Europe is at a crossroads. Demography, labor market realities, and and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century already overwhelmed social protection systems mean that will play a larger role in Europe in the decades ahead. The policy Europe and challenge is this: How can the absorb new flows of immigrants when the 35 to 40 million foreign-born people already in its midst continue to face difficulties in becoming a full part of the Its Immigrants in economic, cultural, social, and political lives of their adopted societies? the 21st Century In this volume, the Migration Policy Institute has gathered some of the finest thinkers to offer insightful counsel and, wherever possible, solutions to Europe’s immigration challenges. They piece together the puzzle of a well-managed, comprehensive migration A New Deal regime, tackling issues ranging from immigration’s economic costs and benefits, to effective selection systems, citizenship, the welfare or a Continuing state, and integration policies that work. Dialogue of the Deaf? This volume marks another milestone in MPI’s deep commitment to European policy and transatlantic cooperation on immigration Edited by Demetrios G. Papademetriou policy. In addition to working closely with the European Commission, Member State governments, and other EU institutions, MPI collaborates on several long-term research and policy initiatives with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and other international institutions. This work is generously supported by the Luso-American Foundation in , the Stavros S. Niarchos Foundation, and the King Baudouin Foundation, among others.

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MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE

LUSO-AMERICAN LUSO-AMERICAN Foundation Foundation Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century

A New Deal or a Continuing Dialogue of the Deaf?

Edited by Demetrios G. Papademetriou

LUSO-AMERICAN

MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE Foundation © 2006 Migration Policy Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without prior permission, in writing, from the Migration Policy Institute. Contents

Foreword Economics v and Labor Migration

Preface and Plan of the Book Migrants and the European ix Labor Market Introduction Rainer Münz and Thomas Straubhaar 121 Managing International Migration Better: Principles and Perspectives for Is Immigration an Enemy Gaining More from Migration of the Welfare State? Demetrios G. Papademetriou Grete Brochmann and Jon Erik Dölvik xiii 155 Integration The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of The Challenge of Integration in Europe Charalambos Kasimis Sarah Spencer 179 1 Future Demographic Change in Europe: Integration Processes of Migrants : Th e C o ntri b uti o n o f M i g rati o n Research Findings and Policy Lessons Wolfgang Lutz and Sergei Scherbov Rinus Penninx 207 31 Selecting Economic Migrants Citizenship Demetrios G. Papademetriou and T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Kevin O’Neil Patrick Weil 223 53 About the Authors Building Successful Urban Policy 257 in the New Era of Migration About the Editor Jorge Gaspar and Maria Lucinda Fonseca 265 71 About the Luso-American Practices and Policies for Immigrant Foundation I n t e g rat i o n i n t h e U n i t e d Stat e s 267 Maia Jachimowicz and About the Migration Kevin O’Neil Policy Institute 89 271 Acknowled gements 275

iii iv Foreword

Ru i Mac h ete President, Executive Council Luso-American Foundation ew issues are likely to prove more resort to increasingly illiberal tactics F consequential for the economic that curtail the rights and liberties of health and social and cultural all who live under our states’ sover- well-being of an increasing number of eign protection. Rather, this is a call to developed countries than international thoughtful and informed action. migration. In fact, it may be only a This is a call to the research community slight exaggeration to argue that what in and out of government for better we do on international migration, and data and better analyses. This is a how we do it, will help define how call to our governments for greater well we do as societies in the years introspection and truth about the role and decades ahead. This includes that immigration plays and will play how we regulate migration’s size and in our demographically challenged composition and how wisely we societies in the years ahead. This is a balance the interests and manage the call for much greater and far-sighted concerns of the broader society that leadership including much larger increasingly feels that “their” jobs, investments in public education. culture, and value systems are eroded This is a call for a more tough-minded by the presence of large numbers of approach to “horizontal” policymaking immigrants. But the challenge goes and execution, in which all government well beyond that to issues of how well agencies with competencies that affect we incorporate both newcomers and or are affected by different aspects of those who by now have become migration, such as labor, social ethnic minorities into our economic, protection, education, foreign affairs, social, and political institutions; how international development, and border we work side-by-side with these and interior police agencies, work communities in a common effort to closely together to devise and deliver build socially robust and economically policies that serve host societies’ viable societies; how intelligently and interests and priorities best. And this honestly we work with immigrant- is a call for Europe’s institutions — sending and transit countries; and, the Council, the Commission, the perhaps most tellingly, how we replace Parliament, and the Court of Justice illegality and the social chaos that — to begin in earnest to give this issue runaway immigration fuels with the centrality it commands. thoughtful and progressive rules that we are able and willing to enforce. This is also a call to our social institutions to reflect on how open This is neither to say that all is lost and inclusive they really are, and how nor to encourage the view, all too to be more so, and to civil society to common among many in the democratic be ever more imaginative in strength- west, that the issue is so complex that ening and, when needed, repairing the addressing it effectively is beyond our social fabric that diversity strains— governance capabilities as they stand and, many will say, threatens. Finally, today — and that we thus need to this is a call to all of us, citizens and vi Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century immigrants (new and “old” ones) Finally, this volume is both a alike, to engage in what amounts to culminating activity and the beginning nothing less than “national projects” of a new phase in the relationship whose express and noble aim is to between the two institutions that build the effective and cohesive have sponsored it: The Luso-American multi-ethnic societies in which many Foundation (FLAD) and the Migration of us already live and the rest of us Policy Institute (MPI). The relationship are fast approaching. is nearly ten years old and goes back to when MPI’s principals were the leaders Europe and Its Immigrants in the of the International Migration Policy 21st Century: A New Deal or a Program of the Carnegie Endowment Continuing Dialogue of the Deaf? for International Peace. During this moves us further towards these objec- decade, the two institutions have tives than any other volume to date. co-sponsored nearly a dozen seminars, Its chapters top the list of issues that workshops, and conferences on various we must address head-on and on aspects of international migration and which we must make measurable have co-produced and co-published a progress. Its authors, the leading number of books and reports, most researchers in their disciplines, are notably, a three-volume study on those upon whom policymakers are citizenship thought and practice across increasingly relying as they try to a dozen states. The present volume come to terms with international completes that phase of the relationship. migration. Although most authors, and in many ways, the book’s “topics” With this as a background, FLAD are “European,” the analyses and and MPI now enter into a new phase recommendations are transatlantic in in their relationship — that of a their essence and are addressed to all strategic partnership. Accordingly, immigrant-receiving societies. In fact, FLAD becomes MPI’s strategic in many ways, the book is a worthy partner in all of MPI’s European work “read” for both migrant-sending and on migration and related issues, while transit countries, as well as for MPI minds FLAD’s analytical and informed readers and thoughtful research interests on Portuguese and observers wherever they are. The more broadly Lusophone communi- volume’s editor, Demetrios G. ties and their concerns in the United Papademetriou, is a widely known and States. This transatlantic cooperation respected analyst who regularly advises is expected to add value to important senior government officials on interests within each organization’s migration across the developed world. priorities and enhance the effective- His judgment and expertise, as well ness of their work on both sides of as his ability to tap into the most the Atlantic. talented pool of writers and policy advisors, is clearly demonstrated in Rui Machete the book’s collection of essays. Lisbon, 2006

Foreword vii viii Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Preface and Plan of the Book his volume, which focuses on In the years that followed, the AMPI T the current state of immigra- team worked with successive EU tion in Europe and suggests a Presidencies on their immigration- way forward, is the product of a unique related efforts. Its most fruitful transatlantic collaboration among partnership was with the Dutch experts, policymakers, and a government, leading to the adoption pathbreaking foundation. by the European Council in December 2004 of the Common Basic Principles The collaboration has its roots on integration and the Hague in an initiative of the former Greek Programme. AMPI, which has evolved Foreign Minister, George A. into an ad hoc global think tank, Papandreou, who was determined to continues its work on a variety of use his country’s 2003 EU Presidency projects that involve the European to offer Europe a thoughtful, Commission, the European Parliament, progressive blueprint for immigration EU Member State governments, and reform. Papandreou gathered together international organizations. some of Europe’s and America’s leading immigration experts under the As a longtime partner of MPI and its aegis of the Athens Migration Policy predecessor, the International Migration Initiative (AMPI). Led by the Policy Program at the Carnegie Migration Policy Institute and Endowment for International Peace, coordinated by MPI Senior Fellow the Fundaçao Luso-Americana (FLAD) Gregory A. Maniatis, AMPI’s experts was involved from the beginning with worked closely with the Greek the effort to advise governments and government and the European policymakers, and supported the Commission to develop a comprehen- group’s efforts and insights. This book sive vision for managing migration and is the result of FLAD’s commitment to integration in Europe. this important work.

The first result of these efforts was In his opening chapter, Demetrios G. inscribed in the European Council’s Papademetriou discusses the Thessaloniki conclusions, which dimensions of the international placed a heavy emphasis on immigrant migration system and offers a global integration. The conclusions called for overview of what drives it, where it is the development of Common Basic going, and the major trends he sees in Principles on integration and of an it. He then focuses on why governments Annual Report on Migration and (and societies) find international Integration in Europe. The Greek migration so difficult to tackle Presidency also shepherded through effectively and uses that discussion the first-ever EU legislation governing to launch into a treatise on migration legal migration, in the form of management fundamentals. He directives on family reunification and concludes with a discussion about long-term residents. the complex relationship between x Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century demography and immigration and volume with a unique analysis of the hazards a look ahead to 2020. European Labor Force Survey that compares the labor-market perform- Sarah Spencer offers an overview of ance of foreign-born residents with how the European Union’s policies that of native-born ones; they related to immigrant integration have conclude with recommendations for developed since the 1990s, as well as a how European countries can better compelling vision for how these can be recruit migrants who match their enhanced in coming years. Rinus labor-market needs. Grete Brochmann Penninx, while summarizing the and Jon Erik Dölvik then address the insights gleaned from the research on vexing political question of whether integration policies, argues that the immigration subverts the welfare state; Union is handicapped by the ambiva- they shed light on the complex game lence of Member States towards of labor-market and welfare-regime working collectively on integration; in competition among states, in which going forward, he underscores the need each is trying to strike a balance for comprehensive efforts that weave among attracting needed workers, together the contributions of all levels fending off welfare seekers, and of government and civil society. protecting national working condi- tions. Charalambos Kasimis shifts the T. Alexander Aleinikoff and focus to the countryside, summarizing Patrick Weil then tackle the issue that the findings from his multi-year is arguably at the heart of integration, research on the impact of immigration the question of citizenship; they on Greek rural areas and agriculture. systematically address concerns revolving around access to citizenship, Wolfgang Lutz and Sergei Scherbov dual nationality, political integration, offer a look into the future, exploring and economic and social rights. Europe’s demographic dynamics, the role immigration will play in them Jorge Gaspar and Maria Lucinda during the coming decades, and the Fonseca discuss how urbanization and policy options available to governments immigration interact, and what the for addressing the demographic deficit. implications of this interacion are for European cities. We then cross the Finally, in the volume’s concluding Atlantic, where Maia Jachimozicz and chapter, Demetrios G. Papademetriou Kevin O’Neil offer a valuable overview and Kevin O’Neil drill down into the and assessment of US integration question of how governments currently practices, while also elaborating on select economic immigrants, dissecting current integration trends, challenges, the US selection mechanisms and the and controversies. point systems of Canada, , and the UK, before concluding with a Rainer Münz and Thomas Straubhaar series of recommendations for how open the economic section of this such selection can be improved.

Preface and Plan of the Book xi xii Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Managing International Migration Better: Principles and Perspectives for Gaining More from Migration

Demetrios G. Papademetriou Introduction the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Background which has itself become a lightning rod for anti- animus. As a or nearly two decades now, result, and rather suddenly and in capital and the market for goods, many ways unexpectedly, the road to F deeper global interdependence has services and workers of many types have weaved an ever more developed enough bumps, diversions, intricate web of global economic and, and detours to make predictions increasingly, social interdependence.1 about the timing and direction of In the last few years, however, such the next big “breakthrough” in “globalization”-fueled interdependence internationalization uncertain. seems to be on the defensive as governments and publics alike across Few by-products of globalization are the globe begin to reexamine some of pricklier for the publics of the the phenomenon’s main principles advanced industrial societies than the and practices and look more carefully movement of people. Such movement, at its effects. of course, also preoccupies the less developed countries, albeit from No component of this introspection different perspectives. For them, has fared more poorly than the movement is an essential lifeline to labor market effects of deeper both their citizens and to their interdependence — effects that had economies — because of their long been posited to be positive across emigrants’ financial remittances, now the board. Evidence is mounting that estimated by the World Bank at well substantial segments of the population over $200 billion per year.2 (This sum of rich and poor countries alike are is more than three times the amount indeed affected adversely by the of overall development assistance.) reigning form of interdependence — at least in the short-to-medium term Their preoccupation does not stop — and that governments along the there, however. They are deeply development continuum have been concerned about three additional caught unprepared to help them adjust issues. First, that some of the behavior to the new competitive environment. of the authorities and the people in Concerns that openness could also be the countries in which their citizens facilitating the financing of terrorist live and work borders on a gross movement and activity have added to disregard for their citizens’ human, the sense of skepticism about further labor, and other basic rights. Second, openness along the lines promoted by that the trafficking industry that has

1 The “Uruguay Round” of global trade negotiations and the various regional trade accords (particularly the North American trade agreements) — all starting in the late 1980s — are somewhat arbitrarily chosen as the beginning points of the newest and most intense phase of globalization. 2 The World Bank had estimated the amount at $111 billion for 2001. The growth reflects primarily more “daring” assumptions and better estimation techniques. xiv Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century grown around the unauthorized migration” — from the establishment movement of their nationals endangers of the Greek colonies and the Roman their citizens’ lives. (At the same time, conquests, through the Byzantine, and by virtue of the fact that such Arabic, Ottoman, and the various syndicates operate in so many less Asian empires, and from the developed countries with near European colonizations to the great impunity, they undermine the migrations of the 19th and early and legitimacy of these countries’ public late 20th centuries. Furthermore, few institutions and complicate their other large social phenomena are as relationships with migrant transit and entwined with human progress or destination country governments.) have been as deeply implicated in the Third, that increasingly selective rise and decline of organized political immigration policies of advanced entities as migration. industrial societies may be tapping too deeply into their human capital pool, Remarkably, however, such long- whose upbringing and education has standing human experience with been paid for by scarce public funds. migration does not seem to have translated into models of good At the root of these sets of contradictory management practices that can be interests and reactions to international readily adapted to and then applied migration is the plain fact that the effectively in different settings. A large phenomenon’s reach is now nearly part of the explanation for this universal. Migration today touches the anomaly lies with the fact that large- lives of more people and looms larger in scale migration, by challenging the the politics and economics of more receiving society’s sense of identity and states than at any other time in the exposing the weaknesses of its social modern era. With the and economic model of governance — (UN) estimating the immigrant stock to as well as its capacity to enforce its be as high as 200 million,3 almost no laws — quickly leads to political country is untouched by international contentiousness. Deeply fractured migration or is immune to its effects. politics, in turn, interfere with the This reality alone guarantees that ability of governments to pursue migration will remain a top agenda item domestic and foreign policies that deal in national, regional, and “global” with the phenomenon thoughtfully conversations for the foreseeable future. and, more importantly, to the systematic advantage of most of those Few social phenomena in recorded involved in or affected by migration. human history are as consequential for civilizations as migration. History Furthermore, when support for is in fact dotted with “ages of immigration collapses (something that

3 There are immense definitional and measurement issues associated with such grand estimates. See also the discussion later in the text about the relative lack of robustness of such estimates.

Introduction xv occurs with pendulum-like regularity), regard, it outlines and explores some of the duration and depth of a society’s the philosophical and practical issues engagement with the process does not that policymakers must understand seem to inoculate it against excessive and address better as they search for reactions to it. This is as close to a more effective policy interventions. “law” of migration as anyone might The chapter admonishes both reader posit. And, as with most laws, it seems and policymaker to be mindful of the to hold independently of such factors limitations in the capacity of as the size of organized immigration’s government to change important and imprint on a society’s evolution and deeply embedded social processes economic progress or the benefits and exclusively through tougher domestic experience that a society has gained regulations and other unilateral from immigration. policies in an increasingly interdependent world. It concludes by A. The plan of the chapter making the case for more thoughtful This introduction is written primarily policies that work with both the with policymakers in mind and is market and human nature, as well as addressed mostly to the advanced in cooperation with countries from industrial world.4 As a result, at times and through which immigrants — and it moves too quickly over issues that particularly irregular or unauthorized are best discussed in the context of ones — get to advanced industrial specific migration relationships or democracies. seemingly papers over (by over- generalizing about) the circumstances The chapter sets the policy target at and perspectives of the less developed drawing out the benefits of world, whose nationals are migration’s immigration better and more protagonists. This choice results in a systematically for all principals in the regrettable loss in the precision that process while controlling for its most comes from focusing on a single case negative and perverse consequences. or the comprehensiveness that comes Managing international migration to from a truly global perspective. collective advantage, the chapter argues, can be done best through laws The discussion dwells briefly on some and regulations grounded in a realistic of migration’s key causes, paints a policy vision, a sensitivity to domestic broad picture of the phenomenon’s size requirements (itself a balancing act of and likely evolution over the next two the first order), and clarity about decades, and then bores deeply into international obligations and the issues of migration management — objectives. The ambitiousness of these the chapter’s principal focus. In this requirements suggests that managing

4 The terms “advanced industrial countries/democracies/societies/economies,” “industrial countries,” “first world,” “developed world,” “advanced West,” “North,” “wealthy nations” and OECD countries are all referring to the 24 states that were members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in the early 1990s, before Mexico and some other developing states also became members. xvi Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century uncertainty and learning to deal with estimate’s many limitations, the most imperfection may be absolute prominent is that the base data are requirements to, and the only realistic government statistics. Such statistics policy goals in, a policy domain as are subject to political determinations complex as international migration. about what to collect or not collect and, more importantly, what to report or not report. Th e I nte rnati o na l Migration System: For instance, the UN figure includes Measuring the Inexact the roughly 30 million persons (most of them ethnic Russians) who had The international migration system been internal migrants until the binds together sending, receiving, and early 1990s but were reclassified as transit countries in increasingly international migrants when the complex wholes. Altogether, more collapsed and broke up than half of all the world’s states “play” into a large number of independent in this system in significant ways, and, states. At the same time, most increasingly, more countries play temporary immigrants whose visas multiple roles simultaneously — as last more than a year, plus half or places from and through which more of all unauthorized immigrants, immigrants come and as places in are typically not included in these which immigrants settle or, estimates, because government data increasingly, may just work for a period systems do not include them. of time. One also notes an almost symbiotic coincidence of parties There are important exceptions to this interested in migration. In addition to “rule.” For instance, the US and the immigrants, they include employers, several South American countries consumers of all goods and services, either produce themselves or otherwise families, transnational networks of all do not contest unauthorized types (including criminal syndicates), population estimates by reputable and a variety of local, state, and analysts. Another group of countries national-level social and even public produces estimates but does not report institutions. them for political reasons. For instance, a closely held British Immigrant Stocks estimate of about half-a-million As noted, the UN Population Division unauthorized immigrants was leaked in estimates the stock of those currently 2005 and caused great embarrassment living outside their country of birth for to the government. A third category of a minimum of one year (its definition countries has “working guesstimates” of an immigrant) at about 200 million. — Canada’s is somewhat lower but This estimate would put the immigrant otherwise in the same range as the stock at about 3.2 percent of the British one. The overall lesson? world’s population. Among this It is important both to disaggregate

Introduction xvii “global” estimates and to look several million irregular immigrants at their component parts as carefully each, but estimates vary wildly. Finally, as possible before making anything also has a large other than the most approximate number of unauthorized immigrants, of judgments. with the southern parts of the European Union (EU) accounting for Yet approximations are important if the largest numbers. Altogether, one is to make observations about the continental Europe probably “hosts” overall scale, distribution, and between 6 and 8 million unauthorized direction of immigration flows. For immigrants, although that number instance, of the UN Population fluctuates in accordance with the Division’s total estimated number of “latest” regularization program. (Such immigrants, about 30 percent are found programs typically offer temporary in the ; Canada and the US legal status while the “legalization” account for about 42 million of that programs in the Americas have tended share. (The Western Hemisphere’s to offer permanent legal status). numbers may be among the most These fluctuations, however, are more robust because many key immigration cyclical than one might think because players in the region include the largest large proportions of those who proportions of irregular immigrants in regularize typically fall back into their statistics.) Continental Europe’s irregular status when they cannot meet share is in the low-to-mid 20 percent the conditions that would allow them range. The uncertainty level is higher to maintain their legal status. in that continent because of the reasons articulated earlier. The other Nor is the half or so of the total is found in the exclusive domain of rich- or middle- rest of the world, with having the income countries. Mexico, the largest number of immigrants of all world’s most consistently proficient world regions. source of unauthorized (and legal) immigrants, may also be hosting close Illegal/irregular/unauthorized/undocum to a million irregular immigrants of ented migration has been by far the its own, many of them American fastest rising single form of migration retirees who have settled in Mexico during the past ten years. A rough without official permission. estimate about the size of unauthorized immigrants in the world’s true Migrant Flows immigrant stock might put it at Estimates about migration flows between 30 and 40 million immigrants. reinforce this picture. Although Among them, the US has the largest annual migration flows are even harder absolute number of irregular immigrants to estimate than stocks — as parts of (about 11 million — about 30 percent them amount to a snapshot in an of its total foreign-born population). otherwise incomplete migration South and also have journey — a best guess may be that xviii Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century they stand at between 10 and 15 stock part of the estimate. Asylum million. That number is again very seekers who stay in the countries in sensitive to who does the counting, as which they have made claims, pending it determines who is counted. The the outcome of those claims, could be broad range used has three component reported as part of the flow estimate. parts: (a) legal permanent and longer- Finally, those asylum seekers who stay term temporary stays, which can be on regardless of the outcome of that counted with some (only some) adjudication would be counted under confidence; (b) unauthorized entries the “unauthorized entries and stays” and stays, which are extremely difficult part of the estimate. to count (discussed in a later section); and (c) asylum seekers who are The , Canada, relatively easy to count but particularly Australia, and New Zealand — the hard to classify. so-called traditional countries of immigration — probably account for Among the key components of the about 40 percent of all such annual first part are the following groups: flows. The other advanced industrial Family immigration and work and societies combined probably take skills’ related streams; another one-quarter of that total, Most all international students with the UK having been by far the (language students attending a most active player on international course of study that lasts three migration in that group in recent months or less might be excluded); years. (Within this same group, a Temporary workers at all large proportion of entrants enter skill levels (except those through the asylum route.) The performing short duration and remainder is distributed among truly seasonal jobs5); growing regional economies in the Business executives who have the top quintile of the developing world right to stay in another country and countries adjacent to advanced for more than one year; and industrial countries. It is in this last Investors and entrepreneurs grouping of countries where many of all types. irregular immigrants are often stranded (or “temporarily deposited” Counting asylum seekers is more by their traffickers/smugglers) for complicated. A possible way to do that more or less extended periods of time is to count those asylum seekers whose waiting for an opportunity to reach applications are successful during the their desired destinations. Few among course of the year in question in the those are thought to be interested in

5 In this classification, many “holiday-makers,” a one or two year tourism/work visa that is found mostly in some countries of the British Commonwealth, would be counted, as would most agricultural workers in the US because they follow a nearly year-long growing “season” by moving from area to area and crop to crop. Most seasonal agricultural workers in Europe would not be counted because the seasons in any one country tend to be highly defined and short and there is no single European Union wide agricultural worker visa.

Introduction xix returning to their home countries the principal immigrant for skills. or in staying there if they are This means that less than a quarter forcibly returned. of all foreigners admitted to Canada for permanent residence in any given Migration composition year are skills tested. In terms of gender composition, the immigrant stock is probably The rest of the class-of-entry sequence roughly equally divided between stands as follows. Family immigrants men and women. Some international are followed in overall size by those organizations, such as the International entering with work visas, whether Labor Office (ILO), suggest that temporary or permanent. With the women have exceeded men in the exception of unauthorized entries, this overall immigrant stock in recent years, is the fastest rising entry class. Many in in large part because some Asian flows the legal-worker group enter with their are dominated by women and several immediate family while others are able classes of movers (see immediately to (re)unify with their families some below) are now majority women. The time after entry. (The administrative fastest rising immigrant cohorts, definition of “immediate family” varies however, both in terms of the stock but from place to place.) particularly in terms of the flow, are those of children, followed by women. Asylum seekers and refugees are the (The number of children is still small third basic entry stream but represent a but the development is a troubling one small proportion of the overall stock. nonetheless.) The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Immigrant entry classes estimates that less than 10 million In terms of immigrant entry classes, persons have gained legal entry the largest category by far has been through the refugee resettlement and and continues to be that of families. asylum routes since 1980. Overall, less Family (re)unification remains the than 10 percent of the total immigrant basic unit and building block, the stock is thought to be composed of key multiplier, of every immigration asylum seekers or refugees at most system. In fact, even in the most points in time. highly selective immigration systems, such as that of Canada with its One last category is of particular highly emulated points-based interest (and is discussed separately immigrant selection system, families below): illegal migration. As noted, remain the formula’s principal pillar. this migration form has been by far That is because even the skills-based the fastest rising single form of part of the Canadian point system, migration during the past ten years. which accounts for about half of that country’s total permanent immigrant admissions (“landings”), only tests xx Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Forms and Definitions of Violators of the terms and conditions Illegal Immigration of a visa. Nationals of one state who As the preceding discussion has enter another state with the proper already suggested, illegal immigration documents and procedures but at takes several forms, four of which are some point violate the terms of their the most common. visa. The most frequent such violation is the acceptance of Undocumented/unauthorized entrants. employment. In a nearly These are nationals of one state who institutionalized variant of this enter another state clandestinely. violation, language schools in some Most such entrants cross land borders, countries, such as Japan, have become but sea routes are also employed notorious for admitting students regularly, and, wherever inspection whose course of study becomes regimes are permeable, so are air the nominal activity while (often routes. In all instances, the entrant full-time) employment, a commonly manages to avoid detection and hence, allowed ancillary activity to studying, inspection. (In the US, where persons is in fact the principal activity. who use this type of entry account for Another variant of this class of about two-thirds of all illegally violation is when persons with special resident immigrants, the category is visa privileges — such as holders of called “entry without inspection,” or “border crosser visas” that allow “EWI.”) Increasing proportions of such border residents from an adjacent clandestine immigrants are smuggled country to reside and be employed in or trafficked. the other country within strictly prescribed time and geographic Individuals who are inspected upon entry parameters — systematically abuse into another state but gain admission by these parameters. using fraudulent documents. The fraud in question may involve the person’s While these four classes of identity and/or the documentation in illegal entries and stays capture the support of admission. A variant of this overwhelming majority of all class of entry involves the making of immigration violations, it is important fraudulent asylum claims where issues to note that many foreigners may also of identity and the documentation and find themselves in brief temporary the narrative in support of the asylum violation of the host nation’s claim may be falsified. immigration laws in what are otherwise legal entries and fundamentally legal Violators of the duration of a visa. stays. For instance: Individuals who enter another state properly but “willfully” (see below) A tourist may exceed his or her overstay their period of legal stay, thus duration of stay pending a lapsing into illegal status. decision on the application for an extension of that term;

Introduction xxi A business visitor may engage in a Homeland Security (DHS) has since business activity that may require changed the way it reports these a different visa classification; data.) Many of these petitioners will A student may work for short typically lapse into illegality during intervals of time in violation of lengthy adjudication delays. the terms of his or her visa, either by working more than the Distribution of the maximum allowed while immigrant stock attending school or working in an The distribution of the immigrant unapproved occupation during the stock stands roughly as follows. The practical training part of his or political space occupied by the North her education; American Free Trade Agreement Workers on temporary work visas (NAFTA), that is, the United States, may change employers (or even Canada, and Mexico, probably employment sectors) without accounts for about 43 million obtaining the proper authorization immigrants out of the world’s entire from the immigration authorities. immigrant stock and about 3.5 million of the annual immigrant flow. The EU While these sorts of violations of 25 plus the immigration laws happen with (EEA) host a slightly lower proportion considerable frequency, and some are of the total immigrant stock in a important, most are relatively population base that is roughly equal “innocent,” that is, they are not to NAFTA’s at about 440 million. This systematic and are of short duration. makes Europe, broadly defined, a In fact, most statistical systems either remarkably significant (if much newer) ignore these infractions or are otherwise destination area for immigrants. incapable of capturing and counting them. Furthermore, in administrative Yet, and as noted, both the largest and regulatory terms, many of these absolute number of immigrants and the violations are typically the result of largest proportion of the immigrant inflexible rules and understaffed (and stock are in Asia. In fact, Asia has held thus overworked) immigration that preeminent position for each of the bureaucracies that do not have the last four decades. Asia is also the most resources to adjudicate immigration likely locus of large-scale migration petitions in timely fashions. activities in the decades ahead as the largest continent (by far) and the space For instance, more than 6 million with the two largest multistate/ethnic immigration petitions — many of countries poised for an economic take- them requests for a change in off: and . Instability in immigration status — were pending , the Middle East, and the in the US in 2004. (More recent data Gulf states only adds to the region’s are difficult to reconcile with this volatility — and hence to its potential figure because the US Department of for large-scale migration flows. xxii Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Immigrant density Germans, virtually all of whom have Finally, in terms of per capita been born and have lived in other immigrant density (here I use the countries for many generations — in broadest and most politically neutral its immigration statistics. Many measurement for “immigrants” — the European countries include the locally foreign born), the leading advanced born children of their immigrants in industrial countries in terms of the their statistics on “foreigners,” and foreign born as a proportion of those none of them include estimates of born in the country of immigrant unauthorized immigrants. destination are as follows. The top tier is composed of , with a Second, if one takes out of the total rate of between 35 and 40 percent, stock of immigrants the approximately Australia with somewhat more than 30 million, mostly Russians, who 25 percent, and with a bit became international migrants under less than 25 percent. The second tier rather “technical” circumstances (state is led by Canada, at about 17 percent, borders moved, not the people), the at about 13 percent, and the immigrant stock today stands at about United States at a little more than 12 2.7 or 2.8 percent of the earth’s percent. These two sets of countries population. This is a proportion that is are followed by a third tier of only marginally higher (by about 15 to countries with foreign-born density 20 percent) than that for the 1960s, levels of between 8 and 11 percent. 1970s, 1980s and much of the 1990s. It Among them, one finds , is only since the second half of the , the , , 1990s that migration seems to have Russia, and . spiraled higher, led by increasingly organized flows of unauthorized entries. Summary By way of summary, three observations Third, although there are a number of may be worth reiterating here. First, trends in international migration that countries include widely different are more or less valid for most populations in their immigration advanced industrial societies, there statistics. For instance, some countries is only one that is truly global in report all foreign-born persons with character. Much of the growth in permanent residence permits in their and maintenance of high levels of immigration statistics. The US also international migration is as much the includes in its estimates most of the 11 result of market realities in advanced million unauthorized immigrants and industrial societies as of “them” about 1.6 million of its longer-term (migrants) somehow crashing the temporary residents. France excludes North’s gates and “imposing” from its official immigration statistics themselves on it. This point goes to foreigners who have naturalized. the root of an analytical perspective Germany will not report the millions that provocatively and controversially of Aussiedler — returning ethnic incorporates fully the fact that

Introduction xxiii receiving countries are deeply issues of cumulative disadvantage — implicated in international migration meaning the various forms of economic of all forms. Receiving countries exclusion and ethno-racial, religious, provide conditions and circumstances or linguistic discrimination that in which immigration survives and systematically disadvantage certain thrives — a perspective that is often segments of a population. missing or, more frequently, underemphasized in many Both of these migration drivers are governmental analyses. It is not a always more or less in evidence. In surprise, then, that the resulting most instances, however, they are not policies are ineffective. sufficient either to start a large new migration flow or to suddenly expand substantially an existing one. For that Triggers, Drivers, and to happen, a number of preconditions Faci litato rs o f (“facilitators”) must be in place. I n t e rn at i o n a l M i g rat i o n The following are among the most notable facilitators. Wars and large-scale disasters, whether natural or man-made, are obvious A. A tradition of migration migration triggers as people flee The preexistence of a long-term for their lives. The triggers of political, social, and economic international migration can also be relationship between a sending and found in the quest to protect oneself destination society that includes a and one’s family from sustained tradition of migration is a most potent physical and economic jeopardy and to facilitator of migration. When such a escape dramatic and persistent declines tradition exists, it simply leads to in economic opportunities. (Colombian more migration until either a and Argentinean during significant new variable enters the the last few years are both examples of picture or the value of one of the this phenomenon.) This migration existing variables changes decisively. cause is qualitatively different than the An example of the former would be a search for economic improvement, dramatic and regime-wide change in which is one of the migration constants. attitudes towards some or all immigrants at the receiving-society Two elements within those broad end. Terrorism concerns that prove causes are likely to remain important real and sustained may in fact act in migration drivers in the next two such a way, as might ethnic or decades. The first is political, social, religious violence that is thought to and cultural intolerance or, at the be exacerbated by migration. (In this extreme, group-based gross violations regard, it will be worth watching in of human rights. The second is the the years ahead the acceptance of systematic failure (some will say willful immigrants and other entrants from indifference) of governments to redress predominantly Muslim and Arab xxiv Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century countries throughout the industrial adequate legal openings to immigration West.) An example of the latter are politically unachievable. would be the persistent reduction in the economic, but especially the In general, the twin forces most opportunity, differential between responsible for the growth in irregular countries. The story of the dramatic migration can be found in two actions. decline in West European immigration The first is the developed world’s to the United States and the rest of pronounced bias against low-skilled the traditional countries of migration in the face of market forces immigration that began in the 1960s that strongly value it (and broad or the stabilization of intra-EU classes of people who need and avail migration since the 1980s are themselves liberally of such migrant instances of this phenomenon. labor.) The second is what broad segments of the developed world’s B. Economic and non-governmental sector view as internationalist elites extreme parsimony towards various When receiving-society elites are forms of social and humanitarian convinced of the economic benefits immigration. of legally authorized and orderly migration (and, within certain The former is most obvious when a parameters, even of unauthorized variety of personal and low-value- migration) they can typically organize added service jobs go begging. Among themselves to open the immigration these jobs are assistants and child- and valve further. In this scenario, elder-caretakers, hospitality industry migration’s benefits will have to be staff that goes beyond the more visible thought of as being substantial enough restaurant kitchen and waiting staff, — and government policies as some retail service providers, as well as inadequate in meeting perceived seasonal and other types of difficult labor market and other needs — to and low-wage work — work to which motivate economic and internationalist first-worlders no longer aspire or are (what Immanuel Kant referred to as interested in accepting. The latter “cosmopolitan”) elites and their plays itself out in Europe’s intense political allies to support significant arguments about the asylum system openings to immigration flows. and in much of the developed world’s Canada’s sustained interest in unease about the growth in family immigration is an example of such immigration. elite-driven legal opening, as are recent openings to migration in the UK C. Communities of coethnics and elsewhere in the EU. The Mature and influential “anchor” United States’ glaring tolerance of ethnic communities in the country of unauthorized immigration is an destination can and do mobilize to example of how far some pro- become “enablers” of substantial immigration elites may go when migration flows when faced with a

Introduction xxv sharp deterioration in the circumstances resettlement of many Southeast of their coethnics/coreligionists in Asians in the 1970s and 1980s another country. This enabling throughout much of the West or the function often includes offering to admission of those who manage to assist with the initial integration of the leave such places as Afghanistan, , newcomers. Much of post-1970 Jewish and much of the Middle East in the emigration to the United States and last two decades are good examples of elsewhere in the West fits well under such “success.” (Foreign policy elites this model. are ready civil society allies in many of these instances.) “Enablers,” however, do not stop there. If the receiving society is Civil society institutions typically unresponsive to their advocacy, they pursue their pro-“protection” and, will often provide the essential secondarily, pro-immigration work in “lubricants” for the unauthorized alliance and through coalitions with migration of their brethren. These ethnic, ideology-driven, and may include the commitment of the economic interests. In doing so, they necessary capital for their travel and and their allies quickly become key entry and the provision of an stakeholders in the effort to sustain incubating social and economic and widen an opening to migration to environment within their own the point where it becomes a community upon arrival. Examples of permanent feature of a society. Once such “network” migration behavior such coalitions mature, unilateral abound throughout the advanced efforts by state bureaucracies to industrial world, although the role of change the migration status quo stand the Mexican and Mexican-American low probabilities of success — communities in the United States particularly when other important may be classified as archetypical. societal actors, such as certain progressive or self-interested6 trade D. Civil society unions, also join in. The support of When key civil society institutions in many labor unions in the US for the prospective destination country, offering illegally resident immigrants such as religious and human rights legal permanent status, and their organizations, stand in strong countenance of most forms of philosophical opposition to the immigration, are examples of alliances circumstances migrants are attempting that cross interests in ways that have to escape — and are willing to use earned them the name “strange their political capital in support of a bedfellows.” migration “solution” to the problem — they are often at least partially successful. The examples of the

6 That is, unions that see in immigrants the prospect for expanding their membership rosters. xxvi Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Tre n d s to Watc h f o r i n can affect both the frequency and I n t e rn at i o n a l M i g rat i o n catastrophic potential of natural disasters.) A series of recent At the dawn of the 21st century, and disasters in have looking ahead to the next two brought that topic “home” to US decades, three types of situations policymakers, while concerns require separate mention because they about nuclear power plant safety have recently gained in both virulence in the western parts of the former and migration-importance. Soviet Union is (or should be) of The first one is outright intense interest to Europe. ethno-racial and/or religious conflict in which forcing a These three types of situations are not targeted group to abandon the the only forces that analysts and contested area is a major policy policymakers must mind on an objective (the many variants of ongoing basis. A number of additional so-called ethnic cleansing). trends also affect the size, direction, Examples from Rwanda, the and type of international migration, if Caucasus region, Sudan, and at smaller scales. Among them one the former make this finds the following. point all too obvious. The second form involves the The first, and perhaps most troubling, deterioration of ecosystems to trend is the refusal to adjust immigration the point where life becomes policies to better reflect market realities. almost unsustainable — with By so doing, governments surrender access to water and extensive ever-larger proportions of their degradation in water quality, the immigration decisions to smuggling contamination of basic foodstuffs, syndicates and their human cargo. and the consequences of desertification being prime The second major trend has two concerns in this regard. The long dimensions and focuses on the conflict in Sudan may be a emerging “competition” for classic example of this migration immigrants of many different types cause, while the Middle East may and skill levels. Competition for become even more of a cauldron skilled immigrants is by now a of instability because of it. well-established fact and includes The third type of situation students, engineers, persons with concerns flight from various forms often advanced technical and of natural and man-made disasters. communications skills, as well as (This situation is often related to medical professionals of all types. the one immediately above in Such competition stems in large part that climactic change and the from the widespread recognition that deterioration of the ecosystem individual initiative, education, and

Introduction xxvii talent are now among the most pieces in the analytical jigsaw puzzle valuable resources a society (and an that the (more) successful management economy) can “possess.” Guaranteeing of international migration requires. those who have these attributes nearly unimpeded immigration access has become a priority across much of the Why G overnments developed world — hence creating the palpable sense of competition one (and Societies) Find observes among the would-be hosts for International Migration talented and well-qualified foreigners.7 So Difficult to Tackle Less appreciated (and more politically Effectively controversial) is a trend that is only slowly coming to the surface and still Four sets of mutually reinforcing factors struggles with political acceptance. seem to be at the root of the difficulty This trend focuses on the entry of governments and, more generally, immigrants who are willing to play by societies, have in dealing well with the rules and work hard in jobs that large-scale immigration’s effects. many of the citizens of the developed The first is found in immigration’s world find increasingly unappealing. relationship to relatively sudden and This is the one form of migration that deep social and cultural change. The is expected to grow most robustly in second has to do with the fact that the next two decades; it is also likely immigration requires the making of to be the most contested. tough policy (and politically painful) trade-offs. The third stems from the The third trend presents the world issue’s deeply uneven distributional community with a governance and effects. The fourth and final set of ethical challenge of the first order: factors can be found in immigration’s the growth in “false promises” and deepening relationship with economic “indentured servitude” migration. interdependence and globalization. All These two often-related phenomena four sets of factors require governments go far beyond the sex trade that has to engage in delicate balancing acts in become such a “fashionable” topic of which the cost of failure is often conversation in some advanced measured both in severe social (and at industrial countries to incorporate the times even economic) consequences large segments of total immigration but also in political ruin. that are now systematically “trafficked” by increasingly sophisticated (and well- A. Managing change financed) smugglers and profiteers. Living organisms evolve at leisurely, almost glacial, rates. Societies, which This chapter will return to these three are first and foremost living organisms, themes repeatedly as they are critical are no exception. Large-scale

7 D. Papademetriou and S. Yale-Loehr, Balancing Interests: Rethinking the U.S. Selection of Skilled Immigrants(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996). xxviii Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century immigration accelerates that pace has also widened enormously, while the and deepens its effect while its manner in which it has grown (often in ethnic/racial/cultural “visibility” makes ways that are unexpected and seem to it more difficult to ignore — making defy attempts at regulation) fuels change, rather than constancy, the rule. discomfort and anxiety — and While social and cultural change are contributes further to the issue’s often identified as undergirding much of prominence as a governance “problem” the public’s concern with immigration, of the first order. one form of change may be underestimated in analyses about the The manner through which a plurality reaction to immigration. Large-scale of immigrants reach their destinations immigration compels societies to has given rise to a new industry — continually re-negotiate the formulas that of the organized smuggling of according to which their social, people. Two challenges appear to be economic, and political power are particularly daunting about this allocated — formulas over which most development. The first is that these societies have often invested enormous syndicates use constantly shifting energy, passion, and even blood. organizational frameworks to protect themselves from being penetrated and Put differently, most modern societies dissolved by the authorities. The are built around the notion of near second is much more consequential. immutability. Nation-building symbols Illegal immigration controls have and myths typically reinforce that spawned lucrative black markets for all sense by emphasizing commonness and types of products and services that can often invent “facts” that support it — defeat regulation, in part by corrupting and reinterpret and otherwise dismiss officials along the entire route to a nonconforming facts. Deep and destination. This challenge points to profound change, by challenging the the need for smarter enforcement. It very foundations of that commonness, also identifies a basic weakness in carries within it the seeds of instability. regulatory practices that stubbornly deny labor market realities and the Certain “facts on the ground” about power of human nature and seek to international migration further alter behavior by focusing almost reinforce many otherwise exclusively on policing responses. understandable popular and governance concerns about it. Migration to the This is a theme to which this chapter advanced industrial North has grown will return again in the pages ahead. since the mid-1990s at a measurably higher rate than before and has spread B. Negotiating difficult trade-offs throughout the advanced industrial If sudden and deep change is tough world. At the same time, its national, to manage, an additional set of ethnic, racial, and cultural composition forces makes managing immigration

Introduction xxix even more difficult by forcing advanced industrial states. The global governments to make choices that competitive forces that trade openings require tough policy trade-offs. Many unleash can make waiting for a society’s trade-offs have political consequences education and training regimes to that can be best described as classic adjust to changing demands in “Hobson’s choices.” Two examples of education and skill-sets akin to such trade-offs — one from an economic suicide. Waiting for the economic/labor market and social attitudes of one’s workers about work policy perspective, the second and associated social protections to through a broader international adapt to the realities of international cooperation lens — offer a sense of competition is an even larger challenge that complexity. and will likely take even longer. In fact, even under the best of circumstances, 1. Trade liberalization, training such adjustments require atypical and education adjustments, and amounts of astuteness, good judgment, social protections and political courage — attributes that Openness to migration can juxtapose a always seem to be in short supply. “just-in-time” philosophy of economic competitiveness, which seeks forever As noted earlier, the reasons go beyond greater access to the global labor pool, the fact that products produced more with a social democracy’s more efficiently and cheaply elsewhere are fundamental interests in training its now imported with few or no duties, own workers and maintaining generous quotas, or licenses, thus forcing social and labor protections. In such a uncompetitive industries and social binary framework, the economic policies that are out of line with an interests that support immigration are economy’s ability to afford them, into a seemingly put on a collision course with corner. Two additional factors are that the interests of the broader society. (a) the developed North has also Obviously, as posited, a large part of pursued vigorously (and very effectively) this tension is intentionally artificial, the liberalization of capital markets and even simplistic. Yet, it is important to the stabilization of foreign investment make the larger point as clear as environments, and (b) many middle- possible. Policymakers are asked to income and even less-developed make virtually instant calculations countries have increasingly well- about complex cost-benefit ratios across prepared, competent (and pliant) a maddening array of policy domains workforces. Hence, unless access to with grossly inadequate information immigrant workers is also liberalized, and crude policy tools. and social policy regimes become more aligned with the economic facts on the An example from international trade ground (especially productivity), some might make this point clearer. Trade of a country’s most competitive firms liberalization is a policy priority that may well decide to “outsource” some of has been pursued relentlessly by the their activities and expand their xxx Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century operations mostly abroad, or even as well as some physical and social relocate entirely. This is not a theoreti- infrastructure assistance. One more cal proposition as the (re)emerging element, however, is also essential: debates about these reemerging issues in far greater access to the advanced the United States, Germany, and world’s labor markets. While the elsewhere make clear. This is indeed policy objective sought in this trade one of the largest policy dilemmas trade off is an important one, the cost of liberalization and global interdepend- such a “deal” is measured not only in ence pose for advanced social democra- jobs and at least some economic pain cies and demonstrates the need for for some of the advanced economies’ uncharacteristic wisdom in making the societal segments, but also in adverse right trade-offs across policy domains. popular reaction and electoral retribution. The pain will in fact 2. International cooperation in be felt twice: first, when affected controlling irregular migration domestic constituencies organize in A second example of difficult opposition to such a bargain, and trade-offs comes from the area of second, when they retaliate against international cooperation. The the government at the polls. example focuses on the challenge of engaging key sending countries in 3. Migration’s distributional effects sharing in the management of The third part of the issue’s international migration deeply enough complexity can be traced to its to, in effect, assume co-responsibility for distributional effects. Migration’s achieving mutually agreed-upon policy economic and social effects are outcomes. Accomplishing such a distributed unevenly across otherwise “joint management” objective will discrete policy domains (such as require both parties to make tough various components of human choices during negotiations. resources policies, trade policies, tax policies, etc.) and among a society’s In order for advanced industrial constituent segments (such as democracies to engage key immigrant- investors, producers, consumers, sending and transit states in serious workers, etc.) These effects, as well as negotiations about a common front those of a government’s responses to against organized forms of illegal migration, unless managed well, migration, the former must place on create distinct categories of “winners” the table items of high value to the and “losers” and sow the seeds for latter in exchange for their “organic” negative political reactions to cooperation. Among the items migration. Failure to address these receiving countries must put on offer reactions quickly and decisively are liberalizing trade in such low can and does lead to political valued-added areas as agriculture, contentiousness about immigration textiles, and garments (sectors highly one is observing in many parts of the protected by all rich countries), advanced industrial world.

Introduction xxxi 4. Migration and economic The opening of foreign markets, interdependence however, requires roughly The near-free movement of capital, commensurate concessions by production, and markets has meant advanced industrial societies — that well-capitalized and highly a reality that is naturally not competitive global firms have been highlighted until an agreement is able to exploit global opportunities reached and the text becomes public. with greater ease and fewer risks. (Few public processes are less This minimization of obstacles and transparent than trade negotiations.) risk has been enshrined in trade and The opening up of protected sectors investment liberalization regimes in advanced industrial countries pursued through the World Trade typically has substantial adverse Organization’s ongoing negotiations, consequences for businesses in as well as in bilateral and regional these sectors and their associated trade and investment accords. In very workforces — just as the opening of limited instances, some regional the less advanced countries’ markets “integration” negotiations are also does for them. Thus, for nearly every moving forward, if slowly (e.g., the opportunity that trade accords Southern African Development create, some social and economic Community — SADC). These sectors “win” while others are asked instruments clearly advance the to absorb a significant amount of risk objectives of the business sectors and pain. that promote them, and, as a result, most producers and consumers The adverse effects of increasing benefit from them. economic interdependence and globalization-dictated restructuring At the same time, and as noted briefly impact most directly noncompetitive earlier in this chapter, such agreements industries and the holders of also blur the lines between opportunities uncompetitive skill sets — wherever and risks for some segments of the these are found. More important societies that are parties to them. for this analysis, however, may be Opening foreign markets, for instance, the social consequences of this creates clear opportunities for Western restructuring. These consequences are businesses to exploit their advantages at the root of the popular uncertainty in endeavors that “contain” higher and fear that globalization forces have value-added and greater technological created. Refocusing on the advanced content. Hence, both those directly industrial societies once more, employed in these businesses and these same social consequences are those employed up and down the also the root causes of much of the economic stream in those and related reaction to immigration. sectors also benefit through the so-called ripple effects.

xxxii Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Managing a Global Social public’s confidence that government and Economic Process can and will manage immigration competently (and protect the Economic and other forms of homeland), (b) address the array interdependence noted earlier place of public grievances relating to countries and entire geographic regions immigration and its consequences, in the grasp of an increasingly global and, in doing so, (c) defuse growing migration system in which economic xenophobia and reduce the and sociopolitical events have direct stigmatization of various ethnic, migration consequences. Recall, for religious, and immigrant communities. example, US fears in the mid-1990s that the failure to “rescue” the Mexican These concerns make clear the depth peso would greatly increase immigration of the migration management pressures from that country, or challenge and point to one of this Europeans’ concerns that the latest EU chapter’s major lines of argument: that enlargement would have substantial international migration has reached a migration consequences for the EU 15.8 management “tipping point” where single-country solutions are no longer At the root of the immigration capable of addressing it effectively and to management quandary, which mutual advantage.9 Managing virtually all advanced industrial immigration more effectively in the societies now find themselves in, years ahead, whether unilaterally, lies the myriad of economic, political, bilaterally, regionally, or multilaterally social, and other calculations and (even globally), thus requires that actions (or, more notably, inactions) policymakers understand much better these societies have made on this issue the following issues: over the years. These decisions and The differences between factors “non-decisions” have invited or subtly that cause or at least substantially encouraged various types of migrants affect migration and those that to enter the international migration merely mediate it — and the policy stream. This process, in turn, has levers policymakers can pull and given rise to a governance challenge the sequence in which to pull them of the first order — a challenge that to bring about a desired outcome. since September 11, 2001, has The reasons some people react acquired a very distinctive public- to certain events by emigrating security component. The issue has while so many others facing thus become how to (a) regain the similar or worse circumstances

8 The EU 15 countries made different interim provisions about such migration. They placed no restrictions on the movement of Cypriots and Maltese. Some of the EU 15 offered liberal entry and work privileges to the nationals of the new Member States, but a subset restricted access to the social benefits for such immigrants. The rest have continued to restrict movement for part or all of the seven-year transition period the accession treaty provides. 9 This line of reasoning, however, does not absolve countries involved in the migration process from making their own tough but smart governance and management choices.

Introduction xxxiii stay put — and how governments in limiting the effects of migration’s can intervene in each instance to challenges enough so as to draw out steer the outcomes towards the even more of its benefits. preferred direction. The role of organized people- Failure to understand the types of smuggling syndicates in the issues outlined above much better and growth of unwanted migration to work with key societal actors in (they are now a critical factor) drawing out migration’s benefits will and the need to reallocate place governments further behind in resources and shift detection and the migration management effort. enforcement paradigms in order to This is especially the case when tackle them systematically and taking into account the ongoing aggressively. adaptations unwanted migrants make The relationship (“fundamental to their entry and labor-market difference” may be a more assimilation strategies. Making things appropriate construction) between worse are the public’s impatience with immigration decisions and experimentation and its intolerance opportunities for terrorists — and for anything but almost-immediate particularly the role that a country’s results. The obsession with foreign political and economic controlling international migration decisions, and its ability to through unilateral law-and-order integrate its immigrants effectively, measures and the distorting effect of play in the growth of this era’s this approach on the public debate clash with nihilistic violence. simply complicates matters further. The limits of unilateralism (or of All these factors allow governments de facto unilateralism10) in precious little leeway to demonstrate responding to unwanted migration. the following key points: First, that immigration is not at The reality is clear: Migration ties the root of the North’s major sending, transit, and receiving problems (although it exposes countries — as well as immigrants, those problems and subjects then their families, and their employers — to public scrutiny). into often reinforcing intricate systems Second, that problems to which of complex interdependence. It takes migration contributes can in fact the cooperation of virtually all these be managed. actors — plus smart policy decisions, Third, that immigration, properly thoughtful regulation, and sustained managed, can provide important enforcement — to make real progress answers to some of the North’s

10 The term “de facto unilateralism” refers to individual or groupings of advanced industrial societies “negotiating” with sending or transit countries with very little to offer them beyond lectures and stern warnings, technical assistance designed to advance the destination countries’ purposes of immigration control and trade “concessions” that are typically both less meaningful than they may appear and have a double-edged sword character in their requirements. xxxiv Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century most intractable longer-term of issues that cut across issue portfolios economic, social protection, (the jargon one hears more regularly and demographic dilemmas. now is about “policy coherence” and “mainstreaming”). In another example, the EU Commission seems to be Migration Management learning how to cooperate more across Fundamentals “competencies” although it seems to be doing so slowly and painfully. If some of Single-purpose policies, just as single- these experiments succeed, managing cause explanations, are poor guides in immigration’s benefits and consequences developing successful responses to could become an archetype of how intricate and politically sensitive policy decisions can be made jointly issues. Decisions that relate to with and implemented across several immigration cut across policy domains line agencies. and administrative responsibilities and thus require extraordinary amounts Another matter also detracts from the and forms of coordination in both opportunity to manage migration planning and execution. (A partial list issues more effectively: the extreme must include border management, tendency to compound and conflate. public order, social welfare, education In fact, the tendency to conflate both and training, and foreign, trade, concepts about and responses to and development policies.) Yet, migration has become endemic. government competencies are almost Conflation denies public servants and always single-issue focused, and politicians alike space for identifying bureaucracies are typically organized what works well (and should be vertically in order to deliver the encouraged) from what may be necessary function. broken about migration — and thus plays into the hands of those intent This need not be always the case. on “tarring and feathering” the entire For instance, the creation of DHS system. For instance, to use just had the opportunity to begin to chip elementary examples, not all away at this public-sector agency immigration is boon (or bane), not all management paradigm. So far, it is temporary worker programs are bad failing badly. (The July 2005 attacks on (or good), not all immigrants are a led some to call for a similar burden to social welfare systems consolidation of key functions under a (although many are), not all single new agency.) Furthermore, the immigrants refuse to commit to subsequent reorganizations of both integrating into the communities in Canadian, and, to a lesser degree, which they live (although many do), Mexican federal agencies to “match” and not all asylum claims are bogus some DHS functions may create an (but far too many are). In the public opening for thinking and acting discourse about these and similar “horizontally” on the increasing number issues, opponents behave as if

Introduction xxxv everything about immigration is internal controls. One must focus on negative while proponents in turn the labor market while the other must argue that all is well. The overall be mindful of the increasingly point remains simple but compelling: complicated array of law-and-order conflation ultimately denies issues, particularly terrorism. In the governments the space they first track, regulators will find their need to identify, experiment with, task easier if they work with the and promote responsible market and civil society. The second management practices. track demands a reorientation of law enforcement priorities, the A. Four Elements of Better development of additional law Migration Management enforcement methodologies, and The approach to better managing all greater resources. Both tracks also migration — and not just its illegal require something else that few variant — has four organically analyses emphasize and hardly any interdependent parts that must be government has tried consistently: pursued in concert if the management sparing no effort to convert key objective is to succeed. societal stakeholders into partners in what should be conceived of and First, legal immigration channels of carried out as “national projects.” various forms must be widened and Such partnerships will require deepened. Greater legal access by exquisite listening skills and the immigrants does not translate, ipso willingness of both parties to make facto, into the silver-bullet solution to compromises — attributes that neither migration’s challenges that some side has demonstrated that it has in immigration advocates may argue. adequate supply. Without it, however, governments will always find themselves in untenable Third, the state’s border control stance positions both in regard to their control must be reviewed frequently with an efforts and public perceptions about eye to continuing to make only their overall governance skills. investments that both make sense and Perversely, such criticism will likely bear fruit. Agreements between major come both from those who feel they are countries of origin and destination not doing enough to produce results that focus on sharing responsibility for and those who argue that they are the management of migration flows doing too much of the wrong things. should be pursued simultaneously with robust border policing. Such Second, internal controls must be agreements must be truly bilateral and systematically and regularly reviewed balanced in terms of what each party with an eye to reducing opportunities gives and receives. A good rule of for unauthorized immigrants to gain thumb upon entering such footholds in the destination country. negotiations is that the benefits to There are at least two tracks to each party must be substantial enough xxxvi Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century to alter behavior while the costs do Marginalization and stigmatization of not undermine either party’s immigrants and their ethno-cultural fundamental legitimacy to the point communities, whether willful, where delivering policy outcomes in inadvertent, or the consequence of accordance with agreed-upon terms inattentiveness, will likely fuel becomes impossible. various forms of anomie and prove to be the source of hard-to-repair Fourth, the task of solving the damage to long-term social cohesion. immigration and intergroup relations Nor is there a shortage of division- puzzle must be engaged with promoting issues. The domestic phase uncharacteristic imagination and of the United States’, and, increasingly, vigor. Nothing a country does on the Western world’s emerging “war on immigration will be more terrorism” is likely to become the consequential in the long term than latest and arguably most potent creating level playing fields for the instrument through which such economic, social, and political stigmatization is occurring. Unless it incorporation of immigrants — new is handled wisely, this “war,” while and old. The new security imperative perhaps making us safer in some ways, amplifies that point a hundredfold. can also set the cause of immigrant But the effort should go much further. integration and social cohesion back As relationships between host for a generation or longer — and thus societies and immigrants evolve, undermine domestic security in the an emphasis on mutuality and on longer run. creating common space and developing an inclusive community B. Thinking Beyond the Advanced identity can help a society move Industrial Countries’ Perspective forward. Collaborative integration These four observations are obviously efforts that engage government, the made from the rather narrow perspective private sector, civil society, and the of developed countries. The overall philanthropic community can leverage objective must remain, however, to scarce resources and establish agendas enhance migration’s role as a critical that recognize immigrants not only as resource for greater human progress. long-term contributors to the This is a goal that is made easier community but also as future through migrant remittances of various constituents. Ultimately, integration forms, the gaining and dissemination efforts succeed best when they of new ideas, and the transfer of reconcile the immigrants’ needs and economic and noneconomic skills.11 interests with those of the broader community in a dynamic process that The dilemma is sharper than usual at weaves a new social fabric. this point in time because interest in

11 The role and value of “social” and “political” remittances are often underestimated as they occur in the long shadow of the far more commonly referenced financial remittances.

Introduction xxxvii and reliance on migration by the less movement is mostly beneficial and developed world is intensifying. This may in fact be desirable. A decided intensification, however, is taking turn to mindless restriction will thus place simultaneously with the struggle threaten international migration’s of many industrial societies to find a historic role as an instrument for balance among reflexive restriction, individual freedom and personal enlightened self-interest, and an growth, as a force for the development admittedly weak but nonetheless of source countries, and as a strategic existing sense of solidarity with the factor in the continuing growth of less developed countries from which destination countries. most immigrants come. Nowhere are these dilemmas playing themselves out C. The Elements of Better more powerfully than in the EU/EEA. Management Practices Considering this wider analytical lens, Not all immigrants are following what might the advanced industrial “south-to-north” trajectories. Very world be doing differently on substantial intradeveloped world migration that is more “development- migration also occurs but there is friendly” and captures and maximizes virtually no discussion about it. This is its many benefits? Mindful that policy only in some part because the prescriptions are always easier to offer movement is treaty-based or otherwise the further one sits from the “real” reciprocal. The largest part of the world of policy and, even more so, relative equanimity wealthy nations politics, the following ideas are offered show towards such migration is that, by with the necessary amount of care. and large, such migration is socially, The discussion is organized along two culturally, and ethno-racially acceptable. broad categories: (1) setting the stage, and (2) basic management rules. The Finally, there are also significant overall management objective sounds north-to-south movements, primarily simple but is extremely difficult when of business persons, aid and managing complex social processes: to development experts, and, regulate international migration in increasingly, retirees. These ways that avoid the vicious circle of movements also occur beyond the failed unilateral and single-purpose radar screens of most analysts and controls and move state actors towards certainly those of the “worried” classes cooperative policies that promote the that often turn issues into problems. virtuous cycles of disciplined pragmatism and good governance. These realities point not only to the complications associated with 1. Setting the stage senseless restriction but also to the a. Recapturing control of the portrayal possibility that such restriction, if of the migration process carried to the extreme, can affect Two mutually reinforcing trends pose persons and processes whose the most imminent and clearest threat xxxviii Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century to continuing to draw benefits from the unreliable data, biased analyses, and global migration system: demagoguery (almost purposefully) obtuse and illegality. Demagogues, irrespective administrative terms of art. For of party affiliation and regardless instance, what is a “working holiday of whether they are in or out of maker” when a visa can last for a year government, ride the issue for political or more, and what is “temporary” about advantage with abandon. As a result, multiyear foreign-worker visas that they often define the parameters of the allow their holder to readily adjust public debate. In the typical scenario, status to a permanent one? Furthermore, governments do not address why migration suffers from too much passion immigration is important, what is on both sides of the issue. Practicing far valuable about it, and how to maximize greater truth-in-immigration might thus its gains and minimize its costs until be supported as a policy objective that a crisis erupts. By that time, however, can stand comfortably on its own merits. they are on the defensive and their actions typically reinforce the case of Two areas shout the loudest for the demagogues. The result is that greater transparency and political public perceptions about migration introspection, as well as for more become further distorted, and the thoughtful discussion: (1) exploring discourse moves even further away further the reasons for the increasing from responsible ideas. demand for the work that immigrants do in industrial countries, at all skill The second obstacle is illegality, levels and across all economic sectors; particularly the perception that most and (2) the relationship between migration is unauthorized. The apparent migration and social democracy/the ubiquity and brazenness of the welfare state (see the chapter by international trafficking syndicates and Brochmann and Dolvic in this the publicity of their “exploits” reinforce volume). The policy complexity of that impression and undermine the both issues (and the intensity of the prospects for deliberate action. In associated politics) requires treatises addition to frequently mistreating the for each. This chapter will simply raise migrants they traffic, these syndicates some of the issues. also harm the social order and rule-of- law interests of the societies in which With regard to the first issue, the their “cargos” end up. Recapturing the United States and all advanced process from both demagogues and industrial societies have to think harder syndicates — in the first instance, about whether and how shortcomings symbolically, in the second one, literally in systemic education and training — is a good governance imperative of failures are linked to greater the highest order. immigration. Additional effort should be invested in exploring systematically b. Practicing far greater transparency the relationship of immigration to the Migration is full of myths, missing and persistent unwillingness of first-world

Introduction xxxix workers to move to where the jobs one hand, post-World War II are and their shunning of what the baby boomers now have a set of Japanese call “3-D” jobs — demanding, expectations from social democracy dirty, and dangerous. And as if those that makes even modest changes in issues are not incendiary enough labor market and social protection in a political sense, a real discourse policies extremely contentious. must also delve deeply and honestly Former German Chancellor Gerhard into the relationship among Schroeder’s experience in making a immigration (legal and unauthorized), number of rather modest labor market unemployment rates, and the and social protection reforms late in availability of relatively generous 2003 attests to that difficulty, as can unemployment and welfare benefits. the experiences of a succession of French political leaders.12 On the In addition, and related to this last set other hand, advanced industrial of issues, the question must also be countries’ failure to adjust their asked whether it is still feasible to pay education and training systems to “high” wages for low-skilled, low- compete globally prior to, or at least value-added jobs in the face of simultaneously with, their deep and international competition that dictates sharp opening to trade liberalization, that wage and nonwage costs for has contributed to high levels of tradable goods and services better structural unemployment in many reflect a worker’s productivity. Finally, sectors. The reason is simple. With and putting it even more directly, the globalization forces galloping on, question is whether 3-D jobs can those without the requisite bundles continue to be rewarded at the level of skills, those who are unwilling to they used to be when protectionism adapt to the rules of global ensured domestic products were able to competition, and those with ready count on several forms of subsidies and access to more or less substantial incentives relative to foreign products. government incentives not to do so The latter could either be kept (in the form of social protections), virtually out of a country outright find themselves among globalization’s through quotas or otherwise be made “losers.” Decisions by many of the much more expensive through a advanced world’s firms to move Byzantine system of high duties and investments and, increasingly, jobs taxes, restrictive licensing, and other abroad — for many of the same kinds forms of “regulation.” of reasons and under a similar imperative to compete successfully The second issue may be even more and draw out additional profits — politically explosive and thus requires contribute to the unemployment even greater care and honesty. On the conundrum further.

12 Although the examples are European to emphasize the political difficulties of changing deeply rooted practices, they are no less valid for the United States or Canada. xl Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century These and associated issues seem to that points to the benefits of pursuing have some policymakers and most immigration policies that address key politicians stymied and even policy priorities directly. It is then far intimidated, while they present more productive, and in some ways others with the ancient Greek easier, to encourage all relevant societal theater’s deux ex machina opportunity actors to participate in a public debate for opposing immigration. A possible that deals with the facts and to conduct roadmap out of this quagmire might such a debate from a stronger position. start not by denying or dismissing the In doing so, the debate and subsequent present (admittedly complicated) enforcement actions stand a chance to relationship between immigration and move from the enforcing of typically social democracy, but by thinking arbitrary rules to sharing responsibility harder and investing more of all forms for implementing mutually agreed of capital in turning immigration into upon bargains across a variety of policy an ally of and contributor both to domains. competitiveness and social democracy.13 Some experiments in A simple rule of thumb may be the that regard have been suggested in the most basic point here. If the political section on “controls plus” below. leadership cannot or is not willing to articulate clearly to its electors why In sum, all governments use facts and the country is or should be in the truth much more sparingly than they immigration “game” in the first place, should on politically sensitive issues. that country should not be in it. On immigration matters, however, Everything else is a potentially willful distortions and outright lies explosive mix of high-handedness and play directly into the hands of political cowardice. It is not uncommon immigration’s detractors and interfere for leaders to be punished in the polls with the more successful management when they are perceived to engage in of the issue. such behavior — whether on immigration or other divisive but c. The imperative of public education unavoidable issues. Electorates in A sustained public education effort is several European countries in essential to making real progress recent years, as well as in Canada towards recapturing the initiative on in the early 1990s, have handed migration. Specifically, governments sitting governments stinging defeats will likely find their public education in significant part because of task both easier and more amenable if such perceptions. they move gradually but firmly away from the rhetoric of just keeping An alternative model exists when it immigrants out and towards a stance comes to immigration. The Canadian

13 D. Papademetriou and K. O’Neil, “Reflections on Immigration and the Welfare State” (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2004).

Introduction xli government “speaks” with Canadians b. Building and maintaining about its immigration policies management capacity regularly and has found this avoids the Building robust management systems “feast-or-famine” cycles with public and funding them properly are opinion on immigration that the US essential preconditions to a sound experiences, the deep skepticism and immigration regime. Instead, “frail” reaction to immigration with which management systems and insufficient virtually all European governments resources for the immigration function have to contend. have become endemic across most advanced industrial countries. But the 2. Basic management rules requirements do not stop there. a. The importance of clear rules Implementation methodologies and Clear rules are an essential part strategies must be reviewed regularly of any sound management system. and adjusted frequently so that they In fact, the greater the complexity are always aligned with policy of the management challenge, the objectives, and the delivery of the greater the need for clear and function must be evaluated constantly. consistent rules. The reason is compelling: it is in implementation that even the most Consistent rules, however, are not well thought-out systems stumble. enough. Complex management systems also require that rules be Building and maintaining effective applied steadily and reliably across the capacity in the management of board. Put differently, a management migration should thus become and system that is rules-based should also remain a policy priority of the first deliver consistent — and hence order for all immigrant destination predictable — outcomes. It is countries. Yet, among countries that predictability in outcomes, in turn, engage in migration in substantial that is the essential precondition to ways, only Australia, New Zealand, building public confidence on complex and Canada come somewhat close and often divisive policy issues. to the management robustness called for here. Predictability in outcomes is very elusive in all countries that engage the c. Working with the market and immigration system — although some civil society states seem to do better in that regard Finally, if most who engage the than others. Differential outcomes migration system are to get greater are most pronounced, and perhaps value out of their “investments” in most troubling from a governance migration, two of the most powerful perspective, in two areas: enforcement and determined critics of migration and naturalization. And both of these policy and systems — the market and seem to be more troublesome in most of organized civil society — must federal, rather than unitary, states. be converted into partners if the effort xlii Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century to create and take advantage of win- even if such responses are coordinated win situations is to stand a chance to to include much tougher border succeed. Working against, rather than controls, ever greater labor market with, the market is often an exercise in regulation, the enhanced intrusiveness futility; working without the benefit of associated with high-energy interior close cooperation with civil society — policing, and persistent efforts to a system’s main stakeholders — makes reduce the demand for asylum by the task of governance on complex making it more difficult both to issues tougher than necessary. There is launch applications and succeed in the another, extremely important, benefit adjudication process. The facts in the to working with one’s critics on United States and throughout much of difficult issues that is often discounted Europe speak for themselves. or even ignored: the two sides can share responsibility for what succeeds Four reasons make the point obvious. rather than always blaming each other First, the enforcement of for the many things that will exclusion, that is, law-and-order inevitably fail. measures without concomitant rules that also admit people along a variety of criteria14 and engage The “Wars” Against Illegal them in common projects Immigration and Terrorism towards building up the communities in which they live, Even if governments are diligent cannot be effective — that is, in observing the management not unless (some analysts will say fundamentals outlined above, perfection “even if”) a society is willing to cannot become the policy goal when militarize its response to dealing with the complex social and immigration and invest always economic issues associated with larger resources in it. The United economic immigration. The standards States has been moving in these perfection demands are too high, and directions, initially in its border any policy designed to meet them will control efforts. Yet, net illegal ultimately be judged a failure. immigration has been rising by an average of more than 500,000 In no policy field has the rhetorical persons per year15 for nearly a pursuit of perfection led to more decade now despite massive total governance (and political) dead ends, expenditures on control than in “defeating” illegal immigration measures. The effort’s perverse exclusively through law-and-order effects do not stop there. Several responses. This premise remains valid hundred would-be immigrants die

14 The criteria will include employment needs, humanitarian responsibilities, and legal obligations. 15 J. Passell, Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2005), http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf.

Introduction xliii each year as they attempt to cross regardless of whether they must into the United States illegally risk their own lives, pay from Mexico. Furthermore, many exorbitant fees, or subvert the Mexicans who used to follow a asylum system or any other migration rhythm of back-and- available means of entry. Then forth movement (what many they will insert themselves deeply analysts call “circularity”), now into the underground economy. find themselves locked in once they make the much higher This is not to propose “going soft” on investments (in smuggler fees illegal immigration. In addition to and personal risk) necessary to undermining a society’s legal order, defeat US border controls. illegal immigration can also hide Second, immigration systems persons who wish the targeted society create their own self-feeding ill and confound or pervert a variety of dynamics that encourage even that society’s domestic and foreign more migration. These dynamics policy priorities. Terrorist issues include both “push” and “pull” temporarily aside, one of the most forces (see also immediately significant consequences of illegal below.) Flexibility, then, and immigration may in fact stem from the smart and clear rules that a state reality that the traffickers’ “cargo” — can enforce firmly, are better most illegal immigration is increasingly policy goals than mere denial. well organized — consists of desperate Third, unless a state buries itself people. Such people are willing to in isolation, a proposition that is work long hours under virtually any absurd on its face, all conditions to pay passage fees that transnational contacts (economic, range from the low thousands of political, social, and cultural) dollars for crossing a single border to have at least some migration many tens of thousands of dollars for consequences. Globalization, “full-service” contracts that include however one defines it, is thus delivery to specific destinations. also a major migration lubricant. If a state believes it can draw Smuggling networks increasingly get important benefits from the only part of their fees up front — a openness globalization function of the reality that few institutionalizes and regulates, prospective immigrants (and their working with it also on migration households) can amass the funds is smarter than working against it. needed to prepay for passage or Fourth, people fleeing otherwise pay in full upon successful circumstances they consider completion of the journey. As a intolerable will enter the illegal result, increasing numbers of migration stream and test various unauthorized immigrants mortgage receiving states’ defenses again their very lives and futures to their and again. They will do so smugglers — turning themselves into xliv Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century peons at the mercy of unscrupulous meaningless to the transnational syndicates and their clients. This criminal syndicates that run the class of modern-day indentured trafficking networks. servants weakens the receiving society’s system of wage and working What may be the governments’ conditions, its social contributions’ greatest disadvantage, however, is that, schemes, its legal and social order, as they line up against market forces, the well-being of communities in they must fight a war in which their which such immigrants settle, and, efforts are resisted from within their conceivably, its security interests — own state. These resisters include while diluting and undermining economic interests, archaic and support for all immigration. overburdened labor market and social protection rules, humanitarians who Nonetheless, as with many other feel that protecting those who flee is lucrative illegal activities, the global the highest order of responsibility (a “war” on trafficking in people is not near “calling”) of a wealthy liberal- winnable under the current rules of democratic society, and many of a engagement. One of the key reasons society’s other public and private focuses on the differences in the sector forces that are more committed fundamental organizational dynamics to openness than the politics of the of the contestants. These dynamics day may allow. favor the agile, transnational, and relatively small trafficking networks The lesson? Instead of engaging in over of the much larger, slower, and battles the government cannot win, a more bureaucratized government smarter way is to let the market find agencies based in a single state. its own equilibrium but within rules set by society and enforced jointly by Relative to the fluidity that charac- government and key stakeholders from terizes illegal syndicates, government the civil society. agencies are also hampered by three additional forces. The first is implied In no field of endeavor is the control immediately above and focuses on the effort more complicated than in fact that governments are at their worst fighting terrorism. Many opponents of when they must act across borders. immigration have latched on to the The second is that, relative to their terrorism challenge opportunistically opponents, government agencies tend in an effort to promote their anti- to be grossly underresourced (at least in immigration agendas. Yet, some of the terms of being resourced in a timely concerns they articulate are legitimate. fashion) both in terms of funds and The attacks on the United States, access to technology. Finally, govern- , and the make ments typically have to observe rules clear that some foreigners were able to and conduct that hamper their ability take advantage of these countries’ to respond “in kind” — rules that are entry management systems and, to a

Introduction xlv much lesser extent, their immigration sympathizers and terrorists are even systems proper, and launch their more of a threat to the well-being of attacks from within. Furthermore, the communities of their coethnics in there is now little doubt that the advanced democracies than they are to terrorists’ cause has active sympathizers the society targeted for a terror attack. in the immigrant and ethnic This reality must serve as a wake-up communities of which the terrorists call to these communities or they will were nominal members — and that find themselves further marginalized such sympathies have aided and and stigmatized. Similarly, the broader abetted terrorist acts. society’s self-interest dictates that inclusive policies be devised and The policy question then becomes implemented with vigor so as not to how to protect oneself and one’s marginalize the immigrants in its midst. country from the threat terrorism But the effort must not stop there. presents. This is not an easy thing. Positive steps must also be taken so Intelligence and police work will have that such immigrants are made into to be the frontlines of protection, as essential parts in solving the will much deeper international antiterrorism puzzle. cooperation than is either the case today or appears likely in the immediate future. The effort must also Controls “Plus” and the include a thorough review of the Importance of Moving developed North’s foreign political Beyond Unilateralism and economic relations with an eye towards identifying policies that fuel Regulation is a critical part of any hatred towards it. robust management system. In fact, regulation is the ultimate guarantor of A parallel track must also be a system’s integrity. On complex and fashioned, however, and followed with constantly evolving regulatory systems, equal diligence. This track must such as migration management, setting involve developing and implementing the right goals is absolutely essential. a plan for winning the hearts and In that regard, instead of seeking minds of ethnic and immigrant perfection with its predictable communities. In doing so, and by disappointments, immigration policies systematically promoting inclusion, might proceed from the premise that participation, and engagement, such uncertainty and imperfection will be a communities can be turned into key way of life. They should also be allies in the fight against terrorism, compatible with a people’s sense of rather than incubators and protectors themselves and with a country’s social, of the next wave of terrorists. economic, labor market, and demographic realities. Immigration The calculus is as clear as it is policy will nonetheless be always compelling. In many ways, terrorist partly an exercise in the inexact. xlvi Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Channeling it is thus a better and service and dedicating such fees to more realistic course than either training and similar policy denying its existence or articulating initiatives focused on the domestic policy goals that seek total control or workforce. The United States exclusion — goals that tend to create employs such a fee in one of its unrealistic public expectations and fuel entry categories for foreign-born further climates of intolerance. professionals and uses it for precisely such purposes — as do The international environment also and some other shapes what is and what is not possible. countries. Fees that might be Consequently, countries (or regional dedicated to building a modest state groupings) should invest in some social safety net for immigrants and modest experiments in smart regulation their immediate families (in health — a learning-by-doing approach — and transitional educational that are continuously evaluated. services, for instance) might also These experiments might test a variety prove to be important investments of market-based responses and towards the better acceptance and introduce ideas that go beyond integration of immigrants. simply building better mousetraps. 3. Experimenting with allowing The following is a sampling.16 employers to offer marginally lower minimum wages for entry-level, low- 1. Requiring bonds from migrants and skilled jobs to permanently resident their employers (any newcomers for a short period of time activity/behavior can be bonded at — say, six months. This might no cost to, and with little effort on, encourage firms to hire and invest the part of the public sector). in training legally permanent , Australia, and New immigrants with few or no skills, Zealand, among others, use such and to do so in the formal, rather bonds as incentives to shape than the underground, economy. certain forms of behavior in a 4. Reducing the social contributions number of immigration-related of temporary workers to induce issues, and several other countries them to invest in tax-protected are also considering them. personal savings accounts that Language training and ensuring the they would access only upon return of temporary workers are the return to their home countries. policy areas most frequently Such an approach would provide targeted by such bonding schemes. an additional incentive for such 2. Charging employers an initial fee workers to return home and gain that goes beyond recovering the access to their nest egg that they cost of the typical administrative then might invest in an economic

16 These responses can be tested individually or in pairs and groupings. The important thing is to test and evaluate novel ideas that, if successful, may allow governments to move beyond the tried-and-failed routine of simply doing more of the same.

