THE PRINCETON JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES

VOLUME VI

SPRING 2014

PRINCETON JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF Charlie Fortin ’15 Ryan T. Kang ’14

COPY EDITING TEAM LAYOUT TEAM FINANCE & OPERATIONS TEAM ASSOCIATE EDITOR LAYOUT MANAGER FINANCE MANAGER Jee Eun (Jean) Lee ’15 Jiweon Kim ’15 Sam Wu ’16

EDITORS EDITORS STAFF Isao Anzai ’17 Vivian Chen ’17 Vivian Chen ’17 Daway Chou-Ren ’16 Jenny Nan Jiang ’16 William Lee ’16 Mary Gilstad ’15 Brian Kim ’16 Kevin Liaw ’15 Hannah Hirsh ’16 Jessica McLemore ’15 Nancy Song ’17 Christopher Yu ’17 Sam Wu ’16 ! IT TEAM SOCIAL MEDIA TEAM IT MANAGER SOCIAL MEDIA MANAGER Pavel Shibayev ’15 Ben Chang ’14

STAFF STAFF Patrick Ding ’15 Samuel Chang ’16 Jenny Nan Jiang ’16 Greg Siano ’15

CHINA EDITORIAL TEAM JAPAN EDITORIAL TEAM KOREA EDITORIAL TEAM ASSOCIATE EDITOR ASSOCIATE EDITOR ASSOCIATE EDITOR Kevin Liaw ’15 Evan Kratzer ’16 Jee Eun (Jean) Lee ’15

GRADUATE EDITOR GRADUATE EDITOR EDITORS Elijah Greenstein ’G2 David Boyd ’G2 Jisoo Han ’14 Alan Hatfield ’15 EDITORS EDITORS Minji Kim ’16 Ben Chang ’14 Adrienne Fung ’14 Jess Lee ’16 Gavin Cook ’15 Morgan Jerkins ’14 Yoolim Lee ’17 Sharon Deng ’17 Chris Edwards van Mujien ’15 Nicholas Pang ’15 Alicia Li ’16 Arjun Naidu ’15 Jay Park ’16 Rebecca Haynes ’15 Buyan Pan ’15 Catherine Hochman ’16 ! Hunter Rex ’16 Emily Tu ’16 Cameron White ’14! FACULTY ADVISOR Professor Amy Borovoy

TABLE OF CONTENTS ! ! 1. WINNING THE SOUTH, LOSING THE PENINSULA: A STUDY OF THE U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY EXPERIENCE IN SOUTHERN KOREA, 1945-1948 | DOORI SONG | COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 1

2. REGIME STABILITY OR MINERAL WEALTH? CHINA’S INTEREST IN TRADE WITH NORTH KOREA| ANNIE MEYJES | HARVARD UNIVERSITY 20

3. K-FILMS, K-DRAMAS, K-POP, NEXT UP... K-VARIETY? KOREAN VARIETY – THE NEW ADDITION TO THE HALLYU WAVE | HUI MIN LEE | NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 46

4. TWO KINGDOMS UNDER GOD: CAESAR AND CHRIST IN THE JERUSALEM OF THE EAST | BRIAN JIHYUK KIM | PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 59

5. POWER OF PLACE AND PLACE OF POWER: SEIGNIOR SHANG KEXI’S TEMPLE-BUILDING CAREER IN GUANGDONG IN THE EARLY QING | MENGXIAO WANG | YALE UNIVERSITY 78

6. EXPANDING POPULATIONS: THE AMERICAN MULTIPLICATION TABLE IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT| RYAN MIKKELSEN | WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS 96

7. BLESSED ARE THEY WHO ARE OPEN-MINDED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE BEATITUDES IN THE “UNION” EDITION OF THE CHINESE BIBLE| GINA ELIA | UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 109

8. “KOREAN WAVE” IN TAIPEI: THE CONSTRUCTION OF BEAUTIFUL WOMEN | XINYAN PENG | UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 123

9. CHINA’S GLOBAL ANIMATION AMBITIONS: CULTURAL FLOWS AND SOFT POWER IN EAST ASIA | RICK MARSHALL | ROYAL ROADS UNIVERSITY 146

10. SPECIAL FEATURE: INTERVIEW WITH HARVARD SOCIOLOGIST EZRA VOGEL ON CONTEMPORARY ASIA | ALAN HATFIELD | PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 178

WINNING THE SOUTH, LOSING THE PENINSULA A Study of the US Counterinsurgency Experience in Southern Korea, 1945-1948 Doori Song Columbia University

ABSTRACT disbandment on August 15, 1948, the United States Army Military Government The US occupation of South Korea was in Korea (USAMGIK) was constantly not without difficulty. From the time of challenged. American authorities had not its establishment on September 8, 1945 to anticipated major resistance movements in the time of its disbandment on August 15, Korea because the peninsula was liberated 1948, the United States Army Military from Japanese colonial rule on August 15, Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was 1945. They had also not expected that the constantly challenged by an insurgency. majority of Koreans would sympathize Because they helped to liberate Koreans with the resistors, who called for the from Japanese colonial rule, Americans establishment of a left-leaning mode of did not anticipate major resistance state governance. It was indeed not movements in Korea. They also did not uncommon to see civilians condone or expect that the majority of Koreans would even participate in uprisings opposing sympathize with the resistors, who called USAMGIK policies. How, then, did US for a left- leaning mode of state authorities deal with these resistance governance. Because of America’s Cold movements?” Because of the United War agenda, the USAMGIK had little States’ Cold War agenda, which required choice but to subdue those opposing its occupation forces to contain the spread democratization in southern Korea. of communism, the USAMGIK had to By instituting various counterinsurgency subdue any opposition movement that mechanisms such as policing operations, sought to thwart the building of a education programs, and trust-building sustainable democracy and capitalist measures while enlisting the support of economy in southern Korea. By Korean elites, the US ensured that its instituting various counterinsurgency objectives in Korea were met. In the end, mechanisms such as policing operations, the USAMGIK suppressed the insurgents education programs, and trust-building and established the first nationally elected measures while enlisting the support of South Korean government on August 15, Korean elites, the USAMGIK devised a 1948. The success of the overall campaign to ensure that its objectives campaign, however, turned out to be only were met. In the end, the USAMGIK temporary— victory came at the expense managed to suppress the insurgents and of creating a more volatile and deep- help establish the first nationally-elected rooted conflict. South Korean government on August 15, 1948.

INTRODUCTION LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE COUNTERINSURGENCY From the time of its establishment on PERSPECTIVE September 8, 1945 to the time of its

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This paper aims to provide a critical immobile and homogenous.iv The works examination of the USAMGIK of Cumings and others reveal that the counterinsurgency experience in South motives of the Korean insurgents were Korea. Although many studies have been not entirely inspired by communist conducted on various cases of insurgency interests but by desires to purge all and counterinsurgency, there is a limited vestiges of the former Japanese colonial- amount of research for South Korean state.v The insurgents’ main concerns were cases. The number of existing works is to nationalize industries, reform land- low and several of them are partial to a holdings, reduce rice collection quotas, specific ideological orientation. The and exile colonial-state collaborators. nation-state histories of the US and They ultimately opposed the USAMGIK Republic of Korea (ROK), for example, because its policies intended to revive are noteworthy for their ideologically several institutions from a prior colonial aligned interpretations. According to these era. Allowing the USAMGIK to rule is views, the overall counterinsurgency ultimately regarded as a failure by experience is seen as nothing more than a insurgents, not because they were unable “victory” in one of their many allied fights to communize the Korean peninsula, but against communism. i The insurgents are because they failed to expel the colonial- invariably classified as communist state vestiges that they vehemently agitators and given little mention of their abhorred. vi Other revisionist accounts motives or interests. Although these views have also helped to expand existing views align with the capitalist interests of both by revealing how some of the insurgents the US and South Korea, these statist protested simply to protect their supplies interpretations risk misrecognizing aspects of rice or to conserve Korean traditions.vii of history.ii This is especially the case with This paper also approaches the the interpretations that deal with an USAMGIK experience from a revisionist ideologically antithetical “Other.” iii angle. It employs a mode of analysis that Notwithstanding slight modifications, the has recently risen in significance in the nation-state views of the US and ROK field of security studies: the have been resistant to change because counterinsurgency perspective. Although elements of the Cold War still exist in the there are revisionist accounts that address Korean peninsula. the subject of USAMGIK Revisionist accounts of the counterinsurgency, none of them USAMGIK experience began to appear systematically analyze the topic from along with the progressive social recent theoretical perspectives. The movements of the 1970s and 1980s. Bruce breakthroughs in this method of analysis Cumings’ two-volume book, The Origins of are largely the product of innovative new the Korean War, deserves special mention studies conducted in the post-Cold War for its exhaustive coverage of era. viii The cumulative contributions and developments in Korea before the Korean interplay of these works, predominantly War (1950-1953). In contrast to the by political scientists and military analysts, nation-state perspectives of the US and have led to a more systematic ROK governments, Cumings recounts the understanding of cases of insurgency and USAMGIK experience from a critical counterinsurgency. The aim of this paper point of view. He aims to produce a is to historicize the USAMGIK “counter-history,” in a Foucauldian sense, counterinsurgency experience through the by introducing dynamism and diversity framework of the counterinsurgency into what was previously considered perspective. Based on data collected from

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 2! declassified USAMGIK documents, and counterinsurgent forces. xi The Korean newspapers, and propaganda counterinsurgents possess much greater manuscripts, this paper argues that in the power from their control of law-enforcing context of the Korean peninsula, the US units, such as policemen and soldiers. occupation failed to eliminate the They also have the advantage of fundamental causes of insurgency and to controlling the main transportation and prevent those causes from returning. communications systems within their territorial borders. Meanwhile, the PRINCIPLES OF THE insurgents have limited access to funds, COUNTERINSURGENCY personnel, weapons and technology. They PERSPECTIVE are generally outnumbered by a ratio of ten to one against the state in terms of According to the counterinsurgency manpower.xii In Malaysia, for example, the perspective, there are no two identical insurgents consisted of about 5,500 units cases of insurgency, but fundamental in 1948 while the British Commonwealth commonalities do exist in most cases. possessed over 40,000 soldiers. The Front First, almost every case of insurgency and de Liberation in Algeria likewise had counterinsurgency reflects an about 29,000 fighters in 1956 compared to incompatible political objective between the 400,000 member army of France. the state and large group of civilians. Insurgent forces also rarely have a Although domestic political disputes can permanent base of operations because be resolved without violence, physical acts they are required to move frequently in of protest often erupt when diplomatic order to avoid capture. This requires efforts have been exhausted. History has much time and energy and makes shown that this often occurs when a coordination and organizational work dissident group, representing a communal slow and inefficient. or socioeconomic body, feels alienated or The decisive factor that ultimately is denied recognition by its political settles an insurrectionary conflict is the system. ix The Hukbalahap rebels in the support of the host nation’s neutral “third Philippines, for example, precipitated party”; that is, when a national consensus mass revolt against the state in 1946 among the civilian population is reached because the Philippine government in favor of one side. xiii The strategy of refused to seat them in legislature. Many winning the hearts and minds of the third other clashes of this type were common party, according to the counterinsurgency after World War II in postcolonial settings perspective, differs between the insurgent where social institutions and norms were and counterinsurgent forces. For the subject to new stresses and strains amid insurgents, since their relative strength is processes of modernization. x The clash much weaker, they have no choice but to between the French and Front de resort to unconventional battle tactics Libération in Algeria, the British such as terrorism, vigilantism, guerilla Commonwealth’s conflict with the warfare, or propaganda warfare to National Liberation Army in Malaya, and delegitimize and demoralize the state and the US Army’s battle with the Viet Cong to coerce or persuade the civilian in South Vietnam are three prominent population. A conventional attack against examples. the much stronger counterinsurgent force Another core aspect of insurgency is tantamount to self-destruction. xiv In and counterinsurgency is an asymmetrical addition, the insurgent group must take an balance of power between the insurgent offensive position against the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 3! counterinsurgent group because the economic and ideological and only 10% former seeks to replace the current combative.” xx The results are more political structure that the latter aims to optimal when coercion, such as torture, perpetuate. The insurgents must make the intimidation, or blackmail, is not used to first move and be ready to assume the ensure the public’s cooperation. In the functions and characteristics of an Philippines, for example, the practice of alternative government.xv They may also ending police brutality while instituting a look to collect taxes and supplies from campaign based on attraction and supporters or organize the population into fellowship helped Governor Ramon local militia units that gradually develop Magsaysay subdue the Hukbalahap into a regular army. The Chinese rebellion.xxi Field Marshal Gerald Templar Communist Party during the early-to-mid likewise succeeded in suppressing the twentieth century, for example, proceeded insurgents in Malaya after convincing the along this course of action until they public to accept British Commonwealth assumed power of the Chinese mainland forces as guardians and friends.xxii Without in 1949. The insurgents also have the the support of the civilian population, advantage, especially against foreign-led according to Mao Zedong, both sides are counterinsurgent forces, of civilian like fish out of water—for the relationship populations that tend to be more between the combatants and the people is sympathetic towards their cause due to like that between fish and water.xxiii bonds of nationalism, race, history, or Overall, an effective campaign other commonalities.xvi requires an appealing and just political On the other hand, the cause for both the insurgent or counterinsurgents must be cautious not to counterinsurgent forces. The tactics for overexert their advantages. Conventional victory, however, are different between fighting tactics—such as the use of the two groups. The insurgents must be machine guns, land mines, or airstrikes— visible to the civilian population but should be avoided because they are invisible to the counterinsurgents. expensive and have the potential for According to Carl von Clausewitz, they collateral damage. They will kill some must employ offensive tactics that nibble insurgents but others will inevitably at but don’t bite the shell of their much emerge to replace them. xvii The stronger opponent. The insurgents must counterinsurgents must instead work to “mobilize like fog” around the persuade the general public to reject the counterinsurgents’ perimeter and “form a insurgents’ political cause. They do so by dark and menacing cloud out of which a demonstrating their legitimacy as bolt may strike.”xxiv In addition, a healthy government leaders. The populace should mix of terrorism to deter civilians from be provided with adequate security, access complying with the state and propaganda to state capital, education, and political to persuade neutrals to join their camp is participation. xviii Counterinsurgents must imperative for the insurgents. In be ready to serve the public as social opposition, the counterinsurgents must workers, teachers, physicians, and civil demonstrate good leadership and engineers. They should also collaborate composure. Their law enforcement units with supportive members of the host should be used moderately and carefully population to help rally support for their so as not to harm civilians or damage cause. xix According to General Rene civilian property. The welfare of the Emilio Ponce, counterinsurgency people must also be protected by ensuring campaigns are “90% political, social, their safety and well-being. Meanwhile,

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 4! the counterinsurgents must work to agriculturally rich south turned to legitimize the current government body by producing rice and grains to develop its fostering public trust in the existing economy.xxvi Postwar rice production was political system. also important globally because rice was the staple food for more than half of the THE US COUNTERINSURGENCY world’s population at the time. Since 90% EXPERIENCE IN SOUTHERN of rice was produced in East Asia, much KOREA, 1945-1948 of the Cold War competition in the region centered on a race to produce rice.xxvii In When US occupation forces arrived southern Korea, about 40% of the in southern Korea after the end of World cultivated land was devoted to rice War II, their top priorities were to revive production. The second and third most the economy and to develop a foundation produced crops were barley at 16% and for sustainable democratic growth. After soybeans at 9% of cultivated land.xxviii the 1945 Yalta Conference, where the US, The USAMGIK aimed to win the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain favor of civilians through its rice discussed terms for a four-power collection program. Because basic trusteeship over Korea, the US and Soviet necessities such as food and clean water Union came to occupy the southern and were scarce after World War II, the northern halves of the Korean peninsula USAMGIK sought to produce an along the 38th parallel respectively. The agricultural surplus that could provide for stakes in Korea were high for America all southern Koreans. American because the US could not afford to “lose authorities believed that such a scenario Korea to the Soviets” and jeopardize its would convince Koreans of the merits of position, primarily in Japan, to halt the the US developmental model. xxix They spread of communism in the Far East.xxv consequently worked to ensure that rice It was imperative for the USAMGIK to was effectively gathered and distributed build a democratic and capitalist base that throughout the south. They needed an could contain and delegitimize the Soviet- estimated four million tons of rice to meet led communist system in northern Korea. the demands of southern Koreans. xxx The US could not tolerate any element of Although imports of food from the US communist support in southern Korea curtailed the amount by several thousand because of its Cold War agenda. tons, the rice program served as the main channel for food collection and BUILDING A RICE ECONOMY distribution. The cooperation of Korean farmers was essential because over 80% of Establishing a nationwide rice southern Koreans at the time lived in rural collection program was one of the first farmland areas. Seoul had the least crucial steps that the US took to carry out number of planted rice paddies at 437 its mission in southern Korea. By while the rural provinces of Jeolla stimulating the production of rice and (353,996), Gyeongsang (340,134), and other grains, the USAMGIK aimed to Chungcheong (214,451) had the most.xxxi boost the south’s economy so that it could In order to gain support for rice compete with development of the production, the USAMGIK encouraged communist north. Since virtually all of the mass participation through public peninsula’s heavy industries, power plants statements such as “the future of Korea is and mineral deposits were concentrated in dependent on the successful collection of northern Korea at the time, the summer grains and rice!”xxxii USAMGIK

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 5! personnel also distributed printed been operated by Japanese executives. manuscripts, such as The Farmers Weekly, The USAMGIK passed laws to change to educate farmers about how the US titles of Japanese firms to Korean names. aimed to address Korea’s economic For example, they renamed the Chosen situation. Food Company to the Korea Commodity The rice collection program Corporation, the Oriental Development functioned by assigning rice collection Company to the New Korea Company, quotas to each province in southern and the Chosen Import Materials Control Korea. Following each harvest season, Corporation to the Materials Control farmers in each province had to transfer Company. xxxvi The USAMGIK believed their shares of rice to local bureaus that that the southern economy would fall were supervised by US authorities. The dangerously behind the developments of USAMGIK’s task was then to distribute the communist north without the help of the supplies of rice throughout the south these agencies.xxxvii to feed as many Koreans as possible. In Although several farmers complied order to facilitate the process, US officials with the USAMGIK’s rice collection employed law-enforcement units from the program, many were reluctant to Korean National Police (KNP) and participate. Those most opposed were volunteers from youth groups to ensure Korean leaders of local people’s that all rice quotas were met. The committees. Since the USAMGIK banned particular duties of these units were to the preexisting system of rice collection arrest farmers who failed to meet their that had been established by people’s shares and to detain agitators who sought committees after the end of colonial rule, to subvert the overall collection program. committee leaders who continued to Rewards such as ration cards and credit collect rice were arrested and often slips were also handed out as incentives harassed by USAMGIK personnel. for farmers to meet their rice quotas. American authorities refused to recognize The USAMGIK activated several people’s committees as governing bodies institutions in the agricultural sector to because only the USAMGIK was help with the overall collection effort. appointed to govern southern Korea by Many of these institutions continued rice the supreme commander of the Allied collection practices from the former Powers.xxxviii The USAMGIK asserted the Japanese colonial-state. xxxiii For example, primacy of its rice collection program over when the New Korea Company was all preexisting systems. Rice in instituted by the USAMGIK in unauthorized transit or on sale in other November 1945, its assignment, just like than USAMGIK distribution channels during the colonial period, was to make was confiscated.xxxix rice crop estimates for the purpose of Many people’s committee leaders assigning and collecting rice quotas. xxxiv and other Korean nationalists aimed to Although the USAMGIK understood that counteract the rice collection program of the use of this colonial-state apparatus the USAMGIK through two main means. would displease many Koreans, they One was by engaging in propaganda chose to revive it for efficiency: American warfare to slander the USAMGIK and to officials deemed the former colonial-state persuade farmers to support their cause. mode of rice collection to be the most They repeatedly accused the USAMGIK efficient and pragmatic at the time. xxxv of seeking to turn Korea into an American Among the 212 large companies turned colony. After the USAMGIK revived over to the USAMGIK, 195 of them had several colonial-state institutions to collect

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 6! rice, the dissidents exploited the situation traitors and collaborators like the Koreans by declaring that Americans, like former who were accused of the same Japanese colonialists, were looking to transgressions during the Japanese exploit Korean farmers and laborers. xl colonial period. One leaflet read, “We They propagated messages such as produce more rice than we eat, and many “American imperialists are trying to turn people are starving to death. Why?” The Korea into a slave of the US!” and “We faithful dogs of Japan, who oppressed us must oppose becoming slaves of in the past, now have new masters. They monopoly capitalism!”xli They also spread turned into faithful dogs of America and messages through leaflets, posters and are killing our brethren with crueler word of mouth that the USAMGIK was methods.” xlvii Another flyer read, “We shipping Korean rice out of Korea to feed have to oppose the pro-Japanese in the Americans and Japanese. According to grain collection program. These one propaganda manuscript, the scoundrels are enriching their pockets USAMGIK had allegedly been caught while farmers are starving and suffering. trying to ship out Korean rice from The time for Korean independence is Inchon in oil barrels.xlii The dissidents also when the pro-Japanese die!” xlviii The discouraged Koreans from eating food propaganda messages resonated deeply handed by US servicemen. They spread with the Korean populace because many rumors that the USAMGIK was Korean employees of the USAMGIK distributing food that caused infertility for were in fact known for their past treachery women and brain damage for children.xliii with colonial authorities. xlix For example, America’s goal, they claimed, was to over 80% of KNP officers in middle-to- control Koreans by limiting their physical high ranked positions had served as law- and mental capabilities. enforcement officers for the Japanese The propaganda efforts ultimately Governor-General. l They provided the convinced many Korean farmers, resistance movement with a strong basis especially in the Gyeongsang provinces, to for effective propaganda to hate the stop transferring rice to American police. According to Korean dissidents, authorities. Many farmers recognized these “racial traitors” and their “Japanese people’s committees as governing bodies, imperialistic ideas” were preventing paid taxes to committee leaders, and Korea’s complete independence. If the demanded the US to “turn over control to interests of workers and farmers were not the people’s committees.”xliv Although the considered, then Koreans, they claimed, rice collection program helped to improve would become “slaves” of another Korea’s food situation, rice production “colonial economic system all over remained below targeted levels and again.”li required an increased importation of raw Propaganda warfare led to the other materials.xlv The dire situation prompted means through which the dissidents the New York Times to publish an article defied the USAMGIK—acts of public under the header “Korea’s Rice Bowl has protest. The propaganda campaign Hunger Crisis: Largest Producer is convinced many students and young Poorest Fed because of Terrorism and individuals of left-wing or poor families to Failed Quotas.”xlvi demonstrate against the USAMGIK. Another goal of the propaganda Although some of the youths did not campaign was to criticize Korean know what they were protesting, their employees of the USAMGIK. The actions nevertheless demoralized US dissidents classified them as national servicemen and encouraged other

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Koreans to join their cause.lii During the kilogram of grain to any place outside of autumn months of 1946 in particular, Korea.”lvii They accused the dissidents of thousands of farmers partook in mass smuggling rice to sell in black markets in uprisings that resulted in the deaths of Japan. American authorities also accused nearly 200 policemen. Many farmers the dissidents of exploiting young refrained from fulfilling their rice quotas students who were “too young and too because they preferred the rationing immature” to know what they were systems of people’s committees. They also doing. lviii They issued statements saying did not want to give in to the rice- that the dissidents were harming the collecting policemen who had “wronged” interests of the Korean people by them in the past. KNP units often pursuing their own selfish interests. The encountered violent retaliation when they USAMGIK called on Koreans to help tried to arrest non-compliant farmers. The stamp out and correct the “many ills in anti-police riots broke down the morale Korea” by cutting off ties with the and discipline of policemen and deterred resistance movement. For example, it them from fully performing their duties.liii encouraged Koreans to report “unofficial” Korean dissidents also concentrated their rice collection programs to US officials so attacks on revived colonial-state agencies. that contraband could be seized and put One flyer directly told demonstrators to in proper channels.lix “concentrate your attacks on the pro- The USAMGIK intensified its Japanese New Korea Company.” liv The suppression efforts against the insurgents. dissidents likewise targeted Korean One common tactic of law-enforcing farmers who partook in the USAMGIK’s units was to enter the homes of non- rice collection program. One leaflet compliant farmers to search for hidden written in blood-red script read, “The man supplies of rice. Other tactics served to who completes his quota is the enemy.”lv intimidate and blackmail farmers until The resistors told the USAMGIK they reached their quotas or to classify that the attacks would stop only if a new non-compliant farmers in official records crop distribution system, similar to the as “communists” to be blacklisted. lx one developed by the Soviets in the north, Although law-enforcing units were not was established in the south. This was not allowed to search homes nor seize because they wanted to further Soviet property without a warrant, ordinance 176 interests. Rather, it was because the excused such actions if there was method of production in the north was “reasonable ground to believe that there perceived as a model that could maintain has been, is being, or is about to be Korea’s political independence and committed therein a crime punishable by freedom from capitalist exploitation. lvi one year imprisonment or graver Such a model was attractive to many penalty.” lxi The ordinance allowed the Koreans who had endured poverty and USAMGIK to incarcerate thousands of hardship under the capitalist system of the non-compliant farmers until their families Japanese colonial-state. brought in enough rice to satisfy their Yet because of America’s Cold War quotas. Many Koreans began to regard agenda, the USAMGIK refused to give in law-enforcing units as “goon squads” to the resistance movement and because men in uniform continued to responded in several ways. American commit physical assaults against authorities rebuked the propaganda Koreans.lxii Many Koreans began to hate messages of the dissidents, claiming that and fear USAMGIK personnel after they the USAMGIK did not ship “even one learned about these occurrences. The

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USAMGIK admitted that a percentage of to confiscate their property. lxvi They the concerns of the people were maneuvered to secure positions of power warranted.lxiii in the US-led system and informed occupation authorities that Korea would DEMOCRATIZATION AND become communist if leftist leaders KOREANIZATION assumed power. Because of America’s Cold War One of the core objectives of the imperatives and ease of communication USAMGIK was to democratize and with English-speaking rightwing “Koreanize” political institutions in politicians, the USAMGIK selected right- southern Korea. American authorities leaning leaders to serve as committee concluded that an anti-communist members of most bureaucracies. lxvii The ideology was not the sole answer because rightwing Korean Democratic Party it only created an appearance of social (KDP) secured the most positions among order. A vigorous and successful active political parties, getting sixteen out democratic policy had to be instituted to of eighty-one representatives into eliminate the communist threat and administrative offices. All but one of the resistance movement. lxiv American eight bureaucracies included members of occupation forces had to move quickly the KDP, three of whom were chairmen: because the US trusteeship in Korea was Kwansu Park of the Legislative and to end in no later than five years Judicial Department, Do Yeon Kim of the according to the 1945 Potsdam Fiscal and Economic Department and Jin Declaration. Their main goal before they Cheol Jeon of the Foreign Affairs and withdrew was to construct a National National Defense Department. lxviii The Assembly—a nationally-elected legislative National Society for Rapid Realization of body that could function as an interim Korean Independence (NSRRKI) had the government until a Korean chief of state second highest number of rightwing was elected. representatives with twelve. The majority The USAMGIK assembled an of others were members of right-of-center advisory council made up of Korean groups or non-affiliates of political leaders on October 5, 1945 to access the parties.lxix political situation of southern Korea. The right-leaning advisory council Leftist leaders, such as Yo Un-Hyong, urged American authorities to allow the refrained from participating in the council National Assembly, rather than the because they did not want to recognize a people, to elect the first president of foreign authority over their provisional South Korea. Rightwing leaders believed governments.lxv They sought to nationalize that a general election would result in a industries, reform landholdings, purge leftist victory. lxx Members of the KDP colonial state collaborators and exercise especially wanted Syngman Rhee as chief sovereignty through their own of state because of his opposition to leftist government systems. Rightwing leaders, agendas. They offered Rhee financial however, embraced the USAMGIK, using support and relied on him to prevent their resources and English language skills leftist leaders from seizing their land and to form a coalition with American industries. Rightwing leaders also told the authorities. Landowners and USAMGIK that Korea would become entrepreneurs of the Right used the communist if Syngman Rhee did not USAMGIK as a means to protect their become president. Although US officials capital against leftist leaders who sought were cautious about their support for

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 9! rightwing groups and Syngman Rhee, they occupation. American authorities also told agreed with the Right and decided to hold election committee members to make sure a general election to select only that all eligible Koreans, both men and representatives for the National Assembly. women, had equal opportunities to vote. In accordance with rightwing proposals, Because men usually made decisions on the task of the National Assembly was to behalf of their households, American draft a constitution and elect the executive officials were concerned that wives and branch of South Korea. lxxi The children would not be able to make their USAMGIK nevertheless prioritized the own decisions. lxxiv They advised election election of National Assembly members, committee members to sufficiently promoting the process as a framework for instruct women and young adults in order future democratic elections. to convince their husbands and fathers The USAMGIK enacted a general that they were capable of voting. franchise law on November 15, 1946 in American officials also encouraged order to prescribe qualifications for Koreans to participate in the election voters. Koreans could register to vote if through public statements and media they were born of Korean parents, twenty prints. They gave speeches through radio one years of age and were listed in a and posted large displays about the Korean family register. They could not election on billboards, walls, street posts vote if they were mentally ill or convicted and buses. They even published of crime against citizens or the instructions on how to register and vote in government. In addition, the USAMGIK cartoon form for illiterate Koreans. denied Koreans the right to vote if they According to a national estimation, about were guilty of collaboration with Japanese 80% of the Korean population was authorities.lxxii Election officials commonly illiterate at the time. lxxv A high voter disenfranchised Koreans if their family turnout rate was imperative for the registers indicated wrongdoings for either USAMGIK because a poor showing offense. They also scrutinized the names, would substantiate claims that the addresses, occupations and household elections were illegitimate and not owners of Korean registrants. representative of the Korean American officials hired several population.lxxvi Korean leaders to work as election The USAMGIK dispatched law- committee members during the election enforcement units from the KNP and process. Their main duties were to other constabulary forces to provide instruct Korean citizens on registration security and protection. Korean affiliates and voting procedures as well as to of the USAMGIK also mobilized youth administer local polling sites on election organizations, such as the Northwest day. They gave lectures in public places, Youth Corps, the Dae Han Labor such as schools and auditoriums, and Organization and the Federation of Labor distributed printed copies of election laws Unions for the Rapid Realization of to voters in every district. The USAMGIK Korean Independence, to assist in matters aimed to redefine the term “election” in of the national election. One of their main Korea because many Koreans were duties was to prevent violence and accustomed to “voting for whomever sabotage by anti-election activists. They Japanese supported” during the elections were stationed around voting sites to of the colonial era.lxxiii Teaching Koreans prevent attacks by dissidents and to about American-style democratic elections ensure safe transport of ballot boxes and was one of the major objectives of the US booklets. The USAMGIK also issued

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 10! orders to keep law-enforcing units a preferred democracy to communism. The minimum distance of 100 meters from USAMGIK even claimed that the election polling places, hoping to prohibit them results were “indirectly representative” of from using coercion to force northern Korea because about one-eighth registration.lxxvii US officials sent checklists of the total votes were made by Koreans to district leaders to ensure that the in the south who had recently come from elections were conducted in free and open the north.lxxxii atmospheres. The USAMGIK was US authorities further highlighted adamant about holding legitimate the success of the election by stressing the elections in southern Korea. failures of the Korean resistance The results of the first national movement. They emphasized that the election exceeded the expectations of the election produced a favorable outcome USAMGIK. The final tally reached a despite the dissidents’ attempts to deter turnout rate of about 90% among eligible Koreans from voting. Many terrorists Korean voters. The USAMGIK armed with rifles, grenades, homemade interpreted the outcome as a positive sign bombs and bamboo spears had harassed that Koreans could one day manage their eligible voters during the election process. own democratic form of government.lxxviii Several of them stationed themselves on American officials were especially hills around voting sites and fired their surprised by the fact that a little less than guns at voters. lxxxiii Others set off half of the final tally consisted of female explosives in polling places to destroy voters. One US authority declared at a ballot boxes and to discourage election post-election conference that “Korean committee members. Several polling women have proven themselves places reported that their registration outstanding.”lxxix books were stolen or destroyed by Yet what impressed US authorities terrorists. lxxxiv The homes of election the most was the fact that every election committee members were also common winner was an opponent of communism. sites of terrorism during the election The 200 member body of successful process. Dissidents threw grenades and candidates primarily composed of dynamite into the living quarters of individuals from rightwing groups, such as several officers and chairmen. One the National Society for Rapid Realization election committee leader was found shot of Korean Independence (57), the Korean and decapitated in his home in Ulsan. Democratic Party (29), the Tai Dong The resistance movement had also Youth Association (13), and the National used propaganda during the election Youth Group (6). The others declared process to spread its message. Students themselves as neutral or without party and members of leftist groups distributed affiliation. None of the candidates from handbills opposing the election. Park Hun the Women’s National Party won a seat in Young and other oppositionists published the National Assembly. The KDP had the magazines, such as The People’s Friend, The highest success rate, getting about a third Front-line of Democracy and The People’s Korea, of their candidates elected for office.lxxx to oppose the election.lxxxv Some of them US officials commended the KDP for advised citizens to spurn or even murder “maturing into political manhood” and candidates from rightwing groups. Other becoming one of the leading parties of forms of propaganda threatened to harm southern Korea.lxxxi They also regarded the Koreans looking to vote. One handbill overwhelming selection of right-leaning read that they would “give the knife of candidates as proof that Koreans justice” to anyone who tried to vote.lxxxvi

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Another leaflet declared “If you register to partake in the voting process. Many vote, then our country will forever be a polling places and rice distribution sites colony of America!”lxxxvii were, in fact, stationed together on The efforts of the dissidents, election day. Because voters needed to however, ultimately failed to achieve their show their family registration booklets, desired effect. American authorities which were primarily used to obtain ration detained hundreds of agitators and cards, in order to vote, the USAMGIK deterred many others from attacking combined the two activities at one site in polling sites. The mere presence of order to accomplish both tasks at the American soldiers in “hot spots” same time.xcii This meant that those who prevented occurrences of terrorism. lxxxviii did not vote were likely to miss their Korean dissidents rarely attacked polling ration cards that month. According to the sites or voters if American soldiers were testimonies of several Korean dissidents, nearby. Moreover, among the 8.2 million it was common to see Korean voters, eligible voters, 7.7 million ended up right before they received their ration registering and 7.1 million eventually cards, vote for whomever the ration card casted their ballots. lxxxix More than two- distributors recommended.xciii thirds of major political institutions in The dissidents also claimed that the southern Korea underwent reforms to conditions of voting sites were align with the results of the election unacceptable. Not all voters marked their process. The USAMGIK transferred ballots in privately enclosed booths as nearly all judicial, legislative and outlined in official USAMGIK guidelines. administrative powers to Koreans. The There were no curtains to screen voting National Assembly wrote the first booths from the public’s gaze in more constitution and elected the executive than half of the 62 voting precincts.xciv branch of South Korea—the president, Most voters filled out their ballots on vice president and prime minister. The tables in front of USAMGIK personnel. aim of the USAMGIK was to transfer the Although the duties of law-enforcing units entire administrative process to Koreans.xc were said to help preserve peace and order US General John Hodge proclaimed that at voting sites, they nevertheless restricted “the tremendous vote polled by patriotic the freedom of voters. xcv Several and freedom loving citizens in the United policemen and defense corps units, States zone is an unprecedented victory sometimes in uniform, stood inside for democracy over the all-out efforts of polling stations. The dissidents resented communist directed propaganda, the fact that employees of the USAMGIK terrorism and wanton slaughter.” xci The and rightist groups “helped” voters USAMGIK interpreted the election complete their ballots.xcvi Although some results as proof that Koreans preferred Koreans such as the illiterate genuinely the US developmental model. needed help with their ballots, many Many Korean dissidents, however, voters, especially women, experienced refused to recognize the outcome of the pressures to vote quickly and for election, claiming that it was whomever their helpers recommended.xcvii unrepresentative of southern Koreans for The dissidents accused the police of several reasons. First, they argued that interfering in political matters by favoring USAMGIK workers coerced eligible one side to the detriment of the other. voters into voting. They claimed that They also viewed defense corps groups as civilians were denied ration cards by gangs dominated by rightist elements.xcviii provincial authorities if they did not

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The resistors also argued that the supported or had already established eligibility requirements to vote rendered provisional governments before the entry the voters partial towards the interests of of US occupation forces. Jeong Eun Bo, the USAMGIK. They claimed that select for example, wanted to give all political Koreans were purposely labeled as power to people’s committees. Young Mo “criminals” to deny them the right to Jung likewise aimed to give political power vote. xcix Koreans who partook in past to people’s committees so that they could uprisings against USAMGIK operations, initiate reforms that mirrored those in the such as those during the autumn uprisings north.ciii of 1946, had indeed been disenfranchised. American authorities disapproved Many of their family members were also that leftist leaders refused their invitation denied the right to vote. In addition, the to participate in the election. They dissidents claimed that the USAMGIK attempted to build a coalition between was being selective about political right and left wing parties in order to participation, citing as proof the exclusion implement government programs with the of Jeju province from the first conference support of all political parties. civ But of the National Assembly. The because major leftist leaders continued to USAMGIK did not recognize Jeju in the resist, the USAMGIK accused them of conference because of its “small vote as a blocking Korean unification and Korea’s result of communist violence.”c American progress toward democratic self-rule. cv authorities regarded provincial leaders of Leftist leaders abstained from the Jeju as “Soviet Stooges” who were elections because they did not want to opposing USAMGIK directives because delegitimize their political platforms by of communist inclinations. They claimed recognizing foreign authority. Moreover, that evidence of communist infiltration according to official reports from election from the north was a firmly established committees, much of the Korean public fact. ci Koreans dissidents accused the became apathetic about the election once USAMGIK of hypocrisy and of holding they realized that some of the top political elections that were fair only in name. leaders were not participating. cvi Many The resistance movement also Koreans were disappointed because rejected the election results because the “persons who should be there” were election process did not include all major omitted and “those who should not be political leaders. The most obvious there” were included. cvii absences, for example, were those of Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik. They both withheld CONCLUSION from the elections because they opposed the idea of having a national election that The counterinsurgency operation of did not include northern Koreans. The the USAMGIK may be regarded as a two Kims also rejected America’s plan for success when considering the results after Trusteeship and separate elections in its occupation in Korea. It is true that the Korea.cii There were also very few left-of- campaign boosted rice production levels center candidates who had run for office. after the USAMGIK instituted a For example, Jeong Eun Bo of the South nationwide rice collection program, which Korean Labor Party, Young Mo Jung of included suppressing its resistors. It is also the People’s Revolutionary Party, and true that the campaign helped to establish Dong Gyu Park of the Democratic Young the first nationally-elected legislative body Men’s Alliance all withheld from running. on May 10, 1948, which then founded the They refused to participate because they Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948.

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Yet many of the effects of the campaign, the USAMGIK were revived institutions according to the counterinsurgency from the prior colonial era. Consequently, perspective, suggest that it was unable to many Korean citizens refrained from eliminate the root causes of insurgency. partaking in USAMGIK programs if they The use of coercion—though effective in were run by collaborators or colonial-state suppressing insurgents in the short- apparatus. They maintained that pro- term—evoked deep repulsion among Japanese elements in government would many Koreans. Although the USAMGIK dissuade Koreans from serving the frequently repeated the slogan “In a country.cix Although American authorities democracy heads are counted, not were aware of the situation, their need for broken,” the US occupation experience highly trained personnel led them to hire suggests that heads were broken and not former employees of the Japanese counted. Farmers were often beaten, colonial-state. Men who had worked for thrown into prison, tortured or the Japanese Governor-General were blackmailed if they failed to meet their rice trained in the bureaucracy since there was collection quotas. Many Koreans were little incentive to find the resources to also disenfranchised or coerced into newly train other men. voting for select candidates in the first The first Republic of Korea lacked national election. A high-ranking US the public’s trust. Many Koreans felt a official even admitted that “it cannot be sense of failure for being unable to claim claimed that there was no intimidation, no sovereignty for their own country.cx They force, used to influence the people.” cviii did not view the national legislative body The use of these measures can be as being truly representative of the South attributed to the USAMGIK’s Cold War Korean population. In addition, they were agenda. reluctant to comply with state orders that Another shortcoming of the overall were issued and enforced by national campaign was the USAMGIK’s inability traitors, and many were still sympathetic to win the hearts of the Korean masses. to the political cause of the resistance American authorities attempted to frame movement. Although the USAMGIK their objectives in ways to appeal to the managed to suppress many of the Korean people. In the economic sphere, dissidents, the spirit of the resistance the USAMGIK reiterated to the Korean movement lingered and later manifested public that rice was being produced and itself in uprisings, for example, in Jeju and collected only for domestic consumption. Yeosu provinces. These uprisings American authorities also echoed mirrored many of the insurrectionary statements that developing Korea into an elements from before—they were independent, unified nation was their instigated by Koreans who wanted to highest priority. Yet many of the manage their own crops rather than employees and institutions of the partake in the government’s rice collection USAMGIK had difficulties working with program, and they were prompted by the people. Many citizens viewed Korean dissidents who wanted to revenge on affiliates of the USAMGIK as “national Korean servicemen who had wronged traitors” or unwanted remnants of the them during the colonial era. former Japanese colonial-state. And The Korean War may also be indeed, many Korean policemen and thought of as an extension of bureaucrats had cooperated with Japanese insurrectionary conflict. When seen from authorities during the colonial era. Also, a the perspective of revolutionary warfare, high percentage of the institutions used by the Korean War was the terminus of a

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 14! three stage conflict—terrorism, guerrilla !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! warfare, and full-scale war. cxi Koreans xv Samuel Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics, 575. continued to oppose the US-led xvi David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare. 185. government system in South Korea in xvii Ibid. 188. part because of their desire to prevent xviii Eliot Cohen, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency.” Military Review (2006): 95. Koreans with questionable pasts from xix David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare. 187. attaining political power. America’s xx Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency persistent support for those Koreans laid in Iraq” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): 106. xxi Ibid. the foundation for insurrection and civil xxii cxii Samuel Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military war in Korea. Furthermore, the Politics, 575. insurgents in the South may have “lost” xxiii Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare. 150. xxiv Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton South Korea to the USAMGIK in 1948, University Press, 1976), 481. but they continued to try to “win” the xxv US Nation Security Council, “NSC 68: US Objectives Korean peninsula even after the and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 1950. xxvi Statement on Independence and Unification of establishment of the ROK. Korea. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xxvii John Kerry King, “Rice Politics” Foreign Affairs 31 (1953): 453. i The World News (Seke Shinmun). Office of Civil xxviii Agricultural Production Goals. 24 January 1947. Information, USAFIK. 47. 22 May 1948. Mikun Department of Agriculture. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Yonʾguso, 1996. ii Prasenjit Duara, “The Global and Regional xxix Talk by American Chief, Bureau of Agriculture Lt. Constitution of Nations” Nations and Nationalism 14 Col. Joyner. Gun Soo Meeting. 16 September 1946. (1999): 28. Summer Grain and Rice Collection Program. Mikun iii Ibid., 24. Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) iv Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology ʻ (New York: New Press, 1998), 375. Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaep an Kirok, 1946-1948. v Dong-Choon Kim, The Unending Korean War (Larkspur: Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Tamal Vista Publications, 2000), 35. Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. vi Namhee Lee, The Making of Minjung (Ithica: Cornell xxx Facts on food, 10 October 1946. Mikun Jonggi University Press, 2009), 5. Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, vii Gi-Wook Shin, “A Critique of Colonial Modernity in 1945. 6 - 1948. 8. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Korea.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 41 (1999): Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. 794-796. xxxi Department of Agriculture: Agriculture Production viii See David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare (Chicago: Goals. 24 January 1947 Mikun Jonggi Chongbo ABC Clio, 2006); Bernard Fall, “The Theory and Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.” Naval Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do War College Review 51 (1998): 46-57; Samuel Huntington, Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: The Free Yonʾguso, 1996. Press, 1990); Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New xxxii Summer Grain and Rice Collection Program. 16 York: Praeger, 1961); Eliot Cohen, “Principles, September 1946. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency.” Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Military Review (2006). Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do ix Samuel Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 560. Yonʾguso, 1996. x Ibid., 557. xxxiii Statement by Office of National Food xi David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare (Chicago: ABC Administration on National Food Regulation. 18 August Clio, 2006), 185. 1947. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu xii Samuel Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics, (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 562. 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim xiii David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 190. ʾ xiv Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yon guso, 1996. xxxiv Praeger, 1961), 145. Collection of Rice. 18 August 1947. Office of National Food Administration. Mikun Jonggi

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Yonʾguso, 1996. xxxv Letter to General John R. Hodge on Conditions in xlvi “Korea’s Rice Bowl has Hunger Crisis: Largest Korea. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John Producer is Poorest Fed because of Terrorism and R. Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Failure of Quotas.” New York Times. 27 Apr. 1947, Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa English ed.: Print. Yonʾguso, 1995. xlvii Death from Starvation, Massacre, and xxxvi Letter to Archer Lerch from Pyeong Koo Yoon. Imprisonment. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8. Kangwon-do Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Yonʾguso, 1996. xxxvii Labor Policy in Korea. 11 September 1947. Mikun xlviii Inspecting Office, Masan Detachment. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Yonʾguso, 1995. Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. xxxviii Statement from the Commanding General John R. xlix Letter to General John R. Hodge from Kim Myun Hodge. 12 December 1945. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Un. 22 October 1945. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo 8.Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. xxxix Statement by Office of National Food l Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1 Administration on National Food Regulation. 18 August (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 166. 1947. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu li Farmer’s Association. File no. 179-27. 23 August 1946. (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, Mikun CIC Chongbo Pogoso.RG 319 Office of the 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Chief of Military History. Soul: Chungang Ilbosa Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Hyondaesa Yonʼguso, 1996. xl Propagation Section of South Cholla Committee of lii Communist Schols and Education Programs. 3 July Korean Communism. 15 August 1946. Mikun CIC 1946. Mikun CIC Chongbo Pogoso.RG 319 Office of Chongbo Pogoso.RG 319 Office of the Chief of Military the Chief of Military History. Soul: Chungang Ilbosa History. Soul: Chungang Ilbosa Hyondaesa Hyondaesa Yonʼguso, 1996. Yonʼguso, 1996. liii Special Press Release. 31 August 1946. Mikun Jonggi xli Memorandum to Colonel Gillette: Circulars Being Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, Distributed in Chinhae and Kimhae. 27 January 1948. 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946- liv Documents Taken From Homes of Arrested Riot- 1948. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Agitators. 11 November 1946. Mikun CIC Chongbo Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Pogoso.RG 319 Office of the Chief of Military History. xlii Kwangju CIC Report on Handbill Disseminated in Soul: Chungang Ilbosa Hyondaesa Yonʼguso, Kwangju by South Korean Labor Party. 24 January 1996. 1947. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu lv Found Leftist Leaflet. USAMGIK Office of Civil (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, Affairs. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do xliii Chief of Police Division: About a Rumor without Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Any Base. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Yonʾguso, 1996. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae lvi Charles Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution (Ithaca: Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Cornell University Press, 2004), 136. Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa lvii Denying Anti-US Propaganda Rumors. 11 November Yonʾguso, 1996. 1946. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. xliv Communist Propaganda. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Yonʾguso, 1995. lviii Warning to Stop Riots. 23 October 1946. Mikun Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Yonʾguso, 1996. Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do xlv The World News Published by Office of Civil Information, USAFIK. 41. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Yonʾguso, 1995. Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do lix Statement of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa the Korean People. 3 January 1946. Mikun Jonggi Yonʾguso, 1996. Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, lxxiii Public Apathy Toward Elections. 29 March 1948. 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946- lx Military Governor, Major Wallace. Rice Collection in 1948. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Hamyang Gun. 14 January 1946. Bureau of Public Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Works. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu lxxiv Ibid. (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, lxxv Letter to Harold Snyder from John Hodge. Mikun 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do lxi The World News Published by Office of Civil Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Information, USAFIK. 41. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Yonʾguso, 1995. Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon lxxvi All Branch Managers, OCI. 26 March 1948. Mikun Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Yonʾguso, 1996. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo lxii To the Members of the American Forces in Korea. 3 Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. March 1946. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji lxxvii Report of Trip to Election Districts. 29 April 1948. (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon- Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946- Yonʾguso, 1995. 1948. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim lxiii Letter to Major Louis B. Atkinson from F.E. Gillette. Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. 11 June 1947. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. lxxviii Headquarters 98th Military Government, 14 May Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae 1948. Report on Election, USAMGIK. Mikun Jonggi Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Yonʾguso, 1996. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo lxiv Memorandum on Korea. 28 May 1947. Mikun Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) lxxix Message From Lieutenant General John R. Hodge Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do to the Ladies. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon- Yonʾguso, 1995. do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa lxv Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1 Yonʾguso, 1995. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). lxxx The World News (Seke Shinbo). Office of Civil lxvi Ibid. Information, USAFIK. 47. 22 May 1948. Mikun lxvii Memorandum on Korea. 28 May 1947. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. ʾ Yon guso, 1995. lxxxi Talk by General Arthur Brown at Second lxviii Revised Roster of Standing Committees of Interim Anniversary of Democratic Party of Korea. 16 Legislative Assembly. 20 March 1947. Mikun Jonggi September 1947. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. ʻ ʻ 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Ch unch on-si: 8.Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. lxix Ibid. lxxxii The World News (Seke Shinbo). Office of Civil lxx Memorandum for General Brown from Archer Information, USAFIK. 45. May 22, 1948. Mikun Lerch. 20 March 1947. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. 8.Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. lxxi Policy for Korea. 18 July 1947. Mikun Jonggi lxxxiii Abstract of Unusual Events from Inspection Team Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, Reports. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do lxxii The World News Published by Office of Civil Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Information, USAFIK. 41. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Yonʾguso, 1996.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! lxxxiv Police Report. 10 May 1948. Mikun Jonggi Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: xcvi Abstract of Unusual Events from Inspection Team Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Reports. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. lxxxv Detailed Report Baesd on Facts Relative to the Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Attempted Riot of 15th August 1947. 13 October 1947. Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Yonʾguso, 1996. Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa xcvii Report on Election. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Yonʾguso, 1995. Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon lxxxvi Threatening Letter. Interpreter for Chief Civil Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Affairs Office. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Yonʾguso, 1996. Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do xcviii Labor Policy in Korea. 11 September 1947. Mikun Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Yonʾguso, 1996. Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do lxxxvii Anti-Election Handbill. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Yonʾguso, 1995. Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do xcix Exercising the Right to Vote. Mikun Jonggi Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Yonʾguso, 1996. Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. lxxxviii Supervision of Election. 30 April 1948. Mikun Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. c The World News (Seke Shinbo). Office of Civil Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Information, USAFIK. 49. May 22, 1948. Mikun Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) lxxxix Patrol Report. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa ci Special Press Release. 20 October 1947. Mikun Yonʾguso, 1996. Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) xc Memorandum for General Brown from Archer Lerch. Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do 20 March 1947. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. Yonʾguso, 1995. 8.Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo cii Trusteeship in Korea: Seoul Leaders Threaten to Fight Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Curb to Self-Rule. 3 January 1946. Mikun Jonggi xci The World News (Seke Shinbo). Office of Civil Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, Information, USAFIK. 47. 22May 1948. Mikun Jonggi 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. ciii Police Report. 3 March 1947. Mikun Jonggi Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. xcii Ibid. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo xciii Headquarters USAMGIK 27 April. 1948. Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Memorandum. Earl Rhodes Lt. Col. Adjutant General. civ Office of Economic Adviser. 21 June 1946. Mikun Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946- Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do 1948. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Yonʾguso, 1995. xciv Abstract of Unusual Events from Inspection Team cv Warning to Stop Riots. 23 October 1946. Mikun Reports. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8.Kangwon-do Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Yonʾguso, 1996. cvi Public Apathy Toward Elections. 29 March 1948. xcv Summary of Eighteenth Week’s Activities of the Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea. Mikun Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946- Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) 1948. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! cvii Strange Two-Sided Campaign Strategy. Maeil Duara, Prasenjit, “The Global and Regional Constitution Shinmoon (Daily News). 25 April 1948. Mikun Jonggi of Nations.” Nations and Nationalism 14 (1999). Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Fall, Bernard. “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. and Counterinsurgency.” Naval War College Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Review 51 (1998): 46-57. Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Foucault, Michel. Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology. New cviii Report on Election. 14 May 1948. Mikun Jonggi York: New Press, 1998. Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Galula, David. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Santa Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Barbra: ABC-Clio Inc., 2006. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Gi-Wook Shin, “A Critique of Colonial Modernity in Korea.” Comparative Studies in Society and History Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. 41 (1999) cix Memorandum for General Brown from Archer Hoffman, Bruce. “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Lerch. 14 April 1947. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Iraq.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 103-121. ʻ ʻ 8.Kangwon-do Ch unch on-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Huntington, Samuel. Changing Patterns of Military Politics. Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. New York: The Free Press, 1990. cx Namhee Lee, The Making of Minjung (Ithica: Cornell Kim, Dong-Choon. The Unending Korean War: A Social University Press, 2009). History. Larkspur: Tamal Vista Publications, cxi Samuel Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics, 2000. 562. King, John Kerry, “Rice Politics” Foreign Affairs 31 cxii Memorandum to George Atcheson from Arthur (1953). Bunce. 23 January 1947. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Lee, Namhee. The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Charyojip.Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. Politics of Representation in South Korea. Ithica: 8.Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Cornell University Press, 2009. Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Shin, Gi-Wook. “A Critique of Colonial Modernity in Korea.” Comparative Studies in Society and History REFERENCES 41 (1999): 784-804. Tse-tung, Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Praeger, PRIMARY SOURCES 1961.cxii

“Korean War Origins, 1945-1950,” Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collecti on/134/korean-war-origins-1945-1950. Mikun CIC Chongbo PogosO. RG 319 Office of the Chief of Military History. Soul: Chungang Ilbosa Hyondaesa Yonʼguso, 1996. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Chilletʻu (F.E. Gillette) Pogoso, Chon Pom-dae Chaepʻan Kirok, 1946-1948. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1996. Mikun Jonggi Chongbo Charyojip. Haji (John R. Hodge) Munsojip, 1945. 6 - 1948. 8. Kangwon-do Chʻunchʻon-si: Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yonʾguso, 1995. Maeil Sinbo [Daily News]. 1945-1948. Seke Sinmun [World News]. 1945-1948.

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Armstrong, Charles. The North Korean Revolution, 1945- 1950. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. Cohen, Eliot. “Principles, Imperatives, & Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency.” Military Review (2006). Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

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REGIME STABILITY OR MINERAL WEALTH? China’s Interest in Trade with North Korea Annie Meyjes Harvard University

ABSTRACT strove to maintain relations with its isolated neighbor to the northeast. During This paper explores the rapid rise in the Soviet era, communist nations bilateral trade between North Korea and (dominated by the Soviet Union and China between 2001 and 2012 from a China) accounted for 70 percent of North political and mineral policy perspective, Korea’s total trade volume. i Two major relying primarily upon the International events in the early 1990s, however, shifted Trade Centre’s Sino-DPRK trade data. It Sino-DPRK relations, including trade argues that Beijing’s North Korean trade patterns. The first was China’s decision to decisions were based upon a combination normalize diplomatic relations with South of a national foreign policy of Korean Korea, thereby hampering economic peninsular stability and a desire to increase relations with the North. Secondly, after economic development in the three the collapse of the Soviet Union and northeastern provinces bordering North Russia’s decision to require North Korea Korea. An analysis of provincial Chinese to pay for its trade in currency instead of actors also suggests that local leaders barter, China moved to do the same. This acted upon Beijing’s economic growth movement was paralleled by China’s targets by seeking to develop both desire to shift its relationship with North domestic mineral production as well as Korea to one based on trade instead of mineral and transport connections with aid.ii As a result, trade between the two North Korea. What is more, North nations plummeted. Korean minerals were attractive locally for Although economic interaction both the satisfaction of domestic demand between China and North Korea suffered and for arbitrage. The analysis presented during the 1990s, bilateral trade recovered in this paper provides insights into with force in the 2000s. The volume of Chinese decision-making at both the Sino-DPRK trade in the latter portion of national and local levels of government, as the last decade is unprecedented, even well as an understanding of implications taking into account China’s policy of for Sino-DPRK relations with the rise of trade-over-aid. Total bilateral trade rose Xi Jinping. 449 percent between 2000 and 2009 alone, compared to a fall of over 11 percent INTRODUCTION between 1995 and 2000.iii This paper seeks to determine the cause of the rapid North Korea and China have increase in trade between the two nations, shared a history based upon mutual and will posit two alternative explanations: struggle and communist ideology since one based upon Chinese foreign policy China’s sponsorship of North Korea in and the other on Chinese mineral policy. World War II and China’s support of the It will also refer to a third, overlapping North in the Korean War. When China alternative explanation, based upon opened to the world in the late 1970s, it

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Chinese northeastern provincial development interests.

