22, 2005, www.lexis- de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Núm 222. Sesión del nexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 14/12/2006, pp.11256; Diario Núm. 222, 2006, p. 11256. 56. Kathryn Sikkink, Te Justice Cascade : How human rights prosecutions 90. Duran i Lleida, J. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, are changing world politics: How human rights prosecutions are Núm. 296. Sesión del 31/10/2007, p.14623. changing world politics. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2004), pp. 91. Georgina Blakeley. “Politics as Usual?: Te trials and tribulations of 24-47.; International Criminal Court, “Situations and Cases,” http:// the law of historical memory in Spain,” Entelequia: Revista Interdisci- www.icc-cpi.int/. ; Amnesty International, “Truth Commissions,” plinar, 2008, p. 318. http://www.amnesty.org/en/international-justice/issues/truth- 92. Blakeley, “Politics as Usual?,” p. 319. commissions. 93. Diario Núm. 925, 2007, p. 32. 57. Javier Maravall, “Derechos humanos y guerra civil,” El País, June 23, 94. Diario Núm. 222, 2006, pp. 11259-11262. 2005, accessed http: //www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 95. Fernández Díaz, J. Diario Núm. 925, p. 34. 58. M. Carrillo, “Contra la corriente,” El País, November 28, 1997, 96. Blakeley, “Politics as Usual?,” pp. 319-323. accessed www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.;G. Tortella, 97. C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, August 29, “Poner la límites a la democracia,” El País, January 29, 2007, accessed 2013. http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.; R. Martínez 98. Diario Núm 222, 2006, p. 32. Monserrat, “¡Qué envidia de Chile!” El País, August 23, 2011, 99. Begoña Lasagabaster Olzábal, Jordi Xucla i Costa, Aitor Esteban Bra- accessed http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic vo, Joan Tarda i Coma, and Gaspar Llamazares Trigo, Diario Núm. 59. C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, August 29, 925, 2007, pp. 11255-11285.; Llamazares Trigo, G. Diario Núm. 215, 2013. p. 10910. 60. United States Embassy. Chile, “Rettig report: Synopsis of cases,” 1991. 100. Aitor Esteban Bravo, Diario Núm. 296, 2007, p. 14619. 61. C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, August 29, 101. Francisco Ferrándiz, “Exhuming the defeated: Civil War mass graves 2013. in 21st‐century Spain,” American Ethnologist, vol. 40, no. 1, 2013, p. 62. “Pinochet’s death confronts Spain with own painful past,” Agence 41. France Presse -- English, December 14, 2006, accessed http://www. 102. Diario Núm. 296, 2007, 14613. lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. ; Alan Riding. “A Mother 103. C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, August 20, Country’s Advice: Do as I Say, Not as I Did,” Te New York Times, 2013. December 13, 1998, accessed http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/ 104. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Repa- lnacademic. ration, UN General Assembly, § VII 63. Zapatero, Virgilio. “Transiciones y Derechos Humanos,” El País, 105. Joan Herrera Torres. Diario Núm. 925, 2007, p. 30. December 18, 1998, accessed http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/ 106. C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, August 20, lnacademic. 2013. 64. Diario Núm. 925, 2007, p. 26. 107. P. Esteban, in-person communication, August 20, 2013. 65. C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, August 29, 108. Evans, Robert. “Spain Tells U.N. No Rethink on Post-Franco 2013. Amnesty,” Reuters, November 06, 2013, accessed http:// 66. C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, August 29, www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/06/us-un-rights-spain- 2013. idUSBRE9A513C20131106. 67. Sikkink, Te Justice Cascade, p. 33. 68. P. Esteban, in-person communication, August 29, 2013. 69. Erice, Francisco. (2006). Combates por el pasado y apologías de la memoria, a propósito de la represión franquista. Hispania Nova: Re- vista de historia contemporánea. 70. C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, August 29, 2013. 71. C. Castresana-Fernandez, in-person communication, August 29, 2013. 72. Diario Núm. 296, p. 14620. 100 do people in equal societies live longer? the relative income hypothesis in light of panel data

maria balgova, university of cambridge (2014)

ABSTRACT Tis paper reexamines the hypothesis of a negative causal relationship between income inequality and life expectancy. Te relative income hypothesis has attracted the attention of policymakers and may become a powerful argument in favor of government redistribution of wealth. To test this claim, this paper draws on panel data from thirty-six countries over eighteen years and employs a specifc variable transformation to enable direct testing of the relative income hypothesis from aggregate data. Te conclusion of this analysis is that a neg- ative impact of income inequality on life expectancy cannot be empirically substantiated.

1. INTRODUCTION macroeconomic channels. In conclusion, the data n 2009, Wilkinson and Pickett published Te do not fnd evidence to support the importance of Spirit Level, an extended version of Wilkinson’s relative income on health independent of covariates. relative income hypothesis (1992).1 Tis book In the frst half of this paper, I outline the possible Iused empirical research to demonstrate negative causal channels between inequality and health (part impacts of income inequality on crime, obesity, 2.1) and summarize the research conducted so far mental and physical health, educational attainment, (part 2.2). Part 2.3 presents a variable transformation and social capital. Wilkinson and Pickett argued that that enables direct testing for the relative income international diferences in these socioeconomic hypothesis from aggregate data. Te empirical indicators are best explained by looking at countries’ analysis follows. Te data are described in part respective inequality levels, thereby forwarding a 3.1, and panel regressions are conducted in parts powerful argument for a more equal distribution of 3.2 and 3.3. Part 4 discusses results, ofers policy income. In 2010, the leaders of the United Kingdom’s implications, and suggests topics for further research. two largest political parties, Prime Minister David Cameron and Labour leader Ed Miliband, cited 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Te Spirit Level to support the case for reducing 2.1. Overview of Main Income-Health Theories inequality. 2 Tis section outlines three diferent ways we Te paper primarily aims to present new can think about the relationship between health and evidence on the relative income hypothesis from income. an aggregate (macroeconomic) perspective while First, health depends on the level of income: addressing the issue of causality and its direction, the poorer a person is, the worse her health, because which is absent from Wilkinson and Pickett’s she lacks the necessities such as basic healthcare simple cross-sectional analyses. Tis is essential and quality nutrition. Tis is the absolute income for understanding the potential implications of hypothesis. Tis pattern is well documented, redistributive policies. especially when looking at the entire income To investigate the relative income hypothesis, distribution.3 data from an unbalanced panel of thirty-six countries Second, the relative income hypothesis states over eighteen years is used in regression analysis of that one’s health depends on his or her position in life expectancy. Various methods are employed— the income distribution of the respective reference including covariates, fxed efects, and a variable group (i.e. the group of people to which individuals transformation—to distinguish microeconomic and compare their fortunes). A poor individual’s health columbia university journal of politics & society does not sufer because she cannot aford quality relative deprivation not only creates chronic stress nutrition and basic healthcare, but because she but also signifcantly weakens the institutions that occupies an inferior position in her society. Tis would otherwise serve to diminish it. health gradient persists throughout the income Wilkinson also drew attention to the fact that relative distribution. Te causal channel is psychological— deprivation that negatively afects one’s health is the stress of having to “keep up with the Joneses” anchored to the income of our social group, not and deterioration of social relations are responsible to the average income of the whole world.11 Tis for poor health outcomes. Merton’s Strain Teory creates verifable implication of the relative income describes the strain of an individual’s success on hypothesis: a health gradient should exist within, but other, less successful individuals.4 Merton uses this not between countries. Wilkinson brings evidence of to explain the inequality-crime relationship. Finally, precisely this relationship in the data.12 Sapolsky documents stress being related to social So far, we have hypothesized that individual health status.5 depends on position in the income distribution. If Wilkinson argues that relative poverty only it is better to be higher up in the income ranking, becomes prominent in countries that have undergone the richest individuals in a group should be lef “epidemiological transition,” a point when the nature unafected by the shape of the income distribution. of mortal diseases changes from infectious to chronic To put it simply, the rich should not sufer from and degenerative. Tis is usually identical to the point relative deprivation. where the marginal returns on money with respect However, an important extension of the relative to health start to fall. While higher incomes can income hypothesis is that income inequality may be a help fght pandemic diseases, chronic diseases like health hazard in itself.13 Some of the causal channels ischemic heart disease respond much less to advances described above are as likely to afect the poor as the in individual earnings. Hence, absolute income does wealthy. Tere are psychological efects in play; in a not have a signifcant efect on health in developed society where wealth is important, the stress related countries. Wilkinson demonstrates that the to maintaining one’s position falls on both the rich epidemiological transition can be seen in both cross- and the poor. Social capital, social support, and the sectional international data that includes poor and provision of public goods are all hypothesized to rich countries, and in a time series data analysis of deplete as inequality grows. Similar arguments can rich countries.6 In the United Kingdom, for example, be found in literature from other felds. For example, coronary heart disease became more common in Alesina, Baqir, and Easterley argue that public working class than higher classes in 1970’s.7 spending falls with population heterogeneity; income While the causal channel from income to health inequality may serve as a magnifer of the diferences is clear, there are several complementary links that between people.14 Knack and Keefer show a positive could explain the negative impact of inequality on link between the levels of trust in a society and its life expectancy: the stress of economic inequality GDP.15 Kahn shows how high inequality reduces may negatively impact the immune and endocrine life expectancy through underinvestment in social systems, encourage fatalist thinking, and induce infrastructure.16 If income inequality fragments people to start smoking or consuming alcohol.8 society and creates stress, envy and mistrust, high Mortality depends on work security and satisfaction inequality will reduce the health of all members of and on support networks. All of these were shown to a given society, even those at the top of the income deteriorate with lower economic status.9 distribution. Tis is the relative income hypothesis, But the causal channel does not run exclusively which is present in all of the literature reviewed in through individual stress levels. Wilkinson argues this paper, and it is also the hypothesis this paper will that inequality breaks down social cohesion and test. Overall, the evidence in favor of this hypothesis trust within a local community.10 Diminishing is strong on the microeconomic level, but mixed at social networks and peer support are known to harm the aggregate level. Te existing literature will be individual health. In this respect, income inequality discussed in part 2.2. is a proxy for social exclusion, with low levels of It is important to note that the causation may autonomy and security as related factors. In sum, run in the opposite direction. Poor health prevents

102 the relative income hypothesis in light of panel data individuals from working, reducing their income Mortality Study revealed that people with household both absolutely and relatively. Afer all, health incomes below $5,000 could expect to live ten is one of the inputs into the production process. years less than individuals with household incomes Policy implications are then very diferent, since exceeding $50,000.18 income redistribution is a symptom, not a cause, Microeconomic research builds on (1) in two of population health. Although this paper does ways: including a growing number of controls (zi), not focus on this relationship, some papers in the and circumventing the problem of endogeneity of discussed literature attempt to correct for reverse individual income. Both of these approaches aim to causation in order to improve the consistency of their identify the direction and specifcs of the causal link results.17 between income and health. Adding control variables helps to pin down the 2.2. Survey of Literature source of income-health relationship by controlling Because it is individuals, not countries, who for potential confounding factors. Te most ready experience health outcomes, microeconomic studies candidates for controls were education, followed by are a natural point of departure. Te conclusion is race, gender, lifestyle factors (smoking, excessive clear: most studies fnd a signifcant and positive drinking), and public health expenditure. For relationship between income inequality and mortality example, in a non-linear study, Smith and Kington at the individual level. Te precise defnition showed the positive efect of income on self-reported of inequality varies—income, social status, and health is only halved (and still signifcant) afer the degree of sub-ordinance all serve as possible variables such as smoking, BMI, and excessive benchmarks—but the causal links overwhelmingly drinking were added to the regression. 19 point towards increased stress, insecurity, and loss One of the frst papers on this topic was of social support that originate in inequality, and by Kitigawa and Hauser, who analyzed diferent have a negative impact on individual health and life microeconomic datasets on income, social status, and expectancy. mortality in the U.S.20 Studies of aggregate data will be reviewed in Te Matched Records Study matched death the second half of this section. Tere is no clear records with data from population censuses to consensus in this literature, although most papers construct a dataset of more than 340,000 individuals seem to reject the hypothesis of a straightforward who died in 1960. Controlling for age, sex, and negative relationship between inequality and health. race, the study found a strong negative relationship Much of the discussion centers around the precise between mortality and education. Te life expectancy interpretation of such a relationship: does it tell us of the least-educated group was fve years below anything about individual health-income relationship the average life span of the most educated group. at all? Tis paper argues that it does not, unless Tis was true for both overall mortality and specifc methodology is employed. mortality from cardiovascular diseases, although the results for cancer mortality did not exhibit a Microeconomic Studies clear trend. Interestingly enough, this relationship Te absolute income hypothesis is the was not observed among those above age sixty-fve, fundamental relationship for the study of income and suggesting that the positive impact of education may health: wear of over time.

(1) Te best predictor of mortality, however, was not education, but income. Te researchers found a where hi represents individual health outcome (e.g. clear negative relationship between the two, although life expectancy or self-reported health status), yi is they pointed out that because they used a measure of individual income, zi is a vector of demographic household income, not wealth, the individuals with control variables, α is a constant and ε represents the poorer health may be forced to take less lucrative error term. jobs. Hence, reverse causation may be one of the To get an idea of the extent of mortality drivers behind the observed health gradient. As a diferences, the 1980 USA National Longitudinal result, the authors argued that years of schooling

103 columbia university journal of politics & society serve as a better proxy for social status than income. Tis relationship also held for changes in health. Tis was supported by a multivariate regression that Furthermore, adding nonlinear function of income included both income and education as explanatory (linearly splined terciles) into the regression function variables (again, also controlling for sex, age, and signifcantly lowered the unexplained fraction of race): these two variables were both statistically racial and ethnic health disparity. Tis suggests that signifcant. A diferent dataset was based on the the health-income relationship is concave. population census in the Chicago metropolitan Smith and Kington controlled for a set of self- area for the years 1930–1960. Te results were reported risk behaviors, such as smoking, alcohol very similar to their previous fndings. Again, the intake, and excess calorie intake, and concluded overall mortality rate in the lowest income group not only that the original health gradient was not was approximately 60–65 percent higher than in the afected, but also that economic factors explained highest income group. more of the ethnic and racial health disparities than Te time series feature of the data revealed an the behavioral risk factors. Te link between income important piece of evidence in favor of the relative (and wealth) and health was strongest for the poorest income hypothesis. If absolute income, and not social individuals and became relatively weak at the top of status, mattered for life expectancy, one would expect the income distribution. that afer several years of income growth, the poorest Similarly to Kitigawa and Hauser, education was and the richest groups would have the same mortality a signifcant control that improved health beyond rate. But instead, in Chicago, mortality was falling at what it contributed to income.23 Smith and Kington an equal rate for all income groups, which preserved saw this as evidence that schooling is either a good relative mortality between diferent income levels and proxy for socioeconomic status or is intrinsically suggested that absolute income is not all that matters benefcial to health, perhaps by enabling the for improving life expectancy. individual to make better health-related choices or to Te problem with Kitagawa and Hauser’s study access health information at a lower cost. is that it failed to control for migration in and out of Menchik explored the direction of causation between the areas over time, which might have been strongly income and health.24 To do so, he used three linked with income and health. Furthermore, neither diferent tools. First, he employed steady household the Matched Records Study nor the Chicago Area wealth as a proxy for income to exclude impacts from Study had any controls available for health-related health on income. Second, he removed bias from factors such as smoking or exercise. Te results unobservable individual diferences by controlling for of this study demonstrate a strong link between parents’ health and self-assessed health status. Tird, education, income, and mortality. this regression was then estimated as a panel logit Kitigawa and Hauser controlled for race, sex, model to allow for non-linearities in the income- education and age, but the seminal contribution health relationship. Te resulting estimate of β, the to health-income covariates was a paper by Smith coefcient of income in the health-income regression and Kington.21 Teir aim was to explain the (1), was positive and signifcant at 5%. Income, he racial diferences in health among the older U.S. concluded, caused higher life expectancy. population, but they employed a wide range of An alternative approach to investigating variables that are illuminating for income-health health-income causality is to make use of natural research in general. Interestingly, this paper used exogenous changes in income. Wilkinson conducted survey data on the predominantly retired population a quasi-natural experiment where he analyzed the in the U.S. Te advantage is that this population’s relative changes in mortality and income for diferent income (pension and annuity from accumulated occupational classes.25 He argued that although wealth) does not depend on their contemporary there was signifcant self-selection into occupations health, so the researchers did not have to worry about at the entry, most people stay within their occupation reverse causation. for the rest of their lives. Tis creates ideal conditions Smith and Kington found a strong health for this type of experiment: once we control for the gradient: self-reported health consistently occupational choice, changes in earnings of a given corresponded to increased household net worth.22 occupational class are independent of individual