Introduction xlvii activity there. Together with sample of asylum seekers and a bonds and with sending countries’ sample of family immigrants work efforts to help their workers permits immediately upon entry, abroad remain engaged with their then observing and measuring families and communities back labor-market attachment and home (for instance, by providing related outcomes over time. Such emigrants’ families with modest an experiment would allow the social protections during the bread making of informed judgments winner’s absence), such schemes about the implications of may offer a real test to the alternative policy decisions. This proposition that circular migration would be particularly relevant for that treats all concerned properly European countries that practice a can be successfully implemented. poorly thought-out policy whereby 5. Requiring family sponsors to absorb most newcomers are not allowed to some of the protection costs — and work — and thus instill in them a risks — associated with the culture of dependence on the state (re)unification of their families by that often spills over into the pooling insurance-like premiums newcomers’ lives after they are into special funds that can allowed to work. underwrite a number of unforeseen changes in the newcomers’ By thus systematically setting up and circumstances. Considering that assessing the performance of new several countries now hold sponsors policies, testing the durability of new financially accountable for those regulatory frameworks, and laying out whom they sponsor, and the menus of policy alternatives, increasingly widespread concern initiatives on migration management about the social insurance costs of stand a better chance of bearing the many forms of immigration, desired policy fruit than they do experimentation in this area holds now. Nor can the importance of the promise of beginning to demonstrating success in migration attenuate one of immigration’s management be emphasized enough. major “image” problems. So far, dealing with migration has 6. Mandating the establishment of taught most advanced industrial migrant-funded trust funds that democracies how to deal with failure. could provide part of the It is now time to look to the future transitional educational costs and consider how to achieve better immigrants and their families may outcomes for the greatest number of need in the early years of actors on international migration and migration. These funds might be how to measure success. independent of, alternatives to, or in addition to the concepts The more important point here, discussed in items 2 and 5 above. however, may be neither to dwell, 7. Experimenting with granting a Cassandra-like, on doom-and-gloom xlviii Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century scenarios nor to be unrealistic about to adjust their policies regularly and to how much success to expect. Rather, it invest systematically in policy research is to recognize that policy coherence is and evaluation has allowed them to a process, not an event; to understand derive substantial benefits from what policymakers are up against when immigration while controlling they talk about “reining-in” illegal its downsides. immigration and managing legal immigration more effectively; and to set Mr. Bush’s intermittent commitment realistic benchmarks against which to to work through the issues of illegal measure progress, rather than “success.” immigration and a spate of bills introduced in the US Congress in Many countries have had considerable 2005 point to the increasingly success with different types of legal, sophisticated understanding among organized immigration. Furthermore, some US governmental circles of the the past decade has shown that good relationship between larger numbers of management practices can prevent permanent and temporary legal visas immigration from becoming a runaway and the curtailment of illegal policy and political “problem” that immigration. Although perhaps less requires extreme measures to contain. ambitious, Italian and Greek bilateral For instance, US actions in the mid- efforts to stem, in the largest part 1990s in support of Mexico’s currency through regulation of work visas, showed a particularly sophisticated illegal migration from and understanding of the complex linkages other Balkan states is also thought to between economic and political have borne very substantial public- stability and unwanted migration, order and labor-market gains. Similar while pointing to the mutual agreements and less formal obligations and liabilities that understandings with and certain NAFTA-like relationships impose on other Mediterranean countries are also all the parties involved. Similarly, the thought to have been beneficial, if to a Bush administration’s negotiations lesser extent. Finally, the most recent with Mexico on sharing responsibility agreement between Spain and for managing the bilateral migration , as well as sustained but not relationship has shown promise yet fruitful negotiations between the towards developing a new bilateral EU Commission and a variety of regulatory paradigm with implications migrant-sending and transit countries, well beyond . (These are important to note and observe as negotiations started in February 2001, they unfold although it is too early to less than a month into the Bush assess their effectiveness. presidency, but stalled after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on These and similar responses, while the United States.) The willingness probably the exceptions in a sea of of the United Kingdom (in the past rhetoric and action that emphasizes decade or so), Australia, and Canada unilateral controls, do represent an

Introduction xlix important ray of hope that advanced bilateral negotiations and, much more industrial democracies can begin to gradually, regional and global regimes acknowledge publicly what their will play increasingly prominent roles. actions have hinted at (“advertised” Of course, the precise roles and the may be a more appropriate word) for pace of their evolution will be several decades now: namely, that different in various geographic and most types of migrants, including geopolitical settings. many unauthorized ones, have been essential to their prosperity. It does A good rule of thumb at the dawn of not behoove them now to forget that the 21st century may be that the closer migrants have basic human, social, a state is to, and the more influence it economic, and legal rights, and can exert over, a supranational process that these rights should not be and its institutions, the more likely it is violated or withdrawn unilaterally. to show significant deference to it on More importantly, it verges on migration management issues. irresponsibility for advanced nations According to this logic, bilateral efforts to deny themselves the benefits of are likely to be preferred over regional smartly regulated international ones, and both will be thought of as far mobility (in which their own superior (in terms of a nation state’s nationals are also major players) or to willingness to negotiate and abide ignore migration’s very positive, if by a set of rules) to global ones. 17 long-term, developmental effects for sending societies and for the world Of course, such a broad statement community as a whole. hides substantial degrees of variation within it. The advantages of bilateralism are obvious. For instance, Managing Flows Better if the United States wishes to address its Mexican immigration problem The overall thrust of this chapter (nearly three-fifths of its undocumented suggests that in terms of effectiveness population is estimated to be Mexican if not in fact, the “age of unilateralism” and an additional one-fifth enters of migration management is in through Mexico), working together sharp retreat, if not already over. with Mexico makes eminent sense. This proposition implies that, in the And the United States is doing so, if migration-flow management area, slowly. Similarly, in the early 1990s,

17 The content of the rules in question is very important in this respect. “Norm-setting” exercises may be useful first efforts at developing and nurturing the sense that a “code of conduct” on migration with which most nations can identify is indeed possible. The Global Commission on International Migration, led by Jan Karlsson, the former Swedish Minister of International Development and Migration, and World Bank former Managing Director Mamphela Ramphele, has just completed such an exercise. The Commission, which presented its report to the UN Secretary General in the fall of 2005, had an opportunity to be the catalyst for starting a multilateral conversation on migration in subsequent years. The rather cool reaction to the report by Mr. Annan, and the disinterest in it by most advanced immigrant receiving governments, point to the political ground that must be covered before the conversation that the Commission had hoped to initiate can be engaged. l Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Germany created a special visa The EU fulfills most — but by no relationship with as a first step means all — of the requirements that towards managing its migration make bilateral conversations the relationship from and through that instrument of choice for migration-flow country better and, some will argue, as management. For the Union to move a down payment to Poland’s entry into closer to meeting more of these the EU in May 2004. (Of course, requirements, and especially that of Germany’s strategic policy aims enforcing compliance, it will have to had even stronger geopolitical and “communitarize” migration well beyond economic rationales, as do those where it is today or is envisioned under of the United States vis à vis both the proposed EU Constitution. Put Mexico and Canada.) Finally, and as differently, the greater the reliance on noted, ’s and Greece’s migration intergovernmental mechanisms for the “deals” with Albania, or Spain’s purposes of managing migration flows, with Morocco, fit under similar the less likely it is that meaningful18 explanatory frameworks. agreements with countries of unauthorized migrant origin and To recap, the advantages of bilateral transit can be negotiated and observed. negotiations lie principally in the Specifically, unless the Commission is ability to agree on and implement given authority to negotiate migration reciprocal obligations whose accords with third countries that observance can be measured (and for include work visas, and unless it and/or which adjustments can be made the Member States are willing to accordingly) and enforced. Regional commit to honor and enforce the terms processes may offer the prospect of of such agreements, Brussels may be in even greater opportunities for only a slightly more advantageous cooperation, but adjustments will be, position relative to the Babel of by definition, more difficult to make. regional dialogues in negotiating true Furthermore, it is infinitely more migration management agreements. complicated to act efficiently and effectively in regional settings when One may be tempted to argue that this noncompliance occurs. And in any is too severe a judgment, particularly event, at this time at least, all but one given the EU’s common visa regime regional process — that of the EU — and the Commission’s ability to are little more than “talk-shop” negotiate these and similar matters on exercises without the institutional behalf of the Member States. The mechanisms to reach binding judgment becomes less harsh, however, agreements and, more importantly, and more accurate, if the analytical the power levers to enforce observations regarding the nature of compliance in meaningful ways. international migration contained

18 The term is used here to underline the importance of engaging in negotiations where both parties give up something of value in order to achieve a result of higher significance for each.

Introduction li herein are endorsed. If they are, it critical roles. As noted earlier, follows that more fruitful negotiations “code of conduct” exercises may on migration flows require a broader indeed develop important dos and approach. This approach must include don’ts on international migration. putting work visas of various kinds on And these codes might include the negotiating table. Simultaneously, compelling ideas on how to more the ability to strengthen compliance successfully integrate immigrants and with the terms of any resulting build more cohesive multicultural agreement through the withholding of societies in the 21st century. other “public” goods (such as certain forms of development aid) must also By its very nature, however, be enhanced. integration/cohesion will always be first and foremost a local affair. This Notwithstanding a spate of activism is because it is at the local level that in the last months of 2005, the critical interactions between Commission does not have these newcomers and the larger community authorities now. Furthermore, a last- occur and where successes and failures minute German reservation on the — and hence the possibility of policy proposed (but now moribund?) EU innovation and gains — happen most Constitution would deny the naturally. Localities, in other words, Commission any authority with are the terrain where governmental regard to such visas. Finally, the decisions and nondecisions with sensitivities of several Member States regard to all aspects of international (especially with regard to tying migration play themselves out. To be foreign and development aid to a sure, national governments and, in party’s obligations under a migration the case of federal and confederal agreement) withhold from the states, state and provincial ones will Commission the basic governance typically provide both the resources power of safeguarding the integrity of and the enabling legal environments such agreements by enforcing full within which experiments will be compliance with their terms. possible, and where performance will be measured. Immigrant Integration and Social Cohesion This reality does not devalue If flow-management issues become the integration role of EU-like more complicated the further one regional levels of governance. moves from bilateral negotiations, the These roles are essential and are integration issue is in many ways more likely to grow in importance. Their complex yet. Here, subnational and effectiveness, however, will fluctuate local levels of government, as well as with the maturity and robustness of the “soft” but crucial power of the the supranational mechanism and the nongovernmental (civil society) thoughtfulness and quality of its sector, must and do play the most intervention. lii Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Both conditions, in turn, will be security (terrorism) and the socio- influenced greatly by four cultural reaction to migration. interrelated factors. First, the Both of these factors have been sensitivity supranational institutions discussed already. display towards the issue, especially with regard to what is expected both For the next 15 years, the supply — of Member State publics and of the so-called migration pipeline — newcomers. Second, the authority will remain robust. There is nothing these institutions have to initiate within this rather short horizon that policy interventions in this area and will change dramatically for the better the courage they display by speaking to affect the major developing-country clearly when Member States fail suppliers of immigrants in ways that to make progress on integration will lead to a pronounced drop in the (this refers to the eternal issues of interest to emigrate. If anything, a competence and deference to Member number of still relatively small State sensitivities). Third, how deeply migration “players” are likely to grow civil society will be engaged and in importance, while China and the intervene at the supranational level Indian Subcontinent could well and the quality of its intervention. become massive players in the Fourth, the resources that will be international migration system with available to this level of governance relatively little notice. so that it might seed new ideas and initiatives, as well as fund “corrective” While the supply is thus expected to region-wide policies. (Most of these remain near infinite, the demand for policies will naturally fall in the social immigrants will also grow substantially, affairs and employment policy areas.) though arithmetically. Three factors will account for the lion’s share of that growth. First, demography, Looking Ahead to 2020 especially the one-two punch of the birth dearth and the growth in the Projecting how international migration population share of the old and the is likely to evolve in the next 15 years very old in the North and China — is both easier and more difficult than it with these groups’ health, pensions may appear at first. It is easier because and personal services’ needs topping we understand the phenomenon’s the list of priorities (introduced in this behavior well enough now, both from chapter’s next section and analyzed what might be called the supply side extensively by Lutz and Scherbov in but, increasingly, also from the demand this volume). Second, increases in side. We now also understand better skill and more general labor shortages the triggers, drivers, and facilitators of (including skill and geographic migration. It is more difficult because demand and supply mismatches) that of two factors whose effect is akin to will be fueled in large part by the that of wild cards in a game of chance: birth dearth. Third, the sheer

Introduction liii momentum of the process itself, Otherwise, migration’s reach during whereby pro-immigration coalitions the next 15 years will expand and go form in support of immigration while beyond the advanced industrial formulaic, legal, and “rights-based” West — to Japan and the “Asian openings to migration — such as Tigers” — as well as to emerging family (re)unification, refugee market societies everywhere. Initially, resettlement, and asylum grants — the government-led or government- continue to build ever stronger assisted part of this expansion will immigration streams. most likely take the form of regulated temporary entry by needed high- and Of course, terrorist attacks may yet low-skilled foreign workers. But it will play a bigger role than they have to not stop there. “Front-gate” date on reshaping the environment provisions for converting valued in which international migration has “temporary” legal immigrants into thrived in recent decades. In that permanent ones will also proliferate, regard, terrorism and the “war” turning temporary admission streams against it have introduced a degree of into transition and filtration systems uncertainty into the calculus that for selecting permanent immigrants. underlies this chapter. That In addition, opportunities for uncertainty raises the possibility, if admitting better-skilled foreigners not yet the likelihood, of extreme outright as permanent immigrants state reactions to most migration. will also increase, particularly when If, however, we are on the brink of a the world economy rebounds and new era of nihilistic conflict rooted in global competition for talented resurgent nationalism (centered not foreigners intensifies. only in the developing world), politically expressed religious At the same time, pressure from fundamentalism, and various other unauthorized migration is also likely nearly forgotten “isms,” and if the to remain robust, and managing it will casualties on both sides grow at rates continue to be a major preoccupation commensurate with the capabilities of of governments. Changing the status our era’s instruments of destruction, quo, however, will require moving the scenario outlined herein may beyond the “tried and failed” indeed be nullified. And if such a paradigms of simply applying always conflict and chaos scenario comes to greater resources to border and pass, the only reasonable projection interior controls. It will also require is that national security will interventions that are as nimble and trump all other policy priorities multifaceted as the phenomenon itself, with regard to migration for an as well as unaccustomed discipline, indeterminate period — and that unusual degrees of coordination across most forms of international migration policy competencies, and new models to the developed world will be cut of cooperation between countries of dramatically. origin and destination. liv Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Demographics, Labor Markets fewer workers will have to support and Migration to 2020 ever larger numbers of retirees — a Low rates of native-population ratio known as the old-age support growth across the advanced industrial (or dependency) ratio. world have meant migration is already a large demographic force The evidence is nothing less than there. For instance, between 1985 compelling. By the year 2020, the and 1990, international migrants Organization for Economic accounted for about one-quarter of Cooperation and Development the developed world’s population (OECD) estimates that most of its growth; that figure grew to about 45 Member States will have old-age percent during the 1990-1995 period support ratios that range from a low — a function of both increased of about 30 percent for some of the immigration and relentlessly low traditional countries of immigration fertility — and likely stands at about to about 42 percent for Japan. two-thirds of growth today. Of (More recent reports from the course, averages typically hide European Commission, as well as a enormous regional, subregional, and 2000 and a 2003 report by the UN’s national variations. For instance, Population Division, validate these international migration now findings completely.) This means probably accounts for all of the EU’s that for states with tax-supported, overall . But what pay-as-you-go retirement systems, will the future bring? the taxes of between 3.3 and 2.4 workers, respectively, will have to The demographic facts are not in support a retired person’s costs to the dispute. Most of the advanced public purse. For the relatively few industrial world has failed to countries where tax-financed reproduce itself for a generation now. pensions are supplemented by private As the post-World War II baby pensions, mandatory occupational boomers (there was a baby-boom echo retirement schemes, and/or so-called in the late 1960s and early 1970s) (and much rarer) capitalized schemes pass from the economic scene over (where each population cohort saves the next decade or so, most Western for its own retirement), the picture democracies will experience sub- is slightly improved because it stantial indigenous working-age balances risks better. However, and population gaps. It is the bulge in the as the OECD pointed out in 2001, retirement age population, however, although a fully capitalized that is of special interest to this system may be less vulnerable to analysis. The number of retirees will demographic forces, it is more reach absolute and relative sizes vulnerable to risks associated with unlike anything we have witnessed. investment rates of return. The With people living much longer than recent performance of stock markets ever before, the taxes of fewer and makes that point extremely relevant.

Introduction lv The data become more troubling when of most states’ actual immigration total support ratios are examined, that intakes for the 1985-1995 period. is, the ratio of the number of persons Such intakes are clearly neither in the workforce relative to the sum of socially nor politically viable. More to those who are already retired and those the point, perhaps, the analytical who are too young to be working. Nor evidence suggests that the permanent does the bad news for the next two immigration “solution” is complicated decades stop here. Most estimation in another key respect: unless a state models assume that young people enter admits primarily very young the workforce in their mid-teenage immigrants, it would need always years and that retirement occurs at age larger foreign-born populations to 65. Both of these conventions are at maintain reasonable old-age support gross variance with actual behavior in ratios. An alternative “immigration” advanced industrial countries and bias option, admitting larger numbers of the estimates systematically in favor of temporary workers, is thus likely to greater optimism — and complacency. become more popular for many The gravity of the situation increases advanced industrial societies and gain further when considering that, unlike in significance relative to permanent long-term projections about fertility, immigration. Introducing age biases which come closer to educated guesses in permanent-immigration formulas in their “out” years, the aging numbers — as do some of the countries that are pretty well known for the next two have point selection systems — may decades. More to the point, even if also become more common. fertility were to increase dramatically and immediately, it would have little Responding to the Challenge of effect on old-age support ratios during the Graying of the Advanced the next two decades because of the Industrial World time it takes most young persons in The aging of the baby boomers and the advanced world to enter the labor higher life expectancies are leading to force full-time. an unprecedented growth in the developed world’s elderly populations. How, then, does migration fit into all But this is only half the “problem.” At this? No reasonable analyst believes the same time, improved birth control that immigration can somehow technologies and numerous powerful “solve” the demographic policy and, by now, deeply embedded social, conundrum. One example of the cultural, and economic forces immigration numbers that might be seemingly conspire to keep the required to maintain reasonable old- number of its youth at historically low age support ratios might suffice to levels. Together, these twin realities make this point. Maintaining 2010- will cause immense economic, social, level old-age support ratios in 2020 and political dilemmas that will through immigration would require gradually come to dominate the West’s intakes that are several times the size political and policy agendas. lvi Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century While the timing and severity of the an explosion in the size of that age challenge will vary among developed cohort. Even with total fertility rates states, the trend is unmistakable and, (TFR, that is, the number of live for the next 20 years, the outcome births per woman during her lifetime) practically predetermined. The increasing modestly, the first two powerful forces that drive it include policy dilemmas above will only often stunning improvements in become more pronounced. (The medical science, almost limitless population replacement level is a TFR access to state-supported or subsidized of about 2.1.) Nor is the TFR for the medical care, affluence (which advanced world likely to increase improves access to more advanced substantially, especially considering medical services and depresses that the total fertility for Europe’s fertility), and ever higher rates of southern and eastern flanks will female participation in the labor force. continue to decline. And although some project Europe’s TFR to increase These realities pose three policy from the present 1.4 to about 1.55, this challenges of the first order; they also is an unlikely feat given that the suggest three key areas for policy continent’s demographic momentum intervention. The first regards the continues to point downward. timing of retirement and targets initially the slowing down and gradually the The challenges this scenario poses are reversal of the growing imbalance as follows. The greatest may be between the time a demographic securing adequate living standards for cohort spends in the labor market pensioners without putting crushing relative to the time it spends in tax burdens on workers — a challenge retirement. The second addresses the that will worsen every decade. In quality of retirement and targets the 1998, the OECD projected that by sustaining of retirement income and 2020, its members would experience health maintenance systems while substantial but wide-ranging increases tending to the needs and (most of the) for pension expenditures as a expectations of the elderly and percentage of GDP — from 2.9 similarly situated populations (the percent for Australia to more than 12 infirm, the disabled, the needy, etc.). percent for Germany and Japan. More The third challenge focuses on the mix significantly, estimates of the of retirement-income forms and on developed world’s size of unfunded how to expand such a mix — an area pension liabilities stand at tens of being explored systematically by the trillions of dollars while paying for OECD but one that is well beyond the elderly medical care adds an equally scope of this chapter. immense amount to the total. Both expenditures will increase at first By 2020, with longer life expectancies geometrically and later exponentially and the post-World War II baby as the aged cohort bulges and medical boomers in their 70s, one will witness consumption patterns explode. (Those

Introduction lvii over 65 are estimated to consume This will not be the only set of worker several times as much medical care as shortages. More workers will also be the rest of the population.) needed to help keep retirement and public health systems afloat through These are not the only implications. their taxes, and, in many cases, to keep The median age of the population will both production and consumption also rise while the relative size of the systems humming. native-born population in most of the developed world will decline. Changes This analysis suggests that societies in the ethnic composition and age that address these demographically distribution of European populations, centered challenges sooner and more as well as actual population declines definitively will enhance their (even with reasonable amounts of prospects for economic stability and immigration), will give rise to growth. Those that do not can expect additional policy challenges ranging greater economic instability and, from the threat of deflationary pricing under certain extreme scenarios, (as goods chase fewer domestic economic decline. Both scenarios also consumers and competition for foreign imagine a spillover into social customers intensifies) to numerous instability; accordingly, responses labor-market distortions. The latter must factor in the requirement of includes increasingly severe labor social cohesion. shortages that will go beyond the mismatches between needed and Among the most critical issues available skills that define many labor governments will have to address markets today. At a minimum, these effectively is the effect of the anomalies will redefine the world of widespread phenomenon of two-earner work in most advanced industrial households on fertility behavior societies — although not during this (including the fertility-reducing but chapter’s time frame. increasingly popular and necessary delays in childbearing). But the policy The labor market implications of this quest cannot stop there. Child- and demographic conundrum will be felt elder-care issues (especially increasing most directly in economic sectors of demands for elder care), and the particular interest to the aged. Among public policy issues associated with the most vulnerable sectors are those intergenerational responsibilities both in which, while demand is already with regard to elder care and income- strong and will continue to grow transfer programs, must also be robustly, the nature, social standing, addressed. In short, what may be and wage structure of the jobs make required may be nothing short of a them unappealing to native workers. new social governance paradigm. These jobs include caregiving to the elderly and tending to the personal Is such a paradigmatic shift likely? One services needs of affluent first-worlders. way to begin to address this question is lviii Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century by breaking the current paradigm into are already moving in this its major components and assessing direction). each part’s amenability (or resistance) Reducing retirement benefits. to change. If one looks at pensions and Experimenting with greater health benefits, for instance, it is clear efficiencies in state-supported, the public purse cannot maintain its health-care delivery systems current responsibilities over the long (including the introduction of term, let alone enhance coverage, competition from private sector under present tax and productivity care providers in publicly funded models. However, increasing tax health systems). burdens on individuals, small Encouraging the development businesses, or corporations will be of additional forms of retirement resisted strongly. European taxpayers systems (“pay-as-you-go” systems already feel over-taxed, and politicians will become unsustainable in the must tread softly if they are interested absence of a set of coordinated in being reelected. Similarly, business policies that include more owners cannot be realistically immigration and extraordinary expected to accept higher taxes when and sustained growth in the twin forces of globalization and productivity). trade liberalization demand they keep Engaging in a new and vastly their costs down and their productivity more severe round of fundamental up to remain competitive — and economic restructuring — this hence in business. one mandated by the political realities of the new demographics. These difficulties, however, should not be understood as a judgment that the Most states are already experimenting developed world has no ammunition with several of these approaches, and with which to combat them. It does. a list of “best practices” is beginning However, every policy response entails to emerge. However, the political significant pain for important societal push-back for the most obvious segments — suggesting that govern- routes is already strong and will ments will likely attempt first to intensify as the service cuts that most prolong the status quo and postpone initiatives also include begin to be more aggressive initiatives. This tactic felt by ever larger population cohorts. will prove both inadequate and harmful It is the judgment of this chapter that in the longer run. only three long-term solutions are truly salient: (a) gradual changes in Among the stop-gap measures that retirement age, (b) significant and are certain to be relied upon will be long-term changes in fertility, and the following: (c) far larger immigration. Mandating longer work lives (Japan, the United States, The first will pit the government and several other countries against retirees and those nearing

Introduction lix retirement, two groups that hold a or if theyattempt to address them disproportionate share of a country’s without the required wisdom. wealth and political power. The government may not be able to win that battle except at the margins — Conclusion and even that may take much longer than the crisis can allow. Categories of social analysis do not develop sui generis; they are The second one, changes in fertility, developed by analysts trying to implies a reversal in long-term trends get a handle on “a problem.” Once and will require nothing less than a established, however, such categories revolution in prevailing social norms are very difficult to change. and economic logic. Nonetheless, The complex, shifting terrain of some governments (such as Japan international migration; the growing and France) already offer enormous complexity of its causes, processes, incentives for having more children, and consequences; and the radically and more governments are expected new global context in which it takes to follow that route. place all demand that we review constantly both the usefulness of The final one, far larger immigration our conceptual and analytical tools intakes, will require even sharper and the resulting administrative attitudinal changes to overcome categories and management the age-old resistance to large-scale structures in this area. immigration and the social and cultural changes it implies. Can Even the most cursory review of the societies that appear to value advanced industrial world’s dominant tradition and continuity virtually administrative-management models above all else, as Europeans and and accompanying data and policies ancient Asian societies do, make the reveals that the current international leap that larger immigration levels migration system is organized around require? Will traditional immigration ideal constructs that are both dated countries start preparing the political and disturbingly binary. Regrettably, ground for the larger temporary much of the analytical literature immigration intakes they will need in reinforces these tendencies. For the future — as they must also do? instance, states are designated as either Will both types of societies be able to sending or receiving; people who move manage the social and political are classified as either permanent reactions this solution will generate? settlers or temporary residents; and These are difficult adjustments reasons for flight are catalogued either indeed. Yet these societies cannot as the improvement of one’s economic remain meaningful international condition or protection from various players if they fail to address the forms of disaster and persecution. demographic issues outlined here Such gross dichotomies and the lx Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century administrative structures and data A more insightful set of policies systems that have been built around would take into account the variety them shed little light on the reality of experiences across advanced of today’s migration patterns. Today, industrial societies and their people move for a variety of reasons different levels of success while simultaneously. Furthermore, appreciating that “success” is most states both send and receive overwhelmingly a function of effort, substantial numbers of migrants resources, commitment, flexibility, and may also act as areas of migrant and adaptability in responses, as well transit. Increasing proportions of as consonance with a state’s culture “permanent” immigrants leave or and history. This is true both for the move beyond their adopted country control of illegal flows and for the of residence. And temporary residents, broader management of legal flows. such as students and professionals, Greater success in solving the often settle in their host countries. immigration puzzle also requires confidence, sure-footedness, Failing to understand these leadership, and vision in the public behaviors better and adapt flow- arena. Although surely precious management models and data commodities, they are well within systems accordingly adds to the the realm of realistic possibility in overall migration management the advanced democratic world. challenges that have been the focus of this chapter. Clearly, since states There is clear agreement that reform and individuals participate all along the migration-management simultaneously in multiple “systems” complex is long overdue. What is far of movement, managing what less clear is whether such reform will amounts to complex transnational be the product of a judicious effort to processes through archaic and address all of a nation’s interests, as unresponsive policies will be of well as balance those interests with diminishing value in the years ahead. international obligations, or be little more than the typical knee-jerk yank Preparing better for the future is on the control levers. essential given the significant migration that economic, political, human rights, and demographic needs and differentials imply. The fact that migration is an increasingly essential This chapter is partly based on a much briefer ingredient to the developed North’s and narrower text that appeared under the economic success, means that policies heading “Managing Rapid and Deep Change in and administrative structures designed the New Era of Migration,” In The Politics of within such naïve frameworks are Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict destined to fall short of even relative and Change, edited by Sarah Spencer, 39-58. long-term success. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.

Introduction lxi Suggested Readings International Organization for Migration. World Migration 2003: Managing Migration: Challenges Aleinikoff, A. and D. Klusmeyer. Citizenship and Responses for People on the Move. Policies for an Age of Migration. Washington, Vol. 2 – IOM World Migration Series. DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Geneva: International Organization for Peace, 2002. Migration, 2003.

Athens Migration Policy Initiative. Proceedings, Migration Information Source. Special Issue: July 2002 – May 2003. Washington, DC: Integration and Immigrants. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2003. Migration Policy Institute, October 2003, http://www.migrationinformation.org/special_in Bilsborrow, R. E., G. Hugo, A. S. Oberai, and H. tegration.cfm. Zlotnik. International Migration Statistics: Guidelines for Improving Data Collection Systems. Migration Information Source. Special Issue: US- Geneva: International Labor Office, 1997. Mexico Migration. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, March 2004, Chishti, M., D. Meissner, D. Papademetriou, J. http://www.migrationinformation.org/special_m Peterzell, M. Wishnie, and S. Yale-Loehr. exico.cfm. America’s Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties, and National Unity After Niessen, J. and Y. Schibel. EU and US Approaches September 11. Washington, DC: Migration to the Management of Immigration: Comparative Policy Institute, 2003. Perspectives. Brussels: Migration Policy Group, 2003. Cohen, R., ed. The Cambridge Survey of World Migration. Cambridge: Cambridge University OECD Continuous Reporting System on Press, 1995. Migration (SOPEMI). Trends in International Migration. Paris: Organisation for Economic Commission of the European Communities. Cooperation and Development. Annual. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Papademetriou, D. “Alles eine Frage der European Economic and Social Committee Ausgewogenheit: Zur Verbesserung der and the Committee of the Regions on Immigration, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit durch eine besonnene Integration, and Employment. Brussels, Steuerung der Zuwanderung – eine grundsät- June 2003. zliche Betrachtung aus amerikansicher Perspektive.” In Arbeitsmarktsteuerung der European Commission. Communication on Zuwanderung – neuere deutsche Ansätze und Immigration, Integration, and Employment. COM internationale Erfahrungen, Ullrich Heilemann (2003) 336 final, 2003. and Hans Dietrich von Loeffelholz, Eds. Essen: Rheinisch – Westfälisches Institut für European Commission. An EU Approach to Wirtschaftsforschung, 2003. Managing Economic Migration. COM (2004) 811 final, 2004. Papademetriou, D. “The Global Struggle with Illegal Migration: No End in Sight.” Migration European Commission. Confronting Demographic Information Source. Washington, DC: Change: A New Solidarity Between the Migration Policy Institute, September 1, 2005, Generations. COM (2005) 94 final, 2005. http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/di splay.cfm?ID=336. Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). Migration in an Interconnected World: Papademetriou, D. “International Migration and New Directions for Action. Report of the Global US Security Interests: An Overview and Commission on International Migration, Assessment.” Prepared for the US National October 2005. Intelligence Council, 1999.

lxii Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Papademetriou, D. “Migration Trends in Russia Pedersen, P., M. Pytlikova, and N. Smith. and the CIS and their Potential Consequences “Selection or Network Effects? Migration for Europe (Migrationstendenzen in Russland Flows into 27 OECD Countries, 1990-2000.” und den GUS – Staaten und ihre potenziellen Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Folgen fuer Europa).” in Illegal Migration Discussion Paper No. 1104. Bonn: IZA, 2004. (Illegale Migration). Bonn: Varus Verlag, 2000. Ratha, D. “Workers’ Remittances: An Important Papademetriou, D. “Reflections on Restoring and Stable Source of External Development Integrity to the United States Immigration Finance.” In Global Development Finance 2003. System: A Personal Vision.” Insight V. Washington, DC.: World Bank, 2003. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, September 2005. Ray, B. “Practices to Promote the Integration of Migrants into Labour Markets.” Report Papademetriou, D. “’The Regularization’ Option in prepared for the European Commission (DG Managing Illegal Migration More Effectively: Employment and Social Affairs), March 2004. A Comparative Perspective.” Policy Brief IV. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, Smith, J. and B. Edmonston, eds. The New September 2005. Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. Washington, DC: Papademetriou, D., ed. Managing Migration: National Academy Press, 1997. A Policy Agenda for Economic Progress and Social Cohesion. Migration Policy Institute, Spencer, S., ed. The Politics of Migration: Managing forthcoming. Opportunity, Conflict and Change. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Papademetriou, D., J. Audley, S. Polaski, and S. Vaughan. NAFTA’s Promise and Reality: Lessons Tribalat, M., J. P. Garson, Y. Moulier-Boutang, and from Mexico for the Hemisphere. Washington, Roxane Silberman. Cent Ans D’Immigration, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Ètrangers d’Hier Français d’Aujourd’Hui. Paris: Peace, 2004. Presses Universitaires de France, Institut National d’Etudes Dèmographiques, 1991. Papademetriou, D. and K. Hamilton. “La inmigración entre México y Estados Unidos: lo United Nations Department of Economic and que está en juego.” Economia Exterior 28 Social Affairs, Population Division. World (Spring 2004): 59-66. Population Ageing 1950-2050. New York: United Nations, 2002. Papademetriou, D. and K. O’Neil. “Efficient Practices for the Selection of Economic United Nations Department of Economic and Migrants.” Report prepared for the European Social Affairs, Population Division. World Commission (DG Employment and Social Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision, Affairs), May 2004. Highlights. New York: United Nations, 2001.

Papademetriou, D. and K. O’Neil. “Reflections on United Nations Department of Economic and Immigration and the Welfare Social Affairs, Population Division. World State.”Washington, DC: Migration Policy Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision Institute, 2004. Population Database. United Nations, 2003. http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=1. Papademetriou, D. and S. Yale-Loehr. Balancing Interests: Rethinking the U.S. Selection of Skilled US-Mexico Migration Panel. Mexico-US Migration: Immigrants. Washington, DC: Carnegie A Shared Responsibility. Convened by the Endowment for International Peace, 1996. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001.

Introduction lxiii lxiv Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century The Challenge of Integration in Europe

Sarah Spencer ntegration is now central to the spreading the politics of exclusion I European Union’s agenda. It is where communities need trust, cooper- recognized that migration — at ation, and mutual respect. Tensions are different levels and in differing forms compounded by the involvement of a — is here to stay and that the successful small minority of migrants in political integration of immigrants cannot be violence and European leaders fear a taken for granted. growing radicalization of migrant youth. Concern focuses most acutely, Migration can bring significant benefits. though not exclusively, on Muslims. For generations, migrants from across The alleged perpetrators of some the world have settled and prospered high-profile acts of terrorism, including in Europe, making a significant the September 11 attacks in 2001, the economic and cultural contribution. Madrid bombings of March 2004, and Migration contributes to the prosperity the killing of film director Theo Van of European societies and to that of Gogh in the Netherlands in November migrants themselves. 2004, were Muslims.1 There is a per- ception that certain beliefs associated Migration, however, also brings chal- with Islam are not compatible with lenges. Integration requires investment. “Western values.” There are many migrants who overcome the barriers to integration without The fear of radicalization dominates assistance. Some, like Indians in the public and political debate on this United Kingdom (UK), perform better issue. The possible accession to the than other residents in education and in EU of a predominantly Muslim country, the labor market. Nevertheless, on each Turkey, has raised the political stakes. pathway to inclusion, economic and While fear of radicalization sets a social, migrants face barriers. And by narrow and negative context for the whichever indices we choose to measure debate, overshadowing the parallel it — language acquisition, education agenda on economic inclusion, it has outcomes, labor market performance, extended the political space for social segregation, health, living condi- policy development across a broader tions, civic participation — there is integration canvas. cause for concern across the European Union (EU) states. The European Union recognized the imperative to change gears on this Moreover, the presence of migrants, agenda at the conclusion of the Greek the most visible evidence of globaliza- EU presidency in Thessaloniki in tion and the rapid social change it June 2003. The foundations of a engenders, has also become the focus new approach had been set out in a of tension in some local communities European Commission Communication and of mobilization by the far right, on Immigration, Integration, and

1 This text of this chapter was completed in April of 2005.

2 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Employment earlier that month. way process, requiring adaptation by Primary responsibility for action on the migrant but also by the institutions integration would remain at the and public of the host country, and national and local level. Yet the that to be successful it must take place Dutch Presidency, in the winter of in four spheres of life: economic, 2004, was able to secure agreement on social, cultural, and political. Common Basic Principles on integra- tion across the 25 Member States, Differing views on the goals of integra- and Justice, Freedom, and Security tion and appropriate strategies to Commissioner Franco Frattini stated achieve it, coupled with Member his intention to develop a broader States’ insistence that decisions should, European policy framework. The ques- wherever possible, be taken at the tion is what form the EU’s developing national level, not in Brussels, have in strategy should take, and how assertive the past inhibited the EU using the the Commission can afford to be in unique levers at its disposal to make an setting the direction for Member States effective contribution. The fact that to follow. integration is necessarily a cross-cutting policy agenda, in particular engaging Many Member States, particularly the the Commission directorates on Justice, original EU 15, have already shifted Freedom, and Security and on their domestic attention to the inte- Employment and Social Affairs (with gration agenda. The focus and commensurate committees in the approach each has taken differs, European Parliament) has not been reflecting contrasting views on the conducive to progress. The imperative meaning and objectives of integration to address integration issues more effec- and the strategies that should be tively could now provide the political adopted to achieve it. In some states in momentum to challenge those barriers. (e.g., , the Netherlands) there has been an The aim of this chapter is, first, to iden- increasing emphasis on programs of tify the barriers to integration and the language instruction and social orien- target groups of any integration strategy. tation for new migrants, often with an It considers the responsibility of the element of compulsion, in targeted state, migrants, and civil society in the programs. Others (e.g., Spain, ) integration process before reviewing have looked to mainstream services recent EU developments and setting out and/or civil society to provide support, a forward policy agenda. It looks first, or focused less on migrants’ needs than however, at the nature of the challenge. on the barriers they face, including dis- crimination (e.g., the UK). The Challenge There is, however, some convergence in approach. In particular, there is Net migration into Europe is increasing, recognition that integration is a two- and is now the largest component of

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 3 population change. Internal mobility entry itself may be illegal. Migrants’ within the EU was also enhanced by immigration status, crucially, will enlargement in May 2004, including determine their right of access to work, mobility to work in those states (UK, public services, and welfare benefits. Ireland, and Sweden) that did not impose a transition period. Some Migrants’ legal status also determines, European states have long experience in part, whether they remain in the EU with immigration but others, like permanently or reside for only a few Ireland and Spain, have become months or years. If free to travel, they countries of immigration only within may retain strong transnational links the last ten years. Eastern European with their country of origin and remit states in particular have little experi- some of their earnings to dependants ence with the social and economic who remain there. Nevertheless, they impact of immigration and the need may not return but move on to another for strategies to manage it effectively. part of Europe or elsewhere. Whereas Member States once made the mistake Migrants now come to EU Member of assuming that all migrants would States from a far wider range of coun- eventually leave, it would now be tries, and bring a greater diversity of equally mistaken to assume that all will languages and cultures than in the stay. Yet those who reside temporarily past. School children in London speak need a level of integration, both eco- more than 200 different first languages; nomically and socially. An integration in a Swedish city, Malmo, Mohammed strategy needs to accommodate these is now the most popular name for a different migration trajectories. newborn son. Fourteen million third-country Migrants also bear differing immigration nationals lived in the EU 15 in 2001: statuses. They may enter as business or less than 4 percent of the population. labor migrants, on short- or long-term But their concentration in particular permits. Alternatively, they may come regions and cities, their vulnerability to as asylum seekers and subsequently exclusion even after they and the sec- secure, or fail to secure, refugee status. ond generation have become nationals, They may enter as family members, as and the fact that EU nationals them- students, or within a vast array of cate- selves can face barriers to integration, gories from minister of religion to au make the issue more significant than pair. The significance of each of these that statistic would suggest. legal categories differs across Member States: In one state family reunification While many are successful in the labor may be the largest category, in another market and enjoy positive relations entry for work. Migrants’ status may, with other residents, there is substantial alternatively, be irregular. They may evidence of disadvantage and exclusion. arrive legally but work without permis- In education, there is disproportionate sion or overstay their visa, or their under-achievement at school, in which

4 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century poor language skills are one factor, as necessary for economic integration. they are in the disproportionate unem- Alternatively, migrants can become ployment and underemployment in “acculturated” while no other forms of the labor market. The employment integration take place. rate for non-EU nationals in the EU 15, at 52.7 percent, is much lower This situation translates into economic than that of 64.4 percent for EU and political pressures for more effec- nationals (2001). The gap is particularly tive integration strategies. Europe significant for women. In housing, needs an educated, trained workforce migrants experience homelessness, to fill skill shortages in an evolving excessive segregation in poor neigh- labor market. Member States cannot borhoods, and unacceptable housing afford to neglect the talents of conditions. Evidence suggests some migrants already in the workforce and, migrants’ health declines after arrival; if states are to compete for the “brightest and in local communities they can and the best,” potential migrants must face hostility and victimization by be confident that they will not face other residents. discrimination and exclusion. Despite high levels of unemployment in parts Patterns of disadvantage and exclusion of Europe, there are also shortages of are complex: There are substantial dif- workers for some low-wage jobs for ferences in levels of economic, social, which it is evident that migrants will and cultural integration between and come with or without permission. within migrant communities. Political leaders cannot allow their Integration, as Portes and Zhou among presence to lead to resentment among others have shown, can be “segment- long-term residents unable to find ed.” Migrants, and the second genera- work. Most salient are the needs to tion, can become integrated not into avoid the eruption of community ten- the middle class but into an under- sions into violence or increased support class, sharing its economic prospects for far right parties, and the EU-wide and modes of behavior. Class and geo- need to re-engage migrants whose graphic location can thus be more sig- alienation may lead to their support nificant as determinants of life chances for religious and political extremism. than ethnicity or length of residence. Moreover, migrants and the second generation can be well integrated on Integration: the Goal one index (e.g., high rates of inter- marriage) but not on others (e.g., low All Member States would now rates of employment). Others can acknowledge that integration is a achieve success in the labor market two-way process: that there is a need while remaining culturally distinct, to address the barriers that migrants maintaining the values of and solidarity face as well as adaptation by migrants within their ethnic group, demonstrat- themselves. This approach reflects ing that cultural assimilation is not academic analysis that has established

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 5 that the outcome of the integration integration and cultural assimilation. process depends on the interaction To avoid segmented integration, how- between factors in the host society ever, the strategy needs to be multi- and the characteristics of migrants. tiered to achieve: Yet states have differed markedly in Integration into the labor market the emphasis they have placed on the — and at a level matching the two of this process. Germany, for migrants’ qualifications and expe- instance, has traditionally focused on rience; increasing the employability of migrant Social inclusion within the main- workers by ensuring that they have the stream institutions and activities skills needed to get a job and prosper. that meet individual and societal In the UK, in contrast, while settled needs — education, health and migrants have had access to mainstream social care, housing; employability programs, the emphasis Inclusion in civic life — active has been on addressing the race discrim- participation in the institutions ination barriers faced by ethnic minority and obligations of civic society, immigrants and subsequent generations particularly for those remaining in in employment, housing, and services. the long term; and Despite continuing differences in “Bridging capital,” trust and good approach across the EU, there is never- relations with neighbors and the theless some evidence of convergence wider community. on which an EU strategy can build. Is the concept of “inclusion” actually It is also significant that integration is more helpful than that of integration? seen as a process, not an end state. Many resist “integration” because of Although states are increasingly iden- associations not with a two-way tifying indices to measure progress on process of mutual adaptation, but with integration — e.g., migrant employment assimilation. Inclusion, in contrast, rates — with the implication that emphasizes the responsibility of society integration is achieved when there is to open up to the excluded, and is the parity with long-term residents, this is goal identified for long-term residents. a reversible process. In an economic The EU has national action plans on downturn, former migrants are more social inclusion for the population as a likely to be unemployed. And there is whole — why not use the same term evidence that the second generation, for migrants? despite having necessary language skills and nationality status, can be less integrated socially than their parents’ Barriers to Integration generation. Barriers in law States have also differed in the empha- A distinction in terminology may sis they have placed on integration need to be maintained for migrants into the labor market, or on social (though not the second generation)

6 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century for a significant reason: because the self-sufficiency and social inclusion — level of economic and social inclusion as well as in the interests of the migrant. permitted by law to non-nationals is less than that for nationals. Depending Discrimination on their immigration status, non- Second, there is the barrier of discrimi- nationals can be subject to restrictions nation — discrimination on grounds of on access to jobs (or be restricted to race and, increasingly it appears, of certain kinds of employment); on religion. Discrimination can be overt, whether family reunion is permitted; but is more often unintended and on access to public services and systemic in the way staff are recruited welfare benefits; and on the length of and services are organized to meet the residence itself. needs of the majority. When not tuned to the differing needs of new commu- These legal restrictions on integration, nities, lacking interpreters or materials whether in the conditions attached to in minority languages, even services immigration status or in the rules intended for migrants can fail to meet governing access to public services and their needs or exclude them entirely. benefits, are rarely the focus of policy debate, and their impact is under- Discrimination is a barrier to inclusion researched. Their purpose is to protect not just because it excludes migrants the public purse and jobs for the resi- from the jobs they are eager to do and dent labor force. It is arguable that the the services they need, but because of migrant who arrives in Copenhagen or the resentment it fosters. Why go on Dublin, who steps on to the tarmac at trying if you keep getting knocked Heathrow or Charles de Gaulle, back? As Trevor Phillips, Chairman of should not immediately be able to the Commission for Racial Equality in access the full range of social benefits the UK, said in 2004: and public services to which long-term Feelings of resentment based on residents have contributed. But states discrimination, or the sense of need to recognize that these restric- rejection, can drive migrants into tions can be a barrier to integration, the arms of the minority who and the balance may need to be would like to retreat to the village reweighed between exclusion of instead of joining the world — migrants from public services (to limit into the arms of the people who public expenditure, deter welfare support forced marriages, the folk tourists, and perhaps appease public who will not allow their wives to opinion) and allowing access to servic- work or speak English, and the es that promote inclusion. For an people who will back any kind of effective integration strategy, it is thus conduct on the ground that it is necessary to consider which services justified by cultural difference. and benefits migrants should, over time, have access to, because it is in Action to address discrimination can the interests of society — promoting be seen, therefore, not simply as a

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 7 matter of individual rights, as a sepa- States themselves require migrants to rate project in a separate department enter through a particular channel and from work on integration — but as acquire a label — “seasonal worker,” one central, essential component of “refugee,” “highly skilled permit holder,” the integration agenda. or “dependant.” They can then assume that their needs differ, or that it is only Public attitudes worth investing in those who will The third and related barrier is public remain in the long term, or that attitudes. In some local communities, European citizens, as holders of equal migrants are warmly received, rights, are by definition integrated reflecting Europe’s best traditions of from day one. hospitality; but in others they are met with suspicion and hostility. Yet we know that, even within the EU Such attitudes can breed discrimina- 15, EU citizens exercising their free tion. But they can also lead to a movement rights can face language breakdown in trust, tension, and barriers, non-recognition of qualifica- even disorder. For the migrant, no tions, or resentment from the public. lessons in citizenship or encourage- We call their arrival “mobility,” ment to identify with the collective not “immigration,” but they are new- “we” will override a negative comers, facing barriers to integration, message from the neighbors that nevertheless. Their need for access to “you do not belong.” An integration language courses, social orientation, strategy that focuses only on advice, and even protection from migrants and not on their neighbors exploitation by employers is often no will not address this powerful force less because they enjoy the status of for exclusion. EU citizen. Will the EU’s integration strategy recognize their needs, or will they be expected to fend for themselves? Integration: the Target Among third-country nationals, those It is often assumed that an integration whose residence is temporary may be strategy need target only sections of the least likely to have families to Europe’s migrant communities: only whom they can turn for support. They those who are from outside the may have the fewest incentives to learn European Union; only those who the language or to build good relation- intend to stay in the long term; or only ships with their neighbors, while having refugees. EU documents consistently greater susceptibility to exploitation. refer, narrowly, to “legally resident They may thus need assistance to third-country nationals” as the target, ensure that they have a level of inclu- assuming that it is this legal status, sion matching their own, and society’s, rather than the experience of transna- best interests. The question arises tional mobility, that is the basis of whether the EU integration strategy their need for support. identifies these temporary residents as

8 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century a priority, or whether their temporary amnesties for irregular migrants. Could status, or simple budget constraints, the European Commission nevertheless will leave them out in the cold? initiate a dialogue among Member States on devising a pathway for some irregular Moreover, within each category of migrants to legal status? It could perhaps migrants, women may have different be the kind of “earned legalization” needs from men, and the young from scheme that Papademetriou advocates those who have greater experience in as part of a broader package of meas- life. This suggests that, in practice, the ures, which could bring this group of strategy needs to be based on: migrants out of exclusion without An understanding of the barriers attracting future migrants to stay when experienced by different groups of their visas have expired. migrants; Clarity of objectives for each group; and Integration: Whose A portfolio of interventions, rec- Responsibility? ognizing that one-size-fits-all will not deliver for this disparate group Whose responsibility is it to promote of people any more than it would the integration of migrants, other than for the population as a whole. migrants themselves? Increasingly, par- ticularly in Northern Europe, national Irregular migrants governments are taking responsibility Last on the list is the most difficult for devising programs, often delivered group to mention in the context of by municipalities. Many large munici- integration — irregular migrants, such palities, like Frankfurt and Rotterdam, as those who came legally but over- already have their own programs, stayed their visas. It is certain that a developed in response to evident need significant number of people are in at the local level. Others support ini- this position, and undoubtedly many tiatives developed outside of the public are doing jobs that legal residents are sector. unwilling to do. Privately, some offi- cials acknowledge that it is unrealistic There is a plethora of initiatives at the for the authorities to detect and local level in operation or development, remove them all, and that it would among employers, unions, community have damaging economic and social groups, and the public, to provide consequences if they did. Moreover, language support, mentoring, advice, while these migrants remain, it is in access to jobs, and means of participa- society’s interests that they have access tion in civic society. This suggests that to essential services such as medical we should see integration not as a state care and education for children. responsibility, but as a shared responsi- bility among a series of actors, includ- There will be concern in some ing but not exclusively the migrant Member States about general and the state.

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 9 Integration Nexus: shared responsibility for the Inclusion of new migrants © Sarah Spencer 2004

Public Friendship Mentoring Foster sense of belonging

Relatives NGOs Information Flexible services Support Advice Accommodation Opportunity to Language contribute Contact with public

Migrants State Learn language Leadership / vision Contribute economy Inform debate & community Employers Defuse tensions Obey law Pay taxes Access jobs Mobilise partners Skills training Consult Language Evidence based policy Induction Agency coordination Housing Mainstream Inform public debate Monitor Legal rights & obligations Access citizenship

Unions Media Advice & Balanced reporting representation Inform attitudes Protection from exploitation Foster relationships with other workers

10 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century There is scope for debate on the Should Member States, at one responsibilities of each player, as extreme, allow migrants to maintain reflected in the diagram at left. any religious or cultural practice, or at the other ban any practice that arouses Migrants disapproval in any section of the public? The most contentious issue is perhaps Where should states draw the line? the extent to which the migrant has a responsibility to adapt, and conse- Before addressing this question, it is quently the degree of adaptation it is important to remember that the vast legitimate for the host society to majority of migrants do not engage in expect. Few would question migrants’ extreme practices or hold values obligation to obey the law and to pay inconsistent with those of European taxes along with other residents. Nor is citizens. It has also been shown that the it unreasonable to expect migrants, security provided by inclusion within like other residents, to make every an ethnic culture is a form of social effort to be self-sufficient and avoid capital that can be of both psychological reliance on the state (and hence and economic importance in enabling reliance on other taxpayers). individuals to overcome the isolation of the migration experience. Beyond those requirements, it is known that language acquisition con- It is also necessary to acknowledge siderably enhances the migrant’s prob- that the nationals of each Member ability of getting a job. The question State are themselves diverse, not only has thus arisen whether it is legitimate with regard to ethnicity and mother to require migrants to take language tongue, but also in terms of class, courses. Where there is no evidence gender, age, religion, and other charac- that migrants are unwilling to take teristics. Values and social norms not such courses, this would seem only differ between groups, but have premature. In some regions there are evolved significantly in recent decades long waiting lists for courses or they and will continue to do so, influenced are offered at a cost or on schedules in some respects by those of migrants that are not feasible for migrants. It themselves. would seem appropriate for states to ensure, first, that migrants have the Moreover, while the majority of opportunity to study. Should there be Europeans would identify themselves reluctance, incentives could be consid- with human rights and democratic ered before considering sanctions for values, commitment in practice (e.g., non-attendance. levels of voting) and standards of social responsibility (e.g., levels of criminality Core values and other forms of anti-social behavior) Should migrants be required to adopt suggest that we can not hold up the values and norms of the host society, Europeans per se as models to which to assimilate rather than integrate? third-country nationals should aspire.

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 11 Rather, the common principles on tool for determining whether, in integration adopted under the Dutch particular circumstances, restrictions Presidency framed the aspiration more are acceptable: the test of proportion- appropriately in affirming that every ality. When considering whether it is person resident in the EU must adhere legitimate for the law to ban a particu- to the basic values of the European lar cultural or religious practice, it Union. It cites the European Treaties requires us to consider: Is this ban to and the Charter of Fundamental achieve a legitimate aim, and is it Rights as the source of those values proportional to the harm it is designed and respect for human rights and the to prevent? Human rights standards do rule of law in particular. not necessarily provide direct answers to the questions raised by cultural In the UK, ministers have highlighted practices — they do not always tell us the importance of human rights as whether the practice is right or wrong core values that can unite a diverse — but they do provide a framework to society. Speaking to civil servants in resolve the conflicting rights which 1999 on the Act of Parliament that the practice has posed. would bring the European Convention on Human Rights into Government and municipalities UK law, the then Home Secretary The state and its agencies at the Jack Straw MP said: national and local levels are responsible, Consider the nature of modern first and foremost, for leadership. British society. It’s a society They must deliver clarity of vision enriched by different cultures on the kind of society that the and different faiths. It needs a integration strategy is designed to formal shared understanding of achieve, while explaining to the what is fundamentally right and public the rationale of the strategy fundamentally wrong if it is to and promoting an informed, balanced work together in unity and public debate. The state, particularly confidence … The Human at the local level, must take responsi- Rights Act provides that formal bility for promoting good relations shared understanding. among communities, including preparing residents for new arrivals. Human rights are, in most cases, not And it should exercise leadership in absolute standards. With exceptions mobilizing the partners it needs in such as freedom from torture, an indi- civil society to make the strategy work. vidual’s human rights may be limited to protect the rights of others and of An effective strategy needs a sound the community as a whole, for evidence base. The state can conduct instance from crime. International or sponsor research, consult others, and human rights standards set down the evaluate “what works.” It can prioritize terms in which these restrictions are effective interagency coordination. allowed and provide the most valuable And it can ensure that integration

12 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century objectives are built into its mainstream migrants by rogue employers is vital. employment, housing, education, Membership in a union is also an health, and urban renewal programs. important way for migrants to engage with non-migrants in circumstances National governments can ensure where they have a common interest. that post-entry immigration controls do not pose an unnecessary barrier to Voluntary organizations play a signifi- integration, and that there is clarity cant role in many countries by provid- (for migrants, employers, and service ing services to migrants that meet their providers) on the rights and responsi- particular needs, from health, educa- bilities of migrants. All Member tion, and housing to specialist advice States have a responsibility to ensure on immigration rules. Governments that there is effective anti-discrimina- acknowledge that they do not them- tion legislation. They may also take selves always have the detailed knowl- direct responsibility for delivery of edge of migrants’ diverse needs and that services to migrants: introductory pro- those needs are better met by organiza- grams, language and skills training, tions and groups in this sector. and so forth. Finally, national states determine the conditions under Beyond services, community and faith which migrants may become nationals groups play another key role in building and entitled to the rights and obliga- bridges between migrants, with other tions, and equality of opportunity, members of their ethnic or faith group, which citizenship status confers. and with the wider community. They provide a means of access for govern- Civil society ments to consult migrants, and can The state’s responsibility is extensive, provide migrants with ways not only to but the integration process happens access mainstream jobs and services, but in daily life, and here the agencies of also to contribute to the community in civil society — employers, trade a voluntary capacity. unions, community and voluntary organizations, and faith groups — have Individuals in the local key roles to play. community Members of the public can offer a vital Employers, for instance, do not only ingredient in the integration process provide employment. Some are also that no government can provide: the providing language courses for new welcome and understanding that can migrants or allowing time off from foster a sense of belonging and security. work to attend courses off-site. Trade Their openness to new people and unions have taken responsibility for ideas, their willingness to engage in ensuring that migrants have access to conversation and invite newcomers information on health and safety and into their homes, can be the most employment rights. Their role in important source of information and addressing exploitation of low-wage advice to migrants on local services

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 13 and social norms, as it is to anyone But it is now recognized that EU who moves into a new neighborhood goals in relation to immigration, within their own country. Through a economic growth, and social cohesion friendly neighbor, migrants can meet all necessitate a focus on integration. other members of the community, hear The EU has no specific legal about vacant jobs and accommoda- competence in relation to the inte- tion, learn how to register with a local gration of migrants. It does, however, doctor, and where to leave rubbish for have competence to address many collection. Neighbors, in turn, learn issues central to it, including the reg- about migrants and can contribute in ulation of migrants’ rights post-entry their conversations with others to a (e.g., the Directive on Family more informed public debate. Reunification); targeted programs for ethnic minorities like Equal; and Media mainstream strategies on employment, The media has a responsibility to social inclusion, and health. ensure that coverage of incidents involving migrants is balanced and Since the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), that information on numbers of the EU has in particular had a mandate migrants or data on use of services, for to require antidiscrimination legisla- instance, is accurate. In some states tion. Directives (2000/43/EC and there are voluntary codes of conduct 2000/78/EC) now require Member providing guidance to journalists. States to legislate against discrimination Governments can ensure access to on grounds of race (in employment, accurate information and that miscon- goods, and services); to establish a ceptions are actively redressed. statutory race body to provide assis- tance to individual victims; and to ban State o f play at th e EU level discrimination in employment on The EU has long recognized that grounds of religion or belief (since integration is a necessary part of a com- December 2003). prehensive immigration and refugee strategy; but only recently accorded it Th e s sa lo n i ki any priority. The European Commission The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) sought to push integration farther up Council in October 2002 asked the the agenda in its Communication on Commission to come forward with Immigration in 1994, and the integra- proposals for a more comprehensive tion of third-country nationals formally integration strategy, and the conclu- reached the agenda at the European sions of the Greek Presidency in Council in Tampere in 1999 as one of Thessaloniki in June 2003 confirmed four themes of a new, comprehensive that, “The European Council deems it migration strategy. necessary to elaborate a comprehen- sive and multidimensional policy on Primary responsibility for integration the integration of legally residing remains at the national and local levels. third-country nationals who should be

14 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century granted rights and obligations compa- to developing “policy initiatives for rable to those of EU citizens.” more effective management of migra- tion in Europe.” Integration was thus It was agreed at Thessaloniki that the clearly seen as one part of a broader policy should cover employment, eco- migration management agenda. nomic participation, education and Finally, it was acknowledged that the language training, health and social success of an integration policy relies services, housing and urban issues, as on the involvement of a wide range of well as culture and participation in actors including not only state agencies, social life, and should take into but also trade unions, employers, account the particularities of different NGOs, migrant organizations, and migrants, e.g., children and refugees. It organizations engaged in cultural, noted approvingly that agreement had social, and sporting activities. now been reached on the directives on family reunification and long-term res- Commission ident status, which it recognized as Communication 2003 essential instruments for integration. The communication from the Commission on Immigration, The Thessaloniki conclusions saw Integration, and Employment had integration as a “continuous, two-way been published earlier, on June 3. process based on mutual rights and It set out the approach to integration, corresponding obligations of legally endorsed at Thessaloniki, which is residing third-country nationals and now being developed and is therefore the host societies.” While primary worth mentioning in some detail. responsibility remained that of Member States, it argued that policies The communication set integration to achieve integration should be devel- within the context of both the oped within a coherent European Tampere (migration) and Lisbon framework, taking into account the (economic prosperity) agendas, seeing legal, political, economic, social, and successful integration of new and cultural diversity of Member States. settled migrants as a matter of social The development of such a framework cohesion and economic efficiency. It would be assisted by defining some emphasized participation: the need for common basic principles. It would also states to create the conditions in be necessary to share knowledge and which it is possible for the immigrant experiences, and to that end, the to participate in economic, social, cul- recently established group of officials tural, and civil life; while “immigrants as “national contact points” on inte- respect the fundamental norms and gration would facilitate coordination. values of the host society and partici- The Commission was invited to pres- pate actively in the integration process, ent an Annual Report on Migration without having to relinquish their own and Integration in Europe, mapping identity.” The Commission foresaw data, policies, and practice, as an aid migrants acquiring more rights and

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 15 obligations depending on their length unnecessary barriers such as dispropor- of residence, with integration measures tional language requirements, to available to them soon after arrival. address discrimination, and to upgrade It recognized that asylum seekers migrants’ occupational and language might also need integration measures skills. The goal should be to reduce by but noted that, as migrants without the half the unemployment gap between right to remain, they were outside of non-nationals and nationals by 2010. the scope of the communication. Social partners needed to ensure that In relation to irregular migrants, while migrants receive equal pay and working endorsing the need for an effective conditions, and employers that diversity policy of return, the communication in the workplace is well managed. went so far as to acknowledge that “integration policies cannot be fully The communication also covered the successful unless the issues arising from importance of education for language the presence of this group of people are acquisition, social orientation, and adequately and reasonably addressed.” bridge-building across communities. It suggested that diversity should be The communication established a reflected in the curriculum, that number of important principles: that schools should work closely with the approach should be holistic parents, and that problems — which it (embracing economic and social inte- identifies only in relation to large gration, addressing cultural and reli- numbers of immigrants concentrated gious diversity, citizenship, and political in one school — should be addressed. rights); should reflect the varying It noted the factors that lead to housing needs of different categories of segregation, the lack of affordable migrants; should engage a wide range housing, and the barriers posed to of non-state stakeholders; and should migrants’ sense of belonging and par- require investment of resources. It ticipation by racism and xenophobia. argued that immigrants should them- Regional planning strategies to address selves participate in the design and segregation were cited as one area for evaluation of the programs and policies policy development. Access to health that affect them. Significantly, it and social services was a further area argued that while special programs where it was suggested that existing were necessary in the initial phase of policies could be adapted to address integration, in the long term it was migrants’ particular needs. Information important that migrants access main- for migrants and training for service stream services, which must take providers, with migrant participation account of their specific needs. in planning services, was recommended.

In relation to integration into the Migrant participation was emphasized labor market, the communication not only to ensure the cultural cited the need to recognize migrants’ sensitivity of services, but also as a existing qualifications, to remove broader path towards social mixing

16 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century and development of mutual respect coordination of policies at the national across communities. The Commission level, while ensuring synergy with stressed the need to ensure that the related EU policies on employment, public has accurate information social inclusion, and antidiscrimina- about the contributions migrants tion. The first priorities identified by make in order to challenge negative the Commission for the contact group attitudes. Politicians and the media were to identify optimal models for should, it suggested, set an example introduction programs for new for civil society. arrivals; extend access to language training; and increase participation The Tampere conclusions (1999) in civil, cultural, and political life. had already endorsed the value of nat- uralization for third-country nationals In relation to the European Employment in fostering a sense of belonging and Strategy, the Communication urged according important legal rights. The Member States to: Commission had itself proposed a con- Increase migrants’ access to train- cept of “civic citizenship” under which ing and employment services to non-nationals would acquire a certain reduce unemployment; level of rights over a period of years, Develop a mix of sanctions and including some rights of participation preventative measures to tackle in elections. It now saw the Charter undeclared labor; on Fundamental Rights as central to Monitor the needs of the labor making these rights a reality. market and the role of immigra- tion within it; Turning to policy levers, the commu- Share information on good nication proposed faster progress on practice; and pending directives, for instance on Implement a series of other meas- recognition of qualifications, and full ures including fast-track language implementation of the directives on training for professionals. race and religious discrimination. It recommended that Member States go Member States have also been required beyond the minimum and give public since 2001 to report on National bodies a duty to promote equal treat- Action Plans for Social Inclusion, and ment. A major publicity campaign was the Commission asked that subsequent anticipated, focusing on employers and reports on measures to promote the employees, and an annual report social integration of individuals at published on equality and discrimina- particular risk of exclusion should pay tion in the EU. greater attention to immigrants.

The national contact points, mostly In addition to the existing European officials from Member State govern- Refugee Fund, 12 million Euros over ments, would be a means of sharing three years would fund pilot projects information and strengthening (“INTI” projects) on sharing information

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 17 and good practice in order to develop on integration, and it had been made greater consistency of practice across more difficult by negative stereotyping the EU. Separately, the Commission is of migrants in the media and the rise exploring the potential for developing in support for the far right. a series of indicators for measuring integration, for comparative purposes, The Commission found it “difficult to as part of an action plan for the collec- assess whether there has been progress tion and analysis of community statis- in developing comprehensive integra- tics in the migration field. tion strategies at a national level,” while acknowledging the increase in Progress in 2004 specific measures and at least awareness The Commission’s first, brief annual of the importance of including immigra- report on migration and integration was tion objectives in mainstream policies published in July 2004. Summarizing and programs. Gender considerations migration trends and evidence on fiscal had not yet been taken on board, in and labor market impacts, the report on policy or data. Nor had the directives integration was drawn from the national on discrimination been transposed into contact points and from the National national legislation in some Member Action Plans on Employment and on States, a situation on which the Social Inclusion. In those plans, the Commission intended to act. Commission found greater priority being accorded to integration issues. The national contact points were However, at EU and national levels, engaged in developing a handbook for in some major policy fields the main- practitioners and policymakers and streaming of integration issues remained this was duly published later in the slow. At the national level, in relation year. It covers good practice on intro- to employment, it found limited partici- duction programs, civic participation, pation by social partners, and scant and indicators for measuring progress. evaluation of the effectiveness of policies on the ground. Many occupations The report stressed the importance of remain restricted to nationals. Provision developing networks for dialogue with of language tuition for new arrivals was migrant organizations, and emphasized increasing, as had provision of civic that it would monitor the legal frame- education (or “social orientation”). work of rights accorded to migrants within Member States. It would also The report found that many Member take forward the proposals to establish States had little analysis of the reasons a set of common principles on integra- why immigrants are particularly at risk tion as the basis for subsequently iden- of poverty and exclusion, and were tifying common objectives across the experiencing difficulties addressing res- policy fields. It foresaw the national idential segregation and poor housing. contact points playing a significant role Action on discrimination and racism in these subsequent developments. But was often not connected to strategies the Commission would also consider

18 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century the need for a more formal basis for the probably more contingent upon solving exchange of information on integration the immigration and inter-group rela- alongside the existing EU mechanisms tions puzzle than some of us may on employment and inclusion. acknowledge publicly.”

Finally, the annual report stated that Its goal was not to harmonize policies the Commission’s budget for 2007-2013 across the EU, but to reach agreement would provide specific support for a on the key elements of the common common policy on immigration, includ- EU framework that Thessaloniki had ing incentives to Member States to endorsed. Its achievement was promote integration, but without further agreement by all 25 Member States clarity on what form this provision on Common Basic Principles for might take. (In practice, it may prove immigrant integration policy at the appropriate to bring the Refugee Fund EU Justice and Home Affairs Council into a broader integration fund in order in November 2004.2 The preamble to to help overcome the institutional the Common Basic Principles estab- barriers between provision for refugees lishes the rationale for action at the and that for other immigrants whose EU level by stating that, “The failure needs are, in many respects, the same). of an individual Member State to develop and implement a successful There are also mainstream funding integration policy can have in differ- streams such as the European Social ent ways adverse implications for Fund which in 2000-2006, for instance, other Member States and the will spend one-fifth of its budget pro- European Union.” moting equal opportunities in the labor market, with some funds directed It cites the potential impact of this specifically at migrants. This is also failure on the economy, on fulfillment true of the Socrates education program, of international human rights obliga- the program supporting vocational tions, and on tensions within society. training, and the Entrepreneurship The preamble suggests, on this basis, Action Plan. This demonstrates the that it is in the common interest of all importance of mainstreaming relative Member States that each is encouraged to targeted initiatives that cannot to pursue effective integration strategies. attract equivalent funding. The Common Basic Principles are Common Basic Principles non-binding but intended to provide The Dutch Presidency (July-December guidance on developing goals and 2004) subsequently gave considerable priorities and on measuring progress, priority to progress on the integration both for states with experience with agenda, arguing that, “The long term immigration as well as for those which well-being of many of our societies is have only recently become migrant

2 Council of the European Union Document 14615/04, 19 November 2004.

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 19 destinations. They are also intended of women to choose whether to practice “to assist the Council to reflect upon a particular religion. The Common and, over time, agree on EU-level Basic Principles emphasize the impor- mechanisms and policies needed to tance of mainstreaming integration support national and local-level measures into all relevant policy portfo- integration policy efforts, particularly lios. They stress the value of engaging through EU-wide learning and non-state actors and of coordinating knowledge-sharing.” their contributions. Looking ahead, they talk of developing clear goals This is clearly seen as a first step and indicators at the EU level and towards greater EU intervention in evaluation mechanisms to learn from ensuring that adequate steps are taken experience and from each other. in each Member State to promote integration, in the interests of the The Common Basic Principles are EU as a whole. less comprehensive than the earlier Commission communication and their The eleven principles adopted after understanding of integration less much debate largely reflect the holistic nuanced: They imply, for instance, that approach the Commission had taken integration is a uni-directional process in its earlier communication: that that will reach completion. Temporary integration is a two-way, multi-dimen- and irregular migrants are not included sional process of mutual accommoda- within the target group. An inclusive, tion, with recognition of the need for positive vision gives way, in places, to a host societies to remove the barriers to more negative tone (references to integration, including discrimination; “law-abiding” immigrants and “migrant and a process that must respect the youth delinquency”), with somewhat rights of migrants as well as their greater emphasis on migrants’ responsi- obligations. The Common Basic bility to integrate than on the responsi- Principles emphasize the importance of bility of the receiving society to provide employment, language acquisition, opportunities for them to do so. The education, living environment, oppor- goal is to overcome a deficit of migrant tunities for social mixing, and migrant integration rather than to build a more participation in decision-making. They cohesive, inclusive society. The strength assert that everybody in the EU must of the Common Basic Principles, how- “adhere closely to the basic values of ever, is in adding the endorsement of the EU,” not only migrants, and that all Member States to a holistic integra- the practice of diverse cultures and tion strategy that focuses not only on religions are guaranteed by the Charter migrants, but also on dismantling the of Fundamental Rights and must be barriers to integration that they face. safeguarded unless particular practices conflict with other inviolable European The Dutch Presidency brought the rights or with national law. Reference government ministers responsible for is made, in that context, to the freedom integration together for the first time.

