Wetland Conservation in Southern Ontario: Exploring a Modified Club Goods Approach
by Brook Coatsworth
A Thesis Presented to The University of Guelph
In partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Food, Agriculture and Resource Economics
Guelph, Ontario, Canada © Brook Coatsworth, December, 2012 Abstract
WETLAND CONSERVATION IN SOUTHERN ONTARIO: EXPLORING A MODIFIED CLUB GOODS APPROACH
Brook Coatsworth Advisor: University of Guelph, 2012 Dr. Glenn Fox
This thesis is an exploration of a modified club goods approach to wetland conservation in southern Ontario as an alternative to the current policy approach. As the regulatory framework for wetland conservation continues to develop, however, so does an emerging resistance to participate in government conservation programs by private rural landowners protesting regulatory erosion of citizen rights in private land ownership. The modified club goods approach was evaluated as a fair and effective conservation method through a multiple-case study that explored six non-governmental organizations applying a modified club goods conservation model. As non-governmental organizations broaden their economic base to increase their scope of operations, they are susceptible to influence from changing sources of revenue. They must remain accountable and transparent to members and donors in order to receive their continued financial support, rather than depending on government funds which leads to an organization’s evolution away from the modified model.
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Acknowledgements
I owe a great debt of gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Glenn Fox, for his invaluable guidance, patience and dedication to my research and for sharing his wealth of academic and professional experiences with me throughout my graduate studies. Dr. Alfons Weersink and Dr. John
FitzGibbon also played an integral role in the development of my thesis as members of my trusted committee. I could not have completed my research without their comments, suggestions and words of encouragement.
Thank you to the to the professors, staff and students of the Food, Agricultural and
Resource Economics Department who took an interest in my research, offered advice and at times, much needed criticism. To everyone else who helped me, including the various non- governmental organizations that I studied, the landowners who shared their stories and the
Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affaires for funding my research – thank you.
To my parents, family and friends, thank you for providing me with an incredible support network and plenty of distractions when they were due.
And most importantly my fiancée Catharina, thank you for being a source of inspiration, motivation and an example of hard work. You are truly an amazing woman and without you I would not have accomplished all that I have.
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1 - Introduction to Wetland Conservation in Southern Ontario 1.1 Background……………………………………………………………… 1 1.2 Economic Problem………………………………………………………. 6 1.3 Economic Research Problem……………………………………………. 7 1.4 Purpose and Objectives………………………………………………….. 8 1.5 Chapter Outlines…………………………………………………………. 9 Chapter 2 - Wetland Conservation in Southern Ontario: The Policy Approach
2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………. 11 2.2 Southern Ontario Wetland Loss from 1800 until 2002………………. 12 2.2.1 Southern Ontario Wetland Loss from 1800 to 1867: An Alternative Analysis…………………………………………….. 15 2.2.2 Wetland Distribution Across Southern Ontario from 1800 to 2007…………………………………………………….. 18 2.3 A Review of Wetland Policies Guiding Wetland Conservation in Southern Ontario………………………………………………………. 21 2.3.1 Canadian Federal Wetland Policy………………………………... 22 2.3.2 Ontario Provincial Wetland Policy………………………………. 23 2.3.3 Regional Wetland Policy in Ontario…………………………….. 27 2.3.4 Local Wetland Policy in Ontario………………………………… 31 2.4 Ontario Provincial Legislative Acts Enforcing Wetland Policies………. 32 2.5 Summary of the Policy Approach to Wetland Conservation in Southern Ontario………………………………………………………. 34 2.5.1 Regulatory Takings………………………………………………. 36 2.5.2 Consequences of the Policy Approach…………………………… 39 2.5.3 Evaluating Wetland Policies and the Policy Approach………….. 41 2.6 Conclusions………………………………………………………………. 43
Chapter 3 - Club Goods Theory and the Modified Club Goods Model
3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………. 45 3.2 An Economic Theory of Clubs…………………………………………... 45 3.2.1 Public Goods, Private Goods and Club Goods…………………... 45 3.2.2 The Provision of Club Goods…………………………………….. 48 3.2.3 The Club Goods Model…………………………………………... 49 3.2.4 Applications of Club Goods Theory……………………………… 50 3.3 Differentiating Club Goods from Public Goods…………………………. 51 3.4 Transforming Public Goods to Club Goods……………………………… 53 3.4.1 Club Provision of Environmental Goods and Services………….. 57 v
3.5 Modifying the Club Goods Model ………………………………………. 58 3.6 Non-Governmental Organizations……………………………………….. 60 3.6.1 Operational Characteristics of Non-Government Organizations... 61 3.6.2 Club Provision of Environmental Goods and Services by Non-Government Organizations…………………………………. 65 3.7 Conclusions………………………………………………………………. 66
Chapter 4 - Method of Economic Research and Analysis
4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………. 68 4.2 Methodology……………………………………………………………... 68 4.3 Method…………………………………………………………………… 69 4.3.1 Research Design………………………………………………….. 69 4.3.2 Data Collection…………………………………………………… 73 4.3.3 Data Analysis…………………………………………………….. 76 4.3.4 Wetland Conservation Data………………………………………. 77 4.4 Case Study Protocol………………………………………………………. 78 4.4.1 Overview of the Case Study Protocol…………………………….. 78 4.4.2 Procedures for Conducting Each Case…………………………… 79 a) Selecting Sources of Evidence ………………………………... 79 b) Conducting Interviews ……………………………………….. 80 4.4.3 Gathering Case Study Evidence………………………………….. 81 4.4.4 The Multiple-Case Study and Analysis Plan…………………….. 84 I. Case Studies…………………………………………………….. 84 a) Case Description …………………………………………….. 84 b) Financial Information and Trend Analysis …………………. 85 c) Application of the Modified Club Goods Model …………….. 87 II. Cross-Case Analysis…………………………………………….. 91 4.5 Procedure for Selecting Cases……………………………………………. 95 4.5.1 Six Non-government Conservation Organizations………………. 97 4.6 Summary…………………………………………………………………. 99
Chapter 5 - Six Case Studies Exploring the Modified Club Goods Approach to Wetland Conservation in Southern Ontario
5.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………. 102 5.2 General Procedures for Gathering and Analysing Financial Data………. 102 5.2.1 Assets, Liabilities and Total Net Assets from 2000 to 2010……. 103 5.2.2 Sources of Revenue from 2000 to 2010…………………………. 104 5.2.3 Expenditures from 2000 to 2010………………………………… 106 5.3 Glossary of Financial Definitions……………………………………….. 108 5.4 Case Study: Trout Unlimited Canada vi
5.4.1 Case Description…………………………………………………. 110 5.4.2 Financial Information and Trend Analysis………………………. 111 5.4.3 Application of the Modified Club Goods Model………………… 114 5.5 Case Study: The Delta Waterfowl Foundation 5.5.1 Case Description…………………………………………………. 118 5.5.2 Financial Information and Trend Analysis………………………. 119 5.5.3 Application of the Modified Club Goods Model………………… 122 5.6 Case Study: The Nature Conservancy Canada 5.6.1 Case Description………………………………………………….. 125 5.6.2 Financial Information and Trend Analysis……………………….. 126 5.6.3 Application of the Modified Club Goods Model…………………. 129 5.7 Case Study: The Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters 5.7.1 Case Description………………………………………………….. 131 5.7.2 Financial Information and Trend Analysis……………………….. 132 5.7.3 Application of the Modified Club Goods Model…………………. 135 5.8 Case Study: The Canadian Wildlife Federation 5.8.1 Case Description………………………………………………….. 138 5.8.2 Financial Information and Trend Analysis……………………….. 139 5.8.3 Application of the Modified Club Goods Model…………………. 142 5.9 Case Study: Ducks Unlimited Canada 5.9.1 Case Description……………………………………………..…… 144 5.9.2 Financial Information and Trend Analysis……………………….. 145 5.9.3 Application of the Modified Club Goods Model………………… 149 5.10 Analysis of the Multiple-Case Study…………………………………….. 151 5.11 Cross-Case Analysis……………………………………………………… 153 5.11.1 Comparing Levels of Conformity to the Modified Club Goods Model…………………………………………………….. 153 5.11.2 Comparing Approaches to Wetland Conservation………………. 154 5.11.3 Comparing Revenue and Expenditure Trends from 2002 to 2010…………………………………………………….. 157 5.11.4 Comparing Government Influence on Conservation Programs… 160 5.12 Summary of Cross-Case Analysis………………………………………. 162
Chapter 6 - Findings and Conclusions
6.1 Summary of Findings……………………………………………………. 164 6.2 Principle Findings……………………………………………………….. 166 6.3 Implications of Findings………………………………………………… 168 6.4 Limitations of Study and Recommendations for Future Research……… 170
References ……………………………………………………………………….. 263 vii
List of Tables
Table 2.1 - Provincial Statutes Protecting the Development of Wetlands…………….. 33 Table 4.1 - Case Study Tactics for Four Research Design Tests………………………. 68 Table 4.2 - Four Sources of Evidence for Case Study Research and the Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Source……………………………. 75 Table 5.1.1 - Trout Unlimited Canada Assets, Liabilities and Total Net Assets from 2000 to 2010……………………………………………... 174 Table 5.1.2 - Trout Unlimited Canada Sources of Revenue from 2000 to 2010………... 175 Table 5.1.3 - Trout Unlimited Canada Expenditures from 2000 to 2010……………….. 177 Table 5.1.4 - Trout Unlimited Canada - The Modified Club Goods Model: Financial Influence of Members and Donors……………... 182 Table 5.1.5 - Trout Unlimited Canada - The Modified Club Goods Model: Accountability to Members and Donors…………………... 184 Table 5.1.6 - Trout Unlimited Canada - The Modified Club Goods Model: Transparency of Operations……………………………….. 185 Table 5.1.7 - Trout Unlimited Canada - The Modified Club Goods Model: Size and Growth of Membership Base…………………….. 186 Table 5.2.1 - The Delta Waterfowl Foundation Assets, Liabilities and Total Net Assets from 2000 to 2010…………………………………………….... 188 Table 5.2.2 - The Delta Waterfowl Foundation Sources of Revenue from 2000 to 2010………………………………………………………….. 189 Table 5.2.3 - The Delta Waterfowl Foundation Expenditures from 2000 to 2010…….... 191 Table 5.2.4 - The Delta Waterfowl Foundation - The Modified Club Goods Model: Financial Influence of Members and Donors……………… 195 Table 5.2.5 - The Delta Waterfowl Foundation - The Modified Club Goods Model: Accountability to Members and Donors…………………... 197 Table 5.2.6 - The Delta Waterfowl Foundation - The Modified Club Goods Model: Transparency of Operations……………………………….. 198 Table 5.2.7 - The Delta Waterfowl Foundation - The Modified Club Goods Model: Size and Growth of Membership Base……………………..199 Table 5.3.1 - The Nature Conservancy Canada Assets, Liabilities and Total Net Assets from 2000 to 2010……………………………………………… 201 Table 5.3.2 - Nature Conservancy Canada Sources of Revenue from 2000 to 2010……. 202 Table 5.3.3 - The Nature Conservancy Canada Expenditures from 2000 to 2010………. 204 Table 5.3.4 - The Nature Conservancy Canada - The Modified Club Goods Model: Financial Influence of Members and Donors……………… 209 Table 5.3.5 - The Nature Conservancy Canada - The Modified Club Goods Model: Accountability to Members and Donors…………………... 211 Table 5.3.6 - The Nature Conservancy Canada - The Modified Club Goods Model: Transparency of Operations……………………………….. 212 Table 5.3.7 - The Nature Conservancy Canada - The Modified Club Goods Model: Size and Growth of Membership Base…………………….. 213 Table 5.4.1 - The Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters Assets, Liabilities and Total Net Assets from 2000 to 2010……………………….. 215
