A Long-Term and Multi-Level View of Medellín's Metrocable
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Galvin and Maassen Urban Transformations (2020) 2:4 Urban Transformations https://doi.org/10.1186/s42854-020-00008-8 FOCUS POINT Open Access Connecting formal and informal spaces: a long-term and multi-level view of Medellín’s Metrocable Madeleine Galvin* and Anne Maassen * Correspondence: madeleine. [email protected] Abstract WRI Ross Center for Sustainable ’ Cities, 10 G Street NE, Suite #800, The inauguration of Medellín, Colombia s aerial cable car in 2004, is widely seen as a Washington, D.C. 20002, USA key turning point in reversing the city’s historical reputation for drug and gang- related crimes towards greater inclusiveness and public safety. Analyses of Medellín’s transformation have tended to focus on establishing the immediate positive outcomes achieved from the cable car and assessing persistent inequality and the fragile balance between enfranchisement and top-down institutional control. In this paper, we take these interpretations of Medellín’s transformation as our starting point and propose that a lasting legacy is to be found in the way the city plans for and works in disinvested areas. Our focus is on examining the elements that have made transformation possible in Medellín. We begin by exploring a set of framing conditions during the period of 1991 to 2000 (‘Before Line K’) and then outline the implementation of Metrocable and its shorter-term outcomes (‘Executing Line K’), before finally reflecting on the wider transformative impacts of this experience (‘Beyond Line K’). As key takeaways, we highlight the role of national policy, municipal finance, and community engagement in bringing a highly informal space into the reach of public institutions, thus providing insights for urban decision- makers looking to do the same. Keywords: Metrocable, Medellín, Informality, Municipal finance, Community engagement, Transparency Policy and practice recommendations 1. Engage with local stakeholders to gain insight as to how and where to target spatial interventions. 2. Support multi-sectoral coalitions through national mandates to ensure greater community representation and transparency in project design and execution. 3. Capitalize on institutional learning through inter-agency partnerships for more strategically designed public projects that appeal to the local context. 4. Diversify public revenue sources and commit to project deadlines to demonstrate state capacity and dedication through meeting public milestones. © The Author(s). 2020 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Galvin and Maassen Urban Transformations (2020) 2:4 Page 2 of 9 Introduction Medellín’s Metrocable, the world’s first urban mass transit application of cable car technology, has been the subject of great interest over the past decade, mainly because of the positive outcomes it is thought to have had on the city. Much of the academic writing on Metrocable focuses on these sectoral outcomes in isolation, such as the re- duction in the homicide and poverty rates around station areas (Bocarejo et al. 2014), which were shown to outpace a general downward trend across the city (Cerda et al. 2012). Others examine the process of transformation in Medellín but do so through a health and wellbeing perspective (Corburn et al. 2019). In this article, we take as our starting point that it is the collective effect of the various changes that occurred in the city’s physical environment, institutional and financial structures, and behaviors and mental models that can be understood as an ‘urban transformation’ (Maassen and Galvin 2019). However, it is also important to note that critical commentary describes Metrocable’s outcomes as promoting neoliberal policies (Franz 2017) and maintaining unequal societal structures (Sotomayor 2015). Accepting the validity of both arguments as indicating that urban transformation is an imperfect and contested process, we here focus on the experience of executing Metrocable (the ‘how’) and achieving its immediate outcomes, to understand how this experience translated into a long-term, multi-level process of planning for large-scale projects in formerly disinvested areas of Medellín. Our focus is on examining the ele- ments that have made transformation possible in Medellín in a long-term perspective. We begin by exploring a set of framing conditions during the period of 1991 to 2000 (‘Before Line K’) and then outline the implementation of Metrocable and its shorter- term outcomes (‘Executing Line K’), before finally reflecting on the wider transforma- tive impacts of this experience (‘Beyond Line K’). Before Line K Medellín is a city of roughly 2.5 million inhabitants located in the Aburra Valley region of Colombia. The city is the second largest in the nation, and has traditionally had a very well-established upper class, due to its beginnings as a gold mining town and its later transition into an industrial hub during the twentieth century (Ferrari et al. 2018). Decentralization in Colombia began in the 1980s, which, coupled with global economic decline, farmland expropriation, and mass rural to urban migration, precipitated a rise in violent conflict in Medellín. Efforts by the state to dismantle the drug cartel behind the violence were unsuccessful and led to increased crime in the city’s poorest neigh- borhoods. By 1991, the homicide rate in Medellín peaked at 381 murders per 100,000 people (Moncada 2016a, 2016b), attracting international attention, damaging the business environment and prompting the national government to intervene with a constitutional reform that further devolved administrative power to local entities in an effort to curb the violence. From this reform, Medellín acquired new fiscal and administrative powers that enabled it to set and achieve actionable goals for its constituents (Sotomayor 2015). The constitutional reform of 1991 led to a significant restructuring of Medellín’s in- stitutions. In an effort to curb the increasing homicide rate, the national government mandated the creation of the Presidential Council for Medellín, a collective of local and national officials, the private sector, community organizations, and academics Galvin and Maassen Urban Transformations (2020) 2:4 Page 3 of 9 (Restreppo-Miethe 2016) that brought the municipality closer to its community-based organizations (CBOs) to develop a strategy to combat the city’s rampant violence. It created a more direct pathway for city-to-citizen communication by mandating that each mayoral term be accompanied by a Municipal Development Plan and vetted by civil society organizations (Gomez et al. 2009). Additionally, it gave the municipality greater resources and freedom to enact specific public works projects by devolving increased central government revenues to municipalities and instituting tax reforms (Salazar 2013). This process brought together diverse stakeholders around reshaping the development narrative of Medellín through the improvement of its most at-risk areas (Restreppo-Miethe 2016). The Council identified the city’s extreme violence as a byproduct of deep socio- economic inequalities and developed its strategy around the establishment and strength- ening of key government institutions and services in conflict-ridden areas (Moncada 2016a, 2016b). In the 1996 Strategic Plan, the impoverished hillside neighborhoods were identified as a hotspot where above-average homicide rates coincided with socio- economic deprivation and spatial isolation from the rest of the city (IDB 2011). Partner- ships with CBOs gave municipal officials insight on how and where to target their spatial interventions in these areas, while the business community funded research centers to monitor municipal actions and promote transparency (Restreppo-Miethe 2016). These ef- forts created a network of organizations to ensure government accountability and increase the connectivity between citizens and the state. It also began to draw diverse stakeholders into the city decision-making process as more people realized their stake in the intercon- nectedness of Medellín. It was in this context that cross-sectoral projects centered around investing in deprived areas were prioritized. A number of large-scale infrastructure projects during the 1990s served as critical op- portunities for the municipality to learn how to best harness and structure its new fiscal and administrative powers to work in informal areas. The construction of Metro Line A demonstrated the significance of stable and local funding sources, as well as local capacity for successful project execution, as the project, originally set to open in the 1980s, was delayed until 1994 due to issues with foreign finance and external contract- ing. While the project was not considered successful from a management