20 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century At a conference in Groningen, After his appointment as Commissioner focusing on introductory programs for Justice and Home Affairs, Franco and on measures relating to youth, it Frattini announced that he would was evident that Member States would launch a communication on a coherent value greater coordination and infor- framework for integration during 2005 mation-sharing but did not agree on to implement the integration dimension the extent to which the EU should of the Hague Program; this communi- take the lead or have significant cation was released in September 2005. financial responsibility. While some supported the creation of a European Fund for Integration, others thought all Conclusion and Way funding for integration should remain Forward within the competence of Member States. They did ask that the European The alienation of a small minority of Commission, with the national contact immigrants, and evidence of broader points, create a dedicated website on economic and social exclusion, has integration to provide access to infor- forced the issue of integration on to mation on good practices in and beyond the EU’s agenda. On each index of Member States. integration — employment, education, health, living standards, civic partici- The European Council in early pation, and community relations — November 2004 approved the migrants are often disproportionately Common Basic Principles in its disadvantaged even in the second and forward agenda for the EU, “The third generations. The strong focus on Hague Program.” Adopted at a time integration could now provide the of heightened awareness of security momentum for addressing the barriers issues, the Hague Program situates faced by migrants. But public concern, integration within the security and some open hostility, and support for justice issues on the EU agenda. the far right, have set up a political Throughout the program there is a Catch-22: Integration measures are sense of urgency about implementa- needed yet the allocation of resources tion, outcomes, and evaluation. On to services that migrants need can be integration, it reiterates the need for contentious when resources for the greater coordination of national poli- population as a whole are limited. cies and EU initiatives and states that “a framework, based on these common Member States recognize that migration basic principles, will form the founda- will be a continuing and evolving tion for future initiatives in the EU, feature of Europe’s future and that the relying on clear goals and means of integration of migrants requires policy evaluation.” The establishment of the intervention. The need to ensure dedicated integration website that the social cohesion is matched by the need ministers had proposed would support to ensure the integration of migrants the exchange of information. into Europe’s labor markets, in which

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 21 their skills and labor will continue to Implementation of anti-discrimina- be essential to its prosperity. Even in tion legislation (albeit contentious those states with long experience with in practice in some states); immigration, integration measures are Mainstreaming of integration into limited and have not been based on a the EU employment and social comprehensive understanding of the inclusion strategies; barriers to integration. States have Sharing of good practice through differed in the extent to which they national contact points, with fur- have focused on foreigners or ethnic ther editions of the handbook and minorities, on newcomers or second a dedicated website; and generation, on economic integration A small budget for pilot initiatives or cultural assimilation. In addition, in with potentially a more significant the northern, southern, and eastern budget from 2007, and regions of Europe, states have differed An annual report on integration in the extent to which there is an to monitor progress. expectation that the state or civil society will take responsibility for inte- The next step is thus to take the gration initiatives. There are signs of existing agenda forward, and for the some convergence, but huge differences Commission to act in those areas remain in emphasis and approach. where it has a clear mandate, for instance in enforcing the discrimina- The Greek and Dutch presidencies of tion directives. the EU in 2003-2004 oversaw progress towards acceptance by Member States Cross-cutting governance that the EU has a role to play in arrangements advancing the integration agenda, The Commission will need to devel- even while primary responsibility op a stronger basis for cooperation remains at the national and local across directorates for this quintes- levels. It is accepted that there sential cross-cutting agenda. This is should be a common framework for particularly important between integration policies and the first step, Justice, Freedom and Security a document on Common Basic (known as “JLS,” formerly Justice and Principles, has been agreed upon. Home Affairs) which leads on migra- tion, integration, and fundamental Despite a heavy emphasis within rights, and Employment and Social some states on the perceived failure Affairs, which leads on employment, of migrants to adapt, and elements social inclusion, and discrimination. of compulsion in language and social It is no secret that differences of orientation programs, Member States emphasis exist between these two have signed up to a more balanced, directorates, and that each insists multi-dimensional analysis. There that it should lead on integration. is, moreover, agreement on some This has made agreement on a concrete steps: common agenda a difficult process.

22 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century It remains unclear how the Commission The Commission could carry out a can develop a consistent integration review to identify which Community strategy mainstreamed across policy policies, programs, budgets, and policy fields unless this division is overcome. levers are most relevant to integration, At the national level there is equally a to inform its mainstreaming approach. challenge for ministers responsible for It could also lead by example, reviewing integration, wherever located, to ensure its own staffing procedures to increase that this issue is given some priority the number of ethnic minority staff at within the departments that lead on all levels — both to ensure equal employment, education, health, inter- opportunities and to guarantee that national development (for cooperation policymaking benefits from their expe- with source countries), and other crucial rience. It could reconsider the bar on policy areas. Mechanisms are thus employment of resident third-country needed for dialogue with stakeholders nationals, while encouraging a review within and across governments, and within Member States of the impact of within the Commission, not only to occupational barriers to non-nationals. secure cooperation in mainstreaming integration objectives across policy Research, monitoring, portfolios, but also to develop a and evaluation common understanding of the strategy’s There is a role for the Commission in multiple objectives. developing a broader evidence base for integration policies, through research, Mainstreaming monitoring, and evaluation. The fact Integration objectives need to be built that we know that language proficiency into all of the Commission’s relevant has a significant, measurable impact on mainstream programs and budgets, as labor-market performance, for instance, has already begun in employment and is a powerful reason for providing social inclusion. There is more capacity access to language classes. But we do in those programs to achieve change, not have an equal understanding of the not least those requiring regular impact of other integration policy reporting on national action plans, levers. An approach that “works” in than in any additional projects targeted one Member State may not be entirely only at the migrant community. suitable for another, but it may offer Targets and performance indicators insights from which others can learn. required in the guidelines of the The Commission is committed to dis- action plans should specifically require seminating information on good prac- reporting on indices that measure the tice through its proposed dedicated inclusion of immigrants alongside website. What constitutes “good prac- those of the rest of the population. tice,” however, depends on criteria for Where relevant, data reported should measuring outcomes, and the evaluation reflect gender, and not mask differences itself should be conducted with inde- between and within the main immi- pendence and rigor. The work being grant communities. carried out to identify indicators to

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 23 measure national progress is valuable, The Commission could also endeavor but the Commission could also ensure to give substance to the notion of civic that resources and guidance are avail- citizenship by developing a framework able to monitor and evaluate individual of minimum civil, political, social, and programs according to agreed-upon cri- economic rights and responsibilities teria that would make comparison that apply to all migrants within the with programs in other Member States EU, some on arrival and others after more meaningful. an agreed-upon residence period. It can, and has given, substance to some Research is also needed on the barriers of these rights through directives such to integration within and beyond the as that on family reunification and the labor market. Results should be dis- rights of third-country national seminated in a form accessible to poli- migrant workers. cymakers to address assumptions and misconceptions on which policy initia- In developing a framework of minimum tives can otherwise be based. rights, the Commission should at least initiate a debate on the position of Review legal controls irregular migrants who, regardless of It is recognized that admission policies legal status, have some civil rights. have an impact on the capacity to inte- Moreover, excluding irregular migrants grate, but little attention has been paid from basic health care, or their children to the impact of post-entry controls on from education, has social conse- migrants’ access to jobs, services, and quences which should be taken into participation. At the EU and national account. Some Member States (e.g., levels, there is a need to review the Italy) protect the access of irregular impact of immigration controls to migrants at least to emergency health ensure that those restrictions that care. The Commission could initiate remain are no more than necessary to research on the impact of this approach achieve competing objectives. The in order to inform policy development. rights and responsibilities accorded to migrants should reflect their temporary Tac k l e d i s c r i m i n at i o n or permanent status, with maximum On discrimination, the Commission has possible access to the rights that pro- the authority to monitor implementa- mote integration — including work, tion of the directives and to take family reunification, public services, action against any of the 25 Member and participation in the democratic States that fail to give them force in system. Understanding the impact of domestic law, including the establish- these controls — for instance on the ment of a specialized “race” body to lifestyle of male migrant workers not promote compliance. The Commission permitted family reunification, or the may need to be tough on Member implications of permits that tie the States that drag their feet. Migrants migrant to a named employer — could who are treated unfairly on grounds of be a further topic of research. race or religion, denied the opportunity

24 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century to prosper and participate, will never social partners, specialized bodies, feel the sense of belonging and commit- NGOs, and migrant organizations. ment to their new country which inte- gration programs, however well designed, EU law currently requires protection cannot deliver. In practice, discrimina- from racial discrimination in employ- tion legislation is itself only the first ment and services, but only in employ- step: Subsequent action is needed to ment if discrimination is on grounds of ensure that employers (and in the case religion or belief. Given current levels of race, service providers) have the of hostility towards Muslims, we may knowledge and incentive to comply. expect to find evidence of discrimina- tion in services on grounds of religion, The Commission suggested in its for instance by landlords or education communication that Member States providers. In parts of Europe, e.g., could go beyond minimal compliance Northern Ireland, discrimination on and put a statutory duty on public grounds of religion has been well bodies to promote equality. The proven. The Commission could ensure has recommended that research evidence on current this to its broader European membership experiences with religious discrimina- since 2003.3 The UK is currently tion is collated and, if necessary, new implementing this for race, and this research undertaken, with a view to new approach has shifted the debate extending the Directive on religious from an emphasis on victims and discrimination in employment to cover litigation to a focus on outcomes. goods and services. If the desired out- Are ethnic minorities securing access come is for religious minorities to feel to jobs and services, and achieving and be included, an effective integra- education, employment, and health tion strategy should ensure that they outcomes, in the same way as the rest are not treated less favorably when of the population? By requiring public seeking access to housing, health, or bodies, from health and education education services. providers to the police and housing authorities, to identify barriers to Information and advice equality in their services and take to migrants steps to deliver change, the new law Member States are increasingly seeing is taking equality from the margins the need to provide migrants with towards the mainstream of each information on their rights and organization’s service planning. The responsibilities, on the practicalities of Commission could play a role in ensur- life such as finding a local doctor and ing that this and broader experience opening a bank account, and on social in implementing discrimination legis- expectations for behavior. The manual lation is shared among policymakers, for new members of Danish society, for

3 ECRI General Policy Recommendation No 7 on National Legislation to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination adopted on 13 December 2002. CRI (2003) 8.

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 25 instance, in addition to practical Mobilization of civil society information, advises migrants not to It is agreed that there is a need for take offense if a colleague’s use of irony dialogue to inform, engage, and mobi- in humor seems rude. lize civil society partners in the inte- gration process. While for governments Migrants may fail to take up essential the agencies in civil society are an services if they do not know that they under-utilized resource, they are also are entitled to use them, e.g., to register an important counterweight to a with a local doctor. Equally, tensions state-driven agenda tending to focus can be caused by inflated expectations too narrowly on language and employa- of a service or by lack of knowledge of bility. Integration happens at the local social expectations. level and it is local employers, trade unions, and voluntary and community Recognizing the need for this informa- organizations that, along with families tion does not, however, necessarily and neighbors, will be central to the translate into a political priority to integration process, whether govern- allocate resources to provide it. This ments engage them within a formal can be exacerbated where integration is strategy or not. the responsibility of a department that currently has significant competing The social partners are, however, only claims on resources, e.g., for dealing vaguely aware of the key role they play with crime and national security. The and the responsibility they share for its EU could help to overcome this with its success or failure. They are, with other dedicated integration budget, for which players in civil society such as faith one category of expenditure could be groups and community organizations, information and advice provision for scarcely recognized as partners in the new arrivals. integration process. Discussions could be initiated at an early stage to establish Migrants need access to independent what would be the most effective advice so that they can access the oppor- means to develop and disseminate tunities that are open to them and avoid ideas on the roles that these partners exploitation, for example, by unscrupu- could play and to monitor their impact. lous employers or landlords. Evidence suggests that many do not join trade The question arises whether the unions in the early period after arrival, European Commission itself can and rely for advice on migrant commu- contribute directly to this exercise, or nity organizations that may not be well should provide a framework of ideas, equipped to provide the information and guidance, and funding to enable it to advice needed. Language barriers may happen. This could be a topic the inhibit migrants seeking advice else- national contact points include in where, so that increasing the capacity of their agenda for policy development migrant organizations as a first port of and guidance in 2006. If local partners call may be one way forward. are to play a significant role, they will

26 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century also need to have a voice in policy a significant role in building bridges development. Eurocities, a network of across communities, need to be the focus large cities in Europe, recently called of research, to put more information for an explicit partnership on integra- and analysis into the public domain. tion and a role in policy design. Understanding and acceptance Build bridges across communities of human rights standards There are many examples of local The Common Basic Principles assert initiatives to build bridges between that all those in Europe need to adhere migrants and their neighbors, bringing to some unifying common values. Each people together in circumstances in Member State is a signatory to the which they develop shared interests, European Convention on Human common understanding, and positive Rights (ECHR), which not only sets relations. Neighborhood welcoming down minimum standards on how the committees, mentoring, and engaging state treats people within its borders but migrants as volunteers in community also provides an ethical code for how projects are some of the schemes that we treat each other. The convention have delivered results. Yet there is little teaches respect for privacy, equality, coordination within or across Member and family life, while challenging States and scant evaluation or shared intolerance and degrading treatment. learning. Nor are there ample resources The Charter of Fundamental Rights to enable such initiatives to be devel- builds on those standards. The EU oped in all of the areas where they are public does not, in its diversity, need most needed. to agree on everything. There was huge diversity of values in Europe Public hostility can reflect racism or before post-war migration added to xenophobia. It can also reflect fears that cultural mix. But Europe needs a about competition for jobs or public common code that overrides unaccept- services, or personal security, and such able extremes. The ECHR and broader fears need to be addressed. Where international human rights standards good practice exists, it has often been provide that, and the EU needs to initiated by community organizations consider what steps should be or municipalities in response to an taken to promote understanding and immediate local need. The Commission acceptance of those standards among could encourage such initiatives by people and institutions. making available matching funds, by disseminating information on successful Where states have established Human initiatives on the proposed integration Rights Commissions or equality com- website, and by suggesting that these missions with a broader human rights initiatives have some priority within mandate, those institutions can play a the work program of the national significant role in raising awareness (a contact points. Major questions, such process in which the Council of as ways in which faith groups can play Europe should continue to play an

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 27 important part). At the EU level, coverage. The Commission could itself the European Monitoring Center on make public EU-wide data. Racism and Xenophobia is to be developed into a broader human rights If the Commission were to embrace agency that could be given a role in and implement this broad integration building awareness and understanding agenda, its role would develop from of human rights, as well as of monitor- that of legislator, regulator, and ing abuse. There is a place here, too, monitor, to one of leader and mobilizer, for interfaith dialogue to clarify the under the watchful eye of Member broad areas of agreement on funda- States and the European Parliament. mental values and those areas where The urgency of this agenda, and the differing interpretations among the value in developing a common majority or a minority within a faith framework that encompasses labor group, need to be resolved. market, social, cultural, and political engagement, suggests that the European Public debate Commission should be encouraged Bridge-building initiatives, and human- and given the resources to do so. rights awareness, could be part of a wider attempt to foster a more positive, The danger inherent in an EU-led balanced public debate. There is an approach is that it develops as a urgent need for leadership of that top-down strategy. Integration happens debate at the EU, national, and local at the local level. Moreover, it is not levels by politicians who could help to something that is done to migrants, ensure that the public has accurate but a process in which they are but information, presented in a way that one significant player. The EU can builds confidence in migration provide a framework, legal minimum management and addresses misinforma- standards, and resources. It can help tion and misconceptions. The public to mobilize the stakeholders. But the has had little explanation of the Commission and Member States must rationale for migration policies and has ensure that the voices of migrants and not accepted that migration is a neces- of agencies at the local level are heard sary part of Europe’s future and that it when the goals and policy levers of can bring benefits. There is little recog- the integration process are chosen. nition by Member States of their immi- Migrants will be a permanent part of gration history and the lessons that can Europe’s future and, in the final be learned from it, for instance through analysis, new residents and old will support for immigration museums. The need to negotiate their future together. Commission framework could address the terms in which national and local governments could help bring the facts about migration into the public domain, explain the rationale for policies, and avoid contributing to negative media

28 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century References Spencer, S. and A. di Mattia. “Introductory Programmes and Initiatives for New Migrants,” Paper for the Ministerial Cabinet Office. Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Conference on Integration, Groningen, Market. Final Report, Prime November 2004, Minister’s Strategy Unit, 2003. http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/Integr ation%20report%20summary.html. European Commission. Communication on Immigration, Integration, and Weil, P. and J. Crowley. “Integration in Theory Employment, COM (2003) 336 final, 2003. and Practice: A comparison of France and Britain.” In Migration and Social Cohesion, European Commission. Handbook on edited by S. Vertovec. United Integration for Policy-Makers and Kingdom/United States: Edward Elgar, 1999. Practitioners. 2004, http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/.

European Commission. First Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM (2004) 508 final, 2004.

European Policy Centre/King Baudouin Foundation. Beyond the Common Basic Principles on Integration: The Next Steps, Issue Paper 27, April 6, 2005.

EU Presidency Conclusions Thessaloniki European Council June 2003. Council of the EU, Brussels, October 1, 2003. 11638/03. Polgen 55, 2003.

Frazer, H. “The National Action Plans on Poverty and Social Exclusion and Provision for Migrants.” Presentation at the Irish Presidency Conference “Reconciling Mobility and Social Inclusion: The Role of Employment and Social Policy.” Bundoran, April 1, 2004.

Parekh, B. Rethinking Multiculturalism, Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. London: MacMillan, 2000.

Portes, A. and M. Zhou. “The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants.” ANNALS, AAPSS, 530, November 1993.

Rudiger, A. and S. Spencer. “Social Integration of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities.” Presentation and paper to the OECD/European Commission conference on The Economic and Social Aspects of Migration, Brussels, January 21-22, 2003, http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/about/publica- tions/Sarah/OECDpaper03.pdf.

The Challenge of Integration in Europe 29 30 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Integration Processes of Migrants : Research Findings and Policy Lessons

Rinus Penninx mmigrant integration is now a years since the enactment of the I hotly debated topic across Europe, Amsterdam Treaty, twenty-three but the history and nature of these binding regulations have been accepted. discussions differ from country to Eleven of these relate to borders and country. In some states, the debate visas, six to illegal immigration and started as a reaction to the perceived expulsion, five to asylum, and one to failure of integration policies. In legal migration.1 The topics reflect Sweden and the Netherlands, for the still-dominant preoccupation with example, longstanding integration restrictive and control-oriented policies have come under fire in a migration regulation at the EU level. politically polarized climate. In other northwestern European countries, It is exactly this ambivalent attitude however, the topic of immigrants of European countries towards became politicized much earlier, immigration that makes integration preventing even the establishment policies problematic. In contrast with of integration policies. Germany, for classical immigration countries like example, only recently reached a Canada, Australia, and the United political compromise on a new law States, European states do not regard on immigration and integration. themselves as immigrant receivers, despite the large numbers crossing This ambiguous stance of most their borders. That is why integration European countries on integration has appeared as a topic on the EU policies is reflected at the European agenda only since the Communication Union (EU) level, where attempts to on Immigration, Integration and establish such policies are quite recent. Employment was published on June 3, This relative newness comes despite a 2003. Under the EU’s Greek Presidency longer history of trying to frame a at the Thessaloniki Summit of June common immigration policy that 2003, this document was accepted as a reaches back to the Amsterdam Treaty basis for developing an EU-wide inte- of 1997, which laid the legal founda- gration policy. It was not, however, tion for a harmonization of asylum and conceived as a communitarian policy. communitarian immigration policies in Instead it was a “Third Pillar” policy, the EU. Later, the Tampere Summit in meaning that any common initiative 1999 developed a political program can only be implemented by the and work plan to gradually build a unanimous decision of the Council of harmonized, common immigration Ministers. A further step towards such policy. The Communication on a a consensus-driven policy was recently Community Immigration Policy taken at the Ministerial Conference (November 22, 2000) set the framework responsible for integration under the for such policies, and in the first four Dutch Presidency, where eleven

1 C.A. Groenendijk and P.E. Minderhoud, “De Nederlandse invloed op nieuwe Europese regels betreffende migratie en asyl,” in Immigratie en asiel in Europa. Een lange web naar gemeenschappelijkheid, ed. W.A. Brusse, D. Broeders, and R. Griffith (Utrecht: Lemma BV, 2004), 137-162; J. Niessen, Five years of EU migration and asylum policymaking under the Amsterdam and Tampere mandates (Brussels: MPG, 2004).

32 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century common basic principles for integration Integration is the process by which policies were discussed and accepted. immigrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as The topic of integration processes groups. This definition of integration and policies has thus been neglected is deliberately left open, because the in the past, but it is now on its way to particular requirements for acceptance the top of the political agenda at the by a receiving society vary greatly from local, national, and EU levels. This country to country. The openness of chapter will develop a conceptual this definition also reflects the fact framework and draw lessons from past that the responsibility for integration experiences. The groundwork will be rests not with one particular group, but laid by making basic observations on rather with many actors — immigrants the logic of integration processes themselves, the host government, then on the often distinct logic of institutions, and communities, to policymaking and implementation. name a few. This will be followed by exploring answers to these questions: if we have There are two parties involved in a sound knowledge of integration integration processes: the immigrants, processes, and if we have managed with their characteristics, efforts and to formulate adequate policies to adaptation, and the receiving society, steer these processes, who must with its interactions with these implement policies and at what newcomers and their institutions. It is level? Furthermore, how do policies the interaction between the two that at the local, national, and EU levels determines the direction and the relate to one another? ultimate outcome of the integration process. These two, however, are Finally, this chapter will examine unequal partners. The receiving what strategies can or should be society, in terms of its institutional followed in implementing policies to structure and the way it reacts to be successful and draw conclusions newcomers, has much more say in the about the kinds of fundamentals outcome of the process. involved in integration policies and which dilemmas should be solved. The process of integration of immigrants is thus not — as is often supposed — only taking place at the The Logic of Integration level of the individual immigrant, whose integration is then measured in terms The moment immigrants settle of housing, employment, education, in a country, they have to acquire a and social and cultural adaptation to place in that new society. This is true the new society. It also takes place at not only for physical needs such as the collective level of the immigrant housing, but also in the social and group. Organizations of immigrants are cultural sense. the expression of mobilized resources

Integration Processes of Migrants: Research Findings and Policy Lessons 33 and ambitions and also at this of organizations. Institutions and level, mechanisms of the integration organizations together create the struc- process apply. ture of opportunities and/or limitations for individuals. Conversely, individuals In addition, there is the level of institu- may mobilize and change the landscape tions, which come in two broad types. of organizations and ultimately even The first are general public institutions contribute to significant changes in of receiving societies or cities, such as institutional arrangements. the education system or institutional arrangements in the labor market. The interconnectedness of integration Laws, regulations, and executive processes on different levels can be organizations, along with unwritten illustrated by comparing Turkish rules and practices, are part of such Muslims in the Netherlands to those in institutions. These, however, may Germany. These immigrants came in hinder access or equal outcome for the same period, for the same reasons, newcomers, or even completely and with roughly the same characteris- exclude them. The functioning of tics, but policy reactions to Islam and these general public institutions (and the Turkish group differed markedly in the possible adjustment of them in the two countries. The Netherlands view of growing diversity) is thus of introduced an “ethnic minorities policy” paramount importance. It is on this in the early 1980s, which implied level that integration and exclusion among other things an official recogni- are mirrored concepts. tion of Islam on the same footing as other religions. This opened opportuni- The second kind of institution ties for its public manifestation. It also belongs to specific types of immigrant entailed recognition of organizations as groups themselves, such as religious or potential partners in integration cultural institutions. These specific policies, including religious ones. In institutions and their possible turn, this implied ongoing relations integration can be viewed in the same and negotiations between these organi- way as immigrant organizations: they zations and authorities both for the may become an accepted part of society public regulation of specific Muslim on the same level as comparable activities in the Netherlands (mosque institutions of native groups, or they building, the public call to prayer, may isolate themselves or remain Islamic public broadcasting, state-funded unrecognized and excluded. Islamic schools, etc.) and for integra- tion activities by Islamic organizations The mechanisms working at the for their rank and file. In contrast, individual, group, and institutional lev- Germany, with some local-level excep- els are different, but the results on each tions, has been much less engaging. of these levels are clearly interrelated. Institutional arrangements determine The result of these diverging policies the opportunities and scope for action relating to specific institutional

34 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century arrangements for Islam and to Islamic mankind, but it becomes more evident organizations is that on the individual in those who change environments level, attitudes towards the receiving through migration. country and towards integration, particularly as measured among young Generally speaking, the descendants and second-generation Turks, seem to of this “first generation” of migrants differ markedly in the two countries. differ from their elders in this respect. Some research in Germany found Through primary relations within their inward-oriented and even fundamen- family and other immigrants, they are talist attitudes among Turkish familiarized with the immigrant youngsters on a large scale. In the community, and possibly with its roots Netherlands, in contrast, researchers elsewhere. At the same time, however, found a much more positive attitude they become thoroughly acquainted towards integration, involvement, with the culture and language of the and participation, particularly in local receiving society through informal society. This goes together with more contacts. These occur in the critical and independent views of neighborhood starting in early youngsters on established Islamic childhood, and further contacts take umbrella organizations.2 place through participation in general institutions, primarily the school One final, critically important system. If such a double process of element of the logic of integration socialization takes place under favorable processes is the time factor. Integration conditions (in which policies play a of newcomers is a long-term process. major role), this second generation At the individual level, an adult develops a way of life in which they immigrant may adapt, learning how combine the roles, identities, and things are done, by whom, etc., for loyalties of these different worlds and the pragmatic purpose of earning situations. They accomplish this immediate rewards. However, individual balancing act in many different ways, feelings and likings, as well as their which makes for more and more evaluations of right and wrong, are differentiation within the original persistent within an individual’s immigrant group. At the group level, lifetime. This is a general rule for this means that the litmus test for

2 K. Canatan et al., De maatschappelijke rol van de Rotterdamse moskeeën (Rotterdam: COS, 2003); J. Doomernik, Turkse moskeeën en maatschappelijke participatie: De institutionalisering van de Turkse islam in Nederland en de Duitse Bondsrepubliek, (Amsterdam: Instituut voor Sociale Geografie, 1991); W.J. Heitmeyer et al., Verlockender Fundamentalismus. Türkische Jugendliche in Deutschland, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997); Y. Karakasolu and S. Koray, Islam and Islamic organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany. A short summary of study of the Zentrum für Türkeistudien on Islamic organizations in Germany, (Birmingham: Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations, 1996); N. Landman, Van mat tot minaret. De instiutionalisering van de islam in Nederland, (Amsterdam: VU-uitgeverij, 1992); Y. Özbek and S. Koray, Muslim voices. A stranger within? Section on Germany, Part I and II, (Essen: Zentrum für Türkeistudien, 1998); N. Ögelman, “Documenting and Explaining the Persistance of Homeland Politics Among Germany’s Turks,” International Migration Review 37 (2003): 163-193; Th. Sunier, Islam in beweging. Turkse jongeren en islamitische organisaties, (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1996); Th. Sunier, “Niederländisch-Islamische Staatsbürgerschaft? Anischten über Islam, Bürgerschaft und Bürgerrechte unter türkische Jugendlichen in den Niederlanden,” in Der Fundamentalismus-verdacht. Plädoyer für eine Neuorientierung der Forschung im Umgang mit allochtonen Jugenlichen, ed. W.D. Bukow and M. Ottersbach (Opladen: Laske und Budrich, 1999).

Integration Processes of Migrants: Research Findings and Policy Lessons 35 integration, and for the success or Second, other studies reveal that failure of policies in this field, is the immigrant groups follow different position of the second generation.3 patterns of integration or incorpora- tion. For the Dutch case, for example, If the integration process results from research has shown that Moluccan, the interaction of two parties that Surinamese, Antillean, Southern takes place at different levels, what European, Turkish, and Moroccan can be expected in terms of outcomes, immigrants — all target groups of the taking into account the differentiating ethnic minorities policies — differ in effect of time and generations? the speed of their integration and in Comparative studies indicate that a the tracks of they tend plurality of outcomes is the rule. to follow.4 For reasons that flow from the design of the studies themselves A first category of studies compares — namely, that these immigrants are the integration process of different living in the same national or city immigrant groups in the same contexts — such differences are institutional and policy context of a primarily ascribed to characteristics nation or a city. Two major messages of particular immigrant groups. transpire from such studies. First, long-term studies in the United A second category of cross-national Kingdom (UK), Germany, France, the comparative studies looks at Netherlands, and Belgium reveal that the integration of the same as a general rule, immigrant groups immigrant group in different national disappear after one or two generations contexts. Such studies have exactly as specific groups because they have the opposite explanatory scheme: become an accepted part of society. they also find differences in outcome, Policies are by definition selective, in but these are primarily ascribed that only those immigrants are to the differential functioning defined as relevant groups who are of the context in which the group is not (yet) an accepted part of society. integrated. Differences also turn out In the Netherlands, for example, this to be significant in this arena, as means that the large group of noted above in the example of Eurasians that “repatriated” from the Turkish Muslims in Germany and Dutch East Indies since 1945 were the Netherlands. Other studies not included as target groups in the have found markedly different ethnic minorities policies of the early outcomes as a consequence of varying 1980s. This indicates that such institutional arrangements and immigrants had, by then, acquired an traditions of public acceptance of accepted place in society. religions in Belgium, the Netherlands,

3 M. Crul and H. Vermeulen, “The second generation in Europe, Introduction” International Migration Review 379 (2003): 965-986. 4 H. Vermeulen and R. Penninx, Het democratisch ongeduld. De emancipatie en integratie van zes doelgroepen van het minderhedenbeleid (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1994); H. Vermeulen and R. Penninx, Immigrant integration. The Dutch case (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 2000).

36 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century and the UK.5 Research on the some of a more recent origin in the attitudes and actions of trade unions post-war decades. in relation to immigration and the position of immigrants in society in The study also indicates that over the seven European countries also indicates last three decades, European countries such differences. For example, the and cities received a varying share high degree of union membership of mixed immigrant flows, i.e., of Turkish immigrants in Sweden significant supply-driven movements (above 90 percent) and the low of refugees, asylum seekers, and degree of this same group in France unauthorized immigrants, often along (around 15 percent) appears to be a with high-skilled cosmopolitan consequence of how trade unions professionals and company-linked are organized, as well as whether or migrants. The overall picture emerging not they are incorporated into from this project is one of significant socio-economic decision-making growth in diversity of immigrant at the national level.6 origins, from mainly European to more and more global. In addition, there are A recent empirical research project marked differences in the social and on multicultural policies and modes cultural capital that immigrants of citizenship in seventeen European bring with them and/or have developed cities shows the heterogeneity of both during their stay. immigrants and the receiving local societies.7 The study looked at Variability is also strong among the immigrants first, showing that the other partners, the receiving cities. background of their migration is very The seventeen urban areas show great diverse, both in time and space. variety in their institutional settings Some migration movements towards and policies, as well as reactions to Europe’s cities reflect colonial immigrants. Some of this variance can relations with the country of be explained by differences in the destination, a fact clearly visible in national institutional systems in cities like Amsterdam, Birmingham, which cities are embedded, but there Lisbon, and Marseille. Another driver are a great many local factors and cir- of this migration goes back to (very cumstances that add to the variability selective) demand-driven migration, of local reactions and policies. These mainly of low-skilled workers, include an area’s political constellations some of it with a long history as in and coalitions, which may work for Swiss, Belgian, and French cities, inclusion or exclusion; the physical

5 J. Rath, et al., and its Islam (Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 2001). 6 R. Penninx and J. Roosblad (eds.), Trade Unions, Immigration, and Immigrants in Europe, 1960-1993. A Comparative Study of the Attitudes and Actions of Trade Unions in Seven West European Countries (New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000). 7 A. Rogers and J. Tillie, Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); R. Penninx et al., Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).

Integration Processes of Migrants: Research Findings and Policy Lessons 37 layout of the city and its relation to may lead to outright exclusion of some neighboring areas; historical experiences immigrants (e.g., aliens) from the with earlier immigration and diversity; formal political system. Even if they are and the concrete instruments and included, it may also marginalize their resources available to local policymakers voices. The way immigrants are per- to steer processes in the vital domains ceived by the receiving society turns of housing and urban renewal, out to be important in such a process, labor market and entrepreneurship, often more so than facts. This tendency education and health, and so on. increases if immigration and the status of immigrants become politicized questions. This mechanism can lead Th e Lo g i c o f either to an absence of integration Policymaking policies and an avoidance of issues related to immigrants or to lopsided Formulating and implementing effective and patronizing policies reflecting integration policies requires more than mainly majority interests and disregard- just insight into the logic of integra- ing immigrant needs and voices. tion processes. It also demands an understanding of how to secure political Although this has been the rule in approval and popular support. The Europe, exceptions exist at both the logic of politics and policymaking, local and national levels. Certain however, is often problematic in British cities may serve as local exam- relation to immigrants. ples. Since most of their immigrants are of ex-colonial origin and have UK As noted, a key condition for effective citizenship, the political system is policies is that long-term residence basically open to them from beginning. should be expressed in an adequate This does not prevent significant legal status for immigrants and in polarization of majority-minority rela- opportunities for them to participate tions, as a wealth of literature testifies. in politics and policymaking. However, But over time, the significant concen- existing political systems often do not tration of immigrants in certain districts, provide such conditions. combined with political coalitions with powerful parties, may lead to The conundrum here is that decisions substantial immigrant political on the content and orientation of participation in cities. Crises in such integration policies are taken in a cities have reinforced this process. political system decided by the majority Thus, cities may play a prominent role vote. In such a system, majority-minor- in establishing new practices of political ity relations and the actual or perceived participation and integration. clash of interests connected to them are played out. This happens on both A different trajectory appears in the national level and in cities, and it Sweden and the Netherlands, where

38 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century society and cities show more political urgency of the situation. In practice, participation and inclusive integration crisis situations often lead to actions policies. In both of these countries, and policies that strongly and lopsid- fairly comprehensive integration policies edly reflect perceptions and interests were introduced at the national level of locally dominant groups. in a period in which immigration and immigrant integration was much less An additional aspect of the logic of politicized. In Sweden in the mid-1970s policymaking emerges when policies and the Netherlands at the beginning win the approval of politicians. In of the 1980s, there also existed an contrast with the long-term nature active and fruitful relationship of the integration processes discussed between research and policy in this above, political mechanisms in field. These conditions promoted the democratic societies require policies early establishment of liberal and to bear fruit within much shorter inclusive measures and policies in terms: between elections. Unrealistic these countries, leading, among other promises and demands derived from things, to the early introduction of this “democratic impatience” — that local voting rights for aliens (Sweden is, the political desire to have quick in 1976, the Netherlands in 1985) solutions for problems and processes and easier access to naturalization. of a long-term character — often lead These measures, all novelties at the to backlashes. The recent vigorous time, were introduced with the debate on the (supposed) failure conviction that forces within migrant of integration policies in the groups must be mobilized to secure the Netherlands is a shining example. acceptance and implementation of policies and to foster social cohesion. More difficult than democratic Naturalization and local voting rights impatience, however, is the situation were seen as means to promote inte- in which the political climate of gration, rather than as final testimony anti-immigration and anti-immigrant of acquired integration. sentiments, when translated into political movements and the The trajectories and achievements politicization of immigration described above for cities in the UK, and integration matters, prevent Sweden, and the Netherlands, however, well-argued policy proposals from do seem to be exceptions to the being accepted. This means that standard pattern. In most other cases much more attention should be given of the seventeen-city project discussed to the question of how to frame above, the stimulating factors immigration and integration policies mentioned above have been absent. in such a way that these are politically The question of what kinds of policies acceptable and embraced by the are developed in these cities, and ruling political system, political when, seems closely related to the parties, and their rank and file.

Integration Processes of Migrants: Research Findings and Policy Lessons 39 All of the foregoing observations relate terms of its historical development; to the political process that may facili- in addition, the practice of it turns tate — or block — the establishment out to be clearly context-bound. of explicit integration policies. An Both of these examples pertain at the important next step is to examine the national level of states, but studies form and content of such policies, indicate that the same rule holds true once established. for the level of cities.

First of all, integration policies are by Local variations in institutional necessity context-bound. Systematic arrangements, as well as opportunities attention has been paid to the different for integration policies and participation ideologies and practical models through of immigrants, may to an extent be which countries incorporate immigrants. explained by diverging national policies, institutional settings, and their This context-bound nature is illustrated underlying conceptions. Embedded as by Hans Vermeulen, whose 1997 study cities are in their national contexts, compares immigrant policies in five they necessarily reflect national European countries since the 1960s.8 policies and conceptions. This can be The research looks specifically at demonstrated by comparing political integration and labor market policies, “problem definitions” of immigrants policies relating to immigrant languages, and their integration on the national and policies in relation to religious level and the ensuing strategies to be systems introduced by immigrants. applied in these policies. Vermeulen’s study shows that the actual content of integration policies is to a A first prototypical definition is great extent dependent on, or inspired the one that defines the immigrant by, the pre-existing institutional principally as an alien and outsider. A arrangements in these areas within society that employs such a definition the different countries. For a country is emphatically not defining itself as an that traditionally has had different immigration country and migrants are recognized languages within its territory therefore temporary “guests.” At best, (or religions, for that matter), it is in measures may be taken to make that principle easier to make additional temporary stay comfortable and provisions for newcomers. In the same profitable for both parties and to vein, a 2003 analysis by Vermeulen and facilitate migrants’ anticipated return; Boris Slijper examines multicultural there are no logical grounds for inclusive policies in Canada, Australia, and the policies that would incorporate these United States.9 The “multiculturalism” immigrants as full citizens or political of these countries differs not only in actors. Such an exclusionary definition

8 H. Vermeulen (ed.), Immigrant policy for a multicultural society. A comparative study of integration, language and religious policy in five Western European countries (Brussels/Amsterdam: MPG/IMES, 1997). 9 H. Vermeulen and B. Slijper, Multiculturalisme in Canada, Australië en de Verenigde Staten. Ideologie en Beleid, 1950-2000 (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2003).

40 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century leads to the kind of policies that The second prototypical inclusive Michael Alexander in his typology vision is the Anglo-American one, in calls either “non-policy” or “guestworker which immigrants are supposed to take policy.”10 Forms and instruments up citizenship individually. Once they of such policies are variable and have done so, the political system haphazard, being mostly ad hoc leaves them ample room for collective reactions to concrete problems. manifestation and action. Ethnicity and ethnic minorities are perceived as In contrast with such exclusionary relevant notions, even to the extent policies, there are definitions that in that the total population, e.g., in principle include immigrants over the censuses, is officially registered as such. course of time. The way this inclusion Although equality is also an important is envisaged, however, two distinct principle in this political vision, there is political definitions of immigrants and the additional notion that substantive their integration can be discerned. The equality may in practice be related to first one is prototypically formulated in membership in cultural, ethnic, the French-republican vision. As a immigrant, or disadvantaged groups. consequence of this vision of the state, Political struggle between groups on its relation to citizens, the resulting issues of multiculturalism is thus an political system, and institutional explicit part of politics (irrespective of arrangements in the public sphere, the the outcomes of such political struggles). distinction between citizens and aliens is crucial. Alien immigrants should The internal logic of these prototypical preferably become citizens and thus inclusive visions leads to different become recognized as individual politi- strategies employed in integration cal actors. Immigrant collectivities are policies. The French-republican system not recognized as such. French republi- leads principally to strategies that can terminology avoids notions like select for the following general policies: ethnicity, ethnic minorities, and multi- equality within the given system as culturalism that suggest collectiveness priority; avoidance of designating fixed and institutionalized difference of any target groups; and non-recognition of sort, be it origin, culture, religion, or collective manifestations and organiza- class. The overriding political principle tions as important actors. The inherent is (formal) equality on the individual problem of such a definition is that of level. In this sense, this definition prin- mobilizing and engaging forces from cipally depoliticizes the issue of immi- within immigrant groups (who are grants and their integration (which in feared to counteract integration) in reality does not prevent immigration the implementation of policies. The from becoming an overriding issue for second vision tends to designate target established parties). groups and formulate group-specific

10 M. Alexander, Comparing local policies toward migrants as an expression of Host-Stranger relations, PhD-thesis (Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2003).

Integration Processes of Migrants: Research Findings and Policy Lessons 41 policies, even to the extent that Several cross-national studies indicate positive discrimination or affirmative forms of convergence, albeit hesitant action may be part of such policies. and partial ones. Vermeulen has listed It is more prone to recognize, if not a number of issues that show at least stimulate, forms of representation of some convergence.11 First, in such groups, for example by extending immigration policy (particularly the subsidies directly to immigrant part of the residential status regulations organizations, or indirectly by for immigrants of non EU-countries) subsidizing certain activities of such the European Union has in recent groups. This vision is also more years issued a number of directives that inclined to combine equality with partially harmonize Member State cultural difference, implying recognition policies. Second, some convergence of cultural and religious aspects of has also occurred in naturalization integration processes. policies. For example, the wide disparities between French and This chapter has deliberately outlined German legislation and practice in this these two models of inclusion as field have narrowed: the jus sanguinis prototypical and contrasting, in order element in German legislation is thus to illustrate their internal logic. In being relaxed and the jus soli principle practice, there are many variations and has been introduced to enable children eclectic assemblages that incorporate of immigrants to gain citizenship more elements of both visions in the easily. In France, meanwhile, the jus definitions and instruments of policies. soli principle has lost ground in recent This is the case on both the national years. Recent studies on methods of and the city level. The elements of this adjudicating nationality to aliens assemblage, moreover, may also change confirm the convergence tendency on over the course of time. a wider scale in Europe.12 Third, Vermeulen also sees some convergence Divergence versus convergence in the use of a common terminology The argument presented in the that is particularly encouraged by preceding section is that differences supranational organizations. He warns, in (national and local) contexts lead however, that such common vocabulary to divergence of integration policies. of “integration” and “multiculturalism” But the picture is different when may not necessarily mean that people evidence and arguments for agree in their ideas, potentially even convergence are compiled. leading to illusory agreements.

11 Vermeulen, Immigrant policy. (see n. 8.) 12 R. Bauböck (ed.), From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigrants in Europe (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994); V. Guiraudon, “Citizenship Rights for Non-Citizens: France, Germany and the Netherlands,” in Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States, ed. C. Joppke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); R. Hansen and P. Weil, Towards a European Nationality. Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality Law in the EU (Houndmills/New York: Palgrave, 2001); P. Weil, “Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws,” in: From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World, ed. A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer (Washington, DC: Carnegie Foundation, 2000).

42 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Apart from these convergence tenden- A logical consequence of such cies that stem from national or even area-specific manifestations as triggers supra-national levels of policy action, for policies is that these policies are there are specific forces at work at the often framed as space-specific policies local level that lead to convergence. It in which housing, concentration, and seems that the strong local character of segregation are central issues. The the settlement process of immigrants “Inner City Policies” in the UK since itself acts as a major force towards 1968 and the “Politique de la Ville” in convergence of policies. Whatever the France since the 1990s illustrates this. institutional arrangement is, local authorities have to find answers to the These forces do not simply stimulate same questions, such as how to provide the emergence of policies and influence immigrants with adequate housing and their content; they also tend to jobs, how to make educational and encourage, in the end, similar health facilities available to them, and strategies in their implementation. how to react to their demands to fulfill In some cases, consultation of immi- religious obligations and teach their grants and engagement of individuals mother tongues. Furthermore, they and organizations in the implementa- have to deal with the native population’s tion is part of policies from the very similar reactions to immigrants, as beginning. If this is not the case, well as processes of discrimination however, it often soon becomes clear and social exclusion. Neglecting and that it is impossible to effectively avoiding these questions is easier at the implement immigrant policies without more distant level of national policies, linking up with immigrant groups but in cities these questions make themselves and engaging them in themselves even more concretely felt, policy formulation and implementa- particularly if the number of immigrants tion.13 Many studies suggest that con- and their concentration in certain ditions for effective implementation parts of the city increase. If city lead to a certain convergence in authorities do not address such the strategy used, although the forms questions on their own initiative, may differ. they may be forced to do so by emerging crises. “Inner city riots,” as they are often called in the UK, or the Levels of Integration: banlieu-problematique (problem neigh- Policies and Actors borhoods in the suburbs) in France are illustrations of triggers to may lead to Integration processes, from the point (new) policies for and of cities. In this of view of immigrants themselves, sense, such crises may be seen as take place primarily at a local level. “bottom-up” forces for convergence. Because circumstances there may vary

13 D. Moore, Ethnicité et Politique de la Ville en France et en Grande-Bretagne (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001).

Integration Processes of Migrants: Research Findings and Policy Lessons 43 significantly, local policies for integra- according to two different patterns. tion should have the highest priority. The first pattern is visible in countries Also, from the perspective of the city, such as Switzerland, Germany, and there is an argument for prioritization. Austria, where national integration The city receives newcomers of all policies have been piecemeal or different origins who bring with them absent, and where pressures to different cultures, religions, and formulate adequate policies and claims lifestyles. Their integration into the for competence and resources have social fabric of the city is not a natural come from large cities. The cities of process: social segregation, social Zurich, Bern, and Basel in Switzerland, exclusion, and marginalization of for example, took — in the complete (certain of these) immigrant groups absence of such policies at the national may threaten the social cohesion in level — the initiative of developing these cities. Cities and their neighbor- local policies in the late 1990s.14 hoods are the places where important Berlin, Frankfurt, and Vienna developed events happen that affect the daily lives such policies even earlier under the of all residents, including immigrants. same conditions: an absence of It is also the level where the loyalty of national policies and resources. newcomers and old residents can be gained, or for that matter, lost. In countries where integration policies were started rather early on the Proceeding from this evidence-based national level, such as the Netherlands starting point, it also follows that and Sweden, such tension has taken a such local policymakers should be different form. The major cities in given tools and room to act in locally these countries have been confronted adequate ways. National policies, and with immigration on a scale quite by implication also different from the country’s average. policies, should primarily facilitate the This has been expressed in high work of local actors, from both the pressure on essential institutions like government and civil society, by the housing system (segregation and creating general frameworks, rules, degeneration of neighborhoods), the and instruments. labor market (disproportionate unemployment, high levels of social National and local policies benefit costs), the educational system In practice, however, relations (concentration of pupils of immigrant between national and local levels of origin in certain sectors and spaces) policy are not always so smooth and and public order (racial harassment, complementary. In the European crime, and tensions between groups). context, tensions between the national To cope with such developments, and local levels have developed these big cities have joined forces to

14 J. D’Amato and B. Gerber (eds.), Herausforderung Integration. Städtische Migrationspolitik in der Schweiz und in Europa (Zurich: Seismo Verlag, 2005).

44 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century claim more executive power and expressed in the Communication of resources from the national 2003, the consent of the Thessaloniki government. In the Netherlands and Summit (June 2003) and the recent Sweden, general policies for urban Ministerial Conference in Groningen areas and integration policies for (November 2004), what can be immigrants have in recent years been expected from EU policies? What brought together — at least in the special tasks could the EU/EC take on formal sense — in one framework, in favor of policies at the national and in principle creating new and more local levels? These can be listed briefly comprehensive possibilities. as follows.

Common to all these cases is that A first task of the EU is “framesetting.” such tensions often lead to a critical The EC could frame both (im)migra- dialogue between large cities and tion and integration and the nexus national governments on topics where between the two differently than it is national and local policies work out now commonly done at the national contradictorily. Cities will not always level in most EU countries. The shift win these battles on principle. At the would be from a defensive and mainly same time, however, city authorities control-centered policy to: 1) a proac- may use their discretionary power to tive, future-oriented, comprehensive gain more room to maneuver in favor approach; 2) a balance between of (certain) immigrants. What such (realistic) problem-orientation and examples make clear, broadly speaking, possible present and future gains of is that the interests at stake in immigration, thus furthering acceptance integration policies and their of immigration; and 3) emphasis on execution at the local level of cities the necessity of common action in may be substantially different, or both the immigration and integration perceived differently at the local and domains. In principle, the EU is national levels. At the city level, the in a position to bend negative confrontation with the day-to-day competition and “burden shifting” consequences of immigration is much practices among EU Member States more direct. Any serious attempt to towards an approach that focuses on cope with related problems, or — in a common interests. positive formulation — to get the best gains out of the presence of newcomers, The framesetting task has to be done will put pressure on the higher and within the political and bureaucratic more abstract national level. setting of the EU/EC and between “Brussels” and the national authorities EU integration policies and policymakers, which implies long In view of the ideal division of tasks and tough negotiations. But, as Sarah outlined above, and taking into Spencer expressed it, the EC/EU account the political will of the EC in should also take “active responsibility the field of EU integration policies as for leading a balanced, informed,

Integration Processes of Migrants: Research Findings and Policy Lessons 45 public debate about the reasons How should admission policies migrants are in Europe by putting into distinguish between temporary the public domain information about migrants and long-terms residents, the contribution they make and barriers and if migrants are initially they experience, acknowledging public admitted temporarily, when does fears, and correcting misinformation.”15 “temporariness” end? This wider task is of great importance, What status should be accorded because it prepares the ground for to family members and marriage policymaking in civil society and among partners of established immigrants? the population at large and mobilizes a counterforce against populist anti-immi- 2) The scope of integration policies. grant political exploitation. The two If the ultimate aim is in principle full communications from the EC in 2000 access of long-term residents to all public and 2003 mentioned earlier can be institutions and facilities of the society of regarded as important first steps in the settlement, then in the course of time, efforts of the EC to establish a sound a system of norms could be developed framework for policy action. systematically (through political nego- tiation) for the three basic dimensions A second function or task that follows of citizenship: socio-economic, legal- from framesetting is “normsetting.” political, and cultural/religious. The abovementioned general frame should be worked out in a number of 3) Antidiscrimination policies. In fact, normsetting regulations, directives, or this is the negative corollary of positive even laws that pinpoint basic starting normsetting. It is a necessary element points for integration policies. Such in policies, but it also has severe norms pertain to: limitations. Any anti-discrimination norm assumes positive normsetting in 1) The definition of the target group the first place, which in turn is being of integration policies. Important trampled upon by discrimination. normsetting regulations could be Since, and as long as, positive norm- developed, including those related to setting differs in national contexts, the the following questions: practical use of anti-discrimination Which immigrants are regarded, norms also differs between countries. and at what particular point in time, as a residents for whom Third, apart from framesetting and comprehensive integration normsetting, the EC has practical policies are applicable? instruments to promote activities (Immigration/admission policies related to the development of and integration policies should integration policies. Specific budget clearly be coordinated.) lines of General Directorates in charge

15 S. Spencer, “The Challenges of Integration for the EU,” Migration Information Source. (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, October 1, 2003), http://www.migrationinformation.org.

46 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century of certain policy domains (Justice and and tactical aspects of such policies. Home Affairs for immigration, asylum, In the first place, in order to become and reception of asylum seekers and effective, such policies have to engage refugees; Social Affairs and Employment partners in the integration process at for integration and anti-discrimination) different levels. First of all, that means can be used to mobilize forces. engaging immigrants at the individual, These mobilizations could include, organizational, and institutional levels. for example, setting up systems for Too much policy conception is systematically collecting information “top-down,” addressing individual (both internally and externally), immigrants, while much of the policy having certain policy questions implementation has to rely on researched externally, etc. Also, the mobilizing forces within immigrant European Refugee Fund has been groups to be successful. A number of created to involve nongovernmental good examples of using the potential agencies in reception of asylum seekers within groups have been developed and refugees. In 2003, an effort to and are developing. One example is promote integration projects and the mentoring projects in which immigrant dissemination of their good practices students monitor younger co-ethnics was started under the so-called INTI during their secondary education.16 program.This program is expected to Other examples include immigrant expand significantly in the coming years. organizations mobilizing their rank and file for training and language courses The significance of such EC-financed or for labor market projects.17 activity for the development of inte- gration policies can be high, if such But local policies should involve activities enable local actors to important institutional actors in the develop and implement strategic receiving society as well, such as projects, if successful pilot projects are churches, trade unions, employer analyzed and reported systematically, organizations, political parties, and the and if these results are disseminated as media. In brief, the whole of civil examples of good practices. society should be involved. Such nongovernmental partners are important in two ways. First, they play a key role Strategi es an d I nstruments as direct partners in the implementa- for Local Policies tion of policies. But they may be even more important as political actors, Evaluations of local policies point influencing the political climate and at a number of important strategic contributing to the framing of policy

16 M. Crul, “Turkish and Moroccan Sibling Support and School Achievement Levels: An Optimistic View” Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences 35 (1999): 110-128; M. Crul, “Success Breeds Success. Moroccan and Turkish Student Mentors in the Netherlands,” International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling 24 (2002): 275-287. 17 A. Zolberg and A. J. Clarkin, Sharing Integration Experiences: Innovative Community Practices on Two Continents (New York: International Center for Migration, Ethnicity and Citizenship, New School University, 2003).

Integration Processes of Migrants: Research Findings and Policy Lessons 47 questions in such a way that adequate integration policies. Monitoring is a policies are accepted. They may be device for developing awareness and important agents in combating establishing an empirically based exclusion, discrimination, and diagnosis and thereby creating an xenophobia. In the Swiss case, for instrument for steering policies. The example, institutional agents like basic assumption here is that the churches, trade unions, and employer position of newcomers in a society is organizations have often helped to determined to a great extent by the avert the danger of anti-immigrant (mostly unintended) differential referenda. In the German case, trade impact of general public institutions. unions and churches have been — in Because of the socio-economic status, the absence of government integration their immigration-related characteristics, policies — the most important actors and sometimes their cultural/religious and promotors in the integration characteristics, the outcomes for process of foreign workers. immigrants may be unequal. Such unintended outcomes may include Second, local integration policies higher unemployment and thus (if should define clear priorities for action access is permitted) overrepresentation in a number of domains. For long-term on social welfare benefit regulations. immigrants, priority should be given to Other outcomes may include lower domains in which local authorities educational attainment of immigrant have effective and generally accepted children or concentration/segregation instruments with which to promote through housing policies and integration (and prevent exclusion): regulations. the economic domain of work and the social domain, particularly education, Turning this reasoning around means health, and housing. In the long term, that monitoring outcomes can lead to policies in the political and cultural awareness of how general public insti- domain (including religion) are crucial tutions function for immigrants. When for integrating immigrants. The initial the procedures through which the forms of policies in the latter domains unequal outcomes come into being are may depend, to a great extent, on scrutinized, a clear diagnosis should existing institutional arrangements in result. At the EU level, the Annual receiving societies and cities. In the Report of States — a regular report long run, however, gradual changes established by the Thessaloniki towards more inclusive policies are Summit in June 2003 — is intended indispensable. to have this same function as an instrument for progressive policymaking. On the more concrete level of strate- gic instruments, evaluations suggest A second important element for local that an important strategy is that of policies is to provide newcomers with monitoring outcomes of both general the basic tools they need to acquire a public institutions and specific place in society independently:

48 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century a toolkit for training in the language politics and policymaking, especially of the society of settlement, basic in policies that affect immigrants’ knowledge of that society, civic positions. Local policies in this legal- training, etc. The basic idea here (and political domain are, to a great extent, the lesson from earlier policies related dependent on immigration, integra- to temporary migrants and guest tion, and naturalization policies at the workers) is that immigrants should be national level. But this dependence given the necessary tools to prepare has its limits. First of all, local them for full participation in society. policymakers have discretionary Several countries and cities are power in the implementation of developing policies in this field. It is national regulations. Furthermore, important, however, to look at such they may develop effective alternative efforts as primarily facilitating the channels for participation, thereby beginning of an integration process creating a city-related form of (and thus avoid normative claims of inclusion and citizenship. adaptation or assimilation). Preferably such activities should take place in Second, integration policies should connection with trajectories for labor be comprehensive in the dimensions market integration or further education. and domains covered, thereby signifying that they represent not only the concerns of the native Policy Fundamentals and majority, but are also built on needs as Dilemmas defined by immigrants. The economic and social domains should take There are many lessons to be priority, with the understanding that drawn from the foregoing general in the long term, policies in the political observations on integration processes and cultural domains are indispensable and related policies. Three fundamentals for integration. The forms that such (which may sometimes present policies may take depend in practice themselves for policymakers as on the existing institutional arrange- dilemmas) can be derived from the ments in receiving societies and cities, logic of integration processes. and on the political willingness to change these to become gradually The first is that a key condition more inclusive. for effective integration policies is transparency of admission of immigrants Third, local integration policies and their residential and legal status should follow strategies and tactics (the immigration-integration nexus). that engage different partners in the Expectations of long-term residence, integration process at various levels. and how such expectations are They should combine “top down” handled in reality, should be expressed activation elements with “bottom up” in an adequate legal position and mobilization. They should define the opportunities to participate in process of integration as “open,”

Integration Processes of Migrants: Research Findings and Policy Lessons 49 within the rules of liberal-democratic majority population. It could also societies, leaving room for a more result in an inclusive process in diverse, but cohesive, society as a result. which immigrants feel recognized.

The preceding observations on the logic of policymaking give rise to some additional fundamentals or dilemmas. The first is that establishing policies requires not only solid scientific knowledge of the logic of integration processes, but also an adequate political definition that makes such policies politically acceptable and endorsed. What is needed is a balanced framework that does not hide problems to be solved, but primarily stresses the common interests of all. There is much to be gained here: not only the avoidance of crises that would become inevitable if problems were consistently neglected, but also the restoration and promotion of cohesiveness in cities and states that makes it possible to reap the potential fruits of immigration. Acceptance of immigrants and their active participation is an essential condition in such a framework. New forms of negotiated diversity will result from it. On this front there is still much work to do for all actors, but primarily for politicians.

A second lesson is that the viability of integration policies in the long term depends heavily on realistic targets to be attained, as well as on adequate analysis of the institutional setting and the options it can support. Such a practical (and less ideology-driven) approach, when combined with the active participation of immigrants and their organizations, could head off potential backlashes among the

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52 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Citizenship

T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Pat ri c k We i l ecent decades have witnessed a This chapter considers four “baskets” R remarkable resurgence of inter- of citizenship issues: access to citizen- est in issues of citizenship ship, dual nationality, political integra- among policy-makers, academics, and tion, and social and economic rights. the public. An important aspect of the Each section presents policy recom- public debate has been the challenge mendations. posed by large-scale immigration. For any state, the arrival and settlement of large numbers of newcomers raises Access to Citizensh i p important citizenship questions. Birthright Citizenship For modern liberal-democratic states, The traditional approach to classifying citizenship is fundamentally a legal sta- how states endow citizenship has been tus that designates full membership in to contrast regimes based on jus soli that state. As a legal status, citizenship (making birth on the state’s territory carries significant rights and duties the crucial determinant) with those that establish nowadays a formal basis based on jus sanguinis (making descent of equality for all of its bearers in a from a parent with nationality the key particular state. Large-scale immigra- determinant). It has been common to tion presents a challenge for states to characterize jus soli regimes as inclusive the extent it produces a settled popula- — more “immigrant-friendly” — tion of less-than-full members with because they endow full membership less-than-full rights and duties. on the children of immigrants at birth; jus sanguinis regimes, in contrast, have Migration makes host societies more been portrayed as exclusive, ethnicity- culturally and socially diverse. It can based policies, sometimes leaving bring new talent and energy, expand second- and third-generation persons the creative horizons of all members, without the citizenship of the state in and enhance the domestic labor pool. which they are born. These characteri- But migration can also be a source of zations are not accurate as an historical tension and anxiety. Citizenship policy matter and the modern practice of can be an effective tool for promoting states is dramatically undercutting the the smooth inclusion of new members. workability of the categorization. Any sound citizenship policy must weigh a variety of complex factors, In 18th century Europe, jus soli was and it must consider deep questions the dominant criterion of nationality of belonging, commitment, and social law. The practice derived from feudal and political integration. In liberal- concepts in which human beings were democratic states, citizenship policy linked to the lord who held the land must also be closely guided by the where they were born. The French norms of fairness and justice that Revolution broke from this feudal tradi- are fundamental to modern liberal- tion and allegiance. The Civil Code of democratic ideals. 1804 granted French nationality at

54 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century birth only to a child born to a French policies. Jus soli rules appear overinclu- father, either in France or abroad. This sive to the extent they recognize the policy of jus sanguinis, representing a citizenship of children born to immi- modern innovation, was not ethnically grants with but slight ties to their motivated; it simply meant that indi- country of residence — such as short- vidual rights and family had become term visitors or immigrants in an irregu- more important than subjecthood and lar status who have been in the country state power. This innovation was exten- a short period of time. Jus soli principles sively borrowed and became the law of also appear underinclusive as regards Austria (1811), Belgium (1831), Spain children born to citizens traveling or (1837), Prussia (1842), Italy (1865), residing outside their state. It is not Russia (1864), the Netherlands (1888), surprising that virtually all jus soli states (1892), and Sweden (1894). recognize the citizenship of some classes of children born to citizens beyond The British tradition of jus soli was state borders. Jus sanguinis rules fre- transplanted unaltered to its colonies quently appear underinclusive, denying in Europe (Ireland), Africa (South citizenship to children and grandchil- Africa), North America (the US and dren of immigrants who are fully social- Canada), and Australia. Most of these ized in their country of birth and may states were countries of immigration, not have citizenship in their parents’ and the legal tradition fulfilled state or grandparents’ country of origin. interest in terms of the integration of immigrants’ children. These developments lead to questions about the viability of the jus soli/jus For most continental European coun- sanguinis analysis. A more penetrating tries that were countries of emigration, and useful analysis of citizenship policies jus sanguinis allowed the maintenance would — considering immigration — of links with citizens abroad. Recent adopt generations as the category for decades have brought large-scale immi- examination. This approach more gration to these states, and most have accurately reflects the social realities adopted jus soli provisions that permit of the immigration process by linking second or third-generation immigrants acquisition rules to differences in the to access citizenship at birth or later stages of settlement. It would also on. At the same time, some traditional reflect legal changes in states that jus soli countries (such as the UK, have blurred the traditional lines Portugal, and South Africa) have between jus soli and jus sanguinis. adopted restrictive rules, such as limiting birthright citizenship to This analysis is premised on the idea children born to lawfully admitted that it is desirable that immigrants and and settled immigrants. their descendants become citizens and have the right to become citizens. This Strict adherence to either system fails premise may be defended as a matter to generate fully appropriate citizenship of morality (i.e., the importance to the

Citizenship 55 individual of state membership in a As a sociological matter, the vast world of nation-states), as a necessary majority of the third generation will implication of a state’s commitment to make their lives in their country of democratic norms (i.e., that persons birth, and their ties to their grandpar- have a right to participate in political ents’ country of origin may well be systems that rule them), and as a slight. Because their parents have been socially advantageous public policy socialized in the country of immigra- (to the extent that citizenship aids in tion, there is no justification for the process of integration). It may requiring them to wait until majority even be justified in terms of protecting to naturalize. A number of jus sanguinis the sovereignty of the state, which states have rules that confer citizen- can be perceived as challenged by the ship on third-generation children at development of large foreign popula- birth, such as France (since 1889), the tions born in the country but dependent Netherlands (since 1953), Spain (since legally on a foreign state. 1990), and Belgium (since 1992).

The first generation consists of Another implication of a “generations people born and raised in another approach” pertains to the second country who immigrate to a new generation. Specifically: country as adults. The second genera- In jus sanguinis states, a child born tion consists of the children of the to immigrants on national territory first generation who are born in the should be entitled to citizenship if host society. In a deviation from the child or one of the child’s par- traditional categorization, this chapter ents has lawfully resided there for also includes in the second generation a period of years. those who were born in a foreign country but immigrated at an early For the second generation, socialization age and were primarily socialized will take place in their country of in the host society. The third birth. They are, for all practical purposes, generation comprises the grandchil- members of the society in which they dren of the first generation, who are reside. In jus soli states, of course, such presumed to have been born and children will be citizens at birth. raised in the host society. But the authors recognize that the traditions and values of jus sanguinis A “generations approach” yields states may vary from state to state. important results for citizenship policy. Accordingly, a range of policies may be acceptable so long as this underlying As a first recommendation: principle is honored: citizenship for the Third-generation immigrants second generation should follow as a should automatically acquire the matter of course if either they or a citizenship of their parent’s host parent has attained and maintained society at birth. lawful status in the host country for some period of years. France, Belgium,

56 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century , Sweden, Denmark, the Naturalization Netherlands, and Italy attribute citi- Naturalization is the process by which zenship to children born in their coun- members of the first generation attain try to foreign parents after a number of citizenship in a host country. Consistent years of the child’s residence (e.g., a with an approach that focuses on the period of time linked to primary educa- growing ties of immigrants to their tion). In Germany, citizenship is attrib- countries of settlement, the requirements uted at birth to children of foreign for naturalization should decrease with parents who are permanent residents. If lengthy residence. Standards may require these children possess another citizen- that an immigrant provide some proof ship they have to choose between their of integration, but the criteria for different citizenships at the age of 23. naturalization should be clear, limited, precise, and objective. Conditions Neither an automatic jus soli rule nor a that are not consistent with liberal- birth-plus-lawful-residence approach democratic citizenship norms should provides citizenship to the foreign-born be reconsidered. Specifically: children of immigrants who arrive States may reasonably require a in a host country at an early age. period of residence and knowledge Traditionally, these children have been of the language; and they may compelled to go through the naturaliza- also take into account a criminal tion process (whether they have settled record. in a jus soli or jus sanguinis state) despite A required period of residence should the fact that they are largely indistin- not exceed five years. Language guishable from second-generation requirements should be related to the children or children of citizens. The circumstances of the applicant. A authors believe that the strong likeli- criminal record should not be a hood of socialization in the state of resi- permanent barrier to citizenship where dence combined with a goal of effective it is not a ground of deportation. If integration of immigrants supports poli- knowledge of history and/or culture is cies recognizing citizenship for these required, the standards should be related children, provided that they have to the circumstances of the applicant. received significant social or educational Overly broad or vague conditions formation in their country of settlement. for citizenship, such as require- Such socialization could be established ments of “good moral character” by long-term residence (perhaps 10 or “evidence of integration with years) or a significant period of school- society,” should be avoided. ing (perhaps six years). Accord-ingly, a In this regard, official discretion should further recommendation is that: be limited and subject to judicial review. Foreign-born children who Naturalization fees should be immigrate at an early age and reasonable and not deter access who meet specified residency or to citizenship. educational requirements should Individuals lacking adequate be entitled to citizenship. resources should be exempted from

Citizenship 57 a naturalization fee. States should countries of origin may produce dual ensure that adequate resources are nationality via naturalization or devoted to naturalization. through jus soli citizenship rules.

Despite common assertions that dual Managing Dual nationality weakens commitments to Nationality states or causes irreconcilable conflicts for individuals, there is no convincing In today’s world, dual citizenship is empirical evidence to support these increasingly common, despite interna- claims. Opponents of dual nationality tional legal norms formally opposed to often treat national allegiance as such a status. Because this opposition inherently exclusive and indivisible. is increasingly at odds with modern But whatever force this argument may needs and realities, actual state policies have had in the 19th or 20th centuries against dual nationality have been in the US or Germany, it carries far widely but unevenly eroded. The old less weight today. Modern nations in stance of some states (Germany, Japan, overwhelming proportions tolerate or United States) against dual nationality encourage a wide range of competing appears increasingly inappropriate and, loyalties and affirmations in civil society in fact, has been undermined by legal — to family, business, local community, changes in many sending and receiving religious denominations, non-govern- states. More appropriate for today’s mental organizations promoting political world would be policies that seek to and nonpolitical causes — and do not manage, rather than prevent, the treat such allegiances (even when they incidence of dual nationality. have an international dimension) as incompatible with a healthy level of The principal reason for the prolifera- loyalty to the nation-state. Dual tion of dual (and multiple) nationality nationals also may feel strong ties to is now treated as commonplace: The two nation-states without ordinarily world has become progressively more sensing that the commitment to one interconnected through technologies compromises or clashes with their that greatly facilitate communications, loyalty to the other. This is not to say travel, and commerce, and through that allegiance to the nation-state is not political changes that are increasingly important. The contrary is true: It calls receptive to cross-border trade and forth the engagement in politics that investment. More people, at all levels democracies need. But such commit- of the economic and social ladder, live ment to a democratic polity is certainly outside their countries of origin. Cross- possible in the modern world even if national marriages have proliferated, one holds two or more nationalities. and the children in these families typically obtain both parents’ national- The weakened case for mono- ities. Even among couples of the same nationality is complemented by nationality, residence outside their increasingly persuasive reasons for

58 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century modern liberal-democratic states to States should readily permit accept dual nationality. Accepting the renunciation of a nationality the legitimacy of dual nationality is by dual nationals as long as justified as a matter of respect for a the decision would not leave migrant’s connections and affiliations them stateless. with the country of origin. In wishing The procedures followed by states to deepen ties with the country of should assure a citizen’s full deliberation settlement, immigrants frequently and free choice. neither wish, nor see the need, to cast Where laws, obligations, or off completely their links to another entitlements conflict, primacy country. And many immigrants who should be given to the country of are otherwise eligible for citizenship principal residence. may not apply if attaining citizenship In the private-law realm, conflict-of- requires them to sever their legal ties law issues once resolved by reference to their original country. to the law of the country of nationality should come to be governed by the law The central premise, then, is this: In of the country of principal or habitual the conditions of the modern world, residence. Similarly, military obligations dual nationality often reflects the real- should be primarily to the country of ity of complex loyalties and allegiances principal residence. A corollary to in an increasingly interconnected these conclusions is that a dual national world. The status of dual nationality should look first to the country of should no longer be suppressed, but principal residence for rights and rather it should be expressly accepted entitlements. and managed more thoughtfully. To ensure a genuine link between The following specific guiding a state and a citizen, citizenship principles are relevant: should not be perpetuated to States should accept the distant generations after the legitimacy of dual or multiple family has lost all real contact nationality when it reflects an with the state involved. individual’s genuine link to the The authors’ analysis is based on the countries concerned. view that a person can maintain effec- States should repeal legal provisions tive and affective ties to two states, that require renunciation of former and that conflicts between obligations nationalities upon naturalization or to two states can be managed. But dual that impose the loss of nationality on nationality should not follow as a matter citizens who naturalize elsewhere. of course or right when a person has no States should sustain gender-neutral real stake in a country whose citizen- rules that allow children to inherit the ship was held by a distant relative. nationality of both parents, and they Rather, states should require some should not require dual-national chil- lifetime link by a parent with the country dren to choose among nationalities of nationality before that parent may upon attaining majority. transmit citizenship jure sanguinis.

Citizenship 59 Furthermore, states may condition they frequently have perspectives on the continuation of the citizenship issues that enhance the consideration of a child born abroad on some later of public policies. Participation is reasonable period of actual residence important training for the kind of or to some concrete link to the engaged citizenship that most liberal country of origin. democracies seek to foster. It can famil- Upon taking an elected position iarize noncitizens s with the political in a national government, a culture and imbue them with a sense dual national should generally of belonging that can make the decision be expected to surrender the to naturalize more attractive. From this other nationality. perspective, state policies that restrict Dual status, however, should not be political liberties of noncitizens resi- considered a bar to civil-service jobs. dents seem counterproductive, and a persuasive case can be made for granti- ng settled immigrants a local franchise. Citizenship Policies and Political Integration Political Liberties and Citizenship Liberal democracies guarantee all their Citizenship has forever been closely citizens’ basic liberties such as freedom linked to political participation. In of opinion, expression, peaceful assem- modern democratic states, many social bly, and association. Citizens participate and economic rights previously enjoyed in political life not only by casting their only by citizens are now granted to votes but also by debating politics in noncitizens on the basis of legal private and public arenas, by joining residence and employment or as political parties, and by demonstrating universal human rights. But nationality in the streets. Today these liberties are still remains a significant dividing line no longer the rights of citizens only; when it comes to political participation. they have been recognized as universal For immigrants, then, acquiring the human rights. nationality of the host society has there- fore always been the most important step Many democratic states have in the past towards political integration. But formal generally prohibited political activity by citizenship is not a sufficient condition noncitizens s. A number of countries for political integration, nor need it be still have special constraints on the lib- a necessary condition for enjoying erties of expression, assembly, and asso- certain political rights. ciation for noncitizens s. Even where the political liberties of noncitizens s are Promoting political participation of not formally restricted, they may be cur- settled immigrants recognizes that they tailed in practice by wide-ranging and are, in the main, fully functioning discretionary powers of deportation. members of the social and economic States have legitimate interests in life of a society, that they have an removing persons who pose imminent interest in their communities, and that threats to national security or public

60 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century safety. But to permit deportations for the The basic liberties of freedom of exercise of political liberties has an thought and expression, associa- obvious chilling effect on political par- tion, and assembly are universal ticipation. Accordingly, in the absence human rights, whose exercise of a clear and present danger for nation- should not be dependent on al security, only those political activities nationality tests. that are punishable under criminal law should lead to deportations. Citizenship and the Franchise Although voting rights for noncitizens Institutions of receiving states can s are rather uncommon, there are encourage and promote forms of politi- several significant examples of such cal activity that are conducive to inte- arrangements. In New Zealand, all gration. By forming their own associa- permanent legal residents have tions and making their voices heard in enjoyed general suffrage in all elections political debates, immigrants become since 1975 (although not the right to familiar with the political culture of be elected). In Britain, citizens from the country and insert themselves into Commonwealth countries and Ireland its political institutions. The freedom can not only vote but also run as can- to engage in political activities has didates in elections at all levels. Ireland several integrative effects. It permits responded in 1985 by granting the immigrants to organize themselves, to national franchise to British citizens. It articulate their interests, and to set has also had local suffrage rights for all their demands on the political agenda; foreign residents since 1963 and it also helps to avoid or counterbalance eligibility for office since 1974. In paternalistic representation by organi- 1975, Sweden introduced the vote in zations that promote the interests of local and regional elections and in immigrants but are run exclusively by referenda for all noncitizens s with native citizens. Furthermore, it allows three years of legal residence. for a free articulation of differences of Denmark, Norway, and Finland have ideology, interests, and identities similarly extended local voting rights among migrants and undermines the that were originally only granted to perception that they are a homogenous citizens of Nordic countries. In 1985, group of outsiders. The experience and the Netherlands adopted a local practice of democratic freedoms may franchise independent of nationality also have an educational effect for after five years of residence. Thus, a those immigrants who come from less franchise for noncitizens s is not a democratic countries. It shapes their utopian goal; it has become a democratic outlook towards their country of origin norm in several countries. There is no and often turns emigrants into a force evidence that it undermines the supporting democratic reform there. integrity of the democratic process, and none of the countries that have Based on these considerations, it is introduced it since World War II have suggested that: seriously considered abolishing it.

