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Caspian Sea Corridor in the Age of Uncertainty, GMF, March 2013, Files Mf/1362595246Chifu Corridor Mar13.Pdf IULIAN CHIFU, NARCIZ BÃLêOIU, RADU ARGHIR THE EAST-WEST BLACK SEA – CASPIAN SEA STRATEGIC CORRIDOR C o l e c t, i a CÃRTI, ÎN LIMBI STRÃINE (4) www.ispri.ro www.librarie.ispri.ro IULIAN CHIFU, NARCIZ BÃLêOIU, RADU ARGHIR THE EAST-WEST BLACK SEA – CASPIAN SEA STRATEGIC CORRIDOR EDITURA INSTITUTULUI DE ªTIINÞE POLITICE ªI RELAÞII INTERNAÞIONALE Bucureºti, 2014 Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naþionale a României CHIFU, IULIAN The East-West Black Sea – Caspian Sea Strategic Corridor / Iulian Chifu, Narciz Bãlãºoiu, Radu Arghir. - Bucureºti : Editura Institutului de ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale, 2014 Bibliogr. ISBN 978-973-7745-96-5 I. Bãlãºoiu, Narciz II. Arghir, Radu 355.02(498:47+55) 32.01:913(498:47+55)(262.5+262.81) Tehnoredactare computerizatã: SANDA STROESCU © IULIAN CHIFU, NARCIZ BÃLêOIU, RADU ARGHIR Opinions expressed in the written or electronic publications do not necessarily represent those of the Black Sea Trust, the German Marshall Fund, or its partners. FORWORD The East – West Caspian Sea – Black Sea Strategic Corridor is a book that tries to elaborate on a vision and a concept that is aimed at linking the land locked Central Asia with the border of EU and NATO, e.g. Romania, on the West shore of the Black Sea. The project that emerged from this concept is covering 5 tracks, some already under development as a natural consequence of the previous cooperation: energy, transport, military transport, investment and trade. The book tried to cover the full range of pros and cons for such a project. In four conceptual and theoretical chapters it showed the current situation of the global scene, in the region of Central Asia, in the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea Area and, finally, is presenting the thinking and the vision of the East- West Corridor, including the benefits it brings to littoral countries and the countries involved in such an endeavor, but also, considering the challenges to that project and possible blockages. The book investigates, using people on the ground and outside views, the interests of the countries on that Corridor, namely Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, but also the interests of the big powers in the region and the added value of this project for the respective policies – Turkey and Russia – as well as other littoral countries that could be involved, are interested and could gain dividends from this construction. In nine chapters all those views are covered in a coherent puzzle that shows everybody how different actors of the region see the construction of such a Corridor, how this fits into their pre-existent policies and what would be the added value for each one if the project is concluded. The Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center put to use its vast experience in this type of research in the Wider Black Sea Region and beyond and provided the platform for this research and study, taking advantage of the previous projects of this kind and of the already existing contacts in the 6 FORWORD region. As usual the researchers and writers from the Center adopted a unified way of presenting the results and edited the result of the interviews and of the work together with their foreign counterparts. Working trips have been made and, in some cases, some of the researchers spend up to 4 month in studying on the ground, for example in the case of Azerbaijan, a crucial actor for the future to be Corridor. As a conclusion, the project could become reality provided that the poli- tical class in the countries involved would assume the project and that the added value of this project, in connection to broader projects like the New Silk Road and the Danube Mein Rhin channel of transportation, would guarantee its viability from an economical point of view and would ensure a solid development of the project, attracting other foreign investors, espe- cially western investors with interests in the area. I also have to thank the Black Sea Trust of the German Marshall Fund, the first financial supporter of this project. Thank you very much for your help, for supporting, as always, the research in that area and on the very important matters for the countries of the Wider Black Sea Region. IULIAN CHIFU 6th of January 2014 Chapter 1 CHANGING THE NAME OF THE GAME: FROM CHESS TO GO IULIAN CHIFU The future shape of foreign affairs is a major concern for prospective studies as the very nature of international relations seems to be changing. The transition is still ongoing and the final format is still undefined. In this context the rules of the game are slightly changing from a pragmatic game of