104 the relative income hypothesis in light of panel data characteristics—the income of an individual does not diagnosis ofen linked to stress. have a signifcant impact on the changes of earnings Marmot et al. analyzed this subsample of her occupational class. Tis makes it possible to and found two clear trends.31 First, the CHD estimate the causal relationship between income and mortality rate increased with age. Second, and mortality. more surprisingly, this mortality rate displayed Looking at the 1971 and 1981 British censuses, a steep gradient with respect to the employment Wilkinson found that 21 percent of the variation in grade. Controlling for age, the men from the mortality rates by occupation can be explained by lowest employment grade (messengers and manual occupational unemployment and the percentage of workers) were 3.6 times more likely to die of CHD men with the lowest earnings. Changes in earnings than the men in the highest grade (employees of the in the higher parts of the distribution were not administration). Te frst Whitehall study also notes statistically signifcant, suggesting that it is relative a strong positive link between employment grade deprivation that reduces life expectancy. and healthy lifestyle (proportion of active sports All of the studies cited so far explored primarily the in leisure time, smoking). Only 29 percent of the efect of absolute income and touched the relative administrators smoked, compared to 61 percent of income hypothesis only indirectly. A measure of those in the “other” grade. A multiple regression was income inequality, gs, was at frst included as a used to assess how important grade is, controlling demographic control variable. Along with measures for lifestyle choices and recorded health status. Only of psychological stress, these were the beginnings of 40 percent of the grade diferences in CHD mortality the relative income hypothesis. Silver was among the could be explained by these behavioral factors, frst ones to use these measures.26 suggesting that social status (inequality) indeed plays While stress proved to have a signifcant a very important role. negative efect on individual health, the results for Indeed, the participants may have been sorted income inequality are still mixed: Gerdtham and into employment grades based on their good Johannesson fail to reject the null hypothesis that health. Tis was the case for Civil Service employees community income inequality causes individual that were hired as “other” grade afer their health mortality in Sweden,27 and Daly et al. fnd that problems prevented them from performing more state-level inequality is insignifcant for individual demanding physical work in better jobs. To examine mortality,28 but Wilkinson shows that life expectancy the possibility of reverse causation, Marmot et al. and relative poverty are very negatively correlated.29 split the sample according to whether or not the Te most persuasive evidence for the relative men sufered from a list of CHD-related symptoms income hypothesis comes from the Whitehall when hired. Although the civil servants hired with studies. Conducted in two waves (1967 and 1985) symptoms were more likely to die of CHD, the health and focusing on British Civil servants, the studies gradient remained relatively unchanged, and was discovered that rather than observing a clustering equally signifcant in explaining CHD mortality. Tis of bad health and risk factors at the lowest social relationship proved to be stable over the seven years class, the data exhibit a continuous health gradient of follow-ups. that afects all social classes, including relatively rich A diferent confounding factor was that the men individuals. Te powerful implication of these studies in the “other” grade were on average fve centimeters is that “inequalities in health cannot be divorced shorter than those in the highest grade. Height from inequalities in society”.30 remained negatively correlated with CHD mortality Te frst Whitehall study was carried out even afer including a range of controls. Furthermore, on 17,530 male civil servants, collecting medical height seemed to be directly linked to socioeconomic information and data on their health-related status (WWII). Te interaction between mortality, behavior. Teir “employment grades” were used as a inequality and early environment is complex and measure of their social status within their workplace. was not pursued further in the paper. Te authors Seven years later, deaths of study participants were concluded that “a man’s grade of employment was recorded. Forty-three percent of these deaths were a stronger predictor of his subsequent risk of CHD attributed to coronary heart disease (CHD), a death than any of the other major coronary risk

105 columbia university journal of politics & society factors“.32 Te researchers discovered that the pressure of low Eighteen years later, a second cohort of British status was proved to be an exceptionally strong Civil Servants participated in an extended follow-up source of chronic stress, and low status also meant to the frst Whitehall study.33 Tis research collected a baboon was less likely to receive social support, a much greater range of data on participants’ which usually serves as an “antidote” to greater levels behavior, as well as on various stress-related factors of stress hormones. such as support networks and job satisfaction. Sapolsky argued that we can extrapolate the Although some things changed—men were qualitative results from the study of baboons onto much less likely to smoke compared to twenty years humans.36 When under stress, human and baboon prior—Whitehall II confrmed the fndings of its bodies release similar hormones and experience predecessor. Not only coronary heart disease, but similar emotions, and similarly to people, baboons also angina pectoris, chronic bronchitis, and other do not face any predators in their natural habitat and chronic and degenerative diseases were less likely in thus most of their stress originates in their social higher employment grade. Te association between group. Hence, there is a reason to believe that at least low employment grade and risky lifestyle choices, some of the fndings about baboon health-status such as greater alcohol consumption, smoking, relationship are transferable to humans. obesity, and less physical exercise, also persisted. Another piece of interesting evidence of the harmful Concerning the new data on social and impact of relative deprivation comes from behavioral psychological factors, fewer civil servants from the economics. Kuhn et al. analyzed data on lottery lower employment grades reported satisfaction with winners and their neighbors in the Netherlands in their work, having a close confdante, and pursuing the period 2003-2006.37 Te postcode lottery in this hobbies; they were also more likely to not own a country randomly allocates a luxury car to the lucky car and to experience problems paying their rent. lottery participants. Te researchers reported a strong In general, having little control over one’s life may efect where neighbors of a lottery winner were much be another channel through which stress infuences more likely to buy a new car than the inhabitants mortality. of a neighborhood where nobody won. Te study Te Whitehall studies give powerful testimony hypothesized that neighbors that cared about how to the impact of inequality on individual life they are socially perceived bought a new car to “keep expectancy. First, the participants were all non- up with the Joneses.” manual workers in stable employment and none Te rest of the microeconomic literature of them were in absolute poverty. Despite that, the focuses on more conventional datasets and income study revealed a strong health gradient based on inequality. position in society. Second, increased probability A paper by Wilkinson followed novel of cardiovascular diseases was associated with methodology to bring evidence of a non-linear stressful jobs, and the Whitehall studies deepened relationship between inequality and health.38 our understanding of what it is exactly about stress Wilkinson used U.K. cross-sectional microeconomic that is detrimental to health. Until Whitehall I, it was data on self-reported health and household accepted that greater stress arose from fast-paced income, and computed “health ratios,” a measure jobs with large responsibility. Tis study revealed of individual health relative to the average score that the true problem is the discrepancy between the of the people of the same age. He regressed these psychological demands of a job and the degree of individually against the household income and found control the employee can actually exert.34 Tis serves a U-shaped relationship between inequality and ill- as a powerful empirical foundation for the claim that health ratio. Te wealthy individuals in the sample inequality is bad for individual health. never experienced worse relative health than their A direct link between social status and health low-income counterparts at the other end of the was observed in primates, too. Archie et al. observed distribution. Although these results are for morbidity, baboons in their natural habitat for over 20 years not mortality, previous studies showed that morbidity and found that alpha monkeys were much faster to is a very good predictor of mortality, and thus these recover from injuries than their lower-status peers.35 results can be generalized.39

106 the relative income hypothesis in light of panel data Why did the ill-health ratio rise at the right Te authors conclude that the loss of the end of the income distribution? Wilkinson pointed health-inequality link in recent literature is a result out that in Britain, class and income are not always of demographic changes in the income distribution. good predictors of each other. For instance, ffy It used to be the elderly population, but now it is percent of manual laborers in the transport sector families with young children who are most likely earned more than the bottom twenty-fve percent to fnd themselves with the lowest incomes. As the of the managerial class. Despite this strong claim, mortality rates in younger age groups are much lower Wilkinson does not address the implications of the compared to the morality above age sixty-fve, the divorce between social status and income for the authors argue that this shif in income distribution is methodology and interpretation of most research likely to obscure the relationship between inequality on life expectancy and inequality, which takes the and mortality. Tis assertion was supported by position that income distribution is a good proxy the four countries for which time series data was for social status. If Wilkinson’s evidence that the available, but it is questionable how robust evidence inequality-health relationship is convex holds, based on such a small sample can be. income redistribution from the rich to the poor may Despite its potential, the Luxembourg Income improve mortality and morbidity at both ends of the Study is representative of only a few European income distribution. countries and has not yet been fully used for income- All of the research mentioned until now health research. To explain international diferences focused on a single country—studies that combine in life expectancy, one must examine aggregate international data are rare. Te limiting factor in this variables. case is the lack of data that is adequately comparable across countries. Macroeconomic Studies An exception is a study by Lobmayer and Macroeconomic studies focus on explaining Wilkinson, which used a relatively new international the variation in mortality rates across countries. microeconomic dataset, the Luxembourg Income Te point of departure for this perspective on the Study.40 Teir paper is a response to a surge in income-health relationship lies in two papers from contemporaneous studies that have failed to fnd an the 1970s. empirical relationship between inequality and life Preston observed a positive and concave expectancy and claim that it was a phenomenon of relationship between income (per capita GDP) and the end of the twentieth century alone. life expectancy.41 Income improves life expectancy Te results for total mortality rates were weak in the initial phases of development, but as a country and mixed, confrming the fndings of the literature becomes richer, an additional unit of income to which Lobmeyer and Wilkinson respond. Looking buys fewer and fewer years. Te income-health at premature mortality, however, delivered clear relationship exhibits diminishing marginal returns. results in line with the relative income hypothesis: it An extreme extrapolation of this concave trend was strongly and positively associated with income is that above a certain threshold (epidemiological and income inequality. transition), absolute income no longer matters. Te two mortality measures used (traditional Te income-health relationship becomes fat when morality and index of premature deaths) attach the distribution of income within a society gains diferent weights to diferent age groups, namely the prominence. Average life expectancy of a country can premature deaths measure gives greater weights to now be raised by taking money away from the rich, the mortality of young population. As a consequence, whose life expectancy will respond only mildly to the discrepancy of results when using diferent changes in absolute income, and giving it to the poor, measures points to the fact that the income-health for whom absolute income still raises life expectancy relationship changes with age. For those under the considerably. Tis was the bottom line of the second age of sixty-fve, mortality grew with inequality, and seminal paper of this feld by Rodgers: on average, also in relative poverty for these age groups. Tat combining the absolute income hypothesis with would explain the positive relationship between diminishing marginal returns on income implies that premature mortality rates and median income. income equality improves health.42

107 columbia university journal of politics & society

An important result of the Preston and Rodgers of diferences in international life expectancy. Per study is that on the country level, relative and capita GDP and health were weakly correlated absolute income hypotheses are indistinguishable: (correlation coefcient of only 0.07), but regressing income inequality reduces life expectancy. Only afer life expectancy on inequality and income resulted in employing special methodology, such as the one used adjusted R2 of approximately 75 percent. Wilkinson in this paper, it is possible to use macroeconomic concluded that income and income inequality alone data to learn about the individual health-income can account for three quarters of the variation in life relationship. expectancy. Te basic aggregate relationship estimated is: Te second part of this paper looked at the (where hs presents state average health outcome, links between changes in variables. Using a diferent ys is country average GDP per capita, gs is a measure dataset with several time periods, he regressed the of state-specifc level of income inequality and zs is a annual growth rate of life expectancy on the growth vector of other parameters). rate of relative poverty. Te correlation coefcient Because the concavity of health on income was -0.73: the countries where relative poverty confounds the individual health-inequality diminished faster also enjoyed faster growth in life expectancy. (2 ) In Wilkinson’s opinion, the high correlation coefcients estimated were sufcient evidence of relationship, δ only measures the impact of inequality causality. He argues that with correlation so strong, on average health outcome in a country. Even for it is unlikely that the health-income relationship a general understanding of δ as a simple measure isn’t driven by a third variable. Moreover, because of covariance between health and inequality, its the data on GDP per capita and life expectancy were value is ambiguous and depends on whether (2) calculated using the whole population, including includes non-linear functions of income. If it does, economically inactive individuals whose income does as in Gravelle et al. (who replicated Rodgers’ paper not depend on their health (such as children and with new data and a range of alternative functional pensioners), the probability that the link between forms, including a nonparametric 3SLS procedure to health and income comes from reverse causation approximate the concave income-health curve), it is is small. Te truth is that both of these arguments not surprising if δ is insignifcant, because inequality could be easily disputed by fnding a signifcant third and non-linear functions of income may be capturing variable, such as strong welfare state. Tis would the same aggregation afect.43 Gravelle failed to fnd render Wilkinson’s empirical fndings spurious. a signifcant link between inequality and health, A more persuasive argument in favor of the which led to the conclusion that the harmful efect relative income hypothesis comes from a diferent of income inequality on individual health is just a paper by Wilkinson.47 In this study, Wilkinson “statistical artifact.” explains the concept of epidemiological transition On the other hand, Kaplan et al. and Wilkinson and gives compelling reasons for drawing from found a large and signifcant efect of inequality on aggregate data in search of evidence of the relative average life expectancy.44 income hypothesis. Overall, these results are very sensitive to In the last half-century, we have witnessed diferent functional forms of (2), the measures of improvements in life expectancy at the rate of two income inequality (household vs. personal, diferent to 2.5 years per decade, even when the income- decile ratios) and the addition of control variables mortality profle was fat. Humanity clearly hasn’t 45 zs. Tus, the literature does not reach a consensus reached the limits of life expectancy; only the about the value of δ. determinants of life expectancy have changed in One of the papers that reported a very large δ in the process called ‘epidemiological transition,’ “the both static and dynamic settings is by Wilkinson.46 shif in the main causes of death from infectious He worked with OECD cross-sectional data from diseases to degenerative cardiovascular diseases and 1986-1987, and his research provides strong cancers.”48 Now that almost all members of society evidence in favor of inequality as the determinant have reached a certain standard of living (such as

108 the relative income hypothesis in light of panel data being able to aford white bread and sugar), the assumed that mortality is a result of a rational choice question is why the probability of dying of a stroke of how much input to sacrifce for better health, and is not the same for the top and the bottom quintiles the only way to consistently estimate this model is by of income distribution. In fact, the diseases among using various covariates. the afuent of the past (obesity, coronary heart Te health demand variables were household disease) have become more common among the poor income, education (as a proxy for the cost of health today. Wilkinson argues that the cause is relative information), “taste variables” such as marital deprivation. status and fertility; and cultural and historic factors, Another piece of evidence comes from for which a region dummy was used. Silver also comparing the historical development of the UK and controlled for stress (death rates of ulcers of the Japan: while the Japanese society became much more stomach) and public health expenditure. egalitarian (at least with respect to incomes) in the A 2SLS regression was ftted along OLS because period since 1970, the UK experienced an increase in there are several reasons why income may depend income inequality. At the same time, Japan became on health, some of them leading to simultaneity bias. the country with the highest life expectancy, while First, disease and injury may lead to loss of work or the UK’s position in OECD rankings slipped from a shif to an occupation with a lower wage. Second, tenth to seventeenth. It is possible, of course, that state benefts for the chronically ill and disabled these trends can be explained by some third variable increase income even as health deteriorates. Tird, driving both health and inequality, such as change in an individual with a shorter life expectancy has attitudes and preferences. Wilkinson did not provide less time to recoup the returns on investment into an answer to this. education, and will therefore invest less. Tus, fewer Another problem arising from the relative years of schooling lead to lower wages. Exogeneity income hypothesis is that given that an individual’s of income is also important for unbiased estimation absolute income determines her position in of the coefcients on other explanatory variables the inequality ranking, how can we distinguish that are likely to be correlated with income, such between the two? A diferent paper by Wilkinson as marital status and physicians per capita. Tis used aggregate data to respond to this issue.49 He paper looked at average variables by area in the U.S. points out that while a strong health gradient is data in the years 1959-61. Te main results were consistently found within countries, it is absent very similar for OLS and 2SLS: both income and from international comparisons. Te strong health education signifcantly improve life expectancy. gradient within countries is a refection of social Stress and smoking were found to be detrimental to status (one’s position in the society usually does not health (ulcers are signifcantly and positively related depend on wealth in other countries) and confrms to mortality), while the coefcient for public welfare the relative income hypothesis. expenditure was signifcant and negative, suggesting Te literature described so far focused on a reverse causality problem where public welfare showing how and what aggregate data tells us grows in areas with worse population health. Overall, about the efects of inequality on individual health. Silver’s results on aggregate data were in line with Little attention was given to additional explanatory similar microeconomic studies, such as by Kitigawa variables. Tis is addressed in the following section. and Hauser.52 When it comes to the addition of covariates, A more recent study by Daly et al., which also opinions vary. Proponents of the relative income focused on the health-income relationship in the hypothesis argue that controlling for the channels U.S., was unique in its simultaneous use of micro via which income inequality damages health (e.g. and aggregate data.53 Teir analysis used various education) artifcially reduces the signifcance of measures of income distribution, some of them inequality variable.50 poverty-sensitive and others afuence-sensitive. On the other hand, studies like Silver champion Tey served not only as a robustness check for the use of a large set of additional explanatory their fndings, but also to see how the shape of the variables to obtain more precise models of the distribution impacts on mortality. income-health interaction.51 In particular, Silver On the state level, Daly et al. found a strong

109 columbia university journal of politics & society positive relationship between mortality and research, the economics of happiness, and animal inequality. Te association between mortality biology. Te authors concluded that income and inequality was signifcantly weaker when the inequality is strongly linked to social ills, and that inequality variable measured the upper end of this channel operates on an individual level. income distribution. Te regression of changes of Te message of the book provoked a strong mortality on changes in inequality, which presented negative response. Most of the criticism of the book a much stronger test of the health-inequality focused on demonstrating that the correlations relationship, similarly suggested that only the presented by Wilkinson and Pickett were a result of changes of inequality among the poorest deciles of data mining and country selection. Tis is partly true the population matter. (as Saunders and Snowdon argue in an article for Linking individual life expectancy with the Guardian): for example, the authors omit South state-level inequality (controlling for age, race and Korea, which is very unequal but has good social median state income) brought rather diferent outcomes, and is therefore not consistent with the results: inequality had the correct sign, but was conclusions of their data.56 Another example is the never signifcant. Te authors admit that they could use of old forecasts of obesity rates in the U.S., which fnd a signifcant inequality-mortality relationship strongly overshoot the actual values.57 However, only afer “considerable experimentation” with the main limitations of the Spirit Level lie in its decomposition of the full sample. Tis is what led methodology and theoretical foundations. them to conclude that the data do not support First, it is rather lax when describing its any role of state-level inequality in determining claims: the authors talk about “the society,” “almost individual mortality. Te main message of their everyone,” and “all individuals” interchangeably, paper is the need to recognize the source of rising although these refer to very diferent income-health inequality: is it a growing pool of the poor, or is it hypotheses: “Te benefts of greater equality spread that the rich are getting richer? Te former seems to right across society, improving health for everyone be more harmful to life expectancy than the latter: – not just those at the bottom. In other words, at “Empirically, the mortality correlations are stronger almost any level of income, it’s better to live in a for measures that stress the depth of poverty rather more equal place.” (emphasis mine).58 Tey fail to than the height of afuence.”54 clearly distinguish between the impact of inequality A very diferent conclusion, a strong negative on average variables, and when the efect pertains relationship between inequality and life expectancy, to individual outcomes. Te interplay between was the center of Te Spirit Level, an infuential book concavity and inequality on aggregate level, as frst by Wilkinson and Pickett that brought the relative described by Rodgers, is not discussed at all. income hypothesis into public discussion.55 Te Wilkinson and Pickett present the large set of authors focus on the relative income hypothesis, the scatterplots for diferent socioeconomic outcomes claim that income inequality harms society by having as evidence that the negative infuence of income a negative impact on all of its members. Tey use a inequality on life expectancy is not a coincidence. large set of aggregate data on developed countries to Te consistent and signifcant inverse relationship prove its point. As a measure of inequality, they use between inequality and negative social outcomes the ratio of incomes of the top 20% versus the bottom is interpreted as a strong indicator of a causal link 20% of the population. Teir data comes from the between inequality and obesity, crime, etc. Tis is World Bank (2004). the second main problem of this book. While the Wilkinson and Pickett produced an impressive authors may be correct about these correlations, set of scatterplots on OECD countries that document which are indeed robust across dependent variables, the negative relationship between income inequality these correlations tell us nothing about causality. Te in a given country and almost any “social bad” observed pattern in the data may be a result of a third imaginable: obesity, drug use, homicide rate, teenage variable, such as culture or history, driving these joint pregnancies, lack of trust, and life expectancy. Tis results. In fact, the authors refer to research that has was complemented by a narrative that encompassed been done on the links between life expectancy and fndings from sociology, their own epidemiological social capital, suggesting that the inequality-health