Figure 1: DPRK Trade With its Two Largest Partnersiv

The first section of this paper will The first alternative explanation is outline the two primary alternative that the rise in Sino-DPRK bilateral trade explanations and the third overlapping has been the economic outcome of explanation. In the second section, it will shifting Chinese foreign policy since the then describe the frameworks of analysis early 1990s. This paper will rely upon the that will be used to judge which, if either, joint hypotheses of Bates Gill, John Park, of the two alternative explanations is Scott Snyder, and Drew Thompson to dominant. The third section will evaluate elucidate what will be referred to as the the two alternative explanations. Finally, “foreign policy alternative explanation.” the fourth will present conclusions and After Deng Xiaoping initiated draw implications for future Sino-DPRK economic reform and opening in China at relations. Ultimately, this paper will show the Third Plenum of 1978, North Korea the multifaceted nature of China’s became increasingly aware that China interests in North Korea: foreign and would seek to establish diplomatic mineral policy have each played a role in relations with its rival South Korea.v The driving increased Sino-DPRK trade since combination of China’s overarching policy the mid-2000s, as have China’s domestic goal of Peaceful Rise, as well as the economic development goals. As such, a demands of managing relations with both thorough understanding of the layers of North and South Korea meant that China China’s relationship with North Korea is would need stability on the Korean crucial to forecasting future relations Peninsula in order to continue developing between the two nations. economically. China has had several strategic desires in maintaining relations ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS with both nations. On the one hand, it is interested in retaining a communist ally in I. ECONOMIC OUTCOME OF the North and a buffer against US-South CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY Korean military forces. On the other, it fears the instability of a nuclear North

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Korea and a potential refugee crisis it reserves. North Korea is a mineral-rich would face should the North Korean country. The nation is estimated to have regime collapse (not to mention the the world’s largest supply of magnesite benefits of trade it receives from South (between three and four billion tons), hold Korea). Snyder asserts that after observing between two and four billion tons of iron the potential for a refugee influx into ore, and possess stores of rare earth northeastern China during North Korea’s metals in its Gyung-Sung and Hur-Chon Great Famine in the late 1990s, China regions.x North Korea’s mineral reserves sought to re-stabilize relations with the are so sizable, that analysis by Goohoon North. vi Relations between the two Kwon of Goldman Sachs Economic improved with a series of exchanges of Research has estimated that the total stock high-level officials in the early 2000s. vii of reserves is 140 times greater than China’s North Korea policy appeared to North Korea’s 2008 GDP, and its shift again in 2003 due to a confluence of development could cover the potential three key events: North Korea’s nuclear costs of a reunification with South test, the United States’ invasion of Iraq, Korea.xi Of particular relevance to China and Hu Jintao’s replacement of Jiang are North Korean coal and iron ore. Zemin as the leader of China. As John According to Gill, China’s imports of Park states, China became fearful that a North Korean coal rose 54 percent nuclear North Korea would be next on between 2009 and 2010, while iron ore the United States target list with the imports doubled over the same period.xii imposition of the Bush Doctrine. viii What is more, Thompson suggests that Increased threats of peninsular instability minerals collectively made up 41 percent drove China to expedite improved of all North Korean exports to China in relations with North Korea and re- 2008.xiii This paper will address whether stabilize the region. China’s North Korea China’s importation of North Korean policy under Hu Jintao came to embody minerals is coincidental, being simply the two key ideals: the denuclearization of easiest way to increase trade with North North Korea in the long-term, and more Korea as a product of foreign policy, or importantly, the stability of the Kim arises out of a targeted mineral policy goal regime. China came to believe that by of the Chinese government. economically supporting North Korea To do so, this paper posits three with trade (and also investment), it might distinct sources of Chinese interest in ensure the survival of the Kim regime.ix North Korean minerals. First, Chinese Ultimately, this would prevent a collapse commodity demand increased rapidly over scenario that would be disastrous in the the past decade as the country’s economic eyes of the Chinese, ensure peninsular growth skyrocketed. As described by stability, and allow China to continue Daniel Gearin, despite being the world’s undeterred on its Peaceful Rise. largest producer of many minerals, China faces a shortage in 19 of 45 major II. TARGETED INTEREST IN minerals. xiv Perhaps in the face of an NORTH KOREA’S MINERAL inability to sufficiently increase domestic RESOURCES supply, China turned to North Korean imports to compensate. Alternatively, the The second alternative explanation mid-2000s saw a global increase in posits that bilateral trade between North commodity market prices, as evidenced by Korea and China increased due to China’s a 191 percent increase in the Global specific interest in North Korea’s mineral Commodity Metal Price Index between

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2001 and 2012. xv This second rationale scrutiny, as evidenced by Hu’s “Plan of posits that China sought to either import Revitalizing China’s Northeast.”xviii Given North Korean minerals at below-market their shared borders with North Korea, prices for domestic consumption, or to Jilin and Liaoning in particular benefit turn to export them globally for profit. significantly from increased bilateral trade; Finally, China may have been stimulated Thompson suggests that 75% of North to seek North Korean minerals in an Korean trade passes through Liaoning effort to begin mineral stockpiling as province alone.xix Both provinces enhance rivals Japan and the United States sought their economic prospects significantly by to do the same. This paper will investigate utilizing their geographical comparative whether some combination of these three advantage with North Korea, and perhaps interests in North Korean natural advance their standing nationally as a resources led China to pursue increased result. The third domestic explanation will bilateral trade in the last decade. be referred to throughout this paper as a factor that overlaps both primary III. THIRD OVERLAPPING alternative explanations. EXPLANATION – CHINA’S NORTHEASTERN DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORKS OF ANALYSIS

Although this paper will seek to In order to discern which of the differentiate between the relative strength two alternative explanations is more of China’s foreign and mineral policies favorable, this paper will rely upon two toward North Korea, China has a third major frameworks of analysis and also domestic economic policy which overlaps several supplementary analyses. The first these two alternative explanations: the is a comparison of two financial models of development of its three northeastern Sino-DPRK trade. In one model, a chart provinces Jilin, Liaoning, and of North Korean exports to China will be Heilongjiang. After Chinese economic overlaid with relevant foreign policy reform began, the development of China’s events: political and diplomatic exchanges. southern and eastern regions took off, The second model will overlay the same leaving the stagnant northeastern chart of North Korean exports to China provinces behind. Cheng Li cites that with mineral-related events—major Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Jilin’s Chinese investment deals in the North provincial ranks as industrial producers Korean mining sector and Chinese fell from 2nd, 7th, and 15th to 5th, 14th, and mineral policy directives. Both models will 18th, respectively, in subsequent years.xvi seek to determine whether there is a The fall in productivity of northeastern causal relationship between foreign or China can perhaps be attributed to mineral policy-related events and trade economic policy under Jiang Zemin, who outcomes via North Korean exports to focused more closely on generating record China. Trade data for this analysis will national economic growth rates and was come from the International Trade less concerned with the distribution of Centre, an UN-sponsored organization economic development. With Hu Jintao’s interested in developing economies’ assumption of China’s three-pronged trade. xx Information on political and leadership position, policy shifted more diplomatic exchanges will be drawn toward sustainable development. xvii This primarily from Bates Gill’s work, along meant that the three northeastern with a variety of secondary sources. The provinces came back under national North Korea Econ Watch blog, Chinese

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 23! policy directives obtained from scholarly to be different between actors within articles, Chinese news sources, and China. That is, the central government in provincial government websites will Beijing may be more focused on broader provide the data for the mineral analysis. regional stability in its relations with This framework of analysis will enable a North Korea, while officials in the local quantitative comparison between the provinces may be more concerned with foreign policy and mineral policy securing commodities at cheap prices. An alternative explanations. analysis of key actors within the Chinese The second major framework in political sphere will provide crucial insight this paper will be a qualitative analysis of into the motives of China in trade dealings national and local Chinese directives with North Korea. relating to foreign, economic, and mineral Given the dominant evidence in policy. These directives will be obtained favor of the foreign policy alternative from secondary source analyses (Fan and explanation delivered by the two primary KPMG), Chinese news releases on the frameworks of analysis, this paper will directives, and provincial government include a third framework consisting of websites. The policy directives will be supplementary evidence in favor of the analyzed to determine the intent of the mineral alternative explanation to provide Chinese government in its relations with completeness. Specifically, this paper will North Korea. In conjunction with close introduce an analysis of Chinese mineral readings of Chinese policy pieces, this exports and commodity market prices, as framework will also rely upon a study of well as a discussion of the Chinese coal the policy decision-making processes and market as it relates to North Korea. balance of power dynamics in the Chinese Together, the two primary frameworks of government. Scholarly articles will serve as analysis and the more minor elements will resources on these two elements. It is provide a collective picture of China’s important to note that intentions are likely aims in its relations with North Korea.

ASSESSMENT OF THE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

I. COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL MODELS

Figure 2: Foreign Policy Financial Modelxxi

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 24!

Figure 2 above is a graphic Korea at the beginning of 2009 after a representation of North Korean exports stagnant 2006-2008 period. 2008 served as to China between 2001 and 2012 in a second key shock-year for the Chinese thousands of USD. Key foreign policy government in its North Korean relations events are numbered one through sixteen due to Kim Jong-Il’s stroke. Given (brackets represent events attributed to a evidence of Kim’s rapidly deteriorating year as opposed to a specified date), with health, China became increasingly aware each representing a visit between Sino- of the need for a leadership transition in DPRK senior officials, either in China or North Korea. As in 2003, the threat of North Korea. The first point of emphasis instability stimulated China’s desire to is that the only major official exchange increase exchanges. Most notably, Chinese not represented on this graph is Kim Premier Wen Jiabao led a large Chinese Jong-Il’s first visit to China in late May delegation to Pyongyang in October 2009, 2000 (not pictured due to lack of 2000 during which China and North Korea export data), emphasizing that relations signed a major agreement encompassing between the two countries were frosty up tourism, development, and education. until 2000. Two key trends can be Park argues that this visit was the deciphered from the chart itself. The first culmination of strong Chinese efforts to is the cluster of events between 2004 and increase relations with North Korea via 2006, and the second is the takeoff in trade. xxiii In addition to Wen Jiabao’s exchanges beginning in early 2009. The notable visit, Gill and Snyder collectively earlier period consists of visits between found 120 total diplomatic exchanges Kim Jong-Il and Hu Jintao, and also visits between the two nations in 2009 alone.xxiv made by North Korean senior legislator xxv Kim Yong Nam, Chinese Vice Premier Together, the 2004-06 and 2009 series of Wu Yi, and Commerce Minister Bo Xilai. events as illustrated by the foreign policy What can explain such a rapid financial model substantiate the first reconstitution of relations between alternative explanation. In the years before Chinese and North Korean senior officials both of these periods, China was after the deficiency between 2001 and presented with evidence of instability 2003? Although the Chinese became within the North Korean regime, and intent upon reestablishing diplomatic exchanges picked up between the two relations with North Korea by 2000, countries in the following years. As a observable changes to foreign policy (with result, after the 2004-2006 period of senior-official exchanges used as a proxy) exchanges, total North Korean exports to did not occur until after 2003. As China increased by 62.56 percent between previously suggested, two major events in 2006 and 2008. Following the pivotal 2003 constituted a shock to China in its 2009 period, North Korean exports to DPRK relations: North Korea conducted China increased 50.63 percent between its first nuclear test and the United States 2009 and 2010 alone. Given the clear invaded Iraq.xxii The combination of the pattern between the clustering of two 2003 events served as a signal of significant number of high-level meetings North Korean instability and its between the two nations followed by a potentially violent ramifications, causing period of rapid trade increases, this paper China to increase exchanges in counter. argues that foreign policy—using The second notable element in diplomatic exchanges as a proxy—did this chart is the takeoff in high-level indeed impact bilateral trade between the exchanges between China and North two nations. As was the case with Wen

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 25!

Jiabao’s 2009 Pyongyang trip, visits officials resulted in concrete decisions on between North Korean and Chinese the part of both nations to shore up trade.

Figure 3: Mineral Financial Modelxxvi

In the mineral policy financial can be drawn between mineral policy model, key events consist of major events and increases in trade. Although investments made by Chinese companies trade does increase in the years following in the North Korean mining industry as the first 2003 mineral event, the steady well as Chinese government policies stream of mineral investments and policy specifically relating to mineral directives does not provide conclusive development (for example, Jilin Province’s evidence toward any particular mineral 12th Five-year plan references the shock causing greater bilateral trade. promotion of North Korean natural Moreover, it would be dangerous to resources). Two points of comparison can extrapolate that the emergence of a more be made between this mineral model and concrete mineral policy in 2003 directly the foreign policy model. On the one led to the takeoff in Sino-DPRK trade hand, both similarly lack major events given that the 2004-2006 period saw a before 2003, corroborating the fact that decline in North Korean exports to China. this year served as a turning point in Sino- As a result, based upon the comparative DPRK relations. More importantly, models of North Korean trade and however, the mineral policy model lacks foreign and mineral policy events, it the clustering pattern exhibited in the appears as though Chinese foreign policy foreign policy model, and instead shows a makes a far more clear impact on relatively consistent series of events economic outcomes between China and between 2003 and 2012 (Figure 3). North Korea. Whereas in the foreign policy model clustering of diplomatic exchanges was clearly followed by rapid increases in DPRK exports to China, in the mineral policy model, no clear causal relationship

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 26!

II. CHINESE POLICY Peaceful Development. As Park states, DIRECTIVES China’s foreign policy enables it to secure both external stability so that it may This section will rely upon the concentrate on economic growth, and analysis of five major elements of Chinese develop relations with other major policy: central and provincial government countries for trade.xxx China’s two North 10th, 11th, and 12th Five-Year economic Korean policy interests of long-term Plans; the 2003 National Policy on denuclearization and regime stability can Mineral Resources; the 2007 Plan of be seen to fit in this broader 2011 white Revitalizing Northeast China; and the paper. Denuclearization works toward 2011 white paper entitled “China’s China’s goal of Harmonious World and Foreign Policy for Pursuing Peaceful regional cooperation, and DPRK regime Development.” These policies span the stability meets the priorities of new foreign, mineral, and economic realms, security thinking and regional and additionally, relate to actors at both cooperation. the national and local levels. This section Chinese mineral policy can be will seek to determine whether China’s illustrated with the 2003 “Policy on foreign policy or mineral policy is rooted Mineral Resources”, which emphasizes more strongly in economic policy, thereby broad, sustainable mineral development. being the primary influence on trade The central government notes that outcomes with North Korea. It will begin although China does have vast swaths of by separately outlining national foreign domestic natural resources, their and mineral policies, and then delving into development is hindered by poor natural which plays a larger role in economic conditions. Thus, while China primarily policy by way of an analysis of actors seeks development of its own mineral within China. resources, “it is an important government Beijing’s foreign policy goals are policy to […] make use of foreign markets most clearly presented in its 2011 white and foreign mineral resources”.xxxi What is paper, “China’s Foreign Policy for more, the 2003 policy states that foreign Pursuing Peaceful Development.” This direct investment in other countries’ white paper outlines five key elements of minerals “is of great significance for the China’s broad foreign policy at the common prosperity” and that national level: support for a Harmonious “prospecting for and exploitation of hard World; an independent foreign policy of rock mineral resources in other countries peace; new thinking on security based on has […] begun”.xxxii It is evident then that mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and Beijing’s mineral policy, as stated in 2003, coordination; international responsibility; is far more explicit toward its intentions and regional cooperation or good with the DPRK than its foreign policy. neighbor policy.xxvii Despite the fact that While its North Korean foreign policy can this paper was published in 2011, the be interpreted within the language used in policy elements it describes have been the 2011 white paper, the central active in China throughout the Hu Jintao government mineral policy is clear that period. With the exception of the shift China would be interested in mineral trade from “Peaceful Rise” to “Peaceful and investment in North Korea. Development”, they are not starkly It is next important to determine different from those under Jiang the extent to which these separate foreign Zemin.xxviii xxix Each of these foreign policy and mineral policies work into China’s goals serves China’s broader interest in economic policies, and to draw upon the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 27! point of view of local actors. Three key Korea.xxxviii Thus, a clear trail can be seen pieces of economic policy were in place between a broader economic decision to during the relevant 2000-2012 period in reduce disparity in economic growth, and China: the 10th, 11th, and 12th Five-Year the mechanism for doing so in the Plans, in which the central government Northeast: reconstituting industrial and outlined the various economic goals of the mining production and moreover, nation, including GDP and production connections to North Korea. Further targets. The transition in policy between evidence toward this fact can be seen in the 10th and 11th Five-Year Plans in 2006 Jilin’s 2004 “Plan of Revitalization of Old is most notable. Since the institution of Industrial Bases”, where the province economic reforms by Deng Xiaoping in looked to increase economic cooperation 1978, Chinese Five-Year Plans and trade with North Korea. xxxix Its consistently emphasized economic growth provincial 12th Five-year Plan also seeks to rates as the primary target of the central increase economic cooperation with government.xxxiii Fan notes that economic North Korea, and emphasizes the policy through the Jiang Zemin era gave importance of the development of a port little recognition to growing income at Rajin, North Korea.xl inequality within China, particularly in its The third, overlapping alternative northeastern provinces. xxxiv This changed explanation is clearly supported through under Hu Jintao with the 11th Five-Year these policy directives, at both the Plan. The language of emphasis in the 11th national and local level. The national drive plan, Hu’s first, shifts from “getting rich to stabilize development is converted into first” to “common prosperity”. xxxv In targeted northeastern policy to increase addition, the 11th plan introduces the word industrial and mineral production. These “steady” in reference to economic growth, directives are then monetized at the local which emphasizes a shift toward a longer- level: as Jilin province illustrates, the term focus by the national national directive to increase provincial government.xxxvi The long-term economic development is interpreted as license to development emphasis was carried develop minerals and transportation with through into the 12th Five-Year Plan, North Korea in order to drive economic published in 2011 with references to growth. Connecting provincial “higher quality growth” and “inclusive development to North Korea, therefore, growth”.xxxvii serves two functions for local leaders: it Given the national goal of provides profit in the mineral and reducing income inequality evidenced in transport sectors, and more importantly, the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans, it is successful economic growth can serve as a important to look at policies specifically promotion mechanism to coveted central pertaining to the three poorer border government positions. provinces of Jilin, Liaoning, and In assessing whether these policy Heilongjiang. Such policies provide a lens directives are evidence toward the first or into how national level economic policy is second primary alternative explanations, implemented provincially. The 2007 one must distinguish between actors national-level “Plan of Revitalizing within China. Interpreting Chinese Northeast China” references hastening the foreign, mineral, and economic policy process of opening-up on a local scale, the directives at the national level does not “[uplifting of] basic and raw materials provide overwhelming evidence toward industry”, as well as transportation the first or second alternative explanation construction along the border with North when viewed in isolation. The language

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 28! contained in Chinese national foreign and his predecessor Jiang had been.xlii, xliii From mineral policies can certainly be the foreign policy perspective, several key interpreted in relation to North Korea, bodies have the ability to impact final but it is not explicit that either policy decisions made by the PBSC and the works directly into China’s economic leader of China. The most important of policy via the 11th and 12th Five-Year these institutions are Leading Small Plans, where northeastern development Groups (LSGs), the International appears the primary objective. On the Department underneath the party Central other hand, given the chain in which Committee, and to a lesser extent, the economic policy at the national level leads Ministries of Foreign Affairs and to connection with North Korea at the Commerce. While the Ministries certainly local level, first through targeted have involvement in foreign policy northeastern development plans and then making, senior ministers are typically out- provincial revitalization and Five-Year ranked by other individuals involved in plans, it is clear that local actors have the decision process. xliv As such, the interpreted national directives as license to Ministries appear to have more of an engage in mineral and transportation implementation role in Chinese policy as a development with North Korea. Simply body of the State and not the superior viewing the local policy directives in Party. Similarly, although the Chinese isolation, it appears as though provincial military also retains some influence over mineral interest in North Korea is the foreign policy, its role has diminished due dominant factor in economic engagement. to its increasing professionalization.xlv In order to determine, though, whether Given the importance of rank in national economic policy toward North Chinese party politics and the makeup of Korea results primarily from foreign or these bodies, it appears as though the mineral policy, one must look toward the LSGs, especially the Foreign Affairs Work balance of power within Chinese policy Leading Small Group and the National decision-making. That is, how are foreign Security Work Leading Small Group, exert and mineral policies determined in China? the greatest influence over the PBSC’s Are the individuals vested with ultimate decisions. While the membership rosters decision-making power the same for both of these two LSGs are unknown, China policies? scholars assert the likelihood that their Constitutionally, the National memberships overlap greatly if not People’s Congress (NPC) retains all law- entirely.xlvi Hu (previously Jiang and now making authority within China, but in Xi Jinping) served as head of both groups reality, the Chinese Communist Party with Xi Jinping as his deputy (likely now (CPC) and the Politburo and Politburo Li Kequiang) and was supported by other Standing Committee (PBSC) at its head members including individuals in the are the true decision-makers, while the Politburo and various ministries (such as NPC serves as a rubber stamp.xli Under Liang Guanglie, the Minister of Defense, Hu Jintao (in charge during the primary and Dai Bingguo, a State Councilor and period of interest in this paper), the PBSC senior diplomat).xlvii was comprised of nine members. While After the LSGs, the International Hu, as Party General Secretary, President, Department appears to be the next most and Chair of the Military Commission, significant foreign policy body, especially had final decision-making authority in in North Korea relations. Traditionally, China, he appeared to be more interested the International Department under the in governing by consensus than perhaps party’s Central Committee served as the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 29! key diplomatic body in relations with the Chinese party and government communist governments. From 1997- structure, it is evident that foreign policy 2003, the director of the International is far more powerful. The LSGs under the Department was Dai Bingguo PBSC and the International Department (subsequently a State Councilor and LSG under the Central Committee are higher member), who was replaced by Wang ranking than the NDRC and MLR as Jiarui in 2003. xlviii Schambaugh describes party rather than state bodies, and include that the International Department has China’s most senior officials. Thus, seven key functions in diplomatic regardless of the extent to which China’s exchanges, three of which are especially central leaders or other influential policy relevant to North Korea. The Department actors are interested in incorporating is responsible for sending party leaders mineral policy into economic policy, abroad (such as Hu’s 2005 visit to North simply given the rank-order of the Korea), hosting foreign leaders (including decision-making structure, foreign policy all of Kim Jong-Il’s visits to China from necessarily dominates mineral policy at the 2000-06), and publicizing China’s policies highest levels of the national government. overseas.xlix As such, although China’s national From the mineral policy economic policy does not explicitly perspective, two bodies appear to be reference North Korea, the implicit responsible for the most important authorization that China’s Peaceful decisions: the National Development and Development and Northeastern Reform Commission (NDRC) and the development policies provide to local- Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR). level actors consequently takes a greater Mineral policy is not covered by an LSG foreign rather than mineral policy flavor. under the PBSC, nor does mineral policy This analysis of Chinese policy directives feature prominently in a PBSC member’s suggests that at the local level, trade policy portfolio. l , li Within the Chinese decisions with North Korea are impacted political structure, both the NDRC and more by mineral policy given the manner the MLR fall under the State Council, and in which local actors monetize national so are outranked by LSGs as bodies of the directives, while at the national level, PBSC. Furthermore, it is important to foreign policy plays a more dominant role. note that between the NDRC and the Both alternative explanations are MLR, the NDRC is the more powerful of supported by policies at different levels of the two, and is commonly considered the the Chinese government. most powerful organ under the State Council.lii This might suggest that because III. SUPPLEMENTARY FACTORS the NDRC’s policy portfolio covers broader economic themes while the It appears thus far as though the foreign MLR’s policies specifically relate to policy alternative explanation has more minerals, mineral policy in general is support given that both the financial watered down in China to the extent that models and national policy directives fall it must fit within the NDRC’s broader in its favor, while only local policy goals for the economy. directives favor the mineral alternative What, then, are the implications of explanation. However, there are a few the structure of Chinese foreign and pieces of supplementary evidence that do mineral policy decision-making bodies on suggest targeted Chinese interest in North North Korean trade policy? Given the Korean mineral reserves. This section will arrangement of policy portfolios within proceed by analyzing supplementary

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 30! evidence from the perspective of the south by sea to major demand centers mineral alternative hypothesis. It will such as Guangzhou. lvi Even though the consider evidence as it relates to Chinese rail-sea transport method does reduce interest in North Korean minerals to serve costs as compared to the road-rail skyrocketing domestic demand, Chinese method, importing coal is still often profit-seeking motives, and will conclude cheaper. Richard Morse and Gange He by examining Chinese mineral stockpiling. believe that this indeed became the case in 2009 when China became a coal importer A. COVERING DOMESTIC SUPPLY for the first time. lvii In the same year, SHORTAGES North Korean coal production rose by 440,000 tons, and mineral fuel exports to While China is the world’s largest China rose 25.2 percent over 2008 (and producer of many minerals, it continues to 53.8 percent between 2009 and 2010).lviii, lix face critical shortages due to its rapid Skeptics might suggest that China couldn’t population and economic growth rates. A possibly satisfy its domestic demand by study of China’s coal industry is especially increasing mineral trade with a small illustrative in this respect. China is the producer like North Korea. Yet, in 2009, world’s largest coal producer and has the North Korea was China’s second largest world’s third largest coal reserves, yet it supplier of anthracite coal.lx This evidence, became a net importer of coal in 2009.liii then points toward the fact that China As previously mentioned, Chinese policy indeed believes it must begin to source directives at both the national and coal imports, especially after seeing new provincial level have sought not only to pricing realities in 2009, and that North increase domestic mineral production, but Korea was a viable option to compensate also to turn to international imports to for domestic shortages. The subsequent compensate. The national government has section’s discussion of North Korean coal sought to curb coal exports since 2002, and iron ore export prices corroborate the has altered tax structures in 2006 and 2007 attractiveness of North Korea as a mineral to encourage coal imports, and then has supplier. abolished coal import tariffs and export tax breaks.liv Why, if China is capable of B. PROFIT SEEKING producing sufficient coal domestically to meet demand, has the country sought coal The number of foreign imports? In all likelihood, it is actually investments in North Korea is difficult to easier and cheaper for China to import say, based on the hazardous business coal than to rely upon domestic environment there. On the low end of the production, simply due to the spectrum, the Nautilus Institute estimates organization of China’s coal industry. 25 foreign investments into North Korean China’s domestic coal is largely mining projects, 20 of which are Chinese sourced from Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, (implied to be since 2001).lxi By contrast, and Shanxi provinces in northwestern Thompson found 138 total Chinese joint China, yet most of China’s coal demand ventures in North Korea between 1997 comes from the southeast. lv Given the and 2010, 56 of which were in extractive high expense of transporting coal from industries. lxii Nevertheless, China the northwest directly to the southeast by represents the largest foreign interest in road or rail, instead the domestic coal North Korean mining to-date. While typically travels due east by rail to major Thompson argues that Chinese joint ports such as Qinhuangdao and then ventures in North Korea are a result of

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 31! broader foreign policies of regional Chinese FDI in North Korea is positively stability and denuclearization, this paper correlated with rising commodity prices argues that FDI in North Korean minerals through 2007. lxiv In this respect, two provides evidence toward the mineral potential goals are possible: first, China policy alternative explanation from a might have sought to develop and import profit-seeking perspective. The bulk of North Korean minerals at below-market Chinese FDI in North Korea comes from prices to then export internationally at smaller firms located within Liaoning and profit. Alternatively, the Chinese might Jilin provinces (34 percent and 29 percent have imported cheaper North Korean of Chinese FDI in North Korea, minerals for domestic consumption. The respectively). lxiii At most, this points first argument is likely not the case, at toward the third alternative explanation— least on large scale nationally. North provincial firms’ decisions to monetize Korea’s largest exports to China are coal national directives to increase provincial and iron ore. By plotting a chart of North economic development. Korean mineral fuel exports to China More likely, the preponderance of (including coal) along with China’s world FDI by small firms in Jilin and Liaoning coal exports, the lack of relationship suggests an independent interest in profit between the two is quite clear. seeking. Thompson goes on to state that

Figure 4lxv DPRK%Mineral%Fuel%Exports%to%China,%China's%

Total%World%Coal%Exports%

If China was indeed relying upon North followed by a rise in total Chinese coal Korean mineral fuels for arbitrage, one exports, which is not the case. would expect to see a rise in North As for the latter objective of Korean mineral fuel exports to China, importing cheap North Korean minerals for internal profit, the Chinese are able to

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 32! import minerals from North Korea at motives, China may seek North Korean below market prices. For example, a 2011 imports in order to supplement strategic Nautilus Report notes that prior to 2007, stockpiles of minerals, especially rare North Korea exported anthracite coal to earths. China is presumed to hold 90 China at below market value, and has percent of the world’s rare earth reserves, continued to export coal for electricity- and evidence suggests increasing efforts generation and iron ore at significant by the national government to stockpile discounts. lxvi, lxvii Even if China does not the minerals, given their importance in nationally seek to turn North Korean technology production and efforts by the mineral imports at a profit in world United States and Japan to do the markets, it is at least able to source coal same.lxviii Beginning in the 1990s, China’s and iron ore for itself at cheaper prices by Ministry of Land and Resources has been turning to North Korea. It is interesting to developing strategic mineral plans. lxix In further consider whether China’s 2007, China began taxing rare earth provinces exhibit internal profit seeking exports (currently as high as 25 percent), via North Korean coal and iron imports. and in 2008, the ministry published a That is, given the competitive drive of paper entitled “Guidelines for the Chinese provinces to increase economic Development of Natural Resources,” growth in order to incur greater favors which declared rare earth minerals from Beijing, it is quite possible that the protected by the central government. In northeastern provinces seek to import 2011, it increased a resource tax on rare cheap North Korean coal as a substitute earths. lxx Meanwhile, North Korea is for domestically produced coal. Then, the thought to have significant rare earth provinces might seek to ship their own reserves in its Gyung-Sung and Hur-Chon coal to other Chinese provinces to earn a regions. lxxi David von Hippel and Peter margin spread over the substitute North Hayes argue that “due to the DPRK’s Korean coal. At this point, while competitive labor costs relative to costs of competition between Chinese provinces is Chinese labor, development of DPRK well known, it is impossible to prove rare-earth resources for export would internal coal arbitrage by the northeastern yield significant benefits.”lxxii Yet, despite provinces. Exact prices of imported the attractiveness of North Korean rare North Korean coal in Jilin and Liaonang earth minerals to a China obviously intent are unknown, as are prices at which the upon stockpiling, at least over the past northeastern provinces trade coal with decade, rare earth minerals could not have other Chinese provinces. Nevertheless, been a primary Chinese interest. Rare when combined with the analysis on earth mining is notoriously complicated, China’s coal industry in the previous even beyond the typical difficulties that section, the evidence on coal and iron ore North Korean mining projects present. export prices presented in this section The separation of rare earth minerals from indeed suggests that China has more their surrounding rock is very labor broadly looked toward North Korea’s intensive, and the process releases a minerals both to satisfy domestic significant amount of toxins to the consumption needs and for profit. environment. lxxiii Thompson notes that China has no officially recognized C. MINERAL STOCKPILING investments in North Korean rare earth mines at this point.lxxiv Thus, while China Beyond interest in North Korean may be interested in North Korean rare minerals for consumption and profit earth minerals for the purpose of

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 33! stockpiling going forward, Chinese policy at the highest levels of China’s stockpiling interests cannot be seen as a decision-making processes also supports legitimate cause of the increase in bilateral the first alternative explanation. trade between the two nations over the Despite the fact that neither the past decade. mineral policy financial model nor an In summary, the supplementary analysis of national policy and decision- evidence presented in this section regards making corroborate the hypothesis that a the Chinese coal industry, North Korean targeted interest in North Korean coal and iron ore export prices to China, minerals caused the rise in Sino-DPRK and rare earth stockpiling provides bilateral trade, two key pieces of evidence support for the mineral alternative do indeed support this second alternative explanation. China is indeed interested in explanation. At a provincial level, Chinese North Korea as a remedy for domestic leaders have monetized national directives mineral shortfalls, as well as a supplier of to stabilize and expand their economic cheap minerals, though not for profit on growth by seeking to develop both an external level. On the other hand, the domestic mineral production and mineral third stockpiling facet of the mineral and transport connections with North alternative hypothesis cannot be proven Korea. Additionally, an analysis of the with respect to rare earths given the lack structure of China’s coal industry and the of development of North Korea’s rare prices it is able to receive on minerals earth industry at this point. trade with North Korea does indicate a targeted interest by the Chinese in North UNITING THE FRAMEWORKS – Korean minerals both to satisfy domestic WHICH CHINESE POLICY demand and for arbitrage. Finally, Chinese DOMINATES IN TRADE WITH policy directives at both the national and NORTH KOREA? provincial levels suggest a keen interest, as part of the overarching Peaceful By collectively examining the Development goal, in inducing stronger evidence in this paper, it becomes clear economic growth and development in the that each of the alternative explanations three northeastern provinces nearest finds support as a byproduct of China’s North Korea. overarching national objective of Peaceful The evidence presented in this Development. Indeed, China’s dominant paper points toward 2003 being the single goal serves to unite economic, foreign, most crucial year in Chinese policy making and mineral policy. With respect to North in the last decade. Although China’s Korea, Peaceful Development necessitates Peaceful Rise policy had been in place two goals: long-term denuclearization, but since the 1978 reforms, it took new form more importantly, regime stability. China in 2003, uniting Chinese goals as relates to clearly believes that in order for the North Korea. Whereas Deng and Jiang regime to survive, it needs money, and had been focused on economic growth bilateral trade is a vehicle for foreign without concern for its distribution, the exchange generation in North Korea. By rise of a more reform- and stability- using diplomatic exchanges as a proxy for oriented Hu Jintao in 2003 led China to Chinese foreign policy, this paper’s shift its rhetoric toward Peaceful foreign policy financial model illustrates Development. It was the institution of the direct impact of foreign policy Peaceful Development that enabled the decisions in increasing bilateral trade. The third alternative explanation of dominance of foreign policy over mineral development of the northeastern

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 34! provinces to take hold. 2003 was also the departure from Hu. lxxvi While the full year in which North Korea conducted its breadth of Xi’s beliefs is as yet unclear, first nuclear test, and China watched the already in his first year in power, China United States invade Iraq. While China has seen two major departures from the had maintained a policy toward North past ten years. In the first place, China’s Korea of a Peaceful Rise with long-term decision to publish an unprecedented list denuclearization and regime stability as its of banned North Korean trade items in goals, under Hu, China began to place September 2013 marks a potentially sharp more importance on reconstituting change in China’s North Korea policy.lxxvii relations with North Korea in a trade- China’s new policy may represent a move versus-aid manner. This, then, enabled the to crack down upon North Korean efforts first alternative explanation—that China’s to import dual-use technology, indicative increase in trade with North Korea was of China’s increasing frustration with the caused by foreign policy interests. 2003 nuclear policies of its neighbor. was important in China from a mineral Alternatively, China may instead have perspective as well, marked by the published its September 24th document publishing of a national Policy on Mineral purely for show to powers, such as the Resources. Again, Hu Jintao’s rise played a United States, who are skeptical of distinct role. While China had relied upon China’s enforcement of international resource development to drive economic sanctions against North Korea. Perhaps growth under his predecessors, it was not the next major North Korean provocation until Hu’s rise to power that China began will elicit an illustrative response from looking to North Korea to satisfy China under Xi. Secondly, China has domestic shortages with intent to profit, experienced a potentially significant and began mineral stockpiling. With the internal economic change under Xi after rise of a new leadership group in China its Third Plenum this November. While this year, it remains to be seen whether China’s broad rhetoric has largely China’s current policies on North Korean remained the same, many analysts have trade will continue into the next decade. argued that Xi Jinping has made himself the most powerful Chinese leader since IMPLICATIONS FOR COMING Deng Xiaoping.lxxviii Again, the results of YEARS this Third Plenum will take months or years to provide clear implications on Whether or not the ascension of Xi China’s North Korea policy. At this point Jinping will constitute a change in China’s though, two opposing interpretations of North Korea policy is difficult to this combination of initial changes under determine at this early stage. Xi’s rise Xi can be made. represents the return of the Shanghai If indeed Xi’s ascension marks a Clique of Princelings to political power, a return to conservative Communist turn from the last ten years under Hu’s policies, and he exercises his increased Youth League (CCYL) faction.lxxv Under power rather than relying upon consensus Jiang Zemin, the Princeling-Shanghai building as under Hu, China may see a clique was known for its focus on lesser emphasis on northeastern provincial economic growth, while the Hu-CCYL development than in the last ten years. In group was aligned with reform and more the same vein, it is possible that provincial equitable economic distribution. Xi has and business leaders will be given a been assumed to exhibit more shorter leash in their attempts to monetize conservative Communist beliefs, a national policy directives. Finally, if

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China’s September 24th banned-trade list will allow for easier Chinese access to points toward Chinese intentions to crack North Korea’s mineral-rich northern down upon its unruly neighbor, these regions, as well as the ability to transport changes may together decrease bilateral products without having to travel around trade with North Korea. the Korean Peninsula. lxxx Although the More likely, however, are far more GTI and Rajin port development have modest changes within China after the rise been goals of the Chinese, especially Jilin of Xi Jinping. As the second ranking province, for some time, it was not until official in China for the last five years 2010 that successful development truly under Hu, Xi’s portfolio most began.lxxxi As China’s goal of increasing its prominently featured foreign policy. lxxix economic and transportation Given Hu’s emphasis on consensus infrastructure in North Korea is realized, decisions, it is likely that most of China’s further increases in bilateral trade with its North Korea policy over the last five years northeastern neighbor become even more had Xi’s support (and potentially did for probable. the five years from 2003-2006 when Xi was the fifth ranking member on the APPENDIX: PBSC). While Xi has indeed consolidated power after the Third Plenum, it is likely FOREIGN POLICY FINANCIAL that his policy preferences as relates to MODEL KEY North Korea have already been seen at this point. Thus, China may intend to 1. Jan 15-20, 2001: Kim visits China, crack down on North Korea’s illegal again meets with Jiang in Beijing and trading, yet still seek to increase legal spends four days in Shanghai (Wang). bilateral trade to maintain regime stability. 2. Apr 19-21, 2004: Kim visits China, Over the coming years, this author meets with Hu Jintao in Beijing hypothesizes that the specific forms of (Wang). trade and foreign direct investment 3. Oct 18-20, 2004: Kim Yong Nam emphasized with North Korea will visits China, agrees to six-party talks continue to be predominantly minerals (Wu). based, but transportation will also play a 4. 2004: China’s International major role. China’s mineral demand Department exchanges 10 delegations continues to rise, and the development of with North Korea. The only country North Korea’s mineral resources will with more delegations was Japan at 13 continue to be attractive, particularly if the (Schambaugh). DPRK improves its mining infrastructure. 5. Oct 2005: Chinese Vice Premier Wu China has already shown interest in two Yi and Commerce Minister Bo Xilai key DPRK projects that are currently in visit DPRK for 60th anniversary of the early development stages - the Greater founding of the KWP (Park). Tumen Initiative (GTI) and the Rason 6. 2005: Hu Jintao visits North Korea Industrial Complex and Rajin port. The (Schambaugh). GTI, an offshoot of the UN’s Tumen 7. Jan 10-18, 2006: Kim visits China, River Area Development Program, is a tours Hubei and Guandong provinces, partnership between China, Russia, and meets with Hu in Beijing (Wang). Mongolia, and South Korea that seeks to 8. Oct 4, 2009: Wen Jiabao visits DPRK create an economic zone along the Sino- on the 60th anniversary of bilateral DPRK border. Along with the relations. Also present are Commerce development of a port at Rajin, the GTI Minister Chen Deming, and National

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Development and Reform Not on chart: May 29-31, 2000: Kim Commission chair Zhang Ping. China Jong-Il visits China, meets with Jiang pledges $21 million for education, Zemin in Beijing, Xinhua notes tourism, and development (Park). significance to new century of relations 9. Late Oct 2009: Choe Thae-bok, (Wang). secretary of the KWP central committee, leads a delegation to MINERAL FINANCIAL MODEL KEY Beijing (Snyder, “China-Korea Relations”). 1. Oct 2003: CPC Central Committee 10. Late 2009: Kim Yang-gon, director of and State Council release “The the United Front Department of the Strategy of Revitalizing Northeast KWP visits China for five days China and Other Old Industrial (Snyder, “China-Korea Relations”). Bases” (Chinaneast.gov). 11. 2009: China and North Korea 2. Dec 2003: Policy on Mineral exchange 120 delegations and over 40 Resources released, focusing on events as part of their “friendship sustainable development and also year” (Snyder, “China-Korea “[making] use of foreign markets and Relations”). Gill cites nine major foreign mineral resources” party-to-party exchanges this year, (English.gov.cn). including Chinese Minister of Defense 3. Feb 6, 2004: Jilin provincial Liang Guanglie, State Councilor Dai government announces its “Plan to Bingguo, and Politburo Standing Revitalize Old Industrial Bases”, Committee Member Zhou Yongkang. which expresses a desire for ports and 12. May 3-7, 2010: Kim visits China, border trade with North Korea (Jilin meets with Hu in Beijing. Reportedly, Provincial Government). Hu urges Kim to refrain from 4. Mar 2005: Beijing signs the provocations and insists on market “Investment Encouragement and reforms (Bajoria and Xu). Protection Agreement” during the 13. Aug 26-30, 2010: Kim visits China, DPRK Premier’s visit (“The Political tours Jilin, its capital Changchun Economy of Chinese Investment in (where he meets with Hu), and Harbin North Korea”, NK Econ Watch). (Wang). 5. Oct 2005: While Wu Yi and Bo Xilai 14. 2010: Gill cites twelve major party-to- are visiting DPRK, China Minmetals party delegations between China and Corp signs an agreement to create a North Korea this year, including joint venture in coal mining in the Wang Jiarui, Zhou Yongkang, and Dai DPRK (“Minerals, Railways Draw Bingguo. China to North Korea”, NK Econ 15. May 20-26, 2011: Kim visits China, Watch). tours Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Jiangsu 6. Feb 8, 2006: Jilin provincial provinces, and meets with Hu and government announces its 11th five- Wen Jiabao in Beijing. Six other year economic plan, explicitly stating a Politburo Standing Committee goal of “going out” to North Korea members (including Xi Jinping and Li with a “focus on… resources Keqiang) also meet with Kim (Wang). cooperation and development” (Jilin 16. 2011: Gill cites four major party-to- Provincial Government). party exchanges this year (Gill). 7. Mar 14, 2006: Chinese government ratifies its 11th 5-year economic plan, notable for emphasizing “common

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prosperity” and reduction in income relationship [of rare earth minerals] in inequality (Fan). the market” (Arredy, The Wall Street 8. 2006: Luanhe Industrial Group of Journal). China reportedly invests in a 51% 15. Nov 23, 2009: Jilin provincial stake in Hyesan Youth Copper Mine government announces China’s for 15 years. *Later opposed by approval of the first cross-border zone DPRK Second Economic in the Tumen River Delta (“China Commission, and mine was closed due Approves Tumen Border to flooding from 1994-2009 (“Chinese Development Zone”, NK Econ Firms Acquire Managerial Control of Watch). Large N.Korean Copper Mine: 16. Jan 4, 2010: China takes 11 rare earth Sources”, NK Econ Watch). blocs in Jiangxi and Ganzhou under 9. Nov 2007: North Korea’s Daepung national control (Arredy, The Wall Investment Group announces a $10 Street Journal). billion fund with China’s Devlopment 17. Feb 2010: China announces $10B Bank to help Chinese firms in North investment in the DPRK via Daepung Korea build roads, rails, and ports Group, unclear in what (“China to (“North Korea, China Will Start $10 Send $10 B Investment to DPRK”, Billion Fund, Yonhap Reports”, NK NK Econ Watch). Econ Watch). 18. Mar 2010: China announces Chuangli 10. Nov 21, 2007: Chinese firm (not Company acquired 10-year rights to named) signs 50-year contract for develop port number one at Rajin control of Musan iron ore mines (“China Leases Rajin Port for 10 (“Musan Mine into Chinese Hands?”, Years”, NK Econ Watch). NK Econ Watch). 19. April 2010: China’s Global Steel seeks 11. Dec 2007: Chinese government stake in Musan iron ore mine, releases “Plan of Revitalizing North reportedly offering 7 billion yuan and East China”, citing “sustainable 10 million tonnes of iron ore per year development” and enforcement of (“Pramod Mittal Eyes Stake in DPRK “state policies of resource Mines”, NK Econ Watch). conservation” (Xinhuanet). 20. May 2010: Chinese enterprise granted 12. June 2008: China’s S Group invests operational control and 60% of profits $57 million in a joint venture iron ore at Saebyul Coal Mining Complex mine. The mine had allegedly been up (“Chinese Take Complete Control of and running just south of Pyongyang Mines”, NK Econ Watch). since 2H 2007. The firm is reportedly 21. Feb 16, 2011: Jilin provincial also interested in magnesite mines government announces its 12th Five- (“Chinese Invest in DPRK Mining”, year economic plan, referencing NK Econ Watch). “promoting [North Korea’s] national 13. Dec 12, 2008: Henan Yima Coal resources to… expand market share” Mining Group invests in a 10 million (Jilin Provincial Government). ton coal mine and a 1.2 million ton 22. Mar 14, 2011: Chinese government coal chemical project (“Chinese ratifies its 12th 5-year economic plan, Expand Reach Over DPRK’s Coal”, which focuses on “higher quality” and NK Econ Watch). “inclusive growth” (KPMG). 14. 2009: Ministry of Land and Resources 23. 2011: Xiyang Group of Liaoning publishes white paper citing need to agrees to a $38 million joint venture to “regulate the supply-demand develop 500,000 tonnes of iron

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powder per year. *Deal terminated a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! few months later (“DPRK Mining koreas-growing-trade-dependency-on-china-mixed- Investment Woes”, NK Econ Watch). strategic-implications/. - Not pictured: June 20, 2012: China v Liu Ming, “Changes and Continuities in Pyongyang’s issues white paper entitled “The China Policy,” in North Korea in Transition: Politics, Situation and Policies of China’s Rare Economy, and Society, ed. Kyung-Ae Park and Scott Snyder (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Earth Industry”, suggesting a need to 2012), 219. increase production, as well as active vi Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, national management of such Economics, Security, 120. commodities (Information Office of vii the State Council, PRC). Ibid., 121-124. - Sept 22, 2012: China announces that viii John Park, “The Rise of China and its Impact on the China Overseas Investment Co will North Pacific Security Environment,” Joint U.S.-Korea manage a $476 million fund to invest Academic Studies, no 20 (Korea Economic Institute, 2010): 140, in North Korea (“DPRK Investment http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/JAS- Seminars”, NK Econ Watch). Park_Final.pdf. ix Drew Thompson, “Silent Partners: Chinese Joint - Late 2012: 70 specialists from Jilin’s Ventures in North Korea,” U.S.-Korea Institute Report, Department of Commerce visit North (Washington, DC: SAIS, 2011), 5, Korea to work on joint ventures http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp- content/uploads/2011/02/USKI_Report_SilentPartner (“China to Provide North Korea with s_DrewThompson_020311.pdf. Consultation on Management and x David von Hippel and Peter Hayes, “Foundations of Operation of Joint SEZs”, NK Econ Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances, Engagement Options, and Future Paths for Watch). Energy and Economic Development,” The Nautilus - Feb 2013: Weijin Investment Group Institute, September 13, 2012, of Hunan announces a $20 million http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp- investment in a North Korean gold content/uploads/2012/12/1990-2009-DPRK- ENERGY-BALANCES-ENGAGEMENT-OPTIONS- mine and luxury hotel (“Chinese UPDATED- Company to Invest in Gold Mine, 2012_changes_accepted_dvh_typos_fixed.pdf. xi Goohoon Kwon, “A United Korea? Reassessing Luxury Hotel in North Korea”, NK North Korea Risks (Part I),” Goldman Sachs Economic Econ Watch). Research, Global Economics Paper No. 188, September 21, 2009, http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk- uploads/global_economics_paper_no_188_final.pdf. xii Bates Gill, “China’s North Korea Policy: Assessing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Interests and Influences,” USIP Special Report 283 i Pui-Kwan Tse, “The Mineral Industry of North Korea- (United States Institute of Peace, July 2010), 2000,” United States Geological Survey, accessed November http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/Chi 16 2013. na's_North_Korea_Policy.pdf. xiii http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2000 Drew Thompson, “Silent Partners,” 4. /9315000.pdf. xiv Daniel Gearin, “Chinese Infrastructure and Natural ii Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Resources Investments in North Korea,” US-China Economics, Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), Economic and Security Review Commission, October 10, 110. 2010, 3. iii Dick Nanto and Mark Manyin, “China-North Korea Relations,” Congressional Research Service, December 28, xv Index Mundi, Commodity Prices, 2013, 2010. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41043.pdf. http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/. xvi Cheng Li. “China’s Northeast: From Largest Rust Belt to Fourth Economic Engine?” China Leadership iv Scott Snyder, “North Korea’s Growing Trade Monitor, no. 9 (January 30, 2004), 1, Dependency on China: Mixed Strategic Implications,” http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents Asia Unbound Blog, Council on Foreign Relations, June 15, /clm9_lc.pdf. xvii Cheng Li, “China’s Northeast: From Largest Rust 2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/06/15/north- Belt to Fourth Economic Engine?” 3.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xviii “‘Plan of Revitalizing Northeast China’ Released,” xxxv Ibid., 709. Xinhuanet, last modified December 19, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007- xxxvi Ibid., 710. 12/19/content_7279455.htm. xix Thompson, “Silent Partners”, 25-26. xxxvii “China’s 12th Five-year Plan: Overview,” KPMG China, March 2011, xx International Trade Centre, Bilateral trade between Korea, http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/Art Democratic People's Republic of and China, 2013, iclesPublications/Publicationseries/5-years- http://www.trademap.org/countrymap/Product_SelCo plan/Documents/China-12th-Five-Year-Plan- untry_TS.aspx. Overview-201104.pdf. xxi See Appendix for chart key and relevant sources. xxxviii “‘Plan of Revitalizing Northeast China’ Released.” xxii See Gill paper for a discussion on party-to-party xxxix “Plan to Revitalize Old Industrial Bases,” The relations as a distinct feature of Sino-DPRK interaction. People’s Government of Jilin, February 6, 2004, http://www.jl.gov.cn/jlgk/fzgh/fzgh_01/201011/t2010 xxiii John Park, “The Rise of China and its Impact on the 1122_901800.html. North Pacific Security Environment,” 143. xl Lee, Young-hoon, “Feasibility of the ‘Chang-Ji-Tu’ Plan and North Korea’s Economic Reform,” Korea Development Institute, North Korean Economy Review, April xxiv Gill, “China’s North Korea Policy.” 2011, http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/layout/content_ xxv Snyder, “China-North Korea Relations,” 3. print.asp?group_id=103609. Note: neither Liaoning nor Heilongjiang specifically xxvi See Appendix for a larger version of this chart, its mention North Korea in their 10th, 11th, or 12th five-year key, and relevant sources. economic plans. xxvii “China’s Foreign Policy for Pursuing Peaceful xli Reuter’s Connected China interactive Chinese Development.” GOV.cn, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/201 government tool provided background for this section. 1-09/06/content_23362744.htm. xxviii Cabestan, Jean-Pierre, “China’s Foreign- and xlii Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Security-Policy Decision-Making Processes Under Hu Policy Actors in China,” SIPRI Policy Paper, September Jintao,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 38, 3 (2009), 26, 2010, http://journals.sub.uni- http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP26.pdf. hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/view/61. xliii Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading xxix Park adds in “The Rise of China” that China’s Small Groups,” Hoover Institute, China Leadership Monitor foreign policy can be synthesized into two principles: no. 26, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents “nonintervention in the internal affairs of other /CLM26AM.pdf. countries, and cooperation and participation in xliv Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox. “New Foreign multilateral institutions”. Policy Actors in China.” xxx Park, “The Rise of China”. xlv Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Foreign- and Security- Policy Decision-Making Processes Under Hu Jintao,” 3. xxxi “China’s Policy on Mineral Resources (2003),” GOV.cn, December 2003, xlvi Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading http://english.gov.cn/official/2005- 07/28/content_17963.htm. Small Groups.” xxxii Ibid. xlvii Ibid., 8-10. xxxiii Anne Wu, “What China Whispers to North Korea,” xlviii David Schambaugh, “China's ‘Quiet Diplomacy’: The Washington Quarterly 28, 2 (January 7, 2010): 35-48, The International Department of the Chinese http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1162/016366 Communist Party,” China: An International Journal 5, 1 0053295239. (March 2007), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/chn/summary/v005/5.1s xxxiv Cindy Fan, “China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan hambaugh.html. (2006–2010): From ‘Getting Rich First’ to ‘Common xlix Ibid. Prosperity,’” Eurasian Geography and Economics 47, 6 (2006): 708–723., l Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/597/300. Small Groups”. pdf.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! li John Dotson, “The China Rising Leaders Project, Part http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special- 1: The Chinese Communist Party and its Emerging reports/dprk-prc-trade-aden/#axzz2lZJVmgCU. Next-Generation Leaders,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Research Report, March 23, 2012, lxvii Since 2007, the report suggests that anthracite coal 13, 48, export prices have actually risen due to 1) increasing http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Researc h/USCC_Staff_Report_Rising_Leadersinthe_CCP_(Ma DPRK marketization, 2) declining anthracite quality, and rch%202012).pdf. 3) increasing competition in anthracite supply to lii Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin, northeast China. “Understanding China’s Political System,” Congressional Research Service, March 20, 2013, lxviii James Arredy, “China Moves to Strengthen Grip http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41007.pdf. Over Supply of Rare-Earth Metals,” The New York Times liii “China,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, April Online, February 7, 2011, 23, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274 http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/chi na.pdf. 8704124504576117511251161274. liv Alicia Campi, “The New Great Game: Potential lxix Impact of Mineral Development in Mongolia on China, Wayne M. Morrison and Rachel Tang, “China’s Rare Russia, Japan, and Korea” (prepared remarks, East-West Earth Industry and Export Regime: Economic and Center, Washington, D.C., September 18, 2012). Trade Implications for the United States,” Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2012, 12, lv Richard K. Morse and Gang He, “The World’s http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42510.pdf. Greatest Coal Arbitrage: China’s Coal Import Behavior and Implications for the Global Coal Market,” Stanford lxx Ibid., 16, 12. Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Working Paper no. 94 (August 2010): 3, http://iis- lxxi David Von Hippel and Peter Hayes, “Foundations of db.stanford.edu/pubs/22966/WP_94_Morse_He_Grea Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy test_Coal_Arbitrage_5Aug2010.pdf. Balances, Engagement Options, and Future Paths for lvi Ibid., 3-4. Energy and Economic Development.” lvii Ibid., 1 lxxii Ibid, 233. lviii Kyung-soo Choi, “The Mining Industry of North lxxiii Mike Ives, “Boom in Mining Rare Earths Poses Korea,” The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, Mounting Toxic Risks,” Yale Environment 360, January August 4, 2011, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet- 28, 2013, special-reports/the-mining-industry-of-north- http://e360.yale.edu/feature/boom_in_mining_rare_ea korea/#axzz2kTCwSnb9. rths_poses_mounting_toxic_risks/2614/. lix International Trade Centre, Bilateral trade between Korea, lxxiv Drew Thompson, “Silent Partners,” 58. Democratic People's Republic of and China. lxxv John Dotson, “The China Rising Leaders Project, lx Alicia Campi, “The New Great Game”. Part 1: The Chinese Communist Party and its Emerging Next-Generation Leaders.” 6. lxi Kyung-soo Choi, “The Mining Industry of North Korea”. lxxvi Ibid., 30. lxii Drew Thompson, “Silent Partners,” 61. lxxvii Jane Perlez, “China Bans Items for Export to North Korea, Fearing Their Use in Weapons,” The New York lxiii Ibid., 50-51. Times Online, September 24, 2013, lxiv Ibid., 55-56. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/world/asia/chi na-bans-certain-north-korean-exports-for-fear-of- lxv International Trade Centre, Bilateral trade between weapons-use.html?_r=0. Korea, Democratic People's Republic of and China. lxxviii “Every Move You Make,” The Economist, November lxvi Nathaniel Aden, “North Korean Trade with China as 16, 2013, Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: 1995-2009 http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21589882- Energy and Minerals Trends and Implications,” The xi-jinping-has-made-himself-most-powerful-leader-deng- Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, July 7, 2011, xiaoping-probably-good.

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Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 45!