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Table 5.4.2 - Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters Sources of Revenue from 2000 to 2010………………………………………………... 216 Table 5.4.3 - The Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters Expenditures from 2000 to 2010………………………………………………………….. 219 Table 5.4.4 - The Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters - The Modified Club Goods Model: Financial Influence of Members and Donors……………… 223 Table 5.4.5 - The Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters - The Modified Club Goods Model: Accountability to Members and Donors…………………... 225 Table 5.4.6 - The Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters - The Modified Club Goods Model: Transparency of Operations……………………………….. 226 Table 5.4.7 - The Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters - The Modified Club Goods Model: Size and Growth of Membership Base…………………….. 227 Table 5.5.1 - The Canadian Wildlife Federation Assets, Liabilities and Total Net Assets from 2000 to 2010……………………………………………… 229 Table 5.5.2 - The Canadian Wildlife Federation Revenue from 2000 to 2010………….. 230 Table 5.5.3 - The Canadian Wildlife Federation Expenditures from 2000 to 2010…….. 232 Table 5.5.4 - The Canadian Wildlife Federation - The Modified Club Goods Model: Financial Influence of Members and Donors……………… 237 Table 5.5.5 - The Canadian Wildlife Federation - The Modified Club Goods Model: Accountability to Members and Donors…………………... 239 Table 5.5.6 - The Canadian Wildlife Federation - The Modified Club Goods Model: Transparency of Operations……………………………….. 240 Table 5.5.7 - The Canadian Wildlife Federation - The Modified Club Goods Model: Size and Growth of Membership Base……………………. 241 Table 5.6.1 - Ducks Unlimited Canada Assets, Liabilities and Total Net Assets from 2000 to 2010……………………………………………… 243 Table 5.6.2 - Ducks Unlimited Canada Sources of Revenue from 2000 to 2010……….. 244 Table 5.6.3 - Ducks Unlimited Canada Expenditures from 2000 to 2010………………. 246 Table 5.6.4 - Ducks Unlimited Canada - The Modified Club Goods Model: Financial Influence of Members and Donors……………… 251 Table 5.6.5 - Ducks Unlimited Canada - The Modified Club Goods Model: Accountability to Members and Donors…………………... 253 Table 5.6.6 - Ducks Unlimited Canada - The Modified Club Goods Model: Transparency of Operations……………………………….. 254 Table 5.6.7 - Ducks Unlimited Canada - The Modified Club Goods Model: Size and Growth of Membership Base……………………. 255 Table 5.7.1 - Cross-Case Analysis: Comparing Levels of Conformity to the Modified Club Goods Model………………………………………... 257 Table 5.7.2 - Cross-Case Analysis: Comparing Approaches to Wetland Conservation……………………………………………………………….. 258 Table 5.7.3 - Cross-Case Analysis: Comparing Revenue and Expenditures Trends from 2002 to 2010…………………………………………………. 259 Table 5.7.4 - Cross-Case Analysis: Comparing Government Influence on Conservation Programs…………………………………………………………………… 260
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List of Figures
Figure 2.1 - Wetland Distribution in Hectares - Across Southern Ontario - Between the Pre-Settlement Era (circa 1800) and 2002……….. 13 Figure 2.2 - Wetland Distribution in Hectares across Southern Ontario between the Pre- Settlement Era (Circa 1800) and 2007……………………………………. 19 Figure 3.1 - The Transformation Path of Pure Public Goods to Pure Private Goods…. 55 Figure 4.1 - Representation of Yin’s (2003) Approach to a Multiple-Case Study Method in the Social Sciences…………………………………….. 70 Figure 4.2 - The Multiple-Case Study Method: Six Cases Exploring the Modified Club Goods Approach to Wetland Conservation………….. 100 Figure 5.1.1 - Trout Unlimited Canada: Trends in Assets and Liabilities Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………... 179 Figure 5.1.2 - Trout Unlimited Canada: Trends in Revenue Sources Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………... 180 Figure 5.1.3 - Trout Unlimited Canada: Trends in Expenditure Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………... 181 Figure 5.2.1 - The Delta Waterfowl Foundation: Trends in Assets Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………... 192 Figure 5.2.2 - The Delta Waterfowl Foundation: Trends in Revenue Sources Using a Three-year Moving 1 Average from 2002 to 2010……………….. 193 Figure 5.2.3 - The Delta Waterfowl Foundation: Trends in Expenditure Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………… 194 Figure 5.3.1 - The Nature Conservancy of Canada: Trends in Assets and Liabilities Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………… 206 Figure 5.3.2 - The Nature Conservancy of Canada: Trends in Revenue Sources Using Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………….. 207 Figure 5.3.3 - The Nature Conservancy of Canada: Trends in Expenditure Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………... 208 Figure 5.4.1 - The Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters: Trends in Assets and Liabilities Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………………………………………………… 220 Figure 5.4.2 - The Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters: Trends in Revenue Sources Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………. 221 Figure 5.4.3 - The Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters: Trends in Expenditure Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………… 222 Figure 5.5.1 - The Canadian Wildlife Federation: Trends in Assets and Liabilities Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………… 234 Figure 5.5.2 - The Canadian Wildlife Federation: Trends in Revenue Sources Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………… 235 Figure 5.5.3 - The Canadian Wildlife Federation: Trends in Expenditure Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………… 236 Figure 5.6.1 - Ducks Unlimited: Trends in Assets and Liabilities Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………... 248 Figure 5.6.2 - Ducks Unlimited Canada: Trends in Revenue Sources Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………... 249 x
Figure 5.6.3 - Ducks Unlimited Canada: Trends in Expenditure Using a Three-year Moving Average from 2002 to 2010………………… 250
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Chapter 1 - Introduction to Wetland Conservation in Southern Ontario
1.1 Background
The Government of Canada established a Federal wetland policy in 1991 in response to the North American Waterfowl Management Plan, which Canada signed in 1986. The Federal
Policy on Wetland Conservation (1991) sets the standard for the development of wetland policies by provincial, territorial and municipal governments in Canada. Its objective is to promote the long-term conservation of all wetlands providing ecological and socio-economic functions in the public interest. 1 From the government’s perspective, the public interest is what stimulates changes to government policies and industry practices in order to improve the quality of life for
Canadians. In order to achieve long-term conservation in the public interest, the Federal government’s goal is “no net loss” of wetland functions for future generations. According to the
Government of Canada, this can be accomplished when all levels of government collaborate to implement effective policy promoting sustainable management and conservation practices.
At the Federal level, Environment Canada (2010) is responsible for implementing policy and initiating conservation programs. They define wetland conservation as “the protection, enhancement and use of wetland resources according to principles that will assure their highest- long-term social, economic and ecological benefits.” The primary benefits from wetland conservation are water quality improvements, the provision of wildlife habitat and recreational opportunities (Costanza et al., 1989; Farber, 1996; Gren et al., 1995; Olewiler, 2004). In order to provide benefits, conservation programs require active wetland management such as
1 The public interest is characterized by the needs and demands of society as a whole. Defining the public interest is impossible because aggregating the perceptions of every individual within a given society into the “public interest.” However, government literature often refers to the public interest and I use the term throughout my thesis to describe the motives of policy development. Additionally, defining a society is also a problematic task this thesis will not take on.
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rehabilitating degraded wetlands, restoring previously drained wetlands and the creation of new functioning swamps, marshes, bogs or fens. These conservation activities produce environmental benefits from an increased provision of environmental goods and services 2 from wetlands.
In Ontario, wetland conservation and management are guided by policies of the Ontario
Provincial Policy Statement, which was issued under Section 3 of the Ontario Planning Act
(1990). The Provincial Policy Statement (2005) 3 outlines wetland development and site alteration restrictions for significant wetlands, while authorizing regional and local authorities to “go beyond the minimum standards [of the Provincial Policy Statement] in developing Official Plan policies and when making decisions on planning matters” for all other wetland areas in the province. This means that wetlands can be identified, evaluated and designated for protection by conservation authorities and municipal governments through their application of the Ontario
Wetland Evaluation System (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 1993), which scores the significance of wetlands on the basis of their production of environmental goods and services.
Additions to the Ontario Conservation Authorities Act (Section 28 (1), 2006) enhanced regional wetland policy development by granting regulatory control to conservation authorities over wetland development and site alteration within their watershed. This creates conflict with local governments who lose tax revenue when a wetland area is regulated for conservation within their municipal boundaries. For example, municipalities can sell or lease municipal land for commercial, industrial or residential development in close proximity to a wetland area. Under
2 The Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (2010) states that wetlands provide environmental goods and services such as water quality, flood reduction and wildlife habitat amongst others.
