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Joint Naval Exercises: a Post-Malabar-2007 Appraisal for India

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Joint Naval Exercises: a Post-Malabar-2007 Appraisal for India NO 52 IPCS ISSUE BRIEF SEPTMBER 2007 Joint Naval Exercises: A Post-Malabar-2007 Appraisal for India Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Cdr Gurpreet S Khurana Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses As part of the burgeoning Indo-US relationship, committed to improving the socioeconomic the two Malabar-2007 joint naval exercises have conditions of its people, its stakes are being been unprecedented in many ways. The Malabar identified increasingly with the maritime domain. exercises were conceived and have been Stability in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and conducted since 1992, as a purely bilateral tranquility in its waters are closely and directly linked event. The Malabar exercises of April 2007 held in to all its interests encompassed within the concept the western Pacific first took Japan into its fold of national security. Besides, India’s sea-borne and then in September 2007 was further trade, has expanded geographically far beyond expanded in scope and participation to include this region. However, shipping and other activity in Australia and Singapore as well. This turned it into the Asian waters continue to be beset by maritime a mammoth war-game in Bay of Bengal involving crimes. Although the overall incidents of piracy are 26 warships from five nations, and encompassing declining, it has now expanded spatially in the IOR virtually every facet of naval operations. and involves greater violence and coordination among miscreants. This has led to a fear of terrorists Malabar-2007 has also for the first time generated shifting their operations to the sea, particularly to a lot of international interest. Considering the maritime choke-points like the Straits of Malacca participation of India – a nation that prides itself and the Hormuz Strait, and the hub-ports that serve on its ‘non-aligned’ credentials – it has raised global trade. To make matters worse, the many questions: Are such exercises the precursors vulnerability of shipping and ports is increasing with to the formation of a military alliance in Asia, the growing mercantile traffic and tonnage of thereby signifying the beginnings of a new Cold vessels. Besides, organized crimes like drug- War? Within the Indian polity itself, a section has trafficking and smuggling of weapons have questioned India’s “independent foreign policy” continued to nourish terrorism and internal and cast doubts on whether the joint exercises instabilities in states. The insurgents in Myanmar and like Malabar are underpinned by legitimate India’s northeastern provinces, for example, are security imperatives? These add on to the existing known to be receiving their small-arms and doubts of some policymakers in India: Do naval explosives from Cambodia/Thailand via the sea- forces derive tangible ‘operational’ benefits out routes of Bay of Bengal. Owing to humanitarian of these exercises? Or are these merely considerations, India also has a normative diplomatic ventures? This commentary is an responsibility to respond to natural disasters and attempt to address these issues. marine accidents in the region. The capacity of India’s maritime security forces – its The Rationale for Security Bonds navy and coast guard – is clearly inadequate to cater to the abovementioned interests and At the outset, it is necessary to examine the responsibilities, even within the IOR. Considering the underlying imperatives for India to build inherent attributes of the ocean-realm, operating cooperative security ties with other nations. As ‘solo’ is impossible even for a state like the US India develops economically as a nation-state possessing a power-projection navy. The recent JOINT NAVAL EXERCISES: A POST-MALABAR-2007 APPRAISAL PAGE 2 proposal of the US naval chief for combining the relationship. Even though the potential threat may resources of regional states into a “thousand-ship manifest only in the long-term, perhaps in navy” to meet common security challenges is decades, India will need to prepare for it today pertinent in this regard. India is also, still a owing to the long lead-time necessary to build developing country with severe resource- naval capabilities. Joint exercises could thus be constraints, where decision-making for financial seen as an effort at capacity-building of naval allocation to maritime forces is often retarded by forces, and also a ‘hedge’ against major powers the ‘guns versus butter’ conundrum. This can be whose interests may be in contradiction with ones considered as the primary rationale for New own in the future. Delhi’s efforts to seek security bonds with major naval powers, grounded in a clear convergence of legitimate interests among partners. Joint An Appraisal of the Malabar Exercises exercises are the essential means to this end, since these enable them to achieve ‘inter-operability’ The Indian and US navies have been conducting so that their assets can be used in a Malabar joint exercises since 1992, but this complementary manner to respond to common became a regular event