K-FILMS, K-DRAMAS, K-POP, NEXT UP… K-VARIETY? Korean Variety—The New Addition to the Hallyu Hui Min Lee New York University

INTRODUCTION culturally and economically. Korean On April 16, 2013, a Korean dramas have been “considered by some television broadcasting station, MBC, media scholars as the most powerful uploaded a video titled “Psy Gentleman – medium of proposing a framework for Wet Psy! (Wet Psy’s meaning and representing the world as a world with history)” on its official YouTube channel, meaning and order, and redefining the MBC entertainment i . Following the context of the world in projecting a social official release of Korean singer Psy’s imaginary” ii . Similarly, Korean variety latest song “Gentleman,” many listeners shows, which use the same mediums (the have wondered about the lyrics of the television and the Internet) as K-dramas song, especially the line “You know who I to reach out to their viewers, reflect am, Wet Psy!” MBC’s video explains that societal trends and in turn have the power “Wet Psy” actually means “Wet (armpit) to reinforce stereotypes and “order” in Psy,” as Psy was previously well-known society. Many scholars have analyzed the for his sweaty underarms before he ways K-dramas shaped Korean society. By became popular due to “Gangnam Style”. applying these same modes of analysis, I The video then goes on to explain the hope to explore and understand the role seemingly random characters that appear of Korean variety shows in shaping in the “Gentleman” music video. Korean society. This paper will focus on Interestingly, these seven strangers are the three main themes: the gender members of the Korean variety show representations in the shows, the way Infinity Challenge, which is produced by nationalistic sentiments are promoted via MBC. Psy has been featured on the show the shows, and the way the shows multiple times and has a close relationship introduce other countries and their with the cast. The featuring of these cultures to Koreans. But before we delve television personalities shows the integral into these themes, it is important to first presence of variety shows in the Korean understand the rise in popularity of media industry. However, few studies Korean variety shows – why them, why have been conducted on the societal now? impact made by South Korean variety shows. Perhaps this is because variety POPULARITY OF KOREAN shows have often been associated with VARIETY SHOWS entertainment and are thought to have little influence over the culture of South The rise in popularity of Korean Korea. I propose the importance of variety shows (hereafter, K-variety) makes viewing beyond the comical façade of it perhaps the most unexpected addition variety shows and recognize the role that to the Hallyu, or “Korean Wave.” Unlike they play in shaping Korean society, both K-dramas and K-pop, K-variety often

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 46! does not have “highly attractive stars” or has signaled its newest addition to the “absorbing narratives that revolve around regional and increasingly international emotion-ridden family relationships” iii . outreach of the Korean culture. Compared to other media forms like To a certain extent, it can be said dramas and films, K-variety is also rarely that the rise of K-variety is a by-product imported by other countries and is of Hallyu. As international audiences come missing from much of the Korean into contact with K-films, K-dramas, and government’s efforts to export Korean K-pop, they are exposed to Korean cultural products and the cultural industry. culture, which includes K-variety. In Variety shows like Infinity Challenge, addition, the Korean media industry is however, have become a staple source of designed in a way to promote comedy in Korean society, providing interdependence between music, drama, viewers with much entertainment and film and variety. As media scholar James relieving them of stress. Like K-dramas, Bennett explains, “the television these variety shows enable fans “to take personality system intersects and temporary flight from the routine and intermingles with wider formations of ordinary” iv . These shows can be celebrity culture”vi. Actors and idol stars characterized as sketch comedy shows often guest on variety shows when they combined with reality television, whose are promoting their newest dramas and main aim is to make people laugh. This albums. In fact, “appearing in [variety] paper will closely analyze two variety shows is considered crucial for idol shows, Running Man and Infinity Challenge. groups because it enables them to reveal In both shows, television personalities on their seemingly genuine selves to the the program are given a theme and a audiences” and create a fan base for mission to accomplish in every episode. themselves vii . Conversely, many fans of For Running Man, the most frequent idols and actors also start to watch variety mission involves eliminating the other shows because their favorite stars are on members on the show in order to become it. the sole survivor. Infinity Challenge is a little In addition, research has shown different in that the missions are not quite that audiences are more “interested in so repetitive. Common themes, such as popular content that is locally relevant, Infinity Company, where members play the and regionally accessible” viii . In recent roles of company workers in an imaginary years, K-variety has started to record company, repeat throughout the show some of its episodes abroad. In these with varying missions. overseas recordings, producers of the With the development of the shows always include the culture of the Internet in recent years, these variety overseas location in the episode, often shows began reaching an international increasing the regional and international audience as well. As media and cultural outreach of the show, which allows the studies professor Keehyung Lee puts it, show to “capture other large cultural “the Korean wave is more than a passing markets” ix . Coupled with the cultural fad,” and Hallyu has been “increasingly proximity of Korean culture to other East framed as a legitimate and highly Asian cultures, these shows are made publicized cultural phenomena to be more “relevant” to viewers in different reckoned with”v. However, I wish to point countries, increasing its “cultural out that Hallyu is not merely limited to meaning,” and allow them to “appeal to Korean films, dramas and pop music. The more than one cultural market” x . rise in popularity of Korean variety shows According to media scholar Tania Lim,

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 47! the increase in appeal of the shows television shows around the world” xiv . increases the likelihood that However, the difference in international “broadcasters, advertisers, and audiences popularity of the shows is not simply will aid the circulation of [K-variety] because of the difference in the style of within the region”xi. In Singapore, Running the entertainment but also because of the Man became the first Korean variety show availability of subtitles online since most since the beginning of Hallyu to be international audience do not have screened on national television. proficient knowledge of the Korean However, official circulation of language. It is almost impossible to find the show is insufficient to account for the the newest episode of Infinity Challenge immense popularity of Running Man and with English subtitles online as compared other variety shows. Instead, a key driver to Running Man, which has a steady stream behind the outreach of the show is the of English translations occurring every Internet. Even though some countries do week, giving the latter a clear advantage in import K-variety programs, these imports their access to the international audience. usually lag behind the screening of the The analysis done on Infinity Challenge in episodes in Korea. On the other hand, the this paper is thus conducted by watching newest episodes of the shows are usually the show with Chinese subtitles instead. available without subtitles online on the Both Running Man and Infinity same day as the screening in Korea. The Challenge are known for being largely Internet also allows the formation of fan unscripted, with writers and producers communities where fellow viewers of planning the general theme and flow of these shows come together to discuss the the episodes and leaving the actual characters in the show or the content of interaction to the cast themselves. This the episodes. These fan communities tend element of spontaneity allows the show to to give rise to ‘subbing teams,’ where reflect social sentiments and trends that current fans group together to translate all surface as the cast members ‘act’ as the episodes of the shows. These themselves and “emphasize the communities serve as an important continuousness and authenticity of their platform for more viewers to gain access ordinary personas” xv . By simply being to the shows. As media scholar Brian Hu themselves in the show and coming across describes it, “the collective act of as ordinary people in society, their adlibs translation mobilizes resources from and dialogues naturally conform to their around the world in order to sustain the personal views and represent how societal emotional investment necessary for norms shape their thoughts and ideals. As fandom,” thus maintaining the popularity Bennett puts it, “ordinariness functions as of these variety showsxii. an ideological marker of class and As mentioned earlier, this paper gender,” and thus the emphasis on will focus on two specific outdoor variety ordinariness of popular television shows: Running Man and Infinity Challenge. personalities places them in a position of Running Man is currently the most popular power to “actively promote and maintain K-variety internationally, whereas Infinity particular meanings about what it means Challenge is the most popular K-variety to be ‘ordinary’ across a range of identity domestically xiii . Infinity Challenge is also formations [including] national identity featured on England Channel 4’s “The [and] gender”xvi. The cast members of K- Greatest Shows on Earth” where the host, variety are then able to define various Daisy Donovan, “travels around the globe forms of masculinity in the Korean featuring some of the most popular

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 48! society via their representations of tenacity allowed her to shine on the show, themselves. and she was eventually offered a fixed appearance, becoming the only female GENDER REPRESENTATION member of the fixed cast on Running Man. As communications scholar Do In K-variety, the majority of the Kyun Kim pointed out, the “media fixed cast in the shows are men, especially content of Hallyu” usually includes for outdoor variety programs: Running “messages empowering women,” and “the Man has 6 male cast members and 1 roles of men are often portrayed as female cast member, Infinity Challenge is supportive to women”xvii. In Running Man, made up of an all-male cast, and another Song’s character is gradually shaped into outdoor variety show, 2 Day 1 Night, is an ‘Ace’ on the show. With each repeated made up of an all-male cast as well. appearance on the show, Song’s Usually, female guests, from idol stars to “television self” is “increasingly actresses, are looked upon as objects of authenticated [and] coheres into the form desire by the male cast members, who are of a ‘genuine’ personality”xviii. She comes often fans of these guests. On the other across as witty, sharp and daring, hand, if the female guests are famous occasionally even outshining her male comedians or television personalities, they counterparts in terms of courage. In are viewed almost like ‘brothers’ to the Episode 133, she is portrayed as a woman male cast. The difference in treatment lies without fear when she completes the in the portrayal of the stars on television. world’s tallest bungee jump at the Macau One thing I must clarify is that the Tower for a mission without any boundary between actors and television hesitation, unlike the male guest actor Lee personalities is not a clear-cut line, as can Dong Wook, who hesitates for up to be seen from the role of actress Song Ji thirty minutes before making the jump, Hyo in Running Man, who changed her and her fellow cast members (excluding profession from an actress to a television Kim Jong Kook, who was not present) personality on the show. who do not dare to take up the challenge. When female stars are featured as Her bravery distinguishes her from the fixed cast in K-variety programs, they are social stereotype of girls being ‘weak’ and usually portrayed as weak and feminine. allows her to come across as a strong and However, they always have a certain independent woman. It thus seems as masculine character in them that allows though she is breaking gender stereotypes them to survive in these shows. Usually via her character in the show. I, on the appearing without makeup, these female other hand, contend that she reinforces stars, who are mostly actresses or singers, the gender stereotype of females being come across as ordinary women instead of generally ‘weak’. She is the only woman to celebrities. They are thus placed in ‘survive’ in an all-male cast, distinguishing contrast to female guests on the episodes, her from the average woman in society. In who often appear with full makeup and Episode 138, Song drags the female guest, pretty hairstyles. In Running Man, the role actress Min Hyo Rin, during a mission to of actress Song Ji Hyo shows the drastic avoid elimination. Compared to other change from an actress guesting on a female guest stars on the show, who often show to a fixed cast on the show. Initially ‘require’ protection from the male cast appearing on Episode 2 as a guest star, during missions, Song comes across as a she was welcomed by the male cast with ‘superwoman’. The gender roles that loud cheers and much excitement. Her involve Song are also occasionally

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 49! reversed. In Episode 55, a mission making him the most feared person required the male cast members to during missions that involve chases. His piggyback the female guests and Song and hyper-masculinity is often emphasized in run down a street. While all the other contrast to his fellow male cast mates. In couples had the men piggyback the Episode 113, Kim inverted fellow cast women, Song piggybacked Gary, a male Yoo Jae Suk during a wrestling match for cast mate instead. Her strength and a mission. Yoo’s apparent physical bravery assigns her masculine weakness is portrayed alongside Kim’s characteristics, which then justifies her strength. However, Kim also displays a position as a fixed cast in the male- “manufactured versatile masculinity,” dominated show. Over the course of the where he displays characteristics that are show, her fellow cast mates then gradually both tough and cute, through exercising treats her as family and ‘brotherly’. In “different images, gestures and voices”xxi. other words, she has become a ‘man’. In some instances, he performs cute Yet, as much as her characteristics gestures (aegyo) and his nametag is even portray her as manly and strong, Song is modified to include a heart shape with his still a female. Another common element name changed to Kookie instead of Kim in most variety shows is the existence of Jong Kook. Kim’s “masculinity is flexible, romantic interest between a male cast and transformable, and hybridized,” increasing a female cast. Cast members and his appeal to the viewers of the showxxii. In producers use this romantic element to this show, the hybrid and hyper- increase the appeal of the show, making masculinity as portrayed by Kim is revered certain scenes in the variety show seem and Kim becomes the most powerful ‘drama-like’. In Running Man, Song is often character in the show, increasing the paired up with Gary, forming the ‘Monday attractiveness of having a good body to Couple’xix. In the show, Gary often plays the viewers and reinforcing the “‘momjjang’ the “supportive role” to Song, sharing (also known as body-master) syndrome, a hints with her and even sacrificing his socio-cultural trend that began in South nametag at the end of the mission to allow Korea in the early 2000s”xxiii. her to win xx . However, it seems that, The gender representations by without Gary’s support, Song is usually Song and Kim can be viewed as a form of unable to win on her own, as her physical “gender performativity” whereby strength is still inferior to that of most of “sexuality and gender are culturally her fellow male counterparts. constructed through the repetition of Besides the representation of stylized performances of gender,” and, females via Song’s character in the show, through repetition, reinforce gender hyper-masculine elements are also expectations xxiv . Gender performativity rewarded on the show. Kim Jong Kook also takes place in K-variety in the form fulfills this role as a hyper-masculine of parodies. In the same way that Song character. During the final mission where jokes that she is “just wearing a skirt” and the cast members are required to rip each is actually a “boy” in Episode 138 when a other’s nametags off, a caption reading fellow Running Man cast mate, Haha, ‘Sparta,’ accompanied by a tiger’s roar and comments that they are in an “all-boys a fierce narration, always accompany school,” the male characters in the show Kim’s initial appearance on the television often parody women. On episodes that screen. Being an avid body builder, his feature female guests, the cast is usually strength and agility are the strongest divided into couples. However, there among all the characters in the show, tends to be a lack of females, resulting in

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 50! the formation of one male-male couple. perform extraordinary tasks. In contrast to One of the men in the couple is then K-pop idols, the older age demographic of asked to ‘act’ as a female. This ‘female’ is the members in the show brings them further expected to fulfill (and thus closer and makes them more relatable to reinforce) gender stereotypes of women – the general Korean audience. Their on- the lack of physical strength and the visual screen performances are “naturalize[d]” appeal by putting on makeup and a wig. and they appear “just-as-they-are”xxv . In In Episode 139, Lee Kwang Soo, acting as addition, members of Infinity Challenge such a ‘female’, is filmed putting on lip tint and as Gil and Jung Jun Ha have also made looking innocently at the camera, trying to use of social networking platforms, like highlight ‘her’ beauty. Twitter, to confirm their authentic selves This parody of women is also via a “process of interaction” with fansxxvi. occasionally done on Infinity Challenge. On As mentioned previously, the variety programs, elements are often members of Infinity Challenge are always exaggerated in order to bring laughter to able to accomplish seemingly impossible the viewers. The parodies of women are tasks. So far, they have succeeded in thus brought to an extreme level with numerous long-term projects, including a elaborate makeup, costumes and Bobsleigh challenge, Aerobics, Wrestling hairstyles. Unlike Running Man, however, and Competitive Rowing. Beyond mere the aim of parodies in Infinity Challenge is entertainment, I propose that the to emphasize the ‘ugliness’ and not the members of the show represent the ideal ‘prettiness’. This difference in aim is that “ordinary people [are] a source of perhaps due to the fundamental difference potential power” xxvii . By stressing their in cast members of the shows. Running own ‘ordinariness’ and by coming across Man features a wide range of multi- as “behaving rather than performing,” the talented entertainers, including singers, members of Infinity Challenge are able to actors and comedians. Singers and actors motivate and empower the average are often assumed to have a basic visual Koreans to pursue their dreams and appeal. On the other hand, the cast ideals xxviii . Yet this ability to complete members of Infinity Challenge are mainly extraordinary tasks is not unfounded. The comedians who often use their looks and show never fails to highlight the hard body to generate laughter and work that the members put in in order to entertainment. In other words, Infinity master the necessary skills. From the daily Challenge uses the ‘ugliness’ of the cast to practices resulting in calluses on their appeal to its viewers. With hardly any hands when training for the Rowing good-looking, ‘visual’ character in the competition, to the wrestling boot camp show, Infinity Challenge distinguishes itself that resulted in full body sores, the show by putting across the message that ‘it is ok puts across a clear message: with hard to be ugly’. In fact, members often tease work, nothing is unachievable. In the each other about their looks and conduct highly image-conscious Korean society, rankings of ‘ugliness’ amongst themselves. this message thus helps ordinary Koreans This element of ‘ugliness,’ to not be discouraged because of their however, is extremely important to Infinity looks. Challenge. The lack of good looks allows Just as Bennett mentioned, “the the members to come across as average stress on television personalities’ and ordinary. Infinity Challenge thus comes ordinariness reveals how television across as a show featuring seemingly personalities are capable of representing average middle-aged men who are able to or reconciling value- or ideological-

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 51! conflicts”xxix. Song Ji Hyo’s character in citizens different cultures around the Running Man, placed in contrast with world. female guest stars on the show, shows how K-variety is able to “offer an NATIONALISM idealized buffer space to reconcile the conflicting discourses of femininities in In contrast to K-dramas and K- reality – traditional women who are… pop, which some argue “have little to do dependent on men at one extreme; and with traditional Korean culture or superwomen who are completely collective popular sentiments,” K-variety independent at another extreme” xxx. Kim has always been a platform for promoting Jong Kook’s character in Running Man Korean culture and nationalism in reinforces society’s admiration and pursuit Korea xxxiv . By featuring Korean stories, of hybrid masculinity. Beyond gender performers, and locations in a fun and representations, with the “kkonminam entertaining manner, these programs are syndrome” and the “momjjang syndrome” able to easily reach out to a large Korean in Korea, the members of Infinity Challenge audience. Excerpts in some shows have appeal to average Korean men, who also taken the form of social satires, possess neither muscular bodies nor a poking fun at governmental policies, “pretty boy image,” and empower them to censorship and social issues. A recent legal continue working hardxxxi. It thus seems as case shows the extent of the social critic though variety shows are designed to offered by variety programs. A politician, target the entire Korean population – Kang Yong-Seok, had sued comedian child-like characters are also present in the Choi Hyo-Jong for his political remarks shows via Haha (who is in both Running on the variety show Gag Concert. Kang Man and Infinity Challenge) and Lee Kwang later withdrew the lawsuit after “the Sooxxxii – which makes K-variety a good show’s writers came back with an entire platform to promote nationalistic episode lampooning [the] lawsuit” xxxv . sentiments and to show the world to Infinity Challenge has also poked fun at Koreans. Korea’s international relations through the While Do Kyun Kim suggests that use of captions reading “This is not “Hallyu [dramas] present some limitations befitting of a country hosting the G20 in terms of cultural diversity when a conference” and “There is no peace product is exported to other countries, amongst provocation” in Episode 223, because they are comprised of primarily when three of the members were hesitant Korean stories, Korean performers, and to disarm in order to co-operate with each Korean locations,” K-variety programs are otherxxxvi. able to overcome these limitationsxxxiii. The Nonetheless, not all variety shows featuring of Korean stories, performers choose to adopt a critical stance in social and locations allow these shows to and political issues. Instead, shows like promote nationalistic sentiments and Running Man choose to promote appeal to viewers who are interested in the nationalism in a subtler manner by Korean culture. In addition, these shows featuring Korean traditional stories as the have begun to feature episodes that are themes of some episodes and filming in filmed abroad, increasing its “cultural iconic landmarks. The location of filming diversity” and its relevance to regional sites in Korea promotes “‘encounters audiences. The shows are thus a part of between stars of television programs and Korea’s globalization and modernization buildings by star architects’ as an everyday efforts as they localize and show Korean experience” xxxvii . These locations

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 52! demonstrate the beauty of Korea to the Other than promoting Korean viewers. From the Suwon World Cup culture abroad, Infinity Challenge is also Stadium to the Gyeonghui Palace, more openly critical about social issues in Running Man has hardly ever repeated a Korea and promotes Korean nationalism location in its 140 episodes. With each in a more obvious manner. Social and location featuring beautiful modern political events are featured in the show buildings and interior designs, or nostalgic with little hesitation. In Episode 294, the traditional architecture, Korea is portrayed members created a parody of Psy’s as a country that has both “modernized famous “Gangnam Style.” In turn, they and retained its tradition”xxxviii. named their parody “Dokdo Style” and The feature of iconic landmarks began singing a song proclaiming that the has also spurred urban tourism in Korea, Dokdo Islets belongs to Korea. The benefitting the economy. As media Dokdo Islets, also known as Takeshima to scholar DeBoer pointed out, “any city that the Japanese, have long been a disputed tries to build an economy based on territory between South Korea and Japan. tourism must project itself as a This episode is not the first time that the dreamscape of visual consumption” xxxix . show sought to raise awareness on this Along with scenic locations promoted by territorial dispute and promote K-dramas, the specific buildings and nationalism by claiming that it belongs to landmarks that are identified in K-variety Korea, instead of taking a neutral stance. help to construct a Korea that is scenic In earlier episodes 266-268, the entire both naturally and artificially. The Korean mission is targeted at the Dokdo conflict. tourism sector grew with the popularity of However, the reference to the conflict is K-drama and is likely to continue to grow less explicit, with the clues in the mission with the increasing outreach of K-variety hinting to the Dokdo Islets dispute. These in the regional and the international clues are designed in such a way that only market. Koreans are able to understand them and However, simply promoting the link them to the conflict. The unique country within the show is insufficient to design of the clues thus situates Koreans reach out to foreigners. Infinity Challenge in a closed community, promoting brings this promotion to a whole new nationalistic sentiments via elements that level through its overseas specials. only they can relate to. Through these special episodes, the Social issues are also frequently “national logo” is rendered “a highly discussed on the show, raising awareness marketable brand,” and culture is of the social environment in Korea and exported overseas as a “cultural good”xl xli. helping Koreans to better understand In the “New York Cooking Special,” the their society. In Episode 320, the cast show’s cast went to New York City, USA, members of Infinity Challenge work as taxi to promote Korean cuisine. In addition, drivers for a day. Their taxis are not they took part in the production of a differentiated from average taxis on the Bibimbap advertisement that was played at roads, and their passengers do not know New York City’s Times Square. Also, with beforehand that they are the drivers. In the burst in popularity of Psy, three the episode, interactions with citizens help members of Infinity Challenge flew to New the members (and thus the viewers) to York City and participated in Psy’s New understand various problems that average Year’s Countdown performance at the Koreans face in society. One passenger Times Square Ball Drop event this year. explains that he lives in anxiety everyday due to his insecure job at an illegal bus

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 53! company. Another shares his personal particular country, further boosting the experience of going out of business, as popularity of the featured locations. huge corporations are squeezing out small Nevertheless, different programs shops in Korea. In addition, the hard lives have different methods of participating in of taxi drivers are also highlighted. the globalization process in Korea. By Through the discussion of political filming abroad, variety shows are also able and social issues alongside the ‘less-serious to expose Koreans to different cultures note’ provided by entertainment, variety around the world. The locations featured programs are able to raise the awareness are not merely limited to Asia – Infinity of these issues to a larger audience. At the Challenge has gone to New York City, same time, these shows seek to promote Alaska, Russia, China, Guam, Japan and the Korean culture and traditions as well Hawaii. However, in Infinity Challenge, the as the modernity of Korea via their introduction of iconic places and the locations, storylines and themes. These cultures in different countries are nationalistic elements position Korea as peripheral to the main theme of the an “independent cultural force,” and it is episodes. A short 20-second feature on this “sign of Korean nationalism” that the place is usually shown when the allows K-variety to have a “powerful members first arrive at the location, but appeal across Asia” xlii . K-variety also the games and mission take precedence makes use of this powerful appeal to show over cultural exchange. Instead, Infinity different cultures to Koreans while Challenge taps on the ‘foreign-ness’ of the promoting nationalistic pride by showing place to increase the freshness of the the popularity of Koreans abroad. program. At times, it also focuses on GLOBALIZATION showing Koreans abroad. In episode 308, the Infinity Challenge 2013 Calendar Delivery Similar to the “two-way Special, the influence of the show around symmetrical approach to cultural the world is emphasized. Every year, the exchange” that communication scholars show produces an annual calendar, and Jeong-Nam Kim and Lan Ni suggested, the cast members deliver the calendars “cultural diplomacy” is enhanced via the personally to some buyers. This year, the cultural exchange conducted in K- show decided to conduct deliveries varietyxliii. In recent years, the effect of this overseas as well. 5,157 requests from all cultural exchange can be observed in over the world were received, and the economic terms. Hotspots have been breakdown is shown in the episode to created in other countries after those highlight the vast outreach of the program places were featured on Korean variety – 1,500 from East Asia, 1,960 from programs. Tour packages have also been America, 615 from Europe, 535 from designed to bring Koreans to the overseas Middle East and South-East Asia, 469 filming locations previously shown on from Australasia, and 78 from Africa. variety showsxliv. The Think Coffee branch During the delivery in New York City, a at Mercer Street in New York City has buyer is revealed to be a Korean become a hotspot for Korean visitors ever American police officer in the New York since it was featured in Infinity Challengexlv. Police Department (NYPD). An interview At the same time, the show is also able to with him revealed that he is proud to be show these locations to any overseas able to protect fellow Koreans in New viewers who may be living in that York City. In addition, the episode also featured Psy, who flew in from

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Philadelphia to meet Noh Hong Chul, the mission on the Great Wall of China. In Infinity Challenge member sent to deliver addition to filming abroad, some episodes the calendars in New York City. The of the show also involve foreign guest NYPD officer and Psy are just some stars such as Jong Tae-Se, a North Korean examples that illustrate Infinity Challenge’s footballer, and Hong Kong film star aim to show Koreans’ achievements all Jackie Chan. Cultural exchange is thus around the world, promoting nationalistic more explicitly shown in Running Man pride while showing the world to than in Infinity Challenge, but both shows Koreans. seek to expose Koreans to other On the contrary, Running Man countries. adopts a very different approach to show In the New York City Special the world to Koreans. The popularity of episode of Infinity Challenge, members Yoo Koreans abroad is shown as a Jae Suk and Haha were able to casually coincidence, peripheral to the main identify scenes in Spiderman and Friends mission of the episode. Since the first that were filmed around the city. This overseas episode on June 19, 2011, perhaps shows the influence of the West Running Man has chosen to focus on Asia, in Korea, but more recently this influence filming in numerous locations including has become more of a cultural exchange. I China, Macau, Thailand, Vietnam and propose that cultural imperialism today is Hong Kong. From the hordes of fans that no longer unidirectional. Some have gather at almost all the locations to see the argued that the “core-peripheral model” Running Man cast, the popularity of the still exists today, with Korea becoming the cast is portrayed as close to that of ‘world core, and that Korea is now a ‘sub-empire’ stars’. As Bennett rightly observes, due to Hallyu. However, with the featuring “television personalities’ fame has always of other cultures in K-variety, extended beyond national borders”xlvi. In “understanding among people” of the Asia Race Special earlier this year, the different cultures is enhanced, and popularity of Lee Kwang Soo – gauged “opportunities for cooperation” have from the number of placards with his increasedxlvii. As media scholar Tania Lim name and the screams of fans when he proposed, the portrayal of other cultures appears – led to other cast members “not only boost[s] the flow of Asian calling him the “Asian Prince”. In another content regionally, but also increase[s] the instance, the filming that was scheduled to intersection of cultural identities and occur in a shopping center in Hong Kong consumer tastes of people from different had to be cancelled and the venue geographically bounded territories” xlviii . changed, due to the large amount of fans The creation of this hybrid taste serves to that gathered at the original location. further increase the appeal of Hallyu The immense popularity of the products and thus increases the soft Running Man cast members is always power that Korea has. In contrast to shown in the overseas specials, but the Keehyeung Lee’s argument that “any self- main focus of the show is still the mission. reflexive understanding of Hallyu as one These missions, when conducted abroad, of the potential conduits for cross-cultural usually include the cultural elements of the sensibilities and inter-regional dialogues” specific country. In the Asia Race Special, is currently lacking, I contend that K- the mission is revealed via a Vietnamese variety has conducted this “self-reflexive cultural performance. When Running Man understanding” and that Hallyu has filmed in China, the cast wore Chinese gradually moved away from the core- traditional costumes and performed a

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 55! peripheral model, focusing instead on significant role in reinforcing and shaping cultural exchange and understandingxlix. societal ideals and beliefs and is poised to become the next element of Hallyu. GENTLEMAN PSY However, it is largely pushed forward by experienced and older entertainment In Psy’s latest music video, artists, such as the “Nation’s Emcee” Yoo “Gentleman,” the cast members of Infinity Jae Suk. Younger television personalities Challenge are not featured as themselves. may thus be overshadowed, as they are Instead, they are featured as one of their usually not the leaders on the show. The Infinity Challenge characters. From ‘Hybrid’ cross-appearance of actors and singers as to ‘Ha&Soo’, the music video seems to be fixed cast members on variety shows may an advertisement for the variety show also be unsustainable, as these stars may itself. In MBC’s YouTube video that choose to focus on their primary jobs explains the ‘strangers’ in the music video, instead. Actor Song Joong Ki left Running the ‘strangers’ are not identified as their Man in order to focus on his drama, and original name, but are identified as the member of idol girl group After School nicknames for their characters. For Lizzy did the same for her album example, comedian Noh Hong Chul is not promotion. It is thus uncertain if K- identified as himself; rather he is identified variety is a fad or a permanent driver of as the ‘Elevator Guy in Psy’s Gangnam the Hallyu. Perhaps, just as the popularity Style music video’. In addition, links to the of K-dramas were revived with the specific Infinity Challenge episodes where introduction of younger stars via “Boys those characters are featured are included Over Flowers,” K-variety may get its in that YouTube video. It thus seems as miracle should the time come. For now, at though Psy is doing for Infinity Challenge least, it is indeed an up-and-coming what he did previously for K-pop with cultural phenomenon as a part of the Gangnam Style – he is doing a global Hallyu wave that is not to be ignored. shout-out and is raising the awareness of the show to his fans. By mentioning that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! he is ‘Wet Psy’ and inserting an excerpt of i MBC. “PSY GENTLEMAN – Wet Psy! (Wet Psy’s meaning and history).” YouTube. April 16, 2013. Infinity Challenge in his music video, he Accessed 27 Apr. 2013 gives credit to the show for shaping his ii Angel Lin and Alvin Tong, “Re-Imagining a television persona and popularity before Cosmopolitan ‘Asian Us’: Korean Media Flows and Gangnam Style. The close interaction Imaginaries of Asian Modern Femininities,” in East between the different genres in the Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave, ed. Chua Korean media industry, in this case Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 94. between K-pop and K-variety, allows for iii Keehyung Lee, “Mapping Out the Cultural Politics of such cross-promotion to occur and helps ‘the Korean Wave’ in Comtemporary South Korea,” in to boost the popularity of Hallyu in East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave, ed. Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi. (Hong Kong: general. Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 181. iv Lin and Tong, “Re-Imagining a Cosmopolitan ‘Asian CONCLUSION Us’,” 93. v Lee, “Mapping Out the Cultural Politics of ‘the Korean Wave’,” 177-78. From the analysis of gender vi James Bennett, Television Personalities: Stardom on the small representation and the role that Korean screen. (London: Routledge, 2010), 190. variety programs play in promoting vii Sun Jung, “K-Pop Idol Boy Bands and Manufactured Versatile” in Korean Masculinities and Transcultural nationalism and globalization in Korea, Consumption: Yonsama, Rain, Oldboy, K-Pop Idols, (Hong there is little doubt that K-variety plays a

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), 168. he is often belittled in the show and seen upon as one of viii Tania Lim, “Renting East Asian Popular Culture for the weakest, just like a child amidst a group of adults. Local Television: Regional Network of Cultural xxxiii Kim, “Hallyu and the Telenovela,” 387. Production,” in East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the xxxiv Lee, “Mapping Out the Cultural Politics of ‘the Korean Wave, ed. Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 37. Korean Wave’,” 184. ix Ibid. 49. xxxv “Lampooning the pols: A hitherto off-limits target x Ibid. 40. proves irresistible.” The Economist, January, 21, 2012. Accessed April 10, 2013. xi Lim, “Renting East Asian Popular Culture for Local xxxvi The mission given to the members for that episode Television,” 40. was to eliminate each other using paintball guns. xii Brian Hu, “Korean TV Serials in the English- xxxvii Stephanie DeBoer, “Scaling the TV Station: Fuji Language Diaspora: Translating Difference Online and Television, Digital Development, and Fictions of a Making It Racial.” The Velvet Light Trap, Number 66, Global Tokyo,” in Television, Japan, and Globalization, ed. (Fall 2010): 36. Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, Eva Tsai and JungBong Choi, xiii “Gallup Poll: Which TV show do Koreans enjoy the (United States of America: The Regents of the most?” allkpop, April 3, 2013. Accessed April 10, 2013. University of Michigan, 2010), 73. xiv “‘Infinity Challenge’ cast calls Psy and brings in xxxviii Youna Kim, “Globalization of Korean Media: hilarious cameo from English actress Daisy Donovan.” Meanings and Significance,” in Hallyu: Influence of Korean allkpop. Apr 10, 2013. Accessed April 27, 2013. Popular Culture in Asia and Beyond, ed. Do Kyun Kim and xv Bennett, Television Personalities, 2. Min-Sun Kim, (Seoul: SNU Press, 2011), 50. xvi Bennett, Television Personalities, 30, 191. xxxix DeBoer, “Scaling the TV Station,” 83. xvii Do Kyun Kim, “Hallyu and the Telenovela: xl Koichi Iwabuchi, “‘Ordinary Foreigners’ Wanted: Strategies for Media Globalization,” in Hallyu: Influence of Multinationalization of Multicultural Questions in a Korean Popular Culture in Asia and Beyond, ed. Do Kyun Japanese TV Talk Show,” in Television, Japan, and Kim and Min-Sun Kim, (Seoul: SNU Press, 2011), 374. Globalization, ed. Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, Eva Tsai and xviii Bennett, Television Personalities, 125. JungBong Choi, (United States of America: The Regents xix The show used to film on Mondays, so the pair jokes of the University of Michigan, 2010), 27. that they are a couple only on that day of the week. xli Lim, “Renting East Asian Popular Culture,” 42. xx Kim, “Hallyu and the Telenovela,” 374. xlii Kim, “Globalization of Korean Media: Meanings and xxi Sun, “K-Pop Idol Boy Bands and Manufactured Versatile,” 165. Significance,” 58. xxii Ibid,. 165. xliii Jeong-Nam Kim and Lan Ni, “The Nexus between xxiii Sun Jung. “Bae Yong-Joon, Soft Masculinity, and Hallyu and Soft Power: Cultural Public Diplomacy in the Japanese Fans: Our Past Is in Your Present Body” in Era of Sociological Globalism,” in Hallyu: Influence of Korean Masculinities and Transcultural Consumption: Yonsama, Korean Popular Culture in Asia and Beyond, ed. Do Kyun Rain, Oldboy, K-Pop Idols, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Kim and Min-Sun Kim, (Seoul: SNU Press, 2011), 145. University Press, 2010), 64. xliv Heemang Tour. “ .” xxiv Sun, “K-Pop Idol Boy Bands and Manufactured Versatile,” 165. Accessed April 10, 2013. xxv Bennett, Television Personalities, 124. xlv Isabella Moschen, “A Coffee Shop, as Seen on TV, xxvi Ibid., 173. Becomes a Must-See for South Koreans.” The New York xxvii Ibid., 152. Times, September 21, 2012. Accessed April 10, 2013. xxviii Ibid., 140. xlvi Bennett, Television Personalities, 19. xxix Bennett, Television Personalities, 149 xlvii Kim and Ni, “The Nexus between Hallyu and Soft xxx Lin and Tong, “Re-Imagining a Cosmopolitan ‘Asian Power,” 141 Us’,” 114. xlviii Lim, “Renting East Asian Popular Culture,” 45 xxxi Sun, “Bae Yong-Joon, Soft Masculinity, and Japanese xlix Lee, “Mapping Out the Cultural Politics of ‘the Fans,” 58. Korean Wave’,” 188 xxxii Haha, nicknamed ‘Haroro’ (similar to the cartoon penguin named Pororo), is extremely popular with REFERENCES children. His television character, and arguably he himself, is often childish and competitive.Lee Kwang Bennett, James. Television Personalities: Stardom on the small Soo, nicknamed ‘Giraffe’ for his height, is the youngest screen. London: Routledge, 2010. DeBoer, Stephanie. “Scaling the TV Station: Fuji in Running Man and is known for being a ‘betrayer,’ as Television, Digital Development, and Fictions he often cheats in order to win. Because of his character, of a Global Tokyo,” in Television, Japan, and Globalization, edited by Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto,

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Eva Tsai and JungBong Choi, 73-92. United Consumption: Yonsama, Rain, Oldboy, K-Pop Idols, States of America: The Regents of the 35-72. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University University of Michigan, 2010. Press, 2010. Hu, Brian. “Korean TV Serials in the English-Language Sun Jung, “K-Pop Idol Boy Bands and Manufactured Diaspora: Translating Difference Online and Versatile” in Korean Masculinities and Making It Racial.” The Velvet Light Trap, Transcultural Consumption: Yonsama, Rain, Number 66, Fall 2010: 36-49 Oldboy, K-Pop Idols, 163 – 170. Hong Kong: Iwabuchi, Koichi. “‘Ordinary Foreigners’ Wanted: Hong Kong University Press, 2010. Multinationalization of Multicultural “Lampooning the pols: A hitherto off-limits target Questions in a Japanese TV Talk Show,” in proves irresistible.” The Economist, January, 21, Television, Japan, and Globalization, edited by 2012. Accessed April 10, 2013. Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto, Eva Tsai and “Gallup Poll: Which TV show do Koreans enjoy the JungBong Choi, 27-50. United States of most?” allkpop, April 3, 2013. Accessed April America: The Regents of the University of 10, 2013. Michigan, 2010. “‘Infinity Challenge’ cast calls Psy and brings in hilarious Kim, Do Kyun. “Hallyu and the Telenovela: Strategies cameo from English actress Daisy Donovan.” for Media Globalization,” in Hallyu: Influence of allkpop. Apr 10, 2013. Accessed April 27, Korean Popular Culture in Asia and Beyond, edited 2013. by Do Kyun Kim and Min-Sun Kim, 369-398. Heemang Tour. “ .” Accessed Seoul: SNU Press, 2011. April 10, 2013. Kim, Jeong-Nam and Ni, Lan. “The Nexus between Hallyu and Soft Power: Cultural Public Diplomacy in the Era of Sociological Globalism,” in Hallyu: Influence of Korean Popular Culture in Asia and Beyond, edited by Do Kyun Kim and Min-Sun Kim, 131-154. Seoul: SNU Press, 2011. Kim, Youna. “Globalization of Korean Media: Meanings and Significance,” in Hallyu: Influence of Korean Popular Culture in Asia and Beyond, edited by Do Kyun Kim and Min-Sun Kim, 35-62. Seoul: SNU Press, 2011. Lee, Keehyung. “Mapping Out the Cultural Politics of ‘the Korean Wave’ in Comtemporary South Korea,” in East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave, edited by Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi, 175-189. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008 Lim, Tania, “Renting East Asian Popular Culture for Local Television: Regional Network of Cultural Production,” in East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave, edited by Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi, 33 – 51. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008. Lin, Angel and Tong, Alvin. “Re-Imagining a Cosmopolitan ‘Asian Us’: Korean Media Flows and Imaginaries of Asian Modern Femininities,” in East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave, edited by Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi, 91-125. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008. MBC. “PSY GENTLEMAN – Wet Psy! (Wet Psy’s meaning and history).” YouTube. April 16, 2013. Accessed 27 Apr. 2013 Moschen, Isabella. “A Coffee Shop, as Seen on TV, Becomes a Must-See for South Koreans.” The New York Times, September 21, 2012. Accessed April 10, 2013. Sun Jung. “Bae Yong-Joon, Soft Masculinity, and Japanese Fans: Our Past Is in Your Present Body” in Korean Masculinities and Transcultural

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TWO KINGDOMS UNDER GOD Caesar and Christ in the Jerusalem of the East Brian Jihyuk Kim Princeton University

ABSTRACT position of a self-proclaimed apolitical Protestant Mission in Korea and trace It is a widely accepted notion that the Protestant Christianity from its entry to colonization and annexation of the growth in Korea, as well as its far reaching Korean Chosun Dynasty (1392-1897) political implications in Korean court under Japanese imperial rule was the politics. The intersection of Protestant natural catalyst that led to the Christianity with Korean identity consolidation of Korean national identity formation will especially be examined on and its fight for independence in the 20th the basis of the Christian role in the century. But the often forgotten point is March 1st Independence Movement of that there was never actually a single 1919, the first major organized protest for consensus on the direction of Korean Korean independence and autonomy national identity to begin with, even after against Japan. Korea had officially become a Japanese Protectorate under the 1905 Eulsa Treaty. Japanese police arrested Paik It was precisely within this embryonic Yong Sok, a Korean milk-seller, on June period of Korean national identity 28, 1912 for being a Presbyterian discourse that Protestant Christianity Christian. He was blindfolded, hung up, entered the Korean peninsula and became and beaten for two days until he was the unlikely source of inspiration for forced to confess to conspiracy against Korean national identity formation. This Japanese imperial rule.i On the same day, paper will examine the complicated Chi Sang-chu, a Korean clerk and

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Presbyterian, testified that a Japanese between the universalistic, civic ideals of policeman had covered his mouth, poured Western Christianity and the water into his nose, and pressed lit particularistic, nationalistic values of cigarettes against his flesh until he Korean patriots, where a western faith confessed to plotting to assassinate Count usually the target of domestic nationalism Terauchi, the Japanese Governor-General emerged as its greatest partner. It was, of Korea. ii Likewise, Im Do-Myong, a indeed, thanks to the often-overlooked Korean barber, was beaten with an iron divergence between the Korean rod at the Japanese police headquarters in Protestants and the Protestant Seoul until he confessed to similar missionaries as well as the relative involvement in anti-Japanese activities. iii independence of the Korean Protestants He, too, was a Presbyterian, and only one under the Protestant Mission’s “Nevius of thousands more who suffered in the Method” that Christian ideals became same way. Across the Korean peninsula, repurposed with a particularistic, Christians were crucified on wooden nationalistic twist opposed by the crosses, missionary schools closed and missionaries themselves. Regardless of an their students arrested, churches torched internal schism, it was at the same time along with their Bibles and hymnals, and the inescapable affiliation of the entire congregations flogged for alleged nationalist Korean Church—however conspiracy. iv Despite demographically independent—with the extraterritorial representing less than two percent of the authority of the Protestant Mission in Korean population, some 300,000 Korean Korea that ultimately triggered the success Christians came to be perceived by of the March 1st Independence Movement Japanese authorities as the prime movers in eliciting international backlash against of the Korean nationalist independence Japan. movement, which culminated on March It is a widely accepted notion that 1st, 1919 when an estimated two million the colonization and annexation of the Koreans spilled into the streets in a Korean Chosun v Dynasty (1392-1897) synchronized public protest against under Japanese imperial rule was the Japanese imperial rule. natural catalyst that led to the How had Protestant Christianity, consolidation of Korean national identity an alien Western faith introduced merely a and its fight for independence. But the few decades earlier in 1884, become often forgotten point is that there was implicated in an indigenous Korean actually never a single consensus on the nationalist movement against Imperial direction of Korean national identity to Japan? After all, Christianity had long begin with, even after Korea had officially been negatively associated with western become a Japanese Protectorate under the imperialism and had often been the victim 1905 Eulsa Treaty. In other words, the of domestic nationalistic efforts to drive intersection of Protestant Christianity and out foreign, western influence. It was a Korean nationalism is especially difficult strange wonder, then, that Koreans living to articulate since the latter was in a in the traditionally isolationist, Confucian constant state of flux as disparate Chosun Dynasty, nonetheless discovered nationalist schools of thought and an unlikely ally in Protestant Christianity movements disappeared as quickly as they and went so far as to assimilate this came, reflecting and adjusting to structural Western religion to challenge Japanese disruptions in the regional political order. authority in their own domestic fight for In order to determine how the Protestant independence. Here was a rare marriage Church, then, eventually entered into a

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 60! mutually reinforcing relationship with the emerge as an independent nation is rather widespread, domestic nationalist campaign bleak.”viii that climaxed on March 1, 1919, it is Kim’s attack was not only in word, important to examine the changing but also in deed. It was, in fact, under landscape of Korean national identity and Kim Ok-Kyun’s own leadership that the its relationship with Protestant Enlightenment Party contrived the Kapsin Christianity as it developed through a Coup in December 1884, its sole objective series of nationalist movements starting in succinctly recorded in the Kapsin Illok: the late 1800s. The first of such “[To] put an end to the empty formalities movements occurred in 1884, of tributary relation with China.” ix coincidentally the same year Dr. Horace Serious for success, Kim, organized a Allen, the first Protestant physician and thousand Korean soldiers and invited 150 missionary, set foot in Korea. Japanese troops into the Korean capital of The Kapsin Coup of 1884 was a Seoul to help murder the country’s leading nationalist movement instigated by a conservatives and expel the pro-Chinese select group of educated yangban elites Queen from Chosun politics once and for including Kim Ok-Kyun, Yun Chi-Ho, all. x Not to be outdone, however, the and So Jae-Pil, who came to despise the frightened Queen Min enlisted the help of traditional superiority wielded by Qing Qing China, who immediately intervened, China in the Neo-Confucian worldview of dispatching 1,500 soldiers into the Korean the Korean Chosun court. On the heels royal palace to quash the political coup of the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876 in and the pro-Japanese followers of the which Japan sought to subvert Chinese Enlightenment Party.xi Despite a bloody primacy in Chosun Korea, these end to their insurrection, the progressive progressive yangban intellectuals were yangbans of the Kapsin 1884 Coup among the first to become cognizant of nonetheless heralded a tectonic shift in the changing realities of their Korean national identity discourse. To surroundings, namely the decline of China them, Japanese-style westernization, not a and the rise of Japan.vi They established centuries-old Neo-Confucian worldview, kaewhadang, or the Enlightenment Party, had seemed the key to future Korean and made no secret of their contempt for survival vis-à-vis a shifting world order in the subservient position conservative which China no longer held sway.xii Queen Min imposed on Chosun in its Protestant Christianity, from the orientation relative to China. Pak Kyu-Su, very moment of its entry, stumbled into a kaewhadang elite aspired to shatter this this political whirlpool and became Confucian, Sino-centric worldview of inadvertently implicated in the domestic Korea as a Chinese vassal state: “Lets look coup d'état. Unlike Roman Catholic at the location of the Middle Kingdom. missionaries from Europe who had often Turn this way, and America becomes the been massacred by the anti-West Chosun Middle Kingdom. Turn that way and authorities for proselytizing and Korea becomes the Middle Kingdom.”vii encroaching on Korean territory, Kim Ok-Kyun, a progressive Korean Protestant missionaries from America did yangban educated in Japan, too, was no less not dare venture into Korea until their critical of China in his Journal of 1883 safety as American citizens had first been (Kapsin Illok): “It is shameful that China guaranteed under the 1882 Treaty of has traditionally treated Korea as its vassal Peace, Amity and Commerce, signed into state and it is…due to this tributary action in 1884 between the United States relationship that Korea’s prospect to and Korea.xiii Although the Treaty, strictly

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 61! commercial in nature, did not grant chance and sheer coincidence, Paul von Americans the legal right to openly preach Molldendorf, the foreign court advisor Christ in Korea, it sufficed to embolden present in the Korean royal palace on the the Foreign Mission Board of the US night of the Kapsin Coup, thought it best Presbyterian and Methodist Churches to to summon American physician- immediately begin deploying missionaries missionary Dr. Horace Allen to treat to Korea, starting with Horace Allen in Prince Min Yong-ik, the powerful cousin 1884 and Horace Underwood, Henry of Queen Min who had been wounded in Appenzeller, William Scranton, and John an assassination attempt during the Heron in 1885. xiv Camouflaging their insurrection.xviii Allen’s own record of the religious commission to evade Korea’s incident demonstrates the utter anti-Christian laws, these missionaries spontaneity of this fateful interaction worked strategically, pursuing “indirect between the Korean royal family and the evangelism,” in which they strove to American Protestant: establish schools and hospitals rather than church buildings to propagate Christian “After being rushed across the city teachings under the guise of western under an escort of native troops, I education and medicine.xv In this context, found the foreign representatives a political breakthrough was achieved in spattered with blood….Prince Min 1884 when Robert Maclay, an American was lying at the point of death missionary in Japan, secured a royal with arteries severed and seven permit through none other than Kim Ok- sword cuts on his head and Kyun— the same man who would lead body.”xix the progressive Kapsin Coup only a few months later—to establish a hospital and Allen resuscitated the dying Prince Min, school in Korea for the purpose of staying by the leader’s side for three “Western” xvi scholarship. xvii In other months until he fully recuperated. xx And, words, Protestant Christianity had become thus, the fate of Protestant Christianity in poised to enter the Korean peninsula, Korea was overturned. For saving the life intimately tied to the political sponsorship of the Prince, Allen earned the trust of the of the pro-Japanese, progressive Korean royal court and the conservative Enlightenment Party of the 1884 Kapsin Mins, who expressed full gratitude by Coup. inviting Allen into the palace and granting him the official rank of court physician.xxi One can only imagine the horror One day the partner of a pro-Japanese of the Protestant Mission, then, when the faction and next day the savior of its pro- Kapsin Coup failed and the conservative Chinese enemy, Protestant Christianity Min faction resurged even stronger as a had teetered its way into the very heart of result. This domestic development Korean politics itself. rendered precarious the political position Thereafter, Allen exercised his of Protestant missionaries, now political leverage as a court physician to dangerously allied to a treasonous faction facilitate the work of the Protestant that had rebelled and failed against the Mission on the Korean peninsula. He Queen. Only a fortunate stroke of immediately capitalized on his newly serendipity delivered the Christian Mission acquired access to the Korean royal family from the dismal fate of its progressive and successfully received authorization Korean sponsors. In fact, purely by from King Kojong to construct a Royal

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Hospital for the practice and teaching of in Korea, specifically ordering Americans western medicine. xxii With no small “to refrain from teaching the Christian amount of flattery and cajolery, Allen religion and administering its rites and assured the King that this court- ordinances to the Korean people.” xxvii sponsored Hospital would certainly The reason citied for such a restriction “endear the people to their monarch,” order was, again, that the 1882 Treaty of then proceeded to recruit fellow Amity between the United States and undercover American missionaries as Korea had never legalized Christian workers for the newly chartered royal activity of Americans in Korea, making medical institution. xxiii His political missionary work technically illegal. xxviii strategy of indirect evangelism was, after After all, Christianity was decidedly a all, to gain access to the Korean natives sensitive matter with inevitable political through innocuous means of education opposition from Korea, since faith in this and medicine as a first step toward western religion, which banned idols and conversion. Riding on this momentum, preached equality before God, could easily missionary Henry Appenzeller, too, threaten the foundational values of a exploited a royal connection through hierarchical Confucian Korean society Allen and requested a permit for a new that instead worshipped ancestors and Western school, which the King depended on a social caste system. xxix delightfully endorsed in 1885, sponsoring Even the royal patronage of the Min the first modern Korean school with the faction for American missionaries was court’s own funds and personally naming solely on the grounds of medical practice it “Paejae Haktang” or “Hall for Rearing and education, and certainly not an Useful Men.” xxiv Queen Min also indication of official toleration for showered her support for the man who Protestant Christians.xxx Moreover, as the had saved her cousin, demonstrating her defeat of the progressives in the 1884 personal favor by bestowing the name Kapsin Coup had previously shown, “Ewha Haktang” to a girls’ school begun constructing Christian goals upon the by the Methodist mission in 1886.xxv The political goodwill of any one faction in the breakthrough of early Protestant Mission volatile Korean court was a dangerous into Korea, therefore, benefited from its gamble that could easily go awry. political connection to the Korean court Such was the essence of the and the strategically a-religious ensuing tug of war between Caesar and presentation of the Mission as a benign Christ: facing pressure from their home force to the Korean people. countries, American missionaries in Korea But the Foreign Mission Board of were forced to choose between due US Presbyterian and Methodist churches obedience to the anti-Christian laws of the was less than pleased with the Protestant Korean Kingdom or unflinching devotion Mission in Korea. A Foreign Missionary to the expansion of God’s Kingdom no article in September 1885 reprimanded the matter the political circumstances or the missionaries in Korea to exercise special means it might take for success.xxxi To the caution, noting that “nothing could be extent that utter deference to the anti- more uncalled for, or more injurious to Christian laws of the Korean King would our real missionary work, than for us to have stifled the prospect of missionary seem to take any part in the political activity in Korea altogether, the choice factions of Korea.”xxvi The United States between Caesar and Christ was simple Minister to Korea essentially issued a and, perhaps, even predictable for death sentence to the Protestant mission missionaries like Horace Underwood, who

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 63! chose God over King: “We’re under and self propagation” of churches among higher orders than that of the Korean the converts, thus promising King…[and] our duty [is] to preach and independence and autonomy to a native take the consequences, resting for population that traditionally suspected the authority on the word of God.”xxxii As his overbearing influence of foreigners. xxxvi wife Lilias Underwood, also a missionary, Horace Underwood, certainly one of the would record later, the two went on to most passionate missionaries in Korea, evangelize in rural villages, baptizing fully endorsed the Nevius Method in 1890 converts in secret, “teach[ing] and as a way to guarantee the autonomous preach[ing] in public and private” and self-multiplication of the Church: even managing to establish Chongdong Church, the first Protestant Church in After careful and prayerful Seoul, with 14 members in 1887.xxxiii Such consideration, we were led to religious activities must have raised adopt [the Nevius Method], and it eyebrows in the Korean court, which did has been the policy of the Mission. voice its complaint to the US legation in Let each [man]…be an individual Seoul that work “not authorized by the worker for Christ, and to live 1882 Treaty [between US-Korea]…shall Christ in his own cease.” Surprisingly enough, however, no neighborhood…to do evangelistic actual persecution followed from the work among their neighbors, Korean government. xxxiv For the time to…provide their own being, indeed, it seemed that Christ had buildings.xxxvii won. Also of special utility in the light In practice, the Nevius Method fostered a of Chosun’s anti-Christian laws was the spirit of independence among the endorsement of the “Nevius Method” by churches and encouraged them to become the American missionaries in Korea. In autonomous in their functions. In the fact, searching for a less disruptive way to spring of 1890, for example, when a group penetrate an anti-Christian Korean society of new Korean converts from Sorai village that was xenophobic towards all things asked for assistance in the construction of foreign, the Protestant Mission adopted their church, Underwood replied that they the “Nevius Method,” an evangelization “already have plenty of trees, stones, straw strategy advocated in 1885 by John L. as materials” to build the church on their Nevius who was a missionary of the own.xxxviii In this way, the Nevius Method American Presbyterian Church in absolved the Protestant missionaries of China.xxxv The Nevius Method was a way the dangerous risk of having to manage to ensure that the native converts would the daily operation of every single church come to own and take charge of most in an anti-Christian country, while at the operations of their church from the same time ensuring that the churches were financing of their congregation to even independent and operative on their own. the construction of their own churches. Before proceeding, it is especially The desired effect was to minimize the illuminating to investigate further the bold impression of Protestant Christianity as a persistence of Protestant missionaries like foreign religion, and the promotion of it, Horace Underwood during this period, rather, as a domesticated, independent and more interestingly, the equally unusual religion close to the people. As a three- tolerance of Protestant activities by the pronged strategy, the Nevius Method normally ruthless, anti-Christian Korean promoted “self governing, self supporting, government. No doubt, the Protestant

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 64! missionaries were primarily driven by their of the Protestant mission, held large spiritual conviction in daring to political implications for the Korean proselytize in a country that had royals, who naively prayed that they had, previously slaughtered Catholic in signing the Treaty, discovered a missionaries; however, while not potential friend in the United States to discrediting the intensity of the counteract the rising threat of Japan. missionaries’ religious fervor, it was, Then, for the Korean royal court, rather, the extraterritorial authority of the looming behind the Protestant Mission in Protestant Mission—decidedly an indirect Korea was the specter of the American American establishment in Korea—that flag, a reality constantly heeded to by both emboldened the missionaries even further the missionaries and the Korean in their religious undertakings. By the government authorities themselves. In same token, it was in recognition of this fact, Horace Allen, in his interactions with extraterritorial status of the Protestant King Kojong, frequently conflated Mission, given its predominantly Protestant Christianity with the political American constituents, that the Korean power of the United States, arguing that royal court felt politically reluctant to fully unlike Catholicism, which would at once execute its anti-Christian policies against render Korea inferior to the authority of a proselytizers.xxxix European Pope, Protestant Christianity The Chosun court, in fact, held a could groom Korea to enter the political agenda that prioritized friendship progressive world of liberty, equality, and with the Americans over punishment of independent spirit exemplified by the their religiosity. After all, the 1882 Treaty powerful Protestant America. xli More of Amity between the United States and importantly, the Koreans themselves Korea had been endorsed specifically to acquiesced to the extraterritorial power of recruit the political support of the Protestant Mission in Korea, each Washington in counterbalancing time punishing and incarcerating only the competing foreign powers on the Korean native Korean Christian converts, but peninsula, namely Japan. Commodore absolving the American missionaries, of Robert Shufeldt who had negotiated the the same consequences. xlii In what US-Korea Treaty noted, in 1882, the became known as the “Pyongyang political utility of American presence in Incident of 1894,” when a few Korea as recognized by the Koreans missionaries, concerned for the plight of themselves: their converts who had been imprisoned for their faith, flexed their political muscle “Both Corea and China are and proceeded to contact the US and anxiously looking for protection British legations in Seoul for assistance, against the growing aggression of the Korean government hurriedly released Japan on the peninsula. In this the Korean converts from jail, fearing for connection, the Viceroy informed potential damage in their relations with me in the strictest confidence that the missionaries’ home countries. xliii the King of Corea would now be Referring to the Mission’s extraterritorial glad to see an American man of status in this specific incident, the wife of war in the Seoul River.”xl missionary Horace Underwood even reflected that, “This victory [in the Therefore, the desired companionship Pyongyang incident] made the people with the American government, though it generally realize…that behind the arrived on the Korean coast in the form missionaries was a power which could

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 65! overcome even magistrates and Japanese and Western Bandits.”xlix Calling Governors.”xliv The occasional expression China and Korea “lips and teeth” and of disapproval from the technically anti- vowing to deliver their King from the Christian Korean government, therefore, corruption of the rapacious yangban elites, proved perfunctory and rarely posed a real the Donghak peasants declared in their threat, as confirmed by Allen: “By 1890, manifesto that they were “sworn to the anti-foreign law had by common death… in [their] common goal to drive consent become a dead letter and was out the Japanese and foreigners, to bring superseded by a general goodwill.”xlv Such them to ruin and to cleanse the country of extraterritorial firepower of the Protestant perfidious people.” l The Donghak mission would return again to assist the peasants truly believed that the future of Protestant nationalists in the Chosun lay in reforming its inefficient Independence Movement of March 1st, social hierarchy, and, most importantly, in 1919. consolidating the powers of the East The extraterritorial authority of (Dong)—namely Korea and China— the American Protestants had shielded the against the hostile influence of Japan and Christians from the wrath of the royal the West.li court, but it failed to offer protection By far, the greatest, albeit from the arbitrary violence of Korean unprecedented, consequence of the mobs who desired to expel Japanese and Donghak Revolution was that it incurred Western influence.xlvi In fact, despite the in the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) benign neglect of Protestant activity under on Korean home soil, triggering the de- the Korean government, an unexpected facto rule of Imperial Japan over Korea. popular shift in Korean national identity In fact, in a political déjà vu eerily discourse threatened the very existence of reminiscent of the Kapsin Coup from just the Protestant Korean Mission from the ten years earlier, the pro-Chinese Queen root. The Donghak Peasant Revolution Min once again employed the assistance of 1894, indeed, was a massive anti-feudal, of Qing China in her attempt to subdue anti-imperialist insurrection that spread the domestic Donghak insurrection. The across the nation from the southern Qing mobilized more than 2000 troops to provinces of Korea and persevered for a assist the Korean court, but not without year in its protest against the feudalistic first provoking the Japanese, who yangban elites of Confucian Korean preemptively sent some 6,000 of their society. xlvii Most importantly, the own soldiers to challenge Chinese revolution was anti-Western, anti- intervention in Korea.lii With an imperial Japanese, and specifically anti-Christian, agenda in mind, the Japanese soldiers orchestrated by followers of the Donghak marched into the heart of the Korean faith (literally, Eastern Learning, ) capital in 1894, murdered Queen Min who deliberately named their religion this inside her own palace, shocked the Qing way to combat Sohak (literally, Western Chinese by annihilating them in the Sino- Learning, ), the Korean term for Japanese war that ensued, and slaughtered Christianity.xlviii an estimated 100,000 Korean peasants Proclaiming themselves the who mobilized themselves in a reinvigorated, Second Donghak “People’s Party” and their meetings the liii “People’s Gathering”, 4,000 armed Revolution against Japan. Donghak peasants convened on February Contemporary Korean historian Pak Un- 17th, 1894 with the slogan “Expel the Sik (1859-1926) recorded that from 1894 until the end of the Sino-Japanese war in

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1896, at least 300,000 peasants lost their tell about Japan. Under uninvited lives and that the Japanese had almost Japanese militarism, their Queen had been entirely obliterated the Donghak murdered, their King exiled, and six movement.liv Above all, King Kojong fled centuries of their Kingdom’s history to the Russian legation in Seoul in 1897, forcefully curtailed. Japan had made no practically leaving his decrepit kingdom in secret of its imperialistic ambitions on the the hands of enemy Japan and, thus, Korean peninsula, and with the Japanese marking an impolite ending to the 600- victory in the Russo-Japanese War, it was year-old Chosun Dynasty. on the fast track to become ruler over the The Donghak Revolution, Korean peninsula under the Eulsa responsible for this chaotic series of Protectorate Treaty of 1905. The political upheavals, immensely Protestant Mission was therefore thrust complicated the position of Protestant into the uncomfortable political position Christianity in Korea. For one, the anti- of having benefited from Japanese military Western Donghak Peasant Revolution had intervention in Korea, while the very wreaked havoc upon Korean Christian people it served had suffered and bled by communities, and Protestants and the same Japanese hand. This tension Catholics, natives and missionaries alike only multiplied for the Protestant Mission, suffered as a result. Especially, Protestant placing the missionaries in an uneasy missionaries in the countryside even had position when a large number of Korean to evacuate from their respective villages, Protestant converts became involved in taking shelter in Seoul merely to save their the establishment and activities of the lives from the onslaught of the Donghak Independence Club, a progressive, anti- peasant mobs. lv Meanwhile, mission Japanese organization with an obvious buildings fell victim to armed Donghak nationalistic bent. soldiers, who indiscriminately burned The formation of the church buildings to the ground.lvi Independence Club, which occurred in The more significant repercussion July 1896 shortly after King Kojong’s of the Donghak Revolution for the flight to Russia, was a development in the Christian mission, however, lay elsewhere. Korean national identity discourse that In fact, the violence of the Donghak seriously complicated the position of the peasants meant that Protestant Protestant missionaries vis-à-vis the missionaries naturally came to appreciate Protestant Koreans. Founded almost as a the intervention of Japanese soldiers when quasi-substitute government in the they arrived in 1894 to slaughter the anti- absence of the Korean monarch, the Christian Donghak peasants. From the Independence Club had been inaugurated perspective of the Protestant missionaries, as a “self-strengthening movement” under the Protestant Mission had crossed into the leadership of none other than So Jae- an interesting relationship with Japan in Pil and Yun Chi-Ho, both yangban turned which it felt indebted to the Japanese Protestants who had participated in the military for indirectly delivering the progressive 1884 Kapsin Coup against the Protestant mission from further suffering conservative Min faction. lviii The under the Donghak Revolution.lvii Independence Club enjoyed enthusiastic From here, experiences of the participation from Protestant Korean Protestant missionaries and the Korean teachers of prominent mission schools natives showed the first symptoms of such as the Paejae Haktang and Kyongsin divergence. The indigenous Korean Hakkyo, and counted among its members Christians, in fact, had a different story to mission school graduates such as future

