Religion As the Instrument of Russian Foreign Policy Towards Neighboring Countries Georgia, Latvia, Ukraine
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Religion as the Instrument of Russian Foreign Policy towards Neighboring Countries Georgia, Latvia, Ukraine Editor Tengiz Pkhaladze International Centre for Geopolitical Studies Tbilisi 2012 1 International Centre for Geopolitical Studies expresses its gratitude to the Civil Institutionalism Development Found for financial support of the publication. Views presented in the publication are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Found. Editor: Tengiz Pkhaladze Project Coordinator: Nato Bachiashvili Authors of publications: Tengiz Pkhaladze: International Centre for geopolitical Studies (Georgia) Tornike Sharashenidze: Georgian Institute of Public affairs (Georgia) Andis Kudors: Centre for East European Policy Studies (Latvia) Olexiy Haran – National Univercity of Kyev-Mohyla Academy (Ukraine); Serhiy Zdioruk – National Institute of Strategic Studies (Ukraine). Printed by “Mtatsmindeli” Publishing House, 2012 2 Contents: Editor’s foreword ………………………………………………………...4 Tengiz Pkhaladze Autocracy, the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church – “How Much is Opium of the People?” ………………………………….6 Tengiz Pkhaladze Russian Orthodox Church Activities in the United Nations……………………………………………………………….…..15 Andis Kudors Church Policy of the Russian Empire in USSR and Georgia…………………………………………………………………..26 Tornike Sharashenidze ROC and Independent Georgia ………………………………………37 Tengiz Pkhaladze The Russian Ortodox Church as an Instrument of Russia’s Foreign Policy towards Ukraine…………………………………………………54 Serhiy Zdioruk, Olexiy Haran Orthodoxy and politics in Latvia ………………………………… 101 Andis Kudors Afterwards ..............................................................................................114 3 Editor’s foreword “People have always been and will always be silly victims to deception in politics until they learn to identify the interests of these or those classes behind any moral, religious, political, social statements and pledges,” – V. I. Lenin “Power cannot be kept with fear only. Lie has been no less necessary,” – J. V. Stalin “Today, we no longer have labour collectives, party units and organizations we used to have during the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there are no educators or mentors. This means that no one but religion can convey universal values to people,” – V. V. Putin To begin with, we’d like to state that this book is not a research of religion as such. Rather, it deals with the use of religious institutions as an instrument of the Russian Federation foreign policy that often becomes a mechanism of manipulation of the society and people as well as a means of strengthening influence upon other countries. Political regimes, which in essence are far from values, make an easy use of religion, having double advantage: trustfulness of believers and one’s own immorality. This book exposes the role of the Patriarchate of Moscow in the Kremlin foreign policy. Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as an institute is increasingly becoming an obedient weapon of the Russian concept of “Soft Power” that in the hands of the current political leaders of RF is taking on growing dimensions and dangerous forms. The post-Soviet republics or the so-called “near abroad” has been announced by the Kremlin as “the sphere of its exclusive interests”, and bolstering influence on the neighboring states is one of the determining strategies of the current Russian foreign policy. The Patriarch of Moscow has unique jurisdiction over these republics. According to Article 3 of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church (adopted by the Assembly of Hierarchs in 2000), “the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church extends to people of Orthodox faith living in the canonical territories of the Russian Orthodox Church: in Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Estonia as well as to Orthodox living in other countries 4 and voluntarily falling within it”.1 Proceeding from the foregoing, the Church can accomplish the RF foreign policy objectives perfectly well. The actual fruits of these acts are highlighted at the example of thee states: Georgia, Ukraine and Latvia. The authors highly respect the Orthodoxy, all the believers and the clergy who care for and convey God’s Word to their parish. However, it is this respect that compels us to set off alarm, when attempts are made to use faith as an instrument of colonial policy and a means of destroying the cultural-historical, including the Orthodox heritage of other peoples. “And said unto them, It is written, my house shall be called the house of prayer; but ye have made it a den of thieves” (Matthew 21:12-13). The team of contributors expresses sincere