THE SECRECY PROBLEM IN TERRORISM TRIALS
SERRIN TURNER & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER
LIBERTY
PROJECT
BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE
AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW
THE SECRECY PROBLEM IN TERRORISM TRIALS
SERRIN TURNER & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER
LIBERTY
& NATIONAL SECURITY
PROJECT
BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE
AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW
www.brennancenter.org We are on strange ground…. But it is the essence of our tradition for judges, when they stand at the end of the marked way, to go forward with caution keeping sight, so far as they are able, upon the great landmarks left behind and the direction they point ahead. If…we are now to enter upon a new era of law in the world, it becomes more important than ever before for the nations creating that system to observe their greatest traditions of administering justice, including this one, both in their own judging and in their new creation.
Justice Wiley B. Rutledge dissenting opinion In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 43 (1946)
The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law unites thinkers and advocates in pursuit of a vision of inclusive and effective democracy. Our mission is to develop and implement an innovative, nonpartisan agenda of scholarship, public education, and legal action that promotes equality and human dignity, while safeguarding fundamental freedoms.
The Brennan Center’s Liberty & National Security Project seeks to promote thoughtful and informed discussion of how to address the threat of terrorism within our constitutional framework. Our efforts are rooted in the belief that accountability, transparency, and checks and balances are vital not only to the protection of civil liberties, but also to developing effective and sustainable strategies for fighting terrorism. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Serrin Turner is Associate Counsel for the Liberty & National Security Project at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law. After graduating from Harvard Law School (2000), he clerked for Judge Sandra Lynch of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Prior to joining the Brennan Center, he served as an Honors Program attorney at the Federal Programs Branch of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Stephen J. Schulhofer is the Robert B. McKay Professor of Law at NYU Law School. He is the author of Rethinking the Patriot Act: Keeping America Safe and Free (Century Foundation Press 2005); The Enemy Within: Intelligence Gathering, Law Enforcement and Civil Liberties in the Wake of September 11 (Century Foundation Press 2002); and many articles on the nexus between liberty and national security in the struggle against terrorism. He also writes extensively on other aspects of police practices, criminal law, and criminal procedure. Before coming to NYU, from 1986 until 2000, he was director of the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice at the University of Chicago, where he was the Julius Kreeger Professor of Law, and he served for many years as a consultant to the United States Sentencing Commission. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School and clerked for two years for Justice Hugo L. Black.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors are grateful for the contributions of Burt Neuborne, John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law at NYU Law School and Legal Director of the Brennan Center, and Aziz Huq, Associate Counsel for the Liberty & National Security Project, both of whom provided extensive review and comment throughout the drafting process. Tom Gerety, Executive Director of the Brennan Center, and Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Senior Counsel, also generously offered their time and guidance in shepherding the project to completion. Valuable research assistance was provided by Rick Simon, Chris Ronk, and Simon Brandler. © 2005. This paper is covered by the Creative Commons Special thanks is owed to the numerous prosecutors, defense counsel, and “Attribution-No Derivs- government officials who agreed to be interviewed in connection with this NonCommercial” license (see http://creativecommons.org). Report. It may be reproduced in its entirety as long as the Brennan Center Finally, we wish to thank the Atlantic Philanthropies and the Open Society for Justice at NYU School of Law Institute for recognizing the need to develop well-balanced counterterrorism is credited, a link to the Center’s policies and responding with critical financial support. web page is provided, and no charge is imposed. The paper may not be reproduced The statements made and views expressed in this publication are solely the in part or in altered form, responsibility of the authors. or if a fee is charged, without the Center’s permission. Please let the Center know if you reprint. ABOUT THIS REPORT In addition to written sources, this Report draws from over