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Korean President Yi Sungman (Syngman that hangul, the Korean language, not Rhee). lix Moreover, participation in the classical Chinese, was exclusively and Independence Club, which had 8 local universally offered to “women, children, chapters across the peninsula, proved and ignorant men in the church,” raising higher where Protestant Christians were Korean consciousness.lxv numerous, and in the Pyongyang branch It was surely not a surprise, then, of the Independence Club alone, all 17 that when the chance arose in the crash of leaders were Protestant.lx Hosting twice a the conservative Confucian order in 1897 “People’s Assembly,” which was attended for progressive ideas to be openly by more than 10,000 Korean patriots in expressed for the first time in the public the capital Seoul for a public discussion discussion of Korea’s uncertain future, about Korea’s future, the Independence Protestant Koreans, being among the few Club advocated constitutional, to have imbibed Western ideas, were first representative monarchy for Korea, and to respond to the call of the even erected an Independence Gate Independence Club.lxvi After all, as author modeled after its French counterpart to Martha Huntley put it, it was vouch for similar Korean autonomy from “inadvertently, the mission schools [that Japan and China. lxi Reaching a had] aided Korean opposition to Japanese membership of 4,173 by 1898 and over colonialism…[and]…political 10,000 by 1904, the Independence Club, enlightenment was a byproduct of mission with a strong Protestant following, quickly education.”lxvii Indeed, politically forward- became recognized as the biggest umbrella minded Koreans were simply more likely organization for nationalistic, patriotic to support the progressive agenda of the action under Japanese rule.lxii Independence Club in 1897, and it was Ironically enough, the missionaries not one bit strange that these Koreans had only themselves and their teachings to “came mostly, if not solely, from the blame for the gravitation of their church community.”lxviii After all, when Protestant converts to the politically the Japanese finally declared Korea its charged activities of the Independence protectorate in the 1905 Eulsa Treaty, the Club. After all, it was the missionaries missionaries were operating 773 of the themselves who had entered the Korean 1218 schools in the modern education peninsula in the first place as conveyors of system in Korea.lxix In other words, it was Western education and modern none other than the missionaries scholarship. It was in fact, through themselves who had equipped their missionaries and the teachings in their converts with the means to conflate in mission schools that Korean citizens of all their minds the progressive ideals of the social classes had first come into contact Protestant Church with nationalistic with the democratic consciousness of the politics. The Protestant Mission in Korea, West and the decidedly Protestant ideals had, therefore, ironically sown the seeds of “equality before God.”lxiii It was here of its own conundrum. that the elite yangbans had come to In fact, thanks to the involvement denounce the very social hierarchy in of the Korean Protestants in the which they flourished, confessing as one nationalistic Independence Club, the man did in his newfound Protestant faith missionaries, by association, too, had to that “God did not make one man a maneuver the difficult choice between yangban and another sangnom (low either deference to the incoming Japanese fellow.)”lxiv And it was also in the unique rulers or loyalty to the Koreans who cried role of the Mission in translating the Bible out for independence. lxx Immediately

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 68! drawing a line between themselves and the Korea, formally acknowledging, instead, activities of the Independence Club, the Japanese occupation of Korea under however, the missionaries in Korea the secret 1905 Taft-Katsura invoked the Protestant belief in separation Agreement. lxxiv In reciprocation, Japan of state and religion. “The missionaries had promised to acknowledge the US strongly believe, with the Boards at home, occupation of the Philippines. lxxv The that…it is better for Disciples of Christ to following decree which John Sill, the U.S. patiently endure some injustice than to Minister to Korea, delivered to the carry Christianity in antagonism to the missionaries in Seoul was articulate [Japanese] government under which they enough: “Refrain from any expression of labor,” wrote Arthur Judson Brown in opinion or from giving advice concerning 1902, the General Secretary of the the internal management of the country, Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions.lxxi or form intermeddling in its political Missionary Charles Allen Clark, too, questions.” lxxvi After all, given their insisted on the apolitical neutrality of the religious work in Korea, it was politically Church, condemning the Korean wise for the missionaries to maintain Protestants for harboring anti-Japanese, friendly ties with their local Japanese nationalistic sentiment: “Our position has authorities. Reverend Arthur Brown, for been that the church is a spiritual one, wrote in a letter of praise to Japanese organization and as such is not concerned diplomat in the US, Hanihara Masana, with politics either for or against the that “Japanese administration is far better present or any other government.” lxxii than Korea would otherwise have had, Missionary Samuel F. Moore stationed in and far better than Korea had under its Seoul even mentioned specifically that rule.”lxxvii In other words, the “neutrality” being “engrossed with the Independence that the Protestant Mission adopted was Club had little thought or purpose in the in and of itself far from neutral, but, work of the Church.”lxxiii rather, a political euphemism for the pro- However, such proclamations of Japanese—as opposed to pro-Korean— neutrality, especially if based on a spiritual attitude already embraced at home in argument of separation of church and Washington. The missionaries, in effect, state, must be questioned further for had chosen Caesar over Christ.lxxviii authenticity unless one is to believe that This was reason enough for a the Protestant Mission was purely a sharp divergence between the Protestant spiritual organization devoid of any Mission and the Protestant Koreans. In political biases. Indeed, as examined once fact, the Protestant nationalists of the before, the predominantly American Independence Club, which became the community of Protestant missionaries “New People’s Association (Sinminhoe)” enjoyed full extraterritorial authority as, in 1907, harshly criticized the “apolitical” practically, an American constituency in stance insisted by the missionaries, who Korea, and, thus, no matter how only sought to quash the anti-Japanese spiritually convicted or genuine, the sentiment of the Koreans. For instance, missionaries always stood within the so angry was Protestant Yun Chi-Ho, jurisdiction of the American government President of the New People’s and the laws of their home country. As Association and founding member of the suspected, the political reality of the former Independence Club, that he cursed American missionaries was that their the Protestant Mission in his private home government in Washington had journal: betrayed its 1882 Treaty of Amity with

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The arrogance and Council a blanket statement that thoughtfulness of missionaries are enshrined the principle of the Nevius alienating the Koreans in schools method: “Our Church neither forces nor and churches…There will be a prohibits its members to take part in state great revolt some day in the near affairs or join any political party (my future on the part of the Koreans emphasis).”lxxxii In 1907, thirty-six Korean unless the missionaries change church elders joined to form the their attitude. What a pity! lxxix Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church of Korea, making a formal gesture that began Kim San, a young Christian youth, who to exclude missionaries from church later became an active leader in the March administration. lxxxiii In other words, 1st movement also added to the sentiment: although Protestant Christianity’s teachings and values were not explicitly One thing in particular made me designed for any form of anti-Japanese angry…was hearing an American nationalistic activism, the decentralized missionary tell the people, “God is and relatively autonomous Korean punishing Korea for the mistakes churches under the Nevius Method were she has made. Now Korea is free to repurpose Protestant ideals for suffering to pay for these. Later nationalistic purposes within their own God will let her recover after individual congregations.lxxxiv penance is done…In Europe, the Such was the fuel behind the Christian nations did not turn the explosive growth experienced by the other cheek. To fight was to gain Korean Protestant Church starting from victory…All over Korea, young the time of the 1905 Protectorate Treaty men felt the same. lxxx leading up to the Japanese annexation in 1910. In fact, the Korean-run Protestant It was the once again the Churches, of which there were 321 in Protestant Mission’s very own Nevius 1905, began catering to the pent-up Method that had sown the seeds of nationalist sentiment of the Korean divergence. Even the mere possibility of populace. lxxxv In a flagrant example of divergence between political Protestant what the missionaries told them not to do, Koreans and their “apolitical” missionary indigenous Protestant Churches and authorities lay in the Mission’s Nevius mission schools conflated Christianity Method of fostering independence and with nationalism, presenting Biblical autonomy among the indigenous churches struggles of the Israeli people as analogies and their leadership. As mentioned for the sure victory of the Korean minjok, before, the Nevius Method, which was or race. “When one looks at the language designed for the domestication of the and deeds of Christians, they profess that western church in xenophobic countries the people of Israel under the oppression like China and Korea, had decentralized of Egypt succeeded in their exodus for the role of the mission authorities while national independence and liberation encouraging self-governance of the under God’s help and under the indigenous church network.lxxxi In action, leadership of Moses,” recalled Paek Nak even as it discouraged anti-Japanese Chun, who lived through the colonial era, activities among the Korean Protestants “They teach the Biblical story that during and supported Japan behind closed doors, the war with another nation, the people of the Protestant Mission in Korea included Israel were vindicated by David, the in the 1901 Resolution of the Mission Apostle of Justice who destroyed the giant

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Goliath.”lxxxvi Even in mission schools like meantime Protestants had experienced Sungin High School, students came up “The Great Pyongyang Revival” and “A and used sermons from the Bible to share Million Souls for Christ Movement,” their active resistance against the Japanese, which swept across the nation, gaining and as Protestant nationalist Cho Mansik tens of thousands of new believers. xci recalled, “We did not mistake the After a meager following of a couple message.”lxxxvii Hymns such as “Believers hundred believers in 1890, the Protestant are like Soldiers of the Army!” “Onward, Church gained 50,000 believers by 1905, Christian Soldiers,” and “Soldiers of leaping yet again to more than 200,000 by Christ Rise” were favorite selections of 1909. xcii Powerful Koreans such as Yi these Protestant congregations for Won Gung, the most famous Confucian obvious reasons. lxxxviii This was the scholar in Korea, Kim Chong Si, former powerful moment where particularistic chief of police of Seoul, and Yi Sang Jae, patriotism and anti-Japanese nationalism former secretary cabinet and later were able to coalesce with the executive leader of the Seoul YMCA universalistic values of Christianity under joined the indigenous Protestant Church the auspices of the autonomous during this period. xciii Native Korean indigenous Protestant Churches in Korea. churches had also taken the initiative of The nationalistic Protestant establishing churches in their local Christianity of indigenous Koreans, in this communities and according to the Chosun way, resonated with the psychological and Christian News, by 1908, Korean political vacuum of the Korean people churches had established “an average of who, under strict Japanese rule, had two schools for every one of the 345 become deprived of a public forum for counties in all the land.”xciv According to political exchange and collective the Report of the World Missionary action.lxxxix Such Koreans flocked to the Conference in 1910, two thirds of all the Church en masse for this specific reason, boys and girls in school were attending as confirmed by the Korea Daily News in Christian schools. By 1910, the presence 1907, a newspaper run by a British man of Korean Protestants had increased to and therefore exempt from much the extent that Korea was being dubbed Japanese censorship: the “Jerusalem of the East.” xcv The Korean Protestant Church had evolved Over the years the people of into a formidable tinderbox of anti- Korea have felt bewildered and Japanese, nationalist sentiment. helpless under government To be certain, the powerful and oppression and Japanese authentic religious experience of maltreatment. As a result more Christianity is not to be ignored as one and more have been converted to sure cause of the Protestant Boom during the faith of the West. Lately their this period. In fact, the experience of numbers keep growing even more, revival among Christians was reportedly and it now seems that Korea as a supernatural, with people “clenching their whole rebounding from fists and striking their heads against the oppression and maltreatment may ground in a struggle to resist the power well turn into a Christian nation. xc that would force them to confess their misdeeds.”xcvi The Missionary Review of the Not surprisingly, by 1907, the number of World reported similarly in 1907 that the churches in Korea had doubled in just “whole congregation of Changdaehyon two years to 642 churches and in the Presbyterian Church united in audible

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 71! prayer which rose and diminished in independence of Korea, the Protestant fervor like the waves of the sea.”xcvii Still, missionaries were increasingly agitated by however, religious experience alone as a the violence exerted on fellow Christians cause of the Protestant Boom does not by the Japanese. Here was the once pro- explain why the Japanese authorities grew Japanese, but now increasingly frustrated so overly defensive, going so far as to missionary, Arthur Judson Brown, send spies into congregations to search following the Conspiracy Trial of 1911: the mission premises, and even reading “It is about as difficult for those who school essays written by students.xcviii In know them (the prosecuted) to believe fact, the Japanese, too, suspected that it that any such number of Christian was certainly not religious experience ministers, elders, and teachers, had alone, but rather the potential of the committed crime as it would be for the indigenous Protestant Church as an agora people of NJ to believe that the faculty, for political exchange that inspired students, and local clergy of Princeton hundreds of thousands of Koreans to were conspirators and assassins.” c The flock to the church. pendulum between Caesar and Christ was So aggressively paranoid of the swinging once more. Korean Protestant Church were the On March 1st, 1919, the fateful Japanese authorities that, in what became day of the March 1st Independence known as the infamous Conspiracy Case Movement, nothing could challenge the Trial of 1911, the Japanese police arrested Protestant Church as the largest, most hundreds of Koreans for no apparent effective, most networked group of reason, charging them groundlessly for Koreans on the Peninsula, what with its conspiring to assassinate the Japanese thousands of pastors, church workers, Governor-General Terauchi Masatake. It some 300,000 believers, 2000 churches, was by no coincidence that of the 123 10000 schools, hospitals, church prosecuted, 94 were Protestant Christians, newspapers, the YMCA, the YWCA, and including nationalist Christian leaders like more.ci Not all nationalists were members Yun Chi-Ho. xcix What exactly ensued in of the Protestant Church, of course, but the torture room until these innocent no other organization enjoyed in its Christians were made to confess to crimes representation such participation from all they had never before heard is not of social classes and such widespread concern, and its details are already distribution throughout all provinces on disclosed in the opening of this paper. the peninsula as the Protestant Church, What does emerge, however, as a point of which included 11 churches in Seoul, 260 interest is that 1911 was only the in Pyongyang, 76 in the Southeastern beginning of intense Christian persecution Cholla province, 126 in the Kyongsang in colonial Korea. Even more Province.cii importantly, it was the increasingly It was no surprise that despite harsher persecution of Protestant representing only two percent of a Christians as the Japanese, more ruthless population of 20 million, when nationalist each time, forced closing of mission sentiment peaked after President schools, banned mission textbooks and Woodrow Wilson’s support for “self- burned Bibles that tested the patience of determination” in 1918, Christians came the Protestant Missionaries who had until to spearhead the independence movement then sided—or remained “neutral”—with of Korea. Sixteen of the thirty-three Japan. Though in disagreement with their signatories to the March First Declaration converts regarding the role of Japan or the of Independence were Protestants, as well

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 72! as 10 out of the 11 organizers of Tokyo Episcopal Church in the USA became ciii Korean Declaration of Independence. concerned for the Korean Church, It was also no surprise that the Movement inevitably attached to the Protestant began from the churches and mission schools, which had grown to become Mission in Korea, and reported that “as centers of Korean anti-Japanese representing the Christian sentiment of a sentiment. Missionary Frank Smith majority of the American churches…we reported that after the Declaration of cannot remain silent while a defenseless Independence was read in churches, people are made the victims of mobs—both Christian and non- cvii Christian—“each time collected from the massacre.” The American Protestant church and started from there,” marching Mission Board, PCUSA, published reports into the streets in protest against Japanese of destruction in Korea and submitted civ rule. It was also not surprising, that, them to the US Congress, while when the Japanese began its crackdown, missionaries in Korea wrote back to their they targeted Christians as the conspirators behind the Independence home countries, revealing shocking details Movement, crucifying them and tying that were published in the newspapers them to telephone poles to flog them. back home: “Korea seems to some After all, Missionary Frank believed it was observers to be punished for being “but natural for the police to take the whole thing for a Christian movement.”cv Christian almost as much for being But this time, the Japanese, by destroying patriotic if not more,” blared a Literary the Korean Church and testing the Digest article in May 1919. cviii Korean patience of the Protestant Mission, had at interests suddenly became American last squandered the political goodwill of interests as Korean Churches, attached the Protestant missionaries, who gathered finally under the moral banner of “No indirectly and inevitably to their American neutrality for brutality,” using their missions, were attacked and burned. extraterritorial authority to bring the Senator Norris in the United States Senate censure of their home countries upon and Senator McCormick even read the Japan. reports of the Federal Council of In fact, it was the extraterritorial Churches in Congress on July 15, 1919 authority of the missionaries, who were presenting the destruction of the Korean inevitably affiliated with the Protestant church as a threat to the American Korean Church though not supportive of Mission. cix Startled by the unexpected its independence activities, that triggered a international criticism that had been boomerang effect from their home triggered by the mission, the Japanese countries now stimulated by the brutalities government finally deposed its own of the Japanese government. Missionaries Governor-General, Hasegawa, in August like Dr. Frank Schofield took pictures of of 1919 and quickly adopted a the Japanese brutalities and published “conciliation” or “cultural” policy, ending 5000 copies of them in a booklet, militaristic governance over the Korean Unquenchable Fire, distributing them to peninsula.cx their home countries. cvi The Methodist

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Although the Protestant Church’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! organization and values had certainly Korean History and Nationalism, trans (Seoul: Jimoondang Publishing Company, 2000), 60; Shin, 45. never been structured for anti-Japanese activism, the Koreans joined the xii Shin, Gi-Wook, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy Politics, and Legacy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, Protestant church in the early 1900s. 2006), 26. xiii Cho, Eunsik. The Great Revival of 1907 in Korea: Its Under the relative independence of the Cause and Effect (Missology: An International Review, Nevius Method, they reshaped Christian 1998), 290.; Matsutami, 59; The treaty was negotiated in 1882, but it was not signed into action until May 1884. values to support their anti-Japanese xiv Matsutami, 60. sentiment, even at the cost of divergence xv Ibid, 149. with the missionaries. When the Japanese xvi “Western” in quotes because the Christian understandably turned towards this anti- missionaries sought to disseminate Christian teachings Japanese, nationalistic Korean Church in and values by establishing schools and hospitals mainly as a cover for missionary work. an effort to throttle anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea, it unwittingly agitated xvii Matsutami, 60. the American Protestant Mission, xviii Kang, Wi Jo, Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History of Christianity and Politics (Albany: 1997), 15; inevitably attached to their work in the Matsutami 61. Korean Church. The allegiance of the xix Kang, 15. Protestant Mission had been put to its xx final litmus test—and Christ had won. Ibid; Matsutami, 61. xxi Matsutami, 61. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xxii i Frederick Mckenzie, Korea's Fight for Freedom (New Ibid, 63. York: Fleming H. Revell, 1920), 225. xxiii These testimonies were heard in the Seoul Appeals Ibid; Wells, Kenneth M. New God, new nation: Court and documented by the author Frederick Arthur Protestants and self-reconstruction nationalism in Korea, 1896- Mackenzie during his visit to Korea. 1937 (Honolulu, 1990), 27. xxiv Kim, In Soo. Asian Thought and Culture: Protestants and ii Ibid the Formation of Modern Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920: a Study of the Contributions of Horace G. Underwood and Sun iii Ibid, 226. Chu Kil (New York, 1996), 59.; Pak, Chong- Shin. Protestantism and Politics in Korea. Seattle, 22. xxv iv Pamphlet Collection, 7, 13; McKenzie, 259. Kim, 61. To this day, Ewha Haktang, which evolved into the Ewha Womens University is a premier women’s v Alternate spelling: Joseon, Chosen college in South Korea.

xxvi vi Kang, Woong Joe. The Korean Struggle for International Kang, 17. Identity in the Foreground of the Shufeldt Negotiation, 1866- xxvii 1882 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005). Matsutami, 68. vii Shin, Yong-ha, Modern Korean History and Nationalism xxviii (Seoul: Jimoondang Publishing Company, 2000), 30-31. Ibid. viii Ibid, 48. xxix Wells, 27. ix Ibid, 45. xxx Matsutami, 68. x Ibid; Kang, Wi Jo, Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A xxxi History of Christianity and Politics (Albany: State University In reference to the New Testament, where Jesus, of New York Press, 1997). confronted about whether or not to pay taxes, tells his followers to render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s. xi Matsutani, Motokazu. Church over Nation: Christian Missionaries and Korean Christians in Colonial Korea. xxxii Matsutami, 68. Cambridge: Harvard University; Shin, Yong-ha, Modern

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xxxiii Kim, Insoo, 48; Matsutami, 68. became clear in the late 1890s, these two men turned anti-Japanese but were equally reform-minded as before. xxxiv Ibid, 68. lix Pak, 126. xxxv Kim, Insoo, 49. lx Pak, 127. xxxvi Cho, Eunsik. The Great Revival of 1907 in Korea: Its Cause and Effect, 291. lxi Shin 137. xxxvii Kim, Insoo, 49. lxii Pak, 126. xxxviii Ibid, 50. lxiii Park, Yong-Shin “Social Change and Christian xxxix Matsutami, 74; Pak, 119. Universities in Korea” (1997), 515. lxiv Park, 514. xl Kang, Wong Joe. The Korean Struggle for International Identity in the Foreground of the Shufeldt Negotiation, 1866- lxv Kang, Wi Jo, 31. 1882 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005), 126. lxvi Wells, 9. xli Matsutami, 65. lxvii Kim Insoo, 66. xlii Matsutami, 74, 75. lxviii Pak, 126. xliiiIbid, 75. lxix Mckenzie, 213 xliv Ibid, 76. lxx Yu, K. Kale, American Missionaries and the Korean xlv Wells, 28. Independence Movement in the Early 20th Century, 175. lxxiYu, 175. xlvi Matsutami, 209. lxxii Ibid, 176. xlvii Shin, 73. lxxiii Matsutami, 190. xlviii Ibid. lxxiv Cho, 290. xlix Ibid, 83. lxxv Ibid. l Ibid, 82, 104. lxxvi Yu, 174. li Ibid, 104. lxxvii Kang, Wi Jo, 14. lii Ibid, 91. Kang, Wi Jo, 33. lxxviii There was of course as in any other case a small liii Shin, 104. minority of missionaries who opposed Japanese authority. Horace Allen, for one, wrote in his journal liv Ibid, 108. that he shed tears for the plight of Korea. But it must be remembered that this was far from the general attitude lv Matsutami, 73. of missionaries and Allen, by the time of his writing, had discontinued his missionary work. lvi Ibid. As already mentioned, Protestant Christianity was persistently presented as a force wholly different lxxix Matsutami, 332. from Catholicism, which was relatively more identified with Western imperialism and, thus, less welcomed by lxxx Matsutami, 344. Koreans due to the implications of being “subjected” to Papal authority. Meanwhile, Protestant Christianity had lxxxi Kim, In Soo, 49. political association with “Protestant America,” although, to the Donghak peasant rebels, the distinction lxxxiiYu, 193 didn’t matter much. lxxxiii Pak, 34. lvii Ibid, 209. lxxxiv Pak, 35 lviii Shin, 15. During the Coup, the two men had been pro-Japanese. But after Japanese imperialistic ambitions lxxxv Pak, 29.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! lxxxvi Yu, 182. REFERENCES lxxxvii Ibid. Cho, Eunsik. The Great Revival of 1907 in Korea: Its Cause and Effect, from Missology: An International lxxxviii Matsutami, 219. Review, 1998. Ireland, Alleyne. The New Korea, New York: E.P. Dutton lxxxix Pak, 119. & Company, 1926. Kang, Wi Jo. Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History xc Pak, 34. of Christianity and Politics. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997. xci Pak, 29. Kang, Wong Joe. The Korean Struggle for International Identity in the Foreground of the Shufeldt Negotiation, xcii Cho, 298. 1866-1882. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005. xciiiMatsutami, 200. Kim, C. I. Eugene, and Han Kim. Korea and the politics of imperialism, 1876-1910. Berkeley: University of xciv Kim, Insoo, 61. California Press, 1967. Print. Kim, In Soo. Asian Thought and Culture: Protestants and the xcv Park, Sandra, “Rebuilding the Jerusalem of the East: Formation of Modern Korean Nationalism, 1885-1920: North Korea’s Christian Past, Present, and Future,” a Study of the Contributions of Horace G. Underwood (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1990), 27-34. and Sun Chu Kil. New York: P. Lang, 1996. Print. Matsutani, Motokazu, Church over Nation: Christian xcvi Cho, 29. Missionaries and Korean Christians in Colonial Korea, Cambridge: Harvard University, 2012. xcvii Park, Sandra, 29. Accessed January 3, 2014, http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn- xcviii Matsutami, 219. 3:HUL.InstRepos:9882530 Mckenzie, Frederick Arthur. Korea's Fight for Freedom,. xcix Matsutami, 283; In addition, testifying to the New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1920. divergence between missionaries and the Korean Neff, Robert and Sung-Hwa Cheong, Korea Through protestants, no missionary was prosecuted during the Western Eyes, Seoul: Seoul University Press, 2009. Conspiracy trial of 1911, and missionaries denied Pak, Chong-Shin. Protestantism and Politics in Korea. Seattle, involvement in any of the independence activities WA: University of Washington Press, 2003. suspected by the Japanese government. Print. Pamphlet Collection, Japanese Atrocities in Korea: Reports c Matsutami, 221. Emphasized and Made Convincing by Japanese Propaganda, 1920. ci Pak, 130. Park, Sandra. “Rebuilding the Jerusalem of the East: North Korea’s Christian Past, Present, and cii Pak, 33. Future.” Chicago: University of Chicago, 1990. P.27-34. ciii Wells, 9. Park, Yong-Shin (1997) “Social Change and Christian Universities in Korea”, paper presented at civ Pamphlets, 6. the symposium “Korean Christianity in Transition”, Center for Korean Studies, cv Pamphlets, 6. University of California, Los Angeles, 17 May. Shin, Gi-Wook, and Michael Edson Robinson. Colonial cvi Kim, In Soo, 173. Modernity in Korea. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center :, 1999. Print. cvii Kim, In Soo, 173. Shin, Gi-Wook, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy Politics, and Legacy, Stanford: Stanford University cviii Takayoshi Matsuo and S. Takiguchi, The Japanese Press, 2006. st Protestants in Korea, Part Two: The 1 March Movement and Shin, Yong-ha, Modern Korean History and Nationalism, the Japanese Protestant, 53; Pamphlets, 10. trans. N.M. Pankaj, Seoul: Jimoondang Publishing Company, 2000. cix Pamphlets, 12. Sohn, Yoon Tahk, The Great Revival Movement in 1907 and cx Kim, 174. the Korean Church Growth. . 18 . 228-234. Takayoshi Matsuo and S. Takiguchi, The Japanese Protestants in Korea, Part Two: The 1st March Movement and the Japanese Protestants. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1979. Pp.581-615.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Wells, Kenneth M. New God, new nation: Protestants and self-reconstruction nationalism in Korea, 1896-1937. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990. Print. William Silcott and Kreinath, Jens. Transformations of a “Religious” Nation in a Global World: Politics, Protestantism, and Ethnic Identity in South Korea. Culture and Religion: An Interdisciplinary Journal. 2013. Yu, K. Kale, American Missionaries and the Korean Independence Movement in the Early 20th Century. International Journal of Korean Studies. Vol. XV, No. 2. 171-186.

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POWER OF PLACE AND PLACE OF POWER Seignior Shang Kexi’s Temple-Building Career in Guangdong in the Early Qing Mengxiao Wang Yale University

ABSTRACT central government in Beijing, the capital city, and many local forces. While many This paper reflects on the role of sacred subjects of the Ming dynasty chose to be places in the political world in late ordained in monasteries so as to reject Imperial China. Focusing on Shang summons from the new government, the Kexi’s religious activities in his Qing royal administration enacted prefecture, Guangdong, during the Ming- regulations to control religious circles and Qing transition, this paper explores endeavored to convert Buddhist monks to ii Shang’s strategies of constructing and their new regime. Against this reconstructing Buddhist temples, as well background, the religious activities of as the functions of these temples in his Shang Kexi (, 1604-1676), one of power operation. A former Ming general the “sanfan” ( , the three famous who surrendered to the Qing and was seigniors), deserve our attention. conferred the title of seignior by the new Focusing on his temple-building career in government, Shang Kexi endeavored to his province, Guangdong ( ), a demonstrate his local authority and province far from the capital Beijing, this establish subtle relations with the central paper explores the strategies of government by (re)building sacred places. constructing and re-constructing temples On the basis of a close reading of records in a transitional period, and the functions in many local gazetteers and other of these temples in local politics. historical texts, I find that, using these As a Han Chinese, Shang Kexi religious sites as a tool in his political life, was a diligent general in the Ming army Shang allied himself with deities so as to but defected to the Qing in 1634. Shang legitimize and even sanctify his military made great contributions to the new victories, rearranged local Buddhist regime in numerous battles and, in 1649, landscapes in order to discipline the he was conferred the new title “Pingnan Sangha community, built temples in the Seignior” (), which means “one Beijing style to send greetings to the who conquers southern China.” To fulfill Emperor in the capital from a remote the promises implied by this title, Shang locality, and negotiated with the central and his army marched south to government to obtain greater autonomy in Guangdong with another seignior, the his own territory. The relation between religion and “Jingnan Seignior” Geng Zhongming ( politics, and the role played by sacred sites ). At the end of 1649, they in power operations, is always intriguing,i finally conquered Guangzhou (), the especially during dynamic times. During capital of Guangdong, and slaughtered its this period, tensions existed between the inhabitants. new regime and the adherents of the Three years after his conquest, in previous dynasty, between the Manchus 1652, Shang Kexi ordered Desheng and Han Chinese people, and between the Temple (, Temple of Victory) and

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Taiping Temple ( , Temple of Guangqing Temple () in 1663, Peace) to be built on the battleground Dafo Temple () in 1664, Tandu outside the small north city gate Temple ( ) in 1665, Nanhua (xiaobeimen ) of Guangzhou city Temple () in 1667, the Hall of where his army had been stationed for Heavenly Kings (Tianwang dian ) in nine months. This marked the beginning of Shang Kexi’s extensive and systematic Haichuang Temple ( ) in 1672, and temple-building career in Guangdong. the Guanyin Hall (, Hall of the According to records in local gazetteers, Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva) in the 1670s. he successively built or renovated (See “Table 1” below for details)

Table 1: Temples Built and Renovated by Shang Kexi in Guangdong Time Name of Temple Building Details Gazetteer Records 1652 East Desheng Both temples were built on Extended Gazetteer of Panyu Temple the battleground outside the County (), () small north gate () of Vol. 5, printed in 1931. 1652 Taiping/Baiyun Guangzhou, where Shang’s Gazetteer of Guangzhou City Temple army had been stationed for ( ), Vol. 88, (/) nine months in 1649. block-printed in 1879. 1663 Guangqing/ Feilai The temple was renovated, Gazetteer of Qingyuan County Temple and monks from Nanhua (), Volume 3, (/) Temple were invited to stay in printed in 1937. it as abbots. 1664 Dafo Temple The temple was restored in a Extended Gazetteer of Panyu () style imitating that of those in County (), the capital city, and many Vol. 36. Tibetan lamas were invited to stay in the temple. 1665 Tandu/Yaoshi The temple was built near the Gazetteer of Panyu County Temple small north gate for the nun ( ), Vol. 24, (/) Ziwu ( ), Shang Kexi’s printed in 1871. daughter, who was ordained. 1667 Nanhua Temple The locations of the Hall of Gazetteer of Qujiang County () the Sixth Patriarch () ( ), Vol. 16, and the Depository of Sūtras printed in 1875; General ( ) were switched in Gazetteer of Nanhua Temple renovation. ( ), printed in 1836. 1672 Haichuang The Hall of Heavenly Kings General Gazetteer of Temple () in the temple was Guangdong Province ( () renovated with royal green ), Vol. 229, printed in glazed tiles. 1822. 1670s Guanyin Temple The Hall was renovated with Extended Gazetteer of Panyu () royal green glazed tiles. County (), Vol. 41.

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In this paper, I will ask several religious sites in Guangdong and granting questions: Why and how did Shang Kexi them political powers, Shang Kexi allied build and rebuild these sacred places? himself with the Buddha or gods of How did he benefit from the rich popular religions, disciplined the local resources of the local Buddhist tradition Sangha community, and negotiated with in Guangdong? What were the reactions the central government in Beijing. from the local Sangha (Buddhist) community and from lay people to CREATING A PLACE OF POWER: Shang’s projects? What kind of role did Building Temples On A Battleground And these sacred sites play in Shang’s political Establishing Local Authority life, including both governing the local community and maintaining a subtle The starting point of Shang Kexi’s relationship with the royal government? temple-building career was the And, finally, we can ask more general construction of East Desheng Temple and questions: how is a site transformed into a Taiping Temple in 1652, which were built sacred place of power through a political discourse, as memorial edifices on the battleground and how is the power of a sacred place employed where Shang and Geng’s army had been for a political purpose? stationed for nine months in 1649. iv Some previous studies hold that Building temples on battlegrounds is a Shang Kexi deeply regretted his brutal deep-rooted tradition in Chinese history, massacre in Guangzhou and built these practiced especially during dynastic temples in order to assuage his guilt. iii transitions. It is a strategy often employed Examining carefully the official historical by a new regime to comfort the violated records of Shang Kexi’s political life, the people.v Some scholars assert that Shang local gazetteers in Guangdong during the Kexi also built these temples on the Qing dynasty (which record a lot of battleground in order to console local informative inscriptions on tablets and people after he slaughtered the population bells), and the many discourses by literati of the city. vi Nonetheless, in the and monks about the temples built by inscriptions on tablets and an iron bell Shang, however, one finds a different and found in these two temples, Shang Kexi more complicated story. On the basis of a did not express this purpose directly. close reading of these texts and case Instead, he demonstrated his gratitude for studies of several temples, I argue that, as the secret battle assistance he claimed to a person with ambiguous identities (a have received from several Buddhist and general of the former Ming dynasty but a popular deities. By endowing these newly disloyal turncoat, a seignior conferred his constructed sacred places with his political title by the new government but an alien power, Shang claimed that his military Han Chinese among his noble Manchu victories in the past and his political fellow officials, a cruel slaughterer but a power in the current were blessed and devout follower of Buddhism), Shang thus sanctified. Kexi endeavored to establish his absolute The East Desheng Temple was authority on a local scale and to maintain constructed on the eastern foot of Baiyun Mountain together with the West a subtle relationship with the central Desheng Temple on the other side, a government as a Han Chinese seignior project carried out by another general— from a remote province. Sacred places the Jingnan Seignior, Shang Kexi’s played a significant role in achieving these colleague in conquering Guangdong. The goals: by constructing and reconstructing positions were chosen according to the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 80! places where the military bases were Figure 1 below), and briefly narrated his located: the Pingnan Seignior stationed his military victory in the bell inscription (see troops to the east of Baiyun Mountain, Figure 2 below): and the Jingnan Seignior to the west. vii () In the seventh year during the Both temples were dedicated to Guan Yu reign of our emperor, I, the (), the God of War in Chinese folk Pingnan Seignior, received faith. The local county gazetteer records imperial orders to restore the inscription on the tablet in the Eastern Guangdong. On the sixth day of Desheng Temple, in which the combat the second month, our troops between the Qing army and Ming officials arrived at Baiyun Mountain to the in Guangzhou is described exaggeratedly north of Guangdong, being in the voice of Shang Kexi.viii quartered at the foot of the Elaborating on the processes they mountain for nine months. used to produce dynamite and defeat their Generals and soldiers were enemies, Shang highlights his primary energetic and diligent, troops and purpose in building the temple: “so as to horses safe and sound. During advocate the god Guan Yu’s will, and not that time, we cast cannons and to forget his blessings.” ( made dynamite without any difficulty, seeming to be assisted ) The word “will” ( ) here is secretly by gods. On the second quite illustrative: by praising the god’s will day of the eleventh month of that as well as advertising his own military year, Guangdong Province being victory, Shang hints that the god actually restored, we recalled that time and desired his victory. Throughout the could not forget. Therefore, I inscription, Shang mentions the god Guan make this donation to sponsor the Yu five times, attributing successes during construction of Taiping Temple, the war to Guan Yu’s protection. He with a sculpture of the Buddha attributes the soundness of the soldiers, inside. Thus, I order the the quick triumph over the high city wall, inscription on this bell, so as to and their foes’ fear of dynamite to Guan record the power of the Buddha Yu’s benediction, proudly proclaiming his forever. ( and the Jingnan Seignior’s secret and sacred bond with the deity: “The Jingnan Seignior and I, from the north to the south, have always been protected by God Guan Yu secretly.” ( ) Dedicated to Buddhist deities, Baiyun Temple, or Taiping Temple, was built to the north of Baiyun Mountain after the two Desheng Temple projects x were accomplished in the same year, ) ix 1652. ( This inscription on the iron bell tells a ) story similar to that on the tablet in East Shang Kexi ordered a huge iron bell to be Desheng Temple. Their successful cast and hung in Baiyun Temple (see production of dynamite, which was crucial

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 81! in winning the war, is especially emphasized again, and ascribed to the power of deities. Two primary differences in this piece compared to the tablet inscription in East Desheng Temple stand out: first, the triumphant conquest is here attributed to the Buddha, instead of the God of War; second, the Pingnan Seignior is described as the sole general who received imperial orders to restore Guangdong in this narration, while the Jingnan Seignior’s participation and contribution is completely excluded. Figure 2: Rubbing of the inscription on the iron bell, collected in Guangzhou Museumxii

The first different point is quite understandable, since Baiyun Temple was designed to enshrine a Buddhist deity, who, according to the inscription on the bell, was the Buddha, but according to another piece recorded in a local gazetteer, was the Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva.xiii In the inscription dedicated to Guan Yu in the East Desheng Temple, the process of their expedition from north to south and the details of their battles were described Figure 1: Iron bell found in Baiyun exhaustively—from which we can infer Temple, now collected in Guangzhou that as the God of War, Guan Yu’s Museumxi principal function was to guide them to a military victory. In contrast, the inscription on the bell draws special attention to the safeness and soundness of troops and horses, which emphasizes the merciful power of Buddhist deities in protecting the lives of living beings. The construction of these two kinds of temples demonstrates the pragmatic orientation of traditional faiths and the flexibility of worshippers: whenever a deity seemed beneficial, it was adopted into a shrine. Sometimes, it was not even necessarily a particular deity, but one with a vague image in a particular category, such as the ambiguous identity of the Buddhist deity (the Buddha or the

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Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva) in the Baiyun than those inscribed on a stone tablet. In Temple. addition, bells serve as ritual instruments The second different point, that in Buddhist monasteries, being involved the Jingnan Seignior’s name is excluded in in regular ritual performances. All these this inscription on the bell, represents the features of the iron bell give it higher subtle competing relationship between status than tablets. Therefore, including these two seigniors. Both the Pingnan the Jingnan Seignior’s name in the tablet Seignior and the Jingnan Seignior were inscription but excluding it in the bell Han Chinese and generals from the inscription could be understood as a way previous Ming dynasty, and both made to demonstrate Shang Kexi’s claim that great contributions to the establishment conquering Guangzhou was his own of the new regime in the early years of the contribution, and to pocket the blessings Qing. Emperor Shunzhi () ordered from Buddhist deities without sharing them to conquer Guangdong using hand- with his competitor. to-hand combat for two reasons: first, the Based on these analyses, we can Ming troops in Guangdong were clearly see Shang Kexi’s desire to be extremely robust and difficult to defeat; memorialized by the contemporary local second, the two seigniors could thus people and later generations. But what prevent each other’s political power from aspects did he want people to remember, growing too extensive. After the conquest and what aspects did he wish to obscure? of Guangdong, however, the two Indeed, Shang Kexi calculated carefully. seigniors began to compete with each In both the inscription on the tablet in other in pursuit of absolute control on a East Desheng Temple and that on the bell local scale. They vied with one another to in Baiyun Temple, he intentionally omits build luxury mansions, levy taxes, the tough process of the war between his construct religious sites, and so on. Years army and the Ming troops in xv later, a local prefect, Yang Yongjian ( Guangzhou, instead describing it as going smoothly without a hitch. By ), could not bear their fighting any clipping historical events and reshaping more and presented a memorial to the the history according to Shang Kexi’s own Emperor, stating that one province could political agenda, the memorial not stand two seigniors, and requesting construction of sacred places actually that the Emperor reappoint one seignior became a way of concealing and forgetting. xiv to another province. ( Moreover, at the place where ) The Jingnan Seignior Shang’s troops were stationed outside the was finally reappointed to Fujian Province small north gate of Guangzhou on Baiyun in the year 1660, which marks Shang mountain, there was another very famous Kexi’s success in this battle. monastery, Jingtai Temple ( ), Situating this inscription, which which was almost ruined because Shang’s omits the Jingnan Seignior’s name, against army cut off all bamboo shoots and trees this background, one can infer that Shang in and around it to make cannons.xvi ( Kexi could have done this intentionally when casting a memoir on the bell. Compared to a tablet, which was usually ) After the war, however, made of stone and stood in front of a Shang did not make any effort to restore temple, the bell was made of iron and this temple, but chose to construct two hung inside Baiyun Temple. Characters new temples to honor the Buddha and cast on an iron bell tend to last longer other gods, as well as his own military

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 83! victory. There are multiple possible option for Shang Kexi, not only thanks to reasons that Shang made no effort to the imperial favor it enjoyed through the restore the Jingtai Temple, but looking at Tang, Song, Yuan and Ming dynasties, but this in light of Shang’s partial narrations of also because it was one of the most his expeditious and trouble-free conquest celebrated Buddhist monasteries of the in the two inscriptions examined above, Chan School. Monk Huineng (), the we are given the sense that it was his Sixth Patriarch of the Chan School in the political interests which inspired him to Tang dynasty, once lived and taught there, conceal his crime of ruining local religious and the temple still housed his sites and slaughtering the city. He may mummified body.xviii (See Figure 3 below) have hoped the citizens would forget Occupying a high position in both the about the bloody battle that took place political world and Buddhist society, three years prior and remember only his Nanhua Temple inevitably attracted Shang glorious victory and his sacred connection Kexi’s attention and he became interested with the deities. In this way, by in reconstructing it. By debating with constructing new sacred places and monks from Nanhua monastery and re- claiming protection from deities, Shang locating the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch ( Kexi was trying to justify his political ), Shang Kexi endeavored to power and even sanctify it, thus intervene in the local Buddhist tradition establishing his authority on a local scale. and discipline the Sangha community in

his prefecture. MANIPULATING THE POWER OF

PLACE: Intervening In Local Tradition And Disciplining The Sangha Community

In addition to creating new religious sites, Shang Kexi also spent considerable energy and funds rebuilding pre-existing ones, some of which were rather old and had enjoyed imperial favor in several previous dynasties. When discussing sacred places in Varanasi, Hans Bakker argues that one of the most remarkable or tragic qualities of a sacred place is that “it holds a special attraction xvii for believers of other religions.” To put this in a political context, Bakker’s Figure 3: The Mummy of Huineng in argument can be adjusted as follows: Nanhua Templexix sacred places, especially those favored by former regimes, hold a special attraction for rulers in a new government. Since Containing the mummy of Monk these places have already been places of Huineng, the core building in Nanhua power, appropriating the power of such Temple was the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch, places becomes a very effective way for which had been located toward the right new governors to establish their authority. rear of the Hall of the Mahavira Buddha In particular for Guangdong, the (). (See Figure 4 below) Showing Nanhua Temple proved a favorable great respect for Monk Huineng, Shang

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Kexi decided to rebuild the Nanhua Patriarch to a better site. Temple and relocate the Hall of the Sixth

Figure 4: Map of Nanhua Temple in the Year 1671xx part [of China], but had heard In “Record of the Pingnan about the reputation of the Seignior’s Reviving of the Nanhua Nanhua Temple for a long time. Temple,” ( ) However, it is tens of thousands Shang first expresses his admiration for of li to the south of my hometown, Nanhua Temple and his regret that he had thus I had never had an no opportunity to visit it before he opportunity to visit it. ( conquered Guangdong: Ever since Buddhism was transmitted to China and accepted by the Chinese people within the territory of China, there have been innumerous tremendous temples [erected] on precious mountains. Among these prominent Buddhist ) xxi sites, the Nanhua Temple is the first and foremost, since it Then, Shang Kexi states his concern inherited the Buddha’s legacy, and about the “inferior” location of the Hall was the origin of the five schools of the Sixth Patriarch and his plan to of Chan Buddhism. I was born relocate this hall to the site right behind and grew up in the northeastern the Hall of the Buddha:

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I was concerned about the Hall of dwelling” from Huineng’s Platform Sūtra the Sixth Patriarch, Monk () xxiii and “Dharma Gate of Non- Huineng, located to the east of the duality” from the Vimalakīrti Sūtra (Ch. Hall of the Buddha. The path was Weimajie jing ).xxiv very circuitous and the space Finally, Shang Kexi refers to a terribly narrow, which was not in appropriate scale to such a hall. supportive opinion of a fengshui expert ( Furthermore, the Sixth Patriarch , a geomancer): “Meanwhile, a established his teachings of “no- fengshui expert observed the situation and thinking” and “no-dwelling,” drew a map, which was in accordance named the “Dharma Gate of with my opinion.” ( Non-duality.” But the Hall of the Buddha and that of the Patriarch )xxv Based on all those considerations, were on two different paths, Shang finally decided to rearrange the which was not an appropriate halls in Nanhua Temple—switching the arrangement in the spirit of such a Hall of the Sixth Patriarch and the hall. I secretly wanted to move Depository of Sūtras, which had been the Hall of the Patriarch right situated right behind the Hall of the behind the Hall of the Buddha, Mahavira Buddha before Shang’s and move the Depository of renovation. Sūtras to the old site of the Hall of Furthermore, in this record, Shang the Patriarch, so as to indicate the Kexi also mentions a natural miracle that true legacy of the Buddha’s he interpreted as supporting his teachings, and [the fact that his reconstruction: “The Spring of Planting teachings engendered] direct Staff began to flow again after it had dried “sudden enlightenment.” ( up for many years, and the common people were all very merry about this unprecedented event.”xxvi ( ) There is a tale about this spring related to Monk Huineng. It is said that when Huineng left his teacher Hongren’s ) xxii ( , the fifth patriarch in the Chan School) monastery with his robe and bowl According to Shang Kexi’s criticism, not (yibo , a metaphor for “legacy of only did the smaller scale of this hall fail dharma” in Chan Buddhist tradition) and to suit the remarkable status of the sixth came to the Nanhua Temple for the first patriarch, but the relative positions of the time in the seventh century, he wanted to Hall of the Sixth Patriarch and the Hall of wash the robe but could not find a pure the Buddha also did not properly spring, so he planted his staff on a represent the supposed relationship particular point on the earth and suddenly a beautiful spring burst out from that between Monk Huineng and the Buddha. xxvii Shang Kexi describes the sacred places in point. Springs have always played an a Buddhist vocabulary, applying real space important role in various sacred sites to symbolize the spiritual space in the among far-flung Buddhist areas. Here, Buddhist master’s discourse, such as “no- with such a tale referring to the sixth

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 86! patriarch, Master Huineng, and, moreover, Here, Shang Zhixin quotes the key words the direct legacy of the Chan School from “no birth, no death” from the famous the fifth patriarch, this spring gained a Heart Sūtra (Ch. Xinjing ) and uses sacred power and became a sanctified site. the spring as a metaphor for this concept, After Huineng passed away, however, this in a like manner with his father who spring ran dry many times, the most connects real spaces with discursive recent of which happened in the year 1665. spaces in Buddhist sūtras. Moreover, From a piece of inscription titled Shang Zhixin’s statement of his “Mister Anda’s Inscription on the Tablet contribution of following Monk Huineng besides the Spring of Planting Staff” ( and triggering the spring to flow again ) written by Shang seems to be very proud, if not arrogant. Kexi’s eldest son Shang Zhixin (), He is actually trying to say that his power we can reconstruct a more complete story of changing the natural landscape and about the miracle mentioned by Shang producing miracles equals that of the Kexi. In the year 1668, Shang Kexi revered Monk Huineng. visited Nanhua Temple together with Being inscribed on a stone tablet Shang Zhixin, who was addressed erected next to the spring in 1668, this respectfully as Mister Anda. Noticing that magical event might become very popular the spring had dried up, Shang Zhixin told among monks from Nanhua Temple and a monk in the temple: “I will plant a staff even common people in that area. here for Master Huineng.” ( Therefore, it is no wonder that Shang Kexi refers to the rebirth of this spring in ) Then he made a great donation to his record so as to justify his own the temple, ordering monks to inscribe intention of rearranging the locations of the tablet again and carry out prayer. halls in Nanhua Temple. Showing his Before long, the spring began to flow son’s great capability in reviving this again and the well nearby was soon filled sacred spring, Shang Kexi seems to be up. Shang Zhixin was very pleased with very confident in his own project of this and wrote a poem to record this relocating the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch. miraculous event: Nevertheless, though grateful for Shang

Kexi’s generous donation in renovating The birth of this spring, who the halls, monks from the Nanhua probably stimulates it? The death Temple appeared strongly against Shang’s of this spring, it has not ceased plan of relocating the Hall of the Sixth being originally. No birth, no Patriarch. The abbot, Monk Derong, led death, who can recognize the the entire Nanhua Sangha community to noble truth. Drying up outside, present a “Statement of the Pingnan filling up inside, the spiritual Seignior’s Replacement of the Hall of the spring becomes silent. Today I follow Master Huineng’s step, Sixth Patriarch” ( planting the staff for you.xxviii ( ) to Shang Kexi, explaining several inconveniences:

The shape of this mountain is like a lively elephant, with its teeth, ) horns, four feet all lively in appearance. And the Hall of the Patriarch is [now] located right

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 87! below the elephant’s nose, on its want to relocate the Hall of the left chin. Since the nose of an Patriarch, then the old site of the elephant is most necessary for its hall would become a wasteland— life, and the chin is below its nose, how will you deal with it in the the site where the Hall of the future? We are afraid that once Patriarch is located is the place this ground becomes empty, it where the geomantic treasures would be coveted by outsiders, aggregate [and it] has lasted for creating infinite trouble for the over a thousand years without any monks.xxix ( change… The mummy of the Sixth Patriarch dwells in this site, on which the divine spirit relies, being so supernatural and so efficacious, that from the Tang dynasty until now it has not been …… destroyed. Now your highness grants us a favor to rebuild the Nanhua Temple, and to relocate the Hall of the Patriarch to the site of the Depository of Sūtras. We humbly think that the site of the depository is the boundary of the dragon vein, not a place where vitality aggregates. Moreover, it is on the right side of the elephant’s nose, from which the elephant exhales. If you relocate the Hall of the Patriarch to this site, there are three inconveniences. First, as for any common constructions of earth and wood, when they endure for many years, they even become divinely efficacious; now as for a site where a Bodhisattva’s fleshly ) body dwells, after standing here for over thousands of years, how From this long statement, we can see that could it not be divinely efficacious? the monks had two concerns: on the one Second, the incense for the Sixth hand, the old site of the hall was the place Patriarch could be inherited where the sixth patriarch’s fleshly body because the Hall of the Patriarch is dwelled and on which his divine spirit located at the most prominent depended; on the other hand, a possible spot of this mountain. Once it is change in ownership of the land would relocated to a place that exhales likely be disputed and criticized by the lively spirit, we are afraid that outsiders. Thus, they sincerely presented our monastery will decline. Third, this statement to Shang Kexi, begging him for any sacred site, the rise always to keep the Hall of the Patriarch in its follows the downfall. Now you original site.

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The most intriguing element is accomplished his project, his that in their debate, Shang and the monks understanding of a sacred place in terms both employed discursive vocabularies of Buddhism, especially Chan Buddhism, that were supposed to be well understood was not accepted by the professional and accepted by the opposite side to monks from Nanhua Temple at all. express their own opinions about a sacred Monks could only express their place. In the main body of his statement, objections in such an obscure writing style. Shang applies the doctrines of Chan But why did Shang Kexi insist on Buddhism, especially concepts from relocating the hall despite their strong Huineng’s Platform Sūtra, such as “no- objections? His action should be thinking” and “no-dwelling,” to justify his considered in the larger religious context decision of moving the Hall of the Sixth of the early Qing period. At the time, Patriarch to a position right behind the Guangdong was one of the most Hall of the Buddha. The monks, on the prominent places where literati adherents other hand, speak primarily of the to the former Ming dynasty were ordained geomantic disadvantages of relocation, a in order to escape from the political life in concern that sounds more likely to come a new dynasty (taochan ).xxxi Monks in from a government official who would Nanhua Temple mostly came from this care about fengshui and hire a fengshui group of people. As a recently established expert in designing new constructions. ruler from the new regime, Shang Kexi on Nevertheless, the result was ironic the one hand used every means to win in both ways. In spite of the rejections over these monks, and on the other hand from monks, Shang still carried out the also tried to discipline them by intervening project of relocating the hall. The monks’ in religious affairs and manipulating local agency, however, was not entirely Buddhist tradition. As a sacred place that suppressed. In the General Gazetteer of had enjoyed the favor of royal families Nanhua Temple that was revised and from the Tang dynasty to the Ming recompiled by Monk Zhenpu () dynasty, Nanhua Temple became one of and Ma Yuan () several years later, it the most revered temples and also a place is recorded that “the Pingnan Seignior of power, which unavoidably attracted adopted the words of a fengshui expert, ambitious politicians from a new thought the scale of the old Hall of the government. Sixth Patriarch was not appropriate, and Therefore, relocating the Hall of thus relocated it to the place right behind the Sixth Patriarch, the very core building the Hall of the Buddha.”xxx ( of a place that had been unmoved for hundreds of years, was a significant move ) in Shang Kexi’s political career. Moreover, Clearly, the monks did not buy Shang in the map of Nanhua Temple drawn in Kexi’s arguments about “no-thinking,” 1671 (see Figure 4 above), one can find “no-dwelling,” or “non-duality.” Shang’s the life-temple of the Pingnan Seignior painstaking and calculated discourses with () at the lower-right corner Buddhist vocabularies are completely xxxii omitted here; instead, the geomancer’s inside the temple. This provides clear opinion, which is only mentioned in one evidence of Shang Kexi’s intention to sentence in Shang’s personal statement, expand his power and even immortalize becomes the sole justification for his himself together with the Buddha and project of reconstructing Nanhua Temple. Monk Huineng. By rearranging the Although Shang successfully landscape in such a celebrated temple in

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 89! spite of the monks’ protests, Shang Kexi Interestingly, although Shang Kexi was displayed his utter authority over the local equated to Anathapindika because of his Sangha community, and more generally, generosity in building Dafo Temple, one the whole territory of his prefecture. can easily notice the main difference between these two: while Anathapindika A SACRED PLACE IN THE BEIJING donated the grove for a religious leader— STYLE: the Buddha himself—Shang Kexi Paying Allegiance To And Negotiating With dedicated Dafo Temple directly to a The Central Authority political leader—the Qing Emperor. The sacred place thus became a pragmatic tool Besides establishing his power in employed by Shang Kexi in his politics. his prefecture and interfacing with the In addition to honoring the local Sangha community, Shang Kexi also Emperor, a more personal motivation also had to manage his relations with the played an important role in the central government in the capital city, construction of Dafo Temple. Shang Beijing, as a Han Chinese general who had Zhilong ( ), another of Shang converted to the new Manchu regime. Kexi’s sons, married a princess and lived Since the Qing government spent much in Beijing. In the 1660s, the Emperor energy controlling and regulating religions, granted Shang Zhilong a favor, permitting especially Buddhism, Buddhist sacred sites him to pay a visit to his parents with his again became an effective device for wife in Guangdong. Receiving this Shang to demonstrate his allegiance to and exciting news, Shang Kexi decided to negotiate with the central authority. build a pure altar that would suit the status Out of this political concern, Dafo of the Emperor’s daughter and son-in-law. Temple (literally, “Big Buddha Temple”) Dafo Temple in the style of Beijing was was built on the relic site of Longcang thus brought into being as the altar for Temple () from the Ming dynasty, Shang Zhilong and his royal wife to in imitation of the temple building styles perform rituals. Along with a daughter of in Beijing, the capital city. The statue of the royal family, Shang Zhilong also the big Buddha in this temple was also brought a group of Tibetan Buddhist carved in the style of the capital. xxxiii lamas from the capital city to Guangdong. Shang Kexi explains that the primary The lamas were hired to hold a grand intention of this project was to “send overall dharma ceremony for 49 days, the greetings to the Emperor in Beijing from ritual of which was so splendid that a remote place.” xxxiv () contemporary people had rarely seen it Later a poet Fan Feng eulogized Shang’s before.xxxvi ( construction of Dafo Temple, comparing ) him to Anathapindika, a generous Why were there Tibetan lamas businessman and a chief lay disciple of instead of local Buddhist masters in the Gautama Buddha who honored the Chan School? In the first place, monks Buddha by laying out about 1.8 million from the capital city were apparently gold bricks in a grove. The last two lines superior to regional monks in Guangdong. of this poem read: “Laying out gold on Taking the primary purpose of this Dafo the ground of previous Longcang Temple, Temple and its close relationship to the kowtowing in southern region to pay royal family into account, however, we homage to the Emperor.”xxxv ( can connect Shang Kexi’s arrangement to ) the holistic religious climate in the Qing

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 90! dynasty. Because of the concern for likely that the Tibetan lamas only stayed in safety on the borderland as well as Guangzhou relying on the Pingnan conditional preference, the Qing royal Seignior’s favor because they could be family preferred Tibetan Buddhism used by Shang Kexi to pay allegiance to (Zangchuan fojiao ) to Han the central government, but had never Chinese Buddhism (Hanchuan fojiao won the support from local people. Thus ). Thus, besides building Dafo once the Shang family fell out of power, the lamas had no choice but to leave Temple in the Beijing style, Shang Kexi Guangdong and abdicate to local Chan and his son also invited Tibetan lamas, monks. who were favored by the central government, from Beijing. Exerting these Nevertheless, the relation between Shang Kexi and the central government dual means of building sacred places and was more complicated than just a relation carrying out rituals, Shang Kexi between an overpowering monarch and a considered carefully how to cater to the completely subordinate subject. As a royal government’s religious taste and general who made enormous demonstrate his allegiance to the central contributions in helping the Qing authority. establish their regime, but at the same What happened to these Tibetan lamas later also deserves our attention, time a Han Chinese and a turncoat from the former Ming, Shang Kexi had an since the records and comments represent inevitably awkward position in the new the attitude of the local people toward the dynasty. His fellows, the Pingxi Seignior lamas from a completely divergent religious culture. According to the Wu Sangui ( ), the Jingnan Seignior gazetteer of Nanhai County, the lamas Geng Zhongming (the two other families stayed in Guangdong after the grand ritual of the “sanfan,” Three Seigniors), and ceremony and were hosted in Dafo Geng’s son Geng Jimao (), rose in Temple as abbots. After Shang Zhixin, rebellion against the Qing government xxxix Shang Kexi’s eldest son and the second successively. Although not as generation of the Pingnan Seignior, was ambitious as his fellows and never having executed upon imperial order, the lamas rebelled in his lifetime, sometimes Shang left the temple in succession.xxxvii ( Kexi’s behaviors also seemed to have ) In 1735, Liu Shu ( gone beyond his political status. This subtle relation was also ), the prefect of Guangzhou City, presented in Shang’s temple-building invited a Chan master, Monk Zile ( projects. When he first conquered ), from Haichuang Temple to act as Guangzhou and was about to construct the abbot at Dafo Temple. The author his own mansion, he had planned to build comments: “Monk Zile possessed a high it in the style of that of Beile (, a rank Buddhist morality, thanks to whom the of Manchu nobility right below that of ethos of Chan got inspirited during that Prince) and ordered many royal green xxxviii time.” ( glazed tiles (lüliuliwa ) to be ) Although there is no direct produced. After Shang presented his judgment of the Tibetan lamas, from the request to the central government, indifferent narrative about their departure however, he received a command saying: and the especially exciting commentary on the Chan master, it is not difficult to see The building styles of the the local people’s preference. It was most mansions of a common minister

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and a member of the royal central government: even if building his nobilities are different. Since the own mansion with materials that Pingnan Seignior and the Jingnan symbolized royal identity was banned by Seignior were both promoted to the Emperor, Shang could still take the position of seigniors from advantage of his absolute power on a local commoners, their requests of scale to use these materials in building using green glazed tiles to build religious sites. Therefore, sacred places in their mansions could not be the Beijing style not only served to pay permitted.xl ( allegiance to the royal authority, but also served as an ambitious claim for Shang’s autonomy in his own province.

