Issue No. 1322 6 July 2018 // USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1322 //
Feature Report
“Special Report: How America Protects Its Citizens and Allies from Ballistic Missiles”. By Ben Watson. Published by Defense One; June 29, 2018 https://www.defenseone.com/feature/Protecting-US-Citizens-from-Ballistic-Missiles/ The U.S. military has four primary means of shooting down incoming missiles. But even together, they can’t promise to stop everything. Whether it’s U.S. islands like Guam or Hawaii, coastal cities like San Diego or New York City, or allied territories across the ocean, the 21st century has heightened the threat of ballistic missiles to the United States and its allies. The U.S. military has four systems to shoot down ballistic missiles. It’s an expensive approach, to be sure; and in 17 years of tests, the four systems have hit their targets about four out of of every five tries. But military planners know that when the missiles actually fly, a single missed intercept could have unspeakably catastrophic consequences.
Issue No. 1320 22 June 2018
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TABLE OF CONTENTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS Nuclear Gravity Bomb Completes First Qual Tests on B-2 Bomber (Military.com) The Air Force, together with the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, earlier this month released a B61-12 non-nuclear test assembly from the Spirit. North Korea Working to Conceal Key Aspects of Its Nuclear Program, U.S. Officials Say (The Washington Post) U.S. intelligence officials, citing newly obtained evidence, have concluded that North Korea does not intend to fully surrender its nuclear stockpile … North Korea Reportedly Expanding Ballistic Missile Production Facility (NPR) The Wall Street Journal, citing satellite imagery, reports that the bulk of the new construction at the facility in the North Korean city of Hamhung took place in April and June, around the time Kim was meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, and later with Trump. Wargaming and Deterrence Options: Signalling a Low-Yield Response (Real Clear Defense) The problem with fielding such a force is politics based on cost and will.
US COUNTER-WMD Exclusive: Japan to Buy Advanced U.S. Radar for Missile Defense System (Reuters) Japan will next week pick a U.S.-made advanced radar for its multibillion-dollar missile defense system, an upgrade that could help ease trade friction with Washington and provide cutting-edge protection against the arsenals of North Korea and China, sources said. Air Force Tests New CBRN-Protective Liner for Mobile Medical Tent System (Global Biodefense) During the event, Airmen employed the new Expeditionary Medical Support System (EMEDS) tent liner airlock system to create an over-pressurized environment that protects from CBRN agents. OPCW Hosts Medical Treatment of Victims of Chemical Weapons Symposium (Global Biodefense) More than 50 scientists, clinicians, experts, academia, and civil society representatives from around the world attended the Symposium … New Nerve Gas Detector Built with Legos and a Smartphone (UT News) The new methodology described in a paper published Wednesday in the open-access journal ACS Central Science combines a chemical sensor with photography to detect and identify different nerve agents— odorless, tasteless chemical weapons that can cause severe illness and death, sometimes within minutes.
US ARMS CONTROL Experts Accentuate Significance of Trump-Putin Summit — Analysis (Eurasia Review) Whether presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin would turn over a new leaf when they meet in Helsinki, Finland on July 16 remains to be seen. UN Chief Marks 50 Years Since NPT Signing (VOA) The United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Sunday hailed the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Iran’s Rohani Due in Switzerland, Austria amid Nuclear-Deal Dispute (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty) Rohani's trip to Switzerland and Austria, which took over the rotating European Union presidency on July
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1, is part of a diplomatic effort by Tehran to rally support in the wake of the Unites States' withdrawal from the nuclear deal. Israel Confident U.S. to Keep Protections in Any Saudi Nuclear Power Deal (Reuters) Israel’s energy minister said on Tuesday after meeting Trump administration officials he is confident that the United States will not relax non-proliferation standards in any nuclear power deal it agrees with Saudi Arabia.
COMMENTARY The Trump-Putin Summit Could Do Some Good If … (Brookings Institution) Having hit a post-Cold War low, the U.S.-Russia relationship could use a push toward a better state. What America Wants from Iran Can’t Be Achieved by Regime Change (The National Interest) The question of what America wants, and above all, how it might get what it is after, still needs to be worked out. Why I’m Still Hopeful about Trump’s North Korea Deal (Politico) As someone who has spent years immersed in the problem of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, as secretary of defense and later as a presidential envoy on nuclear issues, I watched events of the past spring with a mix of hope and skepticism. Low-Hanging Fruit: Ratify Protocols for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) In fact, Washington could now take arms control steps that are entirely within its own control—steps not dependent on the policies or actions of other nations. North Korea: There is No Such Thing as Stable Deterrence (Real Clear Defense) The history of how deterrence actually worked during the Cold War shows that any deterrence arrangement between the U.S. and North Korea will necessarily be subject to a substantial risk of catastrophic failure.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Military.com (San Francisco, Calif.) Nuclear Gravity Bomb Completes First Qual Tests on B-2 Bomber By Oriana Pawlyk June 30, 2018 The B61-12 guided nuclear gravity bomb has gone through its first series of tests on the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. The Air Force, together with the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, earlier this month released a B61-12 non-nuclear test assembly from the Spirit. The kit included a NNSA-designed bomb assembly and the Air Force's acquired tail-kit to be used on the B61-12 variant of the bomb, according to a Department of Energy release. "These qualification flight tests demonstrate the B61-12 design meets system requirements and illustrate the continued progress of the B61-12 life extension program to meet national security requirements," said Brig. Gen. Michael Lutton, NNSA's principal assistant deputy administrator for military application. "The achievement is also a testament to the dedication of our workforce and the enduring partnership between NNSA and the U.S. Air Force," he added in the release. The two non-nuclear system qualification flight tests of the B61-12 took place on June 9 at Tonopah Test Range in Nevada, officials said. They were conducted by the 419th Test & Evaluation Squadron at Edwards Air Force Base, California. The exercises marked first such "end-to-end qualification tests on a B-2A Spirit Bomber for the B61-12," the release said. "The tests are part of a series of joint tests to demonstrate both the aircraft's capability to deliver the weapon and the weapon's non-nuclear functions." Part of the system's hardware is designed by Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory and manufactured by the Nuclear Security Enterprise plants. Meanwhile, Boeing Co. has designed and manufactured the tail-kit assembly under contract with the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, officials said. Using the B61-12 will help consolidate and replace the existing B61 bomb variants in the U.S.'s nuclear stockpile, the release said. The first completed bomb kits are scheduled to debut sometime in fiscal 2020. In May, top Air Force officials announced trials with the B61-12 were progressing successfully. "We've already conducted 26 engineering, development and guided flight tests," said Lt. Gen. Jack Weinstein, deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration. "The program's doing extremely well." The B61-12 modification program, which has been in the works for at least seven years, is slated to be carried by the B-2, as well as the future B-21 Long Range Strategic Bomber, known as the Raider. The F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Office has also been working on integrating the latest modification into its weapons arsenal. The F-35 was designed with a requirement to carry a nuclear payload. In 2015, an F-35 flew with the B61-12 to measure its vibration in the aircraft's weapons bay.
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Both of the fourth-gen fighters will be able to deploy the B61-12 bomb. The B61-12 also conducted its third and final developmental test flight aboard an F-15E in 2015. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/06/30/b61-12-nuclear-gravity-bomb-completes- first-qual-tests-b-2-bomber.html Return to top
The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.) North Korea Working to Conceal Key Aspects of Its Nuclear Program, U.S. Officials Say By Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick June 30, 2018 U.S. intelligence officials, citing newly obtained evidence, have concluded that North Korea does not intend to fully surrender its nuclear stockpile, and instead is considering ways to conceal the number of weapons it has and secret production facilities, according to U.S. officials. The evidence, collected in the wake of the June 12 summit in Singapore, points to preparations to deceive the United States about the number of nuclear warheads in North Korea's arsenal as well as the existence of undisclosed facilities used to make fissile material for nuclear bombs, the officials said. The findings support a new, previously undisclosed Defense Intelligence Agency estimate that North Korea is unlikely to denuclearize. The assessment stands in stark contrast to President Donald Trump's exuberant comments following the summit, when he declared on Twitter that "there is no longer a nuclear threat" from North Korea. At a recent rally, he also said he had "great success'' with Pyongyang. Intelligence officials and many North Korea experts have generally taken a more cautious view, noting that leader Kim Jong Un's vague commitment to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula is a near- echo of earlier pledges from North Korean leaders over the past two decades, even as they accelerated efforts to build nuclear weapons in secret. The new intelligence, described by four officials who have seen it or received briefings, is based on material gathered in the weeks since the summit. The officials insisted on anonymity to discuss sensitive assessments about a country that has long been one of the most difficult targets for spy agencies to penetrate. Some aspects of the U.S. intelligence were reported Friday by NBC News. Specifically, the DIA has concluded that North Korean officials are exploring ways to deceive Washington about the number of nuclear warheads, and missiles and the types and numbers of facilities they have, believing that the United States is not aware of the full range of their activities. U.S. intelligence agencies have for at least a year believed that the number of warheads is about 65, as reported last year by The Washington Post. But North Korean officials are suggesting that they declare far fewer. The lone weapons facility that has been acknowledged by North Korea is in Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang. That site is estimated to have produced fissile material for as many as a couple of dozen warheads. Meanwhile, the North Koreans also have operated a secret underground uranium enrichment site known as Kangson, which was first reported in May by The Washington Post. That site is believed
