The 4th Marine The fight tonight force by Capt Patrick A. Majeski

n the 38th Commandant’s Plan- for a near-peer fight in the projected ning Guidance (CPG), Gen Berger >Capt Majeski is a Company Com- operating environment. To support the declared the III MEF is the main mander with 2/3 Mar. He is a former CPG, the 4th Marine Regiment should effort of the Marine Corps as a CAAT Platoon Commander, Maneuver displace to the MWTC, consolidate its Ifight-tonight force against a near-peer advisor during the Ramadi Counter- organic units, and provide attack, and EWS resident graduate. adversary.1 Gen Berger also cites his that are saturated in mountain warfare predecessor to highlight that the Ma- for rotational deployments to the 31st rine Corps is not organized, trained, existing infrastructure. Specifically, the MEU. equipped, nor postured to fight a peer- Mountain Warfare Training Center adversary tonight.2 If III MEF is the (MWTC) in Bridgeport, CA, should Counterargument main effort, then Marines deploying not only be a training site for pre-de- There are two counterarguments to the 7th Fleet area of responsibility ployment training programs but also to this proposal: one is based on a should orient on Democratic People’s a camp to permanently station an in- myth, while the other is a legitimate Republic of Korea (DPRK), China, fantry regiment. The 4th Marine Regi- concern. First, there is a myth that or Russia as their potential adversary. ment, overseas since World War II, is the 4th Marine Regiment is prohib- These three countries share baseline the most logical unit to fill this demand. ited from returning to the continental tactical methodologies, but more im- The first, second, and third battalions of because GEN Wainwright portantly, they share similar environ- the 4th Mar, scattered amongst the 1st ordered the regiment to burn its colors mental considerations: cold, mountain- ous terrain. In 1950, much of the First Marine Provisional Brigade’s leader- ... there is a myth that the 4th Marine Regiment is pro- ship were veterans of World War II, and their combat experience against a hibited from returning to the continental United States peer-adversary enabled the Marines to because GEN Wainwright ordered the regiment to embark in two weeks and successfully engage the enemy at the Pusan perime- burn its colors ... ter. Today, an overwhelming majority of combat veterans on active duty gained their experience from the Global (GWOT), a predominantly Mar Div, should consolidate under this and surrender to the Japanese during counter-insurgency (COIN) fight. If III parent command as its rightful organic the siege of in the Philip- MEF is called to fight tonight against units. These battalions would provide pines on 26 May 1942.3 The true story the DPRK, it will rely heavily upon a subject matter expertise in mountain is that the Marine Corps created the veteran knowledge reservoir steeped in warfare during rotational deployments UDP in 1977 to reduce the number COIN warfare rather than conventional as the GCE of the 31st MEU. Infan- of unaccompanied tours to Okinawa. warfare against a near-peer adversary. try battalions deploying under the This was achieved by posting the 4th The problem then is how does the Ma- (UDP) will and 9th Marine on Okinawa rine Corps prepare deployable units for execute the Mountain Warfare Train- while their subordinate battalions were a short notice conventional war with ing Exercise (MWTX) to establish a permanently stationed state-side, ro- the DPRK? baseline capability of operating in this tating to the island on six-month de- To train for a conventional war environment. Although it would be ployments.4 Second, if the 4th Marine against the DPRK, the Marine Corps a sizeable near-term investment, this Regiment is moved to MWTC, there must reconsider its force design to fully change would produce long-term gains will not be a higher headquarters for exploit the training opportunities of its that better postures the organization units deploying to Okinawa under the

Marine Corps Gazette • May 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 35 Ideas & Issues (The aIr-Ground Team)

UDP. While this is a legitimate concern, the proposed solution is that both ele- ments would fall under the operational control of the 31st MEU. A MAGTF does not have a standard structure but is rather task-organized to accomplish the mission.5 In this case, battalions of the 4th Marine Regiment would be the GCE of the 31st MEU, while UDP bat- talions would be best used to conduct expeditionary advanced base operations. The UDP should be reinforced with a HIMARS battery to create a competi- tive advantage and facilitate deterrence pursuant to the CPG.6 Aligning both battalions under the MEU improves command relationships and facilitates greater naval integration for littoral op- erations in a contested environment.