Citizenship 61 Any discussion of the franchise for use their vote to promote the interests immigrants must consider the basic of their state of origin or to import its democratic premise that what concerns political conflicts. However, this all should be decided by all. More applies just as well to dual nationals specifically, persons who are subject to and even to those who have renounced the laws of the state, who are currently their previous nationality. A third informed about the issues at stake, and objection is raised in those countries who will be affected by future legislation where foreign nationals are exempted should not be excluded from electing from citizenship obligations such as representatives or running as candi- military or jury service. While con- dates. Together, these considerations scription has indeed been an important disqualify short-term visitors but not historic element of citizenship, this is long-term residents. Most laws of no longer the case. The general duty democratic states apply not only to to obey the laws and the duty to pay their citizens, but to all who live in the taxes is the same for citizens and territory. noncitizens immigrants pay noncitizens s. Other legal obligations taxes, but if they are disenfranchised such as military conscription or jury they have no say over how the money service are not imposed on all citizens is spent. Voters should also be well but only on specific groups or allow for informed about candidates and issues on numerous exemptions. If many citizens the political agenda. Permanent resi- can vote while being exempted from dents are generally just as much exposed these obligations, the argument from to mass media and party campaigns as inequality of duties provides only citizens are. Finally, most permanent weak support for rules that exclude residents will also have to bear the noncitizens s from the franchise. future consequences of political deci- sions in which they participate and are There are two routes towards equal therefore likely to vote responsibly. political rights for immigrants and the native population. One is to extend Opponents of an immigrant franchise the franchise, the other is to facilitate raise a number of other objections that and promote access to citizenship. refer to potential abuse, conflicts of The question is then: Should foreign loyalty, or a lack of corresponding nationals be represented in political obligations. The first concern is that decisions even if they themselves newcomers, who are unfamiliar with choose not to become formal members the political system and democratic of the political community? In states norms, can be easily mobilized to cast where naturalization is encouraged their votes collectively and without and offered on fair terms and where proper consideration. This argument second and third generations are does not hold if a sufficient time of included through jus soli rules, the case residence is required before the fran- for a noncitizens franchise loses much chise can be exercised. The second of its urgency. Facilitating access to objection is that foreign nationals may citizenship and granting noncitizens

62 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century immigrants secure residence, full liber- policy areas, such as public housing, ties, and welfare benefits are equally health services, and education, where important tasks. If both are carried municipal authorities tend to have out, an extension of the general fran- strong competencies. Granting them chise is not an essential requirement. the franchise at a local level may thus provide political representation in A general franchise for noncitizens s, decisions that affect their most then, should not be seen as an impera- immediate interests. tive but rather as a legitimate political option. Different constitutional Second, some reasons for excluding traditions and historic conceptions noncitizens s from the national elec- of citizenship may justify, as well as tions do not apply at the local level. explain, policy differences in this area. In contrast with a national polity, local The authors therefore conclude that: political communities have no immigra- In those states with open access to tion controls that distinguish between citizenship through naturalization citizens and noncitizens s. The right of and automatic acquisition, core free movement within the territory of a political rights, such as access to democratic state is not tied to national- high public office or the right to ity. Membership in a municipality or vote in national elections, may be federal province shifts automatically reserved for their nationals. with a change of residence. Furthermore, the argument that foreign nationals are The discussion so far has concerned exempted from some obligations of voting in national elections. citizenship does not apply at the Significantly different considerations municipal level. In the main, local are relevant at the local level. citizenship has no specific legal duties Immigrants have specific interests in that are exclusively imposed on citizens. local politics and develop local identi- ties. Most contemporary migrants are Therefore: attracted to big cities and the economic In contrast to elections for and cultural opportunities they offer. In national offices, citizenship should receiving countries, immigrants tend to not be used as a relevant criterion develop an urban identity that can for democratic representation in be easily combined with an ongoing local political communities. national affiliation to their countries of Settled immigrants should be origin. Even those who are not ready to granted a local franchise after join the wider political community of some years of legal residence. their host country feel that they have a stake in the city. This sense of belong- Promoting Political ing to the city can be expressed by Participation Among Groups participating in local elections. As of Immigrant Origin members of low-income groups, immi- Communities of immigrant origin grants are also particularly affected by include citizens as well as noncitizens

Citizenship 63 residents. The political integration of interaction with the native popula- these ethnic minorities depends not tion. Participation in civil society only on their individual rights (which prepares immigrants for political are formally equal for those among participation and provides them with their members who are citizens) but influence in the policymaking process. also on opportunities and incentives Integration into civil society is not a for their participation in political life. one-way street of assimilation into the institutions of mainstream society, but It is neither necessary nor reasonable also offers opportunities for groups of to expect communities of immigrant immigrant origin to organize around origin to participate or to be elected in their specific interests and identities proportion to their population numbers, as ethnic minorities. Both forms of given the distinctive characteristics participation will generally contribute and priorities of immigrants settling in to political integration. Empirical a new country. Where these groups research confirms that rates of voting have high percentages of recent arrivals, rise significantly with the membership or of people who plan to return to of groups of immigrant origin in their country of origin, or of people associations of mainstream society who come from countries with no such as churches, sports and leisure tradition of democratic participation, clubs, trade unions, and neighborhood it is highly likely that they will have committees. lower rates of participation, even where the host society enables and The lesson for public policy is that encourages their participation. municipal and national administra- tions should support the formation Nonetheless, the persistent under- of associational networks and consult representation of immigrant-origin them regularly on immigration and communities is a concern. Such integration policies, as well as on under-representation may indicate general issues affecting all citizens. structural barriers to participation Formal or informal consultation and social marginalization of ethnic mechanisms can be important minorities, particularly where it exists instruments for political integration, for long-settled populations. The goal, creating relations of trust between therefore, should not be to guarantee public administrations and spokesper- proportional representation of groups sons of immigrant communities. of immigrant origin, but rather to They also serve as two-way transmis- identify and remove structural and sion belts for integration policies: social barriers to effective participation. Immigrant groups can voice grievances Political participation depends not and suggest policy reforms in a only on the socioeconomic position low-confrontation setting; public of individuals within the group, but administrators can obtain information also on the internal structure of and foster cooperation in the minority communities and their implementation of their programs.

64 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Many European cities have established from campaigns that stigmatize eth- consultative bodies on immigrant poli- nic minorities and from alliances cies. The members of these committees with other parties that incite eth- are appointed by municipal authorities, nic prejudice and racial hatred. designated by immigrant associations, or elected by the immigrant communi- ties themselves. While democratic Social and Economic elections for consultative committees Rights and Citizenship obviously strengthen the mandate of representatives, they should not be accepted as a surrogate for the local Benefit Programs franchise. Such consultative bodies A number of arguments may be offered are special arrangements for making a in support of limiting noncitizens s’ public administration more responsive access to public benefits. First, income to a particular group, whereas a local disparities between developed and franchise for noncitizens s establishes developing countries are so wide that a common local citizenship shared by benefits offered by the host country all residents. can exceed income opportunities in the sending countries. As a result, These arguments suggest: nations that offer immigrants generous Equal formal rights are not enough benefits may serve as a magnet for to achieve effective political par- poor immigrants who would qualify for ticipation of groups of immigrant subsidies and may repel higher-earning origin. immigrants who would contribute taxes to pay for benefits. Thus, welfare’s Electoral systems should be scrutinized availability changes the composition of for overt and hidden barriers that the immigration flow and enables diminish opportunities for members of some unintegrated immigrants to stay such groups to vote, run for office, or who would have otherwise returned. be elected. Public policies should encourage the participation of groups Second, immigrants are said to repre- of immigrant origin in civil society. sent a disproportionately large share of Political authorities should establish welfare users, imposing high costs on mechanisms of cooperation and con- taxpayers. This drain on state resources sultation that involve associations of may jeopardize the social contract that these groups in processes of policy for- maintains the welfare state and turn mation and implementation. public opinion against more inclusive immigration policies. It might also be Furthermore: argued that an immigrant’s support Democratic political parties should fall to his or her sponsor, who should list candidates of immigrant benefits from being able to unite with origins on local and regional pri- a family member or by obtaining a new mary ballots and should refrain employee (or both, in some instances).

Citizenship 65 Finally, it is suggested that restricting usual source of care than their coun- benefits to citizens provides an incen- terparts in families headed by a citizen. tive to naturalize. The naturalization Similar results, presumably, would process, in turn, has an independent obtain in the other industrialized integrating effect produced by require- countries that have introduced benefit ments to learn the language and to restrictions. Restricted access to public develop at least a rudimentary historical, health insurance, coupled with the political, and cultural understanding diminished medical care that results, of the host country. therefore, can lead to poor and declin- ing health outcomes for children. It is But the rationing of benefits by also likely that limiting access to citizenship raises substantial concerns publicly subsidized work supports such as well. In the first instance, such as childcare, transportation assistance, schemes discriminate against settled and job and language training will residents by putting them in the slow immigrants’ labor-force mobility. position of having to contribute to the Furthermore, policies that bar immi- state without receiving the reciprocal grants from cash transfers also generally benefits that flow to other members. bar them from a range of work supports such as job and language training, Second, restrictions on rights may give transportation assistance, childcare sub- citizenship an increasingly instrumental sidies, and health insurance. Denying value as immigrants naturalize to obtain noncitizens s these basic work supports safety-net or work-support services or to can only slow economic integration. relieve their sponsors of a binding sup- port contract. The resulting conception Fourth, restricting legal noncitizens s’ of citizenship may be viewed as being at access to public benefits — especially odds with the nation-building goal of in jus soli nations — has unintended promoting durable and wholehearted and arguably discriminatory spillover civic engagement. effects on citizen children. In the US, three-quarters of all children in immi- Third, restrictions on noncitizens s’ grant families (i.e., with one or more access to non-contributory benefits foreign-born parents) are citizens. imposed by Austria, the US, and Since enactment of the 1996 welfare Britain raise integration concerns. In legislation in the US, there has been a the US, the families that have been reduction in benefits use not just cut off from social benefits by new among the noncitizens adults who citizenship restrictions are among the were the policies’ targets, but also neediest. Immigrant children in the among the citizen children who live in US are more likely to be poor, to live their families and within the same, in overcrowded housing, and to report typically constrained, family budget. being in poor health than children of natives. Not surprisingly, they are far Fifth, federal benefit restrictions less likely to be insured or to have a decouple the national government’s role

66 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century as gatekeeper from its responsibility for social benefits. Settled immigrant paying the costs of newcomers’ settle- status rather than citizenship ment. These costs, then, fall dispropor- should suffice for access to most tionately on the receiving community. benefits made available under the To the extent that state and local welfare state. governments follow the national government’s lead in erecting eligibility At the same time, however, immi- restrictions, noncitizens s are likely to grants’ sponsors should carry a time- suffer more limited freedom of move- limited support obligation for at least ment than their citizen counterparts. some cash and other benefit programs. As the decision to grant or deny health But such obligations should not and other benefits falls increasingly to impose an open-ended fiscal liability subnational units of government, levels on immigrants’ sponsors, and they of food insecurity, health-care access, should not lead to gross disparities and outcomes among immigrants may between the obligations imposed on vary more widely than among citizens. the families of legal immigrants and those imposed on citizens. Thus: Finally, the symbolic message that such Sponsor support obligations exclusions send to established immi- should not impose an open-ended grant populations can be alienating, fiscal liability on immigrants’ effectively discouraging the sentiments sponsors. of membership that would promote citizenship. Labor Market Access and Citizenship These concerns substantially outweigh Citizenship matters in the rationing of the arguments offered in support of public-sector jobs across most states. exclusion of presumptively permanent While blanket exclusions of nonciti- immigrants from social benefits. Thus, zens s from civil-service jobs have been citizenship status should not be the invalidated by the courts in the US, gatekeeper to access to social benefits specific restrictions regarding positions and the labor market. Rather, immi- deemed to be related to the exercise of grants who have a status that authoriz- state power have been upheld. Along es or presumes settlement in the state similar lines, France restricts all rail- should be guaranteed eligibility on way, postal, and hospital jobs to EU terms similar to those established for citizens. Germany bars third-country citizens. Adopting this broader under- nationals from all jobs in government standing of membership complements service, including employment in pub- and supports the institution of citizen- lic transportation and kindergarten. In ship in liberal democracies. countries where major economic sec- tors are administered by the govern- Specifically: ment, the implications of reserving Citizenship should not be used to public-sector jobs for citizens are more ration access to welfare and other far reaching.

Citizenship 67 Two widely accepted rationales for eligibility for public benefits applies restricting public sector employment to public-sector employment as well: are commonly advanced. Such policies Because noncitizens s assume most of are said to promote national security the societal obligations required of cit- and to limit public-policy decision- izens, they should be eligible for most making to full members of the state. of the social and economic opportuni- There are, however, other rationales ties afforded by states to their citizens. for limiting noncitizens s’ access to public employment that sweep far On balance, therefore, states that have more broadly. These include giving blanket exclusions of noncitizens s noncitizens s an incentive to naturalize from public-service jobs should rethink or simply reserving a valuable public such policies. While it is reasonable to good for the citizenry. make exceptions for positions that implicate national-security or high- There are strong reasons to adopt level policymaking positions — just as more inclusionary policies regarding it may be reasonable to ask high-level noncitizens s’ access to public-sector government officials to relinquish jobs. From an instrumental perspective, citizenship in another state — such it could be argued that immigrants exceptions should be closely circum- represent an expanding share of the scribed. Scant justification, for total labor force and that their example, exists for limiting teaching exclusion from the public sector positions in public schools to citizens. restricts governments’ access to a potentially rich labor pool. In an era Settled immigrants frequently enjoy of demographic change, it makes sense the same access to the private labor to include members of language and market as citizens. Furthermore, other minorities in the public service national policies generally do not to promote better communication encourage private employers to between communities of immigrant discriminate in favor of citizens, and origin and police forces, public-school some states have express prohibitions faculties, licensing offices, and the on such discrimination. like. Further, an inclusionary approach to public employment can promote Australia, Britain, Canada, and the a shared identity of immigrants with US offer striking examples of open the state and the nation, rather than access from the time of admission to their withdrawal or exclusion from it. both the labor market and self-employ- In some cases, this may require not ment. This access exceeds some of the only liberal hiring policies, but most progressive, inclusionary proposals also special accommodations by contemplated for the EU. As in the mainstream institutions. area of social welfare, these progressive policies in English-speaking states may From an equity perspective, an argu- be largely a function of immigration ment made in support of immigrant rules, which admit immigrants as

68 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century permanent residents on track for labor-market demand. Access to more citizenship rather than as temporary secure jobs in the large, semi-public labor migrants. sector is heavily influenced by political patronage, strong trade-union There are, however, important excep- control, and citizenship requirements, tions to this overall pattern of compar- which, taken together, virtually atively inclusionary labor-market poli- exclude immigrant workers. cies. While citizens from EU countries enjoy free movement and open access Plainly, policies that facilitate the to the labor markets in other EU acquisition of nationality would open countries, third-country nationals do access to employment for third-country not benefit from such rights; their nationals within the EU. But other rights to residence and employment policies may also hold promise. In are generally defined by and limited to spring 2001, the European Commission the EU state that authorized their issued a directive proposing that after admission. In Germany, for example, five years, third-country nationals be family members of third-country allowed to work in EU states other nationals who do not hold unrestricted than their country of residence. residence or work permits can be refused a labor permit if a German or These considerations suggest: EU citizen is available for the job. In Employment policies, like welfare some German regions these family rules, should be constructed to members — who will likely become promote integration of settled long-term, if not permanent, residents immigrants. Citizenship should — can be excluded from all employ- not be erected as a barrier to the ment. Moreover, access to the perma- labor market. nent-residence status needed for free labor movement within Germany is Citizenship should not be a limited by requirements that the appli- condition for the granting of cant pass language tests and have a professional licenses, for long employment record. apprenticeships, or for entry into the civil service or the great Extensive restrictions on established majority of public-sector jobs. noncitizens s’ access to employment also exist in Austria. Family members States should implement of third-country nationals can be anti-discrimination policies, excluded from the labor market for a which, when coupled with an period of four to eight years. And the enforcement system that is carefully employment rights of many established designed and adequately funded, third-country nationals remain can be an important tool in insecure, as they must periodically ensuring that immigrant rights renew their work permits and can be to access to private employment turned down depending on patterns of are protected.

Citizenship 69 This chapter is adapted from References Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration (2001), T. A. Aleinikoff & Aleinikoff, A. and D. Klusmeyer, eds. From D. Klusmeyer, eds., a volume which Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World. Washington, DC: Carnegie represents the capstone of a multi-year Endowment for International Peace, 2000. study conducted by the International Migration Policy Program of the Carnegie Aleinikoff, A. and D. Klusmeyer, eds. Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices. Endowment for International Peace. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001.

Castles, S. and A. Davidson. Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging. New York: Routledge, 2000.

Hansen, R. and P. Weil. Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality Law in the EU. Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001.

Hansen, R. and P. Weil. Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal Citizenship in the U.S. and Europe, The Reinvention of Citizenship. New York/Oxford: Berghan Press, 2002.

Rubio-Marin, R. Immigration as a Democratic Challenge: Citizenship and Inclusion in Germany and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Weil, P. Qu’est ce qu’un français ? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution. Paris: Grasset, 2002.

70 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Building Successful Urban Policy in the New Era of Migration

Jorge Gaspar and Maria Lucinda Fonseca he world has entered a Understanding what is at stake for both T new age of migration, with cities and immigrants at this pivotal unprecedented numbers of moment requires examining, first, the migrants embarking on international historic role of cities in relation to journeys. As such, migration is migration, and second, the recent eras affecting many sending and receiving of international migration. This will set countries to such an extent that some the stage for a more detailed analysis of analysts have defined the passage how urbanization and immigration now into the millennium as the interact, followed by an examination “era of migration.” of the implications for European cities in general and the abovementioned Today, these migrants’ most frequent cities in particular. This chapter will destination is a city: a complex struc- conclude with a range of recommenda- ture characterized by diversity, where tions for urban policymakers struggling varied economic, social, and cultural to optimize the gains offered by forces create synergies and increase well-managed immigration, while the sense of identity, belonging, and minimizing the potential tensions. inclusion. As cities become home to greater numbers of immigrants, the interface between urban policy Background : Urbanization, and the politics of immigration is Immigrants, and Cycles becoming ever more critical. of Renewal

While international migration For centuries, cities have been places increases the presence of immigrants of interaction and exchange for people in the world’s largest cities, their dis- of different geographical, social, persal to mid-sized, “peripheral” cities professional, and cultural backgrounds. is also accelerating. This has already Cities have served as bastions of ideals, been observed in the United States, symbols of identity, and refuges from and in the European Union the joint oppression and enemies. But the raison forces of EU enlargement and political d’être of cities has been their residents’ change in will make quest to make the best use of their this change even more pronounced. A skills, most importantly by connecting ring of new migrant destinations will with one another. stretch from Glasgow and Helsinki in the north, through Copenhagen and Beyond the individual level, on the the Baltic states, to Warsaw, Prague, scale of societies, cities have long been Bratislava, and Budapest in the east, places of contact, juxtaposition, coop- to Nicosia in the south. In many eration, and conflict between different cases, these cities will receive large cultures. This has sometimes, but not numbers of migrants from a particular always, led to ethnic diversity. Cities sending region, creating important have often hosted coexisting, culturally transnational ties. diverse communities, each with specific

72 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century functions and sometimes enjoying the will to create the “promised” city administrative or judicial autonomy. imagined before emigrating, provided This phenomenon is well illustrated by that there is work, food, and shelter the diversity of some medieval available. The will to construct the Christian and Islamic cities but can promised city is strong, facilitating the also be observed across continents recycling of urban space and turning from Africa to America. Cities can the city once only dreamed of into a thus aptly be described as communities desired reality. of communities. In different eras, and clearly in the 21st At the dawn of the 21st century, cities century, the obsolescence of certain and migration have become even more urban functions and of their respective tightly intertwined. The city has spaces and infrastructures has created emerged as a privileged actor in the conditions for people to return to the economic, social, political, and cultural city, producing new patterns of work, organization of countries, macro- housing, and leisure. Overall, this regions, and the entire planet. Certain process has provided opportunities at cities have replaced regions and even different levels and for various func- countries as cultural, socio-political, tions among immigrant communities. and economic points of reference both As a result, these communities have for immigrants and natives. The litera- become increasingly complex and ture of various diasporas, whose writing functional, both socially and culturally. has been a major influence on cities’ This evolution has also translated into transnational heritage in recent years, new urban forms when partnered with accurately portrays cities as both deci- native-born populations’ tendencies sive actors and arenas. Cities are the towards particular ways of organizing places where immigrants can most space and society. The frequent contri- quickly find points of reference around bution of immigrant communities has which to build new ways of life. been to renew life in obsolete spaces, Identification can be made with the such as declining residential areas, strongest and most typical local allowing for the reinvigoration of the reference points — the soccer team, city as a whole. the river, the neighborhood. Large metropolises and national capitals At the same time, the reality with comprise privileged spaces of interac- which an immigrant comes into con- tion, putting different parts of the tact does not always correspond to world in contact with one another and his/her hopes and expectations. In emerging as leading places in the large cities in particular, immigrants world economy. Despite the growing are often at risk, confronted with hos- mobility of capital and the labor force, tile spaces that have oftentimes urban centers have held tenaciously to already been abandoned by others. Yet their place and prestige. Even in times these spaces can re-instill faith in and of crisis, permanent capital invested in

Building Successful Urban Policy in the New Era of Migration 73 property and infrastructure networks immigrant flows had declined drastically (i.e. highways, railways, ports, airports, (Massey et al. 1998: 2) and emigration water and electricity supply networks, out of Africa, Asia, and sewage networks, telecommunications) had risen along with an increase in the have assured cities’ connections to variety of countries receiving immi- other places, solidifying their grip on grants. In general, this diversification landscapes and power. These factors of sending countries came about ensure that urbanization, in its diversi- because of a variety of factors, including fied forms and contents, is both shap- post-colonial migration, increasing ing and being shaped by globalization. need for laborers in the so-called 3D’s jobs (dirty, dangerous, and difficult), Above all, as in other historical multinational and bilateral agreements, moments for humanity, the contribution recruitment of foreign labor by oil-rich of immigration has been largely to pro- countries, the transition of Southern vide continuity to urban life and its European countries from countries of diversity, filling in gaps left by new and emigration to countries of immigration, spread-out forms of urbanization and new migratory movements connected creating conditions for cities — reno- with economic and social change in vated and modernized — to escape the “newly industrializing countries,” cycles of decay and return to their development of mass movements of worldly ways. refugees and asylum seekers, and the increasing international mobility of high-skilled personnel in both tempo- Eras of Migration rary and permanent flows (Castles and Miller 2003). Over spans of decades, cities have been the site of continuity and discon- By the 1990s, global migration flows to tinuity between successive waves of developed countries were dominated immigration and the communities they by people from a wide variety of com- have helped to build. Different periods munities of origin that were quite have seen global migration ebb and different from those observable up to flow from one region and country to the early 1970s. The restructuring of the next, with far-reaching implica- the global economy, the diffusion of tions for urban policy. competitive mechanisms throughout the world, and the worsening asymme- The 1960s marked a turning point for try in regional development increased international migration, and it is the migration from developing countries in watershed at which it is most useful to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. begin a discussion of modern immigra- tion and urban policy. Before 1925, 85 Immigrants from these two periods percent of international migration thus differed in their ethnic, social, came from Europe. By the 1960s, the and professional composition, patterns weight of European emigrants in world of urban and economic integration,

74 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century and attitudes toward their host soci- to particular ways of entering the eties and their societies of origin. In urban labor market. In this period, the period before 1973, links between cities saw the development of very communities of the same cultural and ethnically and racially diverse situations geographical origins were maintained among communities, cities, and sectors in a more or less organized manner, of economic activity. For example, both in the country of destination and businesses like banks often became with their homeland. Urban spaces associated with residential areas domi- were restored by a succession of immi- nated by particular ethnic communities, grant communities with cultural and based on linguistic accessibility, trust- geographic similarities or simply by worthiness, and relationships back in those casually connected by their the country of origin. For different emigration experiences. The underly- economic reasons, groceries and ing links, transmitted experiences, and restaurants came to be dispersed continuities that existed throughout throughout areas in which an immi- this period have important implications grant owner’s community was hardly for successful integration and the represented. strengthening of links between countries of destination and origin. The transformation of global migration between the early 1970s and the The immigrants of the 1990s differed 1990s, particularly with regard to from their counterparts in previous cities, did not come about in a simple decades not only in terms of their eth- way. Underlying recent changes to nic and social composition, but also migration patterns, in everything from with regard to the dynamics of their settlement patterns to workforce inte- integration into urban spaces. For gration, have been interactions example, some researchers noted how between migration and urbanization. increasing racial and ethnic diversity rendered some traditional conceptions of residential segregation obsolete, Three Driving Forces: such as the assumption that living Globalization, with whites was the main or only basis Urbanization, and for cultural integration and assimila- Migration tion. Some researchers proposed that integration should be considered a Over the last 30 years, the daily life of multi-ethnic process, shunning the use most people — not least immigrants of white populations as the only legiti- themselves — has increasingly been mate reference points (Reardon and shaped by economic, political, and Firebaugh 2002; Wong 1998). cultural activities on a global scale. Connected to this globalization are Other notable aspects of urban immi- urbanization and the expanding influ- gration in the 1990s were economic, ence of global cities — poles of popula- ranging from ethnic business districts tion and centers of economic, political,

Building Successful Urban Policy in the New Era of Migration 75 and cultural power. These cities form a that began to emerge in the last quarter hierarchical network connecting coun- of the 20th century, large cities are tries, regions, companies, organizations, increasingly more multi-ethnic and communities, and individuals world- multi-racial. All indications point to wide. It is to these poles that migrants these differences increasing in the are increasingly drawn. future. Although patterns vary, the geographic distributions of the foreign- In the context of the various types of born population in industrialized interplay that occur among globaliza- receiving countries uniformly show the tion, urbanization, and migration, the largest concentrations in urban areas. most important for the purposes of this analysis is the relationship between In European cities, whether those of urbanization and migration. Only by Northwestern Europe with a longer understanding this relationship can poli- history of immigration (such as Paris, cymakers hope to maximize the gains Brussels, Frankfurt, Munich, Geneva, from immigration, while minimizing Rotterdam, and ) or those frictions. The following are some key of Southern Europe (such as Athens, aspects of the interplay between urban- Naples, Rome, Barcelona, Madrid, and ization and international migration. Lisbon), the percentage of foreigners is always much higher than their respec- Continuity. The growth of cities has tive national percentages. This trend always been fed by migration, whether can also be observed in the United directly from rural areas, or in succes- States, Canada, Australia, and in cer- sive stages of migration from one large tain major Asian cities. Furthermore, urban center to another more distant globalization’s facilitation of commerce one. This phenomenon is not uniquely — with lowering trade barriers, reduc- European, having also taken place in tion in transportation costs, and new the Americas, Africa, and , product-preservation techniques — creating various strands of historical allows for the “cross-breeding” of continuity with the phenomenon of cultural practices, thereby contributing urbanization today. According to the to greater cultural diversity in cities. United Nations Population Division, the world’s urban population reached Varying Urbanization Patterns. It is 2.9 billion in 2000 and is predicted to important to note that urbanization grow to five billion by 2030. In terms manifests itself differently in developed of percentages, the urban population and developing countries. In the former, grew from 30 percent in 1950 to 47 the number of urban dwellers doubled percent in 2000, with 60 percent and their proportion of the total popu- projected to live in cities by 2030. lation grew from 54.9 percent to 75.4 percent during the second half of the Concentrations of Diversity. Because 20th century. At the same time, in of the growth and increasing complex- developing countries, the urban ity of international migratory systems population grew without precedent,

76 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century multiplying by more than six times, ties. This type of transnational identity and leading to a change from 17 per- is a feature of many cities in the cent in 1950 to 40.4 percent in 2000. developed world, where the means of However, even this is still not any- exchange — of goods, of cultural where near the 75.4 percent figure in developments, of information about the the developed world. homeland — is accessible. In the 1990s, as noted earlier, this access was increased Moreover, levels of urbanization and by the rise of niche economic businesses urban growth vary greatly among run by and targeting immigrants. developing countries. In Latin America and the , the part . On the international of the population that resides in urban level, urban areas are most recognized areas (75 percent) is twice that of for their role in facilitating contact Africa and Asia and slightly greater between immigrants and their country than that of Europe (73 percent). of origin, while offering greater Despite all of these differences, the sta- employment opportunities and social tistics correctly reflect the speed at mobility. Furthermore, following the which a once predominantly rural settlement of “pioneering” immigrants, world is becoming much more urban. networking mechanisms tend to develop that attract their compatriots, thus Transnationalism. Progress in trans- reinforcing immigrant concentrations portation and communications has in the receiving countries. In this way, brought sending and receiving contact networks play a decisive role countries closer together and forged in the migratory process and serve to connections between different places explain both the strong urbanization of settlement for populations belong- of international migration and the ing to the same national or ethnic formation of migratory links between community. As such, today’s interna- particular sending and receiving areas. tional migrations increasingly encompass more “nodes of circulation,” Revitalization of Public Space. In defined by a complex network of cities and other urban centers in information, people, goods, and capital receiving countries, the middle classes that connect communities of migrants are abandoning traditional urban pub- throughout the world. lic spaces (i.e. squares, public parks, and sidewalks), with the exception of Researchers have noted the strong public consumption and class-oriented social networks, institutions, and bonds spaces such as theaters, cinemas, between first-generation immigrants museums, stadiums, and gyms. and their countries of origin. These immigrants often travel to their home- At the same time, many lower-income land, send remittances to relatives, immigrants are living in overcrowded keep up on their country’s politics and and poor-quality houses or apartments, crises, and generally cultivate cultural and are feeling cultural isolation

Building Successful Urban Policy in the New Era of Migration 77 brought on by residing in anonymous character of the Lisbon Metropolitan buildings with people who speak other Area (Fonseca 2002). languages and have unfamiliar behaviors and habits. As a consequence, many In Barcelona, non-EU immigrants who immigrants are seeking out public began to arrive in the 1970s are also spaces and traditional gathering places changing the look of the Old City. (i.e., cafés) to gather and to comple- Ethnic businesses fill this older quarter ment their living space. Thus, the new with life and color along the Corders- inhabitants gain the status of belonging Carders-Portal Nou axis and Carrer de to a city and replicate the uses of time la Princesa. The neighborhood is and city space once typical of other eras. broken up into a series of subunits that have been appropriated by diverse In Northern Europe, revitalization immigrant and ethnic minority groups. of this type is observable in Berlin, Carrer Corders, next to Plaça de la particularly in Kreuzberg, where the Lana, recreates an African atmosphere; Turkish community has regenerated Carrer Carders has a Dominican feel; the urban environment’s vibrancy and, from Plaça S. Agustí Vell to and richness. Another example is Portal Nou, North African influences Södertalje, an average-sized Swedish emerge (Monet 2000). city once gripped by post-industrial crisis, where citizens well-versed in In Marseille, the Belsunce neighbor- urban history have rebuilt with the hood, located in the city center participation of immigrants such as between the Vieux Port and Assyrian Christians. Canebière, has long been a point of arrival for immigrants and a focal In Southern Europe, though immigra- point for specialized services. It has tion is a recent phenomenon, immi- hosted successive waves of immigrants grants have left numerous marks on from the Mediterranean (Italians, the urban landscape. In the case of Spanish, Lebanese, Turks, and Egyptians, Lisbon, the Martim Moniz area is an as well as Armenians and the first wave important multi-ethnic commercial of Algerians starting in World War I). enclave that has greatly contributed During World War II, it attracted a to turning around the economic number of Jews and, starting in the decline, urban decay, and social 1950s, it became a host for people in marginality of this area located on the transit, port workers, and a new wave of fringe of Lisbon’s traditional downtown. North African laborers, many of whom Besides animating this area during the were undocumented. Before the tourist day, the progressive appropriation of visa was set up for entry into France in this area by immigrants and ethnic 1986, Marseille was a marketplace minorities has proved to be key to its patronized by many North Africans. rehabilitation and collective re-appro- The urban economy benefited a great priation, thus making it a symbolic deal from this shopping tourism from space that displays the multi-ethnic the other side of the Mediterranean.

78 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century The Belsunce neighborhood had ele- tant and why urban government and ments of an Arab city that were locally governance can make a difference. known as the “Casbah” or “Little Algiers.” In the 1980s, the neighbor- Depending on local contexts, three hood began to undergo major urban different situations can come about. renewal efforts that, associated with the First, there is the possibility of total decline in North African tourism, may obsolescence of public space. This can threaten the local economy and displace induce rejuvenation or reconstruction, the immigrants. The success or failure of with its content totally reconstructed this city-center renewal project will but for the same purpose as before (i.e., depend on Marseille’s ability to preserve social housing projects, traditional and attach value to the area’s cultural businesses, cottage industry, etc.) and uniqueness and history, finding solu- its new users’ identities recognized, tions adapted to the diverse population creating significant ethno-cultural that lives there and frequents it. polarization. Second, total reconstruc- tion for new uses is possible — in the The Role of Urban Policies. These past, in fact, solutions that ended up examples typify different effects of pushing out both immigrant users and immigration on the changing use of nearby native-born residents were urban space and in the dynamics of common. Third, there is the possibility socio-spatial integration of immigrants of the promotion of a gradual large- in cities. Urban policies and spatial scale or even privatized regeneration, planning have an essential role to play in which stratification and gentrifica- in both the economic and social tion can be managed and inspire a new regeneration of cities and in the socio- type of urban integration/mix. spatial integration of immigrants and poor ethnic minorities, because efforts This same process may only wind to improve living conditions in down when improved socio-economic deprived neighborhoods and better use conditions lead immigrants to abandon public space must be anchored in a their use of public space and instead broader urban context that includes seek out better housing and greater long-term planning. comforts, which naturally contribute to more individualistic behavior. The process may differ from place to place. These differences reflect the importance of local contexts: history, Europe’s Experience with urban form, the mixing and specific Urbanization and concentrations of housing, the quality Migration of the environment and the public space, the number and diversity of During Europe’s reconstruction follow- immigrants and ethnic minorities, ing World War II, economic expansion and the economic, social, and political and the end of the demographic transi- structure. That is why place is impor- tion (which involved a decline of the

Building Successful Urban Policy in the New Era of Migration 79 natural population growth rate) led countries. First, Southern Europe has to the mass immigration of laborers, become, since the 1980s, a new portal primarily to France, Germany, the for entry to the European Union for United Kingdom, the Netherlands, many Africans, Asians, and South and Switzerland. To a certain extent, Americans. Most of this immigration there was also mass immigration of this has been clandestine. Second, there type to the industrialized Nordic coun- has been an increase in the number of tries: First from Finland and certain foreigners from developed countries, Baltic countries and then, starting in chiefly Western Europe. These migrants the 1960s, from Yugoslavia and fill highly qualified positions, mainly in Greece, particularly to Sweden. multinational enterprises. Third, the coastal regions of Southern Portugal At first, these workers came from the and Spain have attracted many retired poorest and geographically closest foreigners, particularly British and countries, including Italy, Ireland, and Germans. In the Portuguese case, it is Finland. They also arrived from the also important to note that, between collapsing British, French, and Belgian 1975 and 1976, more than a half a mil- colonial empires. Later, especially during lion Portuguese returnees, mostly from the 1960s, this flow expanded to and Mozambique, came to include migrants from countries along Portugal following the independence of the Mediterranean, including Spain, the African colonies. Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. Of those arriving from the for- East-West migration increased in the mer colonies, many were seeking safety 1990s following the fall of communism and economic betterment for their in Eastern Europe and the former children and hoped to return home one USSR. This new wave of migration day. Others were refugees: Initially, the first affected neighboring countries, most fervent supporters of the colonizers such as Germany and Austria, but of their respective countries, and later, quickly spread to Southern European those threatened by power struggles in countries. The current numerical sig- newly de-colonized countries. nificance of Eastern European migrants in Southern Europe is based on both Southern Europe’s Profile. Southern formal and informal networks active at Europe’s experience with migration has both ends of the migration path. This been quite different from that of has given rise to some quite unbal- Northwestern Europe, because the anced flows (e.g., Ukrainian males transition for Greece, Italy, Portugal, migrate mainly to Portugal, while and Spain from countries of mass emi- Ukrainian women largely go to Italy). gration to countries of mass immigra- This new flow of Eastern Europeans to tion only began in the late 1970s. Southern Europe differs from that of laborers coming from the Southern There have been three major immigra- and Eastern Mediterranean, Sub- tion flows into Southern European Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin

80 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century American, as it is comprised of a large people living in the Brussels region number of skilled migrants. Despite were foreign, while the corresponding their skills, however, they are mainly national rate was only 8.3 percent. incorporated into low-paying and socially undervalued jobs, such as Though immigration is rather recent, construction (men) and professional the same phenomenon can still be cleaning and domestic work (women) observed in Southern Europe. (Baganha and Fonseca 2004). According to the 2001 Population Census, 55.5 percent of foreigners Migration and Urban Growth of lived in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, European Metropolises. Even in the representing 4.7 percent of the total period when Southern European cities LMA population, while immigrants were still growing mainly as a result of represented only 2.2 percent of the an exodus from rural areas (starting in total population in Portugal. In Italy, the 1950s and 1960s, though earlier or Spain, and Greece, the largest concen- later in different areas), large urban- trations of immigrants can be found in industrial centers in Northwestern the main cities. In Italy, more than Europe began to grow as a result of one-half of all immigrants live in the international migration. The percentage northern part of the country. of foreigners in the total population of According to an estimate by the the most important cities tended to be Regional Observatory of Lombardy, 6.1 higher than that of the country in percent of the population living in the which they were situated. Milan Metropolitan Area in 2002 was immigrants from developing countries The cumulative results of these devel- and Eastern Europe, equivalent to 50.7 opments are increasingly clear, at least percent of immigrants living in the in terms of settlement patterns. Lombardy region (Blangiarlo et al. Immigrants and ethnic minorities tend 2003). In Spain, foreigners made up to be concentrated in the most impor- 3.8 percent of the country’s population tant urban areas in each receiving in 2001, while 38.4 percent of all for- country. For example, in 1999, while eigners lived around Madrid and 5.6 percent of the population in France Barcelona. Consequently, the percent- was foreign, foreigners represented 14.5 age of foreigners in these two cities percent of the population in Paris and was higher than the national average, 12.9 percent of the population in with 4.8 percent living in Barcelona Marseille. In Germany, foreigners and 6.8 percent in Madrid. In Greece, made up 8.9 percent of the total popu- the concentration of immigrants in the lation in 2000, though the same statis- Athens Metropolitan Area (AMA) tics in Munich and Frankfurt were can be seen by examining the results much higher (22.8 and 27.8 percent, of the regularization campaigns for respectively). The concentration of undocumented foreigners in 1998 and immigrants in cities can also be seen 2000. Around 40 percent of regulariza- in Belgium. In 2004, 26.3 percent of tion requests made in 1998 and renewal

Building Successful Urban Policy in the New Era of Migration 81 requests for permanence permits made Southern Europe and as the middle in 2000 corresponded to individuals class expands, there has been a living and working in the AMA progressive urban “harmonization” (Sintès 2002). throughout Europe. Differences between Southern European cities are Housing and Segregation in European increasingly based upon their land- Metropolises. The emergence of resi- scapes, heritage, and traditions, and dential segregation based on ethnicity decreasingly based upon their func- is another new feature of the contem- tional and social structure. For this porary development cycle of Southern reason, it is important to note the European cities. However, authors rejuvenation of historical city centers, such as J.M. Leontidou (1993) and suburban renewal, de-population of Jorge Malheiros (2002) describe the city center, and the emergence of Southern European cities as having new urban centralities, as well as fewer levels of socio-spatial segregation processes of gentrification. than their Northern European coun- terparts. Delayed industrialization, the From the 1950s to the 1980s, there was inexistence of a culture of formal little awareness among policymakers urban planning, the nature of the wel- that the clustering of the most disad- fare system (particularly in the domain vantaged social classes (which include of housing), a dualistic housing regime, the vast majority of immigrants) in the recent character of international neighborhoods in and around large migration, and the great geographic, European cities would lead to so many ethnic, and social diversity of immi- social problems in the future. Prominent grants and ethnic minorities of immi- among these problems were immigrants’ grant origin are the main factors that frustrations with climbing the economic help explain the differences observed ladder, as well as the clash of cultures, in Southern European countries growing difficulties with finding (Arbaci 2002). However, in more employment, and the dissatisfaction recent years, the increase in the and revolt of the generation born in growth of immigrant populations and Europe. their descendants in Southern European metropolises has been associ- The oil crisis at the end of 1973 marked ated with the trend towards greater a turning point — a chronological and standardization of urban and social symbolic wake-up call at the end of a policies in the European Union, atten- period of economic euphoria. It corre- uating the differences observed sponded to a crisis for cities manifested between Northern and Southern in rising unemployment, economic European cities. recession, demographic decline, and anti-urbanization movements. In fact, as large-scale urban problems Overcoming the shock of the 1970s involving basic infrastructure, housing, economic crisis, European cities and and accessibility have been resolved in the European urban system underwent

82 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century a profound social and economic In addition, the European integration transformation. The development of a process, associated with greater ease in heavily internationalized service econo- transport and communication, has led my, structured by a network of cities to the development of a come-and-go positioned in different parts of the glob- type of migration for many former emi- al urban hierarchy, reflected the social grants who have already retired. These polarization of labor markets, with the migrants travel between their countries simultaneous demand for highly skilled of origin and their former receiving professionals and low-skilled service- countries in order to visit children and sector workers (cleaning and domestic grandchildren who stayed on in the work, caring for the elderly, security, receiving country, to benefit from commerce, hotels, and catering). social services to which they may not have access or that are better than In this way, the reconstruction of those in their countries of origin, or to cities and the restructuring of Europe’s provide informal temporary assistance economic base generated much more to a family member (e.g., to care for fragmented urban spaces from a socio- an ailing person or a child, etc.). economic point of view. These spaces Similarly, movements in the opposite are associated with the rise in social direction have increased during vaca- inequality and increasing unemploy- tion periods, with second- and third- ment, as can be seen in the emergence generation descendents living in the of new situations of exclusion in which receiving country going to visit family immigrants and their descendants are members in the country of origin. potentially overrepresented (Musterd and Ostendorf 1998). Conclusions and During the 1970s, many emigrants Recommendations from Southern European countries who had contributed decisively to The rebirth and restructuring of the Northern Europe’s reconstruction European urban system under the returned to their countries of origin. influence of globalization, urbaniza- Some returned simply to retire and tion, and a new era of international live off of their pensions; others built migration is shaping the structure of important support structures for the the Europe of the future. The dynamics development of the poorest areas of of urban growth are closely related to Southern Europe, from Greece to the dynamics of migration. Immigrants Portugal. The integration of Greece, and ethnic minorities in the urban Spain, and Portugal into the European space of Southern European cities are Union contributed to the recognition dispersed to a far greater extent than not only of the knowledge of the those in Northern Europe. The two migrants that returned home, but also regions also differ in terms of the types of the webs of relationships they had of spatial segregation that generally developed throughout Europe. emerge at the micro-level.

Building Successful Urban Policy in the New Era of Migration 83 These differences are the products of conditions from those between World the more recent nature of immigration War II and the 1970s in Northwestern to Southern Europe, the continent’s European countries. The politicization demographic transition, the later onset of immigration in the Northern of the processes of industrialization Mediterranean is closely associated and suburbanization in Southern with the European integration process Europe, and the weak public-housing and, unlike other more-developed sector in the region’s metropolises. European countries with deeper-rooted These factors come in association with immigration traditions, ultra-nationalist rudimentary welfare-state systems and movements with xenophobic or racist an urban planning system developed features are still quite marginal in very late and without a consistent all- Southern Europe. However, there are encompassing urban policy. some signs of increasing racial tension, which is cause for growing concern Political and policy measures directed among politicians and citizens alike towards the necessary marriage (Fonseca, Caldeira and Esteves, 2002). between migratory flows and urban development are badly needed. It is also clear that the EU faces Without them, social and economic migratory pressures from North Africa, cohesion, the complementary relation- the Middle East, and the , all ships of the European Union and reinforced by the political instability cities, and social and spatial equality of these regions. Coping with these will all suffer. simultaneous pressures will require greater coordination and harmonization The rapid economic growth of various of EU migration policies. It will also European countries, dating back for demand increased cooperation between decades but in the South only in sending and receiving countries in order recent years, has only been possible to promote the development of the because of successive flows of immigra- former and to curb illegal migration. tion. Immigrants have filled primarily low-wage, low-skill jobs, particularly in As with similar growth in the past, the construction, agriculture, tourism, and enlargements of the European Union low-skill services, where the local labor in 2004 and beyond will have conse- supply has been limited. quences both for urban systems in general and migration flows in particu- Despite this largely positive role, lar. These changes will greatly facilitate immigrants have faced negative movement among economically reactions from sectors of the political unequal countries and develop new leadership and the public in both the forms of interaction (economic, social, North and the South. The emergence and cultural) between the cities where of immigration as a political issue in immigrants live and their regions of Southern Europe happened much origin. These flows will become later and under substantially different increasingly complex, both in terms

84 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century of the levels of qualifications of the of new “peripheral” destinations migrants and in terms of migratory stretches from Glasgow and Helsinki patterns, which will in turn create new in the north, through Copenhagen urban forms, and potentially accelerate and the Baltic states, to Warsaw, the polarization of the urban systems Prague, Bratislava, and Budapest in in the new member states. This, in the east, to Nicosia in the south. turn, will translate into increasing spa- tial disparities between the dominant For the same reason, major cities that capital cities in countries such as those were formerly on the eastern border of in the Baltic area, , and the the European Union, such as Berlin . and Vienna, may become relatively less attractive in comparison with the More specifically, the 2004 enlarge- new peripheral ring of cities. Finally, ment can be expected to maintain and will likely migratory pressure on the cities of the continue to lose population and western core or heartland of the remain economically depressed. As European Union, which will continue such, it is likely that migration flows to attract immigrants. Several factors from this region to Southwestern support this potential trend. First Europe (Italy, Spain, and Portugal), growth rates in the new Member which began in the 1990s, will continue. States are above the EU-15 average, but there is only limited real economic The development of long-distance convergence. Second, the service social relations due to the develop- sector there is growing, but the unem- ments in communication and informa- ployment rate remains very high. tion technologies, combined with the increasingly greater socio-cultural However, coupled with political differences of the population of the change in Eastern Europe, the enlarge- European cities, will accelerate the ment will also give dynamism to a vast trend of the decline in neighborhood ring of peripheral European cities. relations and solidarity. That is why These will become increasingly attrac- diversity and increasing population tive destinations for migrants. One turnover in urban centers has the reason for this attraction is that anti- potential to create new tensions in immigration movements tend to be areas previously characterized by a smaller in traditional cities of immigra- certain homogeneity. tion. Consequently, control over the entry of new immigrants tends to be At the same time, new economic tighter, potentially sending migrants opportunities are likely to arise because towards less restricted urban areas. of the progressive development of These alternative destinations, though transnational communities anchored less attractive from an economic point in the circulation strategies of immi- of view, constitute less hostile atmos- grants with multiple spatial belongings. pheres for their integration. The ring These communities represent great

Building Successful Urban Policy in the New Era of Migration 85 potential innovations for both places immigrant communities that of origin and of destination, due to their have the same cultural identity high density of social capital, the or a common set of values, interchanges they promote, and the traditions, and behaviors. This challenges they pose to traditional reg- creates better conditions for the ulation systems. In this context, immi- provision of services, both public grants have an important role to play and private, and is key to the in the process of economic restructuring successful implantation of and secondary internationalization of immigrant groups. Otherwise, the metropolises. This stands in contrast specific measures should be directed at the integration of with the hegemonic internationalization smaller groups. process associated with transnational 4. Policies should aim to create corporations and their strategies conditions to facilitate and (Fonseca and Malheiros 2004). stimulate the growth of immigrant businesses. In light of the need for the European 5. Social and physical infrastructure Union to develop a comprehensive related to the use of immigrants’ strategy to address the dual issues of leisure time, directed at different urbanization and immigration, the fol- age groups, gender groups, and lowing set of recommendations can be time intervals (daily, weekly, made. They are addressed to resolving monthly) should be developed. problems on the ground and are initially There are some examples of directed at Southern European cities. success in this area, such as sports (especially soccer), crafts, gardening, 1. Each city or metropolitan area and the use of information and should develop, as a component of communications technology. strategic planning, a strategy to 6. Immigrant communities must be address the insertion of immigra- allowed to participate in the design tion into urban economic, social, of urban policies on the same and cultural policies. The way in footing as national citizens. In this which the welfare state adopts and respect, local authorities should take adapts to the new migration flows residence, not nationality, as the is of central importance. main criteria of local citizenship. 2. Housing must be given absolute priority and must be treated as a Urban authorities have an essential broad concept, including not only role to play in this framework. A bot- shelter and accommodation, but tom-up approach, supported by the also community services and their empowerment of civil society at the connection with the workplace. local level, is probably the key to 3. At the metropolitan and avoiding social exclusion mechanisms. intra-metropolitan scale, planning However, any local initiative must be should aim, where feasible, to anchored in a broader urban context ensure that critical demographic that includes long-term planning. dimensions are reached for

86 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century References

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Building Successful Urban Policy in the New Era of Migration 87 88 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States

Maia Jachimowicz and Kevin O’Neil he United States has a history eral-state governance structure that T of immigration and of integrat- puts much of the responsibility for the ing immigrants that is as long relevant social programs in the hands and successful as that of any country. of local and state governments. Yet, the United States has no national immigrant integration policy per se. Of This chapter seeks to give a general the approximately one million immi- picture of how these structures and grants granted permanent residency processes work and, where possible, to annually, only resettled refugees — a what extent they succeed. It also seeks group typically numbering fewer than to identify current trends, challenges, 100,000 people per year and that and controversies in integration. totaled only 28,000 in 2003 — receive integration assistance from the federal Important trends include: the contin- government. Otherwise, the United ued migration of many immigrants States has a largely uncoordinated set who have low skill levels relative to of policies and programs, stitched natives (along with many who have together across policy domains, that extensive skill sets); a change in the promote the integration of “perma- distribution of where immigrants settle nent” immigrants and in some ways away from the traditional cities and many of the assorted other “tempo- states of settlement towards mid-sized rary” and unauthorized immigrants. cities, suburbs, and new regions; and the growth of a few regions and one The US immigrant admissions system country — Mexico — in the origin of grants foreigners residency rights immigrants to the US. primarily based on work or family ties. At some time after immigrants are The associated importance of newcom- admitted to the US, a network of rights ers’ low English-language proficiency, guarantees them: the opportunity to especially in the context of labor-mar- obtain citizenship through a well-devel- ket integration and mobility, and the oped naturalization process; access to an success of immigrant children and educational system that makes including children of immigrants in public and educating immigrant children a schools, highlights some of the chal- priority; and some (if modest) federal lenges of immigrant integration. At the support for language and training pro- same time, the significance of Hispanics grams. Most significantly perhaps, their in the evolving process through which children, when born in the US, are immigrants and their descendants automatically citizens. The remaining emerge as important constituencies for integration services are carried out by a marketers, unions, employers, and robust civil society sector that includes political parties helps explain how co-ethnic and conational organizations, related policies and politics emerge. a vigorous and flexible economy that has proven capable of employing Controversies and policy developments even low-skilled immigrants, and a fed- within the past 10 years include the

90 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century elimination of some welfare benefits institutional framework for integration for many legal permanent residents, a in the US and a brief demographic re-thinking of bilingual education for overview of the size, composition, and children, and the restructuring of the general characteristics of the foreign- federal administration responsible for born population set the stage for a dis- immigration and naturalization. Yet, cussion detailing how integration is the most important challenges lie in achieved through an open, undefined the presence of an estimated 9.3 mil- structure that combines broad national lion unauthorized immigrants and in practices with targeted state and local the growing struggle of low-skilled initiatives. Administrative and admis- workers to earn a decent income and sions policies related to immigration, obtain health insurance. national anti-discrimination legislation, as well as how integration is framed Many of these forces will continue to with regard to employment, housing, exist in the immediate future, but a and education and children are few other emerging trends and issues addressed. Taking into account current are likely to shape immigrant integra- immigration trends, we highlight the tion in America in years to come. role, or lack thereof, of the government Among the most interesting of these is in integrating foreign-born residents in the role of sending countries in immi- the US. grant integration; among the most important are the uncertain impact of The chapter also seeks to examine security concerns and the possibility of some of the recent trends affecting immigration reform. However, none of immigrant integration and integration these trends seems likely to alter fun- policy in the United States. In some damentally the generally “hands-off” policy areas such as employment and approach of American integration the immigrant admissions system there policy. A long tradition of immigration has been little change, but growing insulates the United States neither political pressure to reform the immi- from anxieties about cultural identity gration system could radically alter the nor problems of exclusion and poverty outlook within the next five years. In among immigrants. Yet, the United others, such as education and welfare, States appears content to entrust inte- there has been more action. Still other gration largely to migrants and their trends — such as the changing initiative and hard work, and to civil settlement pattern of immigrants, the society, employment opportunities, growing political power of immigrants, and local actors. and the growing outreach of foreign countries to their emigrants in the This chapter explains the current United States — are not completely framework, including a general within the control of public policy, description of practices and policies, but are shaped by it. for immigrant integration in the United States. An overview of the

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 91 Institutional Overview of responsible for unaccompanied minors Integration Initiatives who enter the country, in addition to housing the Office of Refugee In the largest reorganization of its gov- Resettlement — the federal entity ernment since 1947, the United States tasked with assisting refugees and on January 24, 2003, formally created successful asylum seekers. the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to bring many of its security- In matters having to do with immigrant related agencies under a single admin- integration, programmatic decisions istrative umbrella. The Immigration are made across levels and divisions and Naturalization Service, previously of government while much of the responsible for the vast majority of US implementation is left to the non- immigration-related tasks, was moved governmental sector. Nongovernmental from the Department of Justice into organizations (NGOs) develop their DHS and simultaneously split into own assistance schemes, some of three agencies. The admission of which end up being funded by govern- immigrants, naturalization, and citi- ment agencies. The resettlement and zenship now reside within one bureau integration of refugees is administered of DHS — US Citizenship and largely by State Refugee Coordinators Immigration Services (USCIS). The and private organizations, called other immigration-related apparatuses “Voluntary Agencies,” under within DHS are the Bureau of contract with the Office of Refugee Immigration and Customs Enforcement Resettlement. The departments of and the Bureau of Customs and Border Labor and Education also have impor- Protection, responsible for enforcing tant portfolios related to immigrant and protecting US integration efforts, respectively: assisting borders, respectively. migrant workers (especially agricultural workers), and offering immigrants Certain other functions related to access to training programs and immigration, and whatever federal language-training initiatives. integration functions do exist, are dis- A brief overview of the government tributed among several government components involved in immigrant departments. For example, the integration follows. Department of State continues to maintain authority over visa issuance US Citizenship and Immigration (although visa policy resides with Services DHS), and judicial review under the USCIS deals primarily with adminis- Board of Immigration Appeals remains tering immigration benefits and pro- under the Department of Justice, while viding immigration-related informa- most employment-based immigration tion. The agency has a network of functions reside with the US local field offices throughout the Department of Labor. The Department United States to process immigration- of Health and Human Services is benefit requests. USCIS, among other

92 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century things, maintains a 24-hour free call determination, access to and line in English and Spanish where participation in formal public-sector automated service information can be activities (such as those related to gathered and live representatives school governance), and many welfare answer immigrants’ questions during benefits decisions, local and state regular business hours. USCIS has governments play an influential role in recently upgraded its efforts to immigrant integration. provide, via the internet, information and immigration forms, as well as Office of Refugee Resettlement appointment scheduling and The Office of Refugee Resettlement individual case status information. assists most individuals who enter the Efforts to revise the citizenship oath United States on humanitarian and naturalization test to make them grounds. In doing so, ORR funds and more “relevant” are also under way. facilitates numerous programs such as employment preparation, job and Office of Citizenship language training, social adjustment The primary goal of the new Office and placement, and direct aid. ORR of Citizenship, created as part of the has just completed a multi-year effort, Department of Homeland Security, the Building the New American is “to support [the] integration and Community Initiative, designed to participation [of immigrants] in foster the successful integration of American civic culture.” The office refugees and immigrants at the local announced in November 2003 plans to level through community coalition- provide new immigrants with informa- building exercises. tion packets upon arrival through a web of community groups and non- US Refugee Resettlement profit organizations devoted to the People processed through the US cause. In addition, the Office of Refugee Resettlement program are the Citizenship has established Community only newcomers eligible for the most Liaison Officers in seventeen cities to complete integration benefits the US facilitate its mandate where it matters government offers. The resettlement most: at the local level. procedure includes integration services abroad, reception upon arrival, and State and Local Governments post-settlement short- and long-term Immigrant integration at the commu- integration initiatives at the local nity level is most often delivered by level. Through a proactive resettlement state and local governments, which program dedicated to serving those provide their own programs, create refugees identified abroad through a laws relevant to integration, and facili- set of “refugee processing priorities,” tate partnerships between relevant the US government works with a net- public and private actors. From driver’s work of governmental, international, license authorization and policing and private organizations, at various methods, to in-state university tuition stages of the program, to provide

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 93 individuals and their families with assistance. The latter form of assistance support and services. is administered under regular US social protection schemes. After five years of The President, in consultation with residence, resettled refugees are eligible Congress, establishes annual refugee for naturalization. These programs are admission levels. In fiscal year 2004, under the general supervision and the total refugee resettlement ceiling authority of the Office of Refugee was set at 70,000. These ceilings are Resettlement. frequently not met, however, and shortfalls have ranged from a few thou- Generally speaking, refugees are sand in most years to a shortfall of resettled throughout the United more than 50 percent of the limit for States, although distinct national each year since September 11, 2001. and ethnic origin settlement patterns emerge. Resettlement agencies prefer Various government departments (e.g., to place refugees in areas where they the Departments of State and are most likely to benefit from existing Homeland Security), the United ethnic communities and networks. Nations High Commissioner for For example, in fiscal year 2000 Refugees, and a network of NGOs help Florida resettled more Cubans than identify refugee groups eligible for all other states combined. resettlement according to pre-estab- lished priorities. Eligibility for refugee status is then decided on a case-by-case Demographic Overview of basis, a process that includes individual the Foreign Born in the US interviews, medical examinations, and security background checks. Immigration has been in an upward climb since the mid-1960s, although Upon positive determination of an measured as a percentage of the total application and prior to departure, population, US immigrant stock and refugees receive cultural orientation flow numbers are still below historical sessions administered by the highs set in the 19th and early 20th International Organization for centuries. According to the Current Migration and the Voluntary Agencies. Population Survey, in 2002 the foreign- Each refugee is then assigned to a born population totaled 32.5 million, Voluntary Agency responsible for representing over 11 percent of the initial resettlement services at the time total population. The foreign-born of arrival, including airport reception, population is comprised primarily of initial accommodations, basic naturalized citizens and lawful perma- necessities, and targeted orientation. nent residents (see Figure 1). However, Individuals are also able to participate unauthorized immigrants — most in longer-term integration programs, thought to be residing on a long-term which include modest job and English- basis — make up an estimated quarter language training, and cash and medical of the foreign-born population.

94 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Unauthorized immigrants do manage 1960 to 2000, the foreign-born popula- to become integrated over time despite tion from these two regions grew from their inability to access public services 1.4 million to 24.3 million, an increase other than emergency medical and from 14.3 percent to 78.1 percent of related benefits and de facto education. the total foreign-born population. The The lack of strong government partici- source country with the largest popula- pation in integration initiatives, the tion living in the US is Mexico with relative openness of basic schooling 9.2 million people, representing 29.5 and employment to the unauthorized, percent of the foreign-born population. and a jus solis tradition that grants citi- Following Mexico, the other most sig- zenship to almost all children born in nificant source countries are the US territory may help explain why Philippines (1.4 million people), India unauthorized status in the US amounts (1 million), China (988,857) and to less of a disadvantage in integration Vietnam (988,174). And yet, immi- than might otherwise be expected. grants in the United States represent an increasingly diverse set of countries. Trends over the past four decades show a massive rise in immigrants born in As shown in recent Census data, Latin America, most significantly from immigrants are also more geographically Mexico, and Asia (see Figure 2). From dispersed in their settlement in the US

Figure 1. Legal Status of the Foreign -Born Population, 2002

Unauthorized Naturalized Citizens Immigrants (10.3 million) 30% (9.3 million) 26%

Legal Temporary Residents (1.6 million) 5%

Refugee Arrivals (2.7 million) 8%

Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) (10.5 million) 30%

Source: Graph reproduced from Jeffery S. Passel, Randolph Capps and Michael Fix. 2004. “Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and Figures.” Washington, DC: Urban Institute.

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 95 than any time since World War II. Tennessee. Due to a lack of strong Whereas in 1990 approximately 75 historical immigration flows, these percent of all immigrants were located “new growth” states often times do in just six states (California, New not have resources such as profession- York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New ally organized ethnic associations or Jersey), over the past decade that figure immigrant communities that assist has decreased to 68 percent. newcomers with language, housing, Furthermore, the foreign-born popula- and educational needs. In addition tion in many other states has more to settling in new regions across the than doubled — examples include country, immigrants are also increas- , Arizona, North Carolina, ingly choosing to live in suburban Colorado, Nevada, Utah, and areas, where employment and

Figure 2. Foreign-born Population by Region of Birth, for the United States: 1960 – 2000

35

0.0 1.0 30 0.8

8.2 25

20 0.8 0.8 0.5

5.0 15 0.9 0.3 16.1 0.9 2.5

n-born Population (millions) 0.1 0.1 0.3

g 10 1.0 0.1 8.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.8 4.4

Forei 1.8 5 7.3 5.7 5.1 4.4 4.9

0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Latin Northern Other Not Europe America Asia America regions1 reported2

Notes: 1. The “Other regions” category includes Africa and Oceania. 2. In 2000, in contrast to 1990, non- response on country or region of birth was allocated. For 2000, the “Not reported” category only includes those born at sea. Source: Figure reproduced from “US Historical Trends: Region of Birth of the Foreign Born” Data Tools. Migration Information Source. http://www.migrationinformation.org.

96 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century educational opportunities are now Yet the way immigrants are admitted often stronger than in central cities. does influence their prospects for inte- gration. The bulk — some 63 percent Generally speaking, the foreign born in fiscal year 2002 — of permanent are more likely than natives to be immigrants are admitted in order to young, work, live in poverty, and be of reunite with family members (see Latino origin. There are significantly Figure 3). About three-quarters of more immigrants who fall within the these are the family members of US working-age range than native US citizens. Thus, the majority of incoming residents. For instance, immigrants immigrants have family ties to someone made up 13.5 percent of the total in the United States, and most of population aged 15 to 64 in 2002, these have family ties to someone while composing 11.1 percent of the who is already well advanced in the total resident population that same integration process, as indicated by year. The foreign born comprise about citizenship. 14 percent of the US labor force, due in part to their disproportionate pres- Reuniting families enhances the ence among working-age residents and integration prospects for US residents higher proportion of men to women as well as for their newly admitted (relative to the total US population). family members. Social and civic In addition, as a result of their relatively participation in the host society can low educational and occupational status increase significantly with the presence and difficulties in credential and work- of children and spouses, through, for experience recognition, immigrants example, participation in school-related make up about 20 percent of low-wage activities. Residents are also more likely workers. Immigrant integration in the to buy a home, a powerful indicator of United States takes place within this integration, when living with their broad context of a foreign-born popu- family. Family reunification recipients lation that is relatively large and are granted work authorization upon increasingly diverse in terms of legal entry to the US and are able therefore status, country of origin, location of to contribute to the household’s destination, and demographic and income, and thus reduce the risk of human-capital characteristics. poverty, and often develop additional ties to the community through employment. Admitting Immigrants The second-largest “stream” of US The United States does not select immigrants is people who are admitted immigrants according to their “integra- in order to fill specific jobs. With a few tion prospects,” nor does it require evi- exceptions, they must be “sponsored” dence of language or other qualifications by an employer. The vast majority of prior to entry — qualifications that such immigrants are required to be might ease the process of “integration.” high-skilled, with a college education

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 97 Figure 3. Family Reunification as a Proportion of Total Immigration, fiscal years 1995-2002

1.2

1.0

0.8 rants admitted g 0.6

(millions) 0.4

0.2

Number of immi 0.0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (63.64%%))))))))(64.92 (66.93% (72.56 %%%%%(73.54 (68.62 (63.44 (63.27 Year (percent)

Family reunification (total) Other immigration (total)

Source: Chart reproduced and updated from Ramah McKay. “Family Reunification.” Migration Information Source (May 2003). http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=122.

or the equivalent. Thus, these rary to permanent status). In many immigrants have personal characteris- instances, that time is as long as five or tics that make them more likely to six years. In some cases, the US formally succeed economically, and thus to acknowledges certain types of temporary become better integrated. Additionally, status as a system for admitting future they are funneled directly into the permanent immigrants — many high- workplace, the most important arena skilled temporary visa holders are not for integration in America. required to prove that they intend to return to their home country, as recipi- The interaction between temporary and ents of other visas must prior to being permanent immigration statuses may admitted to the US for multi-year stays. also serve as a vehicle that facilitates In fiscal year 2002, approximately 64 integration. A significant number of percent of all admitted immigrants were immigrants admitted either as family adjusting from a temporary status, a reunification migrants or as workers trend that has been increasing over time have spent time in the United States (see Figure 4). These people have thus with a temporary work permit (many had extensive US labor-market have even adjusted directly from tempo- experience, and, in cases of those who

98 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Figure 4. Adjustments as a Proportion of Total Immigration, fiscal years 1997-2002

1,200,000

1,000,000 rants g 800,000

600,000

400,000 admitted (millions) Number of immi 200,000

0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (52.31%) (45.44%) (37.86%) (52.10%) (61.38%) (63.86%) Year (percent) Adjustments New Arrivals

Source: USCIS. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, various years.

are later sponsored for permanent stock of unauthorized immigrants is residence by employers, have apparently estimated to have increased by demonstrated their ability to succeed 500,000 individuals annually over economically in the United States. most of the past decade — is another, although informal, admission stream. This admission structure means that, of Strong US labor demand, high unem- all immigrants formally admitted to the ployment, and continuing economic United States as permanent residents, uncertainty in source countries (partic- only two small groups — those enter- ularly Mexico), as well as an immigra- ing for humanitarian reasons and those tion enforcement system that focuses admitted under the diversity lottery efforts on border control instead of (numbering 126,084 and 42,829, interior enforcement, makes living and respectively, in fiscal year 2002) — working in the United States illegally enter without some family or work a viable option. Most unauthorized connection to the United States. immigrants come to the US using strong social, often family, networks The United States’ unique experience that facilitate employment, housing, with unauthorized migration — the and other “essentials.”

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 99 The unauthorized immigrant population the various legal statuses granted to exhibits extremely strong labor-force immigrants and the process of participation rates — for unauthorized naturalization. Immigrants are afforded male immigrants the rate is estimated varying benefits depending on their at 96 percent. Aside from employment, legal status, which can facilitate their unauthorized immigrants and children integration. Benefits are granted along (who are often US citizens) participate a continuum of presence in the US, in society in many of the same ways as ranging from unauthorized immigrants their legal counterparts. Many of the to US citizens. unauthorized pay federal and state taxes and file annual tax returns, their Lawful Permanent Residents children attend public schools and, The status of “lawful permanent resident” increasingly, they have access to savings (LPR) is the cornerstone of American accounts and in some instances, credit. immigration. According to estimates, about 30 percent, or 10.5 million, of In what can be seen as a bow to inte- foreign-born residents in the US are gration, the United States has opted to LPRs. LPR status confers residence enact opportunities for unauthorized and work authorization. This status immigrants to obtain legal permanent and the accompanying rights can only status. Of course, the principal reason be withdrawn if 1) an individual has for legalization was an attempt to been absent from the US for over a year; reduce the size of the unauthorized 2) an individual is convicted of a felony; population and allow all residents to or 3) it is found that false information enjoy basic protections and benefits. was provided during the application The legalization program of 1986 process. After five years of LPR status under the Immigration Reform and immigrants are eligible for citizenship. Control Act (IRCA), under which This waiting period is reduced to three 2.8 million foreigners were legalized, years for immigrants who are married has been the only large-scale to US citizens. regularization program. (Other ways of legalizing immigrants, typically as In many important respects, LPR status individuals, involve either administra- confers rights approaching those of tive or judicial processes.) Successful citizenship. Like US citizens, LPRs are applicants under IRCA were given able to serve in the US armed forces language and civics courses to support and, if they do so, are granted expedited their integration. citizenship. In fact, as of 2002, there was no waiting period required before applying for citizenship for all active- A Legal Framework for duty and recently discharged non- Integration citizens. LPRs may also obtain public employment and, in a few cities, The second set of policies shaping certain limited local voting rights. immigrant integration in America is The ability to receive family reunifica-

100 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century tion privileges under US immigration than a year and they are not entitled law is also granted to LPRs, although to a US passport or US government these benefits are less generous than protection and assistance while those for US citizens. While a perma- abroad. In some exceptional cases nent resident can petition for their LPRs may be subject to removal spouse or unmarried children, only (deportation). While removal of LPRs citizens can also petition for parents remains an exceptional practice, laws and siblings. Furthermore, petitions implemented in 1996 have expanded from LPRs are capped annually and are the grounds for removal and the restricted by country-specific limits, post-September 11 heightened while immediate-relative petitions security environment appears to have from US citizens are not subject to placed legal permanent residents in numerical limitations. In effect, precarious circumstances. although LPRs may seek family reuni- fication for immediate relatives, indi- Furthermore, while permanent residents viduals may need to wait years before are eligible for certain federal welfare being granted a visa due to country- benefits (most notably housing assis- specific limits. Family reunification is tance and subsidies to earned income) especially important for immigrants their access to many of the most from some countries — for Mexico, important social-support systems the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica, is now restricted. In 1996, welfare 95 percent, 98 percent, and 94 per- legislation broke with the tradition cent, respectively, of those immigrants of treating LPRs nearly equally to admitted in fiscal year 2001 did so citizens in terms of public benefits. under family reunification categories. That law instituted complex eligibility requirements that barred most LPRs As stated previously, LPR status confers from receiving most “means-tested” work authorization and all labor-market federally funded benefits for low-income rights as well as in-state tuition subsi- people for the first five years of their dies for higher education equal to that stay in the United States. In addition, of US citizens. In other aspects, howev- access by newly arriving immigrants er, LPR status is inferior to citizenship. to these benefits was made conditional Most notably, LPRs are barred from on having worked 40 calendar quarters voting in federal and most state and in the US (refugees and asylees and local elections and holding most public the families of military personnel were offices. They are also unable to make important exceptions to this rule). contributions to political campaigns. The law also formalized a broad bar on unauthorized immigrants receiving In most items related to international federally funded benefits. States movement and the possibility of were given the flexibility to provide removal, LPRs are also at a disadvan- their own benefits to LPRs. Many tage. Legal permanent residents can- chose to do so. These changes mean not travel or live abroad for more that eligibility for benefits now

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 101 varies more from state to state for To become a naturalized citizen, legal immigrants than it does for citizens. permanent residents must meet certain eligibility requirements and, through A few of these public benefits have this process, accomplish a number of been reinstated since 1996 — particu- tasks. In addition to a series of larly for children and the elderly — physical-presence requirements, but the principle remains that LPRs naturalization requires the applicant to generally have a greatly inferior claim be at least 18 years of age, be of good to certain social protections and wel- moral character (i.e., have no criminal fare benefits. The 1996 welfare reforms record), have an elementary level of led civil society organizations to con- facility in English, and have a basic duct extensive naturalization drives knowledge of US civics and history. that are thought to have contributed Upon a positive decision from immi- to a surge in naturalization applications gration officials, immigrants must take in the 1990s. the Oath of Allegiance before being granted a certificate of naturalization. Citizenship and Naturalization Perhaps the United States’ Permanent residents must take their greatest success is the rate at which own steps to become naturalized immigrants acquire citizenship. In citizens, as the US government does 2003, about 49 percent of the legal not notify individuals when they are foreign-born population in the eligible to apply. Delays in granting United States were naturalized naturalization caused by administrative citizens — a figure that, in recent backlogs have frustrated many immi- decades, has ranged as high as grants and could deter future applicants, 64 percent (in 1970) and as low as 39 particularly because continuous presence percent (in 1996). Further, the within the US is required of all United States’ jus solis policy grants applicants from the date of petition to citizenship to all children born in US the date of naturalization. In 2003, territory (with the exception of the there were 702,152 naturalization children of some senior diplomatic applications pending a final determina- staff). Citizenship has many important tion (including some applications practical effects, such as eligibility for from previous fiscal years). all social programs, protection from arbitrary government actions (espe- Currently, an estimated 7.9 million cially deportation), and preference in legal residents are eligible to naturalize, family reunification. Naturalization, and although naturalization rates are however, also has an important rising, certain groups tend to be less symbolic role, with naturalization likely to become citizens than others. ceremonies being festive, flag-waving Asians, Europeans, and refugees are events in which participants break among those immigrants most likely to with their previous allegiances and naturalize. , immigrants embrace the United States. with limited English skills, and those

102 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century with income under the federal poverty Control Act. However, the true power level are less like to naturalize. In the of the Hispanic vote is yet to come: 12 case of Latin Americans (the vast million Hispanics are not yet of voting majority of whom are of Mexican age and nine million more do not have origin), naturalization rates have citizenship, but may yet receive it. been steadily rising over the past years. Changes in 1998 to Mexican Tem p o ra ry M i g ra nts law allowing for dual citizenship may The US also admits large numbers of invigorate this trend. temporary immigrants. The bulk of temporary entrants to the US are The United States’ jus solis policies foreign visitors and those entering for create some interesting opportunities business purposes. Other temporary and challenges for integration. For immigrants include students and example, 85 percent of immigrant exchange visitors and foreign workers families are of “mixed status,” where of varying skill levels. Due to their one or more children are US citizens restricted legal status, temporary while the others, as well as the par- immigrants enjoy more limited rights ents, may be non-citizens. In such than all other legal foreign-born cases, the parent may be ineligible for residents in the country. In fact, some or all public benefits, but one or temporary immigrants are not eligible more of the children are eligible — yet for any social benefits, except for the parent may not realize this. The housing assistance in certain extremely parent of a minor child who is a citi- limited cases (primarily for agricultural zen has no legal right to remain in the workers). Some temporary workers United States — although enforce- may also earn credits that they can use ment is inconsistent. in the pension system of their country of origin. This is the result of bilateral Another effect of the United States’ agreements that allow workers to strong tradition of naturalization and combine time spent working in both jus solis has been the growth in the countries to meet minimum standards proportion of immigrants and their for retirement, disability, and survivor’s immediate descendants in the US benefits in their country of origin. electorate. Most significant is the perceived “Hispanic vote”— a “bloc” Unauthorized Immigrants that is composed of naturalized immi- and Universal Rights grants and native-born citizens of Unauthorized immigrants, who make Latino descent. In the 2000 national up nearly 30 percent of the foreign-born elections, about 5.9 million Hispanics population, live in extremely precarious participated, accounting for about 5 circumstances in the United States. If percent of the total voting public. apprehended, they may be deported Their ranks had been swelled by many (the process is not automatic) and of the immigrants regularized under they enjoy almost no right to access the 1986 Immigration Reform and federally funded public services. Yet

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 103 there are many areas in which they do (and thus cannot obtain a Social enjoy certain rights. Unauthorized Security number). These identifier immigrant children, for example, are numbers can be used to pay taxes, entitled to basic education regardless open bank accounts, and for most of their or their parents’ legal status, other transactions not directly related and emergency health care is provided to employment. without regard to legal status. Much of the ability of unauthorized Unauthorized immigrants enjoy signifi- immigrants to integrate is due to the cant protections in employment. Labor fact that governments below the federal standards and minimum wages apply level typically ignore immigration without regard to legal status and status. US law places immigration unauthorized migrants may join policy and enforcement clearly within unions. Furthermore, employers are the competency of the federal not allowed to fire an unauthorized government, giving state and local worker or to report them to immigra- governments the option of ignoring tion enforcement officials in retaliation immigration status, and, in some cases, for a labor complaint, dispute, or requiring them to do so. For instance, unionization activities. about eleven states issue driver’s licenses without regard to legal status In certain other economic aspects, — a number that has dropped since unauthorized immigrants find the terrorist attacks of September 11, government regulations have unchar- 2001, and continues to fluctuate as acteristic flexibility. Investment and debate over the issue continues. business activities by foreigners have, Furthermore, local and state police thus far, survived increased concerns have been reluctant to detain people about security, terrorism, and money solely on immigration violations and laundering. For example, the US are restricted by federal policy in the Treasury Department allows banks to length of time and circumstances permit foreign nationals to use identity under which they may do so. In general, cards issued by their consulates in local officials consider their neutrality order to open accounts and conduct towards immigration status to be a other transactions. These cards are critical aspect of building trust with, most often used by unauthorized immi- and policing, communities with grants who often have no other form immigrants and, in particular, large of identification. The most notable of numbers of unauthorized immigrants. them is the Mexican matrícula In other situations, such as buying consular; over four million are thought or renting a home or, in some cases, to be carried in the United States. The applying for a business license, Internal Revenue Service, too, issues people are not required to prove “Individual Taxpayer Identification legal status. Numbers” (ITINs) to foreigners who are not authorized to work in the US

104 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Universal Protections the job and English-only rules are broadly prohibited. A number of basic rights, such as the right to a fair trial by jury and access In effect, the prohibition against to legal representation, are guaranteed discrimination on the basis of national to immigrants regardless of legal status. origin extends some protection to those Guarantees of freedom of expression without proper legal authorization as and freedom of religion, for example, well. Although immigration law protect the display of immigrants’ cul- requires employers to request cursory tural and religious symbols in both proof of employment authorization, public and private forums, regardless of anti-discrimination law prohibits legal status. Yet, the precise scope of employers from targeting the foreign these rights is evolving, sometimes in born with more extensive inquiries seemingly contradictory ways. For about their legal status. In other areas example, recent civil rights lawsuits as well, such as in housing, inquiries have resulted in outcomes that support about legal status are forbidden. the right of Muslim girls to wear the hijab in public schools, but that leave in place requirements for Muslim Employment and Income women to bare their faces for identifi- cation photos and in other security- Legal permanent residents in the related situations. United States enjoy unfettered access to the job market. The continuing gap Of these “universal” protections, how- between immigrants’ skills and those ever, the most relevant to immigrant that are well rewarded in the US job integration may be anti-discrimination market remains the most important protections. The United States’ rather factor limiting the labor-market success well-developed anti-discrimination of immigrants. Low returns to and lack legislation, jurisprudence, and enforce- of recognition of foreign credentials ment administration prohibit discrimi- and work experience are significant nation based on “national origin.” As secondary factors. Permanent residents applied, however, these laws also and, in some limited cases, persons prohibit discrimination based on nation- with work authorization may also ality, so long as the immigrant has access federal, state, and locally funded proper legal status. Citizenship status job-training programs. How well these may serve as a “tiebreaker” between a programs serve their needs is another citizen applicant and an “authorized matter, however. alien” applicant in hiring, but this pro- vision is rarely used by employers. In Immigrants to the United States are general, anti-discrimination laws have over-represented relative to natives a rather broad sweep: Requirements at both ends of the skill spectrum. that an employee speak English must Generally speaking, high-skilled be justified by the requirements of immigrants enter primarily through the

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 105 employment stream and low-skilled Canada, Africa, and much of Asia, on immigrants arrive principally through the other hand, are more likely to be family reunification and unauthorized employed in professional, “white col- immigration. There is great variation lar” sectors. European-born and in skills, employment success, and Canadian-born immigrants also have income according to country of origin. higher rates of labor-force participa- Mexican and Central American immi- tion, lower unemployment rates, and grants, in particular, are disproportion- higher household incomes than ately found in such low-skill sectors as natives. Each of these indicators is, of construction, maintenance, production, course, influenced by a host of factors transportation, and service occupations — the labor-force-participation rate (see Figure 5). They have lower rates of alone is determined by the age and labor-force participation (see Figure 6), family structure of the population lower household incomes, and higher concerned, skill levels and success in rates of unemployment relative to both the job market, and cultural factors native populations and other immigrant such as attitudes towards women groups. Immigrants from Europe, working, just to name a few.