rivalries and control to a more strategic approach of positioning and filling the space for a possible use of those assets in a future confrontation. The name of the game is changing from chess to Go. The Big Global Game, the Eurasian Suppliers Belt and “The three geo’s” The geopolitical transformations of the past years succeeded in changing the Global Big Game. The withdrawal from the Central Asian wars, the lack of will and desire to use military action in international politics, the econo- mic subprime crisis in the US and the deficit crisis in Europe etc, all these are shaping the transition and changing the Big Game. But more important is the shale oil and gas revolution that has transformed the US from a consu- mer of energy products into a future exporter. The consequences for the Global Big Game are becoming dramatic: the Middle East ceases to be as important for energy supply, thus the only thing at stake for the US remains its strategic partnership with Israel. The relinqui- shing of oil and gas from the region allowed other consumers to step in and try to fill their own energy deficit. The lack of interest on the part of the US and the rise of China as a competitor, as well as the economic crisis have all determined Washington to prioritize its investments on the global scene and 8 IULIAN CHIFU to choose to pivot towards Asia-Pacific and retreat from other regions to cut the costs. Basically the new Big Global Game shifted to the manner in which the big the consumers of the world, Europe and South East Asia, are being supplied. There were two options: using the Eurasian1 Suppliers Belt running from the Gulf Countries and Middle East via Central Asia to Russia, in a continental approach, or using suppliers from other parts of the world – Africa or Latin America. Answering this question was tremendously important for the Big Game, in order to decide whether China is moving towards being more continental than it was traditionally during its evolution, or becoming more maritime and global, thus challenging the US as a global power. No doubt China is already much more than a regional power, even though it does not recognize this status and claims that its only interest is market- oriented. Its activities in Africa, South America and the Pacific are designed only to grant supplies for its growing economy and no military interests are linked to this behavior. On the other hand, it is true that the G2 format for engaging China and the US and sharing the burden at an international level proved unsuccessful, since China does not want to assume any responsibi- lities2 at a global level. So the main problem in this respect is less to decide between continental and maritime China, between black and white, and more between shades of grey, depending on the extent to which China aspires to become a maritime and global power. Once this step is made, addressing China’s level of am- bition and its strategic posture will be far easier. The second part of the Global Big Game is whether China should remain a predominant continental power, and how the regional game of the big continental Eurasian continuum will look like. Europe (mostly the EU coun- tries), which has a combined economy that strives to be the first in the world, needs energy mostly from the Eurasian Suppliers Belt, as does South East Asia with countries such as China, Japan, India, South Korea etc. Is this going to lead to competition, a confrontation of the Big Bargaining type between the two blocks? Or is it going to be an opportunity for some supplier countries to play the game and raise the price of oil and gas or create artifi- cial disputes between consumer countries? The most important problem is that the Eurasian Suppliers belt is subject to instability and wars, to the Arab Spring and regime changes, to sectarian ———————— 1 Here “Eurasia” is a reference strictly to the great continental continuum of Europe and Asia, and not a geopolitical concept or reference to Russia’s approach to integrative policies or to the Medvedev plan conceived by the Valdai Club for common security in Eurasia by ousting the US, dismissing NATO and offering Russia a veto right in the continent’s security. 2 Ian Bremmer,”Every Nation for Itself. Winners and Loosers in a G-Zero World”, Portfolio/ Penguin, New York, 2012 CHANGING THE NAME OF THE GAME: FROM CHESS TO GO 9 wars, to radicalization and civil wars; all able to reshape the borders of the region and the Middle East. If these major shifts spread North to Central Asia and Russia, this would directly affect supplier routes, contracts and sustaina- bility, shaking the whole global economy. That’s why Central Asia is central to Eurasian Security and stability. Central Asia is not exactly the most stable and secure part of the world.
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