A Comparative Study Between the Outcomes of the American Surges in Iraq (2006-2009) and in Afghanistan (2009-2013)
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Surging: The Tale of Two Bloody Bailouts A Comparative Study Between the Outcomes of the American Surges in Iraq (2006-2009) and in Afghanistan (2009-2013) By Jacob J Diliberto A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR of PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science and International Studies, School of Government and Society, College of Social Sciences, University of Birmingham, May 2016 3 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract During the years from 2006-2009 and 2009-2013, both Iraq and then Afghanistan were under extreme duress, succumbing to the pressures from violent armed non-state groups. This occurred while both cases were already under US occupation. In order to resolve the growing instabilities posed by these non-state groups, the US escalated its initial military efforts first in Iraq and then in Afghanistan. The escalation of military efforts was conceived as a “Surge” strategy. The Iraq Surge was implemented first, starting in 2006. By 2009, the situation in Iraq dramatically changed because there was a significant reduction in the direct violence experienced by Iraqis. Furthermore, the new Iraq government gained political momentum and for a short period, it was able to centralize the states political authority and gain more legitimacy amongst the Iraqi people. Much of the conventional wisdom amongst policy experts and some academics is that the Iraq Surge worked, and the premise for this is the reduction of violence and the growing strength of the Iraqi government from 2006-2009. In light of the success in the Iraq Surge, another Surge was employed in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Surge started in late 2009 and carried on through 2012. The Afghanistan Surge was conceived using the same political plan, and the same military manuals and tactics deployed during the Iraq Surge. However, Afghanistan did not experience the same radical decline in direct violence that was seen in Iraq. Moreover, Afghanistan’s central government did not achieve the same semblance of growing central political authority as seen in Iraq. The divergence in outcomes presents a research puzzle, and this thesis sets to explore it. 4 To the Victims of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 5 Acknowledgements It is most appropriate to acknowledge the help of Professor Stefan Wolff and Dr. Richard North who provided help during my first year of study. I incurred many tribulations adjusting to a new country and adjusting to the academic process. During the first year, I experienced many social problems that impeded my progress, and if these two had not aided me in my time of need, I would never have finished the thesis. In addition, during the third year, Richard Lock-Pullen was instrumental in helping my progress by the use of creative conversations, using notecards and American football references. I imagine his level of frustration was high, but the amount of smiles afterwards will be worth it. I owe another special acknowledgement to two colleagues of mine Dr. Andrew Talbert, and Dr. Mark Tallman who gave me so much wisdom on the Ph.D. process as they were just finishing their own at Nottingham and the Korbel School at Denver. They offered guidance to avoid typical Ph.D. thesis writing mistakes, and often they acted as cheerleaders and drill instructors alike. Another thank you is in order to my good friend and mentor Bill Goodfellow and his wonderful staff at the Center for International Policy. They were kind enough to open their doors, and provide office space. They also provided an extensive social network to assist my fieldwork. In addition to Bill, my friend from CIP, Ed Kenney and his wonderful family, let me stay with them during the summer of 2012. Without their help, I would have encountered an enormous financial burden. Moreover, their friendship provided me rare moments of positive encouragement during the Ph.D. process. In addition, a special friend and colleague I met while working in Beirut Lebanon, Dr. Andrew Smith (Director of Interfaith Relations for Bishop of Birmingham). Over my tenure in the UK, Dr. Smith and his family were so helpful in providing advice on cultural traditions 6 in the UK and adapting to the UK academic system. Many times Dr. Smith opened his house for meals, warm fireside tea, and chestnuts while conversing about things outside of the Ph.D., this included random conversations of faith and Chinese tourists. Indeed, it was a home away from home. Without this family, I would have never have finished my thesis. Lastly, I would be remiss to forget my very dear friend and Ph.D. colleague Sara Alajmi from Kuwait. Our friendship was rich in debates, discussions, and banter. We spent many hours lamenting our difficulties, throughout our Ph.D., and life at the University of Birmingham. The most difficult thing about finishing this thesis is saying good-bye to these friends in the UK. Jacob J Diliberto Birmingham 2015 7 Table of Contents Glossary……………………………………………………………………….