The Slayer Statute and Insanity

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY The Slayer Statute and Insanity Jennifer Piel, JD, MD, and Gregory B. Leong, MD It is common law that persons cannot benefit from their crimes. For this reason, most states have enacted slayer rules that prevent a killer from sharing in the victim’s estate. However, terms in the slayer rules, such as willful and unlawful, can be difficult to apply, as illustrated by the situation in which a slayer is found not guilty by reason of insanity. The Washington Supreme Court has recently addressed whether a man who killed his mother and was then found not guilty by reason of insanity in criminal court can inherit a portion of his mother’s estate. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 38:258–62, 2010 There is a dictum in our society that one shall not admissions. He had diagnoses of paranoid schizo- benefit from his wrongdoing. In particular, no killer phrenia and Capgras syndrome. In Capgras syn- shall be allowed to benefit from having committed a drome, the affected individual harbors the delusion wrongful killing. This principle, carried through the that others, frequently a relative, have been replaced common law, is the rationale behind the slayer rules by impostors. Mr. Hoge had a long-standing delu- statutorily codified in many states, including Wash- sion that his mother was not in fact his mother but an ington.1 A slayer rule is a law that prohibits a killer impostor. Consistent with his diagnoses, Mr. Hoge from benefiting from the victim’s death. In a case of also experienced chronic auditory hallucinations and first impression in Washington State, the Washing- paranoia. ton Supreme Court recently considered whether a In June 1999, Mr. Hoge entered his mother’s man who killed his mother and was found not guilty house and stabbed her and his stepbrother, causing by reason of insanity could inherit a portion of a their deaths. He also attempted to kill his mother’s wrongful death settlement obtained by his mother’s 2 2 boyfriend. At the time, he was not taking antipsy- estate. In In re Estate of Kissinger, the question be- chotic medication. fore the court was whether an insane man was a Mr. Hoge was criminally charged with the kill- slayer, as defined by the state’s slayer statute, and was ings. In the criminal case, both the state and defense therefore barred from benefiting from his mother’s experts agreed that he was legally insane at the time of death. In contrast to several other jurisdictions, the the killings. After a joint motion by both the state Washington Supreme Court ruled that a person held and defense, the trial court found Mr. Hoge not not guilty by reason of insanity can be characterized guilty by reason of insanity, specifically finding that as a slayer. The Kissinger case illustrates some of the he met both prongs of the state’s M’Naughten-type difficulties in applying the slayer statutes outside the insanity statute.4,5 As part of the plea agreement, Mr. context of basic homicide cases. Hoge stipulated that he had committed the acts as Facts of the Case charged. He was committed to the state hospital for 2,3 inpatient psychiatric treatment. The case of In re Estate of Kissinger concerned Subsequently, the estate of Ms. Kissinger filed a Joshua Hoge, who was found not guilty by reason of lawsuit against her son’s outpatient mental health insanity in the killing of his mother, Pamela Kiss- agency, claiming that the agency was liable for her inger, in a criminal case. Mr. Hoge had a long history death as a result of their mismanagement of her son’s of mental illness with multiple inpatient psychiatric illness. After settling the lawsuit, the representative of Dr. Piel is Resident in Psychiatry and Dr. Leong is Clinical Professor of the estate then filed a petition to bar Mr. Hoge from Psychiatry, University of Washington School of Medicine, Seattle, sharing in the proceeds of the settlement, arguing WA. Address correspondence to: Jennifer Piel, JD, MD, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University of Washington, Box that he was prohibited from collecting under the 356560, Seattle, WA 98195-6560. E-mail: [email protected]. slayer statute. Mr. Hoge argued that because he was Disclosures of financial or other conflicts of interest: None. found not guilty by reason of insanity, he could not 258 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Piel and Leong have “willfully and unlawfully” killed his mother, in UPC, limits the applicable actions to murder and accordance with the Washington slayer statue. voluntary manslaughter. Origins of the Slayer Rule The Current Washington Slayer Statute The common law dictum that no person shall be In Washington, Wash. Rev. Code § 11.84 (1955) allowed to benefit from his wrongdoing has a long governs the distribution of the property when a per- history in our judicial system. The first American son is killed by a potential beneficiary. The statute case to articulate a slayer rule was Mutual Life Insur- states: “No slayer shall in any way acquire any prop- ance Company v. Armstrong.6 In that case, a man was erty or receive any benefit as the result of the death of issued a life insurance policy that he assigned to a the decedent, but shall pass as provided in the sec- third party. The third party was convicted of killing tions following.”1 The statute defines “slayer” as fol- the man, and the insurance company refused to pay lows: “‘Slayer’ shall mean any person who partici- the proceeds to the administrator of the man’s estate, pates, either as a principal or an accessory before the prompting the administrator to sue on behalf of the fact, in the willful and unlawful killing of any other estate. The administrator lost the case, and the case person (emphasis added).11 Accordingly, at issue in was subsequently appealed to the U.S. Supreme Kissinger was whether the killing was willful and un- Court. The Court reasoned as follows: lawful. No Washington case had decided this ques- [I]ndependently of any proof of the motives of [the slayer] tion in the context of a defendant found not guilty by in obtaining the policy, and even assuming that they were reason of insanity. just and proper, [the slayer] forfeited all rights under it The first application of the slayer rule in Washing- when, to secure its immediate payment, he murdered the 12 assured. It would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the ton was in In re Tyler’s Estate. In that case, the court country, if one could recover insurance money payable on held that a man who had murdered his spouse was the death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken not eligible for an award in lieu of homestead from [Ref. 6, p 600]. the spouse’s property. Subsequent to this decision, The first noninsurance case was decided three the legislature codified the court’s holding in the fol- years after Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Arm- lowing year, preventing a slayer from obtaining an strong in Riggs v. Palmer.7 The Riggs case, decided by award in lieu of a homestead, but not extending the the New York Court of Appeals, addressed whether a slayer legislation to other applications.13 man could be a beneficiary of his grandfather’s estate The application of a slayer rule next occurred in In when the man had killed his grandfather. The court re Duncan’s Estates,14 wherein the court ruled on a ruled that the grandson could not. However, the dis- son who murdered his father and then sought to senting opinion presented the argument that the inherit from his father’s estate. In that case, the court grandson should benefit under a strict reading of the refused to extend the boundaries of the 1927 slayer statute of wills, as the grandfather had properly exe- legislation beyond awards in lieu of homestead, but cuted the will, and the grandson did not fall within suggested that the “legislature. .take prompt action one of the legislated exceptions to being a benefi- so the result. .in the instant case may be avoided in ciary. The dissent further articulated that it was the the future” (Ref. 14, p 447). The legislature re- role of the legislature, not the court, to define those sponded and adopted Washington’s current slayer who cannot benefit, though named in a will. Since statute in 1955.15 this ruling, most states have passed legislation relat- Washington’s Supreme Court in New York Life ing to slayer rules.8 Insurance Company v. Jones discussed the definition In the 1960s, Professor John Wade attempted to of willful under the current slayer statute.16 In that create a uniform slayer statute.9 The rule proposed by case, a woman pleaded guilty to second-degree mur- Professor Wade required that a killing be willful and der in the killing of her husband. Second-degree unlawful. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) in- murder is a homicide in which the defendant lacks cludes a slayer rule, and most states have adopted the premeditation and deliberation necessary for a some version of the UPC rule.10 In most states that conviction for first-degree murder. At issue was have enacted slayer statutes, the killing must be felo- whether the killing was willful, thus precluding the nious and intentional, which is the language used in woman from being a beneficiary of her husband’s life the current UPC. The slayer rule, as written in the insurance policy.

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