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1322 // by most officials to have twice the enrichment capacity of Yongbyon. U.S. intelligence agencies became aware of the nuclear facility in 2010. In recent years, the United States, through imagery and computer hacking, has improved its intelligence collection in North Korea. Officials in Pyongyang are seeking to obfuscate the true number of their weapons facilities, and U.S. intelligence officials believe that more than just one hidden site exists. The Post is withholding details at the request of intelligence officials The Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined requests for comment. North Korea expert David Albright, a former United Nations weapons inspector and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, said the assessments come at a time when "there's a worry that the Trump administration may go soft, and accept a deal that focuses on Yongbyon and forgets about these other sites." Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has acknowledged that it could take years to implement any agreement on eliminating North Korea's nuclear stockpile, a hard-won asset that North Korean leaders regard as a guarantor of their survival. Asked by senators on Wednesday about the status of private talks with North Korean officials, he declined to offer specifics. "I'm not prepared to talk about the details of the discussions that are taking place," he said in testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee. "I think it would be inappropriate and, frankly, counterproductive to achieving the end state that we're hoping to achieve." Asked about Trump's claim that the North Korea threat had been eliminated, Pompeo said Trump had meant to say only that the threat had been reduced. "I don't think there's any doubt about that," he said. While North Korea made a public show in June of demolishing the country's main nuclear weapons test site, there has been little public evidence of efforts to dismantle scores of other sites linked to production of nuclear and chemical weapons and delivery systems. Even if North Korea's promises were sincere, it could take years of work, accompanied by an unprecedented agreement to grant access to outside inspectors, before U.S. officials could confidently say that the weapons threat has been neutralized. As of now, there is little proof that North Korea intends to go down that road, longtime North Korea observers say. "North Korea has made no new commitments to denuclearization, and in fact has backed away from its previous commitments," Abraham Denmark, Asia Program director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, told a House committee in late June. "North Korea remains free to manufacture more nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction - even though it has unilaterally frozen testing of its nuclear weapons and certain ballistic missiles," he said. "There is no deadline for them to eliminate their illegal capabilities, or even freeze their continued production." https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-working-to-conceal-key- aspects-of-its-nuclear-program-us-officials-say/2018/06/30/deba64fa-7c82-11e8-93cc- 6d3beccdd7a3_story.html?utm_term=.207b53cb2ed3 Return to top
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NPR (Washington, D.C.) North Korea Reportedly Expanding Ballistic Missile Production Facility By Scott Neuman July 2, 2018 North Korea is reportedly expanding a facility to build solid-fuel ballistic missiles — a further sign that despite last month's summit between President Trump and Kim Jong Un, Pyongyang is pressing ahead with its nuclear programs. The Wall Street Journal, citing satellite imagery, reports that the bulk of the new construction at the facility in the North Korean city of Hamhung took place in April and June, around the time Kim was meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, and later with Trump. "New building didn't appear to begin in earnest until April this year, around the time Mr. Kim shook hands with South Korean President Moon Jae-in in a landmark summit meeting at the inter-Korean border, according to a series of satellite images. The bulk of construction took place in May and June," according to the Journal. The satellite photos from San Francisco-based Planet Labs Inc. were analyzed by researchers at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, WSJ reports. Unlike liquid-fuel rockets, which must be painstakingly fueled prior to launch, solid-fuel missiles can be deployed almost at a moment's notice – making them less vulnerable to a preemptive strike and therefore far more destabilizing. At last month's summit with Trump in Singapore, Kim agreed to "work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula," but offered little in the way of specifics. Even so, the president quickly hailed the meeting as a major breakthrough, going so far as to tweet that North Korea "is no longer a Nuclear Threat." At a rally in Duluth, Minn., days after the summit days later, the president touted his accomplishments in Singapore, telling supporters that North Korea had "stopped all nuclear testing, they stopped nuclear research, they stopped rocketry." Instead, there are indications that instead of stopping its nuclear and missile programs, Pyongyang is continuing to bulk them up. The Washington Post, citing intelligence sources who did not wish to be named, reported on Saturday that U.S. intelligence officials have concluded that the Pyongyang regime has no intention of fully surrendering its nuclear stockpile, but was planning "to conceal the number of weapons it has and secret production facilities." In addition, the North Korean monitoring site 38North.org reported last week that North Korea's main Yongbyon nuclear research facility was also undergoing improvements. "Modifications to the 5 MWe plutonium production reactor's cooling system appear complete," analysts Frank V. Pabian, Joseph S. Bermudez and Jack Liu wrote at 38North, adding that "Construction continues on support facilities throughout other operational areas of Yongbyon, especially at the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR), where the new engineering office building appears externally complete and a small building similar to the one observed at the Radiochemical Laboratory has been erected."
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Mere weeks before the Singapore summit, North Korea made a show of destroying its Punggye-ri test site, where it conducted nuclear testing, inviting some journalists to witness the decomissioning. However, as NPR's Elise Hu reported at the time, "longtime watchers of North Korea's nuclear program say the closing of the site will have little impact on the nation's capabilities." Speaking on CBS's Face the Nation on Sunday, White House national security advisor John Bolton – who has taken a hardline on North Korea in the past — said Pyongyang's arsenal could be dismantled in a year. "If they have the strategic decision already made to do that and they are cooperative, we can move very quickly. And it is to North Korea's advantage to dismantle very quickly. Then the elimination of sanctions, aid by South Korea and Japan and others can all begin to flower," Bolton said. In a subsequent appearance on Fox News Sunday, Bolton refused to comment on the Washington Post report. "I am not going to comment on any reports, true, untrue, or partially true, about intelligence," he said. "I will just say this ... we are using the full range of our capabilities to understand what North Korea is doing." https://www.npr.org/2018/07/02/625267839/north-korea-reportedly-expanding-ballistic- missile-production-facility Return to top
Real Clear Defense (Chicago, Illinois) Wargaming and Deterrence Options: Signalling a Low-Yield Response By Adam Cabot July 3, 2018 When wargaming a Russian attack on the Baltic states, the Rand Corporation, demonstrated that current NATO forces in Europe are an insufficient deterrent. Findings indicated that if Russia was to attack the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, the longest length of time it would take their forces to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga is 60 hours. RAND found that a NATO force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades supported by air power and adequate land-based fire support would be necessary to prevent a rapid defeat until more forces can arrive in Europe. This, they argued would be the necessary conventional force required to deter a Russian attack. The problem with fielding such a force is politics based on cost and will. Deploying seven brigades with heavy armored fire support and logistics would cost billions of dollars, and it would most likely be the United States that is required to provide the bulk of these forces. In the current climate where the Trump administration is at odds with most NATO members for failing to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense, the chances of the U.S. being willing to supply the forces required to defend Europe is highly unlikely. If Russia is not adequately deterred and decides to take the gamble and invade the Baltic states, the outcome could mean the end of the NATO alliance if insufficient action is taken to subsequently eject the Russian force. With the current conventional force structure, expelling Russia from the Baltic states would be a huge undertaking, as forces would need to be transported from the United States and logistically supported in the field by a united Europe. One can see why Russia may take this gamble and make the risk analysis that the U.S. won’t act to defend the Baltics. If we add the
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1322 // nuclear component to this argument, Russia may make the further calculation that the U.S. will not risk a nuclear war where New York and Washington D.C are targeted for the sake of defending Estonia and Latvia. The destruction of NATO would mean a great victory for Putin who views the alliance as a major threat to Russian national security. So, what can realistically be done to deter Russia from one day taking this gamble? The answer is twofold. Appropriate nuclear signaling in combination with appropriate non-strategic nuclear capabilities. Let’s look at capabilities first. The current non-strategic nuclear structure of B-61 gravity bombs based in Europe is incapable of adequately deterring a Russian attack. The countering of any mistaken perception of an exploitable gap in regional deterrence was emphasized in the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and formed the basis for the proposal to add low-yield SLBMs and SLCMs into the arsenal. The shortcoming of the B-61 is that it has very limited capability due to the need to penetrate modern air-defenses such as the long-range S-400 and medium-range Buk M2 missile systems, not to mention the up and coming S-500. The key to using non-strategic nuclear weapons to deter a Russian attack is having a credible plan of action should deterrence fail. If Russia launched a full-scale invasion of the Baltic States and reached the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga, how would the weapons be used? With the current option being B-61s, the F-16 and PA-200 aircraft would need to first have the required combat range to reach their target and then successfully evade Russian air-defenses. With their current basing locations, the aircraft carrying the B-61s do not even have the range to encompass the total territory of Estonia and Latvia, let alone over the border into Russia, aside from Kaliningrad. They also lack the capability of evading modern Russian air-defense missile systems. This presents a significant problem, as deterrence is relying on options that an enemy may perceive as impotent. This is where the addition of low-yield SLBMs and SLCMs will close the gap and add a credible non- strategic deterrent. During the Cold War, NATO deployed a range of tactical options including nuclear artillery and mines to use against a conventionally superior Soviet-led force in the event that it invaded Western Germany. The problem is evident in this scenario, as it involved the potential use of multiple nuclear weapons on allied territory. The new additions solve this problem, as they could be used behind enemy lines in Russia itself, in the event of an invasion against NATO, to destroy airfields, logistical centers, military bases, air-defenses and columns of armored forces ready to deploy to the front. The SLBMs proposed to be deployed before the SLCMs, would use a modified W76-1 warhead with an ideal variable yield of 0-10kT, as opposed to the current 100kT warhead. The delivery platform would be the Trident II D-5 missile, launched from the Ohio Class ballistic missile submarine. With its intercontinental range, speed and accuracy, this low-yield option would be able to penetrate Russian airspace and destroy targets specifically involved in supporting military action at the front. While they may not destroy the spearhead itself, the troops that have already pushed into the Baltics, they would snap the spear, preventing further adequate reinforcement and eliminating or dampening Russian Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Next, we move to the so-called “discrimination problem,” posited by academics such as Vipin Narang. This is where appropriate nuclear signaling comes into play. The “discrimination problem” concept refers to Russia potentially mistaking an incoming low-yield SLBM for a full-scale disarming first strike. Russia cannot predict the yield of the incoming missile before it detonates. Thus it could be 0-10kT or 488kT, in the case of a W88 warhead, also fitted to the Trident II D-5 SLBM. The fear illustrated by this problem is that Russia reacts to the incoming missile by launching a full-scale retaliatory nuclear strike against the continental United States to prevent their own ICBMs from being destroyed in their silos.
