Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Challenges Today; Between High Hopes and Expectations and the Missing of Mutual Confidence

March 2010 March START Ends: Ends: START Dr Markku REIMAA, Ambassador, ret. Dr Markku REIMAA, Ambassador,

Disarmament Challenges Today; Today; Challenges Disarmament Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Multilateral Non-Proliferation

How to Start Again? How to Start Between High Hopes and Expectations Expectations and Hopes High Between and the Missing of Mutual Confidence and the Missing of 17

GCSP Geneva Papers 17 START Ends: How to Start Again? START Ends: How to Start Again? Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Challenges Today; Between High Hopes and Expectations and the Missing of Mutual Confidence

The opinions and views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the position of the Swiss authorities or the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

Copyright © Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2010 START Ends: How to Start Again? Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Challenges Today; Between High Hopes and Expectations and the Missing of Mutual Confidence

Dr Markku REIMAA, Ambassador, ret.1* March 2010

*Ambassador Markku Reimaa, b.1943, has been a Finnish diplomat since 1970. Throughout 1973-1990 he served mainly in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), notably as Ambassador in the Vienna Follow-up Meeting in 1986-89. As Finnish Disarmament Ambassador in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament 1997-2005, he participated ia. in the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in 2001 and the NPT Review Conferences in 2000 and 2005, coordinating the CCW negotiations on Mines Other than Anti-Personel Mines (MOTAPM) in 2004-2005. He was an associate faculty member of the GCSP in Geneva in February-March 2010.

This report reflects the personal opinions and views of the author.

The author wishes to thank Mr Joe Brady for his English editing contribution. The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) offers a valuable forum to a world in a continuous search for peace and security. Our mandate is to promote independent policy dialogue and understanding across cultures and, through capacity building, serve to stabilise regions in crisis, transition, and reconstruction.

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2 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 3 4 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Table of Contents

START Ends: How to Start again?...... 7 Overall Security Environment...... 9 Historical Perspective...... 13 The End of East- West Confrontation...... 17 Lessons Learned...... 21 China, India, Pakistan, Israel...... 23 North Korea, Iran...... 29 Step by Step Process of Confidence-Building...... 33 Nuclear -Weapon -Free Zones...... 37 The Role of the UN General Assembly First Committee...... 41 Globalisation and the Fight Against Terrorism...... 43 A Compliance Measure: Always a Problem?...... 47 Conference on Disarmament: Why in the Focus?...... 49 Outer Space: Looking for the Future...... 53 How to Promote the Disarmament Cause?...... 55 Do We Need a New Nuclear Ban Convention?...... 59 More Disarmament PR Needed...... 65 How to Measure Progress?...... 67 Do Personalities in Charge Matter?...... 72 How to Proceed?...... 75 The World is More Complex Today than Yesterday...... 77

List of Abbreviations...... 80

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 5 6 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 START Ends: How to Start Again?

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, signed in 1991 between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation, expired in December 2009. In order to keep the past achievements valid and in force, the two parties have engaged in updating the key provisions of that treaty. When finalised, this may have positive repercussions in the wider world. Pending the final conclusion, it will have an immediate impact on the forthcoming NPT Review Conference in May 2010 and its deliberations. Even though it is widely expected that a positive outcome is at hand, the result will nevertheless be presented as a new example of the two superpowers’ responsibility as regards the commitments made in the NPT 40 years ago. The focus in the review conference discussions could be turned to other participants.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 7 8 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Overall Security Environment

The global security environment today is in many respects very different from what it was 50 years ago. In the 1960s the European map still showed many concrete traces of the Second World War. The Berlin Wall, erected in 1961, was one visible example of the East-West divide. National security was protected mainly by armaments, not by mutually- enhancing confidence-building treaties. National defence doctrines were well-kept secrets. China’s testing of its first atomic bomb in October 1964 it changed many premises and perceptions. One more nuclear power had announced its readiness to join the club of real superpowers, even though the other pa- rameters for reaching that status were still far behind credible standards. The world became multipolar, divided by nuclear weapons. But the security situation was still dominated by European considerations. Political leaders in Washington and Moscow decided to open dialogue on nuclear disarmament. Negotiations began in Geneva on a non- proliferation agreement to strengthen the prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Based on an initiative by Ireland in 1964, the two superpowers came to New York with their own texts in 1967. Final bargaining was conducted between the two and representatives of the nonaligned movement. Finland, represented by UN Ambassador Max

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 9 Jakobson, was instrumental in chairing the meeting and, with the support of like-minded delegations, in spring 1968 the text of the treaty was finalised. On 8 May 1968, when everything was ready, Jakobson said: “The task of making a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is perhaps the most difficult ever undertaken by multilateral diplomacy. It goes to the heart of the strategies of the great powers and security of all states. At the same time the result also affects the prestige and pride of all nations”. Several internationally-binding treaties and agreements carry similar features. They have been negotiated with the help of the conditions then existing. Every multilateral treaty contains plenty of compromises, which can be interpreted afterwards with arguments different to those originally agreed to. The NPT was also a multipurpose instrument, an important element in the European security architecture. Although the German question was still totally open, and although the Soviet Union, with its friends, invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, perhaps the overriding task in the early 1970s was to obtain ratification of the NPT by the Federal Re- public of Germany (FRG). The final items for negotiation were related to the control regime. When the final text was in accordance with the EURATOM provisions and its relationship with the IAEA, Italy and the FRG were able to come on board the NPT without major problems. Not a UN member at the time, China’s voice was brought to the UN members’ knowledge via Albania. The Albanian representative said that the NPT was a confirmation of the “holy alliance between the imperi- alistic United States and revisionist Soviet Union in order to guarantee global hegemony by those two states”. France was silent in the debate. Paris did not openly oppose the treaty but did not see great political importance in it at that time. Today we have an astoundingly similar constellation around the NPT and the forthcoming review conference in May 2010. Moscow and Wash-

10 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 ington are engaged in negotiations to agree on the follow-up to the START treaty. If they can agree on that, they can perhaps show an encouraging example to the other parties attending the NPT review conference. The main attention can be focused on the other problems such as trying to enhance the validity of the treaty and alleviate the international concern regarding the possible nuclear weapons programmes of Iran and North Korea.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 11 12 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Historical Perspective

In the 1950s and early 1960s, India was still an active proponent of global nuclear disarmament on behalf of the nonaligned movement. After the first nuclear tests conducted by China in October 1964, India started to reassess its policy. It is obvious here that national security concerns played an important role. Since then, regionally-motivated considerations and reflections in Beijing, New Delhi, Islamabad and Tehran, and certainly also in Tel Aviv, have been expressed to the international community in various forums. Ambassador Max Jakobson, the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations in New York, reported in January 1967 that due to the uncertainty and anxiety caused by China’s nuclear test explosions, the hot spot of international tension had shifted from Europe to Asia. The main difficulty in reaching an agreement to prohibit the spread and testing of nuclear weapons no longer lay between East and West but between states that possessed nuclear weapons and those that did not. If an agreement were to be concluded under those circumstances the divide and inequality of status between the nuclear powers and the non-nuclear would only grow. India was not the only country to feel threatened in this respect vis-à-vis China. Sweden, too, was showing hesitation towards a non-proliferation regime which would allow the

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 13 nuclear powers to continue the development of their nuclear arsenals. An- other problem involved how the nuclear powers could provide guarantees that the non-nuclear states would not be attacked with nuclear weapons. The status of the Federal Republic of Germany as a non-nuclear country was one of the decisive incentives and arguments both to Washing- ton and Moscow to prepare a bilateral draft for the NPT treaty. It was finalised in New York in a like-minded group chaired by Ambassador Jakobson and was presented to the UN as a new resolution on 10 June 1968. It was adopted by 92 votes in favour, 4 against (Albania, Cuba, Tanzania, Zambia) with 22 abstentions, among them India, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Brazil, France, Spain, Portugal, and several African states. Critical comments have persisted since that time. The NPT has not forbidden what is known as vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and knowledge. There is no “fair balance” between the rights and obligations of the nuclear powers and those of non-nuclear states, no clear commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, no concrete measures to make the treaty universal. And the treaty did not recognise the rights of those states which had already made an agreement to ban nuclear weapons from their region. In a Finnish report immediately after the result was known, the em- phasis was on a message that Sweden had at last come on board, although the resolution text was not “perfect”. The NPT ratification process was finalised on 5 March 1970. Finland’s Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen said on that occasion that according to the pledges the participating states had made in the treaty, particularly in Article VI, the efforts to promote nuclear disarmament cannot be stopped. He therefore welcomed the initiation of bilateral strategic nuclear arms negotiations, SALT, between the Soviet Union and United States. At the first NPT review conference in 1975 the mood in the Swedish delegation was still showing some regret. Ambassador Alva Myrdal said that the NPT did not contain any mutual benefits. To India it was really