…….....7 Chapter 1.) Introduction..…………………………………………………….………..8 Chapter 2.) Structuring Framework of Research…………………………….……….21 (Methodology and Research Design) Chapter 3.) The Bloody Gavel…………………………………………….……….....41 (Literature Review) Chapter 4.) Washington in Wonderland.……………………………………………..70 (Background to Case Study 1) Chapter 5.) Surging in the Land of Two Rivers.……………………………………. 90 (Case Study 1) Chapter 6.) Pride and Prejudice on the Potomac …………………………………...146 (Background to Case Study 2) Chapter 7.) Surging onto the Moon with Gravity……………………………….......159 (Case Study 2) Chapter 8.) The Summary and Comparison of Two Broken Bailouts.……………...208 (Comparison Chapter) Chapter 9.) Summary and Conclusion………………………………………………244 8 Glossary Afghanistan National Army ANA Al-Qaeda AQ Al-Qaeda Iraq (Zarqawi’s Organization) AQI Afghanistan National Security Forces ANSF Counterinsurgency COIN Counterterrorism CT Coalition Provisional Authority CPA Department of Defense DoD Global War on Terror GWOT Improvised Explosive Devise IED Islamic State of Iraq ISI Irregular Warfare IW Joint Strategic Assessment Team JSAT Kurdish Workers Party PKK Low Intensity Conflict LIC Military Operations other than War MOOTW Mujahadeen Shura Council MSC National Security Council NSC National Security Strategy NSS North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO Osama Bin Laden OBL Secretary of Defense SECDEF September 11, 2001 9/11 US Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Manual FM3-24 Quadrennial Defense Review QDR Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD’s 9 Surging: A Comparative Study Between the Outcomes of the American Surge in Iraq (2006-2009) and the American Surge in Afghanistan (2009-2013) Introduction and Theoretical Background to this Study During the years of 2006-2009 and 2009-2013, both Iraq and Afghanistan were under extreme duress and suffered during its conflict between the state and a diverse group of armed non-state actors. This occurred while it was under US occupation after the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 (Afghanistan), and Saddam Hussein in 2003 (Iraq). Increasingly over the time that US forces were in Iraq and Afghanistan, the armed non-state groups strength and prowess increased, and the security in both cases rapidly deteriorated. In response, the US attempted to assist both of the Iraq and Afghan governments by offering an increase of its initial military efforts. This occurred first in Iraq in 2006/2007, and then later in Afghanistan in 2009/2010. The attempt to stabilize both theatres was popularized in the media through the tactic used in both cases, which was identified as counterinsurgency (COIN hereafter). In both cases, the COIN strategy was commonly referred to as “the Surge”.1 Identifying when the Surges occur is relatively easy, but defining what either Surge was can be elusive. The Iraq Surge occurred first, and was comprised of both a quantitative and qualitative adaptation in policy and plans from the preexisting “Shock and Awe” operations (Shaffer 2013). The first defining characteristic of the Iraq Surge was the addition of US forces. Specifically, this addition entailed five US Army brigades and the extension of 1 The reason that the terms Iraq Surge, and the Afghanistan Surge will be capitalized throughout this thesis is to be consistent with Oxford Universities writers thesaurus. The thesaurus indicates, “The full name of a battle or a war is capitalized” e.g. Shay's Rebellion, the Battle of the Bulge, D-Day, the Battle of the Atlantic, the European 10 ongoing US Marine deployments.2 This increase made the overall number of US brigades in Iraq move from 15 and escalating into 20. The five additional brigades added a total of 20,000 additional troops (Nagl 2013, Kagan 2009). The units deployed were as follows: 1. 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division 3,447 troops. Deployed to Baghdad, January 2007 2. 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division 3,447 troops. Deployed to Baghdad, February 2007 3. 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division 3,784 troops. Deployed to southern Baghdad Belts, March 2007 4. 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division 3,921 troops. Deployed to Diyala province, April 2007 5. 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division 3,784 troops. Deployed to the southeast of Baghdad, May 2007 (Kagan 2009, Mansoor 2013, Nagl 2013) The Marine Corps contribution to the Surge was an additional 6-month extension to the preexisting 12 month long deployments. This was most noticeable by the 4,000 Marines in Anbar province.