110 the relative income hypothesis in light of panel data relationship is not straightforward. home country. Te third weakness is that all of their data is Te health-income relationship described in aggregate. Tis would be sufcient if the authors (3) nests various specifc hypotheses. If we set equal only claimed that inequality makes societies worse to zero, diminishing returns of income with respect on average, but as noted above, they ofen use these to health are removed; when θ is zero, the model aggregate correlations as evidence in favor of nega- collapses to the absolute income hypothesis. Hence tive impact of inequality on individual outcomes. (In contrast, to avoid this pitfall, this paper employs specifc decomposition technique to make inferences about the individual from the aggregate.) As Runci- man noted, the book includes one chart that unam- biguously supports the relative income hypothesis.59 this model enables the testing of various assumptions It plots infant mortality rates against father’s social as nested hypotheses under the umbrella expression class for Sweden vs. England and Wales. Tis graph (3). not only shows a clear health gradient (the higher the Next, I need to aggregate (3) to model health- class, the lower the probability of infant death), but income relationship on a macroeconomic level. To it also shows that infant mortality in England and distinguish between the efects of aggregation and Wales is higher for all classes, including the top class. relative income hypothesis, I frst express individual Following Runciman’s argument, this is the type of health and income as deviations from world averages evidence Wilkinson and Pickett should have focused ( ) and income ( ): on to prove the relative income hypothesis. I then sum these deviations for each country, and divide it by the population of the given s. Te 2.3. Model resulting variables are life expectancy and per capita Tis section presents the theoretical model GDP respectively, both still expressed as deviation used to investigate the relative income hypothesis in from the world mean life expectancy and GDP per aggregate data. capita. Tis is the fnal formulation. To formally express the relationship between In other words, I frst express health and income health, income and inequality, I adopt the model of each individual as a deviation from the world by Deaton,60 which draws on the work of Rodgers mean, and then compute country averages of these and Gravelle et al.,61 but includes a way to test the deviations. Tis is done for each time period (note relative income hypothesis with aggregate data. that this is why there is no time subscript on the I start by modeling the individual health-in- variables of this model). come relationship. I assume that this relationship is (5) demonstrates that even if inequality has quadratic, and that health falls within inequality of no efect on individual income (θ is 0), it will still the individual’s reference group. A quadratic health- afect average country health. Tis was at the heart income relationship implies that eventually, health of the critique by Gravelle et al.62 A nonzero will will fall as income grows, which is not very plausible. thus serve as evidence in favor of relative income A quadratic function was used due to its simplicity hypothesis. and because it serves as a good demonstration of De- (4 ) aton’s variable transformation. Later, in the empirical part, a log specifcation is explored as well. 3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS In keeping with the previously used notation, 3.1. Data the health h of an individual i from a country s Te dataset is an unbalanced panel of depends on her income y and on the inequality in her reference group g: I express income inequality as squared deviations from country mean. Is stands for the population size of country s. Note that the implicit assumption is that the reference group of i is her

111 columbia university journal of politics & society eighteen years (1989-2006) and thirty-six countries control for international diferences in healthcare that categorized as follows: may be unrelated to a country’s level of income and Countries were chosen to represent diferent inequality. For example, afer the 1989-91 revolutions types of economies and to maximize data availability. in Eastern Europe, some countries (such as Hungary) Developed countries are taken from Wilkinson and saw less damage to their healthcare sector than others Pickett;63 emerging countries are taken from the (such as the Baltic countries). Wilkinson and Pickett IMF classifcation (World Economic Outlook 2012). also included health expenditure in their health- Altogether, there are 648 (potential) data points for inequality research.64 each variable. Gaps in data are driven by frequency Te public expenditure measure was included of surveys (especially true for the main explanatory to control for a materialistic causal efect that runs variable of interest, the Gini coefcient), and these from inequality to low social cohesion to low public depend on the decisions made by statistical agencies. spending. Hence, there is no reason to believe that the missing When choosing a measure of the control data are related to any economic factor. Instead, variable (secondary school enrollment, health we can treat the gaps in data as random errors that expenditure, and public spending), I picked the should not result in measurement error bias. ones with the highest correlation coefcients with Te UNU-WIDER database is a life expectancy. Consequently, the relative income comprehensive collection of international inequality hypothesis will be easier to reject and easier to defend data. It is not perfect, though: to cover so many if accepted by the data. countries, the database merged many individual Gini Te following table presents correlations coefcient surveys. As a result, the income inequality between all variables, demonstrating a signifcant data are not perfectly comparable across countries. degree of multicollinearity (at the 5 percent Moreover, the source varies also within countries signifcance level). because most inequality surveys are not conducted annually (with the exception of the USA). Tere 3.2. Panel Regressions on Non-Transformed Data are several inequality databases for each country. Te focus of this section rests on the absolute Tey usually difer by their defnition of income, income hypothesis and the detection of any by looking at pre- or post-tax inequality, by unit inequality-health relationship. Direct testing used (household vs. Individual income), and by the of the relative income hypothesis via Deaton’s frequency of their data. When selecting the data, my transformation follows in part 3.3. methodology was to use as few datasets as possible I start with simple pair-wise correlations of the (within and across countries) and to choose the three main variables: life expectancy, per capita GDP, most similar ones (across countries). I assume that and inequality as captured by the Gini coefcient. diferent versions of Gini move together over time, so Figures 1 to 3 confrm that the relationship that a particular defnition should not matter once we between income and health is concave. Life diference the data. expectancy declines only mildly with higher levels of Health expenditure per capita is included to income inequality, and the link between inequality

Developed countries (17) Emerging countries (8) Eastern Europe (11) Australia Netherlands Argentina Bulgaria Slovakia Austria Norway Brazil Czech Republic Ukraine Belgium Portugal Chile Estonia Canada Singapore Mexico Hungary Denmark Spain Pakistan Latvia Finland Sweden Peru Lithuania France UK Thailand Poland Germany USA Venezuela Romania Italy Russia

112 the relative income hypothesis in light of panel data

Table 1: description of variables and their sources (all variables are measured annually) Variable Unit Description Source Life Years “Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a World Bank expectancy newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality Code: at birth at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its SP.DYN.LE00.IN life.” 0 missing data points Gross Thousands “GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by World Bank Domestic of constant midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by Code: Product per U.S. dollars all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes NY.GDP.PCAP.KD capita (PPP, base and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the year: 2000) products. It is calculated without making deductions for per depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and inhabitant degradation of natural resources.” 9 missing data (inflation points adjusted) Gini Index A relative measure of income inequality. Calculation rules: UNU-WIDER coefficient number on income share unit: household (if unavailable: person). Unit World Inequality the (0,100) of Analysis: household (if unavailable: person). Income Database V2.0c interval definition: disposable income (if unavailable: consumption). May 2008 Population coverage: all (if unavailable: urban areas). 101 missing data points Secondary Percent “Net enrolment ratio is the ratio of children of official school World Bank school ratio age based on the International Standard Classification of Code: enrolment Education 1997 who are enrolled in school to the population SE.SEC.NENR of the corresponding official school age. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using 88 missing data more specialized teachers.” points Health Constant “Total health expenditure is the sum of public and private World Bank expenditure U.S. dollars health expenditures as a ratio of total population. It covers Code: per capita (PPP, base the provision of health services (preventive and curative), SH.XPD.PCAP.PP. year: 2000) family planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency KD per aid designated for health but does not include provision of inhabitant water and sanitation.” 216 missing data points Public Percent of “Cash payments for operating activities of the government in World Bank expenditure GDP providing goods and services. It includes compensation of Code: employees (such as wages and salaries), interest and GC.XPN.TOTL.GD. subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other expenses such as ZS rent and dividends.” 257 missing data points Foreign Current U.S. “Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment World Bank Direct dollars to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or Code: Investment more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an BX.KLT.DINV.CD. inflow economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of WD equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from 41 missing data foreign investors.” points 113 29

columbia university journal of politics & society

Table 2: correlation between variables

Secondary Health Gini GDP per Life Public school expenditure coefficient capita expectancy expenditure enrollment per capita Gini coefficient 1,000 GDP per capita -0,284 1,000 Life expectancy -0,265 0,794 1,000 Public expenditure -0,633 0,320 0,374 1,000 Secondary school -0,384 0,598 0,602 0,539 1,000 enrollment Health expenditure per -0,371 0,903 0,734 0,351 0,514 1,000 capita and GDP is unclear. As one would expect, the impact Second, the Roy-Zellner test was used to check of GDP per capita on life expectancy is much less whether data are pool-able. Te hypothesis that the pronounced in developed countries. Te inequality- slopes are the same for all countries was rejected at health gradient is the steepest for Eastern Europe. the 5 percent signifcance level. I continue to treat the In emerging countries, income grows slightly with data as pool-able, but this result needs to be taken inequality, which results in a positive link between into account when evaluating the outcomes of this inequality and life expectancy. analysis. Of course, these correlations do not represent In this section, I start with six diferent causal relationships – they may be confounded by functional forms. omitted variables and the panel nature of the data. I use cluster standard errors to control for

To correct for this, I estimate a range of regressions, possible heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Only which are presented and discussed in the remainder these standard errors are reported. of this section. I carry out specifcation tests to fnd the Results and Discussion correct econometric approach, using the functional Table 3 summarizes the results of these six FE form (A) (see below) for the testing. Te Appendix regressions on raw data. provides more detail on specifcation tests and other Overall, the ft is very good (R2 between 29.9 econometric issues. percent and 66.8 percent). Across all regressions, the First, I use the Hausman test to distinguish data do not reject the absolute income hypothesis. As between random and fxed efects model: does each expected, income improves life expectancy, and this country have an intercept that carries over through relationship is concave. time? Te null hypothesis of random efects was Only one regression, E, fnds a signifcant link rejected at the 5 percent signifcance level, so fxed between Gini and life expectancy. efects regressions were run in the paper. Following Gravelle et al., an interaction variable

Figure 1

34

114 Figure 1

the relative income hypothesis in light of panel data

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115 columbia university journal of politics & society between the Gini coefcient and GDP per capita was from further regressions. added in Regression C to simulate epidemiological An alternative way to approximate the concave transition.65 Tis variable is highly insignifcant, health-income relationship is by the reciprocal mirroring Gravelle’s results. Tere are several function of GDP per capita and GDP per capita possible interpretations: either the data detects no squared (as in Regression E). Tis was Rodgers’ epidemiological transition or all the countries in the preferred specifcation, and it indeed provides more dataset have already passed the transition. Te results support for a link between life expectancy and so far do not allow us to distinguish between these inequality, suggesting that the quadratic function two explanations. may not be the best way to model the income-health In Regression D, I add control variables, but the relationship.66 Nevertheless, the p-value of Gini coefcients of income and inequality do not change. is still only 0.08 percent, while R2 drops to 29.9 Originally, all three control variables (healthcare percent. By switching from a quadratic to a reciprocal expenditure per capita, secondary school enrollment, function, we traded goodness of ft for signifcance of and total public expenditure) were included, but inequality variable. Tis suggests that the functional a series of joint-signifcance tests showed that form of Regression E puts greater importance on healthcare expenditure is the only signifcant one. inequality than the competing regressions. Te other two insignifcant variables were excluded Regression F reproduces the preferred translog

Table 3 (various FE specifications on all countries) A B C D E F Life Life Life Life Life Life expectancy expectancy expectancy expectancy expectancy expectancy GDP per .422*** 1.235*** 1.232*** .723*** -19.436*** 10.078** capita (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.03)

GINI .0176 .013 .012 .015 .057* 35.705 (.68) (.7) (.78) (.57) (.08) (.3)

GDP p.c. -.017*** -.017*** -.014*** 6.133*** 4.373*** squared (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)

GDP*GINI .000 -1.3 (.96) (.59)

Health .002*** expenditure p.c. (.00)

GINI squared -11.3 (.34) constant 68.228*** 62.538*** 62.563*** 66.339*** 75.904*** 34.456 (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) N 539 539 539 369 539 539 R2 0.426 0.578 0.578 0.668 0.299 0.631 Notes: p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. GDPpc and GDPpcsq in regression E are in reciprocals of the variables. All variables in regression F are in logs. 116

the relative income hypothesis in light of panel data

Table 4 (FE regressions of preferred specifications on country subgroups) D E Developed Emerging East Europe Developed Emerging East Europe life expectancy life expectancy life expectancy life expectancy life expectancy life expectancy GDP per capita .612*** 4.157 1.25 -283.008*** -24.945* -20.604*** (.00) (.26) (.11) (.00) (.08) (.00)

GDP p.c. -.011*** -.38 -.066 922.395*** 4.813 7.631*** squared (.00) (.22) (.34) (.00) (.16) (.00)

GINI .023 -.033** .004 -.002 .094 .028 (.22) (.03) (.89) (.95) (.30) (.41)

Health .001*** .005 .002* expenditure p.c. (.00) (.22) (.068)

Secondary .067 school enrolment (.20)

Public -.104 expenditure (.52)

constant 66.271*** 59.048*** 66.454*** 89.008*** 75.367*** 76.475*** (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) N 175 32 129 257 99 183 R2 0.897 0.563 0.626 0.802 0.377 0.555 Notes: p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. GDPpc and GDPpcsq in regression E are in reciprocals of the variables. specifcation from Gravelle et al. Te qualitative perhaps institutions, political stability, or quality of results are identical to the quadratic specifcation. healthcare—play greater roles in determining life One may argue that Gini is insignifcant because expectancy of people in Eastern European countries. the dataset combines developed and developing Diminishing returns of income on life countries. To investigate this possibility, preferred expectancy are detected in all types of countries, specifcations in Regressions D and E are repeated for which suggests they have all passed the point country subgroups. Regression D was chosen because of epidemiological transition. Tis is why the the lack of control is ofen criticized as the weak interaction term between Gini and GDP per capita in spot of relative income research, and Regression E Regression C was not signifcant—all the countries in presents a diferent functional approximation of the the sample have passed the transition, and thus there problem, slightly accentuating the role of inequality. is no variation on which to base an estimate for the In other words, Regression D is stricter while E is impact of the transition on life expectancy. more lenient when testing for an income-health However, signifcance of control variables relationship. Te results can be seen in Table 4. does difer between country groups. Secondary Tese fndings largely echo the full-sample school enrolment is more important in emerging regressions, albeit with a few discrepancies. countries than anywhere else. At low average levels While the values of the income coefcients are as of education, an extra year of schooling may have expected (income is most important in emerging a much bigger marginal impact on life expectancy countries, followed by Eastern Europe), income compared to countries where the average length of plays a statistically signifcant role only in developed schooling is already high. countries. Tis suggests that other factors— Te Gini is insignifcant in all but one case. 117 columbia university journal of politics & society

Tis means that, contrary to the Wilkinson and have any extra infuence on health. However, if the Pickett result in the Sprit Level, these regressions relative income hypothesis holds and inequality per reject the hypothesis that inequality can explain se afects health, then we expect the within-country the international variation in life expectancy. Gini income variation to infuence health diferently than may be insignifcant because it is either collinear the international income variation. Tus, variable θ with the second moment of average income or it will be non-zero. may simply not matter. Further interactions may be Regression G below is equivalent to model in play, but this model does not allow us to make equation (5). Time subscripts were added to capture further assertions, so we cannot distinguish between development over time. alternative explanations. When estimating Regression G, the individual To conclude, the results support the absolute data that were used to derive this regression are not income hypothesis, an increase in average GDP per actually needed to estimate the parameters of the capita by $1000 USD will improve life expectancy by model, as accounted for by the aggregation done in seven months, thirteen months and more than three part 2.3. Tus, I only use data on a country level. years in developed, Eastern European and emerging To distinguish between the transformed and countries, respectively. Te uniformly negative original variables, the latter are labeled life expectancy coefcient on GDP per capita squared serves as and GDP per capita, while the transformed ones are evidence of a negative relationship between income income and health. inequality and life expectancy via the aggregation Te point of interest in this regression is the efect. Gini is almost universally insignifcant, which parameter θ, which measures the impact of inequality may occur for a variety of reasons between which we on individual health. A t-test of is carried out. Under cannot distinguish at this stage of the analysis. Comparing the full sample and sub-sample outcomes, the sum seems to give stronger results than its parts. Tis only highlights the sampling sensitivity of the income-health relationship; subsample results the null, the relative income hypothesis is rejected. are more refective of the underlying relationships If these two coefcients difer signifcantly, then than the full-sample regression. we conclude that inequality afects health in the direction specifed by the sign of θ. 3.3. Panel Regressions on Transformed Data Although the evidence for a health-inequality Results and Discussion relationship is sparse so far, this does not indicate Te results are summarized in Table 5. Te lack anything about the health-inequality relationship on of signifcance of income variables and the low R2 an individual level (see section 2). To address this are suspicious. I hypothesize that they result from the problem, I use the model introduced in part 2.3. I low variation among transformed data. showed how expressing individual health and income Te bottom line of Table 5 presents p-values as deviations from the world means and averaging of θ under the null hypothesis θ = 0, which are them over states enables us to distinguish between insignifcant in all cases. Interestingly, the p-value the efect of aggregation and the relative income is smallest for developed and Eastern European hypothesis. countries. We would expect, given the relative To put it simply, I decompose the variation income hypothesis, that relative deprivation afects in individual income into the deviations from the life expectancy only once a country is rich. Te country average plus the deviations of the country puzzling conclusion is that the sign of θ (implied by average from the world average. Te country-world coefcients on income squared and Gini) is positive deviations capture the concavity of health-income for all but emerging countries, suggesting that relationship. If the variation of income within a income inequality increases average life expectancy. country has only as big an impact on health as the Overall, then, θ provides little evidence of a negative variation of income across countries, then inequality individual relationship between income inequality (which is a function of income variation) does not and life expectancy. If the only problem was little

118 the relative income hypothesis in light of panel data variation in the data, θ would be insignifcant, but Te condition, , could arise its values would be in line with the hypothesis. But for several reasons, including measurement error, because it is both insignifcant and its values fail to omitted variables bias, or reverse causality. Time- tell a consistent story, we must conclude that this invariant omitted variables are not a problem thanks regression failed to fnd any evidence in favor of the to the fxed efects estimation, but country-specifc relative income hypothesis. time trends (idiosyncratic historic development) Controls for education and healthcare or a confounding variable for life expectancy and expenditure were added to the original regression income (e.g. preferences for healthcare) would (Regression G). At frst, the measure of public be problematic. Reverse causation is a threat, too, expenditure as percent of GDP was included as well, because health can be understood as an input—a but this variable was omitted in the end because it form of human capital.67 was insignifcant. If inequality caused a breakdown To address the endogeneity problem, I use of trust and social cohesion, leading to lower public annual infow of foreign direct investment to expenditure, the public expenditure variable would instrument for GDP per capita. FDI increases be signifcant and positive. Tese results show this is investment, which in turn promotes higher wages, not the case; public expenditure does not have a role so average income in a country is higher. Given in explaining life expectancy. that these countries have passed epidemiological Hence, the relative income hypothesis is transition, their health profles should be similar unambiguously rejected. enough and FDI fows should not depend on the health of the population. Addressing the Possible Endogeneity of Income Te instrument proved valid only for developed One of the threats to the consistency of the countries, so the instrumentation did not address estimated results is endogeneity of income. income endogeneity in the full sample of countries.