3 The Ontario Provincial Policy Statement was first written in 1996 and amended in 1997 (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affaires and Housing, 2012). The 2005 Provincial Policy Statement is current used across the province, however, a 2012 version is said to have been written but was not released when this thesis was written. 3
Section 28 of the Conservation Authorities Act, conservation authorities can identify and regulate previously unevaluated non-significant wetlands that are on or adjacent to prime real- estate. This land loses value due to land development restrictions and private companies look elsewhere to invest, nullifying potential property tax revenue.
Ducks Unlimited Canada (2012) estimate that 1.02 million hectares of wetland area exists on private and public land across southern Ontario. They estimate that 370,262 hectares of wetlands have been designated as Provincially Significant 4 and 62,076 hectares have been designated as Locally Significant 5, while 646,621 hectares remain unevaluated. These estimates were found by analysing a combination of data sets 6 from 2002 and 2007 using a Geographic
Information Systems method. Guerra (2010) estimated that 229,630 hectares of southern
Ontario’s wetlands that produce significant environmental goods and services are located on private agricultural lands. He also applied a Geographic Information Systems method and differentiated land use data between private and public land to produce his estimates. Comparing these two studies, approximately 62% of the Provincially Significant Wetlands in southern
Ontario are located on privately owned land. Consequently, tension between landowners and conservation authorities has also emerged from wetland policy implementation.
Landowner frustration results from policies that regulate wetland use and administer government programs on their land with the burden of conservation costs placed on the landowner. Additionally, municipal land designation of significant wetland areas on Official
4 Provincially Significant Wetlands are wetland areas that score 600 or greater on the Ontario Wetland Evaluation System. 5 Locally Significant Wetlands are wetland areas that score less than 600 on the Ontario Wetland Evaluation System. 6 These data sets were compiled by the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and are explained and analysed in Chapter 2, section 2.2 of this thesis. 4
Plans impairs landowner property rights and decreases property values. Frustration has led many landowners to resist participating in government programs by a taking range of actions. Posting anti-Ministry of Natural Resource signs is one approach, while a more drastic and effective approach to ensure property is not regulated is to drain a wetland area before it is evaluated.
Based on this emerging problem, the policy approach to wetland conservation and its public provision of environmental goods and services appears to have run its course and an alternative method needs to be identified.
This study examined a modified club goods approach as a potential alternative. Buchanan
(1965) defines club goods as goods whose benefits and costs of provision are shared between members of a voluntary association who pool resources to obtain a good or service. Cornes and
Sandler (1996) describe club goods by the voluntary nature of their provision, finite membership and exclusivity. In an applicable economic model, clubs are characterised by individuals who choose to join a consumption sharing arrangement in order to influence a provision of club goods, which is decided by the club’s management that is accountable to the club’s members.
I proposed that the provision of club goods includes non-exclusive consumption benefits because full exclusion is impossible and their provision exhibits a degree of “publicness”. While exclusive benefits are derived by members, non-exclusive benefits are derived by non-members who join at their discretion. These benefits are derived through knowledge distribution, where upon joining they will consume benefits from the club’s provision. This means that the existence of clubs, and their operations, provides non-exclusive benefits to informed non-members. Club goods also have a multi-dimensional character in their provision with spill-over effects providing non-exclusive benefits. This means that non-informed, non-members also consume benefits that are generated from a provision of club goods. For example, using an environmental context, 5
clubs promoting waterfowl provision for hunting enthusiasts also provide habitat for non-game species such as birds, fish, mammals, reptiles and insects. Club members enjoy a larger duck population, while non-members enjoy species in their natural habitat in public parks, conservation areas or on their properties.
In order to explore this proposition, I modified the club goods model so that it could be applied to real-world wetland conservation programs. This modification was guided by the following hypothesis: Non-governmental conservation organizations operating in southern
Ontario are applying a modified club goods model to promote wetland conservation. The modified club goods model is characterized by the financial influence of members and donors, accountability to members and donors, transparency of operations and the size and growth of the membership base.
I chose a multiple-case study research method (Yin, 2003) to explore the modified club goods model to wetland conservation and evaluated the level of conformity to the model by six non-governmental conservation organizations operating in southern Ontario from 2000 to 2010. I found that the organizations conformed to the modified model to various degrees. Over time, these organizations appear to be moving away from the modified club goods approach. As non- governmental conservation organizations broaden their economic base to increase the scope of operations, new sources of revenue result in new influences over the organization’s operations.
Applying a cross-case synthesis to compare results across the six cases, I found that three organizations are in fact evolving their operations away from the modified club goods model.
This was based on increases in revenue from government sources over the study period, which can lead to organizations adopting a bureaucratic structure that carries out public services rather than their initial directive. From a policy perspective, the life cycle of the modified club goods 6
approach evolves away from a grass-root, community based initiative to an organization reliant on government agencies to sustain conservation programs from subsidies and grants. Once a non-governmental organization becomes influenced by government funds, it may lose its direction and can evolve into a quasi-governmental organization. This problem is mendable, however, for those organizations which are still small and continue to support initiatives influenced by their members and donors.
1.2 Economic Problem
The Ontario Wetland Evaluation System 7 was implemented by the Ontario Ministry of
Natural Resources and is the official government tool used to identify and evaluate wetlands in the province. According to the Ontario Wetland Evaluation System (1993), wetlands are ranked according to biological, hydrological, socio-economic and special interest components and then classified into one of two categories: Provincially Significant Wetlands which provide many environmental goods and services in sensitive ecosystems that are regulated by conservation authorities, and “Other” or Locally Significant Wetlands that are regulated by municipalities.
Wetlands on public and private land demonstrating any significant natural, social or economic value can be designated for government protection and conservation. This process, however, does not consider the economic value of a wetland perceived by private landowners and results in a disproportionate burden of the costs associated with conservation. Protected wetlands are designated on Official Municipal Plans which regulate land use and development in compliance with the Ontario Planning Act (1990). This does not appear to be in the public interest, but in the interest of the government promoting a public provision of environmental goods and services
7 The Ontario Wetland Evaluation System was developed in 1983 with a second version released in 1993. In 2002, it was updated to its current format to conform to the 2005 version of the Ontario Provincial Policy Statement. 7
from wetlands. Consequently, organizations such as the Lanark Landowners Association, the
Ontario Landowners Association and the Ontario Property and Environmental Rights Alliance have emerged to protect landowner’s rights and freedoms from regulations that remove them.
The economic problem of this study relates to the emerging tension between landowners and government authorities caused by provincial wetland policy implementation. Landowner groups have given citizens a forum to voice their opinions, concerns and present alternatives to land use regulations that limit their property rights. This tension is now evident in provincial politics, where a definitive rural and urban divide has developed since the October 6, 2011 provincial election. The divide has been growing over the past ten years with landowner groups pushing for rural property rights and going as far as threating to make rural Ontario a self- governing district (Ontario Farmer, 2011). As a result, the economic problem is the Ontario government’s policy approach to wetland conservation which unfairly treats landowners and hinders the provision and exchange of environmental goods and services from wetlands.
1.3 Economic Research Problem
The economic problem of this thesis exposes the need for an alternative to a public provision of environmental goods and services. Drozdz (2009) investigated factors facilitating their market exchange in Canada. She found that increases in scarcity and excludability, and decreases in congestion were all important elements to the successful exchange of environmental goods and services. Rosenburg (2010) extended this research by investigating payment for environmental goods and services programs in Ontario as a method of increasing their provision and potential market exchange. She studied the Alternative Land Use System pilot project in
Norfolk County, an incentive based program led by the Delta Waterfowl Foundation and other non-governmental organizations. Funds gathered and pooled by these organizations and their 8
partners are used to pay farmers for their provision of environmental goods and services.
According to Rosenburg, trust and social capital are critical success factors in eliciting participation from landowners in this community based program where conservation costs are distributed amongst those benefiting from the provision. The provision of environmental goods and services by non-governmental organizations also produces non-exclusive benefits and, therefore, resembles a modified club goods approach to conservation. The policy approach, on the other hand, promotes a public provision of environmental goods and services on private land without compensating landowners.
The economic research problem this study answers is whether a modified club goods approach is an alternative to the current policy approach to wetland conservation in southern
Ontario. This is a program evaluation with environmental goods and services policy consequences. Guerra (2010) examined environmental goods and services policy in Ontario. He found that principles guiding policy development include a clear and consistent definition of environmental goods and services, clear definition of objectives, fairness, cost-effectiveness, policy integration and political feasibility. The economic problem of this study relates to fair treatment of landowners and consequences of the policy approach to wetland conservation. In order to answer the economic research problem, I modified the club goods model to explore the operations of six non-governmental organizations promoting a club provision of environmental goods and services from wetlands located on private land.
1.4 Purpose and Objectives
The purpose of this study was to explore a modified club goods approach to wetland conservation in southern Ontario. This was done by fulfilling the following objectives: 9
1. To document, describe and identify consequences of the policy approach to wetland conservation in Ontario by reviewing federal, provincial, regional and local wetland policy and examples of policy implementation.
2. To explore and modify the club goods model by reviewing Buchanan’s (1965) theoretical development, applications of club goods and literature on non- governmental organizations.
3. To develop a multiple-case study evaluating conformity to a modified club goods model by six non-governmental conservation organizations and their approaches to wetland conservation by following the research method guided by Yin (2003).
4. To evaluate the modified club goods approach as an alternative to the current policy approach by conducting six case studies and a cross-case analysis comparing applications of the modified model.
1.5 Chapter Outlines
Chapter 2 – Wetland Conservation in Southern Ontario: The Policy Approach
This chapter documented the policy approach to wetland conservation in southern
Ontario. This was done by analysing the history of wetland distribution and conversion in southern Ontario to understand why policy was developed. A review of federal, provincial, regional and local wetland policy followed in order to understand how the policy approach is applied. This chapter concluded by describing the policy approach and the procedure of designating a wetland, and identified consequences of wetland policy implementation.
