THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO WORLDS COLLIDE: THE COMPETING LEGAL COSMOLOGIES OF TOKUGAWA JAPAN A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVINITY SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY ROBERT FARGO GREENLEE III CHICAGO, ILLINOIS AUGUST 2020 © Robert Greenlee, 2020. All rights reserved. CONTENTS Abstract iv Acknowledgements vi I. Legal Cosmology and Anthropology in Tokugawa Japan 1 II. Forging Tokugawa Law 71 III. Growing Pains- Ietsuna to Ietsugu 146 IV. Yoshimune’s Representation of Tokugawa Law 214 V. Matsudaira Sadanobu’s Imagined OrtHodoxy 282 VI. Conclusion 341 Appendix A Translation of Bateren tsuihō no fumi 367 Appendix B Translation of Shoshū jiin hatto 370 Bibliography 372 iii ABSTRACT This dissertation examines the early modern Japanese legal practice of explaining laws witH narratives drawn from the cosmological and anthropological theories of the archipelago’s varying religious traditions. From the formation of Tokugawa law in 1603 until Matsudaira Sadanobu’s Kansei reforms at the close of the eighteenth century, lawmakers and their critics relied on cosmological and anthropological narratives to explain and justify their attempts to make Tokugawa law and, particularly in moments of crisis, reframe it. While the use of religious narratives occurred consistently over a two-hundred-year period, legal arguments based on cosmology were not a pervasive feature of Tokugawa law. Instead, lawmakers generally used these narratives in a specific context— to support or corrode the authority of the constitutional laws that framed the Tokugawa legal order. Evaluating Tokugawa legal cosmology offers new perspective on a conundrum found in Tokugawa law; the cosmological narratives that appear in Tokugawa law varied widely over the course of the Tokugawa period, even as the substantive laws that they supported remained remarkably consistent. Tokugawa law, and particularly the Tokugawa constitutional laws, presented an appropriate forum to contest the political authority of the Tokugawa government. Here, interested actors constantly contested political authority in Tokugawa law in furtherance of personal or group interests. Legal cosmology served as an ideological battleground precisely because there was no “cosmological consensus.” In analyzing the intent behind the production of narratives of Tokugawa leGal cosmology, this dissertation makes the case against totalizing generalities about the relationship between Tokugawa religion and Tokugawa law in general or during any particular period. The story of Tokugawa legal cosmology is a story not simply of a singular “Buddhism” in conflict with a iv singular “Confucianism” but of a myriad of particular Buddhisms and Confucianisms deployed in the service of legal racionation against themselves and one another at particular times and over the course of time. Focusing on periods of crisis, this work considers the articulation of Tokugawa law at times when social and political conditions demanded new responses from both government and law. Looking closely at laws issued in these historical contexts, instead of finding common themes we find tactical reimaginations by interested actors, and instead of shared cultural understandings we find idiosyncratic interpretations that reflect multiple, open conversations occurring simultaneously. These narratives offer a new viewpoint from which to understand social dissensus, and particularly the types of arguments that shaped Tokugawa law. The competition among legal cosmologies found across the Tokugawa period calls into question totalizing characterizations of Tokugawa law that remain common in legal scholarship and are still commonly used to explain the impact of Tokugawa law on Japanese religion. The constant conflict between contrasting legal cosmologies belies the idea that Tokugawa law was static across the period, or that Confucianism held a preponderant intellectual influence over Tokugawa jurisprudence. At the same time, the ebb and flow of different strands of cosmological speculation calls into question alternative teleological narratives of Tokugawa law. