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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXII No. 1872 May 12, 1975

AN AGENDA FOR AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY Address by President Ford 593

"A CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT FORD"—AN INTERVIEW FOR CBS TELEVISION AND RADIO Excerpts From Transcript 596

SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED FOR L'EXPRESS OF FRANCE 606

Superintendent of Documents

JUL 31875 DEPOSITORY THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover i

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E T I ^

Vol. LXXII, No. 1872 May 12, 1975

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Address by President Ford ^

Today, America can regain the sense of achieved human perfection, but we have at- pride that existed before Viet-Nam, but it tained a very remarkable self-governed so- cannot be achieved by refighting a war that ciety that possesses the flexibility and the is finished as far as America is concerned. dynamism to grow and undertake an entire- As I see it, the time has come to look for- ly new agenda, an agenda for America's ward to an agenda for the future, to unify, third century. to bind up the nation's wounds, and to So I ask you to join me in helping to write restore its health and its optimistic self- that agenda. I am as determined as a Presi- confidence. dent can be to seek national rediscovery of In New Orleans, a great battle was fought the belief in ourselves that characterized the after a war was over. In New Orleans to- most creative periods in our nation's history. night, we can begin a great national recon- The greatest challenge of creativity, as I ciliation. The first engagement must be with see it, lies ahead. the problems of today, but just as important- We, of course, are saddened indeed by the ly, the problems of the future. events in Indochina; but these events, tragic That is why I think it is so appropriate as they are, portend neither the end of the that I find myself tonight at a university world nor of America's leadership in the which addresses itself to preparing young world. people for the challenge of tomorrow. Let me put it this way, if I might. Some I ask that we stop refighting the battles tend to feel that if we do not succeed in and the recriminations of the past. I ask everything everywhere, then we have suc- that we look now at what is right with ceeded in nothing anywhere. America—at our possibilities and our poten- I reject categorically such polarized think- tialities for change and growth, achievement ing. We can and we should help others to and sharing. I ask that we accept the re- help themselves; but the fate of responsible sponsibility of leadership as a good neighbor men and women everywhere, in the final to all peoples and an enemy of none. decision, rests in their own hands, not in

I ask that we strive to become, in the ours. finest American tradition, something more America's future depends upon Ameri- tomorrow than we are today. cans, especially your generation, which is Instead of my addressing the image of now equipping itself to assume the chal- America, I prefer to consider the reality of lenges of the future, to help write the agenda America. It is true that we have launched for America. our Bicentennial celebration without having Earlier today in this great community, I spoke about the need to maintain our de-

' Orleans, La., Made at Tulane University, New fenses. Tonight I would like to talk about (text from Weekly Compilation of on Apr. 23 another kind of strength, the true source of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 28; introductory all of the paragraphs omitted). American power that transcends

593 May 12, 1975 deterrent powers for paace of our Armed enriches life while preserving our natural

Forces. I am speaking here of our belief environment. My goal is to stimulate pro- in ourselves and our belief in our nation. ductivity but use technology to redeem, not Abraham Lincoln asked, in his own words, to destroy, our environment. "What constitutes the bulwark of our own I will strive for new cooperation rather liberty and independence?" He answered: than conflict in the peaceful exploration of our oceans and our space. My goal is to use It is not our frowning: battlements, our bristling resources for peaceful progress rather than sea coasts, our army and our navy .... Our defense is in the spirit which prized liberty as the heritage war and destruction. of all men, in all lands everywhere. Let America symbolize humanity's struggle to conquer nature and master technology. It is in this spirit that we must now move time for our government beyond the discords of the past decade. It The has now come to facilitate the individual's control over his is in this spirit that I ask you to join me in writing an agenda for the future. or her future and of the future of America. But the future requires more than Ameri- I welcome your invitation, particularly, cans congratulating themselves on how much tonight because I know it is at Tulane and products that other centers of thought throughout our great we know and how many we produce. It requires knowledge to country that much consideration is being can new not only be given to the kind of future that Americans meet new problems. We must want and, just as importantly, will work for. motivated to build a better America; we Each of you are preparing yourselves for must know how to do it. If we really want a humane America that the future, and I am deeply interested in your preparations and your opinions and will, for instance, contribute to the allevia- hunger, must realize your goals. However, tonight, with your in- tion of the world's we that intentions do not feed people. dulgence, let me share with you my own good served in views. Some problems, as anyone who the Congress knows, are complex. There are I envision a creative program that goes Willpower alone does not as far as our courage and our capacities can no easy answers. food. take us, both at home and abroad. My goal grow thought in a well-intentioned past that is for a cooperative world at peace, using We could export our technology lock, stock, its resources to build, not to destroy. we and barrel to developing nations. We did it As President, I am determined to offer intentions. are now leadership to overcome our current economic with the best of But we learning that a strain of rice that grows problems. My goal is for jobs for all who another, that want to work and economic opportunity for in one place will not grow in produce at 100 percent in one all who want to achieve. factories that nation produce less than half as much in a I am determined to seek self-sufficiency in habits energy as an urgent national priority. My society where temperaments and work are somewhat different. goal is to make America independent of foreign energy sources by 1985. Of course, I Yet the world economy has become inter- will pursue interdependence with other na- dependent. Not only food technology, but tions and a reformed international economic money management, natural resources and system. energy, research and development—all kinds My goal is for a world in which consum- of this group require an organized world ing and producing nations achieve a working society that makes the maximum effective

balance. I will address the humanitarian use of the world's resources. issues of hunger and famine, of health and I want to tell the world: Let's grow food of healing. My goal is to achieve or to assure together, but let's also learn more about basic needs and an effective system to achieve nutrition, about weather forecasting, about this result. irrigation, about the many other specialties I recognize the need for technology that involved in helping people to help themselves.

594 Department of State Bulletin We must learn more about people, about The new agenda, that which is developed the development of communities, architec- by you and by us, must place a high priority ture, engineering-, education, motivation, pro- on the need to stop the spread of nuclear ductivity, public health and medicine, arts weapons and to work for the mutual reduc- and sciences, political, legal, and social or- tion in strategic arms and control of other ganization. All of these specialties, and many, weapons. many more, are required if young people I must say parenthetically the successful like you are to help this nation develop an negotiations at Vladivostok, in my opinion, agenda for our future, your future, our are just a beginning. country's future. Your generation of Americans is uniquely I challenge, for example, the medical endowed by history to give new meaning to students in this audience to put on their the pride and spirit of America. The magne- agenda the achievement of a cure for cancer. tism of an American society confident of I challenge the engineers in this audience its own strength will attract the good will to devise new techniques for developing and the esteem of all people wherever they cheap, clean, and plentiful energy and, as a might be in this globe in which we live. by-product, to control floods. I challenge the It will enhance our own perception of our- law students in this audience to find ways selves and our pride in being an American. to speed the administration of equal justice We can—we can, and I say it with emphasis and make good citizens out of convicted —write a new agenda for our future. criminals. I challenge education, those of you I am glad that Tulane University and as education majors, to do real teaching for other gi-eat American educational institu- real life. I challenge the arts majors in this tions are reaching out to others in programs audience to compose the great American sym- to work with developing nations, and I look phony, to write the great American novel, and forward with confidence to your participa- to enrich and inspire our daily lives. tion in every aspect of America's future. And America's leadership is essential. Amer- I urge Americans of all ages to unite in this ica's resources are vast. America's oppor- Bicentennial year to take responsibilities for tunities are unprecedented. themselves, as our ancestors did. As we strive together to perfect a new Let us resolve tonight to rediscover the old agenda, I put high on the list of important virtues of confidence and self-reliance and points the maintenance of alliances and part- capability that characterized our forefathers nerships with other people and other na- two centuries ago. tions. These do provide a basis of shared I pledge, as I know you do, each one of values, even as we stand up with determina- us, to do our part. Let the beacon lights of tion for what we believe. the past shine forth from historic New This, of course, requires a continuing com- Orleans, and from Tulane University, and mitment to peace and a determination to from every other corner of this land to use our good offices wherever possible to pro- illuminate a boundless future for all Amer- mote better relations between nations of this icans and a peace for all mankind. world. Thank you very much.

May 12, 1975 595 "A Conversation With President Ford"—An Interview for CBS Television and Radio

Following are excerpts relating to foreign tions for a peaceful settlement out there? policy from the transcript of an intervieiv President Ford: We are exploring with a tvith President Ford by Walter Cronkite, number of governments negotiating oppor- Eric Sevareid, and Bob Schieffer broadcast tunities, but in this very rapid change, with live on CBS television and radio on April 21.^ President Thieu stepping down, there really hasn't been an opportunity for us to make Mr. Croyikite: Mr. President, just this mo- contact with a new government. And the ment as ive came on the air, I was surprised net result is we are planning to explore over this little machine here that the Asso- with them and with other governments in ciated Pi-ess and the United Press Interna- that area or connected with that area so tional are reporting from Honolulu that a that we don't miss any opportunity to try large number of battle-equipped marines, and get a cease-fii'e. 800 or so, have left Hatvaii by air, on char- Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, what is your tered aircraft. Can you tell us what their own estimate of the situation noiv? Do you destination is and what is up? think that the Hanoi people want to nego- President Ford: That is part of a tiate the turnover of the city, a peaceful movement to strengthen, or to bring up to turnover, or just drive ahead? strength, the Marine detachment in that Eric, I wish I knew. I area of the Pacific. It is not an unusual mili- President Ford: tary movement. On the other hand, we don't think anybody can be absolutely cer- them- felt under the circumstances that it was wise tain, except the North Vietnamese to bring that Marine group in that area selves. of the world—the South Pacific—up to You get the impression that in the last strength. few days they were anxious to move in very quickly for a quick takeover. On the other Mr. Cronkite: you tell us where they Can hand, within the last 12, 24 hours, there are going, sir? seems to be a slowdown. It is not certain will President Ford: I don't think I should be from what we see just what their tactic any more definitive than that. be. We naturally hope that there is a period when the fighting will cease or the military Mr. Cronkite: They are not going directly activity will become less intense so that nego- to Saigon? tiations might be undertaken or even a cease- President Ford: No, they are not. fire achieved. But it is so fluid right now I don't think Mr. Cronkite: Now that President Thieu anybody can be certain what the North [Nguyen Van Thieu, of South Viet-Nam] Vietnamese are going to do. has resigned, which was the big neivs this morning, of course, are rve involved in, are Mr. Sevareid: Are they communicating we acting as an intermediary in any negotia- ivith our government through third parties or otherwise? ' For the complete transcript, see White House press release dated Apr. 21. President Ford: We have communications