Chapter 3 - Club Goods Theory and the Modified Club Goods Model
This chapter explored the development of club goods theory by James Buchanan (1965) and applications of club goods since its conceptualization. A theoretical proposition was established, that the provision of club goods produces non-exclusive benefits, which led to the development of research questions and the modification of the club goods model. The purpose of modifying the model was so that it could be applied in the proceeding chapters to the operations 10
of non-governmental organizations in order to determine whether the modified model presents a viable approach to wetland conservation.
Chapter 4 - Method of Economic Research and Analysis
This chapter reviewed the multiple-case study method designed by Yin (2003) and applied it to the development of six case studies. A case study protocol was designed, which incorporated the theoretical proposition and research questions established in Chapter 3 to guide data collection and analysis. This chapter also developed criteria to evaluate the level of conformity to the modified club goods model by each organization. A cross-case analysis was developed to compare the application of the modified model by each organization and the evolution of their operations from 2000 to 2010.
Chapter 5 - Six Case Studies Exploring the Modified Club Goods Approach to Wetland Conservation in Southern Ontario
This chapter presented six case studies exploring the operations of each organization, financial trends exhibited by them and assessed their level of conformity to the modified club goods model. A cross-case analysis was conducted to answer the research questions and determine whether or not a modified club goods approach is a viable alternative to the policy approach.
Chapter 6 - Findings and Conclusions
This chapter summarized the multiple-case study findings, presented the principle findings from the cross-case analysis and described the implications of those findings on non- governmental conservation organizations operating in southern Ontario. This chapter concluded by reporting limitations to this research and suggested implications for future research. 11
Chapter 2 - Wetland Conservation in Southern Ontario: The Policy Approach
2.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to describe the Ontario government’s policy approach to wetland conservation in southern Ontario. This approach relies on wetland policies to achieve conservation goals, which were first developed by the Canadian government in 1991 to guide provincial and territorial wetland management. The Ontario Provincially Policy Statement was developed in response and administered in 1996, with the most recent version released in 2005, to provide policy direction on matters of provincial interest. Regarding wetlands, policies restrict land use, development and site alteration of significant wetlands. In order to understand why wetland policies were established, this chapter begins by assessing wetland distribution and conversion rates in southern Ontario since 1800. Two studies, by Elizabeth Snell (1987) and
Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010), are referred to by federal, provincial and regional government agencies to illustrate the significant rate of wetland loss that has occurred in the province, and in turn, promote the societal benefit of protecting the remaining wetlands through policy
(Environment Canada, 2010; Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 2010; and Grand River
Conservation Authority Wetland Policy, Page 3, 2003).
In order to understand how wetland policies are implemented, a review of federal, provincial, regional and local wetland policies and provincial legislation that enforce policies protecting wetlands was completed. Examples of government applications of the policy approach in southern Ontario are provided throughout the review to add context. This chapter concludes by describing the policy approach, identifying consequences of its application and evaluating the implementation of wetland policies. 12
2.2 Southern Ontario Wetland Loss from 1800 until 2002
Snell (1987) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010) estimated wetland conversion (or loss) rates in southern Ontario from 1800 to 2002 8. According to Ducks, early wetland loss occurred due to conversion of wetlands for settlement and agricultural purposes while more recent conversion accommodates hydro line passages, transportation corridors for rail and roads and clearings within forests for other commercial, industrial and residential developments.
Figure 2.1 documents wetland distribution in hectares (thousands) across southern
Ontario reported by Snell (1987) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010) for the years 1800, 1967,
1982 and 2002. Snell used land use data, regional land use maps, local aerial photographs and comprehensive soil composition surveys to estimate wetland conversion over time. Overall, she analysed 22 sources of data to estimate total wetland area from 1800 to 1982, however, Snell herself states that her estimates are not verifiable because “no maps of wetland distribution were made at the time of settlement” (pg. 8). As a result, her data sources date back to 1967 with most produced in the 1980’s. This means that her analysis assumes that soil surveys, maps and photos available to her, in 1987, that she chose provided accurate data from the previous 200 years.
Wetland maps available in the 1980’s only covered “small and scattered parts of the study area
[southern Ontario]” (pg. 43), which she opted not to use. Figure 2.1 shows that before 1800,
Snell estimated that there were 2.38 million hectares of wetlands distributed across southern
Ontario. By 1967, Snell estimated that total wetland area covered 946,780 hectares. By 1982, she estimated that 933,000 hectares remained. This amounts to a 61% conversion rate from the pre- settlement era.
8 Snell (1987) analysed wetland conversion rates from 1800 to 1982, while Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010) extended the analysis to 2002. 13
Figure 2.1 – Wetland Distribution in Hectares across Southern Ontario between the Pre- Settlement Era (circa 1800) and 2002
2500
Wetland 2000 Area in Hectares (thousands) 1500 Snell (1987)
1000 Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010)
500
0 Pre-Settlement 1967 1982 2002 (c.1800) Years 1
Source: Snell (1987) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010)
Figure 2.1 Notes:
1. Each year listed on the horizontal axis relates to a year of data reported by both Snell (1987) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010). Pre-Settlement (c.1800) refers to the time when Europeans first started to settle the land in southern Ontario around 1800.
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On the other hand, Ducks used updated soil surveys, land cover maps and quaternary geological records unavailable to Snell (1987) to measure wetland distribution in the pre- settlement era and a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) method, applying three data sets
(Canada Land Inventory Present Land Use, 1982 Land Systems, and 2002 SOLRIS 9) to map wetland distribution and analyse conversion rates from 1967 to 2002. Ducks digitized soil maps to analyse pre-settlement total wetland area, while Snell did it by hand, and found different estimates. Figure 2.1 shows that prior to 1800, Ducks estimated that 2.02 million hectares of wetlands were distributed across southern Ontario. By 1967, total wetland area covered 637,020 hectares. By 1982, 631,698 hectares and by 2002, Ducks estimated that 560,844 hectares remained. This amounts to a 71% conversion rate from the pre-settlement era. The higher rate of wetland conversion reported by Ducks (71%), compared to Snell (61%), results from Ducks’ analysis of digitized versions of land maps from the 1960’s to 2002 using a Geographic
Information Systems environment and ArcGIS computer software, which was not available to
Snell.
Figure 2.1 shows that both Snell (1987) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010) observed little change in wetland area between 1967 and 1982 in southernOntario. Ducks extended their analysis to 2002 and reported a slight downward trend in total wetland area. Consequently,
Figure 2.1 shows that the majority of wetland loss in southern Ontario occurred prior to 1967.
However, neither Snell nor Ducks reported exactly when wetland conversion took place between
1800 and 1967. This becomes problematic if most conversion happened closer to 1800 because
9 SORLIS is a primary data layer that provides a comprehensive, landscape-level inventory of natural, rural and urban areas. SOLRIS follows a standardized approach for ecosystem description, inventory and interpretation known as Ecological Land Classification (ELC) for southern Ontario (Lee et al, 1998). 15
the wetland loss picture painted by these studies and described by government officials is incomplete and misleading.
2.2.1 Southern Ontario Wetland Loss from 1800 to 1867: An Alternative Analysis
Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010) reported that 68.6% of the original wetlands in southern
Ontario were converted to alternative uses between 1800 and 1967, with the counties of Essex,
Kent and Lambton experiencing the greatest wetland loss. They are located in the region of southwestern Ontario and cover approximately 724,361 hectares of land between them.
According to Ducks, these three counties lost an estimated 93.7% of their total combined wetland area during this period, while the rest of southern Ontario lost an estimated 61.5% of the total wetland area. Prior to 1967, Ducks estimated that large wetland losses also occurred in the counties of Middlesex (78.1%), Perth (81.9%), Brant (84%), Niagara (83.8%), Metro Toronto
(91.7%), Russell (89.6%) and Prescott (83.8%). However, combined, these seven counties lost an estimated 199,453 hectares of wetland compared to the counties of Essex, Kent and Lambton that together lost an estimated 412,666 hectares of wetland before 1967. This means that wetland conversion, or loss, was concentrated in one region of southern Ontario between 1800 and 1967.
Statistics Canada (2008) archives agricultural land census data of Upper Canada, now
Ontario, from 1826 to 1861 10 . Their records indicate that in 1826 the counties 11 of Essex, Kent and Lambton had 70,061 hectares of occupied or settled land, with 10,387 hectares cultivated for agricultural purposes. Settlement activity required large scale land clearing using primitive methods to build homes, farms, raise livestock and plant crops. By 1841, Statistics Canada
10 These data were not used by Snell (1987) or by Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010). 11 In 1826, the counties of Essex, Kent and Lambton were in the region of Western Upper Canada and are identified on provincial government land maps (Ontario Government Archives, 1969). 16
reports that 168,914 hectares were occupied and that approximately 14% of the land still remained cultivated. By 1861, major expansion had occurred and census data report that occupied land had increased to 325,438 hectares across the counties and that 116,976 hectares were now cultivated. Over the entire period, Europeans expanded their settlement by 255,377 hectares while cultivating 106,580 hectares. This means that 45% of the total land area between the three counties was settled by 1861. Comparing this data with Ducks Unlimited Canada’s estimates provides new insight into wetland loss prior to 1862.
Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010) estimated that 60.8% of the total land area of Essex,
Kent and Lambton was wetland prior to 1800. Assuming this percentage remained fixed while settlement occurred and that 60.8% the total occupied land by 1861 was converted wetland, then
197,866 hectares of wetland was converted in order to establish the 325,438 hectare settlement.
Under this assumption, 47.9% of the total wetland loss in the region estimated by Ducks before
1967 occurred between 1800 and 1861.
Denis Des Rivieres (1971) and Kenneth Kelly (1975) report, however, that the greatest amount of the land clearing and wetland draining that took place in Essex, Kent and Lambton counties occurred during the 1860’s 12 . Unfortunately, neither author provided aggregate figures of wetland distribution or conversion. Des Rivieres reported that many wetlands of various sizes were drained in each of the three counties, with the largest being the Great Enniskillen Swamp which covered approximately 30,000 hectares in Lambton County and was drained in 1868.