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This “discrimination problem” is a concern to be addressed but can be circumvented by appropriate signaling. The U.S. must be on the front foot in deterring a Russian invasion of the Baltic states by specifically and publicly declaring that a Russian military advance against NATO may be met with a non-strategic nuclear attack on its territory to halt the advance. This appropriate signaling will make clear to Putin and Russian military planners that the U.S. is serious about defending NATO and has the nuclear means to do so, without resorting to a full-scale strategic nuclear attack resulting in a global nuclear exchange. In spite of the argument proposed by Narang, it is unlikely that Russia would mistake one or two incoming SLBMs for a strategic first strike even with MIRV capabilities. Russia has an estimated 318 ICBMs in fixed silos and on mobile launchers, not to mention its sea and air-based deterrent. To launch a full-scale retaliatory strike based on one or two incoming SLBMs is an unrealistic concept. While some academics and abolitionists may decry the idea of threatening limited nuclear use in response to a Russian invasion of NATO and argue that it makes a nuclear exchange more likely, in fact, the opposite is true. A deliverable and penetrable low-yield nuclear option coupled with specific and straight-forward signaling of intentions removes uncertainty and provides an option short of global nuclear war. As it stands, Russia may make the miscalculation due to an inadequate NATO deterrence posture and mixed messages from the current U.S. administration that the gamble may pay off. The attractive lure of successfully dismantling the NATO alliance through an invasion of the Baltic states must be completely taken off the table with adequate capabilities and appropriate signaling. Better to take steps to deter now, rather than scramble to push back a Russian force dug into Baltic territory. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/07/03/wargaming_and_deterrence_options_sig nalling_a_low-yield_response_113576.html Return to top
US COUNTER-WMD
Reuters (New York, N.Y.) Exclusive: Japan to Buy Advanced U.S. Radar for Missile Defense System By Tim Kelly, Nobuhiro Kubo June 29, 2018 TOKYO (Reuters) - Japan will next week pick a U.S.-made advanced radar for its multibillion-dollar missile defense system, an upgrade that could help ease trade friction with Washington and provide cutting-edge protection against the arsenals of North Korea and China, sources said. “Aegis will be a big-ticket purchase; it will be a nice gift for President Trump,” said a Japanese government official, referring to the ground-based Aegis Ashore system. Japanese officials could make their radar choice as early as Monday for two Aegis Ashore batteries it wants to deploy in 2023. That means the purchase can be added to a defense budget proposal slated for release in August, three sources with knowledge of the plan told Reuters, declining to be identified because they are not authorized to speak to the media.
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The candidates are Raytheon Co’s (RTN.N) SPY-6 and a version of Lockheed Martin Corp’s (LMT.N) Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), the sources said. Japan had sought the SPY-6 when it agreed to buy Aegis Ashore last year, but Washington was reluctant to supply it. The Japanese budget proposal comes amid an easing of tensions following the June 12 meeting in Singapore between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong un. Although Japanese military planners still see North Korea as an immediate danger, they view China’s growing military power as a bigger long-term threat. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force controls an arsenal of hundreds of ballistic missiles that could reach Japan. Upgrades to Japan’s missile defense system would make it one of the world’s most advanced. Japanese defense officials have estimated the cost of the two Aegis Ashore batteries at about $2 billion. The final tally, including the SPY-6 or LRDR, which can detect targets several times farther away than existing Aegis systems operated by Japan or the U.S., could be at least twice that, the sources said. Although the upgrade adds expense, it fits with Trump’s stated desire to export more American military hardware. In a visit to Tokyo in November, he welcomed Japan’s procurement of F-35 stealth fighters and urged Japan to buy more U.S. weapons and goods. Trump has since cranked up pressure on Tokyo with tariffs on steel, threats of levies on car imports and calls for a bilateral trade deal between the two countries. At a joint news conference with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in June, Trump said Abe had pledged to buy “billions and billions of dollars of additional products of all kinds.” Abe may meet Trump again around the time of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York in September, a Japanese government official told Reuters. He declined to say what the two leaders would discuss. RAYTHEON OR LOCKHEED Raytheon and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (7011.T) developed Aegis Ashore’s SM-3 Block IIA missiles; Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor. The SPY-6 radar is designed for the U.S. Navy’s fleet of Aegis-equipped warships. The LRDR will be integrated into the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defence anti-ballistic missile system in Alaska by 2020. Both cutting-edge radars will allow Japan to make full use of new longer-range interceptors and could be used to defend against any future threat posed by Chinese missiles. Japan’s military procurement proposals for the year starting April 1 come on the heels of Kim’s pledge in Singapore to work toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Trump in return ordered a halt to large-scale military drills with South Korea. Japan, which hosts about 50,000 U.S. military personnel, including the biggest overseas concentration of U.S. Marines and a U.S. Navy carrier strike group, has said it would not change its military posture until it see concrete signs that Pyongyang is prepared to permanently dismantle its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Reporting by Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo; additional reporting by Linda Sieg; Editing by Gerry Doyle
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1322 // https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-japan-aegis-exclusive/exclusive-japan-to- buy-advanced-u-s-radar-for-missile-defense-system-idUSKBN1JP0V4 Return to top
Global Biodefense (Seattle, Wash.) Air Force Tests New CBRN-Protective Liner for Mobile Medical Tent System Author Not Attributed July 2, 2018 New Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) collective protection tent system components were recently put to the test during an Air Force exercise at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, on June 20. During the event, Airmen employed the new Expeditionary Medical Support System (EMEDS) tent liner airlock system to create an over-pressurized environment that protects from CBRN agents. EMEDS is a modular field hospital system developed by the U.S. military for mobile deployment of medical treatment facilities in any location. The toxic-free enclosure will enable medical personnel to work comfortably and efficiently while treating patients in a clean environment without having to wear full Mission Oriented Protective Posture. “Anyone who has been out there doing an exercise on a hot day in the summer, or even a cold day in the winter, knows how terrible it can be after wearing chemical protective equipment for even a short period of time,” said U.S. Air Force Maj. Ben Schumacher, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center CBRNE protective systems program manager. “There is also an increased risk of exposing or contaminating others, including patients, due to fatigue or stress of trying to operate while wearing chemical protective equipment.” Prior to the demonstration, a select group of Airmen from the 633rd Medical Support Squadron attended training to learn the new components and discern which parts can be used interchangeably with the Tent Kit 2 units and the Stand Alone Large units. Airmen understanding the tent models and how to incorporate components with existing infrastructure in the field was a crucial element for exercise. “Collective protection is a part of every major wartime scenario,” said Schumacher. “With the training and equipment exhibited during this exercise, we can be ready to protect the medical mission during an attack, and this can directly result in saving lives.” Results from the demonstration will impact medical decisions for Air Force collective protection systems and aid in Airman readiness in a deployed environment. Story adapted from original by Monica Roybal, 633rd Air Base Wing Public Affairs. https://globalbiodefense.com/2018/07/02/air-force-tests-new-cbrn-protective-liner-for-mobile- medical-tent-system/ Return to top
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Global Biodefense (Seattle, Wash.) OPCW Hosts Medical Treatment of Victims of Chemical Weapons Symposium Author Not Attributed July 2, 2018 An international Symposium on Medical Treatment of Chemical Warfare Victims was convened by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) from 28 to 29 June in The Hague. More than 50 scientists, clinicians, experts, academia, and civil society representatives from around the world attended the Symposium, which focused on various challenges associated with providing medical assistance for victims of chemical warfare, with a special focus on long-term health effects and the treatment necessary for these conditions. The Symposium provided an expert forum for experience-sharing and exchange of ideas that should result in identifying priorities for victim assistance projects and future scientific research. The participants also discussed the latest findings on long-term health effects of exposure to chemical warfare agents, as well as challenges and gaps in treatment provision. A Symposium declaration was prepared by the participants, which elaborated recommendations on how the Technical Secretariat and the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons could most positively provide support for victims of chemical weapons. The declaration also contains recommendations for other relevant international organisations and the medical community at large regarding medical assistance for victims of chemical weapons, as well as research and scientific collaboration in this field. This draft symposium declaration was distributed during the final session and will be finalized for submission to the OPCW Technical Secretariat over the coming days. This declaration will be made available on the OPCW website under the Symposium banner. https://globalbiodefense.com/2018/07/02/medical-treatment-of-victims-of-chemical-weapons- opcw-symposium-addresses-long-term-health-effects/ Return to top
UT News (Austin, Texas) New Nerve Gas Detector Built with Legos and a Smartphone By The University of Texas at Austin June 27, 2018 Researchers at The University of Texas at Austin have designed a way to sense dangerous chemicals using, in part, a simple rig consisting of a smartphone and a box made from Lego bricks, which could help first responders and scientists in the field identify deadly and difficult-to-detect nerve agents such as VX and sarin. The new methodology described in a paper published Wednesday in the open-access journal ACS Central Science combines a chemical sensor with photography to detect and identify different nerve agents—odorless, tasteless chemical weapons that can cause severe illness and death, sometimes within minutes. Eric Anslyn, a chemistry professor at UT Austin, has been studying nerve agents for nearly 20 years, using safe chemical compounds that behave in the same way as nerve agents and can mimic them in testing. He previously developed chemical compounds that neutralize nerve agents and at the same time create a glow bright enough to be seen with the naked eye.