14 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 “discriminatory”. The “threshold states”, Canada, Sweden and Australia, capable of producing nuclear weapons, gave up this option in their national interests. As a consequence, they were all active in promoting international efforts not only in the area of nuclear weapons but in disarmament in general. Whilst the Federal Republic of Germany had given up the nuclear option and ratified the NPT in 1975, the situation on the other side of the Iron Curtain was different. The Soviet Union had a nuclear monopoly inside the Warsaw Pact, including the territory of the DDR. Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Spain, South Africa, and Pakistan still refused to adhere to the NPT. Myrdal said that the international community paid a high price for the nuclear arms monopoly and the concrete consequence was that the stocks of fissile material would be multiplied. Attitudes towards the role of nuclear weapons have been fairly constant since then. The group of countries who showed scepticism immediately, the moment the text of the NPT was ready, have been active in pursuing their principal concerns since then. India carried out its first nuclear test on 18 May 1974.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 15 16 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 The End of East-West Confrontation

The last decade of the existence of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev saw a hectic debate on arms control and disarmament. Bi- lateral negotiations with the United States clearly reduced the nuclear arsenals. Even zero options were discussed in Reykjavik in 1986. In Europe, a treaty on conventional force reductions, the CFE, was negotiated in Vienna in record time in 1989-1990. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the parties had difficulty in adapting to the provisions of the new geographical realities. The European CSCE summit in Paris in November 1990, where united Germany was present for the first time, was supposed to be a new beginning in east-west relations, with common interests and shared values. After the partial nuclear test ban treaty was signed in 1963 efforts were continued to make a more comprehensive test ban agreement in the 1990s. China made an important political decision; it was ready to join the international community in the efforts to control the spread of weapons and to ban nuclear tests completely. The Soviet Union declared on 22 May 1991 that it would conduct its last nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site in January 1992. Prime

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 17 Minister Eduard Balladur of France made a statement in October 1993 that France was ready to take part in arms control efforts while keeping its nuclear capability up to date, credible and sufficient to serve France’s national interests. US President Bill Clinton was ready to continue the nuclear test moratorium announced in October 1992 provided the other nuclear states did the same. Only China continued to test its nuclear weapons, in autumn 1993. Chinese authorities said that China was serious about a possible test ban, and saw it as a goal on the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. China had carried out 24 nuclear tests by then. The United States had tested 204 times between 1960 and 1990. The collapse of the Soviet-led socialist group increased the number of nuclear states suddenly by three; Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The abolition of their nuclear capability was certainly one of the most welcome achievements in post-cold war Europe. One can add to these considerations the internationally-growing awareness and knowledge of environmental concerns, particularly in the light of the Chernobyl disas- ter of February 1986. First tests in the atmosphere and, thereafter, tests underground came under increasing international criticism. In August 1994 representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the Russian Federation announced in Geneva that in order to ar- rive at a complete test ban treaty the participation of China and France was required. When both countries still continued their tests nonethe- less, the Nordic countries addressed a démarche to Sha Zukang, Deputy Director-General of the Department of International Organizations and Conferences of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, in Beijing on 15 June 1994. A new démarche was due in Oc- tober 1994. Sha promised that the testing would come to an end when the test ban treaty entered into force. China was actively participating in the negotiations, he pledged.

18 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 France, too, had a similar approach to the testing. France continued testing until the very eve of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s (CTBT), entry into force, causing considerable irritation among its EU partners and more so in states near the test sites on Pacific atolls. In the meantime, on 11 May 1995, 178 signatories of the NPT accepted a principal declaration in which they asked the nuclear weapon states to show maximum restraint in their testing while the negotiations were still under way. When France continued its test programme, the new Foreign Minister of Finland, Ms Tarja Halonen, followed the example of her Swedish colleague and, in September 1995, forbade the serving of French wines at official government events in Finland. The Nordic countries made their last protest démarche in Beijing on 29 July 1996. The government of China had promised to start following the CTBT provisions from 30 July onwards. The CTBT was the last international disarmament and non-proliferation achievement for more than a decade. Today we are witnessing a new challenge with that agreement. US President Barack Obama has clearly made a new commitment on behalf of the United States; he is determined to bring the US Congress ratification into harbour. When that happens, it will, it is hoped, have an important impact on some other key countries and their attitude to the CTBT. Beijing has for many years repeated its stand that the government has transferred the CTBT text to the People’s Congress for final approval. It may be a fact that these two parliaments are operating fully independently under national juris- diction but, the timing of their decisive moves to ratify the CTBT may fortunately coincide quite nicely.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 19 20 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Lessons Learned?

Multilateral international treaties and agreements are reflections of grad- ually growing mutual confidence. They show how, on a jointly-agreed basis of guiding standards for future behaviour, the participating states could decrease the risks of future misunderstandings. If all concerned could faithfully follow the rules, and implement them in practice, the security of all would be improved. In the field of non-proliferation and disarmament, national security concerns play a key role. The political responsibility taken when a result is accepted will be valid and binding on present and future administra- tions. Nevertheless, we have seen quite recent examples of behaviour where an administration had adopted a very narrow reading of past commitments. The alternative was often a new ad hoc arrangement or a breach in the multilateral proceedings within the original regime. When the NPT was signed many countries that had had the potential to build nuclear weapons renounced that option and dismantled their capacity. Today one may ask whether they lost any valuable assets and elements from their national brand image. Sweden, Australia and the Neth- erlands are good examples of that crucial stage of history. They decided to invest in means other than nuclear weapons to enhance their security.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 21 China and France did not join the NPT regime until 1992. The NPT review conference in 1995 was in many respects historic in its results. The validity of the treaty was extended indefinitely, the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament was repeated once again very clearly, and the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, as a goal, was agreed upon. A new group of countries pledged to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons, namely Ar- gentina, Brazil, South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Some of these decisions were made owing to regime change, thus demonstrating a clear change from past policy. Some perhaps came to the conclusion that they did not have the required knowledge and capacity to keep a nuclear arsenal in safe and credible hands. All in all, the 1995 NPT result was clearly one of the most promising signals that the Cold War had ended and that instead of the East-West confrontation, a new era was providing better possibilities for multilateral cooperation and increased security for all. The NPT and its review conferences provide some of the most comprehensive occasions to assess the global disarmament context, to ex- amine the current security concerns of every participating state, to compare their political intentions and strategies with their past performance and try to agree on further constructive confidence and security building measures. The current international political situation can hardly be described in a single word. It is always multidimensional, multifaceted and mixed with a rich network of bilateral relations both globally and regionally. The way forward is not guaranteed. One might think that Tehran and Pyongyang provide a critical example to the international community, in particular to those who might today be ready to revisit their past decisions in favour of a non-nuclear policy. That would be a gesture faithful to the credibility and role of the NPT regime and its future.

22 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 China, India, Pakistan, Israel

The Middle East, South East Asia and China are today the areas where major developments of potentially global implications are under way. They affect both their neighbourhood and world politics simultaneously. We come back to very pertinent comments made by Ambassador Jakob- son in early 1967: “When talking about the nuclear issues one cannot separate the debate from the national identity and pride of the nation concerned. Security for all, or undiminished security for everybody, is a dogmatic question in the ongoing debate ”. We are no longer talking about a nuclear deterrent in global politics. The deterrence of nuclear weapons has been degraded at least by those who have most of them. The rivalry between Moscow and Washington is seen today in a different perspective than it was 30 years ago. On the Asian continent, the situation is different. Nuclear weapons and weapons capability seem to be today an arsenal desired by governments. Even though India has been characterised by many as the world’s largest democracy, public opinion in India does not question the possession of the country’s nuclear arsenal by its government or the status of India, which belongs to the small group of countries which have not joined the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 23 In practical terms we have an unwelcome chain reaction of proliferation of nuclear weapons. When China decided to start its weapons programme in 1964 it was meant to counter the perceived threat of the Soviet Union’s nuclear potential. When the perceived threat from the Soviet Union started to fade, China became active in proposing no first use of nuclear weapons and, in general, the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. In the 49th UN General Assembly in 1994, China made a comprehensive proposal, on - a convention of a non-first-use declaration, - a CTBT in 1996 at the latest, - better implementation of the then valid nuclear disarmament treaties and further reductions by the main players, - a fissile material cut-off treaty and - a convention prohibiting nuclear weapons. At the same time China tried to make a distinction between itself and the nuclear policy of the main superpowers, stating that the latter they still relied on nuclear deterrence policies. China’s nuclear weapons were meant to be solely “defensive” weapons. In the following year, 1995, China indicated that it would be obliged to review its position on the CTBT negotiations and FMCT endeavours if the USA proceeded with its missile defence programme. Missile defence and long range missile launching capacity seem to be keys to the new opening of serious talks on nuclear disarmament. It took India 10 years, up to 1974, before it was ready to show China and to the world that it was ready to defend its national interests with nuclear capability. In 1998 both India and Pakistan tried out their nuclear weapons in a series of tests. They were in flagrant violation of both the spirit and the provisions of the recently-negotiated agreement on the CTBT. Pakistan has justified its nuclear capability with the assertion that India’s conventional superiority must be balanced with nuclear potential. Both countries try to argue that their nuclear capability is measured as just the minimum needed.