596 Department of State Bulletin with other governments. I can't tell you U.S. military personnel to protect the evac- whether the North Vietnamese are commu- uation. On the other hand, if the South nicating with them or not. I don't know. Vietnamese should make it difficult in their disappointment that our support hadn't been Mr. Sevareid: President Thicu, tvhen he as much as they thought it should be, their stepped down, said one of the reasons was involvement would make it virtually impos- American pressure. What ivas our role in sible, again without a sizable U.S. military his resignation ? commitment. That is one reason why we President Ford: Our government made no want a cease-fire. That is why we want the direct request that President Thieu step military operation stopped—so that we can down. There was no pressure by me or any- certainly get all the Americans out without one in Washington in that regard. any trouble and, hopefully, those South Viet- There may have been some on the scene namese that we feel a special obligation to. in Saigon who may have talked to President But at the moment, it does not appear Thieu, but there was no pressure from here that that is possible. We intend to keep to force President Thieu to step down and working on it because we feel it is the he made, I am sure, the final decision all on humane and proper thing to do. his own. Mr. Schieffer: What if it is not possible? Mr. Sevareid: Surely our representatives Then xvhat do you do? Do you ask the Con- there woidd not speak tvithout your author- gress to let you send those troops in there, ity on this matter? American troops to protect the withdrawal? you send them in tvithout congressional President Ford: It is a question of how Do approval? What do you do next? you phrase it. We never asked anybody to ask him to step down. There were discus- President Ford: As you know, I have asked or not he should or sions as to whether the Congress to clarify my authority as request shouldn't, but there was no direct President to send American troops in to from me for him to relinquish his role as the bring about the evacuation of friendly South head of state. Vietnamese or South Vietnamese that we all, President. After he was an elected He have an obligation to, or at least I think the of that properly was head government, we do. There is no problem in sending U.S. chosen, so his decision, as far as we know, military personnel into South Viet-Nam to was made totally on his own. evacuate Americans. That is permitted under the War Powers Act, providing we give ade- Evacuation From Viet-Nam quate prenotification to the Congress. That is what we did in the case of Phnom Mr. President, on the evac- Schieffer: Mr. Penh, in our personnel there. But if we are hope that some- uation, you have expressed going to have a sizable evacuation of South thing coidd he arranged so tens thousands of Vietnamese, I would think the Congress he hrought of loyal South Vietnmnese could ought to clarify the law and give me specific out of the country. authority. Whether they will or not, I can't you it is possihle to have some- Do think tell you at this point. thing like that if the North Vietnamese op- you do send them in pose it or if the Viet Co7ig are not willing Mr. Schieffer: If authority, they to go along ivith it? Are any kinds of nego- and if Congress gives you the will have to tiations underway right noiv to try to set ivill have to have airpower. It will almost up some sort of an arrangement like that? he a sizable commitment. They have to have an open-ended authority in Ford: I would agree with you President order to protect themselves. That is xvhat that if the North Vietnamese make a mili- you are asking for, isn't it? tary effort, it would be virtually impossible to do so unless we moved in substantial President Ford: Unless the North Viet-

597 May 12, 1975 — —; namese and the South Vietnamese have a Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, one of his cease-fire, and then the evacuation of those coynments 7vas that the United States had South Vietnamese could be done very easily. led the South Vietiiamese people to their Now, if there is a military conflict still deaths. Do you have any specific reply to that going on, or if either one side or the other one? shows displeasure about this, and if we President Ford: There were some public decided to do it—there are a number of and corresponding private commitments there would have to be "ifs" in that—yes, made in 1972-1973 where I think that the some fairly sizable U.S.—on a short term President of South Viet-Nam could have involvement, not on a very precise, military come to the conclusion, as he did, that the broad scale, of course. U.S. Government would do two things: One, replace military hardware on a one-for-one Factors Contributing to Vietnamese Fullback basis, keep his military strength sufficiently high so that he could meet any of the chal- Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, ivhen did lenges of the North, and in addition there you last talk to President Thieu? was a commitment that we, as a nation, President Ford: I have not personally would try to enforce the agreements that talked to President Thieu since I became were signed in Paris in January of 1973. President. I have had a number of exchanges Now, unfortunately, the Congress in of correspondence with him, but the last August of 1973 removed the latter, took time I talked to him was when he was in away from the President the power to move the United States and I was minority leader. in a military way to enforce the agreements That was roughly two years ago, as I that were signed in Paris. recollect. So, we were left then only with the other commitment, and unfortunately the replace- Mr. Croyikite: Gracious, ive have this hot- ment of military hardware was not lived up line with the potential great-power adver- to. I therefore can understand President sary, the Soviet Union, and yet, with an Thieu's disappointment in the rather trau- ally who is in dire straits at this moment matic times that he went through in the last there is no communication betiveen the Pres- week. I can understand his observations. idents. It seems strange. Mr. Sevareid: What is the relative iveight President Ford: Well, there is very good that you assign to, first, this question of how communication between myself, our Secre- much aid we seyit or didn't send, and his use tary of State, and our Ambassador there. of it, especially in this pullback? Where is So, there is no lack of communication in the greater mistake? Because historically and through proper channels. I don't think this is terribly important. it is essential in this situation that there be a direct communication between myself and President Ford: It is my judgment—and former President Thieu. history will be probably more precise but it is my judgment at the moment that Mr. Cronkite: Might it help to solve some the failure of the Congress to appropriate of the misunderstandings you had talked if the military aid requested—the previous Ad- directly to him? ministration asked for $1.4 billion for this

President Ford: I don't think so. We have fiscal year ; Congress authorized $1 billion had communications back and forth, both by Congress appropriated $700 million—and message and as well as by correspondence. the failure to make the commitment for this I think we understand one another. I think fiscal year of something close to what was some of his comments were more directed at asked for certainly raised doubts in the our government as a whole than directed at mind of President Thieu and his military me personally. that we would be supplying sufficient mili-

598 Department of State Bulletin tary hardware for them to adequately defend there could have been a stabilization of the their various positions in South Viet-Nam. situation which, in my judgment, would have Now, the lack of support certainly had an led more quickly to a cease-fire. impact on the decision that President Thieu Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, you have made to withdraw precipitously. I don't said you were not advised of this withdrawal think he would have withdrawn if the sup- of President Thieu's. Are you certain, how- poi't had been there. It wasn't there, so he ever, that none of the American military decided to withdraw. or diplomatic advisers out in Saigon did not Unfortunately, the withdrawal was hastily agree with him that a limited ivithdrawal done, inadequately prepared, and consequent- might be effective in bringing pressure on ly was a chaotic withdrawal of the forces Congress to vote these funds and that there- from military regions 1, 2, and 3. fore there was an American participation How you place the blame, what percent- in that decision? ages, our failure to supply the arms, what percentage related to the hastily and inade- President Ford: As far as I know, Walter, quately prepared withdrawal—the experts, there was no prenotification to any, certain- after they study the records, probably can ly high-ranking, U.S. military or civilian give you a better assessment ; but the initial official of the withdrawal decision. kickoff came for the withdrawal from the failure of our government to adequately sup- Mr. Sevareid: This whole affair is going port the military request for help. to be argued over. There will be vast books on it for years and years. Wouldn't it be Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, what I don't wisest to publish the correspondence be- understand is, if they are saying we have tween former President Nixon and President got to leave because the United States is not Thieu, xohich is disputed now, the 1973 going to give us some more equipment, why correspondence after the Paris accords? did they leave all the equipment up there that they had? Why did they abandon so much of President Ford: In the first place, I have that equipment? personally read the correspondence. The personal correspondence between President President Ford: As I was saying, the with- Nixon and President Thieu corresponds with drawal was very poorly planned and hastily the public record. I have personally verified determined. I am not an Army man. I was that. I don't think in this atmosphere it I talked to a good in the Navy. But have would be wise to establish the precedent of experts, and many Army and Marine Corps publishing the personal correspondence be- withdrawal, military they tell me that a tween heads of state. difficult maneuver withdrawal, is the most Maybe historically, after a period of time, to execute, and this decision by Presi- it might be possible in this instance, but if without dent Thieu was hastily done we establish a precedent for the publication became adequate preparation, and it in effect of correspondence between heads of state, rout. a I don't think that that correspondence or When you are in a panic state of mind, that kind of correspondence will be effective of inevitably you are going to leave a lot because heads of state—I have learned first- military hardware. It is tragic. There is no hand—have to be very frank in their ex- excuse for that kind of a military operation, changes with one another, and to establish but even though that happened, if they had a precedent that such correspondence would General Weyand been given military aid that be public, I think will downgrade what heads [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, of state try to do in order to solve problems. United States Army] recommended during Sevareid: course, there is no way the last month, I am convinced that with Mr. Of publishing it? that additional military hardware on time, to keep President Thieu from

599 May 12, 1975 —

President Ford: No. with me who I might privately think con tributed to the problem. Mr. Sevareid: Things like this have been By 1976, I would hope we could look for- judicioitsl]/ leaked when it served the pur- ward, with some progress in the field of pose of the President or the Secretary of foreign policy. I think we have got some State. You have no such plans for that? potential successes that will be very much President Ford: No, I have no such plans, possible as we look ahead. and to be very frank about it, it seems to So, rather than to replay the past with all that the people today are me American the division and divisive feelings between yearning for a new start. As I said in my good people in this country, I just hope we state of the vi'orld address to the Congress, can admit we made some mistakes, not try let's start afresh. to assess the blame, but decide how we can unless I pressed, I don't say the Now, am solve the problems that are on our doorstep. Congress did this or did that. I have to be And we have a few, but they are solvable frank if I am asked the categorical question. if we stick together, if we have a high de- I think to turn back the past and we ought gree of American unity. take a long look at how we can solve these problems affirmatively in the future. Viet- Mr. Cronkite: There is not much trouble— Nam has been a trauma for this country for leaving the Viet-Nam issue as the nation has 15 years or more. A lot of blame can be Jiad, in leaving Viet-Nam here tonight, but shared by a good many people—Democrats I ivould like to ask just one more. Have you as well as Republicans, Congress as well as talked to former President Nixon about any Presidents. aspects of this Viet-Nam thing in the last We have some big jobs to do in other parts few weeks? of the world. have treaty commitments We President Ford: After my state of the to keep. have relations with adversaries We world speech April 10, he called me, con- or potential adversaries that we should be gratulated me on it. We discussed what I concerned about. It is my judgment, under had said. It was a rather short but a very look ahead these circumstances, we should friendly chat on the telephone. and not concentrate on the problems of the past where a good bit of blame can be shared Mr. Cronkite: Any talk about secret agree- by many. ments?

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, Vice Presi- President Ford: As I recall the conversa- dent Rockefeller suggested he thinks this tion, he reiterated what I have said, that tvould he an issue in the. 1976 campaign. Will the public record corresponds with the pri- you make it an issue in 1976 or will you try vate correspondence in reference to the com- to keep it out of the campaign? mitments, moral or legal or otherwise.

President Ford: I will not make it a cam- Mr. Cronkite: Speaking of your state of paign issue in 1976. the world address, there was speculation Mr. Schieffer: Will Mr. Rockefeller? I around just before that address that you didn't quite understand ivhat he was driving were going to use it to put your own stamp at in that recent interview when he said, yon on foreign policy. I think the phrase was "to know, if 2,000 or 3,000 Americans die in this get out from under the shadow" of Secretary evacuation, that raises some issues. Henry Kissinger. Do you feel you did that ivith that speech, or was that ever your in- President Ford: Well, of course, the rec- tention? ord—whatever a man in public office says can be in and of itself a campaign issue. But President Ford: It wasn't done to show I can speak only for myself, and I do not any particular purpose, other than the prob- intend to go out and point the finger or make lems we had. Viet-Nam, of course, was num- a speech concerning those who have differed ber one on the agenda. We did want to

600 Department of State Bulletin indicate that—and I must say "we," it means Presideyit Ford: Oh, yes. Surely. No ques- the Administration—that we were strength- tion about that. As a matter of fact, in our ening NATO. We had to solve the problem discussions in the National Security Council, of the dispute between Greece and Turkey particularly when we were preparing for over Cyprus. SALT Two negotiations, there were some It was sort of a world look, and I don't options proposed by one individual or others. think it was necessary for me to put my There wasn't unanimity at the outset, but own imprint. I think it is more important by having, as I recall, three or four NSC to deal with reality rather than to try and meetings, we resolved those differences. At go off on my own. the outset there were differences, but when The problems have to be solved, and I we got there, there was unanimity on what don't care who has the label for it. we decided.

Mr. Sevareid: One more short question Foreign Policy Decisionmaking on this. It tvas the complaiyit of many people that worked with President Johnson on the Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, we all get Viet-Nam tvar that he never had time to the impression, and have since you have read any of the books about Indochina, the been in office, that you get your foreign French experience, the Viet Minh movement, policy advice exclusively from Henry Kis- and so on. Have you ever had time to read singer. If that isn't so, who else do you any of the books about that part of the listen to? world?

