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Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law, 6 IND
DATE DOWNLOADED: Sat Sep 25 03:27:50 2021 SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline Citations: Bluebook 21st ed. Edward McWhinney, The Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law, 6 IND. L. REV. 202 (1972). ALWD 6th ed. McWhinney, E. ., The moscow summit meeting and the post detente international law, 6(2) Ind. L. Rev. 202 (1972). APA 7th ed. McWhinney, E. (1972). The moscow summit meeting and the post detente international law. Indiana Law Review, 6(2), 202-219. Chicago 17th ed. Edward McWhinney, "The Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law," Indiana Law Review 6, no. 2 (December 1972): 202-219 McGill Guide 9th ed. Edward McWhinney, "The Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law" (1972) 6:2 Ind L Rev 202. AGLC 4th ed. Edward McWhinney, 'The Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law' (1972) 6(2) Indiana Law Review 202. MLA 8th ed. McWhinney, Edward. "The Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law." Indiana Law Review, vol. 6, no. 2, December 1972, p. 202-219. HeinOnline. OSCOLA 4th ed. Edward McWhinney, 'The Moscow Summit Meeting and the Post Detente International Law' (1972) 6 Ind L Rev 202 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use: Copyright Information THE MOSCOW SUMMIT MEETING AND THE POST-DETENTE INTERNATIONAL LAW EDWARD MCWHINNEY* I. -
Diplomatic Negotiations and the Portrayal of Détente in Pravda, 1972-75
A Personal Affair : Diplomatic Negotiations and the Portrayal of Détente in Pravda, 1972-75 Michael V. Paulauskas A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of History. Chapel Hill 2006 Approved by Advisor: Donald J. Raleigh Reader: David Griffiths Reader: Chad Bryant ABSTRACT MICHAEL V. PAULAUSKAS: A Personal Affair: Diplomatic Negotiations and the Portrayal of Détente in Pravda, 1972-75 (Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh) This thesis explores how diplomatic relations between the US and the USSR changed during détente , specifically concentrating on the period between the 1972 Moscow Summit and the enactment of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Bill . I employ transcripts of diplomatic negotiations to investigate the ways that Soviet and American leaders used new personal relationships with their adversaries to achieve thei r foreign policy goals. In order to gain further understanding of the Soviet leadership’s attitudes toward détente, I also examine how the Soviet government, through Pravda, communicated this new, increasingly complex diplomatic relationship to the Soviet public in a nuanced fashion, with multilayered presentations of American foreign policy that included portrayals of individual actors and not simply impersonal groups . ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction………………………………………..…………………………………………. 1 A Cautious Beginning: Soviet -American Relations before the Moscow Summit ..…………...9 The Lifting of the Veil: The 1972 Moscow Summit …………………………..…………….16 The High -Water Mark of Détente: The 1973 US Summit …..………………………….……30 “Nixon’s Last Friend”: The Watergate Scandal …………………………………………..…37 Détente in Crisis: The Jackson-Vanik Amendment ……………..…………………………..45 Conclusion…………………………………………………..……………………………….53 Appendices ……………………………………………..……………………………………57 Bibliography …………………………………………..……………………………………..65 iii Introduction Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin greeted the news of Richard M. -
Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: the Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf
Roham Alvandi Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: the origins of Iranian primacy in the Persian Gulf Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Alvandi, Roham (2012) Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: the origins of Iranian primacy in the Persian Gulf. Diplomatic history, 36 (2). pp. 337-372. ISSN 1467-7709 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2011.01025.x © 2012 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/32743/ Available in LSE Research Online: March 2012 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process. Some differences between this version and the published version may remain. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. roham alvandi Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf* On the morning of May 31, 1972, the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, received U.S. -
1 the Politics of Ghostwriting Lawyers
