IT-05-87/1-T 6557 D6557 - D6046 19 July 2010 TR
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Case No. IT-05-87/1-T IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER
Before: Judge Kevin Parker, Presiding Judge Christoph Flügge Judge Melville Baird
Registrar: Mr. John Hocking
Date Filed: 16 July 2010
THE PROSECUTOR
v.
VLASTIMIR \OR\EVI]
PUBLIC
PUBLIC REDACTED FINAL TRIAL BRIEF AND CORRIGENDUM
The Office of the Prosecutor: Mr. Chester Stamp Ms. Daniela Kravetz Ms. Priya Gopalan Ms. Paige Petersen Ms. Silvia D’Ascoli Mr. Eliott Behar Counsel for the Accused: Mr. Dragoljub \or|evi} Mr. Veljko \ur|i}
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6556
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
THE PROSECUTOR v. VLASTIMIR \OR\EVI]
Case No. IT-05-87/1-T
______PUBLIC PUBLIC REDACTED FINAL TRIAL BRIEF AND CORRIGENDUM ______ 1. The Prosecution hereby respectfully submits its Public Redacted Final Trial Brief with Annexes A to G. The redactions seek to protect the identities of witnesses subject to protective measures. 2. The Prosecution has identified several errors in its Brief, which it seeks to correct in this filing, as detailed below. 3. Paragraph 171 reads: “Just after the Rambouillet talks had collapsed, at a Serbian Radical Party (SRS) rally in Zemun, Vojislav [e{elj, a deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, stated that “If NATO bombs us, we Serbs will suffer casualties ₣...ğ but there will be no Albanians left in Kosovo.”1 During his testimony in relation to this video, \or|evi} explained that:
"... parliament duly backed Milo{evi}'s rejection of the Rambouillet terms as did the Serb public. Serbia's deputy prime minister revealed what Milo{evi} was planning to do next. If it comes to bombing by the NATO alliance, if an American aggression happens, we Serbs will suffer significant casualties, but there will be no Albanians in Kosovo."2
1 P1510;\or|evi},T.10044 10045. 2 \or|evi},T.10044 10045.
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PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6555
This paragraph should read: “Just after the Rambouillet talks had collapsed, at a Serbian Radical Party (SRS) rally in Zemun, Vojislav [e{elj, a deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, stated that “If NATO bombs us, we Serbs will suffer casualties ₣...ğ but there will be no Albanians left in Kosovo.”3 During his testimony, \or|evi} was shown this video with the following interpretation:
"... parliament duly backed Milo{evi}'s rejection of the Rambouillet terms as did the Serb public. Serbia's deputy prime minister revealed what Milo{evi} was planning to do next. If it comes to bombing by the NATO alliance, if an American aggression happens, we Serbs will suffer significant casualties, but there will be no Albanians in Kosovo."4
\or|evi} testified that he was unaware of Mr. [e{elj's pronouncements at this rally.5
4. Paragraph 234, seventh line reads: The Skorpions also had a Skorpions badge on the beret. This sentence is incorrect as it refers to a previous deployment of the Skorpions in the early 1990s. The last sentence of this paragraph reads: The Skorpions carried SAJ identity papers and were paid as SAJ reservists. This sentence should read: The Skorpions were engaged as SAJ reservists. Footnote 520 reads: Stopari}, P493, paras.13,18; K92, T.2748 (closed session). It should now read: K92,T.2748(closed-session); P86,p.1; D442,p.1.
5. Paragraph 542, last sentence reads: The police also told K87 where to dig, and in cases where graves were more dispersed or difficult to identify, a policeman would show K72 where to exhume by using a flashlight. This sentence should read: The police also told K72 where to dig, and in cases where graves were more dispersed or difficult to identify, a policeman would show K72 where to exhume by using a flashlight. 6. Paragraph 567, third sentence reads: Thirty five to 37 corpses were later exhumed and identified as having originated from Kosovo. This sentence should read: K84 stated that 35 to 37 corpses were later exhumed. These bodies were identified as having originated from Kosovo. Footnote 1375 should now read: K84, 3 P1510;\or|evi},T.10044 10045. 4 \or|evi},T.10044 10045. 5 \or|evi},T. 10046.
Case No. IT 05 87/1 T 2 16 July 2010
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6554
T.2043-2046 (closed session);Baraybar,P453,paras.16 17;P818, pp.11-14. This sentence should follow: Sterenberg indicated more concretely that “Postmortem examination indicated a minimum of 48 individuals, mostly adult males”. ₣See Sterenberg,P815,pp.37, para.1.ğ 7. At page 105, footnote 1030 reads: T.4483,4908; P809,p.4, paras.1 3;P810,pp.3 4. This footnote should read: Hyseni, P809,p.4;P810,pp.3-4. 8. At page 126, footnote 1277 reads: Bucaliu,P825,pp.3 4; Zatriqi,T.8319; P672,pp.5 6,10. This footnote should read : Bucaliu,P825,pp.3 4; Zatriqi,T.3830; P672,pp.5 6,10. 9. At page 202, footnote 2173 reads: P338,p.6. See Peraj,T.1341. This footnote should read: P338,p.6. See Stojanovi}, D724,p.22. 10. At pages 289 290, references to P1595 in footnote 3228 should read: P1595(MFI). 11. At page 304, footnote 3336 reads: P815, pp.31 35; K84, T.5225 5226 (closed session). This footnote should read: \or|evi}, T.9973-9975; P1508; P815, pp.31-35. 12. At page 336, footnote 3585 reads: See Part V, Section (C)(1)(f). This footnote should read: See Part V, Section (C)(1)(g). 13. Three under seal exhibits cited in the footnotes were not identified as non public exhibits. In order to clearly identify the non public status of these exhibits, the following footnotes have been amended to include reference to “under seal”: • Reference to exhibit D113 in footnote 1337 has been amended to read “D113(under-seal)”; • Footnote 1150 has been amend to read: K73,P332,pp.91 92(under-seal); and • References to exhibit P370 in footnotes 1377, 1384, 1392, 1395, 1399,1400 and 3310 have been amended to read “P370(under-seal)”.
Case No. IT 05 87/1 T 3 16 July 2010
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6553
14. In order to preserve the public character of these proceedings and avoid unnecessary redactions to the main text of the brief, the Prosecution has amended the following footnotes to replace the references to P370 with P370A, the public redacted version of this exhibit: • At page 141, footnote 1390 reads: K88,P370A,paras.22,30;T.1985;P371,pp. 6 7 (under seal). The truck is 4V on P370,p.14. This footnote has been amended to read: K88,P370A,paras.22,30;T.1985;P371,pp. 6 7 (under seal). The truck is 4V on P370A,p.14. • Footnote 1393 reads: K88,P370,para.23. This footnote has been amended to read: K88,P370A,para.23. • Footnote 1396 reads: K88,P370,para.26. This footnote has been amended to read: K88,P370A,para.26(under seal). • Footnote 1397 reads: K88,P370,para.31. This footnote has been amended to read: K88,P370A,para.31. • Footnote 1398 reads: K88,P370,para.27,29(under seal);T.1981;T.1986. This footnote has been amended to read: K88,P370A,para.27,29;T.1981;T.1986. • At page 141, footnote 1399 reads: K88,P370,para.27;Map P370,p.14. This footnote has been amended to read: K88,P370,para.27(under seal);Map P370A,p.14. • At page 142, footnote 1400 reads: K88,P370paras.28 29,p.14(map);T.1986 1988. He identified the uniform worn by the driver as #4 on P32. This footnote been amended to read: K88, P370, paras.28 29 (under seal); P370A, p.14 (map); T.1986 1988. He identified the uniform worn by the driver as #4 on P32.
15. Several references to private or closed session testimony were not identified in the footnotes. In order to clearly identify the non public character of this testimony, the following footnotes have been amended to include reference to private or closed session: • Footnote 838 has been amended to read: 6D2,T.12197 12198(closed-session); • Footnote 1645 has been amended to read: See P1127;P1128; Riedlmayer, T.7540. 6D2 acknowledged that religious sites and properties were damaged, including the mosques in Velika Kru{a and Landovica (6D2,T.12308(closed- session));
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PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6552
• Footnote 1878 has been amended to read: K83, T.383; Veljkovi}, T.7046,7048 (private-session), 7049; • Footnote 2775 has been amended to read: See e.g., P350; P1316; P1317; P970; P898; See also P1285; 6D2,T.12444(closed-session);P1548,p.2; • Footnote 3022 has been amended to read: K92,T.2783 2784 (closed session); \or|evi},T.9957 9958(private-session); • Footnote 3077 has been amended to read: Miti}, T.12758 9;K86, T.5123(closed-session); Maisonneuve, P851, paras.33,47; T.5470 5471; P864; • Footnote 3094 has been amended to read: K86, T.5191(closed-session); and • Footnote 3274 has been amended to read: See e.g. K84,T.2191(closed- session). Word count: 1075 Word count of Final Trial Brief: 118,623
Chester Stamp Senior Trial Attorney Dated this 16th Day of July 2010 The Hague, The Netherlands
Case No. IT 05 87/1 T 5 16 July 2010
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6551
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Case No. IT-05-87/1-T IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER
Before: Judge Kevin Parker, Presiding Judge Christoph Flügge Judge Melville Baird
Registrar: Mr. John Hocking
Date Filed: 30 June 2010 THE PROSECUTOR v. VLASTIMIR \OR\EVI] PUBLIC/REDACTED FINAL TRIAL BRIEF The Office of the Prosecutor: Mr. Chester Stamp Ms. Daniela Kravetz Ms. Priya Gopalan Ms. Paige Petersen Ms. Silvia D’Ascoli Mr. Eliott Behar Counsel for the Accused: Mr. Dragoljub \or|evi} Mr. Veljko \ur|i}
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6550
I. INTRODUCTION...... 1
II. THE JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE ...... 2 A. THE ACCUSED ...... 3 B. OTHER JCE MEMBERS...... 3 III. THE PLAN...... 8 A. THE PLAN TO MAINTAIN SERB CONTROL OVER KOSOVO ...... 8 1. Historical and Political Background...... 8 (a) Introduction ...... 8 (b) Legislative Changes ...... 9 (i) Special Measures ...... 9 (c) Demographic Changes ...... 12 2. Early development of the JCE prior to the NATO bombing campaign...... 14 (a) Arming of non Albanians and disarming of ethnic Albanians...... 14 (b) 1998 Operations and the Excessive Use of Force...... 16 (i) Overview...... 16 (ii) February March 1998 Likošane and Ćirez...... 17 (iii) The Attack on the Jashari Compound...... 17 (iv) March April 1998 ...... 19 (v) Attacks on Dečani/Deçan – April to June 1998...... 19 (vi) The Establishment of KDOM ...... 20 (vii) The Plan for Suppressing Terrorism...... 20 (viii) The Summer Offensive...... 20 (ix) The Use of the VJ in these Operations was Unlawful ...... 21 (x) Mid July September 1998 ...... 22 (c) Breach of peace building measures in the October Agreements ...... 26 (i) The October Agreements...... 26 a. Ðorñević Led the Negotiations for the MUP...... 28 b. Kosovo Verification Mission ...... 28 (ii) Violations of the October Agreements ...... 29 a. Refusal to Reduce Forces ...... 29 b. Refusal to Withdraw Heavy Weapons ...... 30 c. Breach of the Ceasefire...... 31 (d) Rambouillet and Paris negotiations...... 38 3. Administration and co ordination bodies in Kosovo used to implement the JCE...... 40 (a) Forces operating in Kosovo...... 40 (i) Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) ...... 40 a. Public Security Department (RJB) ...... 41 b. State Security Department (RDB)...... 45 (ii) Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) ...... 46 (iii) Other units operating in Kosovo...... 48 a. Military Territorial Detachments (VTOd)...... 48 b. Civil Defence and Protection ...... 49 c. Paramilitaries...... 50 d. Volunteers ...... 52 e. Local/Village Defence Forces and Armed non Albanian Population (RPOs) ...... 53 (b) Co ordination/ control of entities implementing the goals of the JCE...... 55 (i) Joint Command...... 56 a. Overview ...... 56 b. Establishment of the Joint Command...... 56 c. The Joint Command commanded and controlled the actions of the forces of the FRY and Serbia ...... 58 d. The Joint Command exercised authority over units engaged in combat actions ...... 58 e. The Planning and Co ordination Process ...... 63
IT-05-87/1-T i PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6549 f. The Joint Command continued to function after October 1998...... 66 (ii) MUP Staff...... 72 a. Establishment and composition of the MUP Staff ...... 73 b. Role of the Head of the MUP Staff, Luki}...... 76 c. The role of the MUP Staff was to plan, organise, co ordinate and control the activities of MUP units engaged in combat actions in Kosovo ...... 77 d. The MUP Staff operated within a functional chain of command...... 83 e. The MUP Staff co ordinated, organised and managed the engagement of MUP units in joint combat actions with the VJ ...... 91 (c) Supreme Defence Council (SDC) and Supreme Command (SC) ...... 96 (i) The SDC and SC were key entities in implementing the objectives of the JCE ...... 96 (d) VJ General Staff and SC Staff ...... 98 (i) The VJ General Staff and its war time equivalent, the SC Staff, were key entities in implementing the objectives of the JCE...... 98 (e) Co ordination of the VJ and the MUP...... 99 B. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JCE IN 1999 ...... 101 1. The leadership of the VJ and the MUP prepare to launch an offensive in the Spring...... 101 (a) The VJ and MUP leadership planned the Spring offensive ...... 101 (i) The VJ and the MUP fortified their units in Kosovo and incorporated armed non Albanian civilians into their ranks...... 103 (ii) The VJ and the MUP amassed weaponry in Kosovo...... 108 2. Launching the Spring offensive...... 109 3. Pattern of crimes ...... 113 (a) The scope and scale of crimes...... 113 (b) Forcible Expulsion ...... 115 (c) Murder...... 121 (d) Rape ...... 121 (e) Seizure of Identification Documents...... 122 (f) Destruction of Religious and Cultural Sites ...... 123 (g) The Existence of a Plan...... 125 4. Steps were not taken to punish those responsible for crimes committed in Kosovo...... 127 5. Investigations obstructed and crimes concealed...... 129 (a) Evidence of the Systemic Removal and Transport of Bodies...... 129 (i) Bodies from the Berisha Massacre ...... 129 (ii) Bodies from the Izbica/Izbicë Massacre...... 131 (iii) Bodies from \akovi}a/Gjakove Municipality...... 132 (iv) Other Evidence of the Systematic Removal and Transportation of Bodies...... 134 (b) The Refrigerator Truck in Bor/Kladovo ...... 135 (c) The Refrigerator Truck Incident at Lake Peručac...... 139 (d) The Concealment of Bodies at the 13 Maj Centre in Batajnica...... 139 (e) Forensic Evidence from Batajnica ...... 142 (f) Bodies Concealed near the SAJ Training Grounds at Petrovo Selo ...... 144 6. The rewards for those supportive of the objectives of the JCE ...... 148 IV. THE CRIMES...... 151 A. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE STATUTE ...... 151 1. Existence of an armed conflict...... 151 2. Nexus between the armed conflict and the crimes...... 152 B. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE STATUTE ...... 152 1. The attack...... 152 2. The widespread and/or systematic nature of the attack ...... 152 3. Civilian population...... 153 4. The acts of the accused formed part of the attack and the accused were aware that their acts formed part of the attack ...... 153 5. Discriminatory intent for persecutions...... 153
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C. THE CRIMES CHARGED...... 153 1. Orahovac/Rahovec municipality...... 153 (a) Celina/Celinë...... 153 (b) Bela Crkva/Bellacërkvë ...... 156 (c) Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe ...... 159 (d) Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel...... 159 (e) Nogavac/Nagavc ...... 162 2. Prizren...... 168 (a) Pirane...... 169 (b) Srbica ...... 169 (c) Landovica...... 170 (d) Du{anovo ...... 170 3. Srbica/Skenderaj ...... 171 (a) Izbica/Izbicë ...... 172 (b) Turicevac/Turiçec ...... 176 (c) Kladernica/Klladernicë...... 177 4. Suva Reka/Suharekë municipality ...... 177 (a) Murder of the Berisha family ...... 179 5. Pe}/Pejë...... 184 6. Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica ...... 187 7. Pri{tina/Prishtinë municipality...... 193 (a) Priština/Prishtinë town ...... 194 8. Ðakovica/Gjakovë Municipality...... 199 (a) Ðakovica/Gjakovë town...... 199 (b) Milo{ Gili} Street/Millosh Giliq Street...... 200 (c) Korenica/Korenicë ...... 203 (d) Meja/Mejë ...... 204 9. Gnjilane/Gjilan Municipality...... 208 (a) Žegra/Zhegër ...... 208 (b) Vladovo/Lladovë...... 210 (c) Prilepnica/Përlepnicë...... 211 10. Uro{evac/Ferizaj ...... 214 (a) Staro Selo/Fshati I Vjeter ...... 214 (b) Biba/Bibe and Sojevo/Sojevë...... 215 (c) Mirosavlje/Mirosalë ...... 217 (d) The Uro{evac Train Station ...... 218 11. Ka~anik Municipality...... 222 (a) Kotlina/Kotlinë...... 223 (b) Ka~anik/Kaçanik town...... 225 (c) Slatina/Sllatina and the Vata/Vataj hamlet...... 226 12. Dečani/Deçan...... 228 (a) Drenovac/Drenoc and Beleg ...... 228 13. Vu~itrn/Vushtrria municipality...... 232 14. Podujevo/Podujevë ...... 237 15. Unscheduled Incidents...... 243 (a) ^uska/ Qyshk ...... 243 (b) Pusto Selo/PustaSelë ...... 245 V. RESPONSIBILITY PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 7(1) AND 7(3) OF THE STATUTE...247 A. LEGAL ELEMENTS OF ARTICLE 7(1) MODE OF LIABILITY...... 247 1. Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) ...... 247 2. Ordering ...... 250 3. Planning ...... 251 4. Instigating ...... 252 5. Aiding and abetting...... 252
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B. LEGAL ELEMENTS OF ARTICLE 7(3) MODE OF LIABILITY ...... 253 1. Superior subordinate relationship...... 253 2. Knew or had reason to know ...... 254 3. Failed to prevent or punish ...... 256 C. VLASTIMIR ÐORÐEVI}'S INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ARTICLE 7(1) OF THE STATUTE ...... 259 1. Ðorñević is responsible for the crimes charged in the Indictment as a member of the JCE259 (a) Introduction ...... 259 (b) \or|evi}’s position...... 260 (c) \or|evi} commanded and controlled all RJB units in Kosovo ...... 260 (i) \or|evi} headed the RJB ...... 260 (ii) \or|evi} continued to command RJB units in Kosovo after June 1998 and during the Indictment period...... 262 (iii) \or|evi} participated in high level strategic meetings ...... 266 (iv) The Serbian military and political leadership, and internationals, recognised \or|evi} as the leader of the RJB in Kosovo...... 269 (v) Conclusion ...... 270 (d) \or|evi} participated in training and arming non Albanian civilians and disarming Albanian villages ...... 271 (i) The arming of the non Albanian population...... 271 (ii) \or|evi} participated in the disarming of predominantly Albanian villages...... 275 (iii) By arming non Albanians and disarming ethnic Albanians, \or|evi} facilitated the commission of the crimes charged ...... 276 (e) \or|ević planned and co ordinated joint MUP/VJ combat operations ...... 276 (f) \or|ević used paramilitary groups and volunteers ...... 280 (i) Prior to the commencement of the NATO campaign Stojiljkovi} and \or|evi} prepared for the introduction of paramilitaries and volunteers in to the MUP...... 280 (ii) \or|evi} approved and facilitated the use of the Skorpions unit in Kosovo in 1999 ..... 281 a. \or|evi} reinforced the SAJ with the Skorpions ...... 281 b. The re grouping of the Skorpions ...... 282 c. \or|evi} ordered the deployment of Medi}’s unit to Kosovo with the SAJ...... 283 d. \or|evi} knew he was deploying a notorious paramilitary unit...... 284 e. The Skorpions were deployed to Kosovo in late March 1999...... 287 f. Upon arriving in Podujevo/Podujevë, the Skorpions killed a group of civilians...... 287 g. The Skorpions were under SAJ command by the time they arrived in Podujevo/Podujevë...... 288 h. At Prolom Banja, the Skorpions were disarmed and disbanded ...... 289 i. In April 1999, \or|evi} redeployed the Skorpions to Kosovo...... 289 j. Once redeployed to Kosovo, the Skorpions participated in “cleansing” ethnic Albanian villages...... 291 (g) \or|evi} played a leading role in the concealment of the crime of murder ...... 292 (i) The Refrigerator Truck in Bor/Kladovo ...... 293 (ii) The Refrigerator Truck Incident at Lake Peruča} ...... 297 (iii) The Concealment of Bodies at the 13 Maj Centre in Batajnica ...... 301 (iv) Bodies Concealed at Petrovo Selo ...... 304 (v) \or|evi}’s flight ...... 306 (h) \or|evi} created an environment permissive of criminal behaviour ...... 307 (i) \or|evi}’s knowledge of crimes ...... 307 (i) Knowledge of crimes in 1998...... 307 a. Knowledge of MUP operations on the ground...... 308 b. Knowledge of widespread destruction and looting ...... 309 c. Knowledge of killings ...... 310 d. Knowledge of the large scale displacement of civilians ...... 311 e. Knowledge of allegations levelled against the MUP by the international community . 313 (ii) Knowledge of crimes in 1999...... 314 a. Knowledge of MUP operations ...... 314
IT-05-87/1-T iv PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6546 b. Knowledge of large scale displacement...... 317 c. Knowledge of killings ...... 317 d. Knowledge of crimes at high level meetings in Belgrade ...... 319 e. Knowledge of crimes from the international community and the media ...... 320 2. \or|evi} shared the intent to carry out the common plan...... 321 3. Other forms of participation under Article 7(1)...... 322 (a) \or|evi} is responsible for aiding and abetting the commission of crimes...... 322 (b) \or|evi} is responsible for planning, ordering and instigating ...... 324 D. VLASTIMIR ÐORÐEVIĆ’S INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ARTICLE 7(3) OF THE STATUTE ...... 325 1. Superior subordinate relationship...... 325 2. Knew or had reason to know and failure to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or to punish...... 328 (a) Failure to prevent ...... 328 (i) Ðorñević had reason to know of and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent crimes committed by his subordinates in 1999...... 328 (ii) \or|evi} had reason to know of and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent crimes committed by the Skorpions ...... 330 (b) Failure to punish...... 332 (i) Ðorñević knew about the Podujevo/Podujevë massacre and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to punish the crime...... 332 (ii) Ðorñević knew that his subordinates had committed murders and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to punish them ...... 336 VI. SENTENCING...... 340
IT-05-87/1-T v PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6545 I. INTRODUCTION
1. This trial is about responsibility for a widespread and systematic campaign of terror and violence conducted by the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbia against Kosovo Albanians from 24 March 1999 to 20 June 1999 (Indictment period). Thousands were abused and killed and over 800,000 were forcibly expelled from the province as an intended consequence of the deliberate and coercive actions of these forces.
2. The purpose of this campaign was to ensure continued Serbian rule over the province of Kosovo. Ðorñević, the Accused, acting individually and collectively with others, orchestrated these events and the evidence discussed in the brief establishes that he is criminally liable for the crimes charged.
Assessment of evidence
3. In a case of this magnitude, it is not sensible to recite in a final brief all the evidence that has been heard by the Trial Chamber. The Prosecution has therefore made a selection of the matters it assesses to be of greatest relevance. However, if the Trial Chamber finds that there is evidence, outside that specifically cited, which lends support to the submissions made by the Prosecution, then its omission in this brief should not be taken as an indication that it is considered less than compelling. The same applies to exhibits.
4. Of the many defence witnesses who testified, only those who are assessed to be of particular interest are discussed. The fact that others are not mentioned in this brief does not mean that the Prosecution accepts that they are credible or reliable. As a general observation, a great number of the defence witnesses were former subordinates of the Accused who carried out his orders during the material time or who were sympathizers of the policies of the Accused or participants in implementing them. Many were vehement in their denial of any knowledge relating to matters they must have known about, for example, the Joint Command or the Accused’s authority as Chief of the Public Security Sector (RJB). This renders their evidence of very little value and it should be approached with extreme caution. Some only relented after documents of irresistible force were shown to them.
5. The Accused elected to testify and made denials of several areas of the Prosecution’s case. His evidence is discussed extensively in this brief but the fact that a particular area of contention is not directly traversed herein does not mean that the Prosecution accepts that it is credible or reliable.
IT-05-87/1-T 1 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6544 Annexes to the brief
6. Several annexes are attached. Annex A contains two maps of the deportation and murder sites charged in the Indictment. Annex B contains two maps of crime site areas where forces of the FRY and Serbia were deployed pursuant to Joint Command orders. Annex C contains the proof of death charts. Annex D is a chart with the structure of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) during the Indictment period. Annex E is a chart with the structure of the Ministry of Interior (MUP) in Kosovo during the Indictment period. Annex F is the glossary of terms and legal authorities used in the brief. Annex G is a map showing the place of origin of the bodies found at mass grave sites in Serbia proper.
II. THE JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE
7. Ðorñević participated in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) to modify the ethnic balance in Kosovo through criminal means in order to ensure continued Serbian control over the province, and the crimes charged in the Indictment were committed in the course of the JCE.
8. A number of other individuals participated in the JCE, including his former co accused — Nikola [ainovi}, Dragoljub Ojdani}, Neboj{a Pavkovi}, Vladimir Lazarevi}, and Sreten Luki} — and Slobodan Milo{evi} (FRY President), Vlajko Stojiljkovi} (MUP Minister), Radomir Markovi} (Head of the Public Security Department), Obrad Stevanovi} (Head of Police Administration), and Dragan Ili} (Head of Crime Police). These persons worked together and with others including members of command and co ordinating bodies and members of the forces of the FRY and Serbia who shared their intent to fulfil the purpose of the JCE.
9. Insofar as any crimes charged in the Indictment were committed by members of the forces of the FRY and Serbia who were not members of the JCE, liability still attaches to the Accused for his participation in that JCE, because the physical perpetrators of the crimes were used by participants in the JCE.
10. The common purpose of the JCE was to be achieved through a campaign of deportations, forcible transfers, murders and persecutions. Such a campaign was the result of a concerted effort. The Kosovo Albanian population was the target of this campaign that aimed to forcibly expel a substantial portion of the majority Albanian population from Kosovo.
11. The Accused shared the common criminal purpose and intended the crimes charged. These crimes were committed pursuant to that common purpose. Alternatively, should the Trial Chamber
IT-05-87/1-T 2 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6543 find that the crimes in Counts 3 to 5 (murder and persecutions) were outside the common purpose, these crimes were natural and foreseeable consequences of its execution. In deciding to participate in that enterprise, the Accused willingly accepted that risk.
A. The Accused
12. The evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that Ðorñević was a key participant in the formulation, preparation and execution of the common purpose to forcibly expel Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo. During the Indictment period, Ðorñević was Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia and Chief of the Public Security Sector (RJB) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP). Ðorñević led the RJB under the direction of the then MUP Minister, Vlajko Stojiljković, and was responsible for all units and personnel of the RJB in Serbia. This included the MUP units deployed to Kosovo that participated in the direct perpetration of the crimes charged during the Indictment period.
13. Through his acts or omissions, Ðorñević contributed to the JCE:
• as Assistant Minister of the MUP, Chief of the RJB and member of the MUP Minister’s Collegium, he commanded and controlled all RJB units and subordinate units in Kosovo, which perpetrated the crimes charged in the Indictment; • as a member of the Joint Command and Head of the RJB, he participated in the training and arming of non Albanian civilians and the disarming of Albanian villages; • he participated in the planning and co ordination of joint MUP/VJ combat operations; • he incorporated paramilitary groups into the MUP in Kosovo; • he concealed murders perpetrated during MUP/VJ actions in Kosovo; and • he created an environment permissive of criminal behaviour by MUP units.
B. Other JCE Members
14. The evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that in addition to the Accused, the following individuals were also members of the JCE charged in the Indictment: Slobodan Milo{evi}; Nikola [ainovi}; Vlajko Stojijlkovi}; Sreten Luki}; Radomir Markovi}; Obrad Stevanovi}; Dragan Ili}; Dragoljub Ojdani}; Neboj{a Pavković; and Vladimir Lazarevi}.
IT-05-87/1-T 3 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6542 15. Milan Milutinovi}, former president of Serbia, was also included among the JCE members in the initial Indictment. The Prosecution in this case has not led sufficient evidence to prove his participation in the JCE beyond reasonable doubt.
16. During the Indictment period, Slobodan Milo{evi}, President of the FRY, was unquestionably the most powerful person in the country.1 He was the one and only person controlling everything in the FRY.2
17. Milo{evi} was the leading figure in the JCE. Milo{evi}’s dominance was built on manipulation of Serbian nationalist policies – the essence of which was that Serbs must live in territory controlled by Serbs or be vulnerable to discrimination, persecution and genocide by non Serbs. Milo{evi} was elected President of Serbia on 8 May 1989, a post he held for the next eight years, until he was elected President of Yugoslavia on 23 July 1997 the position he held until October 2000. 3 In order to maintain his political dominance, it was imperative that Milo{evi} retain Serb control over Kosovo. His strategy was to force Kosovo Albanians out of Kosovo and to move in Serbs in order to alter the ethnic balance in favour of Serbs.4 He manipulated the political, military, and police promotion systems to ensure that his nominees retained control. During his meetings with Knut Vollebaek, the Chairman of the OSCE, Milo{evi} was adamant that Kosovo was the cradle of Serbian culture. Vollebaek concluded that Milo{evi} needed a conflict in Kosovo to keep his personal base of power.5
18. Milo{evi} controlled all major decisions and institutions of government.6 He led the dominant political party at the time, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). He ordered the formation of the Joint Command in 1998,7 which exercised command over MUP and VJ forces in Kosovo until June 1999. The Joint Command had no source of authority in law apart from that delegated to it by Milo{evi}. He commanded the VJ in accordance with decisions taken by the Supreme Defence Council (SDC) and had significant de facto powers over the MUP.
19. Nikola [ainovi} was Milo{evi}’s man on the ground in Kosovo and one of his closest and most trusted associates.8 He was the Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY responsible for Kosovo.9 It was [ainovi}’s close relationship to Milo{evi} that led him to head the Joint Command in 1998 and 1 Surroi,T.347;Vollebæk,P1073,pp.4 5;P1072,pp.12 14. 2 Vollebaek,P1073,pp.4 5;P1072, p.14. 3 Abrahams,P738,p.14. 4 Vollebaek,P1073,p.15;Merovci,P416,para.8. 5 Vollebaek,P1073,p.10 11;P1072,p.42. 6 See Vollebaek,P1073,p.5. 7 P1245. 8 Vasiljevi},T.5700;Merovci,T.2225;P490.
IT-05-87/1-T 4 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6541 1999 and to become the Chairman of the Commission of Co operation with the KVM in late 1998.10 [ainovi} oversaw the activities of the VJ, the MUP and the civilian structures in Kosovo, and also directed them in conformity with instructions provided by Milo{evi}.11 He was in regular contact with MUP and VJ leadership, including Generals Neboj{a Pavkovi} and Sreten Luki}. [ainovi} was able to exert influence over them and was aware of planned joint VJ and MUP actions.12 On 15 January 1999, during the MUP and VJ action at Ra~ak, \or|evi} reported to [ainovi} about that action.13 [ainovi} had a decision making role with respect to Kosovo.14
20. Vlajko Stojijlkovi} was the Minister of Interior during the Indictment period.15 He headed the Ministry and was responsible for all its activities.16 In accordance with the law governing the Ministry of the Interior, he directed the manner in which the Ministry carried out its work, issued instructions to its personnel in the performance of their duties and determined the structure, mandate and scope of the operations of organisational units within the Ministry.17 He was empowered to call up reserve members of the Ministry to perform duties during peacetime.18 As Minister of Interior he was politically responsible to the National Assembly and the President of the Republic for the work of the Ministry.19 As Head of the RJB, \or|evi} was directly responsible to Stojiljkovi}20 and together they were the two highest officials responsible for the work of the RJB in Kosovo.21
21. Sreten Luki} was appointed Head of the MUP Staff for KiM on 11 June 1998 by \or|evi} and was his direct subordinate.22 He remained in this position until June 1999.23 Through the MUP Staff, Luki} played a central role in planning, organising, controlling and directing the work of MUP units in Kosovo, as well as co ordinating and planning joint operations with the VJ. Luki} was a crucial member of the Joint Command and worked closely with the VJ leadership, in particular Neboj{a Pavkovi}, to ensure the implementation of Joint Command directives in a co
1. 9 Vollebaek,P1073,p.4;P1071,p.5;Philips,T.8687;Drewienkiewicz,T.6342;D472;D484;D494. 10 See P1329;Cveti},T.6627 6628. 11 Vasiljevi},T. 5682,5746 5747;Drewienkiewicz,T.6342;P490.See Cveti},T.6627 6628,6655 6657. 12 See Vasiljevi},T.5824 5825. 13 K86,T.5127 5129,5131,5236 5237 (closed session). 14 Drewienkiewicz,T.6342;Ciaglinski,T.5285 5287. 15 Cveti},P1037. 16 Ðorðević,T.9400 9401. 17 P66,Arts.6 8. 18 P66,Arts.28. 19 P66,Arts.9. 20 Ðorðević,T.9409,9410;P263. 21 Vasiljevi},T.5683. 22 P760. Although the date of P760 is illegible, a related document, P57, indicates that the date of this decision is 11 June 1998 (P57,para.6). See also Cvetić,T.6623. 23 P57;P67.
IT-05-87/1-T 5 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6540 ordinated manner between VJ and MUP forces.24 Luki} was also the bridge between the policy planners in Belgrade, such as Stojiljkovi} and \or|evi}, and those on the ground in Kosovo.25
22. Other MUP officers within the JCE were Radomir Markovi}, Head of the State Security Department (RDB);26 Obrad Stevanovi}, Head of Police Administration,27 and Dragan Ili}, Head of Crime Police,28 and \or|evi}’s direct subordinate.29
23. Dragoljub Ojdani} served as Deputy Chief of the VJ General Staff between June 1996 and November 1998. On 24 November 1998, Ojdani} was appointed as Chief of the VJ General Staff,30 a position he held during the Indictment period. As Chief of the VJ General Staff and of the Supreme Command Staff during the state of war in 1999, Ojdani} was the highest ranking military officer in the VJ and exercised command authority over the VJ, and forces subordinated to the VJ. In order to accomplish the directives of FRY President Milo{evi}, he issued orders to strategic units of the VJ and VJ officers who were subordinate to him.
24. Neboj{a Pavković was assigned to the Priština Corps in 1994 and assumed command of the Pri{tina Corps (PrK) on 9 January 1998. On 25 December 1998, he was appointed Commander of the Third Army, a position he took up in January 1999.31 In his role of Commander of the Third Army, Pavkovi} had effective control over the VJ forces in Kosovo throughout the period during which crimes were committed. As a member of the Joint Command in 1998 and 1999, he worked closely with the MUP leadership, in particular Sreten Luki}. Pavkovi} ordered and supported the operation of the VJ in Kosovo in 1999, including joint operations with the MUP co ordinated through the Joint Command. Pavkovi} was Luki}’s counterpart with respect to the VJ. He had a close connection with Milo{evi}, particularly in relation to the activities of the VJ and MUP in Kosovo during the Indictment period.
25. Vladimir Lazarevi} became Chief of Staff of the PrK in 1998, and was appointed Commander of the PrK on 25 December 1998.32 As PrK Commander, Lazarevi} had effective control over members of PrK units in Kosovo. He planned, ordered and commanded the activities of PrK units during operations conducted in Kosovo in the Indictment period. Lazarevi} and the
24 Cveti},T.6650,6655,6657;P1039,p.1. 25 Cveti},T.6645,6597. 26 Cveti},P1037. 27 Cveti},T.6594. 28 Cveti},T.6667. 29 Cveti},T.6667. 30 P1363,pp.3 5. 31 P1343;P1494;P1493. 32 P1494.
IT-05-87/1-T 6 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6539 PrK Command also participated in the planning and execution of joint operations with the MUP in 1999.33 The PrK Command was the source of Joint Command orders.34
26. Milo{evi} surrounded himself with loyal followers. All JCE members shared Milo{evi}’s sentiments about Kosovo and were loyal to him. During a meeting with Michael Phillips of the Kosovo Verification Mission, in November 1998, [ainovi} said that Kosovo was Serbian homeland and the cradle of Serbian civilisation, and that the Albanian population had no desire to coexist with Serbs to whom Kosovo belonged.35
27. With Milo{evi} at the helm, on or about 24 March 1999, the members of the JCE launched a large scale and highly coordinated operation in pursuit of the goal of the JCE: the modification of the ethnic balance of Kosovo through criminal means in order to ensure continued Serbian control over the province. The MUP and VJ units acted together in a closely coordinated fashion to achieve this end.
33 See Vasiljevi},T.5828 5830. 34 See Part III,Section (A)(3)(b)(i). 35 Phillips,P1303,p.15.
IT-05-87/1-T 7 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6538 III. THE PLAN
A. The plan to maintain Serb control over Kosovo
1. Historical and Political Background
(a) Introduction
28. Although Serbs are the minority population in Kosovo,36 many Serbs considered Kosovo to be an integral part of Serbia. The majority of Serbs have a strong emotional connection to the territory which they considered to be the cradle of their culture.37 Illustrative of this sentiment is Commander of the 549th Motorised Brigade Deli}’s statement “We all [Serbs] will protect Kosovo with our lives […]”38
29. During the 1980s, one principal grievance of Serbian nationalist circles was that the 1974 SFRY Constitution39 gave Kosovo substantial autonomy and left Kosovo Serbs vulnerable to discrimination by a government in Kosovo dominated by ethnic Albanians.40 The notorious 1986 Memorandum, which originated from the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, spoke of genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija.41
30. Slobodan Milo{evi}, head of the communist party in Serbia by 1986, came out in strong support of the Kosovo Serbs.42 Milo{evi} rose to power on his ability to convince the Serbian public that he could retain control over Kosovo.43 On 24 March 1987, he addressed a crowd of Serbs in Kosovo Polje protesting maltreatment by Albanians, with the phrase that became a rallying cry for Serb nationalists: “No one should dare to beat you!”44
31. By the early 1990s, Serbian control of Kosovo had become central to Serbian policy.45 The Serbian political leadership under Milo{evi} pursued a two tier strategy to achieve this goal. First, through legislation to bring Kosovo under its direct control. Second, by changing the demographic structure of the province to consolidate the Serbian grip over it.
36 P983,p.16;Abrahams,P738,p.12;Brunborg,T.6113. 37 Abrahams,P738,p.12. 38 Maisonneuve,P860,p.2. 39 D130. 40 Abrahams,P738,p.13.See Jokanovi},T.13191,13152. 41 Abrahams,P738,p.13. 42 Abrahams,P738,p.13. 43 Haxhiu,P992,p.5. 44 Abrahams,P738,p.13. 45 Surroi,T.248;Haxhiu,T.6137;P992,p.5;Abrahams,P738,pp.13 14.
IT-05-87/1-T 8 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6537 (b) Legislative Changes
32. In March 1989, the Serbian Assembly proposed amendments to Serbia’s Constitution that would strip Kosovo of most of its autonomy.46 The SFRY Assembly supported this proposal.47
33. In order to amend the Serbian Constitution, approval was required from the Kosovo Assembly. On the day of the vote, the building was surrounded by MUP and VJ vehicles48 and police were stationed in the building.49 The Assembly members were heavily pressured prior to the vote. Under pressure, the Assembly approved the amendments.50
34. The Serbian Assembly then adopted the constitutional amendments and proclaimed that Serbia was to be unified.51 As a result of the revocation of the autonomous status, all subsequent decisions concerning Kosovo were made in Belgrade.52
35. On 2 July 1990, Kosovo Assembly members were prevented from entering the Assembly building. In response, Kosovo’s parliament declared Kosovo to be an independent republic within Yugoslavia, and LDK leader, Ibrahim Rugova, was elected President.53 The Serbian Assembly responded by disbanding the Kosovo parliament on 5 July.54
36. On 18 March 1991, Milo{evi} signed a proclamation formally disbanding the Kosovo Presidency.55 In a popular referendum in September 1991, Kosovo voted overwhelmingly for independence from Yugoslavia.56 Serbia rejected the results.57
(i) Special Measures
37. Following the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, the situation in Kosovo deteriorated, with public protests often leading to violence.58 As a response to the crisis, in March 1989 the SFRY Presidency imposed “special measures” in Kosovo and sent federal forces into Kosovo to assume responsibility for security in the province.59 Through the imposition of “special measures”, Kosovo
46 Surroi,T.248 249. 47 D905. 48 Surroi,T.248,307,309;Abrahams,P738,p.14;Rugova,P286,pp.4,130. 49 Rugova,P286,pp.4,130. 50 Rugova,P286,pp.4,130;Surroi,T.248,307,309;Abrahams,P738,p.14;D906,p.19. 51 P8;P6;Surroi,T.249;Rugova,P285,p.2. 52 Surroi,T.249 250;Rugova,P285,pp.2 3;P286,p.131. 53 Rugova,P285,pp.2 3;P286,pp.6,7,18;Abrahams,P738,p.14;Surroi,T.255,338 339. 54 P1497;Rugova,P285,p.2;P286,pp.6,18.See also P1584,pp.2 4. 55 P21. 56 Abrahams,P738,p.14;Surroi,T.255;Rugova,P285,pp.2 3;P286,p.7. 57 Surroi,T.255 256. 58 Abrahams,P738,pp.13 16;Rugova,P285,p.2;P286,p.3. 59 Abrahams,P738,p.13;D905.See Rugova,P285,p.2;P286,p.3;Merovci,T.2204.
IT-05-87/1-T 9 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6536 turned into what Human Rights Watch (HRW) researcher Fredrick Abrahams described as a “police state”.60 These measures remained in force until the arrival of NATO troops on 11 June 1999.61
38. Defence witness Vuka{in Jokanovi}, a retired politician, testified that the majority of the Albanian population were in favour of constitutional amendments,62 and that the special measures were needed because separatists tried to paralyze the entire society.63 Jokanovi}’s assessment is not supported by the evidence examined below. Kosovo Albanians perceived the imposition of these special measures as removing their substantial autonomy.
39. After the adoption of these measures, life in Kosovo was negatively impacted. Police violence and repression increased.64 Albanians were harassed, detained, stopped at checkpoints, imprisoned, and punished for acts such as carrying letters in the Albanian language or membership in political organizations.65 In 1992, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia expressed concern about discrimination against the Albanian population, citing allegations of torture and mistreatment in detention.66
40. Throughout late 1990 and 1991, thousands of Kosovo Albanian doctors, teachers, professors, judges, police, civil servants, and other employees were fired from their jobs.67 Kosovo Albanians were removed from managerial and directorial positions in the public administration as well as in public companies.68 Ethnic Albanian employees were asked to sign a declaration of loyalty to Serbia or face termination.69 The majority refused to sign this oath.70 Vacant positions were then given exclusively to Serbs.71 By 1991, all Kosovo Albanian policemen had been dismissed.72 Albanian leaders and government officials were also fired and replaced with Serbs.73
60 Abrahams,P738,p.14;Surroi,T.249;Merovci,T.2201;Rugova,P285,p.3; P286,pp.4 5,7 8,10; Halit Berisha,P598,p.2; P599,pp.4 5. 61 Surroi,T.254. 62 Jokanovi},T.13210 13211,13221 13222. 63 Jokanovi},T.13194 13195. 64 Rugova,P285,pp.2 3;P286,pp.7 8,10. 65 Surroi,T.249 250;Rugova,P286,p.16;P285,p.5;Hyseni,P809,p.3;Merovci,P416,para.19. 66 P1504,paras.99–113. 67 Merovci, T.2201;P416,paras.15 16;Haxhibeqiri,P1068,p.5;T.6973;Rugova,P285,p.3;P286,pp.7 8,10;Beqiraj,T.4824; Surroi,T.317;P34;P35;P38;P39;P10;P13;P15;P16;P18;P20;P26;P27,pp.13,20,38;P33;P36;P17;P19;P23;P27;P28;P30; P31;P32. 68 E.g. P10;P13;P15 P20;P22;P23;P26 P36;P38;P39. 69Surroi,T.250 251;Hyseni,P809,p.2;Bucaliu,T.5102 5103;Merovci,P416,paras.13,16;T.2203;Rugova,P286,p.5; Haxhibeqiri,T.6979 6980;P1068,p.5. 70 Haxhibeqiri,T.6979;P1068,p.5. 71 Hyseni,P809,pp.2 3;Merovci,T.2201;P416,para.14;P417,pp.8,10;Bucaliu,P826,pp.6,38. 72 Rugova,P286,p.5. 73 Halit Berisha,P598,p.2;P599,pp.4 6,23 27;P600,pp.4 6;T.3396 3397;P601;P13,pp.3 8;P1497.
IT-05-87/1-T 10 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6535 For example, Serb held 27 seats on the Suva Reka/Suharekë Municipality Council, even though 95 per cent of Suva Reka/Suharekë was Albanian.74
41. The Assembly of the Republic of Serbia enacted laws that severely affected freedom of the press.75 Throughout the 1990s the Serbian government closed Albanian newspapers and radio and television stations, often with violence.76 Serbian became the official language.77
42. Serbs were not allowed to sell their property to Kosovo Albanians.78 Many Kosovo Albanians had their company owned flats taken and the Serb authorities implemented a system to give accommodation to Serbian employees.79
43. Serbia shut down all Albanian schools from primary to University level and imposed an exclusively Serbian curriculum.80 Teachers who refused to implement the new Serbian curriculum were fired.81 The Serbian government fired Albanian professors, teachers and employees and replaced them with non Albanians.82
44. Pri{tina University’s assembly and several faculty councils were dissolved and replaced by provisional organs staffed predominantly by Serbs who controlled salaries and reported directly to the Serbian Ministry of Education.83 Albanians were forced out of the school buildings and the vast majority of education facilities were occupied by Serbs.84 By 1992 all Albanian institutions of education were closed.85 Only primary school students were still allowed on the premises of state schools. They were nonetheless segregated, had to attend in shorter sessions, and had almost no school resources.86
74 Halit Berisha,P599,p.32;P608. 75 Haxhiu,D227,p.1;P25,p.5;P13,pp.1 3;P11;P22. 76 Rugova,P285,p.3;P286,pp.6,10;Surroi,T.250;Haxhibeqiri,P1068,pp.5 7;T.6977;P13;Haxhiu,P994,p.11;P992,p.10. 77 Beqiraj,T.4839 4840;Surroi,T.252,320;Bucaliu,P825,pp.2 3;P826,pp.8 10,37 42;T.5108. 78 Merovci,P417,pp.4 6;Surroi,T.251. 79 Surroi,T.251,336;Merovci,T.2202. 80 D130,Arts.145,147;Beqiraj,T.4812;P805,pp.9 10;Bala,T.2308;Haxhiu,P993,pp.13 18;P992,p.8;P994,pp.4 6;Hoxha, P881,pp.17 18;Kickert,T.2599;P1504,paras.100,105–106,113;Latifi,4344 4345;P778, p.2;Abrahams,P738,p.14;P28;P17,pp.110 113,186 189;P27,p.24. 81 Abrahams, P738,p.14. See also P1504,para.105. 82Beqiraj,T.4824;Deda,P1031,pp.22,23,32;Mazrekaj,T.3862 3863;Kadriu,P515,p.4;P27,p.24;Haxhiu,P993,pp.14,17;P992,p.9; Abrahams, P738,p.14;P28;P17, pp.110 113,186 189; P27,p.24. 83 P28,pp.3 14;Abrahams,P738,p.14. 84Merovci,T.2202 2203;Deda,P1031,p.22,23,32;Mazrekaj,T.3863;Beqiraj,T.4812,4822 4823,4856;P805,p.10. Haxhibeqiri,P1068,p.5;T.6969,6971. 85 Haxhibeqiri,P1068,p.5;T.6969,6971;Rugova,P286,pp.11 12,26;Kickert,T.2599;Haxhiu,P993,pp.13,15;Surroi,T.325. 86Haxhibeqiri,T.6971;Beqiraj,T.4812 4814,4823;P805,pp.9 11;S.Bogujevci,T.1904 1906;F.Bogujevci,T.1947 1948; Surroi,T.325.
IT-05-87/1-T 11 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6534 45. In response, the LDK and other Kosovo Albanian political parties developed their own parallel educational system.87 From 1990 to 1999, Albanian students were educated through the parallel education system,88 in private buildings and homes.89 As the degrees were not recognized by the Serbian state, graduates seeking employment were forced to leave Kosovo.90
46. The international community attempted to redress the education situation in Kosovo throughout the 1990s, but to no avail.91 On 1 September 1996, Milo{evi} and Rugova signed the St. Edigio Agreement, which envisaged allowing Albanian children to return to school.92 The agreement was never implemented and there was no substantive change to the segregation and discrimination in Kosovo schools.93
47. In 1996 and 1997, Albanian students staged protests and demonstrations asking for access to educational institutions, as well as the return of Kosovo’s autonomy, which were violently suppressed by Serbian police.94
48. Kosovo Albanians also established unofficial parallel systems of defence, government, and health care.95 In 1993 a Kosovo Albanian Ministry of Defence was created for the collective security of Albanians against any attack by the Serbian police or army.96 In 1994 a Kosovo Albanian police force was established. However, by 1995, most of the participants in these bodies had been arrested and the rest fled the country.97
49. By 1996, an armed resistance had also begun, with the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).98
(c) Demographic Changes
50. The Serbian political leadership was convinced that the ethnic demographic balance in Kosovo needed to be altered in order to retain political control over the province.99
87Surroi,T.253 254,258,325 326;Beqiraj,T.4824;Bala,T.2308;Kadriu,P515,p.4;Rugova,P286,pp.11 12;Haxhiu,P992,p.9;Hoxha,P881,pp.17 18. 88 Surroi,T.254;Haxhiu,P992,pp.8 9;P994,pp.5 7. 89 Surroi,T.253 254. See Beqiraj,T.4826,4857. 90 Haxhiu,P992,pp.8 9;P994,pp.5 7;Kickert,T.2596 2597. 91 See e.g. Surroi,T.264 265,330;P267;D2. 92P266;D1;Merovci,P416,para.27;T.2204;P417,p.15;Rugova,P285,pp.5 6;P286,pp.20 23;Beqiraj,T.4825 4826, 4829,4830;Surroi,T.261 263. 93 Rugova,P285,p.6;P286,p.24;Merovci,T.2204 2205;Surroi,T.262 263;Beqiraj,T.4825 4826,4830 4831,4837 4838; Haxhiu,P994,p.8;P992,p.5.The only Albanian institution allowed to remain was the Albanological Institute. 94 Surroi,T.256 257;Beqiraj,T.4829,4836 4837;Haxhiu,P992,pp.9 10,15;D227,pp.1,3;P994,pp.9 10;P992. 95 Abrahams,P738,p.15. 96 Rugova,P285,p.5;P286,pp.19 20. 97 Rugova,P285,p.5;Haxhiu,P992,pp.5,9;P994,pp.3,8 9. 98 Surroi,T.257.
IT-05-87/1-T 12 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6533 51. In January 1990, the SFRY assembly adopted a programme to prevent Serb and Montenegrin emigration from Kosovo. The programme accused Albanian nationalists of pursuing the goal of an “ethnically cleansed Kosovo and set up measures to immediately stop the emigration of Serbs, Montenegrins, and other non Albanian citizens from Kosovo”.100 Ethnic Serbs from outside Kosovo were encouraged to move to Kosovo.101 In 1996, 16,000 Serbian refugees from Bosnia and Croatia were resettled to Kosovo.102
52. On 27 November 1992, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia adopted a “Declaration on Human Rights and the Rights of National Minorities”. It declared that:
the history of Serbia and the History of Kosovo and Metohija is the history of the continual ethnic cleansing of Serbs […]The process of Kosovo and Metohija’s Albanisation, which has lasted for several decades, represents the greatest ethnic cleansing in Europe, […].103
53. This inflammatory rhetoric underlined the extreme anti Albanian climate that led to the widespread and systematic crimes against Kosovo Albanians charged in the Indictment. Also illustrative of this climate is the 1998 proposal from the SPS provincial board of Kosovo. It claimed that over 400,000 Kosovo Albanian inhabitants were Albanian immigrants who needed to be dealt with in accordance with “international law”: a thinly veiled proposal that they be deported.104
54. By 1997, it was evident to the FRY and Serbian leadership that the discriminatory measures were insufficient to dramatically change Kosovo’s demographics. A more drastic response was required.
1. 99 P678,p.30;P55. 100 P5,pp.1 2,4;Merovci,P416,paras.9,14;Abrahams,P738,p.15;P1504,paras.100,104. 101 Merovci, P416, para.9;Abrahams,P738,p.15;P677;P5;P1504,para.100,1004;P9. 102 Abrahams,P738,p.15;Surroi,T.251 252. 103 P55,items 3 4. 104 P677,p.6.
IT-05-87/1-T 13 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6532 2. Early development of the JCE prior to the NATO bombing campaign
55. Prior to the Indictment period, the FRY and Serbian leadership:
• Armed the non Albanian population in Kosovo and disarmed ethnic Albanians; • Conducted an extensive co ordinated campaign against the KLA, during which they used excessive and indiscriminate force against Kosovo Albanian civilians; • Breached peace building measures; and • Obstructed peace negotiations.
(a) Arming of non Albanians and disarming of ethnic Albanians
56. During 1998 and 1999, the MUP and the VJ covertly armed over 60,000 non Albanian citizens from local villages and towns in Kosovo.105 Although the process of selectively arming and disarming the population may have seemed a legitimate policy to fight the KLA on its face, it rendered the Albanian civilian population in Kosovo vulnerable to the forces of the FRY and Serbia, while empowering the non Albanian population. In 1999 armed locals were utilised to forcibly expel the ethnic Albanian population from the province.
57. In mid 1998, the MUP and the VJ began distributing weapons to persons of non Albanian ethnicity,106 who were later organized into Reserve Police Squads (RPOs).107 Various FRY official documents demonstrate that the MUP and the VJ armed the non Albanian population.108 In a parallel process, predominantly ethnic Albanian villages were disarmed in 1998.109 These forces collected weapons in “[iptar villages” throughout various municipalities.110
58. The process of arming and disarming was carried out along ethnic lines. In an order dated 21 May 1998, specifically aimed at arming Serb and Montenegrin inhabitants of villages in which they were a minority, the Chief of the Priština Defence Administration stated that the Defence Administration, in co ordination with the MUP and the VJ, should inform the municipal leadership of the “special plan to protect Serbian, Montenegrin and other citizens loyal to the state of Serbia”.111 On 26 June 1998, the PrK issued an order directed to subordinate commands to arm and train village defence units in Kosovo “to defend and protect the citizens from the [iptar terrorist 105 P688,p.7;P1330,p.9;P1055,p.7;P976;P901. See D340,p.4;P886,pp.18,20,55. 106 Cveti},T.6719;\akovi},T.8137. At a VJ Collegium meeting of 2 February 1999, Ojdani} refers to the distribution of weapons to the so called “armed Serbs”.P1333,p.23. 107 Ðorðević,T.9862,9901,9904;Cveti},T.6634,6663. See P1052;P1055,p.7;see also P1333,p.23;P901,pp.1–2. 108 P688,p.7;P1330,p.9;P1055,p.7;P901,pp.1–2. See also P1054;P975;P1355,p.1;P1333,p.23. 109 P87,p.4. 110 P1220,p.5;P1218,p.6;P1399,p.8.
IT-05-87/1-T 14 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6531 groups” and to organise the distribution of weapons in “Serbian and Montenegrin villages”.112 The following day, 27 June 1998, a Military District command report noted that the organisation of “Serbs and Montenegrins” for the defence of villages was being carried out.113 A 3rd Army combat report of 2 October 1998 assessed the 1998 summer offensive and noted under the heading “positive experiences” that the distribution of weapons to “citizens loyal to the FRY (of Serbian and Montenegrin ethnicity)” had made it possible to organise the large scale resistance against the “terrorists”. The report also stated that the “surrender of weapons by the [iptar population” to the MUP and the VJ had seriously undermined the morale of the KLA.114
59. The arming and disarming of the population was co ordinated by the MUP and the VJ under the direction of the Joint Command. The progress of this process was reported at Joint Command meetings.115 An operational report of the Joint Command dated 15 October 1998 stated that the MUP continued to collect weapons from the Albanian villages and that the VJ was engaged in disarming the population in the border belt.116 A Joint Command report of 20 November 1998 reported on the collection of weapons in Albanian villages.117 Joint Command orders issued in 1999 show that the armed non Albanian population provided support to joint MUP VJ operations.118
60. The arming of the non Albanian population was conducted in a manner to ensure that the large majority of able bodied Serb men in Kosovo were armed by March 1999. When the number of weapons distributed to the population — around 60,000—119 is compared with the total Serbian population in Kosovo, estimated to be 210,000 in 1998,120 it shows that a high percentage of able bodied Serb men were armed.121 The non Albanian population was organised into village defence squads or RPOs.122 Individuals with wartime assignments in the VJ and the MUP were issued weapons through their wartime units and then sent back to their villages when not on active duty.123
1. 111 P1355,p.2. 112 P901,p.1. “[iptar” refers to Albanians from Kosovo and is considered a derogatory term when used by Serbs. Surroi, T.299. 113 P1455,p.1. 114 D340,pp.4,6. 115 See e.g. P886,p.3 (“continue weapon distribution and training in the towns”); p.4 (“weapons have not been distributed to everyone, the problem lies with the Ministry of Defence”); p.22 (“weapons were distributed today in Vitina (1,100) Kosovska Kamenica, training has not bee conducted yet”); e.g P886,pp.18,55,103; See also P886, p. 38 (“weapons surrendered in the villages of Korito and Bec”); p.39 (“the surrender of weapons continues and other villages are expected to join…”) e.g. P886,pp.41,43,48 49,54 55,66,70,73,75,78,84,87,89 90,93,97,99 100,103,120. 116 P1220,p.8. 117 P1218, p.6; P1399,p.8. 118 See e.g. D104,P971,P1382,P1328. 119 P688,p.7;P1330,p.9;P1055,pp.6 7;P976. 120 See Brunborg,T.6113;P983,p.1. 121 See Merovci,T.2215. 122 P1455;D270;Cveti},T.6634,6663. 123 P901;P1052.
IT-05-87/1-T 15 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6530 From May 1998 the Ministry of Defence issued weapons to citizens without wartime assignments in these structures.124
61. The Serbian leadership was aware that ethnic tensions in Kosovo were running high and that there was a real risk of violence against the Kosovo Albanian population. At a VJ Collegium of 21 January 1999, Dimitrijević expressed concern about the armed non Albanian population, stating, “[B]earing in mind the number of people owning or having been distributed weapons there is a realistic possibility on the Serbian and Montenegrin side of the Serbian population organising itself to offer resistance and of an increasing emergence of radical forces.”125 On 1 February 1999, the VJ General Staff warned that in response to attacks against the Serbian and Montenegrin population of Kosovo, “there is a realistic danger of these people organising resistance on their own, which may further complicate the existing situation in Kosovo and Metohija”.126 At a MUP Staff meeting of 17 February 1999, Stojiljkovi} instructed those present, “Tell the RPO and the people that a civil war must be avoided at all costs, but that in case of conflict, no women and children should be killed, only the aggressor.”127 It would have been obvious to the Serbian leadership, including \or|evi}, that arming one ethnic group while disarming another in an atmosphere of mutual hostility and ethnic clashes was likely to facilitate crimes based on ethnicity.
62. The process of arming and disarming was integral to the 1998 summer offensive and was a significant factor in the commission of the crimes in 1999. This process was carried out on a discriminatory basis at a time of intense ethnic tensions. It was designed to render Kosovo Albanians vulnerable to widespread expulsions in 1999, while at the same time enabling non Albanians to participate in the crimes taking place in their respective villages.
(b) 1998 Operations and the Excessive Use of Force
(i) Overview
63. From February to the end of September 1998, the forces of the FRY and Serbia increased their troop levels and significantly intensified their activities in Kosovo, engaging in a co ordinated campaign against the KLA that was typified by the use of excessive and indiscriminate force against Kosovo Albanian civilians. These operations involved heavy handed tactics that resulted in the mass displacement and killing of civilians, and cultivated a climate of fear and oppression for
124 P1355,pp.1 2. 125 P902,p.16. 126 D523,p.16. 127 P85,p.3.
IT-05-87/1-T 16 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6529 Kosovo Albanians. The concerns of the international community were ignored during these operations that laid the groundwork for actions in 1999.
(ii) February March 1998 Likošane and Ćirez
64. On 28 February and 1 March, in response to KLA provocations, the police attacked two adjoining Albanian villages in the Drenica region, Likošane and Ćirez.128 This marked an intensification of the conflict between the KLA and the forces of the FRY and Serbia.
65. \or|evi} addressed the pretext to these police operations in his testimony, stating that a regular police patrol had been ambushed between Likošane and Ćirez. Following this incident, units from the Pri{tina SUP and the SAJ Pri{tina were deployed129 and attacked Likošane and Ćirez with mortars and automatic machine guns.130 In the attack, police killed twenty five ethnic Albanians, including members of the Sejdiu and Ahmeti families.131
66. On 24 May, HRW researcher Fred Abrahams investigated the attacks on Likošane and Ćirez132 and concluded that in both,
…special police forces attacked without warning, firing indiscriminately at women, children and other non combatants. Helicopters and military vehicles sprayed village rooftops with gunfire before police forces entered the village on foot, firing into private homes.133
(iii) The Attack on the Jashari Compound
67. Adem Jashari lived in the village of Prekaz, in the Drenica region, and was one of the founders of the KLA.134 Following the attack on Likošane and Ćirez, Serbian police attacked the Jashari family on 5 March, besieging their compound using armed vehicles and large scale police forces.135 Every member of the extended family inside the compound was killed, with the exception of one 11 year old girl.136 HRW estimated that fifty eight people were killed and subsequently buried after the police action, including a significant percentage of women and children.137
128 Abrahams,T.3941;P741,pp.26 27. 129 \or|evi},T.9537 9538;D424, p.1. 130 Abrahams,P741,p.27. 131 Kadriu, P515,pp.5 6;P516,p.55;P741,pp.29 31;Abrahams,P741,pp.31 33. 132 Abrahams,T.3941 3943;P741,pp.26 34. 133 P741,p.26. 134 Surroi,T.269 270. 135 Surroi,T.270;P741,p.26. 136 P741,pp.26,36;Surroi,T.270. 137 P741,pp.26,38,40.
IT-05-87/1-T 17 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6528 68. The operation against the Jashari family was a co ordinated effort. SAJ units from Pri{tina and Belgrade and a unit from the JSO took a direct role in the operation.138 The broader area was secured by the 37th PJP Detachment from Ni{ and the 24th PJP Detachment from Pri{tina. Local police from OUP Srbica were involved in securing the roads and the Kosovska Mitrovica SUP provided the security detail.139
69. The operation against the Jashari family was confirmed by a statement issued by the Information Service of the MUP.140 Although the Ministry’s statement did not acknowledge any civilian casualties and stated that only twenty “hard core terrorists” were killed, the police subsequently arranged for the bodies of the victims to be put on public display in a warehouse.141
70. The display of the bodies allowed several sources to confirm the number of casualties and the civilian identities of the victims.142 Many of the victims were young children, a number of them ranging from 7 to 13.143
\or|evi}’s Knowledge of and Responsibility for the Jashari Massacre
71. \or|evi} confirmed his own role in the attack on the Jashari compound. He testified that the Minister had ordered “a co ordinated action” of the RJB and RDB to capture the terrorists and set up a Staff for this purpose, headed by Jovica Stani{i} with \or|evi} as the Deputy.144 \or|evi} acknowledged that the MUP had information that “there were also a number of civilians in the area”.145 \or|evi} confirmed his knowledge that civilians were killed in the attack.146
72. It was recognized even within the ranks of the Serb forces that the operation had used excessive force and unnecessarily killed civilians.147
73. Detailed information about this event was conveyed to Milo{evi} by a negotiating group known as the G5, led by Ibrahim Rugova and including Veton Surroi.148
138 Cveti},T.6616;Trajkovi},T.9060 9061;Crosland,P1400,para.28;T.9156. 139 Cveti},T.6616;Crosland,P1400,para.28;T.9156. 140 D424,p.1;\or|evi},T.9543. 141 P741,p.39.See Kickert,T.2625;P478,p.2;P479,pp.8 9;P516,p.7. 142 P741,pp.38 39;Kadriu,P515,pp.6 7;P516,pp.6 9;Crosland,T.9156.See Kickert,T.2626 2629;Surroi, T.271. 143 P741,p.40. 144 See also: Cveti},T.6747 6748. 145 Ðorðević,T.9541. 146 Ðorðević,T.9541. 147 Stojanovi},T.11874 11875;P1543;Trajkovi},T.9061. 148 Rugova,P285,pp.6 7;P286,pp.27 29;Surroi,T.272 274.
IT-05-87/1-T 18 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6527 (iv) March April 1998
74. The heavy handed actions of police in Drenica created a watershed moment in the Kosovo crisis.149 At the end of March, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1160, which condemned, “the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual…”150 Despite the UN resolution condemning their practices, the forces of the FRY and Serbia not only continued with their operations against both the KLA and the civilian population, but in fact began to increase the intensity of their campaign.
75. As of February, the forces of the FRY and Serbia had increased their troop levels in Kosovo.151 There were also increasing indicators of joint activities between the MUP and the VJ – Crosland witnessed the first instances of VJ green vehicles, including APCs and BOV 3s, having been repainted in blue MUP colours as early as April.152
(v) Attacks on Dečani/Deçan – April to June 1998
76. From early April to June, MUP and VJ forces launched operations in western Kosovo, including Dečani/Deçan municipality. VJ forces began a build up in the area in late March/early April153, and as of mid May the PJP and JSO were patrolling the area in a “very heavy handed way”.154 On the main road from Peć/Peja to Dečani/Deçan, Crosland and his colleagues observed spent bullet and shell cases and saw burned houses.155
77. On 29 May, Serb forces surrounded the town of Drenoc and from a hill, shelled villages within Dečani municipality,156 causing the population to flee.157 PJP officer K25 confirmed the presence of the PJP in the area, testifying that his unit had been deployed to liberate the road between Peć/Peja and Dečani/Deçan.158
78. Austrian Diplomat Jan Kickert visited Dečani/Deçan in early June and found “considerable devastation”. He witnessed a strong police presence and noted that the town “appeared dead”,
149 Abrahams,P738,p.18. 150 P1074,p.1. 151 Crosland,P1400,para.32. 152 Crosland,P1400,para.33;P1405,p.4;T.9164.See P1402,pp.17 18 (under seal);P1401,pp.16 17. 153 Crosland,P1400,para.30. 154 Crosland,P1404,p.1. 155 Crosland,P1405,pp.2 3. 156 Mazrekaj,P675,pp.5 6;P676,p.4.See Haxhibeqiri,P1068,p.7. 157 Mazrekaj,P675,p.6. 158 K25,P340,p.5;P342,pp.84 85 (under seal).See Surroi,T.275,317 318.
IT-05-87/1-T 19 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6526 observing many houses that had been burned and destroyed, which his military colleagues concluded was due to arson.159
(vi) The Establishment of KDOM
79. In mid June, Milo{evi} agreed to the establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), which was mandated to observe and report on the security situation in Kosovo. Despite the existence and active deployment of KDOM as of early July 1998, the use of excessive and indiscriminate force by the forces of the FRY and Serbia continued unabated. 160
(vii) The Plan for Suppressing Terrorism
80. On 21 July, \or|evi} attended a meeting with President Milo{evi}, along with other senior representatives of the MUP (Stojiljkovi}, Stevanovi}, Markovi} and Luki}), the VJ (Peri{i}, Samard`i}, Pavkovi} and Dimitrijevi}) and other state officials (Milutinovi}, [ainovi} and An|elkovi}). Milo{evi} discussed that the Supreme Defence Council (SDC) had met previously and decided to draw up a Plan for Suppressing Terrorism in Kosovo.161 This plan, which provided for the co ordinated engagement of MUP and VJ forces, was to be made pursuant to a decision adopted at the 5th session of the SDC on 9 June 1998.162 General \akovi} and his team in the PrK Command were responsible for drafting the Plan, relying on information provided by the MUP, the State Security Service, the brigade commanders and the military district.163 The PrK would later draw up detailed plans for operations whose basic elements had been set out in the global plan, co ordinating combat operations of the MUP and the VJ at various stages of the operation.164
81. \or|evi} participated in two further meetings at Beli Dvor in Belgrade in August, along with the same members of the senior leadership, where the implementation of the Plan for Suppressing Terrorism was assessed.165
(viii) The Summer Offensive
82. In the summer of 1998, from late July through September, the MUP and VJ initiated a large scale offensive against the KLA forces and, more generally, against the Kosovo Albanian population. The combat operations carried out pursuant to the Plan were characterized by the use of 159 Kickert,T.2573 2574;P478,p.2;P479,pp.9 13;P480,pp.1 2. 160 Byrnes,T.8162 8163;P1214,pp.2 7. 161 \akovi},T.7916 7918,8048;Ðorðević,T.9563 9564. 162 P87,pp.3.See P1361;P682. 163 \akovi},T.7994 7995;T.7916. 164 \akovi},T.7996 7997;T.8110.See e.g. P1361,pp.1 2,4;P682,pp.4 5,9 10;P87,p.3. 165 \or|evi},T.9620.
IT-05-87/1-T 20 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6525 heavy handed tactics and the wanton destruction of Kosovo Albanian towns and villages.166 There was a significant increase in the police forces that came from Serbia.167
83. The summer offensive lasted from 25 July until the end of September 1998, and throughout the Joint Command co ordinated joint actions between the MUP and VJ across Kosovo.168 In village after village where Abrahams conducted his research, he observed a similar pattern: the army shelled from a distance, forcing the villagers to flee, and then the police moved in on foot.169
84. Crosland similarly observed that the Serbian forces would often warn the local population to leave the place of assault by firing warning shots, after which the MUP troops would sweep through and wantonly destroy the deserted places in an attempt to ethnically cleanse the area.170
85. From July to September, there were massive movements of displaced civilians from the areas attacked to larger areas, like the Pagaru{a valley north of Suva Reka. Civilians also fled westwards into Albania and Montenegro and southwards into Macedonia.171 Crosland estimated that by the end of the summer of 1998 there were between 100,000 and 400,000 IDPs.172
(ix) The Use of the VJ in these Operations was Unlawful
86. Throughout 1998, the VJ operated in many areas in Kosovo that were well away from the border, and were involved in joint operations with MUP forces.173 However, in order for the VJ to be legally used outside of the border belt area in Kosovo, a state of emergency, a state of immediate threat of war, or a state of war, had to be declared. Actively deploying the VJ outside of the border belt was otherwise illegal.174 However, no such state of emergency was declared.175
87. In the minutes of a meeting of the VJ Collegium held on 20 July 1998, Chief of the General Staff Peri{i} referred to an order he issued that explicitly prohibited the use of the VJ, except in the defence of the border area or to protect military facilities or personnel. Peri{i} complained that the VJ had been deployed when General Samardzi} used a combat group in Orahovac/Rahovec to assist MUP forces.176 On 24 July 1998, three days after Milo{evi}’s meeting to discuss the
166 Crosland,P1400,para.39;Surroi,T.278,333;Kickert,P479,pp.22 23. 167 Surroi,T.279;P1038,p.2; Cveti},T.6608,6618. 168 Cveti},T.6608. 169 Abrahams,T.4076 4077. See P738,p.37. 170 Crosland,P1400,para.46. 171 Crosland,T.9175 9176;Surroi,T.281. 172 Crosland,P1407,p.3;T.9172,9175. 173 See D340;Crosland,P1400,para.38;P1407,p.2,T.9167 9169;Abrahams,P738,p.33;P886. 174 Čučak,T.10952 10954,10956. 175 P87,p.3. 176 P1424,p.1,3;Čučak,T.10954 10956.
IT-05-87/1-T 21 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6524 implementation of the Plan for Suppressing Terrorism, Peri{i} sent a letter to Milo{evi} complaining of the “Constant tendency to use the VJ outside the institutions of the system” and expressly noted that “any engagement of the VJ in combat operations outside the border and beyond is still illegal – with possible consequences unforseeable.”177
88. Complaints from within about the illegal use of the VJ continued throughout 1998 and into early 1999.178 The senior members of the VJ leadership who had complained about this illegal use of the VJ, including Peri{i}, Dimitrijevi} and Samard`i}, were replaced after they raised their complaints.179
(x) Mid July September 1998
89. The PJP was deployed to “liberate” Orahovac/Rahovec in mid July. The VJ had encircled the outside perimeter of Orahovac with tanks and Pragas, armed with self propelled anti aircraft guns, while the PJP and the SAJ were engaged in the town.180
90. The Joint Command minutes from this time period indicate that \or|evi} was actively involved in the operations in and around Orahovac/Rahovec. \or|evi} participated in the discussions and reported back to the Joint Command with respect to progress and activities on the ground.181 \or|evi} was also personally issuing orders. For example, reporting to the Joint Command with respect to the situation on 29 July, Luki} states: “the unit did not leave Orahovac as ordered by General \OR\EVI]”.182
91. The Joint Command discussed the progress of the summer offensive at a meeting on 27 July, with \or|evi} specifically addressing details of the operation against Mališevo/Malisheva. In response, Samardzi} stated, “the main goal is Mali{evo and we must not back away”, and then added, “Mali{evo must be crushed”.183 The next day, 28 July, a joint MUP VJ action was launched against Mali{evo.184
177 P1329;Čučak,T.10957 10960. 178 P1362; D169,p.19;P1335,p.15; P1343,p.9; Čučak,T.10960 10970. See D169,p.19;P1335,p.15 179 See Part III,Section(B)(6). 180 K79,P1259,pp.18 21 (under seal); P1260,p.14. See also Beqiraj,P806,p.2;P805,p.15;T.4841. 181 P886,pp.8 26. 182 P886,p.19. 183 P886,pp.13 14. 184 Crosland,T.9167;P1407,pp.1 2.