Table 5 (FE regression G on full sample and sub-samples) all countries Developed Emerging East Europe Health Health Health health Income .023 -.098 .37 -1.515* (.79) (.22) (.45) (.06)

Income -.005 -.001 .032 -.079** squared (.11) (.63) (.46) (.04)

GINI .006 .02 .034 .007 (.79) (.19) (.17 ) (.84)

Secondary .007 .000 -.029 .044 school (.25) (.95) (.37 ) (.12) enrolment

Health .000* .000** .001 -.000 expenditure p.c. (.07 ) (.05) (.33) (.73) constant -.314 3.923*** -1.662 -14.522** (.65) (.00) (.15) (.02) N 331 163 49 119 R2 0.054 0.230 0.140 0.169 p-value of θ 0.609 0.184 0.954 0.128 Notes: p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 119 columbia university journal of politics & society

Furthermore, instrumenting for income did not economies are a good example of how changes in lead to diferent results and conclusions: income unobservable country-specifc factors, such as insti- signifcantly and positively afects life expectancy, this tutional background, infuence the health-inequality relationship exhibits diminishing marginal returns, relationship. For instance, while inequality was uni- and the relative income hypothesis is not supported formly rising, Russia and Ukraine experienced a per- by the data. sistent increase in mortality to their 1970s levels, but a U-shaped life expectancy pattern was observed in 4. CONCLUSION the rest of the sample.72 Chow tests of structural sta- 4.1. Discussion of Results and Ideas for Further bility and a richer set of controls could address this. Research Dynamics of the health-income relationship In Section 2.1, I introduced three main may also play a role. Blakely et al. suggest a lag as income-health theories: that absolute levels of long as ffeen years may be appropriate.73 income improve health; that income inequality is Income endogeneity, although briefy addressed detrimental to health of all members of the society; in section 3.3, remains a concern. Although and that income changes in response to good or bad Instrumentation showed that income is exogenous health. Te aim of this paper was to test the second in developed countries, a diferent instrumental relationship, the relative income hypothesis. variable should be used for Eastern Europe and Tis paper fails to fnd consistent evidence to emerging countries to arrive at credible estimates. support this theory. Te hypothesis that income Overall, the instrumental variable results did not inequality is detrimental for every member of the contradict previous fndings of this paper, but an society was not supported by the data. If there extensive research on income endogeneity would add is a relationship between income inequality and credibility to the results. population health, it is more complex than one External validity of the results is much less suggested by simple cross-sectional correlations that problematic, although the Roy-Zellner test from dominate the literature. part 3.2 suggested that country responses to Te reliability of my results largely depends on changes in income and inequality may be too id- the assumptions about the data. Te plausibility of a iosyncratic to pool. Tis raises the question of the cross-national study can be questionable when the transferability of single-country fndings. underlying data are not directly comparable. In this Future research should focus on a more realistic respect, this paper follows the benevolent approach modeling of the health-income relationship. An error of most literature. correction model may be used to infer the long-term Using the Gini coefcient as a measure of relationship between health and income. Most im- inequality is susceptible to problems. Te Gini portantly, clearly distinguishing between individual coefcient does not allow for a full description and aggregate health-income relationships will be es- of income distribution because Lorenz curves sential for formulating comprehensible policy recom- representing very diferent inequality patterns may mendations, which I address in the fnal section. intersect.68 Unfortunately, more suitable alternatives such as Generalized Entropy indices are rarely 4.2. Policy Implications reported. Tis paper fnds no support for the relative Another threat to internal validity is structural income hypothesis. Increased government income change. Deaton and Paxson and Ruhm show that redistribution, then, may not result in improved mortality is procyclical.69 Preston and Hill compare health of the population. If UK political leaders wish the main factors behind life expectancy across difer- to reduce income disparities, this must be argued on ent time periods for developing countries, and con- grounds other than mortality rates. clude that this relationship changes signifcantly.70 However, this paper has a second, equally Between 1930 and 1960, socioeconomic factors ac- important message: the data underlying most counted for only thirty percent of life expectancy research are not truly adequate to answer the posed variation, while explaining a majority of it in 1965- questions. Policymakers should frst and foremost 1979.71 Te cases of transitional East European support initiatives such as the Luxembourg Income

120 the relative income hypothesis in light of panel data Study. Creating internationally comparable datasets regression specifcation A: will signifcantly decrease the uncertainty of our results. Te hypothesis that the slopes are the same Finally, one must note that even the most for all countries was rejected at the 5 percent accurate research on the relationship between signifcance level, suggesting that countries respond health and inequality is not enough to state whether idiosyncratically to movements in GDP and Gini. a government should aim for greater income Second, are there any country-specifc efects? redistribution. Tis is a decision that can only be To test this, I estimate (A) by OLS, including country made by careful examination of the benefts, costs, dummies to allow 36 country-specifc intercepts. Te and values associated with such a policy. F-statistic for their joint signifcance is F3, 35 = 13.96, which rejects the null hypothesis of all dummy 5. APPENDIX TO THE EMPIRICAL PORTION OF coefcients being equal at the 1 percent signifcance THE PAPER level. Together with the Roy-Zellner test, this Prior to running the regressions described suggests pooled model does not ft the data. in the main body of the paper, I conducted the Finally, I carry out the Hausman test, which following specifcation tests. compares random-efects with fxed-efects Tere are several models that can be ftted on coefcients. If the null hypothesis of RE holds, these panel data: pooled efects, fxed efects, and random coefcients are statistically identical. Te comparison efects. of coefcients in (A) yields a p-value of 0.11; when Because each makes diferent assumptions I add the square of GDP per capita to the regression about variable endogeneity and disturbances, I (specifcation B), the chi-squared test statistic employ several tests to choose the most appropriate of 79.62 unambiguously rejects the null at the 1 one. percent signifcance level. A fxed-efects model is First, is the data pool-able (i.e. can I ft the same therefore used throughout this paper, i.e. variables health-income slope to all countries)? I use the Roy- are time-demeaned prior to regression to eliminate Zellner test as opposed to the Chow test.74 Both unobservable state-specifc fxed efects. ? = ? compare a pooled model ( ! ! ! ) to an unrestricted Te data transformation carried out in the version with country-specifc slope parameters model is not a standard econometric procedure, as ? ( ! ! ), but Roy-Zellner estimates a random-efects Deaton suggested it to tackle the aggregation problem regression instead of OLS to take into account the in particular. In a more general sense, however, composite structure of disturbances Ԑ if random/ transformation of variables is nothing unusual: it is fxed efects are present - vs. typical to log variables to smooth out time series, to in the Chow test. give the variable a normal distribution, or to be able Te Roy-Zellner test was performed on to directly estimate elasticity parameters. Time series

Pooled model Slope and intercept homogeneity; Gauss- (by OLS) Markov assumptions hold. Random Slope homogeneity; composite effects (by disturbance result FGLS) in serial correlation. !? consistent as long as conditional mean independence

holds: ! !! !!" = 0 . Fixed effect Slope homogeneity, but intercept (by OLS on heterogeneity = country-specific effects,

time- which are correlated with !!" : demeaned . Estimates consistent data) conditional on x and α: , but biased if α isn’t controlled for/demeaned away. 121 columbia university journal of politics & society variables are ofen expressed as diferences relative 18. Eugene Rogot, A Mortality study of 1.3 million persons by demograph- ic, social, and economic factors: 1979-1985 follow-up : U.S. National to the lag value, which equals the growth rate. Te Longitudinal Mortality Study (Bethesda: National Institutes of Health, goal here is to transform a non-stationary series National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute, 1992). 19. Angus S. Deaton and Christina Paxson, “Mortality, Education, into a stationary one. Variables in Real Business Income an Inequality among American Cohorts,” NBER Working Paper No. 7140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 1999; Cycle models such as infation and output are Kitigawa and Hauser, “Diferential Mortality in the United States: A usually transformed into deviations from the steady Study in Socioeconomic Epidemiology,”; Smith and Kington, “Race, Socioeconomic Status and Health in Later Life.” state. Finally, some data are normalized so that the 20. Kitigawa and Hauser, “Diferential Mortality in the United States: A variance is a constant proportion of the mean of the Study in Socioeconomic Epidemiology.” 21. Smith and Kington, “Race, Socioeconomic Status and Health in Later variable (e.g. Box-Cox transformation). To conclude, Life.” although the particular variable transformation is 22. Tey linked individual health to the net worth of their household; the health status of spouses from one family were strongly correlated, relatively unique, this general process is widely used which makes these fndings consistent. in econometrics. 23. Kitigawa and Hauser, “Diferential Mortality in the United States: A Study in Socioeconomic Epidemiology.” 24. Menchik, “Economic Status as a Determinant of Mortality among Works Cited Black and White Older Men: Does Poverty Kill?” 25. Wilkinson, “Income Distribution and Mortality: a “Natural“ Experi- ment.“ 1. Richard G. Wilkinson, “Income Distribution and Life Expectancy,” 26. Morris Silver, “An Econometric Analysis of Spatial Variations in British Medical Journal 304 (1992): pp. 165–8. Mortality Rates by Age and Sex,” In Essays in the Economics of Health 2. Conservatives, “Speeches: David Cameron: Big Society,” November and Medical Care, ed. V. Fuchs (New York: Columbia University 10 2009. Accessed March 26,2013, see http://www.conservatives.com/ Press, 1973). News/Speeches/2009/11/David_Cameron_Te_Big_Society.aspx; Ed 27. Ulf-G. Gerdtham and Magnus Johannesson, “Absolute Income, Miliband, “What this country needs is a Labour with new vision,” Relative Income, Income Inequality and Mortality,” Te Journal of New Statesman, 26 August 2010, accessed March 26, 2013, see http:// Human Resources 39(1) (2004): pp. 228–47. www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2010/08/labour-movement- 28. Mary C. Daly, Greg J. Duncan, George A. Kaplan and John W. Lynch, society-party. “Macro-to-Micro Links in the Relation between Income Inequality 3. Evelyn M. Kitigawa and Phillip M. Hauser, Diferential Mortality and Mortality,” Millbank Quaterly 76(3) (1998): pp. 315–39. in the United States: A Study in Socioeconomic Epidemiology 29. Richard G. Wilkinson, “Income Distribution and Life Expectancy,” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973); James P. 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Medical Journal 312(7037) (1996): pp. 999–1003; Wilkinson, “Income and Dena Ringold, “Health Status during the Transition in Central Distribution and Life Expectancy.” and Eastern Europe: Development in Reverse?” Health Policy and 45. Gravelle, Wildman and Sutton, “Income, Income Inequality and Plannning 12(2) (1997): pp. 132–145. Health. What Can We Learn from Aggregate Data?”; Ken Judge, 73. Tony A. Blakely, Bruce P. Kennedy, Roberta Glass and Ichiro “Income Distribution and Life Expectancy: A Critical Appraisal,” Kawachi, “What is the lag time between income inequality and health British Medical Journal 311 (1995): pp. 1282–5; M. Mellor and Jefrey status?” Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 54 (2000): Milyo, “Re-examining the Evidence of an Ecological Association pp. 318–9. between Income Inequality and Health,” Journal of Health Politics, 74. Badi H. 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ABSTRACT Dependence on foreign energy both constrains a state’s ability to act independently in the international system and increases its vulnerability to other state and non-state ac- tors. Moreover, one of the major oil-supplying regions, the Middle East, continues to be extremely politically unstable, further contributing to the vulnerability associated with dependence on foreign energy. Today, with many states refocusing political capital into the goal of energy independence, it is increasingly important for scholars to understand the consequences of energy independence upon state behavior. Tis study seeks to ex- plain how difering levels of energy independence afect a state’s level of global engage- ment. I have quantifed energy independence for the Organization of Economic Coop- eration and Development (OECD) countries in order to statistically analyze the possible relationship between energy independence and political and economic globalization. To the extent that global engagement provides states with some remedy to the vulnerabil- ity linked to their energy dependence, I hypothesize that as countries are increasingly energy independent, they are likely to be both increasingly politically and economically disengaged in the international arena. Te statistical analysis supports these hypotheses.

INTRODUCTION in oil-producing regions has demonstrated the dangers of energy dependence most notably during “Since the frst price explosion of 1973, we have the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries learned that the energy crisis is not a mere problem (OPEC) oil embargo of 1973. Today, many countries of transitional adjustment; it is a grave challenge have made energy independence a national priority; to the political and economic structure of the free however, very little is known about the consequences world.” – Henry Kissinger of this independence upon their behavior in the international system. nergy independence is defned as the sufcient Tere are two main sides to this unresolved production of energy domestically to meet debate over the implications of energy independence. domestic demand for each source of energy, Some argue that as a country becomes increasingly Efreeing a state from relying on foreign sources of independent, it is more likely to become more energy. It is increasingly clear that dependence isolationist.1 A state does not need to rely on the on foreign energy both constrains a state’s ability international marketplace and the international to act independently in the international system political arena to ensure access to this critical resource and increases its vulnerability to other state and if it is able to meet domestic demand through domestic non-state actors. Moreover, one of the major oil- production. Tus, the country becomes more supplying regions, the Middle East, is currently inward looking, and prioritizes domestic policy over extremely politically unstable, further contributing international issues. Others argue that as a country to the vulnerability associated with critical-resource becomes increasingly independent, it will become dependence. From a historical perspective, instability more globally engaged.2 Such a state does not have columbia university journal of politics & society the limitations of acting in the international political energy. Tis analysis is valuable because it provides the and economic arena with the constraints of ensuring historical backing for the creation of the term “energy a reliable fow of energy, allowing the state free rein dependence.” Yergin describes the dependence of in conducting its foreign policy. Much of the debate, societies at frst on coal and now petroleum, detailing however, is focused on anecdotal literature appearing the dangers associated with this reliance.3 In Te through mainstream media outlets. Quest, Yergin takes a more contemporary approach Tis study seeks to examine this same puzzle to energy security analyzing only the Cold War years. – whether there is a relationship between difering Yergin’s most signifcant contribution is his analysis levels of energy independence and level of global of major current global themes and conficts through engagement – but in a new light. In particular, I ofer the lens of energy, demonstrating the magnitude of an empirically-driven and quantitative test to study energy issues in dictating international afairs. He the nature of this relationship. looks at the role of energy in the Gulf War of 1991 I hypothesize that as states become increasingly and the role of energy in the emergence of China as energy independent, they are more likely to be a contemporary global power. By establishing the politically and economically disengaged in the crucial role of energy in these major international international arena. I argue that countries are themes and conficts, Yergin lays the foundation for heavily engaged because the international arena and future scholarship on the relationship between energy its institutions give them some protection against dependence and international afairs.4 vulnerability stemmed from lower levels of energy James Hamilton argues that energy dependence independence. Tus, I expect to see a negative compromises energy security. Hamilton uses the relationship between energy independence and catastrophic 1973 and 1979 supply disruptions and political and economic globalization because I believe their efect on the United States economy as examples that states with higher levels of energy independence to support his argument. Trough his economic are less vulnerable, making them less inclined to analysis, Hamilton argues that the doubling in oil engage. prices and rise in the price of gasoline during both crises squeezed the supply for petroleum products, ENERGY AND GLOBALIZATION: LITERATURE nearly halting the largest economy in the world. If REVIEW one resource can have such a drastic efect, Hamilton To date, little scholarly work exists dedicated to argues, then it is dangerous to depend too greatly the implications of energy independence. Moreover, upon it.5 because energy independence has never before Cohen, Joutz, and Loungani (2011) argue that been quantifed on an international scale, all prior there is a relationship between energy diversifcation work on the subject has been speculation on the and energy security. Although their study focuses consequences of independence or analysis of the on trends in the diversifcation of petroleum and possibility that a state becomes independent. In spite natural gas in the OECD, the conclusion of the study of all of these speculations, no work has been devoted is a proposed relationship between diversifcation to empirical analysis of the relationship between and energy security. Te study quantifes energy energy independence and globalization. Tere has diversifcation, but it does not include a measurement been much written on energy dependence and energy of energy security to accurately test this relationship. security. Much of the work on energy security and the Te importance of this study is in the proposed link dangers of dependence focuses on the United States’ between diversifcation and energy security and overall history of dependence and how each subsequent oil vulnerability. Although this proposed relationship is crisis demonstrates the dangers of relying on foreign ancillary to the proposed relationship between energy sources for such a vital resource. independence, vulnerability, and globalization, it is a Daniel Yergin, a prominent scholar on energy similar relationship that serves as a model and basis history and security, has written two books on the for the formation of this hypothesis.6 subject. In Te Prize, Yergin chronicles the emergence Similarly, Bengt Johansson (2013) argues that of oil as the lynchpin of a successful globalized economy domestic renewable energy sources contribute to and how all modern societies became reliant on energy security. Johansson claims renewable energy