Historical Context The Mountain Warfare Training Center’s environment is very similar to the terrain and weath- In 1950, the retainer of World War er of North Korea. (Photo by Sgt Anthony Ortiz.) II veterans enabled the Marine Corps to mobilize a brigade in two weeks and Kaneohe—is designed with cohesion forces that can win in combat.”13 achieve institutional lore at places like in mind. A recruit’s first exposure to the Understanding the environment is the Pusan Perimeter, Inchon, and the Marine Corps is the squad bay where critical to comprehend the impacts of Chosin Reservoir. On 25 June 1950, barriers are broken down and horizon- terrain and weather on military opera- 75,000 soldiers of the North Korean tal cohesion; the intangible factor that tions.14 MWTC is strikingly similar People’s Army (KPA) crossed the 38th determines success on the battlefield is to the mountain ranges of the DPRK, Parallel and invaded South Korea.7 On effectively fostered.10 But when Marines characterized by steep slopes, higher 2 July 1950, the FMF, Pacific was direct- join their first unit, they are isolated in elevation, and heavy snowfall.15 From ed to deploy a Marine Air-Ground Bri- two-to-a-room dormitory-style berth- a maneuver perspective, winter weather gade for combat employment overseas.8 ing that reverses the transformation. in the mountains significantly challeng- By 14 July 1950, 6,500 Marines of the Instead, the existing lower base camp es mobility but also masks the move- First Provisional Marine Brigade were at MWTC is the perfect model to build ment of friendly forces. Resupply in loaded and setting sail from the coast BEQs for the battalions of 4th Marine this environment will be constrained, of California to engage in combat op- Regiment. These squad bays are con- and fires assets will have limited ord- erations against the KPA.9 In 1951, the structed to endure the harsh winters nance to prosecute high payoff targets. Marine Corps established the MWTC while providing an open floor plan for However, the environment can be used in Bridgeport, CA, to train follow-on living, sleeping, and hygiene that forces to increase the effects of fires. In the forces in an environment similar to Marines to interact. In the middle of winter, indirect fire systems can be em- North Korea. Thinking offensively, the the squad bay should be locked weapons ployed to set off avalanches in enemy Marine Corps should station the 4th racks where Marines live with and care maneuver corridors.16 In the summer, Marine Regiment at MWTC to man, for “their best friend ... their life.”11 At tactical employment of Mk-77 bombs train, and equip a mountain warfare the end of the squad bay should be a will enable controlled wildfires to divert centric force capable of thriving in the modest desk for the platoon commander enemy units onto preferred avenues ap- in the III MEF area of responsibility. and platoon sergeant to facilitate su- proach.17 Command and control (C2) pervision and vertical cohesion.12 The in the mountainous environment will Sustaining the Transformation squad bays of the 4th Maine Regiment further require adaptive thinkers to The most glaring requirement to per- would be built to achieve the principles effectively employ mission tactics and manently station an entire regiment at of MCRP 6-11D, Sustaining the Trans- vintage high frequency assets that may MWTC is the construction of bachelor formation, that adjacent units will seek be unfamiliar to Global War on Ter- enlisted quarters to berth the several to emulate. ror veterans. Force protection may be a thousand additional Marines. How- broad category, but an essential training ever, this is also a prime opportunity Warfighting objective is to provide warfighters with build a camp that—unlike Lejeune, MCDP 1, Warfighting, states, “the firsthand experience on how to protect Twentynine Palms, Pendleton, and purpose of all training is to develop themselves against the fierce attacks of