IT-05-87/1-T 22 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6523 92. \or|evi} was in the field himself on 28 July when the security forces were undertaking the final operations to enter Mali{evo.185 He in fact called in by radio from Mali{evo to the 28 July MUP Staff meeting and reported that “Mali{evo was free”.186
93. \or|evi} testified that the action was conducted by police and military forces operating from two axes187 and that the action did not entail any damage.188
94. However, the evidence on the ground painted a very different picture. Crosland had entered Mali{evo before the offensive and observed that “life appeared normal”. He saw only about 30 members of the KLA. As he left the town he observed significant numbers of “exceptionally well armed” MUP and VJ forces. After the attack by MUP and VJ forces (on 29 July), Crosland witnessed severe, wanton damage there.189 Crosland estimated that approximately 30,000 civilians had been displaced from Mali{evo and subsequently discovered that they had gone to the Pagaruša/Pagarusha valley.190
95. Surroi toured Mali{evo, observing burnt houses and watched as a uniformed policeman set a house on fire.191 The ECMM monitoring mission also observed destruction in Mališevo, reporting incidents of uniformed policemen looting shops in Mališevo and setting houses on fire in late July/early August 1998.192
96. Kickert noted that “every time you would go through (Mališevo), there was more destruction in the city, until this town was even partly levelled.”193 Kickert expressly rejected the suggestion that the cause of the destruction in Mališevo was continuous fighting between the KLA and the FRY forces.194 Crosland, who visited Mali{evo again in early August 1998, similarly observed that “Mali{evo was completely gutted by fire and looting.”195
185 Ðorðević,T.9597;Stalevi},T.13790. 186 Cveti},T.6621,6644. 187 Ðorðević,T.9597 9598. This was consistent with Crosland’s observations of the forces: T.9169. 188 Ðorðević,T.9597,9599;D386. 189 Crosland,T.9170 9171;P1407,p.3. 190 Crosland,P1400,para.37. 191 Surroi was careful to testify that all he observed was the policeman entering the house and then emerging and “a few seconds later the house was on fire”, the clear inference being that the officer set the house on fire himself. (Surroi, T.280) 192 Kickert,T.2579 2581;P479,p.23;P483,p.2. See also Kickert, P478,p.3;T.2578;P479,pp.18,25. 193 Kickert,P479,p.22. 194 Kickert,P479,pp.86 87. 195 Crosland,P1408, p.2.
IT-05-87/1-T 23 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6522 97. Even the Serb forces themselves acknowledged the excessive use of force in the operations in and around Mališevo. On 7 August, Pavkovi} sent an order to his units stating that some units “made too much use of combat equipment, which resulted in increased damage to buildings”.196
98. In late August, Crosland witnessed VJ, SAJ, JSO, and PJP troops in operation between \akovica/Gjakove and Dečani, in an area that included Junik, Prilep, Rznic and Glodjane. The forces were “torching, burning and firing into various houses”.197 Entire villages like Prilep were razed.198 Crosland estimated that between 200 and 300 villages were damaged, burnt and/or looted in 1998 and early 1999.199 Also in late August, an EU delegation visited the Drenica region and encountered a large congregation of internally displaced persons.200
99. The VJ and the MUP launched a major operation in the Drenica region in September.201 The 37th PJP Detachment, accompanied by the 87th PJP reserve detachment “practically covered the entire territory of Kosovo during that month”.202 During these operations, villages were burned.203
100. K79, a PJP member, came across thousands of refugees in Drenica, Čičavica and Bajgora. He saw PMP members rob the refugees and loot the villages.204 He also witnessed the execution and rape of civilians and the torching of houses in Glogova} and Bajgora in September.205
101. The Head of US KDOM, Shaun Byrnes, observed the PJP in action in September when his team arrived at a village “midway on a road running from Kijevo to the town of Mali{evo.”206 . The village was in flames. 207 Byrnes saw no civilians in the village.208
102. The MUP launched an operation in Pe}/Peje in September. They drove out all the residents.209 An Austrian Embassy report of 11 September noted that “Villages along the main Pri{tina Pe} road are, with the exception of Serbian villages, no longer inhabited.”210
196 P1344,pp.60 61. 197 Crosland,P1400,paras.41 42;P1413,p.2. 198 Crosland,P1400,para.42;P1413,p.2. 199 Crosland,P1400,para. 43;T.9174. 200 Kickert,P478,p.4;P479,pp.25 26. See also P489,p.1;D328,p.2;\akovi},T.8026. 201 Abrahams,T.3949;P753,pp.30 33;P740,p.6. 202 K79,P1259,p.11,34,36 (under seal);P1260,pp.30,32. 203 K79,P1259,pp.39 40, 43 44,69,139 (under seal);P1260,pp.35 36,39;P1261;P1262; P1263 (all photos under seal). 204 K79, P1259,pp.61 63(under seal);P1260,pp.57 59. 205 K79,P1259,pp.52 59,64 65 (under seal);P1260,pp.48 51,54 55,57 60. 206 Byrnes,T.8172;P1214,pp.21 22. 207 Byrnes,T.8172;P1214,pp.21 22. 208 Byrnes,T.8172;P1214,p.21. 209 Byrnes,P1214,pp.26 27. 210 Kickert,P484,p.1;Kickert,T.2582 2585. See also P479,pp.26 32,56 58,98 100.
IT-05-87/1-T 24 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6521 103. The international press reported the events in Pe}/Peje, and Byrnes stated that this embarrassed Belgrade. In response, the MUP went to the areas where the people were gathered in the woods and “herded” them home. The villagers were terrified.211
104. On 26 September, Abrahams heard shelling and saw fires burning in the area of Gornje Obrinje/Abria r Eperme.212 In that day’s Joint Command meeting, both Pavkovi} and Luki} reported on the completion of the MUP VJ action in the area.213 Two PJP units, the JSO and combat groups from the 125th Motorised Brigade took part in the action.214 Serb forces had killed twenty one members of the Delijaj family, including six women and five children between the ages of eighteen months and nine years.215 Police had also found 150 members of the Hysenaj family in the woods, separated the men and stripped them naked. The men were interrogated and brutally beaten at the Glogovac police station for three days.216 Serb forces largely destroyed the village of Gornje Obrinje/Abria r Eperme. When Abrahams visited the village on 29 September, it was “still smoldering” and most of the homes had been destroyed and were marked by bullets, shrapnel or tank fire.217
105. The killings at Gornje Obrinje received widespread media attention, including front page coverage in the New York Times.218 At a 1 October Joint Command meeting, Radovi} specifically addressed an article published in Koha Ditore on these events.219 In February 1999, HRW published a detailed report entitled “A Week of Terror in Drenica: Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo” that set out their findings and the sources they relied upon in detail.220
106. Abrahams also visited the village of Plocice, near Gornje Obrnje, in September. Abrahams observed that the village had been heavily destroyed, saw that the homes were still burning, and “did not find a single shell casing or any other evidence of fighting” or any “signs that the KLA had used the village as a base.”221
107. KDOM observers reported seeing the police in particular engage in excessive activity, such as burning villages, destroying property, and expelling Albanian residents, “unfortunately very, 211 Byrnes,P1214,pp.27 28. 212 Abrahams,T.4045;P740,p.6.Joint actions of the MUP and VJ in the area were noted by the Joint Command: P886,p.112. 213 P886,p.112. 214 P891,p.3. 215 Abrahams,T.3949 3950,3953,3955 3956;P749;P740,pp.7,10 12,16 17;P750;P751;P753,pp.11,37. 216 Abrahams,P753,pp.54 58. 217 Abrahams,P753,p.34. 218 Abrahams,T.3960. See Kickert,T.2586;P485,p.3. 219 P886,p.116. 220 Abrahams,P740,p.12;T.3950;P753,p.3. 221 Abrahams,T.3957 3959;P752;P753,p.12;P740,p.6.
IT-05-87/1-T 25 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6520 very regularly” from June to September 1998, meaning “virtually every day.”222 Byrnes always brought such information to Lukić’s attention.223
108. On 2 October 1998, the 3rd Army Command provided a detailed analysis of the tasks and engagement of Serb forces and an assessment of the operations to date.224 On 29 October 1998, at a large meeting chaired by Milo{evi} and attended by the senior leadership of the MUP, VJ and civilian sectors, the execution of the Plan for Suppressing Terrorism was similarly assessed by members of the Joint Command. Pavkovi} reported that 39,000 MUP and 13,500 VJ were involved in operations, along with 438 tanks, 334 infantry combat vehicles, 236 artillery weapons, 410 anti aircraft guns, 570 mortars, and a tremendous quantity of ammunition.225 The UNHCR estimated that as of October 1998, approximately 285,000 people – roughly 15 percent of the population – had been internally displaced or had fled from Kosovo.226
109. Observing this humanitarian crisis, the international community intervened and sought to find a peaceful solution to the turmoil in Kosovo. The U.N. Security Council responded to the intense fighting in Kosovo on 23 September 1998 with Resolution 1199,227 which made note of the “excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army,” which had resulted in civilian casualties, the displacement of around 230,000 civilians from their homes, and a flow of refugees into neighbouring counties.228 Resolution 1199 gave the OSCE the mandate to address the situation in Kosovo.229
(c) Breach of peace building measures in the October Agreements
(i) The October Agreements
110. In an attempt to convince FRY and Serbian authorities to comply with Resolution 1199 and its predecessor Resolution 1160, U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke travelled to Belgrade in early October 1998 and met with Milošević.230 After these talks, further negotiations took place between representatives of the FRY, Serbia, the OSCE and NATO resulting in the Agreement on the OSCE
222 Byrnes,P1214,pp.22 23. 223 Byrnes,P1214,p.25. 224 D340. 225 P87,pp.4,6. 226 P735. Note that according to the UNHCR, 239,000 persons had been displaced from Kosovo as of 31 August 1998. As Resolution 1199 was adopted on 23 September 1998, the statistics in the two documents would appear generally consistent. 227 D160. 228 D160,p.1. 229 Vollebaek,T.7206 7207. 230 Kickert,T.2638 2639;D62.
IT-05-87/1-T 26 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6519 Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM),231 the Understanding Between KDOM and Ministry of Interior of The Republic of Serbia,232 and the Record of Meeting in Belgrade dated 25 October 1998 (together, the “October Agreements”).233
111. The Agreement on the KVM was signed on 16 October 1998, and aimed at implementing Resolutions 1160 and 1199.234 The Agreement established the KVM.235
112. In the “Record of Meeting in Belgrade,” dated 25 October 1998, the FRY and Serb governments agreed to:
1. withdraw special police units deployed to Kosovo after February 1998; 2. return combined police/special police strength to their February 1998 duty level; 3. withdraw any heavy weapons or equipment brought into Kosovo or transferred from the VJ to the police after February 1998; 4. have police resume normal peacetime activities, and return any remaining heavy weapons and equipment to cantonments and police stations; 5. withdraw all VJ units brought into Kosovo after February 1998; and 6. return all VJ units except three company sized teams to garrison.236
113. This was to be done by 27 October 1998.237 The agreement was signed by Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Šainović for the FRY, Ðorñević for the Republic of Serbia, and Generals Klaus Naumann and Wesley Clark for NATO.238
114. The “Understanding Between KDOM and Ministry of Interior of The Republic of Serbia” came about the same day, 25 October 1998.239 This agreement required the MUP to dismantle all checkpoints, but permitted them to establish 27 observation points and use armoured vehicles with machine guns in case of incidents or increased tension.240 It was signed by Byrnes and Ðorñević.241
231 P835. 232 P836. 233 P837. 234 P835,p.1. 235 P835,paras. I.1 I.2;Vollebaek,T.7203,7208 7210,7242;P1072,p.7;P1073,p.3. 236 P837,paras.1 5. Byrnes explained that the February 1998 date was chosen because “there was a big build up of Serbian security forces, the police, and the army after – in March of 1998.” T.8182 8183. 237 P837,para.7. 238 P837,p.1. 239 P836. 240 P836,paras.1 3. 241 P836;Byrnes,T.8178 8179;P1214,p.32.
IT-05-87/1-T 27 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6518 a. Ðorñević Led the Negotiations for the MUP
115. During the negotiations in late October 1998, Ðorñević headed the negotiations for the MUP.242 Also participating on the Serbian side were Obrad Stevanović, Head of the Police Department; Sreten Lukić, the Head of the MUP Staff, and Mijatović, Luki}’s deputy.243 Byrnes participated in the negotiations on the side of the internationals.244 He understood Ðorñević to be leading the Serbian side because “he was the senior professional, non political official of the Serbian police. And . . . there were formal introductions before the negotiations started, and he was introduced in that capacity.”245 Ðorñević explained that Serbian President Milutinović and Minister Stojiljković decided that he should participate in the negotiations.246
116. Byrnes described Ðorñević as a “very impressive, very imposing, big man, with . . . what we would call command presence. He was a man who was very much in charge.”247 With regards to Ðorñević’s role in the negotiations, Byrnes testified, “General Ðorñević was the lead negotiator. What I recall is General Lukić would very occasionally be involved or say something, but General Ðorñević was clearly in charge.”248
117. The MUP working group dealt with very specific details regarding MUP activities in Kosovo.249 Byrnes stated that during these detailed negotiations, Ðorñević “demonstrated a very clear knowledge of the facts on the ground in Kosovo.”250 Byrnes explained,
He took his job as deputy – as head of the police, deputy minister of interior seriously, and he knew down to detail what was going on and where his people were and what they were doing. . . . General Ðorñević had – very frankly, had a professional’s command of the facts. He was on top of his brief, and he was a very tough negotiator.251
b. Kosovo Verification Mission
118. KDOM served in place of KVM until it became operational.252 Ambassador William Walker was appointed KVM Head of Mission on 22 October 1998.253 Walker and his Chief of Staff, Michael Phillips, arrived in Pri{tina/Prishtinë on 4 November 1998.254
242 Byrnes,T.8177;P1214,p.31. 243 Byrnes,T.8175. There were other participants who Byrnes did not know. T.8175. 244 Byrnes,T.8174 8175. 245 Byrnes,T.8230 8231. See Ðorñević,T.9870. 246 Ðorñević,T.10147. 247 Byrnes,T.8227. 248 Byrnes,T.8178. 249 Byrnes,T.8177 8180. 250 Byrnes,T.8180. 251 Byrnes,T.8180 8181. 252 Byrnes,T.8186,8260 8261;P1214,pp.42 43;P835,para. I.5.
IT-05-87/1-T 28 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6517 119. In early December, Walker and Phillips began to meet regularly with FRY and Serbian government representatives who had been designated to liaise with the KVM in Kosovo,255 including Deputy Prime Minister Šainović, retired General Dušan Lončar, and Lukić.256 In these meetings, Walker regularly reported non compliance issues.257
(ii) Violations of the October Agreements
120. Ultimately, the FRY and Serbia did not comply with the October Agreements. The MUP and VJ violated important technical provisions of the Agreements. The MUP failed to reduce its numbers and withdraw heavy weapons, and ultimately increased both; and the VJ failed to remain in barracks as required and ultimately increased its numbers in Kosovo. Worst of all, the VJ and MUP thwarted the very purpose of the Agreements: they began fighting the KLA anew, destroying the fragile ceasefire. Meanwhile, FRY and Serb officials took deliberate steps to mislead KVM into believing they were complying with the Agreements.
a. Refusal to Reduce Forces
121. The MUP did not comply with the requirement that it return combined police/special police strength to their February 1998 duty level; and the VJ did not comply with the requirements that it withdraw all units brought into Kosovo after February 1998.258
122. At a VJ Collegium meeting on 28 October 1998, the day after these withdrawals and reductions were to be accomplished,259 Chief of the VJ General Staff Peri{i} told participants that:
I want to tell you now that something from Resolution 1199 has not been implemented. If you pass this on outside in this way you will bring a lot of things into question. For example, the MUP has not been cut back to the level of March or the end of February 1998, and not all units of the Yugoslav Army have been withdrawn to barracks, but only these three what I call companies, and nor have these units which were at the border been withdrawn, concerning which no one is yet posing any questions, but they will pose questions.260
123. Additionally, Serbian President Milutinovi} told attendees at a MUP Staff meeting in Kosovo on 5 November 1998 that “With regard to the Yugoslav Army and police, everything will
1. 253 Drewienkiewicz,T.6430 6431;P844,p.2. 254 Phillips,T.8686. 255 Phillips,T.8686 8687. 256 Phillips,T.8686,8717;P1303,pp.4 5,163. 257 Phillips,T.8692. 258 P837,paras.1 5. 259 P837,para.7. 260 P1425,p.12.
IT-05-87/1-T 29 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6516 stay the same as it has been up to now, (a joint command, VJ army units will not withdraw, and police forces have only been reduced by the number that has already been withdrawn).”261
124. In fact, the MUP and VJ actually increased their numbers.262
125. The MUP obscured their failure to comply with these provisions by not providing KVM with the February 1998 baseline numbers or weekly reports about ongoing MUP numbers by which KVM could judge compliance. KVM repeatedly asked for this information.263 They never received the 1998 baseline data or weekly reports about manning.264 This made it impossible for KVM to confirm whether or not the MUP and VJ had reduced their numbers accordingly.265
126. Further, the VJ prevented KVM from monitoring whether its numbers were affected when it rotated troops. Ojdani} advised Drewienkiewicz that the VJ intended to rotate forces in and out of Kosovo in keeping with standard military practice.266 Drewienkiewicz requested that the KVM be involved in verifying the change over ratio in order to ensure that equal numbers of forces were coming in and leaving Kosovo.267 This request was flatly rejected by Ojdani}.268
127. In addition to failing to reduce its numbers as agreed in October, the MUP in fact bolstered its strength by arming Serb civilians and hiding this fact from KVM.269
128. Lukić sought to mislead the KVM about the actual number of armed Serb civilians supplementing the police. At a meeting held with SUP chiefs and PJP detachment commanders at the MUP Staff on 2 November 1998, the following conclusion was adopted:
Make sure that Serbs and members of the RPO do not misuse weapons, let off guns at weddings, celebrations of slava, farewell parties and so on, do not carry weapons or show them in public in the presence of members of the Mission. When on guard duty, use one weapon and prevent individuals bringing in the weapons they have been issued. Tell them not to state the fact that Serbs are armed and to explain this fact, if they must, 270 using the excuse that it is only members of the guard who are armed.
b. Refusal to Withdraw Heavy Weapons
261 P770,p.4. 262 See Part III,Section(B)(1). 263 P838;P1001;Phillips,T.8692,8715 8716;P1303,pp.6 7, 9;Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.63;P998,p.1. 264 Drewienkiewicz,T.6317,6326 6327,6330,6333;P997,pp.154 155;P998,p.1;Phillips,T.8718. 265 Drewienkiewicz,T.6317,6461;P997,p.154;Byrnes,T.8183. 266 Drewienkiewicz,T.6338;P996,para.64. 267 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.66;P998, p.2. 268 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.66. 269 See P87,p.10. See Part III,Section(A(2)(a). 270 P690,p.3.
IT-05-87/1-T 30 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6515 129. The MUP also refused to withdraw its heavy weapons and equipment as required. At a VJ Collegium meeting held on 3 December 1998, General Milorad Obradović reported on the MUP’s refusal to return VJ equipment, including 20 personnel carriers and 23 mortars that were subject to the October Agreement.271
130. The VJ resolved the problem of KVM discovering non compliance through inspections by never allowing KVM to conduct the inspections proposed by General Drewienkiewicz, or to even enter VJ barracks.272
131. These provisions were an important component of fostering peace in Kosovo. The MUP and VJ’s refusal to abide by them contributed to renewed violence.
c. Breach of the Ceasefire
132. The fundamental purpose of the October Agreements was to maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo. The VJ and the MUP thwarted efforts to achieve peace in Kosovo by returning to the use of excessive force and violence. Drewienkiewicz testified that the use of disproportionate force by the FRY government in response to insurgent activities in Kosovo “was observed by (the KVM) on many occasions.”273 This involved the use of heavy artillery, tanks, and machine guns which often resulted in civilian casualties.274
133. Two specific instances of the VJ and MUP breaching the ceasefire were their actions in Podujevo/Podujeva and Račak/Recak, which ultimately brought about a return to violence and the failure of the October Agreements.
Podujevo/Podujeva
134. In December 1998, the VJ and MUP breached the ceasefire and violated technical provisions of the October Agreements through their co ordinated actions in Podujevo/Podujeva. KDOM and KVM observed the VJ and MUP actively working together in a co ordinated fashion, much as they had done during the 1998 summer offensive.
135. Although the Pri{tina/Prishtinë, Podujevo/Podujeva, Niš road was of strategic importance to the MUP and VJ, it was not one of the three strategic supply routes included in the Clark Naumann
271 P967,p.19. 272 Drewienkiewicz,P997,p.216;Ciaglinski,P832,p.6. 273 Drewienkiewicz,T.6322. 274 Drewienkiewicz,T.6321 6322.
IT-05-87/1-T 31 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6514 Agreement that the VJ was permitted to patrol.275 The KLA subsequently moved into some of the positions in the area.276
136. Between 18 and 19 December, the VJ returned the 15th Armoured Brigade Tank Company to the airfield near Batlava/Batllava, joined by MUP and MUP vehicles.277 Verifiers became aware of the deployment because they observed a VJ armoured unit leaving the barracks in the west of Priština and moving to Batlava airfield on 18 December.278 The deployment included heavy weapons, tanks, and artillery.279
137. The deployment involved both the VJ and the MUP working together.280 Drewienkiewicz noted that the VJ and MUP units were not moving separately one after the other as would normally be expected, but were intermixed throughout the convoy.281 According to Drewienkiewicz, “one of the reasons you might do that is … so that the army and the MUP can communicate together in an operation where both have a part.”282
138. VJ representatives told KVM that this was a normal training exercise, specifically tank driver training.283 This claim was not true. At the meeting of the VJ Collegium on 30 December 1998, General Aleksandar Dimitrijević, Chief of the Security Administration, stated,
In addition, the current situation in the vicinity of Podujevo, I think that we must be completely consistent here and completely open towards each other, so to speak. The situation in Podujevo and the surroundings, it was complex before, but when did it suddenly become even more complicated? After the so called pretend or real planned exercises in which this company took part in the field. Generals, these sorts of moves will lead us to disaster, the explanation that this was a planned excercise, that is not true. It was planned that the unit would provoke the terrorists so that the MUP would then have to do whatever it had to do. The fact that the MUP did not do what it had to do afterwards has resulted in what we have now.284
139. General Obradović then told the Collegium that the VJ had “managed to avoid registering it as a combat group” by calling it “some sort of mixed or mechanised company that is on extended combat training in this training ground.”285
140. Dimitrijević’s comments show not only that the “training exercise” explanation was a ruse, but also that this was a joint VJ and MUP plan. The VJ unit was to provoke the KLA, so that the 275 P837,para. II.5. 276 Byrnes,P1214,p.66;Phillips,P1303,pp.79 80;Drewienkiewicz,T.6351 6352.See D351. 277 D590,p.1;Byrnes,T.8191;Phillips,T.8710;Crosland,P1400,para.65;Drewienkiewicz,P996, para.95. 278 Drewienkiewicz,T.6349;P996,paras.95 96; P844,p.4;Byrnes,T.8191;P1246, p.1. 279 P01247,p.1. 280 Phillips,T.8706;P1303,p.22;P1311,pp.1,5,9;Byrnes,T.8199 8200. 281 Drewienkiewicz,T.6349 6350;P996,para.100. 282 Drewienkiewicz,T.6350. 283 Drewienkiewicz,T.6351;P996,para.96;Byrnes,T.8191;Phillips,T.8710;P1246,p.1;D590,p.3. See P1246, p.1. 284 P1330,p.14.
IT-05-87/1-T 32 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6513 MUP would have to to begin fighting the KLA in the area under the guise of self defence.286 Lukić’s comments at the MUP Staff meeting on 17 February 1999 in Pri{tina make clear that this was not a training exercise. He reported to senior leadership of the MUP that “[c]onsiderable police and Yugoslav army forces have been engaged in the Podujevo area to secure the Pri{tina Ni{ road”.287
141. At the time, verifiers rightly perceived that the deployment was not in reality a training exercise.288 Verifiers also correctly discerned that the deployment was intentionally provocative.289 Drewienkiewicz made repeated efforts to protect the ceasefire by warning the VJ that their deployment in Podujevo/Podujeva would provoke fighting and asking them to “train” elsewhere.290 However, the VJ ignored the protests of Drewienkiewicz,291 and made it “impossible” for KVM to properly verify what was actually taking place in Podujevo/Podujeva by sealing off the area to the verifiers.292
142. Verifiers’ fears that the joint VJ MUP deployment would spark fighting proved correct. Within two days of the deployment, US KDOM reported,
F.R.Y. army (VJ) forces flouted the cease fire today when their teams in the Podujevo area attacked KLA positions. . . . The action, in clear violation of the cease fire accords, renders the overall agreement increasingly fragile.”293
143. General Drewienkiewicz was assured by the VJ that the training exercise would end on 22 December.294 However, not only did the company not leave that day, it was instead reinforced,295 as confirmed by the VJ Duty Operations Head, General Mihajlovi}, at the VJ Collegium meeting of 24 December 1998.296
144. The fighting continued up until the NATO bombing,297 with the VJ in fact “heavily reinforc[ing]” its presence there,298 and continuing supposed “training exercises”.299
1. 285 P1330,pp.14–15. 286 Phillips,P1303,p.22;T.8710.See P85,p.1. 287 P85,p.1. 288 Byrnes,T.8193;P1247,p.1. 289 Drewienkiewicz,T.6351 6352. 290 Drewienkiewicz,T.6354;P996,para.94;P1312,p.23;See D590,pp.3 4. 291 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.97. 292 Ciaglinski,P834,pp.34 35. 293 P1248,p.1;Byrnes,T.8198. 294 D590,p.4. 295 D590,p.1. 296 P966,p.14. 297 P1249,p.1;P1529,p.1;P844,p.4;P1334,p.7;Byrnes,T.8206;P973,pp.1 3. 298 P1075,pp.1 2.
IT-05-87/1-T 33 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6512 145. The VJ and MUP’s return to fighting seriously affected civilians. Around 10 January 1999, a UNHCR team observed that the population of Perane/Peran was gone.300 “Most houses at the fringes of Podujevo and along the Pri{tina/Prishtinë to Belgrade road were empty.”301At the end of January, Crosland witnessed the VJ and MUP deliberately “razing, burning, and looting” villages to the west of Podujevo/Podujeva, including Lapaštica, Donje Lapaštica, Bradaš, and Dobratin.302
146. Knut Vollebaek, the Chairman of OSCE, visited Podujevo/Podujeva and neighbouring villages on 15 March 1999.303 He observed that nearby villages had been destroyed.304 He saw people from Podujevo/Podujeva fleeing their homes.305 During last ditch negotiations prior to the NATO bombing, Vollebaek mentioned his observations directly to Milošević.306 Milošević “laughed,” and responded that the refugees were merely “people on picnic” and the burning homes were just “hay burning”.307
147. KVM repeatedly brought up the situation in Podujevo/Podujeva with the VJ and MUP, asking the VJ to return the company to barracks, and the MUP to stop the ongoing fighting.308 Instead, the VJ and MUP remained in Podujevo/Podujeva until the start of the NATO intervention.309 In fact, this VJ unit, along with three PJP companies, had a significant role in an order to combat the KLA in the area just prior to the start of the NATO bombing campaign.310
148. Throughout, the VJ and the MUP worked together, with the “army providing covering fire from its armour, and the police engaging in an infantry assault” in order to take a position.”311
Račak/Recak
149. In another joint action, the VJ shelled the village of Račak/Recak while the MUP rounded up and shot to death 45 alleged KLA members on 15 January 1999. As defence witnesses themselves described, this was a planned action, not reactive self defence.312 The action was co
1. 299 P1529,p.1;P1015,p.7. 300 P1075,p.1. 301 P1075,p.1. 302 Crosland,P1400,para.68. 303 Vollebaek,T.7215 7216. 304 Vollebaek,T.7216. 305 Vollebaek,T.7216. 306 Vollebaek,T.7217 7218. 307 Vollebaek,T.7217 7218. 308 Drewienkiewicz,P996,paras.94,96,97,164;P1026,pp.1 2;P1529,p.5;Byrnes,T.8206 8207;P1005,p.1;P1014,p.2. 309 Byrnes,T.8206. 310 P973,pp.1–3. 311 Byrnes,T.8200;Phillips,P1303,pp.22 23. 312 Mitić,T.12676 12678; Ðorñević,T.9667 9668.
IT-05-87/1-T 34 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6511 ordinated between the VJ and the MUP. The Račak/Recak action marked the end of the fledgling peace in Kosovo.
150. Tensions in the area began around 8 or 9 January 1999, when three MUP members were killed on the Crnoljevo [timlje road.313 KVM observed that in reaction to this incident, the MUP and VJ began to significantly build up forces in the area.314 The VJ was positioned on a bluff that overlooked the region, and the MUP were deployed in Račak and Stimlje, “setting up check points and going through the village in good numbers.”315 Due to this increasing tension, KVM requested KDOM to send a patrol to the area to supplement the international presence.316
151. On 15 January 1999, the KDOM patrol, commanded by U.S. Army Major Brad Scott, reported that the MUP and the VJ were attacking the village of Račak/Recak.317 This was another “co ordinated action” similar to Podujevo/Podujeva, where “the VJ provided covering fire on target before the assault began.”318 KVM had not been notified of this action.319
152. As was their practice, KDOM and KVM vehicles positioned themselves in between the police and the village in order to “calm the situation down.”320 For the first time, however, “the police, had simply ignored our presence, and they had moved through . . . our line and went on into attack the village.”321 A KDOM report described the situation:
US KDOM observed the FRY police/military attack on the Račak Pettovo Malopoljce area throughout the day on January 15. VJ armoured units and mortars fired into the villages, with at least three tank rounds visibly hitting civilian houses. Fires started by the shelling burned in the villages for several hours after the attack. By 4:30 that afternoon, the attack had ended and KDOM entered the villages where one body was found quickly. KDOM called in the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to assess the situation, which turned out to represent one of the most serious humanitarian disasters of the Kosovo crisis. KDOM then undertook the evacuation of wounded civilians, including one child, two women, and an elderly man.322
153. High level actors were involved in the action. On the morning of the operation, Ðorñević himself visited the Stimlje police station and monitored the action while it was underway. He
313 Crosland, T.9183;Phillips,T.8735. 314 Crosland,P1400,para.67;T.9186 9187;Phillips,T.8735;Byrnes,T.8201.Numerous reports in the KVM Blue Book documented this build up:P1029,pp.9,10,11,15,16,17,19. 315 Phillips,T.8735. 316 Byrnes,T.8201 8202. 317 Byrnes,T.8201. 318 Byrnes,T.8205. 319 Drewienkiewicz,T.6504. 320 Byrnes,T.8203 8204. 321 Byrnes,T.8204. 322 P1250,p.1.Byrnes stated that the report was drafted earlier than 26 January 1999, the date on the exhibit, and that may be the date of the Department of State publication of the report. T.8273.
IT-05-87/1-T 35 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6510 received two telephone calls from Deputy Prime Minister Šainović and reported about the situation.323
154. As the action progressed on 15 January, Maisonneuve went to investigate.324 He met with verifiers, who told him they had seen Pragas and T55 tanks on the hills overlooking Račak/Recak.325 They observed tanks firing into Račak/Recak, and then MUP personnel going into the village.326 There was no outgoing fire from Račak/Recak.327 The next day, Maisonneuve went to the hill where verifiers had seen the tanks, and he saw tank tracks on the spot.328
155. On 16 January, members of KVM, including Walker, Phillips, and Drewienkiewicz, travelled to Račak/Recak.329 Phillips and Drewienkiewicz gave similar accounts of what they saw. Both saw police “everywhere” in Stimlje, although not in Račak. Instead there was a KLA presence there. The VJ was behind Račak/Recak up on the hill side.330
156. Phillips described in his notebook the “revolting scene”331 that KVM discovered in Račak/Recak:
The scene in the village of Račak was the most horrifying thing one can imagine – a true tragedy. We counted 45 bodies; all were shot in the head, either front, back, top or behind the ear. Powder burns were noted on most bodies indicating a very close range shot. Some of the bodies had been mutilated with either ears, eyes, fingers and in one case, a head missing.
The majority of those killed were older men, in the 50s and 60s, there were some late 20s and 30s. We also came across three women and one 12 year old boy. Again just a horrifying scene – something I’ll never forget. This is not the way to solve problems anywhere in the world.332
157. Drewienkiewicz recounted the same scene.333 On the way back, Drewienkiewicz inspected the trench system at the bottom of the hill for signs of fighting but found none.334
323 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(e). 324 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.138. 325 Maisonneuve,P851,para.36. 326 Maisonneuve,T.5466. 327 Maisonneuve,T.5467. 328 Maisonneuve,T.5471.Some defence witnesses claimed that the VJ was not involved in the Račak/Recak operation. See ]ur~in,T.10692; Miti},T.12753. In light of the observations of multiple international verifiers, who saw tanks firing into the village, and Maisonneuve, who observed the tank tracks himself, their denials are not credible. Notably, neither ]ur~in nor Miti} were eyewitnesses to the action. Maisonneuve found it inconceivable that the VJ and MUP did not cooperate here, as “they definitely coordinated regularly during action” and “you would never have two forces, friendly forces, which are working on the same side operating in the same zone without ensuring that you have good co ordination to make sure that there are no engagement of friendly forces, any friendly fire.” Maisonneuve,T.5471. 329 Phillips,T.8735;Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.146. See also P1026, p.3. 330 Phillips,P1303,p.29;Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.146. 331 P1312,p.33. 332 P1312,p.44.See also P1575,a video showing the scene that KVM saw in Račak/Recak on 16 January 1999, including a decapitated body and many bodies with head wounds in civilian clothes. 333 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.147;P1013. 334 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.148.
IT-05-87/1-T 36 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6509 158. As no “scene of crime” examination appeared to be being undertaken, KVM “undertook to video all the bodies at close quarters.”335 KVM established that 45 people were killed during the MUP offensive, 23 of them in close proximity to each other.336 Villagers moved forty bodies found in and around the village to the mosque.337
159. KVM immediately and repeatedly called for an independent investigation of the incident. Walker held a press conference during which he condemned the attack,338 and urged that the ICTY be granted visas immediately so that a proper investigation could be carried out.339 Drewienkiewicz also told Lončar that only the ICTY could carry out a credible investigation.340 However, Lon~ar insisted that a FRY “crime scene” team would conduct an investigation if Drewienkiewicz would facilitate their entry into Račak/Recak.341
160. Ultimately, Investigative Judge Danica Marinković conducted an investigation that sought not to uncover the truth of what happened in Račak/Recak, but to clear the MUP of wrongdoing. She entered Račak/Recak on 18 January with her team, including a Professor Slaviša Dobri~anin.342 They went to the mosque, where the villagers had placed 40 of the 45 bodies on 16 January.343 With each body, Professor Dobri~anin “simply picked up the towel to see the head and then . . . put it back.”344 On this basis, which Marinković herself conceded was “not an official examination,”345 Dobri~anin “immediately stated . . . that there were no traces of slaughter on those bodies” – meaning there had been no massacre – and that the head injuries were “caused by birds or animals”.346 She never located the gully where the largest grouping of bodies had been found.347
335 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.148;P1575. 336 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.152;Phillips,P1312,p.44. 337 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.151. 338 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.154;P844,p.5. 339 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.154. 340 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.156. 341 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.155 154.See also Vollebaek,T.7214. 342 Marinkovi}, T.12975 12976. 343 Drewienkiewicz, P996, para.151. 344 Marinković, T.13113. 345 Marinković, T.13115. 346 Marinkovi}, T.12976, 13079, 13085. In light of the testimony of Phillips and Drewienkiewicz about the state of the bodies they saw on 16 January, and the footage in P1575 which confirms their descriptions, this statement of Professor Dobri~anin is incomprehensible. Interestingly, when shown P1575, Marinković claimed these were not the bodies she had seen on in the mosque. T.13083. However, as Drewienkiewicz made clear, they were the same bodies. Villagers took 40 of the 45 bodies killed in Račak/Recak and laid them in the mosque before Drewienkiewicz departed on 16 January. P996, para.151. 347 Marinković, T.12978, 13087.
IT-05-87/1-T 37 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6508 161. In the following days, Marinković made a public statement that there had been no massacre.348 At this time, the autopsies had just begun,349 she had not interviewed any witnesses to the incident,350 and indeed, had not even located the primary crime scene.351 She made no further efforts to do so. Meanwhile, ICTY Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour’s efforts to investigate the Račak/Recak incident were thwarted when she was denied a FRY visa.352
162. Defence witness Mitić claimed that the Račak/Recak action was a legitimate response to terrorism, and that the MUP merely planned to “arrest” terrorists.353 However, they once again used excessive force – their “arrest” turned into the killing of 45 people. Drewienkiewicz explained that he had expressed his concern to FRY and Serb authorities about their use of disproportionate force at almost every meeting he had with them.354
163. The Račak/Recak action caused the ceasefire to collapse. Afterward, the regular meetings between KVM and the liaison group stopped.355 As Byrnes testified, “At the end of the day, Ra~ak destroyed that agreement.”356
(d) Rambouillet and Paris negotiations
164. The Račak/Recak massacre provoked an outcry in the international community. Diplomats made intense efforts to mediate between Kosovo Albanian and Serb representatives, including shuttle negotiations conducted under the auspices of U.S. envoy Christopher Hill and European Union envoy Wolfgang Petritsch.357
165. Kosovo Albanians and Serbs were summoned to Rambouillet, France for negotiations between 6 and 22 February 1999.358 The purpose of the Rambouillet negotiations was to create a transitional situation in Kosovo to restore peace and allow the refugees to return to their homes.359
348 On cross examination, Marinkovi} was shown a newspaper article dated 20 January 1999, entitled, “They were not massacred” in which Marinkovi} was quoted as saying, “The terrorist’ corpses have not been massacred, as the more than biased head of Kosovo Verification Mission William Walker has claimed.” T.13085 13087. 349 Marinkovi}, T.13086 13087; The bodies had been taken from the mosque and transported to the Pri{tina/Prishtina morgue for autopsy. Drewienkiewicz, P1016, p.1. 350 Marinkovi}, T.12979, 13087. 351 Marinkovi}, T.12978, 13087. 352 Drewienkiewicz, P844, p.5. 353 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.155;Miti},T.12676. 354 Drewienkiewicz,T.6323 6324. 355 Phillips,T.8691 8692;P1303,p.5. 356 Byrnes,T.8225. 357 Merovci,P416,para.33. 358 Abrahams,P738,p.21;Rugova,P285,p.7;Surroi,T.283. 359 Rugova,P286,pp.31 32. On 30 January 1999, the Contact Group had formulated “non negotiable principles” on the basis of which the talks at Rambouillet were to proceed. Jovanovi},D455,pp.65 66.
IT-05-87/1-T 38 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6507 166. FRY President Milo{evi} did not attend the peace talks,360 causing many to believe that Serbian delegates never had the will or ability achieve a political solution.361 According to Surroi, “realistically speaking, there was only one address for the negotiations . . . Belgrade. The man who was there was Slobodan Milo{evi}.”362
167. After protracted negotiations, all members of the Kosovo Albanian delegation were ready to sign the agreement, except for Thaqi who would not sign without first returning home and consulting with KLA commanders. The Serbian delegation offered to accept in principle part of the document and discuss the rest of it.363 Before their departure, both delegations agreed to return to Paris on 15 March for the completion and implementation of the agreement.364
168. When the delegations met again, only the Kosovo Albanians signed the agreement that was tabled by the Contact Group negotiators. The Serb side introduced new drafts and went back on earlier agreed issues and eventually refused to sign.365
169. While these peace talks were ongoing, Serb forces were building up in Kosovo and intensifying their operations on the ground.366
170. On 19 March 1999, the Co Chairmen of the Contact Group issued a statement that “the Rambouillet agreements represent the only peaceful solution to the problem of Kosovo” and that the “Kosovo delegation in Paris has taken that opportunity and committed itself to the agreement in its entirety by signing it”, whereas the “Yugoslav delegation has not only not used that opportunity, but it has also tried to dispute the Rambouillet agreement again”.367 They concluded that “it serves no purpose to further prolong the talks”368 and would consult with their allies and contact the NATO Secretary General.369
171. Just after the Rambouillet talks had collapsed, at a Serbian Radical Party (SRS) rally in Zemun, Vojislav [e{elj, a deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, stated that “If NATO bombs us, we
360 Surroi,T.283 284. 361 Rugova,P285, pp.6 7;P286,pp.30 32;Surroi,T.287;Byrnes,P1214,pp.63 64,102. 362 Surroi,T.347. See Jovanovi}, D455,p.66. 363 Surroi,T.287 288;Merovci,P416,para.36;Rugova,P285,p.8. 364 Merovci,P416,para.36. 365 Rugova,P285,p.8;P286,pp.33 34;Surroi,T.289. 366 See Part III, Section(B)(1). 367 D492,p.5. 368 D492,p.5. 369 D492,p.5.
IT-05-87/1-T 39 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6506 Serbs will suffer casualties ₣...ğ but there will be no Albanians left in Kosovo.”370 During his testimony in relation to this video, \or|evi} explained that:
"... parliament duly backed Milo{evi}'s rejection of the Rambouillet terms as did the Serb public. Serbia's deputy prime minister revealed what Milo{evi} was planning to do next. If it comes to bombing by the NATO alliance, if an American aggression happens, we Serbs will suffer significant casualties, but there will be no Albanians in Kosovo."371
172. Vollebaek met with Milo{evi} in Belgrade to persuade him to accept an international military presence in Kosovo. Milo{evi} refused this proposal.372 Vollebaek decided he had to withdraw KVM.373
173. Ambassadors Hill and Holbrooke and other international representatives lobbied Milo{evi} to change his mind and avoid being bombed by NATO.374 These final effort negotiations were unsuccessful.375 Holbrooke asked Milo{evi} if he was aware of the consequences of his decision, and he replied that he was fully aware of the consequences.376 The NATO air strike campaign against Serbia began on 24 March 1999.
3. Administration and co ordination bodies in Kosovo used to implement the JCE
(a) Forces operating in Kosovo
174. Forces of the FRY and Serbia were the principal perpetrators of the crimes charged in the Indictment. They were either members of the JCE because they shared the common criminal purpose or they were used by the JCE members to carry out the actus reus of crimes forming part of the common criminal purpose. These principal perpetrators include the following forces of the FRY and Serbia.
(i) Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP)
175. In 1998 and 1999, Vlajko Stojiljkovi} was the Minister of Internal Affairs.377
176. The MUP was composed of two main departments: the Public Security Department (RJB) and the State Security Department (RDB), whose tasks were set out, respectively, in the Rules on
370 P1510;\or|evi},T.10044 10045. 371 \or|evi},T.10044 10045. 372 Vollebaek,P1072,pp.22 23,31 32;P1071,pp.13 14;T.7277 7278. 373 Vollebaek,T.7223 7227;P1073,p.6,12 13;P1071,p.39;P1076. 374 Surroi,T.290. 375 Surroi,T.290 291. 376 Surroi,T.291. 377 P688;P770;P85.
IT-05-87/1-T 40 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6505 Internal Organisation of the MUP,378 and in the Rules on the Internal Organisation of the RDB.379 During the Indictment period, \or|evi} headed the RJB, while the RDB was headed by Radomir Markovi}.380 \or|evi} was “the number 2 man in MUP”.381
177. In Kosovo, Sreten Lukić headed the MUP Staff, which brought the RJB and the RDB in Kosovo under the direction of a central body.382
178. The RJB in Belgrade was divided into a number of Administrations responsible for specific aspects of MUP operations, all reporting to \or|evi}. In terms of MUP operations in Kosovo, the most important Administrations were the Police Administration, Crime Police and the Duty Operations Centre. The Police Administration headed by General Obrad Stevanović had broad responsibility for all regular police units, as well as the special police units, the SAJ and the PJP.383 The Duty Operations Centre provided a means for senior MUP officials to remain informed of the activities of field headquarters and units. The head of the Crime Police Administration of the MUP was Dragan Ili}.384
a. Public Security Department (RJB)
Secretariats of Internal Affairs (SUPs)
179. The MUP also comprised Secretariats of Internal Affairs (SUPs), managed by a Chief of Secretariat.385
180. There were 33 SUPs in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, seven of which were in Kosovo.386
181. All the 33 SUPs in the territory of the Republic of Serbia were within the RJB. SUP chiefs were subordinated to \or|evi}.387 SUPs in Kosovo reported to the MUP in Belgrade and to the MUP Staff in Pri{tina.388
378 P357,Arts.1 2.See also \or|evi},T.9434. 379 P1349,Art.1. See also \or|evi},T.9434. 380 P694;P85;P770.See also D100. 381 Vasiljevi},T.5933. See also Mi{i},T.14073. 382 P57. See Part III, Section A(3)(b)(ii). 383 Cveti},T.6594. Vasiljevi} testified that Stevanovi} was “the third ranking man in MUP” (Vasiljevi},T.5683). 384 Cveti},T.6667. 385 P357,Arts.2 3;Cveti},T.6746;\or|evi},T.9435.See also P1056. 386 P357,Art.3;P1037;Cveti}, T.6595;Ðor|ević,T.9435;Mi{i},T.14019;Panteli},T.12029. See also P1056,pp.1 2. 387 Cveti},T.6591,6598;Mi{i},T.14075. See also P1056,p.1,item 2. 388 Cveti},T.6597. See also Part III,Section(A)(3)(b)(ii).
IT-05-87/1-T 41 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6504 182. Each SUP was divided into municipal Departments/Sectors of the Interior (OUPs), which in turn controlled local police stations (PSs).389
183. During the Indictment period, the chiefs of the seven SUPs on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija were: Bo{ko Petri} (until April 1999) and Bogoljub Jani}evi} (from May 1999), Pri{tina SUP;390 Ljubinko Cveti} (until 16 April 1999) and Vucina Janicevi} (from 16 April 1999), Kosovska Mitrovica SUP;391 Boro Vlahovi}, Pe} SUP; Milan Kovačevi} (until April 1999) and Dragutin Adamovi} (after April 1999), \akovica SUP; Milo{ Vojnovi}, Prizren SUP; Du{an Gavrani}, Gnjilane SUP; Bogoljub Jani}evi} (until April 1999) and Bozidar Fili} (from May 1999), Uro{eva} SUP.392
Special Police Units (PJPs)
184. In 1998 and in 1999, the MUP had a number of special combat units in Kosovo.393 The RJB possessed two special units: the Special Police Unit (PJP) and the Special Anti Terrorist Unit (SAJ).394 Obrad Stevanovi} was the overall head of the PJP.395
185. The PJPs were the largest group of RJB special units and were used much as light infantry units.396 PJPs were responsible for dealing with complex security tasks.397 Members of PJP units also had regular police duties.398
186. PJP troops were recruited from the regular police forces, but were better trained and better equipped than regular police.399 Detachments of the PJP were assigned regionally400 and attached to SUPs.401 Each SUP in Kosovo had at least one PJP company, while the Pri{tina SUP had two companies.402
389 P357,Art.4;Cveti},T.6595 6596,6746;Ðor|ević,T.9435 9436;K86,T.5117 (closed session). 390 Brakovi},T.4092;P759,para.1. 391 Cveti},T.6590;P78. 392 P1037;Cveti},T.6590;K86,T.5117 (closed session). 393 Byrnes,T.8171 8172;P1214,pp.20 21;Phillips,T.8697;P357,Art.6;Ðor|ević,T.9446. 394 Cveti},T.6601;Crosland,P1400,para.7. 395 Cveti},T.6594;Vasiljevi},T.5683. 396 Crosland,P1400,para.13. 397 Cveti}, T.6603;Ðor|ević,T.9447 9449;P58;Brakovi},P759,para.12. 398 Ðor|ević,T.9448;Stopari},P495,p.14;Panteli},T.12045. 399 Cveti},T.6601;Ðor|ević,T.9448 9449; P58;Brakovi},T.4089. 400 Ðorðević,T.9448;P58;P1360,pp.1 2. 401 Cveti},T.6602;Brakovi},T.4089; K86,T.5119 5120 (closed session). 402 Brakovi},T.4099.
IT-05-87/1-T 42 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6503 187. SUPs were responsible for providing logistics to PJP units.403 SUPs also implemented training programs developed by the MUP HQ for PJP units when these were not on detachment duty.404 PJP commanders were members of and attended the SUP Collegium.405
188. Decisions to engage PJP detachments were made by the MUP Minister or a person authorised by him.406 In practice, the person authorised to deploy PJP units was \or|evi}.407
189. Once deployed, MUP Staff directed and co ordinated PJP units, as “the body directly on the ground that had an insight into the overall security situation”.408 Brakovi} testified that his PJP detachment would usually receive tasks either from the MUP Staff, or directly in the field during briefings that they had together with VJ personnel.409 On the ground, PJP units were commanded by a PJP commander.410
190. PJP units wore green camouflage uniforms, with the flag of the Republic of Serbia on the left sleeve, and the PJP insignia on the right sleeve.411 When conducting operations, PJPs would wear coloured ribbons on the epaulettes of the uniforms.412
191. PJP units employed both light vehicles and APCs and, on occasion, had VJ tanks and artillery supporting them.413 K79 testified that, as a member of the PJP, he had standard police weaponry.414
192. In 1998 and in 1999, PJP detachments from all parts of Serbia were engaged on the territory of Kosovo,415 and participated into anti terrorist operations.416 The 24th PJP Detachment commanded by Brakovi} was deployed in Kosovo.417 In June 1998, the 24th PJP Detachment became the 124th Intervention Brigade.418
403 Cveti},T.6603,6662,6696. See also Ðor|ević,T.9452 9453;Panteli},T.12047 12048;Miti},T.12629. 404 Cveti},T.6698;P1045,p.36. See also Miti},T.12629. 405 P689,p.8. 406 Cveti},T.6604,6607,6649.See also Ðor|ević,T.9453. 407 Cveti},T.6604,6649. See e.g. P131;P132;P137;P138;P139;P1182;P1183. 408 Cveti},T.6650. See also Part III, Section A(3)(b)(ii)(c). 409 Brakovi},T.4095. See also Part III, Section A(3)(b)(ii)(c). 410 Cveti},T.6604 6605,6649 6650;Keri},T.7830 7831. 411 Brakovi},P759,para.7;K86,T.5120 5122,5125 (closed session);P831. In April 1996, the old police uniforms with the insignia “milicija” were replaced with new uniforms with the insignia “policija”. See Cveti},T.6700 6701;P327,items 6,7; K73,T.1511 1512,1514 1515 (closed session); P332,pp.8,14,21 (under seal); P331 A,para.15;P335. 412 Brakovi},P759,para.8;T.4127 4128. See e.g. P761;P762. See also K73,T.1509 (closed session);P334;P335. 413 P1264(under seal); K73,T.1516 1517(closed session); P326;P332,p.9(under seal);Byrnes,T.8171;P1214,pp.20 21; K79,T.8314 (private session). 414 K79,P1259,p.14 (under seal). 415 D340,p.10;Cveti},T.6603 6604.See also Brakovi},T.4124;Mi{i},T.14039. 416 K86,T.5118(closed session); K25,P340,pp.4 7 (under seal);P341,pp.4 5 (under seal). 417 Brakovi},T.4093. 418 Brakovi},T.4092,4123;P759,para.9;Cveti},T.6601 6602,6698;P257;P132.
IT-05-87/1-T 43 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6502 193. Starting from July 1998, and continuing in 1999, \or|evi} ordered the deployment of PJP detachments to Kosovo.419
194. In 1999, the PJP units in Kosovo included the 122nd and 124th Intervention Brigades, and the 23rd, 35th, 36th, 37th, 73rd, 85th and 86th PJP Detachments, among others.420
195. PJP units included sub units known as the Operational Sweep Groups (OPGs), composed of specially trained individuals drawn from the larger PJP units.421 The decision to create OPGs was taken by the MUP Staff in early December 1998.422 OPGs provided the SUP with a quick reaction force, especially for cases when the main PJP unit was already engaged.423 Each OPG had its own commander within the SUP to which it was attached.424 All OPGs were under the authority of the Assistant Head for Special Operations of the MUP Staff, Goran Radosavljevi}.425
Special Anti Terrorist Unit (SAJ)
196. The Special Anti Terrorist Unit (SAJ) was an elite special unit within the RJB.426 Up until 1998, the SAJ had three branches: the Novi Sad, Belgrade and Pri{tina units—each with approximately 100 men.427 In late 1998, Stojiljkovi} disbanded the Novi Sad unit,428 removing “one third of the personnel” of the SAJ.429
197. In 1998 and during the Indictment period, the Commander of the SAJ at the MUP HQ was Živko Trajkovi}.430 The Commander of the Belgrade SAJ was Zoran Simovi}, aka Tutina}.431 The Commander in Novi Sad was Branko Cur~i}, and the Commander in Pri{tina was Radoslav Stalevi}.432
198. SAJ members were equipped with special uniforms and weapons: green and brown tiger stripe camouflage uniforms, Gore Tex boots, modern weaponry and newer all terrain vehicles.433
419 See e.g. P131;P133;P135;P136;P137;P139;P346. 420 P764,pp.2 3;P345;P974;Brakovi},T.4124;Cveti},T.6603 6604;P1392. 421 Brakovi}, P759,para.11;K86,T.5118(closed session);Cveti},T.6605. 422 Cveti},T.6605;K86,T.5118(closed session). 423 Brakovi},P759,para.11. 424 Cveti},T.6605;Brakovi},P759,para.11. 425 Cveti},T.6605 6606;Brakovi},P759,para.11. 426 P357,Art.6;P1037. See also Cveti},T.6601;Crosland,P1400,para.7;Ðor|ević,T.9462;Stalevi},T.13840. 427 Stalevi},T.13770;Simovi},T.13574. 428 \or|evi},T.9694;Stalevi},T.13774;Simovi},T.13579. 429 Simovi},T.13574,13580,13593. 430 Cveti},T.6599;P1037;P57;Trajkovi},T.9056;Stalevi},T.13767 13768;Simovi},T.13572. 431 Simovi},T.13570,13573;Stopari},P493,para.48. 432 Trajković,T.9057;Simovi},T.13572. 433 Crosland,P1400,para.8;Ðor|ević,T.9464;P327,item 12;K73,T.1514 1516(closed session);P332,pp.8,14 (under seal); K86,T.5122(closed session).
IT-05-87/1-T 44 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6501 199. On 23 March 1999, the Belgrade SAJ unit was sent to Kosovo.434 The Belgrade and Pri{tina SAJ remained in Kosovo for the duration of the war.435
Reserve police or police reservists
200. The MUP could also be supplemented by reservists.436 Reservists brought up staffing levels when there were not enough members in the regular force.437
201. Reservists were employed across all MUP organisational units.438 When not mobilised, police reservists were civilians with regular civilian jobs.439 When engaged in MUP activities, reservists had the same entitlements of regular members of the police.440
202. Reservists wore the same blue camouflage uniforms as regular policemen441 and were issued weapons.442
b. State Security Department (RDB)
Special Operations Unit (JSO)
203. The Special Operations Unit (JSO) was a special formation within the RDB.443 The commander of the JSO was Milan (or Milorad) Ulemek Lukovi}, aka “Legija”, who was the Assistant Head for Special Operations of the MUP Staff.444 Until July/August 1998, his superior was Franko Simatovi}, aka Franki.445 The JSO was also known as the “Red Berets”.446 Satellite units attached to the JSO were: Arkan’s Tigers, the Grey Wolves from near Zvornik; the CSB (Central Security Service) from Doboj; the Wolves from Vučjak; and the Vipers commanded by Gumar.447 The JSO had previously fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia.448
434 Simovi},T.13575,13609. 435 Simovi},T.13609 13610. 436 Cveti},T.6739 6740;Mirči},T.13297 13298. 437 Mir~i},T.13297. 438 Mir~i},T.13298. 439 Cveti},T.6740. 440 Cveti},T.6740 6741.See also D101,p.1;D263. 441 K86,T.5120 (closed session). See also K86,T.5121,5125,5202 (closed session);P831.See also Mir~i},T.13297. 442 K86,T.5120 (closed session). 443 Cveti},T.6606;Stopari},P495,pp.15 16;P1349,Arts.5,41,42. 444 P57;Cveti},T.6599,6863;P1037;Crosland,P1400,para.11;K88,T.1983. 445 K79,P1260,p.92. 446 Stopari},P495,p.15. 447 Stopari},P493,para.10. 448 Stopari},P493,paras.10,23;P495,p.8.
IT-05-87/1-T 45 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6500 204. JSO were primarily used for more specialized operations.449 They wore grey camouflage uniforms, and were equipped with newer weaponry450 and a red beret.451
205. The JSO operated in Kosovo.452 Crosland testified that JSO forces operated together with PJPs, and that the JSO was present in the Mali{evo area in mid July 1998, in the Dreniča and Jablanica areas in 1998,453 in the Gornje Streoc area in July/August 1998, and in I{tok, Srbica and De~ani in 1999.454 General Drewienkiewicz also saw JSO forces in Rogovo in late January 1999.455
206. Crosland estimated that there were 8,000 10,000 MUP personnel and 15,000 VJ deployed in Kosovo in March and April 1998.456 In October 1998 and during the state of war in 1999, the MUP had approximately 14,000 personnel in Kosovo.457
(ii) Army of Yugoslavia (VJ)
207. The VJ included the Land Forces, the Air Force, and the Anti Aircraft Defence.458 The VJ General Staff was the “highest professional and staff organ for the preparation and use of the Army in times of peace and war”.459 During the Indictment period, Colonel General Dragoljub Ojdani} was the Chief of the VJ General Staff.460
208. The largest and most important forces of the VJ were the Land Forces, which were divided into Armies.461
209. The 3rd Army’s zone of responsibility encompassed the southern part of Serbia and all of Kosovo.462 During the Indictment period, the 3rd Army was under the Command of General Neboj{a Pavkovi}.463
449 Crosland,P1401,p.13. 450 Crosland,P1400,paras.9 10;P1403,p.4. 451 Stopari},P493,para.11;Crosland,P1400,para.10. 452 See e.g.D340,p.10. 453 Crosland,P1401,pp.14 15;P1400,para.11.See also K79,P1259,p.104(under seal);P1260,p.93. 454 Crosland,P1400,para.12. 455 Drewienkiewicz,P996,paras.165 166,195;T.6370 6372,6481. 456 Crosland,P1400,para.32. 457 P1038,p.2;Cveti},T.6608 6609,6618 6619.In the period between the signing of the October Agreements and the start of the 1999 conflict, the number of police officers was reduced from 14,000 to approximately 10,000. See P769,p.1; P87,p.7;Cveti},T.6608,6618. In March 1999 the number of MUP forces in Kosovo increased to 14,571 (Cveti},T.6609 6610). See also P1509 MFI, pp.4 5, which contains a table indicating that in April 1999, there were 15,779 policemen in Kosovo. With regard to this exhibit, \or|evi} said that he believed the numbers on this table were correct.\or|evi}, T.10043. 458 P43,Art.2. 459 P43,Art.5. 460 P1492;P1363,p.5.See also P1242;\akovi},T.7977. 461 P1440,pp.99 100. 462 Vasiljevi},T.5658.
IT-05-87/1-T 46 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6499 210. The Ni{ Corps and the Pri{tina Corps (PrK) were subordinate corps of the 3rd Army.464 Beyond those Corps, the 3rd Army also had additional independent military units and institutions 465 under its authority, such as the Pri{tina and Ni{ Military Sectors and their Military Departments. Military Territorial Districts and their units were thus also within the organisational structure of the 3rd Army.466
211. By late March 1999, the personnel strength of the 3rd Army was approximately 61,500.467
212. The area of responsibility (AOR) of the PrK was Kosovo.468 In 1999, the Commander of the PrK was General Vladimir Lazarević, who succeeded Pavkovi}.469 The PrK comprised 12 brigades, each assigned to an AOR within Kosovo.470 Lazarević commanded and exercised control over all brigades of the PrK and other attached and subordinated units.
213. During the Indictment period, the main PrK units deployed in Kosovo were:
- the 15th Armoured Brigade, commanded by Colonel Mladen Čircovi};
- the 125th Motorised Brigade, commanded by General Dragan Živanovi};
- the 243rd Mechanised Brigade, commanded by General Kr{man Jelić;
- the 549th Motorised Brigade, commanded by General Bozidar Deli};471
- the 52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade, commanded by Colonel Ranko Milinovi};472
- the 52nd Air Defence Artillery Rocket Brigade, commanded by Milo{ \o{an;
- the 37th Motorised Brigade, commanded by General Ljubi{a \ikovi};473 and
- the 211th Armoured Brigade, commanded by Colonel Mihailo Gergar.
1. 463 P1493;Vasiljevi},T.5659.See also P1343,pp.5 8. 464 P1448;Vasiljevi},T.5658. 465 P1448;Vasiljevi},T.5658,5661;P883. See also P1242;\akovi},T.7977. 466 P43,Arts.279 281;P1440,pp.100 101;P1448. See also infra paras. 219 223. 467 P1441,p.1.See Vasiljevi},T.5658. 468 Vasiljevi},T.5659. 469 P1494;Vasiljevi},T.5659. 470 See P1366.See also P1242. 471 P1391,p.1. 472 P1441,pp.3 4. 473 P1443.
IT-05-87/1-T 47 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6498 214. The total personnel strength of the PrK during peacetime was between 10,000 and 12,000. Additional units were brought into Kosovo before and during the state of war in 1999.474 A 3rd Army report to the Supreme Command Staff presented the total strength of the PrK at 17,971 men, as of 31 March 1999.475 A combat report of 13 April 1999, from the PrK to the 3rd Army Command and Supreme Command Staff, reported the manpower levels of the PrK at 61,892 men, including re subordinated units and volunteers.476
215. The VJ consisted of regular and reserve forces.477 VJ regular forces wore a green camouflage uniform with the VJ insignia (depicting a double headed eagle above the FRY flag) on the upper left arm.478
216. Members of the VJ Military Police wore the regular official uniform of the VJ.479 Depending on the kind of operation they were engaged in, members of the Military Police also wore face masks, as well as black berets or helmets (US type “Panama” helmets).480
217. VJ forces were equipped with standard infantry weaponry,481 three barrel anti aircraft guns, Pragas, tanks and trucks.482
(iii) Other units operating in Kosovo
218. Along with MUP and VJ forces, other units under the control of state authorities also operated in Kosovo in 1998 and in 1999. These included military territorial detachments, the civil defence and civil protection units of the Federal Ministry of Defence, paramilitaries and volunteers. In addition, from mid 1998, non Albanian villagers were armed and organised into local village defence units.
a. Military Territorial Detachments (VTOd)
474 P1341,p.12;P1452;P1238;P1356;P1443.See also P1339,p.15: by 18 March 1999, the total number of VJ forces deployed in full combat readiness was “66,438 or 65.22 per cent of the current Yugoslav Army manning level”. According to the Minutes of the Collegium of the VJ General Staff of 9 April 1999, the VJ had by then increased “by about 70,000 to more than 240,000, in which regard 70 brigades, 15 regiments and 41 independent battalions have been mobilised. Of this number, about 50,500 men are in Kosovo and Metohija alone.” (P1331,p.11). 475 P1441,p.3. 476 P948,p.2.See also P1331,p.11. 477 P43,Art.7. 478K82,P1315,para.2;T.8853,8854(private session);P336;P327,n.3;K73,T.1514 1515(closed session);P332,p.8(under seal). 479 K73,P332,pp.7 8(under seal);P327,n.4 5. 480 K73,P332,pp.11 13(under seal);P333.See Phillips,T.8696;P1029,p.48. 481 K73,T.1516 1517(closed session);P326;P332,p.9(under seal). 482 See e.g.K82,P1315,paras.6 7, 24.
IT-05-87/1-T 48 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6497 219. According to the Law on the VJ, military territorial organs were in charge of the maintenance of VJ manpower levels through the organisation and implementation of compulsory military service in their respective territories.483 Military territorial organs consisted of Military Sectors (VOk), Military Departments, and Military Territorial Detachments (VTOd).484
220. The VOk were responsible for conscription, reservist call up, and their assignments to active VJ units, and were subdivided into a number of Military Departments.485 These departments controlled a number of VTOd activated during wartime to conduct combat operations.486
221. The Pri{tina VOk was responsible for the entire territory of Kosovo,487 and was commanded in 1999 by Colonel Zlatomir Pe{i}.488 The Pri{tina VOk had five Military Departments under its control: Pri{tina/Prishtinë, Prizren, Pe}/Peja, Gnjilane/Gjilan, and Kosovksa Mitrovica/Mitrovica.489 In early 1999, there were 24 VTOd subordinated to the Military Departments of the Pri{tina VOk.490 The tasks of the VOk are set out in an order of 27 March 1999 signed by Pe{i}.491
222. The VTOd within the Priština VOk were re subordinated to various PrK units during the NATO bombing.492 When PrK units carried out operations in the territorial areas of VTOds, they would be attached to PrK Brigades.493
223. By the end of March 1999, the Priština VOk had 4,000 personnel.494
b. Civil Defence and Protection
224. The FRY Law on Defence regulated Civil Defence (CO) and Civil Protection (CZ) units,495 providing for the obligation of citizens to participate in units and organs formed for the protection and rescue of the civilian population during wartime.496 Under the law, the Federal Defence
483 See P43,Arts.279 280. 484 P43,Art.279. 485 P1448;P883. 486 P1440,pp.100 101;P1454. 487 P1448;Vasiljevi},T.5659. 488 Vasiljevi},T.5657 5658,5661;P883.See also P1242;\akovi},T.7977. 489 P1448;Vasiljevi},T.5659. 490 P1448. 491 P896. 492 P1375.See P1374. 493 P1239;P896. 494 P1441,p.5. 495 P44,Arts.22,54 63. 496 P44,Art.22.
IT-05-87/1-T 49 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6496 Ministry (MoD) could organise and arm CO and CZ units,497 although those units were intended to fulfil a non combat role.498
225. The Priština Defence Administration was the MoD entity directly responsible for the organization, administration, and command of the Kosovo CO and CZ units.499
226. Members of CO and CZ units were issued light weapons for personal defence.500
227. At the end of 1998, there were over 9,000 civilians in CO and CZ units in Kosovo.501 CZ units were armed, wore uniforms similar to VJ uniforms with patches of the civilian protection.502
228. During 1998 and 1999, CO and CZ units were used by the VJ and MUP to support their combat actions in Kosovo. In July 1998, the Joint Command issued instructions for the defence of populated areas. Pursuant to those instructions, the MoD issued orders subordinating units of both the CZ and CO to the MUP.503
229. The use of CO and CZ units as combat units was contrary to the provisions of the Law on Defence.504 These units were intended exclusively for self defence for the protection of civilian life and property in the event of an attack.505 Despite this prohibition, these units undertook security tasks during joint VJ MUP operations in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.506
c. Paramilitaries
230. Paramilitaries operated in Kosovo in 1998 and in 1999, and they played an important role in forcibly expelling the Kosovo Albanian civilian population from Kosovo.
231. Notorious groups of paramilitaries that had been active in the Bosnian and Croatian conflicts went to Kosovo in 1998 and during the Indictment period.507 These paramilitary formations supplemented MUP units.
497 P44,Arts.59 63.See also Vasiljevi},T.5941 5942. 498 P44,Arts.59,61;P1224. 499 P1223;P1224. 500 P1345,p.2. See \akovi},T.7903. 501 P1345,p.2. 502 \akovi},T.7902. 503 P1051,pp.3 5;P1224. 504 P44,Arts.59,61. 505 P44,Arts.59,61. 506 P1223;P1224;D348,p.3;P1333,p.23.See also Crosland,P1400,para.19. 507 Vasiljevi},T.5663 5664,5667 5668;Stopari},P493,paras.34 35;T.2816.
IT-05-87/1-T 50 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6495 232. The Skorpions were among the paramilitary groups deployed with the MUP. In 1999, Ðorñević ordered the deployment of the Skorpions to Kosovo.508 The Skorpions were attached to the SAJ commanded by Trajković.509 Slobodan Medić (aka Boca) was the Skorpions’ unit commander.510
233. On 28 March 1999, upon arriving in the town of Podujevo, members of the Skorpions killed a group of civilians, mostly women and children.511 Although the unit was sent back to Serbia,512 \or|evi} later redeployed it to Kosovo.513 The unit was active in Kosovo until May 1999.514
234. On both deployments, the Skorpions were deployed as a separate group, kept together as a group, and not dispersed into detachments.515 The Skorpions were identified by others and identified themselves as a separate unit. Stopari} testified that the Skorpions uniforms had the SAJ patch/insignia (the sword with the 4S’s) on one arm and the Skorpions patch/insignia on the other arm, although there were not enough SAJ patches for every member.516 This uniform with two insignias was only worn by Skorpions members.517 Their hats had MUP insignia and the tricolour Serbian flag.518 The Skorpions also had a Skorpions badge on the beret.519 The Skorpions carried SAJ identity papers and were paid as SAJ reservists.520
235. Arkan’s Tigers were also present in Kosovo.521 Members of the Arkan’s Tigers were incorporated directly into the JSO under Legija.522 They carried official RDB identity cards.523 Members of this unit had well known criminal backgrounds.524
236. Prior to the NATO bombing, Stojiljkovi} and \or|evi} made preparations for the introduction of paramilitaries and volunteers into the MUP. Notwithstanding the fact that by law the MUP could not engage volunteers,525 at a MUP Staff meeting held on 17 February 1999, Stojijlkovi} instructed those present to “₣ağpproach and engage volunteers carefully, linking their 508 Trajkovi},T.9087,9089,9092. See also Part V, Section C (I)(e)(ii). 509 Vasiljevi},T.5663,5667;Stopari},P493,para.35;T.2816. 510 Trajkovi},T.9099 9100;K92,T.2724(closed session);Stopari},T.2814 2815,2859. 511 Stoparić,P493,para.56;Vasiljevi},T.5663;D442;P86. See also Part V, Section C (I)(e)(ii). 512 Vasiljevi},T.5666 5667;Trajkovi},T.9095 9096. 513 Trajkovi},T.9101, 9105 9106.See also Stopari},T.2844;P495,p.17;P493,paras.66 67. 514 Stoparić,P493,para.79. See also Part V, Section C (I)(e)(ii). 515 Stopari},P495,p.101. 516 Stopari},P493,paras.11,41;T.2819. 517 Stopari},T.2820. 518 Stopari},P493,para.41;T.2819. 519 Stopari},P493,para.11. 520 Stopari},P493,paras.13,18;K92,T.2748(closed session). 521 Vasiljevi},T.5663 5664,5668;K89,T.8410 8411. 522 Stopari},P493,para.10;P495,p.8. 523 Vasiljevi},T.5669 5670. 524 Vasiljevi},T.5669.
IT-05-87/1-T 51 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6494 engagement through the reserve police force when assessed as necessary”.526 The following day, on 18 February 1999, \or|evi} issued a dispatch to all SUP chiefs, MUP Staff, border police stations, and the Chief of the RDB ordering them to “carry out the necessary checks, compile lists and establish complete control over volunteer and paramilitary units and their members.”527
237. At the beginning of the NATO campaign, on 24 March 1999, Stojiljkovi} issued a follow up dispatch to reinforce the instructions contained in \or|evi}’s dispatch of 18 February 1999.528
238. The minutes of the evening briefings of the SC Staff show that the VJ was aware of the use of paramilitaries by the MUP in Kosovo.529 At a meeting in Belgrade on 17 May 1999, Milo{evi}, senior members of the VJ and Rade Markovi} discussed the issue of crimes committed by paramilitaries in Kosovo. Markovi} said that Arkan had contacted him offering 100 of his men.530 Markovi} accepted 30 men from Arkan, provided that they wore uniforms.531 Markovi} added that he had learnt the day before that members of Arkan’s Tigers had killed a married couple in Kosovo and investigations had been initiated.532
d. Volunteers
239. According to the Law on the VJ, during a state of war the VJ was authorised to be reinforced by volunteers.533 These were “individuals who are not subject to compulsory military service and military conscripts who do not have wartime assignments”.534
240. During the Indictment period, VJ units in Kosovo were supplemented with volunteers.535
241. Volunteers deployed to Kosovo were not properly screened. A progress report of 10 April 1999, sent by the 3rd Army to the SC Staff, complained about the high number of unscreened volunteers, who were either medically unfit for service, or members of paramilitary groups.536 Problems resulting from deficiencies in the screening process led to the deployment of
1. 525 Cveti},T.6675,6678;Panteli},T.12078. 526 P85,p.3. 527 P356,para.7.See also Cveti},T.6678. 528 P702;P356. See Cveti},T.6680. 529 P1533,pp.2,5;P1534,pp.1,4;P1536,p.3.See also Vlajkovi},T.11271 11272,11274. 530 Vasiljevi},T.5681;P884,p.1. 531 Vasiljevi},T.5681;P884,p.1. 532 Vasiljevi},T.5681;P884,p.1. 533 P43,Art.15.See also P44,Art.18. 534 P43,Art.15.See Cveti},T.6675. 535 See D185;D679;P1943;D185. 536 P1377,pp.1 2.
IT-05-87/1-T 52 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6493 paramilitaries as well as a number of volunteers with criminal backgrounds.537 Complaints against the volunteers included the commission of crimes such as looting and murder.538 Past paramilitary involvement was not a barrier to admitting an individual volunteer, if other requirements were complied with.539 In addition, a group of foreign volunteers, mostly from Russia and Ukraine, were admitted as volunteers and integrated into VJ units.540
242. Despite orders dealing with discipline and screening procedures for volunteers,541 the conduct and control of volunteers continued to be a serious and pervasive issue in the VJ during the 1999 conflict.542
e. Local/Village Defence Forces and Armed non Albanian Population (RPOs)
243. The arming of the non Albanian population began in mid 1998.543 On 21 May 1998, the MoD issued an order requiring local department and section chiefs, in co ordination with municipal leaders, to compile lists for the arming of the local population.544 The order explicitly stated that those with wartime duty obligations in the VJ, MUP, VOk, or MoD (CZ and CO) should not be included in these lists.545
244. Weapons were distributed to persons of non Albanian ethnicity,546 who were later organized into RPOs.547
245. On 26 June 1998, the PrK Command issued an order to distribute weapons to and train village defence units.548 Pursuant to a Joint Command order on the defence of populated areas, the Priština Defence Administration issued an order on 28 July 1998, entitled “Instructions for the Defence of Inhabited Areas.” This order organised the structure of all local defence planning in order to defend Serb villages or enclaves.549 By July 1998, over 54,000 citizens in Kosovo had been armed,550 and this number continued to grow until around 60,000 weapons were distributed to the
537 See e.g.P679,item 8. 538 P680,p.2;D775,items 3 4;P1377,p.2;P679,item 8. 539 D185,item 2.1;P679,item 10. 540 P1377,p.1. 541 See e.g.P681;P680;D775;D185. 542 P681,p.1. 543 P1223;P1051;P901. See also Part III, Section A(2)(a) . 544 P1355. 545 P1355,para.1. 546 P1051;P901;P1355;P1333,p.23;Vasiljevi},T.5946 5947. 547 Ðorðević,T.9862,9901,9904;Cveti},T.6634,6663.See P1052;P1054;P1330,p.9;P1055,p.7.See also P1333,p.23;P901, pp.1 2. See also Part III, Section A(2)(a) . 548 P901. 549 See P1223;P1051. See also Part III, Section A(2)(a). 550 P688,p.7.