President Ford: That is a good question, President Ford: I, over the years, have and I would like to answer it quite frankly. read four to five books, but I have had the The National Security Council meets on the experience of sitting on a Committee on major decisions that I have to make SALT — Appropriations that had involvement going [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], MBFR back as early as 1953, with economic-mili- [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions], et tary aid to South Viet-Nam, and those hear- cetera. ings on appropriations for economic and I get the recommendations from the Na- military aid would go into the problems of tional Security Council. It includes Secre- South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, South tary Kissinger, Secretary Schlesinger [Sec- Viet-Nam, in great depth.

retary of Defense James R. Schlesinger] , the So, this outside reading, plus the testi- head of the CIA, the Chairman of the Joint mony, plus the opportunity to visit South Chiefs of Staff. The major decisions come Viet-Nam I think has given me a fairly the National to me in option papers from good background on the history as well as Security Council. the current circumstances. I meet daily with Secretary Kissinger for

about an hour, because I think it is important for me to be brought up day by day on Mr. Cronkite: John Hersey, in that ex- what the circumstances are in the various cellent New York Times Magazine piece yes- areas where we have potential decision- terday, said that you are quite impatient making on the agenda. But, the actual in- ivith palace feuds— formation that is involved in a major decision comes through the National Security President Ford: That is an understate- Council. ment.

Mr. Sevareid: Suppose there is a position Mr. Cronkite: —yet, reports have gone paper or policy recommendation from some- around quite continually here in Washington body in the National Security Council to that there are members of your most inti- ivhich the Secretary is opposed? Coidd it mate White House staff who would like to get to you? Coidd it get past him to you? see Dr. Kissinger go. Are you aware of that?

May 12, 1975 601 Congressional Oversight President Ford: If they believe it, they CIA's Role and to think have never said it to me. I happen Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, you said last Kissinger is an outstanding Secretary Henry fall—changing the subject—regarding the thought it since I have of State. I have CIA, that you were ordering a study on hoiv him and he has been in the job. known better to keep Congress informed of CIA Fortunately, my personal acquaintance- activities. Can you tell us ho^v that study is Kissinger goes back 10 ship with Secretary coming, and can we expect any report on or 15 years, so I have known him over a that in the near future? period of time, and it is my strong feeling that he has made a tremendous contribution President Ford: I appointed the Rocke- to world peace. feller Commission, an excellent group, and He has been the most effective Secretary they are now in the process of taking testi- of State, certainly in my period of service mony from people within the government in the Congress, or in the Vice Presidency, and people outside of the government. It is or the White House. I have never heard any- a very thorough investigation. They have an body on my staff ever make a recommenda- outstanding staff. tion to me that Secretary Kissinger should I would expect within the next 60 to 90 leave. days I would have from that commission its recommendations for any structural changes Mr. Cronldte: What about suggestions— or any other changes that might be made,

President Ford: I would strongly disagree but I haven't gotten that report yet. with them and let them know it quite forth- Mr. Cronkite: That is the only study. rightly. There is not a study on just congressional Mr. Cronldte: What about suggestions liaison unth the CIA? that perhaps someone else shoidd be the President Fo)d: No. That, to some extent, national security adviser, that he shoidd give is a separate issue. The Congress, in recent up one of those hats? How do you feel about years, has broadened the number of people that? who are filled in by the CIA. to draw a President Ford: If you were When I was on the Committee on Appro- good argu- chart, I think you might make a priations, I don't think there were more than ment that that job ought to be divided. 10 or 12 people in the Congress, House and On the other hand, sometimes in govern- Senate, who were kept abreast of the budget ment you get unique individuals who can of the CIA, the activities of the CIA, but to- a combination of very successfully handle day I would guess that it is close to 50 to 75. jobs like Secretary Kissinger is doing today Now, when the number of people being Council and as head of the National Security told reaches that magnitude, inevitably there Secretary of State. can and will be leaks about some of the jobs person, you ought If you get that kind of a or activities being undertaken by the CIA. And to take advantage of that capability. Of course, the CIA under those circum- circumstances, therefore, under the current stances can't possibly operate effectively, nor would I want, I would not recommend, either covertly or overtly, so I think we have division of responsibilities. a those two got to find a better way of adequately keep- informed, but not enlarging Mr. Cronldte: Is there any talk of his re- ing the Congress signing? the number who have to be informed.

tvouldn't the President Ford: I have talked to Secretary Mr. Seva7-eid: Mr. President, cleaner of State Kissinger. I have asked him to whole thing be safer and clearer and stay and he is committed to stay through if it was simply the law that the CIA gather the end of this Administration, January 20, intelligence only and engage in no covert po- 1977. litical operations abroad?

602 Department of State Bulletin —

President Ford: If we lived in a different President Ford: There have been some world most successful ones, and I don't think it is wise for us today to talk about the good ones Mr. Sevareid: It might help to make the or even the bad ones in the past. world different. It is a very risky business, but it is a very President Ford: Well, I can't imagine the important part of our national security, and United States saying we would not under- I don't think we should discuss—certainly I take any covert activities, and knowing at shouldn't discuss—specifics. I shouldn't indi- the same time that friends, as well as foes, cate we have done this or done that. are undertaking covert activity, not only in But I can assure you that, if we are to com- the United States but elsewhere. pete with foes on the one hand, or even be That would be like tying a President's hand equal in the execution of foreign policy with behind his back in the planning and execu- our friends, we have to have covert activities tion of foreign policy. I believe that we have carried out. to have an outstanding intelligence-gather- can the ing group, such as the CIA or in the other in- Mr. Cronkite: Hoiv in a democracy telligence-collection organizations in our gov- people have an input into what governments overseas they are going to knock or what ernment. But I also think we have to have off to It seems to some operational activity. ones they are going support? the principle de- Now, we cannot compete in this very real be antithetical to whole of mocracy. world if you are just going to tie the United States with one hand behind its back and President Ford: Every four years, Walter, everybody else has got two good hands to car- the American people elect a President, and ry out their operations. they elect a Congress every two years, or Mr. Cronkite: Do you people mean by most of the Congress every two years. covert activities—/ want to get clear on this The American people, I think, have to —does this mean the use of the "dirty tricks" make a judgment that the people they elect department to sxipport friendly governments are going to carry out, of course, domestic and try to bring down unfriendly ones? policy, but equally important, foreign policy. And the implementation of foreign policy President Ford: It covers a wide range of inevitably means that you are going to have activities, Walter. I wouldn't want to get in intelligence gathering as well as operational and try to pinpoint or define them, but it cov- activities by your intelligence organization. ers a wide range of activities. I just happen to believe, as President, but I believed it when I was in the Congress, that our gov- Options for Middle East Negotiations ernment must carry out certain covert ac- Mr. Cronkite: Can we move on to the tivities. Middle East now? Are you reconciled to a Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, what do we Geneva meeting noiv or would you still like get for that, for these covert activities? We to see some more direct diplomacy in the step- hear about this business of "destabilizing" by-step Kissinger pattern? the government in Chile—we didn't seem to help ourselves very much iw that—the Phoe- President Ford: I think, following the last nego- nix program zw Viet-Nam, the "secret war" very serious disappointment of the tiations between Isi-ael and Egypt, we are in Laos. Is it that tve just never hear of the going to successful ones? committed, at least in principle, to Geneva. President Ford: A good intelligence covert Now in the meantime, we are going activity, you don't go around talking about. through this process of reassessment of our Mr. Schieffer: Have there ever been any whole Middle Eastern policy which, prior to good ones? the suspension of the negotiations between

May 12, 1975 603 Egypt and Israel, had been a very successful ties with their own forces in the Middle East. one. Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, does the re- Now, there really are three options. You assessment now going on of the Middle East could resume the suspended negotiations policy also include a reassessment of the U.S. without making a commitment to go to Ge- position toivard the Palestinians ? neva. You could go to Geneva and try to get an overall settlement, which is a very com- President Ford: If you take the path of an plicated matter. Many people advocate it, overall settlement and going to Geneva, I however. But while you were going through think you have to have an analysis of what this negotiation for an overall settlement, as is going to happen there because the Palestin- a third option you might have an interim ians are going to demand recognition. negotiated settlement between two of the But I don't mean to infer that we have parties, such as Israel and Egypt. made any decision. But the Palestinians have Now, those are basically the three options. to be examined as a part of the overall Mid- We have not made any decision yet. We have dle East situation. I am not making any com- had our Ambassadors from the Middle East mitment one way or another, but it has to be come back and report to me. We have under- part of the problem that we are analyzing. taken a study under the leadership of Joe Mr. Schieffer: Let me ask you this just Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for as a followup. Could the Palestinians be in- Political Affairs] to bring together the best cluded if they refuse to deal with the Israe- thinking and all of the options. lis? We have brought in, or Secretary Kissin- ger has brought in, some outside experts in President Ford: I don't see how, because the Middle East. Last week, I had a meeting the Israelis, in the first place, don't recog- with a former State Department official. nize the Palestinians as a proper party, and Gene Rostow, who is an expert in this area. the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] But right at the moment, we have made no doesn't recognize the existence of Israel. So, firm decision as to what our next particular I think that is an impasse right there, and step will be in the Middle East. it will be one of the most difficult things that will have to be worked out if it is worked out Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, can you fore- at Geneva. see any possible circumstances in which you would feel it right to send American armed Mr. Schieffer: Do you have any feel for forces into the Middle East on land or in the when there ivill be a date for the Geneva air? In other words, military intervention? Conference reconvening?

President Ford: I can't foresee any, Eric, President Ford: I have seen a lot of spec- but—and I see no reason to do so. So, I think ulation early this summer, but no set time the answer is pretty categorically no. has been determined.

Mr. Sevareid: What about a wholly differ- Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, the Israeli ent level, if there were agreement for a Rus- Foreign Minister, [Yigal^ Allan, is in Wash- sian-American peace patrol and the alterna- ington now, and there are reports out of Je- tive to that ivas another Mideast war, would rusalem today that he is going to suggest a you go that far? summit meeting between you and President [Prime Minister] Rabin. Do you expect to President Ford: You put it on about the have such a meeting? most extreme alternatives. We want peace in the Middle East, and I think the Soviet Un- President Ford: I wouldn't expect that t ion does, too. would make any commitment on that until I would hope that there wouldn't be a need we are further along in our reassessment. It for either the United States or the Soviet may be desirable at some point. It may be Union having any peacekeeping responsibili- desirable to meet other parties, or other

604 Department of State Bulletin heads of state, in the Middle East, but 1 don't the effectiveness of the treaty, which, as Sec- want to make any commitment tonight as to retary Kissinger said in his address to the any one or as to more than one. U.N. General Assembly last autumn, deserves full and continuing international sup- Mr. Cronkite: Doesn't that sort of imply port. We hope the Korean example will en- that we are still being a little bit hardnosed courage still other countries to become NPT in our disappointment over the Kissinger parties, for we believe that the security of mission ? the international community and each of its I think it is wise for President Ford: No, members can be furthered by wider support look ourselves at the new op- us to take a for the treaty. tions or different options. I certainly wouldn't rule out a meeting with Mr. Rabin, but I don't want to make any commitment to one until we have moved a bit further down in Secretary Regrets Postponement the process of a reassessment. I reiterate that if we meet with one, we of Trip to South America certainly ought to give others an opportunity, other heads of state, to have the same Statement by Secretary Kissinger ^ input.

