World Directory of Minorities

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World Directory of Minorities Europe MRG Directory –> Russian Federation –> Lezgins Print Page Close Window Lezgins Profile According to the 2002 national census, there are 411,535 Lezgins in the Russian Federation. Lezgins are the fourth largest ethnic group in Dagestan, accounting for 12.5 per cent of the population, and according to official Azerbaijani statistics the second largest group in Azerbaijan (178,021 or 2.2 per cent of the population according to Azerbaijan's 1999 census). They live in south-western parts of Dagestan and adjacent areas in Azerbaijan. Lezgin belongs to the Caucasian family of languages. Historical context The Lezgin Democratic Movement Sadval (‘Unity') was created in 1990. Its leadership called for the unification of all Lezgins. In December 1991, the All-National Congress of Lezgins established the Lezgin National Council. The Council has called on Russia, Azerbaijan and Dagestan to redraw present borders to unite the Lezgins in the region. The introduction of a border regime between Dagestan and Azerbaijan produced strong protests from Lezgins. In 1998 Sadval split into ‘radical' and ‘moderate' wings, with the former continuing to advocate the creation of an independent Lezgin state and latter settling for advocacy of a Lezgin territorial autonomy in Dagestan. As a result of infighting between the two wings, the movement reportedly lost much of the popular support it had once enjoyed. In March In March 1999 another organization, the Federal Lezgin National Cultural Autonomy, was established as an extraterritorial movement advocating cultural autonomy for Lezgins. Current issues According to reports Lezgins in Dagestan suffer disproportionately from unemployment, with unemployment rates in Lezgin-populated areas of southern Dagestan twice the republican average of 32 per cent. This may be one contributory factor to renewed calls from within the Sadval movement in January 2006 for a redrawing of the Russian-Azerbaijani border to incorporate Lezgin-populated areas of southern Dagestan within Azerbaijan. Page 1 of 1.

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Dagestan: Stable Instability
DAGESTAN: STABLE INSTABILITY Akhmet Yarlykapov The Republic of Dagestan: general characteristics The Republic of Dagestan is the most multi-ethnic region in Russia. There are 14 ‘indigenous’ peoples whose languages are supported by the state. The total number of indigenous peoples is actually more than 30. The largest groups are: Ethnic group 2002, thousands 2010, thousands Avars 758,4 (29,4 %) 850,0 (29,4 %) Dargins 425,5 (16,5 %) 490,4 (17,0 %) Kumyks 365,8 (14,2 %) 431,7 (14,9 %) Lezgins 336,7 (13,1 %) 385,2 (13,3 %) Laks 139,7 (5,4 %) 161,3 (5,6 %) Azerbaijanis 111,7 (4,3 %) 130,9 (4,5 %) Tabassarans 110,2 (4,3 %) 118,8 (4,1 %) Russians 120,9 (4,7 %) 104,0 (3,6 %) Chechens 87,9 (3,4 %) 93,7 (3,2 %) Nogais 36,2 (1,4 %) 40,4 (1,4 %) Aguls 23,3 (0,9 %) 28,1 (1,0 %) Rutuls 24,3 (0,9 %) 27,8 (1,0 %) According to data from 1 January 2009, Dagestan’s population was above 2.7 million people. 1 Currently, Dagestan is awaiting the birth of its 3 millionth inhabitant. 2 Around 95 percent of believers are Muslims (most are Sunnis, up to 4 percent are Shiites), around 5 percent are Christian (mostly Orthodox), fewer than 1 percent are Jews. Dagestan is situated in the North Eastern part of the Caucasus and is flanked by the Caspian Sea in the East. Dagestan is divided into three zones: mountainous (39.9 percent of the territory), piedmont (15.8 percent) and flat plain (43.3 percent).
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