1 The Politics of Ghostwriting Lawyers “The lawyers of the United States form a party which is but little feared and scarcely per- ceived, which has no badge peculiar to itself, which adapts itself with great flexibility to the exigencies of the time. it acts upon the country imperceptibly, but it finally fashions it to suit its purposes." – Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America1 If, as James Scott argues, most politics are “like infrared rays," taking place “beyond the visible end of the spectrum" and contradicting or inflecting “what appears in the public transcript," then lawyers are the virtuosos of democratic “infrapolitics."2 For under “the auspices of a disinterested exchange in the service of the law,"3 lawyers can remake social relations, broker fields of knowledge, construct novel polities, and dismantle old ones. Ubiquitous in Western societies, they are embedded in any social movement challenging or consolidating political authority.4 Yet officially they are to remain offstage, neither repre- senting their own interests (but those of their clients) nor providing decisions under law (for that is the judge’s job). Amidst clients ‘lawyering up’ and judges ‘pronouncing the words of the law,’ lawyers make do with the appearance of mere go-betweens. 1Tocqueville, Alexis de. 2003 [1862]. Democracy in America, Vols. I & II. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble Books, at 254-255. 2Scott, James C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, at 4-5; 183-184. 3Vauchez, Antoine. 2015. Brokering Europe. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, at 115. 4Halliday, Terence, and Lucien Karpik. -
Checklist for the Moscow Summit,Briefing
65 1 May 20,1988 CHECKLIST FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT,BRIEFING From May 29 to June 2,1988, Ronald Reagan will be in Moscow for his fourth meeting with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The first meeting, in Geneva in 1985, restored United States-Soviet summit dialogue after a six-year hiatus caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the terminal illness of three Soviet leaders. Reagan and Gorbachev met again in Reykjavik in 1986. That meeting broke down over Soviet insistence that the U.S. abandon its Strategic Defense Initiative. The third summit; .atwhichathe Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed, was held in Washington last December. With this fourth Reagan-Gorbachev summit, Reagan will have met the Soviet leader more times than any American President has met any other Soviet leader. In an important sense, therefore, this summit is almost routine. Dramatic agreements should not be expected, nor are they desirable. In keeping with this the Moscow summit should be deliberately low-key. Reagan should downplay arms control issues, except to insist on full Soviet compliance with the INF Treaty and to insist that any strategic arms agreement must include provisions for strategic defense deployment. Items of U.S. Concern. Reagan should emphasize agenda items reflecting U.S. concern over Soviet expansionism abroad and human rights abuses at home. He forcefully should express U.S. opposition to Soviet support for wars that anti-democratic and anti-Western regimes wage against their own peoples. He should tell Gorbachev that the U.S. expects Moscow to end all involvement in Afghanistan; stop its military aid to Nicaragua and pull Soviet-bloc advisors out of that country; support internationally supervised elections in Mozambique and Angola, along with a withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban troops from the latter country; refrain from encouraging the Philippine communist rebels; and end genocide being committed in Ethiopia by the Soviet client regime of the dictator Mengistu Haile Maria. -
Survey on Guidelines and Procedures for CH Management
Ref. Ares(2018)3987590 - 27/07/2018 HERACLES HEritage Resilience Against CLimate Events on Site Deliverable D1.1 Survey on guidelines and procedures for CH management Project details: No: 700395 Name: HERACLES Title: HEritage Resilience Against CLimate Events on Site Start date: May 1st, 2016 Duration: 36 month Version: V3.0 1 This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 700395 HERACLES D1.1 [HERACLES Survey on guidelines and procedures for CH management] Dissemination Level PU Public ● PP Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services) RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services) CO Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services) Document details: Project HERACLES Title Deliverable D1.1: HERACLES Survey on guidelines and procedures for CH management Version 3.0 Work package WP1 Author(s) Antonella Curulli, George Alexandrakis, Patrizia Grifoni, Elisabeth Kavoulaki, Elpida Politaki, Vassiliki Sithiakaki, Kostas Demadis, Ioannis Grammatikakis, Angeliki Psaroudakis, Georgios Tsimpoukis, Francesco Tosti, Giuseppina Padeletti Keywords Survey, guidelines, procedures Document ID HERACLES Survey on guidelines and procedures for CH management D1.1-v3.0 Synopsis Report for work package 1 Release Date July, 27th, 2018 2 HERACLES D1.1 [HERACLES Survey on guidelines and procedures for CH management] Revision history: Version Date Changes changes by 0.1 September, Draft version A.Curulli 16, 2016 0.2 October, Draft version G.Alexandrakis/ 06, 2016 K.Demadis October, 0.3 12, 2016 Draft Version A.Curulli October, 0.4 19, 2016 Draft version P.Grifoni/E.Politaki, October E.Kavoulaki, V.Sithiakaki 0.5 20, 2016 Draft version G. -
About the Results of the Moscow Summit and Their Impact on U.S