Mr. Cronkite: So, there won't be any Events in Indochina are unfolding with favored-nation treatment of Israel in the fu- such unexpected speed that the President has ture? asked me to stay in Washington in the days just ahead. It is with great reluctance and President Ford: I think we have to, in this even greater personal regret that I must very difficult situation, where the possibility therefore postpone my trip to South America of war is certainly a serious one, if you have week. a war, you are inevitably going to have an scheduled for later this I have communicated with the Foreign oil embargo— I think we have to be very cau- of Argentina, Brazil, and Vene- tious in our process of reassessment. Ministers zuela to inform them of this decision and of my determination to visit South America at a later date. The forging of strengthened ties with our neighbors in this hemisphere is a cardinal Republic of Korea Ratifies objective of our foreign policy. The aspira- Nonproliferation Treaty tions of Latin America and the United States are indissolubly linked and are of signifi- Zurhellen, Jr.^ Remarks by J. Owen cance for the rest of the world. For these reasons, I particularly regret the Today the Republic of Korea deposited the postponement of my South American trip it be- instrument of ratification by which under these circumstances. And I look comes a party to the Treaty on the Nonpro- forward to working with my colleagues at liferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United the OAS General Assembly here in Wash- States welcomes this important act by the ington next month, where we will have Republic of Korea to join the 85 countries another opportunity to discuss our common which have given concrete expression to their goals. determination to combat the danger of nuclear proliferation by becoming parties to Treaty Room of the the NPT. Made at a ceremony in the Department of State on Apr. 23 (text from press is of several countries which Korea one release 213). Mr. Zurhellen is Deputy Assistant have completed ratification of the NPT in Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. recent months. These developments enhance '^ Issued on Apr. 21.

May 12, 1975 605 Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for L'Express of France

Following is the transcript of an interview economic vitality and some political con- with Secretary Kissinger by Pierre Salinger stancy. Secondly, the simplicities of the cold of L'Express of France condncted at the De- war began to evaporate. partment of State on April 12. The domestic pressures in all countries for putting an end to tension became greater and Press release 208 dated April 19 greater, and within the Communist world it occasions Q. You have said on a number of was self-evident that we were no longer con- that are historian than a you more a states- fronting a monolith. America had gone man. I wonder might step whether you back through two assassinations and a war in a minute in your role of a statesman and Viet-Nam which was a profound shock to us take on your role as a historian and give me because we entered it rather lightheartedly an assessment American foreign policy of and with great self-confidence, and when we from 1969 to 1975. came into office we found 550,000 men en-

Secretary Kissinger: When I came into gaged in a war against which public opinion office with the Nixon administration, we was increasingly turning, including the very were really at the end of a period of Ameri- people who had gotten us into the war. can foreign policy in which a redesign would With respect to newly developing coun- have been necessary to do no matter who tries it became clear that we faced a problem took over. I think myself, for example, in that was much more philosophical than retrospect that the Kennedy period will be economic in terms of their perception of the seen as the last flowering of the previous era world. rather than as the beginning of a new era. So our problem was how to orient America I don't say this as a criticism, but simply in this world and how to do it in such a way to define the problem. that we could avoid these oscillations be-

What was the situation we faced ? In most tween excessive moralism and excessive of the postwar period we could operate with pragmatism, with excessive concern with a simplicity of the cold war until 1969—of power and total rejection of power, which absolute good against absolute evil or pre- have been fairly characteristic of American venting military aggression against allies. policy. This was the basic goal we set our- Insofar as we were engaged in economic selves. development, we did so really as a projection I think we did establish a new relationship of this abroad on the theory that economic with Europe, with some strain, but I would development would produce political sta- say all our relations now are more mature bility. And we were operating with enor- and calmer than at any period since the mous self-confidence and self-assurance; that fifties. The same is true of Japan.

is, as the only major Western country that I think we have taken, I hope, creative ac- had come out of the war undamaged and in- count of the polarity of the Communist deed had been generally successful in every- world. We have tried to respond to the need thing that it attempted. to ease tensions, and we disengaged our mili- When we came into office in 1969, we faced tary forces from Viet-Nam. a dramatically changed environment. First, I think we have made progress in the Mid- Western Europe and Japan had regained dle East, too, but I think we had better dis-

606 Department of State Bulletin — cuss that more as a tactical than as a public opinion than has been the case philosophical problem. throughout the entire postwar period. What have been our difficulties? Our diffi- This is how I would assess the pluses and culties have been almost entirely domestic on minuses of American foreign policy, and I a variety of levels. am absolutely confident that we can restore In order to be able to unify the country the situation now that certain of our traumas when the war in Viet-Nam was finished, we are seen in that perspective. believed that those who were opposed to the war in Viet-Nam would be satisfied with our Foreign Policy and Domestic Problems withdrawal and those who favored an honorable ending would be satisfied if the United Q. About three moiiths ago in an interview States would not destroy an ally. with an American magazine, you said, and I We will never know whether there would quote, The political problem is that the whole have been a domestic tranquillity, but within Western world with the exception perhaps of three months of the end of that war we were the United States is suffering from a political projected into the middle of the Watergate malaise, inner uncertainty and from lack of crisis that no one could foresee and that had direction. Those very words have been used an enormously debilitating impact on our in Etirope to describe ivhat is going on in the executive authority. The conduct of foreign United States. policy without executive authority becomes Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would say extremely difficult. that they can probably be applied in some This in turn triggered a series of actions respects to the United States right now. I by the Congress which in a number of cases know there is a school of thought that says such as Turkey and Indochina have acceler- if you admit difficulties you are causing ated our difficulties and encouraged pressure these difficulties. These are the people prob- groups of all kinds to influence foreign ably who would have recommended that policy. I think this has been an unexpected Churchill in 1940 say that a group of British event or at least unpredicted by us. yachtsmen decided to cross the channel and So, we face now a problem that while the happened to congregate off the coast of Dun- design of our foreign policy is intact, the kirk. authority to implement it may be impaired, We have had assassinations and two and it is a primary responsibility to attempt Presidents driven from office, a war which to restore that through partnership with the as generally seen is not successful, so we Congress and through perhaps getting more have this problem. But we also have great of a public consensus. strengths, great resources, and a basically all of this has happened at a time Finally, correct design of foreign policy, and there- when the establishment that carried our fore I believe that we can overcome our foreign policy has been both disintegrated domestic problems, and I believe that we can demoralized. and start a period of new creativity. At the time of the Kennedy period, you I would therefore reject the term "political still had a group of people who had carried malaise." We are having major difficulties. policy, who helped shape American foreign We are determined to overcome them. And public opinion and on whom a President I am confident we shall. could count to perform missions. These people are now 15 years older and really have Q. Do you think realistically that in the had no adequate replacements. short term the problems of American foreign So that the administration—and I would policy, as they relate to internal politics in say this would be true as well of a Democrat America, can be righted until you have an as well as a Republican administration election and have a President who has been is more naked to day-to-day pressures of elected running the country?

May 12, 1975 607 Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think they Secretary Kissinger: I believe that when can be, yes, and in fact they must be. History a major country engages in a decade in a won't wait two years until we can have an major effort which then does not obviously election. Moreover, our election could easily succeed, it raises questions about wisdom, be conducted in terms that would not of itself judgment, and effectiveness, and questions give a clear-cut answer, especially if the about the impact of that setback on the President doesn't exercise active leadership. psyche of the country. So the President has to act in terms of the Now, I say this is a problem the United problems he now faces, which he is deter- States has to face. I cite it also as a problem mined to do. we can overcome and will overcome. But we We have some anomalies in our situation will surely not overcome it if we pretend that domestically in the sense that if there was it does not exist and we are going to continue ever an election fought on issues it was the business as usual. last one. Sixty-two percent of the public So I repeat: I think it has produced a voted for a strong foreign policy and moder- problem that affects our general stance in the ate conservatism and, in a way, were disen- world. I want Americans to face this. When franchised because of the series of events they face it, they can also overcome it. I over which they had absolutely no control, don't believe that my saying it creates the which were totally unforeseeable, and which problem. It is my duty as Secretary of State produced the collapse of the Nixon Presi- to describe the world as it is. dency. That is an anomalous situation. Q. And you have said that if American There is no reason to suppose that a new leadership is not there, there is no other election fought on those issues would pro- leadership in the Western world. But as to duce a different result. that leadership present today, are you getting the impression from your reports from Q. Yet today public polls would indicate abroad that people still have confidence in that less than W percent of the American American leadership? people ivould be willing to intervene in

Europe if there tvas a military overrun of Secretary Kissinger: I think right now Europe by the Soviet Union, less than 30 people around the world, from what I can percent in Israel if_ Israel was to fall to the learn, are worried at a minimum about how

Arabs, and it seems that there is a real trend America will assess its present situation. I of isolationism in this country. believe we have to face the fact that the past decade has raised certain doubts about Secretary Kissinger: I think that there is American leadership. I say this in order to a certain trend, but this I think is partly due reestablish American leadership and not to to this disassociation from the political abdicate it. process that has resulted from Watergate. I think the President is absolutely deter- Every public opinion poll shows that about mined to conduct a strong foreign policy, and 70 percent of the people support our foreign in the weeks ahead you will see that he will policy, which is certainly not isolationist, so speak increasingly on foreign policy. a great deal public depends on whether the I believe that the design of our foreign finds leadership with it can identify. which policy can be maintained, and I believe also that our friends will be more reassured if we Q. You have said that credibility of the admit that we have a problem which we are United States in one part of the world is very trying to solve than if we pretend that we important in how people in other parts of the don't have a problem that they recognize. tvorld vietv that credibility. There are those who say that by saying that you are planting Q. Let me go away from the past for a in people's minds the feeling that the Ameri- minute and ask you to look into the future can credibility is no longer to be counted on. a little bit. If you were to portray the best

608 Department of State Bulletin and the worst scenario for American policy work for it. So I think the possibilities now in the world over the next five years, how are better, strangely enough, than say last would you see those tivo possibilities? October when I would give occasionally gloomy interviews and everyone saying, Secretary Kissinger: Well, the best sce- was in God's is talking nario would be one in which our cohesion with "What name he about?" Now that some of these events have hap- Europe is strengthened and the relationship pened, I think we are in a much better posi- across the Atlantic is fostered, in which we tion to transcend our problems. can develop a new set of relationships with Japan, Western Europe, and the United

States that are adjusted to issues that tran- U.S.-Soviet Relations scend events, in which detente becomes not a tactical policy but the method of operation of Q. Hoiu would you assess the state of the great powers, in which relations with U.S.-Soviet relations and detente? China would continue toward normalization, Secretary Kissinger: I think we have had and in which in our relationships with the a setback in the trade agreement. I think underdeveloped world we overcome the pres- there is a tendency on the negative side to ent dilemma of simultaneous confrontation use detente as a sort of a palliative while the and cooperation in a spirit in which at least bureaucracies on both sides, and especially the general conceptions of a desirable world on the Soviet side, continue on traditional structure begin to emerge. courses. I think in America too many people worst scenario is one which will show The have taken detente for granted and have a gradual disintegration of the domestic forgotten what it was like to live in the cold stability of all of our friendly countries, ac- war, and so they think they can hack away companied by a growing sense of impotence at it and think that then there is no price and less self-confidence by the United States, for it. which will sooner or later trigger a series I think we have a possibility and indeed a of more aggressive actions by hostile powers duty to attempt to transform the cold war and increasing confrontations with the less into a more cooperative relationship. I think developed world. when two countries possess the capability to I would put into the best scenario also a destroy civilized life, they cannot conduct creative solution to problems of energy, food, foreign policy by traditional maxims. My the worst scenario and raw materials, and in disagreement with some of our domestic op- that these issues become increasingly issues ponents is that they think that if they would of confrontation. only apply some of the old pure-power polit- Both scenarios are possible. I believe we ical terms to Soviet-American relations they best scenario. I think the can achieve the might get some unspecified concessions, but blocks are there, and I think the will building they also might get a series of confrontations is are going through one of those there. We out of proportion to anything that we began. difficult periods which perhaps because now To be sure, we have to defend our vital in- of very difficulty can be used to start their terests, but Soviet-American relations are creations and so, in a funny way, I am new not designed for tests of manhood. more optimistic now than I was six months I think the relationship has had a setback. ago. It has had a period of stagnation. I have the Six ago I saw the dangers, but months impression that the Soviet Union is now very others agreed with me. Now I think few fairly anxious to pick it up again. I think the dangers and there- most people can see that the possibilities to move in a positive fore they can also seize the opportunities. direction still exist. Six months ago people were satisfied that things were getting juggled into reasonable Q. Do you agree with those who say that shape, and now they know they have got to the ability or the possibility of the super-