126 the relationship between inergy independence and globalization in the oecd nations sources, “… do not sufer from the same long-term international institutions,” is best exemplifed resource availability problems as fnite fossil resources by Bernice Lee (2013). Lee argues that, “Keen to and their geographical location is less concentrated, but guarantee their access to resources in a time of other issues such as dependence on variable fowing scarcity, Middle Eastern importers of food and Asian resources and competition for scarce land resources importers of raw materials are building economic will grow in importance.”7 Both of these arguments and trade relationships with the major producing claim that diversifcation of sources, especially those regions.”10 To fulfll the desire to guarantee their that are not imported and exported like renewables, access to resources, states are creating and/or joining contribute positively to energy security. Tere are international organizations that help them achieve however, limitations to these arguments. Te main these goals. Tus the term “demand for international counterargument is rooted in the fact that alternative institutions” refers to countries creating or joining energy sources, mainly solar and wind, rely heavily on international organizations that help them achieve a fnite set of natural resources that are known as rare their goals. International relations theories have earth metals (REMs); the supply of which is dominated suggested that an increase in the transnational fow by China. Te reason this is signifcant, is because of goods, services, capital, information, and people China has on numerous occasions demonstrated generates a demand for international institutions. its willingness to cut the supply of these resources In other words, interdependence fosters political to the global market, thus limiting the contribution globalization. As the transnational fow of these to energy security as Johansson argues. As recently goods, services, capital information and people as 2010, China abruptly cut exports by 40%, citing increase, increased cooperation is necessary in order environmental concerns8. to ensure the smooth and efcient transfer of these Jonathan Chanis (2012) defnes interdependence goods (Mitrany 1966, Haas 1964, Keohane 1982).11 as mutuality or a reciprocal relation between Functionalist theory, introduced by David interdependent entities. With this defnition, he Mitrany (1966), states that international cooperation argues that full energy independence in the United and integration through the presence of international States is unrealistic. He cites the interdependence institutions is necessary in the search for material between Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s largest oil efciency.12 In A Working Peace System, Mitrany exporters, and the United States, the world’s largest (1966) argues that an “international organization must oil consumer. Tis relationship, Chanis argues, is a do the same things which national governments do in factor that cannot be ignored when determining the modern society, only with a diference in scale. It must probability of the United States achieving energy do those things which cannot be done well, or without independence, even if the United States can produce friction, except on an international scale.”13 He goes enough energy domestically to meet demand, due on to argue that the efcient administration of limited to the mutual reliance created by the purchase of oil resources on a supranational scale is essential for by the United States. Chanis claims, “the essence of cooperation and for the creation of his ideal “working ‘interdependence’ involves reciprocal vulnerability— peace system.”14 the inability of one side to damage the interests of In 1958, Ernst Hass introduced neo-functionalist the other without also damaging itself.”9 Although theory building upon Mitrany. Neo-functionalist he uses interdependence to argue that the United theory argues that international integration is the States will never be energy independent, the link process “whereby political actors in several distinct between energy independence and interdependence national settings are persuaded to shif their loyalties is an important relationship that he builds upon and activities towards a new center, whose institutions in his argument. He also presents the relationship possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing between interdependence and vulnerability, which national states.”15 Although similar to the functionalist the argument in this study is based upon. argument, Haas argues his point on a regional scale, Most prominently, my study builds on Michael not on a broad international scale as Mitrany does. Ross’s earlier research on the demand for international Both Haas and Mitrany establish the relationship institutions (such as the UN, NATO, World Trade between interconnectedness and the demand for Organization and others). Te term “demand for international institutions on both the national

127 columbia university journal of politics & society and regional scale. Robert Keohane added to the Ross shows empirically that oil wealth is associated debate in 1982 when he published “Te Demand with high levels of economic integration and low for International Regimes.” Keohane focuses on the levels of political integration. Oil-rich countries demand for international regimes and was the frst seem to shun international institutions that have a to suggest the causal link between interdependence political character and that require legally binding and the demand for international regimes. Keohane commitments. While he confrms the conventional argues, “increased issue density [when several issues argument that interdependence cultivates political are closely linked] will lead to greater demand for integration, he shows that petroleum exports have the international regimes and to more extensive regimes. opposite efect. Since greater issue density is likely to be a feature of Ross argues, “countries with abundant reserves situations of high interdependence, this forges a link of petroleum—the commodity on which virtually between interdependence and international regimes: all modern economies depend—are freed from increases in the former can be expected to lead the incentives that lead other countries towards increases in the demand for the later.”16 cooperation and reciprocity.” In other words, the Keohane’s main contribution may be in dependence that spurs the demand for international articulating the diference between interconnectedness institutions is removed as the oil exporters have and interdependence. Tis diference is important in limited dependence on goods from other nations determining how the fow of certain types of goods and while the international community is continually services spurs demand for international institutions. reliant on their oil.20 Interconnectedness refers to the fow of goods, Ross’ work introduced the relationship between services, and capital across international boundaries. globalization and energy issues and examined a Interdependence refers to the mutual dependence unique relationship between oil-exporting states and of the fow of such goods, services, and capital.17 globalization that is contrary to existing literature and Keohane claims that “a country that imports all of its theory. However, Ross’ study focuses solely on oil- oil is likely to be more dependent on the continuing exporting states, or according to prior international fow of petroleum than a country importing furs, relations theory, certain states that increase the jewelry, and perfume (even of equivalent monetary transnational fow of goods (in this case oil). Given value) will be on uninterrupted access to these luxury the debate, this study aims to test Ross’ fnding in a goods. Where there are reciprocal (although not broader way with a slightly diferent method and a necessarily symmetrical) costly efects of transactions, diferent data set that includes the OECD countries there is interdependence. Where interactions do and not exclusively oil-exporting states. not have signifcant costly efects, there is simply Tus, where this study adds to the existing interconnectedness.”18 literature is by analyzing what happens when energy In 2011, these theories were applied to the independence, rather than energy interdependence, is energy space, when Ross examined the unbalanced used as the independent variable. I also believe Ross global engagement among oil exporting states. Ross neglected the inclusion of political variables (such as demonstrates that states that export oil tend to be political system, legislative districting, among others) more politically disengaged and more economically to his analysis, which could be extremely important to engaged in the international arena. Ross states that “if this story. I argue that energy independence allows states they were economically infuential but politically well- to be less engaged, and energy dependence results in integrated, their status would be unremarkable. If they states being more engaged. Much work has been done were both economically and politically marginalized, analyzing the dangers of energy dependence, but they would be of lesser concern.” Ross argues that where the study adds to the literature is by analyzing “oil-exporting states have achieved high levels of the implications of energy independence. economic integration, and economic infuence, yet remain relatively unfettered by the network of treaties ARGUMENT and intergovernmental organizations that typically Te literature, as demonstrated above, suggests accompany this level of infuence.”19 Ross defnes that interdependence, defned as mutuality or a this phenomenon as “unbalanced globalization.” reciprocal relation between entities, spurs demand

128 the relationship between inergy independence and globalization in the oecd nations for international institutions. In other words, country’s control. Tese countries also have a greater interdependence spurs political globalization. Tose risk of being exposed to global energy shocks or who are involved in international markets want to be volatility in energy producing regions. engaged in the international institutions that regulate One of the best examples of this vulnerability these markets. Ross adds to the existing literature by can be seen in the United States during the 1973 showing that interdependence spurred by oil wealth OPEC Oil Embargo. Up until the late 1950s the does have this efect, yet he does not fully explain United States was wholly energy independent. why this is the case. However, in the early 1960s, domestic consumption If everyone depends on one state, that state began to outpace domestic production.21 Tis does not need to be engaged in these international meant the United States could no longer produce institutions. Tus, weak countries that are reliant on enough energy to meet both domestic and global others for critical resources must desire international demand. At the same time, the epicenter of global engagement because the international arena and its petroleum production shifed to the Middle East.22 institutions give those states protection against their Middle Eastern oil-producing states began ramping own vulnerability. In my opinion, their decreased up production to meet increasing global demand. vulnerability explains why oil exporting states are By 1973, the United States imported 6.3 million less engaged. It is not about oil exporting, but about barrels of oil per day, 48 percent of which came from dependence and independence, which is precisely OPEC.23 Tus, American energy dependence on why I introduce the variable of energy independence foreign sources was born. Soon thereafer, the 1973 instead. crisis caused dependence on foreign oil to become A state achieves energy independence when the commonly recognized as dangerous and the term “oil production of each major energy source meets that weapon,” was coined by David Yergin.24 Before this source’s domestic demand. Energy independence, crisis, reliance on foreign oil was never viewed as an however, is not binary; it can be achieved to varying issue or concern. Oil was simply a global commodity degrees. In this study, the focus is not on whether exchanged in a global marketplace that was never or not a country is wholly energy independent, but thought of as having the potential of becoming a instead on the degree to which a country is energy political weapon. However, in October of 1973, Egypt independent. Tis study does not seek to test the and Syria together attacked Israel with the support relationship between wholly energy independent of other Arab oil-producing countries and the Soviet countries and globalization, but rather tests the Union. Te same day, the United States supported relationship between varying levels of energy Israel fnancially and militarily. On October 16, independence and globalization. the member states of OPEC raised prices by 17 Ensuring a steady supply of energy is of critical percent and announced cuts in oil production. Te importance to any state. For countries with higher next day, the OPEC ministers agreed to enact an degrees of energy independence, this is more embargo on exports of oil to the United States as a apparent because a majority of the state’s energy mix consequence of the United States’ support of Israel.25 is produced by domestic producers. Guaranteeing a Te embargo lasted until March 17, 1974 and had steady supply of energy becomes signifcantly more near-crippling efects on the United States economy, complicated for states that have very low levels of as domestic production of energy could not meet energy independence. Tese countries rely heavily demand.26 Te price of oil quadrupled, and the price on foreign sources of energy and need to devote of retail gasoline increased by 40 percent in a matter signifcant time and efort to ensure a steady supply. of months amidst massive shortages throughout Tis task is mostly in the hands of foreign producers the country.27 Tis 1973 embargo serves as a and governments, ofen in volatile regions of the quintessential example of the connection between world. Tus, I believe there is a link between difering energy dependence and vulnerability. degrees of energy independence and a country’s Te connection between energy independence vulnerability. States that rely heavily on foreign and vulnerability brings international engagement sources of energy are more vulnerable because the into the equation. I hypothesize that states with low steady fow of energy is only partially under each levels of energy independence are heavily engaged

129 columbia university journal of politics & society because the international arena and its institutions has been collected for each OECD country between give them some protection against vulnerability, the years of 1980 and 2010. whereas those higher levels of energy independence I have chosen to limit the analysis to these are less vulnerable, thus making them less inclined to countries for several reasons. First and foremost, it engage. Tus, I expect to see a negative relationship is logistically simpler to assemble relevant data for between energy independence and both political and OECD member-countries, as energy statistics for economic globalization. Tis conclusion leads me to these countries are reliable and readily available. formulate the two hypotheses that I intend to test in Trough the Energy Information Administration, all this research. data relating to these countries’ energy production and consumption by each major energy source is METHODOLOGY available for easy and transparent access. Te most Tis study difers from prior literature by important aspect of defning energy independence is ofering a quantitative observational approach. I having reliable data available by source. If all or one of have created a cross sectional time series data set the sources of energy used to calculate independence consisting of the energy independence variable, is unreliable, the results will be tainted. Tus, I found political and economic globalization, and political it to be extremely important to ensure the countries variables over the years of 1980-2010. Te sample included in this study were providing reliable data to consists of thirty countries in the OECD. I tested the EIA. my hypotheses through a multivariate regression Te study excluded four states in the OECD from by creating eight fxed-efects models, four for each the analysis: Israel, Luxembourg, South Korea, and dependent variable. Te frst two models were basic Japan. Te reason for omitting Israel and South Korea fxed-efects models. Models 3-8 included a one-year is because they are extreme outliers that result from lag (3,4), a three-year lag (5,6), and a fve-year lag the paramount security threats that skew the policies (7,8) of the dependent variable. Te reasoning behind of these countries. Non-military security issues, such including a lagged dependent variable of difering as energy policies, do not signifcantly infuence degrees was to attempt to determine how long it policy-making in these countries. I reasoned that a takes the relationship to be refected in the dependent diferent vulnerability means these countries would variable if the relationship is not immediately not approach energy policies in a similar manner to evident. Te lagging of the dependent variable proves the other OECD countries. Tis was confrmed when to be signifcant to the results. the analysis showed that these countries were extreme Tere are many motivations behind using outliers. a fxed-efects model for the study. A normal In the case of Luxembourg, I reasoned that the multivariate regression for a cross sectional time country was quantitatively diferent in the way it is series dataset indicates that the efect should be globalized both politically and economically because consistent with no geographic diference. However, of its miniscule size (population, area, resources) I contend that there exist signifcant political, compared to other members of the OECD. Tis was economic, and cultural diferences between the supported by the fact that Luxembourg is approximately countries in the dataset. Tus, by employing a fxed one-hundred percent energy dependent. Luxembourg efects model, the study controls for idiosyncratic also presents extreme outlying data in terms of political cultural and geo-political characteristics of each and economic globalization. Tus, I concluded it was country. necessary to exclude Luxembourg from this study because of its unique size and nature. Again, this was DATA AND VARIABLES confrmed when the data showed it was an outlier. I have created a cross-sectional time series data set Lastly, I excluded Japan post-hoc from the analysis to test the hypotheses. Tere are four types of variables primarily because it is an extreme outlier in terms of in the data: energy independence, a binary political its levels of economic globalization (though the reason variable measuring whether or not the states uses a for this is not entirely clear). Afer a personal interview single member district system, political globalization, with Andrew Sobel, a recognized authority on the and economic globalization. Data for these variables matter, I hypothesize that there may be a few possible

130 the relationship between inergy independence and globalization in the oecd nations explanations. Japan has an incredibly high savings must understand that this study and its conclusions rate and consequently Japanese savers hold most of are only representative of the thirty OECD countries Japan’s public debt, leading to lower levels of cross- included in the study. Te reasons for this are rooted border capital fows. Moreover, Japanese consumers in the reliability of data from countries outside of the tend to buy Japanese products when available in a OECD and the desire to compare a group of countries consumption category for several reasons. Among with similar levels of economic development due to these are hidden protectionism (versus explicit tarif the outcome variable being economic and political barriers) due to health and safety regulations, content globalization. Te similarity of the economic structures regulation, and forms of industrial policy. On top of of the countries included in the study allow for the this, social and cultural norms contribute to the lower relationship to be clearly exhibited while limiting the exposure of the Japanese economy to globalization. interference of dissimilarities between countries and While I acknowledge that this post-hoc exclusion of other variables that could not be controlled for. Japan might weaken the analyses, the fxed efects Te main independent variable in the study is analysis strategy relies on the notion that there might energy independence. Tis variable has never been be unique circumstances in a given country that might precisely quantifed, so I developed a method to do so. lead to diferent conclusions on its energy policies Energy independence, however, is not binary; it can and its levels of political and economic globalization. be achieved to varying degrees. In this study, the term Japan simply turned out to be an extreme case that energy independent does not refer to whether or not required its exclusion from the analysis. a country is wholly energy independent but instead, to Te study ultimately examines thirty OECD what degree a country is energy independent. I divided countries to better understand the interplay of factors energy production and consumption into fve major important to energy independence and political and categories: petroleum, natural gas, coal, renewables, economic globalization in the majority of developed and other. Te main reasoning behind using these fve countries. I acknowledge that the results need to be categories is the breakdown of data made available by approached with slight caution because the results the Energy Information Administration (EIA). I then are based on models including thirty of thirty-four took domestic production as a percentage of domestic countries. However, despite this, I still believe the consumption of each source of energy to determine results are valid because the thirty OECD countries what percentage of consumption of each source comes included in the model, all of which have market from domestic production. From there, I determined economies and similar economic structures, exhibit a what percentage of total consumption comes from each robust relationship. source and created a weighted average of the states’ Te focus solely on OECD countries poses two independence of each source to get an aggregate energy limitations to this study. First, it leaves out Brazil, independence measure from zero (wholly dependent) China, Russia, and India, four of the largest forces to one hundred (wholly independent). For example, driving global energy production and consumption. the United States produced 20.79 British Termal Unfortunately, reliable and precise data from these Units (BTUs) of petroleum in 2012 and consumed countries is not presently available. Te hope is that 34.69 BTUs. Tus, the United States is 59.93 percent with time, the quality of the data coming from these independent for petroleum (20.79/34.69=.5993). and other emerging economies will improve, allowing Since petroleum accounts for 36 percent of the United for their inclusion in Table 1: An example computation of energy independence for the case of the U.S. similar studies. Second, and along similar lines, the OECD is not necessarily wholly representative of the entire world and does omit many of the largest oil producers in the Middle East. One 131

