North Korea: the Risks of War in the Yellow Sea
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NORTH KOREA: THE RISKS OF WAR IN THE YELLOW SEA Asia Report N°198 – 23 December 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE..................................................................................... 2 A. THE ORIGINS OF THE NLL ........................................................................................................... 2 B. DPRK TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ...................................................................................................... 3 C. THE LAW OF THE SEA .................................................................................................................. 3 III. A HISTORY OF CLASHES............................................................................................. 4 A. RIVAL CLAIMS ............................................................................................................................. 4 1. Rules of engagement .................................................................................................................... 4 2. June 1999: The first battle of Yŏnp’yŏng Island ......................................................................... 6 3. June 2002: The second battle of Yŏnp’yŏng Island .................................................................... 8 B. DIPLOMACY FAILS ..................................................................................................................... 11 1. 2000 to 2006: Warming ties ....................................................................................................... 11 2. 2006 to 2007: The peace zone proposal ..................................................................................... 12 3. 2008: A new president, a new tone ............................................................................................ 16 IV. TENSIONS WORSEN .................................................................................................... 16 A. NOVEMBER 2009: THE BATTLE OF TAECH’ŎNG ISLAND ............................................................ 16 1. Tensions after the November 2009 battle .................................................................................. 19 2. Cycle of vengeance in the Yellow Sea ....................................................................................... 20 3. Preparations to retaliate .............................................................................................................. 21 B. THE SINKING OF THE CH’ŎNAN .................................................................................................. 22 1. The torpedo attack ...................................................................................................................... 22 2. KPA submarine capabilities ....................................................................................................... 24 3. The CHT-02D torpedo ............................................................................................................... 25 C. THE YŎNP’YŎNG ISLAND SHELLING .......................................................................................... 26 V. NORTH KOREAN MOTIVATIONS............................................................................ 29 A. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION .............................................................................................. 29 B. DPRK DOMESTIC POLITICS ....................................................................................................... 30 C. SUCCESSION PLANS FORMALISED .............................................................................................. 31 VI. THE ROK RESPONSE .................................................................................................. 32 A. COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS ....................................................................................... 32 B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS ..................................................................................................... 33 C. ROK INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS ................................................................................. 33 D. MILITARY EXERCISES AND THE RESTORATION OF DETERRENCE ................................................ 33 VII. CHINA’S RESPONSE ................................................................................................. 35 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 37 A. THE NLL ................................................................................................................................... 37 B. CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES ........................................................................................... 37 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.............................................................. 38 B. MAP OF THE FIVE ISLANDS AND THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE ........................................................... 39 C. MAP OF YŎNP’YŎNG ISLAND ........................................................................................................... 40 D. GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................................... 41 E. CLASHES IN THE YELLOW SEA ......................................................................................................... 42 F. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 44 G. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2007 ......................................................... 45 H. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 48 Asia Report N°198 23 December 2010 NORTH KOREA: THE RISKS OF WAR IN THE YELLOW SEA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Yellow Sea off the Korean peninsula has become a among North Korean elites that Kim Jong-il is willing to potential flashpoint for a wider conflict. An escalating se- take on the South to promote his son and he would there- ries of confrontations by the Democratic People’s Repub- fore have no problem confronting domestic opponents. lic of Korea (DPRK) has seen the sinking of a Republic of Korea (ROK) naval vessel and the shelling of civilian Pyongyang politics aside, the disputed boundary repre- settlements on an island near the boundary. The disputed sents a grave risk. Negotiations on common exploitation nature of this maritime boundary, known as the Northern of marine resources, particularly the crab that is fished in Limit Line (NLL), as well as the volatility of DPRK poli- the area, have come to nothing and there has been little tics has created a serious risk that any further provocation progress on various confidence building measures that might turn into a wider conflict. While international at- could help prevent future crises, for example: the use of tention is once again focused on the North’s nuclear pro- common radio frequencies, or better signalling of intent gram, there is an urgent need to implement measures that by vessels and a naval hotline. While in past talks the could reduce the possibility of a clash in the Yellow Sea North has been willing to discuss economic cooperation, becoming something worse. it has done little to address security issues. The Northern Limit Line, drawn up after the Armistice of The response to the attack against the Ch’ŏnan culmi- 1953, has never been recognised by the DPRK. The nated in the U.S. and South Korea organising combined boundary, which is not considered an international mari- and joint military exercises in the area, with a U.S. air- time boundary because both Koreas regard this dispute as craft carrier participating for emphasis. Military exercises domestic, crosses an area of fishing grounds that are im- and clear signalling to Pyongyang that it cannot attack its portant to the ailing Northern economy and are close to neighbours with impunity are necessary to restore deter- busy Southern ports. The disputed aspect of the line, the rence and prevent escalation on the Korean peninsula. economic importance of the area, the ambiguities of the North Korea would lose an all-out war against South Ko- rules of engagement and the long history of violent con- rea and its ally the United States, but Seoul is constrained frontations have made it a flashpoint for conflict. in retaliating forcefully because it has so much to lose. Even talk of using force rattles markets and impacts the The sinking in March 2010 of the ROK vessel Ch’ŏnan South Korean leadership, which must take into account the and the shelling in November of Yŏnp’yŏng Island are mood of its electorate. Pyongyang, isolated from global the most recent and deadly of the confrontations in this markets and domestic political forces, does not face such area. Relations are at their worst point in more than a constraints. Rather the disparity permits it to provoke the decade with much of the progress of recent years undone. South at very little cost even while falling behind in the The South has found itself hamstrung, unable to respond overall balance of conventional forces. to North Korea with any force for fear of precipitating a wider confrontation. Impatience