IT-05-87/1-T 53 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6492 population.551 These local defence units were armed in co ordination with the MoD, the VJ and the MUP.552
246. The decision to form and arm RPOs was made at the level of the MUP HQ in Belgrade. The arming then proceeded from the MUP down the MUP Staff and the SUPs.553 On 10 July 1998, the MUP Staff authorized the formation of RPOs and issued directions for their combat training.554
247. While the MUP was primarily in charge of these units, the VJ also influenced the establishment of the RPOs.555 The military sectors participated in training RPO members, in co operation with the commanders of the police stations in the relevant area.556
248. \or|evi} testified that RPOs did not comprise only members of the reserve police forces, but also members of the reserve force of the VJ, locals and people who lived in those villages.557 Thus, there were cases in which the VJ co ordinated with the MUP in the arming and training of RPO members, in the sense that “the Yugoslav army provided assistance to the MUP to train the reserve force”.558 A report from the Kosovska Mitrovica SUP to the MUP Staff indicates that the various RPOs established in villages in the area of that SUP included individuals who were active duty officers, members of the reserve police forces, and VJ reservists.559
249. The primary function of the RPOs was to supplement the active duty rosters of MUP units. The RPOs were tasked with the defence of their villages and towns, inhabited settlements, and particularly with protection from intrusions and attacks by the KLA.560 They were not permanently mobilised and were engaged to aid police and military forces in operations as needed, but only in their respective territory.561 Even when engaged, RPO members did not have the status and rights of MUP employees/officials.562
250. The structure and organization of RPOs followed military principles: these units had their own commander, deputy commander, liaising with the chiefs of the police stations of the area
551 P688,p.7;P1330,p.9;P1055,pp.6 7;P976. 552 P1333,p.23;P975. 553 Cveti},T.6713.See also P1052. 554 P1052,p.2. See also Part III, Section A(2)(a) . 555 P1051,p.7. 556 Cveti},T.6714;P1053. 557 \or|evi},T.9908.See also Miti},T.12624;P1053;D268. 558 \or|evi},T.9908. 559 P1054.See also D268. 560 Cveti},T.6610,6644,6671 6672;P688,p.7;Miti},T.12624. 561 Cveti},T.6644,6672.See also P1333,p.23. 562 Cveti},T.6741 6742;Miti},T.12624.
IT-05-87/1-T 54 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6491 where they were based, and regular members.563 RPOs were less trained and less equipped than regular police reservists.564
251. RPOs did not usually wear a complete police uniform, but parts of uniforms.565 Each RPO member was issued a personal weapon.566 \or|evi} testified that, when not mobilised, some RPO members took their weapons home.567
252. The number of reservists in an RPO depended on the size of the village.568 By February 1999, the total number of RPOs in Kosovo was around 255.569
253. The armed non Albanian population was used by the MUP and the VJ in combat operations during the 1999 conflict. Numerous PrK and Joint Command orders stated that “with its reinforcement and the armed non Šiptar population in KiM, the Priština Corps shall support MUP forces in breaking up and destroying ŠTS in its zone of responsibility.”570 This group, referred to as “armed non Šiptars” or “armed non [iptar population” in military and Joint Command documents,571 was generally composed of armed local non Albanian villagers. The PrK and Joint Command ordered the engagement of the “armed non Šiptar population” in actions with MUP and VJ units.572
254. The absence of written orders setting out the tasks of the non Albanian population suggests that field commanders issued verbal instructions to armed locals and directly organised these groups on the ground.
(b) Co ordination/ control of entities implementing the goals of the JCE
255. JCE members, through command and co ordinating bodies, used the forces of the FRY and Serbia to carry out the actus reus of crimes arising from the common criminal purpose. Through their participation in these co ordinating bodies, JCE members pursued the goals of the JCE and secured its implementation. Notably, \or|evi} and other JCE members had authority over and participated in the following bodies, in which they worked together to implement the common criminal purpose and through which they used the principal perpetrators: 563 Cveti},T.6644,6671 6672,6714. 564 Cveti},T.6610. 565 Cveti},T.6610 6611;D111,para.19.See also P771,p.12;P345,pp.8 9. 566 Cveti},T.6715 6716.See e.g.P1054,p.1;P975. 567 \or|evi},T.9918.See also Cveti},T.6715. 568 See e.g.Cveti},T.6718;P1055,p.4. 569 Cveti},T.6718;P1055,p.4. 570 See P969,p.1;P971,p.2;P970,p.2;P1382,p.2;P766,p.2;P767,p.2;P350,p.2;P961,p.2. 571 See e.g.P961,p.2;D104,p.2;P971,p.2;P1382,p.2. 572 See e.g.P1422,p.10;P889,p.4;P1328,p.2;P969,p.1;P767,p.2;P960,p.3;P350,p.2;P1333,p.23.
IT-05-87/1-T 55 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6490 • Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija (Joint Command);
• Ministerial Staff for the Suppression of Terrorism (MUP Staff)
• Supreme Defence Council (SDC) and Supreme Command(SC); and
• VJ General Staff and Supreme Command Staff (SC Staff);
(i) Joint Command
a. Overview
256. The Joint Command, made up of the senior MUP and VJ leadership in Kosovo and overseen by [ainovi}, was a high level co ordinating body that acted to command and control forces of the military, the MUP, and civilian organizations in Kosovo. Its members, including \or|evi}, attended frequent Joint Command meetings where they would report on events on the ground and then plan upcoming operations. The Joint Command was established in June 1998, held its first meeting towards the end of July 1998, and continued operating through June 1999. The Joint Command derived its authority from FRY President Milošević.
257. The Joint Command did not supplant the authority of the VJ or MUP internal chains of command but operated concurrently with the existing system. The Joint Command brought senior members of the MUP, the VJ and the civilian leadership together in Priština to ensure that they operated in a coordinated manner that was consistent with the political goals of Milošević and the aims of the JCE.
b. Establishment of the Joint Command
258. The Joint Command was formed in June of 1998, on the order of Milošević. It was not established by any specific written document or order.573
259. On 9 June 1998, the SDC decided to intervene militarily in Kosovo on a larger scale and the VJ drew up the Plan for Suppressing Terrorism, which provided for extensive combat operations involving a number of VJ brigades and MUP special units.574 The Plan was adopted at a meeting convened by Milo{evi} on 21 July 1998 to discuss the security situation in Kosovo. Present at the meeting were the senior leadership of the MUP (\or|evi}, Stojiljkovi}, Stevanovi}, Markovi} and 573 P1245;\akovi},T.8110 8112.
IT-05-87/1-T 56 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6489 Luki}), the VJ (Peri{i}, Samard`i}, Pavkovi} and Dimitrijevi}) and other state officials (Milutinovi}, [ainovi} and An|elkovi}).575 Pavković presented the Plan, which set out joint combat actions to be carried out in several stages over the summer. Milo{evi} told the attendees that they would have to start implementing the plan, and that the police and military forces would have to work together.576
260. A large MUP meeting was convened the next morning and attended by \or|evi}, Stevanovi}, Luki}, and, inter alia, all SUP Chiefs and PJP Commanders. At the meeting, \or|evi} officially announced the establishment of the Joint Command and described its role.577 \or|evi} explained that the Plan had been adopted and that the MUP and the VJ would be working together to implement it on the ground.578
261. The first Joint Command meeting was held in Pri{tina/Prishtinë later that same day, in the evening of 22 July 1998.579 It was attended by Minić (President of the Council of Citizens in the Federal Assembly580), [ainović, Anñelković, Pavković, \orñević, Lukić, Gajić and Ðaković.581 The men discussed the implementation of the Plan and Pavkovi} explained the tasks for the first stage, which focused on the unblocking of roads, beginning with Priština Pe}.582
Subsequent Meetings of the Joint Command
262. After this first meeting, and until October 1998, Joint Command meetings were held in the evenings on an almost daily basis.583 They followed a relatively standard format that entailed members of the VJ, MUP (RJB and RDB), and civilian representatives first providing briefings on activities that had occurred, and then the members of the Joint Command – often Šainovi} or Mini} in particular – planning upcoming activities.584 [ainovi} and Mini} were the most senior persons from the state governing apparatus of Serbia and the FRY who attended these meetings.585 Milo{evi} exercised control over the Joint Command through them.586
1. 574 P683,pp.1 2;P682,pp.4 10;P87,p.3;P1361,pp.1 4. 575 \akovi},T.7916 7918; T.8048;Ðorðević,T. 9563 9564. 576 Ðorðević,T.9576 9577,9833. 577 Cveti},T.6627,6629;Ðorðević,T.9574 9575;P768. 578 Ðorðević,T.9574 9575;P768 579 P886,p.2;\akovi},T.7878 7881;Ðorðević,T.9577 9578;T.9800 9801. 580 \akovi},T.8042. 581 P886,p.2;\akovi},T.7880;Ðorðević,T.9577;Cveti},T.6628. 582 Ðorðević,T.9577 9578. 583 P886; and see \akovi},T.7879. 584 P886. 585 Ðorðević,T.9839 586 Vasiljević,T.5699 5700. See also P886.
IT-05-87/1-T 57 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6488 263. [ainović, the Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY, was the person in Belgrade directly responsible for affairs in Kosovo.587 [ainovi} headed the Joint Command.588 He “was one of the closest authorities of President Milo{evi}” and attended the meetings “as a person representing Slobodan Milo{evi} in Kosovo.”589 As Vasiljevi} explained, [ainovi} “came from the very top of politics” and his authority over men like Luki}, Lazarevi}, and Pavkovi} “was beyond dispute”.590 Sainovi} was responsible to ensure that the objectives of the JCE, and of Milo{evi} in particular, were implemented in Kosovo.591
264. While the first Joint Command meeting was held in the MUP building,592 the majority of Joint Command meetings were held at a building in the centre of Priština, which \akovi} believed was the provisional Executive Council.593 Some of the meetings between the MUP and the VJ that related exclusively to co ordination were held either on the premises of the PrK or on the premises of the MUP.594
c. The Joint Command commanded and controlled the actions of the forces of the FRY and Serbia
265. The Joint Command directed the actions of the MUP, the VJ, and attached units operating in Kosovo. The Joint Command would hold briefings on the most important developments on the ground in Kosovo and then agree on orders or decisions for the next day. Once items had been discussed and verified by the Commander of the 3rd Army, MUP Generals and [ainovi}, any associated documents would be drafted by the PrK Command. Since the preliminary decision had been taken during a session of the Joint Command, such documents would bear the phrase “Joint Command”.595 The Joint Command produced daily situation reports on VJ and MUP activities.596 Ðorñević frequently participated at Joint Command meetings.597
d. The Joint Command exercised authority over units engaged in combat actions
587 Vollebaek,P1073,p.4;P1071,p.5;Philips,T.8687;Drewienkiewicz,T.6342;Ciaglinski,T.5285 5287;Vasiljevi},T.5682; P490,p.1;D472;D484;D494. 588 Cveti},T.6627; See also P1329,pp.2 3. 589 Vasiljevi},T.5699 5700. See also Merovci,T.2225;P490;Phillips,T.8687. 590 Vasiljevi},T.5694,5699 5700. 591 P886;Vasiljevi},T.5699 5700. 592 \akovi}, T.7879. 593 \akovi}, T.7879 7880. 594 \akovi}, T.7879 7880. 595 Vasiljevi},T.5824 5845. 596 See e.g. P1220;P1218;P1219;P1221;P1222;P1463;P1462. See also P1461,Item 3. But see: \or|evi},T.9871. 597 See e.g. P886,pp.9,12 14,17,19,23,26 27,29,33,41,46,49,52,54,57, 60,67,69,73,76,78 79,82 83,95 96,100 101,103,105,108,140,141.
IT-05-87/1-T 58 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6487 266. In his testimony, \or|evi} repeatedly sought to deny that the Joint Command directed, ordered or exercised any control over Serb forces in Kosovo.598 When asked directly, \akovi} similarly sought to deny that the Joint Command actually “commanded” or exercised any authority599, although in other aspects of his testimony he appears to have recognized this role implicitly, particularly in his specific approvals of the content and accuracy of his notes. At times, witnesses sought to rely on arguments of technical legality to suggest that no such institution could have existed within the organizational scheme of the VJ or the MUP.600 Defence witnesses Curčin and Stojanovi} also claimed that the title “Joint Command” was merely a phrase intended to indicate to subordinate commanders that activities had been agreed upon between the MUP Staff and the PrK Command.601
267. Taken individually, none of these claims were credible or accurate. More generally, however, these assertions are fundamentally inconsistent with the significant evidence detailing the Joint Command’s existence and actions in both 1998 and 1999. The comprehensive notes of actual Joint Command meetings, the many orders implementing directives that were set forth at these meetings, the internal documentation reflecting the manner in which the Joint Command subverted aspects of the normal chain of command, and testimonial evidence from a range of insider witnesses, make it clear that the Joint Command existed in both 1998 and 1999 and that it exercised these command functions.
The Joint Command Directed the Plan for Suppressing Terrorism
268. It is evident from the Joint Command notes that the Plan for Suppressing Terrorism was directed by the Joint Command from the time of its inception. The first Joint Command meeting sought to establish “Drafting priorities in the second phase” of the Plan, with Šainovi} asking the group for “A plan of special activities listing the goals, tasks and those responsible for them”, and Mini} indicating that “Everyone should be involved in this.”602 Item two on the agenda for the next day’s meeting was, “Plan for the execution of the second phase”, and members issued broad planning directions at the meeting, such as: “we must carry out raids with the help of the army to mop up”[Šainovi}] and “the stationary part of the MUP should be assigned active operations”[Mini}].603 The Joint Command ultimately assessed the second phase of the Plan on 29
598 See e.g. Ðorðević, T.9575 9576,9812 9815,9833 9835,9838 9897. 599 See e.g. \akovi},T.7930 7932;T.8000 8002;T.8011 8012;T.8128 8129. 600 See e.g. \akovi}, T.8000 8001;T.8070; \or|evi},T.9855; ]ur~in,T.10856. 601 See e.g. ]ur~in,T.10790,P555,p.111;Stojanovi},T.11965 T.11968. Vasiljevi} denied this suggestion when it was put to him in cross examination T.5827 5828. 602 P886,pp.2 4. 603 P886,pp.5 7.
IT-05-87/1-T 59 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6486 July, where “Assessment of the planned implementation of the second phase” was identified as the first item on the agenda.604
269. The Joint Command continued to direct the implementation and execution of the plan through to the end of October. The planning and implementation of the third phase was discussed from 29 July to 3 August, and detailed accounts were provided with respect to MUP and VJ engagements over this period.605 On 5 August, the Joint Command began to address the Plan’s fourth phase, with Mini} directing: “in the fourth phase, strongholds, one by one, are to be taken”.606
270. At the 26 October meeting, Šainovi} reported on the results of talks with NATO representatives, ordered particular troop reductions and withdrawals for MUP and VJ in Kosovo, and declared that “This section of combat operations should be closed”.607 Three days later, on 29 October 1998, a meeting of the Operations Inter Departmental Staff for the Suppression of Terrorism in KiM was held in Belgrade and attended by the highest members of civilian, military and MUP leadership, including Ðorñević.608 At the meeting, Joint Command members like Pavkovi} and Luki} summed up the development and implementation of the Plan and addressed the “highly professional successful cooperation between Army and police commands and units”.609 When Mini} took the floor, he proposed that “The Operations Staff should provide an assessment of how successfully the Joint Command for KiM has fulfilled the authorizations conferred upon it.”610 The statements by Joint Command members, and the entire tenor of the meeting, further underline the central role of the Joint Command in actively directing the Plan.
271. The notes of the Joint Command’s activities from July to October of 1998 are replete with examples of orders or directions being given at the level of the Joint Command.611 Though the examples are numerous, a closer look at specific instances may nonetheless be instructive. At the meeting of 10 September 1998, for example, after Luki} and Pavkovi} have reported back about operations on the ground, Mini} states: “Go into Dubovik and Radovic villages and see what the situation is like […] Go into Prapra}an village (VJ/Yugoslav Army/) and have the police occupy it.” He continues, “Go into all villages and pressure them into handing over weapons. Secure the
604 P886,pp.19 22. 605 P886,pp.19 31; And see D324 (first sentence). 606 P886,p.34. 607 P886,pp.137 139. 608 P87;\or|evi},T.9872. 609 P87,p.7;\or|evi},T.9876 9877. 610 P87,p.9 (emphasis added). 611 P886. See also \or|evi},T.9838 9897 and \akovi},T.8118 8126.
IT-05-87/1-T 60 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6485 roads and control the territory. The army will adopt a plan on the arrangement of the territory on Monday. The MUP should do the same".612
272. A review of the notes makes clear that these meetings consisted of far more than a simple exchange of information, and in fact frequently provided both broad and precise directions for taking specific actions in specific places. At virtually every meeting for which detailed notes are available, after information was reported from the field the members of the Joint Command would provide orders and directions for further action. The rather narrow position put forward at times by \akovi}613 and \or|evi}614 that such directions should not technically have been binding on the VJ or MUP pursuant to law are beside the point. The question is whether the Joint Command actually issued directions, instructions or orders that were followed. The evidence is abundantly clear that this was the case.
Documents Implementing Joint Command Orders
273. There are numerous documents that reflect the manner in which orders or directions given at the level of the Joint Command were implemented on the ground. For example, the notes of the 12 August 1998 Joint Command meeting record Ðorñević stating: “do Vokša and Slup and engage the army.”615 The notes of the following day record Stani{i} stating: “Vokša and Slup preparations of the 5th and 8th MUP detachments today; the 6th and 7th detachments and the BG VJ/Yugoslav Army combat group/ as support”.616 Pavkovi} later states, “the Slup and Vokša action can begin with the 8th Detachment”, adding, “draft the plan in the morning”. The next day, 14 August 1998, Lazarević issued an order for a joint MUP VJ action in Slup and Vokša. The order directly states: “Combat operations will be commanded by the Joint Command for KiM/Kosovo and Metohija/ with the PrK IKM/Forward Command Post/ in \akovica.”617 When confronted with this order, \akovi} claimed, “In the computer there must have been a template for all types of command orders, and the operator probably kept this term "Joint Command.”618 This would seem rather implausible. In any event, the existence of a template stating that “Combat operations will be commanded by the Joint Command” would seem to further suggest that the Joint Command was frequently involved in directing combat operations. When \or|evi} was confronted with this order he stated, “I have
612 P886,p.84. 613 \akovi},T.8119 8121. 614 \or|evi},T.9840 9841,9844; See also T.9838 9846,9855,9859 9860,9867. 615 P886,p.41. 616 P886,pp.44. 617 P1232,p.3. 618 \akovi},T.7930.
IT-05-87/1-T 61 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6484 never seen anything like this up till now” and claimed not to remember the corresponding Joint Command meeting.619
274. \or|evi} was also confronted with P890, a decision by Pavkovi} on the joint engagement of MUP and VJ forces in Glodjane village, which similarly stated that “Combat operations will be commanded by the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija”.620 Though he had testified that he was aware of this operation, he again stated that he was “completely unaware” of this statement about the Joint Command exercising a command role.621
275. In P1231, a report dated 7 August 1998, the Commander of the 15th Armoured Brigade states, “MUP units were engaged by decision of the Joint Command for KiM along the following axes[...]” He goes on to report:
[p]revious operations by MUP and VJ units were carried out with the knowledge and approval of the joint command for KiM and there was no deviation from orders…622
Documents reflecting the status of the Joint Command in the command hierarchy
276. The co ordinating and commanding role played by the Joint Command at times led to friction and disagreement within the VJ command structure. The nature of this disagreement further underlines not only the Joint Command’s significance but also its role in controlling the operations of both the MUP and the VJ.
277. In his letter of 23 July 1998, just after the Joint Command’s first meeting, Peri{i} addressed this issue in a pointed letter to Milo{evi}. His comments reflect the manner in which the Joint Command would plan and execute operations through the PrK:
The Corps commander is responsible for assessing the situation and for planning VJ and MUP operations in cooperation with the civilian part of the staff and the MUP, for forwarding it to ŠAINOVI] and MINI] for them to distribute assignments to all except the Pri{tina Corps. In practice, the commander of the Pri{tina Corps plans what he has been ordered to, and this is at the request of ŠAINOVI] and MINI] and the MUP, and so turns into something like a service of theirs, for planning and execution.623
619 \or|evi},T.9847 9851. 620 Ðorðević, T.9858;P890,item 6. 621 Ðorðević, T.9857 9858.Another example concerned operations in ^i~avica. See P886,p.103 “a plan for Čičavica has been made”;P1422,p.5 6;\or|evi},T.9860 9863. 622 P1231. 623 P1329,pp.2 3 (emphasis added).
IT-05-87/1-T 62 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6483 278. A number of orders indicate that decisions were being taken at the level of the Joint Command and evidence the potential complications that could result from the existence of this parallel command structure. In P1229, in the context of a discussion about the 3rd Army’s failure “to carry out its duties under the plan” by delivering rapid intervention helicopter units as was directed by the Joint Command, Pavkovi} wrote to Samardži}: “Moreover, we are giving the members of the ZK for KiM [the Joint Command] the opportunity to report to the president of the SRJ that the VJ has not carried out its duties under the Plan."624 In short, Pavkovi} was warning that the Joint Command could report the VJ to Milo{evi} for not carrying out its assigned duties.625
279. Approximately two weeks later, on 5 October 1998, Pavkovi} again wrote to Samardzi}, stating: On my return from the reporting session with the ZK [Joint Command] on 19 and 20 September 1998, I informed you personally by telephone of the decision to form rapid intervention forces. As part of the conclusions from the ZK [Joint Command] meeting, I sent you the decision to form rapid intervention forces which you forbade in your order strictly confidential no. 168 262 of 3 October 1998.626
Pavkovi} then asked the 3rd Army Command to “determine the composition of these forces”, but re affirmed again in the next paragraph that “We [the Joint Command] have decided on this decision…”627 Pavkovi}’s letter thus makes clear not only that the Joint Command had made the decision to form rapid intervention forces, but also that it did so despite a previous 3rd Army Command order expressly forbidding this.
280. Other instances of tension between the Joint Command and the Third Army Command, and between Pavkovi} and Samardzi} in particular, are apparent in D321/P1227628 and in D324/D327629.
e. The Planning and Co ordination Process
281. Because the Joint Command did not have its own staff, or separate registration log, Lazarevi} and his staff would draft Joint Command documents.630 As Vasiljevi} explained, once the Joint Command had reached a decision, General Lazarevi}, who attended the meetings, was
624 P1229,p.2. 625 \akovi},T.8130;Ðorðević,T.9863 9867. 626 D212,p.1;\akovi},T.8131. 627 D212;\akovi},T.8132 8133. See P886,p.105. 628 See also \akovi},T.8007 8008;7919 7920. 629 See also \akovi},T.8134. 630 Vasiljevi},T.5760.
IT-05-87/1-T 63 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6482 given the assignment of putting that into practice.631 The Joint Command could thus issue orders to both the MUP and the VJ.632 Lazarevi} became Chief of Staff of the PrK in 1998 and was appointed Commander of the PrK on 25 December 1998, giving him effective control over members of PrK units in Kosovo.633 Lazarevi} was a contributor to the JCE, having planned, ordered and commanded the activities of PrK units during operations in Kosovo in the Indictment period.
282. According to \akovi}, the Joint Command approved the joint engagement of VJ and MUP units and directions were then issued for combat operations, which were processed and implemented within the distinctive chains of command. When a decision to use forces was adopted or issued by the Commander of the VJ, that information would be received by the operative organ of the PrK command and the operational and logistics department of the MUP Staff, and on the basis of that decision they would then coordinate and plan the actions. There would be an exchange of information and data between the PrK and the MUP Staff, and they would agree on the forces to be used in a certain operation.634 There needed to be very precise co ordination at all levels, not only at the staff level of the MUP and PrK but also at the level of combat groups, special police units, police detachments and other units.635
283. As a matter of principle, once a decision had been made to break up forces within a certain area, and both the MUP forces and the VJ forces knew where they would be used, then the PrK would proceed to coordinate the operation at a lower level.636 Upon approval, operational plans were passed down to the individual commanders of units on the ground – meaning units of the PJP, SAJ, JSO and VJ.637 In order to pass along a Joint Command plan to MUP units in Kosovo, for example, the MUP Staff in Pri{tina would call PJP commanders to a meeting and hand them the plans.638
284. On the ground, units would be brought within one or two kilometres from the area where they were to be used and the commander of the combat group and the supporting unit would typically meet.639 If both commanders were not in the same place, they would have to make sure
631 Vasiljevi},T.5760. 632 Vasiljevi},T.5829. 633 P1494. 634 \akovi},T.7955. See Ðorðević,T.9840 9841. 635 \akovi},T.7955. 636 \akovi},T.7956. 637 Cveti},T.6655 6657,6864. 638 Cveti},T.6874. 639 \akovi},T.7956.
IT-05-87/1-T 64 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6481 that they had some means of communication, usually a Motorola hand held radio.640 For example, P1232 states (at Item 2.1) that "Battle group 15 3 is to support an attack of the 8th MUP Detachment and the Djakovica PJP ... along the following axes ...", and then describes a particular line of axis.641 In this case, the 8th MUP Detachment and the Djakovica PJP would receive a strictly defined assignment from the PrK as a basis for co ordination.642 Once he received these excerpts, the MUP Commander would use his own forces and would have to assess the situation in the same way that an army commander would.643 The PrK would typically provide certain information for the MUP units, such as the location of neighbouring units, but information relating to issues like the treatment of prisoners or the provision of medical assistance would be left for the MUP to define.644
285. If there were multiple participants in an operation then the PrK would typically have to coordinate via the MUP Staff in Pri{tina because they could not issue the excerpts directly.645 \akovi} typically forwarded such excerpts to Dusan Adamovi} at the MUP Staff.646 Along with such excerpts, a map would also be delivered to the MUP.647
286. For other operations, particularly those of a “lower intensity”, the co ordination might be accomplished more directly. If General Lazarevi} was at the forward command post in \akovica, for example, he would probably coordinate things himself with the SUP Chief in that territory. It was not only the MUP Staff that was in charge of co ordination; co ordination was also carried out at the level of secretariats, combat groups and detachments, all the way down to the lowest level units.648 For example, patrols were organised and “recognition signs” were set for during the night to allow for mutual contact between the MUP and the Army and in order to avoid friendly fire.649 It was not necessary for staff (such as deputy commanders or chiefs of staff) to go to the command post of the other unit; the commanders could simply keep in contact in order to coordinate action.650
640 \akovi},T.7956. 641P1232,p.1. 642 \akovi},T.7957 7958. 643 \akovi},T.7957. 644 \akovi},T.7958. 645 \akovi},T.7959. 646 \akovi},T.7959. 647 \akovi}, T.7959. 648 \akovi}, T.7959. 649 \akovi}, T.8074. 650 \akovi}, T.8108 8109.
IT-05-87/1-T 65 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6480 f. The Joint Command continued to function after October 1998
287. Although the first phase of the Joint Command’s work drew to an end after the signing of the October Agreements, the Joint Command continued to function in the same manner until the end of the indictment period.
288. After [ainovi} declared at the 26 October Joint Command meeting that, “[t]his section of combat operations should be closed”651, the Joint Command nonetheless met two days later, on 28 October. At the conclusion of that meeting, Mini} stated, “I think that this command should remain unchanged and work until the end of the year, meeting when necessary.”652
289. The 29 October meeting that Milo{evi} chaired at the Beli Dvor Palace was held the next day. The minutes record that “President Milutinovi} supported the proposal for consideration of the continued status of the Joint Command”.653 [ainović agreed, although he suggested that “the present composition” of the Joint Command “should be re evaluated”.654 Milošević concluded the meeting, and in his remarks pointed “to the need for the continued functioning of the Joint Command”.655
290. On 5 November 1998, a large MUP Staff meeting was convened that was attended by the men \or|evi} termed “all the major actors in Kosovo”, including Šainovi}, Mini}, An|elkovi} and Pavkovi}, as well as Stojiljkovi} and \orñević himself.656 At the meeting, President Milutinović addressed the implications of the October Agreements, stated that “we are now entering a difficult phase in the resolution of the Kosovo issue”, and announced that the Joint Command would continue to function in the same manner.657
291. Throughout the month of November, the Joint Command continued to produce detailed operations reports, addressing the present engagement of the MUP and VJ in Kosovo and proposing detailed steps for further engagement.658
292. The Joint Command continued to operate through early 1999. For example, in the Minutes of the VJ Collegium for 21 January 1999, Ojdani} expressed his continued frustration with the command role of the Joint Command and its involvement in the Ra~ak operation.659 651 P886,p.139. 652 P886, p.142. 653 P87, p.12. 654 P87, p.13. 655 P87, p.15. 656 P770, p.3; \or|evi}, T.9882 9883. 657 P770, pp.3 4. 658 See e.g., P1218; P1219; P1399.
IT-05-87/1-T 66 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6479 i. Once the state of war was declared, the Joint Command co ordinated and commanded the actions of the VJ and the MUP in furtherance of the goals of the JCE
293. In much the same way as it had before, the Joint Command continued to co ordinate and direct combat operations once a state of war was declared in Kosovo.
Joint Command Orders During the Indictment Period
294. When a state of war was formally declared on 24 March 1999, the MUP was unwilling to submit to full subordination to the VJ for combat operations.660 However the Joint Command compensated for the absence of official subordination of the MUP to the VJ by effecting de facto co ordination and cooperation. In a report dated 25 May 1999, Pavkovi} wrote to the SC Staff and noted that the re subordination of MUP forces had not been carried out as envisaged. After addressing problems on the ground with MUP forces, and the MUP’s failure to re subordinate as planned, Pavkovi} proposed two options: that the SC should take “urgent measures” to re subordinate the MUP, or that they should,
annul the Order on their resubordination and leave the command and commanding of the forces of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior Staff of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia for KiM through the Joint Command as has so far been the case.”661
P888 illustrates that the Joint Command had been commanding MUP forces through the MUP Staff through at least 25 May 1999.662
295. In a public announcement on the VJ website from June 2001, Pavkovi} stated,
The Police had their own headquarters, headed by their own officers, and the cooperation with the Army was coordinated through political actors in joint command, formed for the purpose. Therefore, the information to what the police force units were doing can best be provided by the police commanders and the members of the Joint command in charge of them.663
296. The PrK Command continued to fulfill the role of a command staff for the Joint Command with respect to planning and co ordinating combat operations. Joint Command orders were sent to
1. 659 P902,p.11. 660 See Part III,Section(A)(3)(e). 661 P888,p.2;\akovi},T.7971 7973. (emphasis added) 662 Neither \akovi} nor \or|evi} were able to account for this. \or|evi} claimed that “what the author wanted to say is really unclear to me” (T.9956). \akovi} returned to his usual claim that the Joint Command was only “co ordinating”, although his comments underline the fact that the Joint Command continued to operate in 1999 as it had in 1998 (\akovi},T.7971 7973). 663 P1241,p.2;\akovi},T.7974 7975.
IT-05-87/1-T 67 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6478 field commanders, who then issued their own orders to their units. The MUP Staff was responsible for the implementation of Joint Command orders down the MUP chain of command.664
297. The Joint Command issued a significant number of orders directing combat operations over the Indictment period.665 Each of these 1999 Joint Command orders directly states, at the conclusion of the order: “The Joint Command for KiM is to command and control all forces from the sector of Pri{tina during the execution of combat operations.” These operations have been sorted by area and set out in Annex B.
298. A number of witnesses testified about the operation of the Joint Command during the Indictment period, and the manner in which they received Joint Command orders and implemented them on the ground in Kosovo. Cveti}, for example, reviewed the Bajgora operation described in P969, explained that the operation was “harmonized at the level of the Joint Command”, and testified that the order was likely drafted by the PrK.666
299. Trajkovi}, the Commander of the SAJ, also testified that the Joint Command continued to operate during this period and explained the manner in which he would receive orders for SAJ operations.667 On most occasions in 1999, as in 1998, orders coming from the Joint Command would be excerpted, so that he would receive the specific parts of orders that related to his SAJ units. As Trajkovi} explained, after a joint plan was “adopted at the level of the Joint Command”, the PrK Command would prepare excerpts from the joint decision to carry out certain tasks for the VJ, and the MUP Staff would typically provide excerpts for police units, like the SAJ. These excerpts would first emphasize the tasks of MUP units, and then emphasize the tasks to be carried out jointly with the VJ. Sometimes the heading on the orders Trajkovi} received would say “MUP Staff”, while other times it would say “Joint Command”.668
300. Reviewing Joint Command order P766, Brakovi} also confirmed that he saw similar orders from the Joint Command in 1998 or 1999, although he thought at the time that those were orders from the PrK Command.669 Brakovi} explained how he would receive those orders: he would go to a meeting where it would be agreed that preparations for an action should be undertaken, and he would receive a document containing an order for the execution of a task. The order would come
664 See Section III(3)(b)(ii). 665 P973,D104,P972,P350,P971,P970,P1235,P1382,P766,P1383,P1384,P1385,P969,P767,P1328,P1386,D105. 666 Cveti},T.6631 6632.P1040 is the subsequent order for the Bajgora operation that Cveti} described. 667 Trajković,T.9071. 668 Trajković,T.9071 9075. 669 Brakovi}, T.4146.
IT-05-87/1-T 68 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6477 together with a map, which contained everything in the order and would dictate the operation.670 These orders and maps would be delivered either in person during meetings or in envelopes, and according to Brakovi} this was done “by people from the MUP staff”.671 Brakovi} was familiar with the operation ordered in P766 and recalled that parts of several companies from the 124th Intervention Brigade participated, along with some of the units of the 36th Detachment and the SAJ.672 He also described his participation in the Je`erce action described in P767, which was a broad action comprising units of the MUP and the VJ.673
301. A number of military documents from 1999 refer specifically to the Joint Command and its role in directing operations.674 For example, a combat report from the PrK Command, dated 25 April 1999, states that, “Operations of combing the terrain and breaking up STS continue in line with the decision of the Joint Command for KiM”.675 A combat report sent from the 3rd Army Command to the VJ General Staff Operations Centre, dated 29 April 1999, similarly states that, “measures were undertaken to block the above sectors and carry out tasks in line with the joint KiM command decision.”676
The Joint Command continued to meet in person through at least 1 June 1999
302. As late as 1 June 1999, Joint Command meetings were being convened and attended by the same leading figures as had attended and participated in 1998, including Šainović, Ðorñević, Anñelković, Stevanović, Lukić and Pavković. Vasiljevi} provided a clear and detailed account of a 1 June 1999 Joint Command meeting that he attended, describing its attendees and the specifics of the matters discussed. He was aided in his recollection by some notes that he took at the meeting.677
303. Vasiljevi} described going to the PrK command in Pri{tina/Prishtinë on 1 June 1999, where Pavkovi} told him that a Joint Command meeting was going to be held and invited him to attend. Those in the command building when Vasiljevi} arrived included Pavkovi}, Lazarevi}, \or|evi}, Stevanovi} and Luki}. As was his custom at meetings, Vasiljevi} took notes and would write down “who said what”, but did not include a list of attendees. However, \or|evi}’s attendance would have been memorable for Vasiljevi}, because this was the first time they had met. Vasiljevi}
670 Brakovi}, T.4146 4147. 671 Brakovi}, T.4148. 672 Brakovi}, T.4145; P766. 673 Brakovi}, T.4150. 674 See e.g. P1236,p.1;P1393,p.2; P888,p.2. 675 P1393,p. 2. 676 P1394,p. 2. 677 P885;Vasiljevi},T.5695 5696.
IT-05-87/1-T 69 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6476 already knew who \or|evi} was at the time through the media, and remembered that he was able to easily recognise \or|evi} because his picture had been in the news quite frequently.678
304. At the meeting, the MUP Generals \or|evi}, Luki} and Stevanovi} – sat on one end of the table. The military personnel—Pavkovi} and Lazarevi}—sat at the other end, along with Vasiljevi} and Stojanovi}.679 When [ainovi} arrived at the meeting, along with Andjelkovi}, the whole room rose from their chairs.680 Vasiljevi} was under the impression that this was “a daily reporting session or meeting of the past 24 hours. No broad issues were discussed at the meeting. They only discussed what had taken place the day before and what was being planned for the next day.”681
305. Vasiljevi} remembered the order in which people spoke: Luki}, Lazarevi}, [ainovi}, Lazarevi} and then Pavkovi}682, and he recalled the details that they spoke about, even describing how some of the information was consistent with other evidence he had received from security organ reports.683
306. Defence witness Momir Stojanovi}’s testimony that this was not a Joint Command meeting, and that \or|evi} was not present as Vasiljevi} described684, were not credible. When he testified in Milutinovi} et. al., Stojanovi} had claimed that he could specifically remember that Vasiljevi} had not taken any notes. He repeated this claim in \or|evi}.685 This claim is not credible on its face.686 Nor does it make sense that Vasiljevi}, whose notes were tendered into evidence,687 would have fabricated notes for no discernable reason. Stojanovi}’s claim underlines the fact that he had a clear agenda in his testimony and sought to assist the Defence case in both Milutinovi} and \or|evi} wherever possible.688 Indeed, Stojanovi} generally tailored his evidence to refute key aspects of not only Vasiljević’s testimony, but also that of Nike Peraj. When Vasiljevi} was
678 Vasiljevi},T.5691 5692;5695 5696. 679 Vasiljevi},T.5692. 680 Vasiljevi},T.5693 5695(private session). 681 Vasiljevi},T.5696. 682 Vasiljevi},T.5696. 683 Vasiljevi},T.5696 5698. 684 Stojanovi},T.11790 11791. 685 Stojanovi},T.11977 11979. 686 See Stojanovi},T.11976 11979. 687 See P885. 688 It may also be observed that at the time of Stojanovi}’s testimony in Milutinovi}, from 6 12 December 2007, \or|evi} was already in the detention unit in the Hague awaiting his trial, having been arrested and transferred on 17 June 2007, some six months earlier.
IT-05-87/1-T 70 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6475 confronted with Stojanovi}’s claim that \or|evi} never attended the 1 June meeting, Vasiljevi} convincingly stood by his testimony that \or|evi} had been present.689
307. Stojanovi} also denied that any of the substantive and detailed discussions described by Vasiljevi} took place at the meeting, claiming instead that [ainovi} simply came into the room and announced to everyone that an agreement would be signed imminently that would entail the withdrawal of the VJ and MUP from Kosovo.690 If this profoundly different version of events were true then Vasiljevi} surely would have remembered it – one would recall where he was for an event as significant as the end of the war. Far more likely is that Stojanovi} tailored this account in a specific attempt to contradict evidence about the continued functioning of the Joint Command.
ii. \or|evi}’s denials that the Joint Command continued to function
308. \or|evi}’s denials that he continued to participate in the Joint Command, and even that he knew about the continued existence of the Joint Command after October of 1998, were also not credible. \or|evi} claimed unequivocally that he did not have any further involvement with Kosovo after 5 or 6 October 1998. Asked directly about whether he had attended the 28 October 1998 Joint Command meeting, \or|evi} responded “No, I wasn’t there then.”691 However, the notes of the meeting record \or|evi} not only attending but even participating and discussing matters relevant to events after the October Agreements.692 At the conclusion of this meeting, Mini} announced, “I think that this command should remain unchanged and work until the end of the year”.693
309. \or|evi} also personally attended a large meeting the following day in Belgrade, in which the Joint Command was discussed at length and its continuation was endorsed by both Milutinovi} and Milo{evi}.694 \or|evi} then attended a large MUP Staff meeting on 5 November, at which Milutinovi} announced that the Joint Command would continue to function in the same manner.695 Nonetheless, \or|evi} denied outright in his testimony that he had any knowledge of the Joint Command continuing after October of 1998.696
689 Vasiljevi},T.5930. 690 Stojanovi},T.11786 11787. 691 Ðorðević,T.9836. 692 P886,pp.140 142;Ðorðević,T.9836 9838. 693 P886,p.142. 694 P87,pp.12,15. 695 P770,p.4. 696 Ðorðević,T.9893.
IT-05-87/1-T 71 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6474 310. \or|evi}’s similar claims that he did not attend the Joint Command meeting of 1 June 1999, and that he in fact never attended any meetings with Vasiljevi}, are also not credible.697 In contrast to \or|evi}, Vasiljevi} provided a clear and detailed account of the 1 June meeting. Vasiljevi} recalled not only who attended the meeting, but also where each person sat.698 He recalled the order in which each of the participants spoke. He provided a detailed recollection of what was said at the meeting, and by whom.699 He recalled not only the fact that \or|evi} had attended the meeting, but also described a specific comment that he made.700 Vasiljevi} had no discernable motive not to tell the truth about \or|evi}’s attendance at this meeting.
311. \or|evi}’s evidence with respect to the Joint Command, however, was neither consistent nor credible from the outset. His testimony included statements denying his membership in the Joint Command701 and denying not only that the Joint Command continued to operate in 1999, but stating that it had never even operated in 1998.702 \or|evi}’s testimony about his knowledge and involvement in the Joint Command is fundamentally incompatible with the extensive evidence of the Joint Command’s actual existence and operation.
(ii) MUP Staff
312. The Ministerial Staff for the Suppression of Terrorism (MUP Staff) was based in Pri{tina and was in charge of co ordinating and managing the work of MUP units engaged in combat actions in Kosovo. During the Indictment period, Luki}, a member of the JCE and an immediate subordinate of \or|evi}, headed the MUP Staff.
313. The MUP Staff served as an intermediary command level between the MUP HQ in Belgrade and MUP organisational units in Kosovo, linking the Ministry with the lower ranks of the MUP command structure. Under Luki}’s direction, the MUP Staff planned and co ordinated the activities of MUP units in furtherance of the JCE. During joint actions with the VJ and attached units, MUP units committed the crimes charged in the Indictment.
697 Ðorðević,T.9742. 698 Vasiljevi},T.5692. 699 Vasiljevi},T. 5696 5698. 700 Vasiljevi},T. 5694(private session); T.5938(private session) 701 Ðorðević,T.9896 9897. 702 Ðorðević,T.9834 9835. See also T.9833,9850.
IT-05-87/1-T 72 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6473 a. Establishment and composition of the MUP Staff
i. \or|evi} formed the MUP Staff to co ordinate and manage the work of MUP units in the suppression of terrorism in Kosovo
314. On 11 June 1997, Ðorðević formed the Staff of the Ministry of Interior for Kosovo and Metohija (MUP Staff), based in Pri{tina.703 The duties of the MUP Staff were to “plan, organise, and undertake measures and activities to suppress armed rebellions; prevent and suppress civil disorder; prevent terrorism”, and to undertake other complex assignments and tasks related to the area of Kosovo and Metohija.704
315. In a decision of 15 January 1998, Ðorðević expanded the mandate of the MUP Staff to include co operation with the RDB, the VJ, other state organs and organs of local self government.705 \or|evi} testified that “a system of co operation and mutual exchange” between these organs was necessary given that the situation in Kosovo “had started to drastically deteriorate”.706 The mandate of the Staff included the prevention and suppression of terrorism in KiM.707 In a subsequent decision of 23 January 1998, \or|evi} assigned the Staff the task of training PJP and SAJ units to perform security tasks.708 Both decisions stated that the Staff was responsible for the performance of its work to the Minister, the Chief of the RJB and officials authorised by them.709
316. As the situation in the province continued to escalate, on 15 May 1998 Ðorðević renewed the mandate of the MUP Staff for a year.710 One of the main tasks of the Staff was “the suppression of civil disorder, terrorism and armed rebellion”.711 The following month, on 11 June 1998, he appointed Luki} as Head of the MUP Staff712 and expanded the MUP Staff to 14 members, all RJB personnel.713 \or|evi} testified that he proposed Luki} for the job because Luki} was a very experienced police officer. He had completed his military training, was familiar with the situation in Kosovo and had the experience in directing and managing police units.714 At a MUP Staff meeting, 703 D402.See also Ðorðević,T.9466 9467,9469.This decision superseded a previous decision of 15 April 1994 (D402, item 8).See P357,Art.10. 704 Ðorðević,T.9469 9470;D402,item 2. 705 Ðorðević,T.9473;D402,item 2. 706 Ðorðević,T.9473. 707 D402,p. 1. 708 P704,p.2;\or|evi},T.9475. 709 D404,para.2;P704,p.2,item 6. 710 D100;Ðorðević,T.9476. 711 D100,para.2(a). 712 P760;Ðorðević,T.9553 9554. 713 P760;Ðorðević,T.9476 9477. 714 Ðorðević,T.9552 9553,10158.
IT-05-87/1-T 73 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6472 Stevanovi} informed the Heads of SUPs that Luki} was replacing Vesovi} as Head of the Staff and that the Chief of the RJB had expanded the Staff in order to strengthen the command of PJP units in Kosovo.715
ii. On 16 June 1998, Stojiljkovi} expanded the MUP Staff to include both the RJB and the RDB
317. In mid June 1998, the MUP Staff created by Ðorðević was expanded by the Minister to include both branches of the MUP in Kosovo—the RJB and the RDB. In a decision of 16 June 1998, Stojiljković superseded Ðorñević’s 15 May 1998 decision to include in the MUP Staff “the chiefs of the secretariats for internal affairs, centres and branches of the RDB in the AP of Kosovo and Metohija.”716 Luki} remained Head of the Staff and David Gaji} (Head of the RDB in Kosovo) was appointed deputy.717 Other members of the Staff included: the JSO commander Milorad Lukovi} (Legija) as Assistant Head for Special Operations; Živko Trajkovi} as Assistant Head for Special Anti Terrorist Units, and Goran Radosavljevi} as Assistant Head for Special Police Units.718
318. This MUP Staff was a continuation of the earlier one established by Ðorðević, and shared the same functions.719 As in Ðorðević’s previous decisions, the MUP Staff was tasked “to plan, organize and control the work and engagement of organizational units of the Ministry, and also sent and attached units, in suppressing terrorism” in Kosovo.720 The Staff also had the task “to plan, organise, direct and coordinate the work of organisational units” of the MUP in carrying out complex security tasks.721
319. The 16 June 1998 decision was issued by Stojiljkovi}, rather than by \or|evi} again, because only the MUP Minister was empowered to give Lukić authority over both branches of the MUP in Kosovo.722 Such authority allowed Lukić to coordinate the work of all special units, including the RDB’s JSO unit, during their engagement in combat actions in municipalities throughout Kosovo.
715 Cveti},T.6623. 716 P57,item 1. 717 P57,item 1.See also Ðorðević,T.9478, 9491 9493. 718 P57,item 1;Ðorðević,T.9480,9491 9493. 719 Cf. D402,item 2;D100,para.2(a);P57,item 2. 720 P57,item 2. See also Ðorðević,T.9480. 721 P57,item 2. 722 Cveti},T.6786 6787,6788 6789.See also Mi{i},T.14037 14038, who said that the Minister was the only person who could form a staff which included RJB and RDB members.
IT-05-87/1-T 74 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6471 320. In his testimony, \or|evi} claimed that Stojiljkovi}’s 16 June 1998 decision effectively removed him from the chain of command, because Luki} became answerable directly to Stojiljkovi}.723 The evidence shows, however, that Stojiljkovi}’s decision did not change the functioning of the MUP Staff as set up by \or|evi}, nor did it replace the day to day command structures within the MUP. This decision did not divest \or|evi} of his powers as Head of the RJB. Luki} continued to report to \or|evi}, as Luki}’s role in the Staff included the management of RJB units
321. Indeed, far from being removed from anti terrorist operations conducted by the MUP Staff after June 1998, \or|evi} played a key role in their planning and implementation.724 He was in Kosovo throughout the 1998 summer offensive.725 He directly monitored MUP operations in the field.726 He closely followed the work of the MUP Staff.727 \or|evi} continued to be part of the reporting system from the MUP Staff to Belgrade HQ, and, due to his presence on the ground, continued to be informed of activities and operations of the MUP Staff.
322. \or|evi} also claimed that Stojiljkovi} did not discuss the 16 June 1998 decision with him before issuing it,728 that he was not involved in the process, and that Stojiljkovi} simply decided that the MUP Staff “should probably be organised in a different manner”.729 \or|evi} said that Stojiljkovi} was better placed to decide on changes to the composition of the MUP Staff since he was better informed than \or|evi} about the situation on the ground.730 \or|evi}’s evidence on this point is not credible. By June 1998, \or|evi} was fully involved in operations on the ground and had full knowledge of the security situation in Kosovo. The reasons \or|evi} gave for renewing the mandate of the MUP Staff in May 1998 show that he, too, was fully aware of developments on the ground.731 In addition, as \or|evi} testified, he shared the Minister’s decision: in response to a question from the Bench, \or|evi} acknowledged that he thought that the expansion of the MUP Staff was a good idea because it allowed the MUP to deal more effectively with the complex tasks it was facing.732 He also acknowledged that both he and Stojiljkovi} shared the view that Luki} was
723 Ðorðević,T.9481 9482;P57. 724 See generally Part V,Section (C)(1)(c). 725 \or|evi},T.10031. 726 Ðorðević,T.9853 9854. 727 Ðorðević,T.9637;D432. 728 \or|evi},T.10158 10159. 729 \or|evi},T.10157. 730 \or|evi},T.10158 10159. 731 D100;Ðorðević,T.9476. 732 Ðorðević,T.10158.See Mi{i},T.14035–14036.
IT-05-87/1-T 75 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6470 the man needed to head the MUP Staff.733 \or|evi}’s claims that he was not involved or took part into Stojiljkovi}’s 16 June 1998 decision are not credible.
323. The expansion of the MUP Staff in mid June was required to deal with the increase in MUP activities in Kosovo. Only two days after expanding the MUP Staff, Stojiljkovi} reinforced MUP units on the ground by forming the 124th PJP Intervention Detachment.734 At the time, preparations were being made in Belgrade to involve the VJ in anti terrorist operations in Kosovo and to launch a joint VJ/MUP offensive against the KLA in the summer.735
b. Role of the Head of the MUP Staff, Luki}
324. In 1998 and 1999, Luki} was a direct subordinate of \or|evi} and reported to \or|evi}, since his role in the MUP Staff included the management of RJB units. Luki} remained Head of the MUP Staff throughout the Indictment period.736
325. Luki}, as Head of the MUP Staff, was the overall commander of police forces in Kosovo.737 K25, a PJP member, said that it was “common knowledge” that “₣ağll MUP units in Kosovo were commanded by the MUP HQ in Priština”, and that Lukić was the commander of all the MUP forces in Kosovo.738
326. Luki} acted as the bridge between the MUP leadership (Stojiljkovi}, \or|evi}, Stevanovi}) and MUP organisational units in Kosovo. 739 He was the operational man on the ground in charge of ensuring that the policies and plans adopted at the MUP HQ were implemented.
327. Luki}’s role as a link between the MUP HQ and units on the ground is apparent, for example, from the minutes of the MUP Staff meeting of 2 December 1998.740 At this meeting, Luki} briefed SUP chiefs about a 27 November 1998 meeting in Belgrade chaired by Stojiljkovi} and attended by \or|evi}, Markovi}, the assistant ministers, and Nikola [ainovi}.741 Luki}
733 \or|evi},T.10158. 734 P257. 735 P683,pp.1 2, ;P682,pp.4 5,9 10;P87,p.3.See also P1226;P1227;P1228. 736 P67,p.1;Cveti},T.6790 6792;Ðorðević,T.9490 9491. See also P57,item 2. 737 Byrnes,P1214,p.19;Ciaglinski,P832,p.10;Phillips,T.8687;P1303,pp.4 5. 738 K25,P340 A,p.20. When operations were conducted in Kosovo, “allocation of MUP units and assets was determined by ₣Luki}ğ and his HQ” (K25,P340 A, p.20). 739 Cveti},T.6645,6597;Brakovi},P759,paras.2,31. 740 P689. 741 Cveti},T.6648;P689,p.3.
IT-05-87/1-T 76 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6469 summarized conclusions and recommendations from the 27 November meeting for the attending SUP chiefs.742 Cveti} testified that at meetings like the one of 27 November in Belgrade:
They simply analysed the situation, and then later on this was transformed into certain conclusions, and these conclusions were incorporated into certain plans for the engagement of units. 743
328. Luki} briefed officials in Belgrade about the activities of the MUP Staff.744 He participated in high level meetings with senior MUP and VJ personnel, and other relevant political figures of the FRY and Serbia, where he reported on the activities of MUP units.745 Lukić would also make weekly trips to Belgrade to report and meet with Stevanović and Ðorñević.746
329. In Pri{tina, Luki} chaired MUP Staff meetings.747 He also represented the MUP before the KVM.748 Phillips and Walker regularly met with Luki} to discuss issues of non compliance with the October Agreements.749
c. The role of the MUP Staff was to plan, organise, co ordinate and control the activities of MUP units engaged in combat actions in Kosovo
330. The MUP Staff co ordinated and controlled SUPs, MUP units and attached units engaged in combat activities in Kosovo (PJP, SAJ, JSO).750 As Cveti} testified: “the MUP staff served as an intermediate command which linked the ministry and lower ranks”.751
331. The MUP Staff had authority to issue orders and dispatches to SUP chiefs, PJP and SAJ commanders,752 and would forward instructions and communications from MUP HQ in Belgrade to the SUPs in Kosovo.753 For example, on 21 October 1998, Luki} sent a dispatch to the SUP chiefs in Kosovo with instructions on the implementation of the KVM Agreement, and on providing daily
742 Cveti},T.6648;P689,p.3. 743 Cveti},T.6660. 744 See P1229,p.1;see Ðorðevi},T.9863 9864;P1229. 745 P764,pp.1,4. In addition to MUP Staff meetings, Luki} participated to a number of other meetings involving senior MUP, VJ and FRY representatives: see \akovi},T.7914 7915;P87;P689,p.3, where Luki} informed the participants about a previous meeting held in Belgrade on 27 November 1998 with senior MUP members and FRY representatives. 746 Byrnes,T.8233;P1214,p.19. 747 See e.g, P768;P688;P690;P770,pp.3,7 8. 748 Phillips,T.8686 8687;P1303,pp.4 5. 749 Phillips,T.8691 8692. 750 P57,item 2;P67. See also Ðorðević,T.9480. Brakovi} confirmed that all the PJP units that were in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 would fall under the definition of item 2, which states “and also sent and attached units”. In fact, PJP units were not “organisational units” (see Brakovi},T.4282;P57,item 2). 751 Cveti},T.6645. See also Cveti},T.6597. 752 Cveti},T.6702 6703.See e.g. P1052,p.2;P1046;D247;P1057;P1048.See also Simovi},T.13734,13575–13576,13578 13579,13610;Miti},T.12641;Stalevi},T.13772 13773,13905. 753 Cveti},T.6645,6702 6703;Miti},T.12641. See e.g. P1458.
IT-05-87/1-T 77 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6468 reports related to contacts with the KVM, actions, and police activities carried out;754 the instructions communicated by Luki} had been issued by MUP HQ.755
332. Luki} frequently met with SUP chiefs and detachment commanders to discuss the security situation, current problems and measures to be taken.756
333. The MUP Staff approved the plans for the use of PJP units in Kosovo.757 The engagement of the PJP would be decided at the level of the Ministry by either Stojiljkovi} or \or|evi}, and implemented through the MUP Staff.758 PJPs would receive their tasks from the MUP Staff in Pri{tina,759 and Luki} would supervise and coordinate their operations on the ground.760
334. Requests for replacements or additional forces would also be processed by the MUP Staff. Luki}, or his assistants, would address the Police Administration if replacements, replenishments or the deployment of additional were needed.761 \or|evi} testified that in the staff of the Ministry in Pri{tina:
…there was a man from the police administration, precisely from the department dealing with special police units and the reserve force, who monitored the overall situation regarding the forces necessary for the staff and regarding the replacement of the existing forces by new forces or the additional engagement of forces.762
335. In Belgrade, the MUP Minister’s Collegium was responsible for approving requests on the deployment of units received from the MUP Staff through the Police Administration.763
336. The MUP Staff was responsible for the engagement of the SAJ in actions in the field. Cveti} testified that, once a decision had been taken (from Belgrade) to deploy the SAJ to Kosovo, the MUP Staff could issue specific tasks to such units, as “the body directly on the ground that had an insight into the overall security situation”.764 The SAJ commander would be in charge of commanding the unit in the field for the execution of tasks.765
754 P1041. 755 Cveti},T.6645. See also P762 756 Cveti},T.6659 6661.See e.g. P768,p.1;P689;P85,p.1;P764,pp.3 4;P771,pp.11 12;P690,item.9.See also Brakovi}, T.4165;P759,para.31;P769. 757 P771,p.11;P345,p.7;P1043,p.10. 758 P134;P135;P136;P137;P138;P139. 759 Ðorðević,T.9603;Cveti},T.6650. 760 K25,P340 A,pp.20 21;P85,p.2;Cveti},T.6650. 761 Ðorðević,T.9588. 762 Ðorðević,T.9588. 763 Mi{i},T.14089 14090,14095. 764 Cveti},T.6650. See also P85,p.3, where Stoijljkovi} discussed new measures to be taken by all attending personnel and units, including the more effective inclusion of SAJ units in planned operations. 765 Cveti},T.6650.
IT-05-87/1-T 78 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6467 337. The MUP Staff also had authority to assign tasks to RDB members and employ them for anti terrorist operations.766 For example, at the MUP Staff meeting of 2 December 1998, Luki} assigned the task of sending mixed patrols of policemen and plain clothed RDB and RJB members, to locations where there were “[iptar terrorists”.767 Milan (or Milorad) Lukovi} Ulemek, the commander of the JSO, a special formation within the RDB, was also the Assistant Head for Special Operations of the MUP Staff.768 At a MUP Staff meeting of 4 April 1999, Luki} was briefed and issued tasks to SAJ and JSO commanders.769
338. The MUP Staff exercised authority over RPOs and was responsible for their work in conjunction with the MUP HQ in Belgrade.770 The decision to arm the non Albanian population and form RPOs was made at the level of MUP HQ in Serbia, and was then implemented in Kosovo through the MUP Staff.771 The MUP Staff was involved in arming local non Albanian villagers and in forming RPOs to defend villages.772
339. During the summer offensive of 1998 and the war in 1999, the MUP Staff planned, organised and implemented anti terrorist activities in Kosovo.773 The Staff adopted plans on the use of special units in combat activities and laid down the basic tasks and locations at which those units would be engaged.774
340. MUP Staff minutes from 1998 and 1999 show its role in planning and co ordinating anti terrorist operations. In 1999, during the course of these anti terrorist operations, the crimes charged in the Indictment were committed.775 For example:
• At a meeting of 22 July 1998, attended by \or|evi} and Stevanovi},776 Luki} proposed an agenda to discuss the security situation in Kosovo in the implementation of the summer offensive.777
766 P57. 767 P689,p.7. At this MUP Staff meeting of 2 December 1998, Cveti} is recorded to say that he was not receiving “appropriate information from the RDB on findings and the activities of [iptar terrorists in order for the service to plan and harmonise its activities pursuant to this information” (P689,p.4). Luki} then stated that, “If there are problems with regard to the exchange of information between the RDB and the RJB, notify me so that we can overcome it” (P689,p.6). This shows that the MUP Staff played a role in the communication and exchange of information between the forces of the RJB and the RDB. 768 P57;Cveti},T.6599,6863;P1037. 769 P764,pp.3 4. 770 See Part V,Section(C)(1)(d). 771 Cveti},T.6664,6713.See also P1052,p.2. 772 Cveti},T.6609,6634,6663 6664,6691;\or|evi},T.9901.See P1504,p.1;P1052;P688,p.8;P975;P690,item.8;P689,pp.6, 8;P1043,p.5;P770,pp.4 5;P85,pp.1,3. 773 \akovi},T.7913;Cveti},T.6674;P85,p.3. 774 Cvetić,T.6674;P768;P688;P85. 775 See infra paras. 393 399.
IT-05-87/1-T 79 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6466 • On 28 July 1998, Luki} reported that “the second phase of the Global Plan had been carried out “in co ordination with the Yugoslav Army.”778
• On 2 November 1998, Luki} informed SUP chiefs and PJP commanders that the “MUP Staff will now take on the role of planning and the Secretariats will have greater independence in carrying out their regular duties.779
• On 2 December 1998, Luki} briefed those present about a prior meeting he had attended in Belgrade on 27 November 1998, with Minister Stojljkovi}, the Assistant Ministers, the heads of the RJB and RDB, and Nikola [ainovi}.780 At that meeting, it was decided to continue with anti terrorist actions in Kosovo.781
• On 21 December 1998, Stevanovi} instructed that: “Broader actions towards terrorist bases should be planned by the Ministry Staff, however the initiative should be with the Secretariats, who should made preparations and compile recommendations of the Activity Plan”.782
• On 17 February 1999, Luki} reported that a plan of the RJB has been worked out to prevent and thwart the entry of NATO troops in Kosovo. He said that the Staff planned, when it is ordered, to carry out three mop up operations involving several thousand troops.783 In addition, he informed participants that the Staff members held meetings with RPOs and that the Staff was planning a meeting with PJP commanders “for further consultations about their engagement.”784
• On 17 March 1999, Luki} instructed SUP chiefs and PJP commanders to begin mobilization of reserve police forces and to bring the ratio of active to reserve policemen to 1:1.785 Luki}
1. 776 P768,p.1;Cveti},T.6640. 777 P768,p.1;Cveti},T.6640. 778 P688,p.3;Cveti},T.6641. 779 P690,para.10. 780 P689,p.3. 781 P689,p.3. 782 P1043,pp.1,10. 783 P85,p.1.The plan to carry out the three mop up operations was to be executed “when it is ordered”. Cveti} explained that that meant “ordered” by the Joint Command (Cveti},T.6674 6675;P85,p.1). 784 P85,p.1. 785 Cveti},T.6609,6691.
IT-05-87/1-T 80 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6465 also said that in anticipation of NATO strikes it was necessary to begin the deployment of A and B formations of PJP detachments to Kosovo.786
341. As organisational units of the MUP, SUPs also played a role in the planning and organisation of anti terrorist operations in their respective territories. The MUP Staff ordered SUPs to generate their own plans to prevent and combat terrorism within their jurisdictions.787
342. SUPs also managed the organisation of PJP units. PJP detachments were assigned to each of the seven SUPs in Kosovo,788 and detachment commanders were members of the SUP Collegiums.789 SUP chiefs were responsible for PJP units in the areas of their SUPs and, in some instances, were responsible for MUP only operations falling within the area of one SUP.790
343. When PJP units were not engaged in anti terrorist operations, they operated as territorial units protecting vital infrastructure and commercial facilities and were subordinated to their territorial SUPs and to the MUP Staff.791 All PJPs in Kosovo had to be subordinated to SUP chiefs.792 Commanders of PJP detachments had to attend regular SUP staff meetings.793 In addition, SUP chiefs and PJP commanders would discuss the execution of peacetime assignments handed down by MUP HQ.794
344. SUPs were also involved in the PJP deployment decided by the MUP HQ. \or|evi}, in his position of Chief of the RJB, directly addressed SUP chiefs so that they would prepare their units and dispatch them as ordered. For example, \or|evi}’s dispatch of 28 July 1998 ordered SUPs to deploy PJP units to carry out special security tasks in Kosovo.795
345. SUP Chiefs commanded operations in their AOR.796 A SUP Chief would submit requests for additional units to the MUP Staff.797 K25, PJP member, testified that this was done in the case 786 Cveti},T.6692. 787 For example, at a MUP Staff meeting on 2 December 1998, Lukić instructed SUP chiefs to submit a plan for the prevention of terrorism by 7 December 1998. See P689,p.8. In this regard, Cveti} testified that, in response to Luki}’s instructions, local SUPs submitted draft reports, such as P1042, the one prepared by OUP Glogova} (a unit within the Pri{tina SUP). Other SUP chiefs provided similar reports regarding their municipalities (P1043,pp.4 7). At a subsequent MUP Staff meeting held on 21 December 1998 (P1043), Obrad Stevanovi} indicated that the MUP Staff had received the reports prepared by the individual SUPs, and that it was the assessment of the Staff that the reports “are mostly being implemented.” (See Cveti},T.6651 6652;P1042;P1043,p.9). See also P771,p.11. 788 P1045,p.36;P1041,item (c);P690,para.10. 789 P689,p.8;P771,p.11;P345,p.8. 790 K25,P340 A,pp.20 21. 791 Cveti},T.6696 6697;Panteli},T.12056. 792 P771,p.11. 793 P771,p.11. 794 Cveti},T.6697. 795 P133,p.1. 796 K25,P340 A,p.20. 797 K25,P340 A,p.20.
IT-05-87/1-T 81 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6464 of the Mala Kru{a operation, when the Ni{ PJP operating in the Pri`ren SUP’s area, requested additional support which was provided through the deployment of elements of the 23rd PJP detachment.798 The commander of 23rd PJP detachment would go to the \akovica SUP for operational planning issues.799 Four companies were taken from the \akovica SUP and placed under the command of the Pri`ren SUP for the Kru{a operation.800 The local MUP were not under command of the 23rd PJP detachment, but they reported directly to the SUP Pri`ren.801
346. Defence witnesses claimed that SUPs were not involved in planning and conducting anti terrorist actions.802 Their claims are contradicted by the evidence discussed above and by Luki} and Stevanovi}’s comments at MUP Staff meetings:
- On 2 December 1998,803 Luki} instructed the attending SUP chiefs to prepare and submit a plan for the prevention of terrorism.804 In response to Luki}’s instruction, local SUPs submitted draft reports, such as the one prepared by the Glogova} OUP, a unit within the Pri{tina SUP.805
- On 21 December 1998, Obrad Stevanovi} indicated that the MUP Staff had received the plans to combat terrorism prepared by the SUPs, and that it was the assessment of the Staff that those plans were “mostly being implemented.”806
- On 7 May 1999, Stevanovi} is recorded to say that, “After the end of some of the larger actions such as the “Budakovo Jezerce” one, each SUP will be expected to work independently on organising anti terrorist actions in their own areas. The plan must be approved by the Staff and will be carried out together with manoeuvre detachments.”807
798 K25,P340 A,p.21. 799 K25,P340 A,p.21. 800 K25,P340 A,p.21. 801 K25,P340 A,p.21. 802 Mir~i},T.13317,13324 13326,13394;Miti},T.12829,12831. 803 P689. 804 P689.See Cveti},T.6650 6651,6835. 805 P1042;Cveti},T.6651 6652. 806 P1043,p.9. 807 P771,p.11,item 2.
IT-05-87/1-T 82 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6463 d. The MUP Staff operated within a functional chain of command
347. The MUP Staff operated within a functional chain of command. MUP units in Kosovo had effective and well established reporting procedures in place. The Serbian MUP’s internal regulations dictated how units were to report information.808
348. The MUP leadership in Kosovo met regularly in 1998 and 1999. As a rule, MUP Staff meetings were held at least once a month, or more frequently, if required.809 These meetings were usually attended by SUP chiefs and commanders of special units.810 At times, senior MUP members were also present: Stojiljkovi}; \or|evi};811 Stevanovi}; and Markovi}.812 Other RDB representatives were also present.813
349. Luki} and his headquarters staff were kept well informed of MUP activities on the ground and, in turn, reported to the MUP Ministry in Belgrade.814 As Head of the MUP Staff, Luki} also took measures to ensure that he and his staff in Pri{tina received updated reports.815
350. \or|evi} and Stojiljkovi} also took measures to reinforce the reporting system. On 7 October 1998, \or|evi} ordered the commanders of organisational units at the MUP HQ and in Kosovo to “₣rğeport all events and incidents of security interest to the operations centre and the work lines at the Ministry headquarters immediately.”816 On 18 February 1999, \or|evi} issued a dispatch addressed to all SUP chiefs, MUP Staff and border police stations, requiring “intensified” gathering and reporting of information about the movement of NATO forces, security related events and terrorist activities.817 \or|evi} instructed the addressees to “immediately inform the Operations Centre and lines of work at the Ministry headquarters, organisational units from Kosovo and Metohija and the Staff of the Ministry in Pri{tina”.818
351. Once the state of war was declared, on 24 March 1999, Stojiljkovi} issued a follow up dispatch to order the intensified enforcement of the measures provided for in \or|evi}’s dispatch of 808 P1056,p.3;D232.See also Mi{i},T.14043.As Mi{i} put it: “The intent was to have every last police station or OUP provide information to the competent [SUP], which in turn was under an obligation to provide such operational information to the competent operational centre of the interior and to the staff for combating terrorism in Kosovo” (Mi{i},T.14043). 809 See P768;P688;P770;P689;P1043;P85;P764;P771;P345. 810 See P345;P770;P768;P769;D111;P689;P1043;P690;P771. 811 See e.g. Ðorðević,T.9588 9589.\or|evi} acknowledged that those times he attended MUP Staff meetings he took part in their work and contributed to it. 812 P1043;P85;P764;P771;P345;P688. 813 See e.g. P770;P85;P764. 814 Cveti},T.6723;Ðorðević,T.9585 9586.See also P57,item 3. 815 See e.g.P1041;P1346;P1057;P1459. See also Cveti},T.6727;P1057. 816 P1203. 817 P356,p.1,item 2.
IT-05-87/1-T 83 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6462 18 February 1999, including the responsibility to collect, analyze, and report information from the ground to “the relevant lines of operation within the Ministry.”819 Stojiljkovi} referred to \or|evi}’s dispatch as “our dispatch”.820
352. This reporting system in place within the MUP indicates the existence of a functional chain of command required to control the work and engagement of units of the Ministry in Kosovo.
i. Reporting to the MUP Staff by SUPs
353. MUP regulations dictated how its units were to report information up the chain of command, and indicated that all SUPs were to send dispatches to the MUP Staff and the MUP Ministry in Belgrade.821 SUP chiefs and units commanders were frequently reminded of their duty to report to the MUP Staff during MUP Staff meetings.822 These regulations were complied with.823
354. The MUP Staff was responsible for collating information on the security situation in Kosovo based on reports and dispatches received from the SUPs. Luki} issued guidelines to SUPs regarding their reporting obligations. For example:
- in October 1998, Luki} ordered police stations in Kosovo to send daily reports to the MUP Staff on any significant events in their areas of responsibility;824
- on 1 April 1999, Luki} issued a dispatch to SUPs with guidelines on reporting to the MUP Staff, instructing all SUPs to submit a daily summary of important incidents in their territories;825
1. 818 P356,p.4,item 20. 819 P702,para.1. 820 Cveti},T.6681;P702,p.1. 821 P1056,p.3,item 5. 822 See e.g. the MUP Staff meeting of 4 April 1999, where Luki} stated that “secretariat chiefs and unit commanders must report to the Staff” (P764, p.4). Cveti} testified that this meant that SUP chiefs had not only to submit daily bulletins on security related events in their areas, but also had to call to communicate orally any updates that were not included in the bulletins to the MUP Staff (Cveti}, T.6726). See also P689, p.7, a MUP Staff meeting of 2 December 1998, where Luki} required the attendees that “information and reports should be submitted to the Ministry Staff on time and should be realistic, by way of immediately reporting the more important events by telephone and then sending a dispatch on the incident”. 823 See, e.g. Cveti} who confirmed that these reporting requirements remained in effect throughout his tenure as chief of the SUP Kosovska Mitrovica (Cveti}, T.6722; P1056, p.3). 824 P1041. 825 P1057/D143. Mir~i} said that he was informed of this dispatch at a SUP Collegium meeting. Mir~i} commented that the information they were required to submit “was like the usual information. This would be sent to the secretariat and all the measures mentioned in these items would be registered, would be then sent to everyone. It was the duty service of the SUP \akovica, then they would send it to the staff, and the staff would send it to the minister. That was the usual reporting line.” (Mir~i}, T.13288–13289; D143; D922; D923).
IT-05-87/1-T 84 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6461 - on 15 May 1999, Luki} sent a dispatch to SUP chiefs in Kosovo and chiefs of the Crime Police Departments, instructing them to send information to the MUP Staff on detentions and criminal proceedings in their areas of responsibility.826
355. The MUP Staff received reports from the Kosovo SUPs under its jurisdiction, and these SUPs at the same time also reported to the MUP HQ in Belgrade.827
356. All SUPs sent periodic dispatches, including daily reports, to the MUP Staff in Priština and to Belgrade.828 Cveti} said: “…everything that happened in the territory of the Secretariat in the past 24 hours was reported to the Ministry and to the MUP Staff in Pri{tina. The MUP Staff in Pri{tina as pertains all the events regarding the security situation in Kosovo and Metohija, it reported on that to the Ministry.”829
357. Communication between SUPs, MUP HQ and the MUP Staff was usually in writing, whether in the form of reports, dispatches or orders.830 Before the war broke out in March 1999, reports were mainly sent via a dispatch.831 During the NATO bombing, communications and reports were sent via couriers that operated on a daily basis.832
358. There was a direct phone connection between SUPs and the MUP Staff,833 although during the NATO bombing most telephone communication was interrupted.834
359. SUP chiefs had a duty to call the MUP Staff Head every morning to report on the latest incidents that were not covered by the daily bulletin.835 Special telephone lines and tele printers existed to facilitate communication.836 Panteli} testified that he had frequent contacts with the MUP Staff because he had to know to whom his three PJP companies would be subordinated, and to whom they would report.837
360. 6D2 testified that the Chief of the Prizren SUP was the only contact person between the MUP Staff and the Departments of the Prizren SUP. In practice, communication was based on
826 P1459. 827 Cveti},T.6597 98. 828 Cveti},T.6703,6597 98,6723,6762 6763. See e.g. D275;D277;D280;D414;D415;D416;D922;P1367;P1060. 829 Cveti},T.6723. See also Mi{i},T.14044. See e.g., D407. 830 Cveti},T.6723. 831 Miti},T.12635. 832 Miti},T.12635 12636. 833 Cveti},T.6723. 834 Cveti},T.6723 6724; see also P764, p.1. 835 Cveti},T.6763. 836 Cvetić,T.6723 6724. 837 Panteli},T.12129.
IT-05-87/1-T 85 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6460 direct phone calls and regular meetings of the MUP Staff in which the Prizren SUP Chief participated.838
361. Police stations reported to their SUPs.839 OUP chiefs would liaise with their SUP chiefs for regular duties and the regular work of their departments.840
ii. Reporting to the MUP Staff by PJPs and the SAJ
362. MUP units engaged in combat operations had a duty to report to the MUP Staff. During MUP Staff meetings, the Head of the MUP Staff would reiterate the commanders’ duty to report. For example:
- On 2 December 1998, Luki} recalled: “Commanders of detachments are members of the Collegium of the chiefs of the SUP and should be linked up daily with the chief of the SUP for the purposes of work and control”.841
- On 4 April 1999, Luki} reminded those present that “secretariat chiefs and unit commanders must report to the Staff”.842 The minutes of this meeting also record PJP commanders reporting to Luki} and Stevanovi} on the completion of the first phase of anti terrorist actions.843
- Further, Luki} chaired a MUP Staff meeting on 11 May 1999, where he requested reports on completed operations and issued instructions to PJP commanders.844
363. According to Brakovi}, PJP commanders informed the MUP Staff of events and activities on the ground.845 For example, during anti terrorist operations, a PJP command would provide updates to the MUP Staff on the progress of the operation, only “for information purposes”.846 Brakovi} did not prepare written reports of operations. These were drafted by the commander of the
838 6D2,T.12197 12198(closed session). 839 P1056,p.3;Mir~i},T.13229,13393,13306. 840 Brakovi},T.4173;Mir~i},T.13229,13295,13306. 841 P689,p.8. 842 P764,p.4. 843 P764,pp.2 4. 844 P345,pp.2, 8. 845 Brakovi},T.4094. See also P974. 846 Brakovi},P759,para.21.