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States’ total energy consumption, I multiplied 59.93, primarily because a 2010 study by Costa, Christensen, petroleum independence, by 36 percent to calculate a and Sened demonstrated the signifcance of the role weighted independence of ~21.86. I did this for each SMDs play in afecting a country’s energy policy, and category of energy sources and summed up the fve its alternative energy policy in particular.29 Tere are measures of weighted independence to get a measure a few main explanations of the role of SMDs in existing of energy independence on a scale of 0-100. Table 1 literature that make the inclusion of this variable so provides an example calculation for the United States important. Te frst hypothesis I have based on the in 2012. literature is of procedural nature. Te literature shows Tis measure does have its imperfections. that SMD systems tend to create two-party systems.30 It is impossible at this point in time to accurately In two-party systems, one party usually receives a measure where every unit of energy consumed is mandate, allowing for easy passage of uncontroversial produced. Te global energy arena operates in an legislation like international agreements and treaties. international marketplace, and ultimately market Tus, I believe there may exist a positive relationship forces dictate where a country gets its energy. Even between SMDs and globalization because of the ease if the United States produces 100 hundred units of of passage of international agreements in two-party petroleum and consumes 100 units of petroleum, systems. I also hypothesize that countries with two- the global marketplace of imports and exports could party systems might possibly prioritize and execute the lead domestically produced petroleum to be exported process of achieving energy independence diferently. while foreign oil is imported. Despite the measure’s SMDs and subsequently two-party systems operate imperfections, I believe it is a good indicator of states’ with what is generally conceived as a clear mandate to energy independence. It shows the ability of a country the majority, winning party to do as it sees ft. On the to power its economy from domestically produced other hand, multi-member district countries (MMDs) energy if necessary, thus serving as a measure of and multiparty systems operate through coalition the country’s vulnerability. If the United States is forming. I believe the coalition forming aspect of producing 100 units of petroleum and consuming MMD and multi-party system countries leads to more 100 units of petroleum, the United States would still creative policies to appease smaller, goal-oriented be producing enough petroleum to meet domestic parties, and this might be a variable in infuencing a demand even if another energy crisis arises or another country’s level of energy independence. Although the embargo halts the global marketplace. fxed-efects model does control for country-specifc In considering the more indirect efects that variables, I believe it is important to include SMDs as the larger political structure has on the relationship an independent variable to further granulate whether between energy independence and political and or not this variable is signifcant in infuencing economic globalization, I included a couple of political energy independence or the dependent variable of variables in the models. Te political framework of a globalization. As Costa et al. argue, citing Nobel country impacts policy adoption, and the literature on Laureate Douglass North, “Tese macro level political the impact of political institutions is expansive. It is not institutions do not directly dictate how an economy the goal of this paper to replicate or attempt to refute functions, but they do afect the way in which actors any of the already existing works. Tis study simply function within an economy.”31 draws expectations from well-established fndings In some initial runs, the study also included from that literature, as they relate to the potential a variable that captured whether a system was impact of political institutions on the relationship parliamentary, presidential or ‘hybrid.’ Te idea between energy independence and political and was similar to trying to capture the feature that the economic globalization.28 president has some degrees of freedom in conducting Te study includes a binary political variable in international relations policy in most presidential order to avoid variable-selection bias and control for systems. Tis variable was later omitted as it never domestic politics afecting the dependent variables. proved to be signifcant in the many models tested, a Tis variable measures whether or not a country’s subset of which is reviewed below. legislature consists of single-member districts (SMD) Te dependent variables are political and (1) or multi-member districts (0). I include this variable economic globalization. Te KOF Index of

132 the relationship between inergy independence and globalization in the oecd nations Globalization is a well-accepted measure of political Te main shortcoming of using this index as the and economic globalization which “employs the dependent variables in this study is the slow moving number of embassies and high commissions in a nature of the measurement. Energy independence can country and, the number of international organizations move extremely rapidly, and as a result, engagement to which the country is a member and the number in the international arena can as well. Tis measure of UN peace missions a country participated in. In of engagement, however, is slow moving and might addition, it includes the number of treaties signed take time to accurately indicate signifcant changes between two or more states since 1945.”23, 32 Tese in involvement. Tis is the main reason why I lagged inputs are indicative of a state’s level of political this dependent variable in models three through eight. engagement in the international arena, as it measures With that said, this is a reliable, well-respected, and diplomatic relations, involvement in international well-calculated measure of engagement and is the only peacekeeping coalitions, as well as international measure available. Despite its slow-moving nature, treaties the country signs. Te index then combines I am still very confdent in its ability to measure these inputs to produce a 1-100 measurement. international engagement and its relationship with Te index defnes economic globalization energy independence for this study. as the “long distance fows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that RESULTS AND ANALYSIS accompany market exchanges.” Included in the Te frst pair of models analyzed the measure of economic globalization are actual fows relationship between energy independence and of goods, including “a sub-index on actual economic political and economic globalization. Te frst model fows includes data on trade, FDI [Foreign Direct confrmed H1, demonstrating a signifcant negative Investment] and portfolio investment,” as well as a relationship between energy independence and second sub-index that “refers to restrictions on trade political globalization. Te second model confrmed and capital using hidden import barriers, mean tarif H2, demonstrating a signifcant negative relationship rates, taxes on international trade (as a share of current between energy independence and economic revenue), and an index of capital controls. Given a globalization. Models one and two also both certain level of trade, a country with higher revenues indicated a signifcant positive relationship between from tarifs is less globalized.”33 SMDs and political and economic globalization. I ultimately decided to separate political and I also hypothesized that the relationship might economic globalization and not use the KOF index of be more robust if I lagged the dependent variable. overall globalization for a few reasons. First, although Te thinking behind this decision was that if a I hypothesize that the relationship between energy relationship did exist between energy independence independence and both political and economic and globalization, the relationship with changing globalization will be the same, I felt it was necessary levels of energy independence might not be refected to separate them because of the qualitative diferences in the globalization measures immediately. Tus, I in the variables and the potential impact of energy tested the dataset by lagging globalization one, three, independence on each. Much speculation exists and fve years in models three to eight to test this. regarding the impact of energy independence on I capped the lag at fve years to limit the number of geopolitics and economic involvement separately, so data points lost with each year of lag. I strived to fne-tune the method to address theories In models three and four, I tested the pertaining to globalization as a whole, but also to relationship between energy independence and those specifcally related to politics and economics. political and economic globalization with a one Moreover, the aggregate index of globalization year lag. Again, H1 and H2 were confrmed and the includes social globalization, which makes up a relationship between the variables was maintained; sizeable portion of the measurement. I felt that the coefcient of energy independence was negative including social globalization would dilute the and signifcant to the same degree as models one dependent variable and mask potential relationships and two. SMDs were also equally as signifcant in by adding an ancillary factor and drifing away from afecting the outcome. the crux of the hypotheses. In models fve and six (three-year lag) and

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seven and eight (fve-year lag), the results again all models, it is impossible to perfectly pinpoint confrmed H1 and H2 as these models maintained how long it takes changes in energy independence the negative, signifcant relationship between the to be refected in the relationship with political variables. Te energy independence coefcient and economic globalization. However, it was clear was again virtually constant in models fve and six that increases in lag maintained the strength of the compared to three and four, and subsequently, the relationship. Tis simply indicates that the impact of coefcient was virtually constant in models seven and changes in energy independence may take time to eight compared to fve and six. SMDs also remained be refected in the relationship with the globalization signi fcant in all models, with a strong positive measurement in certain cases, but the fact that the relationship as previously demonstrated. relationship was robust, negative, and signifcant with no lag and robust, negative, and signifcant with each DISCUSSION increment of lag only further supports the validity of Tere are many key points derived from these the relationship. results. First, it is clear that a robust relationship Tis negative relationship between energy exists between energy independence and political independence and political and economic globalization and economic globalization, and the hypotheses corroborates the hypotheses. Countries that are were confrmed in all models. Tis relationship was increasingly energy independent are less inclined to maintained in strength and signifcance when I be a part of the international institutions that protect included the one, three, and fve-year lags. Although states from said vulnerability, possibly because they the relationship remained virtually constant across are less vulnerable. Te argument, however, is not one 134

the relationship between inergy independence and globalization in the oecd nations of causal nature. Tere are countless variables that stemming from supply disruptions, but there exists impact political and economic engagement. Whether a separate but related question of whether or not a it be the Cold War, Western interests in Israel, the country is truly “independent” if it is not protected fear of a nuclear Iran, or combatting terrorism, from price shocks. Even if the United States produces international engagement is not only about energy. sufcient amounts of each source of energy to meet I simply hypothesized, tested, and confrmed that a consumption, a major confict in the Middle East statistically signifcant negative relationship exists will still create a major price shock that the United between energy independence and political and States, despite its energy independence, will not be economic globalization. wholly protected from. It will be protected from the In terms of the relationship between SMDs catastrophe of not having enough energy to meet and political and economic globalization, the robust demand, but it will not be protected from the cost of positive relationship in all models is no surprise. this energy. Tis is a topic I look forward to pursuing Although they were initially included as a control in the near future by arguing that renewable energy is variable, I believe there is a straightforward possible the key to limiting energy-related vulnerability. True explanation to the SMD results. Existing literature freedom from energy-related vulnerability assumes suggests that SMDs create two-party systems, and protection from both shortages and price hikes, and I thus, legislatures in SMD countries usually have a clear hypothesize that renewables are that solution. mandate to act, as one of the two parties will always Future studies that build of of this one could have a majority in the legislature. Tis mandate and be relevant to developing countries outside of the clear majority indicates increased ease in committing OECD, which are not included in this analysis. Te to and passing legislation, which lead to treaties, majority of global energy consumption growth in international trade agreements, and other forms of the coming decades will come from the emerging international engagement. Te United States has only markets of developing states. As consumption recently become an anomaly. Closed primaries and quickly outpaces production in these economies, safe seats most likely due to increased polarization thes countries will be faced with a similar issue that cause this across the board that have both parties developed states face today: ensuring a safe and entrenched in their positions, resulting in gridlock. steady supply of energy amidst consumption growth. Ultimately, I believe the fxed-efects model was As these countries become increasingly globalized, the optimal way to test the hypotheses. With a cross- understanding the relationship between energy sectional time series data set spanning thirty years and independence and global engagement will be critical thirty countries, I felt controlling for country-specifc to the formulation of future energy and foreign variables were important. Once I controlled for each policies in these countries. country, the results were robust. A linear model would not have provided such compelling results.

CONCLUSION While many have speculated about the implications of energy independence but no empirical analysis has been performed to test the implications, thus making this study the frst of its kind. By creating a method to quantify energy independence and test its relationship with political and economic globalization in the OECD countries, I hope I can provide a base study for others to build on. One point that I referenced many times but never fully pursued is the global nature of energy prices and how the global market for energy fts into the story. Te argument focuses on energy independence protecting a state from vulnerability

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Michael Ross, Eric Voeten, “Unbalanced Globalization in the Oil Ex- Paramaguru, Kharunya, Rethinking Our Risky Reliance on Rare Earth Metals, porting States,” Working Paper (2011): 2-4. Time. December 20, 2013 12. David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Popoviciu, Adrian-Claudiu, David Mitrany and Functionalism. Te Books, 1966): 27. Beginnings of Functionalism. Revista Româna de Geografe Politica, 13. Mitrany, A Working Peace System, 29. Volume XII, May 2010. 162-172. 14. Adrian-Claudiu Popoviciu, “David Mitrany and Functionalism. Te Ross, Michael, Voeten, Eric, Unbalanced Globalization in the Oil Exporting Beginnings of Functionalism,” Revista Româna de Geografe Politica, States. Working Paper, 2011. 2-4. Volume XII (2010): 162-172. Yergin, Daniel, Te Prize: Te Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New 15. Ernst Haas, Te uniting of Europe: Political, social, and economic York: Free Press, 1991) forces, 1950-1957, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958): 16. Yergin, Daniel, Te Quest: Energy Security and the Remaking of the Modern 16. Robert Keohane, “Te Demand for International Organizations”. World (New York: Penguin Press, 2011) International Organization, Volume 36, No. 2, (1982): 341. 17. Ross, “Unbalanced Globalization in the Oil Exporting States,” 9. 18. Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Poli- tics in Transition, (Boston: Little Brown, 1977): 9. 19. Ross, “Unbalanced Globalization in the Oil Exporting States,” 3. 20. Ross, “Unbalanced Globalization in the Oil Exporting States,” 31. 21. Yergin, Te Prize: Te Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, 524 22. Yergin, Te Prize: Te Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, 576 23. “US Total Crude Oil and Products Imports,” US Energy Information Administration www.eia.gov 24. Yergin, Te Prize: Te Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, 570 25. Yergin, Te Prize: Te Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, 588 26. Yergin, Te Prize: Te Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, 597 27. Yergin, Te Prize: Te Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, 598 28. Carlos Costa, Eric Christensen, Itai Sened, “Markets and Politics in the Renewable Energy Sector” Working Paper (2010): 12. 29. Costa, Sened, Christensen, “Markets and Politics in the Renewable Energy Sector,” 13. 30. Costa, Sened, Christensen, “Markets and Politics in the Renewable Energy Sector,” 13. 31. Costa, Sened, Christensen, “Markets and Politics in the Renewable Energy Sector,” 4. 32. KOF Index of Globalization: Method of Calculation. 2013. 33. KOF Index of Globalization: Method of Calculation. 2013.

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Chanis, Jonathan, U.S. Petroleum Security and Energy Independence. 137 deceptive development and democratization: stadium construction and securitization in the fifa world cup host countries of south africa and brazil

jasper peet-martel, macalester college (2014)

ABSTRACT Te past few decades has seen increasing attention given toward mega sporting events in the context of development. As countries, especially in developing regions of the world, strive to enhance their political, economic, and social standing, hosting mega events is viewed as an opportune path to growth. However, this view ofen does not take into con- sideration how fall-out, particularly for local communities, afects a country's overall ex- perience with the event it hosts. Te question I pose to test these two competing views of mega event hosting is the following: are mega-sporting events, specifcally the FIFA World Cup, a viable avenue for furthering development and democratization? I examine the dual processes of stadium development and securitization for the 2010 and 2014 FIFA World Cups to answer this question, and argue that the neoliberal governance that drives FIFA World Cup securitization and stadium construction results in signifcant consequences for local development and compromises democratization for developing host countries.