) EPILOGUE: Sacred Places In And After Power Operations Thus the central government forbade him from using these tiles, since he was not a Shang Kexi’s temple-building member of the Manchu nobility but a Han career constituted a great part of his Chinese. Having already finished the political life. The numerous religious sites production of these tiles, Shang Kexi built by Shang played a significant role in applied them to the construction of sacred his power operations, including both places, such as the Hall of Heavenly Kings establishing his authority on a local scale, ( ) in Haichuang Temple, the and dealing with his relationship with the Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva Temple on central government. Based on Shang Yuexiu Mountain, the Temple of Guan Kexi’s constructions and re-constructions Yu, and Dafo Temple.xli ( of different temples, we can summarize several patterns in building sacred places ) and applying them in politics. First, as From this event we can draw displayed in the case of East Desheng several interesting points: first, Shang Temple and Taiping Temple, a brand new Kexi desired to build his own mansion in temple built on previous military sites can a royal style imitating those of the Manchu be endowed with political power, nobles in Beijing, which obviously functioning as both a way of representing demonstrated his political ambition. and concealing, and of remembering and Second, Shang Kexi had ordered the forgetting at the order of the builder. glazed tiles to be produced even before he Second, as for a conventionally celebrated received permission from the central temple like Nanhua Temple, power government. Third, after being prohibited, derived from the sacred place itself Shang did not abandon all the royal becomes an object of desire for politicians materials, but still made use of them in his of new regimes, attracting them to temple-building career. Considering his manipulate the power of the site by luxurious life in general, especially the rearranging its original landscape. Third, a massive construction projects in sacred place built on a remote site but in Guangdong, it might not be proper to the fashion of the capital city can serve as infer that Shang did this just because he an architectural metaphor, symbolizing did not want to waste the expensive green the builder’s homage to a central authority, glazed tiles. There could be a possibility and, at the same time, his or her ambition that he was trying to negotiate with the to imitate the noble style. These three patterns worked together organically in

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Shang Kexi’s temple-building scheme, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! simultaneously bolstered his power. iv Ding Renchang and Liang Dingfen , The afterlives of these temples are Panyu Xian xuzhi [Extended gazetteer of Panyu County] (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1967), also illuminating for us to understand the 386. nature of a sacred place. East Desheng v For example, Halperin indicates that the temples built Temple and Taiping Temple gradually on battlefields in the Song dynasty were uses to comfort the war dead. See Mark Halperin, Out of the Cloister: declined in the later period, and very little Literati Perspectives on Buddhism in Sung China, 960-1279 xlii of them remains today. Dafo Temple (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), was renovated by several officials and 112-30. country gentlemen in the Qing dynasty vi Xing Zhaohua , "Pingnanwang tiezhong ji and the Republican period before it was mingwen kaoshi" , Zhongguo transformed into a factory during the lishi wenwu 3 (2005). Cultural Revolution. Now one can find its relic site on a street in Guangzhou vii Fan Feng , Nanhai baiyong xubian , City. xliii On the other hand, Nanhua ed. Zhang Zhi , vol. 62, Zhongguo fengtuzhi congkan (Yangzhou: Guangling shushe, 2003), Temple has enjoyed a seemingly endless 101-02. stream of pilgrims up until today, and still viii Ding Renchang and Liang Dingfen, Panyu xian xuzhi, boasts a reputation as the “foremost 1872-75. precious monastery in the eastern Yue.” ix Fan Feng, Nanhai baiyong xubian, 101-02. xliv () The divergent fates of x Mai Yinghao , ed., Guangzhoushi wenwuzhi these religious sites provide an (Guangzhou: Lingnan meishu chubanshe, opportunity for us to reflect on the nature 1990), 277. xi See Xing Zhaohua , "Pingnanwang tiezhong ji of a sacred place: compared to shrines mingwen kaoshi." built on the basis of the teachings, tales, xii Ibid. and even fleshly (physical) bodies of xiii Fan Feng , Nanhai baiyong xubian, 101-02. famous religious figures, the lives of sites xiv Wu Zhongkuang , ed., Man Han mingchen zhuan (Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang renmin constructed with the support of a political chubanshe, 1991), 191. figure and his sovereign power tend to be much more transient. xv In a later biography of Shang Kexi, the tough process of the war is recorded in detail. See Anonymous, Qingshi liezhuan , ed. Tianjin tushuguan lishi wenxian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! bu , Sanshisanzhong Qingdai i For example, James Robson studies the power renwu zhuanji ziliao huibian operated on a celebrated Buddhist mountain, Nanyue , vol. 6 (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 2009), 606-08. (), in medieval China. See James Robson, Power of Place: The Religious Landscape of the Southern Sacred Peak xvi Fan Feng, Nanhai Baiyong Xubian, 10304. (Nanyue) in Medieval China (Cambridge: Harvard xvii Hans Bakker, "Construction and Reconstruction of University Asia Center, 2009). Timothy Brook studies ā āṇ ī the relations between gentlemen's Buddhist activities Sacred Space in V r as ," Numen 43:1 (1996): 41. and their political appeal in the late imperial China. See Timothy Brook, Praying for Power: Buddhism and the xviii See the biography of Huineng in Zanning , Song Formation of Gentry Society in Late-Ming China (Cambridge: Gaoseng Zhuan , ed. Fan Xiangyong Harvard University Press, 1993). (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), 175. See Faure's descriptions of Huineng's mummy in Nanhua Temple in ii See Zhou Shujia , Qingdai fojiao shiliao jigao Bernard Faure, "Relics and Fleshly Bodies: The Creation (Taipei: Xinwenfeng chuban gongsi, of Ch'an Pilgrimage Sites," in Pilgrims and Sacred Sites in 2000). In this book, Zhou collects various materials China, ed. Susan Naquin and Chün-fang Yü (Berkeley: reflecting the Qing government's regulations of both University of California Press, 1992). Chinese and Tibetan Buddhisms. xix Shi Chuanzheng , Nanhua shilü iii Liang Yongkang , Guangdong fojiao shi (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2002), 2. (Hongkong: Zhonghua fojiao tushuguan, 1984), 78-79.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xx Ma Yuan and Shi Zhenpu , Caoxi tongzhi Bakker, Hans. "Construction and Reconstruction of [General gazetteer of Nanhua Temple], ed. Sacred Space in Vārāṇasī." Numen 43,1 Bai Huawen and Zhang Zhi , Zhongguo (1996): 32-55. Brook, Timothy. Praying for Power: Buddhism and the fosizhi congkan , vol. 111 (Yangzhou: Formation of Gentry Society in Late-Ming China. Guanglin shuju, 2006), 49-50. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. xxi Ibid., 264. Cai Hongsheng . Qingchu Lingnan fomen shilüe xxii Ibid., 265-66. . Guangzhou: Guangdong xxiii Huineng , Tanjing jiaoshi , ed. Guo gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997. Peng (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 31-32. Chen Yuan . Mingji dian qian foshikao . Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962. xxiv Li Yizhuo ed., Weimojie jing jizhu Ding Renchang , and Liang Dingfen . , vol. 8 (Taipei: Xinwenfeng chuban gongsi, 1977). Panyu xian xuzhi . [Extended gazetteer of Panyu County]. Taipei: Chengwen xxv Ma Yuan and Shi Zhenpu, Caoxi tongzhi, 266. chubanshe, 1967. xxvi Ibid. Fan Feng . Nanhai baiyong xubian . xxvii Ibid., 84. Zhongguo fengtuzhi congkan , Vol. 62. Edited by Zhang Zhi . xxviii Ibid., 269. Yangzhou: Guangling shushe, 2003. xxix Ibid., 509-12. Faure, Bernard. "Relics and Fleshly Bodies: The xxx Ibid., 98. Creation of Ch'an Pilgrimage Sites." In Pilgrims xxxi Cai Hongsheng , Qingchu Lingnan fomen shilüe and Sacred Sites in China, edited by Susan (Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng Naquin and Chun-fang Yu, 150-95. jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997), 17-22. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. Halperin, Mark. Out of the Cloister: Literati Perspectives on xxxii Ma Yuan and Shi Zhenpu, Caoxi tongzhi, 111, 99. Buddhism in Sung China, 960-1279. Cambridge: xxxiii Mai Yinghao, ed., Guangzhoushi wenwuzhi, 188. Harvard University Asia Center, 2006. xxxiv Fan Feng, Nanhai baiyong xubian, 76-77. Huineng . Tanjing jiaoshi . edited by Guo xxxv Ibid., 77. Peng Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983. xxxvi Ibid., 78. Li Weiyun . Guangzhou zongjiao zhi . xxxvii Zheng Rong , Gui Dian , and Zhao Heci Guangzhou: Guangzhou renmin chubanshe, , Xuxiu Nanhai xianzhi , vol. 5 1998. (block-printed, 1910), 15b. Li Yizhuo , ed. Weimojie jing jizhu . Taipei: Xinwenfeng chuban gongsi, 1977. xxxviii Ibid. Liang Yongkang . Guangdong fojiao shi xxxix See Meng Sen , Qingshi jiangyi , ed. . Hongkong: Zhonghua fojiao tushuguan, Wu Jun (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1984. 1998), 14353. Ma Yuan and Shi Zhenpu . Caoxi tongzhi [General gazetteer of Nanhua xl Fan Feng, Nanhai baiyong xubian, 106. xli Ibid. Temple]. Edited by Bai Huawen and xlii See Xing Zhaohua, "Pingnanwang tiezhong ji Zhang Zhi . Zhongguo fosizhi congkan mingwen kaoshi." , vol. 111. Yangzhou: Guanglin shuju, 2006. xliii Mai Yinghao, Guangzhoushi wenwuzhi, 188. Mai Yinghao , ed. Guangzhoushi wenwuzhi . Guangzhou: Lingnan meishu xliv See the first half of the couplets hanging on two sides chubanshe, 1990. of the front gate of the Nanhua Temple. Meng Sen . Qingshi jiangyi . Edited by Wu Jun Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin REFERENCES chubanshe, 1998. Robson, James. Power of Place: The Religious Landscape of the Southern Sacred Peak (Nanyue) in Medieval Anonymous. Qingshi liezhuan . Edited by China. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Tianjin tushuguan lishi wenxian bu Center, 2009. . Sanshisanzhong Qingdai Shi Chuanzheng . Nanhua shilüe . renwu zhuanji ziliao huibian Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, , Vol. 6. Jinan: Qilu 2002. shushe, 2009. Shinohara, Koichi. "Quanding's Biography of Zhiyi, the Fourth Chinese Patriarch of the Tiantai

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Tradition." In Speaking of Monks: Religious Biography in India and China, edited by Phyllis Granoff, 97-218. London: Mosaic Press, 1992. Wu Zhongkuang , ed. Man Han mingchen zhuan . Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1991. Xing Zhaohua . "Pingnanwang Tiezhong Ji Mingwen Kaoshi" . Zhongguo lishi wenwu 3 (2005): 3944. Yan Yaozhong . Zhongguo dongnan fojiao shi . Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2005. Zanning . Song gaoseng zhuan . Edited by Fan Xiangyong . Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987. Zheng Rong , Gui Dian , and Zhao Heci . Xuxiu nanhai xianzhi . Block-printed, 1910. Zhou Shujia . Qingdai fojiao shiliao jigao . Taipei: Xinwenfeng chuban gongsi, 2000.

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EXPANDING POPULATIONS The American Multiplication Table in the Chinese Context Ryan Mikkelsen Washington University in St. Louis

“People are indeed the essential of commerce, and the more people the more trade; the more trade, the more money; the more money, the more strength; and the more strength, the greater the nation…All temporal felicities, I mean national, spring from the number of people.”

~ Daniel Defoe (1660-1731), English novelist

ABSTRACT corresponding lack of individual freedoms under the leadership of Mao Zedong in This paper examines the strong pronatalist China is linked to the disastrous Chinese population rhetoric of American colonials, overpopulation throughout the 20th particularly Benjamin Franklin, and century, culminating with the compares such positions to the pro- implementation of the one-child policy. population views of the early communist party in China, particularly Mao Zedong. The birthrate among white Why did both nations adopt pronatalist Americans in 1800 exceeded the birthrate positions early in their respective of any country, developing or otherwise, histories? This paper presents the anywhere in the world at the turn of the historical context behind Benjamin 21st century.i In the early years of Franklin’s and Mao Zedong’s decisions as nationhood, Americans reproduced at well as the arguments that each leader put historically unprecedented rates, a forth regarding an expanding population. phenomenon that continued for the first The paper transitions to examine the half of the country’s existence. Reflecting difference in outcomes for the respective on this fecundity of American couples in policies, specifically how the United States 1846, Indiana Democrat Andrew was successfully able to avoid Kennedy defined the increase as being overpopulation while the People’s nothing short of an “American Republic of China developed an multiplication table.” ii However, when unsustainably large population. The paper considering nations that experience a concludes by arguing that the success of rapid population increase immediately early American population policies was following formation, the People’s contingent on more than simply having Republic of China is typically the prime the space to accommodate an expanding example, not the early United States. How population and a lower initial population. does this unrivaled “American In fact, various freedoms and the ability to multiplication table” compare to China’s make individual choices within the United infamous population growth? In both States ultimately influenced the ability to situations, early leaders, in particular control overpopulation, as evidenced by Benjamin Franklin and Mao Zedong, the existence of a “population frontier.” A supported an expanding population. By

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 96! examining the historical and personal population was a sign of God’s grace and context surrounding each leader, it favor.”v Moreover, while “population was becomes clear why both Franklin and an index of social health, depopulation Mao promoted each policy: Franklin indicated decay and corruption.” vi desired a growing population to facilitate Supported by traditional values, American western expansion while Mao, population in 17th and 18th century Europe on the other hand, wanted a larger was not only a measuring stick for population in an attempt to validate the development and advancement, but also a benefits of socialism and rule by the popular topic of concern. Communism Party. This historical Economist Adam Smith also background also helps explain why each addressed the relationship between policy was or was not successful: population and wealth in his famous 1776 American social and political institutions treatise The Wealth of Nations. Smith allowed people to make individual concluded that a larger population was in reproduction decisions while Chinese fact the most indicative characteristic of a socialism influenced such choices. nation’s future growth.vii Smith promoted From the middle of the 17th the notion that an increased level of century to the end of the 18th century, wealth led to a larger population, so to every European nation-state actively complain of a larger population was sought to have a larger populace. Elites in inherently to lament “the greatest public both England and France, two of the prosperity.”viii For Smith, children were a largest world powers at the time, bragged source of wealth. This reality was about their respective territorial size as an particularly true for the North American indicator of national well being and status. continent where “labour is there so well English political economist Sir William rewarded that a numerous family of Petty recognized as early as 1662 that a children, instead of being a burthen is a large number of subjects was a source of source of opulence and prosperity to the wealth for a country when he concluded, parents.”ix Labor in America at the time “fewness of people, is real poverty.” iii was expensive, and parents could afford Some 80 years later, in 1741, this analysis to have children, knowing that their still held true when German demographer children would be able to find jobs and Johann Peter Sussmilch noted: “A state support themselves. which has only half as many inhabitants as Such was the contemporary its circumstances and food permit, will be dialogue surrounding population growth only half as fortunate, powerful, and when Benjamin Franklin wrote his wealthy as it could and should be.” iv influential 1751 essay entitled Observations According to the scholars and leaders of Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of 17th and 18th century Europe, a larger Countries, etc. In it, Franklin presented a population was not only desirable but also revolutionary concept in demography: a a goal that every government should country’s population cannot exceed the actively pursue. Historian Alan Houston, amount of subsistence that the country’s however, traces the roots of pronatalism – land provides. Franklin’s caveat: or the support of higher reproduction depending on the degree of development, rates – even further back in time, different societies are capable of identifying biblical roots for advocating producing different levels of subsistence, population growth. The result, according provided the same land. A higher level of to Houston, was that in 17th and 18th subsistence, in turn, led to early marriages century Europe “a large and thriving and more children, promoting the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 97! strength of a nation.x As a result, Franklin interests of the American people at the concluded, in much the same manner that time. Approaching population issues from Mao would many years later, that the a mercantilist point of view, Franklin American population could and indeed viewed population growth as a good ought to expand at its current miraculous thing.xiv Unlike many later demographers, rate as this was proof of a higher state of for Franklin, a larger population would development. Franklin even went so far as not lead to widespread poverty or to calculate just how quickly the American deleterious societal issues, especially population was doubling. His estimate of regarding relations with Britain. Rather, as a 25-year doubling period proved historian Alan Houston notes, “when it remarkably accurate, predicting the came to population growth, he did not see American population in 1890 over 100 disruption and instability, as when a child years later off by only 0.13%.xi outgrows its parents, but mutual Franklin felt so strongly about benefit.”xv While such a rapid explosion in population growth that he even population would have been an challenged several cultural norms that insupportable catastrophe under different inhibited it. An avid supporter of early circumstances, the colonies were blessed marriage because it fostered population with large and resource-filled stretches of growth, Franklin addressed common land. Economic growth within the social views regarding marriage and colonies, then, was a direct result of a high children in his short article “The Speech reproduction rate. xvi Recognizing this of Polly Baker” published in 1741. critical relationship, Franklin, as an Franklin depicted Miss Polly Baker, a economist, became an ardent supporter of young lady brought to court for having a growing American populace. another child out of wedlock. Rather than Franklin, as a politician and admitting guilt, however, Polly Baker diplomat, also advocated for an expanding defends her situation by asking “Can it be population because it led to an expanding a Crime (in the Nature of Things I mean) nation. In 1754, Franklin published an to add to the Number of the King’s essay entitled “A Plan for Settling Two Subjects, in a new Country that really Western Colonies” in which he outlined wants People? I own it, I should think it the future importance of the Ohio River rather a Praise worthy, than a Punishable Valley. Franklin argued that the region Action.” xii By suggesting that single would undoubtedly become not only mothers and bastard children ought to be prosperous but also a major asset to supported rather than punished, Franklin whatever country could claim it. The challenged many of the cultural norms of question was whether that country would his time, including the role of marriage, be England or France. To ensure British for the sake of a encouraging a larger success, Franklin suggested that “it would population. be the interest and advantage of all the Scholars have questioned, though, present colonies to support these new how Franklin, inclined to speculate on the ones… so that the new colonies would future of things and skilled in the art of soon be full of people.”xvii By establishing “political arithmetic,” could neglect to British settlements in the area, Franklin acknowledge the disastrous Malthusian reasoned the colonies would strengthen implications of sustaining his calculated trade with Native American tribes, doubling-rate of only 25 years. xiii become safer, and grow more powerful. Throughout his political career, Franklin Perhaps more importantly, the British pursued what he felt to be the highest would also prevent the French from

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 98! achieving these same ends. British growth as the tool to achieve it. settlements in the Ohio Valley would Starting in 1798 with the preclude a much-feared union of the publication of Reverend Thomas R. French possessions of Canada and Malthus’s An Essay on the Principle of Louisiana. French unity would hem the Population, an increasing number of American colonies in from the west, countries and societies around the world essentially restricting British growth to the began to acknowledge the disadvantages Appalachian Mountains while leaving the of a rapidly growing population. China, rest of the continent open to France. however, remained a notable exception Looking ahead, Franklin recognized the well into the 20th century. Though China potential for either British or French had a large population for hundreds of occupation. The key to each nation’s years, wars, famine, and a high infant success was an ability to provide a mortality rate had traditionally kept the population that could fill the area. As a rate of increase in check. For much of result, Franklin stressed the importance of Chinese history, peasants engaged in the British colonies not only acting and agriculture, which required large amounts reproducing but also doing so quickly, for of manpower. Because infant mortality every moment that passed allowed France was so high, Chinese parents often had to strengthen its hold over the region. many children in order to ensure that Franklin was not the only or the several survived to manage the farm and last political figure to recognize the large take care of the parents in old age. On a role population was playing in the national level, emperors in ancient China colonization of the new world. When the considered a large population to be the Spanish Governor of Louisiana Baron source of power and strength for a Hector Carondelet gave his report on the prosperous kingdom. conditions of the territory, he identified Beyond the practical benefits of a that “The fundamental American threat” large population, however, China’s to Spanish Louisiana was “not military but pronatalist culture stemmed from basic demographic.”xviii Carondelet reported that underpinnings in classical Chinese the region now contained 40,000 philosophy and Confucianism. Traditional Americans “who have been uniting and Chinese philosophy held that the universe multiplying in the silence of peace… with started from life and reproduction. a remarkable rapidity.” xix In much the Confucianism incorporated these notions same manner, the British Foreign and eventually magnified their significance Secretary Lord Castlereagh noted in 1818 such that “sexual relations were the the phenomenal rate of increase of the driving force of changes in the American population and America’s universe.” xxi Without reproduction, corresponding ability to secure territory: nothing could exist. In fact, according to “You Americans need not trouble Chinese scholar Zhou Yutong, yourselves about Oregon, you will “Confucianism is a philosophy of conquer Oregon in your bedchambers.”xx reproduction.” xxii Ancestor worship, Franklin recognized in 1754 what extremely prevalent within Chinese Carondelet would later report and what culture, was initially practiced by the Castlereagh would later concede—the Chinese as a means of recognizing and American ability to reproduce had giving thanks for their ancestors’ ability to tremendous ramifications. Franklin sought reproduce. Filial piety or obedience and to direct land expansion for the good of respect for one’s parents was the logical the nation, and he encouraged population corollary to ancestor worship, and the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 99! greatest way one could show respect for Mao Zedong founded the People’s his or her parents in Chinese culture was Republic of China and began to carry on their lineage by reproducing.xxiii implementing his own pronatalist Therefore, since ancient times, Chinese population policies, known collectively as people, for both practical and cultural “the more people, the reasons, were accustomed to high birth greater the strength.”xxxi That same year, rates and valued reproduction. Mao began refuting the idea of a The significance of these deeply potentially oversized Chinese population, ingrained cultural norms is most clearly saying, “It is a very good thing that China seen in the traditional idioms and sayings has a big population… Of all things in the that still permeate Chinese society today. world, people are the most precious. For instance there are the Chinese Under the leadership of the Communist expressions “more children, Party, as long as there are people, every more happiness or fortune” xxiv and kind of miracle can be performed.” xxxii “four generations Mao reasserted his position in 1957, under one roof equals five generations of claiming, “as long as we have many people, xxxiii prosperity.”xxv One saying even goes so far it is easy to do things.” Indeed, Mao as to contend, “five sons are not too many would defend his pronatalist stance for a man.”xxvi Children were a blessing in throughout the entirety of his career as Chinese culture and if someone had few Chairman of the Communist party. or no children, it was generally looked Furthermore, because of his position as upon as a punishment for doing Party Chairman, Mao had direct control something bad in the past. “To die over the course of Chinese population xxxiv without sons” or “to be the last one’s policy—his word was final. Just as with family line” are common insults in Benjamin Franklin, though, it is insightful China.xxvii When the Chinese government to examine precisely why Mao, often in first began implementing restrictive birth contrast to his peers, so strongly insisted policies, the main resistance came from on a growing population. traditional Chinese values.xxviii Even today, In crafting many of his policies, the rural population, more heavily whether involving population or not, Mao influenced by traditional ideas than drew heavily from his own experiences. Chinese urbanites, has greater difficulty As a result, Mao’s background and rise to accepting government directives regarding power determined his unique outlook on population, and vehemently resists such all manner of topics, including population. efforts.xxix Rural families are often willing As an example, out of the five initial to pay heavy fines to have a second or members of the Central Committee third child, because they view children as Secretariat in 1949, only Mao had never xxxv an indispensable source of wealth. xxx studied abroad. Many of the Together, these traditional sayings and Communist Party’s leaders traveled to contemporary phenomena among China’s either Russia or Europe to study Marxism; rural population demonstrate the Mao, however, felt that Chinese culture profound and lasting impact of pro- was more important than Western culture. population Chinese philosophy and Having never studied abroad, Mao Confucianism on Chinese society. insulated himself from Western ideas Such were the existing ideologies regarding population, studying in greater surrounding population on October 1, detail the traditional Chinese pronatalist 1949 when Communist Party Chairman philosophies described above. In addition

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 100! to his domestic education, Mao’s to reproduce meant that China could childhood and family experience likely withstand attack or war from any nation, influenced his population policies. Mao with the assumption that the population was born into a poor peasant family as would soon rebound to its original level. one of four children. As a child, Mao Beyond a strictly militaristic undoubtedly saw the benefits of having perspective, Mao also approached more children around the house to help population from a Marxist standpoint. out. However, each of Mao’s siblings Under a socialist system, an increasing would die relatively young (at 24, 29, and population is simply an asset to 47 years old) while fighting for the production. Marx criticized Malthus’ Communist Party. Later in life, three of identification of a large population as the Mao’s own children died at young ages. reason for the existence of suffering, These personal experiences, growing up as instead contending that the issue lay with a poor peasant and experiencing the loss the capitalist system not distributing the of loved ones, pushed Mao towards a wealth evenly as the population continued pronatalist stance. to grow. Marxist principles held that a Mao was first and foremost a larger population simply meant a larger military leader, and consequently, he labor supply, increased production, and a approached many problems with a stronger economy. Marxism and the militaristic mindset. More than that, Mao support of a limited population were conceptualized subjects best in military fundamentally and ideologically terms. For instance, in describing the incomparable. Questioning the benefits of fecundity of Chinese mothers, Mao once an expanding population in essence compared women to aircraft carriers, amounted to questioning the veracity of using the analogy that women gave birth Marxism. Because of this duality, many to children who would leave in a similar Chinese citizens up until the 1970s blindly manner to planes that would take off accepted that a growing population was a from aircraft carriers. xxxvi Having benefit to society.xxxix Mao himself strictly successfully overcome both the adhered to Marxian principles and steered Guomindang and Japanese armies, Mao Chinese policy down a path of population developed a profound appreciation for the growth. Mao argued against the “theory of importance of population size when human mouths” through his own “theory fighting against technologically superior of human hands,” essentially emphasizing foes. As a result, Mao viewed a large the productive rather than the population not as a problem but rather as consumption qualities of a population.xl a form of military capital.xxxvii In fact, Mao This analysis led him to declare in 1949 maintained a strong belief that it was “Even if China's population multiplies precisely a large and growing Chinese many times, she is fully capable of finding population that would ensure China’s a solution; the solution is production.”xli ascension as a world power in the second Mao’s belief in the principles of Marxism half of the 20th century. In November solidified his support of a larger 1957, he shocked even Soviet Premier population. Nikita Khrushchev by claiming that The historical context and American nuclear bombs would not be individual reasoning behind both enough to destroy China, as the Chinese Benjamin Franklin’s and Mao Zedong’s would simply have to “get to work pronatalist policies are particularly producing more babies than ever important because they better inform why before.”xxxviii For Mao, the Chinese ability the outcome in each situation was so

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 101! radically different. Americans, pursuing phenomenon of the moving fertility westward land expansion, used an frontier while the lack of freedom in incredibly rapid rate of increase over the China is seen in the implementation of span of the first 120 years of nationhood socialist policies. to populate and settle what would become Early Americans enjoyed the the continental United States. The ability to purchase their own land, one increase in population, expansion of freedom that Chinese citizens lacked. As territory, and abundance of natural historian Walter Nugent writes in his resources quickly made the US a world book Habits of Empire: A History of power. In China, however, Mao Zedong’s American Expansion, “young Americans growth policies led to an unsustainable could procreate as fast as biology allowed and catastrophic increase in population. in the secure expectation that productive After Mao’s death, Chinese officials were land awaited their many children.”xlii The forced to adopt increasingly severe family- US government made the purchase of planning measures, culminating in the frontier property extremely easy by selling draconian One-Child Policy in an attempt large tracts of lands for pennies an acre. to limit a rate of population increase that Federal land laws grew less and less had spiraled out of control. Even today, stringent over time, such that by 1862, any China suffers from immense settler could receive 160 acres of land for environmental issues and urban sprawl, free under the Homestead Act, provided the results of its population growing too that they occupied and “improved” it for rapidly. a period of five years.xliii This situation is Why were these results so starkly different from the land ownership disparate? How can one nation’s potential in China after the ascension of pronatalist policies turn out so much the Communist Party in 1949. Specifically, better than another’s? It is easy to argue the Communist Party seized the property that the key difference lies precisely in the of wealthy landlords and redistributed it fact that America had the land and the among the peasant class. In both instances, resources to accommodate such the government was supplying land to unprecedented levels of population those who needed it. The critical growth whereas China did not. Another distinction, however, lies in the political common explanation is that China started and social conditions under which this with a much larger initial population. supplying of land was taking place. In Beneath these superficial conclusions, America, the government freely and fairly however, lies a more profound sold land to those willing to purchase it; in explanation for America’s success and China, the land was forcibly taken and China’s failure, indicated by the reasons subsequently given out under the auspices that each nation first pursued its of socialist equality. The government respective policy. The American and supplying of property in China is not Chinese societies had distinct social and similar to the freedom in America to political differences, mainly seen in purchase and occupy that property. freedoms in America and a lack thereof in Beyond the freedom to purchase China. Rather than rendering any their own land, Americans were also free comparison impossible, these societal to choose both how many kids to have distinctions serve to better inform an and the age at which they married, a factor analysis of outcomes. The freedom to strongly correlated to population increase. have a desired number of children is These decisions, conducted at an demonstrated in America by the individual level, allowed married couples

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 102! to determine how many children would be people as the far edges of New Spain and appropriate for their unique circumstances. New France did.” xlvi The frontier by Pioneer Timothy Flint remarked in 1815, definition lay at the edge of society, “I have never seen a country to indeed at the edge of the New World, and appearance more fruitful in men… The this dangerous, exciting position may have process of doubling population, without led to increased rates of reproduction. Malthus and without theory, without More concretely, however, due to the hard artificial or natural wants, goes on I am lifestyle and degree of manual labor that sure on the banks of the Ohio as rapidly the frontier required, more men tended to as anywhere in the world.” xliv However, move west than women, resulting in a what Flint observed in 1815 had been natural surplus of young adult males. This going on just a few years earlier along the high male to female ratio created a Appalachian Mountains, and would be younger, earlier marriage age along the occurring just a few years hence frontier, ultimately implicating more somewhat further west. The population children per marriage. xlvii Moreover, phenomenon, in fact, moved with the children on the frontier were, as Adam western frontier. In their 2004 study, Smith noted, an asset.xlviii More children economist Michael R. Haines and meant that a family could farm more land, historian J. David Hacker examined produce more crops, and live a better life. fertility data at the county level from Additionally, parents need not be 1800-1860 both temporally and spatially. concerned that their children would lack They found a statistically significant land of their own. In reflecting on the correlation between longitude and fertility nature of frontier parents, Benjamin rates in America at the time. Moreover, Franklin remarked, “such are not afraid to they demonstrated that this high fertility marry; for if they even look far enough rate moved with the frontier, specifically forward to consider how their Children that birth rates increased, stabilized, and when grown up are to be provided for, then declined, as the frontier got further they see that more Land is to be had at away. xlv This incredible phenomenon Rates equally easy, all Circumstances reflects the fruition of one of Benjamin considered.” xlix The western frontier, Franklin’s original hopes for an increasing advancing as the boundary of the civilized American population: successful westward world, created an environment conducive expansion. to high reproduction rates, and the In examining this moving fertility availability of land provided an outlet for frontier, it is as important to determine subsequent generations to continue to what caused the original spike in push westward as their parents had before reproduction along the western frontier as them. it is to determine what caused its decline, The frontier was a region of high because without the latter America would reproduction rates, but what caused inevitably have developed many of the Americans to so drastically change their same population problems that China habits as the frontier moved away? This experienced some 180 years later. But first, phenomenon is hard to attribute to one why the massive spike in reproduction reason alone; rather the decline appears to rates along the American frontier? In a be a combination of several coinciding crude sense, “frontiers were,” as historian factors. One dominant explanation is the Walter Nugent points out, “lusty places, subsequent diminishing of land availability. and without the love and lust, they To ensure one’s children did not move would’ve remained as empty of white away, settlers had to be able to guarantee

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 103! them some form of property via and high fertility rates have concluded inheritance. With a decline in available many of the same results. The decline in land, this became less and less realistic. reproduction rates as the frontier The rise of new urban centers advanced ultimately came about as the compounded this problem by providing multiple side-effects of modernity, less children alternative, non-agricultural work land, the rise of cities and banks, and opportunities as well as easy methods of ideational changes, combined to alter transport between these new cities. people’s decisions to have children. Society also demanded that children be In the case of China, however, the sent to school. Thus, the cost of raising communist Chinese government under children, mainly in the form of larger Mao Zedong made people’s ability to inheritances per child, began to rise, freely decide on topics such as marriage rendering large numbers of children age, number of children, and family unrealistic. Why was it necessary to keep planning, more difficult than in the US children at home? As Haines and Hacker through its socialist policies. On a explain, “in a society without adequate practical level, the Chinese government financial markets and intermediaries and made it hard to practice family planning with a heavy reliance on wealth holding in by prohibiting the importation and the form of real property (land, structures, production of contraceptives. Additionally, livestock, and equipment), provision for as Chinese historians Zongli Tang and old age was much more likely to be found Bing Zuo note, “birth control was in the form of children.”l However, the considered not only to be illegal and shift away from frontier life also brought inhumane, it was also treated as the by- the increased availability of banks and product of capitalism.” liii In the years other investments, changing how parents following the revolution, there was very conceived savings and investment, shifting little support for any sort of family from existing in their children to lying in planning, especially once the idea became other forms of wealth. related to western capitalism. The result Fascinatingly, the decline in fertility was that young married couples often rates can also be attributed to the struggled for realistic alternatives to ideational transitions that accompany bearing children. Chinese journalist Liu modernization. The fact that people Binyan recalls his personal experience across all levels of society went through with his wife at the time: “Neither of us this fertility swing at about the same time wanted to have a baby yet, but “argues that the growing influence of contraception was discouraged and secular values has changed people’s abortion forbidden by government policy. willingness to control and plan family By 1952, contraceptive devices had size.” li In fact, in his 1977 study, disappeared from the market.” liv The demographer Ron J. Lesthaeghe found Communist Chinese government, in an that in the case of Belgium, fertility effort to have a larger population, strictly decline was positively correlated to limited access to contraceptives and other percentage of citizens voting for socialist, methods of family planning, restricting liberal, or communist candidates and couples’ abilities to choose when it came negatively correlated with the size of the to having children. population paying Easter dues in the More than just inhibiting the ability Catholic Church. lii In the context of to practice family planning, the America, similar studies relating the Communist party also constantly sought number of children given biblical names to influence peoples’ perceptions – and

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 104! therefore their choices – regarding necessity to reproduce. The recollections population. The Party primarily reinforced of Chinese Journalist Liu Banyan further the benefits of a large populace to society corroborate Anchee’s experience: “I through media propaganda. The remember a man who worked at the government argued that having more Youth League Central and whose wife children demonstrated the improvement kept on having children until she was and flourishing of China, because such completely exhausted. She had eleven.”lx children could not have been supported While just one example, the quote brings before Communist rule.lv Accordingly, the to light the reality that Chinese couples at Communist Party also incentivized the time were no longer having children women to have more children by for pleasure or to increase the probability providing families with more ration of old age insurance. Having children was coupons for each additional child, creating both an effort and a chore, and most a system that essentially benefited large importantly, a civic duty. families. lvi Chinese mothers were even The Chinese population, denied given awards by the Party for having more access to contraception and bombarded children. This idea was based on a Soviet with pronatalist propaganda from the policy, whereby women received political Communist Party, had little freedom and financial rewards for having more when it came to practicing reproduction; children. China adopted the policy by moreover, they also lacked the freedom to awarding congratulatory flags to women effectively question these policies. Soviet with large families that read Socialism as practiced under Mao did not “people will flourish, allow for any dissenting views to be reap abundant grain.” lvii Furthermore, incorporated. Mao stifled political historian Judith Shapiro identifies a opponents and perceived threats in all “traditional culture of patronage and facets of government, including any obedience to authority, a coercive contrary ideas regarding population. This organizational status” within China. lviii lack of political agency meant that the This cultural heritage would have made it pronatalist policies espoused by Mao less likely, even difficult, for people to could not readily be called into question. disobey Mao’s policies, including those As noted by Judith Shapiro in her book regarding population. Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the As a result, having many children Environment in Revolutionary China, “Soviet developed over time to become a civic dogma had a deeply constraining effect on duty, an obligation to the Communist Chinese intellectual life, determining Party. In a reflection on her time spent in which topics could be studied and which China during the Cultural revolution, Red schools of thought were considered lxi Azalea, Chinese author Min Anchee acceptable.” In the field of demography, describes how “Mother said that she no school of thought was more widely wouldn't ever have produced nine disallowed than Malthusianism, as children with my father if she had not evidenced by the silencing of Ma Yinchu. wanted to respond to the Party's call, Perhaps the largest tragedy of the ‘More population means more power.’”lix Chinese population growth is that it might Although Red Azalea is fictional, the have been avoided had the warnings of sentiments expressed within are indicative Ma Yinchu been heeded. An economist of the broader, coercive societal trends and demographer, Ma was the president that existed at the time, mainly the of Peking University, the most prestigious institution of higher education in China.

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Also a member of the Standing marriage age and even gave people the Committee of the National People’s choice to question the ramifications of an Congress, Ma, acting as a concerned Party expanding population. member, gave a report in 1957 titled New Most modern demographers agree Demography that cautioned against China’s that overpopulation is indeed detrimental growing population. He predicted that the to a nation’s development. However, as overpopulation of China would inhibit demonstrated by the two very different economic development in the future. As outcomes between the early United States described in Maoism and Chinese Culture, and China, this is not always the case. “In that era, however, any argument for With much of the world still developing population control was perceived as a today, this comparison serves as a form of Malthusianism.”lxii Malthusianism, reminder that a rapid rate of reproduction in turn, directly conflicted with socialism is not necessarily cause for alarm. As in and was a tool for capitalist enterprise. the case of the early United States, an Despite maintaining key differences with expanding population can actually be a Malthus, Ma was stripped of his title as source of strength for a country with president in January of 1960 and silenced plenty of land and resources. Additionally, for the next 20 years. Both nationally and a high rate of reproduction in the across the Peking campus, the Party developing world may still be held in sponsored huge campaigns involving tens check by high rates of infant mortality, of thousands of posters denouncing Ma’s war, or disease. The comparison provides arguments. As a result “there was little the lesson that as these developing nations chance that population issues could be stop waging wars and increase nutrition openly discussed as long as Ma’s ideas and medical care, thereby lowering rates remained ideological heresy.”lxiii After Ma of infant mortality and disease, they must lost his titles and positions, the also put into place the political and social “population issue became a forbidden institutions that allow a fertility transition topic, and nobody dared to touch upon to occur. Both the US and China’s leaders it.” lxiv Paraded before the nation as an adopted a pro-population growth stance; example of what could happen if one only the American political and societal criticized, or even questioned, the institutions, however, provided the Communist Party’s population policies, freedom to adopt that stance as the Ma exemplifies the complete lack of situation changed. Additionally, the freedom that Chinese citizens suffered Chinese government’s recent easing in the from. One-Child Policy makes this comparison The conditions in Communist China particularly relevant. Chinese citizens, under Mao, including basic socialist pressured at one time into bearing too assertions that a growing population many children and later limited to just one, would support economic growth, an will finally have the freedom to choose the inability to practice family planning, a correct number of kids for themselves. perceived civic duty to reproduce, and a While this might seem like cause for lack of political and intellectual freedom concern, perhaps in easing these are all heavily contrasted with the flexible restrictions, Chinese government leaders and adaptable realities of America. More are recognizing what the early American than just having the land space and the fertility frontier demonstrated; modern need for a population to fill it, America Chinese parents will find the costs of also provided the political environment additional children to outweigh the for people to choose contraception and benefits. The rest of the world can rest

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 106! easy; China’s population will likely remain !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! stable. Cambridge University Press, 2001), 30. xxvi Geping Qu, Jinchang Li, Population and the Environment in China, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 176-177. xxvii Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, Maoism and Chinese Culture, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), i Walter T.K. Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of 360. American Expansion, (New York, NY: Vintage, 2008), 234. xxviii Ibid., 348. ii Myron P. Gutmann, et al. eds., Navigating Time and xxix Geping Qu, Jinchang Li, Population and the Environment Space in Population Studies, (Dordrecht: Springer 2011) 37. in China, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 118. iii Alan C. Houston, Benjamin Franklin & the Politics of xxx Ibid., 192. Improvement, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, xxxi Judith Shapiro, Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and 2008) 116. the Environment in Revolutionary China, (Cambridge: iv Ibid., 116. Cambridge University Press, 2001), 20. vIbid., 117. xxxii Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, Maoism and Chinese Culture, vi Ibid., 121. (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), vii Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 360. Wealth of Nations. Edwin Cannan, ed. 1904. Library of xxxiii Ibid., 351. Economics and Liberty. 18 November 2013. xxxiv Judith Shapiro, Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and viii D. P. O'Brien, The Classical Economists Revisited, the Environment in Revolutionary China, (Cambridge: (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 68. Cambridge University Press, 2001), 20. ix Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the xxxv Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, Maoism and Chinese Culture, Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan, 1904. Library of (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), Economics and Liberty. 18 November 2013. 358. x Benjamin Franklin, The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, xxxvi Judith Shapiro, Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and Comp. Leonard Woods Labaree, William Bradford the Environment in Revolutionary China, (Cambridge: Willcox, and Barbara Oberg, (New Haven, CT: Yale Cambridge University Press, 2001), 31. University Press, 1959). xxxvii Ibid., 31. xi Conway Zirkle, "Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Malthus xxxviii Judith Shapiro, Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and and the United States Census.” Isis 48.1 (1957): 58-62. the Environment in Revolutionary China, (Cambridge: JSTOR. Web. 8 Dec. 2013. Cambridge University Press, 2001), 32. xii Alan C. Houston, Benjamin Franklin & the Politics of xxxix Geping Qu, Jinchang Li, Population and the Improvement, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, Environment in China, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 106. 1994), 118. xiii Dennis Hodgson, "Benjamin Franklin on Population: xl Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, Maoism and Chinese Culture, From Policy to Theory.” Population and Development Review (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), 17.4 (1991): 639-61. JSTOR. Web. 24 Oct. 2013. 351. xiv J.J. Spengler "Malthusianism in Late Eighteenth xli Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, Maoism and Chinese Culture, Century America.” The American Economic Review 25.4 (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), (1935): 691-707. JSTOR. Web. 18 Nov. 2013 346. xv Alan C. Houston, Benjamin Franklin & the Politics of xlii Walter T.K. Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of Improvement, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, American Expansion, (New York, NY: Vintage, 2008), 223. 2008), 130. xliii Ibid., 231. xvi Ibid., 122. xliv Myron P. Gutmann, et al. eds., Navigating Time and xvii Benjamin Franklin, The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Space in Population Studies, (Dordrecht: Springer 2011) 39. Comp. Leonard Woods Labaree, William Bradford xlv Ibid., 37-63. Willcox, and Barbara Oberg, (New Haven, CT: Yale xlvi Walter T.K. Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of University Press, 1959). American Expansion, (New York, NY: Vintage, 2008), 233. xviii Walter T.K. Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of xlvii Myron P. Gutmann, et al. eds., Navigating Time and American Expansion, (New York, NY: Vintage, 2008), 51. Space in Population Studies, (Dordrecht: Springer 2011), 44. xlviii Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of xix Ibid., 51. the Wealth of Nations. Edwin Cannan, ed. 1904. Library of xx Ibid., 233. Economics and Liberty. 18 November 2013. xxi Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, Maoism and Chinese Culture, (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), xlix Ibid., 39. 359. l Myron P. Gutmann, et al. eds., Navigating Time and Space xxii Ibid., 359. in Population Studies, (Dordrecht: Springer 2011) 41. xxiiiZongli Tang, Zuo Bing, Maoism and Chinese Culture, li Ibid., 43. (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), lii Ibid., 43. 360. liii Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, Maoism and Chinese Culture, xxivIbid., 360. (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), xxv Judith Shapiro, Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and 346-347. the Environment in Revolutionary China, (Cambridge: liv Judith Shapiro, Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! the Environment in Revolutionary China, (Cambridge: Tang, Zongli, and Bing Zuo. Maoism and Chinese Culture. Cambridge University Press, 2001), 32. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., lv Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, Maoism and Chinese Culture, 1996. Print. (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), Zirkle, Conway. "Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Malthus 346. and the United States Census.” Isis 48.1 lviJudith Shapiro, Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the (1957): 58-62. JSTOR. Web. 8 Dec. 2013. Environment in Revolutionary China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 32. lvii Ibid., 30. lviii Ibid., 12. lix Anchee Min, Red Azalea, (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1994), 99. lx Judith Shapiro, Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 32. lxi Ibid., 26. lxii Judith Shapiro, Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 41. lxiii Ibid., 23. lxiv Zongli Tang, Zuo Bing, Maoism and Chinese Culture, (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1996), 351.

REFERENCES

Franklin, Benjamin. The Papers of Benjamin Franklin. Comp. Leonard Woods Labaree, William Bradford Willcox, and Barbara Oberg. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. Print. Gutmann, Myron P., et al. eds. Navigating Time and Space in Population Studies. Vol. 9. Dordrecht: Springer, 2011. Print. Hodgson, Dennis. "Benjamin Franklin on Population: From Policy to Theory.” Population and Development Review 17.4 (1991): 639-61. JSTOR. Web. 24 Oct. 2013. Houston, Alan C. Benjamin Franklin & the Politics of Improvement. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. Print. Min, Anchee. Red Azalea. New York: Pantheon Books, 1994. 99. Print. Nugent, Walter T.K. Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion. New York: Vintage, 2008. Print. O'Brien, D. P. The Classical Economists Revisited. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Print. Qu, Geping, and Jinchang Li. Population and the Environment in China. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994. Print. Shapiro, Judith. Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Print. Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edwin Cannan, ed. 1904. Library of Economics and Liberty. 18 November 2013. Spengler, J.J. "Malthusianism in Late Eighteenth Century America.” The American Economic Review 25.4 (1935): 691-707. JSTOR. Web. 18 Nov. 2013.

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Blessed Are They Who Are Open-Minded: An Analysis of the Beatitudes in the Union Edition of the Chinese Bible Gina Elia University of Pennsylvania

ABSTRACT to study the social and political dimensions and context of Chinese I study the effects of the translation of the Christianity, though fewer studies Beatitudes in the Chinese Union Bible by concentrate on its underlying theology examining the terminology used for and how it compares to Western several key words and phrases. I first Christianity. For a much longer period— construct an idea of how these terms almost as long as translations of Christian might be conceived in Chinese as opposed scripture have existed in China—much to in English, and then look at scholarship in many languages has been interpretations of the Beatitudes by produced which examines the nature and several Chinese scholars. With the help of methodology of Biblical translation in these materials, I examine to what extent China. ii However, few scholars have the translation of the Beatitudes into strived to combine these two fields of Chinese subtly shifts the meaning of the study by thinking about the manner in text. I conclude that the translation of the which Chinese translations of the Bible Beatitudes de-emphasizes the theological might affect the development of aspects of the text and focuses on its theological thought in China. worldly value as a set of instructions for In this paper, I propose to study living a morally superior life in the here one passage of Chinese Biblical scripture, and now. However, there is evidence that the Beatitudes (shānshàng bǎoxùn de bāfú some non-orthodox churches read the ) in the Book of Matthew Bible in a spiritual sense, closer to the way iii it is frequently interpreted in the west. ( ). I will examine This challenges the assumption that non- the terminology used for several key orthodox churches generally promote words in the passage that carry implicit looser versions of Protestantism than assumptions about the way Christians in orthodox churches, as it reveals that such the West conceive of their faith. These a conclusion is predicated upon the include the words and phrases “God,” unwarranted presumption that the Bible is “poor in spirit,” “mercy,” “persecute,” read the same across Chinese Protestant and “Kingdom of heaven”. I will utilize contexts. dictionaries and several writings on Bible translation theory in China to first INTRODUCTION construct an idea of how the Chinese translations of each of these terms might Although Protestants constitute be conceived in Chinese as opposed to in only one percent of the mainland Chinese an English-language Bible. I will then population, this percentage nevertheless look at interpretations of the Beatitudes translates to over ten million people. i by several Chinese scholars, along with Several scholars, mostly but not one Western analysis, for comparative exclusively writing in Chinese, have begun purposes. With the help of these

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 109! materials, I will examine the ways in which Protestants. I do not mean in this paper English-reading and Chinese-reading to suggest that one unified reading for the Christians conceive of the values Beatitudes exists across all of these groups described in the Beatitudes, and to what of people, which indeed is not the case extent the translation of any of the terms anywhere in the world that the Beatitudes above plays a role in these two reading are read. Rather, my goal is to examine traditions. The Chinese dictionaries that I the translation of certain phrases in order will use, the Hànyīngdàcídiǎn to suggest a framework for how to conceive of the Beatitudes in a Chinese and the ABC Comprehensive Chinese-English context, based mostly on the viewpoints Dictionary, were chosen for their ease of of Chinese intellectuals from both the use and comprehensive coverage of the orthodox and unorthodox Protestant Chinese language. The English dictionary traditions. This could be of use in I will use is the Oxford English Dictionary, comparative studies of how more specific also for its comprehensive nature. groups read the Beatitudes. Chinese Protestants are not one homogenous group of people. Based on THE IMPORTANCE OF THE their backgrounds and experiences, they BEATITUDES TO CHRISTIANITY inevitably come to the Bible with different expectations and interpretations. One The paper is interested in the clear example is that in China, both nuances of scriptural interpretation that officially registered churches and exist in two distinct cultures, and the unsanctioned, unofficial “house” churches extent to which these nuances are caused exist within Protestantism. These by the translations of theologically- churches do have certain differences in significant terms. In order to eliminate belief and outlook, though it is difficult to confounding variables to the greatest conduct studies on this, as the house iv extent possible, it was imperative to churches must remain secretive. The choose a passage from the New official Protestant churches tend to be Testament, the only set of scriptures not composed of educated people and to take shared by any religious tradition other a more liberal stance on Biblical than Christianity. The Beatitudes interpretation. Members of house specifically were chosen because they are churches, on the other hand, tend to written in the form of a series of moral consist mostly of uneducated people and behavioral instructions from Jesus, coming from rural areas where there is no and thus explicitly detail the values that strong tradition of orthodox v Christians believe necessary to lead a Protestantism to be found. Accordingly, godly life. Furthermore, the passage is this means that house churches are more punctuated with many terms whose likely to practice a more folk-belief- meanings are vague at first glance and, in inspired, heterodoxical form of fact, have been often discussed and Protestantism than the government- debated in the long history of scriptural approved churches, although one might scholarship. expect that these, too, would be unlikely to perpetuate a Western religious tradition vi A NOTE ON THE CHINESE BIBLE in its original form. EDITION CHOSEN AND THE Furthermore, there of course HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF exists a socioeconomic and educational BIBLE TRANSLATION IN CHINA distinction between different groups of

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There have been many translations Strandenaes’s study on the translations of of the Bible into Chinese. Evidence exists various Chinese-language editions of the that some books or even the whole Bible Bible. Strandenaes points out that may have been translated as early as the whenever a theological or dogmatic issue Tang Dynasty, though none of these is at stake in the translation of a phrase, specimens survive in the present.vii The the formal correspondence method of first so-called “modern” translation of the translation from the ancient Greek is entire Protestant Bible was completed by employed. Overall, the text is a Robert Morrison and William Milne in conservative, fairly literal translation of 1823 (43). Many more translations the Ancient Greek, with heavy reliance on followed in the wake of this one. the New Revised version.xi The translation The makings of the Union Bible attempts to stress the internal conviction (Héhéběn ), the edition referenced of faith that is so important to xii in this paper, began in the late nineteenth Protestantism. It also specifically century (193). It is the most recent major emphasizes the Beatitudes as a series of Protestant Bible translation effort using entrance requirements to God’s kingdom, xiii Mandarin, undertaken by foreign rather than as “eschatological blessings.” missionaries and first published in its Both of these effects of the translation entirety in 1919 (328). Although some may contribute to the fact that the revisions have been made to the text in Beatitudes are subtly secularized in the the years since it was published, mostly of Union Bible, as will be explored in the an editorial nature, the most widely- analyses of specific terms below. With available version of the Union remains the these general comments in mind, I will original translation. This is the primary now move on to analyses of the edition of the Bible used by Protestants in translations of some of the key terms of contemporary China.viii the passage. The Union was translated primarily from the New Revised version of the Bible, “shén ” v. “shàngdì ” v. “God” v. with cross-referencing to the original texts “Theos” in Biblical Hebrew and Ancient Greek.ix The word “God” is used twice in However, in its New Testament the Beatitudes, in the sentences “Blessed translation, this edition of the Bible are the pure in heart, for they will see God” preserves the Greek meaning to a greater and “Blessed are the peacemakers, for extent than the New Revised version does.x they will be called children of God.”xiv Therefore, in addition to using the New The translation of this word has been a Revised text to compare the Chinese matter of intense contention since the first translation, I will also compare the original attempts to translate the Bible into Ancient Greek terms. Chinese, and justifiably so; centrally important to Christianity, the translation ANALYSIS OF THE BEATITUDES of this word alone has the potential to General Comments on the Translation Style of direct the course of how the faith as a the Beatitudes whole is interpreted and practiced by Chinese Christians. Because so much has Before I begin analysis of specific been written about the translation of this terms in the Beatitudes, I will provide word into Chinese, I will give a condensed several general comments on the nature of history of the discussion here, based the Union translation that stem from Thor mostly on Irene Eber’s convenient

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 111! summary of the affair, and then move on missionary William Boone, argued that to less vehemently disputed terminology this term would be easier for the Chinese in the Beatitudes. to relate to, since they believed the In the early days of Bible Chinese could only conceptualize of translation, there was no consensus on deities in the context of a polytheistic what term for God to use. A number of framework.xix Boone did not agree with variations existed in various translations, Medhurst’s interpretation of the “shàngdì” including “shàngdì ””shén ” term, writing that “shàngdì” was simply ā ǔ the proper name of a high-ranking and “ti nzh ”, among others. Over xx time, as missionaries began to develop Chinese deity. In any case, he argued arguments for the use of one term or that as a generic term rather than a proper another, “tiānzhǔ” came to be employed one, “shén” was more appropriate than more often by Catholics, while Protestants “shàngdì” because it implied that God is continued to debate over the advantages unnamable, and that only generic terms and disadvantages of “shàngdì” and can be used to refer to him. The original xv Greek word “theos”, he pointed out, was “shén.” While the arguments between xxi the missionaries were complex, they can a generic term, not a proper one. be divided into two broad categories. Eventually, missionaries began to Those who were in favor of the term perceive that they needed to ask Chinese “shàngdì”, such as missionary Walter people how they interpreted the terms, Henry Medhurst, believed that the term since it was their perspective as the intended audience that mattered the most, “shén”, which connoted a group of spirits xxii or ancestors as opposed to one God, was not that of the missionaries. When too close to the polytheistic beliefs of the queried on the subject, however, the Chinese to be used to refer to the one and Chinese only added fuel to both only God of the Christian faith.xvi After arguments. It was concluded from the conducting a thorough examination of the queries that generally, literate Chinese use of both of these terms in many associated “shàngdì” with Heaven, while Chinese classics, Medhurst observed that both literate and illiterate Chinese associated “shén” with ancestral spirits, “shàngdì” seemed to always be used in the xxiii context of a supernatural being who had both malevolent and benevolent. This never been created, but had always existed, would seem to support the argument that and from whom all creation had been “shàngdì” should be used to translated born. He therefore argued that “shàngdì” “theos” or “God”. However, the Chinese was the obvious choice for the translation people queried also generally agreed that of “God”, or “theos” in the Greek.xvii In “shén” connoted the idea of an response to arguments that the Chinese unnamable God better than “shàngdì”, which added weight to the opposing had never known a monotheistic God and xxiv therefore could not understand the argument. concept of a single God as founder of all Ultimately, the Union edition did creation, James Legge, who supported the not attempt to solve this problem, but use of “shàngdì”, argued that the Chinese skirted the issue, simply publishing two classics contained evidence that the editions of its translation, one with “shén” Chinese had practiced monotheism at an as the translation of “God” or “theos” earlier time in their history.xviii and one with “shàngdì” as the translation As already mentioned, those who of choice. To this day, both Bibles are supported the use of “shén”, such as available in mainland China, and individual Christians can choose which

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 112! translation they prefer to use. The fact of the Beatitudes, he explains that the that Chinese Christians are presented with phrase “poor in spirit” refers to those a choice regarding how to refer to God is who are humble because they have been quite remarkable. This presumably opens so faith-filled as to have “known God”, up dialogue between Christians in China and therefore are more aware of their own concerning how best to refer to God, inferiority in comparison. He further which means that the Christian God’s comments that the reason this phrase is very representation in language is less often misunderstood by English speakers definitive than it is in English or ancient is most likely because of the translation Greek. This has several effects. On the “poor” of the original Greek one hand, it emphasizes the impossibility “ptochos”. xxvii However, the original of perfectly representing the concept of Greek word “ptochos”, according to God through the human construct of Barclay Newman’s Greek-English Dictionary language, as Western Christians also of the New Testament, is equivalent to the believe. On the other hand, though, the English words “poor; miserable; begging; choice also allows Chinese Christians to pitiful or inferior.” “Inferior”, the most become divided in how they principally similar to “humble” or “modest” of this conceive of God, in one or the other of group of words, nevertheless has a more the manners described above. This allows negative connotation. There is no them greater flexibility in how to conceive avoiding the fact, then, that even the of God than Western Christians using the original Greek maintains the ambiguity of English or ancient Greek texts have.xxv the phrase. The choice of the missionaries to “Xūxīn ” v. “poor in spirit” v. “ptochos translate “poor in spirit” as “xūxīn” tō pneumati” therefore reflects their bias that this term The sentence in which this be interpreted as “humble” or “modest”, expression appears is, in English, “Blessed even though other interpretations are are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the possible. According to the kingdom of heaven”.xxvi At first glance, Hànyīngdàcídiǎn, the term “xūxīn” means this passage seems strange to a native- “open-minded; modest; with an open level English speaker. The phrase “poor mind.” Nowhere does the entry suggest in spirit” conveys a sense of someone that “xūxīn” conveys any of the negative whose spirits are low—a description connotations that “poor in spirit” does to which could potentially refer to those who a native-level English speaker. Thus, in are miserly, those who are selfish, and one sense, it may appear that the those who remain in a state of perpetual interpretive bias of the missionaries that depression, among other negative resulted in them translating “poor in spirit” connotations. Yet, given Christian values as “xūxīn” means that this phrase is less of selflessness, compassion towards vague to Chinese readers of the Bible. others, and joy in the Holy Spirit, it seems Certainly, this is how it is unambiguously unlikely that Jesus would claim that people interpreted by many Christian Chinese with such negative mindsets could be Protestants, such as Lín Xiàngāo , blessed by God. In light of these tenets, it also known as Samuel Lamb in English makes more sense to interpret this phrase (1924-2013) .xxviii as meaning “humble” or “modest”. Furthermore, the translation omits In Rector Robert Eyton’s any specific mention of the word “spirit”, nineteenth-century book-length analysis present in both the English and Ancient