24 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons play a serious role in the regional and sub-regional equation. The area is extremely sensitive to terrorist activities. Pakistan is the first Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons capability. The nuclear key is in the possession of the military establishment. This combination is of great concern to the international community, particularly since a Pakistani nuclear expert was caught some years ago providing North Korea, Libya and other countries with the knowledge to build nuclear weapons. Today it is still an open question as to how the treaty on cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy, signed in 2008 between United States and India, will affect regional discussion and politics and the effectiveness of the NPT regime as a whole. The arguments presented to the US Congress in favour of the agreement were mainly of a general political nature. India is too big a country to be left without close cooperation with the United States in these sensitive areas of modern technology. India’s commitment to a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, its record on non-proliferation measures and its readiness to negotiate a FMCT in the CD were also mentioned. In India criticism was expressed against the agreement because it was seen as a departure from the independent policy of India. Serious questions of principle were raised in this context by the international community, in particular from the NPT parties and Nuclear Suppliers Group members. Once one exception has been made, to make more always becomes easier. It seems as if the sui generis status of India has only been enhanced with the help of agreed exceptions to the non- proliferation treaty, to the nuclear suppliers’ group provisions and to the CTBT regime. Even though India claims to have kept tight control of the general non-proliferation demands, it is not ready to join the CTBT. Indian signature to the CTBT is formally required for the treaty to enter into force. This is hardly forthcoming.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 25 Pakistan can argue that the US government has now taken a clear stand in favour of Indian dominance in the region. Time will tell whether this example will have followers on the way to further exceptions. It is a difficult political challenge, on one hand, to demand from others a strict compliance policy and, on the other, to prepare the ground for major exceptional alternatives. Israel has pursued a nuclear policy of no confirmation and no denial. This is a fact of life. It has served Israeli politics for decades. The Middle East issue still awaits a solution. One side is expecting that Israel will start to implement the UN reso- lutions requiring Israel to stop building and maintaining settlements in the occupied territories. Israel should also openly indicate its readiness to accept a Middle East zone free from weapons of mass destruction. Israel expects its security to be guaranteed and the lives of its citizens protected. To all three of these aforementioned states, India, Israel and Pakistan, the possible opening of FMCT negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) would present a new challenge. It would provide an indirect way to come aboard a non-proliferation regime without their already achieved status as semi-nuclear weapon states being called into question. To what extent this kind of endeavour and process would add concrete steps to confidence-building in the Middle East region overall, remains an open question. The initiation of the FMCT negotiations would certainly be very welcome today. It would unblock the stalemate in the Geneva CD after 15 years. It would give hope that the revitalization of an international negotiating forum will be a substantive sign and contribute to the current efforts in promoting non-proliferation and disarmament. But there are still major hurdles in the way of the opening of negotiations. Some countries stick to the original first draft mandate known as the Shannon mandate for the FMCT. Some want clarity before the negotiations begin, as to whether fissile material stocks would be included

26 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 in the mandate. Some may expect that if the negotiations are started, a ready-made draft treaty would be presented immediately to the parties. These reservations are not helping to solve the problem.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 27 28 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 North Korea, Iran

North Korea and Iran have been in the focus of the NPT debate for near- ly a decade. This is unfortunate. Irrespective of the encouraging results achieved in the 2000 NPT review conference, North Korea and Iran have kept the international community on constant alert since the early 2000s. For North Korea the ambition to have nuclear weapons seems to be a question of life and death. The monolithic decision-making procedures leave little or no room for credible negotiations. The six-party talks have served only to postpone more serious disasters. Even the influence of big neighbour China has apparently not been able to persuade the North Korean leadership to accept the international understanding of their non-nuclear status. One can only hope that time is on the side of constructive and positive solutions to the North Korean problem. Iran is another paradoxical example in the region and on the issue of nuclear energy. It was Shah Reza Pahlavi who, with the help of the Americans, started to build up the capacity for peaceful nuclear energy in the 1970s. When the regime changed in 1979 many other things changed at the same time. A basic misunderstanding and suspicion has prevailed since those days, in particular between Iran and the United States. During recent years this suspicion has focused on Iran’s potential to build military nuclear capability.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 29 With the United States, all other members of the UN Security Council share the same concerns. For years the problem has been about how to obtain clarity concerning Iranian intentions, and namely that Iran as- pires to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes only. The Indian example and India’s treatment by the United States may add to the confusion; Iran and its authorities may consider that the acquisition of nuclear weapon potential is a decisive move towards as- serting itself as the main regional power in the Middle East. Might break- ing international rules and earlier commitments become secondary in a drive towards higher political ambitions? Repeatedly, the key question in this context is the following: does the international community trust what the government of Iran is saying? Are the reports of the IAEA regarding the inspections in Iran comprehensive enough to convince the international community of the professional capacity required by the organisation? We see here features similar to the situation in Iraq in 2002-2003. Basic mistrust is a big hurdle in the way to reaching an understanding acceptable to all sides. Sanctions as a punishment for unacceptable behaviour have very seldom brought the parties concerned to a quick and reasonable agreement. Open discussion among the permanent members of the UN Security Council might encourage the Iranian authorities only to tighten the screw. The seemingly unstable domestic situation in Te- hran cannot guarantee a reliable pathway to real negotiations with the outside world. The way out might come from within or from outside in real negotiations. All parties should be reasonable and agree to follow pragmatic steps so that the original aims can be reached. A peaceful solution to a problem should be everyone’s priority. The acceptance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy by Iran, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the NPT and IAEA safeguards, is one side of the coin. In- ternationally effective verification mechanisms and transparency of the Iranian programme form the other side. National pride and dignity can

30 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 be shown in politics in various ways and connections. The nuclear weapons programme should no longer be the pivotal platform for those ambitions. Discussions have now been going on in various formations for years. This would be welcome provided that the common ground could be broadened in these negotiations. To be avoided is a situation in which a one-country issue would once again prevail as the main item for discussion when the NPT review conference convenes in New York on 4 May 2010.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 31 32 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Step by Step Process of Confidence-Building

Negotiating international agreements and treaties requires readiness to understand the positions of the other parties. Normally the outcome is a negotiated compromise. All parties can live with that, although none is totally happy with the outcome. To come to a final agreement is a confirmation that the jointly-agreed rules and provisions can and would strengthen mutual confidence and international security. The compromise is many times twofold: between the different approaches to the overall agreement, its textual content and formulations; and between the original instructions for the negotiations and the general expectations. Often a long interval transpires from the time when pledges are made to the faithful implementation of practical steps. Since the Second World War, the United Nations has been the central forum for building up a network of agreements for cooperation and security. In the area of military security the UN peacekeeping operations come close to the heart of the safe daily life of people. They have been in operative use both in a preventive way, (trying to prevent armed con- flicts), and in a retrospective manner in order to heal wounds already opened by military actions.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 33 International treaties, be they legally- binding or politically- binding, often need a follow-up mechanism. Irrespective of the degree of mutual confidence among the parties, an element of doubt always follows the promises. The parties gather on a regular basis to assess the progress made, or the lack of it. The political debate is often visible in public. Occasionally the sole purpose is to conduct a public debate. The arguments concerning the performance of the other parties reflect both the current status of the bilateral relations of the parties concerned and of the considerations used when the agreement was originally sealed. The parties have agreed in some instances to give the partners a chance to be present on the spot to verify an actual situation. His- tory was made in Stockholm in August 1986, when Marshal Sergey Ahromeyev of the Soviet Union came to announce that the area of the Soviet Union west of the Urals was to be opened for on-site inspections by the CSCE participating states. This historic transparency measure was announced during a conference arranged on the basis of the politically- binding pledges made in 1975 at the Helsinki Summit of the CSCE. With the results of the Stockholm conference of 1986 and with the Open Skies agreement from 1992, well- protected military secrets from the Cold War finally became accessible. Later, the United Nations established a monitoring team, known as UNSCOM, in order to assure the international community that the Sadd- am Hussein regime in Iraq was faithfully implementing the decisions of the UN Security Council, which prohibited the Iraqi government from possessing weapons of mass destruction. First, the Australian Ambas- sador, Richard Butler, then the Swedish former Foreign Minister Hans Blix, were in charge of those missions. Their ability to verify all the actions the Saddam Hussein regime tried to conceal was not watertight. The monitoring was, nevertheless, applying effective political pressure