INTRODUCTION process of selecting a host nation. More recently, FIFA n June 21, 2013, bonfres, torched cards, de- appears to have been making a concerted efort to have molished lampposts, and a million people the Cup hosted in developing countries. In the past 15 flled the streets of Brazil. Te protesters gath- years, FIFA has accepted bids to host the event from Oered to denounce corruption, poor public services, countries in both Asia and Africa. Te 2010 games police brutality, and — to the disbelief of FIFA (Inter- were held in South Africa; and the 2014 event will be national Federation of Association Football) organiz- held in Brazil, while the 2018 and 2022 Cups will occur ers and investors — the upcoming 2014 World Cup.1 in Russia and Qatar, respectively. While this was not the frst time that a host country Tis pivot to developing countries underscores had experienced political and social unrest in the days the commercialization of the World Cup, manifested and months leading up to FIFA’s fagship event, most through deregulation and privatization, hallmarks observers had believed that the fabled Brazilian attach- of corporate-driven governance. Corporate-driven ment to soccer would prevent any large-scale protests, governance in this paper refers to actions that large, even in the face of ballooning government spending on private associations take to dictate political decisions, the event. Popular opinion of the 2014 World Cup in thereby circumventing existing democratic procedures. Brazil seemed headed in the same direction as that of While politicians and corporate bodies ofen claim that the South African FIFA World Cup in 2010, which suf- mega-events such as the World Cup spur development fered a similar controversy in light of unpopular multi- and ultimately beneft the public, this paper will billion-dollar stadium construction costs and conten- demonstrate that corporate-driven governance, tious securitization policies. manifested through stadium construction and Much of the discontent revolved around the belief securitization, subordinates the interests of those living that corporate interests determined political decision- on or near the mega-event sites to corporate interests. making. Ever since Uruguay held the inaugural 1930 I look specifcally at stadium construction and FIFA World Cup, the mega-event has been used as a securitization and their efects on local development platform to rebrand countries, regenerate economies, and local democratization in the South Africa and and accumulate social capital.2 Tese benefts weigh Brazil World Cups and argue that the processes of FIFA heavily on the minds of bidding countries during the World Cup stadium development and securitization are deceptive development and democratization guided by corporate-driven development principles toward stadium construction despite the efects such that signifcantly and negatively impact local policies have on displaced residents. development and democratization. Te paper is divided into fve main sections, I have chosen the 2010 South Africa World beginning with the grounding of the theory of Cup and the 2014 Brazil World Cup as case studies corporate-driven governance in the common because they are highly comparable examples literature of mega-event research. It then examines of securitization and stadium construction. the processes of securitization and stadium Furthermore, because the two countries undertook construction using the cases of the 2010 South Africa the momentous tasks of securitization and stadium FIFA World Cup and the 2014 Brazil FIFA World construction very recently and within just a few Cup. years of each other, temporal bias can be eliminated. Te twin processes of securitization and Because Brazil will also host the 2016 Summer stadium development are the most glaring Olympic Games, there is some overlap with World manifestations of corporate-driven governance in Cup and Olympic Securitization policies. Similarly, mega-event planning. Te processes of FIFA World South Africa has hosted mega-events such as the Cup stadium construction in developing countries Rugby World Cup in 1995 and also plans to host like South Africa and Brazil result in a governance other major sporting events in the future with its structure “where decisions of public policy are made greatly augmented mega-event infrastructure. by business coalitions and international organizations As the world’s largest single-event sporting like the IOC and FIFA.”6 Informed by corporate- competition, the World Cup has substantial political, driven governance, securitization and stadium economic, and social implications for the host construction curb or suspend the civil liberties of the countries.3 It is thus reasonable to assume such local community, under the assumption that mega- countries will pursue securitization measures for the events such as the World Cup are held for the “good World Cup. Securitization is the process through of the public.”7 To further explain this, I turn to the which an actor enacts and enforces measures to phenomenon Cornelissen calls discursive framing, protect an object it feels is threatened; relevant which legitimizes stadium building and securitization stakeholders identify security risks and risk groups as “extraordinary and extra-legal [practices] to and then implement risk-management policies. protect the collective.”8 While these processes may In this study, corporate and state interests are the provide the local community with development and actors creating and enforcing such policies that aim democratization, corporate-driven governance still to protect the World Cup. When the whole world dictates priorities, thus subordinating the public is watching, the stakes are high. Te securitization interest. process consists of exclusion zones, stringent stadium Discursive framing, a concept originally defned design requirements, and heightened security at by French social theorist Michel Foucault, is a the transnational, national, and local-urban levels.4 rhetorical framework employed by a privileged group Some of these policies are designed to ensure that the in order to direct and shape particular ideas, actions, World Cup games run smoothly, yet many of these and preferences in the larger group. When Swiss required rules and policies exist primarily to promote football administrator Sepp Blatter, the eighth and the fnancial interests of FIFA and its corporate current president of FIFA, outlined FIFA’s legacy in a sponsors. Tis trend toward a policy of proft-seeking recent interview about the upcoming games in Brazil, can also be seen in FIFA’s gradual expansion of he framed the prevailing discourse around football monopolistic control over event venues, surrounding and the “greater good:” areas, and — more recently — main infrastructure “In football, the whole country gets the legacy… (airports, train stations) and accommodation sites Football involves the whole country. Te (hotels, training centers, etc.).5 country improves airports, hotels, highways, Te other manifestation of corporate-driven telecommunications, [and] sustainability governance, stadium construction, operates under programs.”9 similar market rationalities. Large corporate bodies While there are undoubtedly some immediate infuence national policies to direct public tax dollars short-term benefts from World Cup securitization 139 columbia university journal of politics & society and stadium construction policies, the systemic infuence development and democratization in infuence of FIFA through corporate-driven developing contexts. governance channels power away from local With this recent trend of successful bids from communities and toward mega-event organizers, developing countries of the Global South in mind, international corporate sponsors, and government however, it becomes increasingly important to ofcials, thereby inhibiting sustainable local analyze the impacts of the Cup on the host country. development. Proponents of the cup insist that economic growth Securitization measures are not illogical. As generated by the Cup makes hosting it a net gain successful bids for hosting mega-sporting events for the country. Detractors point to the enormous pivot from Western nations to the global South, there political, economic, and social investment a host are added securitization obstacles arising from the country must make to host the World Cup as inherent political, social, and economic conditions of evidence of the event’s harm. Yet, no prior literature these developing host nations. Leading mega-event on the subject ofers the in-depth look at stadium scholar Scarlett Cornelissen details the increased construction and securitization necessary to make securitization complications and needs: a nuanced argument about the ultimate efect of “In settings where heightened income polarities, the World Cup on host countries. To fll this gap societal violence, porous borders and disputed in the literature, this paper analyzes the specifc state capacities overlap with ‘standard’ security repercussions of these two particular sets of costs on risks such as terrorism, increased attention and local development and democratization associated investment is being given to this process of 10 with the two cases of the 2010 South Africa FIFA securitization.” World Cup and the 2014 Brazil FIFA World Cup. Addressing these complications is an arduous task for developing nations such as Brazil and 2010 SOUTH AFRICA WORLD CUP: STRUGGLES South Africa. Te ramifcations of addressing the OF SECURITIZATION complications surrounding securitization amount South Africa, with a GINI Index of 63.1, is to a political mega-project spanning local, national, the second-most economically unequal state in the and transnational levels of policy. However, through world, only behind Lesotho. Tis difers greatly from discursive framing, policy makers and FIFA ofcials the 2006 World Cup host country, Germany, which are able to justify far-reaching securitization policies. scores thirty-six points higher in the GINI Index.12 When justifying stadium construction, they use In addition to being economically unequal, South discursive framing to over-emphasize the potential Africa is one of the world’s most dangerous countries. economic, political, and societal advancements that Hundreds of thousands of South Africans live in follow these mega-events. massive slums, and the national unemployment rate By portraying both securitization and stadium is roughly 25 percent.13 Combined, these factors construction as public goods, ofcials implicitly fail raised security concerns for the mega-event and to take into account how their supposed societal necessitated extensive securitization procedures benefts harm individuals. Tis mode of corporate- during the run-up to the event.14 driven governance sets a dangerous precedent with a Unfortunately, this need for securitization was legacy far more pernicious than an unused stadium co-opted by the interests of event developers and or a new hotel. Eick describes how the heightened came at the expense of local individuals in South securitization can potentially create a “new military African communities. FIFA, the South African 2010 urbanism,” where the precedent of a wide-reaching Local Organizing Committee (LOC), the South and advanced security apparatus remains infuential African government, and multi-national corporate even afer the fans leave.11 Te perceived success sponsors saw these games as a platform to position of a World Cup can also shif priority away from their products instead of an opportunity to improve legislative procedural norms in order to suit the the collective welfare of the South African people.15 needs and desires of a corporate environment at the A “beautifcation” campaign created extensive cost of civil liberties. Te broader implications make exclusion zones for sponsors such as McDonald’s it even more imperative to better understand how and Coca-Cola while marginalizing local, non- stadium construction and securitization policies 140 deceptive development and democratization FIFA afliated actors such as the slum-dwellers’ to the 2010 World Cup preparations.23 organizations and other local community voices.16 Tese events soon sparked persistent and Tis corporate-driven governance was organized protest by the 20,000 strong slum-dwellers’ seen primarily in extensive slum-eviction movement, Abhali baseMjondlo (AbM). In 2005, legislation passed for the purposes of security and AbM staged a dramatic roadblock to resist state- “beautifcation”. One of the more controversial sponsored police oppression and intimidation of the legislative acts, the KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and slum-dwellers. Te use of live ammunition, armored Prevention of Re-emergence of Slums Act of 2007, vehicles, and helicopters against the AbM highlighted aimed “[t]o provide for the progressive elimination of the extent to which the state deployed violent forces slums in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal; to provide against the slum-dwellers.24 for measures for the prevention of the re-emergence Te opposition to the Slums Act and subsequent of slums; to provide for the upgrading and control of state backlash directed against the AbM reveal existing slums; and to provide for matters connected dramatic obstacles to democratization that occurred therewith.”17 Another controversial policy was as a result of the pressures of securitization policy the N2 Gateway Pilot Project, a state-sponsored leading up the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Tough housing and relocation project in the city of Cape the South African Constitutional Court overturned Town, which was criticized by major organizations the Slums Act in 2009, the initial formulation and such as COHRE as being harmful to the local implementation of the Act demonstrates how far the communities’ wellbeing and having the narrow aim South African legislature was willing to go in order of a “beautifcation project” for the World Cup.18 to “securitize” the cities in preparation for the 2010 Te Act authorized evictions of hundreds of slums FIFA World Cup—even at the expense of the welfare without providing sustainably adequate housing of slum-dwellers. alternatives as guaranteed by Te Prevention of Illegal Te consequences of these securitization Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act policies are still being seen. Te U.N. Ofce for the 19 of 1998, Te National Housing Act 107 of 1997, and Coordination of Humanitarian Afairs reported Te National Housing Code. that “tens of thousands of South Africa’s poorest Acclaimed international reporter Dan people face eviction from inner-city suburbs across McDougall conveyed local accounts of evictions the country ahead of the 2010 World Cup.”25 Tis carried out by state-sponsored mercenaries known as report also focuses on the movement of evictees to the Red Ants. In April, right before the 2010 World temporary housing commonly known as “transit Cup began, McDougall wrote that the Red Ants camps,” which are not intended for extended use. “have become a growing force in the past few months One resident recalled, “[t]hey promised us toilets and as South African cities have begun a campaign of good houses at the transit camp…but we are lef to ‘beautifcation’ before the World Cup begins in die. We have been thrown away.”26 A Durban High June.”19 Tese state-sanctioned mercenaries have court recognized the decrepit state of the ‘transit allegedly aided in the forcible clearing of hundreds camps,’ and ruled on September 19 that city ofcials of shacks, destroyed slum-dwellers’ property, and would be imprisoned if permanent housing was not were notorious for their brutality and violence.20 properly sought. Xenophobic rhetoric led many to believe that the Red While the corporate-driven governance Ants’ actions were motivated by ethnic tensions. Te preceding the World Cup did make South Africa Red Ants evicted mostly Zimbabwean immigrants more accessible to foreign viewers, it came at a from more than 100 shacks within the two-kilometer signifcant expense. It is important to note that, in radius of the Mbombela Stadium.21 Tese actions some circumstances, the securitization processes were justifed under the FIFA requirements of a led to an improvement in urban planning, as two-kilometer exclusion zone to give FIFA-licensed dilapidated buildings were cleared out of inner city corporate sponsors a monopoly on food and areas and replaced by new housing and commercial merchandise sales.22 Te Center on Housing Rights developments. However, the local low-income & Evictions (COHRE) has proclaimed that much of communities that lived there previously were sent the escalation in slum eradication was directly linked to the periphery of the city, where job opportunities

141 columbia university journal of politics & society and livelihoods are scarce, schools are far away, securitization procedures in the favelas necessary as and housing is unsatisfactory. Tese peripheral Brazil prepares for the World Cup. Te securitization relocations have been shown to perpetuate the of these favelas can best be broken down into three sprawling, fragmented, and racially divided character phases: frst, by creating the necessary legal and of South African cities.27 COHRE, in one of its “key institutional framework for securitization through fndings” from its 2006 report on South African the 2011 Master Plan, then by actually carrying out development, State of the Cities, found a myriad pacifcation, and fnally through the use of discursive of development risks associated with peripheral framing in order to sell the securitization. At each relocation.28 Tese efects include heightened racial stage of this process, corporate-driven governance division, high concentrations of the poor in areas played an intimate role in framing government with little development opportunities, high rates of policy. HIV infection, and a reduction in women’s economic Despite ofentimes vocal local opposition, autonomy.29 the city government in Rio de Janeiro enacted its securitization policy in preparation for the 2014 BRAZIL WORLD CUP SECURITIZATION: World Cup. To do this, it frst created the legal DECEPTIVE DEVELOPMENT AND and institutional basis for the pacifcation process, DEMOCRATIZATION which resulted in the revised 2011 Plano Diretor Te securitization controversy prior to the do Município do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro Brazil World Cup has centered on the government Municipal Master Plan). Te Master Plan was created occupation of the Brazilian slums. Tis process, and implemented by the Poder Executivo Municipal deemed “pacifcation” by the Brazilian government (the executive council) of Rio de Janeiro to form a and “cleansings” by many anti-slum occupation basis for urban development strategy in advance of activists, pertains largely to Brazil’s urban centers, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic which are home to some of the world’s most vastly Games. Tis plan lays out clear favela development populated slums and unlicensed living developments, objectives to “urbanize” and “develop” these slum commonly called favelas. Tese favelas consist areas to allow private partnerships and corporate- of large unregulated settlements, are ofen in driven development to occur.31 Section VI, “Do geographically precarious locations, and in some Reassentamento de Populações de Baixa Renda cases date back to the 1960s and 1970s.i Tey usually Oriundas de Áreas de Risco (Te Resettlement of began as temporary living spaces for displaced Populations of Low Income from Risk Areas,),” workers and former slaves, but eventually turned of the plan identifes the geographic areas into permanent living spaces. Strangely, favelas are considered “risk areas” such as “fragile hillsides,” commonly located in highly urban settings, ofen “lowlands characterized as areas of geotechnical or in close proximity to wealthy neighborhoods. Te environmental risk,” and other geographic areas of close proximity of these favela neighborhoods to the city where favelas exist as targets of relocation.32 the major wealth centers of cities, which serve as In addition, Section VII extends this favela targeting, sites for mega-event complexes, has heightened citing other geographic areas in the city where favelas the interest in securitizing the areas through the are typically located as “underutilized properties” and government termed processes of “pacifcation.” At the “risk areas.” Tese locales are subsequently zoned to same time, the slum neighborhoods had developed become sites of new housing projects at the discretion complicated socio-political structures and forms of the executive council, which has the additional of self-governance that are averse to governmental authority to label the favelas as illegal and subject to interference and securitization measures.30 “regulation.”33 Chapter VI specifcally authorizes Te security concerns associated with the police and military control of riverbanks, hillsides, favelas, as well as the close proximity of some of and other areas where favelas are present. Te them to the football stadium in Rio, have made policies of this Master Plan are extremely broad and vague, giving a large amount of discretion and power i Some favelas in Brazil date back to the late 19th century as a place of to the UPP forces without thorough democratic residence for former slaves with no options for work or land ownership. Modern favelas, those which I refer to, developed in the 1960s and 70s as a oversight, despite signifcant protests by many local result of rural exodus. 142 deceptive development and democratization community members.34 Tus, the new Master Plan proximity to wealthy areas raises concerns as to the policies dismantled existing power structures within true intent of these pacifcation policies. the favelas and asserted the authority of the state in Te UPP has also failed to reach positive preparation for pacifcation. solutions for a couple of reasons. First, it has Given this institutional framework for remained perpetually understafed given its rapid pacifcation, the Brazilian government then took expansion. Te securitization of the Complexo do the next step of forming of an elite paramilitary Alemão, occupied in November 2010, was only police force, the Unidad de Policia Pacifcadora temporarily sustained due to the deployment of (Pacifying police Unit or UPP) in 2008. Tis force federal troops. Te 2,000-strong UPP police force has commanded thousands of military personnel, trained for years, and with tens of more UPPs to tanks, and helicopters into individual favelas in order institute, it is hard to afrm the long-term practicality to drive out gang leaders that controlled the slums. of UPPs as viable methods of development. In Afer a larger intervention to begin the securitization addition to logistical issues, signifcant fnancial process, protocol called for the institution of a burdens also loom, as the projected completion smaller UPP force consisting of a command center of 100 UPPs by 2016 accounts for over a third of within the favela in order to maintain order. the entire state security budget.40 Even if the goal In some cases, these policies have been of 100 UPPs by 2016 were achieved, there are still implemented peacefully and successfully, as in slums roughly 900 favelas remaining in Rio alone.41 While such as the Lins favela in the Northern Zone of Rio UPP policies ofen lead local residents to see favela de Janeiro. In that case, military forces moved at “pacifcation” as a viable means of creating a mega- dawn without a shot fred, secured the territory, and event hosting environment and also a force for were welcomed by the inhabitants. As Jonathan Watts reshaping the city as a whole through a sustainable describes in his account: “Ten [followed] street social services and infrastructural development, such cleaners with brooms and buckets of whitewash, broad and long implementation is nearly impossible and fnally satellite TV salesmen with a three-month as a result of these personnel limitations. special ofer to frst-time subscribers.”35 Second, UPP actions have been plagued by Other favelas, however, have seen another side, disregard for local input in development decision such as massacres and alleged executions by UPP making.42 UPP policies have limited the freedoms forces.36 Te “pacifcation” of the Complexo do of those living in the favelas, particularly by Alemão favela is no exception to the violence and preventing typical lifestyle practices and inhibiting controversy that has characterized the securitization the expression of cultural identities. For example, process. In June 2007, in anticipation of the the policies subjected artists to arrests for lyrics upcoming Pan-American Games, the Brazilian deemed politically threatening, which are typically government ordered 1,300 state and federal police understood to include songs of the genre baile funk, to surround the favela. According to an ofcial an important cultural cornerstone to the musical investigation, nineteen residents were killed in and art life of the favela.43 Te disadvantaged what has become known as the “PAN Massacre.”37 political position of the tens of thousands of favela Tis massacre occurred to lay the groundwork for residents has stifed their opinions regarding local the construction of a PAC (Growth Acceleration development priorities, increasing their vulnerability Program)-funded cable car project. Tere are to instrumentalized policies such as the PAC. In numerous other incidents of violence, such as in the interviews conducted by Sluis in the Complexo October 17, 2009, when residents shot down a police do Alemão favela, one favela resident expressed helicopter with a surface-to-air missile.38 Muggah frustration at the government’s decisions: and Mulli report that just under 3 percent of the favelas in São Paulo have been “pacifed,” with all of If they’d asked what the community really the occupied favelas located in close proximity to needed, they would have built schools, or a wealthy neighborhoods, mega-event developments, university. In what is considered the biggest 39 complex of favelas of Rio de Janeiro there are or both. São Paulo and Rio de Janiero have only two schools, let alone a university. But they hundreds of favelas and solely targeting those in close don’t listen to us. Instead, they built a teleférico 143 columbia university journal of politics & society