Kelly believes that draining wetlands became an attractive endeavour after the government promoted it as a method of creating rich soils for agricultural. He explained how the Ontario
12 Christina Burr (2005) found that increasing oil speculation in the 1860’s in southwestern Ontario also required wetland drainage in Lambton County to extract oil deposits. 17
Drainage Acts of 1869 and 1873 and the Municipal Drainage Aid Act of 1873 boosted wetland development by providing funds to create main drains that farmers used to carry off the surplus of water from their property. Kelly suggested that farmers initially saw no value in the reclamation of wetland areas but now could install drainage tiles to direct water to the main drain at $16-$20 per acre, which was recouped after 3 crop cycles on the converted land. As a result, wetland draining became a lucrative business venture in the 1870’s. Based on these findings, the greatest amount of wetland conversion in Essex, Kent and Lambton counties took place after
1860 and continued until the 1870’s. Assuming “the greatest amount” equates to at least 50% of the total 412,666 hectares of converted wetland area estimated by Ducks Unlimited Canada
(2010) in this region before 1967, then between 1862 and 1880 an additional 206,333 hectares of wetland were lost.
From this analysis, a new picture of wetland loss in southern Ontario emerges. Between
1800 and 1861 I estimated that 197,866 hectares of wetlands were converted for early settlement, while between 1862 and 1880 I estimated that an additional 206,333 hectares of wetlands were drained to develop agricultural land. This amounts to 404,199 hectares of lost wetland in just one region of southern Ontario. This also means that 97.9% of converted wetland in Essex, Kent and
Lambton counties estimated by Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010) prior to 1967, actually happened before 1880. I assume that this was the same for every southern Ontario County that experienced high rates of wetland loss (estimated by Ducks prior to 1967).
In 1925, another significant agricultural region in southern Ontario, the Holland Marsh, was developed by draining a large wetland covering portions of York and Simcoe counties. The
Marsh is popularly known amongst cottagers traveling north from Toronto and by those living in the region. According to the (former) Ontario Ministry of Culture and Recreation (Ontario’s 18
Historical Plaques, 2004), the Holland Marsh consists of 2,800 hectares of reclaimed land that was drained between 1925 and 1930 to accommodate Dutch farmers’ immigrating to the region.
The (former) Ontario Department of Planning and Development (1949) states that the Holland
Marsh is 8,500 hectares in total, which is divided between reclaimed wetland for agriculture, undisturbed wetland and wetland used for recreational purposes. Based on total land area, however, the Holland Marsh holds no comparison to the amount of converted wetland in Essex,
Kent and Lambton counties.
These two regions of southern Ontario have another important comparison. The Holland
Marsh falls under regional wetland policies of the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan and the Green Belt Plan which protects land zoned for agricultural use. On the other hand, private landowners in southwestern Ontario are governed by municipal wetland policies, which allow zoned land to be adjusted from agricultural to ecologically sensitive based on government discretion.
2.2.2 Wetland Distribution Across Southern Ontario from 1800 to 2007
Figure 2.2 documents estimated wetland distribution in hectares (thousands) across southern Ontario in 1800, 1880, 1925, 1967, 1982, 2002 and 2007. Estimates reported for 1800,
1967 and 2002 were taken from Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010), while estimates reported for
1880 and 1925 were taken from the preceding analysis that combined Statistics Canada data and
Ducks’ estimates. Estimates for 1880 and 1925 in Figure 2.2 are based on the assumption that
97.9% of the wetland area drained by 1967 (according to Ducks) was drained by 1880. The year
1925 was chosen because it represents when wetland conversion began in the Holland Marsh region. The 2007 estimate comes from Ducks Unlimited Canada (Municipal Extensions 19
Figure 2.2 – Wetland Distribution in Hectares across Southern Ontario between the Pre- Settlement Era (circa 1800) and 2007
Coatsworth (2012) 2500 Wetland Area in 2000 Hectares 1500 (thousands) 1000
500 Coatsworth (2012)
0
Years 1
Source: Statistics Canada (2008), Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010), Ducks Unlimited Canada (2012) and Author’s analysis
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Program, 2012) who assessed total wetland area in southern Ontario again and found that there were an additional 518,000 hectares of wetland area than they had estimated in 2002. This estimate was derived from a new data set produced by the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources that included all evaluated and non-evaluated wetlands since 2005.
Figure 2.2 shows that in 1800 southern Ontario had 2.02 million hectares of wetland but by 1880, an estimated 650,000 hectares of wetlands remained. In 1925, southern Ontario experienced a marginal decrease in wetland area, with the development of the Holland Marsh and other agricultural areas, and an estimated 640,000 hectares of wetland remained. By 1967, an estimated 637,000 hectares of wetland and by 1982, the total wetland area decreased to an estimated 631,000 hectares. Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010) estimated that by 2002 only
560,000 hectares of wetlands remained, however, their analysis in 2012 estimated that 1.08 million hectares of wetland was scattered across southern Ontario. The new data set nearly doubles the estimated total wetland area from 2002. Overall, Figure 2.2 shows a different picture of wetland loss in southern Ontario than that painted by Snell (1987) and Ducks Unlimited
Canada (2010). Figure 2.2 reports a wetland conversion rate of 53.4% from 1800 to 2007, which primarily occurred before 1880 for settlement purposes and was subsidized by government.
The available historical evidence revealed that the greatest share of wetland conversion happened in southern Ontario between 1800 and 1880, yet, the Ontario Ministry of Natural
Resources (Wetland Restoration, 2010) refers to wetland loss continuing until “the early 1980’s” when “about 68% of southern [Ontario’s] wetlands had been destroyed.” Ron Reid (2012), founder of Ontario Nature, commented at the 2012 Ontario Wetland Conference held in Toronto that the provincial government “did not lift a finger to protect wetlands until the 1980’s.” He suggested that the pressures from non-governmental organizations, such as Ontario Nature, and 21
academic professionals, such as Elizabeth Snell, forced the provincial government to take an interest in wetland conservation and wetlands have been a hot topic in the development of land use policy ever since. Provincial policies are written to protect wetlands in the public interest while regulating private interests. This method of conservation, however, limits stewardship activities by private interests beyond large profit seeking corporations, such as landowners.
Wetland policy in Ontario could not have developed into its current regulatory structure without the reports by Snell (1987) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (2010) that estimated different, but alarming rates of wetland loss. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the 2010 and
2012 reports by Ducks both analysed data produced by the Ontario Ministry of Natural
Resources, which contradict each other regarding the state of wetlands in southern Ontario. In other words, the provincial government produced data (analysed by Snell) telling a story that led to two decades of policy development, another data set confirming the need for increased wetland development regulations and then released new data that shows wetland conversion has not occurred to the extent Ontarians have been led to believe. The next section reviews the wetland policies that were developed to protect and regulate Ontario’s remaining wetlands from further loss.
2.3 A Review of Wetland Policies Guiding Wetland Conservation in Southern Ontario
De Laporte et al. (2009) refer to wetland policy in Canada as a multi-layered and complex mix of documents, legislation and motivations protecting wetland functions. They describe control over wetland management as being divested down from the federal government down to the provinces, watershed authorities and municipalities. Wetland conservation guidelines and management standards are initiated at the federal level and implemented at the 22
local level, allowing each level of government to develop wetland policy for their jurisdiction.
De Laporte et al. state that wetland policy is implemented to protect wetland functions and the environmental benefits they produce in the public interest. They found, however, that while urban landowners may prefer wetland protection, rural landowners consider the value from alternative wetland usage to be greater than the societal benefits promoted by government policy.
In order to understand how policy is implemented, the next section reviews wetland policies applied in Ontario by documenting the rationale for policy and procedures for wetland designation. Examples of policy implementation on privately owned land and a description of provincial legislation enforcing wetland policies are also included in the review.
2.3.1 Canadian Federal Wetland Policy
Federal Policy on Wetland Conservation (1991)
The Federal Policy on Wetland Conservation (1991) has the stated objective to promote wetland conservation in Canada in order to sustain their ecological and socio-economic functions, now and in the future. The Federal Policy was developed by federal agencies, provincial and territorial governments, and private and non-governmental groups. It provides guidelines for wetland conservation and outlines conservation goals, conservation priorities and strategies for program managers to implement conservation initiatives. The federal government applies these guidelines to wetlands located on crown land. Management of all other wetlands is delegated to provincial and territorial governments who, according to the Federal Policy, must develop policies unique to their boundaries while maintaining consistency with federal guidelines. 23
In relation to wetland designation, the Federal Policy on Wetland Conservation (1991) states that wetland functions must be recognized in “resource planning, management and economic decision-making” and, in order to do so, the “securement of significant wetlands” must be achieved. This implies the development of methods to secure significant wetlands for their protection from private land use and development. As of 2004, Environment Canada’s (2010) federal conservation programs have secured, protected and conserved 36,869 hectares of wetlands across Canada using several methods. These methods include fee-simple purchase, right of first refusal, option to purchase, donation, residual interest, conservation easements, leases, management agreements, restrictive covenants, handshakes and verbal agreements. Each method is legally binding, except handshakes and verbal agreements.
The next section reviews Ontario’s wetland policies and their implementation in response to the guidelines of the Federal Policy.
2.3.2 Ontario Provincial Wetland Policy
Ontario Planning Act (1990)
The Ontario Planning Act (1990) is the primary legislation regulating provincial land use planning and development. Although the Act does not include specific wetland policies and does not provide a method to designate wetlands, it does require Official Municipal Plans to contain policies that manage the natural environment, including wetlands. Thus, municipal authorities are assigned responsibility over wetland conservation and policy development in compliance with the Planning Act.
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Ontario Provincial Policy Statement (2005)
The Ontario Provincial Policy Statement (2005) was developed by the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affaires and Housing in response to federal wetland policies. It guides all matters of provincial interest related to land use and development, including wetlands. Policies of the
Provincial Policy Statement are subject to the land use guidelines of the Planning Act and represent the minimal standards for wetland conservation across the province. Section 2.1.3 of the Ontario Provincial Policy Statement reads:
Development and site alteration shall not be permitted in: a) Significant habitat of endangered species and threatened species; b) Significant wetlands in Ecoregions 5E, 6E and 7E; and c) Significant coastal wetlands This policy allows government authorities to restrict the development of significant wetlands in southern Ontario. Development activities are allowed on significant wetlands but only with approved documentation permitting changes to wetland functions. The Provincial Policy
Statement delegates authority over wetland management and administration of the permit process to regional conservation authorities and local municipalities 13 , while the provincial government takes on the responsibility of identifying and evaluating wetlands and their adjacent land to determine their social, ecological and economic value. This is done in southern Ontario by applying the Ontario Wetland Evaluation System.