609 May 12, 1975 — powers—the United States and the Soviet Q. It is generally believed that the rela- Union—to influence events in the world is tions between the United States and Israel becoming less and less? are less good today than they were before those negotiations because of the feeling that Secretary Kissinger: Not when they are perhaps Israel could have gone further in dealing with each other, but dealing with those negotiations. third powers. It depends on how determined they are to influence events. If they really Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't say our are determined to influence them, I think relations are less good, I would say our rela- that they can do it. tions are now different in the sense that when we were the sole mediator there could Q. If that is true, don't you think that the be a degree of coordination that is more diffi- current perception of the American situa- cult to achieve than when we are dealing tion, ivhether that is true or not, may not with a wider forum. influence the Soviet Union to start moving In any event, it forces us to assess how we into areas ivhere it has not traditionally are. to conduct this diplomacy. This is the moved? essence of our reassessment. Our reassess- Secretary Kissinger: It is one of the dan- ment isn't primarily concerned with ques- gers of the situation; but I think that the tions of economic and military aid. Soviet Union will find over the next few Q. There is a feeling in Israel that there months that this perception is not the real is an erosion of support for Israel in the perception, because I think that the Presi- United States. dent and his associates are absolutely determined to strengthen American foreign Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, my policy. friend Abba Eban once said to me that Israel considered objectivity 100 percent agreement Q. Are you in touch the with Soviet Union with their point of view. So if you slip-to 98 in any way to indicate to them this American percent, you can already be "accused of determination ? erosion and deterioration.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but they also I think there are two separate problems know our determination to pursue detente. the relation between the Israeli Government They know both. and the U.S. Government, and the perception of the American public of the American role

in the world. I think in general the readiness Middle East Negotiations to give foreign aid and to run the risk of war

Q. Do you think there is any possibility has deteriorated in America, but I think that of having a netv round of talks in which the Israel has suffered less from that deteriora- United States played a role before a new tion than almost any other country. Geneva Conference was assembled? Q. What would be your prognosis if you went to Geneva without any further con- Secretary Kissinger: It is entirely up to versations? the parties. The United States cannot be in a position where it seems more interested in Secretary Kissinger: I would send some- an interim settlement than the parties them- one who has a lot of time. selves. It is not enough to have a desire to resume Viet-Nam and Cambodia them. Something has to be put into the negotiations that is different from what preceded Q. The Cambodian Ambassador was it, and until we see that from one or both quoted as saying yesterday that after using of the parties, there is no point in our en- Cambodia for five years and carrying out gaging ourselves. American policy in Southeast Asia, the

610 Department of State Bulletin Americans have now abandoned a naive peo- maybe having triggered panic by the nature ple to their fate. of our domestic debate this year and triggered panic and encouraged moves, but we Secretary Kissinger: What happened in have made a monumental effort in South Cambodia is heartbreaking. In our domestic Viet-Nam. Cambodia is always different. debate, Cambodia is often described as if we went into it because we didn't have enough Q. Those who are your harshest critics of a war going on so we had to add another say if you had made an effort after the 1973 neutral country. accord of Paris to bring about a political In fact, we entered Cambodia because settlement in Cambodia and Viet-Nam in- there were 60,000 North Vietnamese in sanc- stead of concentrating on military help, that tuaries along the border, and we picked up this might not have happened. between 15,000 and 20,000 tons of war Secretary Kissinger: Well, my experience materiel. After entered Cambodia, our we in these negotiations is that you cannot have to casualties dropped from over 100 a week political settlement without military stabi- less than 50 a week and finally to 10 a week lization. I think we can demonstrate that in because, in effect, our operation in Cambodia the summer of 1973 we were closer to a ability deprived the North Vietnamese of the political settlement in Cambodia than at any to conduct military operations in military other period and that this possibility evap- regions 3 and 4, Saigon and the delta. So orated when the right to conduct bombing with- from the point of view of achieving our in Cambodia was removed so that we lost a drawal, the operation in Cambodia was the ability to trade the end of the bombing success. for some political concessions. beginning, 1970 However, from the from As for the rest, I believe that the North on, we were prevented from conducting our Vietnamese would have negotiated only un- operations in Cambodia for any purpose der conditions in which any possibility of a other than promoting the withdrawal of military takeover was foreclosed to them, Americans. We were forced to put a limit of and as these conditions deteriorated, the 30 miles on the extent of our penetration and possibility of a political settlement deterio- from really conducting operations in a way rated, too. that would have supported the Government Q. What is your reaction to the statement of Cambodia. of President d'Estaing [Valery Giscard I must say I have great admiration for the d'Estaing, of France] this week about the bravery of the government that stayed when need for political settlement in Viet-Nam? we withdrew, and I am very saddened by the fact that in its final days we were not even Secretary Kissinger: I agree with him. able to give them ammunition. I am not The question is what kind of a political set- proud of it. tlement and how it is going to be achieved, but I substantially agree with him. Q. Isn't it entirely possible that the situation in Viet-Nam may be identical, the Q. His statement pretty much let it be Americans may be evacuating, the last understood that a political settlement can Americans from Viet-Nam? only be achieved tvith the departure of President Thieu, the President of South Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it is Viet-Nam. settled, but it would be idle to deny that South Viet-Nam is in very grave danger. But Secretary Kissinger: Well, the United there the situation is different. We cannot be States has been in Viet-Nam and Indochina accused of not having made an all-out fight. now for 15 years. I would hate to think that We can be accused in the last two years of everybody that ever worked with us wound having reduced our aid too precipitously and up being discarded by the United States.

May 12, 1975 611 Now, basically the political evolution in NATO commitments, and you have the dan- Saigon depends on the people of South Viet- ger of Portugal leaving NATO. will Nam, and the United States accept any Secretary Kissinger: Well, in the so-called South political settlement that the people of southern tier we are having massive prob- Viet-Nam negotiate among themselves. But lems, and they haven't been made easier by I don't think we will participate in any our domestic events with respect to Turkey political preconditions of this kind. and Greece.

Q. I remember the period from 1969 to As I told you, the Western alliance now 1972 ivhen you were carr%iing out the policy faces a period not so much of strain between of bringivg Americans back home from Viet- Europe and the United States as adjustment Nam that you replied repeatedly to critics of of the domestic structures of various Euro- your policy at that time and stated to them pean countries. The Cyprus problem should this ivas the ivay you had to do it in order to be settled by negotiation, and I think can be prevent a debate in this country that cojtld. settled by negotiation, if the parties are ever tear the country apart in terms of trijing to left alone long enough to develop some pin blame for the disaster in Viet-Nam. rhythm in their negotiations. We will try to be helpful. Secretary Kissinger: I thought it was es- The problem in Portugal, too, is very sential that America withdraw from Viet- serious, because it could be taken as a test Nam in a manner that Americans could feel case for possible evolutions in other coun- carried out the obligations inherent in hav- tries, and not only if the Communists take ing 550,000 troops there, and very often, over. It could also be the case if the Com- popular policies become much less popular munists become the sinews of non-Commu- when people recognize the consequences of nist government, and perhaps especially so. what they have done. Chamberlain was I would think in the Western alliance now extremely popular in Britain in 1938, and the major problem is not the debate that that didn't protect him from those very same seemed so important two years ago between people 18 months later. Europe and the United States. I think that Q. Are you concerned that the cwrent has been almost substantially or almost com- effort of the Administration attempting to pletely overcome by the domestic evolution pin the blame for the problems in South in many European countries, and I would Viet-Nam and Cambodia on the Congress say, irrespective of Europe, also the domestic ivill produce exactly the same kind of debate evolution in America. that you were trying to avoid? Q. Would you see any responsibility on the

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I believe that part of European couyitries to try to do some- the debate that was started this year on the thing about the evolution of matters in supplemental request was quite unnecessary Portugal? and it wasn't started by us. But it is my in- Secretary Kissinger: It is not an appro- tention, and I know it is the intention of the priate subject for me to discuss, but cer- in President, that we will not engage a tainly it is a subject in which I am in close period of recrimination and we will not look contact with my colleagues. for scapegoats. Q. How do you judge the current state of U.S.-French relations ? Developments in Europe Secretary Kissinger: I think that the rela-

Q. Let me turn, if I can, for a minute to tions between France and the United States Europe. NATO, ivhich had its 25th anni- began to improve very rapidly after the be- versary last year, seems to be in more trouble ginning of the Presidency of Giscard right now than it has been in its entire his- d'Estaing and also under the foreign minis- tory, with the Greeks and Turks questioning try of Sauvagnargues.

612 Department of State Bulletin —

I think the meeting between the two sequently, we were prepared to respond Presidents in Martinique was one of the positively to the French initiative for a mul- most successful meetings that I have at- tilateral conference focused on energy while tended, not only in the sense of formal agree- other problems were dealt with in other ments, although some substantial ones were forums, whether existing ones or, where re- made, but in the sense that I think both sides quired, new ones. We remain ready to pro- are now dealing with each other without ceed in this manner. complexes. Q. How do you see your own future ? What We recognize that France is performing is the future of Henry Kissinger? or playing a somewhat special role in Europe. I think France understands that the Secretary Kissinger: For the morale of last problem with respect to America now some of our Ambassadors, I would like to is an unquenchable thirst for domination keep open the possibility of a potential quite the contrary. So we are now dealing vacancy, and also, quite frankly, I was not with each other in a much more matter-of- overly eager to be involved or to have foreign fact way, much less theological. We began to policy involved in the political campaign. have many disagreements on the energy con- But if my analysis of the situation is cor- ference last November, and it was very rect, as I believe it is, and if we have an rapidly settled, and since then I think it is obligation to rally other countries and our correct to say that we have worked together own people to the real tasks and opportuni- most cooperatively. ties before us, then this is not a time in It has become a matter of course for the which I can leave, unless the President asked two Presidents and for the two Foreign me to leave, which he has not done. Ministers to exchange ideas as to events of So I would think that I would stay for a major international importance, so much a foreseeable future. What happens after that, matter of course that it isn't even reported I have absolutely no idea, and I have never any more when letters are exchanged. thought about it. There aren't too many jobs I would say on the whole that the state of for which being Secretary of State prepares the relations between France and the United you. States is better than it has been since I have Mr. Salinger: Mr. Secretary, thank you. been involved in government, which is since 1961. This doesn't mean that there aren't some problems.

Q. What is your view on the termination Mr. Dent To Be Special Representative of the preparatory energy conference this week? for Trade Negotiations

Secretary Kissinger: Let me be clear: Of The Senate on March 19 confirmed the course we recognize the interconnection be- nomination of Frederick B. Dent to be Spe- tween energy and other resource issues, but cial Representative for Trade Negotiations, experience has shown that a "global" nego- with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary tiation on all issues leads to stalemate. Con- and Plenipotentiary.