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Greek renditions. This may have been “timid; fearful”. This definition is done intentionally to avoid the complexity noticeably absent from Eyton’s of translating the theologically-significant interpretation of the phrase “poor in word “spirit.” xxix In mentioning the spirit”, and also differs from the senses of “spirit,” the English term references that “poor in spirit” in English, according to part of human beings that Christians the Oxford definition of “poor”, and believe to be supernatural, linked to God. “ptochos” in Greek of “miserable; Eyton’s interpretation of the phrase as begging; pitiful”. Thus, the use of “xūxīn” referring to those who “know God” also implies that Jesus approves the further highlights the suggestion in the possession of a certain kind of fear or English phrase “poor in spirit” of a link timidity, presumably of the Lord. between this world and the world beyond. Palpable fear of the world beyond this one By eliminating that word altogether, the is certainly evidenced in Chinese Chinese expression remains grounded in Protestantism. In general, non-orthodox the reality of the everyday, and the link sects believe in the possibility of between this tangible world and the possession by evil spirits and the necessity immaterial world of God fades of exorcism, ideas which have fallen out significantly. of favor with many Western Christians.xxxiii “Xūxīn” was also one of the traits Many of them also continue to practice that was valued in ancient Chinese ancient funeral rites alongside Christian philosophies such as Daoism, Buddhism, ones, fearing that the Christian ones alone and Confucianism. xxx This connotation will not be enough to ward off evil spirits allows an entryway for other philosophies from attacking them. xxxiv This kind of to meld with the message of the mixing of traditional and Christian faiths Beatitudes, which are considered distinctly is not uncommon, and marks one of the Christian in the West. This characteristic major differences between Protestantism encourages the intersection of different in China and in the West. The second ideologies in a way that the Beatitudes as meaning of “xūxīn” could serve to they are read in the West do not, at least validate this continued reliance on not with ideologies outside of the traditional rites out of fear. Christian framework. In fact, one of the Lín Xiàngāo’s perspective on the striking features of Chinese Christians is Beatitudes is unique among those the way in which many of them seem to examined in this paper. He was a pastor seamlessly meld Christian and pre- of one of the unorthodox house churches, Christian tradition and belief, apparently and is famous for speaking out during his without thinking it problematic.xxxi The lifetime against the orthodox church, fact that the translation of the Beatitudes which he saw as moving away from the into Chinese subtly encourages this spirit of Christianity and becoming a more combining of philosophies may help to bland, government-controlled explain why more Chinese Christians do organization. xxxv He saw “xūxīn” as not view mixing folk belief and referring to the spirit, thus re-centering Protestantism in observance as a the word on the more abstract, theological xxxii contradiction. meaning it conveys in its English The ABC Chinese-English rendition.xxxvi In his analysis, he suggests a Comprehensive Dictionary’s entry “xūxīn” more literal translation for the phrase, adds another layer of complexity to the “línglǐ pínqióng ” [rough word. The second listing of its entry reads translation: poverty within the soul],

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 114! which he interprets as “zài línglǐ pòchǎn The Chinese word “liánxù”, ” [rough translation: however, does not convey this nuance of bankrupt within the soul].xxxvii He further meaning. Its entry in Hànyīngdàcídiǎn argues that, though this instruction does reads: “pity; take pity on; have not literally entail that good Christians compassion for.” The ABC Chinese- must necessarily be financially poor, English Comprehensive Dictionary seconds this poverty in Ancient Greece may have had meaning exactly. Any connotation of something of a correlation to the first “forgiveness” is absent from both. Christians who were “xūxīn”, the ones Forgiveness is an important trait of who paved the way for others to follow Christianity; therefore, its absence in the their lead. He speculates that, having no dimensions of the meaning of “liánxù” is material wealth to obsess over, they striking. To have compassion and pity for instead turned their entire minds, hearts, others in the broadest sense is quite and spirits to the consideration of different from cultivating the ability to God.xxxviii Thus, he re-centers the meaning have compassion and pity for those who of “xūxīn” on the spirit while still have personally harmed one, physically or connecting the trait’s origin to the material psychologically. Because the connotation world. of forgiving others disappears in the translation of this passage, the importance “Liánxù ” v. “mercy” v. “eleēmones” of forgiveness is de-emphasized. This word appears in the line While forgiveness may not be as “Blessed are the merciful: for they shall significant in the Chinese rendition of this obtain mercy.” xxxix The main way in phrase, it seems that Chinese Christians which this translation differs from the generally do at least take the dictum to act English and Ancient Greek is that the compassionately toward others seriously. It appears that the Chinese Christian latter two terms connote the idea of xli “forgiveness”, while the Chinese population is generally harmonious. translation does not. The Greek word Furthermore, the writings of several Chinese religious figures stress “eleēmones” is defined as “pitiful; compassion as potentially the most merciful; compassionate.” According to important aspect of Christianity. Wàng the Oxford, “pity” denotes the feeling of having sympathy or compassion for Míngdào (1900-1991) wrote that another. “Mercy” encompasses both of he believed the most important teaching these ideas, and further carries the of the Bible was the promotion of good meaning of “forgiveness toward those will and good behavior toward others. He whom it is within one’s power to punish wrote that nobody would notice whatever or harm.” In the English translation, the particular theological views Christians choice of “mercy” over “compassion” or hold, but that they would observe, and “pity” indicates that the translators hopefully be persuaded by, their model xlii wanted to emphasize the dimension of behavior. Dīng Guāngxùn , “forgiveness” in this word, the feature known in English as K.H. Ting (1915- that separates “mercy” from “pity” or 2012), was the former President of the “compassion”. This emphasis is seconded China Christian Council. He framed his by Eyton’s analysis, in which he explicitly understanding of the Beatitudes, and the points out that the meaning of this Bible in general, around the significance xliii passage is to forgive one’s fellows.xl of compassion toward others. Thus, one’s treatment of others seems to take on

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 115! central importance for several writers on is. This makes sense, since a pattern Christian scripture in China, though any emerges throughout the Union; its discussion of forgiving others is translations more accurately reflect the conspicuously absent from their work. ancient Greek reading, in the sense of “to This is another word that, like force out or away” than those in the New “xūxīn”, was heralded by ancient Chinese Revised version.xlvii One consequence of philosophies as an honorable moral this alteration in meaning is that not just attribute. xliv Therefore, it has the same persecution, but more specifically being effect on the text.xlv ostracized and banished, are emphasized as desirable situations for Christians to be “Bīpò de rén ” v. “they that have in, in the sense that their reward will be been persecuted” v. “dediōgmenoi” great in heaven. This phrase appears in the English This stance is reflected in Wàng sentence, “Blessed are they that have been Míngdào’s interpretation of this passage. persecuted for righteousness’ sake: for He writes that true Christians are always theirs is the kingdom of heaven.”xlvi The persecuted; if a so-called Christian is not Greek word means “persecute; seek after, at the moment undergoing persecution, strive for; force out or away; practice then she is not a true Christian but rather (hospitality); follow, run after.” a hypocrite. She may call herself a According to Oxford, “persecute” means follower of Christ, but her God is the world of secular materialism, not the “to subject someone to hostility or ill- xlviii treatment.” The Chinese word “bīpò”, on Christian God. Lín’s study also the contrary, according to the highlights the centrality of this Hànyīngdàcídiǎn, means “force; compel; Beatitude—he argues that fulfilling this coerce; restrain.” The ABC Chinese-English condition is a prerequisite for achieving any of the other values in the Comprehensive Dictionary’s entry for this xlix word is essentially the same. The English Beatitudes. Both Wàng Míngdào and word thus emphasizes suffering for one’s Lín, then, place crucial importance on the belief, but the Chinese word adds the one Beatitude that does not have to do additional meaning of being forced or with moral character, but rather with how compelled to behave or believe in a Christians are treated by people of the certain way. While the difference in the world. Their standpoint contrasts sharply meaning between these terms is nuanced, with Eyton’s teaching on the subject. it is nevertheless significant. The word While Eyton admires those who have “persecute” often carries with it the been persecuted historically for their faith, he admonishes those who would implication of coercion—that is, an l underlying reason that persecution occurs unnecessarily seek out persecution. While is to discourage people from agreeing with a Christian should endure persecution in the philosophy that is under attack. Thus, good faith if it does come his way, it is not in a sense, persecution acts as a force that a responsibility or requirement that he go “compels” people to choose a certain path searching for it, and that his life be one as opposed to another in society. unending stream of persecution. Thus, Nevertheless, this sense is not an explicit Wàng and Lín’s stances emphasize the part of the definition of the term. The greatness of social persecution more than Chinese word is actually closer in meaning Eyton’s interpretation does. Persecution to the original Greek, in the sense of “to is still important in Eyton’s conception, force out or away”, than the English word but it is not the most important among the values that the Beatitudes espouse.

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private, and cordoned off from one’s “Tiānshàng ” v. “heaven” v. “ouranois” experiences in the secular world.li The use Thus far, I have argued that many of the word “tiānshàng” for “heaven” in of the terms in this passage have been this passage reinforces this lack of subtly secularized in their Chinese distinction between secular and religious translations. One major argument that space. might be made in opposition to this is to The conception of heaven as both point out that, regardless of the way these an abstract entity and a component of the words are translated, the passage is still familiar world is present in theologian Wú framed as a list of traits one needs to Léichuān’s (1870-1944) analysis of the possess in order to enter heaven, which is Beatitudes. He understands the quintessentially abstract and otherworldly. “Kingdom of heaven” as referring to a The word “heaven” is used society of economic equality—in essence, multiple times in the Beatitudes, always heaven for him is communist.lii It is clear translated the same way in English. The in his theological writings that he original Greek word, which is also the conceptualizes all of Jesus’ teachings as same in each instance it is used, means centering around one key message, much both “heaven” and “sky”. The Chinese as the writings of Chinese sages do. He translation uses “tiānguó” for the first interprets the central message of Jesus’ mention of “heaven” or “ouranois” and teachings to be the glory of the “Kingdom “tiānshàng” for the other, rather than of heaven” and the salvation it provides. remaining consistent with the same word Therefore, having concluded that the as the Ancient Greek and English texts do. entire sermon is a description of the ideals In both Chinese dictionaries, “tiānshàng” of heaven, Wú argues that the text can is listed as meaning “sky”. It thus denotes also be read as instructions for how to the non-religious sense of “heaven” (or create a heaven on earth. Reading in the “heavens”, more commonly in English), context of the May Fourth Movement, as opposed to “tiānguó”, the usual Wú embraced an interpretation of the translation of “heaven” used when Beatitudes that would largely support the referring to the abode of God. Using social and political aims of that movement, calling for an end to economic inequality, “tiānshàng” in the second instance creates liii an image of a “heaven” which is somehow social injustice, and intolerance. In entwined with and part of the physical sky, making this explicit connection between as opposed to being beyond it, as western the current political and social situation of Christians typically imagine heaven, and as China and the Biblical text, Wú changes the Oxford confirms. the focal point of the passage from a This melding of spaces is reflected consideration of what will get people into in one of the large difficulties missionaries heaven to a tract for social change in the experienced in trying to convey here and now. His actions therefore Protestantism to the Chinese. They noted clearly indicate that he conceives of the that the distinction between sacred and secular and the spiritual not as separate secular space was more blurred in China realms, but as inextricably intertwined. than it was in the West. This made it CONCLUSION difficult to convey to the Chinese one of the integral tenets of Protestantism, a There are of course limitations in conception of one’s relation to God and a study of this sort, the scope of which is journey through life as individualistic, necessarily limited by space constraints.

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One feature that needs further moral value, due to their similarity to the investigation is the Western analyses of teachings of ancient Chinese sages. Wú the Beatitudes, in order to obtain a more wrote that the divinity of Jesus was “too representative sample of how they tend to mystical to fathom and too controversial be interpreted in that context. While the to be helpful.”liv Scholar Tang Yi, in his writings of four Chinese theologians have list of possibilities for what will become of been examined, it could only be beneficial Protestantism in China, includes one that to read more of those as well. It is also describes a world in which Protestantism important to reflect that the Biblical is integrated into Chinese culture – like interpretations I have utilized represent, in Buddhism before it – and made both the case of both the West and the East, human-centered and sinless.lv Hunter and the viewpoints of learned scholars and Chan go on to predict that, in a similar intellectuals. The interpretations of the vein, Protestantism in China may grow to majority of Chinese people go unvoiced. be more concerned with social and In some ways, this is unavoidable in political involvement than its predecessor critical analysis of a text—people outside in the West. lvi This certainly seems to of the formal study of Biblical scripture or describe the picture of orthodox Protestant intellectual inquiry infrequently record Biblical interpretation in China that has their thoughts on such matters. More emerged from this examination of the research into this dimension of the Bible’s Beatitudes. audience in China needs to be conducted. The emphasis in the Chinese Perhaps such a study would be better translation of the Beatitudes on the more suited to the realms of anthropology or concrete, moralistic aspects of the text, sociology than to literary or scriptural rather than on the theological ideology studies, as it would likely involve underlying it, is reflected in Yieh’s essay, interviewing vast numbers of Chinese where he speculates that interest in the Christians. Clearly, it would also be a Beatitudes has actually fallen in recent worthwhile endeavor to examine other years as scholars of Christianity in China key terms in the Beatitudes, as well as the move away from an interest in “humanity” Union Bible in general. to one in “divinity”.lvii Yieh points out Throughout the course of this that one feature that all the Chinese paper, it has become clear that there is no writers examined in his essay share is their neat way to label the alterations in the tendency to think of the Beatitudes in the fabric of Protestantism that the translation context of some kind of tract for how to of the Beatitudes in the Union Bible harmonize with others.lviii creates. If any one pattern emerges, it is One notable exception to this rule the de-emphasis of the more abstract, is the interpretation of the Beatitudes cerebral aspect of Protestant belief, such given by Lín Xiàngāo. His interpretation as one’s relationship to God, the idea of is, overall, more spiritual in focus than heaven, and the presence of sin, and the that of the other Chinese writers greater focus on improving one’s everyday examined, and more in line with reality. Many admirers and studiers of the traditional Western interpretation. He Bible in China, such as Wú Léichuān, announces at the beginning of his study of professed to be Christian not because they the Beatitudes that one of its primary held Jesus’ teachings to be worthwhile due goals is to “convey the good fortune of to his divinity as the son of God, but the spirit”, which automatically casts the rather because his teachings were of high passage into a more abstract framework.lix

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Because he was a pastor in an unorthodox guide for social change and character- church, as opposed to the other thinkers building than as a revelation of the world critiqued in this paper, it is possible that beyond ours. lxii The subtly different unorthodox churches in China tend to translation of the Beatitudes in the Union maintain a greater focus on the more edition fuels this response to the Bible, abstract, otherworldly, spiritual aspects of encouraging a more secularist, humanist Protestantism than the orthodox church, approach to its teachings. which emphasizes using religion as a tool Nevertheless, at least one to further political and social causes. This theologian, Lín Xiàngāo, reads the text is contrary to what one would expect, mostly as a reflection and promise of the based on Hunter and Chan’s statement world to come, in spite of its translation. that orthodox Chinese churches are more His departure from the interpretations of in line with traditional Protestant belief.lx others in the orthodox church suggests Their statement surely stems from the that further inquiry into how unorthodox observation that many unorthodox churches read scripture, as opposed to the churches combine Protestant and orthodox church, may reveal much about traditional Chinese religious and spiritual the way these two groups conceive of tenets, which is certainly heterodoxical in their faith. Hunter and Chan argue that the strict sense of Western Protestantism. unorthodox churches read the Bible more However, it is important to recognize that literally than the orthodox one does. lxiii in absorbing traditional ceremonies However, although the Beatitudes in concerning the afterworld into their Chinese emphasize a more secularized Protestant beliefs, these supposedly approach to Christianity, with an heterodoxical churches place a greater emphasis on improving the here and now, emphasis on the spiritual dimension of the Lín Xiàngāo continues to read spiritual religion than the orthodox churches do, meaning into the text. It is thus necessary which in fact seem rather secularized. It to consider that, in some contexts, the may be necessary, therefore, to reconceive scriptural reading practices of the of how to define what constitutes “being orthodox and unorthodox churches in more faithful to orthodox, Western China may be the opposite of what Protestantism” in the study of these two Hunter and Chan suggest.! branches of faith. The translation of the Beatitudes APPENDIX 1: THE BEATITUDES IN into Chinese resulted in several nuances of ANCIENT GREEK, ENGLISH AND translation that in general de-emphasized CHINESE (MATTHEW 5: 3-12) the otherworldly, theological aspects of the text and focused on its worldly value, Ancient Greek as a set of instructions for living a morally 3 makarios ho ptōchos ho pneuma hoti superior life in the here and now. These autos eimi ho basileia ho ouranos 4 findings reflect the missionaries’ desire to makarios ho pentheō hoti autos parakaleō emphasize the moral and character- 5 makarios ho praus hoti autos building qualities of the passage, rather klēronomeō ho gē 6 makarios ho peinaō than its implications on how to conceive kai dipsaō ho dikaiosynē hoti autos of the cosmos and one’s relationship to chortazō 7 makarios ho eleēmōn hoti autos lxi God and heaven. Most Chinese people eleeō 8 makarios ho katharos ho kardia who have written about the Bible, both hoti autos horaō ho theos 9 makarios ho proclaimed Christians and those outside eirēnopoios hoti autos kaleō hyios theos 10 of the faith, have interpreted it more as a

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 119! makarios ho diōkō dikaiosynē hoti autos eimi ho basileia ho ouranos 11 makarios !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! i Alan Hunter and Kim-Kwong Chan, Protestantism in eimi hotan oneidizō hymeis kai diōkō kai Contemporary China (Cambridge: Cambridge University legō pas ponēros kata hymeis pseudomai Press, 1993), 278. ō 12 ō ō iiChloë Starr, introduction to Reading Chinese Scriptures in eg chair kai agallia hoti ho hymeis China, ed. Chloë Starr (London and New York: T&T misthos polys en ho ouranos gar houtōs Clark, 2008), 1. diōkō ho prophētēs ho pro hymeis iii Note that after the first mention of a Chinese term, only pinyin will be used to refer to it. Also note that by “Chinese” I mean “Mandarin” or Pǔtōnghuà in English the context of this paper. This is the language of most 3 Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is editions of the Bible in contemporary China, although the kingdom of heaven. 4 Blessed are they there do exist earlier translations written in Classical 5 Chinese, as well as several translations into other that mourn: for they shall be comforted. topolects of Chinese. See the collection of essays edited Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit by Irene Eber called Bible in Modern China: The Literary 6 and Intellectual Impact, for more information on the the earth. Blessed are they that hunger translation of the Bible into Chinese languages other and thirst after righteousness: for they than Mandarin. The website www.worldscriptures.org shall be filled. 7 Blessed are the merciful: also contains publication information and a brief history 8 for Bibles published in twenty-six Chinese topolects. for they shall obtain mercy. Blessed are iv Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, 9 the pure in heart: for they shall see God. 3;64-65. Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall v Ibid., 7. 10 vi Ibid., 254. be called sons of God. Blessed are they viiJost Zetzsche, The Bible in China: The History of the that have been persecuted for Union Version or the Culmination of Protestant Missionary righteousness’ sake: for theirs is the Bible Translation in China, (Sankt Augustin: Institut 11 Monumenta Sinica, 1999), 25. kingdom of heaven. Blessed are ye viii Jost Zetzsche, “The Work of Lifetimes: Why the when men shall reproach you, and Union Version Took Nearly Three Decades to Complete,” persecute you, and say all manner of evil in The Bible in Modern China: The Literary and Intellectual 12 Impact, ed. Irene Eber, Sze-Kar Wan, and Knut Walf against you falsely, for my sake. Rejoice, (Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Sinica, 1999), 77- and be exceeding glad: for great is your 99. Upset that this translation of the Bible was done by reward in heaven: for so persecuted they foreigners, several Chinese scholars published new versions of the New Testament of the Union in the years the prophets which were before you. immediately following its release, although these versions make such minor changes that it is more Chinese appropriate to call them “revisions” than new 3 translations. They are not as popular as the original translation (see Zetzsche, The Bible in China, 360-361). 4 In 1979, The Chinese government organized a 5 committee that would have, for the first time, significantly altered some of the theologically-important 6 terminology of the Union version, though these revisions 7 were never published because the government, in its own words, became pre-occupied with the sudden 8 resurgence of activity in the Protestant Church after the end of the Cultural Revolution (ibid., 336-361). 9 ix Zetzsche, “The Work of Lifetimes,” 9. x Thor Strandenaes, Principles of Chinese Bible Translation, as Expressed in Five Selected Versions of the New Testament and 10 Exemplified by Mt 5:1-12 and Col 1, (Sweden: Almqvist & 11 Wiksell International, 1987), 98. xi Ibid. xii Ibid., 98-99. 12 xiii Ibid., 93. xiv 5 Matthew 8-9 (New Revised Standard Version, 1885, from this point on abbreviated NRSV).

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xv Irene Eber, “The Interminable Term Question,” in xlii John Yieh, “Reading ‘The Sermon on the Mount’ in Bible in Modern China: The Literary and Intellectual Impact China: A Hermeneutical Inquiry on Its History of (see note 8), 138. Reception,” in Reading Christian Scriptures in China (see xvi Ibid., 140. note 2), 152. xvii Ibid., 139. xliii Ibid., 156. xviii Ibid., 142. xliv Strandenaes, Principles of Chinese Bible Translation, 93. xix Ibid., 141. xlv See my analysis of the role of “xūxīn” in this capacity xx Ibid., 142. above, on p. 6. xxi Ibid., 141. xlvi 5 Matthew 10 (NRSV) xxii Ibid., 152. xlvii Strandenaes, Principles of Chinese Bible Translation, 82. xxiii Ibid., 153. xlviii Yieh, “Reading ‘The Sermon on the Mount’ in xxiv Ibid., 160. China,” 153. xxv While different terms for God do exist in English xlix Lín Xiàngāo, “Shānshàng Bǎoxùn,” 19-20. and Ancient Greek as well, this is not really the same l Eyton, Beatitudes, 182. phenomenon. In English and Ancient Greek, an li Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, awareness exists that all terms for “God” are simply 145. synonyms for that word, whereas the distinction lii Yieh, “Reading ‘The Sermon of the Mount’ in China,” between “shàngdì” and “shén” represents a 148. disagreement about the fundamental way in which to liii Ibid., 149. conceive of God. It is somewhat akin to being liv Ibid. undecided between whether to use “Zeus” or “God” to lv Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, refer to the Christian entity in English, since “Zeus”, like 265-266. “Shàngdì”, is the proper name of a supreme lvi Ibid., 269. mythological deity (see Eber, “Interminable Term lvii Ibid., 159. Question,” 142). lviii Yieh, “Reading ‘The Sermon on the Mount’ in China,” xxvi 5 Matthew 3 (NRSV). 156. xxvii Robert Eyton, The Beatitudes, (London: Kegan Paul, lix Lín Xiàngāo, “Shānshàng Bǎoxùn,” 11. Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd, 1895), 16-19. lx Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, xxviii Lín Xiàngāo , “Shānshàng Bǎoxùn 254. ,” Ye-su.cn (n.d.) lxi Strandenaes, Principles of Chinese Bible Translation, 93; xxix Eber, “Intermiinable Term Question,” 135. 98-99. xxx Strandenaes, Principles of Chinese Bible Translation, 93. lxii Chloë Starr, “Modern Chinese Attitudes Toward the xxxi Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, Bible” in Reading Christian Scriptures in China (see note 2), 163. 13-31. xxxii Note, though, that given the vast array of different lxiii Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, Protestant groups in China, this is an oversimplification. 254. Most likely, orthodox churches would not approve of this behavior, given their qualities outlined above, on p. REFERENCES 1-2. xxxiii Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, ABC Comprehensive Chinese-English Dictionary: 7. Alphabetically-Based Computerized, comp. John xxxiv Ibid., 163. Defrancis. Honolulu: University of Hawaii xxxv “Chinese House Church Leader Samuel Lamb Dies,” Press, 2003. in Christian Today (2013). www.christiantoday.com. “Chinese House Church Leader Samuel Lamb Dies.” xxxvi Lín Xiàngāo, “Shānshàng Bǎoxùn,” 12. Christian Today (2013). xxxvii Ibid., 14. Lín Xiàngāo may or may not have known www.christiantoday.com. that the missionaries who translated the Union, Eber, Irene. “The Interminable Term Question.” In recognizing that “xūxīn” differed rather significantly Bible in Modern China: The Literary and Intellectual from “poor in spirit”, added a footnote to the first Impact, edited by Irene Eber, Sze-kar Wan, and edition of the Union that read, “Xūxīnyuánwén zuò Knut Walf. 135-161. Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Serica, 1999. ī ǐ x nl pínqióng de ” [rough Eyton, Robert. The Beatitudes. London: Kegan Paul, translation: “xūxīn” in the original text is written “poor Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd, 1895. in the heart”]. However, this note was dropped in Greek and English Interlinear New Testament (NASB/NIV), subsequent editions (see Strandenaes, Principles of Chinese edited by William D. Mounce and Robert H. Bible Translation, 85). Mounce. 12-13. United States: Zondervan, xxxviii Lín Xiàngāo, “Shānshàng Bǎoxùn,” 14-15. 2008. xxxix 5 Matthew 7 (NRSV) xl Eyton, Beatitudes, 73. Greek-English Dictionary of the New Testament: Revised xli Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, Edition, edited by Barclay Newman. Stuttgart: 158. Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2010.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Hàn yīng dà cídiǎn /Chinese-English Dictionary. Shanghai: Shànghǎi jiāotōng dàxué chūbǎn shè , 1999. Hunter, Alan and Kim-Kwong Chan. Protestantism in Contemporary China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Lín Xiàngāo . “Shānshàng Bǎoxùn .” Ye-su.cn, n.d. New Revised Bible. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1885. Oxford English Dictionary, accessed 11/30/2013, www.oed.com. Shèngjīng :/Holy Bible (dual-language edition). Nanjing: Zhōngguó jīdūjiào xiéhuì /China Christian Council, 2000. Starr, Chloë. “Introduction.” Reading Christian Scriptures in China, edited by Chloë Starr. 1-9. London and New York: T&T Clark, 2008. --. “Modern Chinese Attitudes Toward the Bible.” Reading Chinese Scriptures in China, edited by Chloë Starr. 13-31. London and New York: T&T Clark, 2008. Strandenaes, Thor. Principles of Chinese Bible Translation, as Expressed in Five Selected Versions of the New Testament and Exemplified by Mt 5:1-12 and Col 1. Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987. Worldscriptures.org. United Bible Societies, n.d. Yieh, John. “Reading ‘The Sermon on the Mount’ in China: A Hermeneutical Inquiry on Its History of Reception,” in Reading Christian Scriptures in China, edited by Chloë Starr. London and New York: T&T Clark, 2008. Zetzsche, Jost. The Bible in China: The History of the Union Version or The Culmination of Protestant Missionary Bible Translation in China. Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Sinica, 1999. Zetzsche, Jost. “The Work of Lifetimes: Why the Union Version Took Nearly Three Decades to Complete.” Bible in Modern China: The Literary and Intellectual Impact, edited by Irene Eber, Sze-kar Wan, and Knut Walf. 77-99. Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Sinica, 1999.

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THE “KOREAN WAVE” IN TAIPEI The Construction of Beautiful Women Xinyan Peng University of Virginia

ABSTRACT growing appetite for Korean cultural exports among Chinese people. The This thesis is based on my June 2013 Mandarin Chinese translation for “Korean fieldwork in Taipei, Taiwan, which was Wave,” hanliu, literally means “flows of funded by two grants from the University Korea.” The Korean Wave has not only of Virginia: the East Asia Center’s Ellen swept East Asian countries such as Japan, Bayard Weedon Travel Grant and the China, and Taiwan, but also has spread to Raven Society Fellowship. It discusses the rest of Asia, Europe, the United the influences of Korean popular culture, States, Africa, and many other parts of the especially fashion and beauty styles, on world. This phenomenon has generated young Taiwanese women. These much sociological and anthropological influences come from media products research, especially on South Korean exported to Taiwan, such as Korean pop domestic entertainment industries, such as music and television dramas, and they television drama and popular music, as shape how young Taiwanese females well as on the local reception of the construct their physical appearance to fit Korean Wave in foreign lands. new standards of beauty. I argue that the In this thesis, I will analyze the adoption of Korean-style clothing and Korean Wave from the perspective of other Korean aesthetics about women’s gender theory—a study of the social bodies affects how female attractiveness is construction of femininity and women’s expected to be defined and pursued by bodies—and, more specifically, I will today’s young Taiwanese women. I analyze the construction of female emphasize an ironic paradox in this physical attractiveness in Taipei. I intend process: the local reception of Korean to link the female imagery portrayed in fashion in Taipei both expands the South Korean media products, such as possibility of diverse female roles and, at television dramas and popular music, with the same time, restricts young Taiwanese the social construction of standards of females’ expression of self. physical attractiveness and femininity. This interest started with a INTRODUCTION conversation with a female friend at the University of Virginia, who is a Ghanaian The term “Korean Wave” refers young woman in her early twenties and to the increasing global popularity of considers herself quite a fan of Korean South Korean popular culture, which was TV dramas. She told me about a Korean first driven by the spread of Korean TV drama named Prosecutor Princess. This television dramas in the late 1990s and drama series, with many unexpected twists later strengthened by Korean popular and turns, tells the story of how Ma Hye- music and the Korean fashion industry. ri, a wealthy Korean young woman Journalists in Beijing originally coined the graduating from an elite law school in term in mid-1999 when they noticed a South Korea, established her career as a

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 123! prosecutor and found her true love. The pursuit of attractiveness in Korean TV part of the plot that impressed my friend dramas. This is what first aroused my the most was the heroine’s process of interest in doing a serious anthropological losing half of her weight. My friend study on the topic of female beauty narrated, “Everything was triggered by her influenced by the Korean Wave. finding out that her crush was in love with In order to ground this study of her best friend instead of her while she female attractiveness in community-based was studying in the law school. She came fieldwork, I went to do research in Taipei, back home and cried from morning to Taiwan in June 2013, with funding from night. This made her mother decide to the East Asia Center and Raven Society at stop spoiling her with desserts and start the University of Virginia. Before I went the weight-losing plan by force. She woke to Taipei, I did short interviews of Korean up in the next morning only to find that television drama fans at the University of she was no longer in her bedroom but in a Virginia and asked subjects about cell-like basement with a treadmill. She beautiful women and romance in Korean cried out, ‘Mom, I am hungry,’ only to see television dramas. My ethnographic work a plate of salad vegetables slipped through in Taipei involved a month of participant under the window by her strong-minded observation, mainly in beauty-product and yet sympathetic mother. Then two stores and shopping centers filled with strong guys (presumably her soon-to-be South Korean clothes, as well as in-depth trainers) came in and carried her together interviews with both female and male to the treadmill. What follows was a storeowners and young female customers. series of snapshots of her running on the Korean-style clothing has flowed treadmill, and eventually, there appeared a to Taipei as, due to South Korea’s slender girl running on the treadmill. She increasing exportation of media products took out all the clothes that her rich dad in the last decade, the Korean Wave has bought for her but she could not fit into gradually overtaken Japanese popular before, picked the most beautiful one, put culture in Taipei. I argue that the growing on makeup, and walked outside of the consumption of Korean fashion has basement. When she was walking on the reinforced new understandings of what a street, everyone walking past her would beautiful female should look like. The turn around and stare at her; especially the adoption of Korean-style clothing and girls walking past her would jealously other Korean aesthetics about women’s focus on her slender body shape as well as bodies affects how female attractiveness is her pale skin that came from a lack of expected to be defined and pursued on sunshine in the basement where she lost the part of today’s young Taiwanese her weight.” This friend of mine from the women. However, there is an ironic University of Virginia, an American paradox involved. Although Taiwanese representative of Korean TV drama young females now think that they have audience, confessed that it was at that more agency to explore different styles of moment when she felt a strong pressure femininity with the import of the to lose weight and get pale in order to distinctive Korean fashion, the very social match those specific Korean female norms of female physical beauty created beauty standards and buttress her self- in the Korean Wave demand a certain confidence. Then we had a discussion female body that is often unattainable. In about the portrayal of beautiful women – other words, the local reception of their appearance and body and the socially Korean fashion in Taipei both expands constructed norms dominating women’s the possibility of diverse female roles and

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 124! restricts young Taiwanese females’ produce the appearance of expression of self at the same time. substance, of a natural sort of The rest of this thesis is organized as being. ii follows: a literature review, a description of my methodology, ethnographic data Her theories on sex, gender, and sexuality description, ethnographic data analysis, open up new possibilities of expressing and, last, my conclusion. The literature masculinity and femininity. According to review summarizes some highly relevant Butler, gender is a social construction that sociological and anthropological studies of has a high level of performativity. In a gender, femininity, the female body and particular culture, certain types of gender attractiveness, with an emphasis on East or gendered expression are achieved Asia and an elaboration of how these through repeated actions and rituals that works relate to my study. The are sustained over time and eventually get methodology section describes the places naturalized. iii Butler proposes that this of my ethnographic research and the naturalization process will lead people to demographic and background information hold “habitual and violent” assumptions, about my informants. I also include a which delegitimize some minority groups description of my participant observation in terms of gender performance and methods and specific interview questions. sexual practice. iv Butler suggests that Next I describe my informants’ narratives biological differences of sex do not match and opinions and the results of my the cultural construction of gender, and observations, which sets the stage for my also breaks down the assumed gender in-depth analysis of these ethnographic binary by depicting sex, gender, and data. In the end, I draw some general sexuality as different but related conclusions for my study. spectrums. Femininity is not, therefore, defined by biological features but by LITERATURE REVIEW cultural production. She cites what Simone de Beauvoir states in The Second This research project is Sex: “one is not born a woman, but, fundamentally a study of gender and rather, becomes one.”v Through repeated gender roles, and the foremost figure in actions and rituals of cultural meanings, a gender studies is Judith Butler, an woman is no longer an object but a American post-structuralist philosopher process, a becoming, that does not end or and a leading figure in feminist philosophy. reject change. In short, the production of She challenges “the pervasive heterosexual gender norms for both men and women is assumption in feminist literary theory” in regulated and sustained through social her groundbreaking book Gender Trouble.i meanings. Therefore Butler suggests that She argues that the dominant definitions a woman’s body acts as both an active of gender, masculinity, and femininity are agent performing femininity and as a restricting and that a hierarchy is thus passive medium on which cultural created, which excludes certain types of meanings are inscribed. vi In her gendered expression. Her definition of conclusion to Gender Trouble, Butler gender is as follows: challenges the identity politics involved in feminist theories and social movements, Gender is the repeated stylization by proclaiming that there is no need to of the body, a set of repeated acts have “a doer behind the deed,” but that within a highly rigid regulatory “‘the doer’” is variably constructed in and frame that congeal over time to through the deed. vii Butler’s theories,

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 125! including performativity and the cultural that we experience and conceptualize it construction of gender, encourage me to through the mediation of how it is pay close attention to how young constructed by and associated with Taiwanese females use fashion to create cultural images.x She cites Mary Douglas’ different images and styles of femininity. understanding of body as a powerful In order to understand how symbolic form on which “the central gender is socially constructed, I also want rules, hierarchies, and even metaphysical to review theories on the relationship commitments of a culture are inscribed” between body and power, represented by as well as a system of “natural symbols Foucault in his work Discipline and Punish, that reproduce social categories and published in 1975. In his writing, concerns.”xi Foucault describes the body as “the object In her chapter "Reading the and target of power.”viii According to him, Slender Body," Bordo underlines the the body is the instrument through which "disquieting meaning of contemporary hierarchy is implemented and power is beauty ideals in an era of greater female enforced. This implicit mechanism of presence and power than ever before," or power, enacted through social norms what she calls "the tyranny of governing one’s body, functions just like slenderness."xii Similar to Foucault, Bordo the panopticon, in which prisoners feel believes that the physical body is an constantly watched and are thereby instrument and medium of power, which disciplined. leads to the social manipulation of the With regard to the female body female body by the power relationship specifically, I want to highlight the theory between sexes.xiii In order to achieve their of Susan Bordo, a modern feminist “ideal” romantic or sexual relationship philosopher known for her contributions with males, females feel compelled to to the field of contemporary cultural sustain the “appropriate” body, even studies, and the study of the “body.” though it means restricting diets or Susan Bordo's book Unbearable Weight: diligent workouts. Hence, the female Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body, body becomes docile to external published in 1993, is based on her regulation and subjection, as females make research on the female body and more and more efforts to appeal to slenderness in the West, particularly in the whimsical fashion and the “ever-changing, U.S. She introduces a duality of nature homogenizing, elusive ideal of and changing cultural notions of where femininity.” xiv Bordo poses anorexia the body stands: nervosa as a paradox that originated in the pursuit of slenderness on the part of Over the past hundred and fifty females—they care desperately and years, under the influence of a passionately about the “ideal” female variety of cultural forces, the body body in order to reach the stage of has been forced to vacate its long- “coolness, effortless confidence, and term residence on the nature side casual freedom. ”xv of the nature/culture duality and In her attempt to explain why encouraged to take up residence, women in Western cultures seem to be along with everything else that is more obsessed with slenderness than men, human, within culture.ix Bordo ascribes gender-coded significance to the body, which “overdetermines The reason why the body has been taken slenderness as a contemporary ideal of from the nature side to the culture side is specifically female attractiveness.” xvi

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Associating the perception of the female enacting and reenacting received gender body with the shift of females from norms which surface as so many styles of domestic to professional spheres in the flesh.” xx Bartky’s chapter discusses the industrialized West, Bordo postulates that nature and imposition of three categories the revulsion, among both males and of disciplinary practices, and how those females, towards a plump body may be practices contribute to the production of viewed as “expressing rebellion against femininity. Those three categories maternal, domestic femininity.” xvii As include: more and more females enter the male- dominated professional world, Bordo …those that aim to produce a claims: body of certain size and general configuration; those that bring It is required…of female forth from this body a specific desire…to be normalized repertoire of gestures, postures, according to the professional (and and movements; and those that male) standards of that world; are directed toward the display of female bodies, accordingly, must this body as an ornamented be stripped of all psychic surface.xxi resonances with maternal power.xviii In her conclusion, Bartky presents a paradox in which women become more Rose Weitz, a researcher focusing on subject to “the dominating gaze of women, health, sexuality, and the body at patriarchy” as they begin to realize the School of Social Transformation of increasing self-determination politically, Arizona State University, also investigates economically, and sexually.xxii how power structures interplay with social In the third part of this edited norms of the female body in The Politics of volume, titled “The Politics of Women’s Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Appearance,” Weitz asserts that women’s Behavior (2003). In the introduction to this appearances dramatically affect their lives edited volume, Weitz defines the social in a society still largely dominated by men. construction of women’s bodies as the She states: process through which relevant ideas become socially accepted and naturalized. Attractiveness serves as an indirect She argues that this social construction of form of power, by increasing the female body is also “an intensively women’s odds of obtaining the political process, reflecting competing protection of powerful men—as groups, divergent vested interests and long as the women’s attractiveness differential access to power.” xix In her lasts. Among other benefits, opinion, socially constructed ideas attractiveness typically brings regarding women’s bodies have greatly women more marital prospects influenced the power differential between and friendships, higher salaries, women and men throughout human and higher school grades…xxiii history. A chapter written by Sandra Lee Bartky in this volume, “Foucault, More importantly, according to Weitz, Femininity, and the Modernization of what is ironic about social norms Patriarchal Power,” builds on Butler’s governing female beauty is that few perspective of regarding femininity as a female bodies can satisfy those norms for becoming, an achievement, “a mode of their lifetime, or even just for a short

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 127! period of time. If most females cannot submission to men, the achievement of “naturally” meet certain standards of femininity through “appearance, gesture, attractiveness held by the whole society, it movement, voice, bodily contours, is not surprising that women have turned aspirations, values, and political to artificial means, from makeup and behaviors” is obligatory of any woman corsets to diets and, more recently, plastic who wants to be liked by others, especially surgery. male members of the society.xxvii “Women and the Knife: Cosmetic Miejeong Han’s chapter, “Body Surgery and the Colonization of Women’s Image Dissatisfaction and Eating Bodies,” a chapter written by Kathryn Disturbance among Korean College Pauly Morgan, calls for “a feminist Female Students: Relationships to Media analysis to understand why actual, live Exposure, Upward Comparison, and women are reduced to ‘potential women’ Perceived Reality,” describes two and choose to participate in anatomizing sociological experiments conducted to and fetishizing their bodies.” xxiv She examine the effects of exposure to slender claims that plastic surgery is becoming the female bodies in the media. Han states norm for females and leading to a societal that traditionally a round face and chubby shift that stigmatizes women who do not body were considered ideal; however, use plastic surgery. Morgan presents three “young females in Korea today seem to be paradoxes of choice that originated in the captivated with having a thin body like rising popularity of plastic surgery. First, models in fashion magazines.” xxviii Morgan argues that what is being created According to many South Korean health by plastic surgery, most of the time, “is professionals, there is a rising social not simply beautiful bodies and faces but obsession with slenderness, which poses white, Western, Anglo-Saxon bodies in a serious health threats to females, including racist, anti-Semitic context.” xxv anorexia nervosa. It is believed by health Meanwhile, it seems at first sight that professionals and media critics that the females intentionally make the choice to presentation of incredibly slender female get plastic surgery; however, Morgan characters provides unrealistic goals for believes that this seeming choice indicates average young Korean females, and females’ conformity to the socially cultivates a societal obsession with constructed norms of beauty and slenderness. Han then investigates how compulsory heterosexuality – women the social variables of “upward obtain artificial features of beauty through comparison” and “perception of thinness plastic surgery in order to be attractive to as realistic” cause young Korean females men. Therefore the second paradox is the to become dissatisfied with their own colonizing culture of viewing a female’s body image and develop eating disorders. body as “a kind of raw material to be Han defines “upward comparison” as the exploited in terms of appearance, tendency to compare oneself with eroticism, nurturance, and fertility,” “someone who is perceived to be better instead of as the real existing woman.xxvi on important social dimensions,” which The third paradox is that even though the the author suggests would lead to self- set of procedures involved in cosmetic devaluation and feeling of inferiority, surgery are “elective” by definition, according to social comparison theory. xxix pressure to achieve “perfect appearance” Han hypothesizes that females with more makes elective technology imperative. In the exposure to media images of thinness end, Morgan concludes that in any culture would display higher levels of upward where femininity is defined in terms of comparison, have a greater chance of

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 128! dissatisfaction with her own body image, (2002). Thanks to Japan’s economic and develop an eating disturbance. Also, boom and the power of the media, the Han describes the tendency among South circulation of Japanese popular culture Korean college female students to among other East Asian countries in the transform thinness shown in the media late 20th century and early 21st century was into real-life practice, and defines it as intensified. The theory of “cultural “the concept of thinness as realistic.” imperialism,” which used to be dominant Han postulates that the body image in the in defining the nature of globalization, media that is perceived to be real by emphasized “the unidirectional flow of audiences is more likely to affect reality, culture from the dominant (in most cases and therefore females with more exposure equated with the United States) to the to thinness in media will also have greater dominated.” xxx However, Iwabuchi chances of developing an eating elaborates on the decentering of disturbance due to dissatisfaction with globalization today, arguing that new their bodies. In short, the two variables, globalizing forces have made transnational “upward comparison” and “perception of cultural flows “much more disjunctive, thinness as realistic,” combine to affect non-isomorphic, and complex than what how females understand the way their the center-periphery paradigm allows us bodies should be. After introducing how to understand.”xxxi the two experiments were conducted with Therefore, according to Iwabuchi, magazine ads and television shows we should “reconsider the nature of respectively, Han concludes that upward transnational cultural unevenness comparison in particular was a significant highlighted by cultural imperialism predication of eating disturbances in discourses,” and acknowledge the studies of both magazine ads and bidirectionality of the flow of material, television shows, even though the level of capital, ideas, etc. in a global exchange.xxxii significance differs in the two experiments. Scholars such as Iwabuchi acknowledge Like Han’s research, this study of that transnational flows do not make the the perception of the female body under rest of the world replicate the West. What the sway of Korean popular culture in is important in the process of breaking the Taipei also demonstrates how the media homogenized Westernization is not only initiates upward comparison among transnational cultural flow among audiences and shapes reality. Moreover, “peripheral” countries, but also how a my work provides a case study of specific culture is deterritorialized while transnational popular cultural flows in the being exported from its place of origin new era of globalization. For many, and then reterritorialized. xxxiii In this globalization is a unilateral process of regard, Iwabuchi quotes the New York material and cultural flows from the West, University Professor of Spanish and as the “center,” to the rest of the world as Portuguese Language and Literature, Mary the “periphery.” However, the cultural Louise Pratt: “While subjugated peoples exchange between “peripheral” countries, cannot readily control what emanates such as those in East Asia, challenges the from the dominant culture, they do notion that globalization equals determine to varying extents what they “Westernization,” as is seen in Koichi absorb into their own and what they use it Iwabuchi’s study of the rising cultural for.”xxxiv influence of Japan among other East Iwabuchi illustrates this Asian countries, Recentering Globalization: localization process in transnational Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 129! cultural flow using the example of breaks up boundaries of nation-states and Japanese popular culture: boundaries between “us” and “them.” Even though he focuses on the …the international spread of transnational cultural flow from Japan to mukokuseki popular culture from the rest of Asia, Iwabuchi’s approach is Japan simultaneously articulates still relevant to analyzing similar forms of the universal appeal of Japanese cultural flow from South Korea to other cultural products and the Asian countries, including Taiwan. Since disappearance of any perceptible Japanese fashion was and, to some extent, “Japaneseness,” which…is subtly still is popular in Taipei, I researched incorporated into the other scholarly articles investigating this “localization.”xxxv cultural phenomenon. Japanese visual culture authority Sharon Kinsella’s article He claims that the yearning for Japanese “Cuties in Japan” notes the Japanese popular culture in other parts of East Asia female fashion based on a unique is not necessarily due to an appreciation of “cuteness,” described as “childlike, sweet, Japan’s image or the way of being adorable,” and its spread to other Asian Japanese, but to a desire for consuming countries.”xxxvii Japanese popular culture just like other Many other studies have been types of commodities. Hence Iwabuchi’s done with regard to the distinct work reveals the shifting nature of transnational cultural phenomenon of the transnational cultural flows in the local Korean Wave. The panel, “The Korean appropriation and consumption of foreign Wave: Hallyu in Transnational cultural products, such as that of Japanese Perspective,” at the 48th Annual meeting popular culture in East Asia. This shift to of the Southeast Conference of Asian an emphasis on the localization of foreign Studies in 2009 included a fruitful culture leads to a shift in how we discussion about the Korean Wave as understand the gradually diffused power both a national and a transnational structure involved in globalization today. phenomenon. In this panel, Mark Ravina In the process of transnational cultural defined the Korean Wave as “a surge in flows, the export country and import the international visibility of Korean country do not necessarily have a center- culture, beginning in East Asia in the periphery relationship, but the relationship 1990s and continuing more recently in the gets complicated as cultural power gets United States, Latin America, the Middle diffused. Iwabuchi concludes: East, and parts of Europe.” xxxviii It is widely acknowledged that television serials …globalization brings about, as and pop music (K-pop) are the two major Hannerz (1996, 102) put it, “an forms of media, although Korean feature organization of diversity rather films and other music forms are also part than a replication of uniformity,” of the Korean Wave. Ravina believes that or a “repatriation of difference,” the Korean Wave is not only a cultural but which is produced by the local also a commercial phenomenon absorption and indigenization of undergirded by the South Korean homogenizing forces.xxxvi government’s effort to promote its entertainment industry and overall Iwabuchi also asserts that the diversity economic growth. Ravina mentions and multiplicity of difference, created in briefly that certain media products are not this process of decentering globalization, inherently “Korean,” but are marked as

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Korean before being exported to other locate the symbolic interaction in countries in order to raise the visibility of transnational cultural flows. xli In the South Korean popular culture overseas. context of the Korean Wave, popular In the same vein, “Transnational cultural forms, including television dramas Korea: A Critical Assessment of the and music, undergo processes of Korean Wave in Asia and the United localization and reconstruction when they States” by Eun-Young Jung argues that are exported to other countries and the hybridity in transnational cultural intermingle with local cultural forms. It is flows from South Korea to the rest of observed by scholars such as Jung that Asia and the world challenges the validity this mechanism of repackaging and of the Korean popular cultural elements reproducing Korean popular culture is produced at home. Jung attributes the particularly seen in Asian and Asian success of South Korean television American communities around the globe. dramas in Asia to its concentration on Therefore what local people see as “family-friendly” values. However, when Korean popular culture is no longer it comes to the reason why Korean intrinsically Korean, but is instead a popular music has spread more and more hybrid mixture. Jung believes that rapidly, Jung states: embracing the hybrid nature of cultures encourages us to “move away from the …the reasons behind this new problematic qualities of essentialism and craze have very little to do with exclusionism inherent in notions of traditional Asian family values or cultural ‘purity’ and ‘authenticity.’”xlii uniquely Korean musical elements; Regarding the reason for the rising instead, interest in Korean popular popularity of Korean television dramas in music seems to be due to its Asian countries, Jung agrees with the increasingly transnational and theory of cultural proximity developed by hybrid aspect. xxxix Iwabuchi, and also adds that, unlike Japanese culture, Korean culture is not Jung suggests that in the midst of associated with a colonial legacy or with transnational flows from South Korea to offensive content. Finally, Jung concludes the rest of Asia and the world, the multi- that the Korean Wave may not be as layered and multi-directional mobility and “authentically Korean” as expected or hybridity of Korean popular culture has imagined, and that most of the been shaped. On hybridity, Jung quotes characteristics of Korean Wave are hybrid cultural scholar Marwan M. Kraidy’s and intertwined with local cultures. definition that it is “the fusion of two In East Asian Popular Culture: hitherto relatively distinct forms, styles, or Analyzing the Korean Wave (2008), written identities… which often occurs across by Chua Beng Huat and Iwabuchi Koichi, national borders as well as across cultural one of the most common reasons for boundaries.” xl As a result, in the 21st South Korean television dramas’ ability to century, when popular cultural products attract a huge female audience is that they and consumption have become allow space for personalization. The increasingly transnational and hybrid, process of personalization, according to national and ethnic boundaries around the Chua and Iwabuchi, entails “putting world have become less clear-cut. oneself in the drama scenario and Furthermore, Jung borrows Homi K. identifying with the situation and Bhabha’s term “Third Space,” a liminal character.” xliii Chua and Iwabuchi also space between “Ourselves and Others,” to argue that these processes of identification

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 131! and personalization create fantasies that from the Japanese model to reach today’s bridge the gap between reality and wish.xliv booming level. The rest of Russell’s book Females constitute the majority of South narrates seven stories to “encompass the Korean television drama fans, and Chua breadth of Korean popular culture,” and Iwabuchi think that those television which cover a media conglomerate, a dramas provide a channel through which blockbuster, a film festival, television, the women can escape from reality and pop music scene, the Internet Revolution, “express their desires—desires for a pure and comic books and animation.xlix society, for pure romance, for being In the chapter “The Actor and the pampered and loved by men.” xlv Chua television Drama,” Russell weaves and Iwabuchi state that the yearning for together the story of a prominent South “qing,” pure and absolute love, “in a Korean actor, Lee Byung-hun, and that of society that privileges rationalist efficiency the whole South Korean television discourses and non-compassionate industry. According to Russell, the birth approaches to work” determines the of television channels in South Korea was success of Korean television dramas very much shaped by the American media among modern women. Female viewers in the 1950s. There was a short period in on the one hand strive to fit into male- the 1960s, before the military regime dominated workplaces and, on the other increased its control over life in South hand, want to escape to a safe fantasy Korea, when the South Korean television world of traditional/Confucian industry enjoyed diversity and femininity.xlvi independence. l However, according to In addition to the above scholarly Russell, even though the development of work, Mark Russell, a freelance writer the movie industry was hindered by who lived in Korea for thirteen years and government censorship in the 1970s, that specialized in Korean pop culture, has period is still considered the first great era also commented on the Korean Wave in of television in South Korea, with the Pop Goes Korea: Behind the Revolution in flourishing of daily dramas, detective Movies, Music, and Internet Culture (2008). In mysteries, and historical dramas. The his introduction, Russell considers the rise accelerating growth of Korean television of Korean popular culture domestically dramas happened in the 1990s, when they and internationally that started in the were exposed to competition from their 1990s as a shift away from a conservative counterparts in Japan. The industry of and work-oriented culture in South television dramas in Korea was forced to Korea. xlvii Russell traces the growth of move away from the Japanese models, Korean popular culture to South Korea’s because it did not want to be seen by democracy movement, which began in the foreign audiences as mere followers of the 1970s. During South Korea’s struggle for Japanese industry. Meanwhile, Russell a democratic government, restrictions on points out that the rising popularity of the development of popular culture and Korean television dramas benefits not entertainment industry were gradually only the television and entertainment loosened. The 1970s in particular industries, but also the manufactures who witnessed the rise of television in South have been taking advantage of this “drama Korea, “where it quickly displaced cinema wave” to expand their markets across as the center of people’s cultural lives, Asia. much as it did everywhere around the When it comes to the reason that world.”xlviii Russell also delineates the path Korean television dramas are spread so of Korean popular culture breaking away extensively in other Asian countries,

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Russell also touches on Iwabuchi’s notion METHODOLOGY of “cultural proximity,” arguing that Korean dramas share a lot of cultural In June 2013, I did a month of elements that people around Asia can fieldwork in Taipei on female fashion relate to, such as Confucian values, family- consumption under the sway of Korean oriented atmospheres, and modest Wave. The background of my research sexuality.li More importantly, the theme was that the exports of not only Korean that runs through Korean television fashion, but also Korean popular music dramas, jeong (qing in Chinese), which is and television dramas (all of these are literally translated as “emotion” but included in Korean Wave), have shaped specifically suggests an ambiguous understandings of the beautiful female emotion and empathic love, contributes to body in places where the Korean Wave the success at home and overseas. Russell has swept across, such as Taiwan. interprets jeong as follows: Meanwhile, Taiwan itself has been undergoing a shift: Korean popular The idea of jeong exists around culture has been taking over the Japanese much of Asia…However, the popular culture that was prevalent starting word’s meaning in Korean is in the 1990s. In my research, I explored bigger, broader, and more the way that Korean popular culture has powerful, as well as more influenced understandings of beautiful ambiguous…Jeong is like kindness female bodies among young Taiwanese or love, but it also means women. sympathy, attachment, and My initial step was to visit and do obligation. Jeong is not just an observations in several places where emotion you feel, it is a condition young Taiwanese females usually go that possesses you. Jeong is not shopping. The so-called “white-collar just your emotion, it is a office ladies” usually shop in the top-end relationship, an interaction of department stores in the Xinyi District of emotions between two people, a eastern Taipei, and clothing stores there denying of the self in favor of the are geographically distributed according to bond…Jeong is the opposite of the targeted age groups. In order to individualism, and as Korean search for cheaper clothes, these women society modernizes, Jeong is slowly also shop in trendy street stores featuring disappearing.lii Korean and Japanese styles in the East District (west of Xinyi District). College This emphasis on anti-individualistic and and high school girls, who have a strong traditional love particularly attracts female thirst for fashion but less disposable audiences to South Korean television income, usually choose well-known night- dramas, both in Asia and overseas. markets near universities such as National The literature that I have reviewed Taiwan University (NTU) and National so far discusses gender, the female body, Taiwan Normal University, where they globalization, and Korean popular culture. can find clothes at wholesale price but of My ethnographic research weaves these mostly lower quality. Wufenpu Garment themes together by looking at how certain Wholesale Area near Songshan Train aspects of Korean popular culture shape Staition, also known as Wufenpu Fashion the construction of beautiful women in Zone, is known as a fashion landmark to Taipei. both local Taiwanese as well as tourists. By talking to street store owners in the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 133! places listed above and by reading both “How would you define their scholarly articles and fashion magazines, I characteristics, respectively?” found out about the cultural influence of (Since all of them mentioned neighboring countries in East Asia, such Korean fashion in response to the as Japan and South Korea, on fashion first question), “Why do you think trends in Taipei. I had short Korean fashion is now so popular conversations with twenty young among young Taiwanese Taiwanese females in the clothing stores females?” mentioned above, as well as “Can you describe the type of pharmaceutical stores selling cosmetic and clothes fashion you like and/or weight-loss products, metro stations, and wear often? Why this type, if you in NTU. Among them, I chose five pick intentionally?” young Taiwanese women as well as one young Taiwanese man (all of them in their Questions that I posed in all of the longer early to mid-twenties and with a college and deeper interviews with the five young education) to have in-depth interviews in Taiwanese females and one young order to deeply investigate their Taiwanese male include all of the perceptions of the beautiful female body. questions listed above and the following: Questions that I asked owners of clothing stores in night-markets and on streets “How do you like your include: appearance—facial traits and body shape? What do your friends and “What kind of fashion do you family think about them?” think is in vogue now among “Do you ever think about young Taiwanese females?” improving your appearance and “How would you define their body? If so, how? What have you characteristics, respectively?” started doing to reach this goal?” “What are the clothes like in each of the fashions?” (If they mention Depending on each person’s narrative in several types within each fashion) his/her conversation with me, I asked “Can you describe some different follow-up questions in order to characteristics (such as age) of the delve deeper into each individual’s group of girls that like xxx type?” experience and perceptions. I ended up with limited interview “What type of female data, but several factors justify this. First, figure would look good in xxx the grant and fellowship I got from East type/fashion?” Asia Center and Raven Society, as well as my visa, could support me to stay in Questions that I asked in my short Taipei only for a month. Second, I conversations with young Taiwanese realized that my interview data started to females (in their early and mid-twenties) in show repetition shortly after fieldwork clothes and pharmaceutical stores, metro began. For example, among the first three stations, and in NTU include: people I talked to, part of the response to the question what a beautiful young “What kind of clothes fashion do female looks like was the same proverb in you think is in vogue now among Mandarin Chinese, “looking pale rules out Taiwanese females in your age?” every possibility of looking ugly,” which I will analyze later.