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"Chemical weapons are dangerous threats to humanity," Anslyn said. "Detection and neutralization are key to saving lives." The new device uses affordable, accessible materials to make Anslyn's earlier compound more useful in real-world scenarios. The chemical sensors, developed by Xiaolong Sun in Anslyn's lab, generate fluorescence, which is key to the analysis. Different colors and brightness can signal to first responders which of several nerve agents are present and how much. Because different categories of nerve agents require different decontamination procedures and different treatments for victims—and because the weapons act swiftly, making time of the essence—these variations are key. "Unfortunately, it can be difficult to see differences in the level of florescence with the naked eye in the field. And instruments used in the lab to measure florescence are not portable and cost $30,000," said Sun. "This device essentially takes photographs of the glowing." The camera on a smartphone is sensitive enough to detect the differences in color and brightness in the glowing reaction. The team used an iPhone in the lab. Software, developed by graduate student Alexander Boulgakov and available for free on GitHub, analyzes the color and brightness to identify the type and concentration of the nerve agent. The software can be adapted for multiple smartphone systems. But researchers also needed a light-tight space to get a good reading on the camera. They considered 3-D-printing a box, but realized that 3-D printers and the materials used in them can be inaccessible, uneven or cost-prohibitive in some parts of the world. That's when Pedro Metola, a clinical assistant professor at UT, thought of using Legos. "Legos are the same everywhere you go," Metola said. The only other pieces of equipment needed are an ultraviolet light and standard 96-well test plate. The solution is inexpensive, portable and adjustable on the fly. Other authors on the paper are undergraduate researcher Leilani Smith and molecular bioscientist Edward Marcotte. All authors are at UT Austin, and Boulgakov and Marcotte are both researchers at the university’s Center for Systems and Synthetic Biology. Smith is a student researcher in the Practical Sensors research stream, a for-credit course and program led by Metola that is linked to the Freshman Research Initiative, an award-winning UT Austin program that allows undergraduate students to have early experiences with finding solutions to real-world scientific problems. Funding was provided by the U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Welch Foundation, the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation. https://news.utexas.edu/2018/06/27/new-nerve-gas-detector-built-with-legos-and-a- smartphone Return to top
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US ARMS CONTROL
Eurasia Review (Albany, Oregon) Experts Accentuate Significance of Trump-Putin Summit — Analysis By Jamshed Baruah July 2, 2018 “We are on the brink of a new cold war,” warned UN Secretary-General António Guterres on May 24, 2018 adding that there are no negotiations under way between the U.S. and Russia for further strategic nuclear arms reductions. Whether presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin would turn over a new leaf when they meet in Helsinki, Finland on July 16 remains to be seen. However, the U.S. Arms Control Association (ACA) is of the view that the two nuclear giants would discuss nuclear risk-reduction and arms control – in particular the future of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which will expire in 2021 unless extended by mutual agreement, and the compliance dispute over the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In an interview in March, says the ACA, Putin voiced interest in an extension of New START or even possibly further cuts in warhead numbers. The Trump administration is conducting a review of its position on the matter. The ACA director for disarmament policy Kingston Reif says: “Extending New START would be an easy win for the President. It could help create a positive atmosphere for improving the U.S.-Russia relationship without making an unwise or impractical concession to Moscow. Failing to do so, on the other hand, will limit U.S. intelligence on the scale of the Russia nuclear arsenal.” “Without a positive decision to extend New START, and if the INF Treaty comes to an end, there would be no legally-binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear superpowers for the first time since 1972, and the risk of unconstrained U.S.-Russian nuclear competition would grow,” warns Daryl Kimball, the ACA executive director. Former assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, and chair of the ACA board of directors, Thomas Countryman adds: “Should the INF Treaty collapse and New START expire without replacement … the consequences for effective cooperative management of nuclear risks and for nuclear nonproliferation would be severe.” These views underline why the U.S.-Russian summit is both important and significant, coming at a time of heightened tensions, mutual suspicions and conflicts between the two countries. Experts are of the view that the choice of Helsinki for the summit is both appropriate and propitious – being the place where the Helsinki accords were adopted by the United States, Soviet Union and 33 European states in 1975. These accords affirmed the intent, and set in motion a process, to improve relations between the East and West, prevent a nuclear holocaust, and build common security. “The Helsinki accords affirmed the prohibition of armed conflict, non-intervention in internal affairs of other States, obligation to resolve conflicts non-violently, respect for human rights, and obligation to achieve arms control and disarmament,” says Alyn Ware, Global Coordinator for Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament.
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“And it strengthened the European mechanisms for conflict resolution and common security, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” which is now called the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). “As such, holding the Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki signals a step-back from the conflicts and mutual threats between Russia and the West, and the possibility of a stronger focus on dialogue, détente and disarmament,” he adds. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, which meets one week before the Trump-Putin Summit, has already called on the USA and Russia to reduce the risks of a nuclear war by taking nuclear weapons off high-alert and adopting no-first-use policies. In May 2018, 50 leading women parliamentarians from 23 countries (including many from Europe) released an appeal to leaders of nuclear-armed states supporting the calls from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and also urging governments to phase out their reliance on nuclear deterrence with reliance on common security. The joint statement commemorating International Women’s Day for Peace and Disarmament and the 175th birthday anniversary of Bertha von Suttner, the first woman to receive the Nobel Peace Prize on May 24 recalled: “The United Nations was established with an array of mechanisms through which nations can resolve conflicts, negotiate disarmament and achieve security through diplomacy not war. These have been supplemented by additional common security mechanisms such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. “We urge governments to make better use of these common security mechanisms, and especially to replace reliance on nuclear deterrence with reliance on common security.” German parliamentarians Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU), Ute Finckh-Krämer (SPD) and Agnieszka Brugger (Greens) initiated in 2017 a European parliamentarians’ joint letter to NATO and OSCE to reduce nuclear threats and support disarmament. However, according to other policy analysts, incremental disarmament measures are insufficient to end the threat of a nuclear exchange by accident, miscalculation or intent. “Trump and Putin should also consider lowering the alert status of U.S. and Russian weapons that are maintained in a state of immediate readiness to launch, ‘No-First-Use’ commitments, better military-to-military communications (re-establishing and upgrading hotlines instead of scrapping them), and an end to provocative and potentially dangerous military exercises close to each other’s borders,” says John Hallam, Co-Chair of the Abolition 2000 Working Group on Nuclear-Risk Reduction. “In addition, the leaders should reaffirm the joint statement of Gorbachev and Reagan made in Helsinki in 1986 that ‘A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’,” Hallam adds. Initiatives pour le Désarmement Nucléaires (IDN), a French international relations think-tank, has issued an appeal for NATO States to call on President Trump and President Putin to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons from the European theatre. This would involve the U.S. removing its nuclear weapons stationed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey. And it would involve Russia agreeing to verified decommissioning of their tactical nuclear weapons. The U.S.-Russian summit is being held four days after the 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels. Marc Finaud from IDN stresses: “The July 11-12, 2018 NATO summit offers a unique opportunity for the
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European Allies to take the initiative again and demand from the U.S. a negotiation that would lead to the withdrawal of both American and Russian tactical weapons from European soil.” https://www.eurasiareview.com/02072018-experts-accentuate-significance-of-trump-putin- summit-analysis/ Return to top
VOA (Washington, D.C.) UN Chief Marks 50 Years Since NPT Signing Author Not Attributed July 1, 2018 The United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Sunday hailed the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Marking the date, Guterres in a statement said, “The NPT is an essential pillar of international peace and security, and the heart of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Its unique status is based on its near universal membership, legally-binding obligations on disarmament, verifiable non-proliferation safeguards regime, and commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy." What is the NPT? The objective of the international treaty is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons- making technology, allow its signatories to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and phase out the nuclear arsenal of the five original nuclear powers - China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. When did the NPT take effect? The treaty was signed July 1, 1968. It came into force in 1970 and it was extended indefinitely in May of 1995. Who are the treaty’s signatories? Most of the world, as 191 countries have signed the NPT. The holdouts are India, Pakistan, Israel and South Sudan. North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003. North Korea, India and Pakistan have publicly disclosed their weapons program and Israel has long maintained a policy of deliberate ambiguity. How does it work? The treaty establishes a safeguards system that is overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The agency uses inspections as a means to verify compliance of the treaty by member states. https://www.voanews.com/a/un-chief-marks-50-years-since-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty- signing/4462909.html Return to top
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Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (Prague, Czech Republic) Iran’s Rohani Due in Switzerland, Austria amid Nuclear-Deal Dispute Author Not Attributed July 2, 2018 Iranian President Hassan Rohani is traveling to Western Europe this week, amid continued uncertainty over the future of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Tehran and world powers. Rohani's trip to Switzerland and Austria, which took over the rotating European Union presidency on July 1, is part of a diplomatic effort by Tehran to rally support in the wake of the Unites States' withdrawal from the nuclear deal. Before leaving Tehran for his European tour, Rohani said on July 2 that he expected European states to unveil "in coming days" a package of measures aimed at preserving the accord, according to the state-run Mehr news agency. President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the accord in May and moved to reinstate economic sanctions against Tehran. U.S. officials also warned that other nations would face sanctions unless they stopped doing business with Iran. The other parties to the agreement -- Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany -- say they remain committed to the deal so long as Iran is honoring it. Rohani was scheduled to stay in Switzerland on July 2-3 and have talks with President Alain Berset and other officials, the Swiss government has said. The sides will look at "ways of preserving the progress made as a result of the [Iran nuclear] agreement and of ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region," a statement said. It added that the discussions will also touch upon the situation in the Middle East. Both the United States and Saudi Arabia have tasked the neutral European country with representing their interests in Tehran. On July 4, Rohani is to meet with his Austrian counterpart, President Alexander Van der Bellen, and Chancellor Sebastian Kurz in Vienna. Kurz told Austrian news agency APA he will speak plainly with Rohani about Iran's role in the Middle East, amid Western accusations that Tehran is destabilizing the region. He said he will also find "clear words" to discuss the human rights situation in Iran. The Austrian capital is home of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN body that monitors Iran's compliance with the nuclear deal. It also played host to the negotiations that led to the signing in July 2015 of the deal aimed at preventing Iran from building an atomic bomb. Tehran insists its nuclear program is for civilian use. While in Bern and Vienna, Iranian officials were due to sign agreements on economic cooperation, according to Austrian and Iranian media. The Iranian president will be accompanied by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Rohani's planned trip comes as demonstrators protesting against shortages of drinking water in southwestern Iran clashed with police for a second night. Demonstrations have been held recently in Tehran over the country's troubled economy.