twenty detailed interviews with a range of individuals possessing extensive first-hand experience in terrorism investigations and prosecutions. Those interviewed include lead prosecutors and defense counsel involved in the four most significant terrorism cases of the 1990s: the 1993 World Trade Center bombing trial; the trial of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and others for the so-called “Day of Terror” plot, involving a failed scheme to blow up various New York City landmarks on a single day; the trial of Ramzi Yousef for the “Bojinka” plot, a failed Al Qaida plan to blow up a dozen airliners crossing the Pacific over a twenty-four-hour period; and the trial of four Al Qaida members for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Current and former officials from the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Central Intelligence Agency were also consulted. Some of the individuals interviewed did not wish to be quoted by name; they are cited but not identified individually in the text and endnotes. CONTENTS
Introduction ...... 1 Part I: The Federal Courts...... 9 The State of the Debate ...... 9 Basic Rights, Basic Conflicts ...... 10 Ways to Manage the Need for Secrecy ...... 16 Filtering: The Classified Information Procedures Act...... 17 History of CIPA ...... 18 What CIPA Does ...... 19 How Well Has CIPA Worked?...... 22 Restricted Disclosure: Protective Orders and Closure of Proceedings . . . 25 Restricting Disclosure at the Discovery Stage: The “Cleared Counsel” Solution ...... 25 Restricting Disclosure at Trial ...... 29 Declassification ...... 32 Alternate Charges ...... 35 Delay and Pre-Trial Detention ...... 37 Assessment ...... 40 A Case Study: United States v. Moussaoui ...... 41 Looking Ahead ...... 45
Part II: Military Tribunals ...... 47 The Legal and Historical Background ...... 47 Traditional Limits on Military Jurisdiction...... 47 Trial Procedure in Courts-Martial and Military Commissions ...... 49 The Saboteurs’ Case ...... 52 Military Commissions in the Wake of the September 11th Attacks . . . . . 55 What Protection Do Accused Terrorists Deserve? ...... 58 Secrecy without Safeguards ...... 60 Closed Trial Sessions...... 61 Hearsay and Anonymous Witnesses ...... 66 Limits on the Defendant’s Discovery Rights ...... 69 Limits on the Defendant’s Opportunity to Obtain Witnesses and Documents...... 71 Summary ...... 71 Spurious Precedent and Bad Policy ...... 72 Should the Commission System Be “Fixed”?...... 74
Conclusion ...... 79
Endnotes ...... 83
1
INTRODUCTION
More than three years since the attacks of September 11th, the legal landscape of the nation’s fight against terrorism remains unsettled. Remarkably, one ques- tion still unanswered is where and how captured terrorism suspects should be brought to trial.
The government presently lacks any clear or consistent policy. Shortly after the September 11th attacks, the President announced the creation of special new “military commissions” to be available to try “certain non-citizens” suspected of terrorism. The establishment of the new commissions was and continues to be contentious, yet to date they have not seen much use. The rollout of the com- missions was bogged down for more than two years while the Department of Defense hammered out their rules and procedures behind closed doors. Four suspects held in Guantanamo – all non-U.S. citizens captured abroad – were eventually charged and have been brought before the commissions in initial, pre-trial sessions.1 But all commission proceedings have since been halted pend- ing the outcome of litigation in the federal courts, after a district court found that the commissions’ rules violated military and international law.2
Meanwhile, the government has prosecuted dozens of terrorism cases in the fed- eral courts, although none of the defendants has been a high-ranking Al Qaida planner.3 These federal prosecutions have encompassed both U.S. citizens, such as the Lackawanna Six,4 and non-U.S. citizens, such as “shoe-bomber” Richard Reid. The prosecutions in our federal courts likewise have encompassed both suspects arrested within U.S. borders as well as suspects captured abroad – even on a battlefield, as with John Walker Lindh.
Three cases have wobbled controversially between military and civilian categoriza- tion. Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen arrested in May 2002 at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport on suspicion that he intended to launch a “dirty bomb” attack, was initially held within the federal criminal system as a material witness. But within a short time, the Administration changed course and labeled him an “enemy combatant”; Padilla has been held in military custody for nearly three years since. It is unclear whether the Administration will ever charge Padilla with a crime, and if so whether it will prosecute in a federal court or a military commission. (The President’s executive order authorizing military commissions currently applies only to non-citizens, but the stroke of a pen could remove this limitation.)
Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a citizen of Qatar lawfully admitted to the United States to study in Peoria, Illinois, was arrested in 2002 and held for trial on charges of lying to the FBI. But on June 23, 2003, as the trial date approached, he too was declared an “enemy combatant” and transferred to a Navy brig in South Carolina. Relying on undisclosed sources, the President determined that al-Marri associated with Al Qaida and therefore should be held incommunicado indefinitely. He too remains in custody. 2 THE SECRECY PROBLEM IN TERRORISM TRIALS
The third case in this grey area is that of Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national arrested within the United States shortly before September 11th, often described in the press as the missing “20th hijacker” in the September 11th attacks. The Administration initially chose to prosecute Moussaoui in the federal courts. However, because Moussaoui sought access to Al Qaida members held in secret U.S. detention facilities to provide testimony in his case, many argued that the case would prove impracticable to try in the federal courts. Some, even the edi- torial page of the Washington Post, suggested moving the case to a military forum instead.5 But so far, the problems surrounding Moussaoui’s request for access to the classified detainees have been ironed out in the federal courts. At this writing, Moussaoui has pled guilty and a death penalty trial is scheduled for early 2006.
Do we need a special forum – such as the Administration’s new military com- missions – for trying terrorism suspects, or are our existing courts up to the task? The question still has not received the careful, democratic deliberation that it deserves. Congress has not yet stepped into the debate. Instead, the President established the military commissions unilaterally, and the Department of Defense unilaterally developed their procedures. Congress continues to sit on the sidelines as legal challenges to the military commission system unfold in the courts.
This Report aims to advance this debate – and, along the way, to identify areas in need of Congressional action – by exploring the central question at stake: how should we reconcile the competing demands of secrecy, fairness, and accurate decision-making in terrorism trials?
Thus far, the debate has oscillated between two poles. The chief objection to prosecuting accused terrorists in federal court has been that the defendant’s rights in that forum – to confront the evidence against him, to obtain evidence in his favor, and to be tried in a public proceeding – jeopardize secret information vital to counterterrorism efforts. The chief objection to the new military commissions, in turn, has been that secret and un-rebutted evidence will play a major part in the process, unfairly depriving the defendant of the means to defend himself and opening the door to error and executive abuse.
Both sides raise legitimate concerns. Protecting classified information in a terror- ism prosecution is a serious challenge. Prosecution can hinge on evidence gathered through sensitive intelligence mechanisms, such as classified informants, signal intelligence, and delicate cooperation with the military and intelligence services of other countries. Fifteen U.S. intelligence agencies in the civilian and military estab- lishments, besides the FBI and state and local police, may be involved in building a criminal case. Such agencies have good cause for keeping operations and intelli- gence-gathering strategies secret. Complicating matters further, the sheer scale of possible harm from a terrorist act means that waiting for such acts to be com- pleted, or even to approach completion, is not an option. Prosecutors therefore must work with less evidence than in a run-of-the-mill criminal case. INTRODUCTION 3
Introducing secrecy into trials for terrorism suspects, on the other hand, raises rightful concerns about governmental overreaching. Even where government interests in preserving confidentiality are well-grounded, keeping evidence secret from the defendant can prevent him from responding effectively to the govern- ment’s charges. Shutting the press out of the proceedings can hinder efforts to keep the public informed and the government accountable. Moreover, we know that over-classification is a constant pitfall and that executive branch officials tend to exaggerate the need to keep information secret. Indeed, 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean observed that roughly three-quarters of the classified material he reviewed during the Commission’s investigation should not have been classified in the first place.6
These are not partisan concerns; they do not depend on which party controls the White House. The executive has been given considerable powers to combat ter- rorism and, quite properly, is under intense pressure to capture and incapacitate those involved in terrorist activities. As the Framers well understood, systemic checks are essential under such circumstances to keep the executive honest. In Justice David Souter’s recent formulation:
[D]eciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the Government asked to count- er a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to vic- tory; the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that security legit- imately raises.7
To bring sharper focus to the concerns on both sides of the issue, it helps to exam- ine specific examples. The following situations illustrate the potential for tension between secrecy and accountability in the context of criminal adjudication.