34 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 on the behaviour of the Iraqi authorities. As Hans Blix stated, the cooperation between his team and the Saddam Hussein government was improving in the early part of 2003. But for some governments that was not enough. If the Blix Commission could have been given the opportunity to continue their inspections sine die, the Hussein regime could perhaps have been forced to make different decisions and further concessions; not to confront the international community but to start cooperating more intensively with the UN. The US-led coalition invaded Iraq in March 2003. This marked a head- on collision between two different approaches and cultures vis-à-vis international security and cooperation. The step by step method to build confidence on the basis of an international community mandate came to a halt. Efforts to alleviate suspicion by the work of the UN inspection team were replaced by a clear cut military solution. This was based on information from national technical sources and security services provided for the international media and a public audience. The suspicion was presented in a very convincing manner. No compromise was possible. While enquiries and debates on the original order and content of the March 2003 decisions still continue in 2010, one fact is clear; UN inspection expertise and experience were compromised in a very serious and damaging way. At the same time, the capabilities and competence of the intelligence services of some countries experienced a severe set- back. It takes much time and energy before similar patterns can be con- vincingly offered and used in efforts to help solve international crises.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 35

36 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Nuclear - Weapon-Free Zones

Regional arrangements to establish nuclear- weapon free- areas have been a tangible, visible way to build confidence and enhance non- proliferation. Latin American countries came to an agreement as early as 1967 on this issue. In the Southern Hemisphere, Rarotonga 1985; the South Asian Zone, Bangkok 1995; The African continent, Pelindaba 1996 and the Central Asian treaty of 2006 are multilateral arrangements. Mon- golia has been declared a nuclear free region since 1992. These arrangements reflect different circumstances and realities in international nuclear policies. Tlatelolco was a direct reaction to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The African Pelindaba treaty reflected the common desire that, with the 1995 NPT obligations, the continent should become free from nuclear weapons. Europe, North America, and the Middle East are clear exceptions to that trend. There have, of course, been several proposals to establish nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ) also in Europe, the first being the Rapacki Plan of 1958, named after Adam Rapacki, Foreign Minister of Poland, to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Europe. In 1964, Finland’s President, Urho Kekkonen, made a proposal to establish a Nordic nuclear weapon-free area in Scandinavia. While it

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 37 served the purposes of the active neutrality policy of Finland, it was also intended to keep Nordic countries outside speculation as regards the deployment or use of nuclear weapons in the Nordic area. The role of Soviet nuclear weapons and the status of Soviet territory and territo- rial waters were the most frequently debated problems in that context. Denmark and Norway, as members of NATO, had difficulties to engage in serious talks concerning arrangements which were of common concern to all NATO partners. They could assert that they had already made a pledge to not allow nuclear weapons on their territory in peace time. The apparent aim of the Soviet Union was to try to interfere in the internal debate within NATO. Nuclear- weapon-free zones are a good example of the way that like- minded countries, or even a single country like Mongolia, can make a constructive contribution to the international community and security. They have expressed a reasonable wish for their countries to obtain assurance from the nuclear states that they will not be attacked with nuclear weapons, (a process known as negative security assurances, NSA). The Middle East is certainly the most tense and difficult political arena in the world. Some of the states in the region are formally at war with each other. It is difficult to expect that a broad and normal dialogue could be conducted on a daily basis. The most recent common understanding of the need to establish a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East was achieved at the 2000 NPT review conference. Since then some new proposals have been initiated by parties in the region, but to no avail. There are good reasons to assert that an understanding of the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East, separate from a broader political settlement, is hardly possible. In Europe recent comments have been expressed in favour of efforts to make the Western European region free of tactical nuclear weapons. There are still some 200 tactical nuclear weapons from the USA stored in the western European NATO countries. The question has been raised

38 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 whether the Russian Federation should be bound to reciprocate in some way to efforts of this nature. The new military doctrine in Moscow seems not to be very proactive in this matter.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 39 40 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Role of the UN General Assembly First Committee

The three to four week session of the UN General Assembly, held annually in October, is a general barometer of the disarmament discussion. It provides a chance for every UN member state to address current issues. Preparing a text for a resolution becomes a concrete request to the other members to take a stand on it. The success of a resolution will be tested in an open vote. Taking into account that a clear majority of the members of the UN belong to the Nonaligned Movement, it is no surprise that a resolution tabled by a nonaligned delegation will certainly gather a clear majority. On the other hand, a resolution put forward by a western delegation can be regarded as a success if it gets the backing of more than 60 votes in the committee. The problem with results like these is that there is practically no follow-up to associated decisions. The First Committee is only a debating forum. The debate is recorded but concrete suggestions are not necessarily put into practice. Nevertheless, all take the challenge seriously. Informal and official discussions are occasionally tense. At least for daily purposes some debates and results from voting may even make headline news.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 41 Reform of the First Committee’s work has been going on for years. The main aim has been to try to shorten the duration of the session. Es- tablished practices are always difficult to touch. The practical measures proposed for the reform of the First Committee might be linked to the overall process of UN reform. One point has been raised many times in the past. A UN Disarmament Commission normally convenes during the spring session, also for three to four weeks. The original idea was that its role should be to formulate new mandates for disarmament negotiations. It has been unable to do so for more than a decade. Another item on the Disarmament Commission’s table has been the question of whether it should organise a fourth special session on disarmament, reflecting in that way the current priorities and challenges facing the international community? This is an extensive task demonstrating how differing priorities oscillate between nuclear arms, weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, between demands for more intrusive verification regimes or confidence - building measures, regional activities or global approaches. If the Disarmament Commission remains just another discussion forum, it might be asked whether we need two occasions every year in the UN environment to discuss the same issues?

42 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Globalisation and the Fight Against Terrorism

The 2000 NPT review conference was the last “normal” multilateral gathering to achieve a substantive result in addressing non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. A new tone was given to the new millennium with the terrorist attack directed against New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. It was a dramatic milestone in changing international life, political approaches and the functioning of international organisations and regimes. Routine measures were considered inadequate. Ex- ceptional ideas and solutions were called for and provided. One of the first challenges facing the new international climate was the biological weapons review conference in November-December 2001 in Geneva. It was impossible to agree on a verification protocol to the treaty. That would have been the sign of an important compromise. The biological treaty regime came to concentrate on national legislative and administrative practices, norms, and regulations, expected to conform more effectively to modern technological requirements. A small support unit, in the form of an international secretariat, was established in Ge- neva to help collect information and to serve as a focal point available on a permanent basis to the parties to the treaty. Two annual meetings of experts try to keep track of the developments and concerns of the international community.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 43 Today, it is obvious that technological development challenges the whole area of biochemical science. It is more and more difficult to dif- ferentiate between the two areas in practical life, in industrial processes and in scientific research. This is partly due to the growing demand for up-to-date information, knowledge and technical expertise at all levels of daily life, services and production. Information exchanges do not respect national borders. The most modern standards for quality of life and technical requirements are shared globally. For reasons of principle, and on practical grounds, it has become more and more difficult to deny any party enjoyment of the fruits of the most recent developments. High quality requirements and technological skills can be transferred easily from country to country without major disruption in practical production processes. At the same time, the risk that highly powerful and deadly weapons might fall into unauthorized hands will grow. Enhancing the skills of state officials involved in export control processes is one significant way to improve the situation today. Greater resources, more ways of sharing information and the application of joint standards are required in order to make follow-up work more effective. This is particularly necessary within the regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention where the promises and commitments made to dismantle stockpiles of chemical weapons clearly lag behind the schedule set for that operation. This is a common reaction to the question, what should be done next so that the effectiveness of the agreed regimes can be improved? In a world of global dimensions it should be possible to see the different regimes more closely together, to create greater synergies among them and to use similar methods with shared resources more effectively. Key players, for example a troika of past, present and incoming representatives, diplomats from participating delegations in charge of the negotiations, together with civil servants from the secretariat of the

44 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 regime and negotiations, should sit down regularly to check what could be improved to ensure that experience and expertise drawn from previous exercises could be utilised to the maximum. Even though the current challenges are new and require innovative and more efficient approaches to counter their threats, the decision- making procedures involving nations and governments remain more or less unchanged. “The international community”, as a subject, has been used every day in order to give the impression to a wide audience that a great majority of members of the international family are of the same opinion. In the UN context, seemingly clear unanimity among a gathering of 192 independent nations has often been difficult to translate into concrete, definitive action.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 45 46 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Compliance Measures: Always a Problem?

