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Russia's Soft Underbelly: the Stability of Instability in Dagestan

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Russia's Soft Underbelly: the Stability of Instability in Dagestan UC Berkeley Recent Work Title Russia's Soft Underbelly: The Stability of Instability in Dagestan Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0cb7p3j6 Author Walker, Edward W. Publication Date 2000 eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California University of California, Berkeley RUSSIAS SOFT UNDERBELLY: THE STABILITY OF INSTABILITY IN DAGESTAN Edward W. Walker Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series This PDF document preserves the page numbering of the printed version for accuracy of citation. When viewed with Acrobat Reader, the printed page numbers will not correspond with the electronic numbering. The Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (BPS) is a leading center for graduate training on the Soviet Union and its successor states in the United States. Founded in 1983 as part of a nationwide effort to reinvigorate the field, BPSs mission has been to train a new cohort of scholars and professionals in both cross-disciplinary social science methodology and theory as well as the history, languages, and cultures of the former Soviet Union; to carry out an innovative program of scholarly research and publication on the Soviet Union and its successor states; and to undertake an active public outreach program for the local community, other national and international academic centers, and the U.S. and other governments. Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies University of California, Berkeley Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies 260 Stephens Hall #2304 Berkeley, California 94720-2304 Tel: (510) 643-6737 [email protected] http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/ RUSSIAS SOFT UNDERBELLY: THE STABILITY OF INSTABILITY IN DAGESTAN Edward W. Walker Winter 1999-2000 Edward W. Walker is Executive Director of the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post- Soviet Studies at UC Berkeley. Acknowledgements The author wishes to thank Diahanna Lynch and Laura Henry for their research assistance; Sergei Arutiunov, Victoria E. Bonnell, George W. Breslauer, M. Steven Fish, Ronald G. Suny, and Robert Ware for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts; and Denise Monczewski and Alexandra Patten for their copy editing and production work. Support for the publication of this working paper comes from the National Security Education Program. A color version of this map can be found on the Internet at http://www.caspian.net/peoples.gif. 1 Introduction In the first week of August 1999, some 1,000-2,000 armed militants entered into the Republic of Dagestan from the breakaway region of Chechnya (Ichkeria) in an effort to liberate Dagestan from Russian occupation. Apparently comprised of a mix of Chechens, Dagestanis, and Islamic militants from Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Arab world, and possibly elsewhere, the Chechen-based insurgents were nominally directed by an organization called the United Headquarters of Daghestan Mujahadin and commanded by the Chechen guerilla field commander, Shamil Basaev, and his ally, a mysterious Jordanian or Saudi citizen of unknown ethnic background who goes by the name Khattab.1 The previous year, Basaev had been a central figure in the formation of the Congress of Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan (CPCD), the main platform of which was the unification of Chechnya and Dagestan into a single independent Islamic state. Basaev and his allies apparently believed that the incursion would be welcomed by the predominately Avar population in the Tsumadin and Botlikh regions of western Dagestan, where the initial incursion took place. Several days later, a spokesperson in Grozny (Dzhokhar), the nearby Chechen capital, announced the establishment of an Independent Islamic Dagestan and the formation of a government headed by a Dagestani Islamic militant, Siradjin Ramazanov. The August incursion seemed to confirm Moscows worst fears about instability in the North Caucasus and Russias weakening hold on the strife-torn region. It appeared that, as long predicted, the conflict in Chechnya was spilling over into neighboring republics, threatening to precipitate a general uprising throughout the region that might well lead to the total disintegration of the Russian Federation. Moscow officials were convinced that Dagestan was the key to Russias presence in the region if Russia lost Dagestan, it would lose all the North Caucasus, face renewed separatist demands from other Muslim republics such as Tatarstan, and lose whatever influence it still had in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Moscows concerns about instability in the North Caucasus, where all the sustained political