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1322 // https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-rohani-due-in-switzerland-austria-amid-nuclear-deal- dispute/29331787.html Return to top
Reuters (New York, N.Y.) Israel Confident U.S. to Keep Protections in Any Saudi Nuclear Power Deal By Timothy Gardner June 26, 2018 WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Israel’s energy minister said on Tuesday after meeting Trump administration officials he is confident that the United States will not relax non-proliferation standards in any nuclear power deal it agrees with Saudi Arabia. Israel vehemently opposes any effort by the Saudi Arabia to relax “gold standard” non-proliferation limits on enriching uranium or reprocessing nuclear fuel in any deal between the two countries, Yuval Steinitz, Israel’s energy minister, told Reuters in an interview. “Once you allow one country to enrich uranium or reprocess fuel, it will be extremely difficult to tell other countries in this vicinity or elsewhere in the world not to do so,” he said. Steinitz, in Washington for the World Gas Conference, met this week with people in the Trump administration about Saudi Arabia’s quest to build at least two nuclear power stations with the help of U.S. technology. He did not identify who he met with. U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry has been working with Saudi Arabia on a civilian nuclear agreement that could allow the kingdom to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium, practices that non-proliferation advocates worry could one day be covertly altered to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Energy Department did not immediately respond to a request for comment about the status of the nuclear power talks with Saudi Arabia. Israel and Saudi Arabia do not have diplomatic relations, but they share concern about Iranian influence in the Middle East. If the United States allows Saudi to relax the standards, “then you deteriorate the non-proliferation effort, so I am confident the Americans would listen to our concern,” Steinitz said. Steinitz said it would support Saudi Arabia’s development of nuclear power only if it included the gold standard protections and if the kingdom purchases uranium from the United States. Saudi Arabia has said if it does not get U.S. assistance to build reactors it could turn to other international partners. The kingdom is also in talks with companies from Russia, China, South Korea and other countries on nuclear power. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gas-conference-israel-nuclearpower/israel-confident-u-s-to- keep-protections-in-any-saudi-nuclear-power-deal-idUSKBN1JM310 Return to top
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COMMENTARY
Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.) The Trump-Putin Summit Could Do Some Good If … By Steven Pifer July 2, 2018 At long last, Donald Trump will have his fervently desired summit with Vladimir Putin. Having hit a post-Cold War low, the U.S.-Russia relationship could use a push toward a better state. A summit could do that, but only if Trump is disciplined in how he prepares for and deals with Putin. Unfortunately, that appears to be a very big “if.” The president has given little reason to expect he has such discipline. A mere photo-op summit works to Putin’s advantage. And he will prepare and lay traps into which Trump could all too easily stumble. MEETING IN HELSINKI Washington and Moscow announced last Thursday that Presidents Trump and Putin will meet in Helsinki on July 16. That followed a June 27 meeting between National Security Advisor John Bolton and Putin at the Kremlin, after which Bolton said, “the fact of the summit itself is a deliverable.” That sets an awfully low bar. Bolton never would have said such a thing a few months ago. If the White House wants a summit that advances U.S. interests, the president will have to prepare. That means gaining command of key U.S.-Russian issues, such as arms control, Ukraine, and Syria. He has smart people who can help him do that. Preparation also means a positive NATO summit on July 11 and 12 that sends a message of robust allied unity, especially in responding to the challenges posed by Russia. That would strengthen Trump’s hand as he sits down with Putin. Finally, a successful summit in Helsinki requires that Trump confront Putin candidly on issues where Russia is misbehaving. That is important if he wants to earn Putin’s respect. It is also important for how the summit will be seen back home. A WORTHWHILE AGENDA… What should the summit agenda look like? There will be some general discussion, but it will be important that the leaders tackle specific issues. The two presidents should first agree on steps to ensure that the U.S.-Russia relationship does not deteriorate any further. One area to prioritize is nuclear arms control. The 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) put bounds on the U.S.- Russian nuclear competition. Unfortunately, the nuclear arms control regime today faces serious problems. Mutual charges of violations have placed the INF Treaty in jeopardy, and New START expires in less than three years. Trump should press Putin to agree to task experts to resolve INF compliance issues. He could tell Putin that U.S. officials will give serious attention to Russian questions about the U.S. Aegis Ashore missile defense site in Romania, which Moscow claims violates the INF Treaty, if Russian officials address U.S. concerns about their 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile, which Washington maintains is a banned intermediate-range missile.
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As for New START, Putin has hinted that Russia would like to extend New START (by its terms, it can be extended for up to five years, until 2026). Trump should agree to such an extension, which would preserve the predictability and stability benefits that New START provides to both countries. A second area to seek progress is on military-to-military interactions. U.S. and Russian military forces now operate more frequently in close proximity, raising the possibility of an accident or miscalculation. Trump and Putin should have their senior military leaders sit down to agree on ways to reduce the prospect of a mistake that neither side should want. Senior military leaders might also usefully discuss doctrinal questions, in order to better understand the other side’s doctrine and explain elements that cause concern. Trump also has to raise difficult issues. Ukraine tops that list. He should make clear that the United States will continue to support Kyiv, that Russia needs to make peace in eastern Ukraine, and that Western sanctions will remain in place until it does. Trump should press Putin to get serious about ending the Donbas conflict as well as put to rest hopes in the Kremlin that he might fold on this issue. Trump also must raise Russia’s interference in U.S. politics. He should put Putin on notice that a continuation of this behavior will result in retaliation by Washington. Unless the Kremlin understands that its cyber and social media misconduct has costs, it will not cease. A summit that ensures that the nuclear arms competition remains bounded and puts down clear markers on how Washington would respond to continued Russian misbehavior could set the stage for a process, likely a slow one, that would move the U.S.-Russia relationship toward a better place. That would be a useful summit. … BUT REASON FOR APPREHENSION There nevertheless remain good reasons for apprehension about the Helsinki summit. First, is there any reason to expect Trump will prepare? Or will he just wing it? Putin will come to the summit very well prepared to push his agenda with a gullible American counterpart. He could, for example, recite a biased Russian narrative regarding Crimea—colonized by Russians, unfairly transferred to Ukraine in 1954, populated by a Russian ethnic majority—that dupes Trump into reversing four years of the West’s policy of not recognizing Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea. Second, will the NATO summit provide the right scene-setter for Helsinki? A repeat of the June G-7 summit fiasco would weaken Trump’s position and tempt Putin to strive to widen the emerging differences between the United States and its European allies. Third, by a number of accounts, in contrast to his tweets, Trump shies away from confrontation in face-to-face meetings. If he ducks or soft-pedals difficult issues such as Ukraine or election interference, Putin will take Trump for a sucker and play him accordingly. One can and should hope for a successful summit in Helsinki, one that begins the process of improving the U.S.-Russia relationship. Such a summit is possible. But based on what we have seen of Trump’s foreign policy performance, one should have modest expectations … and a certain amount of apprehension. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/02/the-trump-putin-summit-could- do-some-good-if/ Return to top
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The National Interest (Washington, D.C.) What America Wants from Iran Can’t Be Achieved by Regime Change By Amitai Etzioni July 1, 2018 One should not assume that regime change will entail desired behavior changes. Now that the United States is "done" with North Korea, it is time to return to the question of what American policy toward Iran should be. So far all the United States has done is walk away from the agreement limiting Iran's nuclear program and sought to reimpose the sanctions. The question of what America wants, and above all, how it might get what it is after, still needs to be worked out. When I write that America is "done" for now with North Korea, I, of course, do not mean that North Korea is no longer a nuclear threat, as the President held at one point. I mean that it is easy to see that both sides have created a PR cow they will keep milking for many months to come. Both Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump can keep claiming that the Singapore agreement is a major foreign- policy achievement and keep making minor concessions to each other, to sustain the belief that they are on the way to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. For Kim, there is no better way to protect his nuclear force than to keep talking about dismantling it. As for Trump, he will continue to win points for seeking a peaceful resolution, as long as it does not become too clear that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nukes. In my judgment, this "milking" will continue for quite a while and therefore, in effect, frees the United States to focus on Iran. Unfortunately, a familiar bad idea is again raising its ugly head. Major U.S. administration figures are calling for regime change rather than behavior change. National Security Advisor John Bolton said, before his appointment, that "Our goal should be regime change in Iran." While it is true that Bolton mentioned the Libya option favorably he was talking about North Korea, Tehran surely heard that statement he made. Furthermore, Rudy Giuliani told the Iran Freedom Convention for Democracy and Human Rights that “We have a president who is as committed to regime change as we are.” Also before he assumed his current position , Pompeo wrote that “Congress must act to change Iranian behavior, and, ultimately, the Iranian regime.” Such calls make negotiations that could lead to significant behavior change much more difficult because they call for removing the party America must negotiate with, the party in power. One reason the war in Syria dragged on for so many years is that the United States insisted, as a precondition for any negotiations with Syria, that Assad must go. There are two ideas about the way America may change the regime in Iran. One is the way the United States changed it in Afghanistan and Iraq, by military invasion. Given the enormous human and economic costs of these regime changes and their less than favorable results, any notion of another land war in Asia is a common conversation stopper. Indeed, many mavens add that Iran is a much harder nut to crack than were the regimes of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban when America toppled them. The other way is to rely on various groups in Iran—or the “people”—to overthrow the regime. Iran is composed of a large number of ethnic groups, several of which have strongly ambivalent feelings about the regime, such as the Kurds. The CIA has been reported to be in touch with leaders of these groups and is seeking to egg them on. Others point to recent, fairly widespread street demonstrations, which lead them to believe that with American encouragement these demonstrations could lead to an Arab spring moment in Iran. “The essential theme in modern Iranian history is a populace seeking to emancipate itself from tyranny—monarchal and Islamist,”