In principle, all agreements are made on the expectation that all signatories will implement them in good faith and with good intentions. Lack of compliance will cause suspicion, which will be reflected in overall political discourse. Many treaties and agreements include a follow-up mechanism allowing for the scrutiny of progress on implementation. Bilateral treaties, for example the aforementioned START, between the United States and the Soviet Union had comprehensive verification provisions to enhance confidence between the signatories, increase transparency and make the reduction of strategic weapons more predictable. Many arrangements rely only on a political dialogue or discussion. The CTBT, for example, has a worldwide network of seismic stations to monitor possible tests accurately and in real time. The IAEA has, with its safeguards regime, an accurate mechanism to compare past and updated information. It can build up a cumulative data bank on the basis of information given to it or on the basis of inspection made by IAEA experts. Surprisingly enough, the NPT does not refer to verification measures at all. It is a highly political treaty, whose five-year review conference cycle plays a key role. North Korean and Iranian plans to build nuclear capability have been in the focus of the debate. When, in the NPT regime, a country has been caught violating NPT provisions, the reaction

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 47 has been to bring the case to the attention of the UN Security Council. The Iraq issue has been referred to above. UN Security Council resolu- tions from 1991 through to 1998 attempted to put Iraqi compliance under strict international scrutiny, but without acceptable results. Sanctions can be imposed, as has been the case in Iran (Resolution 1747/2007) and in North Korea, (Resolution 1718/2006). The key to imposing UN Security Council sanctions is the required joint approach and understanding among the five permanent members of the Security Council. Imposing sanctions means, in the first instance, political isola- tion of the member state. The country under suspicion will be excluded, at least to some extent, from dialogue and cooperation within the international community. Specific measures are employed to target and curtail the continuation of operations considered illegal. One could ask whether the country under accusation should be excluded from other forms of cooperation in addition to exclusion from cooperation in the field of the violated treaty alone. International norms are to be followed and respected! Export control regimes have been established to restrain trade in sensitive goods and materials. Many items are of dual use, which requires an increasingly sophisticated verification mechanism to respond to present-day technological development.

48 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Conference on Disarmament in Focus: Why?

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament has been characterised as the “only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament”. Those who have been active outside the established international negotiating structures might say that the CD is the only international body that is not negotiating! The CD is not directly part of the UN system but it obtains practical services from the Geneva branch of the UN. The CD comprises 65 members from all the continents. Its membership has been enlarged in several stages from the original 18 nation committee of the 1960s. The most recent enlargement occurred in 1999 when a group of five members joined the club. All the decisions within the CD are to be made by consensus. The CD annually reports on its proceedings to the UN Gen- eral Assembly First Committee. The CD negotiated the CTBT as its last result in 1996. Since then the Conference has had the possibility to agree on its work programme in August 1998 for two weeks and in May 2009 in principle. A structural handicap in the procedural practices is the obligation to agree on the forthcoming programme of work at the start of every year. In August 1988 the understanding lasted only two weeks. And the conference was unable to agree on a further programme at the beginning of 1989.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 49 The deadlock in the CD’s actual work has become a burden to many countries. A number of countries have used the benefit of the consensus rule to block proceedings in the CD. Procedural dispute has been transformed into a political problem. It has raised the question of who is actually interested in opening negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, FMCT. Who is actively hindering business as usual? As long as many other basic questions in the area of nuclear disarmament are open for solution, some might think that the FMCT can wait. One counter argument is, however, that initiating FMCT negotiations, which in any case take time, would enable all concerned to prepare for the forthcoming outcome step by step and at the same time follow the other discussions on nuclear disarmament. Every member should per se show readiness for new negotiations in the CD, which provides a safe mechanism to control the pace of proceedings at all times with the consensus rule. Disarmament expertise still remains in Geneva. Scaling it down on the basis of a deadlock in the CD might be shortsighted. The cultivation and application of disarmament and non-proliferation expertise take time. Geneva is an excellent place to train younger generations for the cause. A useful and practical addition to professional experience is provided by the annual autumn session of the First Committee in New York. Many of the representatives from Geneva join teams in New York for that reason. It should be possible to continue negotiations on a certain item in the CD the following year without a further separate decision linked to the annual programme of work. Outside the problem of the programme of work is the question of the mandate for a certain negotiating item. The Shannon mandate for the initiation of FMCT negotiations has been available for 15 years already. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty has been a priority for negotiation now for more than a decade. Other topics on the agenda have been ne-

50 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 gotiations on preventing the arms race in outer space (PAROS), negative security assurances (NSA) and a general discussion on nuclear disarmament. When discussing the issue of a “balanced” programme of work one acknowledges the set of topics to be discussed or negotiated more or less at the same time. How many simultaneous negotiating processes might it be possible to conduct with the current available resources? It could be said that all nations that have shown an interest in non- proliferation and disarmament are already members of the CD. Eleven EU member states are not yet there. The balanced regional participation requirement has been one obstacle to further progress in the enlargement process. The chair in the proceedings rotates on a monthly basis. One could ask whether this is an effective way to organise the conduct of business. At least in the situation where the programme of work has not been agreed upon, an extended term of engagement for the chairperson might be well- advised. When the actual work and negotiations get under way, the situation for a chairperson changes considerably. He or she then func- tions as a technical chair for the official meetings, the plenaries. The aforementioned items represent the general desired elements of the participants regarding what should be on the table in the CD. The FMCT is the key in many ways. Although India, Israel, and Pakistan are not members of the NPT regime, negotiations in the CD could challenge their basic approach to the nuclear issue; to the possession, production and destruction of fissile material with the practical consequences therein. The FMCT would be a challenge to China, too, if Beijing were required to be more transparent about its current production and available stocks. FMCT negotiations would, as a new regime in the field of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, provide important knowledge of the nuclear powers’ capabilities, long term policies and current intentions. Professor Joseph Goldblat has proposed that the CD should be used

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 51 as a forum where the nuclear states could inform the member states on a regular basis of their actual activities. This would be an important step towards increased transparency and openness and the practice of sharing important information in a multilateral manner. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament should become the main forum for ministers and other political players to address the issues of disarmament, to continue dialogue on appeals and reports and to make concrete suggestions on how to proceed in practical negotiations.

52 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Outer Space: Looking for a Future?

The outer space issue may become one area where new thinking could be possible. It has been said that space is already a part of global life and its economy. Common acknowledgement of future rules of the game in outer space could encourage a number of countries to take part in discussions, be they countries which already possess space technology or new countries, emerging space powers. Safety in space is today an essential part of safe life on earth. Outer space is still in many respects unknown terrain. For this reason, among others, many options and aspirations should be kept open. As the new United States administration representatives have indicated, Wash- ington might be willing to consider options and diplomatic ways to create common standards of behaviour, a code of conduct for outer space traffic. A new policy paper on outer space is expected later this year. In the CD context it has been acknowledged that existing arrangements, the Outer Space Treaty 1967, the Rescue Treaty 1968, the Liability Convention 1972, and the 1974 Registration Convention plus notification of space launches, are not enough to guide responsible space behaviour today. There would be room for the creation of confidence and security building measures including information sharing procedures to address, for example, the problem of continuously increasing orbital debris. When

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 53 a satellite is involved in an accident there are no jointly- agreed procedures for exchanging information on what occurred or who is responsible for which part of any follow-up operation. The principled approach, namely declaring exploration and use of outer space to be for peaceful purposes only, might also be discussed as well as other matters related to cosmic security. Another key element should be an agreement on preventing the testing and use of anti-satellite weapons in space. On 29 February 2008 China and the Russian Federation introduced a draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. Many preliminary discussions have already been conducted on the issue and Canada had tried to activate the colloquium with its own working proposal. Further proposals and suggestions might help to up- date the talks. It has been suggested to bring the International Telecom- munication Union, ITU, with its technical knowledge and expertise into the discussions. Interested parties should show readiness to replace the notion of “PAROS” with a more modern and forward-looking title. “BESOS”, Be Smart in Outer Space!