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe this work primarily to incredible, undeserved good fortune. I have had the opportunity to work for an extended period with my advisors, Wendy Doniger, James Ketelaar, and Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, and for all those who are familiar with their remarkable work, I am sure my deep debt to their insights, ideas, and methodologies will be obvious. Although doubtless clouded by my own limitations, I hope that my attempt to carry forward on the paths of inquiry along which they have led me will offer some reward. What may be less apparent, but is to me much more cherished, are the countless hours that each have spent witH me teaching, explaining, and all too often helping me clarify ideas that I have only too vaguely understood. I am deeply grateful for the time, care and attention each have contributed to me. Throughout this dissertation, I have struggled implicitly with questions of agency and of the loyalty that comes with operating within a lineage. For me, personally, this is no different. I have benefited greatly from the ability to work and share ideas within a fertile collection of lineages, all connected through the University of Chicago. This work could not have been produced anywhere but at the University of Chicago Divinity School, and in no program but the History of Religions program. I would like to thank the faculty of the Divinity School who have assisted particularly in the broadening of these ideas, particularly Daniel Arnold, Matthew Kapstein, Bruce Lincoln, and the warmly-remembered Steven Collins for deepening my appreciation for Buddhist philosophy and the relationship of both religion and law to practice. I would also like to thank Christian Wedemeyer particularly both for his insights into Buddhist practice and particularly for his willingness to assume the mantle for the History of Religions vi seminar from Professor Doniger. As hosted by Professor Wedemeyer and, for many more years, Professor Doniger, I have rehearsed much of this dissertation over far too much coffee and far too many cookies in the friendly, but challenging environment of that special, evening seminar, and I would also like to acknowledge the insights I received from half-a generation of my colleagues. In particular, I received key insights from Charles Preston, Alex Rocklin, Rebecca Wollenberg, Alex Hsu, Kenneth Yu, Andrew Durdin, Emily Crews, Paride Stortini, Nabanjan Maitra, Jetsun Deleplanque, Pete Faggen, Justin Smolin, Bruce Winkelman, Adam Miller, and countless others. Through Professor Ketelaar, I have also had the opportunity to participate in the Japanese History seminar, and I am particularly thankful for the opportunity that I received to learn in this context directly from Professor Tetsuo Najita, as well as from the insights of all who have participated in this institution. Professor Ketelaar also provided the opportunity for me to participate in multiple instantiations of the annual Graduate Workshop with the University of Tokyo, and I wish to express my debt in this context to Professors Yijiang Zhong and Takahiro Nakajima for their insights in this context. Perhaps the unsung hero of this work, however, is Professor Hiroyoshi Noto under whose extremely patient tutelage I first tackled both sorobun and my first turn through the Buke shohatto. Without Professors Noto, Harumi Lory and much of the EALC, this work would not have been possible. In a similar vein, I also with to thank Nobuko Toyosawa for introducing me to the Kuzushiji Working Group, and to the members of the working group, including Professors Susan Burns and Chelsea Foxwell for offering me the ability to participate in the intensive summer workshop graciously taught by Aratake Ken’ichiro. vii Professor Sullivan graciously introduced me to the American Bar Association’s Legal History Workshop, and I would like to thank Christopher Schmidt for hosting this seminar, to useful comments received by Michael Kang, Joanna Grisinger, and the other participants of the seminar. I am also thankful for critical early encouragement from Tom Ginsburg and Richard Ross. Finally, I am deeply appreciative to Professor Mark Moller for countless hours of conversation over the course of a decade working through many of the problems addressed in this work. My work was funded in part at the Divinity School by the Kitagawa Fellowship. I am grateful for that support, and my work is equally indebted to Professor Joseph Kitagawa and his legacy. However, in lieu of many other fellowships offered by the University, I supported myself through the writing process through work, and I want to thank a number of my colleagues for their flexibility over the past decade. This includes Mary Beth Kurzak and the International Association of Defense Counsel for the opportunity to edit the Defense Counsel Journal, Bill Quinlan for the friendship and trust, and Bradley Tusk first for continued friendship and also for the numerous opportunities provided over the past ten years, as well as the numerous opportunities to come. This work was also informed by own experiences in government, and I wish to thank John Filan, Ginger Ostro, Michael Lurie, Paul Miller and all my former colleagues for everything. Finally, I am grateful most of all for the constant support of my amazing wife Lucy and my three lovely children Robert, Kate, and Thomas. I apologize to each of you for the lost months and years spent on this