IT-05-87/1-T 86 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6459 VJ unit with whom the PJP was in the field.847 When he reported on events on the ground, Brakovi} mostly dealt with Du{ko Adamovi} and Miroslav Mijatovi} at the MUP Staff.848
364. Units in the field communicated via radio during manoeuvres.849 A communications work plan existed for each radio station. In each command, how communications were to be maintained and the manner of reporting to the Superior Command were specified.850 Trajkovi} testified that, when in the field, MUP personnel would also use mobile phones to communicate important information.851
365. A telegram dated 26 May 1999 addressed to the MUP Staff by Dragan Živaljević, the Commander of the PJP 122nd Intervention Brigade, illustrates the information that PJP commanders would relate to the MUP Staff.852 The telegram contained a report on the “achieved lines” of the 122nd Intervention Brigade and the position of some “refugees”, and requested from the MUP Staff “further instructions and accommodation for refugees.”853 As the handwritten note at the top right hand corner of the telegram shows, the telegram was sent to “General Lukić, for information and decision”.854
366. Commanders would also report on the fulfilment of the tasks assigned and on ongoing operations at MUP Staff meetings.855
367. The SAJ also reported to the MUP Staff.856 Simovi} testified that, normally, Trajkovi} would report to \or|evi}, since the SAJ was part of the RJB.857 During the anti terrorist operations in the summer of 1998 and the war in 1999, Simovi} and Stalevi} did not submit written reports. Upon completion of each operation, they analysed the operation with Trajkovi}, and Trajkovi} then reported to the MUP Staff.858 Stalevi} added that, while no written reports were created after the completion of an operation, “on such occasions we pointed out any problems we had in the course of the operations, and then he ₣Trajkovi}ğ in turn informed the MUP Staff.”859
847 Brakovi},T.4094. 848 Brakovi},T.4094. 849 Cveti},T.6729. 850 Cveti},T.6729 6730. 851 Trajković,T.9091. 852 P974. 853 P974,p.3. 854 P974,p.3. 855 See e.g. the MUP Staff meeting of 11 May 1999, during which Brakovi} reported about the Jezerce operation and units that took part in it (P345, pp.1, 4; Brakovi}, T.4181 4182). 856 Simovi},T.13736. 857 Simovi},T.13605,13607 13608. 858 Simovi},T.13579 13580,13608,13735 13736;Stalevi},T.13773 13774. 859 Stalevi},T.13773 13774.
IT-05-87/1-T 87 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6458 iii. Reporting of the MUP Staff to the MUP HQ in Belgrade
368. Information was relayed up the MUP chain of command from the MUP Staff to MUP HQ in Belgrade.860 The Head of the MUP Staff, Luki}, was directly answerable to the Minister and to \or|evi}. He had a key role in collating information from MUP organisational units in Kosovo and reporting it to the Belgrade HQ.
369. Although \or|evi} tried to distance himself from contacts with Luki}, by stressing that Luki} was in daily contact only with the Minister,861 the evidence shows that, after the 16 June 1998 decision, Luki} continued to report also to \or|evi}, and that \or|evi} continued to be part of the reporting system from the MUP Staff to Belgrade HQ.862
370. During the implementation of the 1998 summer offensive, \or|evi} was in Pri{tina, and often on the ground for anti terrorist operations.863 He had an office in Pri{tina in the same building that housed the MUP Staff.864 He testified that, before and after an operation, he would go back to his office to use the telephone to call the Minister.865 \or|evi} received information on the activities of the units related to the summer offensive, and on the developments in the area of Kosovo and Metohija.866
371. During the implementation of the summer offensive, \or|evi}’s primary duty was to monitor “the overall situation in Kosovo and the implementation of the global counter terrorism plan”.867 \or|evi} was directly involved in the implementation of the plan and was informed of all the security related issues in Kosovo.
372. The MUP Staff sent daily reports to the MUP HQ in Belgrade.868 Reports issued before 29 March 1999 were addressed to the MUP Minister, Heads of the RJB and RDB, other organs of the Ministry, and SUPs chiefs in Kosovo,869 but as of 1 April 1999 reports were sent exclusively to
860 P57, item 3. 861 Ðorðević,T.9586. 862 See e.g.D283;D284;D285;D286;P718;P697;P719;P720; P721;P698;D297;D298;D299;D300;D301;D302. 863 Ðorðević,T.9585. 864 Ðorðević,T.9585. 865 Ðorðević,T.9585. 866 Ðorðević,T.9585. 867 Ðorðević,T.9587. 868 D283;D284;D285;D286;D287;D288;D289;D290;D291;D292;D293;P695;D294;D295;P696;D299;D300;D302; P700;D305;P701;P694. 869 See e.g. D283;D284;D285;D286;D287;D292;P695;D295;P696;D296.
IT-05-87/1-T 88 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6457 Minister Stojiljkovi} and the Chief of RJB, \or|evi}.870 From 24 April 1999, the Head of the RDB, Rade Markovi}, was also included in the list of recipients.871
373. These MUP Staff daily reports were compiled based on information sent by the SUPs to the MUP Staff.872 These reports consisted of a “summary of security related events, developments, and information”.873 Following an order of 1 April 1999 by Luki} to SUPs,874 the reports from 2 April 1999 onwards included information about the number of Albanians leaving Kosovo through the various border crossings.875
374. Reports also addressed ordinary crimes such as thefts, looting and taking vehicles, committed by VJ, SUPs members, or by civilians,876 and further reported cases of unidentified bodies of civilians found at different locations (Srbica/Skenderaj, Mala Kru{a/Krusha e Vogël, Mamu{a/Mamusha village close to Prizren).877
375. The reporting on anti terrorist operations and other actions carried out by MUP units was relayed up to MUP HQ from the MUP Staff through different channels.
376. For example, at the MUP Staff meeting of 28 July 1998, Luki} “gave a briefing on measures and activities of police units between 25 and 28 July 1998… as well as on which (concrete) actions had been undertaken and by which detachment”.878 Luki} further reported that “₣tğhe second phase of the Global Plan has been carried out, in accordance with the established schedule, with ten detachments”.879 He also reported on the actions carried out in co ordination with the VJ, explaining locations, achievements and axes of action.880 Thus, Luki} played a key role as the conduit. He collated the various reports he received by SUPs and units on the ground and relayed that to Belgrade, thus co ordinating information exchange between MUP forces in Kosovo and MUP HQ in Belgrade.
870 See e.g. P718;P697;P719;P720;P721;P698;D297;D298;D299;D300;D301;D302. 871 See e.g. D305;P701;P694. 872 Cveti}, T.6723,6762 6763. 873 See e.g. P719,p.1;D300,p.1;P723,p.1;P700,p.1;D304,p.1;P701,p.1;P694,p.1. 874 P1057,p.2. 875 See e.g. P718,p.5;P697,p.6;P719,p.6;P720,p.5;P721,pp.5 6;P698,p.4;P694,p.8. 876 See e.g. P720,pp.3 5;D297,p.4. 877 P697,pp.2 3. 878 P688,p.3. 879 P688,p.3. 880 P688,p.3.
IT-05-87/1-T 89 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6456 377. In 1999, the MUP staff continued to operate just like it did in 1998.881 In 1999, before during and after the NATO campaign, the reporting system continued to function in the same way as in 1998.
378. During MUP Staff meetings, Luki} would report to the Minister and \or|evi} about the security situation in Kosovo and anti terrorist plans and operations.882
379. This regular reporting shows that the MUP Staff was part of the system in place in Kosovo to control the work and engagement of the organisational units of the Ministry, and to function as an essential link between the MUP HQ in Belgrade and MUP organisational and other units on the ground in Kosovo.
380. Defence MUP expert Mila{inovi} claimed that pursuant to Stojiljkovi}’s decision of 16 June 1998, Luki} was responsible solely to the Minister, and not to \or|evi}.883 During cross examination, Mila{inovi} showed that he lacked even basic knowledge of MUP related matters.884 Milasinovi} was never an employee of the RJB,885 and has no experience in the functioning of the MUP Staff.886 He is thus not qualified to speak about the actual relation between Luki} and \or|evi}, and between the MUP Staff and MUP HQ. Mila{inovi}’s report amounts to no more than a summary of documents and is replete with unsupported statements887 that merely adopt the Defence position. When questioned in court about the drafting of his report, he indicated that he had tasked “50 individuals” to research it. “They were the ones researching the subject, and these were researchers, scholars who were tasked with providing me with a detailed explanation of the workings of this”.888 He was, however, unable to explain who these individuals were and what methodology they followed to compile the report. Mila{inovi}’s expert evidence is of little value and should be disregarded.
381. Other Defence witnesses testified that after Stojiljkovi}’s 16 June 1998 decision was issued, Luki} no longer reported to \or|evi}. Former MUP Assistant Minister Stojan Mi{i}889 testified that Luki} had to report directly to the Minister about all anti terrorist operations.890 Mi{i}
881 Trajkovi},T.9072 9073. 882 P85,p.1. The plan to carry out the three mop up operations was to be executed “when it is ordered”. Cveti} explained that that meant “ordered” by the Joint Command (Cveti},T.6674 6675;P85,p.1). 883 Mila{inovi},T.14275;D933,pp.28 29. 884 See e.g. Mila{inovi},T.14303 14305,14322 14324,14338 14340. 885 Mila{inovi},T.14286;D931. 886 Mila{inovi},T.14287 14288;D931. 887 See e.g. discussion at T.14294 14297,14298 14300,14308 14310;D933. 888 Mila{inovi},T.14302. 889 Mi{i},T.14008,14064. See also P263;Mi{i},T.14010. 890 Mi{i},T.14039 14041.
IT-05-87/1-T 90 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6455 also added that, if \or|evi} had received reports from Luki} concerning anti terrorist operations in Kosovo, “in all likelihood, ₣heğ would have known because we were frequently close by”.891 Misi}’s evidence on this point is not reliable since his knowledge of \or|evi}’s contact and work with the MUP Staff was limited to Mi{i}’s own area of work. For example, Mi{i} did not know about the MUP Staff meeting of 17 February 1999, which \or|evi} attended,892 nor did he know about anti terrorist operations.893
382. Milo{ Panteli}, Head of the Valjevo SUP in Serbia, claimed that in 1998, Luki} did not report to \or|evi} and was directly responsible to the Minister.894 Not only is Panteli}’s claim contradicted by the evidence illustrated above, but Panteli} himself acknowledged that he was not familiar with the command relationship between Luki} and \or|evi} in Kosovo.895
383. Similarly, Panteli}’s claims that following the 16 June 1998 decision of the Minister, SUP chiefs in Kosovo were no longer subordinated to \or|evi}896 is not credible. His evidence is contradictory and he has no basis for this conclusion, since he was not familiar with the decision or the work of SUPs in Kosovo.897
384. Milan ^ankovi}, the Chief of Communications of the Staff, testified that, both before and during the NATO campaign, Luki}, reported exclusively to Stojiljkovi} about anti terrorist operations conducted by the MUP Staff.898 His testimony is not credible or reliable. ^ankovi} did not have sufficient knowledge or basis to make such statements.899
e. The MUP Staff co ordinated, organised and managed the engagement of MUP units in joint combat actions with the VJ
385. In 1998 and 1999, the MUP and the VJ worked in close co ordination. The MUP Staff had a key role in the implementation of joint operations decided by the MUP and VJ leadership.
386. When the Joint Command was established in June 1998, this also affected the way in which the MUP Staff operated in Kosovo.900 Once authority to proceed was given by the Joint Command,
891 Mi{i},T.14124. 892 P85. 893 Mi{i},T.14126. See also Mi{i},T.14100,14105,14121. 894 Panteli},T.12128. 895 Panteli},T.12131. 896 Panteli},T.12125 12126;P57. 897 Panteli},T.12129. 898 ^ankovi},T.13954. 899 ^ankovi},T.13976 13977. 900 See Part III(A)(3)(b).
IT-05-87/1-T 91 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6454 the MUP and the VJ would each task their subordinates to provide the required units and to liaise with the respective counterparts to finalise the ground level details of the plan. The Head of the MUP Staff, Luki}, was a member of the Joint Command and met regularly with the other members of the Joint Command, such as Pavkovi}, [ainovi} and Lazarevi}, to plan the details of joint VJ MUP operations.
387. The MUP Staff ensured that Joint Command plans involving MUP units were carried out. It would determine units needed for specific actions and task subordinates to provide the required personnel.901 Orders drafted by the PrK that involved joint actions were addressed to the MUP Staff for implementation.902 When the MUP Staff ordered SUPs to generate plans for crushing terrorist groups within their jurisdictions,903 the MUP Staff would review those plans,904 but the ultimate approval of the plans would come from the Joint Command.905 Upon approval of the plans, the MUP Staff would issue specific orders to PJP and SAJ units.906
388. Co ordination with the VJ for operations in Kosovo was done at the level of the MUP Staff.907 At MUP Staff meetings, topics on the agenda included recent and ongoing operations and co operation between the MUP and the VJ.908 To ensure co ordination at the ground level, the MUP Staff instructed MUP units to co operate and liaise with their counterparts in the VJ in carrying out joint combat operations.909
389. \akovi}, the Head of the PrK Department for Operations, described the co ordination of joint VJ MUP actions, and the exchange of information at the level of the PrK and MUP Staff.910 Orders were issued for various stages of the operations and it was at this level that the PrK and the MUP Staff in Pri{tina would co ordinate.911 Detailed plans would be drawn up according to
901 Cveti},T.6655 6657. 902 See e.g., P960, which was sent “to the command of the MUP” and sets out tasks for the MUP. See also D206,p.2. 903 See e.g., P1039,p.1;P689,p.8. 904 See e.g., P1043,p.9. 905 Cveti},T.6655 6657. 906 Cveti},T.6650. 907 K25,P340,p.21(under seal); P340 A,p.21. See also Ðorðević,T.9585: “The MUP staff had experts, qualified people who were perfectly able to plan, decide how each mission would be executed, and what needed to be asked from the Pri{tina Corps in terms of assistance in order to successfully carry out the police tasks. Orders and related activities and control over police units was executed exclusively through the Staff”. 908 P764,pp.3 4 (during this meeting of 4 April 1999, a JSO commander Milorad Jankovi} reported about co operation with the VJ);P345,p.8. 909 See e.g. P764,p.4, where Stevanović is recorded to say: “Conduct co operation with the VJ through the commander on the ground and inform the Staff of any problems”; P345, p.8, a MUP Staff meeting of 11 May 1999 where Stevanović so instructed: “Co operation with the VJ is carried out based on a map of military zones of responsibility. If co operation is disrupted, submit a written report on the problems to the Staff HQ.” 910 \akovi},T.7955 7956. See, for more detail, Part III(A)(3)(b). 911 \akovi},T.7997.
IT-05-87/1-T 92 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6453 activities to be carried out.912 \akovi} explained that co ordination was not only carried out at the level of the MUP Staff, but also at the level of SUPs, combat groups and detachments, all the way down to the lowest level units.913
390. \or|evi} testified about co ordination between MUP and VJ in the implementation of the first stage of the 1998 summer offensive. He confirmed that units of the PJP, SAJ and JSO were involved in the implementation of the plan.914 He explained that all police and army commanders would gather together in one place where they would receive the orders in separate envelopes (for the police and for the military) containing their respective sections of the action to be undertaken.915 Having received these sections,
every commander of one force would know with which commander of the other force to co ordinate. …before operations police and army commanders would be in touch because their units were executing the same task. For this to be successful, they had to be well informed minute by minute of the situation on the ground and the location of their units.916
391. \or|evi} testified that, when on the ground, each unit would posses a coded map of the area where the unit was active, with numeric designations of places, villages, etc. The MUP Staff and the PrK would also have a map of the action.917 In \or|evi}’s words, “that was a system of co operation and co ordination”.918
392. The Trial Record is replete with examples of joint activities carried out by VJ and MUP units in 1998. For example, at a MUP Staff meeting of 28 July 1998, Luki} reported that the second phase of the Plan had been completed, and that actions had been carried out in co ordination with the VJ.919 Also illustrative are two PrK decisions of August 1998, which provided for the joint engagement of MUP and VJ forces in the implementation of several anti terrorist actions.920 Both decisions also contained in the end the clause stipulating that the combat operations were to be “commanded by the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija”.921
912 \akovi},T.7996 7997. 913 \akovi},T.7959. 914 Ðorðević,T.9582. Also \akovi} confirmed co ordination with the MUP Staff in the activities to implement the 1998 Plan (\akovi},T.7913). 915 Ðorðević,T.9580. 916 Ðorðević,T.9583 9584. See also P1061, a Communications Centre plan showing that the VJ and the MUP were using the same communication nets (Cveti},T.6730 6732,6854;P1061). 917 Ðorðević,T.9580 9581. 918 Ðorðević,T.9584. 919 P688,p.3: the minutes record that Luki} “gave a detailed explanation about the locations at which actions had been carried out and about had been achieved, showing axes of action and other things on a topographic map”. 920 P890;P1232. 921 P890,p.3;P1232,p.3.
IT-05-87/1-T 93 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6452 393. In 1999, joint VJ MUP operations and activities continued, and led to the commission of the crimes charged in the Indictment. Witnesses and documentary evidence confirm the continuous co ordination between the VJ and the MUP throughout the war in 1999.922 The MUP Staff kept exercising a fundamental role in the implementation and co ordination of those joint operations.
394. In February 1999, the VJ and MUP leadership began planning a large scale anti terrorist operation in Kosovo. During the 17 February 1999 MUP Staff meeting, Luki} announced a plan “to carry out three mopping up operations in the Podujevo, Dragobilja and Drenica areas”.923 The areas identified for these operations correspond to those envisaged in Lazarevi}’s order of 16 February 1999,924 thereby confirming co ordination.
395. \akovi} also confirmed co ordination with the MUP Staff regarding the preparation and implementation of these operations.925 He testified that the “Order to break up and destroy forces of the Albanian terrorists in the sector of Malo Kosovo, Drenica, and Mali{evo”, dated 19 February 1999 (P889),926 was sent to MUP units “to enable them to use it” and to “provide assistance”.927 \akovi} said that he prepared the document (P1234),928 and passed this template on, through the duty service, to Du{an Adamovi} at the MUP Staff.929
396. This large scale operation planned in February was implemented down both chains of command in late March 1999 through a series of Joint Command orders. Pursuant to these orders, and in furtherance of the goals of the JCE, VJ and MUP units carried out joint combat actions in late March and April 1999 in the areas such as Orahova}, Suva Reka, and Velika Kru{a;930 Kosmač;931 Malo Kosovo (Vucitrn);932 Jezerce and Čičavica;933 Drenica (Srbica);934 Orlane Zlas;935 Zastri};936 Rugovo;937 and Bajgora Bare (Vucitrn/Kosovska Mitrovica).938 These actions led to the crimes alleged in the Indictment.
922 See e.g. P771,p.3 (Sainovi}: “The relationship between the VJ and the police has been defined and settled and this is functioning well”). See also Part III(A)(3)(b). 923 P85,p.1. 924 P889,p.4. See also \akovi},T.7938 7939. 925 \akovi},T.7941 7942;P1234. 926 \akovi},T.7941;P1234;P889. 927 \akovi},T.7942;P1234. 928 \akovi},T.7943;P1234. 929 \akovi},T.8106;P1234. 930 P350. 931 P1382. 932 D105. 933 P767;P955,p.39. 934 P971;P972;P1383. 935 P1384. 936 P1386. 937 P1328;P1396.
IT-05-87/1-T 94 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6451 397. MUP Staff minutes and other documents from 1999 confirm continued co operation between MUP units and the VJ in conducting large scale combat operations across Kosovo. For example:
- On 4 April 1999, Stevanovi} instructed those present to: “Conduct co operation with the VJ through the commander on the ground and inform the Staff of any problems”.939
- A 15 April 1999 Joint Command order directed the VJ and MUP to conduct combat operations in the areas of Jezerce and Budakovo.940 Preparations for this operation were discussed at the MUP Staff meeting of 7 May 1999, attended by Sainovi}, Stevanovi}, Ili}, Luki}, and all SUP chiefs.941 At that meeting, Sainovi} is recorded to say: “After Operation Jezerce, there will no longer be a large terrorist stronghold, except for 30 to 40 smaller scale strongholds numbering 500 to 700 terrorists in areas in which the Secretariats themselves will destroy and completely neutralise them.”942 He further stated: “After Operation Jezerce, all PJP detachments will return to their Secretariats and in cooperation with the VJ work on destroying the remaining terrorist groups.”943
- On 9 May 1999, the PrK reported joint combat activities with the MUP in Budakovo village (549th Mtbr) and other localities.944 At a MUP Staff meeting of 11 May 1999, commanders of the 124th and 35th PJP detachments reported on the successful completion of the Jezerce operation.945
- On 4 May 1999, Lazarević issued an order to PrK units to conduct an operation in the Bajgora area with MUP units, including the 35th PJP Detachment.946 At the 11 May 1999 MUP Staff meeting, Colonel Prljkević, the 35th PJP Detachment Commander, reported that “operation on Bajgora went well.”947
398. The MUP Staff forwarded VJ orders to unit commanders participating in operations. For example, on 20 April 1999, Luki} forwarded to SUP chiefs and PJP commanders an order from
1. 938 P969;P959,p.13;P955,p.51. 939 P764,p.4. See also P764,pp.1 2. 940 P767. 941 P771. 942 P771,p.2. 943 P771,p.2 (see also p.3). 944 P1388,p.2. 945 P345,pp.4 5. See also K25,P340 A,p.6. 946 P1040. 947 P345,p.4.
IT-05-87/1-T 95 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6450 Pavkovi} on the treatment of refugees, with instructions to establish contact with the VJ commanders in their territories.948
399. PrK orders show that VJ and MUP units were operating together, and that anti terrorist actions were conducted. For example, on 9 April 1999, Lazarevi} informed his subordinates that the MUP Staff had issued an order to all SUPs to plan actions to crush terrorists.949 He then ordered his subordinates to co ordinate actions with MUP units and to establish contacts with SUP chiefs in this regard.950
400. The PrK AOR’s security regime confirms joint activities between the VJ and the MUP. When combat operations were carried out, checkpoints were set up in the area of deployment of the units, and many were joint checkpoints manned by both MUP and VJ.951 In a joint checkpoint, the MUP would deal with the passage of civilians and civilian vehicles, while the VJ would control the passage of soldiers, members of the army, and military vehicles.952 These joint checkpoints were based on a VJ/MUP agreement.953
(c) Supreme Defence Council (SDC) and Supreme Command (SC)
(i) The SDC and SC were key entities in implementing the objectives of the JCE
401. The SDC was the highest strategic civilian body in Belgrade. It was responsible for national defence and deployment of the VJ, and interfaced directly with the VJ General Staff, the highest level in the military chain of command.954 The SDC became the SC during wartime.955 The SDC/SC took a number of crucial decisions in 1998 and 1999 regarding the deployment and use of the VJ and subordinated units. These units committed crimes during the Indictment period in furtherance of the goals of the JCE.
402. The SDC was composed of the top echelons of the state. Pursuant to Article 135 of the FRY Constitution, the SDC had three members: the President of the Republic (Milo{evi}), the President
948 P1392. 949 P1039,p.1. 950 P1039,p.1. 951 See e.g. D248, a MUP Staff dispatch dated 26 March 1999, and signed by Luki}. Cveti} testified that, in executing this dispatch, SUPs set up check points that were jointly manned by MUP and VJ forces (Cveti},T.6817;D248). See also \akovi},T.7925. 952 P685. 953 P685. 954 P44,Art.41;P1440,p.93 (“The General Staff of the Army is the ₣…ğ staff organ of the Supreme Defence Council.”); Vasiljević,T.5655. 955 Vlajković,D602,pp.76 77.
IT-05-87/1-T 96 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6449 of Serbia (Milutinovi}), and the President of Montenegro (\ukanovi}).956 The President of the Republic presided over the SDC, and commanded the VJ in accordance with the decisions of the SDC.957
403. During wartime, the SDC became the Supreme Command,958 and the President of the FRY was referred to as the “Supreme Commander.”959 Pursuant to the FRY Law on Defence, the FRY President was, “in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Defence Council,” to order the implementation of the country’s defence plan; command the VJ in wartime and peace; and decide on the country’s territorial division into military areas.960
404. As Chief of the VJ General Staff, Ojdanić attended SDC meetings.961 At those sessions, he reported to those present and also offered his opinions on crucial matters.962 On 23 March 1999, the eve of the NATO intervention, the SDC adopted new Rules of Procedure, which heightened Ojdanic’s involvement in SDC meetings, among other things.963 The Chief of the General Staff and the Federal Minister of Defence, or their representatives, were now required to be present at all sessions.964 They could call a session, and could also propose agenda items.965
405. The SDC, and the SC during wartime, made crucial decisions regarding the use of the VJ and subordinated units in 1998 and 1999. For example, during the fifth session in June 1998, the SDC unanimously concluded that: “should terrorist activities of the Albanian separatist movement escalate, the Army of Yugoslavia will intervene in adequate measure.”966 This decision led to the Plan to Suppress Terrorism in Kosovo during the summer of 1998, which involved the use of excessive and indiscriminate force by the VJ and the MUP.967 During the seventh session in November 1998, the SDC decided to increase the military budget by seventy percent, thus enabling the VJ to conduct extensive combat operations in 1999.968 Further, session minutes demonstrate that the SDC was familiar with the situation in Kosovo, and discussed it.969 The SDC also
956 P129,Art.135;Vasiljevi},T.5655;Vlajković,D602,pp.76 77. 957 P44,Arts.40,41;P129,Art.135;P43,Art.4;Vasiljević,T.5655. 958 Vlajković,D602,pp.76 77. 959 Vasiljević,T.5654 5656;Vlajković,D602,p.78. 960 P44,Art.40. 961 P1343;P1364. 962 P1343,pp.1 3;P1364,p.1. 963 P1468. The new rules also required that decisions be adopted by consensus. P1468,Art.4. 964 P1468,Art.3. 965 P1468,Arts.3,5. 966 P683,pp.1 2. 967 P87,p.3. The excessive and indiscriminate force used by the VJ and MUP during the 1998 summer offensive is discussed in Part III, Section (A)(2)(b). 968 P1363,pp.1 3. 969 See e.g. P1343,pp.1 4;P682,pp.3 7;P683, pp.1 2.
IT-05-87/1-T 97 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6448 discussed VJ personnel decisions, which were then approved by Milo{evi}, including the promotions of General Ojdanić, General Pavković, and General Lazarević.970
406. As the most powerful strategic civilian body that interfaced with the highest military level, the SDC and the SC played a key role in the commission of the crimes charged in the Indictment. By taking decisions relating to the defence of the country, the deployment of the VJ and the appointments of Ojdani}, Pavkovi} and Lazarevi} to the respective positions that they held during the Indictment period, these entities played a significant role in implementing the goals of the JCE.
(d) VJ General Staff and SC Staff
(i) The VJ General Staff and its war time equivalent, the SC Staff, were key entities in implementing the objectives of the JCE.
407. The VJ General Staff was the highest level in the military chain of command. At the level of the VJ General Staff, the military interfaced with the SDC, the civilian leadership in Belgrade.971 It was the highest expert and staff organ for the preparation and engagement of the VJ.972 The VJ General Staff developed plans, directives, orders and other instruments of command that were indispensable to the military operation.973
408. Dragoljub Ojdanić was the Chief of the VJ General Staff. As such, he was the highest ranking officer in the VJ.974 He had authority over all VJ forces, and commanded them through the issuance of orders and other instruments of command.975 He also determined matters such as recruitment, training regulations, education plans, and the organisation and establishment of commands, units and institutions within the VJ.976
409. During a state of war, the VJ General Staff became the SC Staff, and Ojdani} became Chief of the SC Staff. 977 Subordinate commands reported daily to the operations centre of the SC staff, which summarized the information in a combat report that was provided to the SC Staff each day.978 Further, the SC Staff held daily evening briefings. 979 Meetings were chaired by Ojdani}, as Chief
970 P1363,pp.3 5 (replacing General Perisić with General Ojdanić, over the objection of President Ðukanović); P1343,p.8 (promoting Generals Pavković and Lazarević). 971 P1440,p.93. 972 P1440,p.97;P43,Art.5. 973 See e.g. D179;P1502;P1452. 974 P43,Arts.5 6. 975 P43,Art.6;D179,p.13;P1502,p.1. 976 P43,Art.5. 977 Vasiljevi},T.5657 5658;Vlajković,T.11196. 978 Ćurčin,T.10712 10715. 979 Vlajković,T.11258,D600,paras.18, 21.
IT-05-87/1-T 98 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6447 of the SC Staff, or a replacement officer.980 In line with its position as the most authoritative VJ organ, at the evening meetings the SC Staff was briefed as to the situation on the ground during the past twenty four hours, and addressed key military matters arising during the war.981
410. As Chief of the VJ General Staff and the SC Staff, Ojdanić planned, ordered, coordinated and commanded the VJ and subordinated units that committed the crimes charged in the Indictment. The large scale combat operations that were conducted during the Indictment period by the VJ and subordinated units would have been impossible without the role played by the VJ General Staff and the SC Staff.
(e) Co ordination of the VJ and the MUP
411. According to Article 17 of the FRY Law on Defence, during a state of war, MUP units and organs carrying out combat assignments shall be subordinated to the VJ officer commanding combat operations.982
412. Once the state of war was declared on 24 March 1999, the MUP did not submit to full subordination to the VJ for combat operations. Rather, MUP units engaged in joint combat actions on the basis of Joint Command decisions.983 Between 18 and 20 April 1999, Ojdanić, Pavković and Lazarević issued orders on the subordination of the MUP to the VJ, indicating that up to that period, the subordination had not occurred.984
413. During \or|evi}’s visit to Pri{tina on 18 April 1999, he met with Generals Pavkovi} and Lazarevi} at the PrK HQ to discuss Ojdani}’s order on re subordination of the MUP to the VJ. Luki}, Stevanovi} and \akovi} were also at that meeting.985 \akovi} testified that without 986 explaining anything, Pavkovi} handed Ojdani}’s order (P1238) to \or|evi} for him to read. After taking a minute or so to read it, \or|evi} gave the document back to Pavkovi} and said, “What do you mean Ojdani}? Who does he think he is that he can command? There will be no re subordination until we receive such an instruction, an order, from the Minister.”987
414. \akovi} was somewhat surprised because he had not expected this issue to be raised. Some informal conversation lasted for a couple of minutes, and after that the meeting ended without 980 Vlajković,T.11258,D600,paras.18, 21. 981 Vlajković,T.11259. 982 P44,Art.17. 983 See supra. paras 294 307. 984 P887;D204;P1238;\akovi},T.7962 7263 . 985 \akovi},T.7964 7966. 986 \akovi},T.7966;8090. 987 \akovi},T.7966;8090 8091.
IT-05-87/1-T 99 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6446 anything having been settled or defined.988 \akovi} explained that re subordination did not take place because the Minister did not issue an order instructing the police to do so.989
415. \or|evi} confirmed he attended this meeting.990 He said he told Pavkovi} that he had just arrived from Belgrade. “We hadn't received any dispatch to this effect and it was totally unclear to me how the Chief of General Staff was going to resubordination organs of the interior without the knowledge of the minister of the interior.”991 \or|evi} returned to Belgrade that evening and discussed the matter with the Minister.992 Some days later, the Minister told him that the matter had been resolved and it was not raised again.993 \or|evi} said that “the police kept doing their job in concert of the Yugoslav Army according to the regulations.” 994
416. Although the subordination of the MUP to the VJ was not strictly adhered to, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that the VJ and MUP acted in close coordination during the Indictment period. The VJ planned and drafted combat orders (including Joint Command orders) and liaised with members of the MUP Staff to carry out joint tasks.995 As described elsewhere in the brief, the modus operandi of combat operations involved both VJ and MUP participation.
417. That coordination existed is further evidenced by the fact that, when combat actions were carried out, joint checkpoints were set up in the area of deployment of the units.996 These checkpoints were set up on the basis of an agreement between the MUP and the VJ.997 Coordination between the VJ and the MUP was essential to carry out the common plan.
988 \akovi},T.7966 7967. 989 \akovi},T.7967. 990 \or|evi},T. 9738 9740. 991 \orðević,T.9739. 992 Ðorðević,T.9740. 993 Ðorðević,T.9740 994 Ðorðević,T.9741 995 See generally Part III,Section(A)(3)(b)(i). 996 See generally Part III,Section(A)(3)(b)(ii). 997 P685.
IT-05-87/1-T 100 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6445 B. The implementation of the JCE in 1999
418. Following the pattern that emerged in 1998, the JCE members implemented the common criminal purpose to modify the ethnic composition of Kosovo through the commission of crimes charged in the Indictment. Instead of searching for a peaceful settlement, JCE members prepared for the Spring offensive, during which numerous crimes were committed by the forces of the FRY and Serbia.
1. The leadership of the VJ and the MUP prepare to launch an offensive in the Spring
419. In early 1999, the VJ and the MUP leadership in Belgrade began planning large scale combat operations in Kosovo to be launched in the spring. Preparations for this extensive offensive were being finalised, even as authorities of the FRY and Serbia were supposed to be engaged in peace negotiations at Rambouillet and Paris.
420. The NATO bombardment provided the perfect window of opportunity to the members of the JCE to carry out their plans. On its face, the Spring offensive appeared to be a legitimate operation against NATO and the KLA. However, as evidenced by events on the ground, its purpose was the commission of crimes against Kosovo Albanians to further the common purpose of the JCE.
421. The deployment and engagement of large numbers of VJ and MUP units in complex operations required advance planning by the VJ (Ojdani}) and the MUP (\or|evi}, Stojiljkovi}, Markovi}, Stevanovi}) in Belgrade, and the Joint Command (\or|evi}, [ainovi}, Pavkovi}, Lazarevi}, and Lukić) in Priština. These operations resulted in the crimes alleged in the Indictment, in particular, the massive displacement of Kosovo Albanian civilians as VJ and MUP units swept through large parts of the territory where many of the Indictment sites are located. The concerted nature of these joint operations demonstrated the existence of a plan.
(a) The VJ and MUP leadership planned the Spring offensive
422. Between January and early March 1999, joint VJ and MUP operations that were to be conducted in the spring of 1999 were planned. On 16 January, Ojdani} issued the Grom 3 directive for the engagement of the VJ to prevent the introduction of the multinational NATO brigade into Kosovo. The directive sets out tasks to be implemented in two stages: the objective of the first stage was to prevent NATO from entering Kosovo, and the objective of the second stage was the
IT-05-87/1-T 101 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6444 elimination of NATO as well as “terrorist” forces.998 VJ forces were to work in co operation with MUP forces during the implementation of these tasks.999
423. During the VJ Collegium on 21 January, a plan of operation against NATO and the KLA during the spring was discussed in detail.1000 Col Gen Bojovi} spoke about a plan that would include “all forces in Kosovo and Mehtohija,” that had the following goal: “[…] to conduct emergency warfare in a specific way throughout the entire territory of Kosovo and Metohija on a massive scale, so that the terrorists have nowhere they can feel safe […] and ultimately, prevent that spring from coming and not to wait for it.”1001 The Spring offensive was planned as a joint operation. As noted by Bojovi}, the “MUP cannot do it on their own”.1002
424. Ojdani}’s Grom 3 directive was implemented down the VJ chain of command by Pavkovi} and then Lazarevi}.1003 On 27 January, Pavkovi} issued the 3rd Army’s Grom 3 order specifying the two stages mentioned in Ojdani}’s directive.1004 On 16 February, Lazarevi} issued a PrK Command order for the elimination of the Albanian “terrorist” forces in the sectors of Malo Kosovo, Drenica and Mališevo/Malishevë.1005 The tasks listed in this order were to be carried out by the PrK in co ordination with the MUP forces.1006
425. On 17 February, the day after Lazarevi} issued his order implementing Grom 3, the most senior MUP leaders, namely, \or|evi}, Stojiljković, Marković and Stevanović met with the MUP Staff in Pri{tina.1007 Stojiljković said: “Within two or three days of an attack, we have to put our plans in motion and use the time to clear the territory of terrorists.”1008 Lukić outlined the MUP Staff plans on three mopping up operations in the Podujevo/Podujevë, Dragobilja and Drenica areas.1009 The areas identified for these actions broadly correspond to those envisaged in Lazarević’s order of 16 February.1010 In that order, the PrK instructed its subordinate units to act in
998 D179,p.7. See also ^ur~in,T.10686 10688. 999 D179. 1000 P902,pp.24 26. 1001 P902,pp.24 25. 1002 P902,p.28. 1003 \akovi},T.8063. See D179,D343,P889. See also ^ur~in, commenting that D343 was an example of the implementation of Grom 3 directive where “the army command copies, literally, the assignment which they were issued by the General Staff.” (T.10690). 1004 D343,pp.3, 5 7;\akovi},T.8063. 1005 P889,p.4, item 2. See also D179,D343 which precede P889. \akovi},T.7939 7940,8063 8064. 1006 P889,p.4. See also P1234 that is nearly identical to P889 in format and contains orders for the MUP. \akovi}, testified that this was not an order but a template. That is why his initials are on the template which was provided to the MUP. (\akovi},T.7941 7943,8106). 1007 \or|evi},T.6976;P85. 1008 P85,p.3. 1009 P85,p.1. 1010 P889,p.4, item 2.
IT-05-87/1-T 102 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6443 co ordination with certain MUP units (22nd PJP, 35th PJP, 37th PJP, the SAJ and the JSO),1011 thus demonstrating that the VJ and the MUP cooperated in order to plan the major operations in Malo Kosovo, Drenica and Mali{evo/Malisheva.
426. After they planned the Spring offensive, the VJ and MUP leadership took steps to implement the offensive. Their concrete actions set out below evidence the existence of a well planned offensive that was implemented across Kosovo:1012
• The VJ and the MUP fortified their units in Kosovo and incorporated armed non Albanian civilians into their ranks.
• The VJ and the MUP amassed weaponry in Kosovo.
(i) The VJ and the MUP fortified their units in Kosovo and incorporated armed non Albanian civilians into their ranks
427. In violation of the October Agreements, the VJ fortified its units in Kosovo. From February 1999 onwards, the VJ followed the practice of leaving a platoon sized group of soldiers in Kosovo after each military operation.1013 The VJ also brought a number of units into Kosovo to augment its forces. These included the 37th Motorised Brigade,1014 the 72nd Special Brigade, the 211th Armoured Brigade and the 252nd Armoured Brigade.1015 In April 1999, the 37th Motorised Brigade was re subordinated to the PrK and remained in Kosovo until June 1999.1016
428. In February 1999, the VJ also began augmenting its troops on the Kosovo border. At the VJ Collegium of 18 February, Ojdanić stated: “Do not take units into Kosovo but deploy them in the border area,” so that they could intervene rapidly in the province.1017 Nevertheless, in contravention
1011 P889,p.6, item 5. 1012 P833,pp.40 41. Ciaglinski testified that the KVM saw a number of indicators which revealed that an operation was being planned for the spring. These indicators included the deployment of troops from their barracks into winter exercise areas and an increase in the number of conscripts and ammunition columns coming into Kosovo. 1013 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.187. 1014 P1369,p.22, entry 181 for 10 March 1999. On the authenticity of P1369, Philip Coo stated that the contents of the operations log and the war diary tended to match the contents of documents acquired independently, such as that of daily combat reports (Coo, T.8556). P1369 is also consistent with known events established by witnesses (See, e.g., Ciaglinski,T.5267;Drewienkiewicz,T.6373 6374,6380 6381;P1010 and other documents provided independently (P934 and P1341,pp.16,24 25). 1015 P1452, items 4 5;P1341, pp12,24. See also ^ur~in,T.10706. 1016 P1530;Novakovi},T.11175. 1017 P1338,pp.4, 16. See also P1333,pp.20 21. Ojdanić pointed out that “one group” of the VJ forces in Kosovo was in contravention of the Clark Naumann Agreement.
IT-05-87/1-T 103 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6442 of this order to keep units at the border, Pavkovi} brought the 72nd Special Brigade unit into the interior of Kosovo.1018
429. In February, as the Rambouillet peace talks continued, the Serb forces took the opportunity to amass more troops and equipment in Kosovo while intensifying their operations on the ground.1019 While at Rambouillet, Veton Surroi received reports from his associates in Pri{tina that the police were intensifying their activities in Kosovo.1020 During the three weeks between the Rambouillet and Paris negotiations, Merovci estimated around 30,000 troops entered Kosovo.1021 He said, “At the time we are talking about, this three week period, the arrival of Serb troops from Serbia to Kosova was a matter of day. It was a transparent issue, everybody could see that. Now, the Serbs no longer took pains to cover up their activities under the guise of expected air strikes. So they brought their troops in broad daylight.”1022
430. A number of other witnesses also made similar observations. Drewienkiewicz described this new strategy as, “reinforcing overtly”.1023 Michael Phillips and Knut Vollebaek also saw an increase in MUP and VJ strength.1024 KDOM reports document this observation:1025
• On 12 February, KDOM reported that extensive VJ troop and equipment movement the day before had caused villagers to flee their homes in Lapusnik/Lapušnik.1026
• On 19 February, KDOM reported on “a visible increase in the movement of FRY VJ and police units and their equipment has been noted in the past 24 hours.”1027 The report describes “unusually heavy concentrations of FRY armour and heavy artillery deployed in that sector of Serbia just north of Kosovo. These forces seem to be poised along a road leading directly to Podujevo/Podujevë.”1028
1018 P1341,pp.16. 1019 Surroi,T.288;Rugova,P285,p. 8;Merovci,P416 paras.32,38;T.2207;P417,pp.18 19. 1020 Surroi,T.288. 1021 Merovci,P417,pp.19 21. 1022 Merovci,T.2209. In contrast, in his statement Merovci said that “the introduction of troops was done quietly and discreetly, usually at night. Pri{tina was a relatively small town, though, so everyone was aware of the additional tanks and trucks that were coming in.” (P416, para.38.) This apparent contradiction is explained by the marked change in the attitude of the Serbian authorities during the three week period between the conclusion of the Rambouillet and Paris Conferences (Merovci,T.2208 2209). Given the backdrop of the failing talks, they made less of an effort to conceal their actions in reinforcing their troops in Kosovo. 1023 Drewienkiewicz,P1010;T.6381. 1024 Phillips,T.8697 (Phillips saw a rise in the number of armoured vehicles and convoy size); Vollebaek,P1072,pp.29 30;P1073,p.9 (Vollebaek noticed a large number of tanks, gunfire and an overall a large military build up). 1025 Phillips,T.8699 8700. Phillips confirmed these reports to be generally accurate and consistent with his personal observations or awareness of the activities described therein. 1026 Phillips,T.8699 8700;P1304,p.1. 1027 P1305,p.1. See also Phillips,T.8700. 1028 P1305,p.1.
IT-05-87/1-T 104 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6441 • On 22 February, KDOM reported on “extensive movements of VJ and MUP personnel and equipment. Several small convoys of armoured vehicles and trucks were seen near Podujevo/Podujevë and Stimlje/Shtime.”1029
431. In Uro{evac municipality, Bedri Hyseni saw a build up of Serb forces about a month before the NATO bombing.1030 These forces comprised primarily of police reservists, who worked in co operation with the regular VJ and MUP forces.1031 The VJ forces arrived about one month before the bombing, using tanks and pinzgauer jeeps.1032 Similarly, at the end of February, Antonio Russo saw the VJ deploying large numbers of troops, tanks, and APCs surrounding Pri{tina.1033
432. In early March, the KVM observed in the vicinity of Palivodenica and Kotlina/Kotlinë, a large VJ convoy comprised of 13 artillery pieces and armoured vehicles.1034 This was the largest number of artillery pieces seen in one convoy.1035 In the Prizren area, on 8 March, the KVM observed a VJ convoy believed to consist of military police/special forces.1036
433. By mid March, the KDOM reported that:
Reports from the field today indicate that the Serbs continue to move sizeable reinforcements in and around Kosovo. As of yesterday, there were some 18,000 21,000 troops poised just outside the province. Over the past 3 days, there have been significant troop movements along the Albanian border and near Priština. The KVM reported yesterday two VJ convoys in the Gnjilane region including 80 armed Serb civilians (presumably reservists).
The Serb troop movements as well as their attacks on ethnic Albanian villages appear to be designed to further destabilize the situation during the peace talks in Paris. The number of FRY and Serbian troops now out of barracks and in Kosovo and the introduction of new battle tanks puts Belgrade grossly out of compliance with the obligation it undertook last October. 1037
1029 P1306,p.1;Phillips,T.8701. 1030 T.4483,4908;P809,p.4, paras.1 3;P810,pp.3 4. 1031 Hyseni,T.4483,4908;P809,p.4, paras.1 3;P810,pp.3 4. 1032 Hyseni,P809,p.4,para.1;P810,p.3. 1033 Russo,P1213,p.3. 1034 P1077,p.2, item 4;P1029,p.40. For an explanation about the “Blue Book”, see Drewienkiewicz,P997,pp.35 42;T.6400 6402,6418,6446. 1035 P1077,p.2, item 4;P1029,p.40. 1036 P1029,p.48. 1037 P1310,p.1; Phillips,T.8704. See also P1029,p.92. KVM reporting seeing two buses with 80 armed civilians headed from Gnjilane towards Pri{tina; the armed civilians were believed to be reservists called up for active duty.
IT-05-87/1-T 105 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6440 434. Increases in the number of VJ units devoted to the PrK were reported by ^určin at VJ Collegium meetings on 25 February and 11 March.1038
435. Another factor that contributed to the troop build up was the extension of the period of service for the VJ conscripts serving in Kosovo which resulted in an increase in the number of VJ personnel in Kosovo. At the VJ Collegium on 25 February, Samardžić, made a proposal to extend the period of service of VJ conscripts in Kosovo.1039 In mid March, the FRY had adopted legislation that implemented this.1040 Both Ciaglinski and Drewienkiewicz confirmed that VJ conscripts were retained beyond their normal service term.1041 Around this time, the KVM also sighted probable VJ reservists in the Prizren and Orahovac area and noted that reservists had been mobilised, most likely in preparation for actions following the conclusion of the peace talks.1042
436. The VJ and the MUP leadership also increased the size of their units by engaging armed non Albanian civilians to participate in joint operations.1043 At the VJ Collegium on 30 December 1998, Dimitrijevi} reported that there were 60,000 Serb armed civilians, “that can be mobilised outside the control of the official organs.”1044 At the VJ Collegium on 21 January 1999, Dimitrijevi} highlighted the “realistic possibility” of Serbian population becoming radicalised and organising themselves into resistance groups, based on the “number of people owning or having been distributed weapons”.1045
437. The discussions during the VJ Collegium on 2 February, underline the VJ’s role in distributing weapons to non Albanian civilians.1046 During this Collegium, Ojdani} stated, “I’ve heard that there were around 50,000 armed Serbs.”1047 Samard`i} reported that 47,000 weapons had been issued and several thousands had already left with the weapons.1048 In preparation for the
1038 P1341,pp.11 12;P965,pp.11 12. At T.10706, ^ur~in said that the peacetime composition of the 37th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd Army from Ra{ka Garrison was to be relocated to Kosovska Mitrovica and the 21st Combat Group from Ni{ was to be subordinated to 234th Motorized Brigade of the PrK, stationed in Uro{evac. 1039 P1341,pp.18 19. 1040 Drewienkiewicz,P996,paras.168,188. 1041 Ciaglinski,P833,pp.44 45;P844,p.7 (“16 March 1999, Extension of VJ conscript service by 30 days”); Drewienkiewicz,P996,paras.168,188. 1042 P1029,p.75. See also P1029,p.48. Sighting of new and professional VJ units (possibly military police/special forces) in black berets. 1043 See Part III(A)(2)(a). 1044 P1330,p.9. 1045 P902,p.16. 1046 P1333,p.23;P688,p.7 (The MUP was also distributing weapons to civilians). 1047 P1333,p.23. 1048 P1333,p.23. See also P975;P901.
IT-05-87/1-T 106 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6439 spring offensive, at a MUP Staff meeting of 17 February 1999, Stojiljkovi} gave instructions for the use of RPOs in case of conflict.1049
438. Like the VJ, the MUP fortified its units in Kosovo. In late February/March 1999, special MUP forces arrived from outside Kosovo in large numbers.1050 Ciaglinski testified about a particular feature of the MUP in Kosovo — they behaved like soldiers and played mainly a military role,1051 fighting like infantry soldiers.1052 Ciaglinksi also witnessed qualitative improvements as regards the “new” MUP forces in Kosovo in 1999, testifying that these MUP were: “much more highly motivated, more disciplined, almost like elite Special Forces [….] the final echelon of MUP.”1053 The “new” MUP was equipped with better, deadlier equipment.1054 In the field, they were armed with assault rifles and wore combat gear and modern Kevlar helmets.1055
439. Drewienkiewicz made a similar observation during the joint operation in Vu~itrn/Vushtrri in March 1999. He noted the arrival of a company sized MUP unit which appeared better trained and equipped than the regular MUP.1056 The members of this unit were fitter and exhibited higher morale.1057 Instead of the standard blue camouflage uniform, they wore green camouflage uniforms with the word “Milicija” printed on the webbing of the back.1058 Their equipment was also different. They carried rifle launched grenades on their backs.1059 Drewienkiewicz saw this unit for the first time in Vu~itrn/Vushtrri.1060 A similar unit had been observed in the Kačanik/Kaçanik area around the same time.1061
440. In addition to the regular MUP, PJP units were also involved in joint operations. For example, in mid March, during heavy fighting in Klina, PJP units were observed.1062 PJP units were also involved in operation in the Je{kovo operation in March.1063 According to Drewienkiewicz,
1049 P85,p.3. 1050 Ciaglinski,P832,p.12,para.6,p.13,para.1;T.5274 5275,5279. 1051 P833,pp.41,46. Ciaglinski said that 99% of the MUP he saw in Kosovo were performing a military function and carried out typical military tasks. P832,p.12, para.3. See also P1400,para.13. 1052 T.5274. 1053 T.5274 5275. 1054 Ciaglinski,P833,p. 41. 1055 Ciaglinski,P833,p. 41, 46. 1056 T.6376,6378;P996,para.190. 1057 Drewienkiewicz,T.6376;P996,para.190. 1058 Drewienkiewicz,T.6376;P996,para.190;P997,p.89. Drewienkiewicz identified the webbing of the police uniform in P316 as similar to that worn by the special forces in question. (P997,pp.88 89). 1059 Drewienkiewicz,T.6376;P996,para.190. 1060 T.6376. 1061 Drewienkiewicz,T.6376;P996,para.190. 1062 Drewienkiewicz,T.6408;P1029,p.84. 1063 Drewienkiewicz,P1009.
IT-05-87/1-T 107 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6438 PJP presence was significant because these units were more competent and better trained.1064 Moreover, PJP were more mobile as the units could be deployed to various areas based on need and were not tied to a particular location.1065
(ii) The VJ and the MUP amassed weaponry in Kosovo
441. In addition to an increase in the number of units, there was also a huge influx of more modern and powerful equipment to Kosovo.1066 For example:
• On 27 February, a large VJ convoy that stretched for over 50 kilometres was seen travelling from Belgrade towards Ni{ and presumably towards Kosovo.1067 The convoy that included 15 Pragas, 15 BOV 3s and 40 50 troop carrying trucks was never seen returning to Belgrade.1068 • In mid March, the KVM reported that a large VJ armoured group had arrived into Mitrovica/Mitrovicë by train from outside Kosovo.1069 The convoy headed towards Srbica/Skenderaj and had, among other things, seven M 84 tanks1070 and other equipment that was far more advanced than previously used in Kosovo. • On 16 March, over 50 vehicles were brought to an airfield south of Podujevo/Podujevë including two M 84s.1071 • On 17 March, KDOM reported that the FRY was actively reinforcing its military and police troops with new equipment, including T 72 tanks which are larger than those previously used in Kosovo.1072
442. This change from a 1950s tank (T 55) to a newer model from the 1980s (T 84) was significant.1073 In terms of equipment, the VJ brought in new T 84 tanks while the MUP brought in new APCs.1074
443. By the spring of 1999, the VJ and the MUP had amassed the troops and armaments required to launch an offensive. As reported by KDOM on 12 March 1999: 1064 T.6408. 1065 Drewienkiewicz,T.6408. 1066 Ciaglinski,T.5267. 1067 Drewienkiewicz,P1029,p.39. Twelve additional trucks were spotted along the road undergoing repairs. 1068 Drewienkiewicz,T.6405 6406;P1029,p.39. 1069 Ciaglinski,T.5268,P833,pp.40 41;P1029,p.91. 1070 P1029,p.91. 1071 P1029,p.93. 1072 P1309;Phillips,T.8703 8704;Drewienkiewicz,T.6374,6381;P996,para.188;P844,p.7; See also P1029,p.41; Drewienkiewicz,P997,pp.89 92. 1073 Ciaglinski,T.5268. 1074 Ciaglinski,T.5267.
IT-05-87/1-T 108 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6437 Serb force levels have been augmented and remain poised throughout Kosovo for what may be a wider offensive against the ethnic Albanians.1075
2. Launching the Spring offensive
444. After building up their forces and weapons in Kosovo, the VJ and MUP intensified their joint actions there. By late February/early March 1999, large scale operations targeting civilians were conducted jointly.1076 The modus operandi of these operations mirrored that of the 1998 summer offensive. Specifically, the VJ usually provided outer cordon and heavy artillery support, while the ground forces were almost exclusively the MUP. According to Ciaglinski the MUP were responsible for the burning and the attacks on villages.1077
445. From late February/mid March 1999, the VJ and the MUP were “definitely on the offensive [...]”.1078 A number of witnesses testified about these joint VJ/MUP operations in several areas of Kosovo conducted during this period. K82 and K54, two VJ soldiers, testified about a large scale joint operation in Je{kovo.1079 Approximately 1,000 VJ and 300 MUP personnel (including PJPs) participated in the operation which involved completely surrounding the village.1080
446. Heavy military equipment such as three barrel anti aircraft guns and Pragas was used in this operation.1081 Deli}, the Commander of the 549th Motorised Brigade, ordered over the radio for firing to start as soon as the first shell hit the village.1082 When the VJ and MUP units entered the village, Deli} gave the order to “kill anyone you find there.”1083 The soldiers were told to “clean up the village” (“očistiti”), which K82 understood to mean that no one should remain alive in the village.1084 They were also told that only KLA soldiers were in the village.1085 PJP units participated in this operation.1086 The village was then “cleared” and both K54 and K82 saw several bodies in civilian clothes. 1087 In late February, the 549th Motorised Brigade conducted another joint operation
1075 P1308,p.1;Phillips,T.8703. 1076 Drewienkiewicz,P1009. 1077 Ciaglinski,T.5259 5260. 1078 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.190. 1079 K82,P1315,para.6;T.8859;K54,P781,pp.4 5 (under seal). See also P1029,p.64 (joint VJ/MUP operation in villages near Prizren which was believed to be aimed at clearing the KLA from Je{kovo) and p.68 (The KVM reported the sighting of 20 25 PJP members wearing VJ type camouflage uniforms with the PJP flash on the right shoulder, without rank insignia, and armed with AK weapons. The unit was thought to have been involved in the Je{kovo operation the day before). See also D791. 1080 K82,P1315,para.6;T.8860. See also K82,P1321;K54,P781,p.4. (under seal). 1081 K82,P1315,para.6. 1082 K54,T.4373. 1083 K54,P781,p.5 (under seal). 1084 K82,P1315,para.6;T.8861. 1085 K82,P1315,para.6;T.8861. 1086 K82,T.8861;P1321,pp.16 17;K54 P781,pp.4 5 (under seal). 1087 K82,T.8862;P1315,para.6.
IT-05-87/1-T 109 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6436 with the MUP (this included a PJP unit from Prizren SUP), this time in the Suva Reka/Suharekë area.1088 Deli} reported that “cooperation with MUP was exemplary.” 1089
447. In late February/early March, following a large operation in Vu~itrn/Vushtrri villages located to the southwest of Vučitrn were shelled and burnt.1090 Drewienkiewicz observed “large amounts of black smoke rising from burning villages.”1091 On 13 March, heavy fire was reported throughout the day in the Vu~itrn/Vushtrri area and houses were seen burning in some of the villages.1092 The KVM patrol found the village of Salce completely destroyed, while prior to this incident, only a few houses had been damaged.1093 As was usually the case, the MUP led this operation with the VJ acting in support.1094
448. Also in late February/early March, an operation was conducted in Kačanik/Kaçanik.1095 On 11 March, KDOM reported about the VJ’s vast sweep operations that week in the area west of the Kačanik/Kaçanik to \eneral Jankovi} highway that had forced hundreds of villagers from their homes.1096 After the Kačanik operation, the VJ left platoon or section sized units at key locations along the road to \eneral Jankovic.1097
449. Both the Vučitrn and Kačanik operations were ordered and planned at least at the PrK level since they occurred in areas under the responsibility of at least two different brigades.1098 Leif Windmar (Head of KVM Regional Centre 2, Kosovska Mitrovica) wrote to Drewienkiewicz on 12 March that in the Vučitrn area: the “VJ/MUP are now co ordinating their activities in a much better way than before and it is very obvious that they are performing a planned operation against the Albanian population”.1099
1088 P1387. 1089 P1387,p.2. 1090 Drewienkiewicz, T.6407,P996,para.192;P844,p.7;P1029(A1),pp.51,67. On 11 March 1999, there were houses burning in village of Donje Stanovce near Vu~itrn and a KVM patrol established that 7 houses were burnt in the village; See also Ciaglinski, T.5259 5260. 1091 Drewienkiewicz,T. 6375,6376;P996,para.190. 1092 P1029,p.74. 1093 P1029,p.74. 1094 CiaglinskiT.5259 5260,5278;Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.190; 1095 Drewienkiewicz,T.6374 6375;P996,paras.190 191;P844,p.7;P1029,p.52. 1096 P1307,p.1;Phillips,T.8703. 1097 Drewienkiewicz, P996,para.191; See also P1029,p.59. See also P1029(A2),p.62. On 11 March, the village of Osljane to the south of Mitrovica municipality was shelled by T 55 tanks and mortars; burning houses were observed after the attack. 1098 Drewienkiewicz,P996,para.190. 1099 P1009.
IT-05-87/1-T 110 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6435 450. At the VJ Collegiums, the VJ leadership discussed these large scale joint operations in March 1999.1100 At the VJ Collegium on 18 March, Dimitrijevi} reported that the number of KLA attacks against the VJ had intensified.1101 Dimitrijevi} further stated: “There have been 16 attacks on our army units in one week. […] a mopping up of the terrain had been launched. Hence, it was presumably giving support to the MUP.”1102 He also referred to receiving information from the media that “the VJ is launching operations, destroying this or that.”1103 Panteli} referred to the large expenditure of ammunition of the Third Army.1104
451. As a result of these planned operations against the Albanian population conducted across Kosovo during the spring of 1999, the province suffered civilian casualties and property damage. In March 1999, Vollebaek saw fleeing civilians and the destruction of villages in neighbourhoods surrounding Podujevo/Podujevë.1105 Most of the houses had their roofs blown off and there were signs of shelling.1106 Vollebaek believed the increase in the number of civilians being harassed was partly related to the increase in military personnel in Kosovo.1107 For example, in early March, following a firing exercise in the south of Mitrovica/Mitrovicë and the Buko{/Bukosh area, local villagers reported that VJ soldiers were involved in looting and expulsions.1108
452. Following the commencement of the NATO bombing, the VJ and the MUP leadership retained its role in planning these large scale combat operations across Kosovo. Once the bombing began, the Spring offensive was implemented down both the VJ and MUP chains of command through a series of Joint Command orders. Pursuant to these orders, and in furtherance of the goal of the JCE, VJ and MUP units carried out joint combat actions in late March 1999 in the areas of Donja Drenica;1109 Malo Kosovo;1110 Drenica sector;1111 and Rahovec/Orahova}, Suva Reka/Suharekë and Velika Kru{a,1112 among other localities. Joint Command orders issued on 22,
1100 P1334,pp.9,15. 1101 P1339,p.11. 1102 P1339,p.21. 1103 P1339,p.21. 1104 P1339,p.22. 1105 T.7284 7285,T.7216 7218;P844,pp.6 7. 1106 Vollebaek,T.7216,7273;P1072,p.38;P1071,p.7. 1107 T.7228. 1108 P1077,p.2, item 4. KVM monitors heard artillery and heavy gun fire during the night. 1109 P954,pp.1 9; At p.3, expenditure on ammunition is noted at 4000 rounds of 20 mm bullets. When testifying about events in 1998, Crosland explained traditional police operations would not require the use of “anti aircraft and heavy anti aircraft guns, machine guns of 20 30 and 40 millimeters (emphasis added). These machines were used to blow up or blow down…villages in…stand off attacks.” (T.9164.). P972;P936,para.8 (the use of 30 rounds of 120 mm shells, 20 of 122 mm shells, 20 of 100 mm shells). 1110 D104;D105;\akovi},T.8066 8067. D105 is signed by Lazarevi} as it is an amendment to what had been agreed with the MUP Staff (\akovi}, T.8068). 1111 P971;P938,p.1;P940,p.1. 1112 P350;P1316;P1317. These documents also illustrate a massive operation. In P1316, Deli} orders the allocation of a tank platoon, 30 mm anti aircraft guns, self propelled 90 mm guns, 120 128 mm canons (P1316,p.3), and refers to the
IT-05-87/1-T 111 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6434 24, and 28 March evidence the implementation of this plan.1113 The operations occurred in areas where the majority of ethnic Albanians were concentrated. Many of the crimes alleged in the Indictment were committed during these actions. The VJ and MUP continued to employ their usual tactics — the VJ shelled and cordoned off villages while the MUP provided the “feet on the ground.” Confirmation that those operations were carried out can be found in the war diaries and reports of the PrK brigades involved in the combat actions.1114
453. The minutes of the MUP Staff for 4 April 1999 record comments on widespread combat operations.1115 Stevanovi} and [ainovi} identified these operations as the first stage of anti terrorist operations which was to end 4 April 1999.1116 During the Collegium of 9 April 1999, ^ur~in confirmed that a PrK operation with reinforcements to crush the KLA had been executed.1117
454. The offensive continued throughout the spring. A 15 April 1999 Joint Command order directed the VJ and MUP to conduct combat operations in the areas of Jezerce and Budakovo.1118 On 7 May, preparations for this operation were discussed at a MUP Staff meeting.1119 On 9 May, the PrK reported joint combat activities with the 549th Motorised Brigade and the MUP in Budakovo/Budakovë village and other localities.1120 On 11 May, at a MUP Staff meeting, commanders of the 124th and 35th PJP detachments reported on the successful completion of the Jezerce operation.1121
455. On 4 May, Lazarević issued an order to PrK units to conduct an operation in the Bajgora area with MUP units, including the 35th PJP Detachment.1122 At the 7 May MUP Staff meeting, Lt. Colonel Bogunović, the Deputy Chief of Kosovksa Mitrovica reported on the Bajgora operation.1123 At the MUP Staff meeting on 11 May, Colonel Prljkević, the 35th PJP Detachment Commander, reported that the “operation on Bajgora went well”.1124
1. 128 mm artillery support (P1316, p.5). Following the operation, Deli} reported that 21 T 55 tanks, 6 122 mm howitzers, 14 30 mm anti aircraft guns, 4 120 mm mortars, 4 128 mm self propelled multiple rocket launchers were used along other fire power in the operation (P1317,p.3). 1113 \akovi},T.8067;D104;D105;P970;P972;P971. 1114P936;P954,pp.1 9;P938,p.1;P940,p.1;P942,pp.1 2. 1115 P764,pp.1 2. 1116 P764,p.4. 1117 P1331,p.11. 1118 P767. 1119 P771,p.2. 1120 P1388,p.2. 1121 P345,pp.4 5. K25,T.1589. 1122 P1040,p.4. 1123 P771,p.5. 1124 P345,p.4.
IT-05-87/1-T 112 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6433 456. On 12 May, the 37th Motorised Brigade was conducting mopping up operations in the Srbica/Skenderaj area.1125 Around the same time, at the MUP Staff, PJP unit commanders were reporting on operations to mop up KLA in \akovica/Gjakovo, Dulje/Duhël, Srbica/Skenderaj, Bajgora and other parts of Kosovo.1126
457. From early 1999, the VJ and the MUP leadership planned the Spring offensive. To this end, the VJ and the MUP fortified their units in Kosovo, amassed weapons and armaments and engaged in highly coordinated joint operations that intensified during the spring. The VJ and MUP leadership took advantage of the NATO bombardment to undertake these large scale joint operations, which targeted the Albanian civilian population and resulted in the crimes charged in the Indictment. As noted by Colonel Dikovi}, Commander of the 37th Motorised Brigade, the VJ tactics in Kosovo were like “using an elephant to kill a fly”.1127
3. Pattern of crimes
458. Under the cover of the NATO bombs, Serb and FRY forces launched a violent campaign to drive Albanians out of Kosovo. During this campaign, they expelled hundreds of thousands of Albanians, murdered thousands, destroyed Albanian cultural and religious sites, and burned Albanian homes to the ground. The scale of the crimes, their repetition in village after village throughout Kosovo, and the sheer number of victims demonstrate that there was an organised, high level plan to persecute and expel Kosovo Albanians and discourage them from ever returning.
(a) The scope and scale of crimes
459. In less than three months,1128 FRY and Serb forces forcibly expelled approximately 800,000 Albanians from Kosovo. This is tantamount to half of the Kosovo Albanian population.1129 Beyond this number, many Albanians were forced from their homes and displaced within Kosovo.1130 Further, Serb forces murdered thousands of Albanians throughout Kosovo during the expulsion campaign.
460. The mass exodus of Albanians from Kosovo between 24 March and 10 June is beyond dispute. Statistics from the UNHCR show that during that period, an estimated 860,000 Kosovars left the province – some 444,600 fled to Albania, 345,500 to Macedonia, and 69,000 to
1125 P1389,p.3. 1126 P345,p.5. 1127 P1450,p.2. 1128 From 24 March to 10 June 1999. 1129 Wright,P734,p.4. See Brunborg,T.6113;P983,p.1. 1130 See P1029,p.174.
IT-05-87/1-T 113 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6432 Montenegro.1131 Almost half of these, some 400,000 Kosovars, left between 24 March and 6 April; that is, in less than two weeks.1132 The vast majority were Kosovo Albanians.1133
461. MUP reporting for this period supports these statistics. MUP Staff daily situation reports to MUP HQ in Belgrade from 24 March to 1 May recorded the large number of “[iptars” leaving at specific border crossings.1134 For instance, 2/3 April, a mere nine days after the expulsion campaign had begun, the MUP Staff reported that over 300,000 Kosovo Albanians had crossed into Albania and Macedonia.1135 Four days later the MUP Staff reported that over 600,000 “[iptars” had left Kosovo.1136 By 1 May, the MUP reported that over 700,000 “[iptars” had left Kosovo.1137
462. Defence witnesses conceded they were aware of the massive departure of Albanians from Kosovo. Rade ^u~ak, Head of the VJ Department for Border Service Affairs, stated that 837,166 people left Kosovo for Albania and Macedonia.1138 Stojan Mi{i}, an Assistant Minister in the RJB,1139 stated that by the end of April 1999, 700,000 Kosovo Albanians had left Kosovo.1140
463. Beyond statistics, the enormity of the number of people leaving Kosovo was readily apparent. Vollebaek, from the OSCE, described, “looking in to Kosovo … there was a narrow winding road with the largest number of tractors I [had] ever seen in my life”.1141
464. Ciaglinski observed, “I just saw a long thin line of people carrying suitcases which is very reminiscent of what you might have seen if you were in the Holocaust”.1142
465. The refugees came from municipalities and villages throughout Kosovo: from Pec/Pejë1143 and \akovica/Gjakovë1144 in the west to Gnjilane/Gjilan1145 in the east; from Kosovska
1131 Wright,P734,p.4. For a more detailed explanation of the UNHCR’s methodology see Wright,P734. 1132 Wright,P734,p.4. See also P736,p.1 1133 Wright,P734,p.4. 1134 P695,p.5;P696,p.6;P718,p.5;P697,p.6;P719,p.6;P720,p.5;P721,pp.5 6;P698,p.4;P722,p.4;P723,p.3;P699,p.5; P700, p. 4;D304,p.4;D305,p.4;P694,p.8. 1135 P718,p.5. 1136 P721,p.6. 1137 P694,p.8. 1138 ^u~ak,D569,para.11;T.10974,10984 10986. 1139 Mi{i},T.14008;P263. 1140 Mi{i},T.14134–14135. 1141 Vollebaek,T.7228 7229. 1142 Ciaglinski,T.5289;P840. 1143 Se e.g. Zatriqi,T.3809;Konaj,P670,p.3;T.3751,3761; Kelmendi,T.4733 4735;Abrahams,T.3980;P756,pp.41,49. 1144 See e.g. Dula,T.8335,8349,8376 8377,8393,8399;P1268,pp.3–4;Haxhibeqiri,T.6937,6995–6998;Abrahams,T.3973 3974; P756,p.14;Hoxha,P879,p.8;P881,p.15;^aka,T.8649;P1296,p.25;Parashumti,T5968,5977;Vejsa,T.6087 6092;K74, P1095,p.6;Pnishi,P1033,p.4;Peraj,T.1206–1207;Deda,T.6542;P1030,p.5; Malaj,T.818–828;P295. 1145 See e.g. Shabani,P786,pp.3 4;Shaqiri,P729,pp. 8–11;K81,P792,pp. 6–7.
IT-05-87/1-T 114 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6431 Mitrovica/Mitrovica1146 in the north to Prizren1147 in the south; from urban centres such as Pri{tina/Prishtinë1148 to small villages like Korenica/Korenicë and Meja/Mejë.1149
466. The refugees were from all walks of life: young and elderly, rich and poor, healthy and infirm, male and female. Witness K73, a VJ soldier, said of the Reka/Caragoj Valley operation in late April 1999:
all of us who took part in that operation, found it, if I can say, unpleasant to expel women, children, elderly persons and invalids. I know the KLA pretty well and I’ve not seen a single woman of 70 years old or a child or anybody in the KLA, people like that cannot be fighters and terrorists. Or people in wheelchairs. But we expelled them all from the baby in the cradle to the elderly people in wheelchairs and that’s the problem that I have today.1150
467. K74, a refugee who left \akovica/Gjakovë town on 2 April 1999, recounted: “We all had to walk, elder, children, disabled persons. You can imagine what the conditions were. They were disastrous”.1151
468. Forces of the FRY and Serbia killed thousands of Kosovo Albanians during the 1999 campaign. The killings in the Indictment are examples of the widespread murders that took place all over Kosovo.1152
(b) Forcible Expulsion
469. The evidence clearly shows that hundreds of thousands of Albanians left Kosovo because they were forced to do so by the MUP, VJ, paramilitaries and armed Serb civilians. Heavily armed Serb forces created a climate of terror through shelling, murder, rape, threats, looting and burning Albanian homes. They went from house to house and ordered civilians to leave at gunpoint, their orders bolstered by violence, threats and harassment. Serb forces made life intolerable for Kosovo Albanians, and were the clear reason that over 800,000 of them fled Kosovo.
470. Throughout Kosovo, Serb forces forced Albanian residents to leave their homes in minutes, or be killed.1153 For example, witness K14, who lived in a suburb of Pri{tina/Prishtinë, told how police and VJ soldiers came to her home, pointed automatic rifles at her family and ordered them to
1146 See e.g. Hajrizi,P773,p.11;T.4309;Sadiku,T.2967. 1147 See e.g. Beqiraj,P806,p.3;T.4800;R.Krasniqi,T.5428;P848,p.2;Kryeziu,P876,p.3. 1148 See e.g. K14,T.8993 8994(closed session);P1325,p.3 (under seal);Bala,P420,p.7;T.2291–2294. 1149 See e.g. Peraj,T.1215;Pnishi,P1033,p.3;Abrahams,T.3969 –3970;P756,p.25;Deda,P1030,p.6;P1031,pp.5 6,17,34;K90, T.1344;P321, para.48;Malaj,T.818. 1150 K73,P332,pp.91 92(under seal). 1151 K74,T.7439 7440. 1152 Indictment, Schedules B,C,D,F,G,H,I,K,L. 1153 See e.g. Konaj,P670,p.3;T.3751,3761;Zatriqi,T.3809,3829;P672,pp.5 6;Kelmendi,T.4734;Abrahams,T.3973 3974, 3980;P756,pp.14,41,49;Pnishi,P1033,pp.2 3;Haxhibeqiri,P1068,p.9;T.6988 6989;Halit Berisha,T.3406.
IT-05-87/1-T 115 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6430 leave.1154 In Suva Reka/Suharekë, the Berisha family was told that they had 15 minutes to leave, and would “never see this land again”.1155 The same brutal scene was repeated across Kosovo, including in Pec/Pejë,1156 Pri{tina/Prishtinë,1157 \akovica/Gjakovë,1158 Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica1159 and Gnjilane/Gjilan.1160 When residents abandoned their homes as ordered, they often found the streets full of other Albanians who had also been forcibly expelled.1161
471. The consistent evidence of crime base witnesses was corroborated by international observers and human rights workers assisting at the border. Over and over, they were told by refugees that they had left Kosovo because the police or military had forced them out. Byrnes, the head of US KDOM, was told by refugees at the Albanian and Macedonian borders that “the Serbian police had begun systematically moving through Albanian neighbourhoods” and ejecting people, or giving them a very short amount of time to leave their homes.1162
472. Ciaglinski and Drewienkiewicz, both from KVM, were told by refugees from Pri{tina/Prishtinë that “the police entered their locality, banged on all the doors, told everybody that they had 5 minutes to get out, and then herded everybody down to the station [where they were loaded onto the train].”1163 They noted that “it was largely described as a police operation”.1164
473. The refugees Vollebaek spoke to at the Albanian border “were all in unison . . . that they were forced to leave and they had been told that they were not wanted in Kosovo any longer”.1165
474. Refugees “uniformly” told Abrahams from HRW that they left Kosovo because they had been forcibly expelled by the police or the VJ, or because they feared expulsion by these forces. 1166
475. These forcible expulsions were not the acts of rogue criminals. While the sheer number and systematic nature of these expulsions make it clear that this could only have been the product of a co ordinated plan, the testimony of insider witnesses confirms that this was the case.