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very casual and the latter of which is very ETHNOGRAPHY formal.” On the next day, I visited National I found out, through one month Taiwan University and my friend’s of fieldwork, four areas of influence that mother, who works there in the the “Korean Wave” exerts on the administration department, introduced me construction of female attractiveness in to a young lady in her office, who she Taipei: clothing and clothing style, claimed was “a dedicated follower of paleness of skin, slender bodies, and use fashion.” We sat down at a table and of plastic surgery. I am going to organize started our chat. According to her, the and present my ethnographic data in this rising influence of “Korean Wave” in order. Taipei should be attributed to the popularity of Korean television dramas Fashion and Korean styles in Taipei and pop music as well as shopping- oriented tourism in South Korea. I then I still clearly remember the first remembered young women watching day of my stay in Taipei. I was very jet- Korean television dramas on their smart lagged and woke up quite early. Excitedly phones and tablets in subway trains. She searching for bus and metro said, “Many Taiwanese girls, when transportation information online in my traveling in Korea, go shopping in friend’s house, I was getting ready to dongdaimon, a clothes wholesale area and experience a busy morning in this fashion landmark in Seoul. Those girls metropolitan city. I put my “field bring the clothes there back to Taipei, notebook” in my purse and went outside which helps spread the Korean fashion to take an early No. 1 bus to a nearby out.” What she meant by fashion was metro station where I ended up different types of clothing and styles of experiencing culture shock for the first dressing up. She also commented on the time. I was wearing what I often wear in role fashion magazines, especially those school—sporty tank top, running shorts, promoting Korean and Japanese fashions, and a pair of flip-flops—while most of the play in shaping young females’ idea of young Taiwanese women at the metro what they should wear in order to look station were professionally and stylishly nice in the eyes of other people. Her dressed. I knew they were on their way to description of what she called “Korean- work, so I was not that surprised that they style office lady” resembles pictures that were better dressed than I. What can easily be found online, in which the impressed me was that many Taiwanese women look “mature, elegant, and young women look really stylish, which professional” (see Figures 1-2). In even compelled me to go back and comparison, she described the Japanese change. Later that night, I talked to my “cute” fashion to be a style of looking friend’s father, a man in his fifties working “infantile, girly, and pure” (see Figures 3- as an economic analyst, about the 4). The images that I included here are “dressy” culture. He said, “You barely see only examples of an ocean of pictures that people wearing flip flops in metro station, one can get by just a rough search, using where people are supposed to look well the words such as “Korean office lady dressed. In general, I think the dressing style” and “Japanese cute style.” My culture in Taipei is between that of friend’s brother, Dennis, shared similar America and Japan, the former of which is stereotypes of Korean and Japanese female fashion: “Girls dressed in Korean

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 135! fashion tend to look more mature and At the same time, celebrities seem to be professional while Japanese female found more approachable when they are fashion sometimes reveals exaggerated dressed up in this way, and this style is cuteness such as that in Japanese costume very popular on streets in Taipei. Fashion play.” His words formed images of magazines that update young females with different femininities in my mind. I have the newest styles from abroad, such as never been an expert on fashion, so I those from South Korea, inundate started looking at fashion magazines and newsstands on streets, pharmacy stores, websites. and bookstores in Taipei. Vogue is one of the most popular In order to be exposed to different fashion magazines in Taipei. Yura, a host Korean female fashion styles that are of an entertainment television program in popular in Taipei, I spent a good amount South Korea, was once interviewed by of time doing observations and short Vogue about the Korean fashion in Taipei interviews in the fashion landmark, during her first visit to the city. In an Wufenpu Garment Wholesale Area. I article published on VOGUE.com in June always went there in the early afternoon, 22, 2012, she herself manifested the when the stores were just opening and following types of Korean fashion that are owners were organizing their clothes and popular in Taipei (see Figures 5-7; below getting ready for a big flow of customers each image is my translation of her starting in the late afternoon. Streets in words). liii During that interview with this area were quite narrow, with stores Vogue magazine, Yura expressed being adjacent to each other, and this area could very impressed by the fact that Korean get very crowded from late afternoon until clothes fashion dominated the street midnight. When I was wandering in stores in the East District of Taipei. As a different stores and browsing the clothing, native South Korean and a fashion I heard Korean popular music and found connoisseur, she understood the essence a lot of clothes with the tags “made in of Korean female fashion to be “non- Korea” or “designed in Korea,” which are extravagant, comfortable, and elegant.” generally much more expensive than According to her, in daily settings Korean clothes without those tags. By talking young females tend not to look too with some storeowners, I learned that “feminine,” and they do not wear clothes many of the clothes without those tags in order to show their body curves. could still be shipped from South Korea, Foreigners observe that many Korean because storeowners themselves would young women, such as Yura, are so pick out clothes of different styles while slender that they do not have a curvy or they were traveling in Seoul and bring plump body compared to women in the them back to Taipei to sell. West. Yura also agreed that many Korean After several trips to Wufenpu I women have more slender and less mustered the courage to have longer and curvaceous bodies than women in the deeper conversations with some West. These slender women think storeowners. Right after I entered this wearing tight clothes would reveal their area, the owner of the first store on the lack of plumpness and curves. For them, right invited me to come in. We the combination of a very loose pullover introduced ourselves to each other, and he and skinny pants/jeans can show less of told me that I could call him Henry their “unsatisfactory” (according to (almost every Taiwanese person has an Western standards) body curves, and English name). He was wearing a black create a balanced view of their body shape. T-shirt, a pair of tight jeans, and a pair of

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 136! glasses with big black frames, and this pursuing fashion, and creating a “beautiful” type of frame glasses is generally appearance. When I asked him what type considered to be part of the Korean of female’s appearance he personally fashion for both males and females. He preferred, he responded that Taiwanese showed me around the store, picking out guys today like girls who are more clothes that he felt would fit my small size “individualistic” (you gexing), with the and personal preference. He guessed connotation of independence and from the clothes that I was wearing at that maturity. It reminded me of my friend’s time—plain grey tank top with an orange brother’s preference for girls dressed in workout jacket outside and jean shorts— Korean fashion, who look sophisticated that I would prefer “comfortable clothes and professional, over those dressed like of casual styles.” I was impressed that the Japanese high-school girls. Furthermore, clothes he picked for me were exactly the he associated Japanese and Korean ones to which I would pay more attention. fashions with two different age groups: “If I asked him, “Why are you so good at you are a girl younger than twenty-two, quickly sensing your customer’s you could wear colorful, multi-patterned, preference?” He responded, “I used to and loose clothes of Japanese fashion, and work as a hair stylist, and was already very embody its cuteness and casualness. obsessed with clothes and styles back then. However, when you are above twenty-two Because you can see that I don’t have a or twenty-five, you would want to look fitting room in my store [which is true for ‘lightly mature’ in clothes of simple most of the stores in Wufenpu], I need to patterns and plain colors.” He also be able to help a customer make judgment suggested that this group of “lightly about the sizes of the customer and of the mature” females make more use of clothes, just using my eyes.” Korean fashion. When I asked him to show me Similarly, another informant of clothing of South Korean fashion, he told mine named Emily, a 24-year-old me that clothes authentically designed or Taiwanese girl who studied abroad in made in South Korea were very expensive. Canada for almost 10 years and now He picked out one slim and plain T-shirt works in a department store, made the and said, “This T-shirt is from South distinction between females that dress to Korea. It would be tight for you to fit in, look “girly and cute” and those that dress and you can see from this T-shirt that to look “lightly mature.” However, she clothes of Korean fashion are very did not believe it was necessarily due to demanding in terms of body shape age, but attributed the distinction to how a because of their small sizes.” In contrast, female felt about herself. In her case, she he described Japanese styles to be less considered herself to belong to the “cute oriented towards showing a mature female girl” category, and most of the clothes body’s curves and more towards that she wore and bought were brightly displaying a “cute” and “girly” character. colored and designed to fit her body What he said seemed to contradict what loosely. When describing her personal Yura, the South Korean television style, Emily used the popular term, entertainment program host, had said xiaoqingxin, which was coined by young about Korean fashion. I suspect that this people to refer to the style of freshness, indicates diversity within the category of purity and naiveté. Korean clothes styles. Later he commented on Taiwanese young females’ Paleness and slenderness growing passion for buying clothes,

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Young Taiwanese females, like were advertised to prevent one’s skin their counterparts in other parts of the from getting tanned were advertised with world, are working hard to pursue pictures of mostly Korean female beautiful images that include a good- celebrities who had pale faces. looking face and the ideal slender body The ideal beautiful woman exalted figure. When I asked both young females by society not only has pale skin but also a and males about prevalent beauty slender body shape. During my stay, a standards—what a beautiful Taiwanese television news program reported that young woman should look like—I got when some men saw only the back of a answers that repeated the words “pale” random female passerby with a very and “slender.” My informants often “hot”—slender and curvy body figure—in mentioned a popular Mandarin Chinese a metro station, they extensively searched saying: “looking pale rules out every online in order to find out who she was. possibility of looking ugly” (yi baizhe After finding her through collective baichou). Observing Taiwanese girls on efforts, netizens used words like “goddess” Taipei’s streets, I was very impressed by (nüshen) to describe her “perfect” body young Taiwanese females’ efforts to shape. Some male netizens expressed maintain pale skin. Despite the fact that their wish to date girls with such a body each of the girls walking on the streets shape, and some female netizens revealed was already holding an umbrella to their jealousy of her body. Seven-Eleven prevent her skin from sunshine, most of stores also sell weight-control pills that them were wearing tops with long sleeves help women achieve or maintain a slender and pants or leggings. I once asked one body, many of which are pills taken before of my Taiwanese female friends, a girl in or after meals or that directly replace her early twenties working in a meals. I found on the packages of these department store, why young Taiwanese products that some explicitly advertise females would want to wear long-sleeved their effects to be able to help females clothing and pants/leggings when the lose weight quickly, while others describe temperature outside was almost 100 their effects as “facilitating metabolism.” degrees Fahrenheit. Without hesitation, In order to demonstrate how effective she stated matter-of-factly, “You just these products are in terms of maintaining don’t look nice when you get tanned.” a slender figure, pictures of female Compared to South Korea, where the celebrities with the ideal slender body average temperature is lower and sunshine shape are shown on packages of these is less intense in the summer, girls in products. These pictures always visually tropical areas such as Taipei need to make emphasized celebrities’ small faces and more of an effort to maintain pale skin curvy bodies with narrow waist and legs. under the sun. Television programs and boards in metro Young Taiwanese women can easily stations show many advertisements of get access to products that help them those skincare and weight-control maintain pale skin in convenience stores, products. In a funny television the most popular being Seven-Eleven advertisement video for a weight-control stores. The products that sold out very product, a young woman urged the quickly in Seven-Eleven stores during my audience to be cautious of getting fat, stay included skincare products that help because one’s significant other would turn girls stay pale. Many of those products to thinner women if one did not keep a are Korean, or, to a lesser extent, Japanese good body shape. brands. All of the skincare products that

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The Korean Wave has not only conversation with Dennis in a gym in brought Korean-style clothing to Taipei, Taipei. When I saw a girl biking very hard but has also strengthened the society’s there, probably for over an hour, I told obsession with slender women, which was Dennis that I was very impressed by her. not as powerful when Japanese fashion Dennis replied, “Yes she is very was dominant. Magazines featuring impressive. However, this is very Korean fashion reinforce the beauty common among young Taiwanese females standards of looking slender among young now. They work out so hard, especially Taiwanese females, which coincides with after having a big meal, because they want the impression of South Korean females’ to keep slender.” own obsession. For example, I once noticed a fashion magazine with illustrated Plastic surgery and facial reconstruction articles teaching how to work out in order to make a female’s legs five centimeters Under the sway of the “Korean narrower, how to use certain types of Wave”, cultural exports—which include makeup techniques to make one’s face Korean television dramas, popular music, look smaller, and how to dress in order to and fashion industries such as clothing look slender. Dennis noted that a lot of and beauty-products—highlight many young Taiwanese women value their beautiful Korean female celebrities, the figures so much that they work out after majority of whom have undergone plastic every big meal to prevent gaining weight: surgery. The ongoing and fervent debate “Taiwanese girls with small and slender about those females getting plastic surgery figures look nice in Korean- and Japanese- in order to have the “perfect” face and style clothes.” When he said that, I was body has already extended from Asia to reminded of the comment of a Western countries such as the US. For storeowner in Wufenpu Fashion Area that example, the episode of This American Life Korean clothing/fashion is very that aired on January 4th, 2013, featured demanding in terms of female body observations by Julie Lurie who teaches shapes. The young Taiwanese woman in English in an all-girls high school in her mid-twenties working at the Gwangju, South Korea. Lurie reported administrative department at NTU stated that there is a full-length mirror and a at the end of my interview with her: “As scale on every floor of the school because long as a girl has a perfectly slender body the school principal wants all the girls to figure and a good-looking face, she will become skinny. She also reported that look nice no matter what she wears.” plastic surgery in Seoul is so common that Though at first sight I felt as if both almost one-in-five women have done it.liv Taiwanese males and females were deeply I noticed that there were many absorbed in constructing and reinforcing plastic surgery hospitals on the streets in the norms of paleness and slenderness, I Taipei, and several informants told me often heard complaints from my female that the number of plastic surgeries has informants. For example, a female owner been rising exponentially. Young of a clothing store in the night-market Taiwanese people, both male and female, near NTU even used the word “freaks” seem to be quite at ease talking about when she was telling me how she felt females getting plastic surgery in order to about the girls who were obsessed with achieve the “ideal” appearance or to maintaining pale skin and slender body sustain it despite aging. In Mainland figures, no matter how much effort it China (which is where I am from), people required. Her words reminded me of a can be judgmental and tend to tease

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 139! females who have had plastic surgery, gradually been taking over in Taiwan. The which some South Korean celebrities are increasing importation of these Korean known for. For example, the news in styles, intertwined with other aspects of Mainland China reported that some Korean popular culture such as television technology experts developed a game dramas and music, has set itself apart aiming to find differences in terms of from the preexisting Japanese influence facial characteristics among twenty with respect to female imagery. Both candidates of Miss Korea in 2013, all of Taiwanese males and females that I talked whom are suspected of having had plastic to in Taipei stereotypically related the surgery. Players acknowledged that Japanese influence among young without keen discernment, one could even Taiwanese females to the image of a “cute form an impression that all of those high-school girl,” while they related the candidates were the same person dressed Korean influence to the image of a more in different ways. mature, professional, sophisticated, and I did not sense that my Taiwanese elegant “lightly-mature lady.” informants were making fun of females How a female creates her physical who have had plastic surgeries, and appearance is influenced by not only Dennis even estimated that one-in-four popular beauty and fashion trends, but girls in Taipei has had plastic surgery. also by how she views her body and her However, when talking to female selfhood, which is in turn influenced by informants about plastic surgery, I sensed her age, education, profession, and frustration, because they felt the need to personality. The category of “lightly make judgments about their natural mature ladies” (qingshunü)—females from appearance and improve “unsatisfactory” their mid-twenties to mid-thirties who are parts of their body—such as the lack of a economically self-reliant and pursuing “double eyelid,” the size and shape of independence both in their professional their eyes, a flat nose, or a chubby face. and personal life—has become a more Plastic surgery, however, could help and more pronounced category of females obtain an ideal body shape/curve. femininity in Taipei. Femininity is culturally constructed, and comes not in ANALYSIS singular form but as a spectrum of diverse features and types. In Taipei, the In the context of Taipei, female beauty influences from both Japan and South and fashion is not only interesting in itself Korea on female beauty and fashion as a tool for females to create specific contribute to a variety of ways in which kinds of imagery, but also functions as a femininity is performed on the part of mirror reflecting the social norms that young women, and the Korean influence govern females’ physical attractiveness is gradually taking over the Japanese and the production of femininity. More influence. From my male informants, I importantly, dynamic beauty and fashion got the impression that the Japanese style trends influenced by foreign popular of cuteness is more “feminine” because it cultures, such as the Korean Wave, also is less threatening to male authority, display the interaction between the norms whereas the Korean style helps create a themselves and the adoption and refusal female image that is more independent of them by individual females. Though and has more agency and which therefore the Japanese style of cuteness started to could be more threatening to male emerge in Taipei in the early 1990s, authority. Even though “less feminine” is Korean styles of beauty and fashion have often used by my informants to compare

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 140! the Korean fashion embodied by “lightly are now comparing themselves to the kind mature ladies” to Japanese “cuteness,” I of physically attractive female highlighted think the Korean style helps “lightly by Korean popular culture: for example, a mature ladies” perform a type of pale and slender young woman dressed femininity that is distinctively associated stylishly in Korean fashion. with professionalism, sophistication, and Slenderness gets emphasized more self-reliance. This type of femininity is and more as Korean influence increases, distinguished, by both my male and because the clothing “made in Korea” or female informants, from the stereotypical “designed in Korea” that one can find in Japanese “cuteness”— the image of shopping areas in Taipei are either of females as infantile, darling, and innocent. smaller sizes or their styles implicitly With this recent gradual shift from necessitate a slender body. Also, when Japanese to Korean female fashion, many young Taiwanese women see especially among “lightly mature ladies,” slender bodies with narrow waists and legs young Taiwanese females in Taipei now in Korean television dramas, music videos, seem to have more latitude to shape their and fashion magazines, they tend to physical attractiveness, and have different compare this “ideal” female body to her choices about how to be “female” and own. They may feel compelled to get how to enact “femininity.” This social closer to this “perfect” body and therefore trend influenced by transnational cultural start to calculate the calories in their diets, flow coincides with the rise of the concept work out in a gym more often, and take of individuality (gexing) that gets medicines or pills that help with weight recognized and acknowledged by both loss. Due to the influence of both males and females. Based on each clothing fashion and of media celebrities, individual female’s agency—the cultural many young Taiwanese females feel that capacity to act—culturally constructed they must meet certain standards of individuality (gexing) is constantly physical attractiveness in order to look reinforced and recreated through dress good when they are pursuing certain types and the crafting of different types of of fashion. Slenderness already governs imagery. female physical attractiveness and the At the same time, Korean fashion definition of a perfect female body in and female imagery promoted by media Taipei, and the Korean influence has exports, such as television dramas and pushed this standard one step further in popular music, are restricting Taiwanese shaping female imagery among Taiwanese females’ understanding and interpretation women. of what an attractive female looks like and Moreover, the trend of plastic how she should be dressed. What comes surgery has come to Taipei with the with Korean fashion as well as the image Korean Wave, and young females who see of beautiful females in Korean television themselves as unable to meet standards of dramas and popular music is a culturally the ideal beautiful face and body (or constructed system of standards that maintain them as they age) are turning to defines female production of a particular this type of facial and body reconstruction. kind of physical attractiveness. Korean Since it is getting more and more popular, fashion did not originally bring those Taiwanese are becoming more standards to Taipei, but the Korean Wave accustomed to the “artificial faces and has reinforced them. To perform the type bodies” either of South Korean female of femininity that belongs to “lightly celebrities or of young Taiwanese females mature ladies,” young Taiwanese females around them.

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CONCLUSION APPENDIX

Even though Korean styles of beauty and Figure 1 fashion give young Taiwanese females more freedom to create physical variations, they more importantly strengthen social norms of a distinct type of female physical attractiveness. Just like girls in Western societies approach the standards of female physical attractiveness by looking at Barbie Dolls, young Taiwanese females today turn to “beautiful” Korean female celebrities in media in order to learn how they are supposed to look. When they are enjoying shopping for Korean-style clothing, they are also striving for a Figure 2 “perfect” body that looks good in those clothes. The Korean style promotes the image of an independent, mature, and professional “lightly mature lady” that seems to have more agency than that of a “cute high-school girl” promoted by the Japanese influence. However, because they feel compelled to abide by the social norms coming with the Korean style of beauty and fashion, young Taiwanese females are still restricted in the extent to which they can create their own appearance, pursue physical attractiveness, Figure 3 construct their femininity, and express their individuality.

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Figure 4 Figure 6

“elegant”

Figure 7 Figure 5

“tomboy-like/less feminine” “professional/office lady” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! i Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion xxv Morgan, 104. of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 2. xxvi Morgan, 115. ii Butler, 45. xxvii Morgan, 123. iii Butler, 8. xxviii Miejeong Han, “Body Image Dissatisfaction and iv Butler, 20. Eating Disturbance among Korean College Female Students: Relationships to Media Exposure, Upward v Butler, 12. Comparison, and Perceived Reality,” in The Politics of Women’s Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior, ed. vi Butler, 45. Rose Weitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 134. vii Butler, 195. xxix Han, 139. viii Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, 2nd Vintage ed. (New York: Vintage Books, xxx Koichi Iwabuchi, Recentering Globalization: Popular 1995), 136. Culture and Japanese Transnationalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 4. ix Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (Berkeley: University of California xxxi Iwabuchi, 10. Press, 1993), 33. x Bordo, 35. xxxii Iwabuchi, 11. xi Bordo, 198. 33 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of xii Bordo, 141. Minnesota Press, 1996). xiii Bordo, 143. xxxiv Iwabuchi, 50. xiv Bordo, 166. xxxv Iwabuchi, 72. xv Bordo, 164. xxxvi Iwabuchi, 198. xvi Bordo, 205. xxxvii Sharon Kinsella, “Cuties in Japan.” in Women, Media, and Consumption In Japan. Ed xvii Bordo, 207. by Lise Skov and Brian Moeran. 220-254, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995), 220. xviii Bordo, 208. xxxviii Mark Ravina, Southeast Review of Asian Studies: a xix Rose Weitz, ed. , The Politics of Women’s Bodies: Publication of the Southeast Conference (Association for Asian Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior, 2nd ed. (New York: Studies, 2009), 4. Oxford University Press, 2003), 1. xxxix Eun-Young Jung, “Transnational Korea: A Critical xx Sandra Bartky, “Foucault, Femininity, and the Assessment of the Korean Wave in Asia and the United Modernization of Patriarchal Power,” in The Politics of States” (paper presented at the 48th Annual meeting of Women’s Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior, ed. the Southeast Conference of Asian Studies, 2009). Rose Weitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 50. xl Jung, “Transnational Korea. ” xxi Bartky, 52. xli Jung, “Transnational Korea. ” xxii Bartky, 53. xlii Jung, “Transnational Korea. ” xxiii Weitz, 123. xliii Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi, East Asian Popular Culture: Analyzing the Korean Wave (Hong Kong: xxiv Kathryn Morgan, “Women and the Knife: Cosmetic Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 108. Surgery and the Colonization of Women’s Bodies,” in The Politics of Women’s Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and xliv Chua and Iwabuchi, 105. Behavior, ed. Rose Weitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 103. xlv Chua and Iwabuchi, 108.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xlvi Chua and Iwabuchi, 123. 156, edited by Rose Weitz. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. xlvii Mark James Russell, Pop Goes Korea: Behind the Iwabuchi, Koichi. Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture Revolution In Movies, Music, and Internet Culture (Berkeley, and Japanese Transnationalism. Durham: Duke CA: Stone Bridge Press, 2008), vi. University Press, 2002. Jung, Eun-Young. “Transnational Korea: A Critical xlviii Russell, xi. Assessment of the Korean Wave in Asia and the United States. ” Paper presented at the xlix Russell, xiv. 48th Annual meeting of the Southeast Conference of Asian Studies, Atlanta, GA, l Russell, 102. 2009. “Korean Wave.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. li Russell, 117. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. 8 Nov 2013. Web. 12 Nov 2013. lii Russell, 131-132. Morgan, Kathryn. “Women and the Knife: Cosmetic Surgery and the Colonization of Women’s liii “Yura Bodies. ” In The Politics of Women’s Bodies: 100%”. VogueFashion. 22 June Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior, 103-123, 2012. Web. 10 June 2013. edited by Rose Weitz. New York: Oxford Ravina, Mark. Southeast Review of Asian Studies: a Publication of the Southeast Conference. liv “Self-improvement Kick,” narrated by Julie Lurie. Association for Asian Studies, 2009. This American Life. Chicago Russell, Mark James. Pop Goes Korea: Behind the Revolution Public Media. 4 Jan 2013. In Movies, Music, and Internet Culture. Berkeley, “Self-improvement Kick. ” This American Life. Chicago Public Media. 4 Jan 2013. Radio Skov, Lise, and Brian Moeran. Women, Media, and Appadurai, Arjun. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions Consumption In Japan. Honolulu: University of of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995. Minnesota Press, 1996. Weitz, Rose, ed. The Politics of Women's Bodies: Sexuality, Bordo, Susan. Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Appearance, & Behavior. 2nd ed. New York: Culture, and the Body. Berkeley, CA: University Oxford University Press, 2003. of California Press, 1993. ——. “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion Patriarchal Power. ” In The Politics of Women’s of Identity. New York: Routledge, 1990. Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior, 43-63, Chen Nini. “Hanguo meinü zhuchiren Yura dai ni edited by Rose Weitz. New York: Oxford guang Taibei Hanliu xiaodian bianshen 100% University Press, 2003. Hanxi nühai chuanda shizhan” VogueFashion. 22 June 2012. Web. 10 June 2013. Chua Beng Huat, and Koichi Iwabuchi. East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison. 2nd Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. Han, Miejeong. “Body Image Dissatisfaction and Eating Disturbance among Korean College Female Students: Relationships to Media Exposure, Upward Comparison, and Perceived Reality. ” In The Politics of Women’s Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Behavior, 134-

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CHINA’S GLOBAL ANIMATION AMBITIONS: Cultural Flows and Soft Power in East Asia Rick Marshall Royal Roads University

ABSTRACT power bears significance for China’s ambitions. iv Successful media flows Successes in cross-cultural media flows in throughout the East Asian region, with the East Asian culture market have content originating in Japan, South Korea, provided soft power resources for Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, have producing nations, a model that can translated into soft power resources for inform China’s ambitions. Despite large their host countries.v Otmazgin contends government investments and policies that these nations have developed directed to support China’s animation production and distribution models that industry, returns have been minimal. An have mutually benefited the media independent route in building economic industries for participating states, an hard power has proven successful, but this entrepreneurial-driven model that has model has yet to be successful in the effectively constituted the East/Southeast cross-cultural dissemination of cultural Asian culture market.vi The author argues goods as a potential soft power resource. that the dissemination of shared images and ideas creates like-mindedness in those INTRODUCTION consuming the cultural goods. vii As entrepreneurs instill cultural products The global animation industry is a “with certain images, motifs, and feelings multi-billion dollar cultural enterprise, and associated with ‘Asia,’” they effectively China has stated intentions and initiated create a pan-Asian identity across the policy toward establishing its presence in region,viii establishing a primary market in this creative economy. i Through the which China can target its cultural establishment of a domestic production commodities. base that can produce proprietary cultural Scholars contend that a number of content, China’s animation ambitions factors limit China’s equitable (situated in their overall culture industry participation in this transnational flow of reforms) serve the purpose of supporting cultural commodities in East Asia.ix Keane national cohesion in resistance to cultural identifies that in order to protect and globalization, as well as participating in promote its nationalist interest and the lucrative global animation market. ii identity, socialist China has long- Successes garnered through these reforms established state controls and indigenous factor in the development of China’s practices in its cultural production and international influence through soft distribution industries. x These control power.iii structures now inhibit China’s ability to Due to China’s historic position of participate equitably in the transnational isolationism and its contemporary desire culture flows in East Asia. Using a to reengage with the world economically systematic literature review as its method, through the production and export of this study seeks to discover how soft cultural products, the concept of soft power successes in the East Asian culture

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 146! market can inform China’s global from its ability to influence other states animation ambitions. through attraction. Intangible soft power resources, such as “national cohesion, REVIEWING THE LITERATURE culture, ideology and influence on international institutions,”xiv are the assets Within the East Asian region, that facilitate this influence-by-attraction.xv Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Both hard and soft powers have the ability Korea exemplify how nation branding and to influence, and some resources that are cultural export successes can provide soft available and can be wielded by countries power resources for host nations.xi This can produce both versions of power. xvi understanding can inform China’s global For example, economic strength produces animation ambitions as situated in its the ability to coerce others through culture industry reforms and its greater payments, as well as providing a positive soft power initiative. This investigation model that others want to emulate.xvii Nye situates itself in the scholarship by and Wang’s conception of a nation’s soft organizing an initial review of literature power is comprised of three primary exploring these phenomena into five resources: its culture (and the themes. Scholarly discourse on soft power attractiveness of this to others), its provides context in which to situate political values (how it lives up to these), China’s soft power: goals, strategies, and and its foreign policy (where the nation is measures. East Asian culture markets and soft viewed as a legitimate and moral power positions the regions successful authority).xviii As soft power is dependent flows of cultural products for comparison upon a nation’s image and reputation, with China’s creative culture industry. Lastly, Barr posits that “nation branding” (with East Asian animation industry identifies “brand” understood as a defined identity factors that have contributed to the and reputation composed of persons, success of Japanese anime in both the symbols, colours, and slogans) leverages regional and global animation markets, intellectual property to attract buyers for providing a juxtaposition of a historical exports, build tourism, and support and contemporary view of China’s national unity at home.xix This literature animation industry. identifies the elements that constitute soft power for a nation and the benefit derived SCHOLARLY DISCOURSE ON SOFT from these resources. POWER Despite soft power’s ability to Nye and Wang broadly define provide a nation with influence through power as, “the ability to affect others to attraction, scholars Huang and Ding, obtain the outcome one wants.” xii They Holyk, Wang and Lu, and Nye and Wang contend that threatening coercion, identify the difficulty in measuring the offering inducements or payments, or effects and outcomes of soft power.xx Nye setting and promoting an example that and Wang contend that calculating results persuades others to want what one wants from polls and focus groups that ask if are the three means by which power is one group likes another measure whether wielded in order to influence others.xiii In an asset is a soft power resource or not.xxi world politics, categorizing these three However, Huang and Ding argue that the conditions under the headings of “hard intangible qualities of culture, ideology, power” and “soft power” separates a and institutions are difficult to measure nation’s military and economic influence compared to the tangible economic and

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 147! military resources of hard power.xxii Holyk modernization construction.” xxix These attributes this immeasurability to reliance official statements recognize the dual on general questions of influence or objectives of soft power in China: for feeling in soft power surveys rather than national cohesion through cultural empirical findings.xxiii Furthermore, Wang sovereignty, and for its significance for and Lu argue that the link between a China’s overall strength within the nation’s attractiveness and its ability to international arena.xxx influence or persuade others in international relations is a leap to begin Wang and Lu posit that China’s with.xxiv As an example, the authors cite embrace and extension of Nye’s soft power concept addresses fundamental Nye in identifying that Japan’s cultural xxxi power in Asia has not resulted in political concerns faced by China in recent years. influence regionally or globally, and that These concerns are: (1) China is interested American music and fashion are popular in what makes a great power, in relating in the Middle East where there is also a the decline of the Soviet Union to a loss strong hostility toward American of soft power, and in considering how politics. xxv This understanding of Nye’s America maintains its global position due xxxii conception of soft power; a nation’s to its soft power resources. (2) The ability to influence others through the obsolescence of major wars places more attraction of its culture, political values, importance on soft power, as nations and foreign policy, provides a context in must now compete in beliefs, institutions, which to view China’s unique approach to cultural attraction, and human resources, xxxiii hard and soft power. rather than military might. (3) China’s rapid economic rise generates CHINA’S SOFT POWER: GOALS, international concern and fears as to how STRATEGIES, AND MEASURES China will wield this power, and soft power is seen as a path to China’s China has declared its desire to “peaceful rise.”xxxiv (4) A Chinese cultural develop soft power resources to rise can defend against perceived complement its accumulated hard power, American cultural imperialism represented by its rapid economic rise of domestically and regionally, signified in the past two decades.xxvi Nye and Wang the attention paid by Taiwan, South and Su point to Chinese President Hu Korea, and Japan to Western culture and Jintao’s October 15, 2007 keynote speech policy.xxxv To facilitate this peaceful rise, to the 17th National Congress of the China extends Nye’s “America-centric” Communist Party of China as a marker of soft power concept to a “soft power this official position.xxvii In this speech, Hu theory more acclimated to China’s declares, “the Party must ‘enhance culture situation,” xxxvi a conception that shapes as part of the soft power of our country to both foreign and domestic policies. xxxvii better guarantee the people’s basic cultural Cho and Jeong argue that China’s soft rights and interests.’”xxviii Further, Huang power prospects are dependent upon and Ding cite the Ministry of Foreign three resources: the Chinese development Affairs of the PRC’s pronouncement that model (the “Beijing Consensus”), foreign China’s soft power goals are to preserve policy (peaceful rise/peaceful sovereignty, independence, territorial development theories), and the integrity, and to “create a favorable exploitation of traditional Chinese culture international environment for China’s and civilization.xxxviii The following section reform and opening up and

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 148! will discuss these three resources soft power resource is in its cultural individually. traditions. xlvii Its language, literature, philosophy, medicine, art, architecture, “Beijing Consensus,” the title of a cuisine, and martial arts represent a major report authored by Joshua Cooper Ramo world civilization with unique in 2004, distinguishes China’s unique characteristics,xlviii a culture which can be economic and political development utilized to increase China’s soft power “by model (authoritarian government plus a creating common, imagined identities and market economy) from the liberal values for Asians.” xlix In promoting its democratic model (market economics) of culture, China has established 24-hour xxxix the “Washington Consensus.” radio and television stations broadcasting Through tripling its GDP over the past 30 l xl to Southeast Asia, and Chinese Radio years, China’s economic model has International broadcasts in English 24- proven attractive to governments and hours a day. li China has taken steps to populations of developing nations in the xli attract international students, and their Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. enrollment has tripled in the past decade China’s economic strength provides a from 36,000 to 110,000.lii China has also hard power resource in the ability to promoted Chinese language studies coerce others through payments, and it abroad.liii In efforts to manage its identity, provides a soft power resource in the it has undertaken a number of branding attractiveness of their successful economic exercises, such as the 2010 Shanghai model. Expo, the production of promotional films,liv and the successfully host of the In foreign policy, China has 2008 Summer Olympic Games. lv In operationalized its soft power strategy support of its peaceful rise/peaceful through active membership in regional development theories, China has re- and global institutions and organizations established “…Confucianism as an such as the Association of Southeast inherently Chinese value and vision.” lvi Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the East Confucianism and its values have Asia Summit.xlii These efforts complement universal meaning in East Asia, China’s acceptance in the World Trade comparable to Western human rights and Organization in 2001.xliii In an effort to democracy. lvii To this end, China has build global goodwill and influence established 155 Confucian Institutes and through foreign policy, China has forgiven classrooms in 53 countries as of 2007.lviii $1 billion in debts.xliv Additionally, it has These examples represent China’s efforts contributed 3,000 troops to United in promoting Chinese culture as a pillar of Nations peacekeeping operations, has their external soft power strategy. aided non-proliferation diplomacy xlv through hosting talks with North Korea, As the literature in the opening of and settled territorial disputes with its this section identifies, China’s soft power xlvi Russian and Vietnamese neighbors. ambitions also incorporate internal These efforts support China’s peaceful strategies to promote national cohesion. rise claims, as they represent an external Wang and Lu argue that a country can manifestation of their soft power gain international status only when the discourse. population backs its government, and this can only occur when the government Chinese academics and policy satisfies the people’s needs in terms of analysts stress that China’s most valuable social justice and equality. lix

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Operationalizing this internal directive, increasing soft power via popular China has strategized and implemented culture.lxvii various policies to achieve its domestic soft power goals. Since 2002, under the As the literature cited in this slogan “putting people first” (yi ren wei section identifies, China has taken ben), China has launched a series of purposeful steps in the development of its domestic economic and socio-political soft power resources to complement the programs that include anti-corruption hard power gains realized through its campaigns, support for farmers, legal and unique economic development model. It equal status for migrant workers in major further identifies China’s efforts in cities, and dealing with education, public developing and promoting its culture and health, and environmental issues in cultural heritage as a pillar of its soft government policy.lx In the cultural sector, power strategy. The following section the government acknowledges culture as a reviews soft power successes realized in “source of national cohesion, creativity, the East Asian culture markets as a and overall national strength.”lxi In 2002, framework from which to compare the 16th National Congress formally China’s culture industries. acknowledged “the market value and the EAST ASIAN CULTURE MARKETS cultural industrial role of the film sector,” AND SOFT POWER which has led to a dramatic transformation in China’s film industry.lxii Of key importance in the analysis Although scholars have noted the of China’s ambition to participate in the difficulty in measuring soft power global and regional cultural trade market success,lxiii studies point to survey results through animation is the role “soft indicating China’s soft power strategies power” plays in the dissemination and are improving its image internationally. local appropriation of cultural goods. Yu, Huang and Ding cite a BBC poll in which Takata, and Dryland contend that 14 out of 22 countries surveyed held a “…cultural products have become a form positive view of China’s influence in the of ‘soft power’ that enables nations to world, and that no country, including improve their image on the world lxviii Western democracies, had a majority stage,” and point to Japan’s use of negative view of China’s influence.lxiv Cho manga (Japanese comic books) and anime and Jeong point to further survey results (Japanese animated cartoons) “as novel indicating a “palpable improvement of instruments of global outreach and lxix China’s image in the world,” and posit appeal” in its cultural diplomacy efforts. that China’s rapid economic growth and Although Lukacs argues that its “good neighbor” policies aimed at fragmentation in local Asian media easing concerns in the region are two markets factors into the rise of Japan’s lxx dominant factors supporting China’s soft cultural exports, it does not negate the power rise. lxv Nye and Wang point to popularity of Japanese cultural products in Chinese novelist Gao Xingjian’s Nobel the East/Southeast Asian region, Prize for Literature, Ang Lee’s film, throughout which US $40 million in lxxi Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, becoming Japanese television content is exported. the highest grossing non-English film and Nakano identifies Taiwan as the biggest winning an Academy Award in 2000,lxvi foreign consumer of Japanese popular and 17 million tourists visiting China in culture, where five of 70 cable channels 2008, to further exemplify China’s are dedicated to Japanese dramas and

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 150! variety shows.lxxii These figures show the commodification, but also the primary popularity of Japanese cultural products in market in which China can export its East Asia. Their production and culture products. distribution model has informed other nations that strive for economic and soft CHINA’S CREATIVE CULTURE power benefits associated with the export INDUSTRY of cultural products. Tong contends that along with The promotion of Chinese culture Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, through the production and export of its and Singapore have initiated strategies in creative industry products, such as those support and promotion of their creative of the animation sector, can provide industries, which have effectively China with potential soft power resources, constituted a creative economy within the serving both its domestic and East Asian region. lxxiii In explaining this international objectives. However, Keane phenomenon, Otmazgin links identifies a number of factors in China’s entrepreneurship with the production and creative culture industry that hinder dissemination of East Asian popular progress in achieving these goals. China is culture in that, entrepreneurial vision less insulated from global competition in transforms the local cultural markets by its media and culture industries since its connecting trans-regional production 2001 entry to the World Trade systems and has the unintentional result of Organization and the opening of its stimulating feelings of “Asian” sameness markets, which has engendered what across the region.lxxiv The entrepreneurial Keane describes as a “cultural trade commodification of popular culture molds deficit,”lxxviii meaning that China imports the ways in which people perceive their more media content than it exports. The own culture and provides a context for a author describes three historical, systems- regional self-identity. lxxv Jin attributes level characteristics that limited China’s Korean success in exporting its television ability to create innovative content as drama, film, and pop music commodities “structure, dynamics, and performance.” lxxix throughout East and Southeast Asia to Structure refers to the division of labor and this cultural similarity.lxxvi He points to the administrative boundaries.lxxx People were regional success of Korea’s television appointed to jobs because a position drama series To See You Again and Again needed filling, not based on skills, by (depicting the stories of three generations bureaucrats far removed from the living under one roof), as an example of process.lxxxi Adding to this was structural Korean producers tapping into cross- duplication, in which models of cultural culturally relatable Asian themes.lxxvii and media production were duplicated in This literature identifies that the numerous provinces. For example, each success of Japanese and Korean cultural province had its own propaganda exports has not only produced economic department, state administrators, and and soft power benefits for their host regulatory authorities, all guided by a nations, but has effectively constituted an central body. lxxxii These structural Asian market in which to distribute their restrictions affected the dynamics of products. This understanding can inform innovation because companies were China as it reforms its creative culture unable to compete across organizational industry as a pillar of its soft power boundaries or into different media, and ambitions, as it identifies not only a “fragmented authoritarianism” led to successful regional model of cultural over-regulation and confusion. lxxxiii The

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 151! planned system’s structure therefore had a as a coarse nation in cultural and negative effect on performance, as content democratic terms because of its followed state directives with little propensity to copy rather than innovate, attention paid to economic efficiency, and its blatant intellectual property rights sales, ratings, or audience satisfaction.lxxxiv violations.xcii However, Iwabuchi believes The legacy of these restraints in China is a that these perceptions can change, as he media and culture industry that did not argues they did with South Korea, if know how to be competitive, how to China can adapt to globalized formats, break out of the established command and “[work] more collaboratively with system, or how to exploit value in creating transnational media and cultural innovative content. lxxxv However, Ooi industries.”xciii points to Singapore as an example of a nation effectively promoting its creative An understanding of the factors economy while maintaining tight political contributing to successful media flows and social control. lxxxvi Although across East Asia illuminates the limitations democracy is most often a prerequisite to in China’s creative culture industries. The the establishment of open, creative preceding literature reveals that China’s environments, Singaporean authorities embedded control structure precludes maintain limits on the freedom of equitable participation in the East Asian expression within political, ethnic, and culture market. A deeper examination of religious realms, while supporting the the Asian animation industry and China’s development of its creative industries.lxxxvii role in it demonstrates how these Keane argues that competiveness in the systematic control structures restrict global culture economy will require innovation and the ability to create and change to China’s control structure.lxxxviii produce original content capable of Through market correction, control over competing in the international and piracy, and policy liberalization, China can domestic animation market. move from the currently perceived low- EAST ASIAN ANINATION value production model to one of high- INDUSTRY value.lxxxix

These systematic limitations Japanese anime, an abbreviation of xciv identified in China’s control structure the word ‘animation,’ accounts for 60 percent of the world’s animation within its culture industries are reflected in xcv its output of poorly envisioned cultural content and provides Japan and Asia content. In the multidirectional culture with what Schiller identifies as “an xcvi flows across East Asia, where mutual antidote to US cultural imperialism.” consumption, coproduction, and co- Gan distinguishes anime from Western promotion are common among Japan, animation by highlighting the following South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, characteristics: being based on manga China’s value in the chain is providing (Japanese comics); voiced with specific cheap labor for regional industries. xc mannerisms; using selective animation; Iwabuchi argues that, unlike Taiwan and using camera work to provide motion to South Korea, China has yet to master still drawings; employing specific character globalized styles, which limits the export design and facial conventions, and using xcvii value of their cultural commodities. xci storylines with long episodic narratives. Despite China’s developing economic Nakano contends that Asian children have power, Japanese mass media depict China grown up watching Japanese cartoons

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 152! more than American or local productions, lack of a perceptible “Japanese-ness” in and supports this claim by pointing out the anime style makes the characters more that 80 percent of animation aired on approachable for Western reception. Hong Kong’s four national broadcasters is Cooper-Chen identifies these stylistic produced in Japan. xcviii As with other features as non-Asian hair colours and big Japanese cultural exports, anime, and the eyes, features the manga pioneer, Osamu manga from which they derive, were Tezuka, based on the American designs of originally created almost exclusively for Betty Boop and cute characters from the domestic Japanese market.xcix Yet they Disney.cvii This transnational blending of found receptive audiences in other Asian styles can account for the cross-cultural societies. Yu, Takata, and Dryland point acceptance of Japanese anime in Western to cultural proximity (a term developed audiences. An understanding of Japanese and used by Straubhaar, 1991, and cited in anime’s production and reception with Yu et al. 2012) to explain the cross- international audiences provides a base cultural acceptance of anime in the from which to compare China’s animation region.c In this, they argue that East and industry. Southeast Asian audiences found “pleasure in the consumption of cultural China’s animation sector, situated products from culturally similar nations.”ci within its creative culture industry, Pokémon provides an example of this, contends with the systematic control where embedded Japanese values, such as structures that limit other media responsibility, empathy, cooperation, production forms. Wu’s 2009 study of obedience, and respect for elders, are also China’s animation history exposes the rooted in Chinese culture. cii Cultural effects overt ideology and state policy can proximity explains anime’s success with have on a creative industry. The author Asian audiences, but cannot account for examines how the nationalized form of the attraction for Western anime meishu (fine arts) animated film consumers. conceptualized and mediated the Chinese minzu style. cviii Minzu, in film studies Yoon and Malecki argue that scholarship, refers to China’s when media embeds content with globally ethnic/national style of animation, cix unfamiliar cultural codes, it is difficult for where “conceptualization connects with that content to tap into global markets.ciii socialist ideology and aesthetic escape.”cx However, the global acceptance of National policies dictated the linking of Japanese anime provides an example of a animation with Chinese classical painting national style that has succeeded with and folk art forms and furthermore international audiences. In the United defined animation primarily “as a didactic States alone, anime and offshoot paradigm with which to educate merchandising generate $4 billion children.” cxi Wu argues that the annually. civ Lu points to “de-politicized institutionalizing of ideological internationalization” in making anime consciousness and collective patriotism in palatable for Western audiences, a term Chinese animation shackled animators identifying the lack of specific cultural with an inherited convention for characteristics associated with Japanese decades. cxii Zhang criticizes Chinese anime. cv Iwabuchi argues that a cultural animation’s focus on children, as its product “must lose much of its original didactic intent alienates adolescent ‘cultural odor’ so as to be promoted in the audiences who “find the animation bereft international market.” cvi Therefore, the of dramatic artistry, ‘monotonous and

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 153! boring’…and lack[ing] a sense of METHODS modernity.” cxiii Furthermore, Yoon and Malecki point out that the emergence of This systematic literature review, CGI (computer-generated imagery) investigating how soft power successes in technology in lucrative animated features the East Asian culture market inform has raised the aesthetic standard of China’s global animation ambition, audience expectations and broadened borrows systems of meta-synthesis in audiences to include adults,cxiv an audience order to provide focus and systematic China’s restrictive policy effectively procedure to the review of the literature. excludes for Chinese animation producers. An exploration of both primary and secondary reports provides a Countering China’s concern that comprehensive review of scholarly foreign animation has negative effects on research related to this site of inquiry. its children, Donald argues that Chinese children are emerging as cosmopolitan, SITE-SPECIFIC TERMS demanding consumers: an audience able to maintain a local, national identity, but In the context of this systematic literature also competent in an internationalized review, a number of site-specific concepts media environment. cxv Therefore, a and terms require operationalizing. Soft challenge for China’s animation industry is power is the term coined by Joseph Nye, to create innovative content that appeases describing a nation’s ability to get “others state guidelines, can creatively compete in to want the same outcomes that you the East Asian regional market, and can want.”cxviii His theory, based on the power attract a domestic audience already of external influence in international internationalized due to the borderless diplomacy, rests on three primary nature of cultural flows. Chinese resources: a nation’s culture, its political children’s film scholar and scriptwriter values, and its foreign policy.cxix However, Qin Yuquan outlines six problematic areas China’s official position on soft power in contemporary children’s film in extends this definition to include an China. cxvi These are: (1) Chinese internal strategy designed to promote filmmakers are interested in the art of national cohesion.cxx As the dissemination film, not in children; (2) they make films of a nation’s culture is one pillar of soft to make money; (3) they make films to power, nation branding is a strategy express their own ideas on something in employed for the international promotion which children are not interested; (4) they of a state. In this, popular culture is do not respect their audience and think employed as a public relations tool they can make children happy by cheating endorsing a positive image of a nation.cxxi them. (5) The films’ settings are not In the context of this study, cultural appropriate for children, and (6) they globalization refers to the hybridization of emphasize “significance” in scripts rather cultures, as producers target international than plots and storylines, which tend to be audiences in the production of cultural too simple and not funny. The East Asian goods.cxxii In the global animation sector, production model of coproduction, joint anime is used to define the distinctive style venture, and division of labor supports of Japanese animation.cxxiii the internationalization of local audiences, as the diverse East Asian market itself DATA COLLECTION creates the demand for intercultural themes.cxvii

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Meta-synthesis seeks to understand and power resources, as seen in Hu Jintao’s synthesize prior research on a 2007 speech to the 17th National phenomenon.cxxiv Data collection for this Congress of the Chinese Communist study encompasses comprehensive Party. cxxvi Exceptions to the inclusion literature and archive searches through criteria of the past decade are Iwabuchi several online databases: Sage Journals (1998) and Iwabuchi (2002) because of the Online, Academic Search author’s contributions to knowledge Premier@Ebscohost, Oxford Journals, regarding the cross-cultural acceptance of and Taylor & Francis Online via the Royal Japanese popular culture in East Asia and Roads University library database. These globally. This understanding has bearing databases were used between February on China’s culture export ambitions, as and March 2013. Peer-reviewed academic Japan’s culture industry success has journals publishing research incorporated provided a model that others, such as in this study are: Chinese Journal of South Korea, have followed with similar Communication, Media, Culture & Society, success. Excluded are studies focusing on International Communication Gazette, Cinema soft power and culture industries outside Journal, International Journal of Cultural Policy, of East Asia, Western audience Japanese Studies, Asian Studies Review, and acceptance of Asian animation, and International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. aesthetic or sociological analyses of Keywords employed in the data search animated content, in order to keep the include ‘soft power’ or ‘cultural soft sample focused on the East Asian market power’ or ‘China soft power’ or ‘Asia soft and on the political economy of culture. power,’ and ‘animation’ or ‘China The themes identified above were broken animation’ or ‘anime,’ and ‘East Asia down into three sub-themes each culture market.’ A review of sources cited (identified below in the Results and in relevant published works identified Discussion section of this report), where further studies to consider, resulting in a data was further grouped and arranged on pool of 69 articles for consideration. A a chronological timeline in order to sample size of ten studies was determined understand the evolutionary aspects for analysis based upon studies following within the main themes. Grouping the a similar meta-synthesis methodology.cxxv studies by publication date was not a Identification of and arguments for significant factor due to the small sample inclusion of these ten studies appear in size, and the study’s narrow focus on East Table 1 in the appendix of this report. Asia. Similarly, grouping studies by method factored little in providing a CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION AND deeper understanding of the EXCLUSION phenomenon.

Inclusion criteria limited studies to those RESULTS AND DISCUSSION (1) investigating creative industries and transnational culture flows in East Asia, The process of deconstructing the and those (2) investigating China’s studies in this sample and reconstructing animation industry as situated in its the findings in a systematic manner has culture economy. These were further provided a deeper understanding of how limited to studies published in the past ten cultural exports in East Asia serve as a years to keep the analysis relevant to soft power resource for individual states. current discourse, and aware of China’s Although these resources are not official recognition of developing its soft necessarily transferable to international

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 155! political influence, they do facilitate the internationally, it becomes “thingified” branding of a nation as creative and (italics in original), and that “globalization attractive, which can provide economic has led to cultural entities spinning out of benefits, a sense of national pride, and control of their makers: they are added to, legitimacy in international diplomatic modified and innovated upon.”cxxviii Data relations. This understanding can serve as contend that, rather than local cultures’ a model through which to compare domination by foreign invasion, there is China’s animation initiatives as situated in local capacity to assimilate influence, its creative economy, and national soft which spurs innovation. cxxix Iwabuchi power goals. As China’s soft power argues that “cultural borrowing, ambitions mirror these outcomes appropriation, hybridization and (situating its culture as internationally indigenisation are…common practices in attractive in order to boost its creative the global cultural flow.” cxxx Iwabuchi economy, instill national pride, and claims further that the globalization of present the nation as legitimate on the cultures is facilitated by transnational global diplomatic stage), this synthesis media corporations disseminating content serves to answer how soft power to global markets, communication successes in the East Asia culture market technologies connecting the world-over, can inform China’s global animation the emergence of an affluent middle class ambition. in non-Western countries, and people moving about through migration and Data in the ten studies comprising tourism.cxxxi Huang points to three ways this research sample is coded under two that cultural products sell across national main themes: Media flows in East Asia, and borders: cultural transparency, cultural China’s animation industry as situated in its difference, and hybridization. cxxxii In culture economy. Both of these themes are cultural transparency, products targeting broken down into three sub-themes. world markets are generally not culturally Media flows in East Asia analyzes Japan’s specific, permitting audiences to project rise as a cultural power, South Korea’s their own values and beliefs into them. In success in appropriating the Japanese cultural difference, he identifies that model, and how popular culture success foreign distinctiveness is attractive as a transfers to soft power resources for part of the global “cultural supermarket,” producing states. China’s animation industry and in hybridization, foreign influences as situated in its cultural economy analyzes the are amalgamated into local cultural government’s policies and support for its products, or alternatively, imported goods culture industries, the outcomes of and services are tailored to a specific government support in China’s cultural market through a process known as sector, and the limitations affecting “glocalization” (global localization). desired outcomes in China’s culture Otmazgin asserts that, as Japanese, economy. Korean, Chinese, and American commodities disseminate across East MEDIA FLOWS IN EAST ASIA Asia, they represent the multi-directional

cultural confluence in the region. cxxxiii Some scholars situate the Huang points to a fondness for all things successful transnational dissemination of Japanese and Korean across East Asia as cultural goods within a globalization of an example of cultural globalization culture framework.cxxvii Keane argues that reflecting the convergence of tastes in as culture is disseminated and consumed media, signified by the buzz-phrases,

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“Japan-mania” and the “Korean Asian audiences derives from Japan wave.” cxxxiv This understanding of the providing a “competitive alternative to globalization of culture provides a American pop culture,”cxxxviii an alternative framework upon which to base the that offers East Asian audiences a following analysis of soft power successes “concrete and accessible model of what it in the East Asian culture market—an is like to be modern.”cxxxix Iwabuchi claims analysis informing China’s animation that the basic model for Japan’s popular industry ambitions as a part of their culture was American, where Japan comprehensive soft power strategy. “localized” (imitated and partly appropriated) Western influences “rather JAPAN’S RISE AS A CULTURAL than being dominated by American POWER products and colonized by America.” cxl Huang argues that efforts in constructing The data collected in this study’s a Japanese national identity, via the sample supports the claim of Japan’s domestication of Western culture, position as a cultural power in the East established the model on which Japan Asian region and beyond. Scholars based its culture production industry.cxli As contend that Japan is not only a successful Japanese cultural producers indigenized economic model of industry, recognized American culture in order to become for its marketed “hardware” products “interpreters of the West for Asia,” there (automobiles, electronics, and was an awareness that other East Asian telecommunication devices), but has also culture industries could similarly developed cultural power through the appropriate and localize Japanese cultural successful dissemination of its cultural products. cxlii Researchers identify this “software” forms (animation, comics and influence as the region’s indigenous characters, fashion, pop music, and culture industries appropriating and cxxxv television dramas). Otmazgin cites localizing the Japanese model.cxliii This tells 2005 figures from Japan’s Digital Content us that the power of Japanese popular Industries that identify Japan as the culture in East Asia reaches beyond the world’s second largest producer of popularity and sales of its products; it has culture, capturing 9.5 percent of the global shaped the region’s cultural market culture market, compared to the United through its overall influence. States at 41 percent, China at 1.6 percent, and South Korea at 1.2 percent. cxxxvi Otmazgin writes that the success Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and of Japanese popular culture in East Asia Industry reports that three Japanese through the 1990s “was driven by market companies (Sony, Nintendo, and Sega) forces, facilitated by the mechanism of dominate the world’s computer games commodifying and distributing culture, market, and Japan produces 65 percent of and invigorated by piracy.”cxliv The author the world’s animation series, with identifies that East Asian governments offshoot sales of licensed goods reaching recurrently banned or controlled the US $17 billion. cxxxvii These statistics importation of American and Japanese support claims of Japan’s cultural power, cultural products in an effort to resist and the following analysis identifies cultural imperialism, allegedly violent factors that contribute to this rise. content, and the potential of ideological threat, as well as to protect their domestic Otmazgin contends that the industries. cxlv However, protectionist popularity of Japanese culture with East policies did not hamper the flow of

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Japanese media in the region. This study’s appropriation of the Japanese television data provides an example of the role drama format, “‘a package of setting, cast, piracy played in Japan’s cultural export and music’ with a tragic story of successes, that is, others pirating Japanese unrequited love.”cliii Scholars contend that content to consume. Scholars identify Korea’s appropriation of the Japanese that, following Japan’s reestablishment of model has successfully attracted audiences diplomatic ties with China in 1972, cxlvi across East Asia, initiating what they Taiwan banned all Japanese music, identify as the “Korean wave.”cliv movies, and television programs until restrictions began lifting in 1993. cxlvii SOUTH KOREAN SUCCESS IN Otmazgin observes that South Korea had APPROPRIATING THE JAPANESE similar restrictions until the establishment MODEL of a four-stage opening-up-policy in Chua argues that, along with Japan 1998. cxlviii However, the author contends and China, South Korea has been striving that throughout these periods of to increase its regional soft power through restriction, Japanese cultural products the export of popular culture. clv Shim were widely available in both countries contends that in a market once dominated through pirate markets, distributed by Japanese and American cultural through street vendors, satellite products, a “Korean wave” has washed broadcasting, illegal cable, and karaoke over East and Southeast Asia as audiences bars.cxlix The outcome of this piracy was consume Korean TV dramas, movies, pop that, once restrictions lifted, a ready songs, and their associated celebrities.clvi market led to wider consumption of The author posits that media liberalization Japanese products. cl This example across the region, from the mid-1980s illustrates that, rather than negatively through the mid-1990s, facilitated the affecting Japan’s culture industry, piracy in emergence of a strengthened domestic the East Asian culture market facilitated Korean culture industry, as well as success the dissemination and appreciation of in the international dissemination of their Japanese media in the region. The impact media products. clvii Scholars differentiate of this dissemination went beyond simple between the roads to Japanese and consumer appreciation for Japanese media Korean success as, “Japan-mania [being] products, as Japanese entrepreneurs had initiated by the ardent consumers of established a successful production model receiving countries (Nakano, 2002), while that other producers in the region would the Korean wave was facilitated by the emulate. Korean state in order to boost its culture clviii Otmazgin observes that, as East industry (Ryoo, 2008).” Clearly, Asia presented expansion opportunities through the appropriation and for Japan’s cultural industries, Japanese indigenization of the Japanese model, collaborations with local East Asian media other regional producers can find success companies facilitated a knowledge transfer in their cultural production and the of Japanese-style cultural production and dissemination of their products. The marketing. cli Iwabuchi posits that, following section provides a deeper “because [Japanese cultural products] are analysis of South Korea’s cultural rise universally consumed, they are destined to informed through the Japanese model. be copied and indigenized outside of Huang contends that media Japan.” clii Ota (2004) provides South liberalization flooded the Korean market Korea as an example of this in its