54 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 How to Promote the Disarmament Cause?

At this point in time one might ask who is really interested in promoting multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures. The question is not new. When Ambassador Max Jakobson reported from New York in January 1967 to his minister in Helsinki, he approached this question in the following manner: “When disarmament is being discussed there is often an atmosphere of tedium and cynicism. Why? Because everybody knows that nothing is happening.” Up to the present time there have been many high level panels, appeals and reports in which eminent personalities, including politicians, have taken a stand on the need to do something important, something that could transform good intentions into practical steps and actions. The ideals and set goals are not new. The wheel was invented long ago. What is new, perhaps, is the common concern that if something mean- ingful is not done quickly, the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime will be in danger of collapsing entirely. Progress in making the already agreed commitments more effective is a political challenge for the whole UN community. It can be invigorated in two ways: Through a forceful political input in the context of the NPT review conference in the UN General Assembly or at a specifically convened Special Meeting on Non-proliferation and Disarmament;

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 55 Through down- to- earth, pragmatic work at all levels on more effective implementation of the agreed provisions. The policies of Iran and North Korea, and of India, Pakistan and Is- rael all provide examples showing that deviation from the internationally- agreed disarmament and non-proliferation standards is not necessarily causing any crucial negative consequences to the countries in question. Certainly the most distinctive positive messages are coming from Washington. The new US administration under President Barack Obama seems to be coming back to the multilateral negotiation track. The academic community seems to support these efforts widely. The non-governmental international community, too, seems to back these efforts. One should add to these observations the following: Where are the activities of the non-governmental organisations and associations deemed to be legitimate and possible in practical life? That is the case certainly in democracies. Does it mean, in practice, that the demands of the non- governmental groups, who normally advocate important disarmament measures, are actually proponents of unilateral disarmament in the existing democracies? The crucial partners for responsible negotiations on the other side of the table can see from a distance how their principles can be achieved without even engaging in serious negotiations. The most recent appeals and reports have been addressed broadly to the international community. The agenda in these reports and appeals is broad and holistic. Some key statements are repeated in all of them, highlighting in particular the necessity to cope with the challenges of Iran and North Korea. When the O-goals for nuclear weapons cover a time span of some decades, one can ask who can guarantee the consistency and continuity of the current progressive and positive policies of the main players in the future. It has been a historical fact that the credibility and predictability of the foreign policy of a small or medium-sized nation requires predictability and continuity. In the case of the great powers, sudden

56 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 changes and surprises are seen now and then. It was 70 years ago last year that Berlin and Moscow made a deal, in August 1939, to divide parts of Central and Eastern Europe between their two countries, by military force if required. Politically it was one of the most dramatic world news items of the day. One might observe today that in Washington, for example, there is a very complex political and structural situation. The mainstream elements of domestic and foreign policy action are often very interwoven, difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish from each other. The last decade was not favourable to efforts to achieve multilaterally- negotiated results in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament. The change of political will and image from yesterday to today resembles a U-turn. One comes back to the issue of confidence- building and continuity. How long will the current trend last? The readiness to proceed with concrete, positive actions should be met with respective moves from the other sides, too. The window for new achievements and concrete results is open at least for a while. But in addition to positive public signals, concrete evidence and actions are needed soon. Only then will it be possible to build confidence with long-term aspirations. Otherwise there will be a risk of missed opportunities.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 57 58 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Do We Need a New Convention?

The Evans-Kawaguchi Report of 2009 supports the idea, from 1997, of preparing a convention prohibiting the preparation, possession, development, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. An updated version of the draft convention has been available since 2007. The task should be to eliminate all nuclear weapons within a time frame of 15 years. The countries, which are for the moment outside the NPT and other non-proliferation regimes, would be expected to destroy their nuclear weapons within five years after the convention enters into force. This seems very ambitious. A new convention can raise several questions of principle. First of all, one can argue that the decisions and commitments already made clearly indicate that prohibition of the possession, development, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, and their ultimate elimination form a widely- shared common goal within the UN system. The ultimate goal is to provide security for all so that people can live in peace. Disputes should be settled by peaceful means, through negotiation and cooperation. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996 reflected the post-cold war era sentiments in this regard; “Use of nuclear weapons would be generally contrary to the rules of international law

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 59 applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law”. The nuclear powers can point out that the possession of nuclear weapons has preserved global peace. The deterrent has been effective and the nuclear powers have behaved responsibly. The Evans Report claims the contrary, namely that avoiding a nuclear catastrophe has been merely a consequence of great luck. The multilateral network and system of treaties, agreements and practically- guided regimes provide together an acquis of common, civilized behaviour. Although the separate elements have been negotiated and drafted at different times and in different political power constellations, there would be more benefit from keeping them, modernising and com- plementing them if needed, than just to start replacing them with newly negotiated agreements. A new convention would perhaps not attract all the current nuclear states or nuclear-capable states to come on board. The role of nuclear arsenals is viewed very differently among the nuclear states. The United States and the Russian Federation are engaged in negotiations in order to continue on the path of the START treaty. New elements are accompanying these negotiations. The demands and requirements to prevent possible attack with antiballistic defence systems are complicating the negotiations. The newly- approved Russian Federation’s military doctrine does not indicate that Moscow would be ready in the foreseeable future to give up its reliance on nuclear weapons. In Washington a defence review process is also under way. NATO is reviewing its posture at the same time. The role of nuclear weapons will be assessed in many instances. Hopefully the results will show the way forward towards limiting and scaling down the role of nuclear weapons, as well as continuing the decommissioning of weapon stocks in a clearly defined manner.

60 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 France and the United Kingdom have held the view that until such time as the United States and the Russian Federation reduce their nuclear arsenal to the level of 500, France and the UK have no active interest in engaging in further reductions. Paris and London could at this point announce that they have no intention of building up their current nuclear stock. In the United Kingdom former foreign ministers have been active in the nuclear disarmament debate. The UK nuclear weapon concept has been considered expensive and heavily dependent on American expertise. As long as the UK relies only on submarine-based capacity, its deterrent and defensive capacities could be questioned. In France public debate has been rather quiet. A new White Paper in 2008 once again confirmed that France will maintain an operational national nuclear capacity. France is in principle committed to nuclear disarmament by reducing the format of its forces and increasing transparency. President Nicolas Sarkozy confirmed, in his Cherbourg speech in March 2008, that the nuclear strategy of France is a key element control- led by the decision-making powers of a French President. One might ask for what kinds of decision? Whilst he admitted that defence expendi- ture is the second biggest item in the state budget, he refused to lower his guard at all in this respect. France’s nuclear policy is to “remain one of strict self-sufficiency”. It emphasises France’s independent status and autonomy in nuclear policy, independent of Washington and different compared with Berlin. In October 2009 two former Prime Ministers from leading parties, Alan Juppé and Michel Rocard, announced their support for the total elimination of France’s nuclear capability. They reason that radical initiatives are needed from the main nuclear powers, including France, to support complete nuclear disarmament. Deterrence is no longer working because the bloc-to- bloc constellation is no longer valid. Their appeal in

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 61 Le Monde has not initiated any extensive discussion of France’s current nuclear policy. It seems to be a fact of life that when the President has spoken, society remains silent. At the same time as NATO is looking at its strategic concept, debate has opened on the role of American tactical nuclear weapons on Eu- ropean soil. Both government representatives and former politicians in Germany and the Netherlands have been openly advocating the with- drawal of American nuclear weapons from their territories. It remains to be seen how far in detail this type of clear- cut ambition will be reflected in strategic papers and how the other side, the Russian government, re- acts to the suggestion that they, too, should become part of the process of reducing the role and number of tactical nuclear weapons. China is in many ways an open question. It keeps its intentions secret, advocating in public its readiness to support the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons if the main actors do so, too. India, Israel, and Pakistan can follow the debate without adopting concrete positions on the convention issue. The role of nuclear weapons stems in principle from the experiences of those countries in the decades since the Second World War. The practical reduction of nuclear weapons down to a certain level should not be an insoluble problem. This equation, between past, present and future, shows that confidence is mainly placed more on past examples than on forward-looking perspectives of a new world. Under these circumstances, what could be the short- term tangible benefit of negotiations for a new convention - a new formal banning treaty? Perhaps it could just activate a public debate between those who propagate good behaviour and the need to follow the rules of today, and those who still live in the past with arsenals whose usefulness has been called into question for decades. One way of testing the readiness of the key parties would be to present a comprehensive package of proposals from, for example Chi-