13 A new Provincial Policy Statement has been written by the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affaires and Housing, however, the release date was delayed because of the provincial election in October 2011 that would ultimately decide whether the new policies would be implemented. As of the completion of this thesis, the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affaires and Housing has not released any information regarding a new release date of the new Provincial Policy Statement.
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Ontario Wetland Evaluation System (1993)
The Ontario Wetland Evaluation System (1993) was first developed in 1983 by the
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. It was revised in 1993 to include new scientific knowledge on hydrological values of wetlands and then amended to its current format in 2002.
This version ensures accurate wetland identification and evaluation for provincial planning purposes and is consistent with policies of the Provincial Policy Statement.
The stated purpose of the Wetland Evaluation System is to provide development aid for wildlife, fisheries, timber and other environmental management plans while providing the basis for wetland management in Ontario through its evaluation procedures. It uses a ranking system to evaluate wetlands based on four components: Biological, hydrological, socio-economic and special features. According to the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, each component is scored separately and added to a total score out of 1000. The biological component recognizes the productivity and habitat diversity of a wetland and provides guidelines for identifying functions of a wetland and its adjacent land. The social component attempts to measure the direct human uses of wetlands, including economically valuable products, recreational activities and educational uses. The hydrological component characterizes water-related values, such as the reduction of flood peaks and contributions to groundwater recharge and discharge and water quality improvements, which are complex environmental services. The special features component measures the occurrence of rare species or habitats within a wetland.
The Ontario Wetland Evaluation System (1993) divides each component into subcomponents, attributes and sub-attributes, each of which is measured with a numerical score.
Each component has a total of 250 points with scores varying in magnitude at the subcomponent 26
level. Wetlands are scored and fall into one of two classes, Provincially Significant and Locally
Significant, based on its overall score. The Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources classifies a
Provincially Significant Wetland as a wetland area that scores 600 total points, or 200 points in either the Biological or Special Features component, or a full score of 250 points in any component. All other evaluated wetlands receive a Locally Significant or “Other” designation.
The Ontario Wetland Evaluation System (1993) refers to the land adjacent to a wetland as buffer zones, which are defined as “land with functioning features of the wetland area, such as wildlife habitat or wildlife passage.” This means that the total land area protected under municipal designation is significantly larger than the initial wetland boundary. The Wetland
Evaluation System also evaluates functionally linked groupings of wetland areas as one, referred to as wetland complexes, which adds to the potential property loss for wetlands designated on private property. According to the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (Significant Wetlands,
2010), most of Ontario’s wetlands are complexes.
If the Ontario Wetland Evaluation System is applied thoroughly, wetlands will be designated for protection accurately in provincial land use and planning. However, any divergence from the Evaluation System or miscalculation of a wetland boundary on private property puts landowners at risk of losing control over their property. This could result from human error or unforeseen circumstances such as natural or infrastructural disaster. For example, the Goulbourn Landowners Group (2005) reported landowners in Ottawa’s western rural outskirts believe that the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources poorly classified approximately
3,600 hectares of wetlands in the Stittsvile agricultural region. According to the landowners group, local drainage ditches overflowed because of poor city maintenance onto adjacent properties causing low levels of water commonly associated with wetland areas. Their report 27
referred to one farmer that had 30 hectares of his 40 hectare property designated as Provincially
Significant Wetlands, without provincial inspectors even entering his property.
2.3.3 Regional Wetland Policy in Ontario
Ontario Conservation Authorities Act (1990)
The Ontario Conservation Authorities Act (1990) guides policy development by conservation authorities. According to Conservation Ontario (2011), the province has 36 conservation authorities acting as natural resource managers for regions defined on the basis of watersheds. The Conservation Authorities Act authorizes conservation authorities “to study and investigate the watershed and to determine a program whereby the natural resources of the watershed may be conserved, restored, developed and managed.” It allows authorities to enter private properties to survey, investigate, measure and evaluate any wetlands it perceives to exist and to engage landowners in land management agreements to facilitate conservation projects.
Conservation authorities primarily conserve Provincially Significant Wetlands and leave Locally
Significant Wetlands and unevaluated wetlands to local municipalities. However, a conservation authority administers control over all identified wetlands in their jurisdiction. Section 28 of the
Ontario Conservation Authorities Act was revised in 2006 to give conservation authorities the legal power to implement land use and development regulations unique to wetlands within their watersheds. This was done to better conserve wetlands in the public interest.
Section 28 – Ontario Regulation (2006)
Section 28 of the Ontario Conservation Authorities Act (Section 28 [1], 1990) states that
“subject to the approval of the Minister, an authority may make regulations applicable to the area under its jurisdiction.” This grants regulatory power to conservation authorities, enabling them to 28
restrict and regulate “the use of water in or from rivers, streams, inland lakes, ponds, wetlands and natural or artificially constructed depressions in rivers and streams.” This regulation goes beyond the management guidelines of the Ontario Provincial Policy Statement and allows conservation authorities to determine a wetland’s buffer zone and control its use. For example, the Grand River Conservation Authority Wetland Policy (Page 11, 2003) enforces a 120 meter buffer zone around significant wetlands to protect wildlife habitat and upland ecological functions supporting the wetland below.
The government ability to regulate land adjacent to wetland areas is a major cause of social tension in southern Ontario. According to the Ontario Property and Environmental Rights
Alliance (“The Devil is in the Details”, 2006), Section 28 of the Conservation Authorities Act, revises a 120 meter buffer zone from a planning consideration to a regulated piece of land and establishes a no-building zone 120 meters around each 1 acre of wetlands, which transfers a total of 23.5 acres to conservation authority control.
Regulations enacted under Section 28 of the Ontario Conservation Authorities Act (1990) can be challenged by individuals who have been refused permission or have objections regarding conditional development by appealing to the Ontario Municipal Board. 14 Contraventions of regulations under Subsection 1 of Section 28 of the Conservation Authorities Act are subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to a term of imprisonment of not more than three months.
Evidence suggests, however, that landowners are charged in excess of the legislated fines. For example, the Grand River Conservation Authority (Report No. CW-10-11-89, 2011) fined three
14 The Ontario Municipal Board is an independent, quasi-judicial, administrative tribunal responsible for handling appeals of land-use planning disputes and municipal matters. For example, appeals to the Board involve official plans, zoning bylaws, plans of subdivision or minor variances related to planning (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2011). 29
landowners near Cambridge, Ontario for filling a regulated wetland area. They were fined
$15,626 with additional legal fees of $24,859.13 and restoration costs after a laneway was built through a wetland in the summer of 2009. According to the Grand River Conservation Authority
Minutes (Volume 16, Number 9, 2011) from a bi-monthly meeting after the incident, the total wetland area filled by the landowners was a track of land 300 metres long by 12 metre wide, which is about a third of a hectare. In this case, the total charges to landowners for converting one hectare of wetland would be approximately $46,878 15 plus legal fees and restoration costs.
Other Regional Wetland Policy
Three additional regional wetland policies affect wetland land use and development in southern Ontario. The Niagara Escarpment Plan administered by the Ontario Ministry of Natural
Resources, the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan and the Green Belt Plan which are both administered by the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affaires and Housing. Each of these regional policies is enforced through the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, the Oak
Ridges Moraine Conservation Act and the Green Belt Act, respectively.
The Niagara Escarpment Plan (2005) protects Provincially Significant Wetlands by designating them as natural and cultural environment within the boundaries of the Niagara
Escarpment. It is a massive ridge of rock stretching north from the Niagara Peninsula through southern Ontario towards the Bruce Peninsula and up through the Great Lakes basin. Any development within the southern Ontario portion of the escarpment that affects wetland functions is restricted by policies of the Plan, which also protects a 30 metre buffer zone. Under the
15 This figure was calculated by multiplying the total charge to landowners, $15,626, by three to get an approximate per hectare rate for developing a regulated wetland area within the jurisdiction of the Grand River Conservation Authority. 30
Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act (1990), any alteration to wetlands must be permitted by the Ministry of Natural Resources or the local conservation authority. Within the
Niagara Escarpment Plan there are 141 public parks, open spaces, conservation areas and private properties designated for protection that include significant wetlands.
The Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan (2002) protects key natural heritage features such as wetlands and significant habitat by restricting development and site alteration. The Oak
Ridges Moraine stretches 1,900 square kilometres of rolling hills and valleys across southern
Ontario from Caledon to Rice Lake, near Peterborough. A natural heritage evaluation must be completed under the Plan if landowners wish to develop a wetland area on their property. The
Plan also administers a 120 buffer zone around protected wetlands.
The Green Belt Plan (2005) protects green space, farmland, forests, wetlands and watersheds. The Plan restricts development and site alteration of wetlands and an adjacent 120 metre buffer zone across hundreds of public and private properties in the Golden Horseshoe of southern Ontario, just north of the Greater Toronto Area. The Green Belt is 728,000 hectares in total, and encompasses the Niagara Escarpment and the Oak Ridges Moraine. Under the Green
Belt Act (2005), land zoned for agricultural purposes can continue to be used as such even if it crosses into a wetland buffer zone. Despite this exemption, however, agricultural uses are subject to best management practices guided by the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affaires and Housing to protect wetland hydrologic features and functions.
