ETHNIC GROUP REBELLION IN CIVIL WAR A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Luke N. Condra August 2010 © 2010 by Luke Nayef Condra. All Rights Reserved. Re-distributed by Stanford University under license with the author. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/ This dissertation is online at: http://purl.stanford.edu/tg251tn4470 ii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. James Fearon, Primary Adviser I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Jonathan Rodden I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Kenneth Schultz Approved for the Stanford University Committee on Graduate Studies. Patricia J. Gumport, Vice Provost Graduate Education This signature page was generated electronically upon submission of this dissertation in electronic format. An original signed hard copy of the signature page is on file in University Archives. iii Abstract Why do some ethnic groups involve themselves in civil wars, fighting in rebel groups against the state, while others do not? In particular, what explains variation in ethnic group involvement within the same country? The conventional wisdom is that poverty and political grievances are to blame for this involvement and participation in political violence more generally. Such conclusions tend to be based on studies of single cases or large-N studies that analyze a biased sample of ethnic groups. Countering these hypotheses, I propose a theory of ethnic group rebellion that predicts ethnic group involvement in civil war based on sub-national variation in the ability of the state to exercise a monopoly of control over territory and people, and its administrative strength in an area. Using original geographic, economic, and political data collected on an exhaustive set of ethnic groups from 48 African countries, I test hypotheses emanating from my theory and those of traditional explanations in the context of African civil wars between 1980 and 2006. I find that the distance between an ethnic group‘s inhabited region of the country and the capital city – an important measure of the state‘s presence and capacity for control – is positively related to the probability of involvement in rebellion. The periphery is a high risk region for involvement in both territorial (separatist/secessionist) rebellion and rebellion designed to take over the state and oust the government. The goals and organizational requirements for these two types of rebellion are quite different, and my theory proposes that these differences should attract ethnic groups iv from opposite ends of the economic spectrum. Territorial rebellions are likely to involve the poorest ethnic groups living in the periphery, as these movements do not require a high degree of organization or funding to continue a low-level insurgency against the state. In contrast, wealthier groups, which are likely to be better organized and better able to act collectively, are more likely to be involved in government takeover rebellions, which require a higher degree of rebel competence and strength to confront the forces of the state directly. The evidence from statistical analysis and case study examination is strongly supportive of the elements of my theory, suggesting that traditional emphasis on poverty, political representation, and transnational ethnic ties as central factors in this type of political violence is misguided and more focus should be placed on the ability of the state to administer its territory effectively and ethnic group responses to variation in this capacity. v Acknowledgments No amount of paper could provide ample space to express adequately my thanks to those who have enabled me to complete this dissertation. I am grateful, particularly, to my committee members. Each has contributed uniquely to the development of the project and I could not have asked for a more helpful set of advisers. Jonathan Rodden pushed me to think about how the insights from the literature on comparative political economy could be applied to my questions and helped me think more systematically about my general theory of ethnic group rebellion. Conversations with Ken Schultz provided me with both big picture ideas for the framing of the project, as well as detailed and practical suggestions for how to present my empirical results in a way that would contribute most to the advancement of my arguments. Above all, I am profoundly grateful to my chair, Jim Fearon, whose consistent guidance and measured criticism helped me struggle with each new problem that arose, and whose timely encouragement gave me the confidence to persevere and finish the project. Besides being thankful for making me a better scholar, Jim‘s enthusiasm for the puzzle at the core of this dissertation, as well as his own work in this field, convinced me that my interest was well-placed and that my effort was worthwhile. Bertram Ang, Jane Esberg, and Eugene Nho provided expert research assistance and I have their independent thinking and diligent work to thank for not taking even longer to finish the thesis. The advice and suggestions of several other colleagues have been particularly useful over the past several years. I thank David Laitin and Mike Tomz for their patient and foundational instruction, as what they taught me in their classes vi helped me enormously as I tackled all aspects of the dissertation. Discussions with Bethany Lacina in the early stages of the dissertation and throughout graduate school have been instrumental in how I think about political violence in general. Many colleagues have read parts of the dissertation at one stage or another, or have heard presentations of the work and have offered invaluable feedback. I thank Rikhil Bhavnani, Ed Bruera, Dara Cohen, Roy Elis, Laurel Harbridge, Ollie Kaplan, Kimuli Kasara, Charlotte Lee, Maggie Peters, Connor Raso, Natan Sachs, Jake Shapiro, Jed Stiglitz, Alex Tahk, and Jessica Weeks for their comments at various stages of the project. I thank Neil Malhotra and Alex Kuo for their friendship, steady encouragement and wise advice; graduate school would have been decidedly less interesting without them. Chris Baughman, Scott Belzer, Lanny Berg, and Sidney Chang provided a useful perspective on my work. I thank them for sharing their lives with me and for often reminding me who I am. My parents, Ed and Debi Condra, deserve special thanks and more of it than I can provide here. They raised me to pursue Truth fervently and taught me why I should never be afraid of where such a journey might lead. Their life‘s work continues to inspire me to transform a profession into a vocation. Finally, I thank my best friend and most ardent supporter, my wife, Morgan. No one could hope to find a more loving partner. For most of us, our profession is a fickle companion, alternately praising and condemning us on a whim. Morgan‘s unconditional love for me has made the frustrations tolerable and any accomplishments sweeter. I hope to be as supportive to her as she has been to me. vii Table of Contents Abstract iv Acknowledgments vi 1. Introduction 1 2. A Theory of Ethnic Group Rebellion 18 3. Ethnic Group Data Sources and Collection Methods 45 4. Effect of Peripheral Location and Wealth on Group Rebellion 57 5. Role of Political Representation and Cultural Difference on Rebellion 96 6. Transnational Ethnic Ties as Encouragement for Rebellion 126 7. Evaluating Theory‘s Predictions in Senegal, Niger, Guinea, and Chad 143 8. Conclusion 188 References 193 viii List of Tables 4.1 Summary Statistics of Geographic Variables 79 4.2 Cross-Tabulation of Dichotomous Dependent Variables 79 4.3 Estimates of Relationship between Rebellion and Distance from Capital City 80 4.4 Correlation Coefficients: Group Economic Proxies And Distance from Capital City 81 4.5 Estimates of Relationship between Rebellion and Group-Level Wealth Index 82 4.6 Estimates of Interactive Effect of Distance and Wealth on Rebellion 83 4.7 Cross-Tabulation of Distance and Wealth for Ethnic Groups in Countries Experiencing Territorial Rebellion 84 4.8 Cross-Tabulation of Distance and Wealth for Ethnic Groups in Countries Experiencing Government Takeover Rebellion 85 Appendix 4.1a Estimates of the Relationship between Rebellion (All Types) and Wealth 87 Appendix 4.1b Estimates of the Relationship between Rebellion (All Types) and Wealth 88 Appendix 4.2a Estimates of Relationship between Rebellion (No Coups) and Wealth 89 Appendix 4.2b Estimates of Relationship between Rebellion (No Coups) and Wealth 90 Appendix 4.3a Estimates of Relationship between Territorial Rebellion and Wealth 91 Appendix 4.3b Estimates of Relationship between Territorial Rebellion and Wealth 92 Appendix 4.4a Estimates of Relationship between Wealth and Government Takeover Bids 93 ix Appendix 4.4b Estimates of Relationship between Wealth and Government Takeover Bids 94 Appendix 4.4c Estimates of Relationship between Wealth and Government Takeover Bids 95 5.1 Effect