Figure 5. Occupations of Foreign- and US-Born Groups, 2000

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% Percent 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% USA Caribbean Cen. Mexico Europe Asia Africa Amer. Management Production & Transport Services Sales & Office Construction & Extraction Installation, Professional Maintenance & Repair

Source: Brian Ray. 2004. “Practices to Promote the Integration of Migrants into Labour Markets.” Brussels: European Commision DG Labour and Social Affairs.

106 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Looking at these indicators over time, In 1999 these figures had dropped one of the most important factors to 1.2 percent, 1.1 percent, and 3.6 governing the labor-market integration percent, respectively, as the economy of immigrants is the overall state of boomed. However, wages rose more the economy. The sustained economic slowly for immigrants than for natives growth of the late 1990s, for example, in the same period, with natives seeing saw the unemployment rates of immi- a 7 percent rise in the hourly wage, grants fall faster than those of natives, but the foreign born only a 1.6 with foreign-born Hispanic males percent rise. achieving particular gains. In 1996, the gap between the unemployment This snapshot may demonstrate a larger rate of natives and the foreign born truth about the integration of immi- was 2 percent, that between all natives grants in the American workforce: and foreign-born Hispanic men was Low-skilled workers can easily find 3.7 percent, and the gap between all work in the US economy; their work, natives and foreign-born Hispanic however, is not well rewarded. With females was 5 percent. 30 percent of foreign-born workers

Figure 6. Labor Force Participation & Unemployment Rates, Foreign- and US-Born Groups, 2000

80%

60%

40% Percent

20%

0% USA CaribbeanCen. Amer. Mexico Europe Asia Africa

Unemployment Rate Labor Force Participation Source: Brian Ray. 2004. “Practices to Promote the Integration of Migrants into Labour Markets.” Brussels: European Commision DG Labour and Social Affairs.

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 107 without a high-school diploma, and 1979, but 84 percent more in 1995. 46 percent having limited English Both immigrant and native workers proficiency, it is not surprising that the without a high school degree (which earnings of the foreign born trail those describes an especially large portion of natives, and that 17.9 percent of the of unauthorized migrants) have fallen US foreign born live in poverty. even further behind.

With little longitudinal evidence Yet, there are signs that while the available, it is difficult to determine handicap of low skills matters strongly the effect of increased time in the US at entry, immigrants do succeed in on progress immigrants make in the making gains once in the United workforce. This becomes particularly States. Immigrants entering the US as problematic when cohort effects are legal permanent residents after 1988 considered. There are signs of occupa- had an average household income of tional mobility. For example, in 2000, $44,000 in 1997, while those entering the proportion of Southeast Asian and before 1988 had an average household Caribbean immigrants who arrived income of $50,400. This latter figure during the 1990s and were employed was slightly higher than that of native in professional occupations was 15.9 households, although this is due to a and 9.1 percent, respectively. Those of higher average number of earners per the same two groups who arrived in family. Unauthorized immigrants who the 1980s recorded rates of 18.4 and entered before 1988, on the other 11.9 percent in 2000. Likewise, the hand, reported household incomes proportion of Mexicans and Central slightly lower than the unauthorized Americans employed in construction who entered later. These figures, and maintenance, services, and pro- however, like those immediately duction and transportation occupations above, ignore important cohort effects. also decreased between cohorts over time (Ray, 2004). Longitudinal analysis offers a more useful picture. One study of historical There are also signs of gains in earn- data found that the wage gap between ings among immigrants over time — immigrants and natives tended to but for the least-skilled immigrants narrow by about 10 percent (as meas- much of the past two decades has been ured by mean earnings of immigrants an uphill battle in terms of earnings as a percentage of mean earnings of relative to natives (see Figure 7 for natives) over two decades. Another household-income distributions of longitudinal study found that while foreign- and native-born groups in immigrants earn less than natives at 2000). The earnings of both groups entry, and this gap has widened over were affected by economy-wide time, immigrants continue to make changes in returns to education. strong gains with time, particularly College graduates earned 43 percent after 10 years in the United States. more than high school graduates in The earnings gap between immigrants

108 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century and natives closes by 21 percentage the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 points for men and 13 points for was aimed primarily at people with a women in the second decade of 9th grade education or better and had residence (Orcutt, 2004, Orcutt few provisions for English-language and Dowhan, 1999). training. Provisions to increase accountability, and to tie assistance Federal employment policy has not programs to employment, aggravated focused extensively on immigrants. the situation, according to critics of Although employment assistance is the act, by encouraging education available to permanent residents, providers to set high entry requirements advocates for immigrants charge that and by discouraging immigrants from it does not meet the needs of those seeking service in the first place. immigrants facing the most serious The reauthorization of the Workforce integration obstacles. The “one-stop Investment Act, which is being con- shop” assistance program set up under sidered by Congress as of this writing,

Figure 7. Household Income for Foreign- and US-Born Groups, 2000

100%

80%

60% Percent 40%

20%

0% USA CaribbeanCen. Amer. Mexico Europe Asia Africa

0-$25K $25,000-50K $50,001-75K $75,001-100K Over $100,000

Source: Brian Ray. 2004. “Practices to Promote the Integration of Migrants into Labour Markets.” Brussels: European Commision DG Labour and Social Affairs.

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 109 will direct more attention to extremely many banks and credit unions that low-skilled and low-English-proficiency have used remittance-sending services populations. The US Department of as a way to draw in customers from Labor also runs an assistance program one of the last untapped demographics targeted at migrant farmworkers, for retail banking: the estimated 53 which includes English and job-skills percent of Mexican immigrant house- training. In 2002, 36,222 workers holds that do not use banking services. received assistance through this This both influences and is encouraged program. Beyond these efforts, the by public policy. In the case of the burden of basic education and language matrícula consular, the Treasury learning for immigrant workers is still Department’s decision to allow the use borne largely by private organizations of consular identification cards for and migrants themselves. opening accounts helped banks reach that market. The banks, in turn, added At the moment, there is little political an influential voice of support for the drive to change the status quo on Treasury’s decision when it came under employment policy towards immigrants. political fire. This mutual reinforcement The more significant change in inte- has influenced other areas of policy: gration in the workforce — and its Banks now receive credit under the feedback into national politics and Community Reinvestment Act (which policy — may be the continuing gives banks an incentive to serve growth of the importance of immigrants underserved populations) for providing to labor unions. From 1996 to 2003, a remittance services. Businesses are also period in which overall union member- recognizing the value of immigrants as ship declined, the number of foreign- workers and have added many voices born members of labor unions increased to the call for regularization and immi- 24 percent, to 1.8 million people. This gration reform. period also saw unions take up issues of importance to immigrants: The highest priority of those involved is changes to Education and Children immigration policy, particularly the regularization of unauthorized workers, Although the training of immigrant rather than issues of training, benefits, adults receives little political attention, or discrimination. and has been characterized more by policy stasis than by change, the However, immigrants are not only education of immigrant children has wooed by organized labor, but also by received increasing attention and has business. Services to immigrants — been subject to waves of change in such as remittance-sending — that recent years. This is due, primarily, to had long been the province of niche the rising presence of immigrants and companies now attract major banking children of immigrants in the public institutions. Citibank and Bank of school system over the past few America are among the largest of decades (see Figure 8). Of the 55

110 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Figure 8. Share of Immigrant Children Enrolled in grades K-12, 1970-2000

25%

20% 20.1

15% 15

Percent 10% 6.4 5% 4.8 5.2 1.6 0 1970 1980 1990 2000 Year Foreign-born Children US-born Children of Immigrants All Children of Immigrants

Source: Jennifer Van Hook and Michael Fix. 2000. “A Profile of Immigrant Students in US Schools.” In J. R. DeVelasco, M. Fix and T. Clewell (Eds.), Overlooked and Underserved: Immigrant Children in U.S. Secondary Schools. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.

million children enrolled in kinder- The education of immigrant children, garten through the 12th grade in 2000, particularly language learning, has also 10.5 million, or one out of five, are occupied a more mainstream position immigrants or children of immigrants. in education policy debates. The “No Child Left Behind Act,” a general, All children resident in the United national education-reform bill signed States under the age of 18 are entitled in 2002, requires schools to teach and to basic public education. The educa- test children in English within three tional system makes a genuine effort to years of their entry to the school. It make good on this promise through also compels the annual testing of such programs as a $393 million federal children with limited English profi- program funding state-level programs ciency for English, reading, science, for the education of the children of and mathematics skills. Schools not migrant workers (who are primarily achieving specific benchmarks can be immigrants or temporary foreign work- sanctioned and those students may ers). The program also supports joint then be eligible to transfer schools and efforts with the Mexican government, receive special services, such as tutor- including a teacher-exchange program. ing. In addition, the law removes a

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 111 requirement that a portion of the pro- who entered the United States before gram’s $477 million (in fiscal year the age of 16. 2003) in grants for programs targeting limited English proficiency students go The well-being of immigrant children, towards bilingual education and gives too, is greatly influenced by US welfare parents the explicit right to move their policies (most welfare programs in the child to “mainstream” courses. The act United States are intended to benefit has been hailed for focusing on the families). A disproportionate number achievement of disadvantaged students of children living in poor families are in public education, yet criticized for the children of immigrants. Although, imposing unrealistic and poorly as observed earlier, many of these chil- designed standards and for providing dren are US citizens, their parents may inadequate general funding. not be citizens, or even legal residents.

The No Child Left Behind Act fol- Poverty among immigrant families has lowed a trend of re-examining the edu- slightly different causes than among cation of immigrant children whose native families. Immigrant families are beginning was marked by the success more likely to be poor because the of Proposition 227 in California in heads of these households work in 1998. That ballot initiative essentially poorly paid jobs; unemployment and ended bilingual education — in which single-parent households are the more children with limited English proficiency significant factors in poverty among received subject-area instruction in natives. Thus, the 1996 welfare-reform their native language — in the state. provisions that cut benefits to LPRs Although it was opposed by many impacted citizen children as well as immigrant advocacy organizations as non-citizen children. Between 1994 damaging to the education of immigrant and 1998, food-stamp (food subsidies) children, legitimate concerns about use fell by 53 percent among citizen not only the costs but also the children in immigrant families. educational effectiveness of bilingual However, this type of response was not education have brought the issue to observed for all social programs: Use states where immigration is less of a of health care coverage by citizen hot-button issue, such as Massachusetts. children remained relatively stable no matter what the status of their parents. A second new debate on the national Such differing impacts might be political scene centers on the access of partially explained by the varying unauthorized immigrants to publicly efforts that were put into outreach to funded higher education. Legislation raise awareness among immigrants that currently pending before Congress, for their children were eligible for certain example, would allow states to deter- programs, given indications that mine whether to offer tuition subsidies welfare reform had a chilling effect to unauthorized immigrants and would on use of welfare by otherwise eligible regularize certain young immigrants immigrants.

112 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Homeownership and These same factors also influence the Settlement propensity for homeownership among immigrants, in addition to several The large majority of the foreign-born other immigrant-specific ones. Legal population in the United States is status, country of origin, English eligible for federal housing assistance language proficiency, and length of because they are permanent residents time in the country also affect immi- or naturalized citizens (see Figure 1). grants’ access to, views about, and Compared to most other indicators of likelihood of owning a home. As an integration, however, immigrants are indication that immigrants do inte- slow to integrate into the homeowner- grate fully, although late, into the ship market. Currently, immigrants homeownership market, the Research comprise 8 percent of all homeowners Group of the National Association of in the United States — although they Realtors found nearly identical represent over 11 percent of the total homeownership rates between those resident population — and the average immigrants who had resided in the immigrant buys his first home after US for 20 years or more and the residing in the country for 11 years. native-born population, 67.5 percent Nevertheless, the foreign born are dis- and 68 percent, respectively. proportionately represented (at 14 per- cent) among recent first-time home- One of the most recent and telling buyers, indicating the potential of findings about immigrants and home- immigrants to play a key role in the ownership came as a result of new future growth of the homeownership settlement patterns among the foreign market. In fact, the Joint Center for born. With more immigrants settling Housing Studies projects that minorities, within the last decade in states that of which immigrants make up 30 have not traditionally received large percent, will account for 64 percent of numbers of immigrants, a relationship household growth from 2000 to 2010, between location and homeownership creating a 39 percent increase in the rates has developed. An analysis of the share of total homes owned by minori- top 100 metropolitan areas in the US ties over that time span. from 1990 to 2000 points to varying rates of homeownership success for There are many factors that influence immigrants, with the proportion of immigrant homeownership and several immigrants living in the area and the broader trends, most notably immigrant rate of immigrant growth being dispersion throughout the United States important factors. As expected, in the past decade, are particularly rel- homeownership rates are lowest for evant. Individuals in general are more those foreign born living in the likely to own a home if they are white, traditional immigrant gateways due, highly educated, middle aged, married, primarily, to limited availability of have children, and have high incomes affordable housing in these major or intergenerational wealth assets. urban areas.

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 113 Barriers to immigrant homeownership company became a 15 to 20 percent are many, but recent efforts at the fed- turnover rate in 1995. This type of eral, state, and local levels are working creative partnership is an example of to overcome them. Proven obstacles to the crucial role of the private sector homeownership include a lack of in integration in America. affordable housing (especially in central cities where immigrants are most heavily concentrated) and the Conclusion : Tre n d s a n d lack of credit history among the foreign Challenges born (a result of cultural norms and, for some, limited residence and Several trends and debates seem likely participation in formal financial to continue to shape US integration institutions). Perhaps one of the policy for some time to come. Of largest barriers, however, is the paucity course, it is not possible to discuss of housing information and education immigration policy in the United directed at immigrants — particularly States today without mentioning the since some foreign born come from new focus on security and terrorism. regions where rental housing is the Post-September 11 detentions of people norm and mortgages are not an option. with immigration violations, registration programs focused on foreign visitors A promising example of increasing from predominantly Muslim countries, immigrant homeownership through a interviews of immigrants by law community coalition has taken place enforcement authorities, and other in northwest Arkansas through a aspects of the “War on Terror” have lender-employer-immigrant partnership. decreased the sense of comfort felt by In the early 1990s the North Arkansas many immigrants and visitors (Chisti, Poultry company was experiencing et al, 2003). Yet, despite these tensions, ongoing labor shortages. In an effort to the total entry of long-term permanent create stable conditions, the company residents has not been disrupted, partnered with First National Bank although certain types of entries have and Trust of Rogers to initiate Spanish- been slowed. Most notably, administra- language financial-literacy workshops, tive delays caused by security concerns including homebuyer education. The have led to a massive slowdown in employer provided classroom space and refugee admissions and have played a permitted workers to attend classes for role in decreasing student admissions. free during regular work hours. As a The ongoing political, social, and result of the initiative, over 700 immi- institutional responses to terrorism and grant families purchased homes between security preoccupations will undoubt- 1994 and 2000, of which no loans have edly be important factors in immigrant been in default. Furthermore, the bank integration, but are among the most succeeded in capturing a new market, difficult to predict. Meanwhile, the and what was once a 200 percent separation of the immigration bureau- worker-turnover rate at the poultry cracy into two enforcement divisions

114 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century and one benefits division in response target market of great significance to to security concerns — although they media, business, and politicians alike; all remain within one, security-oriented and Mexican and Hispanic cultures department — has created an opportu- have influenced American popular nity to “rebrand” and re-energize the culture and politics arguably more services division. The establishment of than any other “foreign” influence in an Office of Citizenship is one positive recent years. This growing influence is development in the services division, perhaps the most obvious evidence but recent budget allocations and slow that integration in the United States is progress in reducing the backlog of a dynamic two-way process, in which applications for immigration benefits the broader society also adapts to and naturalization indicate that radical immigrants. change is unlikely to happen quickly. Less obviously, national origin plays a As fits an integration framework that role in another possible trend: the is largely shaped by private actors and growing interest of sending countries “organic” processes, many of the more in playing an active role in the lives of interesting trends are not primarily their nationals in the United States. In guided by the federal government. part, this is motivated by the rising One such trend is the continued domi- awareness of the economic importance nance of Mexico, South and Central of migrant remittances to many source America, and Asia in migration flows. countries, and reflects the desire of The fact that such a large portion of source countries to preserve these US immigrants comes from Mexico flows. But it has also emerged from and that this national group trails political pressure to do more for com- many others in integration as meas- patriots abroad. Arguably, the relatively ured by many criteria (income levels, recent willingness of Mexico, the naturalization rates, language acquisi- source of the United States’ greatest tion in the first generation) has led immigration wave, to engage in open some observers to conclude that the dialogue — even lobbying — on migra- national-origin mix of incoming immi- tion issues reflects this new context. grants is itself an integration and Most notably, the Mexican government economic challenge (Borjas, 1999, has engaged the US government on the Huntington, 2004). However, the issues of regularization and labor immi- dominance of Mexican (and, more gration, but it has also expanded the broadly, Latin American) immigrants services it provides to immigrants. also creates a critical mass that generates opportunities. Community The matrícula consular, discussed above, agencies can cross the language barrier is the most high profile of these of the majority of recent immigrants by expanded services provided by the providing Spanish language services Mexican government to its nationals (itself a controversial practice in some abroad. The true significance of the locales); Hispanic immigrants are a matrícula lies arguably not in what the

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 115 identification card can enable Mexican also raising the profile of migration in immigrants to do (which is nonetheless the international development policy important), but in the way the of the US, making remittances a par- Mexican government recognized a ticularly hot issue. need of its citizens abroad, offered a solution, and then educated its citi- Perhaps the most important current and zens, US businesses, and local US gov- future issue in integration, however, is ernments about it through its network the critical importance of dealing with of 45 consulates and nearly 700 the unauthorized immigrant population employees. In doing so, the Mexican and the possibility of immigration Government demonstrated its capabil- reform. The unauthorized population is ity to touch the lives of literally mil- possibly the greatest integration chal- lions of immigrants — a capability lenge that the United States faces. matched only, on the US side, by the Although the level of integration that federal and a few state governments. many unauthorized immigrants achieve is remarkable considering their precari- The matrícula campaign was one of ous legal status, their level of economic several new initiatives designed to and social success lags far behind immi- reach out to Mexicans in the US. grant groups with other legal statuses. Another such initiative was the cre- The number of unauthorized immigrants ation of an "Institute for Mexicans is simply too great to make removals a Abroad" that established a committee realistic option, creating pressure for of Mexican expatriates to advise the some sort of regularization program. Mexican Government on issues of concern to them. In many jurisdictions, Unauthorized immigration may also local businesses, police, and government have spillover effects on legal immi- officials have welcomed the matrícula grants: Although several arguments to and the involvement of the consulates; this effect can be made, one hypothesis in others, the effort was seen as an holds that the lawlessness of illegal unwanted interference in local policy. migration leads the American public At the national level, too, the issue to be more skeptical of immigration has provoked debate. The relationship and immigrants more generally, thus between consular officials and local inhibiting integration of all immigrants. and state governments is thus likely to Immigration reform would likely be a factor of growing importance in attempt to reduce the size of the integration. Although no other country unauthorized population through some has the sheer numbers of nationals in sort of regularization program and try the US, or such extensive consular to head off future unauthorized immi- resources, other countries seem to be gration by expanding legal-migration interested in following the Mexican inflows and improving enforcement. example of increasing outreach to Both President Bush and Democratic expatriates and to actors in the com- leaders in Congress have called for munities where they live. The trend is reform that would include some type

116 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century of regularization and expanded annual caps or the fear that prevents migration pathways, but they differ on some immigrants from seeking social a number of specific points. The pres- benefits for citizen children). sure for immigration reform comes from a broad spectrum of interests, Interestingly, there has been little including employers, labor unions, discussion of integration policy in the immigrant and ethnic organizations, debate about immigration reform, nor and human rights advocacy groups, have expanded integration efforts that agree strongly on the need for been a major component of any reform but differ as to what specific reform proposal. In part, this may be measures they would most like to see indicative of the infancy of the taken. Notably, no mainstream reform dialogue. It may also reflect, however, proposal calls for a restriction of the confidence Americans have in the immigration. This broad political capacity of employment and private coalition, however loose, and the fact and local processes to integrate people that mainstream politicians of both who already have roots in the United parties speak of immigration and immi- States and are largely perceived, in the grants in overwhelmingly positive words of President Bush, as “willing terms, are welcome developments in workers” in a country with a large the political integration of immigrants. number of “willing employers.”

Thus, the possibility of immigration reform is itself a product of today’s Recommendations for integration successes and problems; the US and Europe if it came to pass, it would create an entirely new set of integration chal- Unauthorized immigration presents lenges. Whether expanded immigration an integration problem of the first pathways and regularizations are perma- degree. In the United States, nent or temporary and whether they are unauthorized immigration is the focused on family reunification or dominant issue in immigration, employment, they would have signifi- preventing political progress on cant integration implications. Both reg- other matters important to ularization and expanded admissions, at integration and straining social least as currently being discussed, would acceptance of immigrants. Any likely strengthen existing trends in the attempt to deal with unauthorized geographical focus and skill mix of immigration, in the US or else- legal immigrants. Reform, depending on where, however, must acknowledge the form it would take, would likely the extent to which unauthorized exacerbate some problems (such as immigrants are already integrated. demands on those who administer This means recognizing the immigration and naturalization bene- importance of their labor and the fits) while helping others (such as the degree to which they have social delay in reunifying families due to and family ties in the host country.

Practices and Policies for Immigrant Integration in the United States 117 Furthermore, this means that both a symbolic and practical meas- removal of the majority of the exist- ure is one of the best aspects of its ing unauthorized population is not integration policy. There are further an option for most countries. ways that naturalization can be streamlined and encouraged in the The United States’ blend of a United States, but other countries minimal social safety net, relatively would do well to look to elements high employment rates, and a feder- of the US system that have assured alized system creates an environment broad access for immigrants to citi- for immigrant integration that is zenship and have engendered confi- quite different from that of many dence, and even affection, for the European countries. Yet aspects of process among the native population. this system — the importance of schools and workplaces as venues for The recredentialing of immigrants integration and the importance of is an important facilitator of labor- intervention by local or municipal market success though it is a process governments — could enhance with which no country succeeds integration in other environments. completely. Public-private partner- Schools, workplaces, and the local ships may be a particularly appropri- civic sphere are the places where ate way to deal with this problem. integration happens for most immigrants and should be the Access to financial services, particu- focus of most resources dedicated larly checking and savings accounts to integration. and mortgages, is a crucial factor in enabling the upward mobility of Not all good immigrant integration immigrants. The government has a policies are targeted at immigrants. role to play in creating a regulatory Policy changes that are informed by environment that encourages banks integration needs but affect larger to seek out immigrants as customers populations (such as low-income and perhaps in promoting financial people) often have great beneficial literacy among immigrants. effects on immigrant integration. Conversely, policy changes that tar- Delays in the unification of imme- get immigrants for cuts in support diate family members and confusing may have extreme adverse effects immigration regulations have inte- on both immigrant and non-immi- gration consequences and may fuel grant populations, particularly the unauthorized immigration. Progress native-born children of immigrants. on cutting backlogs and in stream- lining the immigration process Naturalization and citizenship are should be a priority in any country. important steps in immigrant inte- gration. The United States’ success Immigration and security threats with immigrant naturalization as should be distinguished from each

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Patrick, E. “The US Refugee Resettlement Program.” Migration Information Source. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, June 1, 2004, http://www.migrationinforma- tion.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=229.

120 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Migrants and the European Labor Market

Rai n er Mü nz an d Th omas Strau b haar s Europe heads into the 21st the national level, as in most Member A century, it appears set to States, certain sectors of the economy recruit considerable numbers (e.g., agriculture, health care, food of third-country nationals as a main processing, tourism) heavily rely on way of meeting its foreseeable demand migrant workers and employees. for medium- and high-skilled labor. The reasons for this expected trend are Analysis based on the European Labour both demographic and economic. Force Survey reveals that migrants in Europe’s aging native-born workforce Europe experience low employment — a pool already stagnating in many rates and higher unemployment than countries due to low birth rates — has the native-born, and that there is a for the most part already been tapped concentration of immigrants and for- of its skilled workers by European eign nationals from middle- and low- employers. For these reasons, all of the income countries in certain sectors of present 25 Member States of the the economy and in low-paying jobs. European Union (EU 25) as well as Such an analysis comparing foreign- the other members of the European born and native-born populations had Economic Area (EEA; , Norway, not been carried out before. ) and non-aligned Switzerland will either remain or soon The analysis reveals that the employ- become countries of immigration. ment picture is somewhat better when looking at the foreign-born population As demographic aging will intensify (as opposed to the foreign-national after 2010, many European countries population), as it includes naturalized will have to develop proactive migra- citizens of EU Member States, who on tion policies to meet their burgeoning average are economically better inte- demographic and economic needs. For grated than those who remain third a relatively short period of time, country nationals. In this chapter, the European East-West migration, spurred term “immigrants” refers to the broader by factors such as higher wages and “foreign-born” population, not the work opportunities in Western Europe, “foreign national” population (see text will continue to play a role. But in the box). Immigrants from high-income medium and long term, potential countries residing in the EU (including migrants will inevitably be recruited intra-EU migrants), in particular, expe- from other regions of the world. rience above-average employment rates Because Europe will have to compete and, on average, are employed in better with traditional countries of immigra- positions than legal foreign residents. tion — in particular Australia, Canada, and the US — for qualified This suggests the following: The migrants to fill labor gaps, a discussion process of integration of immigrants of labor migration and its effects on differs to a lesser degree from that of employment structure is not only help- traditional countries of immigration ful, but necessary. The same is true at such as the US, Canada, and Australia

122 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century than has been previously assumed, nationality, but not place or country of although labor market outcomes birth, as a standard criterion in their remain disappointing for migrants from demographic, economic, and social low- and middle-income countries, statistics. To date, European adminis- and in particular those from Northern trative practice basically distinguishes Africa and Turkey. This leads us to citizens of the country in question conclude that further sustained efforts from legal (and irregular) foreign resi- to enhance the integration of immi- dents, but does not distinguish native- grants and their children and to pro- born from foreign-born residents. vide equal opportunities are necessary. Available statistics reflect this basic distinction (see text box). Beyond this, The main challenge for European poli- differences in the ways migrants are cymakers will be to position their defined and data on immigration/emi- countries to recruit migrants matching gration is collected remain despite their labor needs, while still sustaining ongoing efforts by the European economic growth and supporting their Commission (EC) to bring about stan- public pension systems. Given those dardization in this field. goals, a common European approach to immigration can play a crucial role Keeping in mind these variations, in tackling shortages of labor and the best estimate of the number of skills, provided the qualifications of migrants living in Western and immigrants are appropriate. This chap- (EU 25+), as of 2001-2, ter concludes with recommendations is 36 to 39 million people. Among for the best courses of action available them, as of 2002, some 33 to 36 million to policymakers. were living in the fifteen countries that constituted the European Union until 2004 (EU 15). Another 1.7 million Identifying Europe’s immigrants live in the other EEA Migrants states and Switzerland, and some 1.5 million immigrants live in the new Understanding the interplay of migra- EU Member States in Central Europe. tion and Europe’s labor-market dynam- ics requires quantitative information The overall estimate of 36 to 39 million on the foreign-born population and covers both legal immigrants — their socio-economic position. whether foreign nationals or citizens However, collecting such information — and irregular migrants. Available is easier said than done. To begin with, official statistics underestimate both one of the most important pieces of foreign immigrants with a short dura- data — the size and composition of tion of stay and/or irregular status, as Europe’s migrant population — is well as naturalized immigrants with a unknown. This is partly due to the fact fairly long duration of stay. This is that many European countries — in particularly true for immigrants who contrast to Canada and the US — use receive settlement privileges because

Migrants and the European Labor Market 123 they share ethnicity with the domi- possible to estimate such differences nant majority of the receiving country both from recent regularization pro- (e.g., ethnic German Aussiedler, grams and from discrepancies between Pontian Greeks), those returning to the local registers and general census historical “homeland,” and people results (see the case of Spain; Table 1). being repatriated from former overseas colonial possessions (e.g., French Pieds Recent Flows Noir from Algeria, British settlers from In 2003, the twenty-eight EEA coun- Zimbabwe). tries and Switzerland had an overall net migration rate of +3.7 per 1,000 In Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, inhabitants. The net gain from the number of irregular migrants was migration was 1.7 million people. apparently above 10 percent of the This accounted for almost 90 percent total foreign-born population prior to of Europe’s total population growth of recent regularization programs. For the 1.9 million people in that year. United Kingdom (UK), a good estimate might be that 10 percent of the foreign In absolute numbers, gross immigra- born are in an irregular status; figures tion was largest in Germany, the UK, for Denmark, Sweden, and Finland and Italy. Relative to population could be lower than 10 percent. It is size, had the largest positive

How Europe Counts “Foreign Nationals” vs. “Foreign Born”

The “foreign nationals” who are traditionally counted in European statistics are legal residents of EU Member States (or other countries of Europe) not holding citizenship of these countries. This includes both immigrants still holding foreign citizenship (usually citizens of their country of origin) and children of immigrants who were born in an EU Member State, but only received the foreign nationality of their parents. The category “foreign nationals” does not include people who have acquired the citizenship of their country of residence. The “foreign born,” on the other hand, are all people with place of birth outside of a particular European country, regardless of their current citizenship. Thus, the definition “foreign born” includes immigrants who have acquired the nationality of the county where they reside. The number of foreign born in a given state can be much greater than the number of foreign nationals. This mainly has to do with the fact that from 1992 to 2001, some 5.8 million people were naturalized in the EU 15.

In many documents of both the European Community (EC) and the EU Member States, the number of legal foreign residents or third-country nationals has been used as “proxy” for the number of immigrants.

124 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century migration balance, followed by Ireland, Entry Channels in Relation Portugal, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, to Labor Migration and Spain. Only , Iceland, Poland, , and recorded a In many European countries for negative migration balance (Table 2). which data are available, recent regu- In the Baltics this is due to the outflow lar immigration is dominated by family of ethnic Russians and other minori- reunification and migration related to ties, while in Poland emigration for the formation of new families, by the economic reasons prevails. inflow of coethnic “return” migrants

Table 1. Total, Foreign Resident, and Immigrant Population (EU 15), 2000 – 2002, Different Data S ou rces Compared

EU 15 Total Foreign Foreign Foreign Immigrant Immigrant Immigrant Immigrant Popu- Resident Resident Resident / Foreign Popu- Popu- Popu- lation, Popu- Popu- Popu- Resident lation lation lation lation, lation, lation Popu- According with with (1) Eurostat, OECD/ with lation, to Country Duration Chronos Sopemi Nationality UN for National of Birth of Stay DB for for Known, 2000 (3) Sources Known, Known, 2000 2001 LFS (2) for 2001 LFS (5) LFS (4) Belgium 10,356 853 847 784 879 n.a. 974 1,034 Denmark 5,384 256 267 166 304 322 225 227 Germany 82,537 7,344 7,319 5,444 7,349 9,700 n.a. 8,915 Greece 11,018 161 762 362 534 n.a. 489 480 Spain 40,683 801 1,109 450 1,259 2,664 858 664 France (6) 59,629 3,263 3,263 2,724 6,277 5,868 4,605 1,327 Ireland 3,964 127 151 118 310 n.a. 232 263 Italy 57,321 1,271 1,363 n.a. 1,634 2,500 n.a. 511 Luxembourg 448 148 167 161 162 145 127 119 Netherlands 16,193 652 690 555 1,576 1,675 1,179 1,593 Austria 8,067 754 764 695 756 893 899 798 Portugal 10,408 191 224 106 233 n.a. 1,119 1,313 Finland 5,206 88 99 50 134 145 81 86 Sweden 8,941 487 476 295 993 1,028 681 933 UK 59,329 2,298 2,587 2,026 4,029 n.a. 3,307 4,467 Total (N) 379,484 18,692 20,088 13,936 26,429 24,940 14,776 22,730

(1) Eurostat, year-end population 2002; (2) European Labor Force Survey (LFS) 2002 (data for Italy not available); (3) UN Population Division, data for 2000 or latest available year (see UN 2002); (4) Data for Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden are from national population registers; data for Austria, France, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands are from the most recent national censuses; data for Spain (2003) are from local municipalities' regis- ters; data for Germany are rough estimates based on foreigners' registers, naturalization statistics and an Allbus survey estimate for ethnic German Aussiedler taking only immigration after 1950 into account (see Münz and Ulrich 2003); data for Italy are based on the number of residency permits (2003, various categories) and an estimate for foreign-born children not required to hold residency permits (see Einaudi 2004); (5) European Labor Force Survey(LFS) 2002 (data for Germany and Italy not available); (6) Chronos data, Sopemi data and Census data for France are from 1999. Sources: Münz and Fassmann (2004), Eurostat Chronos DB and European Labor Force Survey, OECD/Sopemi (2004), UN Population Division (2002), various national sources.

Migrants and the European Labor Market 125 Table 2: Indicators of Population Change in Europe, 2003

Country PopulationChange per 1,000 Population Population January National January 2003 Births Deaths Population Net Total 2004 in 1,000s Decrease/ Migration Population in 1,000s Increase Change EU-25 Germany 82,537 8.6 10.4 -1.8 1.8 0.0 82,539 France 59,635 12.7 9.2 3.5 0.9 4.4 59,901 UK 59,329 11.6 10.2 1.4 1.7 3.1 59,516 Italy 57,321 9.5 10.0 -0.5 8.9 8.4 57,804 Spain 41,551 10.4 9.1 1.3 14.2 15.5 42,198 Poland 38,219 9.2 9.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 38,191 Netherlands 16,193 12.4 8.7 3.7 0.2 3.8 16,255 Greece 11,006 9.3 9.4 -0.1 3.2 3.1 11,255 Portugal 10,408 10.9 10.5 0.4 6.1 6.5 10,475 Belgium 10,356 10.7 10.2 0.5 3.4 3.9 10,396 Czech Rep. 10,203 9.2 10.9 -1.7 2.5 0.8 10,212 Hungary 10,142 9.4 13.5 -4.1 1.5 -2.5 10,117 Sweden 8,941 11.0 10.4 0.6 3.2 3.8 8,976 Austria 8,082 9.5 9.5 -0.0 4.0 4.0 8,114 Denmark 5,384 12.0 10.7 1.3 1.3 2.6 5,398 Slovakia 5,379 9.6 9.7 -0.1 0.3 0.2 5,380 Finland 5,206 10.9 9.4 1.5 1.1 2.6 5,220 Ireland 3,964 15.5 7.3 8.2 7.1 15.3 4,025 Lithuania 3,463 8.8 11.8 -3.0 -1.8 -4.8 3,446 Latvia 2,332 9.0 13.9 -4.9 -0.4 -5.3 2,319 1,995 8.6 9.6 -1.0 1.7 0.7 1,996 Estonia 1,356 9.6 13.3 -3.7 -0.2 -4.0 1,351 Cyprus* 715 11.3 7.7 3.6 17.9 21.5 731 Luxembourg 448 11.8 9.1 2.7 4.6 7.3 452 397 10.1 8.0 2.2 4.3 6.5 400 Total EU 25 454,560 10.4 10.0 0.4 3.7 4.1 456,449 EEA, non EU 25 Iceland 289 14.2 6.2 8.0 -0.8 7.2 291 Liechtenstein 34 8.8 5.0 3.8 10.0 13.8 34 Norway 4,552 12.0 9.4 3.1 2.4 5.5 4,578 Total EEA 459,435 10.4 10.0 0.4 3.7 4.1 461,352 Switzerland 7,318 9.7 8.5 1.2 5.6 6.8 7,368 EU Accession Countries 4,442 9.0 11.4 -2.4 2.0 -0.4 n.a. Bulgaria 7,846 8.4 14.3 -5.7 - -5.7 7,799 Romania 21,773 9.6 12.2 -2.5 -0.3 -2.8 21,716 Turkey 70,173 21.0 7.1 13.9 1.4 15.3 71,254

Source: Eurostat.

126 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century such as the abovementioned Aussiedler while 30 percent were granted for the and their dependent family members, purpose of family reunification. These and by the arrival of asylum seekers figures, however, do not give the full (412,000 applications in the EU 25 picture, because in several EU coun- in 2002). tries, economic migration on a larger scale takes place in the form of season- In other EU Member States — namely al and temporary labor migration in Ireland and several countries of (529,000 people admitted temporarily Southern Europe — regular and irregu- to the EU 15 in 2001), as well as in the lar economic migration still plays a form of irregular labor migration of at dominant role. least the same magnitude. Statistically, the latter phenomenon only becomes The data show that family reunification/ visible on the occasion of regularization formation visas’ share of total visas programs. During the period 1995 to granted by a particular country varied 2005, some 4 million migrants were from as much as 70 percent (e.g., regularized in the EU 15. Sweden in 2001) to as little as 20 to 30 percent in countries such as Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy, and Labor Migration in the Spain in 2000 to 2002. New EU Member States

In terms of migration for employment, In most new EU Member States, admission for work accounted for 61 migrant workers and employees (who percent of all entries into Italy in have come since the opening of the 2000, while this number was as low as borders in 1990) represent a relatively 27 percent for the UK. small segment of the work force. For example, in the new EU states in These differences reflect legal barriers Central Europe (Estonia, the Czech (e.g., Denmark, UK) or quotas (e.g., Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria) restricting family reunion or Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), cur- family formation of immigrants in the rent labor migration is still relatively receiving country. They also reflect the small. Only in the Greek part of country’s history of immigration as Cyprus has the share of foreign labor family reunification usually is a product been above the EU average and con- of past labor migration (which explains tinuously growing. smaller shares of family reunion in Finland and Southern Europe). Finally Despite the fact that many new Member they reflect current openness to labor States have seen net emigration in migration (e.g., Ireland, Italy, Greece). recent years, they, too, receive immi- grants. In Poland, the total number of Looking at the EU 15 overall, nearly work permits for labor migrants fluctu- 40 percent of all residence permits were ated between 15,000 and 18,000 per granted for the purpose of employment, year (1997 to 2002), and irregular labor

Migrants and the European Labor Market 127 Table 3: Foreign Labor Force in Selected European Countries in 2000 – 2001

Foreign Labor Force Foreign Labor Force, total (percent of total labor force) Austria 10.5 398,622 Belgium 8.9 378,243 Czech Republic 2.0 115,431 Denmark 3.4 100,076 Finland (1) 1.5 39,109 France 6.0 1,603,185 Germany 8.8 3,599,877 Hungary (3) 2.3 115.000 Ireland 3.7 59,619 Italy 3.6 926,271 Luxembourg 57.3 107,091 Netherlands (2) 3.4 248,452 Norway 4.9 114,431 Portugal 2.0 101,681 Slovak Republic (3) 0.3 9,100 Spain (1) 1.2 211,736 Sweden 5.0 239,951 Switzerland 18.3 707,294 United Kingdom 4.4 1,293,649 Total 6.5 10,368,817

(1) 1999 values; (2) 1998 values; (3) 2002 estimates. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database.

Table 4: Education of the 15+ Years Old Immigrant Population with Country of Birth Known, EU 15

EU 15 Mig. Mig. CEEC Turkey Africa, USA, Latin Asia Total EU 15 EU EU (4) (others) Middle Canada, America, Foreign- average West (2) South (3) East Austral. Carib. born Low (5) 30.9 76.8 40.8 69.2 58.6 11.6 33.9 41.0 51.8 43.4 Medium (6) 37.8 15.6 39.5 22.5 24.5 34.7 33.0 31.5 28.2 39.4 High (7) 31.3 7.6 19.7 8.4 17.0 53.8 33.0 27.5 20.0 17.2 Total (percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total (N) 2,774 2,801 1,628 766 3,084 346 224 966 12,589

(1) LFS 2002, data for Germany and Italy not available; (2) EU 15 (except Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain) + Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland; (3) Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain; (4) New EU Member States, accession countries, other countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Russia, , , Caucasus, Central Asia; (5) pri- mary/lower secondary school completed/not completed; (6) higher secondary school completed; (7) tertiary education.

128 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century migration has become visible (with an Central Europe, making up 6 percent estimated size of 300,000 people, mostly of all foreign residents in Hungary from Ukraine). In Slovenia, the (data for 2001-03). number of work permits fluctuated between 34,000 and 40,000. In 2001, the Czech Republic counted 104,000 Education and Skills non-nationals legally working. When adding so-called trade licenses (i.e., To understand the impact of migration business visas for particular economic on Europe’s labor market, it is crucial activities), the number of economic to map out the relationship between migrants could be estimated at around education/skill levels and employment 168,000 in 2001. In Slovakia, this patterns. For the purposes of this number was 9,000 in 2002. Relative analysis, “high-skilled” means comple- to work force and population size, tion of tertiary education, “medium- Hungary has had the largest number skilled” indicates completion of lower of legal foreign workers and employees: or higher secondary education, and 115,000 in 2002, or 2.3 percent of the “low-skilled” indicates that no secondary work force (Table 3). education has been completed.

In the new EU Member States, the In 2002, 32.6 percent of the EU great majority of migrant workers population ages 25 to 64 had a “low” come from neighboring countries level of education, 46.7 percent had a and regions. In Slovenia, more than “middle” level education, and 21.8 90 percent of the foreign workers percent had a “high” level (see Figure and employees come from other suc- 1). Within the EU, there are strong cessor states to the former Yugoslavia. differences in the education levels. Foreign workers from Ukraine, Belarus, In most of the countries, the share of and the Russian Federation represent the population with a “low” education the majority in Poland and some 30 level ranges from 12 to 40 percent. percent in the Czech Republic. In The less-educated half of the expanded Hungary, 43 percent of the legal EU is composed primarily of the foreign residents were Romanian Southern European members of the citizens, followed by citizens of EU 15 and several Eastern European (11 percent) and Ukraine (8 percent). new Member States. These countries Many of them were ethnic Hungarians. have the lowest proportion of highly Around 10 percent had come from educated people (10 percent in the other EU Member States. case of Italy and Portugal) and highest proportions of people of “low” educa- The Czech Republic and Poland tion (reaching 80 percent in the case also have a sizeable share of migrant of Portugal). workers from Asian countries, notably Vietnam, whereas Hungary hosts the The skills profile of the foreign-born largest Chinese diaspora community in population is markedly different from

Migrants and the European Labor Market 129 that of the total EU population. Both Most of the EU 25 countries achieved people with low skills (immigrants: 52 employment gains in the period from percent; EU 15 average: 48 percent) 1997 to 2002. However, some of the and with high skills (immigrants: 20 new EU Member States, especially percent; EU 15 average: 17 percent) Poland and Lithuania, had to face are overrepresented among immi- enormous employment losses over the grants. People with medium skills same period (see Figure 2). Luxembourg are underrepresented among migrants and Ireland had employment growth (immigrants: 28 percent; EU 15 rates of 25 percent, exhibiting the best average: 39 percent). This is mainly labor market performance. Spain’s a result of labor markets primarily economic development during this creating demand for high- and period was also was favorable from the low-skilled migrants. perspective of employment opportunities (+15.5 percent employment growth). Migrants from Southern Europe living On the other hand, employment in another EU country, as well as those growth rates of several EU countries from Turkey, North Africa/Middle clearly fell short of the EU average East, and sub-Saharan Africa residing (e.g., in Greece, Austria, Germany, and in the EU, have relatively high pro- Denmark). These countries performed portions of people with low skills. In even worse than some new EU Member contrast, immigrants from Northwestern States (e.g., Hungary and Cyprus). Europe living in another EU country, and in particular immigrants from In 1997, the employment rates of EU other industrialized world regions nationals already had reached 79 (North America, Australia, and New percent for the medium-skilled and 88 Zealand), have higher proportions of percent for the high-skilled. By 2002, highly skilled people (Table 4). they had further risen to 82 percent and 89 percent, respectively. A similar development took place for legal foreign Labor Market Dynamics residents in the EU 15. The number of and Composition medium-skilled increased by 50 percent, while the number of high-skilled In 2002, some 290 million people living doubled, amounting to more than 60 in the EU 15 were of working age (15 percent of the total increase in their to 65). Of these, 62.8 percent were employment. This reflected cyclical actually employed. Labor force partici- growth in employment and the pation rates ranged from 51.5 percent migrants’ disproportionately large in Poland to 75.9 percent in Denmark. contribution to this increase during Of the EU 15, Italy had the lowest the period 1997 to 2002, which was participation rate (55.5 percent). These characterized by economic and employ- differences largely reflect variations in ment growth. The situation for the female labor force participation and age low-skilled was less favorable, with a at retirement. much more modest employment

130 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Figure 1: Education Level of the 25–to–64 Age Group, Percentages of Total Education, 2002

EU 15 EU25 Lithuania Finland Estonia UK Cyprus Belgium Denmark Sweden Ireland Netherlands Spain France Germany Bulgaria Latvia Luxembourg Greece Austria Slovenia Hungary Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Italy Portugal

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

high middle low

Source: European Commission (2004), authors' calculations.

Migrants and the European Labor Market 131 Figure 2: Total Employment Growth Rate 1997 – 2002*

Luxembourg 25,9%

Ireland 2 5,4%

Spain 15,5% Netherlands 10,7% Finland 9,6% France 8,8% Sweden 8,4% Italy 8,1% Portugal 6,9% Hungary 6,8% Belgium 6,4% Cyprus 5,2% UK 5,1% Denmark 4,0% Malta 4,0% Germany 3,9% Austria 3,6% Greece 3,4% Slovenia 0,0% Latvia -1,3% Czech Republic -3,5% Slovakia -5,3% Estonia -5,7% Poland -9,2% Lithuania -11,2%

-20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30%

Source: Eurostat, http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/newcronos. For Cyprus 1997-2001, Lithuania 2000-2002, Malta 1998-2002, Slovakia 2000-2002.

132 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century increase, but still stronger for third- (except Malta) with the highest unem- country nationals than for EU nationals. ployment rates for women. Labor force participation of women is significantly European Unemployment Rates. In above average in countries in 2002, the average unemployment rate Northern Europe (i.e., Denmark, in the EU 25 was 8.9 percent. Finland, and Sweden). Currently, unemployment rates vary significantly among EU states (see In seventeen of the EU 25 countries, Table 5). In 2002, Poland had an more women than men are unem- unemployment rate of 19.8 percent, ployed, although in some of these while the unemployment rate in the countries, these unemployment rates Netherlands was 2.7 percent. differ only slightly. This holds true However, in terms of unemployment, especially for countries with relatively there is no clear pattern that would low unemployment rates (Austria, distinguish EU 15 states from new Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Member States. Some of the new Netherlands, Slovenia, and the UK). Member States, such as Slovenia, But in addition, in some of the coun- Cyprus, Hungary, and the Czech tries with high unemployment — such Republic, exhibit unemployment rates as Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland — below the EU average. Others, such as such gender-related disparities in Poland and Slovakia, face unemploy- unemployment are rare. In Finland, ment rates that are clearly above the there is no difference between male EU average. and female unemployment rates. By contrast, unemployment is distinctly In terms of North-South differences, higher for the female populations in unemployment is relatively high in Greece, Spain, and Italy. some Southern European countries (Greece and Spain), and distinctly low Between 1997 and 2002, the number in Portugal (5 percent). Most countries of people employed in the EU 15 in Northern Europe have relatively increased by about 12 million (+8.1 low unemployment compared to the percent), out of which 9.5 million were EU average, for example Denmark (4.6 EU nationals and more than 2.5 million percent), Ireland (4.3 percent), were third-country nationals. While Sweden (4.9 percent), and the UK third-country nationals’ share of total (5.1 percent). EU employment was 3.6 percent in 2002, they accounted for 13 percent of In all EU countries, the labor force employment growth during the period participation rate of men exceeds that 1997 to 2002. Taking into account for- of women. The biggest difference eign-born naturalized EU citizens, between male and female participation immigrants contributed 20 percent of rates can be found in Southern employment growth. (Table 7). Europe, namely in Greece, Italy, Malta, and Spain — the countries Immigrant Employment. The employ-

Migrants and the European Labor Market 133 ment rate of the foreign-born popula- than the total EU population, which tion ages 15 to 65 is lower (61 per- had an unemployment rate of 7.8 per- cent) than the EU 15 average (64 per- cent in 2002. cent; Table 8). This rate varies accord- ing to place of origin. Western and The opposite is true for immigrants Southern Europeans living in another from other parts of the world. EU 15 country and immigrants from Employment is particularly low and other industrialized countries have unemployment correspondingly high higher employment rates than other among immigrants from Turkey, whose immigrants and the EU average. They rate of employment stands at 50 percent, also have lower unemployment rates and unemployment at 15.5 percent.

Table 5: Unemployment rates in EU 15, 2002, total, male, and female, in percent (ordered by size)

Unemployment Rate total male female Poland 19.8 19.0 20.7 Slovakia 18.7 18.6 18.9 Lithuania 13.6 13.7 13.4 Latvia 12.6 13.6 11.4 Spain 11.3 8.0 16.4 Greece 10.0 6.6 15.0 Estonia 9.5 10.1 8.9 Finland 9.1 9.1 9.1 Italy 9.0 7.0 12.2 France 8.9 7.9 10.0 Germany 8.7 8.8 8.4 Malta 7.5 6.5 9.6 Belgium 7.3 6.7 8.2 Czech Republic 7.3 6.0 9.0 Slovenia 6.1 5.8 6.5 Hungary 5.6 6.0 5.1 UK 5.1 5.6 4.5 Portugal 5.0 4.2 6.0 Sweden 4.9 5.3 4.6 Denmark 4.6 4.4 4.7 Ireland 4.3 4.6 4.0 Austria 4.2 3.9 4.4 Cyprus 3.9 3.0 4.9 Luxembourg 2.8 2.1 3.9 Netherlands 2.7 2.5 3.0 EU 25 8.9 8.1 9.8

Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/newcronos.

134 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Table 6: Employment Rate in EU 25, 2002, total, male, and female, in percent (ordered by size)

Unemployment Rate total male female Denmark 75.9 80.0 71.7 Netherlands 74.4 82.4 66.2 Sweden 73.6 74.9 72.2 UK 71.7 78.0 65.3 Austria 69.2 75.9 62.5 Cyprus 68.6 78.9 59.1 Portugal 68.2 75.9 60.8 Finland 68.1 70.0 66.2 Ireland 65.6 75.5 55.6 Czech Republic 65.4 73.9 57.0 Germany 65.4 71.8 59.0 Luxembourg 63.4 75.1 51.6 Slovenia 63.4 68.2 58.6 France 63.0 69.5 56.7 Estonia 62.0 66.5 57.9 Latvia 60.4 64.3 56.8 Belgium 59.9 68.3 51.4 Lithuania 59.9 62.7 57.2 Spain 58.4 72.6 44.1 Slovakia 56.8 62.4 51.4 Greece 56.7 71.4 42.5 Hungary 56.2 62.9 49.8 Italy 55.5 69.1 42.0 Malta 54.4 74.7 33.9 Poland 51.5 56.9 46.2 EU 25 62.8 71.0 54.7

Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/newcronos.

Table 7: Distribution of employment growth (1997-2003) EU 15

Male Male Female Female total total Nationality/Country foreign foreign foreign foreign foreign foreign of birth national born national born national born Other EU 15 1.3 2.2 1.8 3.2 1.8 2.6 CEE 3.9 2.7 5.6 4.1 3.3 4.8 Other Europe 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.6 0.1 1.0 North Africa 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.2 0.3 0.9 North Am., Austral. 0.4 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.0 Other 7.3 5.5 13.4 10.1 6.3 11.6 Nationals/Natives 85.9 88.4 78.1 81.8 87.3 80.1 Unknown 0.7 0.5 -1.2 -0.7 0.6 -1.0 Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

(1) Data for Germany and Italy not available.

Migrants and the European Labor Market 135 For those from the Middle East/Africa, ployment rates. Women from Latin the employment rate is 51 percent, America have average employment while the rate of unemployment is 16 rates but particularly high unemploy- percent. For immigrants from Asia, the ment rates. The opposite is true for corresponding percentages are 58 and women from Western EU countries 8.2 percent, respectively. Immigrants and from other Western countries living from the new EU Member States, the in the EU 15. Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Latin America have almost the same Because employment and unemploy- employment rate as the EU 15 aver- ment rates vary to a considerable age, 63 percent, respectively, but high- degree with acquired skill levels, lower er unemployment (11 percent for the employment rates among certain Balkans and Eastern Europe, and 11.7 immigrant groups are partly the result percent for Latin America; Table 8). of differences in skills compositions. Employment rates of male migrants Foreign-born men only have a slightly moving within EU 15 countries do not lower employment rate (71 percent) differ much from the EU average, and higher unemployment (9.3 per- while lower-skilled women from other cent) than the EU 15 average for the EU 15 countries have higher employ- male population (employment: 73 ment rates. This is particularly true for percent; unemployment: 6.9 percent; women from Southern EU 15 countries. Table 8). Employment is high among In contrast, immigrants from Turkey male immigrants from other EU and North Africa/Middle East at all Member States, the Americas, and skill levels have lower employment Australia. Only male immigrants from and higher unemployment rates than Turkey, Africa, and the Middle East the EU average. The employment have significantly lower employment rates of immigrants from new EU rates and much higher unemployment Member States, Eastern Europe, and (Table 8). the Balkans are below the EU 15 average for high-skilled men and These differences are larger among women, but above the EU average women. Foreign-born women have a for low-skilled women (Table 8). lower employment rate (52 percent) and higher unemployment rate (10.3 The analysis presented here describes percent) than the EU 15 average for employment rates of the foreign-born the female population (employment: population in the EU 15, an analysis 56 percent; unemployment: 8.7 per- that more accurately represents the cent; Table 8). Female immigrants economic status of “immigrants” than from Turkey, Africa, and the Middle the so far dominant approach that has East have particularly low employment only looked at legal foreign residents and high unemployment, while (i.e., citizens of other EU Member women from Asia have particularly States and third-country nationals; low employment but average unem- see the text box earlier in this chapter).

136 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Table 8: Immigrant (Foreign-born) Population of Working Age (15–64) and Known Origin by Labor Force Status, Gender, and Country of Birth, EU 15, 2002 1

Labor Force Immigrant Population by Country of Birth EU 15 Status EU- EU- EU 8 + Turkey Africa, USA, Latin Asia Total Total West2 South3 CEE4 Middle Canada, America, Immi- Popu- East Austral. Carib. grants lation Employed 67.1 67.3 63.2 50.0 51.4 76.3 62.7 58.6 61.3 64.2 Unemployed 4.7 4.2 7.8 9.2 9.8 3.5 8.3 5.2 6.6 5.4 Inactive 28.1 28.4 29.0 40.8 38.7 20.2 29.0 36.2 32.1 30.4 Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Active (%) 71.8 71.5 71.0 59.2 61.2 79.8 71.0 63.8 67.9 69.6 Unemployment Rate (%) 6.5 5.9 11.0 15.5 16.0 4.4 11.7 8.2 9.7 7.8 Total (in 1,000s) 2,587 2,145 1,516 772 2,706 456 217 1,166 11,565 250,433

Employed 75.0 75.3 72.7 65.1 62.6 86.0 73.9 73.2 71.2 72.9 Unemployed 5.2 4.1 7.6 11.6 11.4 3.2 5.4 6.0 7.3 5.4 Inactive 19.9 20.5 19.7 23.4 25.9 10.9 20.7 20.8 21.5 21.7 Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Active (%) 80.2 79.4 80.3 76.7 74.0 89.2 79.3 79.2 78.5 78.3 Unemployment Rate (%) 6.5 5.2 9.5 15.1 15.4 3.6 6.8 7.6 9.3 6.9 Total (in 1,000s) 1,182 1,135 696 398 1,442 221 92 548 5,714 125,441

Employed 60.5 58.3 55.1 33.9 38.7 67.5 54.0 45.6 51.5 55.5 Unemployed 4.3 4.4 7.9 6.9 8.0 3.4 11.1 4.7 5.9 5.3 Inactive 35.2 37.3 37.0 59.2 53.3 29.1 34.9 49.8 42.5 39.2 Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Active (%) 64.8 62.7 63.0 40.8 46.7 70.9 65.1 50.3 57.4 60.8 Female Male Total Unemployment Rate (%) 6.6 7.0 12.5 16.9 17.1 4.8 17.1 9.3 10.3 8.7 Total (in 1,000s) 1,405 1,010 820 375 1,264 234 126 619 5,853 124,993

(1) LFS 2002, Data for Germany and Italy not available; (2) EU 15 residents born in another EU 15 country (except Italy, Greece, Portugal, or Spain) or born in Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, or Switzerland; (3) EU 15 residents born in Italy, Greece, Portugal, or Spain but living in another EU 15 country; (4) EU 15 residents born in new EU Member States, accession countries, other countries (except Turkey), other countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia. Source: Labor Force Survey 2003.

Migrants and the European Labor Market 137 Table 9: Legal Foreign Resident Population of Working Age (15-64) by Labor Force Status, Gender, and Country of Nationality, EU 15, 2002 1

Labor Force Legal Foreign Resident Population by Nationality EU 15 Status EU- EU- EU 8 + Turkey Africa, USA, Latin Asia Total Total West2 South3 CEE4 Middle Canada, America, LFRs Popu- East Australia Carib. lation Employed 67.5 66.9 60.7 47.5 41.5 76.8 62.6 56.6 58.6 64.2 Unemployed 4.0 5.9 8.9 10.1 12.8 3.1 9.6 5.9 7.7 5.4 Inactive 28.5 27.1 30.4 42.4 45.7 20.1 27.8 37.5 33.6 30.4 Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Active (%) 71.5 72.8 69.6 57.6 54.3 79.9 72.2 62.5 66.3 69.6 Unemployment Rate (%) 5.6 8.1 12.8 17.5 23.6 3.9 13.3 9.4 11.6 7.8 Total (in 1,000s) 2,027 2,310 1,861 2,121 1,373 383 115 525 10,715 250,433

Employed 75.5 73.9 70.3 61.3 55.3 85.9 77.1 74.1 68.9 72.9 Unemployed 4.6 6.4 9.4 13.0 15.6 3.6 4.2 7.5 9.1 5.4 Inactive 19.9 19.7 20.3 25.7 29.0 10.4 18.8 18.4 22.0 21.7 Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Active (%) 80.1 80.3 79.7 74.3 70.9 89.5 81.3 81.6 78.0 78.3 Unemployment Rate (%) 5.7 8.0 11.8 17.5 22.0 4.0 5.2 9.2 11.7 6.9 Total (in 1,000s) 975 1,293 842 1,131 748 192 48 239 5,468 125,441

Employed 60.1 58.1 52.8 31.6 24.8 67.5 52.2 42.0 47.9 55.5 Unemployed 3.5 5.3 8.4 6.9 9.5 2.6 13.4 4.5 6.3 5.3 Inactive 36.4 36.6 38.7 61.5 65.7 29.8 34.3 53.5 45.8 39.2 Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Active (%) 63.6 63.4 61.2 38.5 34.3 70.1 65.6 46.5 54.2 60.8 Female Male Total Unemployment Rate (%) 5.5 8.4 13.7 17.9 27.7 3.7 20.4 9.7 11.6 8.7 Total (in 1,000s) 1,052 1,016 1,018 989 624 191 67 286 5,243 124,993

(1) LFS 2002, Data for Italy not available; (2) EU 15 nationals (except Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain) and nationals of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, or Switzerland living in (another) EU 15 country; (3) Nationals of Italy, Greece, Portugal, or Spain living in another EU 15 country; (4) Nationals of new EU Member States, accession countries (except Turkey), other countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, or Central Asia living in an EU 15 country.

138 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century A comparison between the foreign- ing in another EU country as well as born population and the legal foreign immigrants from the Balkans, Central resident population reveals additional and Eastern Europe, and Turkey are insights about the labor market situa- over-proportionally active in skilled tion of migrants (Tables 8, 9, 10). and unskilled occupations. Asians have an average representation in highly Discrepancies in employment and skilled non-manual positions but are unemployment rates are clearly visible over-proportionally active in unskilled when comparing high-skilled male manual positions. and female immigrants from new EU Member States, the Balkans, and Economic Inclusion and Exclusion of Eastern Europe, with foreign nationals Migrants. In Europe, over the last of these countries and areas residing in decade, third-country nationals’ unem- the EU 15 (Table 11). Such discrep- ployment has remained higher than ancies are visible at all skill levels EU nationals’ unemployment (Table when comparing female immigrants 9). In a majority of Member States, from Turkey with female Turkish the former is twice as high as the lat- nationals, and male and female immi- ter. The difference is less marked when grants from North Africa/Middle East domestic populations are compared to with nationals of these countries the foreign-born population, rather (both men and women) residing in than foreign nationals (Tables 8 and the EU 15. Such discrepancies do not 9). Third-country nationals also have appear when comparing high-skilled much lower employment rates than and unskilled male immigrants from EU nationals (14 percent lower in Turkey with male Turkish nationals 2002), in particular in the prime work- of the same skill level. ing age group (20 percent lower) and for the high-skilled. The gap is on Occupational Structure, Industry average wider for women than for men Structure. On the whole, the occupa- within all working-age groups. tional structure of the foreign-born population in Europe is different from In more than half of the EU 15, the EU 15 average (Tables 12, 13). this gap has been shrinking over the Economically active immigrants are last decade. From 1994 to 2002, the underrepresented in medium-skilled employment rates of non-EU nationals non-manual positions and overrepre- improved significantly in Portugal sented in non-skilled manual positions. (+28 percentage points), Spain, (+22 Immigrants from Northwestern Europe percentage points), Denmark (+18 living in another EU country as well as percentage points), the Netherlands immigrants from other industrialized (+16 percentage points), Ireland countries (North America, Australia/ (+13 percentage points), and Finland New Zealand) predominantly occupy (+12 percentage points). Smaller high-skilled non-manual positions. increases were recorded in the United Immigrants from Southern Europe liv- Kingdom, Sweden, and Greece.

Migrants and the European Labor Market 139 Table 10: Activity Rate (age groups 15-65) of the Immigrant Population from the Maghreb and Turkey and the Foreign Resident Population (citizenship of Maghreb countries and Turkey), selected EU countries 1

Immigrants from Maghreb Immigrants from Turkish Maghreb Countries (2) nationals (2) Turkey nationals Belgium 34.5 21.6 31.9 26.2 Denmark 43.5 36.4 46.7 30.8 Germany — 47.1 — 48.5 Greece 63.2 75.0 57.1 57.1 Spain 56.3 57.0 — 37.9 France 50.8 39.1 42.2 50.6 The Netherlands 53.2 41.9 55.9 57.0 Austria 55.6 42.9 59.8 33.3 Sweden 44.3 34.5 50.0 44.4 UK 65.3 60.4 55.9 26.2

(1) LFS 2002; (2) Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia.

Table 11: Employment Rates of Working-Age Legal Foreign Residents and Immigrants of Known Origin by Nationality or Country of Birth, Gender, and Educational Attainment, EU 15, 2002

Foreign Nationals (LFRs)1 Nationality Male Female Low Medium High Low Medium High education2 education3 education4 education2 education3 education4 Turkey 55.5 73.3 _ 27.9 49.7 _ North Africa 49.3 65.0 67.5 18.9 32.7 49.1 North America _ 79.6 87.3 _ 60.6 76.9 EU 8 + CEE 61.3 76.1 77.8 45.7 60.2 53.3 EU-West5 59.5 78.5 87.8 35.0 61.3 78.0 EU-South5 66.9 80.3 84.3 52.3 67.8 69.8 EU 15 average 60.9 76.3 85.8 36.9 63.3 78.6

Foreign Born (Immigrants)6 Nationality Male Female Low Medium High Low Medium High education2 education3 education4 education2 education3 education4 Turkey 58.4 75.3 _ 25.5 49.3 76.9 North Africa 51.6 68.4 79.9 25.1 48.5 66.0 North America _ 82.3 87.6 _ 58.9 78.5 EU 8 + CEE 64.5 77.1 80.5 46.5 59.9 63.1 EU-West7 59.7 74.4 86.1 41.7 61.6 76.8 EU-South7 71.6 76.2 85.6 53.4 62.4 77.4 EU 15 average 60.9 76.3 85.8 36.9 63.3 78.6

(1) LFS 2002, data on foreign nationals for Italy not available; (2) Primary education only; (3) Lower or upper second- ary education completed; (4) Tertiary education completed; (5) EU 15 nationals living in EU 15 but outside their country of citizenship; (6) LFS 2002, data on foreign born for Germany and Italy not available; (7) People born in EU 15 but living in EU 15 outside their country of birth.

140 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century The employment rates for non-EU in the health and domestic caretaking nationals remained below average in sectors, as well as in education. France and Belgium, and there was a Domestic services also play an impor- decline in the employment rates of tant role, though this is not always non-EU nationals in Austria (-3.5 visible in available statistics due to the percentage points), Luxembourg high proportion of irregular migrants (-3.1 percentage points), and Germany working in this sector. In contrast, (-2.0 percentage points). young people of foreign origin increas- ingly tend to have an occupational Migrant workers and employees origi- profile closer to that of natives. nating from non-Western and non-EU countries are concentrated in a few Whether or not these changes mean sectors of the economy, and within a better starting point for migrants’ them, in the lower-skilled segments. A longer-term integration into the labor growing number of them are employed market is debatable, as they still tend

Table 12: International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) of the Immigrant Population with Country of Birth Known, EU 15 1

EU 15 EU EU CEEC Turkey Africa, USA, Latin Asia Total EU 15 West South (4) (others) Middle Canada, America, (2) (3) East Austral. Carib. Highly skilled non-man. 49.9 20.9 20.1 21.4 35.8 64.7 36.5 38.8 34.9 36.8 Medium skilled non-man. 11.7 6.9 5.4 6.6 11.1 12.6 12.4 9.4 9.3 12.9 Low skilled non-man. 13.0 13.1 16.0 14.2 12.5 7.5 20.4 17.5 13.7 14.0 Skilled manual 10.4 32.0 22.1 22.6 15.7 5.8 11.7 6.5 17.7 17.7 Non- skilled manual 14.5 27.0 36.4 34.7 24.2 7.5 19.0 27.6 24.0 17.9 Armed forces 0.5 — — 0.5 0.7 2.0 — — 0.4 0.7 Total (percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total (N) 1,758 1,527 959 380 1,391 348 137 691 7,191 161,906

(1) LFS 2002, data for Germany and Italy not available; (2) EU 15 (except Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain) + Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland; (3) Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain; (4) New EU Member States, accession coun- tries, other countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia.

Migrants and the European Labor Market 141 Table 13: Economically Active Immigrant Population with Country of Birth Known, by Sector/Industry, EU 15 1

EU 15 EU EU CEEC Turkey Africa, USA, Latin Asia Total EU 15 West South (4) Middle Canada, Am., (2) (3) East Austral. Caribb. Agric, fish., mining 0.4 0.4 0.3 — 0.2 0.9 — — 0.3 0.3 Manufact. 16.4 18.2 19.4 25.3 15.6 11.2 14.9 18.1 17.4 20.9 Construct. 6.4 18.8 15.7 12.3 8.8 3.3 7.5 2.2 10.4 8.2 Wholesale, retail trade 13.5 13.0 11.8 16.6 14.7 9.1 11.9 16.2 13.6 15.2 Hotels, restaurants 5.9 7.8 10.1 10.4 5.9 3.6 15.7 13.5 7.9 4.4 Transport, storage, communic. 6.2 5.1 5.0 5.7 7.1 3.9 6.0 9.4 6.2 6.5 Financial intermed. 4.3 1.7 1.1 1.4 2.3 7.3 2.2 3.1 2.8 3.5 Real est., renting, 14.4 9.8 12.1 10.4 13.2 22.7 14.2 10.9 12.8 9.7 Public adm. 4.8 4.1 1.6 2.7 8.1 5.7 3.0 3.7 4.7 7.9 Education 8.9 4.3 3.9 4.9 7.8 11.8 5.2 5.6 6.6 7.2 Health, social work 12.8 6.5 9.2 6.0 10.7 10.6 8.2 12.7 10.1 10.2 Personal services 5.6 3.7 4.0 3.5 4.2 9.7 8.2 3.5 4.6 5.0 Private households 0.5 6.6 5.9 0.5 1.7 — 3.0 1.0 2.8 1.1 Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total (N) 1,706 1,365 933 367 1,351 331 134 680 6,867 155,470

(1) LFS 2002, data for Germany and Italy not available; (2) EU 15 (without Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain) + Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland; (3) Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain; (4) new EU Member States, accession coun- tries, other countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia.

to remain concentrated in low-quality citizens tend to be better integrated service jobs offering little room in than legal foreign residents. However, terms of adaptability and mobility. even in the first comparison, differences between immigrants from non-industri- The picture, however, tends to alized countries and Europe’s majority improve when comparing native-born populations remain strong. Third- with foreign-born workers and employ- country nationals who entered the EU ees, rather than contrasting third- in recent years tend on average to country nationals with EU nationals. have higher skill levels than those This is to be expected, as naturalized already established in the EU for a

142 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century decade or longer. The activity rates of tative of the migrant population. As a the newcomers are lower, however, result, the average economic position and their unemployment rates higher of the foreign-born population in the than those of longer-established immi- EU 15 differs less from Europe’s popu- grants. In 2002, the 45 percent lation as a whole than it does from the employment rate of migrants from economic position of the foreign resi- non-EU countries who arrived in 2001 dent population. The latter are in a was nearly 20 points below that of less favorable economic position. those who had arrived 10 years earlier. Looking at foreign nationals only, Differences in employment, economic instead of immigrants with or without performances, and integration of third- citizenship of the receiving country, country nationals are strongly correlated paints an overly negative picture. An with the country of origin. The incomplete examination of the avail- employment rate of legal foreign resi- able data leaves the impression that dents from North Africa and Turkey is the economic position of migrants is consistently lower than for EU nationals deteriorating, particularly in EU coun- at every skill level. This gap is more tries with a longer tradition of immi- marked for women (Table 10). Again, gration and higher naturalization rates. the differences are somewhat less pro- nounced if native-born vs. foreign-born Analysis of European Labor Force populations are compared (instead of Survey (LFS) data for 2002 shows that EU citizens vs. legal foreign residents). immigrants in Europe are more success- In contrast, citizens of Balkan countries ful than surveys and data exclusively have employment rates at or above EU focused on foreign nationals would nationals’ levels both for men and suggest. Thus, differences between tra- women. The same is true for North ditional countries of immigration — Americans and Australians residing in such as Australia, Canada, and the Europe, as well as for citizens of United States — and many European Northwestern Europe residing in countries are apparently smaller than another EU member state (Table 9). assumed. Nevertheless, for certain immigrant groups — in particular In the decade 1992 to 2001, some those coming from middle-and low- 5,855,000 legal foreign residents were income countries — considerable naturalized in the EU 15, marking a employment gaps remain. considerable increase in comparison with previous decades. Sweden, the Analysis of LFS data also makes clear Netherlands, and Denmark had the that immigrants who do not naturalize highest ratio of non-nationals acquiring within their first 10 to 15 years in the citizenship; Luxembourg and Greece receiving country are more likely to showed the lowest relative numbers. In remain in low-skilled and low-paid this period, the sub-segment of foreign employment. This sectoral concentra- nationals became much less represen- tion of legal (and irregular) foreign res-

Migrants and the European Labor Market 143 idents can partly be explained by labor Demographic Imbalances shortages and lower requirements in terms of specific skills. Such circum- Low fertility and increasing life stance may provide immigrants and expectancy in Europe reverse the age their children with better opportunities pyramid, leading to a shrinking num- to enter the labor market. At the same ber of younger people, an aging work time, relatively large numbers of non- force, and an increasing number and EU nationals in some sectors with lim- share of older people. According to ited rights or scope for mobility within available data and projections, the size the labor market will not be in a of Western and Central Europe’s total strong position regarding wages and population will remain stable during job quality. the next 20 years and start to decline after 2025 (see Figure 3; see also the In this context, the integration of third- chapter by Wolfgang Lutz and Sergei country nationals newly arriving and Scherbov). More important than the residing in Europe remains an important overall trend is the expected change in issue for the EU, its Member States, and the age group 15 to 65 defining the European civil society. In fact, in recent employable part of the population. In years, a growing number of EU Member the absence of massive recruitment of States have introduced integration economically active migrants, the programs ranging from language-train- number of people ages 15 to 65 will ing courses to civic education. decrease by 4 percent from 306 million (2005) to 295 million by 2025 and to While Europe’s situation clearly shows 245 million (-61 million = -20 per- the importance of citizenship for the cent) by 2050 (Figure 4). process of integration, there is, however, no simple causality. It is true that, on During the same period, the old-age the one hand, naturalization may help dependency ratio — the population of reduce discrimination and boost immi- people past retirement age expressed as grants’ access to certain segments of a percentage of the population of the labor market, particularly in the working age people — is likely to public sector. On the other hand, it is increase from 23 percent in 2000, to evident that successful economic inte- 35 percent in 2025, and between 45 gration of immigrants makes it more and 50 percent in 2050. likely that they will become citizens of the receiving country. Naturalization We can assume that European societies may therefore be both a cause and a will respond to this demographic trend consequence of integration. In any by raising retirement ages, by trying to case, the results clearly show that sus- increase female labor force participa- tained efforts toward the economic and tion rates (which is an option in civic integration of immigrants and Southern Europe, Germany, Austria, their native-born children (the so- and Poland in particular) and by called second generation) are necessary. recruiting migrants.