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 158! with American products in the mid-1980s, and music industries, which are analyzed raising fears that Korea’s national culture in the following section. would be overrun in modernization. clix Data supporting this claim shows that Shim identifies the official mantra for Hollywood’s share of the local film Korea’s culture industry rejuvenation as clxvii market rose from 53 percent in 1987, to “learning from Hollywood.” However, 80 percent in 1994.clx Shim attributes this Huang argues that domestic and pan- imbalance to Korean audiences finding regional success in copying the Japanese local films “poorly made, boring and often formula for “trendy” or “idol” television maudlin,” as compared to Hollywood drama reveals how affected the industry clxviii products. clxi Data from the Korea Press was by Japanese media culture. As with Foundation shows that the Korean the successful dissemination of Japanese television industry was in equally dire media in the region, Shim claims that a straits due to channel expansion and blending of Western and Asian beliefs satellite broadcasting, reflected in the rise (such as family values) allowed Korean cultural products to tap into Asian of imported content from a monetary clxix volume of US $19.86 million in 1994 to sentiments. As an example of Korea’s $42.82 million in 1995. clxii To combat export success, Shim points to a 1997 these trends, scholars identify the Korean airing of the Korean drama What is Love government’s establishment of a Culture All About? on China Central Television Industry Bureau in 1994 to lure Station (CCTV), which proved so popular “corporate and investment capital into the that it was re-broadcast in 1998 to the second highest ratings ever in Chinese local film industry,” leading to major clxx Korean business groups, such as LG, television. Scholars observe that, since Samsung, Hyundai, and Daewoo then, a string of Korean television dramas expanding into the media sector. clxiii To have filled airtime across East and provide a legal basis for this governmental Southeast Asia as broadcasters feed support, Choe points to the Basic Law for audience demand for Korean idol dramas, the Cultural Industry Promotion, enacted programs that are cheaper to purchase in 1999, which allocated a budget of than Japanese or Hong Kong-produced clxxi $148.5 million to the task of supporting television drama. Shim argues that the and promoting Korea’s culture Korean music industry saw a similar industries.clxiv Shim acknowledges that the renaissance through media liberalization, large Korean companies folded their as Korean musicians hybridized global media operations following the economic styles, increasing a domestic interest that crisis of 1997, but suggests that the spread throughout East Asia via the industry had learned lessons in market regional music TV broadcaster, Channel clxxii research, production, distribution, and V. Macintyre notes that early “K-pop” exhibition. clxv He further argues that an music successes led to an “endless crop of influx of young talent from international imitation groups” that established Korea film schools, combined with more lenient as the second largest music market in censorship policies (artists could now Asia, with $300 million in album sales per clxxiii explore sensitive issues, such as North- year, as of 2002. Shim posits that South Korea relations or homosexuality), market liberalization freed the Korean led to a string of critically recognized and culture industries from public service, profitable films. clxvi This tide change in thereby allowing them to maximize profit Korea’s film industry led to similar by targeting the largest audiences possible initiatives in the development of its TV for their cultural commodities,

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 159! domestically, regionally, and globally.clxxiv disseminate positive images of their Clearly, the indigenization of international national cultures to East Asian audiences. styles and production models can inform Chua argues that a positive influence on China’s global animation ambitions as targeted foreign audiences is achievable situated in its cultural economy, and in through the attractiveness of one’s support of its soft power goals. An culture.clxxix However, Otmazgin suggests analysis of how Japanese and Korean that there are limitations in cultural export media successes translate to soft power success transferring to soft power resources follows. resources for diplomatic use, because market forces, not governments, control SUCCESS OF JAPANESE AND the creation and dissemination of cultural KOREAN POPULAR CULTURE AS products, and even when these products SOFT POWER RESOURCES carry messages of cultural values, they do not oblige consumers to accept these In identifying popular culture as a ideals. clxxx This tells us that nations can potential soft power resource, Otmazgin build soft power resources through the suggests that Nye’s theory illuminates dissemination of their cultural products, America’s ability not only to intimidate but foreign audiences must appreciate and persuade others via hard power these products in order to achieve this resources (military and economic desired outcome. This is an important strength), but to “entice, attract, and understanding that can inform China’s fascinate other countries and societies by soft power strategies. its mass culture and ideals.”clxxv In this, the author argues that culture is a means of The spread of Japanese popular public relations, where commercial culture in East Asia has arguably products carry and distribute values and reasserted Japan’s cultural superiority in beliefs, and if found attractive in foreign the region, and the acceptance of its consumption, become soft power animation and video games globally clxxvi resources for their producers. stimulates what Iwabuchi claims is a Otmazgin presents Hollywood as an “soft” nationalism in Japan: “a narcissistic example of American culture as a soft discourse celebrating the transnational power resource, as it “constantly extracts dissemination of Japanese ‘software,’ set artistic innovations, translating them into against technical ‘hardware.’” clxxxi As an accessible consumption products and clxxvii example, the author cites Japanese marketing them worldwide.” Huang scholars identifying young consumers of offers East Asia as another example, Pokémon in American markets regarding where a fondness for all things Japanese Japan as a “cool nation capable of and Korean, spawned by the popularity of producing such wonderful characters, these nations’ exported television idol imaginaries, and commodities.” clxxxii dramas, among other cultural However, Iwabuchi argues that the commodities, underscores “how popular “culturally odorless” nature of Japanese culture helps polish the image of a clxxviii animation and video games drives their nation.” As Hollywood provides soft universal appeal, and that this appreciation power resources for America through the does not necessarily equate to an dissemination of an attractive Western appreciation of Japanese lifestyle or ideas, culture to global markets, Japan and as there is little “Japaneseness” perceptible Korea derive soft power benefits from in them. clxxxiii By “culturally odorless,” their idol dramas, as these products also Iwabuchi refers to the “erasure of racial or

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 160! ethnic characteristics and any context that consumerist choice, not a conscientious would embed the characters in a particular attempt of coercion by the state.cxc The culture or country.” clxxxiv This data can author further posits that, “Japanese address China’s domestic goal of cultural products represent a group of developing national cohesion as a part of highly appreciated commodities which its soft power strategy, but further effectively disseminate new images of identifies that cultural attractiveness Japan,” providing East Asian youth with through the appreciation of media exports an alternative, contemporary view of does not necessarily equate to marked Japanese society and culture, without cultural influence on global audiences. generating authority, nor Japanese dominated “spheres of influence.”cxci As the dissemination of culture is a pillar of Nye’s conception of soft power, Data in this study’s sample relates and in light of Japan’s international media soft power resources, accumulated industry success through the 1990s, through Japan and Korea’s cultural Otmazgin identifies the Japanese industries, with statistics identifying their government’s recognition of cultural regional cultural attractiveness. Taiwan’s products as profitable exports, as well as Tourism Bureau reported that the number having the ability to boost Japan’s image of Taiwanese tourists to Japan rose from overseas, as contributions to the nation’s 498,565 in 1995, to 1,309,847 in 2006, and diplomacy.clxxxv Chua points out that in the in the same time frame, Taiwanese tourists early 2000s, recognition of Japan’s culture to Korea rose from 100,959 to 363,122.cxcii economy successes led to state financial Scholars point to trendy dramas, in part, and administrative support for the media encouraging these visits, as regional travel industry, aimed at keeping Japan’s global agencies package TV drama-themed group pop culture (anime, J-pop music, film tours to visit the shooting locations of the studios, game developers, and toy shows. cxciii This attractiveness is further producers) competitive. clxxxvi Otmazgin exemplified in Asians’ desire to learn the contends that the economic value of Korean language, where Sage (2005) cultural exports is the government’s reports that the Singaporean Inlingua priority, and the diplomatic benefits are School of Language witnessed a 60 complementary.clxxxvii Scholars suggest that percent increase in students learning prior to the 1990s, Japan’s government Korean from 2001 to 2003.cxciv held back from framing cultural export successes as “soft power” due to regional The data cited above provides memories of Japanese aggression during examples of cultural attractiveness World War II, and fears of stoking a transferring to soft power resources, but perception of Japanese cultural does not explain the process that achieves imperialism in the region.clxxxviii In arguing these results. Huang argues that “nation that Japan’s governmental support of its branding” (the promotion of a nation culture industries was a result of the through a planned marketing strategy) is commodities’ transnational success, and not only a profile-raising tactic of a host not a pre-planned strategy, Otmazgin nation, but is also a process where cultural writes that there was “no obvious influences are appropriated by receiving cxcv intention to disseminate subliminal nations as a pattern of consumption. In Japanese values or ideals through popular this, the author argues that Japanese-ness culture.”clxxxix The successful dissemination (and Korean-ness) is a transnational of these products was constituted through process, exemplified in the Taiwanese

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 161! consumption of Japanese and Korean Keane argues that China’s motivation cultural commodities.cxcvi In the Taiwanese rests on two prevailing concerns. First, example, scholars identify three steps in China’s integration into the World Trade this process: (1) trendy dramas promote Organization (WTO) in 2001 led to trans-Asian entertainment idols depicting worries of its culture industries being positive images of Japan and Korea. (2) overrun by transnational media giants Taiwanese media signify Japanese and such as Time Warner and News Korean cultures as stylish, commodifying Corporation. cxcix Second, China needed and feeding the audience’s obsession, and content to feed its expanded information (3), local businesses exploit this popularity and technology industries (China has ten through product packaging, promotion, million broadband subscribers, 70 million and advertising depicting positive images internet users, over 200 million cell phone of Japanese and Korean culture, thereby subscribers, and many million digital TV encouraging the craze for all things subscribers), and this content is currently Japanese and Korean. cxcvii Huang supplied by Hong Kong, Taiwan, and summarizes this data, contesting that the South Korea.cc This tells us that China’s dynamic interaction of the cultural policies motives in reforming its cultural sector of nation states, marketing strategies of align with its stated soft power goals: culture industries, and local appropriation building national cultural cohesion to supported by profit making in Taiwan’s resist the threat of media globalization, consumption of Japanese and Korean and an ability to compete economically in cultural products exemplifies how national the regional and global cultural markets. cultures transcend borders and creates a In support of these goals, China has hybrid form of consumption that does not instituted policy and provided support for result in cultural homogenization.cxcviii its culture industries, including its animation sector, described below. Numerous factors that constitute the establishment of East Asia’s culture GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND market, and the production models and SUPPORT FOR CHINA’S CULTURE practices that have facilitated the INDUSTRIES successful dissemination of cultural products in the region can be identified in Chua identifies China’s official call the above analysis. This data further to raise the nation’s cultural soft power relates how cultural attractiveness through the export of its popular culture represented in media export success products, and cites Li’s argument that transfers to soft power resources for the “China suffers from a general ‘deficit in cci producing states. This analysis provides a cultural trade.’” In addressing this base from which to compare China’s shortcoming, Keane reports that China’s animation industry ambitions, as situated government encourages its film industry in its culture economy and overall soft to be self-reliant and engage with the ccii power goals. economy. The author points to China’s 11th Five Year Economic Development CHINA’S ANIMATION INDUSTRY Plan, where focus shifted from AS SITUATED IN ITS CULTURE technological infrastructure to the ECONOMY generation of media content, by identifying China’s official efforts to In addressing the impetus for stimulate the domestic animation and film China’s reformation of its culture sector, sectors as a part of its soft power

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 162! strategy. cciii This shift has resulted in example in defense of their restrictive increasing critical acclaim and box office media policies, where limiting competition success for China’s film industry products, through government restrictions on triggering official calls for the television, imported foreign content supports an animation, and video games industries to official recognition of cultural industries follow suit.cciv as “wealth-creating” resources. ccxii However, Keane points out that in Scholars contend that China’s China’s case, over-protection and trump card in the global culture industry is censorship has effectively alienated its market size, with a potential base of 1.3 audiences. ccxiii Data identifying China’s ccv billion consumers. Chua writes that, in official policies in its cultural sector order to access this market, Chinese policy provide grounding upon which to frame obliges regional and global companies to its specific policies and support for its relocate or co-produce with local partners developing animation industry. in order to by-pass official obstacles, such as bureaucracy in the state-owned In 2006, China’s State Council industries, ideological content controls, announced its aim “to become a strong and import quotas.ccvi Chan argues that to world power of creation, development, limit competition for domestic producers, and production in the animation industry, and despite economic reforms and an and to develop the international market emphasis on openness, China’s while gradually occupying the main government maintains strict controls on domestic markets.” ccxiv This declaration media imports (books, newspapers, reflects China’s internal and external soft terrestrial television, satellite TV), and power goals, as it speaks to the desire of further, the government views television resisting external cultural influence in its as a tool “to cultivate socialist values and domestic market, as well as the goal of weed out bourgeois influences.” ccvii Ishii positioning China as a cultural power in suggests this data reflects the nationalistic the global animation marketplace. Fu and leaning in China’s media policy. ccviii Wang (2009) report that since 2006, However, Lee (1991) argues that China’s China’s government has invested large concern for the unidirectional nature of amounts of money in its animation sector cultural imports, or the fear of cultural “to boost the creation of original invasion, is unfounded, as empirical animation and development of domestic studies show that imports do not have so companies.” ccxv Keane identifies China’s marked an effect. ccix Rather than regard for animation as a new growth globalization weakening national culture industry, and to fast track this growth, and local knowledge, there is synergy both national and regional governments where internationals work with locals to support animation companies with derive mutual benefit.ccx Furthermore, as financial incentives, as well as provide noted in the example of Taiwan, Ishii resources for the construction of asserts that restrictive policies on cultural animation “bases” (organized clusters imports feed the piracy markets.ccxi This established in industrial parks, grounded data reveals China’s defensive stance in its in the industrial economy model).ccxvi Data media policy. This restrictive policy runs in this study suggests that the formation counter to the examples set in the open of animation bases facilitates innovation Western and Japanese media markets, but through intellectual networking and the is in line with Korean media policy. Ishii generation of original content, much in contends that China points to the Korean the manner that Silicon Valley and

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Hollywood represent hubs of innovation China’s animation industry infrastructure. in America.ccxvii Keane points out that the However, these successes can be partially grouping model pulls media and culture attributed to China’s restrictive media activity toward regional centres that policy. Ishii reports that in 2006, China’s support efficiencies through “network government banned all domestic consolidation, research and development broadcasters from airing foreign capacity, distribution management and animation during the prime-time hours of joint venture management,” ccxviii with a 5-8 PM in efforts to protect the goal of producing “national champions” development of domestic animation with the ability to challenge international production, and to counter the perceived media conglomerates. ccxix Keane argues negative effects of Japanese anime on that the grouping model is a “deliberate China’s youth (criticized for promoting attempt to refashion the Chinese violence and obscenity).ccxxv Ishii contends bureaucratic network…into a new quasi- that these control policies cannot be oligopoly that is informed by global justified simply by their economic effects business trends,”ccxx a model that Keane and that they reflect the nationalistic further argues facilitates supervision by requirements the government imparts on government officials. ccxxi The following the animation industry. ccxxvi The author section will discuss results of China’s acknowledges that these broadcast policies policy and support for its cultural have been effective in limiting foreign industries. animated content on television, as domestic productions constitute 70 OUTCOMES OF GOVERNMENT percent of all animation broadcast in SUPPORT FOR CHINA’S CULTURAL China.ccxxvii SECTOR Despite government investment Data in this study’s sample report and broadcast control policies, Ishii argues on early results of China’s strategies to that China has yet to achieve its intended boost its animation industry through results in the animation sector, as many financial incentives, the institution of Chinese consumers of animation remain animation bases, and restrictive content devoted fans of Japanese anime import policies. Ishii confirms the (downloaded or streamed online), and the establishment of 70 animation parks few domestic animated shows that have where more than 6,000 comic and been popular are primarily targeted at animation companies are primarily based, young children. ccxxviii Furthermore, ccxxii employing 200,000 workers. Wu government-dictated educational and reports that these efforts have increased patriotic themes in Chinese animation the production of animated content from have difficulty in attracting buyers in 46,000 minutes between 1993 and 2003 to export markets, as regional audiences ccxxiii 200,000 minutes in 2008. In addition, relate such pedagogy with socialism.ccxxix Ishii points out that, as of 2009, the Keane further argues that, despite the government has supported a number of large market, revenue generated from animation contests and festivals, as well as selling animation in China can be less than offering animation and cartooning majors 15 percent of production budgets, due to at 1,800 schools, including 447 the low rights fees paid by the state- ccxxiv universities. This tells us that owned broadcasters.ccxxx Keane notes that, government support has had some to help close this gap, incentives such as positive results in the expansion of one year’s free rent are offered to

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 164! companies located in the regional enterprises to grow, and “guanxi” animation bases, and financial bonuses are (informal relationships and networks) paid to productions airing on CCTV.ccxxxi hinders professionalism and the Keane further identifies that companies implementation of international standards can also generate returns through the and best practices. ccxxxviii This data merchandising of branded content, identifying the limitations in China’s however, with success comes imitation, overall culture economy is applicable to and “fake” brand products can flood the China’s animation industry as well, as can market.ccxxxii be seen in the following section, which analyzes the specific limitations in this LIMITATIONS AFFETING THE sector. DESIRED OUTCOMES IN CHINA’S CULTURE ECONOMY In 2006, China’s State Council announced that China’s animation Keane argues that, “China’s industry “is important in terms of cultural economy is situated precariously satisfying the spiritual and cultural ccxxxiii between innovation and imitation.” requirements of the Chinese people,” and He contends that, despite government- therefore must promote socialism, sanctioned slogans promoting innovation, provide moral and ethics education for this innovation is primarily occurring in children, and meanwhile advance the the formatting and distribution stages of economic strength of the culture the value chain, and not in the industry. ccxxxix In operationalizing this creative/conceptual stage where proclamation, Keane identifies the innovation leads to the creation of government charging “small screen” ccxxxiv proprietary goods that hold value. He industries to target domestic markets to writes, “Decades of regimented reduce the impact of foreign influence and conformity and state regulation have competition. ccxl Ishii points to official created an ‘innovation deficit effect’” slogans, such as “rejuvenation of Chinese (restrictive policies in the parameters of animation,” as an indicator of the innovation provide little motivation to nationalistic interests motivating control innovate), and where innovation does policies.ccxli Supporting this, Ishii points to exist, it is due to “entrepreneurial China’s government approving “almost opportunities and economic no new foreign animation programmes ccxxxv liberation,” not governmental policy. since 2006.”ccxlii However, Fu and Wang Keane further argues that impediments in (2009) claim that despite the large the distribution segment of the value government investment in China’s chain have a negative effect on China’s animation sector, only 15 percent of the ccxxxvi creative/cultural industry success. In companies producing animation and this, large numbers at either end of the comics were profitable in 2009.ccxliii Keane chain (creators at one end, consumers at argues that this is due to the Chinese the other) exert pressure on the middle animation industry as being raw, adept at links (government officials who control cutting corners, and creatively constrained licensing and permits for television, or by government content prescriptions.ccxliv make funding decisions), which are He further contends that China’s position ccxxxvii “stymied by institutional rigidities.” in the global animation economy is that of Furthermore, data points to piracy and the a low-cost service provider for bartering of services and content as international television animation restricting the capacity for creative production.ccxlv Over the past decade, the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 165! global animation industry has transformed cultural sector in support of it soft power from a focus on children’s cartoons, to an goals. China has instituted policy in industry attracting older audiences support of its culture industry and through the mature themes provided in financed the promotion of Chinese anime and 3D/CGI films. ccxlvi Through culture internationally. However, a general findings of a questionnaire survey, tendency to imitate rather than innovate, Ishii reveals that pirated Japanese restrictive policies on domestic content animation is widely viewed by China’s and foreign media imports, a systematic adolescents online, while televised lack of professionalism in employing domestic animation is only popular international best practices, and a among children.ccxlvii Keane identifies three combination of wide-spread piracy and factors that limit China’s ability to create low rights fees paid by state broadcasters original, popular animated content: (1) limit China’s equitable participation in the The prescribed market for animation in regional culture market. In its animation China is children, thereby limiting the sector, financial incentives, and the business development model, leaving a establishment of animation bases and large market of teens and adults untapped. schools support the goal of developing (2) Pedagogical content with educational and producing original animated content. and patriotic themes in Chinese animation Yet government policy dictates that restricts regional exports, as audiences in animation be produced only for the Taiwan, Japan, and Korea are not education of children, limiting the interested in the socialist-leaning content. domestic audience base, as well as (3) The government predetermines the restricting exports due to regional lack of criteria for themes and ideas, so there is interest in the didactic paradigm of no motivation in the industry to be Chinese animation. creative or innovative. ccxlviii Furthermore, attaining government support for CONCLUSION production is based on adherence to China’s official and academic discourse on policy, not on the quality of the product. soft power acknowledges the necessity for As a result, “the industry is locked into [a] the development and promotion of its low-value circular flow of product and creative industries and culture, ideas.”ccxlix domestically and internationally, to Data in this study sample identify complement its hard power resources Japan’s cultural power in East Asia, where represented in its rapid economic rise. regional appreciation of their cultural These efforts are designed to nurture a products translates into soft power cohesive national identity through which resources for the state. The successful to unite China’s numerous ethnicities, as dissemination of Japanese media products well as support China’s “peaceful rise,” has shaped the East Asian culture market offsetting regional and global fears of a and provided a model for regional “China threat” in its ambition to establish producers to emulate. South Korea itself as a global power. Japan’s cultural exemplifies this in the successful export of power in East Asia presents a successful their television drama, movie, and pop model for the production and music commodities, where the Japanese dissemination of cultural commodities, a model informs production and model replicated by the creative industries dissemination. This understanding is of South Korea. Entrepreneurs juxtaposed with China’s reformation of its expanding the market potential of their

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 166! products initiated Japan’s cultural rise, and region and beyond. As there is a long the widespread appreciation of these return cycle on investment in animated commodities, initially supported by the content, future studies will be better able piracy of goods, not only established an to gauge the success of China’s initiatives international culture market in East Asia, and policies in support of its animation but also helped construct a pan-Asian industry. identity through the dissemination and appropriation of these products. Successes in the East Asian culture markets have provided soft power resources for host nations exporting their media commodities, and can inform China’s global animation ambitions. China has some global success in its film sector, but its creative industries remain challenged by official structural and systematic restrictions. Ideological concerns remain a lingering obstacle for innovation in the creative sector. The monitoring and control of imported media limits the ability to assimilate global styles into local products and encourages the piracy markets, which further limits any return on investment. Tasking small screen industries with targeting domestic audiences and animation with educating China’s children further limits innovation and constrains creators and producers ability to target export markets. These controls hamper innovation in China’s creative industries and, therefore, restrict the ability to create high value, proprietary products and services. An understanding of globalization and the transnational nature of cultural media flows informs the challenges facing China’s ambition to participate in the lucrative global animation industry. China’s geographic and cultural proximity with the East Asian market (especially with Mandarin-speaking audiences in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and dispersed across the globe) provides a massive potential audience for China’s cultural commodities. As China’s political and economic influence grows, a soft power approach to the dissemination of animated content permits localization of the Chinese culture across the East Asian

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APPENDIX

Table 1: Studies included in the systematic literature review

Included Studies: Purpose of Study Research Design Findings

Chua, B. (2012) To analyze the East Asian • Secondary research China’s control policy pop culture industry through • Content analysis on media imports the context of broadcast facilitates an ability to television in China determine the content of transnational productions, due to regional producers’ desire for the large Chinese market Huang, S.(2011) To analyze Taiwanese • Secondary research The dynamics of state- acceptance of Japanese and • Content analysis sponsored policies Korean cultural imports promoting a nation’s cultural industries, and consumer acceptance in receiving nations, contribute to the globalization of culture in East Asia Ishii, K.(2013) To study audience • Primary research Chinese adolescents preference for either • Intercept surveys prefer pirated domestic or foreign Japanese content animated content in China (which does not significantly correlate with anti-government attitudes), and domestic animation is primarily favored by China’s children Iwabuchi, K. To explore factors • Secondary research Producers’ marketing contributing to Japanese • Content analysis strategies, local (1998) media export successes in industries finding the East Asian culture economic value in market promoting Japanese products, and the “culturally odorless” nature of Japanese media products contribute to Japanese

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success in the East Asian culture market Iwabuchi, K. An examination of the • Secondary research Japanese popular effects global acceptance of • Content analysis culture export (2002) its popular culture has on successes engender a nationalism in Japan nationalist, narcissistic discourse in Japan. However, these successes only look strong when one discounts the contemporary, decentered nature of global culture Keane, M. To identify factors affecting • Secondary research Identifies the China’s efforts in developing • Content analysis creativity deficit (2004) its creative economy challenging China’s global animation ambitions, and the ideological, political, and economic factors that will determine China’s ability to brand its culture for export to regional and global markets Keane, M. Examines the challenges • Secondary research Identifies the facing China’s animation • Content analysis systematic changes (2009) industry required (transfer of ideas and tacit knowledge) for Chinese animation success Keane, M. Examines the importance of • Secondary research The success of Japan cultural soft power in the • Content analysis and Korea’s cultural (2010) reformation of China’s exports exemplify creative industries how soft power can promote a sense national pride and economic success through the regional commodification of cultures

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Otmazgin, N. K. An exploration of Japan’s • Primary research Japan provides new cultural power in East Asia • Mixed methods varieties of cultural (2008) • Content analysis consumption options • Market surveys for regional • Interviews consumers, establishing a successful industrial model for others to follow, rather than creating Japanese- dominated “spheres of influence” Shim, D. Analyzes factors • Secondary research In the shift toward contributing to the • Content analysis globalization, the (2005) dissemination and author identifies the acceptance of Korean pop potential of Asia’s culture in Asia cultural hybridization to counter imperial domination (primarily American)

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xiii Ibid., 18. i Wenjie Li, “An Analysis on the Diversified Extension xiv Strategy for China’s Animation Industry,” Asian Social Yanzhong Huang and Sheng Ding, “Dragon’s Science 5, no. 3 (2009): 178. Underbelly: An Analysis of China’s Soft Power,” East Asia: An International Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2006): 23. ii Kenichi Ishii, “Nationalism and Preferences for xv Domestic and Foreign Animation Programmes in Nye and Wang, “Hard Decisions,” 18. China,” International Communication Gazette 75, no. 2 xvi (2013): 227. Ibid. iii Michael Keane, “Keeping Up with the Neighbors: xvii China's Soft Power Ambitions,” Cinema Journal 49, no. 3 Ibid. (2010): 130. xviii iv Michael Keane, “From Made in China to Created in Ibid., 19. China,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 9, no. 3 xix (2006): 285,6. Barr, “Nation Branding,” 83. xx Huang and Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly;” Gregory G. v Ibid., 131. Holyk, “Paper tiger? Chinese Soft Power in East Asia,” Political Science Quarterly 126, no. 2 (2011): 223-254; Nye vi Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin, “Commodifying Asian- and Wang, “Hard Decisions;” Hongying Wang and Yeh- ness: Entrepreneurship and the Making of East Asian Chung Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power and its Popular Culture,” Media, Culture & Society 33, no. 2 Policy Implications: A Comparative Study of China and (2011): 259, 60. Taiwan,” Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 56 (2008): vii Ibid., 259. 425–447. xxi Nye and Wang, “Hard Decisions,” 18. viii Ibid., 260. xxii Huang and Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly,” 24. ix See: Stephanie H. Donald, “Little Friends: Children xxiii and Creative Consumption in the People’s Republic of Holyk, “Paper tiger?” 227. xxiv China,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 7, no. 1 Wang and Lu, “The Conceptions of Soft Power,” (2004): 45-53; Ishii, “Nationalism and Preferences;” 446. Beng Huat Chua, “The Regionalization of Television xxv and China,” Chinese Journal of Communication 5, no.1 Ibid. (2012): 16-23; Koichi Iwabuchi, “‘China.’ Japan's xxvi Chimera, and Media Cultural Globalization,” Cinema Cho and Jeong, “China’s Soft Power,” 458. Journal 49, no. 3 (2010): 149-153; Keane, “From Made;” xxvii Michael Keane, “Between the Tangible and the Nye and Wang, “Hard Decisions.” Wendy Su, “New Intangible: China’s New Development Dilemma,” Strategies of China’s Film Industry as Soft Power,” Chinese Journal of Communication 2, no. 1 (2009): 77–91; Global Media and Communication 6, no. 3 (2010): 317-322. xxviii Weihua Wu, “In Memory of Meishu Film: Catachresis Barr, “Nation Branding,” 82. xxix and Metaphor in Theorizing Chinese Animation,” Huang and Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly,” 33. Animation: An Interdisciplinary Journal 4, no. 1 (2009): 31- xxx 54. Barr, “Nation Branding,” 82; Nye and Wang, “Hard x Keane, “From Made.” Decisions,” 20. xxxi Wang and Lu, “The Conceptions of Soft Power,” xi See: Michael Barr, “Nation Branding As Nation 434. Building: China’s Image Campaign,” East Asia: An xxxii Ibid., 435. International Quarterly 29, (2011): 81-94, doi:10.1007/s12140-011-9159-7; Young Nam Cho and xxxiii Ibid. Jong Ho Jeong, “China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects,” Asian Survey 48, no. 3 xxxiv Ibid., 435, 6. (2008): 453-472; Joseph Nye and Jisi Wang, “Hard Decisions on Soft Power: Opportunities and Difficulties xxxv Ibid., 436. for China’s Soft Power,” Harvard International Review 31, no. 2 (2009): 18-22; Su Tong, “Cultural Resources, xxxvi Cho and Jeong, “China’s Soft Power,” 456. Creative Industries and the Long Economy,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 9, no. 3 (2006): 307-316; xxxvii Barr, “Nation Building,” 81; Cho and Jeong, Xiaojiang Yu, Kazuyuki Takata, and Estelle Dryland, “China’s Soft Power,” 458; Wang and Lu, “The “Cultural Attraction, ‘Soft Power’ and Proximity: the Conceptions of Soft Power,” 445. Popularity of Japanese Language in Hong Kong Since the 1980s,” Journal of Cultural Geography 29, no. 3 (2012): xxxviii Cho and Jeong, “China’s Soft Power,” 461. 315-336. xii Nye and Wang, “Hard Decisions,” 18.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xxxix Ibid., 462-5; Nye and Wang, “Hard Decisions,” 19. lxvii Nye and Wang, “Hard Decisions,” 19. xl Ibid., 19. lxviii Yu, Takata, and Dryland, “Cultural Attraction,” 326. xli Holyk, “Paper tiger?” 225; Huang and Ding, lxix Ibid. “Dragon’s Underbelly,” 29. lxx Gabriella Lukacs, “Iron Chef Around the World: xlii Cho and Jeong, “China’s Soft Power,” 454; Holyk, Japanese Food Television, Soft Power, and Cultural “Paper Tiger?” 225; Huang and Ding, “Dragon’s Globalization,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 13, Underbelly,” 29. no. 4 (2010): 418. lxxi Yoshiko Nakano, “Who Initiates a Global Flow? xliii Nye and Wang, “Hard Decisions,” 19. Japanese Popular Culture in Asia,” Visual Communication 1, no. 2 (2012): 233. xliv Huang and Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly,” 38. lxxii Ibid., 234. xlv Nye and Wang, “Hard Decisions,” 19. lxxiii Tong, “Cultural Resources,” 309. lxxiv Otmazgin, “Commodifying Asian-ness,” 259. xlvi Wang and Lu, “The Conceptions of Soft Power,” 439. lxxv Otmazgin, “Commodifying Asian-ness,” 272. xlvii Ibid., 427. lxxvi Dal Yong Jin, “Reinterpretation of Cultural Imperialism: Emerging Domestic Market vs Continuing xlviii Ibid. US Dominance,” Media, Culture & Society 29, no. 5 (2007): 753. xlix Cho and Jeong, “China’s Soft Power,” 470. lxxvii Ibid.,760. l Ibid., 454. lxxviii Keane, “From Made,” 288-90. li Nye and Wang, “Hard Decisions,” 19. lxxix Ibid., 288. lii Ibid. lxxx Ibid. liii Cho and Jeong, “China’s Soft Power,” 454. lxxxi Ibid., 289. liv Barr, “Nation Building,” 81. lxxxii Ibid. lv Alan Hunter, “Soft Power: China on the Global Stage,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, (2009): 373. lxxxiii Ibid. lvi Cho and Jeong, “China’s Soft Power,” 471. lxxxiv Ibid., 290. lvii Ibid. lxxxv Ibid. lviii Wang and Lu, “The Conceptions of Soft Power,” lxxxvi Can-Seng Ooi, “Reimagining Singapore as a 439. Creative Nation: The Politics of Place Branding,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 4, no. 4 (2008): 287. lix Ibid., 429. lxxxvii Ibid. lxxxviii Keane, “From Made.” lx Huang and Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly,” 29. lxxxix Ibid., 291. lxi Su, “New Strategies,” 318. xc Iwabuchi, “‘China.’ Japan's Chimera,” 151; Keane, lxii Ibid. “From Made,” 288. xci Iwabuchi, “‘China.’ Japan's Chimera,” 151. lxiii Barr, “Nation Building,” 87. xcii Ibid., 152. lxiv Huang and Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly,” 35,8. xciii Ibid., 153. lxv Cho and Jeong, “China’s Soft Power,” 454. xciv Sheuo Hui Gan, “To be or not to be: The lxvi Su, “New Strategies,” 319. Controversy in Japan Over the ‘Anime’ Label,” Animation Studies 4, (2009): 41.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xcv Anne Cooper-Chen, “Cartoon Planet: the Cross- cxxii Doobo Shim, “Hybridity and the Rise of Korean Cultural Acceptance of Japanese Animation,” Asian Popular Culture in Asia,” Media, Culture & Society 28, no. Journal of Communication 22, no. 1 (2012): 44. 1 (2006): 27. cxxiii Ishii, “Nationalism and Preferences,” 226. xcvi Ibid, 46. cxxiv Denis Walsh and Soo Downe, “Meta-Synthesis xcvii Gan, “To be or not to be,” 40. Method for Qualitative Research: a Literature Review,” Journal of Advanced Nursing 50, no. 2 (2005): 204. xcviii Nakano, “Who Initiates,” 231. cxxv Soo Downe, Louise Simpson, and Katriona xcix Cooper-Chen, “Cartoon Planet,” 50. Trafford, “Expert Intrapartum Maternity Care: a Meta- Synthesis,” Journal of Advanced Nursing 57 no. 2 (2006): c Yu, Takata, and Dryland, “Cultural Attraction,” 328. 127–140, doi:10.1111/j.1365-2648.2006.04079.x; Juliet Thomas, Barbara A. Jack, and Annette M. Jinks, ci Ibid. “Resilience to Care: A Systematic Review and Meta- Synthesis of the Qualitative Literature Concerning the cii Yu, Takata, and Dryland, “Cultural Attraction,” 329. Experiences of Student Nurses in Adult Hospital Settings in the UK,” Nurse Education Today 32 (2011): ciii Hyejin Yoon and Edward J. Malecki, “Cartoon 657–664. Planet: Worlds of Production and Global Production cxxvi Nye and Wang, “Hard Decisions,” 20. Networks in the Animation Industry,” Industrial and Corporate Change 19, no. 1 (2009): 263. cxxvii Huang, “Nation-Branding;” Koichi Iwabuchi, civ Cooper-Chen, “Cartoon Planet,” 44. “Marketing ‘Japan’: Japanese Cultural Presence under a Global Gaze,” Japanese Studies 18, no. 2 (1998): 165-180; cv Amy Shirong Lu, “What Race do they Represent and Keane, “Between the Tangible;” Otmazgin, does Mine Have Anything to do with it? Perceived “Commodifying Asian-ness;” Shim, “Hybridity and the Racial Categories of Anime Characters,” Animation: An Rise.” Interdisciplinary Journal 4, no. 2 (2008): 173. cxxviii Keane, “Between the Tangible,” 80. cvi Ibid., 175. cxxix Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 4; Shim, “Hybridity and cvii Cooper-Chen, “Cartoon Planet,” 45. the Rise,” 39. cviii Wu, “In Memory,” 32. cxxx Iwabuchi, “Marketing ‘Japan,’” 168. cxxxi Ibid., 178 cix Ibid. cxxxii Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 3-4. cx Ibid., 33. cxxxiii Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power: cxi Ibid., 37. Japanese Popular Culture in East and Southeast Asia,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8, no. 1 (2008): 75. cxii Ibid., 35. cxxxiv Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 3. cxiii Cooper-Chen, “Cartoon Planet,” 54. cxxxv Koichi Iwabuchi, “‘Soft’ Nationalism and Narcissism: Japanese Popular Culture Goes Global,” cxiv Yoon and Malecki, “Cartoon Planet,” 248. Asian Studies Review 26, no. 4 (2002): 447,51; Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power,” 74, 8, 86. cxv Donald, “Little Friends,” 45, 48. cxxxvi Ibid., 79. cxvi Ibid, 48. cxxxvii Ibid., 87, 88. cxvii Ibid., 49 cxxxviii Ibid., 80. cxviii Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World cxxxix Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 4. Politics, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 5. cxix Ibid., 11. cxl Iwabuchi, “Marketing ‘Japan,’” 169,71. cxx Barr, “Nation Building,” 82. cxli Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 4. cxxi Shuling Huang, “Nation-Branding and Transnational cxlii Iwabuchi, “Marketing ‘Japan,’” 171-2. Consumption: Japan-mania and the Korean Wave in Taiwan,” Media, Culture & Society 33, no. 1 (2011): 3. cxliii Iwabuchi, “Marketing ‘Japan,’” 169; Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power,” 75, 90.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! cxliv Ibid., 97. clxviii Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 4. cxlv Ibid., 83. clxix Shim, “Hybridity and the Rise,” 40. cxlvi In October 1949, following a twenty-year civil war clxx Ibid., 28. between China’s Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communist Party under Mao Tse- clxxi Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 8; Shim, “Hybridity and tung, the Communists overthrew the Nationalists and the Rise,” 28. established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole ruler of mainland China. The Nationalist clxxii Ibid., 28, 35. government retreated to the island of Taiwan and set up a separate independent government, the Republic of clxxiii Ibid., 37. China (ROC), also claiming to be the sole ruler of all China. Following US President Richard Nixon’s 1972 clxxiv Ibid., 40. visit to mainland China, both the United States and Japan abandoned Taiwan politically, and established clxxv Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power,” 77. diplomatic relations with the PRC. Alice Shih, “A Brief History of Taiwan's Film Industry,” Cineaction 85 (2011): clxxvi Ibid. 63,7. cxlvii Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 7; Otmazgin, clxxvii Ibid. “Contesting Soft Power,” 83. clxxviii Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 3. cxlviii Ibid. clxxix Chua, “The Regionalization,” 17. cxlix Ibid., 84. clxxx Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power,” 77. cl Ibid., 85. clxxxi Iwabuchi, “‘Soft’ Nationalism,” 447-8. cli Ibid., 87. clxxxii Ibid., 453. clii Iwabuchi, “‘Soft’ Nationalism,” 458. clxxxiii Ibid., 455-6. cliii Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 6. clxxxiv Iwabuchi, “Marketing ‘Japan,’” 167. cliv Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power,” 91-2; Shim, “Hybridity and the Rise,” 25. clxxxv Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power,” 80. clv Chua, “The Regionalization,” 20. clxxxvi Chua, “The Regionalization,” 17. clvi Shim, “Hybridity and the Rise,” 25. clxxxvii Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power,” 82. clvii Ibid., 28, 31. clxxxviii Chua, “The Regionalization,” 17; Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power,” 79. clviii Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 3. clxxxix Ibid., 82. clix Ibid, 6. cxc Ibid., 96. clx Shim, “Hybridity and the Rise,” 31; cxci Ibid., 73, 92. clxi Shim, “Hybridity and the Rise,” 31. cxcii Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 13. clxii Ibid. cxciii Ibid., 13; Shim, “Hybridity and the Rise,” 30. clxiii Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 7; Shim, “Hybridity and the Rise,” 32. cxciv Ibid., 29, 30. clxiv Ibid., 34. cxcv Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 3. clxv Ibid., 33 cxcvi Ibid., 12. clxvi Ibid. cxcvii Ibid., 15; Iwabuchi, “Marketing ‘Japan,’” 172. clxvii Ibid., 32. cxcviii Huang, “Nation-Branding,” 15.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! cxcix Keane, “Brave New World,” 268. ccxxix Keane, “Between the Tangible,” 83. cc Ibid., 268,9. ccxxx Ibid., 82. cci Chua, “The Regionalization,” 20. ccxxxi Ibid., 82-4. ccii Keane, “Between the Tangible,” 79. ccxxxii Ibid., 82,6. cciii Ibid., 80,1. ccxxxiii Keane, “Brave New World,” 265. cciv Keane, “Keeping Up,” 131. ccxxxiv Ibid., 266. ccv Chua, “The Regionalization,” 18; Michael Keane, ccxxxv Ibid., 269. “Brave New World: Understanding China’s Creative Vision,” International Journal of Cultural Policy 10, no. 3 ccxxxvi Ibid., 273. (2004): 265-279. ccxxxvii Ibid. ccvi Chua, “The Regionalization,” 18. ccxxxviii Ibid., 273; Keane, “Between the Tangible,” 84. ccvii Ishii, “Nationalism and Preferences,” 226. ccxxxix Ishii, “Nationalism and Preferences,” 227. ccviii Ibid., 229. ccxl Keane, “Keeping Up,” 31. ccix Ibid., 230. ccxli Ishii, “Nationalism and Preferences,” 240. ccx Keane, “Brave New World,” 266. ccxlii Ibid., 225-6. ccxi Ishii, “Nationalism and Preferences,” 230. ccxliii Ibid., 228. ccxii Ibid., 229. ccxliv Keane, “Between the Tangible,” 77. ccxiii Keane, “Brave New World,” 268. ccxlv Ibid., 82. ccxiv Ishii, “Nationalism and Preferences,” 227. ccxlvi Ibid. ccxv Ibid., 227-8. ccxlvii Ishii, “Nationalism and Preferences,” 226. ccxvi Keane, “Between the Tangible,” 77. ccxlviii Keane, “Between the Tangible,” 82,3. ccxvii Ibid., 78, 81. ccxlix Ibid., 83. ccxviii Keane, “Brave New World,” 271. ccxix Ibid., 270-1. REFERENCES ccxx Ibid., 271. Barr, Michael. “Nation Branding as Nation Building: ccxxi Keane, “Between the Tangible,” 81. China’s Image Campaign.” East Asia: An International Quarterly 29, (2011): 81-94. doi:10.1007/s12140-011- ccxxii Ishii, “Nationalism and Preferences,” 228. 9159-7. ccxxiii Ibid. Cho, Young Nam, and Jong Ho Jeong. “China’s Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects.” Asian ccxxiv Ibid. Survey 48, no. 3 (2008): 453-472. doi:10.1525/as.2008.48.3.453. ccxxv Ibid., 227. Chua, Beng Huat. “The Regionalization of Television and China.” Chinese Journal of Communication 5, no.1 ccxxvi Ibid., 228. (2012): 16-23. ccxxvii Ibid., 227. Cooper-Chen, Anne. “Cartoon Planet: the Cross- Cultural Acceptance of Japanese Animation.” Asian ccxxviii Ibid., 240. Journal of Communication 22, no. 1 (2012): 44-57. http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rajc20/current.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Donald, Stephanie H. “Little Friends: Children and ------. “Brave New World: Understanding China’s Creative Consumption in the People’s Republic of Creative Vision.” International Journal of Cultural Policy 10, China.” International Journal of Cultural Studies 7, no. 1 no. 3 (2004): 265-279. (2004): 45-53. doi:10.1177/1367877904040604. doi:10.1080/1028663042000312516. 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Japanese Popular Culture in Asia.” Visual Communication Huang, Yanzhong, and Sheng Ding. “Dragon’s 1, no. 2 (2012): 229-253. Underbelly: An Analysis of China’s Soft Power.” East doi:10.1177/147035720200100207. Asia: An International Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2006): 22-44. Nye, Joseph. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Hunter, Alan. “Soft Power: China on the Global Stage.” Politics. New York: PublicAffairs, 2004. Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, (2009): 373–398. doi:10.1093/cjip/pop001. Nye, Joseph, and Jisi Wang. “Hard Decisions on Soft Power: Opportunities and Difficulties for China’s Soft Ishii, Kenichi. “Nationalism and Preferences for Power.” Harvard International Review 31, no. 2 (2009): 18- Domestic and Foreign Animation Programmes in 22. China.” International Communication Gazette 75, no. 2 (2013): 225-245. doi:10.1177/1748048512459148. Ooi, Can-Seng. “Reimagining Singapore as a Creative Nation: The Politics of Place Branding.” Place Branding Iwabuchi, Koichi. “‘China.’ Japan's Chimera, and Media and Public Diplomacy 4, no. 4 (2008): 287–302. Cultural Globalization.” Cinema Journal 49, no. 3 (2010): doi:10.1057/pb.2008.18. 149-153. Otmazgin, Nissim Kadosh. “Commodifying Asian-ness: ------. “Marketing ‘Japan’: Japanese Cultural Presence Entrepreneurship and the Making of East Asian Popular under a Global Gaze.” Japanese Studies 18, no. 2 (1998): Culture.” Media, Culture & Society 33, no. 2 (2011): 259– 165-180. 274. doi 10.1177/0163443710393386. ------. “‘Soft’ Nationalism and Narcissism: Japanese ------. “Contesting Soft Power: Japanese Popular Popular Culture Goes Global.” Asian Studies Review 26, Culture in East and Southeast Asia.” International no. 4 (2002): 447-469. Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8, no. 1 (2008): 73-101. http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/casr20. doi:10.1093/irap/lcm009. 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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Thomas, Juliet, Barbara A. Jack, and Annette M. Jinks. “Resilience to Care: A Systematic Review and Meta- Synthesis of the Qualitative Literature Concerning the Experiences of Student Nurses in Adult Hospital Settings in the UK.” Nurse Education Today 32 (2011): 657–664. doi:10.1016/j.nedt.2011.09.005. Tong, Su. “Cultural Resources, Creative Industries and the Long Economy.” International Journal of Cultural Studies 9, no. 3 (2006): 307-316. doi:10.1177/1367877906066877. Walsh, Denis, and Soo Downe. “Meta-Synthesis Method for Qualitative Research: a Literature Review.” Journal of Advanced Nursing 50, no. 2 (2005): 204–211. doi:10.1111/j.13652648.2005.03380.x. Wang, Hongying, and Yeh-Chung Lu. “The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: A Comparative Study of China and Taiwan.” Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 56 (2008): 425–447. doi:10.1080/10670560802000191. Wu, Weihua. “In Memory of Meishu Film: Catachresis and Metaphor in Theorizing Chinese Animation.” Animation: An Interdisciplinary Journal 4, no. 1 (2009): 31- 54. http://www.uk.sagepub.com/journals/Journal201763. Yoon, Hyejin, and Edward J. Malecki. “Cartoon Planet: Worlds of Production and Global Production Networks in the Animation Industry.” Industrial and Corporate Change 19, no. 1 (2009): 239-271. doi:10.1093/icc/dtp040. Yu, Xiaojiang, Kazuyuki Takata, and Estelle Dryland. “Cultural Attraction, ‘Soft Power’ and Proximity: the Popularity of Japanese Language in Hong Kong Since the 1980s.” Journal of Cultural Geography 29, no. 3 (2012): 315-336. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08873631.2012.717414.

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EAST ASIA’S CURRENT CHALLENGES An Interview with Ezra Vogel, Professor Emeritus, Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University Alan Hatfiled Princeton University

On March 29th, 2014, Alan Hatfield but a number of Southeast Asian nations (Princeton University Class of 2015), and tried to find what was the nature of interviewed Ezra F. Vogel concerning the those industrial societies. In 1972, early days of East Asian studies in the Harvard started the concentration in East United States, changing U.S. perceptions Asian Studies for undergraduates, and I of Asia, and the challenges the region now was in charge of that. So, for about 18 faces. Vogel is author of Canton under years, my job was to build up the program Communism: Programs and Politics in a for undergraduates. Specialists in East Provincial Capital, 1949-1968 (1969), Japan Asia numbered about 15 a year initially, as Number One: Lessons for America (1979), and by the time I retired there were over and more recently, Deng Xiaoping and the 50 graduating annually. In the late 70s, Transformation of China (2011) and The Park when Japan was seen as the giant threat, I Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South thought I ought to help warn Americans Korea (2011), among other books. by writing about Japan and putting it in a constructive way, saying, “Here are some AH: So, I want to start off by asking you about things that Japan does well. Why don’t we your work in general. How would you describe use this competition in a way that serves yourself in a professional capacity? us for the better?” In the end, that became my book Japan as Number One: Lessons for EV: Well, I’m retired now, but I got my America. tenure at Harvard in 1967. I was the successor to John Fairbank as the second AH: So, the book was meant to prevent a head of the Harvard East Asian Research generally negative and unconstructive reaction to Center, with a main objective of trying to Japan caused by national competition? oversee work that Harvard did in East Asia. Since I was a specialist on both EV: Well, we were in trade wars at the China and Japan, I felt that it was my time to try to cope with the first country responsibility to introduce both to that really seemed to be a threat to our Harvard and to the broader world economic balance. When I retired in 2000, information about East Asia. So, I’ve I decided that rather than continue to taught courses in Chinese society and teach, my main responsibility was to try to Japanese society, and when Harvard write something that really deepened developed a core curriculum committee, I American understanding of East Asia, and was in charge of a course called Industrial of course the biggest thing at the time was East Asia, which tried to compare with the rise of China. I felt if I could help Western industrial development with what Americans and the rest of the Western was happening in East Asia as it was just world understand what was going on in emerging. So we looked at not just one, China, then that would be a contribution.

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! So, I wrote a book on Deng Xiaoping and AH: You have a piece in the Japan Times in the transformation of China, and I think which you discuss the intimate impact of historical that has played a role in helping inform interactions between Japan and China on Americans about the rise of China. diplomacy between the two countries. Is China’s Harvard Press publishes about 100 books growing assertiveness catalyzing a radicalization a year, and my book was the bestseller of of rhetoric in the region and strengthening this its year. Then when it was translated into sense of history? Chinese in Hong Kong, it did very well. It also did well in Taiwan, Singapore, and EV: When a country rises, it always many places with significant Chinese disturbs the surrounding status quo. But, diaspora communities. Then, I found a in the end, the response of the Chinese publisher who was able to get the surrounding countries determines how big essence of the book through censors in of a problem it can be. And since the mainland China for a January 2013 United States is still the dominant power publication. in that part of the world, I think that the resolution of the problem is also affected AH: What was the response to the book like in by the American response. Right now, the China? Did you face any opposition or backlash Obama Administration is trying to for diverging from the CCP’s historical narrative preserve the perspective that has at times? predominated since Nixon, namely that the United States needs to remain engaged EV: In its first year, the book sold 720,000 with China. In case they should become copies across China and was the best too aggressive, the U.S. would certainly seller of any foreign scholar. I think it was use the system of alliances built up in the used by China to describe Deng in the region to defend territory. The U.S. has context of the transformation and as a continued that policy and tried to be means of defining what China is. I was prepared even when China becomes very also allowed to publish some things on assertive. I suspect there’s a dispute within Tiananmen that others Chinese authors China now whether, because of the were not able to publish. They used my pushback from neighbors such as the book as a way of letting the public Philippines and Vietnam, the country understand more about the period and should stick to a more peaceful process of some of the context. It was an awful thing growth. As you know, there are tensions to gun down students. The book describes with many countries, especially with Japan that horror, giving an overall objective over territories like the Senkaku/Diaoyu account of how Deng responded in his Islands. Tokyo at this point is worried. attempt to keep stability but also continue Recently the Prime Minister of Syria said reform and opening. Since that time, I’ve Japan is their best friend in the region, so been inundated by invitations to go to I think there are many places where you China, and I try to respond as best I can. can sense the rising concern with China’s The book is not just a full-length willingness to cooperate. That being said, biography, but attempts to give an there are still many voices within China understanding of Deng the person to that advocate peaceful solutions. explain the context for the major decisions he made during reform and AH: How relevant will American patronage and opening. the system of alliances in the region remain? Do you feel the general mindset of American

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 179! policymakers to be conducive to a cooperative AH: With recent outbursts in violence across relationship with China in the future? China, including those in Xinjiang, what challenge is regionalism leveling against China’s EV: Various top leaders in the State political and social hierarchies? Do you think Department understand that we have to persuasive competing regional identities in China engage positively with China and get them might come out of the woodwork in the near involved in a constructive way as a future? stakeholder in global affairs. But as you know, in Congress, there are a lot of EV: If one thinks back to the 19th and voices that prioritize their political party early 20th centuries, regionalism then was and interests above the national good by a natural function of people’s lack of using generally unconstructive rhetoric. geographic mobility. People in one There are real problems in the U.S. in the locality didn’t know much outside of their political realm that provide obstacles to a own localities, so one region did not working relationship with China. If only necessarily oppose another. Rather, rational people were in charge in various people generally had very limited countries, then that would be one thing, horizons. In the traditional Chinese but all of these people are moved by other imperial system a unified official class forces as well. China has now ramped up represented the nation as a whole. patriotic appeals toward Japan, so you Officials were cycled between the capital have a situation where a lot of people and various regions, but most people were have become victims of their own bound to their locality. After the propaganda, giving their government less centralization of power at the end of 1949, flexibility at the same time. there was a concerted government effort to control regionalism more tightly. AH: Do you also interpret a parallel rise in Unlike in the case of the Soviet Union, in Japanese nationalism and militarism? which half of the total population had local ethnic identities, only seven percent EV: There is an increase in nationalism in of the Chinese population identified as a countries that feel threatened, so as China distinct ethnic minority. Despite diversity overtakes Japan in overall GNP, spends a of language within specific regions, those lot more on its military, and puts pressure regional identities did not severely on Japanese-administered territories, it threaten the idea of the Han Chinese will have ramifications on Japanese people. For instance, the dominant policies. For instance, within the last few language of much of the South before years China once allowed students to Mandarin was Cantonese. If one went the throw stones at Japanese consular officials Pearl River and its main tributaries, in Beijing for a few hours. Many Chinese Cantonese was dominant. However, in the people still feel World War II very mountainous areas, languages like Hakka strongly, and this sentiment has also seen and Chaozhou were more prominent. a recent increase with patriotic education, Then, in addition there were small which includes frequent airing of anti- numbers of Li and Miao. So even within Japanese movies about World War II. In Guangdong, there were lots of sub- 1980, shortly after Deng visited Japan, identities. 78% of the Japanese population polled had a favorable rating of China. It’s now AH: Do you see regionalism as more of a threat down to below 10%. to these solidified national identities in the region as a whole or in China more specifically?

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EV: There are many serious problems that EV: China’s most dangerous regional add to the pollution. One of the biggest is threats come specifically from Tibet and soft coal, which is a primary source of Xinjiang. I wouldn’t be surprised if 10 to pollution. However, most people don’t 15 years from now the Korean minority realize that the coal supply isn’t predicted of Northern China experiences a similar to last much more than 15 years, so there regional conflict. However, as a whole, will eventually be a severe shortage of national culture has grown since 1949 and coal. The water shortage is much more especially since 1978 with reform and severe. The water table continues to opening that increased mobility. As in the shrink, and the effects of global warming United States, regional accents have could also see the supplies from declined since the advent of television, so mountainous areas such as Tibet decline that Mandarin has become more significantly as well. The air pollution now entrenched across China. The regions has suddenly gotten much worse in the have been brought into a more extensive last few years and this causes many other state system. When Mao took over the problems. Many foreigners working in country in 1949, he tried to get people Beijing and Shanghai who have families from a local region who were part of the are considering moving outside China. Communist ruling structure to dig Cosmopolitan, world-class scientists who Communist roots at the local level. have opportunities abroad may decide to Several years later, he transferred them take advantage of those opportunities. back to Beijing, just as governors in the Now, to get pollution in control, the past traditionally wouldn’t serve where leadership has focused more on solar, they might work with locals against the wind, and other renewable forms of central government. This prevented power, but their main goal is a vast localism from developing into challenges increase in nuclear power. By 2050, they to central authority. Of course local expect to generate about the same sentiments remain, but generally not so percentage of their energy from nuclear strong as in Tibet where you have a strong power as United States does today. So, local identification of culture and, along they really do have a long way to go. with it, a desire for local autonomy. In Xinjiang with the Uighurs it’s the same AH: How does this play into urbanization? way, but across most of China, the Han With such a huge mobile workforce shuttling to civilizational identity has only been and from cities on an annual or seasonal basis, solidified. how is the state’s ability to deliver key services affected? AH: I want to ask about urbanization and resource management, which I think are two EV: They now have 50% of people living really interconnected questions. The status quo is in cities compared to 20% back in 1979. I telling of issues in air quality, water quality, and think the biggest problem is the growth of in the management of other resources. Taking into heavy industry, automobiles, and account the historical imbalance in development transport. Cities have now begun to install between the coastal provinces and the interior, rapid transit as a means of curbing what kinds of pressures do you think will come automobile sales. For several years, into play? Do you think China will be able to Guangzhou was installing one whole deal effectively with the growth in its polluting, subway line per year. Despite measures coal-fueled industries as well? intended to fight such a steep rise in automobiles, there are now more sold

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 181! annually in China than in the U.S., and the see it in its best interests to continue to stand by as pollution from cars has become serious. North Korea’s main partner? At the same time, China’s steel production has jumped from roughly 30 million tons EV: Economic conditions are generally a year in 1979 to 600 millions tons better than during the devastating famine annually, or roughly half of global in the early 1990s, but there are serious production, in the course of only thirty tensions in the transition of power to Kim years. These kinds of growth rates in Jong-Un, as one can see from the heavy industries and in automobiles execution of his uncle. The Chinese are require tremendous amounts of energy, so very aware that a nuclear North Korea it’s not the urbanization itself that has put could cause an arms race, especially the re- such a strain on natural resources, but militarization of Japan and a similar re- mostly the expansion of these two sectors. armament in South Korea. Japan might even go nuclear depending on how large AH: What about the urban poor? Do these of a threat it perceives. So, China has trends put strains on them in a way that might already distanced itself from North Korea lead to the articulation of class tension? and has made very clear its concern for the future reunification of the peninsula EV: The government has tried to slow and I think they have understood that down migration to major cities because it they will have to work with and through couldn’t provide a sufficient level of urban South Korea in the future, making a shift services to new or temporary residents. in policy necessary in the short to mid- Restrictions put in place were meant to range future. avoid the difficulty of registering such a huge number of new residents, and AH: The other day, a UN report on human economic policy was designed to reduce rights released and compared statistics on national the geographic inequality of development use of the death penalty, placing China at the top. between coastal provinces and those The issue of human rights does seem to appear inland. In fact, even urban residents who frequently in debates surrounding China. Do you do not have household registration remain feel that criticism of China’s human rights record optimistic and are willing to work very will remain a rhetorical tool in the future or will hard. If I were a leader, I would be less there have to be a change in government policy worried about these migrants without towards the detained? registration and more about the bright guys who go to school with kids who EV: A lot of the people who make don’t have to exert themselves to get a criticisms about human rights often don’t good job because their fathers are high think of the context or consequences of officials. Nepotism and favoritism are their actions. But, it can be a vicious cycle. actually the most provocative of For instance, in Tibet—Americans like to inequalities and have been for quite a complain about the way that they are while now. So, I think the most serious treated and then Tibetans, thinking that tensions come from those people who the United States will support them, work hard and see their opportunities agitate to the point of a crackdown. It just taken away unfairly by their classmates. tends to keep the Tibetans in an unproductive cycle. A lot of people will AH: As far as North Korea is concerned, how feel good about themselves as they drive resilient is that state, and if it were to destabilize around with a bumper sticker, without or take over-aggressive action, would China still thinking about the need for the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 182! governments of other countries to act in the face of agitation. It is true that leaders now need to find a way to be more considerate, but at the same time you can’t ignore the need of governments to respond in a certain way to internal unrest, especially if facilitated by outside interference.

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