1154 K14,T.8993 8994 (closed session);P1325,p.3 (under seal). 1155 Halit Berisha,T.3410;P599,pp.20 21. See also Part IV,Section(C)(4). 1156 See Part IV,Section(C)(5). 1157 See Part IV,Section(C)(7). 1158 See Part IV,Section(C)(8). 1159 See Part IV,Section(C)(6). 1160 See Part IV,Section(C)(9). 1161 See e.g. Konaj,T.3754;P670,p.4;Vejsa,T.6093;Deda,T.6537 6538;K14,T.8994 (closed session);Morina,P283,p.4; P284,pp.34 36. 1162 Byrnes,T.8209 8210. 1163 Drewienkiewicz,T.6396–6397. See also Ciaglinski, P833,p.78 1164 Drewienkiewicz,T.6397. 1165 Vollebaek,T.7229 7230. 1166 Abrahams,T.3967.
IT-05-87/1-T 116 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6429 476. Witness K73 testified that the VJ deliberately expelled “hundreds” of Albanians and set their homes on fire during the Meja/Mejë operation in late April 1999.1167 Witness K90 testified that in April 1999 his VJ unit told Albanians to leave nine or 10 villages in \akovica/Gjakovë municipality.1168 Witness K79 testified that his PJP unit received an order to move Albanians out of Ljubi`da/Lubizhdë in Prizren municipality. The unit went from house to house and told the Albanians that they had to leave and go towards Prizren.1169
477. In some cases, FRY and Serb forces drove out Kosovo Albanians by creating a climate of fear. They would surround or enter a village, and then terrorize villagers through shelling, murder, threats, looting, burning, and brandishing weapons.1170 One frequent practice of Serb forces was for the VJ to shell a village, followed by the police and ground forces entering the village and terrorizing the population.1171 This made conditions intolerable for Albanians, and caused them to flee.
478. Serb forces deliberately created this climate of terror. Witness K82 explained how his VJ unit shelled the village of Trnje/Tërm, Suva Reka/Suharekë at the end of March 1999.1172 When the shelling was over, two groups of villagers began running away in different directions.1173 The villagers were unarmed and offered no resistance.1174 The unit cleared the village of people,1175 searched homes and set them on fire.1176 This was done pursuant to orders from the unit’s sergeant.1177
479. Another consistent tactic used by Serb forces during the expulsion campaign was the deliberate burning of Albanian homes. Witnesses consistently testified that they saw Serb forces
1167 K73,P330 A,para.42. 1168 K90,P321,paras.41,43–44;T.1366. 1169 K79,P1260,pp.70 71. 1170 See e.g. Hyseni,T.4866–4868;Dula,T.8335,8349,8393,8399;P1268,p.4;Hoxha,P879,pp.6 7;Parashumti,T.6015– 6016; K74,P1095,pp.2–3,5;P1096,pp.4–5,31;K82,P1315,para.7–8,10,13;Bucaliu,T.5058;P824,p.2;Raka,P664,paras.8 27. 1171 See e.g. Jemini,P635,p.6;P637,p.4;Salihi,T.3482 3483,3486 3487;K90,P321,para.48;T.1344 1345;Latifi,T.4348; 778,p.2. 1172 K82,P1315,para.7–8,10,13. 1173 K82,P1315,para.13. 1174 K82,P1315,paras.8,23. 1175 K82,T.8865 (private session). 1176 K82,P1315,paras.15–16. 1177 K82,P1315,para.15.
IT-05-87/1-T 117 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6428 burning Albanian homes during the expulsion campaign,1178 or that when they returned home after the war they found their homes and their Albanian neighbours’ homes burned to the ground.1179
480. The torching of homes was ethnically based: Albanian homes were destroyed while Serbian homes remained untouched.1180 Some witnesses reported that their Serb neighbours marked their homes so they would not be targeted by Serb forces.1181 Further, Albanian homes next to Serbian houses were left alone because they “could not be destroyed without destroying the Serb’s house”.1182
481. The torching was intended to both drive Albanians away and prevent their return. Stoparić testified that after the Skorpions took a village, they would withdraw and the PJP would enter and set fire to the houses.1183 He explained,
This was a deliberate tactic in order to deprive any Albanians or terrorist of shelter if they returned. It was the intention that no Albanians returned to their houses. The livestock were driven away. A PJP member told me that in burning a house, curtains and settees were set alight first. This was because they were set alight more easily and burnt well spreading the fire. Gasoline was used to start the fire.1184
Stopari} added: “I presume if you set somebody’s house on fire that they have no place to go to or to go back to. I think that’s the only reasonable conclusion”.1185
482. Many defence witnesses testified that Serb forces were not responsible for forcibly expelling Kosovo Albanians from their homes.1186 These witnesses claimed that people left Kosovo because of NATO bombs,1187 depleted uranium,1188 KLA terrorist action1189 or KLA propaganda.1190
483. Their claims should be given very little weight for several reasons. First, these witnesses had an insufficient basis for making such claims. At trial, the Prosecution called witnesses who were actually refugees from Kosovo. They gave first hand accounts of why they and those travelling with them left Kosovo. In contrast, the defence witnesses who claimed to know why 1178 See e.g. K74,P1095,pp.2–3;Peraj,T.1202 1203;Dula,P1268,pp.3 4;T.8336,8370, 8372–8373;Haxhibeqiri,T.6940– 6943,7030;P1068,pp.9 11;Parashumti,P903,pp.5–6;Vejsa,T.6089;Pnishi,T.6582;Malaj,T.818–820. 1179 See e.g. Zatriqi,T.3830;P672,p.6;Konaj,T.3758;Dula,P1268,p.4;T.8342 8344;P1270,p.3;Haxhibeqiri,T.6941;Malaj, T.873–874;K20,T.8495(closed session). 1180 See e.g. Zatriqi,P673,p.7;Parashumti,T.5977;Vejsa,T.6098;P978,p.3;K74,P1095,pp.1–2, 4;T.7457;Hazir Berisha, P796,para.10;T.4605 4606;Shabani,P787,para.19;K81,P792,p.8;M.Krasniqi,T.991. 1181 See e.g. Bucaliu,T.5070;P824,p.2;Shabani,P786,p.2;P788,pp.22 25. 1182 K74,P1095,p.2;Parashumti,P907;T.5980 5982;Vejsa,T.6096 6097;P980. 1183 Stoparić,P493,para.68. 1184 Stoparić,P493,para.68. 1185 Stopari},T.2889. 1186 See e.g. \o{an, D685,pp.29,80;Stojanovi},T.11933;Miti},T.12734 12735. 1187 See e.g. \o{an,T.11424,11469–11470;Mi{i},T.14043;Stojanovi},T.11757;Miti},T.12731–12733. 1188 See e.g. Petković,T.10510;\o{an,T.11424,11469–11470;Filipovi},T.11595,11598. 1189 See e.g. \o{an,T.11424;Mi{i},T.14043;Filipovi},T.11590;Stojanovi},T.11756.
IT-05-87/1-T 118 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6427 people left Kosovo were not part of this mass exodus themselves. Rather, they were generally members of the MUP or VJ who claimed to know what was in the minds of refugees.
484. They had very little basis for their assumptions and opinions. For example, Milo{ \o{an, Commander of the 52nd ARB and Commander of the \akovica/Gjakovë Garrison,1191 admitted that he “personally did not talk to a single refugee”.1192 Instead, he just claimed to know people’s reasons for leaving because he “was there all the time”1193 and heard about people’s reasons from his soldiers.1194
485. Mi{i} claimed that Albanians left because of NATO bombs, clashes between security forces and terrorists and KLA propaganda.1195 However, he had no first hand knowledge that this was actually the case.1196
486. Slobodan Petković, Chief of the VJ Atomic, Biological and Chemical Defence Administration,1197 claimed to know that Albanians left Kosovo because of depleted uranium,1198 even though he had not spoken to one Albanian refugee about why they left Kosovo.1199 When asked by the Trial Chamber if he had had any contact with the civilian population in Kosovo, Petković answered, “I did not have any time to spend on any . . . issues of the civilian population”.1200
487. There were a few instances where defence witnesses claimed to have asked refugees in columns why they were leaving. For example, Milutin Filipovi}, a former VJ colonel who held positions with the PrK,1201 said he knew “[iptars” left due to NATO bombings1202 because “I spoke to many citizens. I also could feel that myself”.1203 This second hand, hearsay evidence is in direct conflict with the numerous first hand accounts received by the Court and should be given little weight.
1. 1190 See e.g. \o{an,T. 11514;S.Mi{i},T.14043;Filipovi},T.11566;Miti},T.12713. 1191 \o{an,T.11338. 1192 \o{an,T.11469–11470. 1193 \o{an,T.11424. 1194 \o{an,T.11469–11470,11472. 1195 Mi{i},T.14043. 1196 Mi{i},T.14133 14134. 1197 Petkovi},D513,p.2. 1198 Petković,T.10510. 1199 Petković,T.10524. 1200 Petković,T.10524. 1201 Filipovi},T.11522. 1202 Filipovi},T.11587,11590. 1203 Filipovi},T.11563.
IT-05-87/1-T 119 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6426 488. Moreover, these defence witnesses had an interest to not be truthful about why Albanians left Kosovo. Almost all of them were members of the very forces, the MUP and VJ, that crime base witnesses consistently said forced them from their homes. They had an interest in shifting the blame.
489. Some defence witnesses testified about leaflets purported to have come from the KLA telling Albanians to leave.1204 These pamphlets should be disregarded. Fundamentally, it is illogical and unlikely that the KLA, a group fighting for an independent Kosovo for Albanians, would tell Albanians to leave the land they were trying to claim. Further, defence witnesses could not authenticate these leaflets at all, merely guessing at where they came from and how widely they were distributed.1205 There were signs that the leaflets were not authentic. One leaflet’s contents and insignia related to the KLA, but the person who signed it, Ibrahim Rugova, led the LDK, not the KLA.1206 Also, it used grammatically incorrect Albanian.1207 This suggests that the leaflets were made only for propaganda purposes, likely by Serb forces.1208 When presented with these anomalies, defence witnesses were unable to sufficiently respond.1209
490. In contrast to the unsupported, hearsay testimony of defence witnesses; the testimony of prosecution witnesses about why they left Kosovo was clear, consistent and based on first hand knowledge. Consistently, witnesses said they did not leave Kosovo because of NATO bombs.1210 Notably, the defence did not ask any crime base witnesses during cross examination whether they left Kosovo due to depleted uranium, so they had no opportunity to answer that question. Certainly, none of them offered that as a reason for their departure. When witnesses were asked why they left Kosovo, they did not say it was because of NATO or the KLA. Consistently, witnesses said that they left Kosovo because they were ordered to by Serb forces and because they feared for their lives. Witnesses made it clear they would not have left Kosovo had it not been for the actions of Serb forces.
491. These witnesses were from different parts of Kosovo, and had different backgrounds. In most cases they did not know one another. The only thing they had in common was their expulsion. The only explanation for their independent, consistent testimony is that they are telling the truth about what happened to them, and the thousands of others who were expelled along with them.
1204 D698;P419;Filipovi},T.11565–11566;\o{an,T.11378 11379; Mladenovi}, T.12535,12575; Mir~i}, T.13350. 1205 \o{an,T.11379;Filipovi},T.11566,11603–11605;Mir~i},T.13358. 1206 Merovci,T.2233. 1207 Merovci,T.2233,2235. 1208 Merovci,T.2233,2235,2271 1209 Filipovi},T.11609,11614.
IT-05-87/1-T 120 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6425 (c) Murder
492. During the expulsion campaign, Serb forces deliberately killed Albanian civilians. This was not accidental, nor an unfortunate consequence of the highly charged environment. Rather, it was intentional and widespread.
493. One consistent practice was for Serb forces to separate the men from the women and children, and then kill the men.1211 This horrific scene was repeated throughout Kosovo. In Pusto Selo/Pustaselë,1212 Meja/Mejë and Korenica/Korenicë,1213 Izbica/Izbicë,1214 Bela Crvka/Bellacërkë,1215 and Mala Kru{a/Krushë e Vogël,1216 police and soldiers systematically separated men from women, expelled the women, and executed he men.
494. Serb forces killed thousands of Albanians during the expulsion campaign.1217 The hundreds of killings listed in the Indictment1218 are examples of the widespread murders that took place all over Kosovo.
(d) Rape
495. During the Serb forces’ campaign of fear, they persecuted and terrorized Albanian women through rape. K14 testified that as she travelled in a convoy after being expelled from Pri{tina/Prishtinë, a policeman and a paramilitary soldier pulled an Albanian woman off a tractor and dragged her into the woods.1219 They both raped her, as the Albanians in the convoy listened to her “screaming, shouting, and crying” from the forest.1220 K14 herself was raped by a policeman in a hotel basement in Pri{tina/Prishtinë,1221 and he threatened to return with a second policeman to rape her and her sister.1222 In Beleg in Decani/Deçan, soldiers and a policeman selected young girls from a room and repeatedly raped them.1223
1. 1210 See e.g. Dula,P1268,p.4;T.8375;Hoxha,P880,p.25;K74,P1095,p.6;Bucaliu,P825,p.5;Vollebaek,P1073,p.13;T.7230 7231;K58,T.7312 7313;K20,P1281,pp.23 24,33 34,47 (under seal);F.Krasniqi,P630,p.15;Hyseni,P809,p.8. 1211 See Abrahams,T.3967. 1212 See Part IV,Section(C)(15)(b). 1213 See Part IV,Section(C)(8)(d). 1214 See Part IV,Section(C)(3)(a). 1215 See Part IV,Section(C)(1)(b). 1216 See Part IV,Section(C)(1)(d). 1217 P477. 1218 Indictment, Schedules B,C,D,F,G,H,I,K,L. See also Annex C. 1219 K14,T.8997 (closed session);P1325,pp.3 4 (under seal). 1220 K14,T.8997 (closed session);P1325,pp.3 4 (under seal). 1221 K14,T.9000 9001 (closed session);P1325,pp.5 6 (under seal). 1222 K14,T.9001 (closed session);P1325,p.6 (under seal). 1223 K20,P1280,pp.5 6;P1281,pp.19–21 (under seal);K58,P1080,p.9;P1081,p.9.
IT-05-87/1-T 121 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6424 496. It is no accident that in each case, the perpetrators were Serb forces, and the victims were Albanian women who were at their mercy. Through sexual assault, Serb forces persecuted and traumatized these women because they were Albanian.
(e) Seizure of Identification Documents
497. In addition to forcing Albanians out of Kosovo, FRY and Serb forces took deliberate measures to prevent them from returning. Witnesses who fled Kosovo consistently testified that at the borders or other points during their expulsion, police, VJ and paramilitaries seized their identification cards, passports, driver’s licences, car registration and licence plates.1224
498. International observers who assisted at the borders were repeatedly told by refugees that their IDs had been taken by Serb forces. Refugees told Ciaglinski that prior to boarding trains at the Pri{tina/Prishtinë station, they had all of their IDs removed.1225
499. Internationals saw more evidence of the deliberate destruction of IDs after the war ended. Upon returning to Kosovo in June 1999, Drewienkiewicz saw a burning bonfire in front of the police headquarters in town. He picked out about a dozen documents from the fire and they all belonged to Kosovo Albanians.1226
500. Ciaglinski re entered Kosovo on 13 June 1999.1227 In the courtyard opposite a MUP building, Ciaglinski saw a MUP officer burning thousands of documents. MUP officers were throwing documents from the windows of the upper floors.1228 He went to the fire and examined the documents, and found passports, documents and applications for passports belonging to Albanians. The pile of ashes was large and burning all day.1229 Ciaglinski took a photo of the pile of burning papers.1230
501. Serb forces seized and destroyed IDs based on orders from above, to prevent Albanians from returning. K54 stated that “[i]t was … common knowledge” that the police and VJ had orders
1224 See e.g. Konaj,T.3757;P670,p.5;Dula,P1268,p.4;T.8347–8349;^aka,T.8649;Hoxha,P879,p.8;P881,p.15 16,30 31;P880,p.34;Parashumti,T.5978;Vejsa,P978,p.3;Pnishi,P1033,p.4;Malaj,T.828;Halit.Berisha,T.3412;S.Berisha,T.493; Bala,T.2299,2344;Hoti,P628,p.20. 1225 Ciaglinski,P833,p.78. 1226 Drewienkiewicz,T.6399;P997,p.263. 1227 Ciaglinski,P832,p.13. 1228 Ciaglinski,P832,p.13;T.5290 5292. 1229 Ciaglinski,P832,p.13;P834,p.42. 1230 Ciaglinski,T.5292 5293;P841.
IT-05-87/1-T 122 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6423 to seize IDs from Albanians at the border and to burn them in order to prevent them from claiming they were from Kosovo.1231
502. Defence witnesses denied that FRY and Serb forces took away people’s identity papers.1232 However, while the IDs of some witnesses were not taken,1233 the consistent testimony of numerous independent witnesses who experienced the seizure of IDs first hand, corroborated by the testimony of international witnesses and insiders, shows this was indeed a widespread practice.
(f) Destruction of Religious and Cultural Sites
503. FRY and Serb forces targeted and destroyed Albanian cultural and religious buildings. The damage was not due to random acts of violence. It was deliberate and widespread.
504. András Riedlmayer, an art documentation specialist,1234 undertook a post war survey of cultural heritage in Kosovo.1235 He found that all types of Islamic architectural heritage in Kosovo were attacked during 1998 and 1998, particularly mosques.1236 Prior to the war, there were 568 functioning mosques. Almost half of these were destroyed in 1998 and 1999, with the bulk of the damage occurring from March to June 1999.1237 Virtually every mosque that Riedlmayer was aware of between Prizren, \akovica/Gjakovë, and Suva Reka/Suharekë had been damaged or destroyed. There was one exception: a mosque in the ethnically Turkish village of Mamu{a/Mamushë.1238
505. Additionally, three of the four historic urban centres in Kosovo suffered severe devastation: Pec/Pejë, \akovica/Gjakovë and Vucitrn/Vushtrri.1239 Witnesses described the destruction they found upon returning to their cities after being expelled: mosques damaged or burned in Pec/Pejë;1240 the historic neighbourhood destroyed, a minaret lying on the ground, and bazaar shops still smoking in \akovica/Gjakovë town.1241
506. Riedlmayer’s findings and the observations of witnesses on the ground demonstrate that Serb forces deliberately destroyed Albanian cultural and religious sights.1242 With regard to
1231 K54,P784,p.2. 1232 See e.g. \o{an,D685,p.62;^u~ak,T.10977. 1233 See e.g. Bucaliu,P824,p.5;Hyseni,P808,p.4;F.Krasniqi,P631,p.7. 1234 Riedlmayer,T.7483. 1235 Riedlmayer,T.7488;P1099,pp.5,7. 1236 Riedlmayer,P1098,p.7. 1237 Riedlmayer,T.7497;P1098,p.13;P1099,p.25. 1238 Riedlmayer,P1098,p.14;P1099,p.99. 1239Riedlmayer,P1098,p.6. See also Abrahams,P756,p.13;Dula,P1268,pp.2–4;T.8336–8337,8372–8375;Haxhibeqiri, P1068,p.9;P1069;T.6947 6949. 1240 Zatriqi,T.3830;P673,p.7;Konaj,P671,pp.6 7. 1241 Dula,P1268,p.4;T.8336 8337,8339 8341;Haxhibeqiri,T.6942;P1069. 1242 See Part IV, Section(C)(4),(8),(9),(11),(13).
IT-05-87/1-T 123 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6422 mosques, he found that the far reaching damage was not a consequence of air strikes, but ground attacks directly targeting the mosque itself, such as “explosive devices planted in the mosque or inside the minaret, artillery aimed at the minaret, or fires started in the mosque”.1243 In some cases, attacks on mosques involved anti Albanian or pro Serbian graffiti and vandalism of religious scriptures and mosque furnishings.1244 With the exception of one mosque and one church, none of the damage to religious sites visited by Riedlmayer after the 1999 conflict demonstrated any evidence of being a result of NATO strikes.1245
507. With regard to the destruction of historical urban centres, Riedlmayer found that it was “evident from the nature of the damage that this destruction was not the result of aerial bombardment, but of fires set on the ground in individual buildings.”1246
508. Further, the targeted nature of the damage demonstrates that it was the result of deliberate acts by Serb forces, not NATO air strikes. As with homes, Albanian religious sights were destroyed, while the religious and cultural sights of Serbs and other ethnicities were spared. Prior to the war, there were at least 500 kullas – indigenous stone houses, symbolic of Albanian culture.1247 They were attacked and burned, while the few Serb kullas remained untouched.1248 “In many cases, a kulla was burned while all surrounding buildings were left unscathed.”1249 Likewise, most non Albanian mosques were undamaged: in the area around the primarily Serb area of [trpce/Shtërpcë, there was virtually no damage;1250 and the mosques in the Muslim Slav villages of Brod and Draga{/Dragash were not damaged.1251 Further, in destroyed urban centres where Ottoman era buildings were mixed with modern ones, the historical buildings were destroyed, while the modern buildings were left “largely untouched”.1252 Maps charting the destruction of cultural sights in Riedlmayer’s report demonstrate the disproportionately large number of damaged and destroyed Islamic monuments.1253 The widespread, systematic, and targeted nature of the damage to Albanian cultural and religious sights can only be explained by a deliberate Serb campaign to target and destroy them.
1243 Riedlmayer,P1098,p.8. 1244 Riedlmayer,P1098,p.8. 1245 Riedlmayer,P1098,p.5 6. 1246 Riedlmayer,P1098,p.6. 1247 Riedlmayer,P1098,p.6;P1099,pp.28–29;T.7600–7601. 1248 Riedlmayer,P1098,pp.6–7. 1249 Riedlmayer,P1098,p.6. 1250 Riedlmayer,T.7498;P1098,p.13. 1251 Riedlmayer,T.7498 7499;P1098,p.13;P1099,p.98. 1252 Riedlmayer,P1098,p.6. 1253 Riedlmayer,P1099,pp.99 100;P1098,pp.12 14.
IT-05-87/1-T 124 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6421 (g) The Existence of a Plan
509. Many defence witnesses testified that “there was no plan to expel Kosovo Albanians”.1254 They willingly made this claim even when they had no basis to know whether there had been a plan or not. For example, Milan ^ankovi}, Chief of Communications of the MUP Staff in Pri{tina/Prishtinë,1255 testified that he knew of no plan to expel Kosovo Albanians within the MUP.1256 However, he was primarily involved with setting up, repairing, and taking down radio equipment.1257 He conceded that he attended only one MUP staff meeting,1258 did not participate in planning MUP combat actions, and indeed, “wasn't interested in any such thing”.1259
510. Similarly, Milan Radoičić, the Deputy Chief of Office of the Chief of the General Staff,1260 testified to the same effect.1261 However, Radoičić, who described himself as “only involved in processing documentation”,1262 conceded that he would have known of such a plan only if it had been archived in a log book.1263
511. Contrary to the often unfounded denials of these witnesses, the evidence adduced at trial shows that there was a high level, co ordinated plan to expel Albanians. First, the fact that the MUP and VJ followed a similar mode of operation in different municipalities throughout Kosovo demonstrates planning and co ordination. The sheer scope and volume of the crimes shows that these were not random acts of violence.
512. There is significant evidence of pre planning and co ordination. In addition to the evidence of systematic and widespread expulsions, it is clear that Serb forces methodically channelled Albanian refugees toward the borders and transit points. The testimony of Nazalie Bala is illustrative. Bala, a human rights observer and Pri{tina/Prishtinë resident,1264 saw on 26 March that Serb forces had blocked every entry and exit point in Pri{tina/Prishtinë, using barbed wire
1254 See e.g. \o{an,T.11434;Stojanovi},T.11758 11759,11917;^u~ak,T.10924;^ankovi},T.13962;Filipovi},T.11567, 11576. 1255 ^ankovi},T.13928–13929. 1256 ^ankovi},T.13962. 1257 ^ankovi},T.13964 13966. 1258 ^ankovi},T.13981. 1259 See ^ankovi},T.13976–13977. 1260 Radoičić,D581,p.2. 1261 Radoičić,D581,p.4. 1262 Radoičić,T.11073. 1263 Radoičić,T.11073. 1264 Bala,T.2283.
IT-05-87/1-T 125 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6420 blockades manned by VJ, MUP and Serb civilians.1265 There were checkpoints throughout Pri{tina/Prishtinë, including one leading to the train station.1266
513. She was ordered to leave her house on 29 March,1267 and joined a group of thousands. Serb forces directed them to the main checkpoint in the centre of Pri{tina/Prishtinë,1268 and from there to the train station.1269 Other convoys from Pri{tina/Prishtinë joined her convoy.1270 At the station, thousands of people were waiting to get on the train.1271 Policemen surrounded the refugees1272 and controlled the area.1273 They were ordered to board a train.1274 The train carriages were so crowded that there was no room at all to move and it was hard to breathe.1275 The train went to the Ðeneral Janković/Han i Elezit border crossing.1276
514. Further, leading up to and during the expulsions, the MUP, VJ and Serb civilians organised trains and buses to transport all the Albanians they were pushing toward transit points.1277 The trains ran on “irregular” schedules1278 and had passengers packed into many more carriages than usual.1279 Albanian passengers were even stuffed into freight cars.1280 Many trains had either a police or military escort travelling with them,1281 which was not usual.1282
515. Serbs also arranged for buses and trucks to transport Albanians to the border.1283 The drivers of the buses were Serbs and all the passengers were Kosovo Albanians. Buses ran that were non existent during peacetime.1284
516. Additionally, police and soldiers directed and ordered civilian convoys toward the borders. As Albanian civilians walked or drove to the borders after expulsion, they were subjected to orders, threats and harassment from policemen and soldiers to make them continue their journey.1285 1265 Bala,T.2290,2334–2338. 1266 Bala,T.2336 2337. 1267 Bala,T.2291–2292;P420,p.7. 1268 Bala,T.2293–2294;P420,p.7. 1269 Bala,T.2349. 1270 Bala,T.2349. 1271 Bala, P420,p.7;.2296. 1272 Bala,P420,p.7. 1273 Bala,T.2296. 1274 Bala,T.2296;P420,p.7. 1275 Bala,P420,p.7;T.2296. 1276 Bala,T.2298;P423. 1277 Bucaliu,P825,pp.3 4;Zatriqi,T.8319;P672,pp.5 6,10. 1278 Bucaliu,P826,pp.17 18,51,78. 1279 Bucaliu,P826,pp.16 17; T.5059. 1280 Bucaliu,P826,p.17. 1281 Bucaliu,P826,p.20. 1282 Bucaliu,P827,p.63. 1283 See Bucaliu,P826,p.19;Halit Berisha,P598,p.4;Hysni Berisha,P584, pp 5 6;K25,P340 A,p.11;Morina,P283,p.5; Mazrekaj,T.3847;P675,pp.12 13. 1284 Hyseni,T.4870.
IT-05-87/1-T 126 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6419 517. Further, police controlled the borders into Albania and Macedonia, and thereby controlled refugee flows. ^u~ak confirmed that the MUP controlled the border crossings.1286 Refugees testified about the police presence at borders, with police ordering them across the border and confiscating IDs.1287
518. Finally, the consistent and widespread practice of the MUP seizing Albanians’ IDs as described above is also strong evidence that there was a co ordinated plan to expel Albanians and prevent their return.
519. The sheer scope of the crimes and number of victims; the channelling of refugees toward the border and transit points; the organization of trains, buses, and trucks to transport Albanians to the border; and the systematic seizure of IDs show that VJ and MUP units on the ground were following a larger plan. These were not random or spontaneous crimes. The VJ and MUP’s consistent mode of operation throughout Kosovo was nothing less than the execution of a plan to rid Kosovo of its Albanian population.
4. Steps were not taken to punish those responsible for crimes committed in Kosovo.
520. There were very few investigations and prosecutions for crimes against civilians during the Indictment period. The VJ military justice system focused on crimes committed against the VJ by its members.1288 Similarly there were very few MUP investigations and prosecutions for MUP crimes against Kosovo Albanian civilians. The limited prosecutions reflected an atmosphere of impunity which encouraged and instigated crimes against Kosovo Albanians. Given the scale of the crimes alleged in the Indictment, this manifestly inadequate prosecution of crimes against ethnic Albanians during that period is linked to the MUP’s failure to properly investigate them.
521. The few investigations conducted against police for serious crimes were initiated only because information on the crimes became public and the police had no choice but to conduct investigations.1289 The investigations into the massacres in Izbica/Izbicë,1290 Pusto
1. 1285 See e.g. Zatriqi,T.3809–3811;P673,pp.6,13;Konaj,P671,pp.6,10,26–29;P670,pp.3–5;T.3751–3752, 3756– 3757,3761;Dula,P1268,p.4;T.8229,8347–8349;Hoxha,P880,pp.34 35;Salihi,P632,p.4;Beqiraj,T.4806 4810;Kryeziu,P877,p.9. 1286 ^u~ak,D570,pp.63,74. 1287 See e.g. Konaj,T.3757;P670,p.5;^aka,T.8668;K74,P1095,p.6. 1288 See e.g., Gojovi}, T.10434 10438; D496, pp. 80 83,107 108;D508;D509;D510; P1521. 1289 P726,p.13. 1290 See Loshi, T.720 721; Stojanovic, T.11934 T.11935. Stojanovi} said the incident in Izbica/Izbicë was investigated due to “bad international press” See also D510, p.73, item 1; Gojovi}, T.10458 10462.
IT-05-87/1-T 127 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6418 Selo/Pustaselë1291 and Račak/Recak illustrate this point.1292 Drewienkiewicz had observed a certain modus operandi for the manner in which investigations were conducted in Kosovo. He said:
I'm very very familiar with the way on site investigations are carried out in the FRY. Certainly in Kosovo. People went in, looked around, took a very short time, and walked out declaring it all to be legitimate. That is not a proper investigation. You do not need to be a policeman in order to see a bad investigation. Bad is bad.1293
522. In 1999, this was the prevailing judicial and police practice when faced with crimes committed against Kosovo Albanians.
523. The massacre of the Berisha family in Suva Reka/Suharekë perhaps best illustrates the climate of impunity that prevailed in 1999. Although the police murdered over 40 members of the Berisha family on 26 March 1999, these murders were not investigated until years later.1294 The Berisha family were murdered in broad daylight in the centre of Suva Reka/Suharekë, at locations close to the police station. PJP units arrived from outside Suva Reka/Suharekë to execute the killings together with local policemen. The bodies of the victims were then collected by policemen and loaded onto trucks by civilians who had been brought to the crime scene for this purpose.1295 Nevertheless, this incident was not even recorded, let alone investigated by the MUP at that time. As was the case with the Podujevo/Podujevë massacre that occurred a few days later, the murders in Suva Reka/Suharekë were not reported in the relevant MUP Staff Daily Bulletin. Instead, two incidences of aggravated theft were reported.1296
524. This was a highly visible crime committed by the police against a prominent family.1297 The shocking failure to investigate the murder of the Berisha family highlights the impunity with which the police committed crimes against Kosovo Albanians. The policemen involved in the Berisha
1291 Investigations into this massacre were initiated when photographs of mass graves in the village were found on the internet. 6D2, T.12288 12289, 12374–12384 (closed session). See also Part IV Section (C)(15)(b). 1292 See Part III,Section (A)(2)(c)(ii)(c). 1293 Drewienkiewicz made a similar point in relation to the investigation into the Rogovo incident on the 29 January 1999, when Serbian forces stormed an Albanian farm that they suspected was a KLA safe house. He said, “There was a so called investigation by the judge. It appeared to take about two hours. And in two hours you cannot investigate a scene of crime about 100 metres by 200 metres, much of which is up to your ankles in mud and water, and involving 25 corpses. So there was not a proper investigation carried out by that judge under the terms of an investigation as I understand it.” (T.6477 6479) 1294 Veljkovi}, T.7086 7088 (private session). 1295 K83, T.390 391. See also Part IV Section (C) (4). 1296 P1059,p.5. See also \or|evi},T.10079 10081,12279, 12401 12402 (closed session); 6D2, T.12421 12422 (closed session) Shyrete Berisha, T.491;6D2, T.12416 (closed session); P1514. 1297 P1514; \or|evi}, T.10079 10081.
IT-05-87/1-T 128 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6417 massacre remained in the police force during the war.1298 The pervasiveness of crimes in Kosovo was well described by Drewienkiewicz who characterized all of Kosovo as a crime scene.1299
5. Investigations obstructed and crimes concealed
Overview
525. Throughout the Indictment period, the MUP systematically concealed the bodies of Kosovo Albanian civilians who had been massacred by Serb forces in furtherance of the JCE. These bodies were frequently transported away from the sites in which they were killed, temporarily hidden in local mass graves, and then subsequently exhumed. These bodies and body parts, taken from throughout Kosovo, were then loaded into trucks and driven hundreds of kilometres across Serbia to be reburied in large mass gravesites, and thus concealed from the eyes of the international community and the local population. During this operation, two refrigerator trucks full of bodies were found in rivers on opposite sides of Serbia and were subsequently re concealed. Hundreds of bodies of Kosovo Albanians were later found in mass graves at the SAJ’s training centre in Batajnica, and approximately 77 bodies were found by the SAJ base in Petrovo Selo. The proof of death charts set out in Annex C show that Albanians killed in crimes throughout Kosovo had their remains transferred and concealed elsewhere.
526. This systematic concealment of bodies, and the extensive cover up of the serious crimes they evidenced, proves there was a JCE in this case. \or|evi} was extensively involved in the direction and co ordination of this concealment operation, and his specific participation is addressed in detail in the section dealing with his individual responsibility under Article 7(1).1300
(a) Evidence of the Systemic Removal and Transport of Bodies
(i) Bodies from the Berisha Massacre
527. On 26 March 1999, members of the MUP massacred 47 members of the Berisha family in a pizzeria in Suva Reka/Suharekë.1301 Following these killings, members of the Civilian Protection Unit (CPU) were made to organize trucks to transport the bodies. The men were told by a police officer named Sladjan Čukarić that they would be killed if they did not cooperate. The bodies were 1298 K83,T.405 406. 1299 In response to a question on the KVM’s role at the Račak/Recak crime scene he said, “What was it we were supposed to do? We weren't equipped with, sort of, scene of crime tape. And if we had attempted to put scene of crime tape down anywhere, I'm sure that the MUP would have come along and told us not to. We might have put it all the way around the whole border of Kosovo, mind you. (T.6520 6521). See also P888, paras.3 4: Vasiljevi}, T.5746 5747; P1505, paras.1 2. 1300 See Part V, Section C(1)(g).
IT-05-87/1-T 129 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6416 loaded into two trucks that drove off in the direction of Prizren. Three survivors who had been loaded onto these trucks managed to escape mid transit.1302
528. Some of these bodies were hidden in the Suva Reka/Suharekë cemetery, while the majority were buried in a mass grave at the VJ firing range in Korisha/Korishë. These bodies were subsequently disinterred once again and transported and reburied at the 13 Maj Centre in Batajnica.
Initial Concealment at the Suva Reka/Suharekë cemetery
529. The remains of at least 18 individuals, most of them male and elderly, were found at the Suva Reka/Suharekë cemetery in September 1999 by a British forensic team. The bodies of Faton Berisha, Fatime Berisha and Sedat Berisha, who were killed on 26 March 1999 during the massacre, were among them.1303
Mass grave at the firing range in Korisha/Korishë
530. The majority of bodies from the Suva Reka/Suharekë massacre were transported to a VJ firing range in Korisha/Korishë, south of Suva Reka/Suharekë in the direction of Prizren, where they were buried in a mass grave. Ali Gjogaj, a cleaner who worked for the Public Hygiene Company, was tasked in early April 1999 with exhuming bodies from two mass graves at this firing range.1304 Police officers both stood guard and participated alongside Public Hygiene employees in removing bodies, which were loaded into a refrigerator truck.1305 Gjogaj personally helped to remove 80 90 bodies, dressed in civilian clothes, and load them onto a truck.1306 No tests were performed on the bodies, and no blankets or body bags were used.1307
531. Police accompanied the Hygiene workers while they unearthed more bodies at a garbage dump near Korisha/Korishë, where another mass grave was located.1308 Thirty to forty bodies, clad in civilian clothes, were exhumed and loaded onto another truck. Police escorted the workers from
1. 1301 The evidence of this crime is addressed in detail below, in Part IV, Section C(4)(a). 1302 K83,T.390 393;S.Berisha,T.490 491. 1303 Baccard,P1139,pp.74 78;P1175;P1179;P1180;P1177,p.1. The remains referenced in these reports are: Faton Berisha,SCG/27/SR; Fatime Berisha,SCG/28/SR; and Sedat Berisha,SCG/33c/SR. And see: S.Berisha,T.460; P272. 1304 Gjogaj,T.596 597, Though the witness and counsel used several names (“Kori{te”, “Streliste”, “Firing range” or “shooting range”) the two mass graves were at the same location. 1305 Gjogaj,T.545 548,550,552 553,568 569,589 590,P278. For the presence of police and the uniforms worn, see: T.593 594, 546. 1306 Gjogaj,T.553 555,587. 1307 Gjogaj,T.555,597 598. 1308 Gjogaj, #2 on P279.
IT-05-87/1-T 130 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6415 the garbage dump back to Prizren. Again, no tests were performed and no blankets or body bags were used.1309
532. In late summer/early fall of 1999, a British Forensic team opened the mass graves at the firing range in Korisha/Korishë, labelled mass grave 1 and mass grave 2.1310 Hysni Berisha assisted and was able to identify many of the victims, along with their clothing and personal effects. He composed a list of those murdered.1311 Halit Berisha also attended the exhumations and identified the clothing and remains of his brother, Jashar Berisha. On the day Jashar was murdered he was wearing a blue “Beopetrol” jacket and jeans over red tracksuit trousers and striped long underwear. During exhumations, Halit Berisha found fragments of these clothes attached to a part of his brother’s leg. The rest of Jashar’s body, however, was later discovered in a mass grave in Batajnica, hundreds of kilometres away. The body was identified using a blood sample provided by family members. His arms and legs had been burnt and he had been shot in the back and in the head.1312 Further evidence with respect to the victims found buried at the 13 Maj Centre in Batajnica is addressed further below.
(ii) Bodies from the Izbica/Izbicë Massacre
533. Serb forces massacred over one hundred people in the town of Izbica/Izbicë at the end of March 1999.1313 Dr. Liri Loshi witnessed the bodies of over 100 people lying where they had been executed and video recorded them.1314 A burial council was formed, victims were identified and the bodies were buried. The graves were marked and a list was compiled of who was buried and where.1315
534. When Loshi returned to Izbica/Izbicë on 23 June 1999, however, the local villagers told him that they had seen Serb forces enter the area, exhume the bodies and take them away. Loshi went to the exact location where the bodies had been buried and recorded another video. The bodies were gone and there remained only “bits and pieces” of the graves. Gloves that had been used to exhume the bodies had been left at the scene.1316
1309 Gjogaj,T.556 559,597. 1310 P589,p.3;Hysni Berisha,T.3345 3346;P597,P584,p.11. 1311 Hysni Berisha, T.3346 3349;P593,P595,P597,P584,pp.11 12;P590,P591,P592. Berisha pointed out 3 members on the list as former members of the KLA: 106, Lulzim Shaip Guta; 107, Bahri Hajrush Gollopeni; and 110, Naser Hazir Kelmendi. 1312 Halit Berisha,T.3384 3387;P599, pp.13 15,38,90.P587; pp:5 8,P591,P594. 1313 See Part IV, Section(C)(3)(a). 1314 Loshi,T.699,702 711;P288. 1315 Loshi,T.708 710,718;P292. And see Schedule F of the Indictment. 1316 Loshi,T.721 726;P293.
IT-05-87/1-T 131 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6414 535. The bodies of many of the victims of the Izbica/Izbicë massacre were subsequently found in mass graves in Petrovo Selo, Serbia, hundreds of kilometres away. This is addressed further below.
(iii) Bodies from \akovi}a/Gjakove Municipality
536. Evidence from a variety of sources outlines a large MUP operation that took place during the same time period that \or|evi} was overseeing the various shipments and burials at Batajnica. Beginning at the end of April, members of the MUP took the bodies of civilians who had been murdered in and around the Municipality of \akovi}a/Gjakove, loaded them into trucks, and transported them to new locations where they were buried. From late April and through May and June of 1999, these bodies were exhumed once again, loaded into trucks, and then transported out of Kosovo. They were driven to the 13 Maj Centre in Batajnica, where \or|evi} arranged for their concealment in mass graves.
Evidence of the Initial Removal and Burial of Bodies
537. On 27 April 1999, Martin Pnishi observed five Serb policemen march seven young men to a bridge in Meja/Mejë and then kill them with a machine gun.1317 On 2 May 1999, the bodies of these seven men were collected by a Roma man named Hamdi and his three sons, using a tractor. A truck then came from \akovi}a/Gjakove to Meja/Mejë to collect the bodies, met up with the tractor, and then the two vehicles headed to the \akovi}a/Gjakove cemetery.1318
538. On 27 April 1999, when she was between Korenica/Korenicë and Meja/Mejë on the outskirts of \akovi}a/Gjakove, Merita Deda saw VJ soldiers load two bodies covered with blankets onto a truck and then heard one of the soldiers tell the driver to go to \akovi}a/Gjakove.1319
539. On 29 April 1999, following extensive killings in Meja/Mejë,1320 Nike Peraj saw two trucks containing human bodies driving from Meja/Mejë towards \akovi}a/Gjakove. Although the trucks were covered by tarpaulins, Peraj could see the body parts when the wind lifted the covers. He estimated that each truck held about 20 bodies. The trucks were escorted by a Lada Niva, with a policeman driving the car and two or three men wearing police uniforms seated in the passenger seats. Peraj also described that the MUP and VJ had been looking for bulldozers/excavators after
1317 See Part IV,Section(C)(8),infra. 1318 Pnishi,P1033,pp.4 5. 1319 Deda,P1030,pp.6,10. 1320 See Part IV,Section(C)(8)(d),infra.
IT-05-87/1-T 132 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6413 the killings in Meja/Mejë. Although this was ostensibly for the repair of roads, he suspected that they needed them to remove bodies.1321
540. Human Rights Watch researcher Fred Abrahams also interviewed the Head of the Ðakovica/Gjakove Public Works Department, Faton Polloshka, who explained how he and his team of ethnic Roma had been ordered by the police to remove the dead from the city and bury them in the Ðakovica/Gjakove cemetery.1322
The Bodies were Exhumed and Transported Once Again
541. Civilian excavator driver K72 testified that beginning in April 1999 he was directed by the MUP to systematically unearth large numbers of bodies from three distinct locations in \akovi}a/Gjakove Municipality: near the Bistra`in Bridge, at Brekovac/Brekoc Cemetery, and in Guska.1323 The corpses at all of the sites were adult males wearing civilian clothing1324 and the bodies did not appear to be in an advanced state of decomposition.1325 Under the cover of darkness, these bodies were loaded onto trucks and driven out of the region, where they could be more effectively concealed.1326
542. The scale and organization of these exhumations indicates that they were ordered and coordinated at a high level within the MUP.1327 For each of these three operations, a police officer came to K72’s house, took him to pick up his excavator at the police station and then led him to the site where bodies were to be exhumed.1328 Each of the exhumation locations was secured by a significant police presence, and police typically set up roadblocks and patrolled access points.1329 The police also told K87 where to dig, and in cases where graves were more dispersed or difficult to identify, a policeman would show K72 where to exhume by using a flashlight.1330
543. Each of these operations required the acquisition of trucks into which the bodies could be loaded, personnel to assist in loading the trucks, and drivers to transport them. The trucks were 1321 Peraj,T.1228;P313,paras.86,88. 1322 Abrahams,T.3975;P756,p.10. 1323 See K72,T.8951 8952;P1323. 1324 K72,T.8927 8928;8933 8934,8936 8938;8941,8943. 1325 K72,T.8928,8934 8935 (in the case of Brekovac, K72 testified that the graves were recent and the soil was fresh). 1326 Abrahams also provided corroboration for these operations. Polloshka described to him in an interview that over seventy bodies were removed from the Brekovac/Brekoc cemetery in May (Abrahams,T.3975 3976;P756,p.11) and Abrahams separately interviewed another member of the Public Works Department who confirmed this. In July 1999, Abrahams visited the cemetery himself and observed clear track marks from heavy machinery in the area (See Abrahams,T.3975). 1327 K72 himself expressed this view, noting that “since this was a considerable job, it must have been ordered from a high level.” (T.8949 8950). 1328 K72,T.8925 8927,8931 8933,8936,8939,8950,8978,8981. 1329 K72,T.8929 8930,8950,8979; 8936,8981,8942.
IT-05-87/1-T 133 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6412 then driven and unloaded hundreds of kilometres away, which required that sites in disparate jurisdictions be identified and secured ahead of time, and that all the necessary clearances be provided.
544. These exhumation operations were conducted in a deliberately clandestine manner. K72 noted the unusual way in which he was informed of these tasks and the fact that he was made to conduct the exhumations after nightfall, observing that “these were jobs that would, of course, have been much easier in daylight.”1331 He rejected the Defence suggestion that the exhumations were carried out at night because of safety concerns from air strikes, noting that the operation could equally have been a target while digging at night.1332 After completing his final exhumations, K72 was approached by a uniformed MUP officer who directly threatened that he could lose his head if he talked too much, causing K72 to fear that he would be “eliminated”.1333
545. The MUP paid K72 in cash for his services.1334 He received daily allowances for each working day on a bi weekly basis and was paid by a uniformed official he called a “treasurer” who carried money in a suitcase.1335
546. These bodies were brought to Batajnica, where \or|evi} co ordinated their burial in mass graves.1336
(iv) Other Evidence of the Systematic Removal and Transportation of Bodies
547. The evidence of various witnesses suggests the broad ambit of the operation to hide the evidence of civilian massacres by transporting and concealing bodies.
548. After the Trnje operation at the end of March, in which the MUP and VJ killed civilians, K54 was ordered to collect a truck from the Higijena Cleaning Company. Escorted by two truckloads of soldiers, he returned to the murder scene, where the Battalion Commander ordered him to collect the bodies of the women and children. K54 saw that the bodies of the children and most of the women who had been killed were already gone from the scene when he arrived. The Battalion Commander told him that the PJP had already removed them. K54 and the others opened a box containing gloves and body bags, collected the bodies of 5 women, and loaded them into the 1. 1330 K72,T.8942. 1331 K72,T.8944,8981. 1332 K72,T.8974,8981. 1333 K72,T.8944 8945. 1334 K72,T.8923. 1335 K72,T.8966 8968. 1336 See infra para.587.
IT-05-87/1-T 134 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6411 truck. They found a new location, dug a grave and buried the bodies.1337 K54’s evidence was extensively corroborated by K82.1338
549. Agim Jemini, the former Mayor of Celina/Celine, fled the town when Serb forces entered at the end of March 1999. Hiding nearby and sneaking into the town after nightfall, Jemini observed uniformed policemen, along with Roma, who were gathering bodies. He estimated that they collected at least 20 to 30 bodies. Having observed the police practice of removing bodies from the scene of massacres, Jemini and his group attempted to collect and bury bodies that had been killed by Serb forces.1339
550. In mid April 1999, in Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosovë, Goran Stopari} observed uniformed police driving two open backed trucks that were loaded with bodies in civilian clothing, driving in the direction of Pri{tina/Prishtinë.1340
551. In late April, Rahim Latifi saw two police trucks containing bodies on the road from Krusa to Pirane/Piranë (roughly between Prizren, Orahovac and \akovi}a).1341
(b) The Refrigerator Truck in Bor/Kladovo
Discovery of a Truck in the Danube
552. On 5 April 1999, a truck was found floating in the Danube River, near the village of Tekija.1342 Boško Radojković, a crime technician in the Kladovo police station in North Eastern Serbia, went to the scene with a diver, who discovered nobody in the passenger booth and a large stone on the accelerator pedal. 1343
553. Early the next day, Radojković returned to the scene with a team. There were various officials present, including the Chief of the Crime Prevention Squad in Kladovo, the Deputy Municipal Prosecutor, an investigative judge from the Kladovo Municipal Court, and a coroner from Kladovo. By noon, the workers had managed to lift the freight box out of the water. The truck had no licence plates, the back door of the freight box was cracked and broken, and a human 1337 K54,T.4384 4385,4416;P781,pp.6 7(under seal);D113,p.105(under seal). 1338 K82,P1314,paras.13,15,19,26,31 32 (under seal);P1315,para.13,15,19,26,31 32;T.8864 8873 (private session); P1320,pp.22 23;66 67 (under seal);P1321,pp.22 23;66 67. 1339 Jemini,T.3625 3627,3535,3539 3540;P635,p.9;P637,p.38. 1340 Stopari},P493,para.81. 1341 Latifi,P778,p.3. 1342 Radojković,T.1764 1765. 1343Radojković,P359,pp.2 3;T.1812 1814;Golubovi},T.1737;P353,p.5. In Milutinovi}, Radojković testified that this happened on 4 April 1999:P359,p.3. However, his statement to the MUP working group stated that the truck surfaced
IT-05-87/1-T 135 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6410 leg and arm were protruding.1344 When the door was finally opened, Radojković saw a number of corpses piled up in the freight box.1345
554. The persons inside the refrigerator truck were thought to be Kosovo Albanians from the outset. An inscription on the door of the truck stated “Pik Progres, Exportna Klanica Prizren”, indicating that it was from Prizren, Kosovo.1346 The clothing on the bodies inside the truck also appeared to be Albanian in origin.1347
555. The door was shut again and the on site investigation was stopped.1348 The municipal prosecutor and investigating judge left the scene, stating that the presence of the bodies made this a responsibility of the District Prosecutor and the District Investigating Judge.1349 Radojković sent a dispatch to the Bor SUP regarding the events and informed Vukašin Sperlić, Chief of the Kladovo police station.1350 Shortly thereafter, Radojković received a message from Sperlić to suspend all activities and secure the area.1351
556. At a meeting that night at the Kladovo police station, it was agreed that the inscription on the truck should be painted over and that Bor licence plates should be attached to conceal that the truck was from Prizren, Kosovo.1352
557. The next day, at around 18:30, the Chief of the Bor SUP, Caslav Golubovi}, was contacted and briefed that a refrigerator truck containing 20 30 corpses had been found in the Danube.1353 Golubovi} was told that both male and female bodies had been found, and there was mention of one or more children.1354
558. Golubovi} contacted \or|evi} in Belgrade at approximately 21:00 that night, 7 April 1999, seeking further instructions on how to proceed.1355 Golubovi} briefed \or|evi}, informing him of everything he had been apprised of.1356 Ten or fifteen minutes after this initial conversation,
1. on 5 April and was observed by policemen on the road late on 4 April. Golubović testified in Milutinovi} et al. that this happened on 5 April:P353,pp.4 5. 1344 Radojković,T.1765 1766,1812 1813,1822 1829;P361;P359,pp.5 8; D40;D41;D42;D43;D44;Golubovi}, T.1738. 1345 Radojković,T.1828 1829;Golubovi},T.1738;P353,p.5. 1346 Radojković,T.1766 1767;P362; Golubovi},T.1661 1662;T.1735;P353,pp.14 15. 1347 P352,p.3;Golubovi},T.1735 1736;P353,p.14. 1348 Golubovi},T.1738 1739. 1349 Golubovi},T.1709,1738 1740;P353,pp.5 6,9,23;P352,p.2; Radojković,T.1829,1831,1834 1835;P359,pp.8 9. 1350 Radojković,T.1837,P359,pp.9–10. 1351 Radojković,T.1834 1835,P359,pp.13–16. 1352 Radojković,T.1837 1838. 1353 Golubovi},T.1734;P353,p.3;P354. 1354 Golubovi},T.1735 1736;P353,p.14. 1355 Golubovi},P353,p.8. 1356 Golubovi},T.1662,1740;P353,p.8.
IT-05-87/1-T 136 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6409 \or|evi} called Golubovi} back and instructed him that the bodies should be retrieved and buried in Kladovo, noting that this incident was to remain confidential 1357
Attempts to Bury the Bodies Onsite
559. Pursuant to \or|evi}’s instructions, Golubovi} organized for the bodies to be removed and buried. The task was to be done at night.1358 At around 9 p.m., Golubovi} met with Miladinovi}, Sperli} and MUP employees, as well as the municipal investigating judge and the public prosecutor from Kladovo. Having received the order from \or|evi}, the men discussed “how we should go about this, how we should carry out the task.” They decided that Sperli} and other Kladovo personnel would arrange for the removal and burial of the bodies by acquiring a truck, workers, blankets and gloves.1359
560. Golubovi} went to Tekija with Miladinovi}, where they stayed in an office and maintained communications with the workers.1360 At the scene, people started pulling bodies out of the truck and taking them to another truck.1361 Radojković saw two children and about ten women among the retrieved bodies. All of the bodies wore civilian clothes. Radojković estimated that the bodies were of people who had been dead not longer than three to four days, and observed injuries mainly from objects such as large blades. He observed a gunshot wound on one of the bodies, a male, whose hands were tied with wire.1362
Loading the Bodies into New Trucks
561. As they worked, it became apparent that there were approximately 50 more bodies in the truck than they had anticipated. At about 22:30, after about 30 bodies had been moved into the first truck, Golubovi} phoned \or|evi} to explain that they would not be able to finish by morning.1363 \or|evi} ordered Golubovi} to instead load the bodies into a new truck and to have them transported to Belgrade. When Golubovi} told \or|evi} that one truck would not be enough to transport all of the bodies, \or|evi} told him to send the truck with as many bodies as they were 1357 Golubovi},T.1725,P353,p.10;Ðorðević,T.9721 9722. 1358 Golubovi},T.1742,1713;P352,p.3. 1359 Radojković,T.1837;Golubovi},T.1741,1746;P352,pp.2 3,P353,pp.4,11,30. 1360 Golubovi},T.1743;P353,p.12,15. 1361 Golubovi},P353,pp.15 16. 1362 Radojković,T.1776,P359,pp.19–22; And see: Golubović,P353,p.7416. Note that page 1 of P366, a Working Group communique relating to Radojkovi}, states that: “Several male bodies wore UCK uniforms”. Radojković testified that there must have been a mistake in writing the report, because he did provide information that some bodies were found wearing UCK uniforms, but that this was not with respect to the refrigerator truck incident. He had informed the author of the communiqué about this mistake [Radojković, T.1778; P366, p.1]. K84 confirmed that there had been an error in the Working Group communiqué as a result of a misunderstanding: the KLA uniforms related to another grave site that had been exhumed during the same period [K84, T.2011(closed session); P366, p.1].
IT-05-87/1-T 137 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6408 able to put into it, and that he would see what could be done about arranging for another truck.1364 \or|evi} told Golubovi} that this first shipment would be transported in the direction of Belgrade. Golubovi} persuaded his driver, Ljubinko Ursuljanovi}, to drive this first lorry.1365
562. After this first truck had driven off, Golubovi} asked \or|evi} to secure a vehicle so they could transport the rest of the bodies to Belgrade.1366 Meanwhile, Radojković and his men unloaded a further 53 corpses and three decapitated heads. Golubovi} was told that there had been a total of 82 83 corpses in the truck.1367
The Second Lorry – K93
563. The second truck was driven by K93. Petar Zeković, the Assistant Minister of the Interior in charge of the Administration for Joint Affairs, had called K93 and told him that he was needed to perform a very important task for the country. K93 was told to maintain confidentiality about the assignment. He borrowed a Mercedes truck from a neighbour and drove towards Tekija, accompanied by MUP major Du{ko Peri}.1368
564. In Tekija, K93 was escorted by a police patrol car. The remaining bodies, about 53 in total, were loaded into his truck. K93 and Peri} drove the bodies to the SAJ training centre in Batajnica.1369
565. \or|evi} ordered Golubovi} to have the original refrigerator lorry destroyed after the bodies had been transported to Belgrade. Golubovi} thus left instructions with the personnel in Kladovo to destroy the truck.1370 Around 8 or 9 April 1999, the refrigerated truck was transported to Petrovo Selo, where it was destroyed by Radojković, on the instructions of Toma Miladinović, the Chief of the Crime Police in Bor. 1371 After an unsuccessful attempt to destroy the truck by setting it on fire, it was destroyed with explosives.1372 Golubovi} acknowledged that “most probably” the truck should instead have been the subject of an official investigation.1373
1. 1363 Golubovi},T.1663,1735,1743 1744,1747;P352,p.4;P353,p.12 13;15 16. 1364 Ðorðević,T.9726 9727. 1365 Golubovi},T.1744,1747,1758 1759;P352,p.4;P353,pp.15 16. 1366 Golubović,P353,pp.18 19. 1367 Golubović,P353,p.19. The Working Group later determined that there were a total of 86 bodies:K84,T.2003 2004 (closed session);P387;P389,p.1. 1368 K93, P1062(under seal), pp.15,50; P1063(under seal), p.1; P1064 (under seal), pp.1–2; P1065,pp.1 2,4(under seal). 1369 Golubovi},P353,p.18 19;K93,P1064(under seal),pp.2–3,7;P1065 (under seal),pp.3–4. 1370 Golubovi},T.1715;1755 1756;P353,pp.19 20;Ðorðević,T.9726. 1371 Golubovi},T.1715,1755 1756;P353,pp.19 20. 1372 Radojković,P359,pp.23 24;T.1783;Golubovi},T.1755 1756;P352,p.4;P353,p.20. 1373 Golubovi},T.1757.
IT-05-87/1-T 138 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6407 566. Golubovi} told Sperli} that everything concerning the refrigerator lorry was to be kept “closed” and that all the dispatches regarding the incident should be destroyed.1374
(c) The Refrigerator Truck Incident at Lake Peručac
567. In mid April of 1999, another refrigerator truck full of bodies was found floating in Lake Peru~ac. Under \or|evi}’s supervision, these bodies were gathered together and concealed by burying them in a mass grave onsite. Thirty five to 37 corpses were later exhumed and identified as having originated from Kosovo.1375 They exhibited a pattern of direct gunshots to the cranium, and fire damage suggested that previous attempts had been made to burn the bodies.1376 This operation is addressed in detail in Part V, Section (C)(1)(f)(ii), below.
(d) The Concealment of Bodies at the 13 Maj Centre in Batajnica
568. The 13 Maj Centre in Batajnica, located about 20 kilometres from central Belgrade, was the SAJ’s only training centre. Three or four days after the war began, the remaining SAJ members, about 20 men who were tasked with securing the 13 Maj Centre facilities, were relocated to a temporary establishment that was 3 4 kilometres away.1377 Although the Centre was not itself bombed during the NATO air strikes, the NATO attacks had targeted and destroyed the neighbouring VJ barracks.1378
569. K88 testified that after attending the funeral of Radovan Aleksi} in early April 1999, he had gone to check the Centre, where he hadn’t been in several days. Upon arriving, he discovered three new trucks parked in the shooting range.1379 K88 mentioned seeing these new trucks to K87, who simply told him that the trucks were from the MUP and had been relocated there. A guard who had been in and out of the Centre subsequently told K88 that there was a bad smell coming from a truck there. Returning to the Centre two or three days after his initial observation of the three trucks, K88 observed that only the first truck (an “FAP” Daimler Benz) remained. He did not know where these other trucks went and never saw them again, although he later heard that they had also contained bodies.1380
The Initial Burials
1374 K84,T.1999 2000;2002(closed session);P386,p.1 3. 1375 Baraybar,P453,paras.16 17. 1376 Sterenberg,P815,pp.36 41. 1377 K87,P1414,para.8 (under seal);Ðorðević,T.9731;K88,P370,para.11(under seal). 1378 K87,P1416,p.5;P1414,paras.8 9 (under seal);K88,P370 A,para.11;K84,T.2016 (closed session). 1379 K88,P370,paras.13 14(under seal);P371,pp.4 6(under seal). 1380 K88,P370,para.16(under seal).
IT-05-87/1-T 139 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6406 570. \or|evi} contacted K87 and instructed him to report to his office the following day at 9 a.m. When K87 arrived as instructed, \or|evi} told him that there were two trucks at the 13 Maj Centre containing bodies and instructed him to bury the bodies onsite.1381 After the meeting, K87 went to the Centre, where he found two trucks parked on the Danube side of the Centre.1382
571. The following day, K87 went back to the Centre, accompanied by K88. K88 collected the excavator from a nearby construction company and drove it back to the base, where he saw K87, along with drivers Lipova} and Ba{anovi}. K88 commenced digging. K87 was coming and going as K88 dug the hole and observed that it took approximately 3 or 4 hours to complete the digging process.1383 Both K87 and K88 described the initial unloading of the bodies. K88 explained:
[K87], BASANOVI] and LIPOVA] were there all this time and either LIPOVA] or BASANOVI] then drove the truck near the hole, I don’t remember which one drove it. . . . The rear door was open and the idea was to reverse down the decline and then hit the brakes hard so that the bodies would fall out of the truck with the jolt and luckily they did, we did not have to handle any of the bodies.1384
572. K87 provided a similar description, although he described two trucks being unloaded in this manner, one immediately after the other.1385 The smell from the bodies was so strong that they had to wear gas masks. The trucks left the Centre immediately after the bodies were unloaded. Once the bodies were in the hole, K88 covered them with earth.1386 K87 then called \or|evi} and told him “that the thing was finished, that is, that the bodies had been buried.”1387
Additional Trucks and Burials of Bodies
573. Shortly after these first bodies were buried, more trucks containing bodies were driven to the Centre, and \or|evi} arranged for their burial as well.1388 K87 testified that in the 10 days following the first burials, two or three trucks arrived at the Centre. He stated that K88 dug a new hole with his excavator, and may also have dug a third hole. K87 personally observed as these bodies were dumped into the holes. The trucks were generally parked in the same location when they arrived at the Centre.1389
1381 K87,P1414,para.13(under seal);Ðorðević,T. 9731 9732(private session);T.9978. 1382 K87,P1414,para.16(under seal). 1383 K87,P1414,para.18(under seal);K88,P370,para.18(under seal). 1384 K88,P370,para.19(under seal);see also P371,pp.9 10(under seal). 1385 K87,P1414,para.19 (under seal). It may be noted that \or|evi} also stated that there were two trucks in the first shipment – see T.9978. 1386 K87,P1414,para.19 20 (under seal);K88,P370,para.20(under seal). 1387 Ðorðević,T.9731 1388 \or|evi},T.9732 9733;T.9978;K87,T.14174 14175;P1414,paras.21,23(under seal);P1416,p. 6. 1389 K87,P1414,paras.21 22 (under seal).
IT-05-87/1-T 140 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6405 574. K88 provided more specific detail with respect to the arrivals of additional trucks and the subsequent burials of the bodies they contained. Three to five days after the first burial, an old yellow truck arrived with a trailer attached. The truck did not have a license plate and was driven by two men with Montenegrin accents wearing blue camouflage uniforms. The drivers told K88 that while they were en route to Belgrade, between Belgrade and Ni{, the doors of the truck had opened accidentally and 50 bodies had fallen out. They had to stop and were assisted by locals to get the bodies back into the truck.1390
575. The bodies from this second truck were buried in grave 2 behind the firing range.1391 There was a lot of soil on the bodies.1392 In the midst of the burial, part of the trailer fell into the grave. K88 purposely jerked the truck several times so that the bodies would fall out and then detached the cab from the trailer so the driver could drive away. He was able to pull the trailer from the hole and then parked it close to the grave, where it remained until the bodies were exhumed years later.1393
576. While the bodies were being buried, the two drivers of the truck were put up in a police hotel in town. While they stayed there, over a period of two or three days, their truck was repaired and re fueled.1394 After the job was finished “the two drivers had to go back to Kosovo.” Since the trailer had broken off from the cab of the truck, the men drove back in the unattached cab unit.1395
577. After this burial, K88 also had to go to Kosovo. He was therefore unsure about what may have happened during the period when he was away.1396 Nonetheless, when he returned to the Centre he took part in a number of additional burials.
578. Altogether, K88 was aware of 6 deliveries of bodies. They were brought to the base over a period of 20 days.1397 A new Mercedes truck was driven by an old man in civilian clothes. The man told them that the truck was his own and that it contained 35 bodies.1398 They buried these bodies in grave 3. During the burial process, the ramp door fell off of the truck and was found during the exhumations.1399
1390 K88,P370A,paras.22,30;T.1985;P371,pp. 6 7 (under seal). The truck is 4V on P370A,p.14. 1391 K88,P370A,para.22; Grave n. 2 on Map p.14. 1392 K88,P370,para.25(under seal). 1393 K88,P370A,para.23. 1394 K88,T.1985. 1395 K88,P370,para.24(under seal);P371,pp.7 8(under seal). 1396 K88,P370A,para.26. 1397 K88,P370A,para.31. 1398 K88,P370A,para.27,29;T.1981;T.1986. 1399 K88,P370,para.27(under seal);Map P370A,p.14.
IT-05-87/1-T 141 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6404 579. A refrigerated thirty ton truck also arrived at the Centre. K88 had to break it open at the side to empty it. He did not initially see any bodies, but observed that the truck was full of earth, smelled bad, and had part of a coffin with a cross in the earth. The driver wore a camouflage police uniform. The truck was emptied into grave 4 or 5.1400
K93’s Drove a Second Truck Full of Bodies to Batajnica
580. K93 also testified about driving a second truckload of bodies to Batajnica (the first being the bodies found in Kladovo). Acting pursuant to instructions from Zeković, K93 went to the Rilindija building in Priština/Prištinë where he met with a police officer named Du{an Nenadovi}. Nenadovi} gave him a confiscated refrigerated truck with bodies inside, which K93 drove to Batajnica, where it was buried.1401 K93 estimated that he transported around 600 bodies in total.1402
\or|evi} Ceased Operations at Batajnica
581. Following a conversation in which K87 expressed his dissatisfaction to \or|evi} with the ongoing concealment of bodies at the Centre, the trucks containing bodies stopped arriving.1403 The SAJ returned to the 13 Maj Centre after the war in June or July 1999.1404
(e) Forensic Evidence from Batajnica
Involvement of the Working Group
582. In early May 2001, following an article appearing in the Serbian press about the refrigerator truck found in the Danube, a Working Group was set up on the order of Minister Du{an Mihajlovi} to investigate this issue and produce a report.1405 The Working Group went to the 13 Maj Centre in the course of its investigations and confirmed that the refrigerator trucks had been taken there.1406 They interviewed officers who had been engaged at the scene, including K88 and K87, and noted that these men approached their interviews reluctantly.1407
1400 K88,P370,paras.28 29(under seal),P370A,p.14(map);T.1986 1988. He identified the uniform worn by the driver as #4 on P325. 1401 K93,T.6902(closed session);P1062(under seal),pp.17–18,23; P1063(under seal),pp.3 4;P1064(under seal),pp.4 5; P1065(under seal),p.4. 1402 K93,P1065(under seal),p.4 1403 K87,P1414,para.25 (under seal);\or|evi},T.10000. 1404 K87,P1414,para.27 (under seal). 1405 K84,T.1993;2075 (closed session). 1406 K84,T.2012 (closed session); P366,p.2. 1407 K84,T.2013 (closed session);K87,P1414,para.32 (under seal).
IT-05-87/1-T 142 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6403 583. The Working Group found the first grave just outside of the training centre compound, behind a slope of the firing range, and it was subsequently ordered that the bodies be exhumed and autopsied.1408 Ultimately, between 700 and 800 bodies in total were found.1409 A number of documents were also found, including identification documents. The names on those documents were those of ethnic Albanians, and the documents indicated that they were from Kosovo. Many of the documents featured the last name “Berisha” and had been issued in Suva Reka/Suharekë, Kosovo.1410
Further Forensic Evidence Suva Reka/Suharekë
584. The victims of the Suva Reka/Suharekë massacre were discovered at the 13 Maj Centre in a mass grave referred to as “Batajnica 1” (BA01). At least 36 bodies were exhumed from this grave.1411 The small amount of remains recovered suggested that one vehicle, most probably a covered truck, had been used to transport the remains to this location. A timber grill found at the base of the body mass, which would have taken some time to construct, suggests that BA01 was likely the first grave to be constructed.1412
585. The bodies found were of both genders and varying age groups. Nine of the bodies were younger than seven years old. One was an unborn child, as one of the victims from Suva Reka/Suharekë had been pregnant.1413 No military clothing was found.1414
586. The DNA was analysed in Madrid, Spain.1415 Antonio Alonso, an expert in genetic identification, analysed samples from 56 skeletal remains and 13 blood reference samples of family members of people allegedly killed in Suva Reka/Suharekë. After analysis, Alonso produced four reports. Genetic identification tests were performed on the skeletal remains. Forty one unique individuals were distinguished, and twenty one people were specifically identified.1416 When the
1408 D49;K84,T.2014;2180 2181(closed session). 1409 K84,T.2015 (closed session). 1410 K84,T.2017 (closed session). 1411 Dunji},P527,p.9. For additional bones not related to any of these 36 bodies see P580 and P581. 1412 Sterenberg, P815,p.27. 1413 Dunjić,T.3229;P93;P579. See also P580;P581. The forensic reports of persons later identified by DNA analysis have also been admitted separately from P93 as P528;P534;P563;P571;P529;P566;P567;P572;P568;P532;P530;P569; P570;P531;P533. 1414 Dunji},T.3259. 1415 Dunji},T.3242. 1416 Alonso,T.4679,P799;P801,pp.5 6,17. Many of the twenty one victims positively identified are named in Schedule D of the Indictment: Sofije Berisha, Vesel Berisha, Hava Berisha, Drilon Berisha, Redon Berisha, Melinda and/or Herolinda Berisha, Musli Berisha, Fatmire Berisha, Besim Berisha, Granit and/or Genc Berisha, Nexhmedin Berisha, Lirije Berisha(who was pregnant), Afrim Berisha, Hamdi Berisha, one of Hamdi Berisha’s four daughters, and Jashar Berisha. S.Berisha identified all but one of the victims, Afrim Berisha, listed as persons she saw murdered on 26 March 1999 in Suva Reka/Suhareka.
IT-05-87/1-T 143 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6402 DNA results were received, this information was used to identify the bodily remains.1417 UNMIK collected blood samples and other information from the relatives of the missing persons in Kosovo and provided it to the ICMP.1418 A family tree provided by the ICTY and a table from the ICMP linking family members of the Suva Reka/Suharekë massacre helped to determine parent/child/sibling relationships.1419 Further evidence is available in Annex C, Schedule D.
\akovi}a/Gjakove and Meja/Meje
587. The Office of Missing Persons and Forensics (OMPF) was established in June 2002 by UNMIK, with a mandate to determine the whereabouts of missing persons from Kosovo, identify their remains, and return them to the families of the missing.1420 The OMPF list of missing persons records that over 300 people went missing from the Meja/Meje area on 27 April 1999.1421 The remains of 287 of these people, listed in Schedule H of the Indictment, were found in graves in Batajnica. These remains were identified through DNA testing and comparison with surviving family members.1422 OMPF also consulted with members of the community from where the victims went missing.1423 For example, Merita Deda described the murder of a group of men including her father, uncle and cousin by Serb forces in Meja/Meje on 27 April 1999.1424 Their bodies were found buried in Batajnica.1425
(f) Bodies Concealed near the SAJ Training Grounds at Petrovo Selo
588. While bodies were being buried in Batajnica, the MUP also transported bodies out of Kosovo to Petrovo Selo, in Northeastern Serbia. K93 made trips to Janjevo/Janjeva and Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica, picking up bodies with a truck and driving these bodies to Petrovo Selo, where they were concealed in mass graves.1426
Transporting bodies from Janjevo/Janjeva to Petrovo Selo
589. After his journey from Tekija/Kladovo to Batajnica, K93 received another call from Zeković. Zekovi} told him to pick up a truck from a company called Gemaks and go to
1417 Dunji},T.3240,P527,pp.19 20,22. 1418 Dunji},T.3240,3242,P527,p.22. 1419 Alonso,T.4685 4687,4696;P802;P800,p.9;P801,pp.9 11,15;P272. These documents were only used after the Institute conducted a blind comparative analysis (P802,p.3). 1420 Baraybar, P453,para 3. 1421 See P477. 1422 See Annex C, Schedule H. See also:P99,pp.24–29;P472;P474;P576;P473;P456; and P818(under seal). 1423 Baraybar,P453,paras.29,31. 1424 Deda,P1030,pp.6 7;P1031,p.6 7. 1425 Deda,P1031,p.7. 1426 K93,P1062,pp.16 17,22 23 (under seal).
IT-05-87/1-T 144 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6401 Pri{tina/Prishtinë. Zeković also instructed him to call a certain phone number, which he provided, once he was at the Priština MUP headquarters. K93 called the number and a man he believed to be General Luki} answered. He was told to go in the direction of Skopje, and that a dark red Golf car would travel in front of him.1427
590. K93 followed these instructions. The Golf led him to the village of Janjevo/Janjeva, about 20 kilometres from Priština/Prištine. An escort from Belgrade drove behind him. The local police in Janjevo/Janjeva accompanied K93 in the hills above the village, where a tractor with a trailer and an excavator arrived. The trailer was loaded with 17 19 bodies.1428
591. As instructed by Luki},1429 K93 then drove the bodies to the MUP training centre in Petrovo Selo.1430 Upon arriving at the training centre, K93 saw that two pits had already been dug there. The contents of his truck were unloaded into one of them, and a number of people were present, wearing a mixture of civilian clothes and camouflage uniforms.1431 K93 recognized Goran Radosavljevi}, Radomir \eri}, Sreten Popovi}, and other MUP police officers. Radosavljevi} contacted the OUP chief, Sperli}, who sent a truck and firemen to wash the box of the truck.1432 After the bodies had been unloaded, K93 drove the empty truck to the 13 Maj Centre at Batajnica and left it there “because they needed it”.1433
K93’s Second Trip to Petrovo Selo
592. Several days later, K93 received another phone call from Zeković, after which he was instructed to pick up a “dumper” truck and to call the same phone number he had called previously.1434 K93 dialled the number and, as before, believed that Luki} answered the phone.1435 He was instructed once again to go to Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica to collect more bodies and take them to Petrovo Selo.
1427 K93,P1064(under seal),p.3;P1063(under seal),p.3;P1065(under seal),p.3. 1428K93,T.6900(closed session);P1062(under seal),pp.67–69;P1063(under seal),p.3;P1064(under seal),p.3;P1065 (under seal),pp.2–3;P1066(under seal),pp.4–5. 1429 Luki}’s identity was confirmed further by K93’s evidence that he went to see Luki} when this issue went public, and that both Luki} and \or|evi} arranged for him to go away to Bujanova} [K93,P1062 (under seal),pp.86–87; T.6908, 6913 (closed session)]. 1430 K93,P1064 (under seal),p.3. 1431 K93,P1064 (under seal),p.4;P1063 (under seal),p.3. 1432 K93,P1065 (under seal),p.3. 1433 K93,P1064 (under seal),pp.3–4;P1065 (under seal),p.3. 1434 K93,P1064 (under seal),p.4;P1063 (under seal),pp.3 4;P1065 (under seal),p.2. 1435 K93,P1065 (under seal),p.2.
