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Underground Mine Communications Infrastructure Guidelines Part Iii: General Guidelines

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Underground Mine Communications Infrastructure Guidelines Part Iii: General Guidelines 20180921_Underground Mine Communications Infrastructure III-GMG-UM-v01-r01 UNDERGROUND MINE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE GUIDELINES PART III: GENERAL GUIDELINES SUBMITTED BY Underground Communications Infrastructure Sub-Committee of the Underground Mining Working Group VERSION DATE 21 Sept 2018 APPROVED BY Vote of the Underground Mining Working Group 25 Feb 2019 and GMG Governing Council 11 Mar 2019 EDITED BY Purple Rock Inc. 26 Nov 2018 PUBLISHED 13 Mar 2019 DATE DOCUMENT TO BE REVIEWED 13 Mar 2024 PREPARED BY THE UNDERGROUND MINING WORKING GROUP UNDERGROUND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE SUB-COMMITTEE Global Mining Guidelines Group (GMG) i | UNDERGROUND MINE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE GUIDELINES – PART III: GENERAL GUIDELINES ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THE PREPARATION OF THESE GUIDELINES ABB, Accenture, Agnico Eagle Mines LTD, Alexander Proudfoot Africa, Alternate Futures PTY Ltd, Ambra Solutions, Anglo American Ltd, Aveva Group PLC, Barrick Gold, BBA, Bestech, BHP, Caterpillar, CBS Australia, CEMI, Cisco, CommitWorks, CSIR, Dassault Systemes GEOVIA, Datamine, De Beers Group Services, Deloitte, DesSoft, Deswik, DetNet, Dexcent, Dwyka Mining Services, E.C. MacDonald Inc., Echo Engineering Ltd, Epiroc, Excel Project Management, Glencore, Global IO, Gription, Hatch, Hexagon Mining, iMining, Inisys Africa BIM Solutions, Innovative Wireless Technologies, Ivy Tech Trading, JG & Co Manage- ment Consulting, JV Associates, KNS Communications, Komatsu, KPMG, Laird, Leoka Engineering, Maclean Engineering (Africa), Maestro Digital Mine, MetsTech, Micromine, MineRP, Minetec, Motorola, MST, Newmont, Newtrax Technologies, NL Technologies, North American Palladium, Northern Lights Technology, ORBCOMM, PA Spatial, PACE, Purple Group, Rio Tinto, Rockwell Automation, RPMGlobal, Sandvik Mining, Schneider Electric, SDMT, Sibanye-Stillwater, SITECH WA, Stantec, Tech- nical University of Madrid, Telstra, Terrative Digital Solutions, Tetherco, University of Queensland, Thiess PTY Ltd, Thyssenk- rupp, Torex, Transrupt, Tunnel Radio, University of Johannesburg, University of Pretoria, Vale, West Arm Consulting Group, Wipro, Worley Parsons, Yamana Gold Global Mining Guidelines Group (GMG) UNDERGROUND MINE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE GUIDELINES – PART III: GENERAL GUIDELINES | ii DISCLAIMER Although these guidelines and other documents or information sources referenced at http://www.gmggroup.org are believed to be reliable, we do not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any of these other documents or information sources. Use of these guidelines or the above documents or information sources is not intended to replace, contravene, or otherwise alter the requirements of any national, state, or local governmental statutes, laws, regulations, ordinances, or other require- ments regarding the matters included herein. Compliance with these guidelines is entirely voluntary. Global Mining Guidelines Group (GMG) iii | UNDERGROUND MINE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE GUIDELINES – PART III: GENERAL GUIDELINES COPYRIGHT NOTICE This document is copyright-protected by the Global Mining Guidelines Group (GMG). Working or committee drafts can be reproduced and used by GMG participants during guideline development. GMG hereby grants permission for interested individuals/organizations to download one copy. Written permission from GMG is required to reproduce this document, in whole or in part, if used for commercial purposes. To request permission, please contact: Global Mining Guidelines Group Heather Ednie, Managing Director [email protected] http://www.gmggroup.org Reproduction for sales purposes may be subject to royalty payments or a licensing agreement. Violators may be prosecuted. Global Mining Guidelines Group (GMG) UNDERGROUND MINE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE GUIDELINES – PART III: GENERAL GUIDELINES | iv TABLE OF CONTENTS DISCLAIMER ii COPYRIGHT NOTICE iii TABLE OF CONTENTS iv 1. FOREWORD 1 2. DEFINITIONS OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 1 3. KEYWORDS 1 4. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1 4.1 Parts Descriptions 2 4.1.1 Positioning and Needs Analysis 2 4.1.2 Scenarios and Applications 2 4.1.3 General Guidelines 2 5. SCOPE 2 6. ADMINISTRATION: GENERAL GUIDANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 6.1 Potential Administrative Tasks 2 6.2 Examples of Legislative Zones and Associated Codes 2 6.3 Risk Matrix 2 7. GENERAL BEST PRACTICES 5 7.1 Terms and Definitions 5 7.2 Notes on Industrial Communication Technologies 7 7.3 Network Selection and Design 7 7.4 Seven-Layer Model for Networking 8 7.5 High-Level Communications Infrastructure Decision Matrix 9 7.6 Technology Specifics 9 7.7 LTE® as a Communications Infrastructure 10 8. GENERAL TOPOLOGY 11 8.1 Types of Mining 11 8.2 Underground Mining Methods 11 8.3 Ideal Network Topology Models for Underground Mines 12 8.3.1 Bus Topology 12 8.3.2 Ring Topology 14 8.3.3 Mesh Topology 15 8.3.4 Star Topology 15 8.4 Integrating Mine and Wireless Communications Topologies 16 8.4.1 Intrinsically Safe Devices—Special Considerations for Coal Mines 17 8.5 Choosing IP Network Infrastructure 17 9. BEST PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNDERGROUND MINES 19 9.1 Communications Coverage 19 9.1.1 Audio Communication Systems 19 9.1.2 Video Communication Systems 19 9.1.3 Data Communication Systems 20 9.1.4 Specialty Communication Systems 21 9.2. Tracking Technologies 21 9.2.1 Asset Location 21 Global Mining Guidelines Group (GMG) v | UNDERGROUND MINE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE GUIDELINES – PART III: GENERAL GUIDELINES 9.2.2 Uses of Tracking Underground 22 9.2.3 Tracking Approach 22 9.2.4 Detection Systems 22 9.2.5 Base Infrastructure 23 9.2.6 Location Zones 23 9.2.7 System Reporting 23 9.2.8 Use Cases 23 9.3 Best Practices for Underground Communications Installation 24 9.4 Case Study: Implementation of LTE at LaRonde Mine 25 10. NETWORK SECURITY FOR UNDERGROUND MINING OPERATIONS 26 10.1 Operational Technology (OT) Security 26 10.1.1 IT security considerations for underground mining operation 26 10.1.2 Physical Access Protection 26 10.1.3 Data Level Access 26 10.1.4 Internal and External Risk 26 10.1.5 Wireless Networks 27 10.1.6 Internet of Things (IoT) and Telemetry 27 10.2 Malicious Software 27 10.3 Segmentation to Facilitate Network Security 27 10.4 Network Security—Conclusions 29 11. CONTROL ROOMS AND REMOTE MANAGEMENT 29 11.1 Definitions for Remote Operations 30 11.2 Remote Operations and Benchmarking 30 11.3 Monitoring 30 11.4 Process Risk Assessment (Example) 31 11.5 Zone Classification (Examples) 31 11.6 Process Zone Matrix 31 11.7 Control Room and Remote Workstation Design 32 11.7.1 Remote Workstations 32 11.7.2 Control Rooms 33 12. RESOURCES, REFERENCES, AND RECOMMENDED READING 34 APPENDIX A: REGULATORY BODIES 37 APPENDIX B: TECHNOLOGY SPECIFICS 37 Global Mining Guidelines Group (GMG) UNDERGROUND MINE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE GUIDELINES – PART III: GENERAL GUIDELINES | 1 1. FOREWORD TDD Time Division Duplex The Global Mining Guidelines Group (GMG) is a network UDP User Datagram Protocol of representatives from mining companies, original equip- UHF Ultra High Frequency ment manufacturers (OEMs), original technology manufac- UID Unique Identifier turers (OTMs), research organizations, and consultants UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply around the world, creating multi-stakeholder working groups UTP Unshielded Twisted Pair to systematically remove the impediments to building the VHF Very High Frequency safe, sustainable, and innovative mines of the future. To VOD Ventilation on Demand achieve this goal, GMG working groups establish focused VOIP Voice over Internet Protocol projects to develop guidelines, such as this one, for the inter- VPN Virtual Private Network national mining industry. Draft documents are checked and WAN Wide Area Network approved by working group members, prior to approval by the GMG Governing Council. 3. KEYWORDS Please note: if some of the elements of this document Communications, Network, Security, Topology, Tracking are subject to patent rights, GMG and and the Canadian Systems, Underground, Workstation Design Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum (CIM, of which GMG is a legal entity) are not responsible for identifying such 4. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND patent rights. The rapid development of industrial and communica- tions technology in recent years increasingly benefits mining 2. DEFINITIONS OF SYMBOLS AND activities around the globe and has affected nearly every ABBREVIATIONS facet of the mining process. Companies are rapidly deploy- 4G Fourth Generation ing these new tools and applications to gain the associated ATA Analogue Telephone Adapter productivity and financial benefits. However, they face a key BBU Broadcast Base Unit challenge in that they require the appropriate infrastructure BLE Bluetooth® Low Energy to support data communications technology in the mining CCTV Closed Circuit Television environment, particularly underground mines. DC Direct Current Many new technologies developed and sold by vendors DMZ Demilitarized Zone require high-speed digital networks to manage the increas- DSS Decision Support System ing volumes of data generated in the underground mining EIRP Equivalent Isotropically Radiated Power environment. The data range from video and voice commu- FDD Frequency Division Duplex nications to vehicle telemetry, dispatch, and other critical IoT Internet of Things systems and services. In the past, each vendor required sep- IP Internet Protocol arate networks for their proprietary solutions. Today, indus- ISO International Organization for Standardization trial control and
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