(cable car) of 500 million Dollars.44 Cable Car project. Instead, these projects are driven by corporate interest and serve to harm locals. Te sidelining of local interests through the Te harm to locals caused by the dominance use of discursive framing to further empower large of corporate-driven governance of securitization business coalitions and international organizations procedures has also been felt in the establishment and corporations exemplifes the executive of stadium exclusion zones. Tese stadium exclusion committee’s instrumentalization of the PAC program. zones have been a critical aspect of FIFA’s profts in Te 2011 Master Plan also laid the ground the two previous World Cups, with the zones ofen for other types of securitization policies, namely extending “far beyond the stadia and the inner city planning programs such as PAC (Growth cities.”48 In the case of Brazil, the zones occupied Acceleration Program) and PAC2 (Growth a two-kilometer radius around the stadiums.49 Acceleration Program-2). Te PAC and PAC2 Tese exclusion zones are tightly controlled rings projects invested nearly $306 billion through 2010 of security that not only maintain peace, but also in Rio de Janeiro, with a commitment that promised regulate the vendors. Within these areas, hundreds additional expenditures of $582 billion from 2011 of traditional local vendors would be displaced, to 2014.45 While, on the surface, many of these usually from proftable city center areas, to make way programs would seem to have been benefcial to for the FIFA-approved vendors.50 Te surrender the areas, they ofen led to problems. One such of autonomy to business interests through this signifcant PACs-funded project was the construction controversial set of legislation is yet another example of a cable car in the Complexo do Alemão favela of the decrease in democratization that the FIFA in Rio de Janeiro.46 Te cable car was intended World Cup brought to the local communities to connect the favelas and make them more safely through stadium construction. accessible to tourists; however, it resulted in small Te fnal mechanism that the government has restaurant and store developments around the utilized to push through its securitization policies various cable car stations throughout the favela, for the World Cup has been to frame them positively which were tightly regulated by the government in public media, through discursive framing and which gave contracts to fast food chains like techniques. Te goal of this framing was to imply McDonald’s and Bob’s Burgers.47 Te prioritizing of that the favelas were unsafe, which would thereby corporate interests marginalizes the involvement of legitimize securitization procedures, regardless of the local community and has lef the residents of the the costs to locals. A clear example of the language favela with only low wage positions at these chain used to make this argument is found in the 2011 restaurants. In addition, these cable car stations are Master Plan, which used terms such as “underutilized built in areas that the master plan defned as “areas of properties” and “areas of risk.” Favela residents found risk” which contradicts the regulation set forth by the themselves in a signifcantly hampered legal position 2011 municipal development plan. due to their illegal geographic location. Additionally, At the same time, state-sponsored development serious cultural and racial divisions between the policies such as PAC and PAC2 are overseen by residents of the favelas and those of the asfalto, organizations such as the executive council and further complicated the integration of the favela other corporate-infuenced government institutions. residents into the political arena.ii Te 2011 Master Evidence of this oversight can be seen through the Plan’s distinction between the illegality of the favela selective targeting of favelas that are only in areas and the need to preserve the city serves as further deemed of interest to the business coalitions and political justifcation and framing so as to implement international organizations such as FIFA and the undemocratic securitization policies.51 IOC. Tis examination into “pacifcation” policy Te discursive framing of the favelas as implemented for the World Cup in Brazil further illegal and in need of relocation exacerbates the demonstrates that this mega-event securitization marginalization of local political involvement and policy fails to address local development interests facilitates an incursion on the lives of the slum- due to its lack of sustainability and corporate-driven ii A Portuguese term used to denote the area and people living outside of the aims, such as in the case of the Complexo do Alemão favela. Terms such as this represent the common racial and socio-economic tensions that exist between favela and non-favela residents. 144 deceptive development and democratization dwellers. of FIFA and the LOC. However, it is not obvious Delving deeper into the corporate-driven whether local South Africans, and indeed the country governance of pacifcation policies we can see the as a whole, truly beneftted from the construction pervasive discursive framing and the consequential of the new stadium. According to a study by Grant jeopardized development opportunities for local Tornton, afer accounting for $1.8 billion in communities. Yet the sustainability of this model is construction costs, the Games increased GDP by one highly questionable, even if the implementation of and a half percentage points, infusing $3 billion into some progressive social programs and infrastructure the South African economy. A study conducted by in specifc favelas succeeded. Bohlmann and van Heerden disputes these numbers, which have been found to vary signifcantly, and AFRICA 2010: STADIUM CONSTRUCTION concluded that the games have only contributed to a POLICIES AND IMPACT 0.94 percentage point increase in GDP.54 Tis lack of Much like development in Brazil, corporate- consensus on the economic efect of stadium building driven discursive framing and instrumentalization makes an economic justifcation for the stadium of the law legitimized stadium development in difcult. preparation for the South African World Cup. Here, In fact, we see a detrimental impact on local we must note that the construction of stadiums development afer examining construction labor forms an integral part of two main objectives policies, as well as the decisions of corporations that Maguire cited as underlying a host country’s that received contracts for the Soccer City stadium responsibilities: frst, using the mega-event as a form construction. Although many politicians claimed of “sof power,” and second, leveraging the games as that funding the stadium was justifed by the infux a way to address internal concerns such as economic of local, high-quality construction jobs, a closer regeneration, nation-building, and development.52 examination undermines these claims. Seventy Maenning and Plessis describe the importance of percent of the local job opportunities from these stadium developing, arguing that Durban’s new King ventures paid less than $245 per month, which is Senzahgakhona would be “the anchor of a concept to 10 percent below the national median income. 55 develop the city area and re-image Durban as one of Seventy percent of the 2,200 local employees were the leading sports cities in Africa.”53 also only on limited contracts, and were thus subject From the beginning, the decision to build the to high levels of job instability. One example of this new Moses Mabhida stadium was controversial. fuctuation is the decision by security frm Stallion Although the initial plan was to renovate the Security to fre over 3,600 contracted security preexisting Kings Park Stadium, the agreement fell workers “without warning.”56 More broadly, only apart when a policy shif required the construction one hundred workers were ofered permanent of an entirely new stadium. Tis new stadium would employment with the main contractor afer the be built on the site of the Kings Park Soccer Stadium, project was completed. costing the city an additional $240.7 million, In addition, the sudden change in focus of the compared to the projected cost of $5.3 million for quinquennial Johannesburg Integrated Development the renovation of Kings Park. Tis controversial Plan (IDP) refected the fnancial burdens of the decision to build the Moses Mabhida Stadium 2010 World Cup. According to Hlatchwayo, in 2000, delivered the same seating capacity that Kings Park the IDP issued extensive policy recommendations Stadium would have ofered: 70,000 for the World to increase local public participation, with priorities Cup and 54,000 afer the games. Te choices behind such as “the provision of infrastructure, housing, this change in construction plans can be attributed and township establishment, development planning, to corporate-driven governance when considering local economic development, the protection of the potential for greater profts from the construction the environment, the provision of public health of a new stadium as compared to a relatively simple services, local safety and security, and a focus on renovation. delivering services such as water, housing, and As a centerpiece of development, Durban’s electricity.”57 Following the 2006 elections, with the new stadium was of great importance to the plans kickof of the World Cup less than fve years away, 145 columbia university journal of politics & society priorities shifed, as demonstrated by the new fve- of “associated development prospects”—additional year 2009/2010 IDP: “Te 2010 World Cup is the development projects incidental to the required biggest project the city of Johannesburg has ever infrastructure—reveal a corporate-driven approach undertaken. It is therefore not surprising that in that sidelined local development projects.66 We the current IDP revision, the 2010 project features can therefore see that corporate-driven governance prominently.”58 Ward meetings, regional meetings, is far less efective at promoting long-term local sectorial meetings, and the Growth and Development community and infrastructure development, largely summit promoting the 2006/2011 IDP did not serve because of FIFA’s strict regulations regarding stadium as forums for genuine public discourse, because construction, which sacrifce local community they operated under the terms of corporate-driven development interests in favor of private, corporate government.59 Ofen, these gatherings existed interests.67 solely to serve as a “rubber stamp” for government Afer the drone of fans and their vuvuzelas policies.60 Tis marginalization of the public faded and the multi-national sponsors and exacerbated developmental issues, and made locals construction companies lef South Africa, the true unable to voice their needs through accountable, impact of the World Cup stadium constructions democratic institutions. became apparent. Despite the billions of dollars A massive budget shortfall, which occurred allocated for World Cup preparation, South African as a result of underestimating construction costs President Jacob Zuma insisted that, “it was worth for the Soccer City stadium, was balanced by every penny spent.”68 However, when looking at decreasing funding for public services, a move that various construction projects that were not only exacerbated the project’s detrimental impacts on over-budget but detrimental to local community local economic welfare. In the area afected by the development, this statement seems increasingly budget shortfall, the eTekwini municipality, features unsubstantiated. President Zuma’s claim embodies a 44 percent poverty rate. Moreover, 8.5 percent of the rampant discursive framing that rationalized households have no annual income and 9.9 percent the stadium construction policies on the basis of of households have an annual income of less than supposed economic benefts for local communities. $948, with the average family of four earning less than $1 per day per person.61 However, the stadium’s BRAZIL 2014: CONTENTIOUS WORLD CUP fnal construction cost of $98.3 million drastically STADIUM CONSTRUCTION overshot the initial allotment of $34 million, and Te headline read “Soccer Stadium the Stage “put pressure on a council that [was] under pressure as Brazilian Anger Erupts,” as tens of thousands of to deliver basic services.”62 City department heads people protested outside of the newly built stadium were required to slash their budgets by $65.86 in the Brazilian City of Belo Horizonte. Shortly million, prompting eTekwini’s deputy mayor Logie afer, for the frst time in twenty-fve years, the Naidoo to speak on the matter and note that “the Brazilian Supreme Court sentenced a Member of extra 2010 World Cup costs ‘will certainly afect Parliament to thirteen years in prison on corruption service delivery.”63 Te $334.2 million spent on the charges. Tensions remained high across Brazil as construction of Soccer City could have provided twelve new or remodeled stadiums are prepared for 202,380 people with permanent housing in the FIFA inspections. At the time of this writing, Brazil province of Gauteng through the local government’s is projected to spend $18 billion in construction Reconstruction and Development Program.64 Tis and remodeling—out of $33 billion over all—with comparison illustrates the signifcant opportunity stadium construction alone projected at least to costs of the World Cup stadium construction cost $3.3 billion.69 As in South Africa, Brazil’s projects.65 controversial expenditures has been scrutinized In this way, instrumentalized law and corporate- for prioritizing public funding of stadiums that driven discursive framing produced troublesome serve private interests over much needed public development projects and policies for local South social services.70 Mega-event expert and theorist African communities that were in close proximity to Christopher Gafney speaks of the evolution of stadium constructions. Pillay and Bass’s conception mega-event ideology, comparing Brazil’s hosting of 146 deceptive development and democratization the upcoming 2014 World Cup to the time it hosted building potential” to Atlético Paranaense’s private the 1950 World Cup. Contrary to the democratic construction project of Américo Guimarães ideologies that were at the forefront of the 1950 Stadium.74 World Cup, the discourses surrounding the 2014 However, this private funding of the Arena World Cup refect the exigencies of an increasingly da Baixada led to a signifcant decrease in public globalized and corporate-infuenced political involvement in policy-making. One of Brazil’s rising economy.71 Tis ideological shif and its efects on domestic investigative journalism organizations, World Cup stadium construction in Brazil have Comitês Populares, takes a close examination of sidelined local democratization and development the funding streams in their article, “A Partnership interests in the name of “civic boosterism” and for the Cup: Te People Pay and the Club Takes.”75 broader corporate-privileged development.72 Although the process of issuing a building certifcate, I argue that, as in the case of the 2010 South along with the requisite funds, was legally permitted Africa World Cup, Brazil’s stadium construction under the Municipal Master plans, the process policies were delivered through a model of remained thoroughly undemocratic. Te allocation of corporate-driven governance, in which deregulation, this large sum of public funds was not subject to local privatization, and the funneling public funds toward referenda or any other signifcant process involving corporate interests dominated government policy. In public input. Comitês Populares reported that the turn, corporate-driven governance undemocratically only public engagement in the decision making directed funding and policy attention away from process were two public hearings where citizens, local development issues, creating environments civil society organizations, and social activists that threatened local civil rights and hampered local voiced strong concerns and strong objections. development. As Gafney stresses, the driving mantra Furthermore, requests for specifc information of mega-events is “accelerated development” that regarding these projects and participation went creates corporate-privileged “dreamworlds.”73 Tese entirely unanswered.76 Leandro Franklin, Chair of “dreamworlds” empower the executive government to the Human Rights Legal Practice department at the meet the stringent deadlines set by FIFA and ensure University Federal do Paraná, points out that this that all event-related projects are carried out so as form of public funding is ofen given without public to fully cash-in on the benefts of “civic boosterism.” consultation, and can be deceptively sold to the While the efects of stadium construction are known public as private expenditures.77 Marginalization of to positively afect certain aspects of society, they the general public and exploitation of public funds adversely infuence democratization within the local under the guise of mega-event “civic boosterism” communities. Tis section analyzes the impact of displays the rampant corporate-driven governance Brazilian stadium construction prior to the 2014 fomented by the World Cup stadium construction World Cup on local communities. process. Te construction of the Arena da Baixada, a Te political process for funding the Arena stadium located in the southern city of Curitiba, da Baixada in Curitiba highlights signifcant local is an important example of how corporate-driven development concerns. Tese concerns involve the governance was able to work in practice. On January exclusion zone policy, which prioritizes the short- 13, 2010, it was determined that Curitiba’s Arena term business interests of large national construction da Baixada would be one of the twelve World Cup conglomerates and FIFA and its international stadiums. Te private club that used the stadium, corporate sponsors.78 Te allocation of public funds Atlético Paranaense, realized that they would be away from local development and into stadiums is a short on funding for the necessary renovations, to clear example of Gafney’s discussion of “neoliberal which FIFA president Marcos Malucelli responded dreamworlds,” where public space is restructured that the club should not go into debt because of and commoditized “in the image of global capital.”79 the World Cup. Malucelli claimed that additional In 2007, the then-Sports Minister Orlando Silva, responsibilities resided with the local city and like many other World Cup promoters, asserted that state, prompting the Municipality of Curitiba stadium projects wouldn’t require public money; to allocate roughly $40 million toward “special however, the latest estimates, however, show that 91

147 columbia university journal of politics & society percent of costs associated with the 2014 World Cup of FIFA policy further aggravated civil rights disputes will be publicly funded.80 because local politicians were given little room or Tis use of public funds carries with it time to address labor safety issues. Te pressures substantial pernicious impacts on local public FIFA and powerful government actors placed on services. Tus, as was the case in South Africa, local ofcials and workers were further exacerbated corporate-driven governance has also afected the when the Judge Colnago’s ruling was overturned long-term prospects for local development in some to reopen construction a day afer FIFA inspection parts of Brazil. While local organizing committees visits began.86 Te threat to workers’ safety and and pro-mega-event evaluators laud the renovation rights was not limited to Curitiba, and in just one and construction of all twelve World Cup stadiums, example of workplace tragedy, a twenty-two year serious concerns remain regarding the legacy of old construction worker fell 115 feet to his death these state-of-the-art stadiums. Stadiums such as the on December 14, 2013 at the Arena Amazonia Arena da Amazônia in Manaus, which cost $256.7 only weeks before the stadiums were due for million dollars, are in communities with lower league completion.87 soccer teams, whose games are attended by less than Given their infuence in local politics, FIFA also 500 spectators in a stadium with a host capacity of plays a very signifcant role in fueling the practices 46,000.81 Tese stadiums may see little public use of instrumentalization of law and general corporate- afer the end of the World Cup and cost signifcant driven governance. Te then-recently passed “World time and resources in areas where both are in short Cup Law” signed by Brazilian President Dilma supply and have pressing public service needs. Roussef highlights the nature of controversial For example, government sources in 2012 reveal and sweeping FIFA-oriented legislation. Te law that 20.2 percent of houses in Manaus do not have entailed a series of legislative measures that Roberto proper plumbing. Nationally, roughly 15.1 percent of Gurgel, Brazil’s Federal Prosecutor, challenged as Brazilian children up to four years old live in areas unconstitutional. Gurgel contended that the law where sewage runs outdoors.82 Tus, rather than violated citizens’ “constitutional guarantee to equal being spent on much-need infrastructure in places treatment, as well as provisions of Brazilian tax like Manaus, public money has been spent on what law.”88 Gurgel, in his fling, writes: are expected to be, in the afermath of the World Te World Cup law violates the constitution by Cup, largely underutilized football stadiums. requiring the state to assume civil responsibility Diminished labor rights for stadium - instead of FIFA - for any damages during construction workers further exemplify the lack the events. “Te exception given to FIFA, its of substantive public oversight that resulted from subsidiaries, legal representatives, consultants corporate-driven governance in Brazil. Outcry over and its employees manifestly violate” the taxpayers” equal status under Brazilian law. ... the paucity of workers’ rights, as in the case of the “Legislators cannot favor a taxpayer in detriment construction of the Arena da Baixada, demonstrated to another, but may only identify situations in the failings of stadium construction policy. For which there are diferences which justify diferent instance, work on this stadium project in Curitiba, treatment.”89 Brazil, was suspended when Brazilian judge, Leonora Te questions posed by the Federal Prosecutor 83 Colnago, ruled that there were safety concerns. raise important concerns surrounding the general Judge Colnago wrote, “countless infractions have democratic procedures through which policy at been committed, in various stages of the building all levels of government is implemented. Tese project….[that there was] a serious risk of workers allegations of civil rights violations apply not only to being buried, run over and of collision, falling from government politics, but also to the FIFA-mandated heights and being hit by construction material, “stadium exclusion zones” and the resulting 84 among other serious risks.” Tis placed pressure labor rights standards violations, evictions, and on preparations as FIFA was unrelenting in its displacements. demand that all twelve stadiums, including Arena da Baixada, be “ready for delivery in December and CONCLUSIONS 85 [that] no delays will be tolerated.” Te infexibility Tis paper advances the existing theoretical 148 deceptive development and democratization notions of development and democratization in weekly death toll that could rise to twelve workers.90 hosting the 2010 South African and 2014 Brazilian Te reality is clear. Developing nations will continue FIFA World Cups. More specifcally, it scrutinizes the to struggle with maintaining ethical standards for securitization and stadium development processes. development and democratization as they host mega- As mega-event hosting venues in developed events such as the World Cup. nations fade in importance and developing nations Addressing these issues will require signifcant increasingly host them, the impacts on local international cooperation and investment democratization and development are even more commensurate with the abandonment of existing hazardous. Te harmful efect of hosting mega- corporate-driven policies and norms. Te incredible events in developing nations becomes most apparent monopoly that the FIFA brand possesses over the upon dissecting the implications of corporate-driven world’s most popular and proftable sport promises governance via processes inherent in the political, immense opportunities for host countries. Yet social, and economic environment surrounding FIFA’s ability to demand sweeping legislation in the World Cup. For both Brazil and South Africa, host countries, set its own security and construction corporate-driven governance has taken the forms standards, and put on a show for almost half of the of discursive framing and instrumentalized law. world places unparalleled power in the hands of its Te detrimental efects of policies that have been executives. Tough this concentration of power has promoted and implemented as a result of corporate- proven to be highly vulnerable to corporate-driven driven discursive framing and instrumentalized governance, a reorientation of development policy law include the disenfranchisement of the local toward local and more democratically accepted population of their rights to just governance priorities in the host countries is essential in order and sustainable development. Tese forms of to ensure that the hosting of mega-events does not marginalization, which originate from both World come at the expense of the host countries’ citizens. Cup securitization and stadium development, weaken the political and socioeconomic participation of the Works Cited local communities while building and fortifying a 1. “Giving World Cup To Brazil Might Have Been A Mistake: FIFA hegemonic corporate-driven system that consistently Head Sepp Blatter,” Te Hufngton Post, July 19, 2013. undermines local interests. 2. “Almost half the world tuned in at home to watch 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™,” last modifed July 11, 2011, http://www.ffa. 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Andrew Downie, “World Cup legacy for Brazil goes beyond soccer, says Blatter,” Reuters, June 19, 2013, accessed March 10, 2014, http:// 2022 World Cup games remain years ahead, the www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/us-soccer-world-brazil-blatter- initial stages of stadium construction have already idUSBRE95I11020130619. 10. Cornelissen, “Mega Event Securitization in a Tird World Setting,” brought controversy. A recent assessment of stadium 3235. construction in Qatar by the International Trade 11. Volker Eick, “Lack of legacy? Shadows of Surveillance afer the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany,” 3334. 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15. “Savior of the Poor,” Sunday Tribune South Africa, June 9, cessed December 4, 2013, http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/ 2012. rio-business/brazil-pac-2-spending-plans/#. 16. Dan McDougall, “Slum Clearance, South Africa-Style; Te ANC is 46. Giulianotti, Richard, and Francisco Klauser. “Security Governance Hiring a Militia Known as the Red Ants to Raze Migrant Shacks to and Sport Mega-events: Toward an Interdisciplinary Research Agen- ‘Beautify’ Cities for the World Cup, Says Dan McDougall,” Sunday da”. Journal of Sport & Social Issues. 34 (2010): 57. Times London, April 25, 2010. 47. Ibid., 7. 17. Lilian Chenwi, “Slums Act Unconstitutional,” ESR Review10 (Univer- 48. Eick, “Secure Our Profts!’ Te FIFA TM in Germany 2006,” 91. sity of the Western Cape: Community Law Centre 2009): 9-10. 49. Maria Carrion, “Brazil’s Poor Pay World Cup Penalty.” Te 18. 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