May 12, 1975 613 President Kaunda of Zambia Visits Washington

Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of the Re- Mr. President, we have been following de- public of Zambia, visited Washington April velopments in southern Africa with great, 18-21. He met tvith President Ford, Secre- great interest. For many years the United tary Kissinger, and other U.S. Government States has supported self-determination for officials. Following is an exchange of toasts the peoples of that area, and we continue to between President Ford and President do so today. Kaunda at a dinner at the White House on We view the coming independence of April 19. Mozambique, Angola, and the island terri- tories with great satisfaction, just as we viewed the independence of Guinea-Bissau Weekly Compilation Presidential Documents dated April 28 of just last year. PRESIDENT FORD May I say, Mr. President, America stands ready to help the emerging countries, the President, Mrs. Kaweche Mr. Kaunda, emerging nations, and to provide what as- Kaunda, distinguished guests: Let say me sistance we can, and we know, Mr. Presi- that Mrs. and I are extremely delighted Ford dent, that these new states will continue to to have you, Mr. President, your family, and look to you for wise, wise counsel as they your distinguished gue.sts with us here this build to nationhood in the future. evening. It has been a great pleasure for Much still remains to be done in southern to talk to lovely wife and to know me your Africa. In this connection, Mr. President, we of delightful family, and on behalf of your welcome your commitment to change through wish Mrs. Ford and myself, we extend and peaceful negotiations and understanding be- to you our very, very best. tween the parties concerned, rather than Your visit to Washington is a mark of through recourse to violence. friendship that has existed between our two We deeply believe that patient diplomacy nations since Zambia gained her independ- will bear great fruit, and we promise our con- ence in 1964. tinued efforts and our support as you seek, America knows and respects you, Mr. with others, to resolve these problems at President, but also I should say we know the conference table. that in the modern history of Zambia and Mr. President, in my April 10 speech to the history of Kenneth Kaunda, they are the Congress and to the American people, inseparable. Your moral and intellectual I noted that America is developing a closer leadership guided your country to independ- relationship with nations of Africa, and I ence, and for that we praise you. said that Africans must know that America Your leader.ship has made your young na- is a true and concerned friend, reliable both tion an example of respect and admiration in word as well as in deed. throughout the world. The American people Your visit, Mr. President, coming so soon join me in saluting you for your accomplish- after that occasion, is most timely for all of ments, your dedication, and your wisdom in us. I hope that you will take back to your a controversial and difficult world. countrymen and to all Africans our renewed We ask that you convey to your people pledge of friendship. in Zambia our admiration for them and for Our wide-ranging discussions, Mr. Presi- you and our greetings. dent, this afternoon after my return from

614 Department of State Bulletin some of our historic celebrations of our We come, Mr. President, to America with 200th, or Bicentennial, anniversary covered a clear purpose. We simply want to be un- matters of common interest and concern, and derstood. We seek American understanding it confirmed the relationship between your of Africa's objectives and America's fullest country and my country. support in the attainment of these objectives. There is, however, one area, Mr. Presi- The relations between Zambia and the dent, of mutual interest which we tacitly did United States cause me no concern, because not discuss. I have since found, tonight, from they are cordial, although there is room for your lovely wife, that we have a close and improvement through more sound coopera- intimate interest in a special area. I tion. understand that you do enjoy playing golf. What gives Zambia and Africa great cause

[Laughter.] I feel sure, Mr. President, that for concern is, Mr. President, America's our common problems, nationally, interna- policy toward Africa—or is it the lack of tionally, bilaterally, on some occasions in the it, which, of course, can mean the same future can best be resolved by a little compe- thing. tition on the links. [Laughter.] I intend to I have not worked at the U.N., but I have make an honest effort to see if our friend- been told that at the U.N. sometimes there ship cannot be broadened by such an ex- are tricks in which an abstention in a vote perience. can be a vote for or against. A no-policy So, I say to you, Mr. President, to your position may not be a neutral position indica- lovely wife and your son and your colleagues tive of a passive posture, but a deliberate here this evening, let me propose a toast act of policy to support the status quo or to to you, to the Republic of Zambia, and to influence events in one direction or the other the continuing excellent relations between at a particular time. our two countries: To you, Mr. President, We have, in recent years, been most and to your Republic and to your wonderful anxious, Mr. President, about the nature and people. degree of the United States' participation in building conditions for genuine peace based on human equality, human dignity, freedom, PRESIDENT KAUNDA and justice for all—for all—particularly in Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, brothers and southern Africa. President, for our sisters: I first want to express my deep You will forgive us, Mr. appreciation and gratitude for inviting me candor if we reaffirmed on this occasion our has not ful- to visit Washington, D.C. I also thank you, dismay at the fact that America the government, and the people of the United filled our expectations. Our dismay arises agreed States for their warm welcome and the kind from a number of factors. We are hospitality given to my wife and the entire that peace is central, that peace is central to '\ Zambian delegation. all human endeavors. Mr. President, we are happy to be in Our struggle for independence was de- thank God, our Washington, D.C. It is a very brief visit, signed to build peace, and internal peace. but since we come for specific objectives, it is people have enjoyed not the duration that matters, but the results. We are agreed, Mr. President, that we So far, we have done a lot. We find we must help strengthen peace wherever it is in have a lot in common on vital issues affect- threatened. There has been no peace ing mankind. Our discussions have been southern Africa for a very long time, a very characterized by a spirit of frankness and long time indeed, even if there was no war cordiality. as such. This spirit, coupled by the definition of The absence of war does not necessarily areas of urgent action, should move the mean peace. Peace, as you know, Mr. Presi- United States and Africa closer toward the dent, dear brothers and sisters, is something attainment of our common objectives. much deeper, much deeper than that.

May 12, 1975 615 The threat of escalation of violence is can Affairs, "Soapy" Williams [G. Mennen now real. It is our duty to avoid such an Williams], could be slapped in the face by a escalation. We want to build peace in the white reactionary on our soil and yet, un- place of violence, racial harmony in place of daunted, still smile, still stand by American disharmony, prosperity in place of economic principles of freedom, justice, and national stagnation, security in place of insecurity independence based on majority rule. Yes, now dogging every family every day. the reactionaries hated Americans for "spoil- Mr. President, to build genuine peace in ing the natives," as they would say, for help- southern Africa, we must recognize with ing dismantle colonialism. honesty the root causes of the existing con- We ask and wonder what has happened flict. throughout America. Have the principles First, colonialism in Rhodesia and Nami- changed? The aspirations of the oppressed bia. The existence of a rebel regime in Rho- have not changed at all. In desperation, their desia has since compounded that problem. anger has exploded their patience. Their Second, apartheid and racial domination in resolve to fight, if peaceful negotiations are South Africa. Over the last few years, a num- impossible, is borne out by history. ber of catalytic factors have given strength So, their struggle has now received the to these forces of evil. baptism of fire. Victories in Mozambique External economic and strategic interests and Angola have given them added inspira- have flourished in colonial and apartheid re- tion. Africa has no reason, no reason at all, gimes. Realism and moral conscience dictate not to support the liberation movements. that those who believe in peace must join Can America still end only with declara- hands in promoting conditions for peace. We tions of support for the principles of freedom cannot declare our commitment to peace and and racial justice? This, I submit, Mr. Presi- yet strengthen forces which stand in the dent, would not be enough. Southern Africa way of the attainment of that peace. is poised for a dangerous armed conflict. The era of colonialism has ended. Apart- Peace is at stake. heid cannot endure the test of time. Our The conflict with disastrous consequences obligation is that these evil systems end can be averted, but I submit again, Mr. peacefully, peacefully. To achieve our aim, President, there is not much time. Urgent we need America's total commitment, total action is required. commitment to action consistent with that At this time, America cannot realistically aim. wait and see what administering powers will So far, American policy, let alone action, do or to pledge to support their efi'orts when has been low keyed. This has given psycho- none are in plan. America must heed the call logical comfort to the forces of evil. of the oppressed. We become, Mr. President, even more dis- America, once an apostle in decolonization, mayed when the current posture of America must not be a mere disciple of those which toward Africa is set against the background promise but never perform and thus give of historical performance in the late fifties strength to evils of colonialism and apart- and early sixties. heid. We cannot but recall that America did not If we want peace, we must end the era of wait for and march in step with the colonial inertia in Rhodesia and Namibia and vigor- powers but, rather, boldly, boldly marched ously work for ending apartheid. America ahead with the colonial peoples in their must now be in the vanguard of democratic struggles to fulfill their aspirations—an revolution in southern Africa. America undaunted by the strong forces of This is not the first time we make this reaction against the wind of change, whose appeal. It is Africa's constant plea. nationals helped teach the colonial settlers Now, Africa has taken an unequivocal about the evils of racial discrimination; an stand on decolonization. We do not want to America whose Assistant Secretary for Afri- fight a war to win freedom and full national

616 Department of State Bulletin independence in southern Africa. Africa rooted in human dignity and equality and wants to achieve these objectives by peaceful freedom without discrimination. means ; that is, through negotiations. We have recently demonstrated, Mr. Our declaration to give high priority to President, our readiness to make peaceful peaceful methods to resolve the current change possible in Mozambique and Angola. crisis is a conscious decision, a conscious We are equally committed to assist the op- decision. We feel it to be our moral duty to pressed if they should convince us that the avoid bloodshed where we can. road to peaceful change is closed and armed We are determined to fulfill this obliga- struggle is the only alternative. tion—but, Mr. President, not at any price, The rebels in Rhodesia, assisted by South not at any price, not at the price of freedom African troops, have committed some of the and justice. There we say no. No. worst atrocities on the continent. Africa Africa has made it clear that if the road cannot allow them to continue, and we urge to peaceful change is closed by the stone America not to allow them to continue. walls of racial bigotry and force of arms by Victory for the majority is a matter of minority regimes, then we are equally duty- time, a matter of time. Let us, therefore, bound to take the inescapable alternative. make it as painless as possible to those who The oppressed people have a right to an- have dominated their fellow men for years. swer force with force, and Africa and all Mr. President, we wish America, we wish her friends in the world will support them. America to understand our aims and ob- Liberation movements fought fascist jectives. We are not fighting whites; we are Portugal. We supported them. They won. fighting an evil and brutal system. On this Now we must turn to Rhodesia and Namibia. there must be no compromise, none at all. Can America stand and be counted in im- America should also understand our strat- plementing the Dar es Salaam strategy egy. We want to achieve our objectives by adopted by Africa? In Dar es Salaam early peaceful methods first and foremost. Africa this month, Mr. President, Africa reaffirmed is ready to try this approach with patience its commitment, its commitment to a peace- and exhaust all possible tactics—for peace ful solution to the crisis in southern Africa is too precious, is too precious for all of us as a first priority. —but our patience and the patience of the Our strategy opens even new doors, now oppre.ssed has its limits. new doors to peaceful change, if those caught Mr. President, we are here only for a short up in the crisis seek an honorable exit. Here time. We have no other mission except to is a chance in a century to achieve peace take the opportunity of the visit to put based on human equality and human dignity Africa's stand clearly. We want to avoid without further violence. confrontation, but let us not be pushed. President, on behalf of We call upon America to support our ef- Once again, Mr. forts in achieving majority rule in Rhodesia my wife and my compatriots, and indeed on and Namibia immediately and the ending of my own behalf, I thank you, Mrs. Ford, and for this apartheid in South Africa. If we are com- our colleagues, brothers and sisters, hospitality. mitted to peace, then let us join hands in warm welcome and building peace by removing factors under- This is indeed a memorable visit, memor- lying the current crisis. able because it has been fruitful, and it launching only yesterday If the oppressed peoples fail to achieve coincides with the con- these noble ends by peaceful means, we call of your Bicentennial celebrations. We States for upon America not to give any support to the gratulate the people of the United since inde- oppressors. Even now we call upon America their tremendous achievements justified the anti- to desist from direct and indirect support pendence, which have of their Founding to minority regimes, for this puts America colonialist struggle in direct conflict with the interests of Fathers. opportunity of inviting Africa; that is, peace deeply rooted, deeply Finally, I take the