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1322 // wrote Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh. “Devising a strategy to collapse the clerical regime isn’t difficult.” The "street" did overthrow the governments of Tunisia and Egypt. However, Iran is much more effective in controlling its citizens. Its success is based on permitting some expressions of objection to government policies and granting reformers some power by making limited reforms. Iran also often looks the other way when young people drink and watch porn—while also using a rather effective secret police to keep control. Those who seek to rely on the people of Iran to change the regime may well have a very long wait. Such a policy is hardly compatible with the fact that if Iran also abandons the current agreement, it could develop nuclear weapons rather quickly. Additionally, Iran continues to increase its meddling in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and even Afghanistan. Moreover, one should not assume that regime change will entail the desired behavior changes. I was the guest of one of these groups that are expected to challenge the regime when I visited Iran in 2002. It soon became clear that while indeed these groups have significant complaints against the regime, and would be willing to overthrow it if they saw a chance that they could succeed—they all were patriotic Iranians. They made it clear that they hate the U.S. (and above all, for some historical reasons, Britain) more than the mullahs. And if they came to power, they would maintain the nuclear program. Indeed, they reminded me that it was the reformers that started the military nuclear program when they were in control. On the other hand, the current regime has shown itself to be very keen to negotiate denuclearization—when faced with military threats. The time was mid-2003, a point at which the United States demonstrated its military might by quickly disposing of Saddam's army in weeks, and with few casualties—a feat Iran could not accomplish after fighting him for eight years. The fact that the Bush administration openly listed Iran as one of the three members of the Axis of Evil and otherwise indicated that it could be subject to military attacks alarmed Tehran. In May 2003, Iran sent the U.S. government a proposal that called for a comprehensive dialogue between the two countries that would address Iran’s nuclear program. Several observers considered this proposal to be the blueprint for a “grand bargain.” Flynt Leverett, former Middle East director for the National Security Council, compared it to the diplomatic communications between Beijing and the Washington that paved the way for the opening of relations with China during the Nixon administration. New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof called the document “astonishing” and said it offered “a real hope for peace.” But the Bush administration rejected the proposal—because it sought regime change. In short, leaders in Washington may turn awfully blue if they hold their breath until the people of Iran will overthrow the regime and—if they do—there is little reason to believe the new government will abandon the military nuclear project. In contrast, the record suggests that a combination of military and diplomatic pressure may work, as long as it seeks only behavior and not regime change. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-america-wants-iran-cant-be-achieved-regime-change- 24727/page/0/1 Return to top
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Politico (Washington, D.C.) Why I’m Still Hopeful about Trump’s North Korea Deal By William J. Perry July 2, 2018 And why it also won’t be easy. For a euphoric moment, it seemed everything was about to change on the Korean Peninsula. Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un—two leaders with a flair for the dramatic and a willingness to shatter precedents—fanned expectations of a diplomatic breakthrough that would end a nuclear standoff and open a pathway to peace between the two Koreas. As someone who has spent years immersed in the problem of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, as secretary of defense and later as a presidential envoy on nuclear issues, I watched events of the past spring with a mix of hope and skepticism. Now, from the vantage point of summer, that skepticism seems amply justified. The recent Singapore summit was grand theater, but the actual statement signed by the two leaders offered nothing more than a promise of denuclearization, comparable to what North Korea has promised in the past. Just this past weekend, NBC reported that U.S. intelligence officials believe North Korea has secretly ramped up production of enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in recent months, and that Kim is actively trying to deceive the U.S. about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. It is important for people to know, however, that hope also remains justified. Expectations of solving a decades-long standoff with a sudden, made-for-TV breakthrough were never very realistic. But recent events have demonstrated something important: The North Koreans are willing to engage seriously, and diplomacy remains by far the most promising path in one of the world’s most dangerous places. Moving forward with North Korean talks—as the Trump administration and other nations in the region by all means should do—it is worth keeping three main points in mind. 1. Everything hasn’t suddenly changed in Pyongyang. Despite the drama of recent months, the North Koreans have a few clear strategic objectives that have not varied substantially in 20 years. They understandably perceive that two primary goals— preserving the Kim dynasty and commanding international respect—are more reliably advanced with nuclear weapons than without, even if this means sacrificing a secondary objective, an end to punishing economic isolation. Effective diplomacy will use incentives and disincentives, applied in concert with other countries in the region that have even more at stake than we do, to convince North Korea that its strategic objectives have better prospects by turning away from nuclear weapons. This won’t involve pulling diplomatic rabbits from a hat. It will be a complex, long-term effort, and speculation about who takes the credit and what the Nobel Committee will think of it all is decidedly premature. 2. There are no attractive military options. I write from the vantage point of someone who has prepared military plans against North Korea and been ready to use them. Unlike during the Clinton administration, when North Korea’s nuclear efforts had not yet produced actual bombs, the country now has an estimated 20 to 30 of them, as well as an increasingly sophisticated missile program to deliver them. These weapons, combined with formidable conventional forces, means that any preemptive strike against North Korea would likely escalate into a wider war that could kill millions of people in South Korea and other
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1322 // neighbors. Make no mistake: The United States would “win” such a war, whatever that means, but at an appalling price that we should not risk while other options are at hand. Nor should we take comfort in the suggestions that missile defense systems could reliably protect us or our allies. Even if this technology worked exactly as promised—an unlikely prospect—there is no missile defense that cannot be defeated by saturating it with even more missiles and decoys. Finally, there is scant hope in the idea that we could revive a Cold War doctrine, mutual assured destruction, by encouraging South Korea and Japan to build their own nuclear arsenals to deter North Korea. This was an idea that Trump seemed to praise in the 2016 campaign. It would lead inexorably to an arms race, just as it did during the Cold War. Back then, through years of crises and close calls, we avoided blowing up the planet as much by good luck as by good management. We should not test our luck again. 3. This moment is perishable. Trump, Kim and South Korean President Moon Jae-in all deserve credit for helping create a moment of real diplomatic promise. However, I witnessed first-hand how the last equivalent moment of promise curdled unexpectedly into a tragic missed opportunity. Perhaps a review of that sad history can help us avoid it this time. After serving as Bill Clinton’s defense secretary in his first term—when we came close to a military strike against North Korea before achieving a cessation of its efforts to build nuclear bombs—he asked me to lead a team to find a long-term solution. Working closely with diplomats from other countries in the region, we reached what looked like victory for our security interests based on much the same principles that are being contemplated now: recognition, security assurances that the U.S. would not initiate a military attack against North Korea, and some economic incentives, in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons program. The clock ran out on Clinton’s term in January 2001 before the proposed agreement was made formal. But this bargain seemed so self-evidently in the interests of the United States and its regional allies that I had every reason to believe that President George W. Bush would quickly finish the Clinton administration’s work. Instead, Washington abandoned that diplomacy and, during both the Bush and Obama administrations, Pyongyang plunged with disturbing success into a bomb- and missile-development program that now gives North Korea the capacity to kill millions of people in neighboring countries and even the United States. This capacity does not mean they are intending to initiate a nuclear war. North Korea is bombastic and warmongering in its rhetoric, and often ruthless in its tactics. But the regime is not irrational. Its leaders seek survival, not martyrdom. But as long as they possess these weapons in a region infused with intense and long-standing conflicts, the risk of blundering into a nuclear catastrophe through miscalculation or brinkmanship gone awry is unacceptably high. The best odds for changing this frightening reality—and for not repeating the missed opportunities of 18 years ago—requires clear thinking about what the North Koreans want, and what the United States and its allies would need to have confidence in any deal. Kim has stated that he seeks major improvements in the economy of North Korea, but he will not accept these at the expense of security. North Korea’s actions have demonstrated that its primary objective is regime survival. For more than three decades and three leaders, North Korea has made major sacrifices to achieve that objective, and, against all odds, has succeeded. As we enter this critical phase of negotiations, we need to be thinking about how North Korea can achieve its security without nuclear weapons, because that it what they are going to be thinking about. This is not a hopeless task. In my negotiations in 2000, our most persuasive proposals were
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1322 // recognition and security assurances—both were critically important to the negotiators from North Korea. The hurdle is higher today because two decades ago, North Korea could not have been sure that its nuclear development program would be successful. So the diplomatic problems are more difficult now than they were in 2000, and will require more creative approaches. Perhaps the biggest diplomatic problem the U.S. will face, if we can get North Korea to agree to fully denuclearize, will be the timing of that denuclearization and how we verify the component steps. These steps will be complex, will take many months, if not years, and will require intrusive verification procedures. But the U.S. has negotiated agreements equally difficult with the Soviet Union, so we do have a positive precedent. And even before achieving a full denuclearization, effective diplomatic engagement with North Korea could yield valuable interim benefits, including a commitment to stop building and testing new weapons and a reduction in tensions with South Korea. Indeed, one very important difference this time relative to previous negotiations is the critically important role of the North-South discussions. When I was negotiating with the North almost 20 years ago, I could not get the North to treat South Korea as an equal partner in the negotiations; they treated South Korea as entirely subsidiary to the United States. That has dramatically changed. President Moon has taken bold and intelligent initiatives in reaching out to the North; and they have been reciprocated. Moon’s initiative could, in time, lead to a normalization between North Korea and South Korea, and that normalization will be critical in building the trust necessary to make any agreement actually work. South Korea should not play a subsidiary role as the negotiations proceed. They are critical to success, and, after all, it is their country that we are negotiating about. And there is another important difference today over the failed negotiations of the past. If Trump is able to get an agreement, he will be able to get support for it in the U.S. Congress. Clinton was not able to get the Republicans in Congress to support the Agreed Framework negotiated in 1994, so he was never able to fully implement it. But Trump, as a Republican, would benefit from what is sometimes called the “Nixon effect”—when Nixon negotiated the Shanghai Agreement that normalized relations with the PRC, he was able to get the support of congressional leaders who would not have supported a similar agreement made by a Democrat. Although the negotiations will be difficult and complex, they could be successful if the three parties enter them with good faith and make good use of the experiences—both good and bad—of previous negotiations. And if the negotiators succeed, they will have solved a very dangerous problem that has eluded other negotiators for more than two decades. Then it will be time to celebrate; then it will be time to allocate credit. If that happens, there would be plenty of credit to go around. Certainly Moon would deserve great credit for his unprecedented initiative in engaging the North. Certainly Kim would deserve great credit for seeing that he could achieve his country’s security without nuclear weapons. And certainly Trump would deserve great credit for seeing the possibility of a peaceful solution where many of his advisers saw military action as the only option. In the meantime, we have much hard work ahead. It won’t be easy, and it won’t be quick. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/02/why-im-still-hopeful-about-trumps- north-korea-deal-218943 Return to top