only from 2002. Malabar- adversities and contingencies. Such necessity is 2002 was pitched at a fairly basic level, involving best exemplified by the collective disaster relief manoeuvres, communication drills, underway operations undertaken by the navies of Australia, replenishment and exchange of personnel. The India, Japan and the US in the aftermath of the scope was expanded for the exercises that December 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean. followed in 2003 and 2004 to include helicopter cross-deck landings, submarine operations and Of course, security bonds may also be seen to be anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The exercises also backed by a strategic rationale. A major naval involved two American long-range maritime power operating in Indian Ocean in an inimical patrol (LRMP)/ASW aircraft. By 2005, Malabar had manner could potentially impinge on India’s vital become a high-level and complex exercise interests, its territorial integrity, or even threaten its involving aircraft-carrier operations. Malabar-2006 survival as a nation-state. The posture adopted by was the first time that a complete US the US carrier battle group in Bay of Bengal during expeditionary strike group also participated in a the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war will be a constant large-scale joint amphibious exercise. reminder to the nation of the possibility of political coercion. Similarly, while China’s compulsion to The two Malabar-2007 exercises have been safeguard its vital interests in Indian Ocean is conducted on a substantially larger scale, not only in terms of their greater ‘operational’ scope, but These exercises also help nations to fill capability also due to their multinational nature. Also, all ‘voids’ of their maritime forces. To meet its security exercises have hitherto been conducted off needs, India continues to rely upon countries with India’s western seaboard (the exercises are in fact named after India’s western Malabar Coast). The an advanced defence technology base for a major exercise area chosen for the second Malabar- part of its military hardware. For its navy, this is an 2007 is instructive. The exercise was held 350 km opportunity to ascertain the parameters of potential south-west of Andaman Islands, close to the acquisitions and assess their worthiness in a near- international sea-routes leading to the Malacca real ‘combat’ scenario, rather than in a Straits. This indicates that the primary purpose of ‘conditioned’ environment created to demonstrate the exercise was to develop synergy for protecting sea-lines through counterterrorism and anti-piracy their ‘best’ performances. missions. undoubtedly legitimate, it is known to be making Since 2003, the Malabar exercises have invariably efforts to cultivate strategic ‘nodes’ of influence in included vessel board search and seizure (VBSS) the IOR, which is being referred to as its “string-of- operations. These ship-interdiction exercises are pearls” strategy. This may be perceived in New integral to the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative Delhi as a move that bears an adversarial intent, (PSI), which seeks to counter the illegal particularly when irritants persist in the Sino-Indian transportation of weapons of mass destruction NO 52 PAGE 3 (WMD). While the proliferation of nuclear/ the US anti-submarine platforms to practice radiological, chemical and biological weapons to detecting the much quieter diesel submarines of non-state actors is among the foremost global the Indian Navy, considering that the US Navy security concerns today, it is particularly relevant operates without such boats. in Indian context. These exercises could be seen as a means to increase India’s policy options if it decides to join the PSI. Malabar-2007 is the manifestation of a growing Broadly, such exercises aim to achieve ‘inter- security relationship among major powers with a operability’ in terms of both ‘procedures’ and convergent worldview, and hence, its military- ‘technological compatibility.’ The process of achieving these objectives itself accrues strategic import cannot be discounted. The necessity substantial dividends. For all participants, it and an unstated additional aim of these exercises translates into widening the awareness horizon in were probably to pose a ‘strategic deterrence’ to terms of the doctrines, best practices and drills of China. The fact that Malabar-2007 attracted the other navies, which have evolved over decades attention of, not only the Chinese political in different security scenarios. In addition, the leadership, but also that of the Chinese media, is an motivational and training value of such exercises indicator that Malabar-2007 may have succeeded in cannot be ignored. Such events induce the ‘man behind the machine’ to ‘stretch’ himself to the achieving this objective as well. limit and put his endurance to the test. These exercises also help nations to fill capability These exercises also provide an opportunity to a ‘voids’ of their maritime forces. To meet its security navy to learn more about the platforms and needs, India continues to rely upon countries with equipment acquisitions planned for the future.
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