617 May 12, 1975 you, Mr. President, and Mrs. Ford, to pay Pan American Day and a visit to Zambia. We will be happy to re- Pan American Week ceive you in our country at any time con- venient to you. A PROCLAMATION! And may I say, sir, at that time I might Organi- answer the challenge of playing golf. Each year, we and other members of the of American States celebrate our shared [Laughter.] zation origins and the close ties that continue to flourish I now invite you, ladies and gentlemen, to among us. To do this, we commemorate a significant and wife and my colleagues in join me my event in the diplomatic history of the Western Ford: this toast to the President and Mrs. Hemisphere—the founding, late in the last century, Mr. President, Mrs. Ford. Bilateral relations. of the International Union of the American Re- publics. This year marks the 85th anniversary of the establishment of that first inter-governmental regional organization and forerunner of the Organi- zation of American States. From its earliest days, the organization has taken Congressional Documents for its two major objectives the maintenance of Relating to Foreign Policy peace and the promotion of economic, social and cultural development in the Americas. The strength and longevity of inter-American cooperation in 94th Congress, 1st Session furtherance of these goals derives from its tested ability to evolve and reconstitute itself to meet new Suspension of Presidential Authority To Temporary realities and new challenges over the years. Impose Fees on, or Otherwise Adjust, Petroleum In the Americas, we have come to recognize the Imports. Report from the Senate Committee on Finance, together with minority and supple- fresh challenge presented by a new interdependence, mental views, to accompany H.R. 1767. S. Kept. which is global as well as hemispheric, linking de- 94-11. February 17, 1975. 23 pp. veloped with less developed countries both in and Proposed Legislation To Amend the Arms Control beyond the hemisphere. We sense the opportunity from the and Disarmament Act. Communication for effective inter-American cooperation to advance President of the United States transmitting a our traditional goals of peace and progress for our draft of proposed legislation to amend the Arms hemisphere while strengthening the global coopera- Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization of appropria- tion decreed by our world. tions, and for other purposes. February 19, 1975. Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President H. Doc. 94-54. 3 pp. of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Monday, April 14, 1975, as Pan American Day, and Related to NATO and the Middle East. Study the week beginning April 13, 1975, as Pan American prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Investi- Week, and I call upon the Governors of the fifty gations, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, by states, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto the Congressional Research Service, Library of Rico, and appropriate officials of all other areas Congress. February 28, 1975. 63 pp. flag of the United States to issue similar Standby Energy Authorities Act. Report of the under the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Proclamations. together with minority and additional views, to In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my accompany S. 622. S. Rept. 94-26. March 5, 1975. hand this eleventh day of April, in the year of our 90 pp. Lord nineteen hundred seventy-five, and of the Inde- Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appro- pendence of the United States of America the one priation Bill, 1975. Report of the House Commit- hundred ninety-ninth. tee on Appropriations, together with separate and dissenting views, to accompany H.R. 4592. H. Rept. 94-53. March 10, 1975. 71 pp. Legislative History of the Committee on Foreign ^^ Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third /^^^ Congress, January 3, 1973-December 20, 1974. S. Rept. 94-37. March 17, 1975. 196 pp. ' 40 Fed. Reg. 16643.

618 Department of State Bulletin I

Preparatory Meeting for Proposed Conference

of Oil Producers and Consumers Held at Paris

A preparatory meeting for the interna- I believe that we can agree on at least two tional conference on energy and related things.

economic problems was held at Paris April First, the quintupling of oil prices over the 7-15.^ Following is a statement made in the past two years, although posing problems meeting on April 7 by Charles W. Robinson, for the world economy, has heightened Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, who awareness of the interdependence of nations. headed the U.S. delegation, together with a Second, the problems emanating from the statement by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant current oil situation cannot be resolved Secretary for Economic Affairs, issued to the through confrontation or by unilateral ac- press on April 15 at the conclusion of the tion, but only through cooperative efforts meeting. among all major parties. We all share a common concern that the social and economic well-being of our peo- STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON ples be enhanced rather than retarded, that developing nations be able to look forward The United States is pleased to participate to their rapid development rather than have in this preparatory meeting for the interna- their prospects undermined, and that the in- tional conference on energy and related ternational financial and trading system be economic problems, which initiates an im- responsible enough and strong enough to portant—in fact an essential—dialogue be- cope with new stresses and meet our common tween oil producer and consumer countries. needs. We congratulate the Government of France In calling the Washington Energy Con- for its initiative and express our apprecia- ference a little more than a year ago, we tion for its efforts in convening this meeting made clear from the outset that the initial today. We also extend thanks for the gener- discussion among the major industriahzed ous hospitality which is being extended to importers of oil was only a first step toward those of us fortunate enough to be invited the necessary dialogue between both con- to Paris in April. sumers and producers of oil. There have been various analyses and in- At the conclusion of the Washington Con- terpretations of the oil crisis that began in ference, ministers of the major industrial- the autumn of 1973. There are clearly dif- ized countries stated their recognition of ferences of view among us, which will be the "need to develop a cooperative multi- discussed in the conference that we will be lateral relationship with producing coun- meeting, but organizing at this preparatory tries, and other consuming countries that there are also many areas of common in- takes into account the long-term interests to devote our terest to which we will need of all." primary efforts. Returning to this theme in February, one year later, Secretary Kissinger stated that:

an interdependent world, our hopes for pros- ' Attending the meeting were the United States, In cooperative the European Common Market, and Japan for the perity and stability rest ultimately on a industrialized consumer countries; Saudi Arabia, long-term relationship between consumers and Iran, Venezuela, and Algeria for the producing coun- producers. tries; and Brazil, India, and Zaire for the developing consumer countries.

619 May 12, 1975 The producers seek a better life for their peoples international economic relations are linked." and a future free from dependence on a single de- The social, economic, and political dimen- nations seek to pleting resource; the industrialized sions of this problem are enormous, and the preserve the hard-earned economic and social prog- characteristics of the relations between pro- ress of centuries; the poorer nations seek desper- ducers and consumers of oil are in many ately to resume their advance toward a more hope- ful existence. respects unique. Our discussions are bound A year has passed since the Washington to overlap at times with other aspects of the Conference. In that time, energy problems world economy, and due account must be and the inflation and recession to which they taken of such linkages. But I feel strongly have contributed have adversely affected that the work program to be developed here large numbers of people throughout the should be concentrated on the specifics of world. We and other like-minded consumer energy and related matters and not become nations have agreed on a series of collective diluted with parallel discussions of other measures to enable our economies and the issues, however important they may be. world economy to meet the problems as- I say this recognizing that oil is only one on sociated with the increased price of oil. We of the major commodities traded world sought the consumer cooperation that we markets and that, indeed, all commodities considered necessary to insure a substantive are interrelated within the world trade and and constructive dialogue. The International financial system. We recognize the need for Energy Agency, present today as an ob- imaginative new initiatives in this area and server, was established last November in are indeed prepared to discuss these other recognition that a degree of consumer issues elsewhere in appropriate fora, and I solidarity had been achieved and to serve take particular note of the upcoming special as the institutional vehicle for the further session of the U.N. General Assembly in elaboration of necessary cooperative meas- September. The point I wish to make here ures. is simply that we have more than enough to Our purpose at this preparatory meeting handle with the energy-related problems in is to organize the procedures for the con- the eff"ort we are initiating today. To broaden ference that will build on the dialogue ini- the scope of our discussions would substan- tiated at this meeting. Toward this end, we tially decrease the likelihood of a productive need to strike a balance between the immense outcome. scale and complexity of the world energy As for the number of participants in the problem on the one hand and the constraint main conference, we would foresee a reason- of realistic expectations for concrete results able limitation in participation, but with on the other. It is certainly true that today balanced representation of industrialized we are living in a highly interdependent consumer countries, developing consumer world economy. The countries of the world countries, and the oil-exporting countries. have an interest in many economic issues in The total number should be sufl^iciently re- addition to the international oil situation. stricted to permit constructive discussions But if we are to have a conference with a but large enough that all interests are reasonable expectation of tangible results, adequately represented. we must set bounds as to what such a meet- It will obviously be impossible for us in ing is designed to achieve. We must there- this preparatory meeting to designate in a fore consider carefully the scope of both the specific manner the participants in the even- agenda and participation of the conference. tual main conference. However, we can con- With regard to the agenda, we are here, centrate on developing procedures under in the words of the invitation received from which participants can be designated in the the President of the French Republic, to period between the end of this meeting and organize a conference "to examine the the convening of the full conference. energy problems to which many aspects of In conclusion, we are initiating a process

620 Department of State Bulletin of vital and far-reaching concern to the aspects of the relationship between the in- international economy. The people of our dustrialized countries and the developing nations and of other nations expect and de- world. serve constructive results from this process. We have been and will continue to be We must respond with determination and willing to discuss seriously raw materials imagination and take the initial steps at this and other development issues in forums meeting toward more harmonious relation- more directly concerned with them and to at- ships in energy and related economic fields. tempt therein to seek mutually beneficial I pledge the best efforts of the U.S. Gov- solutions. However, we believe that the pro- ernment to that end. posed conference could achieve constructive results only if it were focused on a relatively limited number of points related to the cen- STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS tral subject of energy.

I wish to express appreciation to the Gov- I would like to stress that the discussions ernment of France for acting as host at this of the past nine days have taken place in an preparatory meeting, on behalf of Under atmosphere of cordiality, and genuine at- Secretary Robinson, the U.S. delegation, and tempts have been made to understand respec- myself. It has provided a useful opportunity tive points of view. In this sense we must all for an exchange of views among industrial- consider this meeting has not been a failed ized countries, oil-exporting nations, and effort. The United States attaches great im- developing countries on a range of subjects portance to its exchanges with each of the of mutual interest. The meetings have pro- countries represented at this meeting. Our ceeded constructively, and there has been a intention is to continue our efforts to pro- genuine desire to understand and appreciate mote cooperation with them through all respective points of view. channels. We are disappointed that we have not been able to complete the arrangements necessary for the convening of a formal conference. We have agreed to return to our capitals to con- U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector sider various points of view which have been Extended for Three Months discussed in considerable detail over the past nine days. We will remain in contact through Folloioing is a statement made in the U.N. appropriate channels to resume together Semrity Council by U.S. Representative preparations for a conference as quickly as John Scali on April 17, together with the possible. text of a resolution adopted by the Council you are aware, subject of As the major that day. discussion during the last several days has been the proposed draft agenda for a full conference. I do not believe it useful to com- STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI ment in detail on the various issues involved USUN press release 31 dated April 17 in these discussions. There has been a basic difference of view with regard to the scope I would like to congratulate you, Mr. and objectives of the proposed conference. President [Louis de Guiringaud of France], We were, of course, invited here by the for your leadership in the consultations President of the French Republic to prepare which have led today to the agreement of the for a conference on energy and energy- Council to renew the mandate of UNEF. The related issues. We came here ready to discuss United States is pleased to join in this con- these issues, which are of central concern sensus and to support extension of the to all countries. Others have insisted on a United Nations Emergency Force and its much broader conference, extending to all mandate.