144 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Figure 3: Population forecasts until 2025 and 2050, 2000=100, EU 25

EU25 90,1 Austria 86,8 Belgium 99,7 Cyprus 113,9 Czech Republic 83,3 Denmark 99,1 Estonia 48,1 Finland 95,4 France 108,3 Germany 96,2 Greece 90,0 Hungary 75,8

Ireland 130,8 Italy 78,0 Latvia 56,1 Lithuania 72,2 Luxembourg 164,6 Malta 103,3 Netherlands 106,6 Poland 85,3 Portugal 90,1 Slovakia 91,8 Slovenia 78,8 Spain 91,6 Sweden 98,2 UK 112,7

050100 150 200

2025 2050

Sources: UN (2004), http://esa.un.org/unpp/; authors’ calculations.

Migrants and the European Labor Market 145 Figure 4: Projected Decline in Working-Age Population, 2000 – 2025

Average annual % change 2.5 2.5 2 2 1.5 1.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 -0.5 -0.5 -1 -1 -1.5 -1.5 -2 -2 -2.5 -2.5 LU E CY UK FR NL MT BE SK DK EU15SE PT ES AT EL RO PL DE FI N12 CZ IT SI HU LT BG LV EE 2000-2010 2010-2025

Source: UN demographic projections.

The data for 2003 already show that 1.5 in 2040. If EU Member States were on one hand, the number of countries to achieve the goal of 75 percent with a shrinking native-born popula- employment set by the Lisbon tion is growing; on the other, the num- European Council between 2010 and ber of countries with a negative migra- 2020, the decline in this ratio would tion balance has become very small be attenuated, reaching 2.4 in 2020. (Table 2). This contrasts with the situ- ation in neighboring regions to the south and southeast, where fertility is Labor Force Structure much higher, albeit declining, life expectancy is increasing, and the over- Large changes in the size of Europe’s all population is projected to continue labor force are expected for the to grow at a rapid pace. decades to come. However, the changes in the economically active Even more worrisome is the change in population will be smaller than the the ratio between economically active projected changes for the “active” 15 and retired persons. With an employ- to 65 age group, because only 60 to 80 ment rate of 70 percent, the number of percent of this group is currently people employed per person aged 65 employed or self-employed. After and over will decline from 2.7 in 2010, 2010, the EU 25 can expect a decrease to some 2.2 in 2020, 1.8 in 2030, and in this active population. By 2025, this

146 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century age group is projected to shrink by 16 expanding service sector will probably million. In European countries not have to cope with skills shortages. belonging to EU 25, such as Bulgaria, These problems will become even Moldavia, Romania, and Serbia and more acute if brain drain within the Montenegro, the active or job-seeking EU 25 and to traditional countries of population is already shrinking. immigration becomes a quantitatively significant phenomenon. In addition to shortages due to demographic changes, significant In the years to come, trends toward skills shortages or qualitative the service society and changing mismatches are on the horizon due production processes imply a qualita- to structural change and innovation. tive change in labor demand (i.e., changing demand for particular occu- In terms of structural change, pations or skills). If the labor supply European countries can expect a fails to keep pace with these changes, decrease in the employment share of there are likely to be serious skills the manufacturing and agricultural shortages in EU markets. This type of sectors, and an increase in the service qualitative mismatch of labor demand sector’s share. These structural changes and supply could in turn become a will be accompanied by changing qual- serious problem for economic growth ifications requirements. While the throughout Europe. share of the service sector in EU 15 countries is already relatively high, However, an analysis by the OECD significant structural changes will take implies that labor supply is expected place in the new EU Member States. to adjust to increasing demand for a In these countries, a relatively high well-educated labor force (Table 14). share of the labor force is still For their part, students seem to be employed in the agricultural sector, anticipating the impending structural while the service sector is underdevel- change, resulting in a higher share of oped compared to the EU average. white-collar jobs in total employment (Table 15). Compared to current With regard to finding the appropriate employment patterns, the figures migrants to fill empty jobs, there are presented in Table 14 imply that a substantial mismatches dating back to much higher share of the EU popula- post-communist economic transforma- tion will occupy high-skilled jobs than tions of these countries, which brought is the case today. However, it remains about a decline in the oversized public unclear whether or not the growing sector. Further structural changes in number of EU residents participating new EU Member States and EU acces- in tertiary education and aspiring to sion countries may mean continuing white-collar jobs will be enough to labor market problems. Low-skilled compensate for the expected increase workers will lose their jobs in the in demand for highly qualified labor. agricultural sector, while parts of the

Migrants and the European Labor Market 147

(1995=100)

combined combined

all levels of education education of levels all

school expectancy for for expectancy school

index of change in in change of index

tion combined tion

All levels of educa- of levels All

part-time: part-time:

tion combined tion

All levels of educa- of levels All full-time: full-time: ased component in combined school and work-based program. At

el, an individual is considered part-time if he or she taking a course

me if they attend school for less than 75 percent of the day or e if they attend school for at least 75 percent of the day or week Tertiary education Tertiary

d requiring at least 75 percent of a full-time commitment time and

mmmm

tertiary education tertiary

Post-secondary non- Post-secondary

education Upper secondary secondary Upper full-time and part-time* total male female All levels of education combined AustriaBelgiumCzech Rep.DenmarkFinland 16.3 16.0France 19.2Germany 16.2 18.0Greece 15.9 18.6Hungary 19.2 16.3 17.5Ireland 16.1 16.6 19.8 17.3Italy 18.5Luxembourg 18.5 16.1 8.2 16.4 16.4 17.5 9.1 9.3 20.0 16.3 15.9 9.6 m 16.8 3.8 16.2 17.2 3.6 5.7 16.1 9.1 15.8 16.4 16.7 3.9 10.1 9.5 0.5 m 0.2 0.4 15.7 16.8 4.5 9.0 8.1 3.0 3.3 n 2.4 16.4 1.6 m 10.8 2.8 0.1 2.8 3.8 0.5 16.3 n 8.2 2.6 15.8 2.2 16.2 9.1 4.2 0.3 0.7 2.1 N 18.0 4.4 0.2 3.0 2.6 0.7 3.6 19.2 3.1 17.3 2.2 104 N 112 0.1 16.6 107 2.5 0.1 N 15.9 0.1 14.8 106 2.4 N 15.3 112 0.2 106 1.6 16.0 1.0 10 116 115 0.1 106 m NetherlandsPolandPortugal 17.3SlovakiaSpain 17.5Sweden 16.7 17.1UK 14.9 17.2 16.2 16.7 17.3 20.0 14.8 10.5 17.2 17.6 16.9 18.5 15.0 18.9 3.3 8.0 10.8 17.7 21.6 17.9 9.0 0.1 4.1 2.9 10.9 19.9 9.7 3.0 2.5 0.3 2.3 n 8.9 5.2 0.1 16.5 2.9 0.1 2.5 7.4 0.1 1.6 0.8 14.6 3.0 13.8 x(5) 3.2 14.2 m 2.1 16.7 3.3 2.6 16.5 0.6 116 0.6 14.6 104 3.5 m 102 4.3 m 110 Note: m - data not available; n value nil Source: OECD, 2003b, p. 257. *Part-time student: students enrolled in primary and secondary-level educational programs are considered to participate part-ti week (as locally defined) and would normally be expected to be in the program for the entire academic year. At the tertiary lev week (as locally defined) and would normally be expected to in the program for entire academic year. load or educational program that requires less than 75 percent of a full-time commitment time and resources. Full-time student: students enrolled in primary and secondary-level educational programs are considered to participate full-tim This includes the work-b (as locally defined) and would normally be expected to in the program for entire academic year. the tertiary level, an individual is considered full-time if he or she taking a course load educational program considere it is expected that the student will remain in program for entire year. resources. Additionally, Table 14: School expectancy (2001) — Expected years of schooling years under (2001) — Expected 14: School expectancy Table education for children under ofexcluding five theconditions, age current

148 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Table 15: 15-year-olds' occupational expectations by age 30, by gender; Percentage of 15-year-olds expecting to have a white- or blue-collar occupation, by gender (2000)

Total Male Female White/blue w w b b w w b b w w b b High/low high Low High low High low high low high low High low Austria 55.3 17.2 11.7 15.8 56.3 8.6 21.9 13.3 54.8 25.1 2.2 17.9 Belgium 65.6 14.2 15.4 4.9 58.5 7.6 27.9 6.0 73.1 21.3 1.8 3.7 Czech Republic 44.5 22.0 16.2 17.3 41.1 11.9 28.3 18.7 47.6 31.1 5.3 16.0 Denmark 58.5 17.5 19.6 4.3 50.5 10.9 34.1 4.5 67.7 25.1 2.9 4.2 Finland 60.4 15.8 12.2 11.5 55.5 9.1 21.4 14.0 65.0 22.0 3.7 9.2 France 48.9 14.7 9.9 26.5 44.1 8.5 18.7 28.7 53.4 20.5 1.7 24.4 Germany 48.8 20.9 17.2 13.2 44.7 13.3 30.1 11.9 53.1 28.0 4.6 14.3 Greece 72.3 11.7 9.4 6.6 66.0 8.6 17.9 7.6 78.5 14.6 1.3 5.6 Hungary 52.7 19.0 16.6 11.7 50.3 9.5 28.0 12.2 55.3 28.5 5.1 11.1 Ireland 64.1 12.2 11.7 12.1 57.5 7.2 22.6 12.7 70.3 16.9 1.3 11.5 Italy 69.1 15.2 5.8 9.9 66.6 11.9 10.6 10.9 71.6 18.7 0.9 8.8 Luxembourg 59.6 14.3 8.7 17.4 55.7 11.3 15.4 17.6 63.0 16.9 2.8 17.2 Poland 68.8 15.4 14.2 1.7 63.3 9.4 24.4 2.9 74.5 21.7 3.5 0.4 Portugal 76.5 9.5 5.1 9.0 72.7 7.0 9.8 10.5 79.8 11.7 0.8 7.7 Spain 66.6 12.2 8.2 13.1 61.2 7.7 16.1 15.0 71.7 16.6 0.7 11.0 Sweden 63.2 10.3 8.1 18.5 62.0 5.8 13.6 18.6 64.5 14.8 2.4 18.3 UK 57.1 16.3 7.6 19.0 51.0 14.0 14.5 20.5 63.0 18.6 0.8 17.6 Source: OECD, 2003b, p. 137.

Relatively robust demographic projec- predictions about specific occupations tions clearly indicate a decline in and skills requirements. In any case, Europe’s working-age population for while demographic projections give a the foreseeable future (Figure 4). clear picture for the next 40 years, pro- There are, however, significant obsta- jections of emerging skills gaps cannot cles to deriving accurate projections to realistically cover more than a 15-year help with the middle- and long-term timeframe. More accurate projections, planning of policies to meet labor supply or ones broken down into more specific requirements. This is partly linked to categories, may not be possible even problems with predicting phenomena within that 15-year span. that are influenced by complex, often volatile economic factors, and which The migrants most likely to help meet may also be significantly affected by shortages of labor and skills, and with unforeseeable policy developments. the best chances to integrate, are prob- Analysts attempting to make accurate ably those most able to adapt to projections are confronted with further changing conditions, in view of their problems when attempting to make qualifications, experience, and personal

Migrants and the European Labor Market 149 abilities. Selection mechanisms must either remain or become countries of be incorporated into future migration immigration. and admission policies in order to assess both the qualifications and The main challenge for European adaptability of potential immigrants. policymakers in the decades ahead will be to position their countries to At the same time, given the political recruit migrants matching their labor sensitivity of immigration, it is likely needs, while still sustaining economic that governments will find it difficult growth and supporting their public to justify introducing programs in the pension systems. In the medium and absence of already existing acute labor long term, potential migrants will shortages. Even if projections might need to be recruited from regions of highlight quantitative and qualitative the world beyond Europe. At that shortages with a sufficient degree of point, Europe will have to compete certainty, governments may require with the world’s other traditional more tangible “proof” in order to con- countries of immigration for qualified vince their electorates of the need for migrants to fill labor gaps. additional foreign labor. This implies that while projections may provide a Given those goals, European policymak- basis for policy planning in the areas of ers have several options to maximize education, labor market, welfare, or the opportunities migration presents, social reforms, because of the special specifically, to meet labor demand: political sensitivity of immigration, it is likely that migration policy will Develop common European remain subject to more short-term, ad medium- and long-term migration hoc planning. In this context, the EU policies. This approach can play a is better positioned to develop medium- crucial role in tackling shortages and long-term migration policies able of labor and skills, provided the to cope with Europe’s looming demo- qualifications of immigrants are graphic and economic challenges than appropriate. A common approach to make short-term adjustments. will be an advantage as all EU Member States will face competi- tion from traditional countries of Conclusions and immigration and emerging immi- Recommendations gration countries such as Russia.

Both demographic and economic Refine selection mechanisms. trends point to Europe’s future need to Future migration and admission recruit increasing numbers of third- policies must be modified in order country nationals as a main way of to better assess both the qualifica- meeting its rising demand for low-, tions and adaptability of potential medium-, and high-skilled labor. In immigrants. This will pay dividends this context, all of the EEA states will as the pace of socio-economic

150 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century integration largely depends upon and integration policies. But the way qualifications of migrants matching forward requires thoughtful planning labor market needs in receiving based not only on the available data, countries. but also on public perceptions and careful weighing of political costs. Incorporate gender analysis into policies. With several EU states reporting wide gaps in the employment rates of men and women, labor market (and family) policies that address the causes and consequences of such differ- ences can contribute to higher labor force participation rates of native and foreign-born women.

Address brain drain. The prospect of investing in an educated popula- tion, only to watch them emigrate, has policymakers in many parts of the world struggling to either retain their nationals or exploit benefits such as remittances. Europe’s common policy should help develop skills in other parts of the world before starting selective recruitment.

Expand public education on labor/immigration. Policymakers’ planning will come to naught if policies are not politically viable. Governments need improved communication with their elec- torates to convince them that the facts and data support the need for additional foreign labor.

In the end, the interaction of Europe’s labor markets and migration flows can have positive outcomes for both natives and the foreign born; in particular, if more emphasis is given to admission

Migrants and the European Labor Market 151 References

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154 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Is Immigration an Enemy of the Welfare State?

Between Human Rights and Realpolitik in European Immigration Policies

Grete Brochmann and Jon Erik Dölvik he welfare state is a central welfare on its head. It is now widely T element in explaining the believed that supplies of foreign approach to immigration labor are necessary to maintain policies in Western Europe. Generous economic growth and the level of welfare models that embrace all legal welfare in a society. This new inhabitants can be undermined by approach emphasizes the role of excessive burdens. This fact requires immigrants as producers of welfare. that some limits be set on the numbers and characteristics of potential new Exploring this new paradigm first members from outside the state. In requires an in-depth look at how extensive welfare states that espouse immigration may affect the ways the principle of equal treatment of all European welfare states and labor residents, immigration challenges the markets are run, as well as how population’s generosity. If large numbers variations in such regimes may of newcomers are unable to support influence the patterns and volume themselves, it may, in the longer term, of migratory flows. This chapter affect the sustainability of the welfare will frame the central dilemmas system itself. Crucial here is how large and political mechanisms facing a share of those who come is absorbed modern welfare states, mapping out into gainful employment. Thus, con- their room to maneuver under the trolling inflow into the country — the overlapping pressures of labor needs, first gateway to the territory and, by international humanitarian responsi- extension, access to welfare benefits — bilities, and welfare budget has been seen as a prerequisite for constraints. Using the enlargement governing a welfare state. of the European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) as Most thinking in Western Europe examples, the chapter will then since the 1970s has been based on the illuminate how changes in border assumption that immigrants represent control and free movement of labor a burden on public budgets: They are within the EU/EEA may influence consumers of welfare. The prevailing national strategies for reform of the immigration policies have turned this welfare state/labor market nexus. assumption into a fact. Restrictions on Finally, the prospect that increased labor immigration have channeled labor immigration from the new most immigrants through the humani- EU/EEA states might affect political tarian gate, thus generating burdens on approaches to admission of third- the welfare system — at least in the country immigrants will be addressed, short run. followed by conclusions and recom- mendations for policymakers. Rather The fairly recent awareness that an than conducting a detailed empirical aging society calls for a more liberal analysis, the aim here is to provide a labor immigration policy has turned basic analysis of the mechanisms at the conventional wisdom about work and their principle effects.

156 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Framing the Issues choices that are influenced by a coun- try’s specific mix of social provisions, Whether increasing immigration civic obligations, and employment represents a threat or a cure for Europe’s opportunities. This implies that a ailing welfare states depends on the given country’s ability to attract or extent to which immigrants become deter specific groups of immigrants consumers of welfare or net contributors. depends not only on its domestic Their mix of consumption and welfare and labor-market policies, but contribution shifts over their lifespan, also on those of neighboring countries. and varies between different categories of immigrants, just as it does for the The addition of ten new states to the native born. Regardless of the national EU on May 1, 2004, opened the possi- backgrounds of the population, two bility of free movement of labor, services, issues are critical for the viability of the capital, and goods within that zone, welfare state. First, people must be spotlighting potentially sensitive channeled into gainful employment. questions about the relationships Second, states must counteract the among individual states’ and the EU’s demographic trend towards an ever policies to accommodate migration more unfavorable ratio of workers to from both inside and outside the retirees and others not in the labor force. EU/EEA area. Although cross-border labor mobility in the EU has remained In this context, the issue of immigra- low throughout previous phases of tion is particularly important, repre- enlargement, the phased abolition of senting both an opportunity for swift labor-market frontiers between the increases in the labor force (without poor and rich sides of the former Iron the costs of education, etc., associated Curtain is making Europe into a with the native born) and a risk of historically unprecedented laboratory immediate growth in the number of for “globalization on one continent.” welfare recipients. As such, immigration Given their gaps in income and welfare is a high-stakes game that heightens the benefits, geographical closeness, existing inherent challenges of welfare state/ migration “bridges,” and the proximity labor market reform in most EU of cultures and language, the reunifica- countries. Because various kinds of tion of European labor and product immigration (e.g., asylum seekers markets has opened new and unpre- versus labor migrants) are likely to dictable trajectories for migration of weigh differently on the sides of the labor, services, and companies. The cost-versus-revenue budgetary equation, prospect of extending the EU to coun- new links and interdependencies are tries such as Croatia, Romania, and being created between internal labor- Bulgaria — let alone Turkey — will market-cum-welfare-state policies and further accentuate this unpredictability. external immigration policies. This is magnified by migrants’ choices of The existing welfare state/labor particular destination countries, market regimes in Western Europe

Is Immigration an Enemy of the Welfare State? 157 are precariously balanced due to prob- 1990s, emphasizing training, active lems of competitiveness, budgetary labor-market schemes, in-work benefits, deficits, unemployment, and social and elimination of easy access to wel- exclusion. In that context, even limited fare as key elements of raising labor flows of companies and labor may have market participation. However, the a significant impact on the viability links between such domestic policy and scope for renewal of Europe’s post- reforms and external policies for war welfare states and class compromises. migration have been subject to little The first instance of such an impact systematic deliberation. may appear when such flows transform the links among migration, welfare, An important impetus for the recent and labor policies into a burning shift towards more restrictive immigra- issue in the development of national tion policies in Denmark, the UK, and adjustment/reform strategies. The next the Netherlands, among other coun- impact may be manifested in the risk tries, stems from the public’s panic that competition among individual over revelations of the extent to which states’ welfare state/labor market many communities, particularly of regimes could produce unintended refugees, are unemployed and depend- aggregate effects on a European scale. ent on social welfare. This situation, in Both scenarios suggest a need for combination with the prospect of improved transnational coordination increased migration from the new across these policy fields. The EU Member States driven by a search for Communication on Immigration, work and possibly welfare benefits, Integration, and Employment (COM calls for more comprehensive 2003) is a first and promising sign that approaches to the study of social a new approach may be in the making integration. The most productive when it comes to more comprehensive focus would be on the interplay among approaches and coordination. policy developments in the fields of migration, labor market, and welfare So far, European research in this state reform. realm has been marked by a lack of exchanges among scholars studying Such approaches will also have to take migration, labor relations, and welfare- into account the two-level interplay state policies. European political between policy developments at the debates in recent years increasingly national and European levels. This is have focused on the need for reforms especially so given the contingent to the labor market/welfare state nexus relationship between the elimination in order to get more people into gainful of internal EU/EEA frontiers and the employment and reduce the numbers control of external borders with third living on public benefits. These have countries. The scope for national policy been central issues in the EU employ- reform thus becomes increasingly ment strategy and the high-profile dependent on the concurrent choices Dutch and Danish reforms in the of fellow countries.

158 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Th e Nati o na l S et ti n g for various reasons. This illustrates how today’s welfare states are torn between Today, many unemployment-ridden humanitarian responsibilities and Western European welfare states find economic imperatives — the contra- themselves in a paradoxical situation, dictory situation European welfare with some sectors in need of labor that states must act upon in the near future. is hard to find at home, and sometimes The following are some factors that even internationally. While this is must be taken into consideration: partly due to structural constraints, it is also due to competition for labor The interplay between admission and among Western countries. Authorities integration. Social-welfare approaches are under pressure from trade and and immigration flows are closely industry to liberalize immigration poli- related, yet it is not always clear how cies. At the same time, asylum seekers their relationship operates in practice. are constantly arriving, often to be Changes in general welfare policies joined by family members. Although may affect actual flows of migrants, in the labor market is, in principle, irrele- terms of both control policies and vant when processing asylum applica- integration measures. On the other tions, it is nevertheless crucial to the hand, immigration policy and immi- economic integration of those asylum gration flows may influence the seekers and refugees who are accepted welfare policies of receiving countries. for long-term residence. It appears that the basic approach to welfare — i.e., the particular In this context, authorities are con- welfare-state regime formed historically fronted with a mismatch between through institution-building — does immigrant supply and demand. Those significantly affect the range of options who actually come are often not the available for policymakers in different ones needed: Either they have the countries. The path dependencies of wrong qualifications, or — if they historically formed welfare policies should match — retaining them limit the scope of structurally possible depends on approval of their asylum and politically legitimate action in application. A third category — unreg- each context. This is true to a certain istered or unauthorized migrants — extent, yet even path dependencies may be working illegally, thus neither encounter dead ends when external contributing to nor being protected by pressures reach a certain strength, or the welfare state. If they are detected, internal contradictions completely they should in principle be sent out of drain the system. the country (unless they are offered an amnesty — a policy only applied in Immigration policy is generally divided some countries). Thus, receiving coun- into two main spheres: an external tries do not get the labor they want, sphere of admission (who is given the while many of those who actually come opportunity to enter the country), cannot be incorporated productively and an internal sphere of rights

Is Immigration an Enemy of the Welfare State? 159 and possibly integration (what terms immigrants received growing attention entrants are offered). in Western Europe. Immigrants who could not be encouraged to return to Politically and legally, these spheres their home country, and who could are usually treated separately. be expected to wish to remain in the Regulation of admission to a country receiving country, had to be incorpo- is closely connected with the nation- rated into the community. The “immi- state’s historical right to control its gration stop” introduced in many territory. Civil, social, and political receiving countries early in the 1970s rights for aliens who settle in a country was in the form of a dual strategy: are closely linked to the country’s Authorities would apply strict long-term general development as a regulations to prevent or limit new rechtsstaat — a state ruled by law. immigration, and concurrently take Modern welfare states have further- steps to improve the adjustment of more developed policies to promote immigrants who had come to stay. integration — a genuine incorporation This dual strategy was first announced of aliens into the community beyond in France, but soon set the tone for the granting of rights pure and simple. other Western European countries. The justification for the dual strategy Developments in the wake of the was the presumed causal connection so-called “new immigration” (i.e., from between external control and condi- countries outside the Organisation tions for integration: A successful for Economic Cooperation and integration policy was said to depend Development (OECD) from the end of on strict entry control. Conversely, the 1960s onwards) brought to light an free immigration was viewed as a extensive and complicated interplay threat to peaceful coexistence among between the two main spheres of groups of the population. immigration policy. The political space between the external and This dual strategy reflects both internal spheres has developed into an realpolitik and rhetoric. Free immigra- arena for unforeseen consequences tion may, under certain conditions, that governments throughout Western threaten the community by undermin- Europe have had problems facing. ing central-government regulation of Although the external and internal the labor and housing markets and spheres are still generally dealt with impeding social planning in general. separately in legislation, and their In the longer term, free immigration interfaces are difficult to regulate, may alter the premises underlying the it may be useful to examine the type of welfare state built up in mechanisms operating between them. Western Europe since World War II; more permanent segregation of the The basic structure of immigration population along ethnic lines may policymaking. At the start of the threaten social and political stability 1970s, the issue of integration of in the community.

160 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century The dual strategy’s rhetorical element of such states. Concurrently, the welfare refers to the “moral compromise” state’s need to control its geographical inherent in it: Declarations of intent boundaries increases in step with new to stimulate integration of established rights given to newcomers. It is here immigrants may function as a that the basic tension exists between legitimization of stricter immigration entry control and conditions for immi- policy. Over time, a growing number of grants’ lives in welfare states. The increasingly complex connections have modern rechtsstaat is required by inter- become clear in the wake of changed national agreements to give lawfully migration patterns, and not least as a established immigrants the same treat- result of European integration. ment as its own citizens in terms of most civil and social rights. Two further Rights and restrictions. Economic and factors play a part and set premises for social rights are mainstays of modern policy development: first, labor market welfare states and play an important dynamics, and second, public education role in the successful realization of the of the population when it comes to ideals of the rechtsstaat for all members immigration and multicultural societies.

The basic structure of immigration policy

Social integration (welfare state)

Duties/ Rights Contributions

INFLUX

Employment Competition Attitude molding

Is Immigration an Enemy of the Welfare State? 161 Over and above this, many welfare general population in order for the states have formulated an integration integration project to succeed. It must, policy addressed to lawfully established in other words, win support for this immigrants, designed to promote an policy, through “public education.” integration process in the community and to improve immigrants’ opportuni- At the same time, a country’s direct or ties to realize their rights. This policy indirect integration policy may bear on generally covers an array of areas with the number and type of immigrants who a bearing on immigrants’ situation in a come. A duality or dilemma is inherent receiving country, such as labor market in a state’s granting of rights and welfare schemes, social care and general welfare, benefits to newcomers. While these education, language training, support goods represent a desirable and neces- for NGOs, and so on. sary aspect of rechtsstaat principles in modern welfare states, in many contexts Efforts to incorporate newcomers into they are also a premise for the success of the economy and the constitutional the integration policy. In addition, state have become a consequence of generous integration conditions may the welfare-state model. Good welfare constitute a pull factor for potential states do not tolerate significant immigrants. Making integration elements of persons or groups who fail difficult is counter-productive to politi- to make the grade, disturb the regulated cal stability and immigrants’ functionality world of work, or burden social budgets. in society in the long term, while If the political framework of the welfare appearing necessary in the short term state is to be maintained, new inhabi- to avoid a “magnet effect.” tants must be made a part of it through inclusion in work and society. Once In this context, differences in condi- new immigrants are lawfully present in tions between countries have acquired the country, they should be integrated increasing significance. Within a region for the good of themselves and the such as the EU, where immigration community. Hence, important societal policy is in general restrictive, marginal considerations underlie the country’s differences in the package of rights/ben- policy of integration of new members, efits and duties/contributions may have in addition to humanistic principles in major effects on the influx of immigrants. the form of rights and norms. Welfare-state regimes based on univer- salism and taxation are more attractive Immigration policy since the 1970s has and vulnerable in this regard than more operated in a somewhat contradictory insurance-based regimes that offer way; immigrants are not desired at the benefits according to previous input. outset, but if they manage to enter In recent years this duality — i.e., the anyway, they must somehow be incor- presumed or de facto interplay of control porated. The responsibilities of the and rights — has heavily affected policy state go further still — it must lay the development in the sphere of immigra- basis for a positive attitude in the tion throughout Western Europe.

162 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Family reunification is an example of Visa policy for visitors has similar a policy area where varying degrees of features: The opportunity to receive generosity can be a means for countries visits from close family members or to make themselves comparatively friends can be seen as an important more or less attractive to certain immi- measure of life quality and hence ability grants. However, the calculations to adjust, although the interplay is involved in liberalizing or restricting probably weaker here than in the family-reunification rules pose a case of family reunification. However, problem for Western Europe’s policy- the potential for defection (visa over- makers. On the one hand, some staying) is regarded as high in many Western European authorities have cases, prompting restrictive practices. characterized family reunification as an The EU has already established a increasingly important channel for common policy in this area, restricting fraudulent migration, which would national scope for discretion. Extensive argue for more restrictiveness. On the immigration to the EU area from other hand, in terms of realpolitik (i.e., countries assigned to the “defection- control), established immigrants can- risk category” makes for a problematic not be expected to adjust to society situation: The fact that significant easily if family members are denied res- sections of the population are affected idence. Furthermore, in terms of by curbs on opportunities to receive humanitarianism (i.e., rights), the uni- visitors gives food for thought. Based versal human need to live with one’s on this logic, the potential for further family is protected by international immigration rises concurrently in conventions. proportion to increased immigration, in a self-reinforcing manner. The September 22, 2003, approval of the EU Directive on Family Amnesties or regularization extended Reunification for Third Country to people not lawfully resident in a Nationals (Council Directive country have in some cases involved 2003/86/EC) does only a partial job of several hundred thousand people at a smoothing out variations in family- time. These amnesties — which reunification policy, as it only prescribes in many ways are a governmental minimum standards. While preventing admission of defeat in relation to frontier a “race to the bottom” by states trying controls and labor-market regulations to deter immigration by tightening — have their own rationale. Authorities restrictions, the directive may encourage have tried to “legalize” the sizeable the more generous states in the clandestine labor market in a bid to EU/EEA to sink towards the median/ get an overview of the situation, bring minimum standard. This may, never- order to working conditions, and theless, increase uniformity of family- improve immigrants’ opportunities for reunification rules in the longer run, integration and inclusion in welfare- and thereby also reduce the “pull state arrangements, generally speaking. effect” of this policy area. However, the repeated amnesties are

Is Immigration an Enemy of the Welfare State? 163 an unequivocal message to potential alongside high labor costs and extensive new immigrants that anyone who labor rights, the de facto demand for succeeds in entering the country will cheap, poorly qualified labor has acted eventually have a good chance of as a pull factor for immigrants. being allowed to stay. Irregular immigration usually brings Amnesties have been a national uncertainty and turbulence to the policy in the countries in question. labor market, which in turn may make However, EU integration means that it more difficult for lawfully established the amnesties have indirect relevance immigrants to obtain registered to other member countries, to the employment and be recognized as full extent that the volume of immigration citizens. This again has specific conse- increases to the EU as a region, and quences for advanced welfare states, that the pull effect towards potential where an orderly labor regime is one unauthorized migrants is maintained. of the basic preconditions for the oper- ation and maintenance of the system. An important lesson to be learned from the immigrant amnesties in Incorporating new members of society Southern Europe is that control of into the regular labor market relieves irregular immigration is hard to public welfare budgets and can stimulate achieve without addressing structural economic growth. For immigrants as aspects of the labor market. Alongside well as other citizens, the labor market entry control and international police can also act as a springboard for cooperation, facilitating access to individual social integration. regular employment and imposing Conversely, unemployment regularly fines on employers and their interme- leads to marginalization and strains on diaries are relevant aspects of a policy public budgets. These are familiar for overcoming illegal immigration. mechanisms to the population in gen- eral, but their effect is probably even The increase in illegal immigration is greater for immigrants, many of whom one of the unforeseen consequences of have developed fewer alternative the “immigration stop” in the 1970s. resources for survival in the new society. The more difficult it is to enter Western Europe legally, the greater the The question of integration in connec- number of people who attempt to do tion with unauthorized immigrants has so illegally. In addition, the greater the both formal and substantive aspects. risk associated with illegal immigration, The absence of rights in the form of the larger the profits reaped by those various kinds of social support, service acting as intermediaries. facilities, and other welfare goods con- strains these immigrants’ integration in While Western European countries the receiving country. On the other have pursued a restrictive policy on hand, irregular immigrants may de labor migration since the 1970s, facto be relatively well integrated into

164 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century their particular niche of society by and consequently often end up in virtue of employment and residential informal segments of the labor market. setting. In many cases, they may even In liberalized labor markets of the be better integrated than refugees and Anglo-American kind, in contrast, asylum seekers, who often remain in entry into legal or illegal work is often reception centers for long periods of easier but many immigrants end up in time without employment. unstable, low-paid jobs and are overrepresented among the growing Hence there is a complicated interplay underclass of the working poor. among entry control, labor-market structure, potential social rights, Overarching this whole complex demand for foreign labor, and integra- picture is the issue of “public educa- tion opportunities. In the national tion”: the population’s interpretation context, labor market dynamics — of the situation and the rules, the reflected in the type of demand, wage political support and steps taken, and structures, extent of unemployment, the population’s actual receptiveness and size of the illegal market — will to newcomers who wish to be integrated. affect the scope and composition of immigration, and, conversely, actual This issue has become increasingly immigration will affect the labor salient and disturbing in Western market. Consequently, entry control Europe. Real problems and phantoms and internal control will (directly and are mixed together among the public, indirectly) affect labor-market dynamics, and translated into broad generaliza- at the same time that the regulations tions and stereotyping. This affects and structure of the labor market are foreign-looking or sounding people important premises for effective at random, and feeds policymaking in control and integration. On the other ways that are hard to fully grasp. hand, restrictions on lawful entry have often led to illegal immigration. As long as the major concern of Moreover, restrictive policies often policymakers was how to keep people cause people who would otherwise out — as was the case after the have returned home to choose to stay, stop-policies of the 1970s — popular i.e., an integration problem may arise support for restrictions was necessary as an indirect consequence of a restric- and tolerable, as long as it did not take tive control policy. There is thus a violent or aggressive forms. Politicians, complex relationship between regimes on the other hand, were pushed in an of employment regulation and the even more restrictive direction by pattern of immigrant integration in increasingly negative public opinion, the labor market. In regimes with strict particularly after the fall of the Iron employment protection, high labor Curtain, and the alleged prospects for costs, and compressed wage structures, mass immigration from Eastern Europe. immigrants (with assumed low produc- Yet, when attracting foreign labor now tivity) tend to face high entry barriers becomes an issue alongside the urge to

Is Immigration an Enemy of the Welfare State? 165 keep unwanted immigrants out, structures, institutional arrangements, policymakers are enmeshed in commu- and the history of immigration in nication problems. terms of magnitude and duration. Over the last 30 years, and increasingly Today, the fact that selective frontier since the beginning of the 1990s, most controls are in place that regulate of these states have tried various ways categories of immigrants renders this of curtailing immigration. Several dual message unclear for most people. countries (e.g., Germany, the UK, This is compounded by the fact that to France, the Netherlands, and those of most people, the specific category to Scandinavia) have tried in recent which an immigrant belongs is not years to compensate for their loss of immediately obvious. Popular interpre- control over access and residence in tations are, furthermore, sensitive to their territories by diversifying immi- shifts in the labor market and unem- gration regulations, making them more ployment in particular, fueling percep- specific in terms of defining series of tions of rising competition for jobs and categories entitled to very different sets growing immigrant welfare dependency. of rights (and subject to different poli- As employment growth is considered cies). These distinctions of categories both a result and precondition for of migrants have come along with successful integration of immigrants, attempts to reduce access to national politicians face an uphill battle to con- territory, in tandem with fewer or vince the public that long-term gains shrinking entitlements and permits. In from immigration justify the short- addition, tests of newcomers’ economic term costs, whether real or perceived. means have become more common, hand in hand with measures that In addition, where integration is con- reduce assistance, leaving many immi- cerned, public opinion can play a role grants with only basic provisions. that is full of contradictions. Public opinion may become intolerant and These more restrictive policies take xenophobic not only when welfare many forms. Some countries deny conditions are so (relatively) generous asylum seekers a work permit while that they act as a pull factor, but also their applications are being processed. when discrimination and exclusion, In others, financial support has been depending on welfare provisions, create reduced and is increasingly delivered large marginal groups in society. as benefits in kind; in still others, reception facility standards have been simplified and internment has been Reforming introduced as a policy instrument. In the welfare state Austria, for example, family reunifica- tion is part of the general quota system; These very basic dilemmas have con- applications for reuniting families after fronted European welfare states to the completion of the annual quota different degrees, depending on societal are not taken into consideration.

166 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century The Scandinavian countries’ experi- welfare budgets in all three ences with welfare and asylum seekers Scandinavian countries, and it is also are particularly illuminating. Swedish used as an indicator of the failure of authorities found their country’s gener- integration policy. In Denmark, before ous image abroad to be such a problem the reforms in 2002, 35 percent of that in the beginning of the 1990s, they the public social assistance went to felt compelled to actively — and possi- non-Western immigrants, both first bly more forcefully than others — and second generation, who constitute demonstrate the will and power to limit only 5 percent of the population. the number of asylum seekers. The The equivalent figures for Sweden are burden on the already drained welfare 50 percent to 11 percent of the popu- system was considered too heavy. lation, and in Norway the equivalent Sweden, despite having implemented a figures are 34 percent to 4.5 percent. more restrictive policy, today still repre- sents one of the most generous welfare In response to this growing dependency states in relation to asylum seekers. on transfers, most Western European countries in the 1990s strongly empha- For its part, Denmark has been in the sized compulsory participation in forefront of far-reaching reforms, making employment-activation schemes, changes both to welfare for immigrants training, and workfare programs. In and to its Foreign Law. Denmark was Denmark, such measures were success- actually the Scandinavian country ful in reducing general unemployment with the most generous welfare system in the 1990s. In 2002, the Danish before the reform process began in the government implemented a number 1990s. Eligibility requirements were of new, targeted reforms aimed at much weaker than in Sweden and 1) reducing the number of foreigners Norway. The level of support was also arriving in Denmark; 2) ensuring that somewhat higher, creating disincentives newcomers are to the largest extent for marginal groups to work. possible self-sufficient, rather than burdening the welfare system; and In all three countries, income transfers 3) curtailing arranged marriages and through the public-support system forced marriages partly blamed for have disproportionately gone to immi- facilitating immigration fraud. It is grant groups. The fact that newcomers too early to evaluate possible concrete to the labor market have earned weak effects of these reforms. rights in insurance systems (i.e., have had meager possibilities to pay the The most striking adjustments made premiums, and therefore do not qualify under the Danish reforms included for this support) has put pressure on eradicating the category de facto noncontributary provisions such as refugee, i.e., only giving protection social assistance (which most often to refugees under the 1951 Geneva means less money and less security). Convention relating to the Status This has become a major burden on of Refugees. In addition, to be able to

Is Immigration an Enemy of the Welfare State? 167 marry a foreigner, both partners now of newcomers. Providing social rights need to be older than 24, and their is also a way of managing marginal combined attachment to Denmark groups and monitoring those who are needs to be stronger than to their residing in the nation’s territory country of origin. This is estimated by temporarily or more permanently. the authorities according to mixed States that refrain from providing or criteria. The reforms also added cut back material support to immigrant requirements for the applicants’ populations simultaneously relinquish economic capacity to support them- many of the government’s chances to selves with a decent standard of keep tabs on those same immigrants. housing, as well as a bank guarantee of In Germany, an amendment aimed at Dkr 50,000 to cover any sort of public ending support for asylum seekers was assistance needed for the foreign turned down based on such reasoning. spouse. Permanent residency will only The support was subsequently reduced, be given after seven years (a change instead. In other places, material from the previous three-year require- support is used to direct asylum seekers ment), conditioned upon knowledge to specific geographical areas due to of Danish and a clean police record. labor needs or housing considerations. Social assistance will be differently In Italy, in contrast, where public distributed, and full rights will not be welfare is very limited and asylum given before seven years of residency. seekers are not allowed to work, there is a clear likelihood of such immigrants Sweden and Norway have so far not finding illegal employment. followed Denmark in these specific reforms, although the general tendency Another limit pertains to the question has been more restrictive even there. of integration, as discussed earlier: In Norway is extensively revising its many cases, these new welfare cuts and Foreign Law, with further restrictions restrictions create obstacles to the very likely to appear. The purpose of these integration that these societies may tightening measures is clearly to seek in the long term. Cuts in discourage the arrival of asylum language training, daycare for children, seekers and family members of social assistance, and so on, are clearly established immigrants. not conducive to inclusion in society.

In welfare states there are, however, The process of restricting access to limits to the rationality of cuts. An welfare benefits has accelerated rapidly intrinsic part of the welfare system is in the last five years, and have been also control and supervision. The very trying to accommodate the very mixed same welfare state that allocates rights and contradictory concerns of most to citizens and residents (and to a cer- receiving countries in Western Europe. tain degree also to immigrants without On the one hand are demands for cer- permanent residency) can also control tain kinds of labor; on the other are and restrict the movement and actions efforts to reduce what are perceived as

168 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century excessive flows of asylum seekers. that increasingly constrain national These reform processes were well policy formation. Since the respective under way when the question arose nation-states’ actions have conse- of the EU’s eastward expansion. quences for other states’ maneuvering room, and for any common inter/ supranational political development, Interplay of national and immigration policies are becoming EU levels increasingly Europeanized.

Immigration policy in the EU (along The establishment of the single with Norway and Iceland, two coun- European market and the eventual tries of the “Schengen” treaty area of abolition of border controls within the eased cross-border movement for sig- imply that market forces, natories’ nationals) is under pressure to a larger degree than before, will on two fronts. On the one hand, there determine migration flows across the is rising pressure from the national EU region. By allowing free movement control complexes — the places where of persons and labor in the EU/EEA, entry control, integration efforts, labor the nation states have in practice market conditions, and public opinion relinquished control over intra-EU/EEA combine to set the premises for what migration flows. This represents a kind of policy can feasibly be pursued. radical break with the thinking and On the other hand, EU quarters are practice that have dominated the pushing for stronger coordination and migration sphere in recent times, i.e., supranational control. The governance the sovereignty of the state in relation of immigration policies in the EU to its territory and population. thus entails a twofold coordination challenge, reflecting on one side the So far, mobility within the EU has been growing horizontal interdependence of limited. With the extension eastward, national immigration policies, and on this may change — at least in the short the other, the vertical interaction run, before the new Member States between national and EU-level policies. have closed part of their earnings gap in relation to the existing members. The complicated dynamic between The opening of new avenues for immi- integration and control sets the frame- gration from the new Member States work for nation-states’ planning and may stimulate contradictory dynamics policy development. At the same time, of regime competition among the old the nation-states are confronted by Member States, be they to attract, forces outside this dynamic, and have divert, or control labor flows from the to take into account the policies of the extended EU area. For single Member other Member States as well as common States, the enhanced potential for labor European commitments. The interna- immigration from other EU states may, tional context sets the outer parame- in turn, trigger a tightening of policies ters for political action, boundaries towards third-country immigration.

Is Immigration an Enemy of the Welfare State? 169 For the EU as a whole, the effect of thus eventually chose to apply transi- such national adjustments may entail a tional arrangements allowing for a con- twofold set of unintended consequences. trolled, phased introduction of free First, there may be an undesired reduc- movement of labor vis-à-vis the eight tion in external immigration flows at a new Central and Eastern European time when the aging and shrinking of Member States until May 1, 2011. the EU labor force would suggest the This instance of policy imitation under- opposite. Second, a competitive scored the growing interdependence of dynamic of poaching and reshuffling national policies in this realm. As of labor among the Member States regards the mobility of labor associated may take place. Accentuating the with cross-border provision of services, links between internal and external however, no transitional arrangements control policies, such dynamics will apply. This implies that service strengthen the case for coordination providers from the new low-wage at the European level. A possible third Member States can bring their own consequence may be that attempts to workers and compete for temporary accommodate (short-term) inward contracts in the old high-wage states. labor migration become associated with the retrenchment of national The new trajectories for company and welfare-state schemes, in effect labor migration opened by this event impeding the long-term integration may represent a crystallization of the of third-country immigrants. internal and external challenges facing the advanced European welfare states, possibly serving as a catalyst for change. Enlargement — Whether enlargement will prove a Catalyst forWelfare threat or a cure for these ailing regimes and Labor Reform? is a matter of dispute and uncertainty, reflecting the fact that even minor The transformation of the EU from changes to policy may sometimes cause basically a club of rich, advanced wel- big differences in outcomes. Given the fare states to an arena for “globalization precarious internal balance of the exist- on one continent” implies a significant ing welfare state/labor market regimes shift in the external conditions for in Western Europe, even limited migra- national labor-market and welfare-state tory flows of companies and labor may policies. Never before has there been disturb the balance of the post-war such a simultaneous opening of the social compromises. markets for capital, goods, services, and labor among highly developed industri- In a Western European context, rising alized countries and underdeveloped, outflows of capital and companies may transitional economies. Contrary to eat into the revenues of already their original promises (to open up from deficit-ridden welfare states, while at day one), all the “old” Member States, the same time adding to the cost side except Sweden, the UK, and Ireland, by increasing unemployment. The pos-

170 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century sibility of outsourcing production and the Western welfare states’ point of serving domestic customers from close view, represent both opportunities and and cheap havens in the new Europe risks. In the long run, increased labor may improve company competitiveness migration may help to fill the but strain domestic production and demographic gaps in domestic labor employment. Although expanding supply, but the parallel aging of the markets and growing direct investment population in the new Member States flows into these countries may also indicates that the potential will be stimulate domestic export production, limited (and may pose ethical problems the capital “exit threat” is likely to with regard to drainage of scarce strengthen employer and political human capital needed for the recon- demands for tax relief, labor-market struction of these countries). In the deregulation, and reduction of labor shorter term, the picture is more costs, potentially narrowing the tax-base complex. If company emigration turns of the welfare state. Many of the new out to be the scenario, then stagnating Member States make no secret of their labor demand in the private sector of enthusiasm for tax competition as a the West, combined with increased means to attract foreign investment labor supply from the East, may and boost domestic growth. Hence, prompt tougher competition for jobs. the long-disputed mechanism of Combined with a growing supply of regime competition may eventually be cheap services from the East, this set in motion by enlargement, adding could, in turn, impede the inclusion to existing pressures to roll back the of marginal domestic groups and welfare state. third-country immigrants in the private-sector labor market. Growing The dynamic link between the effects labor immigration may, on the other of capital and product-market integra- hand, make it easier to fill labor short- tion, on the one hand, and migration, ages in public welfare and care services. on the other, is the labor market, which plays a twofold role. First, it Although there are considerable offers the option to take advantage uncertainties regarding the balance of of the untapped sources of often labor demand and supply in the short high-skilled, low-paid labor in the new to medium term, enhanced inward Member States. This may, as mentioned, migration may, in combination with stimulate outward company migration the impact of regime competition, and import of labor-intensive services. strengthen the employer’s hand and Conversely, the welfare gap and high exert pressures on existing standards unemployment in the new Member for wage and working conditions in States may encourage westward certain labor-market segments. labor migration. Nevertheless, increased labor immigra- tion is likely to be positive for economic The prospect of increased immigration growth and hence for the financing of of Eastern European labor may, from the welfare state.

Is Immigration an Enemy of the Welfare State? 171 Tra n s iti o na l a rra n g em e nts , qualifying for long-term rights in the short-term cut-backs, and Western welfare states. long-term retrenchment In reality, individual labor immigration Whether such gains will balance proved quite modest during the first increased burdens on the costs side, eight months following the new however, is not as crystal-clear as is Member States’ accession in 2004. In often claimed in official parlance. the fully opened Swedish labor market, The generosity and high level of wel- for example, only some 3,000 workers fare benefits in most Western welfare from the new Eastern European states, combined with the principle of Member States found a three-month equal treatment of EU/EEA citizens job qualifying them for a residence in this regard, may act as a pull factor permit. Yet the number of short-term for immigrants. The gate of entry here and seasonal workers was presumably is, once again, the labor market. The higher, as indicated by the Norwegian transitional arrangements, which are case, where some 25,000 workers to be phased out in two to seven (mainly from Poland and the Baltic years, ensure the right to come to states) registered in 2004, of which most countries and search for a job 7,000 had obtained a job for more for six months. The usual formula is than three months. It is not clear, that a temporary work/residence however, what the workers in short- permit is granted if a full-time job term positions would do when the job with host-country pay is obtained. was over. In England, some 90,000 After one year of work, the EU rules workers from the new Eastern on free movement of labor and social European Member States registered security fully apply. The signing of a during the first seven months after work contract then opens the way for May 1, 2005, of which roughly 40 per- long-lasting legal residence, including cent had already been present on an for the extended family. In the case of illegal basis. Although registered labor involuntary loss of work, sickness, inflows during 2004 were modest, gov- workplace accidents, or a shift to ernments are closely monitoring devel- work-related education, the residence opments, partly due to uncertainty permit is to be extended, along with about the magnitude and character of the right to partly portable social- unregistered migration. In the Nordic security provisions. When the transi- countries, at least, authorities also seem tional arrangements are phased out, better prepared to crack down on illicit there are, according to European work and misuse of welfare benefits. Court of Justice jurisprudence, very modest thresholds concerning the Furthermore, in most Northern kind of job required for obtaining a European countries, governments have residence permit. Entry through a been busy figuring out how eligibility minor, short-term job might thus requirements can be reviewed in order represent a tempting avenue towards to prevent undesired welfare tourism

172 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century after the transitional arrangements are contributions in accordance with the finished. In Denmark, for instance, it insurance principle. Given the EU was proposed that only tax-paying citi- principles of non-discrimination, such zens should be entitled to social bene- reforms will have to be given general fits, but the idea was dropped because application and will thus also affect it collided with international human the access to Social Security of national rights. At the same time, thresholds citizens and third-country residents. and time limits are being introduced The asylum seekers among the latter in the basic social allowance system, group will be particularly vulnerable in alongside changes to generous, this respect. exportable financial schemes for supporting the children of employees. Furthermore, the outlined interplay Similarly, critics in Norway would like between internal and external pressures to see such schemes converted into tax for reform is likely to have the greatest relief or territorially bound subsidies impact in the most inclusive welfare for child-care services. In several states, i.e., the universalist, tax-based countries, e.g., Germany, Norway, and regimes in Scandinavian countries. Sweden, the eligibility criteria for This may, in turn, promote convergence obtaining sick pay and unemployment in the direction of the less inclusive, benefits have been tightened; in contribution-based systems. Denmark, laid-off workers from new Member States have been denied Besides, most EU countries have in unemployment benefits. Such measures recent years been turning towards illustrate how even prospects for limited more activation-oriented welfare labor/welfare immigration can cause policies based on compulsory participa- significant concern and trigger tion in employment schemes, training, potentially important changes in the and workfare. This is in accordance universalist principles of formerly with the Nordic tradition of an active inclusive welfare states. labor-market policy, now also incorpo- rated into the European employment The flipside of measures to restrict strategy. One example is the contested labor immigrants’ access to welfare reforms of the German welfare state, consumption is, however, that they according to which the duration and interact with and tend to give size of unemployment benefits have direction to ongoing reform processes been cut, pressure to accept “offered” designed to tackle the inherent imbal- jobs has been strengthened, and the ances of the welfare states themselves. retirement age has been raised. It is too soon to assess the overall impact of this interplay, but it seems The corollary of the shift towards a plausible to expect strengthened “workfare state” is the ongoing struggle pressures for the introduction of more over the reform of European labor elements of targeting, thresholds, markets. While there is broad consen- eligibility tests, and required previous sus about the need to improve the

Is Immigration an Enemy of the Welfare State? 173 adaptability and inclusiveness of welfare that in many ways reminds European labor markets, the issue of analysts of the chasm separating the deregulating labor markets and United States and Mexico. industrial relations remains a flash- point between capital and labor, right The challenges to national employment and left. With still relatively high conditions have, at least thus far, been unemployment and low employment much less associated with the fairly rates in many EU countries, especially limited inflows of individual job seekers among women and elderly workers, than with growing short-term mobility increased labor immigration and of workers tied to cross-border provision mobility of services is causing concern of services, construction projects, and in many camps, not least among the like. The EU Directive on Posting organized labor and its allies. of Workers (COM 96/71EC) stipulates While the European Trade Union that service providers from abroad Confederation has been a stealth must respect certain minimum labor supporter of enlargement and the standards of the host country, and, if opening of labor markets from the first specific legislation is in place, pay day of the latest EU expansion, many minimum wages set by statute or national trade unions have complained generalized collective agreements. In that increased provision of cross-border the Scandinavian countries, however, services delivered by underpaid such practices are alien and the unions workers posted in their countries has have relied on direct action to compel led to social dumping and put pressure foreign employers into national on existing labor standards and collective agreements. This tradition collective agreements. Concerned was recognized when Sweden joined voices are sometimes also heard from the EU in 1995. But when a Latvian corners of the employer camp, com- firm building a school in Sweden plaining that Eastern European service recently became stalled by union providers can put them out of business. action, the Latvian government and trade unions accused Sweden of breeching EU principles of freedom Th re e s c e na ri o s of movement. The Labor Court ruled, however, that the union action was From the perspective of labor-market entirely lawful. Regardless of rules, and industrial-relations governance, it is indeed a demanding task for the opening of a common labor and unions and/or labor inspectorates to service market spanning two regions monitor companies and conditions in once separated by the Iron Curtain fluid transborder construction markets raises profound challenges, especially and service-delivery chains. In practice, in the encompassing high-cost, foreign companies therefore often reap high-standard Northern European competitive advantages by paying regimes. Uncertainty is high because their employees home-country rates. of an East-West gap in labor costs and With wages in the new Member States

174 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century averaging anywhere from a seventh With respect to the impact of enlarge- to a tenth of those in the West, radical ment on national labor relations, three changes in the terms of competition stylized trajectories can be envisaged. for contracts and jobs are thus unfolding In the first, imports of cheap Eastern in certain markets for services. European labor and services are Short-term supplies of foreign labor exploited to circumvent national can also be provided by temporary collective bargaining agreements and work agencies and hiring firms, undermine unionism, serving as a opening new avenues for revolving- Trojan Horse for fragmentation and door labor migration. the Americanization of national labor markets. In the second, the external Such temporary imports of cheap competitive pressures spur factions of labor represent an attractive option national business, labor, and politicians for host-country companies (which to unite in attempts to protect their can replace expensive domestic staff) common interests through re-regulation and for Eastern European workers who and stricter control of employment can obtain higher wages than at home. along a path of tripartite renationaliza- The host country, furthermore, stands tion. In the third, the reunification of to avoid incorporating such workers European labor and service markets into the system of welfare-state rights. sounds the death knell of the nation- Besides domestic unions and workers state as a framework for labor market in the affected branches, who face governance and triggers initiatives to the risk of diminished wages, fewer forge a broader Europeanization of job opportunities, and more limited collective organization and regulation bargaining power, the most likely of employment. Hence, much like the losers are subdelivery companies case of the welfare state, the external in the host country. Vulnerable opening of the labor market accentuates branches are typically construction, contested issues as regards the direction, cleaning, catering, home services, pathways, and levels for internal and restaurants. reform in labor market governance. This also poses difficult questions If the supply of labor and services from about the boundaries of solidarity and the Eastern European Member States the interplay between national and proves to manifest itself in the same European policies in counterbalancing niches in the market where established (or re-embedding) market forces. immigrants already operate — as it may seem — EU immigration will also To date, attention seems overwhelm- pose a competitive challenge to these ingly concentrated on national groups. If this happens, it may weaken responses. In most countries, the tran- the position of groups that are possibly sitional arrangements are assigned to the most vulnerable to marginalization secure host-country conditions for in the labor market, thus reinforcing individual employees. There is also a their dependence on welfare. common thrust towards development

Is Immigration an Enemy of the Welfare State? 175 of more stringent regimes for control- each country is trying to strike a bal- ling and monitoring the granting of ance among attracting desired labor, work-based residence permits for EU fending off welfare seekers, and pro- citizens, alongside strengthening of tecting national working conditions. labor and tax inspectorates. Also in the EU enlargement is reinforcing such works is better statistical monitoring of dynamics, making labor immigrants labor-market developments, wages, and from the new states a more attractive working conditions, in order to ensure option than third-country residents that safety clauses can be activated in knocking on the humanitarian gate. case of imbalances. In Norway, for Accordingly, the restrictive asylum example, a legal mechanism for the regimes developed in recent years in generalization of collective agreements Western Europe are likely to be has been invoked for the first time, developed even further. Acting solely aimed at preventing social dumping by on the nation-state level, apparently foreign providers on seven large-scale rational strategic responses could thus construction sites in the petrochemical easily aggregate into unintended and industry. The external liberalization undesirable collective outcomes for of labor and service markets has thus Europe as whole. Attempts to divert prompted tendencies towards internal un/low-productive immigrants could, re-regulation of national labor-market for example, strengthen spirals of policy governance. But it remains to be seen tightening and social cutbacks that whether such attempts will suffice to render integration more difficult and regain national control or rather will reduce overall EU immigration at a be hollowed out by growing streams of time when the opposite is needed. cross-border mobility. In this perspective, this chapter’s analyses suggest a strong case for closer Scope for Action and integration of both the research and Recommendations policies of migration, labor markets, and welfare-state reform in Europe. This chapter draws attention to three The social and political actors of facts: First, the labor market is the welfare, labor, and immigration policies main gate of entry to the national at national levels are faced with complexes of work-based welfare-state common and multiple collective-action rights; second, the inflows of potential problems. This quandary can only be jobseekers are highly contingent on resolved through better and more open the policy responses of neighboring methods of coordination, information countries, and third, all countries are exchange, learning, and policy integra- therefore keeping their cards close to tion across the vanishing boundaries the chests and looking over their between nation-states and the EU. shoulders. This situation is promoting To prevent the enlarged EU, with its a complex game of labor-market and immense social inequalities, from welfare-regime competition, in which becoming a neo-colonial playground

176 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century for companies searching for the lowest References taxes, the cheapest labor, and the laxest regulations for work and the Bommes, M. “The shrinking inclusive capacity of environment, European politicians the national welfare state: International migration and the deregulation of identity and institutions would do well to formation.” (2003) in Comparative Social adopt the following recommendations: Research, forthcoming.

Commission of the European Communities. Strengthen policies for economic Directive concerning the posting of workers in the growth, restructuring, and framework of the provision of services. COM employment in the new Member 96/7Ec final, 1996. States of the EU; Commission of the European Communities. Develop (and improve monitoring) Communication from the Commission to the of proper EU minimum standards in Council, The European Parliament, The the field of social security, labor European Economic and Social Committee protection, working conditions, and and the Committee of the Regions on Immigration, Integration and Employment. COM (2003) 336 company taxation; final, 2003. Strengthen common policy orienta- tions in these fields by defining Dölvik, J. E. Redrawing Boundaries of Solidarity? joint objectives, information ETUC, social dialogue and the Europeanisation of trade unionism in the 1990s. : exchange, and learning in accor- ARENA/FAFO Report 238, 1997. dance with the open method of coordination; Dölvik, J. E. “European trade unions: coping with globalisation?” In The Solidarity Dilemma: Promote social institution-building Globalisation, Europeanisation and the Trade and cooperation among social actors Unions, edited by J. Hoffmann, 83-118. and working-life organizations across Brussels: ETUI, 2001. the East-West divide; Dölvik, J. E. “Industrial Relations in EMU: Are Re- Ensure that the integration of Nationalization and Europeanization Two Sides service and labor markets does not of the Same Coin?” In Euros and Europeans. undermine Member States’ capacity Monetary Integration and the European Model of to monitor and apply national Society, edited by A. Martin and G. Ross. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. working conditions; Clarify the range of rights available Entzinger, H. “The rise and fall of multiculturalism: to newcomers of different cate- The case of the Netherlands.” In Towards assimilation and citizenship: Immigrants in liberal gories, both for purposes of compari- nation-states, edited by C. Joppke and E. son within the EU, and as a basis Morawska. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, for coordinated policymaking; and 2003. Support research that combines Esping Andersen, G. The Three Worlds of Welfare analyses of immigration, welfare, Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University and the labor market. Press, 1990.

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178 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Th e N ew Ro l e o f M i g ra nts in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe

Charalambos Kasimis igration flows into Southern further immigration among some sectors M Europe, particularly into of the native-born population in many Greece, have grown over EU states, whose anxiety appears to the last 15 years. This influx has both stem partly from cultural apprehen- shaped and been shaped by important sions and fear of competition for jobs. developments in the large agricultural sector in Southern European countries, On closer examination, however, sev- where farming’s share of GDP is on eral of the obstacles to sound migration average double that of the average for management appear less formidable European Union states as a whole. In than some media and political leaders this context, policymakers are increas- portray them. An in-depth look at ingly confronted with a thorny question: Greece’s migration and the agricultural How can Southern Europe’s growing sector, for example, shows that demand for migrant labor be balanced migrants are mainly filling agricultural with the many blueprints, often more and other low-skilled jobs, not com- restrictive, for Europe’s future migration peting with the native born for skilled management? positions. Furthermore, suggestions of monolithic public hostility to more Complicating matters is a rapidly immigration actually mask a more changing context, including reforms to sympathetic reality, in which rural the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy Greeks recognize the valuable contri- (CAP) for rules and subsidies; the EU’s butions of foreign workers. May 2004 enlargement to include several new Member States with com- In short, a more detailed examination petitive agricultural sectors; and World of the new role of these migrants is in Trade Organization (WTO) negotia- order. What follows is an overview of tions on reducing direct subsidies and migration patterns in Southern tariff protection to farm products. The Europe, and then a focused look at possibility of a vastly changed economic Greece and the lessons its experiences landscape for farming has large parts of with migrants and agriculture may Southern Europe’s agricultural sector hold for the region. Finally, a series of feeling threatened not only by cheap recommendations will outline how imports, but also by innovative and national and EU-level policymakers can technology-powered competitors. In best balance calls for more restrictive this context, inexpensive migrant labor immigration policies with increasing may be more sought after than ever. demand for migrant workers.

Policymakers striving to meet the chal- lenge of importing labor for Southern Southern Europe and Europe’s vital agricultural sector must Labor Migration grapple with a wide range of factors. For example, they must take into con- In the period of reconstruction that sideration a growing hostility towards followed World War II, Southern

180 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Europe was the main contributor of the abandonment of agriculture, for migrants to the labor-hungry industri- reasons described later, by many alized nations of Northern Europe. native-born Southern Europeans. However, the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 helped cause an economic To fuel this often labor-intensive decline and a sharp drop in demand regional economy, migrants have been for labor. This led to the introduction arriving from the Balkans, Africa, and of restrictive immigration policies in even Asia, bound for work in econom- Northern Europe, as well as return ically restructured rural areas and migration by Southern Europeans to increasingly specialized seasonal agricul- their homelands. Later, in the 1980s, ture. However, they are not restricted Southern European countries became to agriculture. These migrants are also transit points for African, Asian, engaged in non-agricultural economic Polish, and Yugoslav migrants whose activities and in the overall support of final destinations were the US, Canada, aged populations, especially in marginal and to a lesser degree, Western Europe. or mountainous rural areas.

In the last 15 years of this process of The influx into Southern Europe has change, migration flows to Southern come from various source countries, Europe, particularly Greece, have and continues to evolve. Spain’s 2001 increased considerably. The end result Census showed that 17 percent of all has been a transformation so sweeping migrants are settled in mostly rural that all Southern European countries areas with less than 10,000 people, have evolved from senders of migrants concentrated in regions like Alicante, to migrant receivers and permanent Malaga, Las Palmas, Tenerife, the immigrant destinations. Balearic Islands, Murcia, and Almeria. This pattern was confirmed by the One particularly important aspect of 2001 regularization program, in which this process of change is connected to 13 percent of all work permits were the agricultural sector. Migrant provided for the agricultural sector. employment in agriculture is no longer Recent evidence shows that a secondary phenomenon. Evidence and have nowadays sup- from Southern European countries planted the once-dominant African shows a rapid increase in migrant migrants in the Spanish labor market. employment in agriculture and rural regions during the past 15 years. This In Italy, migrants are over-represented is related to agriculture’s significant in agricultural employment in compar- role in the economies and societies of ison with the economically active all Southern European countries. In population of the country (13.1 percent fact, half of the agriculturally employed as against 5.3 percent). They make up population and two-thirds of the farm 60 percent of the total seasonal labor holdings of the EU are concentrated in force in agriculture, while the majority Southern Europe. It is also related to of them, three-fifths, are illegal. The

The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe 181 presence of seasonal labor arriving and to a lesser extent from Southeast from present and former non-EU Asia. Non-EU Eastern European countries increases by 15 percent every migrants are concentrated in the year; two-thirds of this workforce origi- Lisbon metropolitan area and the nates from Poland, Slovakia, the region of Algarve, but they are also Czech Republic, and Romania. spread out in rural regions. There, they are employed in construction and the The role of migrant workers in the agricultural sector (especially in the Italian labor market varies by sector and Alentejo, Ribatejo, and Oeste region. In Northern Italy, regularized regions). Brazilians and “traditional” foreign labor is in demand. Migrants migrants from PALOP (Portuguese- are mostly employed by pig and cattle speaking African) countries generally farms. Moroccans and increasing are employed in construction and the numbers of Indians are taking these service sector. jobs because local youths are not prepared to do this kind of hard and The arrival of migrants from Eastern unpleasant work, even for the relatively Europe in Portugal has put pressure on good wages offered. Migrants from “traditional” migrants, much as it has Central and Eastern European countries in Spain, leading to strong competition are mostly employed in vineyards and for jobs and to social conflicts among the fruit and vegetable sectors. In the different ethnic groups. The Ukrainians, South, because of the massive, often the most dominant group from Eastern organized-crime-controlled, continu- Europe, have the reputation of being ous arrival of migrants and the seasonal competent and disciplined workers and characteristics of the regional economy, seem to benefit from a sort of “reverse the demand is for illegal, highly discrimination.” As a result, resentment exploitable labor. and tensions are brewing among African and Latin American migrants, Only in Portugal has migrant employ- who are seeing their employment ment been largely locked out, in this situation deteriorate. case due to very strong cooperative networks among locals. But even Portugal’s large-scale agriculture now Reasons for Increased reportedly relies heavily on inexpensive Labor Migration migrant labor. A qualitative change in migration inflows to Portugal has been Efforts to analyze the causes of observed in recent years. All previous Southern Europe’s growing dependence inflows were part of an international on migrant labor are complicated by a migratory system united by the lack of research. While there is a long Portuguese language, but nowadays tradition of studying migration to rural there is greatly increased migration areas, this is more true of the United from Eastern European countries States than of Europe. Such studies, (Ukraine, Moldava, Romania, Russia), where they have been undertaken in

182 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Europe, have tended to concentrate on housing construction, return migration the implications of a rural exodus from of urban dwellers to their place of origin, sending societies rather than on rural and the growth of new consumption areas as receivers of migrants. patterns connected to leisure and recreation. Out of a desire for “flexible” In view of this research shortfall, the manpower, free of constraints like EU Social and Economic Committee trade unionism, businesses large and has recognized the importance of small have increasingly turned to studying migration to rural areas. In a migrant labor to fill their empty posts. 2000 report, the committee stated that although migrant labor in agriculture Additional demand for paid workers and rural regions has increased exten- has been created by the increasing sively, there is still insufficient quanti- integration of native-born women into tative and qualitative research. the labor market, primarily starting in Furthermore, the report states that 1980s. Their departure from the home data are not being collated at the EU has led to the creation of domestic level, and that no analyses are available jobs — e.g., child and elder care — of with respect to specific groups. the low-paid, low-prestige kind increasingly turned down by local Despite these gaps in available populations for reasons detailed below. research, some factors that are driving more migration to Southern Europe Changing social attitudes. Improved are fairly clear. The most important living standards and young people’s include: attainment of higher levels of education in the last few decades have lowered Demand fueled by economic restruc- the native-born population’s willing- turing. Increased demand for migrant ness to work away from home, particu- farm workers can be traced in part to larly in low-status, seasonal, and the integration of Southern European low-income jobs. These are precisely nations (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) the kinds of jobs often available in into the EU in the 1980s. This helped several of Southern Europe’s key spur a rapid economic transformation economic sectors: agriculture, tourism, that has narrowed the economic and fisheries, construction, and commerce, social distance between Southern and as well as the large informal family- Northern Europe, and in turn helped based sector. With higher expectations, trigger an exodus of farm family labor the young people of the countryside to off-farm employment. Periods of have increasingly sought out better-paid, prosperity, coupled with CAP subsidies higher-status urban jobs, leaving labor and protectionism, have further fueled market “holes” in rural areas to be the expansion of agricultural sector filled by migrants. jobs. Additional demand for labor has stemmed from the expansion of non- Demographic imbalances. Migration agricultural activities such as tourism, has also been encouraged by the

The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe 183 youthful nature of the migrant popula- close West Asian states such as tion as compared to the increasingly and Afghanistan, are experiencing large elderly population of native-born waves of emigration spurred in part by Southern Europeans. Policymakers have poverty or conflict. Southern Europe’s noted that falling birthrates and the location has combined with the other graying of the native-born population factors mentioned above to make it a in Southern European receiving coun- destination for these migrants. tries will make it difficult to sustain economic growth and a healthy tax A multitude of similarities along these base, prompting more tolerant official lines exist among the countries of attitudes and policies towards migrants. Southern Europe. At the same time, it At the same time, the retirement of would be impossible to catalogue the the native born from their jobs has many ways in which they differ, making created more demand for labor, as has a country-by-country breakdown prob- the expansion of medical and care lematic. More useful, in terms of poli- services for the elderly. cymaking, is to focus on one country’s experience in order to glean lessons in Visa overstay opportunities. The how to properly manage the new role cross-border nature of Southern of migrants in Southern Europe. economies — e.g., heavily weighted Greece’s status as a receiver of large towards mobile commerce, shipping, migrant flows, as well as its important and tourism — has facilitated the position in Southern Europe’s agricul- legal entry of migrants as tourists and tural sector, makes it a good candidate visitors. Many of these individuals for such an examination. have remained illegally after their visas have expired. Government efforts to rein in such activity have been lax Th e Cas e o f G re ec e because officials recognize these migrants’ economic value. Greek agriculture employs almost 17 percent of the economically active Proximity to sending countries. population, contributes approximately Extensive coastlines and easily crossed 10 percent of GDP, and accounts for borders, which are difficult to police, almost one-third of the total value of have facilitated migrants’ entry into exports. Immigrant wage labor has Southern Europe. At different times, grown extensively in the past decade nearby countries in Eastern and and now accounts for almost 20 percent Central Europe have been vigorous of the total labor expended in the sending countries, particularly after sector. Understanding how Greece the collapse of the Communist Bloc arrived at this situation, which in vari- in the late 1980s and early 1990s. ous ways mirrors the experiences of its Moreover, Southern Europe’s neighbor Southern European neighbors, requires states on the far shore of the a focused look at the country’s overall Mediterranean, as well as relatively migration patterns, past and present.

184 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century These patterns have their modern Trading Places: roots in the period following World Immigration Replaces War II, when Greece became, along Emigration with other countries of Southern Europe, one of the main contributors Declining emigration and return migra- to migration to the industrialized tion created a positive migration bal- nations of Northern Europe. More ance in the 1970s. Immigration grew at than one million Greeks migrated in the beginning of the 1980s when a this wave, mostly between 1950 and small number of Asians (primarily 1974. Most emigrated to Western Filipinos), Africans, and Poles arrived Europe, the US, Canada, and and found work in construction, agricul- Australia. Their movement was ture, and domestic services. Nevertheless, prompted by various factors, immigration was still limited in size. In primarily economic, but also political 1986, legal and unauthorized immi- (connected with the consequences grants totaled approximately 90,000. of the 1946-1949 civil war and the One-third of them were from EU 1967-1974 period of military rule). countries. The 1991 Census registered Official statistics show that in the 167,000 “foreigners” in a total popula- period 1955-1973 Germany absorbed tion of 10,259,900. 603,300 Greek migrants, Australia 170,700, the US 124,000, and The collapse of many Central and Canada 80,200. The majority of Eastern European regimes in 1989 these emigrants came from rural transformed areas, whose residents supplied into a massive, uncontrollable both the national and international phenomenon. As a result, although labor markets. Greece was at that time still one of the less-developed EU states, in the 1990s Following the oil crisis of 1973 and the it received the highest percentage of adoption of restrictive immigration immigrants in relation to the size of its policies by Northern European coun- labor force. tries, these immigration flows were severely reduced and return migration Many factors explain the transforma- increased. Other factors contributing tion of Greece into a receiving country. to these changes included integration These include geographic location, difficulties in the receiving countries, which positions Greece as the eastern the restoration of democracy in Greece “gate” of the EU, with extensive in 1974, and the new economic coastlines and easily crossed borders. prospects developed following the Though the situation at the country’s 1981 entry of the country into the northern borders has greatly improved European Economic Community since the formation of a special border (EEC). Between 1974 and 1985, control guard in 1998, geographic access almost half of the emigrants of the remains a central factor in patterns of post-war period returned to Greece. migration to Greece.