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2.3.4 Local Wetland Policy in Ontario
Ontario Municipal Act (2001)
The Ontario Municipal Act (2001) guides the development of local wetland policy by municipalities in their Official Plans. The Act states that Official Plans must comply with the
Ontario Planning Act and be consistent with the Ontario Provincial Policy Statement. For example, the Planning Act (1990) provides municipalities with four approaches to conserve wetlands and regulate their development:
1) Through designation of specific land uses in their official plans 2) By restricting land use through zoning by-laws 3) By the enactment of Site Plan Control By-laws
4) By granting or denying building permits
The first approach has been identified as the primary the method of protecting wetlands for conservation in southern Ontario. In order to develop a wetland designated in an Official Plan, the developer must comply with local municipal wetland policies. They must ensure that their plans meet the requirements of the regional conservation authority in order to receive permission to alter any wetland functions. According to the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and
Housing (2010), Official Plans must document land use and development within municipal boundaries, including housing, industry, shops, roads, sewers, parks and community improvement initiatives. They must also identify any Provincially Significant, Locally
Significant and unevaluated wetlands and their respective buffer areas. Official Plans are designed with both public and private interests in mind, which requires equal involvement by the local government, private enterprises, non-governmental organizations and landowners when a municipality is being surveyed, studied and evaluated. 32
Amendments to Official Plans can be made by appealing the Ontario Municipal Board who had the final decision related to municipal planning. For example, the City of Cambridge
(Memorandum, 2005) found that two sub-watershed studies completed in 2004 were flawed, presenting incorrect outflows from local storm drains to catch in a drainage area estimated to be much larger than in actuality. The Ontario Ministry of Environment and Energy (Sub-watershed
Planning, 1993) describe sub-watershed studies as plans that “recommend how water resources and related resource features are protected and enhanced to coincide with existing changing land uses.” Sub-watershed studies are conducted by engineering firms and evaluated by municipal authorities before being incorporated into Official Plans. Cambridge landowners caught the errors immediately, appealed to the Municipal Board and ensured that land designations were accurate in the Cambridge’s Official Plan. Discussing this event with a local landowner, he suggested that the regulated area was so poorly calculated that it included the physical property 16 of his neighbours.
2.4 Ontario Provincial Legislative Acts Relevant to Wetland Policies
Table 2.1 lists provincial legislation enforcing land use and development policies which directly affects wetland conservation in southern Ontario. The Ontario Planning and
Development Act (1990) restricts and regulates land use planning in Ontario and describes how land may be controlled and who may control it. The Ontario Conservation Land Act (1990) was implemented to guide the development of conservation easements and covenants on private land by conservation authorities and any other organization involved in land conservation. The
Ontario Lakes and Rivers Improvement Act (1990) directs the management, protection,
16 In a discussion with another landowner in an unrelated sub-watershed study, she said that half of her bathroom was in a regulated zone on her property. She now needs permission from the local conservation authority in order to replace a broken toilet. 33
Table 2.1 – Provincial Statutes Protecting the Development of Wetlands
Provincial Statute Date of Purpose of Legislation in Relation to Wetland (Date Created) Latest Conservation in Southern Ontario Revision Ontario Planning 2006 To restrict and regulate land use planning in Ontario and Development beyond those described in the Ontario Planning Act, Act (1990) and superseding policies in municipal official plans. Ontario 2009 To guide the development of conservation easements Conservation Land and covenants on private land by conservation Act (1990) authorities and any other organization involved in land conservation Ontario Lakes and 2009 To direct the management, protection, preservation and Rivers use of waters of the lakes and rivers of Ontario, and the Improvement Act land under them. (1990) Ontario Drainage 2010 To direct the creation, maintenance and repair of Act (1990) municipal agricultural drains Ontario 2010 To improve social welfare for Ontario’s citizens by Environmental providing for the protection conservation and wise Assessment Act management of the environment. (1990) Ontario 2011 To ensure the conservation, restoration and responsible Conservation management of water, land and natural habitat through Authorities Act programs that intend to balance human, environmental (1990) and economic needs. Ontario Water 2011 To provide for the conservation, protection and Resources Act management of Ontario’s waters and for their efficient (1990) and sustainable use, in order to promote Ontario’s long- term environmental, social and economic well-being. Ontario Fish and 2011 To restrict harmful human interaction with fish and Wildlife wildlife existing in the wild, and not in captivity, in Conservation Act order to protect wild habitats. (1997) Ontario Municipal 2011 To identify the responsibilities of municipalities within Act (2001) their jurisdictions and to grant powers to the municipalities to uphold their responsibilities providing good government Ontario N/A To identify and protect species at risk and their habitats, Endangered Species and promote stewardship activities to assist the Act (2007) protection and recovery of species at risk.
Source: Author (2012) 34
preservation and use of waters of the lakes and rivers of Ontario, and the land under them. The
Ontario Drainage Act (1990) directs the creation, maintenance and repair of municipal agricultural drains. The Ontario Environmental Assessment Act (1990) provides guidelines for the protection, conservation and wise management of the environment. The Ontario
Conservation Authorities Act (1990) ensures the conservation, restoration and responsible management of water, land and natural habitat through programs that balance human, environmental and economic needs. The Ontario Water Resources Act (1990) guides the conservation, protection and management of Ontario’s waters and for their efficient and sustainable use, in order to promote Ontario’s long-term environmental, social and economic well-being. The Ontario Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act (1997) administers rules for human activity and interaction with fish and wildlife existing in the wild, and not in captivity, in order to protect wild habitats. The Ontario Municipal Act (2001) identifies the responsibilities of municipalities within their jurisdictions and to grant powers to the municipalities to uphold their responsibilities providing good government. And, the Ontario Endangered Species Act (2007) identifies and protects species at risk and their habitats, and promotes stewardship activities to assist the protection and recovery of species at risk. All of these legislative acts must be adhered to when attempting the development of a wetland area. If the development activity contradicts any or all of these legislative acts, the developer must comply with any review, permit or application processes set out by the provincial ministry enforcing the legislation.
2.5 Summary of the Policy Approach to Wetland Conservation in Southern Ontario
The Ontario provincial government’s policy approach to wetland conservation aims to achieve the conservation goals outlined in the Federal Policy on Wetland Conservation (1991), including “no net loss” of wetlands. In order to do so, the policy approach applies the Ontario 35
Planning Act (1990) to guide land use and development and the Ontario Provincial Policy
Statement (2005) to restrict wetland alteration and development. The policy approach delegates wetland management to conservation authorities and municipal governments. Wetlands and their buffer zones are identified and evaluated through the Ontario Wetland Evaluation System
(1993), which classifies wetlands as either Provincially Significant Wetlands or Locally
Significant Wetlands. For the most part, Provincially Significant Wetlands are conserved by regional conservation authorities, while Locally Significant Wetlands and other unevaluated wetlands are conserved by local municipalities.
Ontario’s policy approach to wetland conservation has developed a system of regulatory legislation limiting wetland conversion for alternative purposes through the designation process, which is the primary method of protecting wetland functions. While this approach intends to conserve wetlands in the public interest, the wetland designation process has resulted in public frustration. The problem begins with the way wetlands are identified by the provincial government. The Ontario Wetland Evaluation System does not recognize the economic value private landowner’s associate with wetlands on their property. For example, landowners can convert a wetland into farmland in order to produce marketable agricultural outputs. Landowners can also develop wildlife habitats in wetland areas on their property for their own benefit. Once a wetland has been designated for protection, however, private landowners’ lose their right to develop, alter or drain the wetland area unless permission has been granted by the regional conservation authority.
The threat of heavy fines for altering a protected wetland may lead landowners to convert or drain wetlands before they are designated. There are no government landowner compensation programs in Ontario for property value lost due to designation, which is why public frustration 36
has led to resistance of government conservation programs. The procedure of designating a wetland without compensation suggests the policy approach uses a regulatory taking to conserve wetlands and promote the public provision of environmental public goods and services.
2.5.1 Regulatory Takings
A regulatory taking is when the government takes control of private property in order to control its development and no compensation is provided to landowners. This occurs through provincial legislation and regulations that legally entitle the government to control land and its uses as they deem necessary. Expropriation of private property also occurs through government regulation, however, the process differs from a taking by compensating landowners based on the market value of their land, plus any damages incurred or costs associated with relocating
(Expropriations Act, 1990). Another critical distinction between expropriation and a regulatory taking is that, with the former, title changes and with the latter, it does not.
Roger Pilon (1995) studied the implications of regulatory takings and refers to uncompensated takings becoming a big problem in the United States, describing the situation similar to how the wetland designation procedure is initiated in Ontario. He advises that policy makers need to account for all costs associated with the provision of public goods before regulating private land. To accomplish this, he believes landowner compensation programs should be implemented to reach equilibrium of social welfare. In an environmental context, this could be a payment for environmental goods and services program that distributes conservation costs evenly amongst beneficiaries.
Pilon (1995) states that American citizens are protected from regulatory takings under the
Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, which states that private 37
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. In Canada, sections 92 of the Constitution Act of Canada (Section 24 [1], 1982) states that provincial legislatures are given exclusive jurisdiction over municipal institutions, property and civil rights in the provinces. Paul
Peterson (2009), a municipal and environmental planning attorney in Ontario, describes these statements as the legal framework for the municipal and regional planning acts [in Ontario] and for the municipal zoning by-laws enacted in response to provincial legislation. Although the
Canadian Constitution does not explicitly provide private property rights protection or protection over land ownership, common law in Canada does.
The Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (2011) states common law can be applied to land disputes between private citizens and federal, provincial and municipal governments, where the courts resolve conflicts and grant property rights to landowners or compensate them for land designated for government protection. The Canadian Bill of Rights also provides protection of private property, however, it is legislative, not constitutional, and is subject to other legislations with precedence over land use and development rights such as the
Planning Act.
The process of designating a wetland for protection and taking a wetland through regulation are the same. Landowners bear the burden of policy implementation through the loss of property rights. Peterson (2009) believes that alternative methods, outside of public policy, for advancing land conservation should be adopted. His suggestions include the acquisition of land ownership by conservation organizations or through conservation covenants and easements.
These approaches include landowners in the management decisions of how to best conserve wetlands and produce environmental goods and services while compensating them for any decreased land value. Conservation easements also suggest a movement away from a public 38
provision to a collective provision of environmental goods and services. This is because conservation easements create an agreed upon land exchange between non-governmental organizations and landowners, rather than regulating landowners to produce environmental benefits in the public interest.
Mark Milke (2012) reports that government takings freeze private property for public purposes without compensation. Disputing regulated land in the common law system can grant compensation to landowners if the court finds that government action deprived landowners of all reasonable use of their land. Milke described examples of landowners in Alberta and British
Columbia being compensated for disputed land regulations constituted as a “de facto taking”, but found that Ontario’s environmental legislation and wetland designation process dismisses the need for landowner compensation. He recommends that governments treat regulatory takings akin to expropriation and compensate landowners with government funds for any loss in property value. He believes that this approach allows governments to accurately assess the true cost of a desired regulation as it is applied to private property.