May 12, 1975 621 :

Once again I wish to offer my govern- I said that no one could doubt that the road ment's appreciation to those countries which toward peace would be long and difficult, have supplied and maintained contingents that it would try the patience and test the for UNEF, to the civilian staff, the UNTSO good will of all concerned. This has been [U.N. Truce Supervision Organization] ob- proven all too true. But the essential point servers in the field, and particularly to the is that we are still on that road—the road U.N. troops who contribute so directly to toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle the continuous search for peace in the area. East. The United States is determined to The Commander of UNEF, Lt. Gen. Ensio continue that search. As President Ford said Siilasvuo, deserves a special tribute from us in his address to the joint session of all for his exemplary and steadfast leader- Congress: ship of UNEF since its inception. His exam- The United States will move ahead on whatever ple provides an enviable model for any course looks most promising, either toward an over- future U.N. peacekeeping endeavors. all settlement or interim agreements should the The Secretary General and his head- parties themselves desire them. We will not accept quarters staff also deserve our highest com- stagnation or stalemate with all its attendant risks to peace and prosperity and to our relations in and mendation for continuing to perform such a outside of the region. difficult task so well. The operational efficiency of the UNEF force is borne out by Renewal of UNEF today is an important the latest report of the Secretary General. contribution toward continued movement in The most conclusive evidence of UNEF's this process. We are happy to join with the effectiveness is that the situation has re- Council in this action, and we pledge our best mained quiet and that both sides have gen- efforts in the continued search for peace in erally complied with the agreement of dis- the Middle East. engagement and cooperated with UNEF. In consequence there have been no significant TEXT OF RESOLUTION i incidents since the preceding report of the Secretary General. The Security Council, These U.N. peacekeeping troops are es- Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973), 340 (1973), sential not only in maintaining the lines of 341 (1973), 346 (1974) and 362 (1974), separation between Egypt and Israel and Having considered the report of the Secretary- providing a deterrent to renewed hostilities General on the United Nations Emergency Force but also in creating a climate of trust and (S/11670 and Corr. 1), Having noted the developments in the situation confidence upon which the success of further in the Middle East, negotiations depends. The U.N. Emergency Expressing concern over the prevailing state of Force and the disengagement agreement be- tension in the area, tween Egypt and Israel are both means to Decides an end, not settlements themselves. They are (a) To call upon the parties concerned to imple- part of the process toward an overall peace- ment immediately Security Council resolution 338 ful solution through negotiations as envis- (1973) ; aged in Security Council Resolutions 242 and (b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations 338. Emergency Force for a period of three months, that is, until' 24 July 1975; As a matter of principle, we would have (c) To request the Secretary-General to submit preferred an extension for a longer period at the end of this period a report on the develop- of time. But whether the mandate is extended ments in the situation and the measures taken to for three or six months or even longer, we implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973). believe there is an urgent need to move ahead in achieving a negotiated settlement. 'U.N. doc. S/RES/368 (1975); adopted by the Council on Apr. 17 by a vote of 13 to 0, with the The last time this Council met to renew a People's Republic of China and Iraq not participat- U.N. peacekeeping force in the Middle East, ing in the vote.

622 Department of State Bulletin Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on TREATY INFORMATION the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975. Accession deposited: New Zealand, March 26 1975.

Current Actions International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Enters into force June 19, 1975. MULTILATERAL Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, April 2, 1975. CofFee Accession deposited: Denmark, April 2, 1975. Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter- Amendments to the international convention for the national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Ap- amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London proved by the International Coffee Council at October 12, 1971.' Acceptance deposited: London September 26, 1974.' France, March 24, 1975. Signature and acceptance deposited: Uganda, International convention on the establishment of an international fund for March 11, 1975. compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971.' Judicial Procedure Accession deposited: Denmark, April 2, 1975. Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in Safety at Sea civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague Agreement regarding financial support of the North March 18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, Atlantic patrol. 1972. TIAS 7444. ice Done at Washington January 1956. Ratification deposited: Portugal (with reserva- 4, Entered into force July 5, 1956. TIAS 3597. tions and declarations) , March 12, 1975. Acceptance deposited: Poland, April 22, 1975. Maritime Matters Convention on the international regulations for preventing Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.' sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, Accession deposited: Romania (with statements), 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. March 27, 1975. Acceptance deposited: Austria, April 2, 1975. Space Amendment of article VII of the convention on Convention on registration of objects launched into facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 outer space. Opened for signature at New York (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, January 1975.' 1973.' 14, Signature: Switzerland, April 14, 1975. Acceptances deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- many (applicable to Berlin (West)), December Telecommunications 30, 1974; Tunisia, February 19, 1975; United International telecommunication convention, with States, April 2, 1975. annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torre- Narcotics molinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.'' Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Accession deposited: Colombia, February 21, 1975. New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298. BILATERAL Ratification deposited: Italy, April 14, 1975. Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Australia Vienna February 21, 1971.' Ratification deposited: Denmark, April 18, 1975. Agreement transferring the facility for research on Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic aerospace disturbances at Amberley to the Aus- drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.' tralian National University. Effected by exchange Ratifications deposited: Denmark, April 18, 1975; of notes at Canberra January 31 and February Italy, April 14, 1975. 26, 1975. Entered into force February 26, 1975. Agreement concerning a program of research on Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation aero-space disturbances. Effected by exchange of Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. notes at Canberra January 3, 1964. Entered into

Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, force January 3, 1964. TIAS 5510. 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS Terminated: February 26, 1975. 6839. Ratification deposited: Republic of Korea, April ' Not in force. 23, 1975. - Not in force for the United States.

May 12, 1975 623 Agreement for the establishment and operation of Viet-Nam additional facilities in connection with a program Agreement supplementing the agreement of Novem- of research on aero-space disturbances. Effected ber 5, 1957, as supplemented and modified (TIAS by exchange of notes at Canberra April 12, 1965. 3932, 5419, 6869), relating to investment guaran- TIAS 5801. ties. Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon Terminated: February 2G, 1975. January 13 and March 7, 1975. Entered into force March 7, 1975. Bangladesh Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 (TIAS 7949). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca April 11, 1975. Entered into force April 11, 1975. PUBLICATIONS International Committee of the Red Cross Grant agreement concerning emergency relief and assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and war victims in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic. Signed at Washington and GPO Sales Publications Geneva February 20 and March 16 and 17, 1975. Entered into force March 17, 1975. Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock Documents, Jamaica number from the Siiperiiifendenf of U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20U02. Agreement amending and extending the agreement A 25-perccnt discount is made on orders for 100 or of September 29, 1967, as amended and extended, more copies of any one publication mailed to the relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- exchange of notes at Washington April 2, 1975. tendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Entered into force April 1975. 2, Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, Romania are subject to change. Agreement on trade relations. Signed at Bucharest Privileges and Immunities for American Technicians April 2, 1975. Enters into force on the date of Assisting in Modernization Program of Iranian exchange of written notice of acceptance by the Armed Forces. Agieemcnt with Iran. TIAS 7963. 3 two governments. pp. 25<'. (Cat. No. S9.10:7963).

Syria Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aeronauti- cal Products and Components. Agreement with the Loan agreement to assist Syria to increase its Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 7965. 12 pp. 30^'. agricultural production. Signed at Damascus (Cat. No. 89.10:7965). February 27, 1975. Entered into force February 27, 1975. Defense—Continuation of Agreement of May 5, 1951. Grant agreement for general participant training. Agreement with Iceland. TIAS 7969. 8 pp. 30<'. (Cat. Signed at Damascus February 27, 1975. Entered No. S9.10:7969). into force February 27, 1975. Narcotic Drugs— Provision of Helicopters and Re- Grant agreement to promote the economic develop- lated Assistance. Agreement with Jamaica. TIAS ment of Syria. Signed at Damascus February 27, 7966. 5 pp. 250. (Cat. No. 89.10:7966). 1975. Entered into force February 27, 1975. Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, Technology, United Nations Children's Fund Industry and Defense. Agreement with Saudi Grant agreement concerning assistance for children Arabia. TIAS 7974. 10 pp. 30^. (Cat. No. 89.10: and mothers in South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and 7974). Laos. Signed at Washington and New York Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- December 26 and 30, 1974. Entered into force public of Korea amending the agreement of April December 30, 1974. 12, 1973, as amended. TIAS 7976. 7 pp. 30('. (Cat. Agreement amending the grant agreement of De- No. 89.10:7976). cember 26 and 30, 1974, concerning assistance for children and mothers in South Viet-Nam, Cam- Launching of NASA Satellites From San Marco bodia, and Laos. Signed at New York February Range. Agreement with Italy extending the agree- 10 and 14, 1975. Entered into force February 14, ment of April 30 and June 12, 1969. TIAS 7972. 3 1975. pp. 25(f. (Cat. No. 89.10:7972).

624 Department of State Bulletin iiNucA may iz, i>i/o vol.l,a.a.ii i\o.i^i^

Africa. President Kaunda of Zambia Visits Treaty Information Washington (Ford, Kaunda) 614 Current Actions g23 Republic American Principles. An Agenda for Ameri- of Korea Ratifies Nonproliferation ca's Third Century (Ford) 593 Treaty (remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary Zurhellen) Congress 605 Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Policy 618 L'Express of France 606 Mr. Dent To Be Special for Representative United Nations. U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Trade Negotiations 613 Sector Extended for Three Months (Scali, Disarmament. Republic of Korea Ratifies Non- text of resolution) 621 proliferation Treaty (remarks by Deputy Viet-Nam Assistant Secretary Zurhellen) 605 "A Conversation With President Ford"—An Economic Affairs. Preparatory Meeting for Interview for CBS Television and Radio Proposed Conference of Oil Producers and (excerpts) 596 Consumers Held at Paris (Enders, Robin- Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for L'Ex- son) 619 press of France 606 Egypt. U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector Ex- Zambia. President Kaunda of Zambia Visits tended for Three Months (Scali, text of Washington (Ford, Kaunda) 614 resolution) 621 Energy. Preparatory Meeting for Proposed Conference of Oil Producers and Consumers Name Index Held at Paris (Enders, Robinson) .... 619 Dent, Frederick B 613 France. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Enders, Thomas O 619 L'Express of France 606 Ford, President 593, 596, 614, 618 International Organizations and Conferences. Kaunda, Kenneth D 614 Preparatory Meeting for Proposed Confer- Kissinger, Secretary 605, 606 ence of Oil Producers and Consumers Held Robinson, Charles W 619 at Paris (Enders, Robinson) 619 Scali, John 621 Zurhellen, J. Owen, Jr 605 Israel. U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector Ex- tended for Three Months (Scali, text of resolution) 621

Khmer Republic (Cambodia). Secretary Kis- Check List of Department of State singer Interviewed for L'Express of France 606 Press Releases: April 21-27 Korea. Republic of Korea Ratifies Nonprolif- eration Treaty (remarks by Deputy Assist- Press releases may be obtained from the ant Secretary Zurhellen) 605 Oflice of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. Latin America Release issued prior to April 21 which ap- Pan American Day and Pan American Week pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 208 (proclamation) 618 of April 19. Secretary Regrets Postponement of Trip to South America (statement) 605 Mo. Date Snbjet^t

Middle East *209 4/21 Foreign agricultural and nutri- "A Conversation With President Ford"—An tional specialists visit U.S. Interview for CBS Television and Radio *210 4/22 Reinhardt sworn in as Assistant (excerpts) 596 Secretary for Public Affairs Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for L'Ex- (biographic data). press of France 606 *211 4/22 Regional Foreign Policy Confer- U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector Extended ence, Pittsburgh, Pa., Apr. 29. for Three Months (Scali, text of resolution) 621 *212 4/22 Study Group I of the U.S. Na- tional Committee for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secre- CCITT, May 15. tary Kissinger Interviewed for L'Express of 213 4/23 Republic of Korea ratifies Non- France 606 proliferation Treaty. Presidential Documents *214 4/23 Shipping Coordinating Commit- tee, May 22. An Agenda for America's Third Century . . 593 "A Conversation With President Ford"—An *215 4/23 Regional Foreign Policy Con- Interview for CBS Television and Radio ference, Birmingham, Ala. ' May 7. (excerpts) . . . . 596 Pan American Day and Pan American Week t216 4/24 U.S. and Canada extend Fisher- (proclamation) 618 ies Agreement. President Kaunda of Zambia Visits Wash- *217 4/25 Maj. Gen. David S. Parker, ington 614 former Canal Zone Governor, U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector E.xtended receives Department of State for Three Months 621 award.

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 624 * Not printed. Trade. Mr. Dent To Be Special Representative t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. for Trade Negotiations 613