The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe 185 Also key have been rapid economic regularization program. This legislation changes that have narrowed Greece’s dealt with “the admission and residence economic and social distance from the of foreigners in Greece and the acqui- Northern European countries since the sition of Greek nationality through integration of Greece into the EU in naturalization.” Because of their illegal 1981. In step with economic develop- status, a good number of immigrants ment, the improved living standards were not included in census registra- and higher levels of education attained tion, while still others entered the by young people have led most Greeks country specifically to take advantage to reject low-status and low-income of regularization. jobs. Meanwhile, the large size of the informal, family-based economy, Immigration was the main cause of together with the seasonal nature of population increase and demographic industries like tourism, agriculture, and renewal in Greece in the period construction, have created demand for between the 1991 and 2001 censuses. a labor pool independent of trade union The average number of children per practices and labor rights legislation. woman in Greece has fallen to 1.3, against a European average of 1.5, and well below the average of 2.1 required Greece’s Migrants in for the reproduction of a population. Context Of the immigrant population, 16.7 percent are in the 0-14 age bracket, According to the latest census, the 79.8 percent in the 15-64 age bracket, population of Greece increased from and only 3.5 percent in the over-65 10,259,900 in 1991 to 10,964,020 in age bracket. The respective percent- 2001. This increase can be almost ages for the national population are exclusively attributed to immigration 15.2 percent, 67.7 percent, and 17 in that decade. The census shows that percent, demonstrating the key role the “foreign population” of Greece in immigrants of child-bearing age 2001 was 762,191 (47,000 of them EU play in the population as a whole. citizens), making up approximately 7 Albanians, who are mainly married percent of the total population. Of couples raising families, are the these migrants, 2,927 were registered youngest population overall. In as refugees. contrast, immigrants from the United States, Canada, and Australia have It is estimated that the real number of the highest percentages of people in immigrants is higher; many analysts the over-65 age bracket, because they believe that migrants make up as much are mainly returning pensioners as 10 percent of the population. They of Greek origin. cite, among other factors, that the 2001 Census was carried out before the Males and females make up 54.5 implementation of Act 2910/2001, percent and 45.5 percent of the otherwise referred to as Greece’s second total, respectively. However, gender

186 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century composition varies widely among the Soviet Union, , and India. various nationalities. Albanians and The majority of Albanians arrived in Romanians show the most balanced the first wave; however, the collapse of picture, because the percentages of enormous “pyramid schemes” in males fluctuate just above the average Albania’s banking sector in 1996 also with 59 percent and 57 percent, respec- spurred significant migration. tively. Other nationalities show sharp asymmetries, such that either males or According to the 2001 Census, the females far outnumber the other gender. largest group of immigrants draws its For example, females make up almost origins from the Balkan countries of two-thirds of the immigrants from the Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. People former Soviet Union and Bulgaria, as from these countries make up almost well as approximately four-fifths of the two-thirds of the total “foreign popula- Filipinos. On the other end, immigrants tion.” Migrants from the former Soviet from Pakistan and India are almost Union (Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, exclusively male. , etc.) comprise 10 percent of the total; the EU countries approxi- Fifty-four percent of immigrants enter mately 6 percent. A heterogeneous the country for work. Family reunifica- group of people from places such as the tion (13 percent) and repatriation (7 United States, Canada, and Australia percent) are other main reasons they (mostly first- or second-generation give for their arrival. Albanians show Greek emigrants returning home), also the highest level of participation in account for around 6 percent. Finally, a family reunification, while immigrants remaining group drawn from a wide from United States, Canada, and variety of countries makes up 13 percent. Australia are the most often repatriated. None of the individual countries included An unspecified “other reason” con- in this last group exceeds 2 percent of cerns 21.5 percent of the total, while the total “foreign population.” “asylum” and “refugee” status seekers account for 1.6 percent. Of the main countries of origin, Albania accounts for 57.5 percent of the total, with second-place Bulgaria far National Origins of Recent outdistanced at 4.6 percent. Common Migrants borders with both of these countries have facilitated crossing over to Greece, In the 1990 to 2001 period of mass leading to a cyclical form of migration. immigration to Greece, immigrants arrived in two waves. The first was that of the early 1990s, in which Education and Workforce Albanians dominated. The second Participation arrived after 1995 and involved much greater participation of immigrants Immigrants have contributed signifi- from other Balkan states, the former cantly to the improved performance of

The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe 187 the Greek economy over the past few (54 percent) enter Greece for work. years, and they have boosted Greece’s Bulgarians and Romanians are the successful participation in the EU’s nationalities that most often cite economic and monetary union. Their employment as the most important structural role in the workforce of the reason for migrating to Greece. agricultural and construction sectors Immigrants are mainly employed in has been widely acknowledged. Despite construction (24.5 percent), “other a high unemployment rate, estimated services,” meaning mostly domestic at 11 percent for the country as a work (20.5 percent), agriculture whole in the first half of 2004, there (17.5 percent), and “commerce, hotels, appears to be no serious competition and restaurants” (15.7 percent). by native Greeks for the kinds of jobs secured by immigrants. On the Because of the size of their presence contrary, immigrants have played a in the total immigrant population, complementary economic role. Albanians dominate in all sectors. Within the Albanian nationality, Nearly one-half of all migrants however, construction absorbs the have secondary education (including highest percentage (32 percent), technical-skill schools) and one-third followed by agriculture (21 percent), have either completed or acquired and then “other services” (15 percent). primary school education. Almost In contrast, Bulgarians are mostly one-tenth have a higher education. occupied in agriculture (33 percent) A qualitative analysis of the and “other services” (29 percent). educational levels of the various nationalities shows that, comparatively In the construction sector, immigrants speaking, Albanians have the lowest currently provide a quarter of the level of education and former Soviet wage labor, and in agriculture, citizens the highest. In terms of a fifth of the total labor expended higher education, females have the (and almost 90 percent of the largest share of the total, while males non-family wage labor). Immigrants appear to predominate in all other play an important structural role in educational categories. both sectors.

Immigrants are almost exclusively “Other services” — a sector identi- (90 percent) engaged in wage work fied with domestic services where and, to a much lesser extent, are female migrant labor predominates — self-employed (6.5 percent). Most of mostly employ immigrants from the jobs are non-skilled, manual work the former Soviet Union (37 well below the immigrants’ level of percent) and Bulgaria. At the same education and qualifications. time, migrants’ employment in domestic services allows larger According to the 2001 Census numbers of Greek women to join the data, the majority of immigrants labor market.

188 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Immigration Policy their good health, a clean court and Developments police record, and proof of having paid national social-insurance contributions The Greek government has been for a total of 40 working days in 1998. unprepared to receive the large num- A total of 150 days of social-insurance bers of immigrants of the last decade, contributions were required for the and has hesitated to introduce the acquisition of the “green card.” necessary legal and institutional No registration fees were charged at changes necessary for the regularization this stage. and integration of this population. By the end of the first regularization, The government has, however, been 371,641 immigrants had been regis- forced to adopt a regularization proce- tered for the “white card,” but only dure, under often contradictory pres- 212,860 received a “green card.” It is sures. From one side, in an environment estimated that less than half of the of growing xenophobia, the public has migrants living in the country were demanded the registration of immi- registered during this first regulariza- grants. From another, human rights tion program. and labor organizations have sought more humanitarian and less exploitative In 2001, the government passed treatment. Act 2910/2001 on “the admission and residence of foreigners in The first regularization program to Greece and the acquisition of Greek handle recent illegal migration was nationality through naturalization.” introduced in 1997 with presidential This gave immigrants a second decrees 358/1997 and 359/1997. These opportunity to legalize their status, aimed at the implementation of Act provided they could show proof of 1975/1991 on the “entry-exit, residence, residence for at least a year before employment, expulsion of foreigners, the implementation of the law. and procedure for the recognition of Immigrants were given a six-month the status of refugee for foreigners.” period to submit all the necessary documents to acquire the work permit, The twin decrees gave unregistered which became the precondition for immigrants the opportunity to acquire obtaining a residence permit. a temporary residence permit known as a “white card.” This, in turn, gave The two regularization methods them time to submit the complementary differed, but the documents required documents necessary to acquire a for both were similar. The most “green card,” essentially a combined important differences were that in work and residence permit. To qualify 2001 the immigrant had to submit a for the “white card,” they had to have copy of an official contract with his or lived in Greece for at least one year, her employer for a specific period of and submit documents testifying to time, as well as confirmation that

The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe 189 national social-insurance contributions extended to the end of October 2003. had been paid for at least 200 working By then, the government expected to days (150 days for those employed in have all the applications processed. agriculture, construction, and domestic A year later, however, all of the services). The immigrants themselves applications had not yet been could also pay for their insurance con- processed. Once more, promises were tributions. In addition, a payment of not fulfilled, and to date, thousands of 147 euros per person over the age of migrants remain “hostage” to a sluggish 14 was required. All applicants to the legal and institutional structure. 1997 regularization program whose permits had expired by 2001 were sub- The enthusiasm shown by immigrants ject to the provisions of the new law. upon the announcement of the latest act has now vanished. This is as a result The 2001 act also set preconditions for of, on the one hand, the weakness of future legal migration into the country, public administration in supporting the giving the Organization of Employment implementation of the act and, on the and Labor (OAED) responsibility for other, the act’s “philosophy” of contin- preparing an annual report that would uous checks and controls that make it specify labor requirements at the occu- difficult to implement. These weak- pational and regional levels in order to nesses have been identified and raised define quotas for temporary work per- by many organizations and institutions mits. These job vacancies would be directly or indirectly involved with the advertised in the sending countries by issue. The Greek ombudsman, in a Greek embassies, which would also be report to the minister of the interior, responsible for receiving the applica- warned as early as 2001 of the imple- tions for those jobs. To date, however, mentation problems and asked for the government has not made wide use amendments that would make it work of this procedure. for the benefit of both immigrants and the Greek public administration. When the official application deadline for this second regularization program However, amendments to the act expired in August 2001, it was reported introduced by the government in 2002 that 351,110 migrants had submitted did not address the problems connected their documents for the acquisition of with the one-year duration of the work a work permit — a precondition for and residence permits, the yearly fee for the provision of a residence permit. the residence permit for the applicants, However, bureaucracy and a lack of and the insurmountable bureaucratic necessary infrastructure created problems. Only recently, the govern- tremendous problems and delays in ment decided to extend the residence application processing. This forced permit to two years starting from the government to give temporary January 2004 (Act 3202/2003). residence to all applicants until the In the meantime, in order to end of June 2003, subsequently overcome bureaucratic obstacles,

190 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century many immigrants have had to either At this stage, despite the acknowledged hire lawyers to handle their regulariza- importance of migration in Greece’s tion procedure, or lose time and money economy and society, migration in standing in lines. general and integration specifically do not seem to be high on the govern- ment agenda. The expressed anxieties Integration of human rights and migrant organiza- tions about integration and migration To date, the integration of migrants policy seem to have done little to shift into Greek society appears to have the debate. resulted largely from individual/family strategies of the migrants themselves, Integration may come to the fore- rather than from the provisions of an ground again, however, in connection institutional framework. This may with social unrest that could follow change as government efforts to the foreseen negative prospects of the systematize integration take hold. economy in the post-Olympics period. The high growth rate of the Greek Greece’s integration policy was economy — 4.3 percent in 2003 — is designed and announced by the expected to slow after the Olympic government in 2002 in its “Action Games, which drove huge amounts of Plan for the Social Integration of activity in construction and other Immigrants for the Period 2002-2005.” sectors. If not dealt with, this type of The plan included measures for the economic pressure, along with the labor-market integration and training uncertainties evident in the legal of immigrants, improved access to and institutional framework for the the health system, emergency centers regularization and integration of for immigrant support, and measures immigrants, is expected to lead to for the improvement of cultural social friction and extensive racism exchanges among the various ethnic and xenophobia in the next few years. communities. No special provisions were made, however, for migrants living and working in rural areas. Changes in the EU The plan has not yet been and Beyond implemented and recently it was reported that the government intends The arrival of large numbers of to redraft it. Two of the reasons for migrants in the past 15 years has the non-implementation of the plan coincided with regional and global appear to include pressure on the state developments with important budget resulting from the nation’s implications for Southern Europe’s hosting of the 2004 Summer Olympic rural areas in general, and its Games, as well as the long, politically agricultural sector in particular. sensitive period before the national These developments have special elections of March 7, 2004. weight in Greece’s family-centric farming,

The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe 191 which still holds an important position predict extensive restructuring of culti- in both the economy and society. vation, reduction of agricultural pro- duction in some sectors, extension of As the agricultural sector changes in both crop and animal production, and response to national and international a 20 percent reduction in the popula- developments, migration patterns can tion in the agricultural sector. All this also be expected to evolve. More is expected to result in an increase in specifically, the most recent important agricultural incomes of no more than development is the 2003 introduction 1.7 percent. For Greece in particular, of reforms to the CAP. The need for contradictions seem to be on the hori- CAP reform was pushed to the forefront zon. On the one hand, no serious by the EU’s May 2004 enlargement to reduction is expected in the total sup- include 10 new Member States while port for agriculture until 2013. On the simultaneously holding steady the total other hand, certain producer groups, EU financial support to agriculture up e.g., cotton cultivators, have already to 2013. WTO negotiations for a new experienced important income cuts agreement on agriculture, which have and others are expected to find it implied adjustments to the level of impossible to adjust to the new com- agricultural supports, have also played petitive conditions. As a result, they a role. Rounding out the factors creating will have to withdraw from agriculture. momentum for reform has been pressure from European citizens for the produc- With the old CAP benefits now in tion of safe food and protection of the question, large parts of the agricultural environment. sector feel threatened not only by cheap imports but also by innovative The new elements of the CAP reform and technology-powered competitive include the following: “decoupling” of agriculture. The pressures for technolog- support for production and the provi- ical modernization and the restructuring sion of “single-area payment” decoupled of agriculture towards both capital and from what the farmer produces; “cross- labor-intensive crops have incited, on compliance” with EU-defined “good the one hand, a further exodus of farm farming practices” for the protection of family labor to off-farm employment. the environment, public health, food On the other hand, they have created safety, and animal welfare; and “modu- greater seasonal demand for labor. lation of support,” which provides for These developments have been rein- the redistribution of a portion of direct forced by the demographic deficiency payments away from large farm holdings connected with the aging of the rural for the support of rural development. population and the flight of working- age people in particular, which was The implications of CAP reform for created by the massive rural exodus of the future of European agriculture are the 1950s and 1960s and by the difficult to foresee and quantify. Some restructuring of rural areas. The expan- early studies carried out for the EU sion of other non-agricultural activities

192 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century such as tourism and housing construc- between 2000-2002. The first is tion, the return of urban dwellers to the “marginal/mountainous” region their land of origin, along with the near the Albanian border, in the growth of new consumption patterns Prefecture of Ioannina, which is connected to leisure and recreation, defined by small-scale agriculture has created a rural environment char- and extensive livestock production. acterized as “multifunctional.” The The second is a “dynamic” region labor demands of this multifunctional in coastal Peloponnese, in the environment, in which a combination Prefecture of Corinthia, which is of agricultural and non-agricultural defined by labor-intensive agriculture activities support rural household and lowland second-home develop- incomes, cannot be met by the ment. The last is a “pluriactive” native-born population. region on the island of Crete, in the Prefecture of Chania, that is typical of island areas combining agriculture Dynamics of Migrant and small-scale tourism. Labor in Rural Greece Marginal/mountainous. This region, While much research remains to be which runs along the Albanian done, the available data and research by border, has been the main gate for the author suggest that migrant workers both legal and illegal migrants have addressed four structural develop- entering Greece. It is characterized by ments in rural Greece: first, the long- an elderly population left behind by standing shortages of labor that resulted the massive rural exodus of the 1950s from the restructuring of the agricultural and 1960s and by limited productive sector and rural economy; second, the activities concentrated in agriculture demographic crisis resulting from the and stockbreeding. Its marginality 1950-1970 rural exodus connected results not only from its geography with emigration; third, the younger and economy, but also from the generation’s increasing rejection of cold-war climate in the region rural life and jobs; and fourth, the developed after the defeat of the left growing opportunities of the rural pop- in the 1946-1949 civil war and the ulation to obtain off-farm employment. establishment of communist Albania. The recent development of the The way migrant labor has incorpo- mountainous communities as “return rated itself into rural Greece has sites” for older Greeks and as “recre- produced its own dynamics that ation sites” for the young, the rebuild- correspond to each area’s particular ing of the region after a devastating socio-economic conditions. Three earthquake in 1996, and the increas- representative rural regions, all more ing support needs of the aged popula- or less equal in population size tion have increased the demand for (4,000 households), are considered labor and set the context for the here based on the author’s research reception of migrants.

The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe 193 Dynamic. This region has a long history Second, a survey was made of a repre- of market integration and export-driven sentative sample of households aimed agricultural development. Cultivation of at the collection of information on the grapes, the dominant crop, has expand- role of migrants and the implications ed rapidly over the past few years, occu- of migrant employment for the opera- pying a large part of the cultivable land. tion of farms, family businesses, and Processing and commercial companies the overall support of households. The in the region are involved in the export survey also registered the opinions and of this product. The seasonality of the attitudes of local populations towards grape harvest has spurred intensive migrants and their evaluation of the demand for labor, particularly during the prospects for the migrants’ integration. summer. The region is characterized by a good age structure and improved Third, a qualitative study was made of educational levels that often lead the migrants, in the form of semi-structured native born into off-farm employment. interviews, aimed at the documentation of the social, economic, and cultural Pluriactive. This region combines experiences of the migrants, as well as activities that are considered traditional their future plans. agriculture, such as olive groves, “dynamic” agriculture such as green- This chapter continues by examining house cultivation, and non-agricultural the impact of migrant employment on businesses, particularly small-scale the operation of farms and households, tourism. These activities take place at as well as the wider implications migra- both individual and household levels. tion has for the economic and social The local population is aging without make-up of rural societies. In the final being satisfactorily replaced by a part, some conclusions are drawn younger generation. These elements about the contribution of migrant have created the need for a low-skilled, employment to agriculture and rural flexible labor force. society. Recommendations with wide relevance to Southern European In order to gain insight into the migration policymakers are then pre- dynamics of migrant labor in rural sented in the light of developments in Greece, the authors carried out three both rural and migration policies. empirical studies in each region.

First, a qualitative study was carried out Migrants and the Farm through semi-structured interviews of local/regional administrators and opin- Migrants offer an unexpected solution ion leaders in order to understand the to Greece’s chronic rural labor short- characteristics of migration in the ages, which are a pressing structural region and opinions on the implications need, mainly in regions of intensive of migration for the local economy and agriculture. The mass availability of society. migrant labor has covered a large

194 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century deficit in the workforce and in the of the agricultural sector in each of early years of its arrival contributed the three regions. In the “dynamic” decisively to lowering the cost of region of Corinthia, the contribution agricultural production. of migrants was primarily in agricul- tural production and processing, and The authors’ research shows that two- only secondarily in the construction thirds of the rural households surveyed sector. In the “pluriactive” region of operated a farm holding. Just over half Chania their contribution was to all of the total number of rural households sectors — not only in agricultural (53 percent) and two-thirds of the production (seasonal in the case of farm-operating households (66 per- traditional agriculture and permanent cent) employed migrant labor. These in the case of modern/intensive) but figures varied widely in the three also in manufacturing, construction, regions (Table 1). and tourism. In this region, their contributions were particularly Non-family labor contributed almost important to “marginal” areas, where 25 percent of the total labor spent on their role was expanded to all-around the farm, nine-tenths of which was support for aged rural households. migrant labor. The nationality of Finally, in the “mountainous/marginal” almost four-fifths of these migrant region, migrants’ contributions were laborers was Albanian. mostly associated with construction of houses and public works, as well The positive contribution of migrant as the general support of aged labor to the local economy varied in households, while only secondarily accordance with the size and position in farming and stockbreeding.

Table 1. Employment of Migrants by Rural and Farming Households, 2000

Ioannina Corinthia Chania Total Total number of rural 98 96 99 293 households % of rural households 31% 68% 62% 53% employing migrants Total number of farm- 39 72 81 192 operating households % of farm-operating 28% 88% 65% 66% households employing migrants

The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe 195 Migrants contributed to the survival same time, it has facilitated the adop- and expansion of the farm holdings. tion of new family employment strate- However, the use of migrant labor gies and the partial withdrawal of family was, in economic terms, more labor from the farm. This dynamic significant for the larger farms than appears to be explained by a combina- for the smaller ones. As the size of the tion of developments connected with farm increased, so did the weight of the regions’ general lack of working- migrant labor. In farms of 3-5 age people, the new seasonal demands hectares, migrants offered 62 days of of agriculture in some rural regions, work annually per farm, while for and the shift of local labor towards those of 5-10 hectares, they offered non-agricultural, more demanding, 163. The employment of migrants in and specialized job placements. agricultural production seemed to have contributed to an increase in Evidence of the complementary role of socio-economic differentiation in the migrants appears in the answers given countryside. It is important to note by survey respondents to the question that a good number of farmers who asking why they employed migrants. have increased the size of their farm The most common answer (59 percent) operations in the past decade relate it to the multiple-choice question was to the availability of migrant labor. “Because migrants were all we could find,” followed by “Because Greeks do The employment of non-family/ not work in the fields” (40 percent), migrant labor in all three research and finally “Because they cost less” (9 regions increased extensively in terms percent). of both duration and size in the 1990s. At farms that employed non-family Competition for work between the labor both before the arrival of migrants, native born and migrants was noted in in the late 1980s, and after their arrival a limited number of professions, con- in 2000, the number of non-family cerning mainly unskilled Greek workers labor days per farm doubled from 80 to and apprentices in the construction 157 days per farm. In fact, according to trades who could not compete with the the National Statistical Service of low wages charged by migrant workers. Greece, between 1991 and 2000 family In the agricultural sector, a small num- labor in Greek agriculture decreased by ber of field hands and a number of 20 percent, while permanent non-family older women in the food-processing labor increased by 85 per cent and sea- industry were driven out of the labor sonal labor by 43 percent. market by low-paid migrant labor.

Migrant labor in all three regions has Following the introduction of migrant not substituted for the local workforce; employment, important changes took instead, it has complemented family place in the division of family labor on labor by covering labor deficits and the farm. The participation of migrant meeting increasing demand. At the labor in farm work increased substan-

196 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century tially, allowing not only the farmer differentiation has been evident in how but also his wife and other family migrants contribute to the substitution members to significantly disengage and/or complementing of family mem- from heavy manual work. As a conse- bers’ farm and household work roles. quence, a division developed between manual and organizational/managerial In this way, and because of the expan- work, especially for those operating sion of the wider labor-market charac- large farms. Almost 60 percent of the teristics to rural areas, migrant workers farm heads reduced their workload and may have supported a form of devoted more time to their farm’s “de-agriculturalization” and “urbaniza- organization and management. tion” of the Greek countryside. This At the same time, their spouses either may have been accompanied by a dif- reduced their workload or abandoned fusion of middle-class attitudes and farm work altogether to return practices to rural households. Two exclusively to housework, while other examples of this can be provided. family members sought employment The first concerns the expansion of outside agriculture. domestic services provided to rural households by migrants — something The developments described above new compared to the experience of have strengthened the existing economic urban areas — and the second concerns and social pressures connected with the development of a new “boss” atti- the intensification of competition tude in some parts of Greece’s formerly among Greek farmers and foreign com- more egalitarian rural population. petitors, the technological moderniza- tion and the specialization of production for the professionalization of agriculture, Migrants and Rural the integration of women into the Households non-agricultural labor market, and the transformation of domestic work into Migrants can take much of the credit wage labor. To this end, migrants have for maintaining Greece’s elderly popu- provided, at a low cost, the necessary lation in their own villages and for labor for the modernization of agricul- preserving their small-scale activities. ture and an alternative farm and In marginal regions, in particular, the domestic labor pool that has allowed households of the elderly employ family members to pursue personal laborers needed to repair their houses, employment and career goals. For look after their vegetable gardens and example, rural women liberated from animals, and cut their firewood for the farm work and/or domestic and other winter — to maintain, in other words, family labor have had better prospects their traditional way of life, which they for seizing opportunities in the non- would otherwise most likely have lost. agricultural labor market. Even their domestic work has often been out- Migrants offer support for the care of sourced to migrants. Thus, a gender the aged and physically challenged

The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe 197 members of rural households. Needless attitudes towards migrants. Both to say, this development greatly modes are widespread in the Greek relieves the burden on the able-bodied countryside, but how they are mani- children of these households, who fested varies in accordance with local often had to provide this support in rural socio-economic conditions and the absence of a satisfactory social-wel- the availability of migrant labor suited fare system. All types of labor are to those conditions. usually provided by one or two migrant families settled in a village, or by indi- The first mode can be defined as entre- vidual migrants who arrive periodically preneurial, purely maximizing use, and to cover seasonal labor needs. In some is connected mostly with large farms remote villages, migrants also manage that extensively employ migrant labor. the village café, often provided rent- This mode creates the basis for the free by the community, thus helping to widening of socio-economic inequality maintain the traditional social life. in these regions, because its extensive application leads to higher profit mar- Beyond these benefits, migration gins for large farms while facilitating has improved the demography of rural their modernization and expansion. regions. In mountainous regions, for This, in turn, is likely to adversely example, stockbreeders can now find affect local social and economic both women to marry and the oppor- cohesion in ways that have not yet tunity to establish families. Laborers been clearly defined. The second can facilitate the preservation and expan- be defined as a utilitarian, purely sion of their flocks, simultaneously functional use that involves a range improving working conditions for the of rural social groups according to their native born. needs and specific conditions under which they may employ migrants. In In the same regions, the extensive this case, migrants play a balancing construction of housing and public role, meeting multiple, small-scale works owes much to migration. Since needs and labor deficits that cross-cut the arrival of migrants, people who local social structures. What distin- had their origins in the region but lived guishes the two modes is the fact that permanently in cities have found it eas- in the first case, migrants are employed ier to either repair their family house or exclusively on farms in accordance construct a new one, in a symbolic with entrepreneurial principles, while move back to the family roots. Migrants in the second, their employment is also contribute to the renovation of old limited in size and multifunctional in buildings and the revival of traditional role, satisfying the very basic needs architectural styles through their car- of the rural household. pentry and masonry skills.

There are two main modes of using migrant labor that determine local

198 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Local Attitudes Towards lives. Another factor reinforcing more Migrants positive attitudes among the older generation appears to be bonding in In the three regions studied, there connection with many migrants’ roles were varied, but in some cases similar, as caregivers to the elderly. opinions and attitudes towards migrants and their contributions to More negative attitudes were found local society. These opinions and atti- in younger respondents and those who tudes were not always consistent or did not hire migrants. These respon- predictable. dents showed a lack of experience with migration and deprivation. This, In all three regions, both household coupled with a “perceived fear” of an members and local administrators/ incoming economic, social, and cultur- representatives of organizations al “threat,” seemed to lead to expres- thought that the presence of migrants sions of xenophobia. had a positive effect on the local economy, mainly because labor supply Respondents expressed the belief that increased, labor costs fell, and con- the local economic sectors that bene- sumption expanded. More specifically, fitted the most from migrant labor almost half of the households surveyed were first, agriculture, and second, called the impact on the local economy construction. As a consequence, farm “positive,” 30 percent assessed it as holders had positive impressions about both “positive and negative,” and migrant labor on their land. The only 17 percent characterized it solely majority of respondents (60 percent) as “negative.” saw only “positive” implications and a large number (29 percent) “no impact” The native-born respondents related at all. “Negative” implications were the positive impact of migrants only noted by a limited number of primarily to the acquisition of workers respondents. and secondarily to lower labor costs. Those respondents who saw negative When asked to clarify the positive implications mostly referred to a implications of migration, the most reduction in work available to locals. popular answers given by farmers were However, such a consequence was not that migrants helped them “preserve identified in the regions surveyed. the farm” (35 percent) and “reduce Both respondents who were older and the cost of labor” (22 percent). In the employers of migrants had the most dynamic region, respondents also positive attitude of all the respondents mentioned that they were “able to towards the newcomers. This response enlarge the farm holding” and “devote may be connected to declarations by more time to the management of their some of the older respondents that the farm.” In the pluriactive region, deprivation experienced by migrants respondents emphasized that their reminded them of their own difficult “production increased,” that they were

The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe 199 allowed to be “employed in off-farm the last decade’s changes had already activities,” and that they were able to left their mark on the social and eco- “secure a better quality of production.” nomic life of rural regions. Finally, in the marginal/mountainous region, respondents stressed that the These migrants adopted strategies that presence of migrants made possible the were immediately related to the future “maintenance of unprofitable/subsis- of their children. Education and strate- tence agricultural activities.” gies for these migrant families’ integra- tion into the local economy and society There were, however, negative stereo- seemed to be more successful. For types common to all three regions migrants with no family members in studied, mainly concerning Albanian Greece, a longer timeframe was consid- migrants. These stereotypes appeared ered necessary because their integration to reflect national stereotypes, all process was much slower. largely shaped by the mass media, rather than stereotypes developed A consensus was evident among locally as a product of the respondents’ respondents on the issue of regulariza- everyday social experiences. tion of undocumented migrants. Regularization was widely considered The research indicated that migrant an essential precondition for the inte- workers were relatively more accepted gration of migrants into local society and integrated in the less-developed and the labor market. In step with this rural regions than in the developed attitude, the majority of respondents ones. This was related to the the took a positive position on the most proportion of migrants in the total recent regularization initiatives (Act population of each region, their family 2910/2001) of the central government. status, and their job characteristics. For example, there seemed to be a greater acceptance of intergrating Conclusions and Policy migrants who lived permanently in Recommendations one region together with their families, as opposed to seasonal/irregular Over the past 15 years, migrant labor laborers traveling without families. has contributed to the economic, social, and demographic survival of Greek Migrants and the local population had agriculture and rural regions, which largely overlapping opinions about the have been threatened by demographi- prospects for integration. Both popula- cally, structurally, and socially created tions believed that the prospects for labor shortages. Migrants had a positive integration were much better for impact in the following key ways: migrants who lived in the countryside with their families. In addition, both First, they have been very important populations shared the feeling that for the agricultural and wider economic integration was not unfeasible and that development of rural areas. Migrants

200 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century have been employed in many Third, migrants have offered great tasks, with differing skills, and with services in other forms of rural significant geographic mobility over economic activities such as construc- the seasons. In short, they have tion, tourism, and personal/domestic provided a highly flexible labor force. services. The generally positive view of They have not supplanted native wage migrants’ contributions to the local laborers; rather, they have comple- economy has been further strengthened mented family labor, improving the through migrants’ support for the organization and management of maintenance of social and economic farms, relieving family members of continuity in the Greek countryside. manual tasks, and facilitating the search for off-farm employment. Hired The Greek experience is a valuable to do arduous, health-threatening, and frame of reference for policymakers low-paid jobs, they have greatly served of most Southern European countries agriculture and other sectors such as — and indeed, some in Northern construction and tourism that are Europe — as they grapple with the often shunned by native-born workers. challenges and opportunities of migration. These policymakers must Second, in regions where agriculture cope with Southern Europe’s persistent holds a significant position in the demographic and structural problems, local economy, the positive conse- the informality of rural labor markets, quences of migrant labor have ranged and the exodus of native workers from from farm preservation to farm rural areas as a result of increased expansion and modernization. The social and economic expectations. If most appreciated economic effects not tackled, these issues are expected have been on large-scale farms and to negatively affect the future of rural businesses that depend heavily on the areas at a time of severe worldwide availability of migrant labor. Migrants pressures connected with the have played a significant role in these WTO negotiations, CAP reforms, farms’ expansion, agricultural and EU enlargement. intensification, and modernization. For smaller and pluriactive farms, they Prevailing policy instruments, however, have offered the opportunity to preserve are generalized and are not sufficiently the farm while the farm operator targeted. They are predominantly based and/or family members hold off-farm on production or factors of production jobs. In marginal areas, migrants have such as land and capital. In addition, provided rural households with the they have a negative impact on equity labor necessary for the maintenance and income distribution, and much of of their traditional/cultural life. the funding is transferred to beneficiaries This last contribution is key to who are not in need of support. understanding the social and demographic implications of European policymakers must formulate migrants’ presence in rural Greece. flexible responses to this combination

The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe 201 of pressures and inadequate agricultural In relation to migration and migration policies, including the need to: policies, the plethora of more or less restrictive national policies and bilateral Judge policies on how effectively agreements on migrant entry, quotas, they reverse the trend of migrant etc., highlight the need to: workers flowing from rural areas to urban centers. Strong evidence Regulate migration at the EU indicates that conventional sector- level and consolidate the wide specific agricultural policy meas- range of national provisions ures, despite their high cost, do under an EU directive that would not deliver sufficient income sup- secure the balanced integration port to households and small of migrants in rural economies farms, especially those in remote and societies. and mountainous areas. Improved Design operational plans at a income distribution and enhance- national level and adopt ment for such households would differentiated policies, on the undoubtedly have a beneficial basis of varying regional charac- impact on migrant workers’ teristics, for the management of well-being and would provide regional/seasonal or permanent incentives for them to continue demands for labor. Greece, for their activities in such areas. example, needs to redesign the Define target groups at the legal and administrative framework national level on the basis of for the legal entry of migrants. sound criteria in order to design For agriculture, in particular, the and implement proper policies. recent regularization (Act 2910/ Farms and rural households that 2001) makes it nearly impossible lack resources and that are for migrants to obtain legal entry located in areas with no viable for seasonal employment — hence economic alternatives are the danger of new illegal migration earning low incomes. Such areas in the future, particularly in could be made more attractive regions of intensive agriculture. to investors by properly Expand EU agricultural training designed rural policies such as programs to include migrants infrastructure improvement. in a way that improves their Provide the appropriate incentives professional capabilities and (targeted payments, training, and understanding of new farming information, etc.) to less-efficient practices within the framework of small farmers and rural households new EU agricultural policies. in target areas to ensure that they can continue to provide desired Policy formulation of this sort public goods by remaining in the presupposes an informed discussion by countryside with the support of all parties of the nature and implica- migrant workers. tions of this complex and spreading

202 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century phenomenon. A step in the right References direction would be for the EU to establish a rural migrant labor observa- Baldwin-Edwards, M. “The changing mosaic tory that would provide the quantita- of Mediterranean migrations.” Migration Information Source. Washington, DC: tive and qualitative information need- Migration Policy Institute, June 1, 2004, ed to regulate and monitor migration, http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/di while identifying the needs, difficul- splay.cfm?ID=230. ties, and experiences of migrants Baganha, M. I. and M. L. Fonseca, eds. New themselves. Waves: Migration from Eastern Europe to Southern Europe. Lisbon: Luso-American The demographic and structural prob- Foundation, 2004. lems of Southern Europe’s agriculture Bell, N. “The exploitation of migrants in Europe.” and rural regions require policies that Presentation at the Borders and Migration will regulate and monitor integration, Conference of the Austrian League for Human while evaluating policies with an eye to Rights. Vienna, October 29-30, 2002. social justice and economic efficiency. Berlan, J. P. “Agriculture et migration.” Revue This must be done within the scope of Europeennes des Migrations Internationales 2, no. supporting the restructuring of the 3 (1986): 9-32. agricultural sector and the development Cavounidis, J. The characteristics of migrants: the of the countryside, which faces inter- Greek regularization program of 1998 [in Greek]. national pressures and the new EU Athens: National Institute of Labor and policies of rural environmental protec- Sakkoulas Publications, 2002. tion, production of quality agricultural Clogg, R. A short history of modern Greece. goods, and multifunctionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

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The New Role of Migrants in the Rural Economies of Southern Europe 205 206 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Future Demographic Change in Europe : Th e C o ntri b uti o n of Migration

Wolfgang Lutz and Sergei Scherbov urope is frequently called the uncertainty around the three key E “Old Continent” and it truly questions: Will the birth rates in deserves this name in a demo- Europe recover, stay around the graphic sense. Europe’s population current level, or even continue to fall? currently has the highest median age Are we already close to a maximum of any world region, 37.7 years, life expectancy beyond which there according to the United Nations. By will be no further decline in mortality the middle of the century, the median rates? And how many migrants will age is likely to be as high as 48 years in enter Europe in the coming decades? Europe, while in the “New World,” i.e., North America, the median age All three of these factors matter for will be around 40. The rest of the the future population size and structure world will be younger still. of Europe, but this chapter will primarily focus on the role of migra- Europe spearheaded global demographic tion in future population dynamics. growth in the 19th and 20th centuries, This will be achieved by looking at and it is likely to spearhead population different possible future migration aging in the 21st century. The regimes against the background of population above age 60 has been realistic ranges of future fertility and increasing rapidly, and that below age mortality changes. A short summary of 20 has been diminishing. Because of the principles of population dynamics the very low levels of reproduction that will be followed by a look at proba- have prevailed in large parts of Europe bilistic population projections for the over the past decades, the age structure European Union and an attempt to of the population has already been quantify the importance of future altered to such a degree that there migration for this outlook. The final will be fewer and fewer women of part of the chapter will explicitly and reproductive age in the years to come. systematically address the frequently The total population size of Europe is asked question: To what degree can expected to decline in the long run, immigration compensate for the low even when assuming sizeable immigra- birth rate in Europe? tion and continued increases in life expectancy. Without migration gains, Europe’s population would age even Population Dynamics more rapidly and population size would start to decline in the near future. As compared to other social and economic factors, demographic trends Although significant future population are very stable and have great momen- aging in Europe is a near certainty, the tum. For this reason, population exact degree of aging will depend on dynamics can be projected with greater future trends in fertility, mortality, and accuracy over a longer time span. Of migration that cannot yet be fully course, such projections are not anticipated. There is significant absolutely certain because human

208 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century behavior is not purely deterministic, steady improvements over the years, and there can be unforeseen trends has recently become more uncertain. and disasters. But since most of the Over the last 50 years, life expectancy people who will be alive in 2020 are in Western Europe has increased by already alive today, we know with a about 10 years, implying an average high degree of probability what the age gain of two years per decade. Despite structure of the labor force is likely to this significant gain, which has be in that year. surpassed all expectations expressed in earlier years, most statistical offices Future population size and age producing projections assume a structures are determined by the slowing of improvements over the present age structure and the future coming years and in some cases even trends in three basic demographic constant life expectancy. Eurostat, the components: fertility (birth rate), statistical office of the European mortality (death rate), and migration. Commission, assumes, in the medium Any change in the population must projection, a gain in life expectancy at operate through one of these three birth of about three years over a period factors. But due to the great inertia of of 20 years. But there is increasing population dynamics, even rather scientific uncertainty about limits to rapid changes in one of the factors human longevity and consequently may take quite a long time to have an about the future gains still to be impact on the total population. If, for expected. In contrast to the traditionally instance, smaller and smaller cohorts dominant view that we are already of women are entering the childbearing very close to such a limit (actually, the ages, even a possible increase in the assumed limits are being constantly mean number of children per woman moved upwards by projectors as real may not lead to an increase in the gains surpass their expectations), total number of births. Similarly, the alternative views suggest that such so-called “Baby Boom” (and not a limits (if they even exist) might be discontinuity in life expectancy gains) well above 100 years. This scientific is the main reason why we expect the uncertainty about the future trends in proportion of the population above age old-age mortality also needs to be 60 to increase sharply after 2020. reflected in the population projections.

The fact that there are only three Fertility is the most influential of the factors to be considered in population three demographic components under projections does not necessarily make a longer time horizon. Changes in the task easier, because the projection fertility not only impact the number of of each of the factors is difficult and children, but also the number of associated with significant uncertainties. grandchildren, etc. For this reason, Even the future of mortality, which relatively small changes in fertility traditionally has been considered the may have very significant consequences most stable demographic trend with for population size and age structure in

Future Demographic Change in Europe: The Contribution of Migration 209 the longer run. Despite its significance, Migration is the most volatile of the we know fairly little about the future three demographic components. The trends of fertility in Europe. History number of people entering or leaving since World War II does not help us a country can change from one year anticipate the future trend. During the to the next due to political events or “Baby Boom,” most Western European the enforcement of new legislation. countries had period fertility rates of The past 10 years have witnessed above 2.5 children per woman. This great ups and downs in European was followed by a rapid fertility decline migration levels. The problem with during the 1970s, bringing the projecting migration trends is not European average down to about 1.5. only the intrinsic difficulty of Since then we have seen diverging foreseeing such political events, but trends, typically at levels well below also the fact that net migration is the replacement fertility. The most result of two partly independent significant fertility declines have streams (in-migration and out- appeared in the Mediterranean migration) that depend on conditions countries, with Italy and Spain having in both sending and receiving around 1.2 children per woman. Some countries. In this respect, projections of the Central and Eastern European can do little more than demonstrate countries have reached even lower the impacts of alternative net- levels, while France and the Northern migration assumptions. European countries have showed somewhat higher levels. There have Policies to manage the future and also been significant regional differen- meet demographic challenges require tials within countries, e.g., between the best available information about northern and southern Italy. future demographic trends. The standard way to project the future A further uncertainty is due to the fact population path that is considered that part of these trends is caused by most likely by experts is a well- the depressing effect of “tempo” established methodology, the so-called changes, i.e., a postponement of births, “cohort component” method. The and it is unclear for how long this will more difficult issue is how to deal with continue. There is no clear scientific uncertainty in future demographic paradigm to adequately anticipate trends. As indicated above, there are future reproductive behavior. The significant uncertainties associated notion of a “second demographic with all three components: fertility, transition” has been suggested to mortality, and migration. capture these trends, but it does not say where and when the end-point of this The conventional way of handling transition might be reached. For this these uncertainties is to produce reason, again, population projections different scenarios or variants that need to reflect uncertainty through a combine alternative fertility range of fertility assumptions. assumptions with single mortality and

210 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century migration paths. The current Comparing Population practice of providing “high” and Outlooks “low” variants to communicate uncertainty around the medium This section presents two different sets projection suffers from several of population projections for the EU drawbacks. The most important are: (with its 15 Member States as of (a) in many cases, variants only 2003)1. Both are based on identical address fertility uncertainty, ignoring assumptions about the future ranges of mortality and migration uncertainty; fertility and mortality, but have (b) the variants approach is unspecific different migration assumptions. The about the probability range covered case labelled “regular” considers the full by the “high” and “low” variants; range of uncertainty in future migration (c) the variants are probabilistically as it looks plausible from today’s inconsistent when aggregating over perspective. In the second case, which countries or regions because the is labelled “no migration,” the purely chances of extreme outcomes in many hypothetical, unrealistic case of Europe countries or regions at once are being entirely closed to migration is portrayed as being the same as an examined. The comparison between extreme outcome in a single the two projections will allow us to country or region; and (d) the evaluate the contribution of migration variants typically do not allow for to Europe’s demographic future. fluctuations such as baby booms and busts that can produce bulges in the In numerical terms, the following age structure. assumptions are made about future trends. For fertility, we assume These problems can only be solved that by 2030 there is likely to be by turning to “fully probabilistic some recovery, with the total fertility projections” to cover the uncertainty. rate (TFR) increasing from the current 1.5 children per woman to Probabilistic population projections 1.7. The 80 percent uncertainty range are a rather recent methodological is half a child up and down from this development about which a large body median. In other words, we assume of literature has been written. The that in 80 percent of all simulated specific methodology applied in this cases in 2030, the TFR in the EU 15 paper has been extensively described will lie between 1.2 and 2.2. This elsewhere and cannot be described in range is kept constant until 2050. detail here. The model specifications For female life expectancy, which follow those of the 13 world regions currently stands at 81.5, we assume delineated by the authors and Warren that the 80 percent range will be C. Sanderson in 2001. 82.9-88.9 in 2030 and 84.9-94.9 in

1 The text of this chapter was completed in early 2005, using the most recent data available at that time. Population projections that incorporate the EU accession countries would follow a similar trajectory.

Future Demographic Change in Europe: The Contribution of Migration 211 2050. For male life expectancy, which For the coming decade, the range is presently is 75.5, the assumed 80 very narrow, while in 2050 the 95 percent ranges are 77.0-83.0 for 2030 percent range goes almost from 300 and 78.3-88.7 for 2050. Each uncer- million to 450 million inhabitants. In tainty distribution is modeled in the “regular” case (Figure 1a), the total terms of a normal distribution with population of the EU 15 is still likely tails of 10 percent of the cases above (in more than half of the simulations) and below the stated values. to increase somewhat until around 2020 and then start to decline. The For future migration into the EU 15, median of the projection shows a small the following assumptions were made. increase from the current 376 million In the “regular” case, the annual net to 385 million in 2025, followed by a migration gain for the EU was decline to 376 million in 2050 (see considered to lie between zero and one Table 1). In other words, even in the million in 80 percent of the cases for case of significant immigration (on the every year. This means that an average order of half a million per year) the annual migration gain of half a million population size in the EU 15 is likely was assumed. But the assumed uncer- to be smaller in 2050 than it is today. tainty distribution also implies that in 10 percent of the cases, Europe actually In the case of a hypothetically closed loses migrants and in another 10 population (the “no migration” case percent will gain more than one shown in Figure 1b), the median starts million. In the “no migration” case a to fall immediately. An initially closed population was assumed, i.e., the moderate decline will then gain EU is neither winning nor losing momentum over time and result in a people by migration. For each of the rather steep decline after 2030. In this cases 1,000 independent population case, the median would decline by projections by age and sex were around 10 million over the coming 25 performed drawing each year from years, but by more than 30 million the above-defined fertility, mortality, over the second quarter century. A and migration distributions with comparison of the two “trumpets” of stochastic annual fluctuations (which uncertainty in Figure 1 shows that the avoid traditional but unrealistic uncertainty range for the “regular” case assumptions of linear trends, instead is much broader than for the “no providing for more realistic annual ups migration” case because of the added and downs in rates). migration uncertainty, which makes a significant difference in the total Figures 1a and 1b show the resulting uncertainty. The comparison of the uncertainty distribution for the two graphs shows that in the case of future total population size of the “no migration” the uncertainty is 15 Member States of the EU. They essentially downwards, i.e., the open show that, as can be expected, the question would not be whether the uncertainty range expands over time. population declines, but by how much

212 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Figure 1a. Probabilistic projections for the total population size of the European Union (EU 15) taking migration into account and including fractiles of the resulting u ncertainty distributions

500 Fractiles

450 0.975

400 0.8 0.6 Median 350 0.4 0.2

Total Population (millions) Total 300 0.025

250

200 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Year

Figure 1b. Probabilistic projections for the total population size of the European Union (EU 15) assuming a closed population and including fractiles of the resulting uncertainty distributions

500 Fractiles

450

400 0.975

350 0.8 0.6 0.4 Median 0.2 Total Population (millions) Total 300 0.025

250

200 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Year

Future Demographic Change in Europe: The Contribution of Migration 213 Figure 2. Age pyramid of the population of the European Union (EU 15) in 2000

Age Period of Birth 105 1895 100 MALES FEMALES 1900 95 1905 90 1910 85 1915 80 1920 75 1925 70 1930 65 1935 60 1940 55 1945 50 1950 45 1955 40 1960 35 1965 30 1970 25 1975 20 1980 15 1985 10 1990 5 1995 0 2000 4 3 2 1 0 01234 Population (millions)

it declines, depending on future tions, with or without migration. Any fertility and mortality trends. meaningfully assumed level of immi- gration, even when combined with In 2050, the median of the “no high fertility and low gains in life migration” projection is 35 million expectancy, cannot stop a very lower than that of the “regular” significant increase in the proportion projection. This is on the order of 10 of the elderly. In terms of the medians, percent of the total population of the it would increase to 30.8 percent in EU 15. In other words, this shows that the “regular” case and to 32.5 percent over a 50-year horizon, migration gains in the “no migration” case by 2050 in the EU 15 are likely to make a (see Table 1). This difference looks difference of 10 percent in total relatively minor when compared to the population size. huge change from the current 16.3 percent. The difference is on the order But migration matters not only for of 10 percent of the expected increase. population size; the speed and the Ninety percent of the increase is degree of population aging are also already embedded in the current age sensitive to migration. Table 1 shows structure due to continued low fertility that the proportion of the population and increasing life expectancy. age 65 or above is almost certain to increase from its current level of 16.3 A look at the full age pyramids is percent under practically all condi- very illuminating. Figure 2 shows the

214 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Table 1. Total population and proportion above age 65 in the EU 15 (medians with 80 percent uncertainty ranges), “regular” and “no migration” cases

Year Total Population Proportion 65+ (in millions)

2000 376 0.163 2025 “regular” 385 0.226 (369-401) (0.214-0.238) “no migration” 367 0.235 (355-378) (0.222-0.246)

2050 “regular” 369 0.308 (325-418) (0.268-0.355) “no migration” 334 0.325 (300-372) (0.282-0.368)

current age pyramid of the EU 15. recover to the replacement level of two There the picture is clearly dominated surviving children. by the so-called “Baby Boom” generation, those large cohorts born Figure 3 gives probabilistic age during the 1960s. Never before and pyramids for the population of the never since have birth cohorts been that current EU 15 for the year 2050. large. The pyramid is narrow at the These pictures are still dominated by bottom as a consequence of the decline the “Baby Boom” generation, which in in birth rates since the 1970s. This age 2050 will be above age 80. The female structure has future population aging sides of the pyramids show that this and even shrinking pre-programmed. At cohort of women ages 80-85 is still the moment, the sizes of younger likely to be the biggest cohort alive. cohorts are still a bit inflated by the fact This is difficult to imagine today, but that the large “Baby Boom” cohorts especially in the “no migration case,” have just moved through their prime Figure 3b clearly shows that in 2050 reproductive ages, increasing the no other age group of women will be number of potential mothers. Over the as numerous as those ages 80-85. This coming years, the number of potential incredible pattern is somewhat less mothers in Europe will significantly pronounced for men because of their decline and therefore the number of lower life expectancy. By 2050 a higher births will go down, even in the proportion of male members of the unlikely case that fertility would fully “Baby Boom” generation will have died.

Future Demographic Change in Europe: The Contribution of Migration 215 Figures 3a and b also show how projections assume, for simplicity’s important fertility uncertainty is in the sake, that immigrants have the same longer run. Under the “regular” average birth rates as the general projections (Figure 3a), the 95 percent population. If it is assumed that uncertainty range for children aged 0 immigrants have on average more to 1 goes from less than one million children, the difference between children to about three million the two cases becomes even more children, i.e., it differs by a factor of pronounced. three. No other age group has such huge uncertainties. Uncertainty at the highest ages is also quite sizable due to Can Immigration the uncertainty about the future Compensate for Low increase in life expectancy. The range Fertility? is smallest for ages 50-70, which are the cohorts born between 1980 and The second part of this chapter 2000. These cohorts are only affected chooses another demographic by migration uncertainty, because they approach to studying the quantitative are already alive today (we know the contribution of migration. Without actual cohort size; there is no fertility considering the full uncertainty of uncertainty) and they have not yet future demographic trends, it focuses entered the high mortality ages in on this specific question: What are which mortality uncertainty matters the implications for Europe’s popula- greatly. This is also evident in the “no tion size and structure of alternative migration” case (Figure 3b). There, for future fertility levels combined with the cohorts born shortly before 2000, alternative levels of immigration? there is no uncertainty because in this What follows presents the results of projection there is zero migration and 28 scenarios that combine seven therefore no migration uncertainty. different fertility levels with four different migration levels for the Figures 3a and b, which provide a 15 Member States. comparison between the two age pyramids, also illustrate visually what Figures 4 and 5 present selected has been discussed about the contribu- findings from a large number of tion of migration to population size different simulations that were and aging above. In the “no migra- calculated at the level of the EU 15 tion,” case the pyramid is narrower at with a population of 376 million in the base because of fewer young 2000. Since the discussion of this people in Europe and smaller in total question mainly concerns the long-term area because of smaller total popula- impacts, the figures only show the tion size. The “regular” pyramid has a results for 2050. They are based on broader base because migrants tend to alternative population projections in come at a younger age and because which fertility and net migration are migrants also have children. These kept constant over time at the level indicated, while mortality — the third

216 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Figure 3a. Probabilistic population pyramids for the European Union (EU 15) for 2050, with the “regular” projection. The different shadings refer to the fractiles of the uncertainty distributions (see Figure 1)

Age Period of Birth 105 1945 100 MALES FEMALES 1950 95 1955 90 1960 85 1965 80 1970 75 1975 70 1980 65 1985 60 1990 55 1995 50 2000 45 2005 40 2010 35 2015 30 2020 25 2025 20 2030 15 2035 10 2040 5 2045 0 2050 4 3 2 1 0 01 234 Population (millions)

Figure 3b. Probabilistic population pyramids for the European Union (EU 15) for 2050, with the “no migration” case. The different shadings refer to the fractiles of the uncertainty distributions (see Figure 1)

Future Demographic Change in Europe: The Contribution of Migration 217 Figure 4. Total population of the European Union (EU 15) in 2050, according to alternative projections assuming a wide range of fertility and annual net migration levels. The level of 2000 is marked as a black line

500

400

300

200

100 Total population (in millions) Total

0 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 Total fertility rate

MIG=0 MIG=400,000 MIG=800,000 MIG=1,200,000 Year 2000

component of population change Over the past decade, however, — is improving slowly, as assumed in migration flows have shown strong the regular projections (the median of annual fluctuations and great differ- the above-discussed uncertainty ences between the 15 Member States. distribution). The figures group the The figures show the results for four projection results by the assumed TFR different levels of annual net migra- ranging from 1.0 to 2.2. For 1999, tion, ranging from zero (no migration Eurostat gives a TFR of 1.45 for the gains) at the low end to a constant EU 15, which covers a range from annual gain of 1.2 million, which over Spain (1.19), Italy (1.21), Greece the 50-year period would accumulate (1.30), and Austria (1.30), at the low to a 60 million immigration surplus. end, to Denmark (1.74), Finland (1.74), France (1.77), and Ireland Figure 4 presents the results with (1.89), at the high end, according to respect to the total population size of the European Commission in 2001. today’s EU 15. Not surprisingly, the The different bars under each fertility lowest population size in 2050 (271 assumption refer to different assumed million, or a 28 percent decline from levels of net migration gain. For 1999, today) results from the combination of Eurostat estimates a positive net a TFR of 1.0 with the assumption of migration rate of 1.9 (per 1,000 zero net migration gains. At the high population) for the EU 15, which in end, the combination of a TFR of 2.2 absolute terms implies a migration gain with a 1.2 million annual migration of 714,000 persons. gain results in a population size of 431

218 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Figure 5. Old-age dependency ratio for the European Union (EU 15) in 2050, according to alternative projections assuming a wide range of fertility and annual net migra- tion levels. The level of 2000 is marked as a black line

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3 e dependency ratio g 0.2

Old-a 0.1

0.0 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 Total fertility rate

MIG=0 MIG=400,000 MIG=800,000 MIG=1,200,000 Year 2000

million in 2050, which is an increase ratio is presently 0.24. Due to the of 15 percent as compared to today. inevitable changes that are mostly Of all the alternative scenarios pre-programmed in the current age included in the figure, the overwhelm- structure of the population, this ratio ing majority point to population is bound to increase significantly decline, but the impacts and the under all scenarios. Up to 2050, this differences among the scenarios are dependency ratio will increase by a not too dramatic considering that they factor of roughly two to three reflect change over half a century. This depending on the future fertility and shows that total population size is a migration levels assumed. It is rather inert variable, and even rather interesting to see that even massive extreme combinations of assumptions immigration to Europe makes little affect it very slowly. difference for the old-age dependency ratio. This difference is somewhat Figure 5 shows that the population more pronounced in the case of age structure is expected to change very low assumed fertility and less more rapidly and more profoundly pronounced for the higher fertility than population size. The graph plots scenarios. Even in the extreme case of the so-called old-age dependency 60 million young immigrants added to ratio, which is defined here as the the EU labor force, over the next five proportion of the population above decades the expected increase in the age 65 divided by the population ages old-age dependency ratio would be 15-64. At the level of the EU 15 this only slightly more moderate than

Future Demographic Change in Europe: The Contribution of Migration 219 under current migration rates and support ratio, i.e., the proportion of not even significantly different the population ages 15-64 over the from the other extreme case of no population 65 or older. For the migration gains. individual countries, the results show that significant immigration can result The above-described analysis shows in constant population sizes and even that there is a clear compensatory constant sizes of the working age relationship between fertility and population, whereas the support migration: A TFR of 1.0 combined ratio can only be maintained with with a migration gain of 1.2 million implausibly high immigration levels. per year yields the same old-age The absurd number of 5.1 billion dependency ratio in 2050 as a TFR immigrants necessary to maintain a of 2.2 and a migration gain of zero. constant support ratio until 2050 in There even is a fairly clear general the Republic of Korea has received a linear relationship that holds for both lot of attention in this context. For population size and the old-age the EU 15, these calculations show dependency ratio: One million that a total of 47.5 million migrants immigrants per year have the same (or 0.95 million per year) would be effect as a TFR difference of 1.0. required to keep the population size On a more realistic scale, the effect constant; 79.4 million (or 1.6 million of 100,000 additional immigrants per per year) would be needed to maintain year corresponds to that of an increase the working-age population; and an in the TFR of 0.1. impossible 674 million (13.5 million per year) would be needed to keep the support ratio constant. It was Discussion and interesting to see that in terms of Recommendations public reactions to these calculations, one could find opposing conclusions The question discussed in this chapter ranging from “immigration can has gained wide public prominence never solve the aging problem” to following the 2000 publication of a “immigration is urgently needed to United Nations (UN) study entitled solve the aging problem.” “Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Aging This UN study chose an approach Populations?” This study presents that works top down — or more several scenarios for a set of eight precisely, “back from the future.” countries as well as Europe and the A certain demographic target EU as aggregates. One scenario (such as keeping the working age computes and assumes the migration population constant) is set and then required to maintain the size of total one calculates what immigration population; another keeps the would be needed to achieve this goal, working-age population constant; assuming invariant paths of future and yet another maintains the current fertility and mortality. This chapter

220 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century does not set a target, but rather labor productivity through better, calculates the outcomes of possible continued education. Having said variations in the future paths of all this, it is difficult to imagine that a three demographic components: Europe entirely closed to migration fertility, mortality, and migration. would not suffer welfare losses. Since policy considerations typically are not based on a certain target in the 2) Of the three determinants of distant future that is difficult to population change, only fertility establish and defend substantively, but and migration can be subject to rather work in terms of processes influence by policies in order to evolving over time, the approach diminish the speed of aging (for presented in this chapter may be more mortality, only interventions that relevant for policy discussions about continue to bring down old-age migration in the context of an aging mortality are acceptable, although European population. they reinforce population aging). It is important to be clear that From the above analysis, two specific fertility and migration have a very policy recommendations can be drawn: different timing with respect to 1) It is not correct to speak of a their impacts on population “need of migrants for demographic dynamics. Migrants can be let reasons,” a phrase often heard in into the country at rather short policy circles. Demography and notice (provided that the exercises in population dynamics mechanisms are in place) at the of the kind presented in this time when a labor shortage is chapter are transparent and imminent. In contrast, policies objective calculations that do not aimed at increasing the birth rate prove or disprove any “need.” need more than two decades in Demography can show that with order to result in additional near certainty in Europe, the ratio educated members in the labor of people ages 20-30 to people age force. This crucial difference in above 60 will decline over the timing is often forgotten in the coming decades. Whether or not debates, but it makes a big this is seen as a serious problem difference when it comes to the depends on judgments about the planning of policies. consequences of such trends that have little to do with demography. And even if it is considered a problem, immigration is not the only solution; there are other possible counter-strategies, such as increased female labor force participation, increases in the age of retirement, or faster gains in

Future Demographic Change in Europe: The Contribution of Migration 221 References

Bongaarts, J. and F. Griffith. “On the quantum and United Nations Population Division. Replacement tempo of fertility.” Population and Development migration: Is it a solution to declining and Review 24, no. 2(1998): 271-291. aging populations? New York: United Nations Population Division. ESA/P/WP.160, 2000. Bucht, B. “Mortality trends in developing countries: A survey.” In The Future Population United Nations Population Division. World of the World: What Can We Assume Today? Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision. New Revised Edition, edited by W. Lutz. London: York: United Nations, 2003. Earthscan, 1996. Van de Kaa, D.J. “Europe’s second demographic Cliquet, R.L. The second demographic transition: Fact transition.” Population Bulletin 42, no.1 (1987): or fiction? Population Studies Series, no. 23. 1-59. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1991. Vaupel, J.W. and H. Lundström. “The future of European Commission. Demographic Report 1997: mortality at older ages in developed countries.” Employment and Social Affairs. Luxembourg: In The future population of the world: What can Office for Official Publications of the European we assume today? (Revised Edition), edited by Communities, 1998. W. Lutz. London: Earthscan, 1996.

European Commission. The Social Situation in the European Union 2001. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001.

Lutz, W. “The future of international migration.” In The Future of Europe’s Population. Population Studies Series, no. 26, edited by R. Cliquet. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press, 1993.

Lutz, W. and J. Goldstein, eds. “How to Deal with Uncertainty in Population Forecasting.” International Statistical Review 72 (2004): 1-4.

Lutz, W., B.C. O’Neill, and S. Scherbov. “Europe’s population at a turning point.” Science 299 (2003): 1991-1992.

Lutz, W., W.C. Sanderson, and S. Scherbov. “The end of world population growth.” Nature 412 (2001): 543-545.

Lutz, W., W.C. Sanderson, and S. Scherbov. “The end of world population growth.” In The End of World Population Growth in the 21st Century: New challenges for human capital formation and sustainable development, edited by W. Lutz and W.C. Sanderson. London: Earthscan, 2004.

Lutz, W., J.W. Vaupel, and D.A. Ahlburg, eds. Frontiers of population forecasting. Supplement to Population and Development Review 24 (1999).

222 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Selecting Economic Migrants

Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Kevin O’Neil Introduction and the possibility that migration may threaten the sustainability of European he demographic predicament welfare states. On the other hand, of most advanced industrial there is growing acknowledgement that T Europe needs the young workers that nations is by now clear enough. So is the fact that the market for the rest of the world has to offer and goods, many types of services, and, that the rhetoric of “zero immigration” indeed, workers of all skill levels now is impossible to put into practice. cuts across international borders. The role that immigration will play in This latter, new line of thought has led maintaining the economic vitality of many forward thinkers to conclude the developed countries through the that Europe would benefit from a demographic transition, globalization, proactive approach to immigration, in and other challenges, however, is which immigrants would be recruited anything but clear. specifically for the economic benefits they would bring. Such a strategy would The so-called “Traditional Countries raise the proportion of immigrants that of Immigration” (TCIs) — for the a country “chooses” for economic and purpose of this chapter, Australia, related reasons relative to those over Canada, New Zealand, and the whose admissions it has relatively little United States (US) — have long control (immigrants who are reunifying recruited immigrants for economic with family members, humanitarian reasons and are most explicitly open immigrants, and irregular migrants). to immigration. Even in these coun- This would have countries like France tries, the question of how many and (which admits only about 10 percent which immigrants to admit remains of its permanent immigrants each year very much open. Although immigra- for “economic” motives) adopt policies tion is clearly a part of these coun- more like those of countries such as tries’ economic futures, none has Canada (which selects around 23 achieved a perfect formula for manag- percent of its immigrants for economic ing it, and each is continually redefin- purposes, primarily by level of educa- ing and changing their policy. tion and other personal characteristics, and admits another 30 percent of its Europe is even more deeply ambiva- immigrants as the immediate family of lent about immigration. Although these immigrants). many European countries now rival and even exceed the TCIs in number This chapter discusses various strategies of immigrants per capita, European that have been developed for recruiting, countries in general have a less devel- selecting, and admitting economically oped framework for admitting economic active immigrants, and examines the immigrants. On one hand, there is advantages, pitfalls, and potential of great concern over the social and cul- each. It does not attempt to exhaus- tural change that immigration brings tively catalog the immigration policies

224 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century and outcomes of developed countries the importance of context in under- — an exercise which has been carried standing the outcomes of immigration out elsewhere. The strategies discussed policy. “Best practices” applied clumsi- here include ones that could be ly in different economic, social, and applied for temporary immigration historical settings may very well result programs, permanent settlement, or for in worst outcomes. In particular, a both, and although the mechanics of country’s labor market and social successfully administering a temporary welfare policies strongly influence the work program are too complex to be labor market experience of immigrants, adequately discussed here, the impor- and thus the outcome of immigration tant intersection between temporary policies. migration and the selection of perma- nent immigrants will be addressed. The second point is that while recruit- Many of the examples it uses are ment of “desired” economically active drawn from the TCIs, with the goal of immigrants may be a valued economic not only educating European audiences resource, and may enhance social about the state of the art in selecting stability and the public perception of immigrants, but also of provoking the overall experience with immigration, examination of how TCI immigration it cannot reduce or replace in any systems might be improved. substantial way the “other” migration streams. Canada, for example, has The chapter begins by proposing a set of achieved such a high percentage of principles that should inform the design selected immigrants primarily by of immigrant recruitment practices and expanding its entire immigration policies. It continues with a discussion program quite significantly. Family of the evolution of “economic” immi- reunification immigration makes labor gration into the developed countries immigration more stable, improves that actively welcome it on a significant integration outcomes, and, in most scale, including the changing balance countries, comes close to being a legal between permanent and temporary right for citizens and permanent settlers. migration programs. It then describes Humanitarian immigration is clearly the four major selection strategies used part of international law and is an to choose both temporary and perma- important element of most developed nent immigrants, and moves on to dis- countries’ foreign policy and chosen role cuss variants of these techniques and in the world. Additional opportunities other strategies that can facilitate the for legal immigration for economic selection of economic immigrants. reasons may discourage some “unwanted Finally, it will point out some emerging immigration” by providing an alterna- challenges and opportunities related to tive to unjustified asylum claims or the recruitment of immigrants. clandestine immigration and employ- ment, but this effect is likely to be limited, Three points should be emphasized at particularly if legal immigration is the outset of the discussion. The first is offered only to the educated and skilled.

Selecting Economic Migrants 225 The third point is that “economic” an important part of the migrant immigrants need not be highly skilled. “recruitment” process, much of this dis- It is true that the vast majority of the cussion will speak to the selection of TCIs’ permanent “economic” immi- skilled migrants. grants and the majority of their tem- porary migrants are required to have a college degree or equivalent skills or Thinking Harder About experience. Many argue that high- “Recruiting” Immigrants skilled migration alleviates income inequality, leads to better integration Recruiting immigrants today is largely outcomes and public acceptance of a matter of setting a framework for immigrants, and creates fewer burdens admitting immigrants: Depending on on the welfare system. In addition, the method, criteria, and type of only skilled migrants, by definition, admission chosen, the recruiting can relieve a “skills shortage.” process will be facilitated by outside allies, from employers and recruiting Without disputing these arguments, companies, to powerful networks of there remain legitimate reasons to co-nationals, to foreign governments, consider accepting immigrants of a to the initiative of migrants them- variety of skill levels. Most developed selves. However, an effective admis- nations, particularly European ones, sions policy should be regarded as a will have unskilled workforces that recruitment process, and should decline quickly in the coming years, address the following questions: while demand for low-skill, low-status services such as home health care, What economic and social goals is domestic duties, or food service will the immigration program intended likely remain robust and climb with to meet, and what are the criteria increasing prosperity and demographic for success derived from these goals? change. In addition, there are interna- tionally traded sectors, such as agricul- What personal characteristics ture or manufacturing, in which should admitted migrants have, wealthy countries will not be able to and how will these be assessed? compete without access to lesser-skilled workers. Such demands can be met What is the anticipated period without legally admitted low-skilled that the immigrant will be immigration beyond that of humanitari- allowed to stay and work, and an and family reunification immigrants, what happens at the end of that but this would involve its own costs, period? including the likely costs of accepting or combating illegal immigration. What balances will be struck However, because high-skilled migrants between the need of employers to are relatively scarce and choosing respond quickly and precisely to among skill sets and qualifications is economic demand by choosing

226 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century their employees and the need to truly discretionary basis are selected protect the labor-market interests according to such factors as an of resident workers and foreign employment offer and/or potential for workers from exploitation? employment, education, experience, age, and demonstrated business skills, How can the admissions process among others. Increasingly, the allow employers to gather infor- willingness to commit to move to a mation about the potential specific location for a minimum number migrant and give the prospective of years is gaining in importance migrant a chance to learn about in Canada and elsewhere. A signifi- the domestic labor market and cant, but usually smaller, group of acquire useful local knowledge immigrants are admitted to work in and skills prior to admission to a low-skill occupations — but almost given migration status? always on a temporary or seasonal basis, at least in theory. Finally, a very Will the strategy chosen and the small number of immigrants are administrative resources deployed admitted because they will invest to support it make the admission significant amounts of money in starting process timely enough to satisfy or expanding a domestic business. the program’s goals? This discussion will focus on the much larger stream of immigrants How will the number of migrants who are admitted primarily because admitted be controlled? of their human, not financial, capital. This “economic stream” of workers is How will admissions be distributed rounded out by a group whose admis- “efficiently” across different immi- sion is only partly discretionary: gration programs? intracompany transferees and other professional workers whose entry may In the case of sought-after highly be protected under World Trade skilled migrants, will the immigra- Organization (WTO), regional, tion “package” offered be enough and/or bilateral trade agreements. to attract them? There are two basic component A quick survey of the immigration pro- flows to economic migration: perma- grams of developing countries, particu- nent immigrant, or settlement, larly those of the TCIs, reveals volving, admissions that grant permanent and in many cases, converging practices. permission to live and work in the destination country; and temporary, Th e State o f th e A rt i n S e l ecti n g or “non-immigrant” (the US term of Economic Immigrants art) admissions that grant stays and Today, most better-educated and work permits of a determinate length skilled immigrants who are admitted to a foreigner, usually anywhere from to work in developing countries on a one to eight years.

Selecting Economic Migrants 227 Permanent visas for economic immi- significant presence in most immigra- grants are rather limited. The four tion systems. The various schemes for TCIs, for example, which have the agricultural and other seasonal work, as longest and strongest traditions of well as for caretaking, domestic servic- granting permanent residence up front, es, and a constellation of personal admit a total of roughly 400,000 people, (domestic) services recognize that reality. including principal applicants and their immediate family members, for While not all immigration countries permanent residence as part of eco- treat foreigners who ply their labor and nomic immigration streams each year. skills in the international migration system identically, most follow common On the other hand, temporary admis- mechanisms for the selection of perma- sions of foreigners who enter either nent immigrants. Similarities between explicitly in order to work or gain a the systems that countries use to match derivative right to do so (also referred the proper worker to the proper job to here as labor migration) have been grow further when temporary immigra- growing by leaps and bounds, particu- tion programs are examined. larly in the TCIs but also in Europe, which is reconsidering (opponents of Converging Practices in such openings will say “forgetting”) its Recruiting Immigrants experience with guestworker programs The increasing popularity of tempo- in the 1960s and early 1970s. The rary admissions across TCIs (and other United States has been most aggressive states) has been paced by a remarkable in this regard with its “H” class of visas convergence in admissions procedures. but the other three TCIs have joined There are various reasons for this the competition with considerable convergence. Among these is the reality vigor. Increasingly, temporary labor of multilateral agreements, such as migration has become the means — those relating to trade-in-services that the transmission belt, as it were — by are anchored on the principle of which ever-larger proportions of per- reciprocity, and demands among manent immigrants initially find their economic partners to codify reciprocal way legally into immigration countries access for each other’s nationals in the around the world. areas of business, trade, investment, or cultural exchanges. Regional reciprocal Most formal entries in the economic arrangements (e.g., the Trans-Tasman migration stream, whether permanent Travel Arrangement between or temporary, are skewed strongly Australia and New Zealand and towards better-educated and skilled for- the reciprocal rights to employment in eigners. Admissions for jobs requiring nearly seventy professional occupations few formal skills but that reward relevant established between the US, Canada, experience, however, continue to be and Mexico by the North American valued by receiving and sending coun- Free Trade Agreement — NAFTA) tries alike and are thus a constant and have also proliferated. Finally, certain

228 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century categories of temporary entry allow The TCIs offer permanent immigra- employment that is in some ways tion status up front to many of these “incidental” to the visa’s primary foreign workers, but the administratively purpose. Among those are student simpler route of entering on a temporary visas (under certain more or less visa and then applying for permanent restrictive circumstances), trainee or residence is gaining in prominence, cultural exchange visas, under which a making some temporary visas into visitor is allowed to work as part of the veritable “transition” visas. The most- training or exchange, or “holiday traveled routes in this transition-to- maker” visa holders who are allowed to permanence admission framework are work for a period of time during their high-skill temporary work and education stay in the host country. visas. The first route initially involves temporary work in information tech- However, there is another increasingly nology and communications, engineer- consequential reason for such conver- ing, the medical professions, or other gence in practices. With “globalization” high-skill sectors. The US’s high-skill having advanced to the point where H1-B visas may have provided the speaking of national firms may in largest opening of this type, but the many ways be anachronistic, at least other TCIs have been expanding their among the advanced economies, com- own such pathways. petitive pressures have put a premium on cutting-edge technical skills and The second temporary-to-permanent talent — wherever these may be found. route is through a country’s institu- With trade barriers falling — in large tions of higher education. In absolute part as a result of persistent efforts by numbers, the United States has been the TCIs and the European Union — again the leader in this form of entry and with technology, like capital, for decades. The other TCIs, however, recognizing neither borders nor nation- have also expanded their opening to ality, individual initiative and talent the student talent pool by removing are increasingly recognized as the most administrative barriers to hiring foreign valuable global resources. The TCIs students directly out of tertiary have long recognized this reality, education and converting them, in designing and redesigning their immi- due course, to permanent immigrants. gration systems to gain ready access to The greatest activism in this area, those who have the desired human however, may be coming from several capital attributes. Increasingly, this European countries, such as France, has led to competition among TCIs in Germany, and the United Kingdom what might be called a human capital (UK), which have always had robust accretion “sweepstakes,” a contest in foreign student populations. (On a which increasing numbers of European per capita basis, the foreign student countries are now eager to participate, populations in some of these countries with Germany, the United Kingdom, exceed that of the United States.) and France leading the way. These and other European destinations

Selecting Economic Migrants 229 are experiencing somewhat of a “wind- corporate entities for a specific job; fall” in foreign student applications as (2) admitting people who are qualified a result of the US preoccupation with in occupations that the government security screenings and the less decides are in short supply; and (3) welcoming attitude towards nationals selecting immigrants based on their from a large number of countries. overall levels of human capital. The permanent-to-temporary transition The expansion of the temporary and route discussed above constitutes a temporary-to-permanent immigration fourth major (and quickly expanding) stream is refueling two “old” discourses. selection strategy of sorts, although it The first one focuses on the receiving necessarily makes use of at least one of countries’ failure to adequately adapt the other three strategies. As a result, their own training and education the systems used by TCI countries that systems to the requirements of the select immigrants, both temporary and so-called new economy sufficiently and permanent, form a continuum of sorts. effectively enough to meet employment needs from within their own labor At one TCI end is the United States, pool. The second dwells on the effect which emphasizes immediate economic (and propriety) of deeper and more needs and allows employers to choose systematic “takings” by the TCIs (and, virtually all economic migrants directly. increasingly, by other advanced indus- At the other end lies Canada, which trial societies) from the human capital admits almost all of its permanent pool of the developing world. Neither economic immigrants through a “points issue falls within the scope of this system” that selects immigrants on the discussion, but both raise enormously basis of a mix of skills, experience, important questions. education, age, and other characteristics that presumably maximize the proba- Admitting Immigrants: bility of both immediate and long-term Competing Selection labor market and economic success. Mechanisms New Zealand and Australia, which admit most of their economic immi- All developed countries, and/or their grants under similar points systems but corporate citizens, choose the foreign also have a small number of permanent workers they are interested in admit- and temporary employment-based ting permanently on the presumption admissions, lie in between on the that such admissions serve national continuum. In the United States, economic interests. But each country Australia, and New Zealand, a small emphasizes different facets of that number of immigrants receive prefer- interest by using different selection ence in admission in order to fill specific strategies. In effect, most countries use labor needs identified by the govern- different combinations of three general ment. Occupations identified include strategies: (1) admitting workers who medical doctors who will work in under- have been hired by duly registered served areas (in the United States),

230 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century and medical and information technology modified a French practice of about professionals (in New Zealand and 30 years ago and allows employers Australia). who have found an unauthorized foreign worker to go to the Ministry The principal agent in each selection of Welfare and register him or her. scheme varies accordingly. In the United States, the principal agent is Employment-based Selection almost always the employer, both for The primary focus of US economic the permanent and the temporary immigration is on rectifying labor employment-based systems. In the market shortages and mismatches — other three countries, the principal with an increasingly pronounced agent for the permanent immigration tendency towards simplifying the labor system is the public servant, with the market tests it requires. Specifically, employer playing only a minor role. In the US law has since 1990 established all TCIs, employers play a principal a maximum “quota” of 140,000 role in the fast-expanding temporary “permanent” visas for employment- worker admissions system. In Australia based immigration (Table 7). More and New Zealand, nongovernmental than 90 percent of such visas target organizations that assess occupations well-educated and skilled immigrants also play a key role in verifying the and their immediate families. Australia skills of potential immigrants. maintains a database to match employers and skilled migrants and admits about Most of Europe also falls in between 21 percent of its economic permanent on this continuum. The UK may be migrants through employment-based most advanced in its participation in admissions. A number of New Zealand’s the selection sweepstakes. For example, new “work-to-residence” visas are pred- the UK uses simultaneously a points icated on an offer of employment from system, an employment-based system, a government-approved employer and sector-driven admissions (the when the visa is issued and later when latter two primarily for temporary the immigrant applies for permanent immigration). The United Kingdom’s status. These entries also bypass the most important innovation, however, points system. Canada makes no may be an administrative technique permanent admissions based primarily through which “pre-cleared” employers on employment but, like Australia (presumably those with good records of and New Zealand, gives applicants “playing by the rules”) can gain access with an employment offer an advan- to a needed foreign employee within tage in entry under the points system a week or less. (discussed below).

