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Comparison of Manual and Autopilot Breakout Maneuvers with Three Closely Spaced Parallel Runway Approaches

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Comparison of Manual and Autopilot Breakout Maneuvers with Three Closely Spaced Parallel Runway Approaches Comparison of Manual and Autopilot Breakout Maneuvers with Three Closely Spaced Parallel Runway Approaches Savita Verma, Sandra Lozito, Deborah Ballinger, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA Thomas Kozon, Perot Systems/ NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA Gordon Hardy, SAIC/ NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA Herbert Resnick, Raytheon Corporation, Waltham, MA Abstract Introduction This study used a high-fidelity flight simulator Many US airports depend on parallel runway to explore approach operations for three closely-spaced operations to meet the growing demand for day-to-day parallel runways using autopilot and manually flown operations. The main objective for increasing breakout procedures. An initial study investigated the simultaneous approaches on parallel runways is to concept under manual control mode only. The concept improve the throughput of the airport. Several concepts aimed to achieve visual meteorological conditions for simultaneous approaches have focused on capacities under instrument meteorological conditions achieving Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) when landing aircraft on runways as close as 750 ft capacities under Instrument Meteorological Conditions apart. This investigation studied procedures related to (IMC) because poor weather often reduces the capacity autopilot breakout maneuvers for triple parallel aircraft of airport with parallel runways to half. Triple parallel flying in an echelon formation and compared them to runways have the potential to increase capacity the manual procedures investigated earlier. All of the especially when they are 750 ft apart. Some airports data collection runs had an off-nominal situation, such as John F. Kennedy and Atlanta Hartsfield have which was either caused by the wake of the lead adequate space between th eir two parallel runways to aircraft drifting too close to the center and trailing build a third runway between them such that they are aircraft, or the lead aircraft deviating from its course all 750 ft apart. The biggest challenge with closely and blundering towards the center and trailing aircraft. spaced parallel runways approaches is achieving safe The location of the off-nominal situation (high/low operations. For runways that have greater than 3400 ft altitude) and the position of the ownship (center or separation between them, a No Transgression Zone right runway) were also manipulated. Statistically (NTZ) of 2000 ft between the runways provides a significant results showed that autopilot breakout safety net. In the concept investigated for this study, maneuvers were flown more accurately than manual the runways were 750 ft apart and a breakout maneuver breakout maneuvers. Some improved lateral separation was shown on the navigation display in the cockpit. was also observed between the paired aircraft while the Studies have researched missed approaches using auto autopilot was used, which could be attributed to the pilot or manual procedures for single runway airports improved accuracies with which the breakout [2] and there has been some research to compare the maneuver was flown using autopilot. On the subjective procedures under auto-pilot and manual flight control ratings, pilots experienced reduced workload, a similar modes prior to a breakout for two runway operations level of situation awareness, and a reduced level of [3]. However, no previous research has been done to situational demands under the autopilot condition. compare using auto-pilot and manual flight control Objective and subjective data from the current study modes for flying breakout maneuvers on three parallel extends the results from the previous research [1], with runway operations. some evidence to suggest further improvement in these factors when autopilot breakout procedures are used. This paper will compare the procedures for performing breakout maneuvers for triple simultaneous procedures under off nominal conditions using either the auto pilot or manual flight control mode. Several metrics including the workload and situation awareness navigation methods (VOR-Very high frequency Omni experienced by the pilots have been compared in this Range or GPS - Global Positioning System). He found study. that overall workload was higher in manual flight mode as compared to the auto pilot for the missed The following sections of this paper describe the approach phase of flight. The author also found that on background research and the experimental approach the subjective survey items, the pilots indicated a that was taken to study the effect of manual and “strongly agrees” to autopilot reducing their workload autopilot flight control modes on breakout maneuvers. (4.63 on a scale of 5). They showed preference for Then, the results and discussion section focuses on using auto-pilot during periods of high workload (4.63 separation between the aircraft, accuracy of flying the out of 5). Similarly, they also showed mid-level breakout trajectory and subjective data such as preference (3.38 on a scale of 5) towards using auto- workload and situation awareness. pilot for missed approaches. The authors of the current study also explored Background triple runway procedures for breakout maneuvers Most of the previous research on very closely conducted under manual flight control mode. They spaced parallel approaches has focused on dual found that pilots experienced high workload and a runways [4] [5]. The research on triple streams of reduction in situation awareness because they had to aircraft has been mostly exploratory in nature, such as focus too much attention on flying the breakout investigating the effect of adding a third stream of maneuver shown on the navigation display using the aircraft on capacity. There have been several flight director on the primary flight display [1]. The procedures defined for triple simultaneous approaches, current paper explores the differences in flying the and most of them define a no transgression zone or a breakout maneuver using the autopilot control mode, safety net to protect against aircraft blundering or as compared to the manual mode with three closely deviating from their intended path towards the other spaced parallel runways. aircraft. Previous research [6] described several permutations of Simultaneous Offset Instrument Approach (SOIA) procedures for triple parallel Experimental Approach runways. For example - an independent SOIA Airport and Airspace Design procedure [7] for triple aircraft arrivals procedure The experiment used a fictitious airport (KSRT) requires an independent monitor for each runway and loosely based on the current Dallas/Fort Worth has a 2000 ft No Transgression Zone established International Airport (DFW) layout and operations between each pair of simultaneous streams. except for three parallel runways that were set to be Breakout procedures were also defined by a 750 ft apart. Because the simulation focused on concept called Airborne Information for Lateral TACEC approaches to very closely spaced parallel Separation (AILS) studied by Abbott (2001) [3] at runways using south flow scenarios, only the west side NASA. They explored procedures where the flight runways (18L, 18C and 18R) were used. The outside control mode prior to the breakout was either autopilot runway (currently 18R) was moved inward to create or manual. The breakout procedure was always 18C with a 750 ft separation between the runways and performed under manual flight control modes. They a third 18R was also added at 750 ft from 18C. All found that if the pilots were flying under an auto pilot three of the runways were assumed to be equipped to a control mode prior to the actual breakout maneuver, CAT-IIIB level. they took longer to respond to the breakout. TACEC Procedures Several researchers have investigated the effect of Terminal Area Capacity Enhancing Concept [7] flight control modes on workload and errors. Casner (TACEC) allows for any aircraft arriving from any of [2] also explored the effect of flight control mode on the four arrival meter fixes (NE, NW, SE, and SW) to different phases of flight that included missed be paired for a simultaneous parallel landing, based on approaches for single runway operations, which are in aircraft characteristics and relative timing criteria. The some ways similar to the breakout maneuver. Among three paired aircraft flew their assigned 4D trajectories the other variables manipulated in the study were the with a high level of accuracy to meet timing constraints at the coupling point and to ensure wake safety different bank angles for the breakout maneuvers were throughout the approach. TACEC assumes augmented used and the curvature of the breakout trajectory Global Positioning System (GPS) and ADS-B changed on the navigation displays. The pilots flew the (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-B). breakout trajectory manually using the flight director when they received an aural and visual alert under the TACEC calls for the three aircraft to be paired at manual flight control mode condition. In the auto-pilot meter fixes located near the edge of the terminal condition, they flew the breakout trajectory without airspace, normally 40-60 nmi from the airport [8] and disengaging the auto-pilot. given TACEC-assigned 4D arrival trajectories to the runway. Flights in the simulation began 25 nmi from Displays the airport, assuming they were already The displays were similar to the displays used for paired/grouped. Routes to the airport included the study of two runway very closely
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