About the Results of the Moscow Summit and Their Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy and Soviet-American Relations. As experience shows, final results of such events as the Soviet-American summits become apparent over more or less extended period of time. So far, we can only talk about preliminary results. Among them, the following are the most significant. First of all, the summit brought substantial political and diplomatic results. It is important that we did not allow any breaks in the process of dialog, even though it was possible and even probably due to the U.S. political calendar (the electoral campaign, the situation in which the outgoing administration now finds itself—according to the American political terminology—the state of “lame duck”). Thanks to the summit, the year 1988 did not fall out of the process of normalization of Soviet-American relations; to the contrary, it already became an important marker in their development, which help ensure the continuity: both most likely presidential candidates are simply forced by the logic of events itself to speak positively about Soviet-American relations, about disarmament and other important issues, which were on the agenda. Thus it is as if they are “taking the baton” from Reagan. Furthermore, the preparation for the summit, the summit itself, and the subsequent realization of those agreements, which were achieved or outlined there, do not just cement the constructive changes in Soviet-American relations, but also give them a new impulse for further development in all the spheres— disarmament, resolution of regional problems, and improvement of bilateral relations. -
THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: General Secretary Brezhnev's Visit to the United States, June 18-25, 1973
THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: General Secretary ~rezhnev 1 s Visit to the United States, June 18-25, 1973 DEPARTMENT OF ST ATE Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Com mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, arrived in the United States on June. 16 for an official visit June 18-25, 1973. This pamphlet consists of documentaJion, reprinted from The Depcirtrnent of Stcite Bulletin of July 23, relating to that visit. Contents June 18 ____ Welcoming Remarks, White House 1 Exchange of Toasts 2 .Tune l9____ Agreements 5 Agriculture 5 Studies of World Ocean 7 Transportation 8 Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation 9 June 20 ____ Convention on Matters of Taxation 13 June 2L ___ Agreements 17 Strategic Arms Limitation 17 Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 18 Dr. Kissinger's News Conference, Washington 19 Exchange of Toasts at the Soviet Embassy 26 June 22 ____ Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War 30 Dr. Kissinger's News Conference, Washington 31 Protocols 3 7 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce 37 Commercial Facilities 3 7 June 23 ____ Protocol on Expansion of Air Services 38 Remarks at Reception, San Clemente 40 June 24 ____ Departure Remarks, San Clemente 41 General Secretary Brezhnev's TV and Radio Address 43 June 25 ____ Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communique 49 Dr. Kissinger's News Conference, San Clemente 53 Cover: President Nixon greets General Secre tary Brezhnev at the White House on June 18. Standing behind the General Secretary is V .M. Sukhodrev, Counse lor and Interpreter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. -
Rhetoric of Richard Nixon
Madman 1 Running Head: Madman The "Madman" Rhetoric of Richard Nixon: An Alternative Means to Establish Geopolitical Ethos. David K. Scott Department of Communication Arts Northeastern State University Tahlequah OK 74464 A Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the 2005 Central States Communication Association (Kansas City, MO April 6-10). Madman 2 Abstract In a geopolitical context, the means of establishing deterrence is premised on the military capability of a country and the perceived willingness of a leader to use force as a means to achieve policy goals. A key function of rhetoric is to establish the personal ethos of a leader regarding their willingness to use force. During the Cold War the rhetorical context of geopolitical discourse was premised on a rational choice model of decision-making based on a strategic calculation of the relative strength of each country. This paper argues that rhetorical strategies need to change relative to the strategic situation facing each leader. Further, the rhetorical burden of building and maintaining strategic credibility inversely increases relative to a country's military power. This paper explores Richard Nixon's innovative rhetorical strategy of cultivating irrationality and uncertainty as a means to maintain and enhance "deterrent credibility" during a period of national decline. Madman 3 Introduction Aristotle identified "ethos" or speaker credibility as a key component of successful rhetoric. One particular context of ethos can be referred to as "geopolitical credibility." Geopolitical credibility concerns the reputation of countries and leaders in relation to one another. In this context, credibility can be defined as a form of power and deterrence. -