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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago, Illinois) Low-Hanging Fruit: Ratify Protocols for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones By Adam M. Scheinman June 28, 2018 The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review helpfully affirms that the United States “remains willing to engage in a prudent arms control agenda.” Sadly, the arms control landscape looks decidedly bleak—littered with Russian treaty violations and the nuclear build-ups under way in various Asian countries. But to paraphrase former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld—who famously said that “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”—the absence of arms control partners is not evidence that opportunity is absent. In fact, Washington could now take arms control steps that are entirely within its own control—steps not dependent on the policies or actions of other nations. Specifically, the United States could ratify treaties that were signed in prior years but that now lie dormant in the Senate inbox. I do not mean the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which the Trump administration indicates it will not support. Rather, I refer to lower-hanging fruit: US ratification of protocols to treaties through which nations in several regions have established nuclear-weapon-free zones. The odds that the Senate will take up the protocols are admittedly long, but there are nevertheless sound arguments in favor of doing so. In essence, ratifying the protocols would help the US meet its nuclear nonproliferation goals without exposing it to any added security risk. Washington the laggard. To back up a step, five nuclear-weapon-free zones are in force around the world—in Latin America, Africa, the South Pacific, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. The nations included in the zones account for nearly two-thirds of all UN member states. In each zone, a treaty requires that regional parties forego nuclear weapons and accept constraints on nuclear activities, in some cases exceeding the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Provisions include prohibitions against nuclear weapon tests; requirements that nuclear materials and facilities be secured; and, in certain treaties, requirements that member states accept the Additional Protocol, a measure that significantly enhanced the International Atomic Energy Agency’s ability to verify the peaceful use of nuclear material. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are designed not just to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of states within the region but also to prevent others from bringing these weapons in—whether for testing (the French used to conduct nuclear tests in the South Pacific) or basing (the Soviet Union once based nuclear weapons in Central Asia). The latter task is accomplished through protocols open only to the five nations recognized under the NPT as nuclear weapon states: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China. The protocols commit the five not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the regional parties (so-called “negative security assurances”); not to station, test, or manufacture nuclear weapons in the zone; and not to help any regional state violate its zone treaty commitments. The United States is well behind the other four nuclear powers when it comes to protocol ratification. The Senate ratified the protocol for the Latin American zone in the Reagan years. Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China have done likewise—but have also ratified the protocols covering the South Pacific, Africa, and Central Asia. (None of the five has signed the protocol to the Southeast Asia zone treaty due to unresolved issues regarding the clarifying statements that would accompany protocol signature and ratification. Diplomatic efforts to break this impasse petered out in 2015.) President Obama, to demonstrate support for nonproliferation aims, submitted the zone protocols for Africa and the South Pacific to the Senate for consideration
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1322 // in 2011, but no action was taken—not a hearing, not a follow-up request for information, and certainly not a vote. Nor did the Senate take action when Obama submitted the protocol for the Central Asian treaty in 2015. The Senate’s inaction was not totally unforeseen, particularly in light of an unexpectedly bruising campaign in 2010 to secure Senate ratification of New START, a US-Russia arms reduction agreement. Arms control cooperation between the branches hardly improved over the remainder of Obama’s presidency. Ultimately, ratification of the protocols found its way to the bottom of the State Department’s treaty priority list and was of little interest to a Congress more focused on Iran, proliferation sanctions, and compliance matters. The zone protocols stood no chance in that environment. What’s really troubling is an increasingly pervasive sense of fatalism in Washington regarding arms control and treaty ratification. This fatalism stems from the executive branch’s reluctance to engage in political fights it may lose and from a lack of interest among key congressional committees. In fact, so few treaties dealing with US nuclear weapons have come before the Senate in the last 20 years (examples are limited to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1999, the Moscow Treaty in 2002, and New START in 2010)—and so few senators with a working knowledge of the technical and strategic details of arms control remain in office—that debate on arms control, to the extent it occurs, is limited, often superficial, and partisan. Where you stand is largely a function of where, in relation to the political aisle, you sit. Correcting this institutional deficit constitutes one argument for ratification of the zone protocols. In earlier years, Congress organized itself to maintain support for arms control and to ensure that congressional concerns were taken on board before treaties came up for a vote. After all, the Senate’s constitutional role is to provide both advice and consent to ratification. The Senate Arms Control Observer Group, which disbanded years ago, as well as Senate luminaries such as Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, John Kerry, and Charles Mathias, kept lines of communication open between the branches while shepherding nuclear treaties through the Senate for approval. Periodically, calls emerge to regenerate the Senate Arms Control Observer Group, which seems like a worthy idea. Alternatively, a small, bipartisan group of senators interested in arms control and the regions covered by the zone treaties could, with the support of party leadership, use the zone protocols as a kind of physical therapy—exercising unused muscles before ratification atrophy sets in. Staying normal. Of course, one should not seek protocol ratification for its own sake. Indeed, the first-order question is whether ratifying the protocols would contribute to US national security. On balance, I believe it would. Here’s why: First, US ratification would enhance the norm surrounding non-use of nuclear weapons. No state has used a nuclear weapon against another state since the United States did so to end World War II—and, given the hugely destructive potential of nuclear weapons, every effort should be made to keep it that way. Indeed, the non-use norm is a primary rationale for maintaining a robust US nuclear deterrent. The norm explains long-standing US support for nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agreements—and is part of the fabric of US efforts to avoid nuclear wars, not fight them. Extending negative security assurances through protocol ratification can contribute to that aim. Some critics question the necessity and wisdom of ratification. Former Senator John Kyl—no fan of arms control, but one of the few in the Senate to take notice of the protocols when they were submitted to the Senate—characterized ratification as an attempt to “codify by international agreement [President Obama’s] flawed nuclear weapons declaratory policy, which would limit the
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1322 // instances in which the President would use nuclear weapons to defend the United States from attack.” But which countries and circumstances legitimately provoke such a concern? No state in the various regional zone treaties is pursuing nuclear weapons or poses a military threat to the United States—in fact, some are close US allies (such as Australia and New Zealand) or major partners (such as Kazakhstan and South Africa). Further, no state capable of posing a threat to the United States (such as Syria, Iran, North Korea, Russia, or China) would be covered by US negative security assurances. Those assurances would apply only to the regional parties to the treaties—that is, nations in Africa, Central Asia, and the South Pacific—not to other nuclear-armed countries or to states outside the region. Moreover, the Obama declaratory policy that Senator Kyl rejected in 2011 is repeated precisely in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. The review says “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.” When the Obama administration submitted the protocols to the Senate, it recommended that the instrument of ratification repeat this statement of US policy verbatim. The Trump administration could ask for the same. Some are understandably reluctant to make US nuclear assurances legally binding, especially given today’s uncertain global environment. Yet the risks seem manageable. After all, the threat that a nation in Africa, Central Asia, or the South Pacific will conduct a strategic-type attack against the United States or its allies is extraordinarily remote—and US conventional military forces are more than adequate to deter or respond overwhelmingly to such attacks in the future. Second, a number of policy and legal concerns regarding the protocols have been clarified through recent diplomatic efforts, making US ratification more appealing. For instance, the treaty for the Central Asian zone contains ambiguous language that does not clearly prohibit Russia from basing nuclear weapons in the region under a separate mutual defense pact. Under such circumstances, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France refused to sign the protocol. But following several rounds of talks in 2013 and 2014, the Central Asian states and Russia conceded that, if Russia based nuclear weapons in the region, the zone treaty’s most basic commitments would be violated. With this understanding in hand, the United States, together with the United Kingdom and France, signed the protocol in 2014—while making clear that they would exercise their right to withdraw if faced with an imminent violation of the zone treaty. The United Kingdom and France went on to ratify the protocol on this basis; the United States did not. US diplomacy has won other important clarifications in recent years. Most important is recognition among all concerned that regional zone treaties and protocols do not prohibit US vessels and aircraft that may carry nuclear weapons (or may not—US policy is not to confirm) from transiting through nuclear-weapon-free zones. In other words, no conflict exists between zone treaty protocols and US rights under international law regarding freedom of the seas and transit. A shared understanding on this point is critical given the role of the US Navy in securing sea lanes, assuring allies, and projecting US nuclear military power, and is a sine qua non for US support of the protocols. To emphasize the point, any US instrument of ratification would restate Washington’s rights under international law to exercise freedom of the seas—while making clear that regional states are free to decide for themselves whether to host visits of foreign vessels and aircraft. This leads to a third argument for ratification: that US participation in the protocols would do no harm to US security relationships around the world. Washington would continue to mount military operations from Diego Garcia—which, though it appears on the map of the African zone treaty, is under the sovereign control of the United Kingdom. The United States would continue to conduct naval port calls or over-flights based on existing or anticipated arrangements and would continue to conduct military exercises with regional partners.
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Looking at the substance, and setting aside partisan politics, it is hard to understand why the United States would not go forward with ratification. The major players in the executive branch—the State Department, the Defense Department, and the White House—have been around and around on this issue and have completed their homework. They have drafted and shared with the Senate the statements of policy and law that would be included in an instrument of ratification. The current administration could easily update and resubmit the Obama administration’s submission packages if it wished to do so. The hard truth is that the protocols will go nowhere unless either the executive or legislative branch decides to make ratification a priority. Realistically, neither branch is likely to do so. That’s a shame—it is far better to judge arms control agreements on their merits rather than on one’s own predisposition for or against arms control. Policy makers should not blind themselves to the possibilities or the limitations of any arms control measure. The zone protocols, if ratified, would neither secure the peace nor wreck US security. Instead, ratification would represent a modest step toward realizing US nonproliferation goals—and help re-establish bipartisan support for the “prudent arms control agenda” advocated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Defense Department, or the US government. https://thebulletin.org/low-hanging-fruit-ratify-protocols-nuclear-weapon-free-zones11939 Return to top
Real Clear Defense (Chicago, Illinois) North Korea: There is No Such Thing as Stable Deterrence By Kevin R. James July 3, 2018 The overwhelming consensus in the U.S. foreign policy community is that a nuclear-capable North Korea is perfectly acceptable since North Korea can simply be deterred. As Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda put it in their analysis of the Singapore summit’s failure to bring about North Korean denuclearization, "the significant silver lining is that [the Singapore summit] could lead to a stable deterrence relationship between the two countries." The history of how deterrence actually worked during the Cold War shows that any deterrence arrangement between the U.S. and North Korea will necessarily be subject to a substantial risk of catastrophic failure. The only way to avoid exposing the U.S. to an unacceptable risk of a nuclear strike by a vastly more powerful North Korea in the future is to bring about the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) of North Korea today–by diplomacy if possible (as unlikely as that now appears) or by preventive war if necessary. The logic of the deterrence option is essentially this: A) Kim is rational and wishes to preserve his regime; B) Any use of nuclear weapons by North Korea will lead to a retaliatory strike by the U.S. that would end Kim's regime; therefore C) Kim will not use his nuclear weapons against the U.S. or its allies. I admit that this logic does sound superficially persuasive...unless one has thought about financial crises. Here we can rephrase the "deterrence works" syllogism to: A) Bankers are rational (at least as rational as Kim Jong Un); B) A financial crisis is bad for bankers (undoubtedly true); therefore C) Banks will not act in a way that brings about a financial crisis. However, the 2008 financial crisis still happened. What went wrong?