62 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 na, the USA, and Canada, based on several appeals and reports, and to convene a SSOD IV (Special Session Devoted to Disarmament) to draft an updated agenda for new agreements as soon as possible. This could take into account the new threat perceptions and security needs in a holistic and comprehensive manner.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 63 64 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 More Disarmament PR Needed

The risk of Iran becoming a nuclear weapon state is in the news every day. North Korean policy appears in the media occasionally. These are daily concerns of the international community at large. Why is it that these “alarms” are not taken seriously enough? Are the international tools considered to be too ineffective, or is the international community unable to agree on a decisive common approach? Do we still need more dramatic events or accidents before the common international conscience comes to its senses? The current situation should, in contrast, be made use of so that international disarmament efforts become more widely- known to the general public. The visibility of the daily work of various organisations is very clear. It must be admitted, however, that not all the details can be translated into simple, understandable language. Normally, the best way to create public acknowledgment is to produce concrete results. But something certainly could be done so that wide awareness could be further broadened to cover the huge spectrum of questions and practical programmes under way all the time. The UN Secretary-General and his representative, the Under Secretary for Disarmament Affairs, visit Geneva occasionally to deliver a statement

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 65 at the Conference on Disarmament. It is obvious that events like these, and their visibility, are not enough to keep a bigger audience informed and up to date on what in practical terms is going on. One specific example of possible improvement to the information system in the field of disarmament would be to establish in Geneva a separate information unit to produce effective promotional materials featuring the activities going on continuously in Geneva. Geneva remains a key focal point gathering knowledge of and expertise in differing disarmament activities, both in the form of official representations and in the form of non-governmental and academic resources. A continuing flow of information could be the best guarantee to ensure that whatever occurs, whether positive or negative, background knowledge would be available and the consequences visible.

66 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 How to Measure Progress?

This Report is of the opinion that there is much room and potential to enhance the effectiveness of existing agreements and treaties. They should be put in the forefront before any attempts are made to prepare new ones. Much could and can be done to improve domestic homework in many areas, to keep domestic legislation and practices up to date with daily evolution and development, and to make sure that administrative procedures are in the hands of experts and other well- trained people. The acute issues associated with existing commitments should be debated regularly, so that public awareness could be broadened and the public at large could have an opportunity to follow the performance of the powers that be. Too often a high-level meeting can be regarded as a success when a photo is taken and the participants look pleased. Explanations of what has been really achieved, in discussions or on paper, often remain scarce and without understandable lines of reasoning. This is particularly a concern regarding EU activities. They are, to a great extent, internal administrative managerial procedures, poor in visibility and difficult to explain to a home audience in concrete terms. But in many regimes, the EU happens to be the major contributor, both in finance terms and as the provider of arms control and non-proliferation expertise.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 67 The latest progress report on EU strategies to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction covers all the main areas of the work of the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization to Prohibit Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organiza- tion and the World Health Organization. The EU has stepped up efforts to raise awareness in scientific and academic circles, has adopted codes of professional conduct and has made improvements in national export procedures. The EU has been visibly active in the CD, in the IAEA and in GA First Committee debates. The EU is consistently promoting a substantive and balanced outcome from the 2010 NPT review conference. The EU is supporting the project to establish a nuclear fuel bank under the control of the IAEA. The EU is also supporting the objectives of the IAEA to strengthen the security of nuclear and radioactive materials particularly in the Balkans, the Caucasus region, Central Asia and Africa. In bilateral disarmament treaties the United States and the Soviet Un- ion/Russian Federation have made a concrete decision to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals. By bringing down their numbers, they argue, there is definitely progress in nuclear disarmament efforts. When it comes to NPT commitments, multilateral debate on nuclear disarmament is more vague. Nonaligned delegations have criticised that the agreement made in the context of the 1995 NPT review conference has not been met by the nuclear powers. The latter have not proceeded in a credible way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The nonaligned will certainly once again call for more from the nuclear P-5 nations. The 2000 NPT review conference achieved concrete results. Reference has been made often to the set of decisions called the 13 steps. Was the result too good to be implemented? The 2000 review conference was the last one involving the Clinton Administration, where the US showed readiness to agree on substantive compromises. One of the last minute

68 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 achievements was with the regime of Saddam Hussein on Iraqi policy on the basis of previous commitments made in the NPT context. The 2005 review conference saw a quite different US delegation. It was challenging agreements made by the preceding administration. In that way debate neglected the achievements of the 2000 conference. No progress was made. Disappointment was clearly felt at the end of the meeting but one can always say that the debate in itself was useful. It has become a general feature of NPT debate that it focuses more on negative aspects than on what progress might have been achieved in efforts to fulfil commitments made. Every national delegation certainly emphasises its positive contribution to the regime. Criticism is mainly directed against the big five. The target is clearly visible and has been the same for decades. The NPT is a political treaty. It is inevitable that the possibility to measure progress always depends solely on the political judgement of the participants.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 69 70 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Do Personalities in Charge Matter?

Negotiations and discussions take place among human beings. For that reason the question above is actually absurd. Still, in many negotiations, different roles of the person in charge of the exercise can be observed and they can make a difference. The normal pattern today is to rotate the chairmanship among the three/four principal groupings of countries and among their representatives. The first hurdle to be passed is a consensus inside the group. It is not totally excluded that the representatives of other groups try to influence the selection. This is not normally permitted because it is not correct and should not determine the election of a chairperson. In many negotiating processes the person in charge will know his/ her duties well in advance, in some cases a couple of years ahead of the actual operation. As is often the case, if the negotiations have been well and carefully prepared, the job is more than half done. But the chairperson will be in the hands of the delegations and the group of persons who have the interest and capacity to try to influence outcomes. The overall picture of the set-up of different expectations and instructions can initially be very confusing. In such circumstances the actions and personal contribution of the chairperson may play an important role.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 71 He/she may have at the outset a determined approach, which could strike a balance between divergent expectations. If the chairperson can be independent, credible and convincing, taking into account views from all the parties and listen to all of them, he or she will have a good chance of bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion. In many negotiating exercises it has been customary not to select for the position of chairperson a representative from a country which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This has been just a fact of life, without any further explanation. One, however, might be that the other participants might assume that the chairperson is more anxious to pursue his or her own country’s original positions than to listen to the views of others. Permanent membership of the UNSC may provide additional political lever- age, which might be used via all possible diplomatic channels and with all available tools, to direct the negotiations. There are several negotiating processes where personality has made a distinctive contribution. The Mexican politician Garcia Robles was certainly one of the great personalities of the 1960s. Alva Myrdal of Swe- den was an active proponent for nuclear disarmament together with the other nonaligned countries. The Finnish Ambassadors Risto Hyvärinen and Ilkka Pastinen were actively engaged, as the representatives of the Secretary-General in Geneva in the 1970s, to keep the NPT in the focus of international disarmament debate. In the 1980s US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev conducted a peaceful competition of constantly far-reaching disarmament proposals. In the context of the NPT review conference of 1995 the Sri Lankan Chair, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, strongly advocated for a substantive and important result. All delegates who participated in that meeting remember his role vividly. Later, as UN Under-Secretary-General for Dis- armament Affairs, he continued to play a constructive role in the 2000 NPT review conference.

72 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 When I joined the CD community in Geneva in 1997, Ambassador Carlos de Icaza of Mexico, the Brazilian Ambassador Celco Amorim and Ambassador Steve Ledogard of the USA were the primi inter pares. On the basis of my personal experience one could identify the following as pertinent assets to successful chairmanship: - Have a credible substantive record for constructive approach and result-oriented behaviour; - Ensure that you have the support of your like-minded group as well as support back home; - Listen to all parties and keep information channels open all the time; - Do present, at an early instance, your own concept in order to proceed in the negotiations without sudden surprises; - A credible momentum in the negotiations when the key players are ready to reassess their original instructions; - At every stage, consolidate what can be agreed upon, not waiting only for the final big agreement; - A package deal is always necessary if in matters of principle the key players are waiting for compromises from the other side first; - Keep the media up to date on the proceedings while holding regular briefings with them; - The successful performance of a chairperson is always a result of teamwork involving delegations and the secretariat.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 73 74 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 How to Proceed?