appreciation to Civil Institutionalism Development Fund for its kind assistance. Tengiz Pkhaladze Chairman of the Board of International Center for Geopolitical Studies 1 See the official website of the Department for External Church Relations; Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church. http://www.mospat.ru/ru/documents/ustav/i/ 5 Autocracy, the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church –“How Much is Opium of the People?” Tengiz Pkhaladze The Russian Orthodox Church relates its origin to the Christening of Rus (988) when the Kiev Metropolis of the Patriarchate of Constantinople was formed. During the reign of Ivan III (1462-1505) and his son Vasil III (1505-1533), a Russian concentration of the Third Rome emerges in Grand Duchy of Moscow, under which following the fall of Byzantium, Moscow must have become the only stronghold of the universal orthodoxy. First the dukes of Moscow and then kings and emperors tried to get closely involved in the ecclesiastical matters and turn the church into a ruled political institute. In this respect, the ecclesiastical reform initiated by Emperor Peter I proved to be a determining factor. The Emperor abolished the Patriarch’s rule and set up an Ecclesiastical Board that was subsequently renamed Holy Synod that was a state body. The office of the Chief Prosecutor was also introduced. The Chief Prosecutor was a civil person accountable only before the Emperor’s Court and served as a “Royal Eye and a solicitor in state affairs”.2 Initially, he was an overseer of the Synod but later became its real leader. Later the Office of Orthodox Creeds emerged. In a narrow sense, it implied the Office of the Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod, including the office of the Chief Prosecutor and his Chancellery but in a wide sense – used to mean the Synod along with its Chancellery, and in certain cases – all the power establishments of ROC in their entirety, as they were regarded as the establishments falling within the system of state governance, including, e.g. eparchial authorities as well as consistories.3 So “the orthodox patriarch, setting next to the king, disappeared. And the idea of a special autonomous canonical law also disappeared. There is only one single source of all the laws, including for the church: the power of the secular monarch. Being subordinated through a system of ministries and offices, the church is only one of such ministries and offices, namely the Office of Orthodox Creeds” abbreviated to OOC – a classical stamp on all official papers of the entire ecclesiastical rule of the synodal period.”4 2 See Scientific-Educational Magazine «СКЕПСИС»; Nikolai Nikolski: “State Church of Serfdom Epoch”. Formation of Synod and Secularization of Church Assets”. http://scepsis.ru/library/id_1814.html 3 See Orthodox Encyclopedia; “Office of Orthodox Creeds”; http://www.pravenc.ru/text/150023.html 4 See Anton Kartashev’s History of the Russian Church; Volume II - http://krotov.info/library/k/kartash/kart207.html#_Toc531401513 6 During the reign of Peter I, special decrees were issued, requiring that communities confess: “in order for men and women of any rank in cities and districts confess before their spiritual fathers”. Anyone refusing to confess was charged with penalty.5 Even more interesting is that just a few years after Peter I commanded that the clergy take an active part in the search for and identification of people disloyal to the throne. If being told through a confession that the person confessing committed a crime against the state, was involved in a riot and malice upon the life of the monarch and his family, the priest was required to report such person and his confession to the secular authorities. Otherwise, the priest himself faced capital punishment.6 In this way, the sacrament of confession – one of the seven sacraments, on which the Christian religion is based, was abolished in the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church actually turned into one of the institutes of national security. The ecclesiastical system established by Peter I existed until 1917. After the Bolsheviks came to power, the Church became of one the main targets of the red terror and communist repressions. During World War II, realizing that the Church could become a useful instrument for his regime, Joseph Stalin restored the rule of the Patriarch of Moscow in 1943. The true motives of this decision are highlighted in the Chronicle of G. G. Karpov on the Reception by Joseph Stalin of the Leading Clerics of the Russian Orthodox Church (Gregory Gregorevich Karpov was Major- General of the Organs of National Security of USSR, in 1943-1960 he held the post of the Chairman of the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs with the Council of Ministers of USSR): “...Thinking a little, Stalin said: 1. We must organize with the Government