IT-05-87/1-T 145 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6400 593. K93 was escorted once again. He went to the heavy machinery repair shop of a timber manufacturing company, where he found over 50 bodies in pits normally used to fix vehicles.1436 He was met there by some 15 people in civilian clothes, whom he described as “chiefs of secretariats sent to Kosovo from Serbian municipal secretariats”.1437 The bodies were loaded onto his truck and he drove them to Petrovo Selo, to another pit very close to the first.1438
594. In his \or|evi} testimony, K93 changed his position with respect to the presence of the chiefs of secretariats. He now states that he saw men in civilian clothes and that maybe only one of them was a Chief – the SUP Chief for Kosovska Mitrovica.1439
Discovery of the Petrovo Selo Graves – May 2001
595. These two graves were discovered in 2001 as a result of the MUP Working Group investigation. The two pits were located just outside the SAJ training ground, at the edge of a sort of forest.1440 Seventy seven bodies were exhumed in total, by the Forensic Medicine Institute in Ni{.1441 Radojkovi}, who had previously assisted in hiding the bodies from the truck in the Danube, assisted with the exhumations.1442
Forensic Evidence
596. Sterenberg produced a report on the Petrovo Selo graves, which labels the two pits as PS/I and PS/II.1443 At both sites, it appears that after the bodies had been buried, other holes were dug around the pits and dirt was dumped on top of the mass graves. The newly created holes were filled with garbage. These additional pits may have been created deliberately to mislead any potential investigations. There was also garbage found on top of the bodies within the graves themselves.1444
597. The remains of 75 persons were found at these sites, with evidence of gunshot wounds.1445 At both pits there were strong indicators that prior to burial the bodies had lain decomposing for
1436 K93,P1066(under seal),pp.15–16;P1062(under seal),pp.17,22;P1064(under seal),pp.11–12. 1437 K93,P1062(under seal),pp.24. 1438 K93,P1062(under seal),pp.17,22;P1064(under seal),pp.4,11–12;P1066(under seal),pp.15–16. 1439 K93,P1062(under seal),p.24;T.6906 6907(closed session). 1440 K84,T.2041 2042(closed session). 1441 K84,T.2037 2038(closed session);P395, marking #3 indicates Petrovo Selo. 1442 Radojković,T.1800 1801;P358,p.3; P359,p.25;T.1785 1786,1801. 1443 P815,pp.31 35. 1444 P815,p.33. 1445 P815,p.31.
IT-05-87/1-T 146 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6399 several days to a week prior to their burial. There were many indicators that the bodies had been collected from different areas at different times.1446
598. Although the majority of the bodies appeared to be civilians, one body was dressed in a KLA uniform, two were dressed in partial uniforms, and one was wearing the “special policeman” uniform. Seven of the bodies were female.1447
599. The PS/I pit was lined with a large plastic sheet similar to the one found at BA 05 in Batajnica.1448 It contained sixteen male bodies.1449 The three uppermost bodies appeared to have been executed on site, having been blindfolded and shot in the head. These bodies were later identified as the Bytyqi brothers.1450 \or|evi} had instructed a policeman to collect the brothers, who were serving sentences for misdemeanors in Prokuple, and transport them to the SAJ training centre in Petrovo Selo.1451 The pit also contained ligatures, blindfolds and ballistic evidence, along with surgical gloves and clothing that appeared to belong to persons handling the remains.1452
600. PS/II contained fifty nine individual bodies, seven of which were female.1453 Many were wrapped in clear plastic sheets with the ends taped, similar to wrappings found at BA 05 in Batajnica.1454 Bodies were found on different levels, suggesting that more bodies were deposited on top of the original 50. Bodies at the higher level were in open black or blue body bags.1455 Amongst the bodies in the lower level were more than 20 victims of the killings in Izbica/Izbicë.1456 Death certificates and autopsy reports prepared by the Niš Institute of Forensic Medicine confirm the identity of many of the victims named in Schedule F.1457
DNA Analysis and Identification
601. Hard tissue samples were taken for DNA analysis from all of the bodies discovered at Petrovo Selo.1458 OMPF experts were able to establish the cause of death for 53 of the 61 bodies, concluding that all 53 of those individuals died as a result of gunshot wounds. Twenty individuals
1446 P815,p.34. 1447 P815,pp.31–32. 1448 P815,pp.33 34. 1449 P815,pp.33 34. 1450 P815,pp.31 32,34 35. 1451 \or|evi},T. 9974 9975. 1452 P815,pp.30.33,34. 1453 P815,p.34. 1454 P815,p.34. 1455 P815,p.34. 1456 See Annex C, Schedule F. 1457 See P457 P470. 1458 P815,p.32.
IT-05-87/1-T 147 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6398 sustained at least one gunshot wound through the head, 21 through the chest, five through the upper limbs, and 13 through the lower limbs.1459
6. The rewards for those supportive of the objectives of the JCE
602. Far from being punished for their criminal behaviour, members of the JCE were rewarded by Milo{evi} for carrying out the goals of the JCE. Many commanders and senior officers of the MUP and the VJ, as well as those whose units implemented the goals of the JCE, were promoted and/or commended for their actions in Kosovo and their loyalty to Milo{evi}’s political aims.
603. As the Heads of the RJB and MUP Staff, respectively, \or|evi} and Luki} played a crucial role in Kosovo, as did Stevanovi}. According to \or|evi}, Stevanovi} was in Kosovo throughout most of the war until the signing of the Kumanovo Agreement.1460
604. In July 1999, pursuant to a Presidential Decree, \or|evi}, Luki} and Stevanovi} received from Milo{evi} the Order of the Yugoslav Flag of the First Degree, “for the exceptional results achieved in commanding police units, for the courage, determination and discipline exhibited in discharging security tasks of combating terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija and in defending the country from aggression, serving as examples to other units and police members”.1461
605. Luki} had already been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General in May 1999.1462 Stojiljkovi} praised Luki} for excelling “in successful command and control of the MUP units engaged in the prevention of terrorism in Kosovo" when recommending him for promotion in May 1999.1463 In January 2001, Luki} replaced \or|evi} as Assistant Minister and Head of the RJB.1464
606. Pursuant to the same Presidential Decree, Milo{evi} also decorated senior members of the MUP, such as commanders of the PJP, SAJ and JSO units who had furthered the goals of the JCE in Kosovo.1465 The 124th Intervention Brigade of the PJPs received the award of national hero.1466
607. These MUP members and units were active in Kosovo and were decorated for discharging security duties in Kosovo.1467
1459 Baraybar,P454,p.11 12,14–15;P455. 1460 \or|evi},T. 9780. 1461 P1506,pp.1 2;Order on Agreed Facts,p. 25. Ðorðević,T.9791. See also T.9783. 1462 \or|evi},T. 9535 9536;D423. 1463 D423. 1464 P1495; Order on Agreed Facts, Annex B,No. 31,p. 25. 1465 Ðorðević,T.9780 9782;P1506,p.2. 1466 Ðorðević,T.9779;P1506, p.1. See also pp.2 3 1467 Ðorðević,T.9779 9782;P1506,p.1.
IT-05-87/1-T 148 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6397 608. As was the case with the MUP, key VJ officials were rewarded for their support for the JCE. In December 1998, JCE members Lazarevi} and Pavkovi} were appointed to new positions to facilitate the furtherance of the common purpose of the JCE. Pavkovi} (then Commander of the PrK), was promoted to Commander of the Third Army,1468 while Lazarevi} (then Chief of Staff of the PrK), replaced Pavkovi} and was appointed Commander of the PrK.1469
609. In addition to rewarding those who supported the JCE, those who opposed it were removed and replaced by more compliant individuals. One such area of contention was the proper or constitutional use of the VJ in Kosovo. Some senior VJ officers opposed the use of the VJ outside of the established chain of command in combat operations in Kosovo and the attempts to centralize command of the VJ and MUP.1470 This resistance was led by the then Chief of the VJ General Staff Mom~ilo Peri{i}.1471 In November 1998, he was removed from his position as Chief of the VJ General Staff and replaced by Ojdani}.1472 Ojdani} was intentionally positioned by Milo{evi}, as a member of the JCE, in order to facilitate the implementation of the common purpose. As a reward for his contribution to the JCE, Ojdani} was appointed Federal Minister of Defence on 15 February 2000.1473
610. Moreover, the removals of senior members of the VJ were not carried out in accordance with military procedure. Mom~ilo Peri{i} in a public statement of 27 November 1998, complained that he was removed “in an inappropriate and illegal manner”.1474 At a meeting of the VJ Collegium, it was reported that Peri{i}, upon handing over his duties to Ojdani} on 27 November 1998, made and signed a statement for the public, stating: “The current regime does not like leaders of high integrity and those who use their own heads to think. I was removed from the position of Chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav Army without consultations in an inappropriate and illegal manner. I do not accept the invented position in the current Federal Government that has been offered to me. I remain at the disposal to my Army, state and people.”1475
611. Many participants in the JCE, whether members of the VJ or the MUP, received awards and recognition, and attained, retained or improved the positions they held during the Indictment period
1468 P1343,p.8;P1493. 1469 P1343,p.8;P1494. 1470 Under Article 4(4) of the 1994 FRY Law on the VJ (P43), it was the responsibility of the President of the FRY to “regulate and order readiness of the Army in case of an imminent threat of war, state of war, or state of emergency,” none of which were declared in Kosovo in 1998. Peri{i} complained about this unconstitutional use of the VJ in a letter to Milo{evi} dated 23 July 1998 (P1329,pp.2 3). 1471 P1329. 1472 P1363, p.3 1473 Order on Agreed Facts, Annex B, No. 27,p. 25 1474 P965,p.27. 1475 P965,p.27.
IT-05-87/1-T 149 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6396 as a result of their demonstrated loyalty to Milo{evi} and their willingness to implement measures to achieve objectives of the JCE.
IT-05-87/1-T 150 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6395 IV. THE CRIMES
A. General Requirements of Article 3 of the Statute
1. Existence of an armed conflict
612. An armed conflict between the KLA and forces of the FRY and Serbia existed in the territory of Kosovo during the Indictment period. In addition, from 24 March 1999 to 20 June 1999, a state of armed conflict existed between the forces of the FRY and Serbia and NATO.
613. The KLA was established to conduct an armed struggle to achieve the independence of Kosovo.1476 In 1997 and 1998, the KLA trained in Albania and smuggled weapons from Albania across the state border into Kosovo.1477
614. While it began as individual groups of lightly armed guerrillas, by the spring of 1998 the KLA had become a well organised military force.1478 By April 1998, a conflict existed between the KLA and the forces of the FRY and Serbia in Kosovo.1479 By mid July 1998, the KLA controlled about half of the territory of Kosovo.1480 The conflict escalated in 1999.
615. At least from the spring of 1998 onwards, the KLA was a well organised military force.1481 The KLA had a General Staff,1482 a formal structure with a clear chain of command where commanders were able to issue orders,1483 rules setting out the military code of conduct,1484 and distinctive insignia.1485 The KLA also possessed uniforms, KLA emblems, logos and its own flag,1486 and had developed a communication system.1487
616. The KLA was organized into seven zones of responsibility and had commanders and deputy commanders in charge of each of these zones.1488 KLA Zone Commanders had a duty to report to the KLA General Staff.1489
1476 Abrahams,P738,p.16;Vasiljevi},T.5791;Rugova,P286,p.64;Zyrapi,P427,pp.167 168. 1477D320;Zyrapi,P428,pp.8 10,56 57. 1478 P436;Zyrapi,P428,pp.10 11. See also Crosland,P1400,para.23;P1401,p.31. 1479 Zyrapi,P428,p.93. See also Crosland,P1401,p.170 for the quasi front line in May 1998. 1480 Zyrapi,P428,pp.93 94. Crosland,P1400,para.36;T.9168 1481 P436;Zyrapi,P428,pp.10 11.See also Crosland,P1400,para.3. 1482 D152;Zyrapi,P428, pp.9 10,17 18. See also Zyrapi, T.2403 2404,2460,2503. 1483 P444;P440;D792;P452;Zyrapi,P428,p.45. See also Zyrapi,T.2402 2410.P431,P432 1484 P436. 1485 Zyrapi,T.2401,P428,pp.51 52,265 266. See also P325,p.10. 1486 P436;Zyrapi,T.2401,P428,pp.51 52,265 266;P1347,p.2. 1487 Zyrapi,T.2466,P428,pp.57 58. 1488 Zyrapi,T.2462,P428,p.43;P430. 1489 P436;P437;Zyrapi,T.2456,P428,pp.22 23.
IT-05-87/1-T 151 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6394 617. Forces of the FRY and Serbia consisted principally of the VJ and the MUP. Section III(A)(3)(a) provides further detail as to the VJ and MUP units and other armed organisations deployed in Kosovo during the Indictment period.
2. Nexus between the armed conflict and the crimes
618. The nexus existed in relation to the crimes charged under Article 3 of the Statute. The perpetrators were members of the forces of the FRY and Serbia acting in furtherance of a criminal purpose to modify the ethnic balance of Kosovo through criminal means. The victims were not taking active part in hostilities at the time of the crimes.
B. General Requirements of Article 5 of the Statute
619. As required under Article 5 of the Statute, each of the crimes against humanity charged formed part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.
1. The attack
620. During the Indictment period, forces of the FRY and Serbia conducted an attack directed against the Kosovo Albanian population of Kosovo province. The purpose of this attack was to modify the ethnic balance in Kosovo in order to ensure continued Serbian control over the province through criminal means. This attack is described in detail in Section IV(C) of this brief.
2. The widespread and/or systematic nature of the attack
621. Each of the crimes against humanity charged formed part of a widespread and/or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. Forces of FRY and Serbia attacked ethnic Albanian villages throughout the province of Kosovo during the Indictment period. The Kosovo Albanian civilian population was targeted. The evidence establishes the widespread mistreatment, killings and expulsions of Kosovo Albanian civilians, resulting in a large number of victims.
622. The attack on the villages throughout the province of Kosovo was conducted in a systematic way. Forces of FRY and Serbia shelled village after village, burnt houses, killed livestock, mistreated, expelled and killed ethnic Albanians civilians. These attacks followed a pattern of crime. The repetition of similar criminal conduct during the Indictment period was not accidental. It was the direct result of high level planning by members of the JCE.
IT-05-87/1-T 152 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6393 3. Civilian population
623. The attack was directed against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population. Kosovo Albanian civilians, including women, children and elderly villagers, were systematically mistreated, killed and expelled from their villages. The Kosovo Albanian civilian population, and not the KLA, was the primary, and by no means incidental, target of this attack.
4. The acts of the accused formed part of the attack and the accused were aware that their acts formed part of the attack
624. The Accused planned and implemented the attack on the Kosovo Albanian population and was among the main participants in the JCE, the purpose of which involved carrying out this attack. As a result, his acts, by their nature and consequences, formed part of this attack. The Accused was clearly aware of the attack on the civilian population and that he was carrying out the crimes against humanity charged in furtherance of it.
5. Discriminatory intent for persecutions
625. The crimes charged in the Indictment were carried out with the intent to discriminate on racial, religious and/or political grounds within the meaning of Article 5(h) of the Statute. The general pattern of crime described below establishes the persecutory and discriminatory nature of these crimes. The Accused, together with other JCE members, headed this campaign of persecutions. He had the intent to discriminate against Kosovo Albanians because of their racial, political or religious affiliations during the relevant time. This is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.
C. The crimes charged
1. Orahovac/Rahovec municipality
(a) Celina/Celinë
626. On the early morning of 25 March 1999, Serb military and police surrounded the village of Celina/Celinë with tanks and armoured vehicles, and started shelling. The shelling continued throughout the day.1490 Agim Jemini, mayor of Celina/Celinë, climbed into the roof cavity of a
1490 Jemini,P635,p.6;P637,p.4;Salihi,T.3482 3483,3486,3460;P632,pp.2 3.
IT-05-87/1-T 153 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6392 house under construction and hid there with his cousin.1491 The next morning, from a window,1492 Jemini saw about 500 soldiers enter the village from four directions: Bela Crkva/Bellacërka, Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe, Orahovac/Rahovec, and from the direction of the main Ðakovica/Gjakova– Prizren road.1493 Most of the villagers fled to a nearby forest before the army and police arrived.1494 At the time of the attack, there was no KLA presence in the village.1495
627. Throughout the day on 26 March 1999, these forces looted objects of value, loaded them onto their vehicles,1496 and set fire to houses and the local school.1497 They also stole cars and tractors.1498 Soldiers took up positions around the village and stayed for about two days, shooting at random at night in order to scare villagers.1499
628. From his hiding place, Jemini saw around 35 soldiers break the gate of his family compound and loot the five houses in the compound.1500 The two commanders of the unit took their position on the balcony of a house in the compound and supervised what was going on in the village.1501
629. Later that morning, Jemini saw a group of policemen and paramilitaries enter his house, question and rob his family, and then shoot and kill five members.1502 A short time later, a truck arrived and the men loaded what they had stolen from Jemini’s house onto the truck.1503
630. Throughout the day, Jemini heard the two commanders giving orders over the radio to their men in the village.1504 He heard the radio call for “Commander 444” and one of the Commanders answered. The voice on the radio then asked, “What is the situation in Celina?’ The Commander answered, “All is good.” The person on the radio then said, “Is it the same as in Ra~ak.” The commander then answered, “Twice as much as in Ra~ak.”1505 At about 7:00 pm, Jemini heard a radio call for “Commander 444” and the same commander answered. The voice on the radio said something like, “Stop the offensive on Celina.” The Commander answered, “Yes, we will stop.”1506
1491 Jemini,T.3588 3589;P635,p.6; see also P642;P641; Jemini,P637,pp.8 9; D76. 1492 Jemini,T.3580,3603 3604;D75. 1493 Jemini,T.3593;P635,p.6;P637,p.4;P636,p.23. 1494 Salihi,P632,pp.2 3;T.3493 3494. See also Jemini,P635,p.6. 1495 Jemini,P635,p.6. 1496 Salihi,T.3460 3461,3492,3498;P632,pp.2 3. 1497 Jemini,P635,pp.8 9;Salihi,T.3460 3461,3464,3492,3498;P632,pp.2 3;P633,pp.4 5,8. 1498 Salihi,P632,p.3. 1499 Jemini,P635,pp.6 8. 1500 Jemini,P635,p.6. 1501 Jemini,P635,p.6. 1502 Jemini,T.3533 3534,3602,3616;P635,p.8;P636,pp.31 32;P637,pp.9,53. See also P644,P639 and P643. 1503 Jemini,P635,pp.8 9. 1504 Jemini,P635,p.7. 1505 Jemini,T.3608;P636,pp.6 7. 1506 Jemini,P635,p.7;P636,pp.6 7;T.3607 3608.
IT-05-87/1-T 154 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6391 631. Reshit Salihi, a local resident, was hiding in his family farm and saw policemen enter nearby houses and set them alight.1507 His brother Bajram stood on a wall of the farm to observe the movements of the police, and was shot and killed.1508 Salihi ran to a hill beyond the houses where he hid in a deep hole.1509 A “very short while later”, Salihi heard bursts of automatic gunfire and then women and children screaming from the direction of his compound.1510 The shooting continued for about 15 minutes.1511 A total of eight members of Salihi’s family were killed in the shooting, as well as all of the members of the Zeqiri familiy.1512 That evening, Salihi and his remaining family members fled into the woods.1513 The “whole village” along with refugees from nearby villages also hid in the woods.1514
632. Salihi and his family remained in the woods for the next three days,1515 during which time they heard shots and saw smoke billowing from the village.1516 On the fourth day, approximately 40 policemen in blue camouflage uniforms and armed with assault rifles arrived on foot to the edge of the woods and started firing in the air.1517 They rounded up the villagers, and separated women and children from men.1518 The police searched the men and at gunpoint ordered them to hand over money and identity documents.1519 Salihi handed over his identity card and saw that the police put all the identification documents in a pile and set them on fire.1520 Three policemen searched and stripped a local villager, Agim Ramadani, to the waist.1521 They shot him in the head, killing him on the spot.1522
633. The police then forced both groups to march at gunpoint back through the village.1523 Along the way, the police assaulted people “with rifle butts” and beat some villagers.1524 While passing through the village, Salihi noticed that the village was on fire.1525
1507 Salihi,P632,p.3. 1508 Salihi,P632,p.3;P633,p.14. 1509 Salihi,P632,p.3;T.3503 3504,3520. 1510 Salihi,P632,p.3. 1511 Salihi,P632,p.3. 1512 Salihi,T.3465 3468. 1513 Salihi,P632,p.3;T.3461. 1514 Salihi,P633,p.6;T.3461 3462,3469. 1515 Salihi,P632,p.3. 1516 Salihi,T.3462. 1517 Salihi,P632,p.3. 1518 Salihi,T.3510;P632,p.3;P633,pp.6,20. 1519 Salihi,T.3510;P632,pp.3 4;P633,p.6. 1520 Salihi,P632,p.4. 1521 Salihi,P632,p.4. 1522 Salihi,T.3510,3512 3513,3519 3520;P632,p.4. 1523 Salihi,P632,p.4. 1524 Salihi,T.3462;P632,p.4. 1525 Salihi,T.3462 3463.
IT-05-87/1-T 155 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6390 634. In Celina/Celinë, the villagers were handed over to another group of policemen dressed in blue camouflage uniforms,1526 who marched them out to the main road towards Prizren.1527 The police beat and harassed the villagers for money at gunpoint.1528 A large number of trucks arrived, and the police ordered them to board the trucks,1529 which transported them to @ur/Zhur.1530 Before crossing the Albanian border, they were ordered to hand over identity documents.1531
635. On or about 29 March 1999, several villagers returned to Celina/Celinë and saw that the village had been burned, and many villagers killed.1532 Jemini buried approximately 78 bodies.1533 Jemini kept detailed lists of the names and burial sites of all the victims.1534 Sabri Popaj and Nazim Rexhepi found and buried approximately 85 bodies. All had been shot, and some of them burnt.1535 The victims wore civilian clothes.1536
636. Three months after being deported to Albania, Salihi returned to Celina/Celinë and found that the village had been burnt.1537
(b) Bela Crkva/Bellacërkvë
637. In the early hours of 25 March 1999, Isuf Zhuniqi, a local farmer, and Sabri Popaj, also from the village, saw five VJ tanks enter Bela Crkva/Bellacërkvë from the direction of \akovica and Prizren.1538 Two tanks drove towards the schoolyard, while the other three moved past the mosque and up a hill above the village of Celina/Celinë, where they took up positions.1539 At around 4:00am, police and army started shooting towards the village from their positions on the hill.1540 Popaj understood the shooting as a warning to leave their houses and the village.1541 He saw Serb police in light blue uniforms enter the outskirts of the village and set fire to houses using petrol and flame throwers.1542 In response, the villagers began to flee.1543
1526 Salihi,P632,p.4. 1527 Salihi,P632,p.4. 1528 Salihi,P632,p.4. 1529 Salihi,P632,p.4;P633,p.22. 1530 Salihi,P632,p.4;P633,p.22. 1531 Salihi,T.3463. 1532 Popaj,P1082,p.12;P1083,p.32;Jemini,P635,p.9. 1533 Jemini,T.3535;P635,p.9. See also P648;P649; Jemini,T.3539 3540. 1534 Jemini,P635,p.9;Popaj,P1082,p.14;T.7418,7422. 1535 Popaj,P1082,pp.12 14;P1083,p.32. 1536 Popaj,P1082,p.14;P1083,p.32. 1537 Salihi,T.3463 3464;P633,p.8. 1538 Popaj,P1082,p.7;P1083,p.7;Zhuniqi,P1251,p.5;P1253,pp.6 7;P1252,p.12;P1254. 1539 Popaj,P1083,pp.7,8,46 48,64,67 68;P1084;P1091. See also Zhuniqi,P1251,p.5;P1253,p.7;P1254. 1540 Popaj,P1082,p.7;P1083,pp.9,90. 1541 Popaj,P1082,p.7;P1083,pp.9,90. 1542 Popaj,P1082,p.7,P1083,pp.9,48,90,127;P1092. See Zhuniqi,P1251,p.5;P1252,p.13. 1543 Popaj,P1082,p.7;P1083,pp.9,48;Zhuniqi,P1251,p.5.
IT-05-87/1-T 156 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6389 638. The population fled along the Belaja stream and sought shelter near a railway bridge over the stream.1544 Zhuniqi took his family to the Belaja stream, which had steep, high banks that could conceal them.1545 As they walked, they could hear the sounds of automatic gunfire and explosions coming from the village.1546
639. When Zhuniqis reached the railway bridge that connects the village of Zrze/Xërxa and Prizren, they took shelter in an irrigation canal for a few hours with another 700 other villagers.1547 At about 9:30 a.m. Isuf Zhuniqi saw a squad of policemen heading towards the bridge along both sides of the stream.1548 All the policemen were dressed in greenish blue camouflage uniforms and armed with rifles and long knives attached to their belts.1549 Zhuniqi recognised one of them as a local policeman from Orahovac/Rahovec.1550
640. From his home, Popaj heard children’s cries coming from the Belaja stream.1551 He went to the stream to investigate and found 14 members of the Zhuniqi and Spahiu families trying to cross the water.1552 Popaj helped them across.1553 On his way back home, Popaj heard shooting from snipers in the hills. He lay down, crawled about 100 metres and hid in a hole.1554
641. From his hiding place, Popaj saw a dozen policemen in camouflage “green” uniforms approach the Zhuniqi and Spahiu families and shout insults like, “Ask NATO for help now.”1555 One policeman shouted “Shoot!” and two others opened fire with their assault rifles.1556 Other policemen on the other side of the stream joined in as well.1557 At least 12 members of Zhuniqi and Spahiu families were killed, including 10 women and children.1558 Only a two year old child survived.1559
642. The policemen then proceeded along the stream, near the railway bridge.1560 Once there, they ordered the remaining villagers out of the streambed, and separated the men and older boys
1544 Zhuniqi,P1251,pp.5 6;P1253,pp.8 9;Popaj,P1082,pp.7 8. See also P1255. 1545 Zhuniqi,P1251,pp.5 6;P1253,pp.8 9;P1255. 1546 Zhuniqi,P1251,p.6;P1253,p.19. 1547 Zhuniqi,P1251,p.6;P1252,p.14;P1253,pp.8 9,20;P1255. 1548 Zhuniqi,P1251,p.6;P1253,pp.8 9;P1255. 1549 Zhuniqi,P1251,p.6;P1253,pp.32 33;P1252,pp.15 16. 1550 Zhuniqi,P1251,p.6;P1253,pp.11 13. 1551 Popaj,P1082,p.7;P1083,p.90. 1552 Popaj,P1082,p.7. 1553 Popaj,P1082,p.7. 1554 Popaj,P1082,p.7;P1083,p.91. 1555 Popaj,P1082,pp.7 8;P1083,pp.10,12,82,121;P1084. 1556 Popaj,T.7397;P1082,pp.7 8;Zhuniqi,P1251,p.6. 1557 Popaj,P1082,p.8. 1558 Zhuniqi,P1251,p.6;Popaj,P1082,pp.7 8. See Annex C, Schedule B. 1559 Zhuniqi,P1251,p.6;P1252,pp.15,18;Popaj,P1082,pp.4,9 10;P1083,pp.4 5. 1560 Popaj,P1082,p.8;P1083,p.17; see also P1085.
IT-05-87/1-T 157 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6388 from the elderly men, women and children.1561 The men were ordered to strip to their underwear, and the policemen robbed them of all documents and valuables.1562
643. The women and children were ordered to follow the railway tracks to the adjacent village of Zrze/Xërxë.1563 A doctor from Bela Crkva/Bellacërkë tried to speak with the police commander, but was shot and killed, as was his nephew.1564 The police forces then ordered the remaining men and older boys to go back into the streambed, and opened fire on them, killing approximately 65 people.1565
644. After this incident, the police moved off in the direction of Celina/Celinë.1566 These police forces also killed six men hiding in an irrigation ditch in the vicinity.1567
645. After the police had left, Popaj then learned that five members of his family had been among those executed.1568
646. Agim Jemini corroborates these accounts of the killings. On the morning of 27 March 1999, he and his cousin passed the murder scene on their way to Zrze/Xërxa.1569 They saw around 40 bodies there, all in civilian clothes.1570
647. In the following days, Popaj returned to the stream and, with the help of other villagers, collected a total of 38 bodies and buried them.1571 Popaj made a list of the names of the victims before burying them.1572
648. Serb police killed more than 60 people on 25 March 1999 in Bela Crkva/Bellacërkvë.1573 A British forensic team conducted exhumations from late June to early July 1999 and recovered 54 bodies. Relatives identified the victims. The cause of death of the victims was determined to be gunshot wounds.1574
1561 Zhuniqi,P1251,p.7;P1252,pp.15,18;Popaj,P1083,p.83. 1562 Zhuniqi,P1251,p.7;P1253,p.9;Popaj,P1082,p.8;P1083,p.19. Zhuniqi identified the policemen commander as Nenad Mati} on a photograph shown to him by KFOR representatives. Zhuniqi,P1252,pp.15,17,23;P1251,p.6 1563 Zhuniqi,P1251,p.7. 1564 See Annex C, Schedule B. See Zhuniqi,P1251,p.7;P1252,p.19;Popaj,P1082,p.8. 1565 Zhuniqi,P1251,pp.7,8 9;P1252,p.19;Popaj,P1082,pp.8 9. See also P1085;P1086. See Annex C, Schedule B. 1566 Popaj,P1082,p.8. 1567 Popaj,P1082,p.8. Popaj found those 6 bodies on a side of the railway track in an irrigation canal near the Belaja bridge. Popaj,P1083,p.16. 1568 Popaj,P1082,p.9;T.7362,7363,7411,7421. Other survivors are listed on p.9 of P1082. 1569 Jemini,P635,p.9;P637,pp.11 12; see also P645, mark nn.“1” “2”; Jemini,P637,pp.12,13. 1570 Jemini,T.3535 3536;P637,pp.11,12. See also P646;P647;Jemini,T.3538 3539. 1571 Popaj,P1082,p.10;P1083,pp.28 29,103. 1572 Popaj,P1082,pp.10 11. 1573 See Annex C, Schedule B. 1574 P1151,pp.3 5,48 49;P1139,p.27;Baccard,P1140,pp.15 16,64. See also Popaj,P1083,pp.31 32.
IT-05-87/1-T 158 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6387 (c) Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe
649. The same day, 25 March 1999, police and VJ surrounded the neighbouring village of Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe.1575 Ali Hoti, a doctor from that village, saw VJ tanks, APCs, and Pragas moving along the main road of the village that connects Prizren, Ðakovica/Gjakova, and Orahovac/Rahovec.1576 The population fled and sought shelter in the hills above the village.1577 Some villagers fled in the direction of Nogavac/Nagavc, in the valley of Cili, where tens of thousands of people from the villages of Brestovc, Zorqisht, Opterusha, Reti, and Celina/Celinë had gathered.1578 The refugees spent the night in the valley, from where they saw Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe burning, and Serb forces heading towards Nogavac/Nagavc.1579
(d) Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel
650. Mehmet Krasniqi, a local villager, testified that on the morning of 25 March 1999, he was woken up by the noise of heavy artillery, tanks and APC’s moving along the Prizren \akovica road.1580 All Kosovo Albanian villagers fled into the woods in the mountain.1581 At day break, the forces began firing above the villagers’ heads in the direction of the woods. This lasted for about an hour.1582 Police entered the village and started looting and burning houses.1583
651. Local Serbs from the village participated in the attack with the police. They assisted in setting fire to houses and gave information to the police on where the houses of the Kosovo Albanians were.1584
652. At night fall, most of the villagers came out of the woods and took refuge in the house of Sejdi Batusha on the outskirts of the village, where they spent the night.1585
653. In the morning of 26 March 1999, Serbs from the village together with police started to open fire, loot and set fire to houses.1586 A group of policemen forced those villagers who were still
1575 Hoti,P628,pp.4 5. 1576 Hoti,P628,p.5. 1577 Hoti,P628,pp.4 6. 1578 Hoti,P628,pp.5 7;P629;Zhuniqi,P1251,p.6. 1579 Hoti,P628,p.7. 1580 M.Krasniqi,T.979 980,1024 1025,1039;P305,pp.4,11. See Ramadani,T.1109;P306,pp.2–3,35. 1581 Ramadani,T.1109 1112;P306,pp.4,6;M.Krasniqi,T.979 980,1024 1025,1039;P305,p.11. 1582 M.Krasniqi,T.980 983. 1583 Ramadani,T.1110;P306,pp.3 4;M.Krasniqi,P305,p.11. (Ramadani used the expression “militia” to refer to the MUP, Ramadani,P306,pp.61 63). 1584 Ramadani,P306,pp.4 5,43. 1585 Ramadani,T.1082,1112;P306,pp.6 7;P307 (a circle indicates the house of Sejdi Batusha; Ramadani,T.1087);P308 (a circle marks the house of Sejdi Batusha; Ramadani,T.1091). See also M.Krasniqi,T.983;P302, mark n.2. 1586 Ramadani,T.1082 1083;P306,pp.8 9.
IT-05-87/1-T 159 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6386 hiding in the woods to come out.1587 They also located the villagers in the house of Sejdi Batusha, and ordered everyone to gather in the courtyard of the house. The police separated the men from the women and children.1588 The boys aged 13 and above were ordered to join the men. The group also included elderly men, two mentally disabled and two paralysed men.1589 The police ordered the women to either “drown themselves in the river Drin” or to leave and “to go to Albania”.1590
654. After the women left, the men were forced to kneel with their hands at the back of their heads.1591 The police then ordered the men to stand up and to line up in three rows.1592 They took the men’s wallets and identity cards and insulted them, asking why NATO did not come to rescue them.1593
655. Krasniqi described the uniforms of the police as dark blue uniforms with ribbons on their upper arm, and yellow and white bands.1594 Outside the courtyard of Sejdi Batusha’s house, Krasniqi recognized three Serbs from his village: Dimitrije Nikoli}, Zvezdan Nikoli} and Sava Nikoli}. They were dressed in police uniforms and armed.1595
656. After beating the men and confiscating their IDs and valuables,1596 the police escorted the group of men to the Batusha barn.1597 Approximately 109 men were forced into the barn. The barn had two rooms and a corridor, which the men filled.1598 One of them, Sait Hajdari, was in a wheelchair and was left at the door.1599 The policemen remained outside the barn.1600
657. The police then opened fire on the men. When the shooting stopped, the police set the barn alight.1601 Approximately 103 Kosovo Albanian men and boys were killed.1602 Seven or eight men
1587 M.Krasniqi,T.983 984,1039 1041. 1588 Ramadani,T.1082,1085;P306,pp.10 11;M.Krasniqi,T.983 984,1039 1041;P305,p.11;P302, mark n.2. See also Sweeney,T.883. 1589 Ramadani,T.1082,1085;P306,pp.10 11;M.Krasniqi,T.983 984,1039 1041;P305,p.11;P302, mark n.2. See also Sweeney,T.883. 1590 Ramadani,T.1085;P306,p.12;M.Krasniqi,T.984,1044 1045;P305,p.11. See also P302, mark n.3; M.Krasniqi,T.985. 1591 Ramadani,T.1086;P306,p.13. 1592 Ramadani,T.1086. 1593 M.Krasniqi,T.984 985,1044 1046;P305,p.11;P302. 1594 M.Krasniqi,T.985,1045 1049;P305,p.5. 1595 M.Krasniqi,T.994 996.P302 n.5 marks the place where Krasniqi saw Sava, Zvezdan and Dimitrije Nikoli} (see M.Krasniqi,T.994 995). See also Sweeney,T.904,911,916;P299. 1596 Ramadani,T.1086;P306,p.13;M.Krasniqi,P305,p.11. 1597 Ramadani,T.1086;P306,p.13,17. See also P308;P309;Ramadani,T.1091,1093. 1598 M.Krasniqi,T.986;P305p.12;P302;P310 (mark n.3 indicates the second room of the barn; n.4 indicates the position where Ramadani was standing in the corridor of the barn; Ramadani,T.1096). See also Sweeney,T.886. 1599 Ramadani,T.1091,1097;P311. 1600 Ramadani,P306,pp.18,45. 1601 Ramadani,T.1091 1092;P306,p.18; M.Krasniqi,T.987 989,1053 1055; P305,pp.11 12;P304. See also, Sweeney, T.883 887.
IT-05-87/1-T 160 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6385 survived this massacre,1603 including Lufti Ramadani1604 and Mehmet Krasniqi.1605 Ramadani managed to escape through the entrance and fled with other survivors towards Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe.1606
658. Krasniqi escaped the fire by jumping through a window. He ran to his uncle’s house, where he hid in the cellar. From his hiding place, Krasniqi saw local Serbs throw dried maize into the barn to fuel the fire. He heard a policeman say to the men: “If you see anyone move, don’t feel sorry for him. Kill everyone you see”.1607 He also saw that all the houses belonging to Kosovo Albanians were burning, while those belonging to Serbs remained untouched.1608
659. After two or three days, VJ vehicles left Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel.1609 Krasniqi remained in the forest for three days, and then went to Nogavac/Nagavc, where his wounds were treated by doctor Ali Hoti.1610 On 2 April 1999, Krasniqi left the village of Nogavac/Nagavc and later crossed into Albania.1611
660. A large number of refugees from other villages passed through the Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel railway station from 25 March to 27 March 1999.1612 During the entire day of 26 March 1999, refugees were coming out of the areas of operation of Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel and Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe.1613 PJP units took women and children to the Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel railway station, from where they were taken away on buses.1614
661. During the operations in Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel and Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe, PJP units handed over refugees to the local police, and the police then separated the men from the
1. 1602 Ramadani made a list of the persons killed in the Batusha barn (Ramadani,T.1130;P306,p.24;P312). He compiled this list before going to Albania during the weeks following the massacre (Ramadani,T.1098 1099). See P312,pp.1 3. See also M.Krasniqi,T.916,986,1070 1071;P305,pp.13 15;P306,p.20. See Annex C, Schedule C. See also P1139;P1158. 1603 Krasniqi explained that Sefer Batusha was in Germany at the time, however Krasniqi didn’t know that when he made his list of victims (see T.1014). M.Krasniqi,T.998,1004,1008 1017,1071;P305,pp.13 15. See also Ramadani, P306,pp.17;P312,p.4. 1604 See P312,p.4;Ramadani,T.1092;P306,pp.17 18,25,29 30;P311,p.1. 1605 M.Krasniqi,T.989,996 997;P305,p.12;P302, mark n.4; P303. See also Sweeney, who interviewed Mehmet Krasniqi, Lutfi Ramadani and other survivors (Sweeney,T.883,886 887,895,912). P297 and P298 are two documentaries produced by Sweeney that contain statements by and images of survivors and of the site of the Batusha barn (see Sweeney,T.880 882,890 894,961,975). 1606 Ramadani,P306,pp.20 21. 1607 M.Krasniqi,T.990 991;P305,p.12. 1608 M.Krasniqi,T.991. 1609 Ramadani,P306,p.22. 1610 M.Krasniqi,P305,pp.12,19. 1611 M.Krasniqi,T.992 993;P305,p.12. 1612 K25,P340 A,p.11. 1613 K25,P340 A,p.11. 1614 K25,P340 A,p.11.
IT-05-87/1-T 161 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6384 women and children.1615 K25, a PJP member, testified he handed over about 5,000 people (men, women and children) to the local police during the operations in the Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel and Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe areas.1616
662. Those who survived the various attacks in Orahovac/Rahovec municipality left for the Albanian border. Military forces in camouflage uniforms were on the roads.1617 When the refugees arrived at the border, policemen took away all their identification documents, telling them that they would live in Albania, and that “Kosovo is Serbian land”.1618
(e) Nogavac/Nagavc
663. Ali Hoti testified that on 25 March 1999 he fled his village after it was encircled by “Serb military forces”. He saw VJ vehicles, tanks, APCs and Pragas moving along the main road to the village.1619 Hoti and his family joined a group of around 20,000 refugees in a valley in the area of Nogavac/Nagavc.1620
664. On the morning of 26 March 1999, the refugees in the valley began to move away in the direction of Nogovac/Nagavc and Velika Kru{a/Krusha e Madhe with the intention of heading to Albania.1621 They were led by an old man who carried a stick with a piece of white cloth attached to it, as a sign of surrender.1622 At the entrance to Nogovac/Nagavc, the convoy of refugees met Serb forces who redirected the group to a school yard in the centre of Nogovac.1623 The refugees remained in the schoolyard for two hours. When nothing happened, the people began to take shelter in empty houses.1624
665. Hoti testified that on 28 March, he was stopped on the street by three men in camouflage uniform who demanded money from him.1625 Some of the other refugees recognized the three men as former neighbours.1626 Hoti was forced to take the three men to the house where he was
1615 K25,P340 A,p.9. 1616 K25,P340,p.9 (under seal). 1617 Hoti,P628,p.20. 1618 Popaj,P1082,p.16;P1083,p.108;Hoti,P628,p.20;M.Krasniqi,T.994. 1619 Hoti,P628,pp.4 6. 1620 Hoti,P628,pp.5 7;P629. 1621 Hoti,P628,pp.7 8. 1622 Hoti,P628,p.7. 1623 Hoti,P628,p.8. 1624 Hoti,P628,pp.8 9. 1625 Hoti,P628,p.21. 1626 Hoti,P628,p.33.
IT-05-87/1-T 162 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6383 staying.1627 At the house, he was ordered to collect money from the male refugees, while one of the uniformed men collected money from the women and children.1628
666. Hoti and his family stayed in Nogovac until 2 April 1999.1629 During that time, Hoti was frequently called on to help the wounded and the elderly.1630 On or about 27 March 1999, Hoti administered first aid to Mehmet Krasniqi, who had sustained severe burns on his hands and face.1631 Krasniqi told Hoti about the execution of 112 men at the Batusha barn in Mala Kru{a/Krusha e Vogel.1632 Krasniqi told Hoti that he survived only because some bodies fell on top of him and shielded him from the bullets and the fire.1633
667. In the early hours of 2 April 1999, Hoti was awakened by the sound of a low flying aircraft.1634 The aircraft bombed and set Nogavac/Nagavc to fire.1635 After the attack, the refugees left Nogavac in the direction of Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe, Prizren, and then on to Albania.1636 As they passed through Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe, they saw that the village was “completely burnt”.1637
668. On the road to the border, Hoti saw military forces in camouflage uniforms.1638 The refugees reached the border late on 2 April 1999 and spent the night there.1639 Before crossing into Albania the next day, policemen in blue uniforms seized all their identification documents and forced them to take off the license plates from their vehicles. The policemen told them that they did not need them anymore because they would never come back to Kosovo and would live in Albania.1640 They also told the refugees that this act was a “present from NATO and Clinton. Kosova is Serbian land.”1641
Destruction of cultural or religious property
669. In the course of the forcible expulsions and deportation of Kosovo Albanians from the Orahovac/Rahovec municipality, forces of the FRY and Serbia systematically burned and looted 1627 Hoti,P628,p.21. 1628 Hoti,P628,pp.21 22. 1629 Hoti,P628,p.9. 1630 Hoti,P628,pp.9 11. 1631 Hoti,P628,p.11. 1632 Hoti,P628,pp.11 12, 14. See M.Krasniqi,P305,pp.12,19. 1633 Hoti,P628,pp.11 14. 1634 Hoti,P628,p.16. 1635 Hoti,P628,p.16. 1636 Hoti,P628,pp.18 19;M.KrasniqiT.992 993;P305,p.12. 1637 Hoti,P628,p.19. 1638 Hoti,P628,p.20. 1639 Hoti,P628,p.20. 1640 Hoti,P628,p.20.
IT-05-87/1-T 163 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6382 houses, shops, cultural monuments and religious sites belonging to Kosovo Albanians.1642 Several mosques were destroyed, including the mosques of Bela Crkva/Bellacërkvë,1643 Brestovac/Brestovc,1644 Velika Kruša/Krushë e Madhe,1645 and Celina/Celinë.1646
670. Popaj testified that the mosques of Celina/Celinë, Bela Crkva/Bellacërkvë and Rogova were blown up on or around 28 March 1999, Bajram day.1647
671. The police blew up the mosque of Celina/Celinë with explosives during the offensive against the village.1648 Policemen in blue camouflaged uniforms1649 drove in an armoured vehicle to the centre of the village and stopped at the mosque. They went inside and remained there for about an hour.1650 Shortly after they left, there was a loud explosion and the mosque was completely blown up.1651 Popaj was in the hills between Bela Crkva/Bellacërka and Celina/Celinë, and was able to hear the explosions.1652 From his position in the hills, Popaj then heard a second explosion.1653 He looked in the direction of Bela Crkva/Bellacërka and saw that the mosque had collapsed.1654 A third explosion followed, which damaged the minaret of the mosque in Rogovo/Rogova.1655
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes in Orahovac/Rahovec municipality
672. Witnesses identified VJ and MUP units and armed local Serbs as perpetrators of the crimes committed in the Orahovac/Rahovec municipality, both through the uniforms they wore and the fact that some of the soldiers and policemen who committed crimes were known to them.
673. Police and army attacked Bela Crkva/Bellacërkvë on 25 March 1999, and set houses on fire. Local policemen were responsible for the killings along the Belaja stream.1656
1. 1641 Hoti,P628,p.20. 1642 See e.g. Salihi,T.3460 3461,3464;P632,pp.2,3;P633,p.8. 1643 See e.g. P1119;P1118;P1120;Riedlmayer,T.7528 7531. 1644 See P1130;P1129;Riedlmayer,T.7541 7542. 1645 See P1127;P1128; Riedlmayer,T.7540. 6D2 acknowledged that religious sites and properties were damaged, including the mosques in Velika Kru{a and Landovica (6D2,T.12308(closed session)). 1646 See P1112,P1114;P638;P634;P1113;Riedlmayer,T.7522 7524. See also P1115. 1647 Popaj,T.7417;P1082,p.15;P1083,pp.5,33 35. See also P1119;P638. 1648 Jemini,P637,pp.13 14;Popaj,P1083,p.35;P638;P634. 1649 Popaj,P1083pp.36,41. 1650 Popaj,P1082,p.15;P1083,p.36. 1651 Popaj,T.7417;P1082,p.15;P1083,p.35;P638. 1652 Popaj,T.7417;P1082,p.15;P1083,p.34. 1653 Popaj,P1083,pp.5,34. 1654 Popaj,P182,p.15;P1083pp.33 34. See also P1119;P1089; Riedlmayer,T.7528 7529;P1118. 1655 Popaj,P1083,p.34;P1090. 1656 Zhuniqi,P1251,p.6;P1253,pp.13,32 33;Popaj,P1082,p.7,11;P1083,pp.8 9,12,107,120 122;P1288.
IT-05-87/1-T 164 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6381 674. The forces that attacked the village of Celina/Celinë on 25 March 1999 were identified as soldiers and policemen.1657 Jemini recognised two commanders as soldiers from Orahovac/Rahovec.1658
675. The forces that surrounded and looted the village of Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel were identified as Serb army and police.1659 Local Serbs participated in the attack on Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel.1660 Some wore uniforms, others wore civilian clothes.1661
676. Serbian military forces were responsible for the attack on Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe.1662
677. K25, a PJP member, testified that his company conducted an operation north of Orahovac/Rahovec in late March/early April 1999.1663 K25 showed the deployment of VJ, police and PJP units in the Orahovac/Prizren area, including the villages of Bela Crkva/Bellacërkvë, Celina/Celinë, Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel and Nogavac/Nagavc.1664 On 25 March 1999, sub units of the 23rd PJP Detachment received oral orders to hold the blockade line from Rogovo to Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel, while the mop up operation was conducted from “the other direction”.1665 The VJ provided mortar fire support to the 23rd PJP detachment from Kro{avina.1666 Members of the 23rd PJP detachment wore green camouflage uniforms, while the local MUP and local PJP wore blue camouflage uniforms.1667
678. There is overwhelming evidence showing that the crimes committed in the Orahovac/Rahovec municipality by forces of the FRY and Serbia were part of an organised operation and that there was co ordination between these forces.1668
679. VJ units operating in Orahovac/Rahovec municipality during the operations in late March/April 1999 included the 549th Motorised Brigade commanded by General Bo`idar Deli}, and
1657 Salihi,P632,pp.2 3;Jemini,P635,pp.6,8;P637,pp.5,37,41,43 45. See also P327. 1658 Jemini,P635,p.8;P637,pp.6 7,49. See also: P639,P641;P640;P642. 1659 Ramadani,P306,pp.2 4,35;T.1115,1165; M.Krasniqi,P305,p.5. 1660 Ramadani,P306, pp.4 5,18 19,38,43;T.1085,1103; M.Krasniqi,T.986 988,1057 1058;P305,p.12. See also P1288,p.2;P1289,p.3;P1293. 1661 Ramadani,P306,pp.4 5,39 40,53,81 83. 1662 Hoti,P628,pp.4 5, 7. 1663 K25,P340 A,p.6. 1664 P349. 1665 K25,P340 A,p.7. 1666 K25,P340 A,p.6;P341,p.37 (under seal). 1667 K25,P340 A,p.20;P342,p.24 (under seal). See also P325. 1668 See Abrahams,P738,pp.26,33. See also P1285.
IT-05-87/1-T 165 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6380 the 243rd Mechanised Brigade, commanded by Krsman Jeli}.1669 Deli} and Jeli} were direct subordinates of Lazarevi}.
680. The 5th company of the Prizren PJP, 37th and 23rd Detachments, and the 4th company of the \akovica PJP were operating in the area.1670 Members of the 4th company of the 37th and 87th PJP Detachments were also sent to Orahovac.1671 Four companies from the SUP Ðakovica were placed under the command of SUP Prizren for this action.1672 Luki} co ordinated the PJP through the MUP Staff.
681. On 23 March 1999, the Joint Command issued an order to “provide assistance to MUP in crushing and destroying terrorist forces in the Orahovac, Suva Reka and Velika Kruša sector”.1673 The order explicitly assigned tasks to units of the 549th Motorised Brigade for the villages of Bela Crkva/Bellacërkvë, Celina/Celinë, Velika Kruša/Krusha e Madhe, and Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel.1674
682. This Joint Command order was implemented at the brigade level, through joint actions of the VJ, MUP and PJP in the villages of Bela Crkva, Celina, Velika Kruša and Mala Kru{a.1675 The tasks for VJ units in co operation with the MUP included “destroy the [TS in Mala Kru{a”, “carry out an energetic attack and search the village of Bela Crvka ₣…ğ destroy [TS in the village of Celina and the village of Nogavac. Seal off Velika Kru{a”.1676 The entry for 25 March 1999 of the War Diary of the 549th Motorized Brigade (2Mtbr) stated that the villages of Bela Crkva, Celina, Nogovac, and a part of Velika Kru{a were blocked and “cleansed”.1677
683. Pursuant to another Joint Command order, another action was carried out in Orahovac/Rahovec municipality between 30 March and 3 April 1999.1678 The PrK, with the support of the “armed non–[iptar population”, was ordered to provide support to MUP forces in an action in the general area of Mališevo/Malisheva.1679 This Joint Command order was implemented down the chain of command. On 29 March 1999, Delić ordered his units to support the MUP forces on the axes of Mali Grab–Pagaruša/Pagarusha village, Velika Hoča/Hoça e Madhe village–Milanović
1669 P350,p.3, items 5.1,5.2;P1317,p.3. See also K89,T.8407,8435,8440,8471(private session);P1274,pp.85 86;P1276. 1670 P1316, items 5.4, 5.5;P1317,p.3. 1671 P1483, which refers to \or|evi}’s dispatch n.218: P134. 1672 K25,P340 A,p.21. 1673 Cf. P350,pp.1 2. 1674 P350,p.3. 1675 P1316,pp.2,4 5. 1676 P1316,items 5.4, 5.5. 1677 D37,p.3. 1678 P970,p.1. 1679 P970,p.2.
IT-05-87/1-T 166 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6379 village, Jančište/Jancishte village and Orahovac/Rahovec–Ostrozub village.1680 Deli}’s post combat report stated that complete control was established over the territory.1681
684. K25 testified that on or about the end of March/beginning of April 1999, four PJP companies were deployed for the operations in the southern area of Orahovac/Rahovec.1682 At the beginning of April 1999, PJP members were deployed to liberate the road from Peć Kula Rožaje.1683 K25 also confirmed that during these operations, co ordination between MUP and VJ forces functioned well.1684
685. K54, a former VJ member, testified that on or about 22 March 1999 his battalion was deployed in Novake, near Orahovac.1685 On 24 March 1999, all units moved from the barracks in anticipation of the NATO bombing.1686 On the morning of the 25 March 1999, they received an order to clean all Albanian villagers, by ordering all people to leave Kosovo and go to Albania. K54 stated that most of the people “were just killed”.1687
686. K89 testified that VJ, MUP and paramilitary forces, including forces he identified as Arkan’s men, were involved in searching the Albanian villages in Orahovac/Rahovec municipality.1688
687. Other documentary evidence in the Trial Record confirms that VJ and MUP forces had full control of the area of Prizren/Orahovac,1689 that the operations in the relevant area continued from 25 March until at least 29 March 1999,1690 that the co ordinated actions between the VJ and the MUP forces were functioning well,1691 and that the command over the forces was under the “joint command of the MUP and the VJ forces”.1692
688. Deli}’s post combat report of 30 March 1999 stated that the objectives of the action were met and that approximately 1000 VJ and 1020 MUP had taken part in the action.1693
1680 P898,p.2. 1681 P944,p.1. 1682 K25,P340,p.8 (under seal). See also P109. 1683 K25,P340,p.6 (under seal). 1684 K25,P342,p.58 (under seal). See also P1317,p.3. 1685 K54,T.4438 4439;P781,p.5,para.2 (under seal). 1686 K54,T.4439 4441;P781,p.5,para.3 (under seal). See also D112. 1687 K54,P781,p.5,para.3 (under seal). 1688 K89,T.8407,8410 8411,8457(private session),8468. 1689 P1317,p.1. 1690 P1317,p.1. 1691 P1317,p.3, para.2. 1692 P1317,p.5. 1693 P1317,pp.1,3,para.2.
IT-05-87/1-T 167 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6378 2. Prizren
689. Beginning on 25 March 1999, numerous villages in Prizren municipality were attacked by Serb police and military forces. They shelled villages, burned down homes and cultural sights,1694 and expelled and killed villagers. The villages of Pirane, Srbica, Landovica, Du{anovo, Reti e Ulet, Reti, and Randobrava were all attacked.
690. In the days after the NATO airstrikes began, Xhafer Beqiraj, a resident of Prizren town, saw a “continuous column” of people walking south from Dakovica. They were escorted by mixed forces of police, paramilitaries, and VJ.1695 In Prizren town there was heavy presence of Serb police manning checkpoints and patrolling the streets.1696 There were also paramilitaries based in the near by village of Nashec.1697
691. On 28 March, police forces came to the home where Beqiraj and his family had been staying and ordered everyone to leave in five minutes or be shot.1698 The same ultimatum was given to people sheltering in neighbouring houses.1699
692. Beqiraj and his group boarded a tractor trailer and left in a long convoy of expelled Albanians.1700 During their 12 hour trip to the border, they were directed and ordered by police, and threatened that if they got off the tractor, they would be killed.1701 Police and paramilitaries cursed at and threatened them, taunting, “Where is NATO?” and “Go to Albania.”1702
693. Beqiraj recognized police special forces wearing blue camouflage uniforms and bullet proof vests.1703 Other men had black masks or painted faces with black and red bandanas on their heads.1704 During the journey he also saw the VJ with mortars and APCs.1705 The soldiers were wearing green uniforms, and drove green tanks and armoured vehicles.1706
1694 Riedlmayer,P1099,p.99;P1098,p.12. 1695 Beqiraj,P806,p.3. 1696 Beqiraj,T.4797 4798. Beqiraj described the policemen as wearing “blue uniforms, camouflage blue”. See Beqiraj, T.4797 4798. 1697 Beqiraj,P806,p.3;T.4798. Beqiraj described the paramilitaries as wearing green and green camouflage uniforms; they were generally older (40 and above) than regular soldiers, and drove cars that were painted in different colours. See Beqiraj,P806,p.3;T.4798. 1698 Beqiraj,P806,p.3;T.4800;P805,pp.23 24. 1699 Beqiraj,T.4800. 1700 Beqiraj,P806,p.4. 1701 Beqiraj,P806,p.4;T.4802. 1702 Beqiraj,P806,pp.4 5;T.4803 4807. 1703 Beqiraj,P806,p.4;T.4801,4803. 1704 Beqiraj,P806,p.4;T.4803. 1705 Beqiraj,P806,p.4;T.4803. 1706 Beqiraj,P806,p.4; T.4804 4805;P318, nn.2,6,7.
IT-05-87/1-T 168 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6377 694. At the Morina border crossing,1707 Beqiraj’s tractor was stopped by five policemen, who asked for the identification papers of all the people on the tractor.1708 A policeman in a plain blue police uniform also took the license plate off the tractor and threw it to the side of the road.1709 The identification papers were either torn up or thrown in a huge pile of other documents.1710 “Everyone was subjected to the same procedure.”1711
(a) Pirane
695. On 25 March, in the early morning hours, forces of the FRY and Serbia surrounded and shelled Pirane.1712 The police shot and set houses on fire until they burned down almost the whole village.1713 Through a free corridor, the majority of the residents started fleeing towards the village of Mamusha, while another part of the villagers moved towards Srbica.1714
(b) Srbica
696. On 25 March, refugees fleeing from other villages of Prizren municipality arrived in Srbica.1715 The next day, about 70 policemen entered the village of Srbica and started shooting at the tractors of refugees.1716
697. On 8 April, Serb soldiers and paramilitary re entered Srbica.1717 They called the local Serbs “traitors” because they were sheltering Albanian refugees in their village, and ordered them to expel their Albanian neighbours within twenty four hours.1718 The next day, local Serbs arranged buses on which all the refugees were driven in the direction of Zhur, on the Albanian border.1719 Police escorted the refugees.1720 From Zhur, they had to walk for about 6 kilometres to reach the border.1721 Before crossing the border into Albania, police confiscated the IDs from the refugees and threw them on a pile of similar documents.1722
1707 Beqiraj,T.4809 4810;P807. 1708 Beqiraj,P806,p.5;T.4807. 1709 Beqiraj,P806,p.5. 1710 Beqiraj,P806,p.5;T.4808. 1711 Beqiraj,T.4808. 1712 Latifi,T.4348,4351 4352;P778,p.2;P779,pp.5 6. 1713 Latifi,T.4348;P778,p.2;P779,pp.7 8; See also, Morina,P284,pp.4,39. 1714 Latifi,T.4350,4352 4353;P778,p.3. 1715 Latifi,P778,p.3;P779,p.9. 1716 Latifi,P778,p.3. 1717 Morina,P283,p.4. 1718 Morina,P283,p.4;P284,pp.34 36,61,77. 1719 Morina,P283,p.5;P284,p.34. See also Latifi,P779,pp.9,38;P778,p.3. 1720 Morina,P283,p.5;P284,p.34. 1721 Morina,P284,p.35. 1722 Morina,P283,p.5;P284,pp.36 37.
IT-05-87/1-T 169 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6376 698. On 25 April, Serb forces started a major offensive in the area of Srbica, and from there began shelling the villages of Pirana, Reti e Ulet, Reti and Randobrava.1723 At the border crossing in Morine, refugees had their personal documents taken away.1724
(c) Landovica
699. On 26 March, MUP, VJ, and paramilitary forces arrived to Landovica in tanks, APCs, and Pragas.1725 They shelled the village, injuring and killing civilians, and burned houses at the outskirts of town.1726 Serb soldiers and police then entered the village and went from house to house, causing villagers to flee in different directions.1727
700. The next day, VJ soldiers went back to Landovica, entered the mosque and blew it up.1728 The minaret fell down, and the roof of the mosque was destroyed.1729 Those soldiers were wearing regular Serb army uniforms and had white ribbons on their arms.1730
(d) Du{anovo
701. On 28 March, forces of the FRY and Serbia attacked the Prizren suburb of Du{anovo1731 with tanks and armoured vehicles, firing at houses.1732 They sealed off the main streets.1733
702. Police broke into Rexhep Krasniqi’s house, and told everyone to leave for Albania.1734 Police then threatened, beat and robbed them.1735 Then a mixed group of police and military personnel set the houses of the neighbourhood on fire.1736
703. The same thing happened in almost every house in the neighbourhood: around 4,000 to 5,000 people were forced out of Dušanovo, and a convoy was formed that moved towards the border.1737
1723 Latifi,P778,p.3;P779,p.39. 1724 Latifi,T.4358;P778,p.3. 1725 Morina,P283,p.2;P284,pp.2,8,11 13. 1726 Morina,P283,p.2;P284,p.15. 1727 Morina,P283,p.3;P284,pp.15 17,22,24. 1728 Morina,P283,p.4. 1729 Morina,P283,p.4;P284,pp.27 28,59;P1123;P1124; Riedlmayer,T.7536 7539;P1099,pp.79 80. See also P1124. 1730 Morina,P284,pp.27,29. 1731 Kryeziu,P878,p.3; R.Krasniqi,P850,p.3. 1732 Kryeziu,P877,p.9;P878,p.7;P318. 1733 R.Krasniqi,P849,p.13. 1734 R.Krasniqi,T.5418 5419,5428;P849,p.13;P850,pp.30 31;P848,p.2. 1735 R.Krasniqi,P849,p.13;P850,p.9;P848,p.2. 1736 R.Krasniqi,P849,p.14;P850,p.10. 1737 R.Krasniqi,P848,p.2;Kryeziu,T.5569 5570,5593 5594,5601 5603;P878,p.7;P876,p.3;P318.
IT-05-87/1-T 170 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6375 704. At the Albanian border in Kukes, policemen asked people for money, stole cars, and took identification documents and license plates.1738 Two witnesses recognised a policeman called Nebojsa, a Serb living in the village of Du{anovo.1739
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes in Prizren municipality
705. As described above, several witnesses identified VJ, MUP and paramilitary forces as perpetrators of these crimes, either through the uniforms they wore, or because they knew some of the policemen committing the crimes.1740
706. Documentary and insider evidence corroborates their observations. The 549th Motorised Brigade operated in Prizren, commanded by General Bozidar Deli}, a direct subordinate of Lazarevi}.1741 MUP units in the area included the 5th PJP company from Prizren,1742 the 4th PJP company from \akovica, the 87th PJP Detachment and the 37th PJP Detachment of Ni{.1743 The 37th and the 87th PJP Detachment was dispatched to the area of the SUP Prizren by \or|evi}.1744 VJ and MUP units carried out joint combat actions in late March 1999 in the Prizren/Orahovac areas.1745
3. Srbica/Skenderaj
707. Beginning on 25 March 1999, the MUP and the VJ shelled several ethnic Albanian villages in Srbica/Skenderaj municipality,1746 including Vojnike/Vocnjak, Leocina/Lecine,1747 Kladernica/Klladernicë,1748 Turicevac/Turiçec,1749 Tusilje/Tushile1750 and Izbica/Izbicë.1751 Houses, shops and mosques were destroyed, including the mosque in the village of Cirez/Qirez.1752
1738 Kryeziu,T.5571;P877,p.10;P876,p.4;R.Krasniqi,T.5400 5401,5438 5439;P849,p.14;P848,p.3. 1739 Kryeziu,P877,p.10;R.Krasniqi,P849,p.14. 1740 See also Kryeziu, who recognised one of the perpetrators as Milo{ Sceki}, a local Serb police commander. P877,p.9;P878 p.4. 1741 P1316,p.2;P1317,p.3;P1445,pp.2 4. See also K82,P1314,para.2 (under seal); P1315,para.2;T.8855 (private session); K54,P782,p.5. 1742 P1316,p.2;P1317,pp.3,4. 1743 P1316,pp.2 4,paras.2,5.4,5.5;P1317,p.3;P711;P713. 1744 P711;P713;P134;P1183;P1197;P1485. 1745 See P1285;P350,pp.1 2;P1316. 1746 Loshi,T.763. 1747 Draga,T.604,620,654;Januzi,P282,p.6. 1748 Januzi,P282,p.7;P281,p.2. 1749 Fazliu,P621,p.10;P623,p.6. 1750 Fazliu,P623,pp.5 6;P621,pp.3 5,12 13;P622;P823,p.11. 1751 Loshi,T.691 692. 1752 Riedlmayer,T.7544 7546,7630 7631;P1132;P1133;P1134.
IT-05-87/1-T 171 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6374 (a) Izbica/Izbicë
708. As a result of the attacks throughout Srbica/Skenderaj municipality, on or about 26 March 1999, thousands of civilians fled to the village of Izbica/Izbicë, where they gathered in a meadow.1753 They remained out in the open for a few days.1754
709. By 27 March 1999, a mixed group of about 200 300 MUP and VJ encircled Izbica/Izbicë. They heavily shelled the village and set fire to many of the houses.1755 Many civilians fled to Tusilje/Tushile, however a few thousand people remained.1756
710. On 28 March 1999, MUP and VJ forces approached the group of refugees in the meadow.1757 After stealing their valuables, the soldiers separated the men from the women and children.1758 The women and children were ordered to go to Albania.1759
711. Over 100 men were ordered to sit in rows along the road. The police and the army harassed the men, telling them: “Where is NATO now? Where is Clinton?” The men were forced to throw their traditional caps (plis) in the mud and put them back on.1760 The commander issued orders to the police and soldiers,1761 including “[e]verbody knows their own duty”1762 and not to leave any man alive.1763 Approximately 150 elderly men were divided into two groups and taken in different directions: around 30 men were taken to a stream and a larger group was led up a hill.1764 Police shot both groups of men, killing at least 116.1765 Only a few survived.1766 One of the survivors, Sadik Januzi, heard soldiers checking whether anyone was still alive, firing some additional shots and then he heard one of them saying: “Let’s go, our work is over”.1767
712. In total, approximately 147 civilians, mainly elderly men, were killed on 28 March 1999 in Izbica/Izbicë.1768 Several women were burned alive while on tractors.1769
1753 Januzi,P282,p.6;Thaqi,T.4944,4948,4950 4953,4956;P819;Loshi,T.690;Draga,T.605. 1754 Thaqi,T.4948. 1755 Draga,T.606 607;Loshi,T.691 692;Januzi,P282,p.6. 1756 Loshi,T.691 693,707;P288. 1757 Draga,T.605,607,610,663;Thaqi,T.4948,4953,4956;Loshi,T.690 691;P288,clip 4. Januzi,P282,p.6.Draga,T.607 608. 1758 Januzi,P282,pp.6 7;Draga,T.607. 1759 Draga,T.609. 1760 Draga,T.607;Januzi,P282,pp.6 7;Thaqi,T.4962. 1761 Januzi,P282,p.7;Thaqi,T.4962. 1762 Thaqi,T.49623 1763 Januzi,P282,p.7. 1764 Loshi,T.707;P288; Draga,T.608. 609;Januzi,P282,p.7. 1765 Draga,T.610. 1766 Januzi,P282,p.7;Draga,T.610 611. 1767 Januzi,P282,p.7. 1768 See Schedule F;Draga,T.607 608,612,616,678;Loshi,T.704 706;Draga,T.607 608.
IT-05-87/1-T 172 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6373 713. MUP and VJ forces remained in Izbica/Izbicë until 30 March 1999.1770 On 31 March 1999, civilians and KLA members buried the victims of the Izbica/Izbicë massacre.1771 A list of 127 victims and their grave locations was compiled,1772 111 of which are named victims in Schedule F. Survivors of the massacre, Mustafa Draga and Milazim Thaqi, testified that they buried about 147 bodies, with some bodies taken by family members to be buried elsewhere.1773
714. Liri Loshi, a local doctor, filmed the massacre sites and burials.1774 Loshi smuggled his video into Albania and provided it to ICTY investigators in Tirana and the press.1775
715. After news of the massacre came out in the media, authorities were obliged to carry out an investigation. VJ forces went to Izbica/Izbicë and exhumed the bodies of the victims in late May 1999.1776 A team from the Belgrade Forensic Institute carried out an external examination of the bodies.1777
716. Remains of 20 victims were found in a clandestine mass grave in Petrovo Selo in 2001.1778 Once the victims were identified through DNA analysis, the OMPF conducted forensic examinations to establish the cause of death. Based on the pattern of injuries observed on skeleton fragments, Jose Pablo Baraybar, the head of OMPF, concluded that the victims had died from gunshot wounds .1779
717. Defence expert Stanković made a number of baseless claims in relation to the Izbica/Izbicë massacre.1780 For example, he claimed that it was impossible for approximately 150 victims to have been killed by gunfire, since only 84 military bullet fragments were collected from the site by the French forensic team in June 1999.1781 Given that the massacre site was disturbed in May when the VJ exhumed the bodies of the victims, the absence of cartridges on site in June is not sufficient basis to conclude that fewer victims were killed. Stankovi} also claimed that the bodies shown in
1. 1769 Draga,T.615;Loshi,T.703;T.707 708. 1770 Draga,T.613. 1771 Draga,T.613 614,616;Thaqi,T.4980. 1772 Loshi,T.709 710,717 718;P292;Draga,T.617,673;Loshi,T.708;P288. See Annex C, Proof of Death Chart for Schedule F. 1773 Draga,T.616;Thaqi,T.5020 2021. 1774 Loshi,T.699 701,801. 1775 Loshi,T.719 721. 1776 Draga,T.618 620;Thaqi,T.4983,4984;Loshi,T.721 726;P293. 1777 P1344,pp.156 157;Stankovi},T.13514 13515. 1778 See supra para.600. 1779 Baraybar,P453,pp.5 6,33 40. 1780 D926,pp.10 11. 1781 D926,p.10.para.1;Stankovi},T.13449 13450,13511 13516.
IT-05-87/1-T 173 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6372 Loshi’s video had been brought from elsewhere, because they had mud on their shoes.1782 However, in cross examination he conceded that this was a mere assumption from his part and that there were other possible explanations.1783 Stankovi}’s conclusions in relation to this site should be disregarded.
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes in Izbica/Izbicë
718. Joint Command orders and VJ reports indicate that VJ and MUP units conducted joint operations in Srbica/Skenderaj municipality in the period of the Izbica/Izbicë massacre.1784
• On 22 March 1999, the Joint Command ordered the 125th Motorised Brigade, 37th Motorised Brigade and seven PJP companies to conduct a joint action along the eastern side of Srbica/Skenderaj.1785 On 24 March 1999, the Joint Command issued an order for an attack on villages near Izbica/Izbicë, including Kladernica/Klladernicë and Vocnjak/Vojnik.1786
• In an operations report of 27 March 1999, the 37th Infantry Brigade Commander, \ikovi}, reported to Lazarević that the brigade was to “[c]ontinue with the planned activities in line with the decision to smash and destroy [TS in the Drenica sector”.1787
• In combat report of 28 March, Ðiković asked Lazarević for instructions on what to do with the thousands of civilian refugees that his brigade was expecting to encounter in the Vocnjak/Vojnik village sector, outside Izbica/Izbicë.1788
• That same day, the Joint Command ordered the 37th Motorised Brigade that “[u]pon completion of the task in Drenica […] take control of Srbica …”.1789 Lazarevi} issued an order to the 37th Motorised Brigade, implementing the Joint Command’s order.1790
• The 125th Motorised Brigade recorded that three combat groups were involved in coordinated combat operations in the Srbica sector.1791
• On 29 March, the 37th Motorised Brigade reported that the KLA did not carry out any operations against its unit members while they carried out their scheduled activities.1792 The
1782 Stankovi},T.13522–13523;P288. 1783 Stankovi},T.13524 13525. 1784 See P970;P897;P972;P971;P940. See also P1029,p.141. 1785 P972,pp.2–3;P823,p.6. 1786 P971,pp.3,5,7;P823,p.5. 1787 P940,p.2. 1788 P942,p.2;P823,p.5. 1789 P970,p.8. 1790 P897. 1791 P954,pp.8–9.
IT-05-87/1-T 174 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6371 report contained no mention of the thousands of refugees referred to in the combat report of 28 March.
• On 29 March 1999, units of the 125th Motorised Brigade reported that it had successfully completed combat operations and were “regrouping” and preparing for its next tasks.1793
719. Survivors of the massacre identified the perpetrators as police and soldiers. Thaqi found it very difficult to describe colours with their names, but could identify them in a picture.1794 He said that about 25 “policemen” in the meadow wore “police clothes”.1795 Thaqi identified the camouflage pattern of these men’s uniforms.1796 The pattern identified is blue camouflage. Thaqi said that he thought that all men in the field had the “milicija” insignia on their uniform’s shoulder”.1797 This insignia belonged to the “police forces of Serbia”.1798
720. Thaqi described the commander as a “soldier”,1799 and identified his uniform’s camouflage pattern.1800 The pattern identified is green, black, and light and dark brown.1801
721. Thaqi said that his shooter “looked like a policeman”.1802 He identified the camouflage pattern on the shooter’s uniform.1803 The pattern identified is green, black and brown.
722. Thaqi saw “soldiers” or “policemen” who wore “the army uniform” which was “the colour of grass”.1804 These “soldiers” or “policemen” participated in the separations and harassment of the civilians.1805 Thaqi also saw paramilitaries with black scarves, hats with a “five pointed star”/“Petokraka”, knives and weapons.1806 Their uniforms were “the same colour as the army’s”.1807
1. 1792 P915,p.1. 1793 P954,p.11. 1794 Thaqi,T.5044. 1795 Thaqi,T.4956–4958,4987,5029–5030,5033–5034,5044;P318;D126,p.4. 1796 P822, nbr.2;Thaqi,T.4986. See also P318;Thaqi,T.4958,4987,4991–4993;D121. But see Thaqi,D126,p.3;T.5028– 5029. 1797 Thaqi,T.4989–4990,5044;P318. 1798 Thaqi,T.4989–4990;P318. 1799 Thaqi,T.5034–5035. See also Thaqi,D125,pp.26–29. 1800 P822,no.1;Thaqi,T.4986;D126,p.4. 1801 Thaqi,T.4963,5010;D125,p.9. 1802 Thaqi,T.4966,5035–5036. But see D225,p.31,47. 1803 P822,no.3;Thaqi,T.4986,4988. See also Thaqi,T.4966,5035–5036;D126,p.5. 1804 Thaqi,T.4958–4959;D125,p.8. 1805 Thaqi,T.4962. 1806 Thaqi,T.4958–4959,5036,5041. See also Thaqi,D125,pp.7–8. 1807 Thaqi,T.5037.