There is always a reason why serious work should not be started immediately. Many participants currently want to wait and see what happens in the American-Russian START negotiations. Many want to see positive signals before the NPT review conference starts work in early May 2010. Because the FMCT question is so closely linked to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, there is a widely- shared view in Geneva that before the NPT conference a major movement in CD activities is not expected. The CD reconvenes for a working session in June 2010. It will adjourn for the summer recess in July. The UN General As- sembly calls the delegates from Geneva to New York for October. Once again an argument can be repeated; it is worthwhile to wait and see how the mid-term elections are going to turn out in the United States in November 2010? The outcome might give a fresh signal of the possibilities for the US government to make further concessions in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament. A couple of conventional arms treaties have been negotiated and prepared outside what might be called the UN system, meaning outside the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The point has been raised also in the context of the future FMCT. Would it be better to relocate those

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 75 negotiations outside the CD? This proposal is not very convincing. It is both an assault of principle on the established responsible multilateral system, and it raises more questions than it solves. If negotiations could be started, who might be the organiser and who would be responsible for the conference services? If the negotiations were open for participation, who could guarantee that they would be more representative than the CD community? Would the unconventional set-up also indicate that the ambition and the character of the possible result would be sui generis, less or more ambitious than in the CD context? The Secretary-General of the CD, Sergei Ordzhonikidze, made an important statement in the CD on 11 February 2010. On behalf of the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, he stated that it is unacceptable that the CD is not starting practical work. It is seldom the case that the representative of the organisation himself resorts to this kind of language. One can with good reason ask what might be the alternative to the CD if substantive work is not started soon? The best solution would be that the key players stop giving signals that something which is not possible today may be possible tomorrow. The best ways to make progress through common efforts are present today. Multilateral negotiations deserve responsible international behaviour. Bilateral and narrow regional problems should be placed on a different track. They can certainly be addressed at the same time as the CD negotiations go on. But to hold a multilateral forum such as the CD hostage by a purely national or bilateral issue could be regarded as an irresponsible act.

76 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 A World More Complex Now than Yesterday

Globalisation is a daily catchword for describing the overall trend in international relations. Everything looks as if it is linked to everything else, to different processes or movements. There has been talk of “man- aging globalisation”, trying to keep its consequences under control. In the economic crisis of 2008-2009, joint measures of that kind were undertaken. But with regard to overall disarmament efforts, the results have been modest, not clearly visible. In the field of weapons of mass destruction the past decade has been void of positive results. Alongside the global trends, the world has become more sophisticated and nuanced. Individual desires can be met more precisely. The Internet provides a supermarket to meet all the needs of the customer. It also makes weapons technology accessible to all possible users. In the name of conventional security, what are the tools and methods to control this development? What has been written in this text hitherto is based on a traditional way of reading the security needs of the international community, of the members of the international family, of the 192 member states of the United Nations. Whatever the role of a responsible government may be in modern society, the record of its international behaviour is one vital

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 77 part of a nation’s image, prestige and history. It will be one key factor in the assessment by its partners of how, when and to what degree the country’s credentials stood up to scrutiny when making deals, agreements, treaties. As the above Report indicates, some countries have had a very uni- form image and policy in the disarmament field for many decades. This can be called a policy of consistency and predictability. In the actual event of negotiations this policy comes to a test, namely how far is it able, in the name of compromise and flexibility, to deviate from long- term principles and fixed positions? Often that dilemma has been solved in a final document by a preamble section in which several topics of principle and good intentions will be recorded. “Keeping in mind… Mindful of the… Referring to the earlier commitments made in the context of…” Decisive compromises are called for when the operative provisions are to be finalised. That will tune the level of ambition, set the target in action, or in a time frame, and call for possible new measures by the participating members. When the NPT was extended in 1995 it was prolonged indefinitely, sine die. Thereafter, many comments have been made that the dynamism of the treaty and its commitments suffered a big loss when the schedule for a reassessment process disappeared. The routine-type regular review meetings are no longer challenging the parties in a serious way to make more concrete progress in disarmament measures. When strengthening of the NPT regime is called for, it often seems as if a common appeal had been made to ask the key parties to show more political will and readiness to proceed in fulfiling the positive pledges they made in 1968, 1995 and 2000. At the same time, the representatives of the common will and proponents of the NPT regime try to keep the members, criticised for their behaviour, under effective control so that they might see that it is ben- eficial to come aboard and follow the rules more faithfully.

78 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 When this Report has been printed a summit in Washington in April 2010 will have taken place in order to enhance measures for nuclear safety. This subject is a common concern of the international community and is closely related to the tasks and obligations given to the Vienna- based IAEA. The agency should be made the capacity to assess the cor- rectness and the completeness of the declarations made by the states parties to the comprehensive safeguards agreements. The operational resources should be increased so that the effectiveness of the work would be soon dependent on voluntary contributions from the member states. The conceptual strategic defence policy papers from Washington and Brussels should be available soon. Their message will undoubtedly have a crucial influence on the future debate and actions regarding the role of nuclear weapons and their possible elimination. Some changes and/or modifications are expected to follow. They are perhaps not meeting the expectations of the most advanced views in the current public debate? The Evans-Kawaguchi Report on “Eliminating Nuclear Threats” presents a vision covering the years 2012 to 2025 and beyond. A nuclear weapon-free global world remains a genuine goal for this generation and perhaps also for the generation to come. Active work, official and unofficial, should continue non-stop. At the same time knowledge should be made available and circulated widely, informing people of the potential consequences were the task of nuclear disarmament neglected and dropped from the daily lives and thoughts of citizens in modern societies.

GCSP Geneva Paper 17 79 List of Abbreviations

CD GENEVA GENEVA CONFERENCE CONFERENCE ON ON DISARMAMENT DISARMAMENT

CFE CONVENTIONAL CONVENTIONAL FORCES FORCES TREATY TREATY IN IN EUROPE EUROPE

CSCE CONFERENCE CONFERENCE ON ON SECURITY SECURITY AND AND COOPERATION COOPERATION IN IN EUROPE EUROPE

CTBT COMPREHENSIVE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR NUCLEAR TEST TEST BAN BAN TREATY TREATY

DDR DEUTSCHE DEUTSCHE DEMOKRATISCHE DEMOKRATISCHE REPUBLIK REPUBLIK

EURATOM EUROPEAN EUROPEAN ATOMIC ATOMIC ENERGY ENERGY COMMUNITY COMMUNITY

FMCT FISSILE FISSILE MATERIAL MATERIAL CUT CUT -OFF -OFF TREATY TREATY

FRG FEDERAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC REPUBLIC OF OF GERMANY GERMANY

IAEA INTERNATIONAL INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ATOMIC ENERGY ENERGY AGENCY AGENCY

ICJ INTERNATIONAL INTERNATIONAL COURT COURT OF OF JUSTICE JUSTICE

ITU INTERNATIONAL INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION UNION

NATO NORTH NORTH ATLANTIC ATLANTIC TREATY TREATY ORGANIZATION ORGANIZATION

NPT NON NON PROLIFERATION PROLIFERATION TREATY TREATY 1968 1968

NSA NEGATIVE NEGATIVE SECURITY SECURITY ASSURANCE ASSURANCE

NSG NUCLEAR NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS SUPPLIERS GROUP GROUP

PAROS PREVENTION PREVENTION OF OF ARMS ARMS RACE RACE IN INOUTER OUTER SPACE SPACE

SSOD SPECIAL SPECIAL SESSION SESSION ON ON DISARMAMENT DISARMAMENT OF OF THE THE UNITED UNITED NATIONS NATIONS

START STRATEGIC STRATEGIC ARMS ARMS REDUCTION REDUCTION TREATY TREATY

UNSC UNITED UNITED NATIONS NATIONS SECURITY SECURITY COUNCIL COUNCIL

UNSCOM UNITED UNITED NATIONS NATIONS SUPERVISORY SUPERVISORY COMMISSION COMMISSION ON ON IRAQ IRAQ

80 GCSP Geneva Paper 17 Newidea – naturaprint 01.2010

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