47Th Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 1st APRIL 1976 - 31st MARCH 1977 BASLE 13th June 1977 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction I. Economic Developments and Policy Issues Positive developments on the international scene (p. ß) ; the central issues : unemploy- ment and inflation (p. j) ; outline of the Report (p. y). II. The Course of Economic Recovery io Recession and upswing: some international comparisons (p. 10); patterns of recovery: a varied picture (p. iß); cyclical and structural change: where do we stand? (p. ij); the utilisation of resources: adjustment versus accommodation (p. iy): personal consumption and saving (p. iy), dwelling construction (p. 20); business fixed investment spending (p. 21); fiscal policy and demand management (p. 2j): United States (p. 2y), Germany (p. 2y), Japan (p. 2y), United Kingdom (p. 28), Italy (p. 28). III. Inflation and Unemployment 31 Price inflation: recent trends and present prospects (p. ßi); international commodity prices: will history repeat itself? (p. ß2); exchange rates and domestic inflation (p. ßy); prices, wages and profits: the domestic aspects (p. 41); cyclical and structural un- employment (p. 4;); inflation and unemployment: the policy choices (p. 48). IV. Domestic Credit Markets and Monetary Policy 51 The pattern of sectoral financial positions (p. JI) : the financing of the corporate sector (p. jß), borrowing and lending in the personal sector (p. JJ), the financing of public-sector bor- rowing requirements (p. jy); monetary developments and policies (p. ;<>): monetary policy (p. jp), developments in monetary aggregates (p. 62) ; the use of monetary targets : problems and policies (p. 64) : actual results: how close to the mark? (p. -
1 Conversation No. 670-13 Date: February 14, 1972 Time: 1:04 Pm
1 Conversation No. 670-13 Date: February 14, 1972 Time: 1:04 pm - 2:25 pm Location: Oval Office The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman. Monday -Recent issue -Julie Nixon Eisenhower [?] -The President’s Vietnam peace plan -Democrats -Vietnam -Edmund S. Muskie statements form 1968 -Peace talks -Possible endangerment -Chicago -John A. Scali -The President’s 1968 statement Julie Eisenhower [?] Attorney General’s [John N. Mitchell] resignation An unknown man entered at an unknown time after 1:04 pm. Item -Delivery to residence -Thelma C. (“Pat”’) Nixon The unknown man left at an unknown time before 1:27 pm. Ronald L. Ziegler Portraits -Autographs -Rose Mary Woods -Older photographs -Milling -View -Family -Serious -Oliver F. (“Ollie”) Atkins -Candid shots Press 2 -Forthcoming trip to the People’s Republic of China [PRC] -Ziegler -Meeting with the President -Possible movie shown to the press -News -Hawaii -Movie -The President’s briefing -Contents of movie -Henry A. Kissinger -Inclusion -Ziegler’s concern -Stories -Pressure on the press corps -Hawaii -Ziegler -Concern Kissinger -Talk with Haldeman -Scali -Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Briefing books -Mrs. Nixon -Press -Ziegler -Chinese -Questions to Mrs. Nixon -President’s instructions -Brief -Kissinger -Sending a briefing book to Mrs. Nixon -Instructions to Haldeman -Guiding points and suggestions -Patrick J. Buchanan -Questions and answers [Q&A] -Things to be said in contrast to things not to be said -Kissinger -Buchanan -Press conference -Guiding points -Length -Kissinger -Ziegler -Scali 3 -Kissinger -Examination Ambassadors -Joseph S. Farland -Kissinger -Martin J. Hillenbrand -West Germany -Kissinger -Peter M. Flanigan -Hillenbrand -Kissinger -Possible rejection -Foreign Service -[David] Kenneth Rush -President’s support of Hillenbrand -William H. -
1 the Great Communicator and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War1 by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman President Ronald Reagan Is
The Great Communicator and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War1 By Ambassador Eric S. Edelman President Ronald Reagan is known as the “Great Communicator,” a soubriquet that was awarded to him by New York Times columnist Russell Baker, and which stuck despite Reagan’s disclaimer in his farewell address that he “wasn’t a great communicator” but that he had “communicated great things.” The ideas which animated Reagan’s vision were given voice in a series of extraordinary speeches, many of them justly renowned. Among them are his “Time for Choosing” speech in 1964, his “Shining City on a Hill” speech to CPAC in 1974, his spontaneous remarks at the conclusion of the Republican National Convention in 1976 and, of course, his memorable speeches as President of the United States. These include his “Evil Empire” speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, his remarks at Westminster in 1982, his elegiac comments commemorating the 40th anniversary of the D-Day invasion and mourning the Challenger disaster, and his Berlin speech exhorting Mikhail Gorbachev to “Tear Down this Wall” in 1987, which Time Magazine suggested was one of the 10 greatest speeches of all time.2 Curiously, Reagan’s address to the students of Moscow State University during the 1988 Summit with Mikhail Gorbachev draws considerably less attention today despite the fact that even normally harsh Reagan critics hailed the speech at the time and have continued to cite it subsequently. The New York Times, for instance, described the speech as “Reagan’s finest oratorical hour” and Princeton’s liberal historian Sean Wilentz has called it “the symbolic high point of Reagan’s visit….