36 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • May 2021 winter weather. Through this experi- to support the CPG. The transition 3. Matthew Burke, “Honor vs. Dishonor: The ence, the inputs of the 4th Marine Regi- from COIN to conventional warfare Story of the Pacific’s 4th Marine Regiment,” ment may inform updates to programs is a monumental shift in tactical focus. Stars and Stripes, (April 2018), available at of record and acquisitions, such as up- Waging a conventional battle in cold, https://www.stripes.com. dating cold weather gear or maybe the mountainous terrain presents additional 4. Jason Bohm, From the Cold War to ISIL: Jetboil©. Stationing a regiment to train challenges including environmental and One Marine’s Journey, (Annapolis, MD: Naval in this environment will produce more human factors that can determine suc- Institute Press, 2019). mountain warfare subject matter experts cess or failure. Our projected adversary, that, as they progress in their careers, the KPA, has the advantage as they train 5. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, War‑ will carry forward their informed to employ the environment to support fighting, (Washington DC: 1997). perspectives to the rest of the fleet. their scheme of maneuver. To gain an Orienting on the enemy is a fun- advantage, the Marine Corps should 6. 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance. damental aspect of maneuver warfare consolidate the 4th Marine Regiment to attack the enemy system.18 The 4th at MWTC with its organic battalions 7. Victor Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View Marines can study KPA tactics which to man, train, and equip mountain war- of the United States Marine Corps, (Annapolis, oversimplified involves a 3:1 troop MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1984). concentration at a specific point sup- 8. Ibid. ported by indirect fire with a preference To gain an advan- for maneuver during adverse weather 9. Ibid. and periods of darkness.19 Testing of- tage, the Marine Corps fensive and defensive tactics against should consolidate the 10. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCRP 6‑11D, the perceived threat is optimized by Sustaining the Transformation, (Washington training in an emulative environment. 4th Marine Regiment at DC: 1999). Upon deploying as the GCE of the 31st MWTC ... MEU in support of the 7th Fleet, bat- 11. William H. Rupertus, “Riflemen’s Creed,” talions of the 4th Marine Regiment will USMC Press, (n.d.), available at http://www. be well prepared to thrive in the pro- usmcpress.com. jected operating environment against fare-centric fighting forces. If existing 12. MCRP 6‑11D, Sustaining the Transforma‑ a tangible enemy. Additionally, these command relationships are retained, the tion. mountain warfare battalions trained in 3d Mar Div will have two fully manned DPRK tactics will provide outstanding organic regiments to support III MEF. 13. MCDP, Warfighting. red cells and red teams for units un- 3dMar is stationed on an island, and 4th dergoing MWTX. Red cells can allow Mar will be stationed in the mountains, 14. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1‑3, operational planning teams to identify both are complementary environments Tactics, (Washington, DC: 1997). strengths and weaknesses of their plans, to conduct combat operations in the but it relies heavily on the competency Pacific area of operations. Leaving the 15. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, North of the red cell.20 Red teams can similarly 4th Mar in Okinawa does not posture Korea Country Handbook, (Washington, DC: 1997). provide outstanding training value but the Marine Corps for a fight tonight require a high degree of professionalism with a peer-adversary. Although their 16. Robert Rice Jr., et al, “Avalanche Hazard and understanding of enemy tactics. presence in Okinawa looks good on a Reduction Using the Avalanche Guard: A Cache The training value of stationing the 4th C2 diagram, it does little to provide and Mortar Technology,” (Merced, CA: Uni- Marines at MWTC is not limited to units that are effectively prepared for versity of California Merced, 2005). providing highly capable units to the their perceived adversary. The 4th Mar 31st MEU but also highly competent should move to MWTC to man, train, 17. Jordan Golson, “The Flame-Throwing He- opposition forces to exercising units and equip mountain warriors capable licopter That Fights Wildfires,” Wired, (August during MWTX. of winning battles in the III MEF area 2015), available at https://www.wired.com. of operations. Conclusion 18. MCDP 1, Warfighting. In 1951, the Marine Corps deduced 19. James Minnich, North Korean Tactics, (Fort Notes that Bridgeport, CA, was a suitable loca- Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and tion to train Marines to thrive against 1. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s Staff College, 2001). a fight with the KPA. Nearly 70 years Planning Guidance, (Washington DC: July later, the MWTC continues to provide 2019). 20. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCWP 5‑10, a mountain warfare block for pre-de- Marine Corps Planning Process, (Washington, ployment training programs, but this 2. Ibid. DC: 2016). is merely scratching the surface of the potential that this location can serve

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