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Let me begin by noting that financial deterrence worked (in a fashion): the fact that a financial crisis is bad for bankers meant that the financial crisis wasn't caused by 17 financiers waking up in New York one morning and randomly deciding to wreck the global financial system. The crisis happened regardless because individually rational decisions that made sense to the people who took them at the time interacted in ways that exposed the financial system as a whole to the risk of a catastrophic failure (systemic risk). If systemic risk is high and if you play financial crisis roulette for long enough, you lose. So, in the absence of CVID, the U.S. will be forced to play deterrence roulette with North Korea. Just how risky would that be? As the long history of financial crises demonstrates, this question isn't about the risk that Kim acts irrationally (nobody thinks that Kim is going to wake up one morning and randomly decide to nuke Los Angeles). The question comes down to this: how much risk is built into the system when everyone behaves rationally? And here the evidence indicates that any deterrence arrangement between the U.S. and North Korea will inevitably be subject to an enormous amount of systemic risk. In this situation, it would be exceedingly rash to bet that the U.S. will never lose a round of deterrence roulette. North Korea seeks to obtain nuclear weapons to prevail against the U.S. if the U.S. acts to prevent North Korea from achieving objectives that harm the U.S. and/or its allies (a nuclear crisis episode). As Matthew Kroenig's new analysis of nuclear strategy shows, countries rationally seek to prevail in these situations by acting to increase the probability of a nuclear exchange. As this probability ratchets up, each country weighs the expected consequences to them of a nuclear exchange against the importance of their objectives. Eventually, as the risk of a nuclear exchange increases, one country throws in the towel and the other one wins. Alternatively, a nuclear war happens. History shows that crisis episodes have come very close to ending in nuclear war. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, the captain of a Soviet sub came under the mistaken impression that he was being attacked by the U.S. and would soon be sunk. He seriously contemplated using a nuclear- armed torpedo to destroy a U.S. aircraft carrier first (he was talked out of doing so by other senior officers on board). Given that the U.S. military was on a hair-trigger alert at the height of the crisis, any Soviet attack that killed thousands of Americans–let alone one with nuclear weapons–would surely have led to war. Reflecting upon the crisis, Graham Allison wrote that "Kennedy thought the chance of escalation to war was 'between 1 in 3 and even', and what we have learned in later decades has done nothing to lengthen those odds". Even without the protection that nuclear weapons provide, North Korea has attacked U.S. military assets, raided Japan and kidnapped Japanese citizens, sunk a South Korean ship, shelled South Korean territory, bombed a South Korean passenger jet, provided military assistance to hostile powers, and engaged in extensive cyberwar operations against the U.S. and its allies. Given this track record, North Korea will almost certainly act in a way that provokes a crisis in the future. Still, one may think that even a 33% chance of war at some point in the future is a much better bet than a 100% chance of a preventive war now to eliminate that risk. And that would indeed be the case if North Korea in the future would be no more powerful than North Korea is today. Unfortunately, North Korea's nuclear program is advancing rapidly. The yield on North Korea's nuclear weapons has increased from around 10 kt in 2013 to around 250 kt in 2017, and North Korea is now perfecting its ability to mount these much more powerful weapons on missiles capable of striking the U.S.. Furthermore, Kim vowed earlier this year to "mass produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles." Consequently, it would be worth a preventive war with a far weaker North Korea now to eliminate a significant risk of a nuclear exchange later.
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A crisis that spins out of control is only one–and perhaps not the most dangerous–pathway to nuclear war. In a deterrence arrangement between two hostile countries (say N and U), each country will logically, rationally, and sensibly put into place a second strike capability so as to deter an attack by the other. But these logical, sensible, and rational actions designed to prevent a deliberate attack inevitably create the risk of an accidental nuclear war. If N rationally commits to launching a retaliatory strike on U given a true alarm that U is attacking (or is about to attack), then there is necessarily a chance that N launches a first strike on U by mistake in response to a false alarm that U is attacking. Obviously, U cannot deter N from launching what N mistakenly thinks is a retaliatory strike because launching a retaliatory strike when under attack is precisely what deterrence is all about. In a sense, accidental nuclear war is the autoimmune disease of nuclear deterrence. The risk of an accidental nuclear war is real and substantial. In what may be the most famous (but by no means the only) nuclear war near miss, Soviet early warning systems detected (with the highest level of reliability) the launch of a U.S. first strike on 26 September 1983. The early warning duty officer had standing orders to report such an attack to senior military and political officials. Given the reliability of the signal and the extreme fear of a U.S. first strike by the most senior levels of Soviet leadership at the time, it is likely that, if the alarm had been reported, the Soviets would indeed have retaliated (by mistake). Fortunately, the duty officer on the spot was Stanislav Petrov. He deliberately ignored his orders to report the alarm up the chain of command. Instead, he went with his gut instinct and classified the incident as a false alarm before knowing that it was, in fact, a false alarm. Now, one may think that–given the disastrous consequences of a nuclear exchange–everyone in a nuclear command chain will always act as Stanislav Petrov did. Stanislav Petrov himself did not agree with this view. Reflecting upon the incident in a BBC interview, he thought that there was only a 50/50 chance that even he acted as he did instead of reporting the alarm up the chain. He also thought that, if any of the other duty officers had been on the crucial shift, they would definitely have reported the alarm up the chain. History suggests that Petrov is correct. In 1995 a Norwegian satellite launch appeared to the Russians to be a missile launch by a U.S. submarine. The duty officer on the spot did report the alarm up the chain of command. Russian nuclear forces went onto heightened alert, and President Yeltsin had to decide whether or not to retaliate. Fortunately for the world, Yeltsin was not as paranoid as Andropov was in 1983, so he chose not to retaliate (by mistake). But, in slightly different circumstances, either the 1983 near miss or the 1995 near miss could have resulted in a U.S.-Russian nuclear war. As informative as this case study evidence is, a more rigorous statistical examination of accidental nuclear war risk would be extremely valuable. However, as one might expect, there is only very limited publicly available data on nuclear early warning system effectiveness and performance. Using the data there is, Barrett, Baum, and Hostetler put the chance of an accidental U.S./Soviet nuclear war at 2% per year (mean estimate). If the chance of a U.S.-North Korean nuclear war is also 2% per year (and it could be higher), then there is about a 45% chance of a U.S.-North Korean nuclear exchange at some point over the next 30 years (Kim is in his mid-30s). Deterrence is in part about putting into place a second strike capability to eliminate your rational opponent's incentive to launch a first strike. But deterrence is also a submarine captain, mentally and physically exhausted from attempting to dodge detection by the enemy navy, breathing bad air, thinking that his sub is about to be destroyed, and deciding whether or not to take some of the enemy with him before that happens. Deterrence is an early warning duty officer seeing a "Launch" alarm on his screen, feeling like he is sitting on a hot frying pan, and deciding whether to disobey his orders or to report what his gut is telling him is a false alarm up the chain of command (in North
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Korea disobeying orders in such circumstances could lead to torture and death). Deterrence is a leader being woken up at 3 am with the news that early warning systems have detected with high reliability the launch of a decapitation strike, and having a few minutes to decide how to respond. The cold serene logic of game theory offers no guarantees against a catastrophic deterrence failure here. In practice, then, choosing to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat by deterring them rather than by CVID is to take a leap of faith–a bet that somehow, in some mysterious way, things will always work out for the best. The crisis won't spin out of control. The early warning systems will always work perfectly, or, if they don't, a Stanislav Petrov will be there to save the day. Studies of nuclear crisis episodes, the case study evidence on nuclear war near misses, and the statistical evidence we have on accidental nuclear war risk all suggest otherwise. The risk of a catastrophic deterrence failure is inevitably real and substantial. Or, in other words, there is no such thing as stable nuclear deterrence. The awful arithmetic our situation is that a preventive war now–as horrible as that would undoubtedly be–is a much more prudent option than a reckless gamble on never losing a round of deterrence roulette (where losing means a nuclear exchange with a vastly more powerful North Korea in the future). Every day that the U.S. delays acting makes the preventive war that it will need to wage more costly. As John von Neumann put it, "If you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at 5 o'clock, I say why not 1 o'clock?". President Trump needs to present North Korea with a final opportunity to comply with the Singapore summit agreement by taking concrete steps to begin the CVID process. If North Korea declines, he must summon up his inner Lincoln, find his General Grant, and get it done. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/07/03/north_korea_there_is_no_such_thing_as_s table_deterrence_113573.html Return to top
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1322 //
ABOUT THE USAF CSDS The USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University — while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff’s Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON) and Air War College commandant established the initial personnel and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. In 2008, the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." This led to the addition of three teaching positions to the CPC in 2011 to enhance nuclear PME efforts. At the same time, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide professional continuing education (PCE) through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the CPC in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research on not just countering WMD but also nuclear operations issues. In April 2016, the nuclear PCE courses were transferred from the Air War College to the U.S. Air Force Institute for Technology. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. In May 2018, the name changed again to the Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies (CSDS) in recognition of senior Air Force interest in focusing on this vital national security topic. The Center’s military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. The Latin inscription "Armis Bella Venenis Geri" stands for "weapons of war involving poisons."
DISCLAIMER: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.
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