IT-05-87/1-T 175 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6370 723. Draga said that the Serb police and the army arrived in Izbica/Izbicë on 28 March 1999, separated the men and women and escorted the men to be killed.1808 Only police shot at his group.1809 Draga said that men were wearing uniforms in “[b]oth police and military colours”,1810 but did not dare to look at the forces because he was afraid of being shot.1811 In his witness statement, Januzi referred to “soldiers” as engaging in the activities described above.1812
(b) Turicevac/Turiçec
724. On 29 March 1999, a number of Turicevac/Turiçec residents returned to their village believing that since the houses in the village had already been burnt, Serbian forces would not return. However, on 1 April 1999, uniformed forces driving civilian cars returned.1813 They shot at and harassed the civilians, who were primarily women and children.1814 After being questioned about the whereabouts of any men, the civilians were ordered to join a convoy to Klinë/Klina.1815 On her way out of the village Fazliu saw the bodies of three men.1816
725. On the way to Klinë/Klina, Fazliu saw Serbian forces looting and burning houses and livestock as they passed through villages.1817 She also saw a lot of dead bodies of men along the road,1818 multiple checkpoints manned by Serb forces,1819 and many soldiers with tanks and armoured vehicles.1820 The forces continually directed the convoy to Klinë/Klina.1821
726. Klinë/Klina was full of MUP and VJ.1822 The refugees were put onto trucks and transported to Volujak/Volljake.1823 There were soldiers and tanks all along the road to Volujak/Volljake.1824 They were then forced to walk on foot to \akovica/Gjakove.1825 When the convoy reached \akovica/Gjakovë the next day, they found the town in flames.1826
1808 Draga,T.607,610. 1809 Draga,T.664. 1810 Draga,T.610. 1811 Draga,T.623. 1812 P282,pp.6–7. 1813 Fazliu,P623,p.6. 1814 Fazliu,P623,pp.6 7;P621,pp.10 11. 1815 Fazliu,P623,p.6;P621,pp.12 13;P622. 1816 Fazliu,P623,p.6;P621,pp.11 12. 1817 Fazliu,P623,p.7. 1818 Fazliu,P623,p.7. 1819 Fazliu,P623,p.7. 1820 Fazliu,P623,p.6. 1821 Fazliu,P623,p.7. 1822 Fazliu,P623,p.7. 1823 Fazliu,P623,p.7. 1824 Fazliu,P623,p.7. 1825 Fazliu,P623,p.7. 1826 Fazliu,P623,p.7.
IT-05-87/1-T 176 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6369 727. Convoys of civilians were then directed to the Albanian border.1827 There was a large presence of Serbian forces between \akovica/Gjakovë and the border crossing of Ćafa Prušit/Qafa e Prushit.1828 The forces warned the civilians to walk on the road because there were mines on the sides.1829
728. At the Ćafa Prušit/Qafa e Prushit checkpoint, Fazliu saw parked tractors and vehicles in the area with no license plates.1830 Fazliu and her family crossed the Albanian border on 4 April 1999.1831
(c) Kladernica/Klladernicë
729. Shortly after the Izbica/Izbicë massacre, Serb forces shelled the village of Kladernica/Klladernicë.1832 Joint forces of MUP, VJ and paramilitaries forced approximately 400 500 young men to accompany them, and then ordered the women, children and elderly men to head towards Albania, telling them that Kosovo was not their place.1833 Serb forces composed mainly of MUP escorted them all the way to the border, first on foot and then in buses.1834
730. On the road to the border, Januzi saw soldiers pointing their weapons at his convoy and burning villages.1835 In @ur/Zhur, many refugees were ordered to hand over money to be taken closer to the border.1836 At the Albanian border, Serb policemen took the refugees’ ID cards and threw them into a garbage bin.1837
4. Suva Reka/Suharekë municipality
731. In the 1990s, the majority of 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Suva Reka/Suharekë municipality were Kosovo Albanians.1838 Suva Reka/Suharekë town, with some 8,000 residents, was the biggest town.1839
732. On 20 March 1999, VJ and MUP forces launched an attack on several villages in Suva Reka/Suharekë municipality, including Re{tane/Reshtan, Slapu`ane/Sllapuzhan, Pecane/Peqan, 1827 Fazliu,P623,p.7. 1828 Fazliu,P623,p.8. 1829 Fazliu,P623,p.8. 1830 Fazliu,P623,p.8. 1831 Fazliu,P623,p.8. 1832 Januzi,P282,p.7;P281,p.2. 1833 Januzi,P281,p.2. See P282,p.7 8. 1834 Januzi,P281,pp.2 4;P282,p.8. 1835 Januzi,P282,p.8. 1836 Januzi,P281,p.4. 1837 Januzi,P282,p.8;P281,p.4. 1838 Halit Berisha,P599,p.7.
IT-05-87/1-T 177 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6368 Semeti{te/Semetisht, Studencane/Studençan, Samodra`a/Samadrexhë, Dobredoljane/Dobërdolan, Bllacë, Grejcevce/Greiçec, Budakovo/Budakovë, and Kru{cica/Krushicë. These attacks were not only directed at KLA positions but also targeted ordinary civilians and resulted in considerable civilian casualties. Following these attacks, thousands of civilians fled to Pagaru{a/Pagarushë and Belanica/Bellanicë.1840
733. When the NATO bombing started, MUP and VJ presence increased in Suva Reka/Suharekë town.1841 They were heavily armed and set up sniper and mortar positions around town.1842 The MUP wore blue camouflage uniforms while the VJ wore green camouflage uniforms.1843 They were joined by armed local Serbs.1844
734. During the following days, policemen went from house to house, threatening, assaulting and killing Kosovo Albanian residents, and expelling many of them from their homes at gunpoint.1845 Halit Berisha’s neighbour, a policeman, told him to go to Albania or he would be killed.1846 Houses belonging to Kosovo Albanians were looted and burnt.1847
735. By 31 March 1999, thousands of Kosovo Albanians displaced from different villages in Suva Reka/Suharekë and other municipalities had gathered in Bellanica/Bellanicë.1848 The KLA had left the village at the end of March 1999.1849
736. On 1 or 2 April 1999, VJ, MUP and paramilitaries arrived outside Bellanica/Bellanicë and shelled the village and neighbouring villages.1850 The heavily armed forces wore blue police uniforms, green army uniforms, and black paramilitary uniforms.1851 They killed and robbed the refugees and set fire to houses.1852
1. 1839 Halit Berisha,T.3396;P599,p.7. 1840 Zogaj,P615,pp.5 6;P616,p.6;Fondaj,P627,p.6;P626,pp.4 6. See also P944. 1841 Hysni Berisha,P584,p.5. 1842 Halit Berisha,P598,p.2,P600,pp.11 13;P599,pp.8 11,48 49,56 57;T.3393,3418. Halit Berisha made the following markings on P613: A(post office building);B(police station);C(tower); D(the pizzeria or café where the Berisha family massacre occurred), E (old post office);F(Balkan Hotel);G(Halit Berisha’s house);H(mosque). 1843 Halit Berisha,P598,p.2;P599,pp.48 49,56 58;T.3393 3394,3418. See also Hysni Berisha,P584,p.5. 1844 Halit Berisha,P599,pp.56 58;P600,p.13.T.3392 3393,3418. See also Halit Berisha,P598,p.2. 1845 Halit Berisha,T.3379;3405 3406;P599,pp.50 54;P598,p.3;P600,pp.18 19. See also T.3415. 1846 Halit Berisha,P598,p.3. 1847 Veljkovi},T.7063;Hysni Berisha,P584,pp.5 6. 1848 Zogaj,P615,pp.5 6;P616,p.6;Fondaj,P627,p.6;P626,pp.4 6. See also P944. 1849 Zyrapi,P428,p.72 82;P452;Fondaj,P626,p.5. 1850 Zogaj,T.3424;P615,p.7;P616,p.5,7;P617,pp.92 93. 1851 Zogaj,T.3439;P617,pp.19,24,48,60 62. Fondaj,P627,p.6,P626,pp.6 7. See also P615,p.7 1852 Zogaj,T.3424 3425;P.615,pp.7 9;P616,pp.7 8;Fondaj,p.626,pp.6 9;P627,p.7.
IT-05-87/1-T 178 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6367 737. The refugees were directed by these forces towards Albania.1853 Along the way, they were maltreated, robbed and taunted by the same forces, who said that they “will never come back to Kosovo,” and that “Kosovo has been and will be Serbian soil.”1854 At Mališevo/Malishevë, Fondaj saw thousands waiting for buses to take them to the border.1855 At the Albanian border, Serb policemen took the refugees’ identity cards.1856 Zogaj was told, “Don't even look at Kosova anymore. Kosova is Albania Kosova is Serbia. Go to Albania.”1857
738. On 21 May 1999, armed paramilitaries and policemen in blue camouflage uniforms expelled the residents remaining in Suva Reka/Suharekë.1858 One of them said, they would “never see this land again”.1859 This expulsion had clearly been organised in advance as transport was arranged for those who did not have their own transport.1860 At Kukeš and Morina border crossings, the police confiscated the refugees’ ID cards and the licence plates of their cars.1861
Destruction of cultural property and religious sites
739. On 28 March 1999, soldiers dynamited the minaret of the Suva Reka/Suharekë mosque.1862 6D2, said the mosque was “most likely” damaged by a NATO bomb but he did not witness the incident or participate in the investigation.1863 His testimony is thus unreliable and is contradicted by Riedlmayer who testified that the damage to the mosque was inconsistent with an outside projectile.1864
(a) Murder of the Berisha family
740. On 25 March 1999, Shyhrete Berisha, a Kosovo Albanian woman who lived in Suva Reka/Suharekë saw a “tank with wheels” facing her house.1865 The police looted her home and forced her family to leave.1866 They beat her husband Nexhat Berisha, and said: “Now the
1853 Zogaj,T.3425 3426;P617,pp.22 23;P615,p.10;Fondaj,P627,p.7;P626,p.9. 1854 Zogaj,T.3426;P615,pp.8 9,11 12;P617,pp.20 21,84 85;Fondaj,P626,p.8;P627,p.7. 1855 Fondaj,P626,p.10;P627,p.7. 1856 Zogaj,T.3426;P615,p.11:P616,p.10;Fondaj,P626,pp.36 37,P627,p.8. 1857 Zogaj,T.3426;P615,p.11;P616,pp.9 10;P617,p.55. 1858 Hysni Berisha,P584,pp.8 9;Halit Berisha,P.598,p.4. 1859 Halit Berisha,T.3410,P599,pp.20 21;P598,p.4. 1860 Hysni Berisha,P584,p.9;P598,p.4. 1861 Halit Berisha,T.3411 3414,P598,p.4. 1862 Halit Berisha,T.3387 3389;3420;P598,p.3;P599,pp.16 17,76 79;P600,p.15;P614,p.1; See also T.3416;P614,p. 2. 1863 6D2,T.12308,12357 (closed session). 1864 Riedlmayer,T.7643 7644. See also, T.7519 7521;P1111;P1099,pp.51 53;P614. 1865 S.Berisha,T.470;P274. S.Berisha marked her house (number 3), Agron’s house (number 1), and the tank (number 2). 1866 S.Berisha,T.464 474;P271. See also Halit Berisha,P599,pp 11 12;P598,pp.2 3.
IT-05-87/1-T 179 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6366 Americans should come and defend you. You asked them for help so Father Clinton should come and help you now”.1867
741. On 26 March 1999, VJ and MUP forces started shelling.1868 There were two tanks with gun/cannons pointing at the Berisha houses.1869
742. That morning, two camouflage military coloured lorries arrived.1870 Policemen exited and set out to the houses opposite the police station.1871 They were led by “^egar 1,”1872 which is the code name1873 for Radomir Mitrovi}, commander of the 37th PJP (Ni{) Detachment.1874 “^egar 1,” started yelling at Assistant Commander Jovanovi}. He said, “What are you waiting for? Go after these men who came to assist.”1875 Jovanovi} ordered K83, Radovan Tanovi}, Sla|an ^ukari} (“Jajce”) and Miki Petkovi} to head to the former OSCE house (Shyhrete Berisha’s home).1876 ^ukari} and Tanovi} (duty policemen) ordered K83 and Petkovi} (reserve policemen) to provide cover for them.1877 K83 heard ^egar 1’s unit shooting at the houses.1878
743. Amongst the men who came to the house, Shyhrete Berisha recognised “Zoran,” as did Drilon and Sedat Berisha.1879 She knew Zoran well because he was a Serb who lived and worked in Suva Reka/Suharekë and spoke Albanian well.1880 She also recognised Zoran’s voice.1881 Shyhrete Berisha recognised “Mi{kovi},” a policemen from Suva Reka/Suharekë whom she knew well.1882
1867 S.Berisha,T.471 472. 1868 Hysni Berisha,P584,p.5. 1869 S.Berisha,T.476 477. 1870 K83,T.378,381. For the position of the lorries, see “A” on P270. 1871 K83,T.378. For the position of the police station, refer to marking C on P270. S.Berisha,T.477; See also Hysni Berisha,P584,p.5. 1872 K83,T.380. For the position of Cegar 1, see “B” on P270. 1873 K83,T.379 382;P270 indicates the positions of the trucks (A), K83 (X), ^egar 1 next to a Jeep, facing the police station (B) and police station (C) 1874 K83,T.405 406. 1875 K83,T.381. 1876 For the position of OSCE building, see “D” on P270. K83,T.382; Hysni Berisha,P584,pp.5 6. 1877 K83,T.377,383; Veljkovi},T.7042,7075. For K83’s position behind a house by the OSCE building and Petkovi}, see “E” and “L” respectively on P270. 1878 K83,T.383;Veljkovi},T.7046,7048(private session),7049. 1879 S.Berisha, T.478. S.Berisha accepted that she was unable to identify Zoran Petkovi} during the proceedings in Belgrade in a line–up because his physical appearance had changed since the incident (T.540) However, she was adamant that she recognised Zoran’s voice, when he called for Bujar on 26 March because it was the loudest voice among the perpetrators, and he spoke Albanian well (T.480,485,538 540). The lack of clarity about recognising Zoran’s voice seems to be caused by S.Berisha saying that she had never spoken to Zoran before; this appears to have led to the assumption that she could not recognise his voice. However, as clarified in re examination, even though S.Berisha had not personally spoken to Zoran, she recognised his voice as she had heard him speak before and knew him from around town. 1880 S.Berisha,T.480. 1881 S.Berisha,T.480. See also S.Berisha,T.485,538 540. 1882 S.Berisha,T.481.
IT-05-87/1-T 180 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6365 “Mi{kovi}” shot her husband, Nexhat.1883 Bujar, Faton, Fatime, Nexhmedin and Lirija Berisha were also killed by the policemen.1884
744. Shyhrete Berisha and her family fled and gathered near the shopping centre.1885 The policemen herded them into the café and shouted that they would kill all Albanians, and fired their automatic weapons at the family.1886 The police later threw explosives into the shop.1887 K83, who was at the café with Petkovi}, said that ^ukari} and Tanovi} were throwing hand grenades and were shooting.1888 Shyhrete Berisha recognised Zoran’s voice.1889 When the policemen saw someone alive, they would shoot to kill.1890 Jashar Berisha was also murdered on 26 March.1891
745. At least 47 members of the Berisha family were killed on 26 March 1999.1892 Those shot in the pizzeria were predominantly women and children.1893
746. Two trucks then arrived from the direction of Prizren and were loaded with bodies from the pizzeria and driven back in that direction.1894 Shyhrete Berisha and the two other survivors were loaded with the other bodies.1895 They managed to jump off the truck en route to Prizren.1896
747. After the murders, Veljkovi} learnt from a colleague that orders had come from the MUP in Belgrade that the killings should stop and that the Albanian population should leave town.1897 Local Albanians began departing and heading towards Albania.1898 Having fled Suva Reka following the massacre, Shyhrete Berisha crossed into Albania at Kukës in early May 1999.1899 Policemen there took money and identity documents.1900
1883 S.Berisha,T.481. 1884 S.Berisha,T.481 483;P272. See also K83,T.385, 404 405; Veljkovi},T.7046,7049,7079 7080. 1885 S.Berisha,T.483; K83,T.384. For the position of the pizzeria, see P270, mark “G”. Veljkovi},T.7046,7126 7128;P1070;D309. Note: witnesses used “pizzeria” or “café” interchangeably when referring to the massacre site. 1886 S.Berisha,T.484,486,488;P275, mark “1”; K83,T.386 387. 1887 S.Berisha, T.485;K83,T.389. Veljkovi} heard gunshots and an explosion from the direction of Re{tanski Put between the area of the Metohija Vino winery and the Municipal Hall. See Veljkovi}, T.7051 7052,7135;7059 7060, 7132,7136;P1070. 1888 K83,T.388 389. 1889 S.Berisha,T.485. 1890 S.Berisha,T.485 486;Veljkovi},T.7053 7055,7139. 1891 K83,T.392 393,399,426 427; Halit Berisha,P598,p.3; T.3383. 1892 S.Berisha,T.460,474. See also Indictment, Schedule D. 1893 S.Berisha,T.459 460;P272. 1894 K83,T.390 393;Veljkovi},T.7055,7132. See also Veljkovi},T.7046,7050 7051. 1895 S.Berisha,T.486 488. S.Berisha testified that amongst the names in blue that represented those present at the café only herself and two others survived. See also Halit Berisha,P598,p.3. 1896 S.Berisha,T.490 491. 1897 Veljkovi},T.7062 7063. 1898 Veljkovi},T.7063. 1899 S.Berisha,T.491 492. 1900 S.Berisha,T.492 493.
IT-05-87/1-T 181 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6364 748. The human remains of the Berisha family members were later exhumed from two locations. Bodies were originally buried close to Prizren and then later moved to Batajnica. Parts of Jashar Berisha’s body were found at both locations.1901
749. Veljkovic said he saw ^ukari}, Tanovi} and Petkovi} at the OUP prior to the massacre.1902 Veljkovic’s testimony differs from K83’s to the extent that he does not include K83 with these men at the OUP building and insists that K83 was with him later as he collected the bodies.1903 Veljkovi}’s denial of K83’s presence at the OUP and insistence that K83 was with him collecting the bodies is not credible. K83 was a reliable witness and his willingness to admit having witnessed the Berisha massacre is good indication of his honesty. Veljkovi} himself testified in Belgrade in 2004 that he only saw K83 at the pizzeria,1904 thus corroborating K83’s testimony that he was with the perpetrators (^ukari}, Tanovi}) and thus witnessed the massacre.
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes in Suva Reka/Suharekë
750. Various VJ and MUP units were stationed in Suva Reka/Suharekë town.1905 They conducted joint patrols.1906 The Commander of the 37th PJP Detachment had his headquarters at the Balkan Hotel.1907 The VJ had a base at Birać outside the town.1908 On 24 March, Halit and Shyhrete Berisha saw the VJ and the MUP passing through Suva Reka/Suharekë.1909
751. On 23 March 1999, the Joint Command ordered the 549th Mtbr to support the MUP in an operation to take place on 25 March in the Orahovac, Suva Reka/Suharekë, and Velika Kru{a sectors.1910 That day, Delić, Lazarevi}’s direct subordinate, issued an order implementing the Joint Command order,1911 and instructed the 5th combat group of his brigade to deploy to Re{tane/Reshtan, outside Suva Reka/Suharekë town, with two companies from the 37th PJP (Ni{) Detachment.1912 The crimes took place during the course of this joint action. K83 said that the operation was set in motion when “^egar 1” or Mitrovi}, Commander of the 37th PJP (Ni{)
1901 See Part III, Section(B),(5)(a)(i). See also Annex C, Schedule D. 1902 Veljkovi},T.7042,7075. 1903 Veljkovi},T.7047,7050,7085,7088 (private session). 1904 Veljkovi}, T.7086 7088 (private session),7052,7059 7060,7132,7136;P1070. 1905 Hysni Berisha,P584,p.6;Halit Berisha,T.3393;P598,p.2;P599,pp.48 49,56 57. 1906 Halit Berisha,P598,p.2. 1907 K79,P1259,p.71 (under seal). 1908 Halit Berisha,P599,p.61. 1909 Halit Berisha,P599,p.63;S.Berisha,T.463 465. 1910 P350. 1911 P1316. 1912 P1316,p.3, item 5.1.
IT-05-87/1-T 182 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6363 Detachment, came to the police station in Suva Reka/Suharekë.1913 \or|evi} ordered the deployment of the 37th PJP (Ni{) Detachment to Kosovo in 1999.1914 Luki} co ordinated the work of PJPs through the MUP Staff.
752. The massacre of the members of the Berisha family was not a random killing:
• Tanks were parked outside behind the Berishas’ houses hours before the assault, which clearly indicates that the operation was planned.1915
• The perpetrors of the massacre were policemen.1916 They and their superiors remained in the police force during the war.1917
• On 26 and 27 March, Jovanovi}, a crime policeman took photographs of the corpses of the Berisha family at the café and of the other corpses that were on the road in the vicinity of the OSCE house.1918 • Before the murders, Repanovi}, OUP Commander, stopped Veljkovi} and gave him an order.1919 Veljkovi} realized that he was being asked to commit murder, “the gravest breach of work duty.”1920
• The police ordered the Berisha family to enter the café.1921
• Policemen brought Jashar Berisha to the café and shot him dead.1922
• Following the massacre, Cukari}, a perpetrator was in radio communication.1923
• Shortly after the massacre occurred, Boban Vuksanovi}, mayor of Suva Reka/Suharekë, arrived with a truck to remove the bodies, indicating that he must have known in advance about the massacre.1924
• The massacre took place only a short distance from the OUP, so the explosions and shooting must have been audible there. Numerous people saw and participated in loading the bodies.1925 People talked about the massacre.1926 1913 K83,T.381 382;K79 testified that the radio call sign “^egar 1” was used by a detachment of the 37th PJP Detachment: K79,P1259,p.9 (under seal).See also Cveti},T.6731 6732;P1061. 1914 P711. 1915 S.Berisha,T.470,476 477;P274. 1916 S.Berisha,T.484 486;K83,T.385,387 390,393. 1917 K83,T.405 406. Proceeding were only initiated several years later (Veljkovi},T.7086 7088) (private session). 1918 K83,T.402. 1919 Veljkovi},T.7042 7043. 1920 Veljkovi},T.7042 7043,7068 7069,7074;See also Veljkovi},T.7062 7063. 1921 S.Berisha,T.530. 1922 K83,T.392 393,399. 1923 K83,T.406 407. 1924 P598,p.2;K83,T.390 392;Veljkovi},T.7055,7132.
IT-05-87/1-T 183 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6362 753. The destruction of the mosque in Suva Reka/Suharekë was also part of a plan to intimidate and harass the Kosovo Albanian population in Suva Reka/Suharekë. The mosque was damaged on 28 March, Bajram day, when the police were still forcing Kosovo Albanians out of Suva Reka/Suharekë.1927 There was no legitimate military purpose in the destruction of the minaret.
754. The crimes in Bellanica/Bellanicë took part during the course of a VJ MUP operation in that area. The post operation report of the 549th Mtbr of 3 April 1999 refers to a joint operation of the PJP and the 15th Armoured Brigade in Bellanica/Bellanicë village on 1 April.1928 The KLA had left the village by this time.1929
5. Pe}/Pejë
755. On 27 and 28 March 1999, VJ, MUP, and armed Serb civilians attacked the town of Peć and forcibly expelled its Kosovo Albanian population. Preparations for the mass expulsion began several days earlier when local Serb police illegally requisitioned buses from Edison Zatriqi, a coach company owner.1930
756. In the morning of 27 March 1999, Serb military used their tanks to shell the ethnic Albanian neighbourhood of Kapeshnica from the hospital yard and the secondary school.1931 The firing lasted for several hours. There was no outgoing fire from Kapeshnica.1932 In the evening a very powerful searchlight went over the town and there was occasional shooting.1933
757. On 27 March 1999, some 20 fully armed and masked paramilitary troops entered the neighbourhood of Karagaq, shot at Albanian houses and gave residents a five minute ultimatum to leave their homes and go to Montenegro.1934 The paramilitaries yelled “[y]ou asked for Clinton call them now let them rescue you.”1935 Police and military uniforms were on the streets of the town during these expulsions.1936
1. 1925 K83,T.391 392;Veljkovi},T.7055 7065. 1926 Veljkovi},T.7063,7055 7056,7132; S.Berisha,T.491;K83,T.391 393. See also P1514. 1927 Halit Berisha,P598,p.3. 1928 P944,p.3. 1929 Zyrapi,P428,p.72 82;P452;Fondaj,P626,p.5. 1930 Zatriqi,T.3819;P672,p.5,10;P673,pp.11 12. 1931 Zatriqi,P672,p.5;T.3803,3806,3825. See also P674. 1932 Zatriqi,T.3819 3820. 1933 Zatriqi,P672,p.6;T.3809. 1934 Konaj,P670,p.3;T.3751,3761. 1935 Konaj,P670,p.3. 1936 Konaj,T.3753;P671,p.6;P670,p.3.
IT-05-87/1-T 184 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6361 758. On the morning of 28 March 1999, Konaj, a local resident, observed large crowds of people gathered in the streets.1937 MUP, VJ, and paramilitaries were stationed at the entrance of every street, blocking access to the town.1938 MUP and armed Serb civilians at various junctions directed the convoys towards Montenegro or Albania.1939 Those on foot were ordered to go to the centre of town.1940
759. Thousands gathered in the town centre.1941 MUP officers and VJ soldiers pointed their guns at the residents.1942 A policeman ordered the crowds to divide into two groups.1943 However, the separation did not happen due to the panic that ensued among the crowds.1944 That evening, three army tanks entered the centre of town.1945
760. Konaj’s family was forced to board a bus going to Albania.1946 The bus that Konaj and his family were travelling on stopped at a police station checkpoint in \akovica/Gjakove,1947 where Konaj saw a large group of MUP, paramilitary and civilians,1948 and saw MUP officers brutally beating refugees.1949 Konaj’s bus reached the junction at Vermica (Vrbnica) and the bus driver ordered everyone off the bus.1950 He also told them to “go to Albania, this is not your place, this is greater Serbia”.1951 Konaj saw “police and military” on the other side of the road where they were dropped off.1952
761. At the border, MUP officers and “people dressed in military uniforms” ordered the refugees to throw their identification cards, passports, driver's licences and registration plates in a big wooden box.1953
762. Zatriqi corroborated Konaj’s account of the forcible expulsion of the Kosovo Albanian population of Pe}/Pejë town. On 28 March 1999, a police car stopped at the entrance of Zatriqi’s street. Policemen got out of the car and ordered Zatriqi and his family to leave the house in five
1937 Konaj,T.3754;P670,p.4. 1938 Konaj,P671, p.6;P670,p.4. 1939 Konaj,P670,p.4. 1940 Konaj,P670,p.4;P671,pp.10,26. 1941 Konaj,P670,p.4. 1942 Konaj,P670,p.4. 1943 Konaj,P670,p.4; P671, p.29. 1944 Konaj,P670,p.4. 1945 Konaj,P670,p.4. 1946 Konaj,P670,p.4. 1947 Konaj,P670,p.5. 1948 Konaj,P670,p.5;T.3756,3763. 1949 Konaj,P670,p.5;T.3756. 1950 Konaj,P670,p.5. 1951 Konaj,P670,p.5; See also T.3756. 1952 Konaj,P670,p.5. 1953 Konaj,T.3757;P670,p.5.
IT-05-87/1-T 185 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6360 minutes.1954 Police cars were stationed at the two entrances of the road, and a police officer went from home to home ordering people out.1955 Additional policemen could be seen coming down a hill near the villagers’ houses, so Zatriqi and other people in the neighbourhood moved on to a safer place.1956
763. Zatriqi and his family got in their car and drove to the main road where they met a long convoy of vehicles going in the direction of Ro`aje, Montenegro. They drove their car to Ro`aje in a long convoy consisting of vehicles and people.1957 The convoy of Albanians who had been evicted from their homes was so long that Zatriqi could not see its end.1958 There were armed civilians and MUP officers at various road junctions directing the convoy towards Montenegro.1959
764. While in the convoy, Zatriqi saw one of his buses full of refugees.1960 The driver of the bus was a policeman dressed in a blue camouflage uniform.1961 In addition, there were other buses that belonged to his colleagues that were also packed with people.1962
765. Zatriqi said that the residents from Pe}/Pejë left unwillingly and in fear for their lives.1963 The police had expelled the residents from their houses and forced them to leave town.1964
766. The convoy moved on towards Ulqin after reaching Ro`aje, Montenegro.1965
767. Kosovo Albanians who returned in July 1999 found many Albanian houses completely burnt, while Serb properties remained undamaged.1966 Zatriqi testified that eighty per cent of the houses and many religious facilities were damaged or burned.1967 The old mosque in the Sahat Kulla neighborhood was damaged, and the Qarshia Xhamia mosque in the old bazaar of Pe}/Pejë was completely burned.1968
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes in Pe}/Pejë
1954 Zatriqi,T.3809;P673,p.10. 1955 Zatriqi,P673,pp.4 6,8. 1956 Zatriqi,P673,pp.9 10. 1957 Zatriqi,P672,p.6;T.3810;P673,pp.6,13. 1958 Zatriqi,T.3810 3811. 1959 Zatriqi,P672,p.6;T.3810;P673,p.6. 1960 Zatriqi,T.3830;P672,p.6,10;P673,p.6. 1961 Zatriqi,T.3830;P673,p.6. 1962 Zatriqi,P673,p.6. 1963 Zatriqi,P672,p.6;T.3829. 1964 Zatriqi,T.3826;P673,p.4. 1965 Zatriqi,T.3826. 1966 Zatriqi,P672,pp.6 7;Konaj,T.3758;P671,p.6. 1967 Zatriqi,T.3830;P673,p.7. 1968 Zatriqi,T.3831;P673,p.7;Konaj,P671,pp.6 7.
IT-05-87/1-T 186 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6359 768. The area of Peć/Peja fell within the AOR of the 125th Motorised Brigade of the PrK, commanded by Dragan Živanović.1969 Živanovi} was Lazarevi}’s direct subordinate. The Armoured Battalion of this Brigade was stationed in the municipality and had its command post in the village of Raušić/Raushiq, south of Peć/Peja town, until 26–27 March 1999, when it was relocated to Peć/Peja town.1970 The Brigade remained in the town until at least 11 April 1999.1971 The War Diary of the Armoured Battalion of the 125th Motorised Brigade also noted the presence of units of the Brigade in Peć/Peja town as of 27 March 1999.1972
769. \or|evi} deployed members of the 21st, 22nd and 72nd PJP Detachments from the Belgrade SUP to Pe}/Pejë municipality in early March 1999.1973 Luki} co ordinated the PJPs through the MUP Staff.
770. Police and armed civilians were involved throughout the series of events in Pe}/Pejë and during the deportation process:
• Policemen confiscated Zatriqi’s buses;1974 • Police shot in the direction of Zatriqi’s house on 26 March 1999;1975 • The police again entered Pe}/Pejë on 27 March 1999, and brought in a police pinzgauer;1976 • The police and armed Serb civilians deported Albanians from Pe}/Pejë on 27 and 28 March 1999; • Konaj saw MUP officers brutally beating refugees at one of the checkpoints along the way to Montenegro;1977 and • Konaj encountered the MUP and the VJ at the Albanian border, where they ordered the refugees to throw their identification cards, passports, driver's licences and registration plates in a big wooden box.1978
6. Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica
771. Beginning in February 1999, VJ forces increased their presence in Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica municipality. The forces included elements of the 37th Infantry Brigade, the
1969 P1366; P929,p.2.P929,p.2; also P957,pp.1 2. 1970 P957,pp.1–2. 1971 P957; see also P954,p.4. 1972 P957. 1973 P1189. 1974 Zatriqi,T.3819;P672,pp.5,10; P673,p.11. 1975 Zatriqi,T.3808. 1976 Konaj,P670,p.3;P671,p.5. 1977 Konaj,P671,p.6;P670,p.4. 1978 Konaj,T.3757;P670,p.5.
IT-05-87/1-T 187 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6358 125th Motorized Brigade, and the 211th and 252nd Armoured Brigades.1979 In mid March 1999 a large number of MUP forces, including PJP units from outside Kosovo, were also mobilized in the area.1980 After KVM withdrew, the Serbian MUP increased their presence, set up checkpoints and began conducting mobile patrols in Žabare/Zhabar village. 1981
772. On 24 March 1999, MUP forces began targeting and killing prominent Albanians in Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica. MUP officers from the Mitrovica SUP broke into the home of Agim Hajrizi, a prominent human rights activist.1982 They shot and killed him, his son, and his mother.1983 Latif Berisha, the local Chairman of the LDK, was murdered that same evening.1984 The homes of Mahmut Halimi, a judge, and Halit Barani, a local activist, were burned.1985
773. From late March and into April 1999, MUP, VJ, and paramilitary forces expelled tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians from Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica. There were two major waves of expulsions: the first from late March to early April, and the second in mid April.
774. In the morning of 28 March 1999, the MUP, VJ, and paramilitary started to burn houses and expel residents of the primarily Albanian neighbourhood of Tamnik/Tavnik.1986 They told people to go immediately to Albania.1987 The forces yelled phrases such as “You wanted NATO and call NATO now to come and help you. We will kill you all,”1988 “Go to Albania, this is not your place.”1989
775. Thousands of people were routed to Žabare/Zhabar, a village in the outskirts of Kosovksa Mitrovica/Mitrovica town, where refugees from other villages had gathered.1990
776. On 1 April 1999, the refugees in Žabare/Zhabar were ordered to return to Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica town.1991 There, Serb forces arranged buses for the Kosovo Albanian population to be transported to Montenegro.1992 Serb forces surrounded the bus station.1993 The
1979Cveti},T.6636 6637;P965,p.11;P1366;P1443;P1029,p.53. 1980 Cveti},T.6609 6610,6691;P711;P1191;P139. 1981 Sadiku,P502,paras.2,7 8; T.2967. 1982 Halimi,P499,pp.4,27;T.2897 2898. 1983 Hajrizi,T.4305 4308,4314; P773,pp.9 10; P775,pp.6,11; P776,pp.5,9,10;P1288. See P777. 1984 Halimi,T.2898;P499,p.4;Hajrizi,P773,p.11;P775,p.21;P776,p.4 1985 Hajrizi,P774,p.7,para.5;Halimi,P499,p.18. 1986 Hajrizi,P774,p.7;P776,pp.13,28 30. 1987 Hajrizi,P774,p.7. 1988 Hajrizi,P774,p.7. 1989 Hajrizi,T.4309;P774,p.7. 1990 Hajrizi,T.4310;P773,p.11;P774,p.7. 1991 Hajrizi,P774,p.8;P773,p.11. 1992 Hajrizi,P774,p.9;T.4332. 1993 Hajrizi,P774,p.9.
IT-05-87/1-T 188 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6357 buses left for Montenegro on 4 April.1994 A Serb driver drove each bus.1995 Just before crossing the Montenegrin border, many men were forced off the buses, mistreated, interrogated, and forced to shout “Serbia, Serbia”.1996 Montenegrin border police seized their identity documents and told them that they would “never come back to this country again.” 1997
777. A second wave of expulsions took place in mid April 1999. Mahmut Halimi and Sadije Sadiku were both expelled from the village of Žabare/Zhabar during this time.
778. On or around 14 April 1999, Serb forces fired some rounds in the direction of Žabare/Zhabar from Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica town.1998 Halimi saw the population from Suhadol, Tavnik and Shipol neighbourhoods moving en masse to Žabare/Zhabar.1999 He heard from the refugees that soldiers, police and paramilitaries had expelled them from their homes.2000 These forces looted and set fire to houses at one end of the village.2001
779. Over the next few days, the MUP ordered civilians to form convoys leaving the village.2002 Halimi was part of a first column of about 25,000 Albanians ordered to head down the Peć/Pejë road.2003 People were on foot and also in vehicles.2004 As Halimi drove out of Žabare/Zhabar with his family, two VJ soldiers forced them to get out of their car and continue on foot.2005 He saw regular MUP units securing the road and VJ and reservists along the road.2006 At the border, the police ordered the refugees to discard their identification documents and car registration plates.2007 Halimi and his family handed over their registration plates and IDs, after which they were allowed to cross the border.2008
780. Sadiku joined another column of approximately 8,000 9,000 people heading towards Albania under MUP escort.2009 The refugees passed multiple police and military checkpoints on the
1994 Hajrizi,P774,p.9. 1995 Hajrizi,P774,p.9. The buses were from the State Transport Company called “Kosova Trans”. 1996 Hajrizi,P774,p.9;P776,p.20. 1997 Hajrizi,T.4335;P774,p.9;P773,p.12. 1998 Halimi,P499,pp.6 7;T.2901. On P500, Halimi identified Gornje (Upper) Žabare/Zhabar with the number “1”, and Donje (Lower) Žabare/Zhabar with the number “2. 1999 Halimi,P499,p.8;T.2901 2902;P500. 2000 Halimi,P499,p.8,39,40. 2001 Halimi,P499,p.11;Sadiku,T.2967. 2002 Sadiku,T.2967 2969;P502,paras.13 14;P504. Halimi,P499,pp.14,53. 2003 Halimi,P499,pp.9,14;T.2901 2902. On P500, Halimi identified the Kosovska Mitrovica Pe} road with the number “5”. 2004 Halimi,P499,p.10;T.2902 2903. 2005 Halimi,P499,pp.7,12 13,22,41 42. 2006 Halimi,T.2895,2905;P499,pp.14 15,68. 2007 Halimi,P499,pp.16 17. 2008 Halimi,P499,pp.16 17. 2009 Sadiku,T.2970;P502,paras.15 16.
IT-05-87/1-T 189 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6356 road.2010 At each checkpoint, the forces told the refugees which way to go.2011 At one checkpoint, Sadiku heard police say “go quickly, disappear from Kosovo and go to Albania.”2012
781. Sadiku’s convoy walked without rest for two days under MUP escort. Many refugees were barefoot and lacked food and water.2013 When the column reached Klina e Perme, a MUP officer split the convoy into two groups. He ordered one group of about 2,000 people to head back towards Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica.2014 The other group of about 6,000 people was instructed to continue on to Peć/Peja.2015
782. On the third night, Sadiku’s convoy was permitted to rest in a field beside the road, somewhere near Srbica/Skenderaj.2016 The next morning they continued to walk through the Istok/Istog and Klina municipalities.2017 The police ordered them to return to Zablaće/Zabllaq village.2018
783. Zablaće/Zabllaq was deserted and the homes were in ruins due to shelling.2019 The police were positioned at the entrance of the village.2020 They ordered the refugees to stay in the abandoned homes. The refugees remained there for three weeks.2021
784. On 6 May 1999, Sadiku and some friends left the home in which they were staying to collect some potatoes, their only sustenance at the time.2022 She noticed that police were stationed in the courtyard of a church.2023 On the return to the house, Sadiku was shot in the back.2024 She attempted to drag herself into the house, but the gunmen continued firing for approximately 30 minutes.2025 Eventually her sisters were able to pull her back into the house.2026 Sadiku believes she
2010 Sadiku,T.2971;P505. 2011 Sadiku,P502,para.17. 2012 Sadiku,P502,para.16. 2013 Sadiku,P502,paras.18 19. 2014 Sadiku,P502,para.20. 2015 Sadiku,P502,para.20. 2016 Sadiku,P502,para.21. 2017 Sadiku,P502,para.22. 2018 Sadiku,P502,para.23. 2019 Sadiku,T.2973 2974;P506. 2020 Sadiku,P502,para.23. 2021 Sadiku,T.2972 2973;P502,para.24. 2022 Sadiku,P502,para.25. 2023 Sadiku,T.2973;P502,para.28. 2024 Sadiku,P502,paras.25 26;T.2973. 2025 Sadiku,P502,para.27. 2026 Sadiku,P502,para.30.
IT-05-87/1-T 190 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6355 was shot by the police stationed in the church.20277 The only people in the village who had guns were the police who controlled the village.2028
785. Some men carried Sadiku to the village of Zahać/Zahaq in Peć/Peja municipality to seek medical attention.2029 Sadiku stayed in Zahać/Zahaq for a few days until police expelled the residents of that village.2030 The refugees formed a convoy of tractors and cars and headed towards Peć/Peja.2031 Sadiku rode in a tractor with other women and children.2032 Police at numerous checkpoints demanded money from the refugees.2033 At a police checkpoint in Peć/Peja, police seized and burned their identification documents.2034 When the convoy finally reached the Albanian border, again police demanded money, jewellery, and seized remaining identification documents.2035
786. Upon reaching Albania, Sadiku received medical attention from KFOR. She was then taken to a hospital in Tirana and later to Germany. After many surgeries, Sadiku remains paralyzed and confined to a wheelchair.2036
787. Halimi returned to Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica on 11 July 1999, after the war was over.2037 He found that his house had been completely burned down, along with several other houses in Gornje Žabare/Zhabar.2038
Destruction of cultural or religious sites
788. There were four mosques in Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica town prior to the war.2039 All four mosques were damaged or destroyed sometime after 25 March 1999.2040 The mosque located next to the Ibar River had been razed to the ground and covered with dirt.2041 A number of people explained to Halimi that Serb forces had set fire to the mosques2042
2027 Sadiku,T.2996 2999;P503,pp.38 53. 2028 Sadiku,P503,pp.60 61. 2029 Sadiku,P502,para.32. 2030 Sadiku,T.2974;P502,para.34;P506. 2031 Sadiku,T.2974;P502,para.34. 2032 Sadiku,P502,paras.34 35. 2033 Sadiku,P502,para.36. 2034 Sadiku,T.2975. 2035 Sadiku,T.2975;P502,para.38. 2036 Sadiku,T.2976;P502,paras.5,39 41. 2037 Halimi,P499,p.18. 2038 Halimi,P499,p.18. 2039 Halimi,T.2907. 2040 Halimi,P499,p.19;T.2907 2908. 2041 Halimi,P499,p.19; T.2907. 2042 Halimi,T.2907 2908;P499,p.19.
IT-05-87/1-T 191 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6354 The forces of the FRY and Serbia committed the crimes in Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica municipality
789. Witnesses identified the perpetrators as members of the MUP, VJ, and paramilitaries. They were able to identify them by their uniforms and the fact that some of the police committing crimes were known to the victims.
790. Hajrizi identified the perpetrators of the murder of her husband as local policemen.2043 She described the forces responsible for the expulsions in Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica town as police, paramilitary and VJ.2044 The police wore regular blue uniforms, whereas the military wore green uniforms.2045 Paramilitaries wore dark blue/black camouflage uniforms and black masks, and were armed with large knives.2046
791. Halimi described the police as wearing dark blue camouflage uniforms with the words “MUP Serbia.”2047 Halimi said paramilitaries wore black bandanas and dark uniforms. Many of them had beards and shaved heads. They were armed with knives and long barrelled weapons.2048
792. Sadiku stated that the uniforms worn by the police who expelled her from her home and who manned the checkpoints along the road were “blue camouflage”2049 or “blue and black”.2050 In court, she identified a photograph of the camouflage pattern worn by the police.2051
793. Documentary evidence shows that MUP and VJ forces were engaged in actions in Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica at the times of the crimes:
• From 24 to 31 March 1999, the 125th Mtb war diary recorded that BG 4 was engaged in a blockade in Stari Trg.2052 • On 29 March 1999, the PrK Command ordered the 125th Mtbr to let the refugees go anywhere, so long as it was towards the south. • The next day, the 125th Mtbr reported seeing a large number of civilian refugees moving out of Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica.2053
2043 Hajrizi,T.4307;P773,p.9;P775,p.6;P776,p.7. 2044 Hajrizi,P774,p.7;P776,p.29. 2045 Hajrizi,P776,pp.28 30. 2046 Hajrizi,P774,p.8. 2047 Halimi,P499,p.54. 2048 Halimi,P499,pp.10 11,13. 2049 Sadiku,P502,para.14;P504. 2050 Sadiku,T.2968;P504. 2051 Sadiku,T.2968 2969;P504. 2052 P954. 2053 P954.
IT-05-87/1-T 192 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6353 • On 2 April 1999, Lazarevi} tasked the 37th Infantry Brigade to engage in combat actions with the 252nd Armoured Brigade, the 15th Armoured Brigade and the MUP in a zone near Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica.2054
7. Pri{tina/Prishtinë municipality
794. Beginning on or about 24 March 1999, the MUP and the VJ, along with armed Serb civilians and paramilitary units, forcibly and systematically expelled the Kosovo Albanian residents of the Priština/Prishtinë municipality.2055 The speed, scale and extent of the expulsions were dramatic. Large scale forced expulsions were carried out in the town of Priština/Prishtinë itself,2056 and also throughout Dragodan,2057 Vranjevac/Kodra e Trimave,2058 Kodra e Diellit,2059 Velanija/Velania,2060 the villages of Maticane/Matiqan2061 and Kojlovica/Kolovicë,2062 and the town of Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosovë.2063
795. Preparations for the mass expulsion began weeks in advance.2064 The presence of VJ and MUP units increased significantly in and around Priština/Prishtinë.2065 The VJ deployed large numbers of tanks, trucks, APCs, and troops.2066 The MUP mobilised and armed Serb civilians.2067
796. NATO commenced bombing Kosovo, including Pri{tina, on 24 March 1999.2068 Beginning on the eve of the bombing, Serb forces commenced an initial thrust around the perimeter of Priština/Prishtinë, pushing Albanians from these surrounding areas towards the centre of town. Civilians came to Pri{tina from the surrounding areas and nearby villages: places like Dragodan, Vranjevac/Kodra e Trimave, Kojlovica/Kolovicë, Sofali, and Taslixhe. Nazlie Bala testified, for example, that beginning on 24 March, people kept arriving at her house from surrounding areas until there were approximately 100 people staying there. The VJ, the MUP and Serb civilians had been giving the Kosovo Albanians ultimatums to leave their homes, and told that they had minutes
2054 P912. 2055 See e.g. Bala,P420,pp.6 8;T.2286 2301;Kabashi,P424,pp.2 5;P425,pp.3 12;T.2356 2364;Russo,P1213,pp.4 7; Haxhiu,P994,p.22 29;P1028,pp.848,855 856,863,868,883,914,942. 2056 Bala,T.2286 2301;P420,p.7. 2057 Kabashi,P424,pp.3 4;P425,pp.4 6;Bala,T.2291;P420,p.6;P422. 2058 Kabashi,P424,p.4;Bala,P422. 2059 Haxhiu,P994,pp.22 24. 2060 Russo,P1213,pp.5 6. 2061 Russo,P1213,p.5. 2062 K14,T.8993 8995 (closed session);P1325,pp.2 3 (under seal); Bala,T.2287 2289;P420,pp.5 6;P422. 2063 Kabashi,P424,p.2. 2064 Merovci,P416,paras.38 39; Russo,P1213,pp.3 4;Bucaliu,P825,p.3. 2065 Bala,P420,pp.5 6;T.2287;P1028,pp.820,848,868;Russo,P1213,p.3;Merovci,P416,paras.38 39,44,75. 2066 Russo,P1213,p.3;Merovci,P416,para.38. 2067 Merovci,T.2215 2216;P416,para.49;P417,pp.27 28. 2068 Bala,P420,p.5.
IT-05-87/1-T 193 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6352 to leave or they would be killed.2069 By 26 March 1999, Serb forces had blocked all roads in and out of Pri{tina and had set up barbed wire blockades manned by VJ, MUP and Serb civilians.2070
797. From the outset of the NATO bombing, MUP, VJ and Serb civilians began looting and burning Kosovo Albanian homes and shops, driving around town firing their weapons, and committing more direct acts of violence.2071 Serb forces also undertook a number of symbolic and violent actions against the Albanian community in Priština/Prishtinë. Leading human rights lawyer Bajram Kelmendi was targeted and killed, along with two of his sons.2072 The office of the newspaper Koha Ditore was broken into, the Albanian night guard was killed, the computers and equipment were removed and the printing offices were burnt down; when Baton Haxhiu arrived at the scene on 25 March 1999, he found MUP officers still there, smelling of alcohol and with traces of blood on them.2073 Prominent Albanians like Haxhiu went into hiding.2074
(a) Priština/Prishtinë town
798. From 24 March to early April 1999, MUP, VJ, paramilitary and armed Serb civilians systematically expelled and deported the ethnic Albanian residents in Priština/Prishtinë.2075 Mixed Serb forces (VJ, MUP, and Serb civilians) went from door to door and ordered Albanians to leave their homes, threatening to kill any residents who refused to leave.2076
799. Several witnesses related similar accounts of expulsions from Priština/Prishtinë. On 29 March 1999, Bala watched from her terrace as VJ, MUP, Serb civilians and “gypsies” went to Albanian homes and forced them to leave. Later that day, an armed VJ officer and a gypsy she recognized as a traffic police officer came to her house and told Bala and the others that they had five minutes to leave. Bala had observed that the procedure was for the VJ officer and gypsy to go first to tell people to leave, and that they would be followed later by a group of mobilized personnel, consisting of armed police and armed civilians, who would beat or kill anyone remaining
2069 Bala,T.2287,P420,pp.5 6. 2070 Bala,T.2290,2334 2338;P420,p.6;D52. 2071 See e.g. Bala,T.2333,P420,pp.5 6;Kabashi,P424,pp.2 3;Russo,P1213,pp.4 5. 2072 Surroi,T.292 293;Haxhiu,T.6237 6239;P994,p.19;Rugova,P285,p.9;P286,p. 36. Later, Ibrahim Rugova, his Chief of Cabinet Adnan Merovci, and their families were found and held at gunpoint by VJ and MUP forces, and kept under house arrest from 31 March 1999 to 4 May 1999: Merovci,T.2219 2222;P416,paras.52 53,73;P417,pp.29 35; Rugova, P285,pp.9 10;P286,pp.38 41,117. 2073 Haxhiu,T.6228 6230;P992,p.6;P994,p.21;P995, n.3. 2074 Haxhiu,T.6230 6231,6237,6287 6288;P994,p.25. 2075 Bala, T.2291 2295, P420, p.7; Russo, P1213, pp.4 5; Kabashi, T.2358 2361, P424, pp.3 5; P425, pp.4 9; Haxhiu, T.6241 6243, P994, pp.22 27,32; Drewienkiewicz, T.6396 6397. 2076Russo,P1213,p.5;Bala,T.2291 2295,P420,p.7;Kabashi,T.2358 2361,P424,pp.3 5;P425,pp.4 9; Drewienkiewicz,T.6396 6397.
IT-05-87/1-T 194 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6351 in the house. Bala thus left her house, along with the others, and joined a group of people in the thousands who were directed by Serb forces towards the centre of Pri{tina.2077
800. On 31 March 1999, journalist Antonio Russo also witnessed the MUP and VJ advance into the city and conduct house to house searches, expelling the occupants. Hundreds of these civilians were directed into a nearby park, and subsequently directed by a soldier with a radio to start moving. Serb forces directed the crowds of Albanians in the streets to combine and start heading en masse towards the railway station.2078
801. Veton Surroi also observed the police directing the Albanians to leave Priština/Prishtinë. He noted that they were not given time to collect their things and had been expelled rapidly from their homes. Surroi described finding the houses of his friends empty, with all the family members expelled, even on one occasion finding a pie on the stove that was still warm and a teapot boiling on the stove.2079
802. K14 described a similar process that took place in nearby Kolevicë e Re. Four days after the NATO bombing began, six policemen with automatic rifles and six VJ soldiers came to her home and told her family they would have to leave.2080 Out on the street, K14 discovered crowds of other Albanians who had also been expelled from their homes. Police were beating up men and cursing at the Albanians.2081
803. Haxhiu witnessed the residents of the Bregu e Diellit/Kodra e Diellit neighbourhood being expelled on 2 April 1999. Armed and masked paramilitaries evicted the residents from their homes, while VJ and MUP directed people on the streets and ordered the displaced persons to proceed in specific directions. Car owners were ordered to leave for Macedonia, while those without cars were ordered to go to the Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosove train station.2082 The convoy of cars leaving the city was many kilometres long.2083
804. Witness accounts from Priština/Prishtinë establish that Serb forces and armed civilians methodically channeled thousands of ethnic Albanians towards the train station. Bala described that as she walked there were armed MUP and VJ on one side and Serb civilians on the other, with their weapons pointing at the Albanians. Her group was funneled towards the main checkpoint and then
2077 Bala,T.2291 2294,P420,p.7;P421,pp.19,50. 2078 Russo,P1213,pp.5 6. 2079 Surroi,T.294 295. 2080 K14,T.8993 8994,9016,9043 9044 (closed session); P1325,p.3 (under seal);P1326,pp.18 20 (under seal). 2081 K14,T.8994 8995,9022 (closed session);P1325,p.3 (under seal). 2082 Haxhiu,T.6241;P994,pp.22 28,32; P992,p.6;P993,pp.44 45. 2083 Haxhiu,T.6243
IT-05-87/1-T 195 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6350 directed to the train station.2084 En route, it was apparent that Albanian shops had been destroyed by fire and by demolition.2085 Russo similarly described walking in a convoy, comprised primarily of women, children and the elderly, for approximately two kilometres to the train station. He noted that the various crossroads and road junctions had been blocked off and that armed groups of MUP, “militia personnel” and occasionally armed civilians were guarding the road every 10 15 metres to keep people on course. As the convoy passed certain junctions, large numbers of refugees from other areas would join. Consistent with the haste of their forced departure, the majority of people did not even seem to be carrying suitcases or bags of personal effects.2086 Along the way, Serb civilians standing at the roadsides or looking out of their windows were making derogatory gestures, throwing things or yelling threats and insults at the Albanians, while the police made no efforts to stop them.2087
805. Emin Kabashi also described walking to the Pri{tina/Prishtinë railway station with “a very long column of people”. Police were escorting the column all along the way.2088 There was a tank stopped on the Vranjevac/Vranjevc Bridge that divided the convoy in two: police sent one section to the Islamic seminary and the other to the railway station.2089 There was a Serbian police patrol checkpoint on the way to the railway station, where police had a computer and a list of names and were asking people about the names on the list. Kabashi saw his name on the list and so did not give his real name to the police.2090 At one point, Kabashi saw four snipers watching them from atop buildings.2091
806. On 1 April, Surroi similarly observed “a very big wave, a river of people” heading towards the railway station in Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosova while “escorted by the Serbian police”. On 2 April 1999, he saw Albanians being stripped of their personal documents and observed a large mass of identity cards that had been piled on the street.2092
807. Thousands of Albanians were arriving at the train station each day.2093 Armed MUP, paramilitaries and armed Serb civilians guarded the exits of the station and killed those who attempted to flee.2094 Bala, for example, observed MUP wearing blue camouflage uniforms
2084 Bala,T.2294,P420,p.7. 2085 Bala,P420,p.7. 2086 Russo,P1213,p.6. 2087 See: Bala,T.2295,P421,p.83;Russo,P1213,p.6. 2088 Kabashi,T.2379,P424,p.4. 2089 Kabashi,T.2360,2377,P424,p.4;P425,p.9. 2090 Kabashi,T.2378;P424,p.4;P425,pp.16 17,73. 2091 Kabashi,P424,p.5. 2092 Surroi,T.296. 2093 Bala,T.2296,P420,p.7. 2094 Kabashi,P424,p.5;Russo,P1213,p.7;Bala,P420,p.7.
IT-05-87/1-T 196 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6349 surrounding the Albanians and amongst them recognized particular traffic policemen from Dragodan. There were thousands of people, primarily children, youth, women and the elderly, who were waiting to get on the train. It seemed “as if the entire population of Prishtina was there”, and they were tired, scared and traumatized.2095 Some people were put onto trains relatively quickly, while others waited days and nights outside.2096 People were also loaded into buses outside the station.2097
808. The MUP forced hundreds of Albanians into each train carriage. The compartments were so crowded that there was no room to move, it was hard to breathe, and the children were pushed into the overhead luggage compartments for their own safety.2098 Several trains left each day to Ðeneral Janković/Hani I Elezit, a village near the Macedonian border.2099 The Uro{evac/Ferizaj railway station logbook shows that after 24 March 1999, trains were running on exceptional schedules to and from Priština, and both the number of trains and the number of carriages was increased.2100 These trains would go towards the border full of people and return empty.2101 Serb soldiers and police were onboard the trains.2102 When the trains finally stopped, police and VJ soldiers ordered the refugees at gunpoint to walk along the train tracks to the border with Macedonia.2103 The border area – a “no man’s land” between Macedonia and Kosovo” – was full of thousands upon thousands of displaced Albanians.2104
809. Throughout the deportation process, police sought to take any identification documents from the Albanians and destroy them. IDs were demanded and destroyed along the convoy routes,2105 as Albanians walked along the train tracks to the border,2106 and/or upon arrival at the border zone.2107
Sexual Assault
810. During this period of expulsions, the Serb forces sexually assaulted Kosovo Albanian women.2108 After being displaced to Graštica for two weeks, K14 joined a convoy of Albanians and began walking back towards Priština, escorted by police, soldiers and men with shaved heads, green 2095 Bala,T.2295 2296;P420,p.7. 2096 Kabashi,T.2380,P424,p.5;Russo,P1213,p.7;Bala,T.2295 2296;P420,p.7. 2097 Kabashi,P424,p.5;Bucaliu,P826,pp.52 54. 2098 Bala,T.2296 2297;P420,p.7;Kabashi,P424,p.5. 2099 Russo,P1213,p.7;P829;Kabashi,P424,p.5;P425,p.10;Bucaliu,P826,p.17. 2100 Bucaliu,P826,pp.12 16,51,76 77;P829,pp.108 122. 2101 Bucaliu,P826,p.92. 2102 Bucaliu,P826,p.20;P829,pp.5 6;Bala,P420,pp.7 8. 2103 Bala,T.2300,2347 2348;P420,p.8;P421,p.52;Kabashi,P424,pp.5 6;Drewienkiewicz,T.6396. 2104 See e.g. P840, Drewienkiewicz, T.6394 6397; Bala, P420, p.8. 2105 Surroi,T.296. And note the similar observation of Drewienkiewicz at a later stage:T.6399. 2106 Bala,T.2299;P420,p.8;P421,p.70. 2107 Kabashi,T.2363;Drewienkiewicz,T.6396 6397.
IT-05-87/1-T 197 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6348 camouflage pants, bandanas, and knives. During the walk, a policeman in a blue police uniform and a man with a shaved head and green camouflage pants took an Albanian woman off of a tractor and dragged her into the forest. K14 could hear the woman “screaming, shouting, and crying” from the forest for about 30 minutes, after which the men “threw her back on the tractor with her family” wrapped in a blanket. It was clear to K14 that the woman had been raped.2109
811. On 20 May 1999, having returned home to Kolevicë e Re, policemen wearing blue camouflage and soldiers wearing green camouflage came to her home and gave K14 and her family cards to fill out, explaining that this was because they were not “regular inhabitants in Priština.”2110 Two of those policemen returned and forced K14 to leave with them in a car, taking her to a room on the second floor of the Bozhur Hotel. A policeman took K14 into the room and raped her, while another policeman stood outside the door and waited his turn.2111 The threat of further rape prompted K14 and her family to leave Kosovo. They walked to the Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosovë train station, caught one of the trains to the border, and then walked into Macedonia on foot.2112
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes in Priština
812. The forces that participated in the expulsions in Priština/Prishtinë were identified by witnesses as Serb police, soldiers, local civilians and “paramilitaries”, based on the clothing they wore. There was extensive evidence that these forces worked together.
813. Despite defence witness Milutin Filipovi}’s claims that there were no tanks or combat units in Priština/Prishtinë following the outbreak of the war,2113 orders make clear that forces were actively deployed to the area. A 27 March 1999 order from the Priština Military District, for example, tasked units “To protect the Serbian population” and “To guard roads, military installations, and other features”. Under the heading “Neighbours”, the order also identified “Commands and units of the PrK and MUP deployed in the area”.2114 The order also tasked the 50th Military Territorial Detachment to “protect features of importance” in “co ordination with forces of the MUP and internal security”, and to “protect the Serbian population in the southern part of the town of Pristina".2115 On 1 April 1999, the PrK Command also directed the 15th Armoured Brigade
1. 2108 K14,P1326,pp.25 27 (under_seal). 2109 K14,T.8995 8998(closed session);P1325,pp.3 4 (under seal);P1326,p.26 (under seal). 2110 K14,T.8998 8999,9027 9029 (closed session);P1325,p.4 (under seal). See also: T.9004 9005 (closed session); D381. 2111 K14,T.8999 9002,9029 9031 (closed session); P1325,pp.4 6 (under seal);P1326pp.25 26 (under seal). 2112 K14,T.9002 9003(closed session);P1325,p.7 (under seal). 2113 Filipovi},T.11619 11624. 2114 P896,pp.1 2. 2115 P896,p.3(item 5.4). See also: Filipovi}, T.11624 11627.
IT-05-87/1-T 198 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6347 to “establish control of the territory and law and order in the general area of Priština.”2116 More generally, Filipovi} was a manifestly untrustworthy witness across a broad range of topics, and in particular with respect to events in Priština/Prishtinë.2117
814. At the time these crimes were committed, the MUP and the VJ had full combat control over Priština/Prishtinë and the surrounding areas. Priština/Prishtinë was the location of the Third Army Command Post, the PrK Command Post and the MUP Staff.2118 The MUP Staff continued to issue orders and dispatches from Priština/Prishtinë while these extensive deportations were being conducted,2119 and Luki} issued many MUP Staff daily reports from Priština over this period that expressly referred to the number of Albanians leaving Kosovo. These reports went directly to \or|evi} and to the Minister.2120
815. \or|evi} himself visited the MUP Staff HQ in Priština/Prishtinë in mid April 1999, and then met with Pavkovi} and Lazarevi} at the PrK Headquarters, along with Luki}, Stevanovi} and \akovi}.2121
816. The Pri{tina SUP was fully operative during these massive deportation operations and was responsible to \or|evi}. \or|evi} in fact personally visited the Priština SUP and met with the SUP Chief in the midst of the deportation campaign.2122
8. Ðakovica/Gjakovë Municipality
817. Ðakovica/Gjakovë municipality, located in the western part of Kosovo,2123 was primarily ethnic Albanian.2124
(a) Ðakovica/Gjakovë town
818. From on or about 24 March 1999 through April 1999, police systematically went from house to house in Dakovica/Gjakovë town ordering Kosovo Albanians to leave.2125
2116 P928,pp.1 2. See also: Filipovi},T.11621 11622. 2117 Filipovi},T.11578 11673. 2118 See e.g. Drewienkiewicz, P1012 and P996,para.23;\akovi},T.7878 7879: “we arrived on the MUP premises, which was about 100 metres from our command headquarters”. 2119 See e.g. P1057,P718,P1459. 2120 See e.g. P719,P720,P721,P694,P697,P698 (\or|evi} is directly named as a recipient at the top of the documents). 2121 \akovi},T.7964 7966;\or|evi},T.9738 9740. 2122 \akovi},T.9737 9738. 2123 P823,p.30. 2124 Haxhibeqiri,T.6967 6968;P1068,p.5. 2125 Haxhibeqiri,P1068,p.9;T.6988 6989,6996 6997. See also Dula,T.8345,8398.
IT-05-87/1-T 199 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6346 819. During expulsions, MUP forces created a climate of terror and fear. MUP forces attacked people’s compounds and killed residents.2126 In addition, police and paramilitaries, and sometimes soldiers, set on fire, destroyed and looted many of the houses and shops belonging to Kosovo Albanians.2127 All damaged property belonged to local Albanians.2128 Reports in the OSCE KVM Bluebook corroborate the pattern of violence and destruction of property in Dakovica/Gjakovë town from 24–26 March 1999.2129
(b) Milo{ Gili} Street/Millosh Giliq Street
820. During the night of 1 2 April 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia launched an operation against the Ćerim/Qerim district of Dakovica/Gjakovë town. Over a period of several hours, Serb forces forcibly entered houses of Kosovo Albanians, killed the occupants, and set their houses on fire.2130 Serbian houses were left untouched.2131 Over 50 persons were killed during the action.
821. During that night, Serb police and paramilitaries attacked a house at 157 Milo{ Gili}/Millosh Giliq Street, firing with their automatic weapons.2132 There were 21 civilians, mostly women and children, in the basement of the house.2133 The policemen forced them to move from the basement into the house,2134 and shot indiscriminately at the group.2135 The policemen then set the house on fire.2136 Only 10 year old Dren Čaka survived the massacre.2137 The remaining 20 civilians from the basement were killed.2138 Forensic data, assessed by Eric Baccard, a forensic pathologist, confirmed that there were at least 20 victims: one adult male, several adult females, and 12 children.2139
822. That night, 44 other people were killed in the neighbourhood.2140
2126 Dula, P1268,p.3;T.8328,8334–8335,8361–8367;Hoxha,P879,p.5;P880,pp.13,15 19;P881,p.5;Haxhibeqiri,P1068, pp.9–11. 2127 Dula,P1268,pp.3–4;T.8336,8341–8343,8347 8348,8372–8373,8395,8399–8400;Hoxha,P880,p.12;P881, p.4; Haxhibeqiri,P1068,pp.9–11;T.6941–6943,6947–6949,7013,7030;P1069;P1068,p.10. 2128 Haxhibeqiri,T.6943;Vejsa,P978,p.3. 2129 P1029,pp.133,135,140,142,151,153. 2130 Hoxha,P879,pp.6 7;Vejsa,T.6089;P978,pp.2–3;P979,pp.16 17;K74,P1095,p.2;Parashumti,P903,p.5;T.5968,5993. 2131 Vejsa,P978,p.3;P980;T.6096–6097;K74,P1095,pp.2–3;Parashumti,P903,pp.5–6;T.5972 5974,6002,6004;P906. 2132 Hoxha,P879,pp.6–7;K74,P1095,p.5;Vejsa,P978,pp.2 3. 2133 Čaka,T.8633;P1296,pp.6–7;Vejsa,P978,p.4. 2134 Čaka,T.8635 8636;P1296,pp.13,15–16;P1302. 2135 Čaka,T.8635–8637,8642–8647;P1296,pp.10,16–22,34;P1300;P1301,pp.6 8; Hoxha,P879,p.7;P880,pp.26–27; Vejsa,T.6091. 2136 Vejsa,P978,p.3;P979,p.18;K74,P1095,p.5; Hoxha,P879,p.7;T.5625;P880,p.28; Parashumti,P903,pp.5–6;T.5972 5974,6002,6004;P906. 2137 Čaka,T.8639 8640,8645;P1296,pp.16 17,22–23;P1302. 2138 Hoxha,P879,pp.8 9;Vejsa,P978,pp.3 4;Čaka,P1296,pp.21, 33. See Proof of Death Charts, Schedule G. 2139 Baccard,P1139,pp.15,37–39;P1161, pp.2–10;T.7661 7663;P1140,pp.18 19. 2140 Hoxha,P880,pp.33,37.
IT-05-87/1-T 200 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6345 823. On the early morning of 2 April 1999, residents and survivors from the Ćerim/Qerim district joined a convoy of people leaving the town on foot and on tractors.2141 Similarly, between late March and April 1999, thousands of people left Dakovica/Gjakovë town and joined “a river of people, many kilometres long”, moving towards Albania.2142
824. The police and the army were at almost every street corner.2143 Checkpoints manned by police were in the town, including at the Mete Efendi Bridge and barracks, near the town exit.2144 Here, policemen ordered refugees to throw all IDs and driver’s licences into two large boxes.2145 Serb police and soldiers escorted convoys to the Kosovo/Albanian border at Ćafa Prušit/Qafa e Prushit.2146 There, police and soldiers manned the checkpoint and asked refugees for their IDs.2147 People in the convoy were eventually allowed to cross the border at Qafa e Prushit.2148
825. Defence witness Milo{ Do{an, Commander of the 52nd ARB based in Dakovica/Gjakovë town,2149 observed large groups of people moving through and leaving Dakovica/Gjakovë town at the end of March and early April 1999.2150 He denied Serb forces deported Kosovo Albanians from their homes.2151 He claimed that people left because of NATO/depleted uranium, terrorist activity and propaganda.2152 Do{an’s testimony is neither credible nor reliable because it is biased. He had an interest in distancing himself from crimes because his brigade was involved in crimes in Meja/Mejë.2153 In contrast to his testimony, witnesses leaving Dakovica/Gjakovë town consistently testified they left because Serbian police forced them to leave and made them fear for their lives.2154
Destruction of cultural property and religious sites
826. Between the end of March and early April 1999, VJ and MUP forces burned or damaged many Albanian historical and religious sites in Dakovica/Gjakovë town, especially its old historic quarter, including: the bazaar, Hadum mosque and adjoining Islamic Library. 2141 Hoxha,P879,p.8;P881,p.15;Čaka,T.8649;P1296,pp.26–27; Haxhibeqiri,P1068,p.11;K74,P1095,p.6; Vejsa,T.6092 6093;P978,p.3. 2142 Haxhibeqiri,P1068,p.11;T.6938. 2143 Hoxha,P879,p.8. See also K74,P1095,p.6. 2144 Dula,T.8347;Vejsa,T.6093–6094;P978,p.3;P979,pp.8–9;Parashumti,T.5978,6013;Hoxha,P879,p.8. 2145 Dula,T.8347 8349;Vejsa,T.6093–6094;P978,p.3;P979,p.9;Parashumti,T.5978;Hoxha,P879,p.8;P880,p.34. 2146 Dula,P1268,p.4;T.8229,8347,8349;K74,P1095,p.6. 2147 Dula,P1268,p.4;Hoxha,P879,p.8;P881pp.15 17,30 31;Vejsa,P978,p.4;P979,p.9;K74,P1095,p.6;^aka,T.8649,8663– 8664,8668. 2148 Hoxha,P879,p.8;P881,pp.16–17;Vejsa,P978,p.4. 2149 \o{an,T.11338,11435–11436;D685,pp.2 3. 2150 \o{an,T.11383–11384,11467–11469;D685,pp.28,367. 2151 \o{an,D685,pp.29,80. 2152 \o{an,T.11424–11425,11469–11470,11514–11515;D685,pp.27–28,61,79. 2153 \o{an,T.11392–11393,11398,11473;D703,p.2;P958,p.33. 2154 Dula,P1268,pp.2, 4;T.8349,8357–8360,8375,8399;Hoxha,P879,p.8;P880,p.25;K74,P1095,p.6. See also Part III, Section(B)(3).
IT-05-87/1-T 201 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6344 827. Witness Dula’s house was situated approximately 300m away from the old Hadum mosque in the town’s historic quarter.2155 In the night between 24 and 25 March 1999, Dula heard Serbian voices,2156 wood and shops burning,2157 and explosions and shelling from the bazaar area.2158 The following morning, 25 March 1999, Dula saw that almost her entire neighbourhood was destroyed. Many of the old bazaar shops were still smoking or on fire,2159 and the Hadum mosque had been damaged: the top of the minaret tower had collapsed on the ground.2160 Haxhibeqiri, a town resident, saw the old historic quarter burning2161 and mosque damaged2162 at similar times to Dula, corroborating her evidence. In early April 1999, he also saw “paramilitaries” setting houses on fire in his neighbourhood, Hadum or Carshia e Vjeter.2163
828. Riedlmayer’s report and testimony support the conclusion that the old bazaar shops, Hadum mosque, its library and Islamic school had been heavily damaged and burned.2164 The pattern and the nature of the damage suggested that fire from the ground, rather than air strikes, caused the destruction.2165 These findings do not support the Defence claims2166 that NATO air strikes had caused the damage in the old bazaar of Dakovica/Gjakovë. Further, Riedlmayer’s report recorded that informants saw MUP forces setting the bazaar and Hadum mosque on fire the night after the NATO bombing began.2167
829. Corroborating Riedlmayer’s conclusions, Vejsa, a Milo{ Gili} Street resident, testified that NATO did not bomb the Dakovica/Gjakovë historic centre between 24 March and 2 April 1999.2168 Similarly, VJ daily situation reports do not record a significant bombardment of Dakovica/Gjakovë around 24 March 1999.2169
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes committed in ðakovica/Gjakovë
2155 Dula,P1268,p.2. 2156 Dula,P1268,p.2;T.8358. 2157 Dula,P1268,p.2;T.8333,8361. 2158 Dula,T.8374–8375. 2159 Dula,P1268,p.3;T.8336–8339,8378–8379;P1269. 2160 Dula,P1268,p.4;T.8336–8337,8339–8341;P1104,p.1;P1107. 2161 Haxhibeqiri,P1068,p.9;T.6947–6949;P1069. 2162 Haxhibeqiri,T.6942;P1069, mark 2. 2163 Haxhibeqiri,T.6940–6943;P1068,p.10. 2164 Riedlmayer,T.7509–7519;P1104,p.1;P1108,p.1;P1099,pp.87 92;P1106;P1110. See also Haxhibeqiri,T.6945,7008 7009 2165 Riedlmayer,T.7510–7511,7646–7647;P1099,p.88. 2166 See e.g. \o{an,D685,p.29. See also \o{an,T.11353 11354,11456 11458;D687,pp.1 2;D685,pp.58,310. 2167 Riedlmayer,T.7503;P1099,pp.92–93;P1105,p.2;P1108. 2168 Vejsa,T.6098 6099. 2169 See D930,pp.1 2. The first mention of damage inflicted in the \akovica is the entry from 28 March 1999: between 22:00 and 23:15, the Devet Jugovica barracks were bombarded with no consequences: D930,p.4.
IT-05-87/1-T 202 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6343 830. The crimes committed in the Ðakovica/Gjakovë municipality were committed by forces of the FRY and Serbia in organised and co ordinated actions. The evidence shows that VJ and MUP units were involved in operations, often together, in Ðakovica/Gjakovë town and municipality during the Indictment period.
831. Already from summer 1998, VJ units were present in Ðakovica/Gjakovë.2170 From March until June 1999, the VJ operated in Ðakovica/Gjakovë with the 549th Mtbr,2171 the 52nd ARB,2172 the 52nd MPBn,2173 the 125th Mtbr,2174 and Ðakovica VTOd.2175 The commanders of these units were subordinated to Lazarevi}.
832. In 1999, Dordevi} personally ordered the deployment and redeployment of the 23rd and 73rd PJP Detachments to Ðakovica/Gjakovë.2176
(c) Korenica/Korenicë
833. On 25 March 1999, VJ forces entered the villages of Deva/Devë and Babaj and executed eight civilian men.2177
834. On 27 March, soldiers led by a VJ commander named Dragan ordered villagers to leave Guska/Guskë within one hour for Albania.2178 They left in a convoy,2179 and were ultimately sent to Korenica/Korenicë.2180 Similarly, on 4 April 1999, a uniformed and heavily armed policeman named Milutin Praščevi} and other police officers ordered families in Korenica/Korenicë to leave for Albania.2181 They too left in a convoy,2182 but were ordered back to Korenica/Korenicë.2183
835. On 27 April 1999, Korenica/Korenicë was attacked during the Meja operation, as described below.
2170 D728,p.1. 2171 See e.g. D37,pp.2,4–6,18;P1032. 2172 P958,pp.6,9,12. 2173 P338,p.6. See Peraj,T.1341. 2174 P919. 2175 P900. 2176 P136;P711;P1182. See also P1193;P1195;P1487;P1185;P1189;P1196;P1199;P1488. 2177 Deda,P1030,p.5. 2178 Deda,P1030,p.5;P1031,p.4;T.6542. 2179 Deda,P1030,p.5;T.6537–6538. 2180 Deda,P1031,p.5;T.6537–6538. 2181 Malaj,T.811,857 858. 2182 Malaj,T.809 811. 2183 Malaj,T.811.