violence that has taken place in Russia since independence has been concentrated, are understandable.2 The 1994-1996 war between federal forces and separatists in Chechnya, which was responsible for an estimated 35,000-70,000 deaths and 400,000-500,000 refugees (technically, IDPsinternally displaced persons), has been the most deadly conflict in the former Soviet Union. The Ingush-Ossetian conflict over Prigorodnyi raion, which erupted into violence in late 1992 and caused at least 500 deaths and 43,000-73,000 IDPs, is likewise unresolved and threatens to degenerate into another 1 While Khattab is usually described as ethnically Arab, there has been speculation that he may be of Chechen or Circassian ancestry. Like radical Muslims elsewhere, however, he considers himself a member of the Islamic community (the umma) and above national or ethnic identity. He accordingly refuses to disclose his ethnic background. 2 For overviews of political conditions in the North Caucasus, see Helen Krag and Lars Funch, The North Caucasus: Minorities at a Crossroads, Minority Rights Group International Report 94/5 (1994); and Fiona Hill, Russias Tinderbox: Conflict in the North Caucasus And Its Implications for The Future of the Russian Federation, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, 1995). 2 round of fighting.3 And across the watershed of the great Caucasus Mountains, wars between newly independent Georgia and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been ended by precarious cease-fires that have yet to lead to comprehensive political settlements. As for Dagestan, its strategic importance is obvious. Territorially the largest republic in the North Caucasus (50,370 sq. km, roughly the size of West Virginia), it is also the largest in population (an estimated 2.1 million in 1996). The highly mountainous republic (Dagestan is a Turkic word meaning Land of the Mountains) lies on the eastern edge of the Caucasus range on the Caspian Sea. Makhachkala, the republics capital, is Russias only year-round warm water port on the Caspian. The republic shares borders with Chechnya to its east, Kalmykia to the north, Stavropol krai to the northwest, Georgia to the southwest, and Azerbaijan to the south. While its north forms part of the great Eurasian steppe, its south and west are extremely mountainous, except for a narrow coastal plain between the Caspian and the end of the Caucasus range. For millennia, Dagestans narrow littoral plain has been the principal transportation route between the Eurasian steppes to the north and the Transcaucasus and the fertile and warmer lands to the south. The only other significant transportation arteries between the North and South Caucasus are the Georgian Military Highway, built by the Russians in the nineteenth century through the Darial Gorge and over the Krestovyi Pass in the central Caucasus range, and the Black Sea coastline of Abkhazia, which is even less negotiable than the coastal plain of Dagestan. Both corridors have been severed by conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the railroad line through Abkhazia joining Russia and Georgia is no longer operational. The only railroad connecting Russia to the South Caucasus today passes through Dagestan.4 Even more important, at least in the minds of many Moscow officials, is the oil pipeline passing through Dagestan. The existing pipeline has limited capacity and can bring only a small volume of Caspian oil from Baku to the Russian port of Novorossiisk for export to foreign markets.5 Moscow 3 For estimates of numbers of causalities and IDPs in the North Caucasus, see Greg Hansen, Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus: A Guide for Practitioners, (Providence, RI: Brown University, The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Humanitarianism and War Project and Local Capacities for Peace Project, 1998). Violence again broke out between Ossetians and Ingush in Prigorodnyi raion in early September 1998 when Ossetians destroyed dozens of Ingush homes after five Ossetian policemen were killed, allegedly by Ingush militants (RFE/RL Newsline, 14 September 1998). 4 The Russian government completed a 78-kilometer railroad spur between Karlan-Yurt in Stavropol Krai and Kizlyar in Dagestan in July 1997, thanks to which trains from the rest of Russia can now reach Dagestan without passing through Chechnya. 5 The current pipeline passes through Dagestan, into Chechnya, and then on to the junction town of Tikhoretsk before reaching Novorossiisk. In 1997, the Russian and Chechen governments, along with the Russian pipeline company Transneft, entered into an agreement giving the Chechen government a share of the transit fees. However, the inability of the Chechen government to prevent the illegal tapping of oil from the pipeline or to provide effective security for Russian maintenance and repair crews meant that the pipeline
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