While this approach lessens the financial burden on landowners and according to Milke is closer to equilibrium in social welfare, which means no additional gains in welfare resulting from conservation can be made by society, it may cause public frustration by tax payers who do not care about environmental conservation. This may pose even bigger problems in the future based on Milke’s findings that land use regulations favour compensating foreign companies over domestic property owners as a result of Canada’s participation in the North American Free Trade
Agreement. Under Article 1110, Meilke suggests that investors from the United States or Mexico can claim compensation if a Canadian government imposes land use measures on land investments that are determined equivalent to expropriation. 39
2.5.2 Consequences of the Policy Approach
Margaret Troyak (1995) explored issues concerning the implementation of Ontario’s wetland policies. She analysed six decisions made by the Ontario Municipal Board over disputes of wetland land use and development, municipal by-law enactments and official plan amendments. She identified several issues with policy implementation and found that Public frustration was apparent in all six cases, stating it was most significant amongst rural landowners in Ontario. These findings strengthen the landowner side of the economic problem described in
Chapter 1 of this thesis, where public frustration over wetland policy has led to resistance to participate in conservation programs. Troyak also reported that landowner compensation was a significant issue in her six cases. She found that Ontario landowners do not receive fair compensation for loss of property rights and associated loss in property value due to wetland designation. Another reason why landowners resist government conservation programs being implemented on their land.
Troyak (1995) identified other issues concerning policy implementation, including the loss of “development rights”, lack of appeal process, lack of information, inaccuracy of information, inexact wetland and adjacent boundary identification, poor interpretation of policy statement, poor use of policy statement, unclear role of the Ontario Ministry of Natural
Resources, overlap of government agencies, council’s discretionary power, role of politics in decision making, consistency between official plans, zoning and wetlands, poor government agency staff knowledge, defining an acceptable use in a wetland, Environmental Impact Study requirements, wetlands treated as “islands”, cumulative impacts of development and flexibility in implementation. These issues not only add to the frustrations of landowners and the conservation costs they bear but they hinder the provision of environmental goods and services, which is what 40
conservation programs intend to promote. Each of these issues is a consequence of the policy approach that adds administrative, enforcement and operating costs on landowners, conservation organizations or local groups trying to conserve wetland functions. Additional costs slow the active side of conservation that produces environmental goods and services, while more resources must be used to attend to government barriers and hurdles.
Troyak (1995) described four underlying root causes to the issues she identified. The first is a lack of balance between individual property rights and the public good, relating to the government protection of a common or public good that is located on private property. The second is the nature of environmental systems identified by the government, relating to issues surrounding wetland boundaries, wetland functions and other technical issues. The third is when wetlands are perceived as economically “valueless”, relating to the difficulty of comprehending the monetary value of a wetland and its functions. The final root cause she found is the lack of balance between local power and provincial intervention in policy matters. According to Troyak, this relates to municipal authorities challenging the power of the provincial government in relation to policy implementation. For example, a dispute may arise if the provincial government regulates municipal land for environmental conservation while the municipality had an alternative plan to lease the land to commercial interests and collect tax revenue.
Each of these root causes relates to government procedures and methods of the policy approach to wetland conservation. Troyak’s findings show that the policy approach lacks consistency and cohesion amongst government agencies, which has resulted in private rural landowners dealing with the consequences of policy implementation.
41
2.5.3 Evaluating Wetland Policies and the Policy Approach
De Laporte et al. (2009) evaluated each government level of wetland policy in Canada from an economic perspective. Their evaluation assessed the economic effectiveness of the wetland policy processes in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario 17 . Economic effectiveness was evaluated using criteria established by Field and Olewiler (2002), which are the ability to achieve goals in an efficient and cost-effective manner and consider fairness, incentives for innovation, enforceability and moral behaviour. According to Field and Olewiler, an effective wetland policy must satisfy five different criteria. De Laporte et al. evaluated each criterion and found that “Ontario considers a specific wetland benefit [water quality], with little emphasis on [wetland conservation] targets, has a well-defined wetland definition system, does not consider cost-effectiveness or incentives for innovation, partly considers fairness and moral issues, and has a high degree of enforceability [regulating conservation].” They also found that
Ontario’s wetland policies are most effectively enforced through provincial legislation 18 that relate to environmental conservation. While this might be true, De Laporte et al. believe that both policies and legislation deemphasize fairness towards landowners, which causes landowners to resist conservation programs from being implemented on their property. De Laporte et al. explained that monitoring compliance to legislation protecting wetland development becomes problematic when landowners do not cooperate with government authorities and even drain wetlands to avoid regulation. This circular problem is another indicator that the policy approach to wetland conservation is not achieving its goal of promoting benefits from wetlands with no net loss their functions.
17 De Laporte et al. (2009) evaluated the Ontario Provincial Policy Statement, the Ontario Conservation Authorities Act, the Grand River Conservation Authorities Act, the City of Guelph Official Plan and the Wellington County Official Plan. 18 Refer to Table 2.1 for a list of Ontario Provincial legislation affecting wetland development. 42
De Laporte et al. (2009) define a fair policy as one that distributes costs equally among stakeholders who equally benefit from a policy’s objectives. To be fair, a stakeholder who receives greater benefit must bear more of the costs of policy implementation. They state that fair policies are those which balance private and public interests equally, however, I contend that not all policies are important to all members of the public and fairness does not always require equal distribution of costs and benefits. The question of fairness must relate to the stakeholders directly affected by policy implementation. In Ontario, the costs of wetland conservation are borne by private landowners who have wetlands designated on their property while the benefits accrue to general public who may not be aware or care about environmental conservation efforts of the government. Thus, the policy approach to wetland conservation in Ontario does not balance the interests of public and private stakeholders and is unfair to landowners.
De Laporte et al. suggest payment mechanisms to compensate individuals for their conservation services as one method of balancing private and public interests. Troyak (1995) also identified the lack of landowner compensation for wetland conservation. She suggests public education of wetland conservation and wetland policy needs to be addressed in order for compensation methods to be implemented. Her thought is that educating Ontario’s citizens about the benefits of conservation will shift the policy approach away from strict enforcement policies and force the government to develop a financial incentive structure, such as landowner stewardship programs.
There is one provincial government program that recognizes the loss of property value to landowners from policy implementation. The Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources
(Conservation Land Tax Incentive Program, 2010) introduced the Ontario Conservation Land
Tax Incentive Program to provide landowners with 100% tax relief for the portion of their 43
property that was designated as a wetland for protection. The Ontario Property and
Environmental Rights Alliance (2006), however, reports that lands adjacent to wetlands, the buffer zones, are not included in this property tax relief program This means that landowners participating in the Conservation Land Tax Incentive Program receive a small amount of financial compensation compared to the total property value lost due to designation. For example, if one acre of wetland is protected then the landowner receives a tax break on that one acre, but the (120 meter buffer zone around the one acre) 23.5 acres of adjacent upland is not included in the tax break. This problem has resulted in landowner frustration rather than cooperation and provides another example of why the policy approach is facing a fairness and efficiency problem.
2.6 Conclusions
The Ontario government’s policy approach to wetland conservation focuses on protecting wetlands on privately owned land by regulating their use, development and site alteration. Policy implementation is unfair to landowners who are frustrated by costly government conservation methods that restrict independent wetland conservation. Non-governmental conservation organizations such as the Delta Waterfowl Foundation, however, present an alternative approach to that includes private landowners in decisions affecting wetland management. Delta uses a community-based model for conservation programs. Their primary program in Ontario is the
Alternative Land Use System, which compensates landowners on a per acre basis for active conservation of wetlands producing environmental goods and services. Compensation for landowners is financed through the Delta’s networks of public, private and non-governmental partners. This approach has resulted in the restoration, rehabilitation and creation of wetlands 44
involving 85 families on 94 farms in Norfolk County in southern Ontario since 2007 (Rosenburg,
2010; Alternative Land Use System, 2011).
The policy approach to wetland conservation also hinders the provision of environmental public goods and services from wetlands. This is an efficiency problem, where policy implemented to enhance wetland functions is in reality providing incentive for landowners to drain wetlands on their property. On the other hand, the non-governmental approach has the potential for a more efficient provision through a market exchange which would better equate costs and benefits of conservation. This approach promotes a provision of environmental goods and services that is supported by local communities and consumed by individuals financing the organization’s operations, such as members and donors. Although the economics of the non- governmental approach to supply environmental goods and services differs from a public provision, they both provide non-exclusive environmental benefits. For example, Delta focuses on waterfowl provision exclusively for members while also improving habitat for other species and water quality enjoyed by non-members. This approach is not motivated by profit and does not provide environmental goods and services to conventional private markets.
The non-governmental approach attracts those who are willing to share in the cost and benefit of provision. James Buchanan (1965) developed club goods theory to establish a theory of goods which covers the spectrum between purely private and purely public goods. Club goods are goods whose benefits and costs of provision are shared between members of a voluntary association who pool resources to obtain a good or service. Consequently, the theory of club goods possesses similar characteristics as the non-governmental approach to wetland conservation. The next chapter explores club goods theory and its potential application as an alternative to the current policy approach to wetland conservation in southern Ontario. 45
Chapter 3 - Club Good Theory and the Club Goods Model 3.1 Introduction
This chapter explores club goods theory and modifies the club goods model so that it can be applied to the operations of non-governmental conservation organizations.
3.2 An Economic Theory of Clubs
Buchanan (1965) defines club goods as goods whose benefits and costs of provision are shared between members of a given sharing arrangement or association. In the club goods model, utility from the consumption of a club good is a function of the number of other members consuming the same good. According to Buchanan, the optimal size of a club sharing a good is greater than one (purely private good) and less than infinite (purely public good). His theory of club goods determines the membership margin or the size of the most desirable cost and consumption sharing arrangement for a club good.
3.2.1 Public Goods, Private Goods and Club Goods
In order to distinguish club goods from purely private and purely public goods, Buchanan
(1965) describes the consumption of purely private as “consumption by one individual automatically reduces potential consumption of other individuals by an equal amount.” The utility function of an individual consuming purely private goods is shown by equation (1):