The UK, however, is not the only Allowing employers to select immi- hotbed of experimentation in the grants has several advantages. It makes employment of temporary foreign immigration directly sensitive to labor workers. Italy, for instance, has needs, puts the admission decision into

Selecting Economic Migrants 231 the hands of those best able to assess needed and that migrant workers and the immigrant’s immediate labor their already-resident colleagues are market prospects, reduces bureaucracy not affected adversely by the immigra- and cost, and ensures that immigrants tion process. Most use caps or quotas have jobs when they arrive. Tying to restrict the number of employment- immigrants to a job, and requiring that based admissions permitted in a given they notify the immigration service year. They may also restrict the ability when they change jobs (if this is of the employers of migrants to sub- permitted), also facilitates monitoring contract their services to other entities. of working and pay conditions by the In most cases, countries restrict employ- government. In addition, tying admis- ment-based admissions to certain types sion of an immigrant to a specific job of occupations, educational levels, or that “cannot be filled with a native sectors. In the United States, for worker” is thought to bolster political example, almost all permanent support for labor immigration. The employment-based admissions and temporary labor immigration programs, most temporary work visas are for both high-skill and low-skill, in immigrants who have a college educa- all of the TCIs and in most European tion or better. The United States also countries continue to use the employ- admits between 5,000 and 10,000 ment-based selection approach. permanent immigrants and a much larger number of temporary migrants However, placing so much of the to fill low-skill positions, but virtually recruitment process into the hands of all of these admissions are restricted employers runs the risk that employers either by sector (the agricultural sector) may use immigrants to undercut more or by type of work (the work involved expensive domestic workers, or that must be seasonal, temporary, or meet immigrants may be exploited with the demands of “peak load”) and are inferior wages or working conditions. often subject to an annual cap. When immigrants are granted perma- nent work and residency rights, this Regulating Employment-based risk decreases dramatically because Admissions they are free to change jobs, but it can Case-by-case certifications be quite substantial in the case of tem- (pre-entry control) porary admissions, where immigrants One method of selecting foreign may have to leave the country if they workers is to test each application lose their job. Making work permits against the available pool of eligible “portable” to other jobs with as few domestic workers interested in the job restrictions as possible is one way of opening. This process is called “labor reducing this risk. certification” in the United States, “job validation” in Canada, and “labor As a result of these concerns, devel- market testing” in Australia and else- oped countries use a menu of controls where. It requires the petitioner to ensure that admitted workers are (typically the prospective employer)

232 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century to demonstrate two things to the case-by-case approach can seriously government’s satisfaction: first, that undermine the economic benefits no eligible workers are available for gained by labor migration. On the the job in question; and second, that other hand, a test to see if resident the employment of the foreign national workers are willing to take the job is will not depress the wages and working somewhat spurious if wages and working conditions of other workers in similar conditions are not improved to attract jobs. This approach is still the dominant them. Thus, this “test” has the poten- process for admitting economic immi- tial to serve neither employers nor grants (chiefly temporary ones) in workers well. continental European states. In Member States of the European Union Britain, when it revised its temporary (EU) and European Economic Area work-permit program in 2000, largely (EEA) these requirements are some- retained the case-by-case admissions time taken to another level, as model, but streamlined the process by employers may be required not only creating a two-tier system. For top-tier to demonstrate that they were unable applicants — including intracompany to find nationally resident workers, but transferees, board-level managers, and were also unable to attract workers workers whose occupational skills are from other EU/EEA states. determined by the government to be greatly needed — the requirement These requirements have proved that the employer search for resident extremely vexing both on methodolog- workers is waived. In that regard, ical and administrative grounds. As a entries in this tier emulate the United result, one notices a slowly emerging States’ H-1B system. Second-tier consensus that the value and efficacy applicants, like first-tier applicants, of processes that rely on case-by-case are not subject to a numerical cap, assessments for choosing labor-market- but their employers are required to bound immigrants are increasingly at show proof that they have searched odds with today’s globally competitive for qualified British residents and EEA realities. More specifically, firms today nationals to fill the position. often choose workers (domestic or foreign) because small differences in Multi-case attestations attributes (both in the quality and in An alternative, pioneered in the US, the specificity of skills) can lead to to approving an immigrant’s employ- substantial differences in the firm’s ment eligibility on a case-by-case basis ability to compete, and being obliged prior to his or her admission is granting to hire a resident candidate who is the employer access to certain types of “sufficiently” or “equally” qualified in foreign workers on the basis of an the government’s eyes may leave firms “attestation.” Attestations are legally at a significant competitive disadvan- binding employer declarations about tage. Additionally, the bureaucratic the terms and conditions under which burden and delay imposed by the a foreign worker will be engaged, and

Selecting Economic Migrants 233 are used for both high- and low-skill and that both worker representa- temporary work visas. Attestations are tives and management have designed to reduce up-front barriers and opportunities to influence. delays to the entry of certain foreign workers while still protecting the wages Whether attestations are accomplishing and other labor-market interests of these policy goals or not is the subject domestic workers, so compliance is of much dispute, and attestations have safeguarded through post-entry auditing received strong criticism for failing to and enforcement of the employer sufficiently protect both domestic and declarations. Attestations (or, more foreign workers. Strengthening formally, “labor conditions applica- oversight of working conditions and tions,” LCAs), focus on four major compensation after workers’ employ- policy objectives: ment begins is one way of addressing First, safeguarding basic interests these concerns. Australia, for example, of domestic workers in terms of monitors employers who sponsor wages and working conditions employees for temporary visas to ensure while offering employers willing compliance with the employment to play by pre-agreed rules timely contract. Sponsors must show that they and predictable access to needed are paying the proper wages, taxes, and foreign workers; pensions, and fulfilling any other Second, meeting a “public obligations agreed to, such as imple- process” test by giving potentially menting training programs for local affected parties (such as other workers. Site visits are used to confirm workers in a firm or their represen- information the employer provides. In tatives) an opportunity to know the event of a violation, the temporary about and challenge the matters to visas in question can be cancelled and which an employer attests; the employer may be declared ineligible Third, responding most directly to for future sponsorship. changing conditions in labor mar- kets (by allowing employers the New Zealand uses a slightly different freedom to choose and gain swift sort of control on a, thus far, extremely access to foreign workers they need) small scale. In the “work-to-residence” while requiring the least amount of program, employers are accredited hands-on engagement by the gov- annually by the government on the ernment in areas such as employ- basis of good labor relations, sound ment demand data and labor finances, and a history of employing market testing procedures, where and training native workers. Once it has proved to be weakest; and accredited, employers can bring in Finally, inducing more coopera- workers on 30-month visas without tive labor-management relations any labor market tests and with mini- by streamlining access to foreign mal paperwork and delay. At the end workers under working terms and of two years, these workers can apply conditions that are transparent for permanent residence.

234 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Labor Market “Waivers” professionals. France does so by granti- In a second general strategy for selecting ng streamlined permanent residence immigrants, the government identifies permission to foreign students who labor market segments that are graduate from a French university experiencing supply shortages or need with an IT degree. The United strengthening with well-prepared Kingdom, Canada, and several foreigners and grants preference to other Organisation for Economic applicants qualified in those occupa- Cooperation and Development tions or intending to work in those (OECD) countries now facilitate sectors. These candidates may be employer access to foreign students, admitted outright, granted streamlined and under the still-pending German processing, granted additional credit immigration law, Germany would too. in a “points system,” or exempted from Australia keeps a list of occupations bureaucratic obstacles such as the that receive preferential treatment requirement that employers search for when being assessed in their general resident workers. Labor-market waivers economic immigration category. of this sort often consider a variety of indicators such as vacancy rates, wage Under the UK’s work-permit system, growth, forecasted demand, the unem- the requirement for a labor market test ployment rate, and the time needed to is waived if the industry in question train new workers. is on the “shortage occupation list.” Applications from industries on this The process is neither as methodologi- list receive highest priority in process- cally robust as it appears at first nor ing. The shortage occupation list is simple. In practice, governments are set periodically with the consultation most likely to respond to lobbying by of “sector panels” including major employers and tend to use the simplest companies, employers’ representatives, of “tests”: When employers cannot trade unions, government agencies, find employees at the current market and other relevant actors. In recent wage, a shortage is deemed to exist and years, the sector panels have incorpo- the inflow valve is adjusted accordingly. rated industries such as finance, In some cases, labor unions and other engineering, healthcare, catering, stakeholders may also be part of the and teaching. process of “authenticating” that a shortage exists. At the lower end of the skill spectrum, the UK targets sectors with labor New Zealand, and, to a lesser extent, shortages through its Sector Based the United States, identify specific Scheme (SBS), introduced in May supply shortages and streamline visa 2003 to specifically deal with labor applications in those occupations. shortages in the food, manufacturing, Other countries have given explicit and hospitality sectors. While the priority to the entry of information process for obtaining the permit is technology (IT) and communications similar to that of the regular work

Selecting Economic Migrants 235 permit scheme, with employers filing indicators as the number of years of applications on behalf of the workers, schooling, training, or experience, rel- the skill requirements are substantially evant language ability, and degrees or lower, and the eligible applicant age is certifications when they can be prop- limited to 18 to 30 (Rollason, 2004). erly assessed.

The sectors included in this scheme Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were agreed upon by representatives rely most heavily on this method. In of key societal interests. These included each of these countries, a points system Jobcentre Plus (the government is used to select a large proportion of employment agency), workers’ immigrants; the new German legisla- representatives through the Trade tion also follows suit. In all three Union Councils, and employers’ repre- systems, education and experience in sentatives through the Confederation any skilled field are relied upon as the of British Industry. Employers must primary criteria used in rating applicants. still fulfill a labor-market test by In one selection category, the United advertising the position in question States also makes use of a variant of through Jobcentre Plus and the the talent accrual approach. Persons of European Job Mobility Portal (the “extraordinary ability” can be admitted European Commission’s job-posting simply by demonstrating the high website). Each work permit is for a quality of their credentials and pro- 12-month duration, with renewal only fessional accomplishments, although available if the applicant leaves the these are a small proportion of UK for at least two months. The work permanent admissions. permit can also be carried by the holder to another position, as long as the new The points tests job is similar (Rollason, 2004). Because the employer plays a less pivotal role in the process of choosing Talent Accrual: Choosing the immigrants in a talent accrual strategy, Best and the Brightest and because the immigrant is not This strategy looks at the immigrant’s necessarily destined for a specific job, skills independently of the context of a these systems rely little on labor market specific job offer or specific occupation. tests per se. In the points test system, It recognizes that many highly skilled only those foreign workers whose immigrants will change jobs often and quantifiable personal attributes add may even change occupations. The up to a pre-agreed “pass-mark” are characteristics that make immigrants allowed to immigrate and/or settle. immediately employable may not Among the characteristics currently necessarily be those that lead to long- receiving the highest point totals term employment success or optimal across all three countries are education integration outcomes. Thus, the talent and specific training; work experience, accrual approach aims to admit the especially in occupations in demand; “best and brightest” as defined by such age; and language skills — generally in

236 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century that order. Offers of employment gen- criteria both with the family reunifica- erally play a small and diminishing tion stream and with employment- role (Table 1). based admissions — acknowledging the social and labor market value of Other factors that promote integration these additional immigrant selection or employability, such as sponsorship systems. Business skills and the by a family member or experience willingness to invest substantial sums working or studying in the country of in economic enterprises in the country destination, are also included. In this of destination are also rewarded way, there is significant “overlap” of throughout the TCIs and elsewhere,

Table 1. Point Systems in Comparison: Relative Weights of Selection Factors, as percentage of total possible score.

Factor New Zealand New Zealand Australia Canada UK (HSMP) (old) (new) Education/Training 24 28 34 25 14 Work experience (Relevant to occupation/Nonrelevant) 20/20 22/0 6/3 21/21 23/23 Age 20 12 17 10 2* Family resident in destination country 6 0 9 5 0 English and French (Canada only) language skills (beyond minimum required for eligibility) 0 0 14 24 0 Job offer (Relevant to training or experience/Non-relevant) 16/4 24/0 4/4 10/10 0/0 High-priority or high-demand occupation/skill set/location 0 12 9 0 23 Prior work or study in destination country 8 38 11 5 0 Qualified/Skilled spouse or partner 4 8 3 10 5 Prior income 0 0 0 0 23 Other factors 4 0 6 0 11 Pass mark, as percentage of points possible, March 2004 (except old New Zealand system, June 2003) 59 74 63 67 30

Note: Totals may exceed 100 percent because some points are awarded on the basis of multiple factors. The compar- isons of pass marks are not intended to assess the relative “difficulty” of qualifying under the various systems, but can be used as an indicator of the flexibility of each system. Source: Authors’ calculations from tables 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. *Applicants under 28 are assesed by less rigorous criteria in other areas. Thus, this figure understates the advantage given to the young under this points system.

Selecting Economic Migrants 237 sometimes within the points system systems are less politically “visible” (in Australia and in the UK, which (and hence “targetable”) than the has its own points system for entrepre- government certifying that no neurs, separate from the one it uses to domestic workers are available to select skilled workers), and at other do a specific job time and again or times independently of it (the United that a specific sector can continue States, Canada, and, presumably, to absorb large numbers of foreign Germany). professionals without affecting the opportunities of domestic Generally, supporters perceive several professionals. advantages to points selection systems over other selection mechanisms: Third, a point system can adopt new characteristics, discard obso- First, they are thought to inspire lete ones, and “tweak” the process confidence because they seem to by changing categories’ relative apply universal, and ostensibly weights and/or the overall pass hard (i.e., quantitative data-based), mark. This is thought to be selection criteria to economic- administratively valuable in that stream immigrants. Hence, they regulators can respond quickly to are less susceptible to the criticisms shifting economic priorities and/or associated with the case-by-case perceptions of what is “good” for system’s “gamesmanship” between the receiving economy and society. employers and bureaucrats. In addition, because the points system assesses people according to Second, depending on the attrib- a variety of criteria, it can easily utes a point system emphasizes, it is make immigrant admissions serve thought to reassure key segments of several national goals (economic, the receiving society that econom- demographic, and social) within a ic-stream immigrants are selected single selection system. on the basis of criteria that place the highest priority on the receiving Finally, properly conceived and state’s economic interests. In an implemented, and accompanied by increasingly competitive world, this opportunities for firms to select key line of reasoning goes, choosing workers on their own, a points highly skilled immigrants makes system is thought to reinforce the economic immigration politically government’s ability to manage more defensible than the alterna- the system by allowing it to adapt tives discussed earlier. This primarily admissions to general occupational is due to two reasons: first, because trends and the broad needs of of the obvious potential for wider the economy. economic multipliers, measured in “downstream” economic and labor The points system approach, thus far, market gains; second, because point has been used exclusively to admit

238 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century highly skilled immigrants. However, This dual-stage selection can allow the general principle — that of “earn- the government — or employers — ing” admission through personal char- to select immigrants based on acteristics and behavior — could be observed performance. In addition, used with other criteria and for lesser- the experience of working or studying skilled immigrants. While it might be in the host country often better equips difficult to make the points framework temporarily resident foreigners for practical for the purpose of admitting work there and allows them to decide lesser-qualified immigrants for the first if they would like to make it their time, it could be used for the purpose permanent home. New Zealand’s most of granting permanent settlement recent version of its points system, rights to temporary workers or for introduced in 2003, makes qualifica- regularizing unauthorized immigrants. tions and experience gained in New For example, one approach to “earned Zealand a major factor in selection, regularization” of the United States’ clearly and directly rewarding those unauthorized immigrant population currently employed in New Zealand proposed by the authors would give (Tables 2 and 3). immigrants the chance to earn points (or “credits”) for such characteristics This strategy also reflects two basic as steady employment and tax-paying, realities of temporary work and study having legally resident family members, programs: first, that many temporary English-language ability, and evidence immigrants want to become long-term of social integration. residents and will find a way to do so; and secondly, that temporary workers “Filtration” Systems (particularly skilled workers) generally The fourth major strategy admits become more valuable to their employ- immigrants “temporarily” for work — ers (and the broader economy) with usually but not exclusively to fill a spe- time, and may be occupying jobs that cific, high-skill vacancy — or as uni- are, in fact, permanent. The recruitment versity students and later gives them of immigrants through university the chance to become permanent systems is discussed more directly later residents. This method selects immi- in the paper. Here, the focus is on the grants at two points: first, when the transition from temporary work permits individual is admitted on a temporary to permanent residence. visa, and again, when the temporary immigrant is considered for permanent The United States has long led the residence. Thus, it is possible to use way with this method. In 2002, for one set of selection criteria (drawn instance, 134,918 permanent from the strategies above) for the first immigrants admitted through employ- selection and another set for the second. ment-based preferences — about 77 percent of all permanent employment admissions — adjusted from some type of temporary visa.

Selecting Economic Migrants 239 Table 2. “New" New Zealand Point System — 2004

New Zealand Point system as modified in 2004 (introduced in 1991). Applicants must score 100 points to enter the “pool.” Every month, applicants from the pool are selected to meet admissions target. In March of 2004, the applicants scoring over 185 were accepted. Accepted applicants’ applications are then examined and verified. Applicants without skilled work or education experience in New Zealand or a job offer are normally issued temporary residence permission, convertible to permanent, while others generally receive permanent resi- dency up front. 1. Qualifications (Maximum: 70) Points Recognized Basic Qualification: Qualifications and diplomas in certain trades, Bachelor’s degree 50 Master’s degree or higher 55 Bonus points for: Qualification from study in New Zealand 10 Qualification in prioritized fields (identified future growth area, identified cluster or area of absolute skills shortage) 5 2. Skilled Work Experience1 (Maximum: 55) 2 years 10 4 years 15 6 years 20 8 years 25 10 years 30 Bonus points if work experience is in New Zealand: 2 years 5 4 years 10 8 years 15 Bonus points if work experience is in prioritized fields: 2 to 5 years 5 6 years or more 10 3. Skilled Employment (Maximum: 60) Current employment in New Zealand, of more than 12 months duration 60 Offer of employment or current employment in New Zealand of less than 12 months duration 50 Bonus points if employment offer is: Outside of Auckland 10 In a prioritized field 5 4. Age (minimum age 20, maximum age 55) (Maximum: 30) 20-29 years 30 30-39 years 25 40-44 years 20 45-49 years 10 50-55 years 5 5. Partner (Points scored only if partner has English proficiency) (Maximum: 20) Partner has basic qualification 10 Partner has job offer in skilled occupation 10 Total Points Possible 250

1. Work experience only counts if it is relevant to the applicant’s qualification or current or offered skilled employment in New Zealand, or allowed the applicant to gain specific specialist, technical, or management expertise. If the appli- cant is not currently working in New Zealand and does not have a job offer, experience only counts if the applicant was working in a list of countries (primarily upper- and upper-middle income countries) or nationals of these coun- tries who were employed by a multinational corporation. Sources: New Zealand Embassy in Washington DC, 2002 (public information announcements); New Zealand Immigration Service world wide web pages http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migration/general.html.

240 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Table 3. “Old" New Zealand Point System — through 2003

New Zealand Point system, first introduced in 1991. Applicants must score 29 points to be granted a visa (as of June 11, 2003). 1. Qualifications (Maximum: 14) Points Base Qualification: A degree, diploma, or trade certificate of minimum 3 years training, study, or work experience. 10 Advanced Qualification: Bachelor’s degree or equivalent. 11 Master’s degree or higher 12 New Zealand Qualification (bonus points if qualification is from study in New Zealand) 2 2. Work Experience (Maximum: 10) 2 years 1 10 years 5 20 years 10 3. Employment (Maximum: 8) Offer of employment (relevant to qualifications and experience) 5-8* 4. Age (maximum age: 55 years for General Skills, 84 for investors) (Maximum: 10) 18-24 years 8 25-29 years 10 29-49 years, score reduces with age. 8-2 5. Settlement Factors (Maximum: 7) Settlement Funds $100,000 1 $200,000 2 Partner’s Qualifications Base Qualification 1 Advanced Qualification 2 New Zealand Work Experience 1 year 1 2 years 2 Family Sponsorship 3 Non-relevant offer of employment 2 Total Points Possible 49*

* Score depends on current passmark. Sources: New Zealand Embassy in Washington DC, 2002 (public information announcements); New Zealand Immigration Service world wide web pages http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migration/general.html.

Selecting Economic Migrants 241 Table 4. Australian Points Test-2004

Australia Points test, first introduced in 1989. Applicants must score at least 115 points to be granted a visa, 110 if sponsored by family1. (As of March 20, 2003) Factors considered 1. Skill Training specific to the occupation2 60 General occupations 50 Other general skilled occupations 40 2. Age (at time of application) 18 to 29 years 30 30 to 34 years 25 35 to 39 years 20 40 to 44 years 15 3. English Language Ability Vocational (reasonable command of English) 15 Competent 20 4. Specific Work Experience Applicants with 60 points for nominated occupation3 and 3 years of work (in the 4 years immediately prior to application) in the nominated occupation or a closely related occupation receive full points. 10 Applicants with 40 to 60 points under skill and experience working in any occupation (despite relevance to the nominated occupation) on the Skilled Occupations List for at least 3 of the 4 years before application. 5 5. Occupation in Demand4/ Job Offer Occupation in demand, but no job offer 10 Occupation in demand, with job offer 15 6. Australian Qualifications Australian qualification: Study for at least 12 months full-time in Australia toward the receipt of an Australian post-secondary degree (or higher qualification), diploma, advanced diploma, or trade qualification. 5 Australian Master’s or upper second class Honours (or higher) Bachelor’s degree. 10 Australian PhD, minimum of 2 years study in Australia. 15 7. Spouse Skills Points are awarded if the applicant’s spouse is also able to satisfy the basic requirements of age, English language ability, qualifications, nominated occupation, and recent work experience and if s/he obtains a skill assessment. 5 8. Bonus Points (for any one of the following) Capital investment (minimum AU$100,000) in Australia 5 Australian work experience: At least 6 months of work experience in one of the occupations on the Skilled Occupations List immediately prior to application. 5 Fluency in one of Australia’s Community Languages (other than English) 5 9. Points for Relationship (applicants with relatives in Australia only) Points are awarded if the applicant or the applicant’s spouse is sponsored by a relative who is an Australian citizen or permanent resident. 15 Total Points Possible5 165

1 Applicants must gain sufficient points to reach the pass mark. Applications scoring below the pass mark, but above another mark, the “pool mark,” are held in reserve for up to two years. If within that time the pass mark is lowered and the reserved score is above the new mark, the application is processed further. As of 2002, the pool mark for the skilled-Australian sponsored category was 105 and was 70 for the skilled-independent category. All other pool marks are currently equal to the pass mark of 110 or 115. Note that applicants who are sponsored by family receive a cumula- tive advantage of 20 points (extra points plus a lower pass mark). 2 The occupation nominated must be on the Skilled Occupations List published by DIMIA. 3 See footnote 2. 4 Published as the Migration Occupations Demand List. 5 In practice, the maximum score is 150. Applicants scoring 150 points do not need to be sponsored by an Australian.

242Source: AustralianEurope and Department Its Immigrants of Immigration in andthe Multicultural 21st Century and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) world wide web pages (http://www.immi.gov.au/allforms/skill_general.htm); Philip Ruddock MP world wide web pages (http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/). For another glimpse of the importance advantage of being more administra- of this de facto transition system for the tively simple — the temporary visa United States, 102,316 of all perma- requires the employer to file an attes- nent immigrants (including those tation, while permanent sponsorship reunifying with family) adjusted from typically requires a case-by-case deter- temporary work visas. (All US figures mination of a vacancy. Thus, although include the principal visa-holders as the up-front adjudication cost of an H- well as dependents.) 1B visa is higher (with a $1,000 fee levied on top of processing costs) than The United States’ H1-B visa category for permanent employment immigra- has been perhaps the most important tion, lower legal fees and speedier pro- (although not the only) route for cessing make it an attractive alternative. temporary-to-permanent immigrant transitions. The H1-B visa allows highly H-1B admissions are subject to a skilled (college educated or better) pro- numerical cap set by Congress, but cer- fessionals from any country to receive a tain categories of employers, including three-year (extendable to six) work and government research facilities, univer- residency permit. Large proportions of sities, and nonprofit research institu- H-1B workers adjust to permanent tions are exempt from the cap, as are employment-based and other statuses, a applicants applying for extensions of process that the US Congress has facili- existing H-1B visas. As a result, H-1B tated further recently. H-1B workers are admissions have not always reached not required to demonstrate that they their designated cap, and many types intend to return home and are allowed of admissions occur even after the cap to bring family members. The latter are has been reached. not given permission to accept deriva- tive employment but can be employed if This route to permanent residence can they get their own H-1B visas. be cast both in a good and a bad light. For those more skeptical about or who The qualifications required of H-1B oppose temporary immigration in gen- workers correspond quite closely with eral, using temporary work permits as a those expected of most permanent holding pen for those desiring perma- “employment-based” immigrant cate- nent residence gives employers even gories, making the H-1B a natural fun- more power over would-be immigrants. nel into permanent immigration. As of This perspective thus views temporary 2000, the H1-B program grants visa work programs as poor alternatives to holders a (theoretically) unlimited streamlined and expanded opportunities number of one-year extensions beyond for employer-sponsored permanent the normal six-year stay if the foreign immigration. In addition, the multiple worker has a pending application for applications and adjudications required permanent residence or other status. in this transition visa are a significant From the perspective of both applicant bureaucratic burden. On the other and employer, the H-1B has the hand, the “filtering” effect of the

Selecting Economic Migrants 243 temporary-to-permanent transition Britain’s Highly Skilled Migrant may be a particularly efficient way to Programme, started in 2002, grants all of “ration” permanent immigration slots. the highly skilled migrants admitted through the program’s point system a To a significant degree, this “filter one-year initial stay (Table 5). The and transition” approach to choosing program allows migrants to extend their permanent economic stream immi- stay for an additional three years, after grants has been adopted by other which the migrant may apply for perma- immigration systems. In Australia, nent settlement rights. It is too early to New Zealand, and Canada, which, tell at what rate migrants will seek unlike the United States and most permanent settlement in the program, European countries, select the bulk and at what rate they will be accepted. of their immigrants based on the (At this time, the criteria for receiving applicant’s general skills and educa- settlement permission through the tion, domestic work experience or program appear rather undemanding.) education while on a temporary visa earn an applicant extra points. So does a job offer. In these ways, applicants Other Immigrant are able to “work their way into” Recruitment Tools permanent immigration. Bilateral Cooperation For a period, New Zealand took In the strategies outlined above, the this system one better by granting a government plays a relatively passive one-year temporary visa to marginal role in the recruitment process, serving applicants who, if they could secure a primarily as a gatekeeper. However, job offer, would qualify as permanent government or quasi-governmental immigrants — in effect, creating a “job entities can play a more activist role, searcher’s visa.” Under that country’s particularly when the personal charac- current point system, a variant of this teristics of the desired migrants are not provision remains available to applicants greatly differentiated (i.e., for low-skill who score above the pass mark but are jobs) and where private recruitment judged to have not demonstrated mechanisms have led to problems of sufficient employment prospects. abuse. This type of approach can be These individuals are thus issued tem- even more effective when it is admin- porary residence permission, with the istered bilaterally, as has been done by possibility of a transition to permanent a number of European countries. (This status. New Zealand also has a “work approach is rarely used by the TCIs.) to residence” visa that allows migrants employed by government-approved In the immigrant-sending country, the employers, in high-need occupations, government (or its designated agent) or with exceptional talents to enter on can verify the bona fides of potential a 30-month visa and apply for perma- workers and give all relevant informa- nent residency after 24 months. tion that “qualifies” them for work

244 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Table 5. UK Point System

The United Kingdom’s “Highly Skilled Migrant Program”: Applicants who score a sufficient number of points must also demonstrate that they are likely to find employment in their field of expertise in the UK and attest that they will make the UK their primary residence. Additionally, graduates of designated MBA programs are automatically allowed to work in the UK under the HSMP scheme. The program grants residency for one year, which can be extend- ed to four years provided the candidate is economically active. After four years, applicants who have met residency requirements may apply for permanent settlement rights. Applicants must score at least sixty-five points to be admitted (as of April 2005). Factors Considered: Education (30 points maximum) Bachelor’s Degree (e.g., BA, BSc) 15 “Exceptional” Achievement — The candidate will have “be at the top of their profession, be recognized beyond their field of expertise, and have obtained international recognition.” 25 PhD 30 Employment experience (50 points maximum) Under 28 years old Over 28 years old 2 years graduate level 5 years graduate level or PhD and 3 years graduate level. 25 4 years graduate level As above, including 2 years at senior or specialist level. 35 As above, including 1 year at 10 years graduate level, including 5 years at senior senior or specialist level. of specialist level. 50 Prior Income — Points are awarded according to income, depending on country in which income was earned. Examples, from the extremes of the schedule, are provided below. (50 points maximum) Under 28 years old Over 28 years old United States - £27,000 per year United States - £40,000 per year Afghanistan - £2,350 per year Afghanistan - £3,500 per year 25 United States - £40,000 per year United States - £100,000 per year Afghanistan - £3,500 per year Afghanistan - £8,750 per year 35 United States £60,000 per year United States - £250,000 per year Afghanistan - £5,250 per year Afghanistan - £21,875 per year 50 Achievement — This is based on supporting evidence such as prizes, press articles, published work, patent rights, or references. (25 points maximum) “Significant” Achievement — The candidate has “developed a body of work that is acknowledged by their peers as contributing significantly to their field of work.” 15 “Outstanding” Achievement — The candidate should “be at the top of their profession, be recognized beyond their field of expertise, and have obtained international recognition.” 25 Partner’s Achievements (10 points maximum) The spouse or partner that is intending to migrate with the applicant has at least a Bachelor’s degree or equivalent vocational or professional qualifications, or is employed in a graduate-level job. 10 Priority applications — These are occupations determined of be of high importance. (50 points maximum) Qualified physicians intending to work as General Practitioners in the UK 50 Age allowance (5 points maximum) Applicants under 28 5 Total Possible Score 220

Selecting Economic Migrants 245 Table 6. Canada Points Test — 2004

Canada New point system, implemented in 2002 Applicants must have at least 67 points to qualify for admission (as of March 20, 2004). Factors considered are: Points 1. Education: Additional years of tertiary vocational training or college education are rewarded equally, but points awarded for vocational training cap at 22 for 15 years of total education. Maximum points are awarded to applicants who have completed a Master’s or PhD and at least 17 years of study. 25 2. Language Ability: Applicants choose the language (English or French) with which they are most comfortable as their first language. The remaining language is counted as the second language. Points are awarded according to the applicant’s ability to read, write, listen to, and speak both languages. 24 3. Experience: This is awarded for work experience in a skilled occupation. Experience need not be in the occupation in which they will be employed in Canada, nor does it need to be in an occupation for which there is high demand in Canada. Applicants earn 15 points for one year’s experience in the occupation and two points for each additional year to a maximum of 21. 21 4. Arranged Employment: Applicants with a non-temporary job offer approved by Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) or who have been working for at least one year as a temporary employee in an HRDC-approved position and have a non-temporary job offer earn 10 points. Applicants from NAFTA partners and intracompany transfers receive 10 points without HRDC approval. 10 5. Age: Applicants 21 to 49 earn a maximum of 10 points. Score is discounted 2 points for every year younger than 21 or older than 49. 10 6. Adaptability: This category awards points for a spouse or partner’s education, or if either the applicant or his or her spouse has previous work or study experience in Canada or relatives in Canada. Points are awarded for arranged employment in this category as well. 10 Total Points Possible 100

Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) world wide web pages. http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/skilled/qual-5.html abroad. In the immigrant-receiving Canada provides one model of such a country, the government can verify program in the form of a temporary the wages, working conditions, and agricultural worker program that in types of jobs offered through post-entry 2004 offered about 17,000 visas. The inspections and audits. Thus, the dif- program has been in place since the ference between a so-called “govern- 1960s. At that time, Canada negotiated ment-to-government program” and an bilateral agreements with Mexico and “employer-driven” admissions program several Caribbean states to provide is found not so much in principle, but temporary workers to fill vacancies in in the degree of government involve- agricultural sectors from Quebec to ment. Rather than playing passive Saskatchewan. Under the Canadian enforcement and regulatory roles, temporary agricultural worker program, the governments involved play active employers request foreign agricultural administrative roles, granted additional workers through the Canadian labor oversight that, presumably, safeguards department (Human Resources the program’s integrity. Of course, such Development Canada — HRDC). activism implies a substantial fiscal cost. HRDC aids the employers in assessing

246 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century the availability of domestic workers for also had its own problems, however, the vacant positions. Farmers are points to the challenges other such allowed to access Mexican and other programs have always faced. An earlier program workers only if HRDC version of the program, for instance, acknowledges that a shortage of conducted with Jamaica, was marred Canadian workers exists and if they are by allegations of political patronage members in good standing of Foreign and embezzlement on the Jamaican Agriculture Resource Management end. In the current program with Services (FARM), a nonprofit associa- Mexico, both migrants and employers tion of Canadian farmers and businesses. have complained of bureaucratic hassles, Employers pay a fee for each vacancy and the program has not been free of registered. Applicants who meet the charges that it does too little to requisite criteria undergo a medical protect the workers. Further, the lack check and confirmation of credentials of widespread criticism of the program by the Secretariat of Labor and Social may well relate to its size (it is quite Welfare in Mexico. FARM handles small) and thus its relative “anonymity.” contracts and travel arrangements Finally, costs have been significantly (these costs are later deducted from higher than those of temporary workers’ pay). Workers are provided agricultural-worker programs elsewhere with free housing, inspected annually, that have less government regulation. and are assigned to a job. Employers Rather than a best practice that can request specific workers by name deserves replication elsewhere, the and typically do so. Temporary workers Mexico-Canada program demonstrates generally work 6 1/2 days per week for the value of bilateral cooperation in pay similar to that earned by Canadians. designing and executing similar pro- (The Mexican consulate in Canada grams; it also speaks to the importance also monitors the workers’ welfare.) of responsibly enforcing contractual Income taxes, unemployment insurance, terms in the administration of tempo- accident insurance, and pension contri- rary worker programs, particularly in butions are deducted from salaries but low-wage sectors. workers may apply for an income-tax refund upon returning home and a Databases pension return once retired. The final Databases are now a tool that immigra- paycheck is withheld until the worker tion programs can deploy more readily returns to his home country. and reliably than in the past to reduce time spent on administrative controls. The Canada-Mexico program has For example, a shared database can be received less criticism than low-skill used both to register an employer’s agricultural-work programs in other intent to hire a foreign worker, to make countries. This is especially the case the job announcement available to with regard to migrant rights, working local, regional, and national employ- conditions, and control of overstays ment agencies (in cases where employ- and illegal work. That the program has ers are required to search for resident

Selecting Economic Migrants 247 workers), and/or to advertise the vacancy intracompany Transfers to qualified candidates from abroad. a n d Tra d e Treaty Wo rke rs Once permission to recruit a foreign Another significant and widening route worker is granted to an employer, a through which migrants are admitted database of applicants who have into the advanced industrial nations is already been precleared to emigrate through the temporary entry of workers — that is, their identities, credentials, whose access to the labor market of the employment experience, and legal host country is allowed in part to facil- and security vetting have all received itate international commerce or falls at least initial verification — can under the terms of a trade agreement. speed the process enormously. One general model for these entries is the schedule of commitments made Australia maintains a web-based under the World Trade Organization’s “Skill Matching Database.” Employers General Agreement on Trade in can search an archive of resumes of Services (GATS). Provisions made pre-approved candidates (if the under regional and bilateral trade employer decides to nominate a candi- agreements often follow the framework date from the database, no further visa set by the GATS, with the exception application is required). This database of NAFTA, which narrowly preceded can be used for three of Australia’s — and in some ways may have served migration categories: (a) entry under as a model for — GATS. The GATS a “labor agreement,” by which a structure leaves a large scope for coun- employer receives pre-approval to hire tries to set their “commitments” in this immigrants to fill vacancies; (b) under regard, and most have been far less Regional Skilled Migration, in which aggressive in pursuing openings on the employers in certain low-immigration movement of people than they have regions may sponsor applicants after other trade topics. demonstrating inability to fill a vacan- cy; and (c) in the “State/Territory The movements of intracompany Nominated Independent” category, transferees and personnel transferred whereby the government of an by a firm based in a foreign country Australian state or territory selects to perform contract work in another candidates for admission even though country are widely accepted, but they do not have a specific job offer. almost all developed countries retain In each case, employers or states may significant restrictions on such work- also sponsor candidates who are ers, including the right to require a not included in the Skill Matching visa for entry, minimum requirements Database. All of these categories are on how long intracompany transferees only for skilled migrants (both tempo- must have worked for their employer, rary and permanent), but only the and limits on the length of stay, quali- State/Territory Nominated Independent fications, and eligible occupations. category requires the applicant to pass With few exceptions, such workers Australia’s “points test.” must be highly skilled and/or have

248 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century firm-specific experience. Developed Stu d ent Admi ssi ons countries remain highly reluctant to The education of foreign nationals give individuals access to their labor has now become an important way markets under trade agreements that advanced industrial nations (with the creation and expansion of recruit immigrants and a significant the European Union and European industry in its own right (Table 8). Economic Area being the most radical Hence the recruitment of students exceptions and NAFTA also breaking deserves discussion that goes beyond new ground through the movements of the brief comments made under the professionals in designated occupations). “transition” systems above. The They also vary on whether temporary “funnel” that draws foreigners in as status can be converted into perma- students and then allows them to stay nent status in employment categories as temporary workers or permanent negotiated under trade agreements. settlers is particularly attractive from the receiving country’s perspective Intracompany transfer entries can be because education in a domestic significant (in the case of the United institution is a “known” for both Kingdom, for example, 30 percent of employers and bureaucrats — and general temporary work permits go to because it may promote better intracompany transferees) but are per- on-the-job and language skills and haps not best thought of as an immi- integration outcomes. grant recruitment tool. The decision to proactively admit immigrants gen- Countries have several policy erally leads to admissions policies that levers that guide this recruitment are more generous in terms of eligible mechanism. First, and most obvious occupations and length of stay than among these, is the initial admission those arrived at via trade agreements. of students. Decisions about the Furthermore, few developed countries quantity of student visas issued and are eager to enshrine immigration the administrative ease of admitting policy in international treaties. foreign students, as well as (in countries However, there are perhaps a few les- where the university system is state- sons to be drawn from such admis- controlled) the policies of educational sions: In many cases the administrative institutions towards foreign students, procedure for admitting “treaty all establish the “pool” from which migrants” is faster and less cumber- future workers will be drawn. Even some than that for admitting other seemingly unrelated policies, such as migrants. While some might charge the United States’ 2002 decision to that this opens a “back door” for require nationals of certain Middle immigration, others would argue that Eastern and Asian countries to register it shows the administrative ease and with authorities, may lead students to efficiency that can be achieved when seek out less intimidating environ- migration policy is responsive to ments in other developed nations. broader economic objectives.

Selecting Economic Migrants 249 Table 7. Preference System for Permanent Empoyment- based Immigration — United States

Canada Preference System, first introduced in 1952. Legal Cap 2004 actual admissions1 Total Employment-based Immigration 140,000 179,195 First preference (28.6 percent): “Priority workers,” including persons of “extraordinary ability”; outstanding professors and researchers; and executives and managers of US multinationals. offer of employment is required for persons in this category, except those regarded to be of “extraordinary ability.” 40,000 41,801 Second preference (28.6 percent): Professionals with “exceptional ability” in the sciences, the arts, or business. Requires both an offer of US employment and a labor certification. The employment requirement can be waived in special circumstances. 40,000 42,620 Third preference (28.6 percent): Skilled workers (in occupations that require at least two years formal training); professionals (must have Bachelor’s degrees or appropriate licenses); and “other workers” (unskilled workers). Number of visas issued to “other workers” is limited to 10,000 per year. Requires a labor certification. 40,000 86,058 Fourth preference (7.1 percent): Ministers of religion and employees of religious organizations, foreign medical school graduates, employees of the US government abroad, and employees of international organizations defined as “special immigrants.” 10,000 8,523 Fifth preference (7.1 percent): Employment-creation (investor) visas 10,000 193

1 Includes both adjustments and new arrivals. Sources: Kramer, 2001; Papademetriou, 1994: 87-88; US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) world wide web pages (http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/IMM00yrbk/IMM2000list.htm; http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/history/2.pdf; http://www.ins.gov/graphics/services/residency/employment.htm); US Department of State world wide web pages (http://travel.state.gov/visa;employ-based.html).

Table 8. Student Visas, Permits, and Admissions — Selected Countries Years 1998-2003

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 United States 564, 683 567,146 659,081 698,595 646,016 624,917 Canada1 40,996 51,035 62,016 72,317 68,024 61,293 Australia 110,915 119,103 146,565 151,855 162,575 New Zealand2 22,470 27,396 34,544 55,694 91,745 114,977 Japan 28,000 33,900 41,900 47,300 50,700 France 23,500 25,100 36,100 40,000 55,500

1 Canada’s admissions figures only include students who enter Canada for the first time in that year. 2 Numbers based on fiscal year Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Facts and Figures 2003: Immigration Overview: Temporary Residents; Australian Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA), Population Flows, 2001, and Immigration Update, 2003; New Zealand Information Service world wide web pages, http://www.immigra- tion.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/F3073A08-D1BF-43EF-88AE-5DD1608FB627/0/S1.xls; Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development: Trends in International Migration 2004; United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Statistical Yearbook 2003;

250 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century As with temporary work visas, whether by also granting points to those who or not a migrant is allowed to transition have studied at domestic universities. from a student visa directly to a perma- France takes another approach by grant- nent or temporary work visa without ing graduates of national universities leaving the country is a critical factor. with degrees in high-demand fields If this is permitted and administratively (such as information technology) near- happens in a timely fashion, a student automatic work permits. can make a seamless transition to work. This transition can be further facilitated by allowing students to Conclusions undertake employment not directly related to their studies, either concur- In immigration, as much as in any rent with their studies, during school field of public policy, a government’s breaks, or after their studies. best strategy is to do only that which Employment under the terms of a it can and does do well or that which student visa allows employers to gather no other entity can do, and leave the more information about prospective rest to private actors. The evolution of students and students to learn more policies for the admission of immigrants about the labor market and workplace. for economic purposes gives some indi- Work or residency permission related cation of where this principle should to a student visa can also serve as a lead. For immigration that is chiefly “bridge” that allows a job search to designed to satisfy immediate labor take place or bypasses problems caused needs or skills shortages, the selection by administrative delays. In the of immigrants has been largely turned United States, for example, it is not over to employers, with growing efforts uncommon for a recent graduate to to make that process as predictable begin work under the terms of a stu- and smooth as possible for employers dent visa while her application for an who “play by the rules.” The bureau- employer-sponsored visa is processed. cracy retains a powerful role (as in the point systems) where the goals of the Finally, the qualifications required program are broader and criteria for for participation in labor migration selecting immigrants have been kept programs also determine whether appropriately general, with longer-term students will be able to stay (or return) economic and integration prospects in to work after completing their studies. mind. Increasingly, governments are Requirements that applicants for labor wisely resisting the temptation to iden- immigration have work experience, for tify skill shortages themselves and example, put recent graduates at a micro-manage admissions. Nevertheless, disadvantage and may force them to some occupations to which advanced return to their home country. Australia, industrial nations give admissions New Zealand, and Canada reward priority serve social goals as much experience heavily in their points as economic ones (doctors, nurses, system, but compensate young graduates and other health care workers,

Selecting Economic Migrants 251 for example) and are thus rightly the or placing would-be permanent domain of government. immigrants in potentially exploitative situations. Coherence across programs Experimentation and the willingness is also necessary to balance the to make necessary adjustments to pressure to satisfy immediate skills programs are the hallmarks of successful shortages and labor needs with the immigrant admissions systems. In the goal of admitting immigrants who past two decades, experimentation, will be successful workers and citizens particularly in the TCIs, has led to the over the long term. Australia and development of immigrant admissions Great Britain, for example, attempt to strategies based not exclusively on a achieve this balance by mixing admis- specific job, or purely on human-capital sions based on points systems with characteristics, but on a hybrid of employer-driven admissions. selection strategies and methodologies. The development of temporary-to-per- Another method of achieving better manent transition visas is one of the diversity and balance in the allocation best examples of such a hybrid. of immigrant visas is by allowing local Although it raises new challenges, the and provincial governments to partici- addition of the “transition visa” to the pate in the selection of immigrants. immigration policy lexicon gives poli- Canada allows its territories to select a cymakers an important new tool. The small (in 2002, almost 1 percent) bimodal policy categories of “temporary” portion of its permanent immigrants, and “permanent” have never adequately and the province of Quebec takes accommodated the actual desires and special responsibility for selecting all behavior of migrants or their employers. immigrants intending to settle there. The transition visa may be a next step Australia allows provincial and terri- in making immigration policy work torial governments to sponsor migrants with, rather than against, labor and has a streamlined admissions markets and human nature; but the process for businesses in rural and concept needs to continue to be tested low-population-growth areas that wish and refined as it is applied. to sponsor skilled immigrants.

Coherence and balance are also impor- Selecting immigrants is only one part tant factors in the effective management of the recruitment process. There of economic migration. If properly appears to be emerging competition for “joined” by opportunities to convert skilled migrant workers. Countries that status, student, temporary work, and have long accepted such workers, permanent-settlement immigration particularly Anglophone ones, have programs can allow the efficient and an advantage here, but it is not insur- just allocation of immigration rights mountable. Policymakers should and make all three programs easier to consider the overall package their policies administer without creating populations present to perspective migrants (as well of “long-term temporary” immigrants as to their employers). For instance,

252 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century if the competition for skilled workers the government’s strengths are rela- heats up, the immigration policies and tively limited, then enforcement of processes offered by a country may an immigration program’s terms and become an advantage or disadvantage conditions is an area where only the for employers. There are anecdotes to government has competence. For the effect that some of the highly countries that choose to use migration qualified migrants coming to Germany as an economic tool, investments in under its green card program are staying protecting the system from fraud and only long enough to cultivate a job abuse and in verifying the compensa- offer in the United States. This would tion and working conditions of admitted imply that the German program is immigrants are both a necessary cost serving as a stepping stone to—and of doing business in the immigration losing sought-after migrants from—the realm and a way to build public confi- US H-1B program. There is no evi- dence in immigration in general. Good dence to suggest that any sort of enforcement requires setting up realistic “migration competition” is occurring regulations that minimize perverse in this case (if these anecdotes amount incentives and power dynamics; to anything, it probably has more to do choosing intelligent and efficient with the relative economic conditions ways to back up those regulations; and and the size of the conational immi- finally, dedicating adequate resources. grant community in each country) but a comparison of the two programs Enforcement of program terms and offers an illustration of the potential working conditions is thus as critical a for such competition. The German point for the success of an immigrant program offers migrants a temporary recruitment program as is creating a stay of up to five years with little sensible framework for admitting prospect of permanent immigration. immigrants. After all, in the admission The United States program, on the of immigrants, government will find other hand, offers a six-year stay with many allies and facilitators in the a high probability of permanent immi- private sector. The greater task, how- gration. Widening the advantage for ever, may be in demonstrating that the United States is the fact that the recruited immigrants are a net public German program asks candidates to benefit and in distinguishing labor stay temporarily in a country where migration programs in the public mind refining their language skills may be a from irregular migration flows and the significant (yet nonportable) invest- oft-maligned asylum system. In this ment and that exacts relatively heavy project, there can be no more important taxes and social contributions, the full task than keeping labor immigration benefits of which the migrant will not programs honest. be able to reap. Recommendations Finally, if the actual selection of Enforcement of the terms of specific immigrants is an area where economic immigration need not

Selecting Economic Migrants 253 be costly — to the government, an intracompany transferee immigrants, or workers. One way should be vigorously guarded to maximize efficiency in enforce- against. Similarly, the practice of ment is to put resources into sponsoring temporary immigrants verifying the terms of employment whose services will merely be after the fact: site visits and audits subcontracted to another firm of employers who have not yet must be both better understood developed a track record of behav- and regulated more intelligently. ior on the issue, as well as the Ultimately, the integrity of more rigorous enforcement of programs that are politically general labor laws in sectors and controversial is the best guarantee companies that employ large num- that they can survive and continue bers of migrants, as well as less to offer the returns they are burdensome and more effective designed to yield. ways to maintain the system’s integrity than erecting bureaucratic The efficiency of the process barriers prior to the admission of through which migrants are an immigrant. Enforcement is admitted is critical to the success particularly important for programs of economic immigration programs. that are more likely to invite Long processing times and unnec- abuse. Those based on short-term, essary documentation requirements low-skill labor migration in which can destroy much of the benefit of a worker’s work permission is tied labor immigration — particularly to the job, or programs that are in migration intended to relieve skill problem-ridden employment shortages or meet peak labor sectors (e.g., agriculture or domestic demand. To reduce inefficiencies, services) where workers have few governments can start by adopting other options, need more scrutiny innovations such as accelerated than do high-skill or permanent processing of high-priority migration programs. Thus, programs applicants and fewer procedures can be “triaged” and resources for “low risk” sectors, that is, directed to those most in need sectors in which shortages are of supervision. endemic. They can also consider employing alternatives to case-by- Enforcement of the recruitment, case processing and labor-market working, and wage conditions of tests, such as “attestations,” and/or employer-driven temporary-work charging a fee for the privilege of programs, in particular, is a criti- employing a foreign national. cally important investment in Migrants entering for work in good governance. Practices such professional occupations might as employing a worker abroad also be asked to pay a modest fee chiefly for the prospect of allowing before entry or after they have him or her to enter a country as secured employment.

254 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Countries should continue to be likely to settle permanently in realistic about their ability to their localities and to fit their identify “skills shortages” quickly economic and social needs. and accurately enough to justify government activism in selecting Transparency to immigrants, immigrants. In addition, the employers, and the public is a advantages and disadvantages of crucial factor. Easily accessible imposing numerical caps on par- information on the application ticular migration programs must process and waiting times, and be weighed carefully. While politi- clear, simple regulations reduce cally expedient, such caps (partic- the costs and risks to employers ularly if set by legislative action) and migrants and fight public may force migration admissions to misconceptions. Canada, trail cyclical changes in the econ- Australia, and New Zealand, omy and demand for skill sets by a which have extensive on-line wide margin. information about their point systems and other migration A willingness to experiment will categories, provide examples also pay dividends in how best to of good first steps here. engage local, provincial, and state governments in the selection of immigrants. Allowing these governments to select a small pro- portion of immigrants adds diver- sity to the stream of immigrants and puts selection in the hands of those best able to assess a local community’s needs. However, these selection mechanisms will need to be adapted over time. Immigrants, like the native-born, follow job opportunities, most of which are in or near certain larger and medium-sized cities. The less economically and demographically dynamic regions and cities that might most appreciate the contributions of migrants may be least able to attract them. With experience, these jurisdictions may be able to use the ability to select “their own” immigrants to identify and attract those most

Selecting Economic Migrants 255 References

Bauer, T., M. Lofstrom, and K. Zimmerman. International Organization for Migration. World “Immigration Policy, Assimilation of Migration 2003. Geneva: IOM, 2003. Immigrants, and Natives’ Sentiments Towards Immigrants: Evidence from 12 Jupp, B. “The local security challenge: Can we OECD Countries.” Swedish Economic Policy devise policies that are compatible with Review 7, no. 2 (2000): 11-53. peaceful co-existence?” Presentation at the Invitational Conference on People Flow in its Bauer, T. and K. Zimmerman. “Immigration Policy Wider Context: A Comprehensive Exploration, in Integrated National Economies.” IZA Tilburg University, Netherlands, November Discussion Paper Number 170. Bonn: Institute 25-26, 2003. for the Study of Labor (IZA), 2000. New Zealand Immigration Service. New Zealand Carzaniga, A. “GATS, Mode 4, and the Pattern of Immigration Service Website. Commitments.” Paper presented at the http://www.immigration.govt.nz/. Wellington: Conference on Movement of Natural Persons NZIS, 2004. Under the GATS held by the World Trade Organization. Geneva, April 11-12, 2002. Niessen, J. and Y. Schibel, eds. EU and US approaches to the management of immigration: Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Citizenship Comparative perspectives. Brussels: Migration and Immigration Canada Website. Policy Group, 2003. http://www.cic.gc.ca. Ottawa: CIC, 2004. Office of Immigration Statistics. Statistical Department of Immigration and Multicultural Yearbook. Washington, DC: US Department of Affairs. Department of Immigration and Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Multicultural Affairs Website. Statistics, various years. http://www.immi.gov.au/. Belconnen, Australian Capital Territory: DIMA, 2004. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Maintaining Prosperity in an Fotakis, C. and G. Coomans. “Demographic Ageing Society. Paris: OECD, 1998. ageing, migration and the challenge for growth and labour market sustainability.” Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Paper presented at the Joint Conference on the Development. International Mobility of the Economic and Social Aspects of Migration, Highly Skilled. Paris: OECD, 2002. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Commission. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Brussels, January 21-22, 2003. Development. Trends in International Migration. Paris: OECD, 2003. Greenhill, D. “Managed Migration Best Practices and Public Policy: The Canadian Rollason, N. “Labour Recruitment for Skill Experience.” Paper presented at the Workshop Shortages in the United Kingdom.” In on Best Practices Related to Migrant Migration for Employment: Bilateral Agreements Workers, International Organization for at a Crossroads. Paris: OECD, 2004. Migration. Santiago, Chile, June 2000.

256 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century About the Authors T. Alexander Aleinikoff is the Dean of Grete Brochmann is Research the Georgetown University Law Center Director at the Institute for Social and the Executive Vice President for Research in Oslo as well as a Professor Law Center Affairs. He is a member of of Sociology at the University of Oslo. the Board of Trustees of the Migration Currently, Dr. Brochmann is working Policy Institute and was a Senior on welfare state dilemmas in a Nordic Associate in the International comparative perspective, as well as Migration Policy Program at the continuing her work on the history of Carnegie Endowment for International 900-2000, in Peace. In 2001-2002, he was a Visiting which she has focused on 1975-2000. Fellow at the Institut Universitaire des This comprehensive history work Haut Etudes Internationales, Geneva. received the Brage prize for 2003. Dr. Brochmann has been a member of From 1994-1997, Mr. Aleinikoff served several commissions in the Norwegian as the General Counsel and then Research Council and has held a num- Executive Associate Commissioner for ber of board positions at institutes Programs of the Immigration and including PRIO, ARENA, and the Naturalization Service (INS). Prior to History Department at the University joining the Clinton administration, he of Oslo. She has also been member of was a full Professor of Law at the two governmental commissions, University of Michigan Law School. and has held positions or board After receiving his law degree, Mr. membership with the Council of Aleinikoff served as a law clerk to the Europe, COST, the Danish research Honorable Edward Weinfeld, US program AMID, and the Swedish District Judge. He has published numer- Power and Integration Investigation. ous articles in the areas of immigration, Grete Brochmann received her PhD race, statutory interpretation, and con- in Sociology from the University of stitutional law, and he is also the author Oslo in 1990. She has published several of the principal text and casebooks on books and articles on international US immigration. His most recent schol- migration; sending and receiving arship includes: co-editor (with Douglas country perspectives; EU policies; Klusmeyer) of Citizenship Today: Global welfare state dilemmas; and historical Perspectives and Practices; co-author studies of immigration. She has also (with Douglas Klusmeyer) of From been involved in a number of Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a international research projects and Changing World; co-author (with David evaluations. She has lectured Martin and Hiroshi Motomura) of internationally for many years, and has Immigration: Process and Policy; and served as a visiting scholar at the co-author (with John Garvey) of Université Catholique de Louvain in Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader. Brussels and at the University of His book Citizenship Policies for an Age California — Berkeley. In 2002, she of Migration was published in May 2002. held a visiting professorship in honor He holds a JD from Yale University and of Willy Brandt in Malmo, Sweden. a BA from Swarthmore College.

258 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Jon Erik Dölvik is Research Director Portuguese Metropolises: migrants and at the Fafo Institute for Labour and urban governance and Deprivation and Social Research in Oslo. He is a soci- Social Exclusion in Metro Lisbon. ologist by training and his main field of research is comparative employment Dr. Fonseca received her PhD in relations in the Nordic and European Human Geography from the University context. He has published extensively of Lisbon in 1989. Some on issues related to Europeanization of her most recent publications include and globalization of labor markets and Reunificação familiar e Imigração em employment relations. Dr. Dölvik has Portugal (Family reunification and served as a visiting scholar at immigration in Portugal) (co-author Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin, the and coordinator); New waves: Migration European Trade Union Institute in from Eastern to Southern Europe Brussels, the Institute of Industrial (co-editor with Maria I. Baganha); Relations at the University of “Migration in the Mediterranean California — Berkeley, and as a Basin: bridges and margins,” Finisterra research fellow at the ARENA Centre (Revista Portuguesa de Geografia) for Advanced Research on the (geography journal) (co-editor with Europeanisation of the Nation-State, Russell King); Immigrants in Lisbon: University of Oslo. He is currently routes of integration (co-author); engaged in studies of the labor market Immigration and Place in Mediterranean implications of EU enlargement. Dr. Metropolis, (co-editor). Dölvik is a member of the Editorial Panel of the European Journal of Jorge Gaspar is a Professor in the Industrial Relations and of the Editorial Department of Geography at the Committee of Transfer - European University of Lisbon and Director of the Review of Labour and Research. Centro de Estudos e Desenvolvimento Regional e Urbano, Lda (CEDRU). Maria Lucinda Fonseca has been an Currently he serves as coordinator of Associate Professor in the Department the Portuguese National Program for of Geography of the University of Spatial Planning Policies within the Lisbon since 1993. Her main scientific Ministry of Environment, Cities, and areas of research include International Regional Development. Jorge Gaspar is Migration, Social and Economic a member of several organizations, Geography, and Urban and Regional including Academia Europaea, the Development and Planning. Currently, Lisbon Academy of Sciences, the she is a member of the International Association of Portuguese Geographers, Migration, Integration and Social the Association of American Cohesion in Europe Network of Geographers, Società Geografica Excellence (IMISCOE), co-leader of Italiana, Società Italiana di Studi the IMISCOE research cluster on Elettorali, the Portuguese Association social integration and mobility, and for Regional Development, and the the research coordinator of Reinventing Portuguese Society of Urban Planners.

About the Authors 259 Dr. Gaspar received his PhD in and Society” in the Journal of Ethnic Human Geography from the and Migration Studies; “Greece: A University of Lisbon in 1972. He has History of Migration” and “Migrants in published fifteen books and more than the Rural Economies of Greece and one hundred articles and research Southern Europe” on the Migration reports focusing on topics such as Information Source; and “Migrants in urban studies, land management and Rural Greece: a Qualitative Analysis planning, electoral studies, economic of Empirical Findings” in Sociologia geography, regional and urban devel- Ruralis. He received his PhD from the opment, and Portugal. University of Bradford, UK in 1983.

Wolfgang Lutz is Director of the Charalambos Kasimis is a Professor Vienna Institute of Demography of the of Rural Sociology at the Department Austrian Academy of Sciences and of Agricultural Economics and Rural Leader of the World Population Development at the Agricultural Program at the International Institute University of Athens. His work for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). has focused on questions of rural He is an Affiliated Professor at the transformation and development in College of Population Studies at Greece and the Balkans and specifi- Chulalongkorn University (Bangkok) cally on family farming, employment, and Adjunct Professor for Demography and rural community change. and Social Statistics at the University Migration and, more particularly, of Vienna. He served as a Secretary migration to rural regions has become General for the International Union one of his main research priorities for the Scientific Study of Population in the past few years when he (IUSSP) from 1998 to 2001. His main coordinated the project: The research interests are in population Implications of the Settlement and forecasting, fertility, and the analysis of Employment of Migrant Labour in Rural human capital formation. He was also Greece. His current research projects involved in the coordination of the include: A Cognitive Approach to Rural European Observatory on the Social Sustainable Development: The Dynamics Situation, Demography and the Family. of Expert and Lay Knowledge (financed by the EU), and The Multifunctional Dr. Lutz studied philosophy, mathemat- Role of Migrants in Rural Greece and ics, and statistics at the Universities Rural Southern Europe (financed by of Munich, Vienna, Helsinki and The John D. and Catherine Pennsylvania. In 1983, he received T. MacArthur Foundation). his PhD in Demography from the University of Pennsylvania and in Dr. Kasimis has recently co-authored 1998 a second doctorate (Habilitation) migration-related articles including: from the University of Vienna. He has “The Multifunctional Role of Migrants written or edited nineteen books and in the Greek Countryside: more than 120 scientific articles and Implications for the Rural Economy

260 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century book chapters (including contributions Opportunities of International Migration to Science and Nature, as well as lead- for the EU, Its Member States, ing journals in the field of population). Neighboring Countries and Regions (with His most recent books include: Robert Holzmann; Migrationsreport Frontiers of Population Forecasting; 2004 (Migration Report 2004) (with Population and Climate Change; Klaus Bade and Michael Bommes); Population and Environment: Methods of Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants. Analysis; and The End of World Germany, Israel and Post-Soviet Population Growth in the 21st Century: Successor States in Comparative New Challenges for Human Capital Perspective (with Rainer Ohliger); and Formation and Sustainable Development. Das Schweizer Bürgerrecht (The Swiss Citizenship Law) (with Ralf Ulrich). Rainer Münz is Head of Research at Erste Bank in Vienna and a Senior Rinus Penninx is a Professor of Ethnic Fellow at the Hamburg Institute of Studies at the University of Amsterdam International Economics (HWWI; and served as Director of the Institute Migration Research Group). He is an for Migration and Ethnic Studies expert on population and migration, (IMES) at the university from 1993 including labor migration and to 2005. He has been co-chair of migration policy. Between 1992 and International Metropolis since 1999. In 2003, Dr. Münz was head of the April 2004, he became Coordinator of Department of Demography at the International Migration, Integration Humboldt University, Berlin. Prior to and Social Cohesion in Europe Network that, he was Director of the Institute of of Excellence (IMISCOE). Demography at the Austrian Academy of Science. Rainer Münz is a member Dr. Penninx has written for many of several boards and advisory boards, years on migration, minorities’ including the International policies, and ethnic studies. His report Organization for Migration (Geneva); Ethnic Minorities (1979) for the Dutch the Center for Migration, Integration Scientific Council for Government and Citizenship at Oxford University; Policy (WRR) served as the starting the International Metropolis Project point for integration policies in the (Ottawa — Amsterdam); the Netherlands. From 1978 to 1988, he Association of German Pension Insurers worked as a senior researcher in the (Frankfurt-Berlin, Germany); SOT Research and Development Accountants (Vienna-Graz-Munich); Department of the Ministry of VBV Pension Insurance (Vienna); and Welfare, Public Health and Culture, OBV-HTP Publishers (Vienna). with the focus of his research being migration and integration of Dr. Münz studied at Vienna immigrants in the Netherlands. University, where he earned his PhD Professor Penninx received his in 1978. His recent books and edited PhD in 1988 from the University of volumes include: Challenges and Amsterdam. Much of his present

About the Authors 261 research work relates to two topics: scientific journals, and recently migration and integration policies at co-authored “Europe’s population at a the EU-level and the functions of turning” in Science, as well as “The immigrant organizations. End of World Population Growth” and “Average Remaining Lifetimes Sergei Scherbov has been Leader Can Increase as Human Populations of the research group on Population Age” in Nature. Additionally, Dynamics and Forecasting at the he co-authored several papers in Vienna Institute of Demography, Population and Development Review. Austrian Academy of Sciences since 2002. He is also a Senior Research Sarah Spencer is Associate Director at Scholar at the International Institute the Centre on Migration, Policy and for Applied Systems Analysis Society (COMPAS) at the University (IIASA). Previously he served as of Oxford and directs its Managed researcher and lecturer for the Migration Programme. She is also a Population Research Centre at the Commissioner at the Commission for University of Groningen, The Racial Equality, Chair of the Equality Netherlands, and as head of the and Diversity Forum, and a Visiting World Health Organization Professor at the Human Rights Centre, Collaborating Centre for design and University of Essex. She was formerly application of models of chronic Director of the Citizenship and non-communicable diseases for Governance Programme at the modeling morbidity and mortality. Institute for Public Policy Research and is a former General Secretary of Dr. Scherbov received his PhD in the National Council for Civil Theory Systems, Control Theory, and Liberties. Sarah Spencer has twice Systems Analysis from the All-Union been seconded into the Cabinet Office Research Institute for Systems Studies to contribute to policy research on of the USSR Academy of Sciences in migration, was a member of the 1983. His research interests include government’s Taskforce on the Human demographic modeling and software Rights Act, and on the proposed development, data processing, popula- Commission on Equality and Human tion projections, applications of multi- Rights. She contributes to the work of state demography, Soviet and Russian the European Policy Centre in Brussels demographic studies, and population- and to the MPI’s Athens Migration environment interactions. He has Policy Initiative. co-edited several books including, most recently, The End of World Her current projects include: Changing Population Growth in the 21st Century: status, changing lives? The socio-economic New Challenges for Human Capital impact of EU accession on low wage Formation and Sustainable Development. migrant labour in the UK; The impact Dr. Scherbov has also published a large of the migration NGO sector on the number of articles in international development of migration policy: Ireland

262 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century as a case study; and Muslims and Community Cohesion in Britain. Her recent publications are available at www.compas.ox.ac.uk.

Thomas Straubhaar is President of the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) and a Professor of Economics at the University of Hamburg, both positions which he has held since 1999. He is a founding member of the IZA Policy Fellows Group and in 2004, Dr. Straubhaar received the Ludwig-Erhard Prize for his publications on economics.

Dr. Straubhaar worked as an external adviser to the Swiss bank UBS between 1992 and 1995, and served as an advisor to the European Commission for Issues of Migration and Labor Market Problems between 1986 and 1987.

About the Authors 263 264 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century About the Editor Demetrios G. Papademetriou is the America’s Challenge: Domestic Security, President of the Migration Policy Civil Liberties, and National Unity after Institute (MPI), a Washington-based September 11 (2003, co-author), think tank dedicated exclusively to and Caught in the Middle: Border the study of international migration. Communities in an Era of Globalization He is also the convener of the Athens (2001, senior editor and co-author). Migration Policy Initiative (AMPI), a task force of mostly European senior immigration experts that advises EU Members States on immigration and asylum issues, and the Co-Founder and International Chair Emeritus of “Metropolis: An International Forum for Research and Policy on Migration and Cities.”

Dr. Papademetriou holds a PhD in Comparative Public Policy and International Relations (1976) and has taught at the universities of Maryland, Duke, American, and New School for Social Research. He has held a wide range of senior positions that include: Chair of the Migration Committee of the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Director for Immigration Policy and Research at the US Department of Labor and Chair of the Secretary of Labor’s Immigration Policy Task Force; and Executive Editor of the International Migration Review. Dr. Papademetriou has published more than 200 books, articles, monographs and research reports on migration topics and advises senior government and political party officials in more than twenty countries. His most recent publications include Secure Borders, Open Doors: Visa Procedures in the Post-September 11 Era (2005, co-author), NAFTA’s Promise and Reality (2003, co-author),

266 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century About the Luso-American Foundation The Luso-American Foundation project, METROPOLIS INTERNA- (FLAD) was created by the Government TIONAL, based in the United States, of Portugal in May 1985 as a private, Canada, and Europe. FLAD continues independent grantmaking foundation to fund research, and policy analysis with the mission of assisting Portugal meetings joining US and EU partners in its development, mainly by building in strategic planning in this crucial, strong ties with the United States. social/political area. In October 2006, FLAD’s priority program areas are: FLAD and its partners will host Education, Science and Technology; the XI International Metropolis Culture; Environment; Civil Conference in Lisbon. Society and Innovation; International Cooperation; and Public Administration. FLAD has published, either alone From its inception FLAD was also or with other organizations, the recognized as a 501(c) 4 foundation following books on migration and in the United States. Twenty years citizenship: later, the Foundation has become recognized as a leading Portuguese Metropolis International Workshop actor in , with 1998, 1999 an active program linking Portugal’s Conference proceedings, with a institutions with partners in the Foreword by Charles Buchanan and United States as well as in other José Leitão European Union (EU) countries. Metropolis Portugal: An FLAD has been an active supporter of International Comparative Research research projects, conferences and and Policy Project for Migration publications in all aspects of migration Cities and Minorities, Booklet, 1999 studies. Since 1996 FLAD has support- ed many research projects at three Is an Ethclass Emerging in Europe? Portuguese universities – University of The Portuguese Case, 2000 Lisbon (Center of Geographic By Maria Ioannis Baganha, José Carlos Studies), the New University of Marques, and Graça Fonseca Lisbon (Socinova), and the University of Coimbra (Social Studies Center). Immigration and Place in Projects supported by FLAD included Mediterranean Metropolises, 2002 research on immigration legislation, Chief Editor, Lucinda Fonseca, with a family reunification laws, immigrant Foreword by Charles Buchanan labor market entry, and integration best practices, among others. New Waves: Migration from Eastern to Southern Europe, 2003 With FLAD’s financial support, Edited by Maria Ioannis Baganha and these universities and their research Maria Lucinda Fonseca teams joined the preeminent interna- tional migration research and policy

268 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century From Migrants to Citizens Edited by T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2000

Citizenship Today, Global Perspectives and Practices Edited by T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2001

Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration By T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, 2002

For more information about FLAD programs and projects, publications, and events, please visit www.flad.pt

About FLAD 269 270 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century About the Migration Policy Institute The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) is Countering Terrorist Mobility: an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit Shaping an Operational Strategy think tank dedicated to the study of the By MPI Nonresident Fellow Susan movement of people worldwide. MPI Ginsburg, former Senior Counsel and provides analysis, development, and Team Leader, National Commission evaluation of migration and refugee on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United policies at the local, national, and States (9/11 Commission) international levels. It aims to meet the rising demand for pragmatic and Managing Integration: The European thoughtful responses to the challenges Union’s Responsibilities Towards and opportunities that large-scale migra- Immigrants tion, whether voluntary or forced, Edited by Rita Süssmuth and Werner presents to communities and institutions Weidenfeld, Bertelsmann Foundation in an increasingly integrated world. Published by the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Migration Policy The Migration Information Source, Institute MPI’s award-winning online resource for timely and accurate migration data The United States Refugee and analysis, features articles by lead- Admissions Program: Reforms for a ing thinkers in the field of migration, New Era of Refugee Resettlement resource pages for more than fifty By MPI Nonresident Fellow David A. countries, and easy-to-access data on Martin, University of Virginia migration to countries around the world. Source Special Issues have Leaving Too Much to Chance: provided in-depth analyses on A Roundtable on Immigrant Migration and Human Rights, US- Integration Policy Mexico Migration, Integration and By Michael Fix, Demetrios G. Immigrants, Africa, Women and Papademetriou, and Betsy Cooper Migration, and Development and Migration. The Migration Information One Face at the Border: Source is available online at Behind the Slogan www.migrationinformation.org. By Deborah Meyers

MPI publications provide timely Real Challenges for Virtual Borders: independent, nonpartisan analysis on The Implementation of US-VISIT the issues of migration management, By Rey Koslowski, Rutgers University- national security and civil liberties, Newark refugee protection and international humanitarian response, North Secure Borders, Open Doors: Visa American borders, and immigrant Procedures in the Post-September settlement and integration. Recent 11 Era titles from the Migration Policy By Stephen Yale-Loehr, Demetrios G. Institute include: Papademetriou, and Betsy Cooper

272 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future: The Roadmap By Michael Fix, Doris Meissner, and Demetrios G. Papademetriou

For more information about the Migration Policy Institute’s experts, policy research, publications, and events, please visit www.migrationpolicy.org.

About MPI 273 274 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Acknowled gements This book project was made possible and their insights, they made the through the generous support of the papers included in this volume far Luso-American Foundation (FLAD) better than they might have been in Lisbon, Portugal, and especially otherwise. Thanks also to the many FLAD’s President of the Executive other supporters of MPI’s European Council, Rui Machete, and Executive work, particularly the Niarchos and Council Member Charles (Buck) King Baudouin foundations. Buchanan and his team. For more information about the foundation, The final thanks are reserved for my please visit http://www.flad.pt/. colleagues. Jonathan Pattee played a crucial role in editing and helping The Editor would like to express to bring this volume to fruition. sincere thanks to each of the Thanks also to my superbly talented authors for sharing their insights and mission-driven colleagues about the evolution of European Gregory Maniatis, Colleen Coffey, immigration and immigrant Julia Gelatt, Kirin Kalia, and Aaron integration policies and the Erlich for their editorial and massive challenges EU Member production assistance, as well as States and the Union’s central insti- their good humor. Finally, Patricia tutions face. The variety and depth Hord Graphik Design did their of the questions and policy solu- usual superb job with publication tions posed provide an essential, layout and design. fact-based framework for local, national, and European policies that can increase immigration’s benefits for communities, sending countries, and migrants themselves.

A heartfelt thanks also goes to former EU Commissioners Antonio Vitorino and Anna Diamandopoulou, Dutch Minister for Immigration and Integration Rita Verdonk, Alex Rondos, Giorgos Glynos, Jean Louis de Brouwer, Sandra Pratt, Antonis Kastrissianakis, Kostas Fotakis, Rob Visser, Alex Sorel, Marilyn Haime, Ali Rabarison and Chavi Nana. These individuals were critical in offering generous guidance to MPI throughout this work. By affording the MPI team privileged access to information

276 Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century Europe is at a crossroads. Demography, labor market realities, and Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century already overwhelmed social protection systems mean that immigration will play a larger role in Europe in the decades ahead. The policy Europe and challenge is this: How can the European Union absorb new flows of immigrants when the 35 to 40 million foreign-born people already in its midst continue to face difficulties in becoming a full part of the Its Immigrants in economic, cultural, social, and political lives of their adopted societies? the 21st Century In this volume, the Migration Policy Institute has gathered some of the finest thinkers to offer insightful counsel and, wherever possible, solutions to Europe’s immigration challenges. They piece together the puzzle of a well-managed, comprehensive migration A New Deal regime, tackling issues ranging from immigration’s economic costs and benefits, to effective selection systems, citizenship, the welfare or a Continuing state, and integration policies that work. Dialogue of the Deaf? This volume marks another milestone in MPI’s deep commitment to European policy and transatlantic cooperation on immigration Edited by Demetrios G. Papademetriou policy. In addition to working closely with the European Commission, Member State governments, and other EU institutions, MPI collaborates on several long-term research and policy initiatives with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and other international institutions. This work is generously supported by the Luso-American Foundation in Portugal, the Stavros S. Niarchos Foundation, and the King Baudouin Foundation, among others.

Price: $24.95

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