IT-05-87/1-T 203 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6342 (d) Meja/Mejë
836. On the morning of 27 April 1999, VJ, MUP and paramilitary forces began sweeping through the Reka/Caragoj Valley, from the village of Dobroš/Dobrosh to Korenica/Korenicë, forcibly expelling Albanian residents and setting their homes on fire.2184
837. Witness K73 stated that his VJ unit first “sealed” the village of Dobroš/Dobrosh and the “cleansing” continued from there for two days until they reached Korenica/Korenicë.2185 On the first day they expelled “hundreds” of Albanian civilians and set their houses on fire.2186 They did not focus on the KLA. Rather, they expelled all civilians, “from the baby in the cradle to the elderly people in wheelchairs”.2187
838. Similarly, witness K90 said his VJ unit blockaded and “secure[d]” the area around Korenica/Korenicë and Meja/Mejë.2188 Many police were then deployed into the area, and “randomly fired into homes”.2189 As villagers began to flee, their homes would be “set alight”.2190
839. About 35 soldiers, paramilitaries and policemen ordered Lizane Malaj’s family out of their house in Korenica/Korenicë, stole three cars and made the men lie down at gunpoint.2191 Elsewhere in Korenica/Korenicë, nine men wearing uniforms which were not the “normal” army uniforms forced everyone out of the house in which Merita Deda, a refugee from Guska/Guskë, was sheltering.2192 That same morning in Meja/Mejë, four uniformed men, including two local MUP officers, told Martin Pnishi’s family to leave, as they were about to burn the house down.2193
840. A consistent practice of Serb forces, including policemen, throughout the Meja/Mejë operation was to separate the men from the women, and then beat, rob and kill the men. This happened to the men in Malaj’s and Deda’s family and houses.2194 Serb forces made the women in Deda’s house raise three fingers and shout “Serbia, Serbia”.2195 The rest of the family members were told to walk to Albania.21962197 After the killings, Serb forces set the houses on fire.2198
2184 K73,T.1526,1534,1548 (closed session);P332,pp.38–37 (under seal);P330 A,para.41. 2185 K73,T.1524 1525 (closed session); P330 A,para.41. 2186 K73,P330 A,para.42;P331 A,para.8;T.1528 1529 (closed session). See also P332,p.104 (under seal). 2187 K73,P332,pp.91–92 (under seal). 2188 K90,P321,para.48;T.1452 1453. 2189 K90,P321,para.48;T.1344 1345. 2190 K90,P321,para.48. 2191 Malaj,T.813 816,864–865. 2192 Deda,P1031,pp.5–6,8,17,34;P1030,p.6. See also Peraj,P313,para.90. 2193 Pnishi,T.6574 6575,6578;P1033,pp.2–3;P1034,pp.5–6. See also K90,P321,para.30 (under seal). 2194 Malaj,T.818; Deda,P1031,pp.5–7;P1030,p.6. 2195 Deda,P1030,p.6;P1031,pp.5 6. 2196 Malaj,T.815 818.
IT-05-87/1-T 204 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6341 841. Police, VJ soldiers and paramilitaries manned checkpoints on the roads where they separated out the men and killed them.2199 At one checkpoint, K90 saw hundreds of displaced Albanians “coming from everywhere”.2200 MUP officers separated men from women, and “herded” at least three to four groups of up to 10 men into houses in a compound at gunpoint.2201 There, the police executed the Albanian men.2202 Later, K90 saw the police set fire to these houses.2203
842. At a checkpoint on the road near his home in Meja/Mejë, Pnishi observed Serb forces separating the men from the women, then sending some men to the nearby school building.2204 Nike Peraj, a VJ officer, later saw four men’s dead bodies lying behind the school’s toilets.2205
843. During the course of the Meja/Mejë operation, forces of the FRY and Serbia killed at least 344 people. Years later, the human remains of approximately 300 of these victims were exhumed from mass graves at Batajnica, including those of some of Malaj’s and Deda’s relatives.2206
844. The displaced Albanians who were not executed were forced to leave Kosovo. Convoys of refugees from villages throughout the Reka/Caragoj valley, including Korenica/Korenicë, Guska/Guskë, Junik, Dakovica/Gjakovë and Skivjane/Skivjan, made their way to Albania.2207 Along the way, VJ soldiers and police manned checkpoints and lined the road, forcing them to keep walking.2208
845. So that Kosovo Albanians could not return, Serb forces, including police, took the refugees’ IDs and registration plates as they expelled them from their houses, at checkpoints and at the border.2209
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes committed during the Meja/Mejë operation
846. Peraj stated that in early March 1999, the PrK Chief of Security, Momir Stojanovi}, told him that Serbian forces would carry out a cleansing plan against Albanians in Dakovica/Gjakovë 1. 2197 Malaj,T.819. 2198 Malaj,T.819 820,873 874. See also K73,T.1535–1536 (closed session);P332,p.43 (under seal);K90,T.1346. 2199 See also Pnishi,P1033,p.4;T.1448;Peraj,P313,paras.73–74. 2200 K90,P321,para.53. 2201 K90,P321,paras.54,59, 61;T.1351 1352. 2202 K90,P321,paras.59–60. 2203 K90,P321 para.66. 2204 Pnishi,P1033pp.4,9. 2205 Peraj,P313,para.69. 2206 See P98;P99;P100;P576; Annex C, Schedule H; Deda,P1031,p.7;Malaj,T.830 832. 2207 Malaj,T.821–823,825–828;P295;Abrahams,T.3969–3972;P756,pp.25–31. 2208 Malaj,T.821,823,827–828. See also Deda,P1030,pp.6–8.
IT-05-87/1-T 205 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6340 municipality.2210 On 22 April 1999, Stojanovi}’s relative, Milutin Praščevi},2211 was killed along with other MUP officers in a KLA ambush.2212 Stojanovi} held an informal gathering in Dakovica/Gjakovë town and prior to mourning Praščevi}’s death.2213 There, in an “emotional outburst” he told Nikola Mičunovi} (VJ Major commanding reservist units of the Territorial Defence, aka “Dragan”) and Colonel Kovačevi} (commander of Dakovica/Gjakovë MUP station) that at least 100 “heads” had to be eliminated and all houses burned in revenge.2214 Days later, Mičunovi} told Peraj that “the valley of Carragojs was going to pay a very high price”.2215 As demanded by Stojanovi}, six days after Praščevi}’s murder, over 300 Albanian “heads” were in fact eliminated, and most Albanian homes burned.
847. Around this time, about 400 policemen arrived in the area in buses and civilian vehicles.2216 By at least 25 April 1999, the VJ and the MUP had deployed their units to the area northwest of Meja/Mejë, towards Junik.2217
848. Documentary evidence shows that both VJ and MUP units were engaged, specifically: VJ 125th Mtbr;2218 elements of the 63rd Parachute Brigade, 52d MPBn;2219 2nd Battalion of the 549th Mtbr;2220 52nd ARB;2221 and one company of MUP PJP 73rd Territorial Detachment was deployed in the Pono{eva}/Ponoshec, Korenica/Korenicë, and Smocica/Smolicë villages area.2222
849. On a map, Peraj showed the deployment of VJ and MUP units along the Dakovica/Gjakovë Decane/Deçan road.2223 During the operation, the 63rd Parachute Brigade moved down the left side of the valley, parallel with the 52nd MPBn. The PJP 73rd Territorial Detachment moved down the right side of the valley.2224
850. In a 27 April combat report, the Commander of the 125th Mtbr, Dragan Živanovi}, referred to a column of “[iptar civilians” on the axis of the Seremet/Sheremetaj Racaj/Rracaj
1. 2209 Malaj,T.816,828;Pnishi,P1033,p.4;Peraj,P313,para.73;D34,para.8. See also K89,P1274,pp.82–83. 2210 Peraj,P313,para.57. 2211 Stojanovi},T.11888. See Malaj,T.809 811,857–858. 2212 P1544;Peraj,P313,para.59;K90,P321,para.47. 2213 Peraj,P313,paras.59–62. 2214 Peraj,P313,paras.59–60. 2215 Peraj,P313,para.58. 2216 K90,P321,para.47;T.1343. 2217 P949;P950. 2218 P949;P950. 2219 Peraj,P313,para.65;T.1200;P317. 2220 D37,pp.10–12;\o{an,T.11479,11481;P927 (under seal). 2221 P958,p.33;\o{an,T.11392–11393,11398,11473;P703,p.2 2222 P949,p.2. See also Peraj,P313,para.65. 2223 Peraj,P313,paras.64–65;P317;T.1225–1227. 2224 K73,P330 A,paras.37,41;T.1524,1527,1534,1569 (closed session);P337;P332,pp.37 38,45 (under seal).
IT-05-87/1-T 206 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6339 Dakovica/Gjakovë and “further on”.2225 This axis would have passed through or near Meja/Mejë. The task for the following day was to “continue mopping up the general area of Reka in a concerted action with the MUP”.2226
851. On 27 April, the 2nd Battalion of the 549th Mtbr blocked off the Korenica/Korenicë villaje axis.2227 Other VJ units did the same.2228 Many police were then deployed into the area.2229
852. Šešelj’s and Arkan’s units were also deployed in the area.2230
853. General Lazarevi} and Lieutenant Colonel Goran Jeftovi} (Staff Officer for PrK operations) coordinated the overall action from Dakovica/Gjakovë.2231 By late April 1999, Lazarevi} was primarily based at the Dakovica/Gjakovë forward command post, together with other members of the PrK Command.2232 From there, he directed the operations on the ground and received reports from Novica Stankovi} and Milan Kotur at a VJ command post.2233 Colonel Kotur, from the PrK,2234 was deployed to a command post at the Catholic Church northwest of Osek village, where he had a clear view of the Reka/Caragoj valley to direct the operation.2235 The MUP command post was located in the Dervish prayer house in the Dužlje/Duzhnjë village.2236
854. Defence witness Momir Stojanovi} went to great lengths to undermine Peraj’s testimony. Stojanovi} denied he ever said that there would be a cleansing operation, and that Serb forces should seek retribution for Praščevi}’s killing.2237 Stojanovi} had a personal interest in undermining Peraj’s testimony, as it implicated him in instigating the murder of over 300 Albanians. To distance himself from these comments, Stojanovi} made highly incredible claims, including: he did not remember Praščevi} was killed during the war,2238 he was evasive about whether Praščevi} was a police officer;2239 he even denied that he knew at the time that the KLA killed Praščevi}.2240 Given that it was Stojanovi}’s job to gather KLA intelligence, that the initial criminal report stated clearly
2225 P950,p.2. 2226 P950,p.3. 2227 D37,p.11. 2228 K90,P321,para.48;T.1452 1453;P927 (under seal). 2229 K90,P321,para.48;T.1344 1345. 2230 Pnishi,P1033,p.5;Peraj;P313,para.80. 2231 Peraj,P313,para.65. 2232 Peraj,P313,para.91. 2233 Peraj,P313,paras.91,93. 2234 Peraj,T.1264. 2235 Peraj,P313.para.63;P317. 2236 Peraj,P313.para.63;P317. 2237 Stojanovi},T.11894 11895. 2238 Stojanovi},T.11890. 2239 Stojanovi},T.11906 11908. 2240 Stojanovi},T.11889 11890.
IT-05-87/1-T 207 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6338 that terrorists killed Praščevi},2241 and that multiple witnesses were aware that the Meja/Mejë action was at least partly in response to this terrorist killing,2242 these denials are not worthy of belief.
855. Further, Stojanovi} went to great lengths to distance himself from the crimes committed in Meja/Mejë. He claimed not to know that the VJ had committed any crimes during the operation, even though it was his job to learn of crimes committed by the VJ and investigate them.2243 Since the action led to the murder of over 300 people, thousands of displaced Albanians, and homes burning throughout the entire valley, either Stojanovi} was negligent in his job or he was not truthful. At a minimum, it is clear that he had little interest in investigating the crimes committed during the Meja/Mejë operation: when remains of those killed there were found in a mass grave in Batajnica, he conducted no investigation, even though he was Chief of Security of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro at the time.2244 In general, Stojanovi} was an incredible witness who tried to assist himself and the defence rather than give objective, truthful testimony.
856. The organisation and planning involved in the Meja/Mejë operation are further evidenced by the fact that VJ and MUP forces hid the dead bodies of the Albanians they murdered. Peraj saw four trucks driving towards Dakovica/Gjakovë town from Meja/Mejë with a police escort, transporting piles of bodies.2245 The MUP then buried these bodies in mass graves.2246
9. Gnjilane/Gjilan Municipality
857. Beginning around 24 March 1999, VJ, MUP and paramilitary forces expelled thousands of Albanians from Gnjilane/Gjilan municipality, including the villages of Žegra/Zhegër, Vladovo/Lladovë, Vlaštica/Vlastica, and Prilepnica/Përlepnicë.
(a) Žegra/Zhegër
858. In 1999, the village of Žegra/Zhegër had approximately 4,000 residents. Out of about 600 houses, roughly 70 houses were Serb.2247
859. Throughout March 1999 there was a noticeable build up of MUP, paramilitary and VJ forces in Žegra/Zhegër.2248 These forces were primarily based in the radiator factory, the
2241 P1544;Stojanovi},T.11905. 2242 \o{an,T.11476 11478. 2243 Stojanovi},T.11929. 2244 Stojanović,T.11938 11944. 2245 Peraj,P313,paras.86,88. 2246 See Part III, Section(B)(5). 2247 Shabani,P786,p.2;P787,para.4. 2248 P1028,p.812. See also Shabani,P786,pp.2 3;P787,para.2.
IT-05-87/1-T 208 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6337 agricultural co operative and the primary school.2249 VJ forces also expelled Albanian families from their homes in order to quarter soldiers.2250 Two or three weeks before the NATO campaign started, reservists and regular VJ soldiers manned a checkpoint at the entrance of the village to check residents’ identity documents.2251 Forces in APC’s and tanks patrolled the area daily.2252
860. On 28 March 1999 (Muslim holiday of Bajram), the Serb families in Žegra/Zhegër started to mark their homes with a white cloth on the door to distinguish their houses from the Albanian ones.2253 Paramilitaries assisted by local Serbs searched the village for prominent Albanians.2254 They attempted to locate the LDK president, Tahir Tahiri, but did not succeed and instead killed his brother, Shyqeri Tahiri.2255
861. On 29 March, MUP, VJ, paramilitary and local Serbs began systematically expelling the ethnic Albanian residents from Žegra/Zhegër.2256 Serb forces in APC’s drove through the village firing machine guns at houses.2257 VJ soldiers went from house to house, forcing people to leave at gunpoint.2258 They shot at and injured several residents.2259 Most of the villagers fled to the mountains.2260 They sought refuge in the woods and the neighbouring village of Donja Stubla/Stubëlle E Poshtme, where they lived in very difficult conditions for about five weeks.2261
862. In early April, villagers from other parts of Gnjilane/Gjilan municipality, such as Ribnik/Rimnik, Delekar, Budrika/Burrke E Eperme, Mogila/Mogille, Nosalje/Nosalë and Vladovo/Lladovë, also fled to Donja Stubla/Stubëlle E Poshtme, after Serb forces attacked their villages,2262 killing and injuring many civilians.2263 Some of the wounded died upon arrival in Donja Stubla/Stubëlle E Poshtme.2264
2249 Shabani,P786,pp.2 3. See also K81,P792,p.6;P793,p.16 (the factory was located at the entrance to the Žegra/Zhegër village approximately one kilometre away from Vladovo/Lladovë). 2250 Shabani,P786,p.3. 2251 Shabani,P786,p.2. 2252 Shabani,P786,p.2. 2253 Shabani,P786,p.2;P788,pp.22 25. 2254 Shabani,P788,pp.5 6;P786,p.3. Shabani names the local Serbs who provided the list of prominent Albanians (P787, para.5). K81 corroborated Shabani’s evidence and gave a list of civilians he saw working with the soldiers/paramilitaries. K81,P792,p.8. 2255 Shabani,P786,p.3;P788,p.5. 2256 Shabani,P786,p.3;P788,pp.4 6. 2257 Shabani,P786,p.3;P787,para.8. 2258 Shabani,P786,p.3. 2259 Shabani,P786,p.3;P787,paras.9 12. 2260 Shabani,P786,p.3. Some villagers attempted to go back and were expelled a second time (Shabani,P787,paras.13 14;P788,pp.6 7). 2261 Shabani,P786,pp.4 5;P788,pp.41 42. 2262 Shabani,P786,p.4. 2263 Shabani,P786,p.4. 2264 Shabani,P786,p.4.
IT-05-87/1-T 209 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6336 863. By mid April, roughly 20,000 people had amassed in Donja Stubla/Stubëlle E Poshtme.2265 Food and water became scare, so large groups of refugees began leaving the village everyday in the direction of Macedonia.2266
864. One group of about 600 Albanians left Donja Stubla/Stubëlle E Poshtme in early May.2267 On their way to Macedonia, they were shot at by VJ soldiers. Later, thirty to forty VJ and paramilitary forces stopped them near a border crossing and separated the men from the women. The forces surrounded the men at gunpoint, and threatened to kill them.2268 Their commander yelled ethnic insults at the Albanians, and ordered the group to walk to Preshevë/Preševo, Serbia.2269 The convoy set off for Preshevë/Preševo and, over the night, was joined by 300 other Albanians, including some from Žegra/Zhegër.2270 They all crossed into Macedonia the following day.2271
865. In total, about 1,200 to 1,300 people fled Žegra/Zhegër at the end of March 1999.2272 By 26 June 1999, when some villagers returned to Žegra/Zhegër, all but a few of the Albanian houses were either totally or partially burned, while Serb houses were intact.2273
(b) Vladovo/Lladovë
866. On 25 March 1999, armed VJ and paramilitaries entered Vladovo/Lladovë on eight to 10 buses.2274 Many of the paramilitaries, including men known as Arkan’s Tigers, stayed in a factory with the VJ at the entrance to Žegra/Zhegër.2275 They were armed with automatic guns and drove civilian vehicles. They set up check points, stole residents’ cars, and mistreated the civilian population.2276
2265 Shabani,P786,p.4. 2266 Shabani,P786,pp.4 5;P788,pp.41 42. 2267 Shabani,P786,p.5;P788,p.7. 2268 Shabani,P786,p.5; P788,pp.45 46. 2269 Shabani,P786,pp.5 6 P788,pp.7 9,84. 2270 Shabani,P786,p.6;P788,p.7. 2271 Shabani,P786,p.6. 2272 Shabani,P786,pp.3 4;P788,pp.6 7. K81 also witnessed people fleeing Žegra/Zhegër around this time (K81,P792,p.8). 2273 Shabani,P787,para.19 (Shabani said that roughly 120 Albanian houses were totally burned and 420 were partially burned). K81 also confirmed that Albanian houses in Žegra/Zhegër were burned, while Serb houses were intact (K81,P792,p.8). 2274 K81,P792,p.6;P793,p.3 (correction to the number of buses: 8 to 10, not 80 buses). VJ soldiers wore dark green uniforms, while the paramilitaries wore parts of uniforms or civilian clothes, had long beards, and appeared to be older than the VJ soldiers (K81,P792,p.6;P793,pp.17,20). 2275 K81,P792,p.6;P793,pp.16,20,23. The factory was located at the entrance to the Žegra/Zhegër village approximately one kilometre away from Vladovo/Lladovë. 2276 K81,P792,p.6;P793,p.19.
IT-05-87/1-T 210 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6335 867. Many of the villagers, including women, children and the elderly, fled to the mountains, from where they could see that Serb forces kept shooting in the village.2277 Around 2 April, a handful of villagers decided to go back to Vladovo/Lladovë.2278 VJ soldiers in dark green uniforms opened fire on them with automatic guns, wounding and killing villagers.2279
868. After about two weeks, the villagers ran out of food, and a group of them went to the village of Zub/Zhub.2280 Shortly thereafter, the VJ began attacking civilian houses in Zub/Zhub, causing the residents to flee. Soldiers opened fire on the fleeing civilians.2281 The group from Vladovo/Lladovë managed to escape and later joined a convoy of 1,000 people travelling to the Macedonia.2282 Police and VJ escorted the convoy to the Macedonian border.2283 At the border, MUP searched the convoy, and took everyone’s ID papers.2284 The convoy had to remain at the Macedonian border until the border crossing opened, and eventually crossed on 14 April 1999.2285
(c) Prilepnica/Përlepnicë
869. Prilepnica/Përlepnicë, located north east of the town of Gnjilane/Gjilan, had about 3,000 primarily Albanian inhabitants as of March 1999.2286
870. On 6 April, ten to fifteen soldiers came into the village, fired their guns, and caused some frightened residents to flee.2287 The soldiers said that they had orders from Belgrade to empty the village and threatened the village imam, Abdylhaqim Shaqiri, and told him to instruct the population to leave their homes.2288 The villagers were given two hours to leave in the direction of Uroševac/Ferizaj.2289
871. A convoy of about 3,000 people and 400 cars left Prilepnica/Përlepnicë.2290 The convoy first stopped near Kmetofc/Kmetovce village at a MUP and VJ checkpoint, where they were questioned
2277 K81,P792,pp.6 7. 2278 K81,P792,p.7. 2279 K81,P792,p.7. 2280 K81,P792,pp.8 9. 2281 K81,P792,p.9. 2282 K81,P792,p.9. 2283 K81,P792,p.9. 2284 K81,P792,p.9. 2285 K81,P792,p.9. 2286 Shaqiri,P729,p.5. 2287 Shaqiri,P729,pp.6 9. Most of the soldiers wore solid olive green grey uniforms. One or two wore green camouflage. They carried automatic rifles, Kalashnikovs, and spoke Serbo Croatian. 2288 Shaqiri,P729,pp.8 11. 2289 Shaqiri,P729,p.17. 2290 Shaqiri,P729,p.23.
IT-05-87/1-T 211 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6334 by VJ soldiers.2291 They continued on the road and were later stopped by the police who informed them that the Gnjilane/Gjilan SUP had sent orders instructing the convoy to return to Prilepnica/Përlepnicë.2292 Some villagers returned to Prilepnica/Përlepnicë that night to find their houses destroyed, looted and raided.2293
872. About one week later, on 13 or 14 April, the VJ ordered Prilepnica/Përlepnicë villagers to leave again. Two local reserve VJ soldiers, Ljuba Palamarevic and Djilas Mladenovic, said that they had orders to empty Prilepnica/Përlepnicë.2294 The entire village evacuated again the following day with a MUP escort in a convoy of approximately 500 vehicles. They were later joined by expelled villagers from Kosac/Kosovce.2295 When they reached Macedonia, border police ordered them to leave all their vehicles in a nearby field along with the keys and licenses. They were later taken on buses from Macedonia to different refugee camps.2296
Destruction of cultural property: Vlaštica/Vlastica
873. In late March to early April, forces described as VJ soldiers assisted by local armed civilians attacked the village of Vlaštica/Vlastica. They looted and burned houses.2297 The forces also set the VlašticaVlastica mosque on fire.2298 Riedlmayer categorized the VlašticaVlastica mosque as “heavily damaged”.2299 The database entry for the Vla{tica mosque shows that the interior was burned out.2300 Information from the EU/IMG report as well as a media account also confirmed damages to the interior of the mosque.2301
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes in Gnjilane/Gjilan municipality
874. VJ, MUP, and paramilitary forces were present during the expulsions of the civilian population from Gnjilane/Gjilan municipality. The VJ was present with the 175th Infantry Brigade,
2291 Shaqiri,P729,pp.23 24. VJ soldiers were wearing olive green grey uniforms. The MUP were wearing traffic police uniforms with white ribbons on the arm. 2292 Shaqiri,P729,pp.25 30; P731. 2293 Shaqiri,P729,pp.30 32. 2294 Shaqiri,P729,pp.33 36. 2295 Shaqiri,P729,pp.38 41.P733 maps the route. 2296 Shaqiri,P729,pp.55 56;P732;P733. 2297 K81,P793,p.18. 2298 K81,P792,p.7;P793,pp.7 8;P795. 2299 Riedlmayer,T.7538;P1099,pp.78 79;P795,P1125;P1126. 2300 Riedlmayer,T.7539;P1126;P1099,p.78. 2301 Riedlmayer,T.7539;P1126.
IT-05-87/1-T 212 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6333 deployed in the area until at least mid April, together with MUP forces.2302 Various “armed non Albanian civilians” and “paramilitaries” were reported to be working alongside the Serb forces.2303
875. Witnesses identified both VJ and MUP forces as perpetrators of the crimes committed in Gnjilane/Gjilan municipality, either through the uniforms they wore, or through the fact that some of the soldiers, policemen or local Serbs committing crimes were known to victims and witnesses.2304
876. Documentary evidence in the Trial Record shows that:
- On or about 19 March to 21 March 1999, the OSCE KVM reported a large military presence including armored vehicles in the border area to the south of Gnjilane/Gjilan.2305 This coincides with the expulsions in Žegra/Zhegër, which began in late March.2306
- By the end of March 1999, the 58th Military Territorial Detachment (VTOd), in coordination with the 52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade, the 175th Infantry Brigade, and MUP forces, was deployed in the town of Gnjilane/Gjilan and in other villages in the area.2307
- At a MUP Staff meeting of 4 April 1999, SUP chief Gavrani} reported “problems with volunteers in Žegra”, and that about 50,000 persons had moved out.2308
- A report on criminal proceedings alleged that, on 29 March 1999, seven soldiers/volunteers from the 175th Infantry Brigade committed crimes in Žegra/Zhegër.2309
- On 13 April 1999, a Joint Command order tasked the Ni{ Corps, a tactical group of the 252nd Armoured Battalion, and the 175th Infantry Brigade, with the assistance of the armed non Albanian population, to support the MUP in combat actions in the area.2310
2302 P766,p.2. See also P1028,p.812;P896. 2303 Shabani,P786,pp.2 3;P788,pp.5 6;K81,P792,pp.6,8;P793,pp.16,20,23;Shaqiri,P729,pp.6 9. 2304 Shabani,P788,pp.5 6;P786,p.3;P787,para.5;K81,P792,pp.6,8;P793,pp.17,20;Shaqiri,P729,pp.6 9,23 24. 2305 P1028,p.812. 2306 Shabani,P786,pp.3 4;P788,pp.5 6. 2307 P896,p.5(8.1). 2308 P764,p.2. 2309 P964,p.7. See also \akovi},T.8151 8152. 2310 P766,p.2.
IT-05-87/1-T 213 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6332 10. Uro{evac/Ferizaj
(a) Staro Selo/Fshati I Vjeter
877. On the night of 24 March 1999, a Praga sitting on the Uroševac/Ferizaj–Gnjilane/Gjilan road fired towards Staro Selo/Fshati I Vjeter.2311 “[M]any houses were hit by the shells.”2312 In response to the shelling, the residents in the outlying houses in the village, including witness Bajram Bucaliu and his family, moved in with relatives living closer to the village centre.2313
878. On 2 April, a VJ forces consisting of approximately 50 soldiers and 5 tanks entered the village.2314 The soldiers confiscated villagers’ vehicles and required villagers to hand over weapons2315
879. The soldiers remained in Staro Selo/Fshati I Vjeter until the morning of 5 April 1999, when they left in the direction of the Gnjilane/Gjilan road.2316 Before leaving the village, they set fire to some of the Albanian homes they had previously occupied.2317
880. In the early afternoon that same day, approximately 80 paramilitaries arrived in the village from the direction of the Pri{tina Skopje road.2318 The paramilitaries said that they were Šešelj’s men.2319
881. The paramilitaries took control of the village, placing a curfew, confiscating vehicles, extorting money, and forcing a number of local young men to dig trenches.2320
882. On 13 April 1999, the paramilitaries killed three villagers and took four others, including two women, to an unknown location.2321 News of the killings spread quickly,2322 and caused the entire village, except four Albanian families, to flee the next day. Bucaliu explained that the killings left the villagers no choice but to leave.2323
2311 Bucaliu,T.5068,5099;P824,p.2. 2312 Bucaliu,T.5068. 2313 Bucaliu,T.5068;P824,p.2. 2314 Bucaliu,P824,p.2;P827,p.4. 2315 Bucaliu,P826,p.2;P827,pp.6,42,45,68. 2316 Bucaliu,P824,p.3;P826,p.25.P827,p.6. 2317 Bucaliu,P824,p.3;P826,p.25;P827,p.6. 2318 Bucaliu,T.5054,5090,5093;P824,p.3;P827,pp.7 9;P826,p.27. 2319 Bucaliu,P827,p.9. 2320 Bucaliu,P824,pp.3 4;P826,pp.28,57;P827,p.9. 2321 Bucaliu,T.5081;P824,p.4;P826,p.28;P827,p.10. 2322 Bucaliu,T.5078. 2323 Bucaliu,T.5058.
IT-05-87/1-T 214 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6331 883. The villagers travelled in a convoy of 500 to 600 people toward Uroševac/Ferizaj.2324 The convoy had to pass through a joint VJ MUP checkpoint at the bridge junction with the Skopje Priština/Prishtina highway.2325
884. In Uroševac/Ferizaj town, there were tanks in the town centre and checkpoints throughout the town “at crucial points,” allowing them to control the exits and entrances to neighbourhoods.2326 There were streams of people walking on foot towards the train station.2327 Bucaliu and his family began their journey to Macedonia by train the following day as described below.
885. Bucaliu returned to Staro Selo/Fshati I Vjeter on 6 July 1999 and found that his house and many others had been completely burned down.2328
(b) Biba/Bibe and Sojevo/Sojevë
886. During the NATO bombing, local Serbs were armed and wearing uniforms.2329 Conversely, the Serbian authorities did not distribute any arms to the Kosovo Albanians in the area.2330 On 24 March 1999, most of the residents of Biba/Bibe moved to houses in the centre of the village, away from the main road.2331
887. That night, APCs shelled houses in Biba/Bibe along the main road.2332 After three days, Hyseni moved with his family to his uncle’s house in Sojevo/Sojevë.2333 The VJ was stationed at the village school, and also occupied some private homes.2334 He saw three tanks and two anti aircraft artillery cannons positioned near his uncle’s house.2335 This unit stayed there for several days, then left and joined the unit stationed at the Sojevo/Sojevë school.2336
888. Around 6 April 1999, Hyseni saw a group of 18 “paramilitaries” and two “policemen” enter Sojevo/Sojevë from the direction of Gnjilane/Gjilan.2337 The paramilitaries wore green uniforms and carried automatic weapons and knives, while the policemen wore blue/black uniforms and
2324 Bucaliu,T.5056,5083 5088;P825,p.3;P826,p.30;P827,pp.10 12. 2325 Bucaliu,T.5056;P825,p.3. 2326 Bucaliu,P825,p.4;T.5056 5057. 2327 Bucaliu,P825,p.4. 2328 Bucaliu,T.5066,5111;P825,p.5;P826,pp.33 34; P827,p.14. 2329 Hyseni,P809,p.4;P810,pp.3 4. 2330 Hyseni,P810,p.4. 2331 Hyseni,P808,p.2;P809,pp.4 5;P810,p.7. 2332 Hyseni,P808,p.2;P809,p.5. 2333 Hyseni,P808,p.2;P809,p.5;P810,pp.7,19 21. 2334 Hyseni,P809,p.5. 2335 Hyseni,P810,p.8. 2336 Hyseni,P810,p.8. 2337 Hyseni,P808,p.2;P809,p.5;P810,pp.8 9.
IT-05-87/1-T 215 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6330 carried automatic rifles.2338 The paramilitaries and police terrorized the villagers. They “torched the entire neighbourhood” of Limanaj2339 and also killed two Albanians.2340
889. Paramilitaries and police then moved toward the neighbourhood where Hyseni was staying, and the villagers began to flee into the woods.2341 Hyseni saw that two paramilitaries shot his paralyzed uncle and his aunt.2342
890. Hyseni and his family hid in the woods with over 200 other villagers.2343 This group then split in two.2344 Paramilitaries found one of the groups,2345 robbed the villagers2346 and ordered them to travel to Ferizaj or be killed.2347
891. The VJ unit stationed at the Sojevo/Sojevë school ordered everyone in that neighbourhood to “leave the village” and travel to Uroševac/Ferizaj.2348 Hyseni travelled with hundreds of others towards Uroševac/Ferizaj town.2349
892. Once the convoy reached Uroševac/Ferizaj, it was stopped by the “Serbian traffic police” and ordered to proceed to Gnjilane/Gjilan.2350 The convoy left Uroševac/Ferizaj, but only travelled to Slatina/Sllatine village, where Hyseni and his family stayed for about 12 days.2351 While they were there, thousands of refugees flowed into the town from Gnjilane and other villages.2352
893. Hyseni and his family ultimately left Slatina/Sllatine and travelled to Uroševac/Ferizaj.2353 Hyseni described the situation in Uroševac/Ferizaj as “terrible.”2354 The army, the police, and paramilitaries were present, and there was constant shooting.2355 Hyseni and his family eventually left Uroševac/Ferizaj and travelled to Macedonia by bus on 28 April 1999 as described below.
2338 Hyseni,P808,p.2. 2339 Hyseni,P810,p.46;P809,p.5;T.4905 4906. 2340 Hyseni,T.4866;P808,p.3; P809,p.5;P810,pp.8 9,46. 2341 Hyseni,P809,p.5. 2342 Hyseni,P808,pp.2 3. 2343 Hyseni,P808,p.3;P809,p.5. 2344 Hyseni,P809,p.5. 2345 Hyseni,T.4867 4868;P809,p.5. 2346 Hyseni,T.4867. 2347 Hyseni,T.4867 4868. 2348 Hyseni,P810,pp.31 33. 2349 Hyseni,P809,p.6 2350 Hyseni,P808,p.3;P809,p.6;P810,pp.11,51 52. 2351 Hyseni,P808,p.3;P809,p.6;P810,p.11. See also P811. 2352 Hyseni,P809,p.6; P808,p.3. 2353 Hyseni,T.4868 4869. 2354 Hyseni,P809,p.7. 2355 Hyseni,T.4870.
IT-05-87/1-T 216 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6329 894. Hyseni returned to Biba/Bibe a year later, and discovered that his house had been burned to the ground. 2356
(c) Mirosavlje/Mirosalë
895. Around 4 April 1999, Florim Krasniqi, a resident of Mirosavlje/Mirosalë, observed a very large convoy of military vehicles travelling on the main road from Gnjilane/Gjilan towards Uroševac/Ferizaj town.2357 These forces shelled towards the villages of Rahovica/Rahovicë and Zlatare/Zllatar.2358 From his position Krasniqi could hear, but not see, the shelling.2359 His observations are corroborated by the War Diary of the 243rd Mechanised Brigade, which documented for 4 April 1999: “Mb /mortar/…as decided by the commander, is engaged on providing support to MUP forces on the axis of /illegible/ village – Rahovica village.”2360
896. The next day, Krasniqi travelled to Rahovica/Rahovicë and Zlatare/Zllatar and learned from the residents that the shelling had killed four and wounded five villagers. He attended their funerals.2361
897. As Krasniqi returned on 5 April 1999, he could hear the “very loud noises of the automatic weapons firing and shelling” and “the noise of large vehicles like tanks moving around the area.”2362 The sounds were coming from the direction of Pojatistë/Pojatishme village.2363 A short time later, approximately 1,000 displaced people from Pojatistë/Pojatishme sought shelter in Mirosavlje/Mirosalë.2364 The displaced were citizens of Pojatistë/Pojatishme and refugees from other villages, such as Uroševac/Ferizaj, Muhadžer Prelez/Prelezi i Muhaxherëve, and Muhovce/Muhoc, who had been staying in Pojatistë/Pojatishme because they had been driven out of their villages.2365
898. Krasniqi helped find shelter for the refugees in Mirosavlje/Mirosalë – there were so many displaced people that often 40 people had to share a single room.2366 Krasniqi spoke with about 20
2356 Hyseni,P810,p.14. 2357 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.2. 2358 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.2;P630,p.34. 2359 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.2. 2360 P956,p.10. 2361 F. Krasniqi, P631, p.2. 2362 F. Krasniqi, P631, p.2. 2363 F. Krasniqi, P631, p.2. 2364 F. Krasniqi, P631, p.2. 2365 F. Krasniqi, P631, pp.2 3. 2366 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.3;P630,p.15.
IT-05-87/1-T 217 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6328 to 30 of the refugees.2367 Consistently, the refugees told him, “They were all forced out of their villages by the Serb military.”2368
899. Around 7 April 1999, Krasniqi saw fires in the distance, and houses burning in the villages of Sojevo and Komoglava.2369 The next day, Krasniqi saw a military convoy approaching the outskirts of Mirosavlje/ Mirosalë, and several soldiers began running towards the houses in the village.2370 The residents of Mirosavlje/Mirosalë feared for their safety and immediately fled.2371
900. A convoy of approximately 20 vehicles and hundreds of villagers started heading towards Uroševac/Ferizaj town.2372 They encountered several checkpoints and soldiers along the road.2373 On the way, Krasniqi saw many homes on fire or destroyed.2374
901. When they arrived at Uroševac/Ferizaj, the refugees encountered a police checkpoint on the outskirts of town.2375 Krasniqi and his family arrived in Uroševac/Ferizaj on 8 April.2376 On 14 April 1999, Krasniqi decided to leave the town because he feared for his safety.2377 He and his family travelled to Macedonia by bus as described below.
902. Defence witness Radomir Mitić, the chief of the police department of the Uroševac/Ferizaj SUP,2378 testified that the population did move from surrounding rural areas to Uroševac/Ferizaj town, but that this was due to antiterrorist operations, fighting between the police and the KLA, and NATO cluster bombs.2379 This runs counter to the first hand testimony of three independent witnesses – Bucaliu, Hyseni, and Krasniqi – who described not only their experiences, but those of their fellow villagers. They were clear that they and their neighbours fled solely because of the actions of Serb forces.
(d) The Uro{evac Train Station
903. The chief of the Uroševac/Ferizaj train station co ordinated with the MUP and the VJ to transport large numbers of Albanians across the border into Macedonia. In 1999, the railway station
2367 F.Krasniqi,P631,pp.3 4. 2368 F.Krasniqi,P631,pp.3 4. 2369 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.4. 2370 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.5. 2371 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.5;P630,p.26. 2372 F.Krasniqi,P631,pp.5 6;P630,p.28. 2373 F.Krasniqi,P631,pp.5 6;P630,p.29 2374 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.6. 2375 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.6. 2376 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.6. 2377 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.6. 2378 Mitić,T.12615. 2379 Mitić,T.12732.
IT-05-87/1-T 218 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6327 in Uroševac/Ferizaj was the second busiest in Kosovo, after the station in Kosovo Polje.2380 Trains running through the Uroševac/Ferizaj station originated at Kosovo Polje, and then continued on to Ðeneral Janković/Hani i Elezit and then Skopje, Macedonia.2381
904. Shortly before the NATO air strikes began, the Serbian chief of the station, Zika Ilić, began to meet with VJ officers. Bajram Bucaliu worked at the Uroševac/Ferizaj train station until 25 March 1999.2382 He noted that in the week prior to the NATO air strikes, military officers began coming to the station to meet with Ili}, which was unusual.2383
905. Once the air strikes began, Serb employees took exclusive control of the station. On 25 March 1999, Ilić fired all the Albanian employees at the Uroševac/Ferizaj station, including Bucaliu.2384 Ilić explained, “It’s an order from above.”2385 The Serb employees continued working at the station.2386
906. Trains running on this line transported an extraordinary number of passengers from Pri{tina to the Macedonian border. Following the start of the NATO bombing, train service ceased for five days from 24 to 28 March.2387 Once train travel resumed on 29 March, most of the trains were running on a special, irregular schedule.2388 Many of these trains did not stop in Uroševac/Ferizaj,2389 which was very unusual.2390 Bucaliu observed that these trains did not stop because they were already “crammed” with passengers.2391
907. Further, these trains had many more carriages than usual – ten to twenty instead of the usual two to three.2392 Also, passengers were loaded into freight cars.2393
908. Additionally, many trains had either a police or military escort travelling on them, which was unusual.2394 The log book entries indicate that the trains were “running according to the rules,
2380 Bucaliu,P825,p.2. 2381 Bucaliu,P825,p.2. 2382 Bucaliu,T.5061;P825,p.2;P826,pp.2 3;P827,pp.14 15. 2383 Bucaliu,P825,p.3;P826,pp.10 11. 2384 Bucaliu,P825,p.2;P826,p.11. 2385 Bucaliu,P826,p.11. 2386 Bucaliu,P826,p.11. 2387 Bucaliu,P826,p.75, 90;P827,p.21;P829,pp.110 112. 2388 Bucaliu,P826,pp.17 18;P827,p.21;P829,pp.112 118. 2389 Bucaliu, P826,pp.18,51;P827,p.22. Bucaliu explained that an arrow in columns 3 and 4 indicates trains that passed through the Uroševac/Ferizaj station, but did not stop there, even when scheduled to do so. See P829,pp.112 116. 2390 Bucaliu,P826,p.95;P827,p.26. 2391 Bucaliu,P826,pp.18,51 52,91 92. 2392 Bucaliu,P826,pp.16 17. 2393 Bucaliu,P826,p.17. 2394 Bucaliu,P826,p.20;P827,p.63.
IT-05-87/1-T 219 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6326 with an escort from Kosovo Polje/Fushe Kosove.”2395 Bucaliu saw policemen riding on trains,2396 wearing “regular police uniforms,” with a camouflage pattern of “blue, white and a kind of brown.”2397
909. While many trains were already full before reaching Uroševac/Ferizaj, others did stop there, and they transported Albanians from Uroševac/Ferizaj out of Kosovo.
910. On 14 April 1999, Bucaliu and his family travelled to Uroševac/Ferizaj town, and went to the train station the next day.2398 Approximately ten policemen were at the train station.2399 There were ten passenger cars to take people to the border.2400 Thousands of Kosovo Albanians boarded the train,2401 packed “like sardines.”2402 There were policemen escorting the train.2403 However, at the border, the train was not allowed to disembark by the Macedonian authorities, and was ultimately sent back to Uroševac/Ferizaj.2404
911. The next day, 16 April 1999, Bucaliu and his family boarded another train headed for Ðeneral Janković/Hani i Elezit.2405 Again, the train was packed with about 3,000 Kosovo Albanians and not all people waiting to board could get on.2406 Again, policemen escorted the train.2407
912. At Ðeneral Janković/Hani i Elezit, the train was allowed to continue all the way to the border.2408 According to Bucaliu, this was “not a normal thing to happen, because usually passenger trains shouldn’t go up to the border but remain at the station.”2409 Policemen and soldiers took control at the border crossing2410 and directed passengers to cross the border.2411
913. According to Bucaliu, to manage overcrowded trains after the NATO air strikes, the station chief at the Uroševac/Ferizaj railway station sought additional transportation from the bus station.2412 In addition, the station chief also called on a private truck company, “Fertrans”, to 2395 Bucaliu,P826,p.20;P829,pp.112 113. 2396 Bucaliu,T.5059 5060; P826,p.20. See also P824,p.5. 2397 Bucaliu,P826,p.20. 2398 Bucaliu,P825,p.4;P826,pp.30,34. 2399 Bucaliu,P825,p.4. 2400 Bucaliu,P825,p.4. 2401 Bucaliu,T.5057 5059;P825,p.4;P824,p.5;P826,pp.30 31;P827,pp.12,23;P829,pp.124 125. 2402 Bucaliu,T.5059. 2403 Bucaliu,P826,p.31. 2404 Bucaliu,T.5057;P825,p.4;P824,p.5;P826,p.31;P827,pp.12,23 24. 2405 Bucaliu,P824,p.5;P825,p.4;P826,pp.31,34;P827,pp.13,24. 2406 Bucaliu,P824,p.5;P826,p.31. 2407 Bucaliu,T.5059;P824,p.5;P827,p.13. 2408 Bucaliu,T.5060;P826,p.32;P824,p.5;P827,p.14. 2409 Bucaliu,P826,p.32. See also,T.5060. 2410 Bucaliu,T.5060;P824,p.5;P825,p.5;P826,p.32;P827,p.14. 2411 Bucaliu,T.5060; P825,p.5;P826,pp.32,72,74;P827,p.14. 2412 Bucaliu,P826,pp.19.
IT-05-87/1-T 220 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6325 transport passengers to the border by trucks.2413 Krasniqi and his family experienced this when they fled Uroševac/Ferizaj, around the same time that Bucaliu left.2414 They could not board a train because it was already overcrowded, and they took a bus instead, which took them to the Ðeneral Janković/Hani i Elezit border crossing.2415
914. On 27 April, Hyseni and his family joined a group of 30 displaced people who had travelled to Uroševac/Ferizaj after being expelled from Nerodimlje/Nerodime.2416 The next morning the group went to the Uroševac/Ferizaj bus station, where Hyseni saw four buses filled with people.2417 Hyseni testified that, “Of course [the buses] were arranged by the Serb forces, because the road to Skopje doesn’t . . . employ four of five buses.”2418
915. Soldiers and policemen were present at the bus station. Everyone was made to pay 20 DM before boarding.2419 In Kačanik/Kaçanik town, the VJ and MUP stopped the four buses at a checkpoint and exhorted the refugees for money and valuables.2420 The bus ultimately arrived at the Ðeneral Janković/Hani i Elezit border crossing.2421 Police ordered refugees in a column to cross the border in groups of ten.2422
916. Defence witness Mitić claimed that the Uroševac/Ferizaj SUP was not involved in organizing transportation for Albanians to leave Kosovo.2423 However, whether it was at the level of the Uroševac/Ferizaj SUP or higher, it is clear that the MUP and the VJ were directly involved in transporting Albanians out of Kosovo. The VJ met with the Serbian station chief, Ilić, on multiple occasions prior to the NATO air strikes. Once the air strikes began, the station operated irregular trains with more carriages, and fired all the Albanian employees. The MUP escorted passenger trains from Kosovo Polje to the Macedonian border, were present in unusual numbers at the Uroševac/Ferizaj train and bus stations, and exercised control over buses during their journey to the border.
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes in Uroševac/Ferizaj municipality
2413 Bucaliu,P826,pp.19. 2414 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.6. 2415 F.Krasniqi,P631,p.6. 2416 Hyseni,P809, p.7; P810, p.14. 2417 Hyseni, T.4870; P808,p.3; P809,p.7;P810, pp.14 15. 2418 Hyseni, T.4870. 2419 Hyseni,T.4912;P809,p.7;P808,p.3. 2420 Hyseni,T.4912;P808,pp.3 4;P809,p.7. 2421 Hyseni,T.4871;P809,p.7. 2422 Hyseni,T.4871. 2423 Mitić,T.12733.
IT-05-87/1-T 221 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6324 917. Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes in Uroševac/Ferizaj municipality. In the month before the NATO bombing started, there was a build up of Serb forces there, comprised of VJ and MUP forces working in cooperation with reservists.2424 By mid February 1999, there were thirty six RPOs in Uroševac/Ferizaj municipality, and a total of 4.951 weapons had been issued to reservists by the MUP and the VJ.2425 There were frequent police patrols, and checkpoints along the main road from Pri{tina to Skopje.2426 Police forces used the MUP building, while the military used the barracks along the road to Prizren.2427
918. The Uroševac/Ferizaj SUP was fully operative during these massive deportation operations and was responsible to \or|evi}. \or|evi} in fact personally visited the Uroševac/Ferizaj SUP and met with the SUP Chief in the midst of the deportation campaign.2428 The SUP chief briefed \or|evi} about the situation on the ground and about the mass scale departure of civilians by train to Macedonia. 2429
919. The 243rd Mechanised Brigade was deployed in Uroševac/Ferizaj, and was reinforced with volunteers.2430 They worked together with the MUP, and were heavily engaged in combat operations in the villages of Uroševac/Ferizaj during the NATO intervention.2431 On 13 April 1999, the Joint Command tasked two VJ brigades, MUP units, and armed non Albanians to participate in an action in the area between Gnjilane/Gjilan and Uroševac/Ferizaj.2432 The same day, the 243rd Mechanised Brigade worked with Uroševac/Ferizaj PJP to “crush[] and destroy[]” KLA in the “Firaj, Brod and Slatina sector”.2433 It was these forces, together with paramilitaries and armed civilians, that committed the crimes throughout Uroševac/Ferizaj municipality.
11. Ka~anik Municipality
920. Between March and May 1999 forces of the FRY and Serbia attacked villages in Ka~anik/Kaçanik municipality, including Kotlina/Kotlinë, Slatina/Sllatinë, Vata, and Ka~anik/Kaçanik town. These attacks resulted in the destruction of houses and religious sites and civilian deaths.
2424 Hyseni,P809,p.4;P810,pp.3 4. 2425 P1055,p.7. 2426 Hyseni,P809,p.4. 2427 Hyseni,P809,p.4. 2428 \or|evi},T.9738. 2429 \or|evi},T.10021. 2430 P962;P956,p.7. 2431 See e.g. P956,pp.7 9,12. 2432 P767. 2433 P947,p.1.
IT-05-87/1-T 222 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6323 (a) Kotlina/Kotlinë
921. On the morning of 24 March, Serb forces entered Kotlina/Kotlinë and fired on the village for hours.2434 There was no outgoing fire from the village.2435 When the shelling ceased, VJ and police forces encircled the village. The men fled into the hills, while the women, children and elderly gathered in an open field near the centre of the village.2436
922. From a vantage point, Loku observed tanks and Pinzgauers enter the village.2437 He saw police and soldiers capture approximately 20 unarmed men in a wooded area and then beat them.2438 Loku described the forces involved in Kotlina/Kotlinë as wearing blue camouflage police uniforms and bullet proof vests.2439 Some had the word “POLICIJA” in white letters on their backs. Some were also wearing black masks. Others wore red bandanas on their heads.2440 The soldiers were wearing green camouflage VJ uniforms with green berets on their heads.2441
923. By noon, these forces had gathered all the remaining people from the village. They separated the women and the children from the elderly men, took the men to another area of the field and made them lie face down on the ground, while kicking or beating them with rifle butts.2442
924. Later, two military trucks arrived in the village, and around 400 people, mainly women and children, were forced onto the trucks and driven towards Kačanik/Kaçanik town.2443 At gunpoint, the police ordered the remaining villagers to follow the trucks on foot.2444
925. Police and VJ forces then led the group of 20 captured men towards the north of the village.2445 Loku saw soldiers and policemen beat the prisoners and throw them into the wells. About 30 minutes later, Loku heard shots and a loud explosion from the area of the wells and saw smoke rising from them.2446
2434 Loku,T.3639. See also P654. 2435 Loku,P652,p.4;P653,p.20. 2436 Loku,P652,p.4,9. 2437 Loku,P653,p.64;P652,p.4. 2438 Loku,P652,pp.4–5;P653,p.11. See also marking n.3 on P656. Loku,T.3641. 2439 Loku,P652,pp.4–5;P653,p.11. 2440 Loku,P652,p.5. 2441 Loku,P652,p.5. 2442 Loku,P653,p.8;P652,p.5. 2443 Loku,P652,p.5;P653,pp.9 10. 2444 Loku,P652,p.5;P653,pp.9 10. 2445 Loku,P652,pp.5,9;P653,pp.11 12,82 86. See also marking n.4 on P656. Loku,T.3641,3643,3681. See also P660. 2446 Loku,P652,p.6;P653,p.13;P660.
IT-05-87/1-T 223 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6322 926. After the police and VJ forces left, Loku and other villagers returned to the village.2447 They found the bodies of Idriz Kuqi, Vejsel Vlashi, and another villager, Zimer Loku, who was badly injured but still alive.2448 He later died from his injuries.2449 During his testimony, Loku was able to identify the people killed in Kotlina/Kotlinë on a set of photographs.2450
927. In September 1999, an Austrian forensic team exhumed 22 bodies from the wells.2451 Families members identified the victims.2452 Baccard gave evidence on the report prepared by the Austrian forensic team regarding the Kotlina/Kotlinë site.2453 A total of 25 victims were recovered: 22 were in the upper and lower wells, and 3 in the mosque.2454 At the time of Baccard’s report, 21 individuals were identified from the recovered remains, while 5 bodies remained unidentified.2455 Marks of explosion or shrapnel were found on 21 bodies.2456 The cause of death of the three bodies exhumed at the mosque was gunshot wounds.2457 Ten other bodies also bore gunshot wounds.2458 There were three cases of injuries to the head by blunt force.2459 Tests of samples of clothing found at the well sites confirmed the presence of traces of explosives.2460
928. Defence expert Zoran Stankovi} challenged the findings and methodology of the Austrian forensic team.2461 He claimed that the bodies had been brought from elsewhere and thrown down the well shafts, and that the killings happened before the bodies were thrown into the wells.2462 In reaching his conclusions, Stankovi} ignored the evidence discovered by the Austrian team on site, which confirmed that the bodies had been blown up in the wells. The Austrian team found that: (a) the walls of the upper and lower well shafts were blackened with soot;2463 (b) all 22 bodies in the wells were severely damaged from the effects of the explosions or fire;2464 and (c) tests of soil samples from inside the wells revealed the presence of TNT.2465
2447 Loku,P652,p.6;P653,pp.65 66. 2448 Loku,P652,pp.5 6;P653;p.65 66. See also Annex C, Schedule K. 2449 Loku,P652,p.6. See also Annex C, Schedule K. 2450 Loku,T.3646 3649;P659;P653,pp.16 17.See also Annex C, Schedule K. 2451 Loku,P653,pp.14 15;P1167;P658. 2452 Loku,P653,pp.14 15. 2453 Baccard,P1139,p.48. See also P1167. 2454 Baccard,P1139,pp.48,51. 2455 Baccard,P1139,p.49;P1140,p.27. 2456 Baccard,P1139,pp.50 52. 2457 Baccard,P1139,pp.49,50,51. 2458 Baccard,P1139,pp.50,52. 2459 Baccard,P1139,pp.51,52. 2460 Baccard,P1167,p.42;P1140,p.28. 2461 Stankovi},T.13410 13411;D926,para.1. 2462 Stankovi},T.13414 13415,13489;D926, para.3. 2463 P1167,pp.8 9. 2464 P1167,p.72 2465 P1167,p.91.
IT-05-87/1-T 224 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6321 929. Stankovi} also claimed that the fact that only 12 bullet casings were recovered on site supported his thesis that the bodies had been killed elsewhere.2466 However, in cross examination, he conceded that he did not have any basis to reach this conclusion.2467 Stankovi}’s expert evidence in relation to this incident is, at best, no more than speculation and should be disregarded.
(b) Ka~anik/Kaçanik town
930. On 27 March 1999, Isa Raka saw two military Jeeps and a car arriving at a lime factory2468 across the river from Raka’s house.2469 Around 20 30 police officers got out.2470 Two officers wore VJ camouflage uniforms with a green and brown pattern and the others wore blue camouflage uniforms.2471 Raka recognized the person who was giving orders and who appeared to be in charge as “Lubisha”, the Deputy Commander in the Kačanik/Kaçanik police station.2472
931. The policemen took up positions in the lime factory and began firing towards the houses across the river.2473 One grenade hit Raka’s house, going through the roof.2474 No one was firing towards the factory.2475 Several civilians were wounded or killed by the shooting.2476 Raka’s pregnant wife, Sherife, was hit by the gunfire.2477
932. The next day, people from other neighbourhoods told Raka that the police were going from house to house expelling residents, and that they had killed a civilian and taken away two others.2478
933. Out of fear, Raka’s family and the rest of the neighbours decided to leave before the police arrived.2479 They fled through the woods towards Macedonia in a group of around 500 1000 people.2480 Raka travelled with other men who helped him to carry his wounded wife on a stretcher.2481
2466 D926,para6. 2467 Stankovi},T.13490 13492. 2468 Raka,P664,para.12;T.3729;P665,p.6;D92,p.3;P667 (Raka marked with the n. 1 his own house and n. 2 the house from which he observed the policemen at the lime factory; Raka, P665,p.11). 2469 Raka,P664,para.12;T.3731 3732;P665,pp.6,10;P666. 2470 Raka,P664,para.12;T.3729;P665,pp.6,24;D92,p.3;P666 (the lowest red marking shows the location of the jeeps, and the two higher marks show the positions of the policemen and the two VJ soldiers; Raka, P665,pp.9 11). 2471 Raka,P664,para.12;P665,p.6;D92,p.3. 2472 Raka,P664,para.13;T.3729 3730;P665,pp.7,24;D92,p.3. 2473 Raka,P664,paras.14 15;T.3730;P665,pp.7 8, 20;D92,p.3;P666. 2474 Raka,P664,para.15;D92,p.3. 2475 Raka,P665,p.8. 2476 Raka,P664,para.17;T.3738;P665,p.28; D92,p.3. 2477 Raka,P664,para.20;P665,pp.12 13;D92,p.4. 2478 Raka,P664,para.22; T.3739;P665,pp.13 14. 2479 Raka,P664,para.22;T.3741;P665,pp.13,33. 2480 Raka,P664,para.22;P665,p.14. 2481 Raka,P664,para.22.
IT-05-87/1-T 225 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6320 934. Raka’s wife was sent to the hospital in Skopje, but died days later.2482 When Raka returned to Kačanik/Kaçanik in mid June 1999, he found his house damaged.2483
(c) Slatina/Sllatina and the Vata/Vataj hamlet
935. On 13 April, Sejdi Lami saw VJ forces entering Vata/Vataj with four Pragas and six military lorries loaded with approximately 100 soldiers.2484 Some soldiers wore brown and blue camouflage uniforms, while others wore dark brown and black camouflage uniforms.2485 Lami described another group of men wearing bandannas and dark uniforms as paramilitaries.2486 Lami also saw two other groups of soldiers heading to Vata/Vataj: one group of approximately 150 persons moved around the village of Slatina/Sllatina, while the other group came from the direction of Brod in the Štrpce/Shtërpc municipality.2487
936. The soldiers started shooting at the houses in Vata/Vataj,2488 and then entered the village, causing the local population to flee.2489 There was no outgoing fire from the village.2490
937. After the soldiers left the village, Lami and his brothers found four dead bodies lying along a path.2491 He recognized them as Mahmut ^aka, Hebib Lami, Rraman Lami,2492 and Brahim Lami.2493 That day, seven more bodies were brought to the village: they were all civilians and had no weapons.2494 All the 11 bodies were buried on 14 April in the local Muslim cemetery.2495 In July 1999, KFOR exhumed these bodies, and forensic experts examined them and reburied the bodies.2496
938. Between 14 and 15 April 1999, the whole population fled Vata/Vataj and headed to the Macedonian border in fear.2497 They were stopped by the VJ and asked for money to be allowed to
2482 Raka,P664,para.27;T.3733;P665,p.15;D92,p.5. 2483 Raka,P664,para.28. 2484 Lami,P661,p.3;T.3718. 2485 Lami,P661,p.3;P662,p.11;T.3698. 2486 Lami,P661,p.3;T.3698 3699. 2487 Lami,P661,p.3;T.3718. 2488 Lami,P661,pp.3 4;P662,pp.13 14;T.3699. 2489 Lami,P661,p.4;T.3699. 2490 Lami,P661,p.4;T.3722. 2491 Lami,T.3720,3722 3723;P663, marks nn.1 2 (mark n.1 indicates the hamlet of Vata, mark n. 2 indicates the location of the four dead bodies); Lami,T.3700 3703. 2492 Lami,P661,p.4;P662,p.8. 2493 Lami,P661,p.4;P662,p.7. All these victims, except for Rraman Lami, are listed in Schedule K of the Indictment. 2494 Lami,P661,p.5;T.3723 3724. Lami remembered the names of only four of 4 of the 7 bodies: Ilir Osman Caka, Jakup Caka, “Shyqyri”, and Ramadan Xhokli (Lami,P662,p.7). 2495 Lami,P661,p.5;T.3724. 2496 See P1169;P1170. 2497 Lami,T.3701,3724 3725.
IT-05-87/1-T 226 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6319 cross the border. They paid 500DM and were then allowed to pass.2498 When Lama returned to his village in July 1999, he found that his and other houses had been looted.2499
939. Baccard gave evidence on the burial site at Vata/Vataj based on the examinations of a Canadian Forensic Team.2500 Ten of the bodies were exhumed and autopsied.2501 The cause of death in all the cases was gunshot injuries.2502 Further, a Danish Forensic Team autopsied three additional victims from a second grave site in Slatina/Sllatina: Qemajl Deda, Nazmi Elezi, and Vesel Elezi.2503 The cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds, stab wounds, and head injury from a grenade.2504
Destruction of cultural property and religious sites
940. The attack by Serb forces on the villages of Kačanik/Kaçanik municipality resulted in the destruction of religious sites. The mosque in Kotlina/Kotlinë was damaged.2505 Further, during an attack on Ivaja/Ivajë on 8 March,2506 the mosque in the village was set alight, and the minaret was partially destroyed.2507
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes in Kačanik/Kaçanik municipality
941. The evidence shows that VJ and MUP units were involved in operations in Kačanik/Kaçanik municipality in late March and April 1999. Kačanik/Kaçanik municipality was in the AOR of the 243rd Mechanised Brigade, commanded by General Jeli}, Lazarević’s direct subordinate. When the charged crimes occurred, Jelić’s brigade was involved in actions in support of the MUP, including the Uroševac/Ferizaj PJP, in Kotlina/Kotlinë, Slatina/Sllatinë, Stagovo/Stagovë and Dubrava/Lisnaje.2508
942. Further, as described above, witnesses identified both VJ and MUP forces as perpetrators of the crimes committed in Kačanik/Kaçanik municipality, either through the uniforms they wore, or because they knew the soldiers and policemen committing the crimes.
2498 Lami,P661,p.5;T.3717. 2499 Lami,P661,p.5. 2500 Baccard,P1139,p.56. See also P1168;P1169. 2501 Baccard,P1139,pp.56,59;P1168,pp.14 16. The grave of Ramadan Xholki was left undisturbed at the request of his father (see P1169,pp.5,15). 2502 Baccard,P1139,pp.57,59;P1168,p.16. See Annex C, Schedule K. 2503 Baccard,P1170. 2504 Baccard,P1170,pp.5,11,19. 2505 P1131;Riedlmayer,P1099,pp.68 69. 2506 Loku,P653,p.62. 2507 Loku,T.3669;P653,p.5;P1135,p.1;Riedlmayer,T.7551;P1099,pp.69 71. 2508 P935;P937;P947.
IT-05-87/1-T 227 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6318 12. Dečani/Deçan
(a) Drenovac/Drenoc and Beleg
943. On or around 27 March 1999, police entered Drenovac/Drenoc and ordered the Kosovo Albanian population to leave.2509 K58, a local resident, saw houses burning.2510 The villagers went to the nearby village of Beleg.2511 In Beleg, K58 sought refuge in a house belonging to Naim Vishaj, along with about 100 refugees from the villages of Drenovac/Drenoc, Crnobreg/Carrabreg and Glodane/Gllogjan.2512
944. On the evening of 28 March 1999, a large group of police, soldiers and paramilitaries entered Beleg,2513 continuously shelled and shot, and created an atmosphere of fear and tension.2514
945. Early on 29 March 1999, armed policemen and soldiers surrounded K20’s family house in Beleg, ordered the family out and took them to the basement of an unfinished house.2515 The basement quickly filled to about 300 people.2516 From inside the basement, the villagers heard shooting.2517
946. Policemen and soldiers guarded the civilians, threatening them with guns.2518 K20 testified that an armed, Albanian speaking policeman gave orders to others and kept watch over the villagers.2519 That afternoon, policemen took the civilians out of the basement to a field/meadow.2520 As they exited, Serb forces pointed APCs, tanks and other heavy weaponry towards the villagers.2521 Serbian police and paramilitaries also surrounded Naim Vishaj’s house
2509 Mazrekaj,T.3840,3859;P675,p.8;P676,pp.10–11;K58,P1080,p.5;P1081,p.24. 2510 K58,T.7313,7340 7341;P1081,p.24. 2511 Mazrekaj,T.3840;P675,p.8;P676,p.17;K58,P1080,p.5;P1081,p.25. See also K20,T.8496–8497(closed session); P1281,pp.3–4(under seal). 2512 K58,T.7293,7313–7314;P1080,pp.5–6; P1081,pp.4,13. 2513 Mazrekaj,T.3842;P676,pp.17,53–56;K58,T.7308,7315;P1080,p.6; P1081,pp.5–6;K20,T.8487,8497–8498, 8515(closed session);P1280,p.3;P1281,pp.4–5(under seal);P1282,pp.6,15(under seal);P1283. See also P954,p.10; P954,pp.3–4. 2514 K58,T.7293,7314–7315,7341–7342;P1080,p.6;P1081,pp.11–12,25;K20,T.8496–8498(closed session);P1280,p.2; P1281,pp.4,6 7,46–47(under seal);P1280,p.2;Mazrekaj,P675,p.8;P676,p.19. 2515 K20,T.8487,8498–8499(closed session);P1280,pp.2–3;P1281,pp.7–10,44–45(under seal);P1283;P1282,p.6(under seal). See also Mazrekaj,T.3843;P675,p.9;P676,p.19. 2516 K20,P1280,p.3;P1281,pp.10,36(under seal);P1282,p.3(under seal). See also Mazrekaj,T.3843;P675,p.10; K20,T.8499(closed session);P1280,p.3. 2517 Mazrekaj,P675,p.9;K20,P1280,p.3;P1281,pp.11,35,46–47(under seal). 2518 K20,T.8491(closed session); Mazrekaj,T.3843;P675. 2519 K20,T.8491,8499–8500(closed session);P1280,p.3;P1281,pp.11,27,29–30(under seal). 2520 K20,T.8491–8492(closed session);P1280,p.3;P1282,p.15(under seal);P1281,p.12(under seal);Mazrekaj,P675,p.10. 2521 K20,P1280,p.3;P1281,pp.12 13(under seal).
IT-05-87/1-T 228 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6317 and ordered everyone out.2522 Like K20, the policemen took K58 and her family to a basement; however, it was overcrowded, so they took them to a large meadow.2523
947. In the field/meadow, about 100 police and soldiers or paramilitaries separated men from women and children, stripped many people naked and searched everyone for valuables and documents, which they then took.2524 Policemen beat Mazrekaj with blows and rifle butts,2525 and did the same with other men.2526 The women were later taken to a basement, searched, and forced to hand over their valuables.2527
948. The group in the field/meadow was kept outside in the rain until darkness.2528 Men, including Mazrekaj, were detained overnight in the house with the basement.2529 The women, including K20 and K58, and children were taken to two rooms and a cowshed/stable in a different house in Beleg.2530 Paramilitary guarded the rooms.2531
949. During the night, two or three men in green uniforms came to K58’s and K20’s room and took out around 20 girls and young women for “cleaning” tasks,2532 including K20 and her two sisters, one of whom was 14.2533
950. K20 and the other two girls were taken to a burnt house.2534 K20 was put in a room, where a soldier forcibly undressed her.2535 The Albanian speaking policeman had joined them at the door by that time.2536 K20 was raped several times that night by different soldiers.2537 The Albanian speaking policeman and other soldiers stood in the doorway occasionally illuminating the scene
2522 K58,T.7293–7294,7307–7309,7318,7338 7339;P1080,p.6;P1081,p.4. See K58,T.7307 7309,7328,7338 7339. 2523 K58,T.7294–7295,7319;P1080,p.7. 2524 K20,T.8492,8501 8502(closed session);P1280,pp.3–4;P1281,pp.13–14,37–38,48(under seal);P1282,p.15(under seal); K58,T.7296,7321,7343;P1080,pp.7–8;P1081,pp.14,29,40–41; Mazrekaj,P675,p.10. 2525 Mazrekaj,T.3844;P675,p.10;K58,P1080,p.8;P1081,pp.28–29,36. 2526 K20,T.8492(closed session);P1281,pp.12,47–48(under seal);K58,P1080,p.8;Mazrekaj,T.3845;P675,pp.10 11. 2527 K58,T.7297–7298,7320–7321;P1081,pp.29–32,41 42;P1080,p.8;K20,T.8492–8493(closed session);P1280,p.4. 2528 K58,P1080,p.8;K20,P1280,p.4;P1281,p.14(under seal). 2529 Mazrekaj,P675,pp.11–12; K20,P1280,p.4;P1281,pp.14 15(under seal); K58,P1080,p.8. 2530 K20,P1280,p.4;P1281,pp.14 15,38(under seal);K58,P1080,pp.8 9;T.7325. 2531 K58,P1080,p.9. 2532 K20,P1280,p.4;P1281,pp.15 16,38 40(under seal);P1282,p.12(under seal);K58,T.7326 7329,7343;P1080,p.9; P1081,pp.8,15 16. 2533 K20,P1279,p.4(under seal);P1281,pp.16,40(under seal);K58,P1080,p.9;P1081,p.8. 2534 K20,P1280,pp.4–5;P1281,pp.16–17(under seal). 2535 K20,P1280,p.5;P1281,p.18(under seal). 2536 K20,P1282,pp.13–14(under seal). 2537 K20,P1280,p.5;P1281,pp.19–21(under seal).
IT-05-87/1-T 229 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6316 with a torch.2538 K20 said the policeman “command[ed] the soldiers in the burnt house during the time I was raped”.2539
951. At least three young girls, K20 included, were sexually assaulted by soldiers that night.2540 K58 testified that when the girls returned they were crying and looked dishevelled. She overheard one telling her mother that she had been raped.2541
952. On 30 March 1999, Serb forces ordered the villagers to leave Beleg and to depart for Albania.2542 The women, children and elderly were put on tractors and trucks,2543 and joined a convoy of hundreds of refugees heading for Kukës, on the Albanian border.2544 Police and APCs, from the VJ and MUP, escorted the refugees out.2545 The refugees were asked for their IDs, but explained that they had already been seized in Beleg.2546
953. Between 40 and 66 men from Beleg, Drenovac/Drenoc and Slup/Sllup, including K58’s husband, were kept behind. The men have not been heard from since.2547
954. After the end of the war, K20 and her family returned to Beleg. All houses along the road had been burnt and their roofs had fallen in.2548
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes in Dečani/Deçan municipality
955. Both the VJ and the MUP were involved in operations in Dečani/Deçan municipality at the end of March 1999.2549
956. The OSCE KVM Bluebook reported that on 30 March 1999, there were 12 tanks and 100 vehicles in Dečani/Deçan.2550 Witnesses testified that police and VJ entered Beleg and escorted
2538 K20,P1280,p.5;P1281,pp.20, 42(under seal). 2539 K20,P1281,p.28(under seal). 2540 K20,P1280,p.6;P1281,p.21(under seal). See also K58,P1080,p.9;P1081,p.9. 2541 K58,P1080,p.9;P1081,p.9. 2542 K58,T.7300,7330;P1080,p.10;P1081,p.13;K20,T.8494,8505(closed session);P1280,p.6;P1281,pp.22,36(under seal); Mazrekaj,T.3847;P675,p.12. 2543 K20,P1280,p.6;P1281,pp.22,43(under seal); Mazrekaj,T.3847;P675,pp.12–13;K58,T.7300;P1080,p.10. 2544 K58,T.7300;Mazrekaj,P676,p.21. 2545 Mazrekaj,T.3847–3848;P675,p.13;P676,pp.20–21;K58,T.7331–7332;P1081,p.10;K20,P1281,pp.23,43(under seal). See also P1029,pp.151–152. 2546 K58,T.7321;K20,P1281,p.23(under seal). 2547 K20,P1280,p.6;P1281,pp.22,38,45(under seal);K58,T.7301;P1080,pp.9–10; P1081,pp.9,33–34. 2548 K20,T.8495(closed session);P1282,p.8(under seal). 2549 P954,p.10. 2550 P1029,pp.151–152.
IT-05-87/1-T 230 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6315 civilians out with blue and green APCs/army vehicles.2551 They also had Pragas, trucks, tanks and anti aircraft artillery.2552
957. Witnesses identified policemen, paramilitaries and soldiers as the forces that ordered villagers to leave their homes in Drenovac/Drenoc on 27 March 1999,2553 and Beleg on 29 and 30 March 1999.2554 It was again policemen, assisted by soldiers or paramilitaries, who separated men and women, and beat, stripped, searched and stole money, valuables and IDs from them in Beleg on 29 March 1999.2555 Soldiers, directed by a policeman, raped several young girls in Beleg on the night of 29 March 1999.2556
958. The War Diary of the 125th Motorised Brigade confirms that the VJ was conducting combat operations in Dečani/Deçan at the end of March 1999, and that it was engaged in “providing support” to MUP forces.2557 Dragan Živanović commanded the Brigade.2558 Zivanovi} was Lazarevi}’s direct subordinate.2559
959. The Dečani/Deçan OUP was based in Dečani/Deçan town.2560 Defence witness Vukmir Mir~i}, the OUP Chief, was directly subordinated to the \akovica SUP Chief, both of whom were subordinated to \or|evi}.2561
960. Mir~i} denied that MUP and VJ forces expelled Kosovo Albanians or committed any crimes against the population.2562 Although admitting that he saw long convoys of Kosovo Albanian refugees leaving in late March 1999,2563 Mir~i} said they left because of NATO and the KLA.2564 Mir~i}’s testimony is neither credible nor reliable. Witnesses testified that they were forced to leave by the police; they did not leave because of NATO and there was no KLA presence in Beleg at the
2551 Mazrekaj,T.3842,3847–3848; P675,p.13;P676,pp.17,20–22,44–45;K20,T.8512(closed session);P1280,p.2;D359. 2552 K20,T.8488–8489(closed session);P318,pp.2–3;P1280,p.2;P1281,p.10(under seal);K58,T.7298,7327. 2553 Mazrekaj,T.3840,3859;P675,p.8;P676,pp.10–11,17;K58,P1080,p.5;P1081,pp.24–25;T.7313,7341. 2554 K20,T.8494,8498,8505(closed session);P1281,pp.2,7–9,22,34,36(under seal);P1280,pp.2,6;K58,T.7293– 7295,7300,7307–7309,7318–7319,7330,7338–7339;P1080,pp.6–7,10;Mazrekaj,T.3847–3848;P675,pp.12– 13;P676,pp.21–22. 2555 K20,T.8492,8501–8502(closed session);P1280,pp.3–4;P1281,pp.12–14,37–38,47–48(under seal); P1282,p.15(under seal);K58,T.7296–7298,7320–7322,7324–7325,7343;P1080,pp.7–8;P1081,pp.14,28–33,36,40–42; Mazrekaj,T.3844–3845; P675,pp.10–11. 2556 K20,P1280,p.5;P1281,p.28(under seal). See also K58,T.7326–7328,7343;P1080,pp.7,9; P1081,p.8. 2557 P957,pp.3–4. See also P954,p.10. 2558 \o{an,T.11480;P1366;P929,p.2. See also P957,pp.1 2. 2559 See e.g. P954,p.1. 2560 Mir~i},T.13340–13341. 2561 Mir~i},T.13228 13229,13293,13295,13306. 2562 Mir~i},T.13362–13364,13372–13373,13375–13376,13390. 2563 Mir~i},T.13290,13343–13344,13346–13349. 2564 Mir~i},T.13290–13292,13344,13347,13349–13351; D698; D922,pp.2–3; D923.
IT-05-87/1-T 231 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6314 time of their expulsion.2565 Mir~i} sought to detach himself from the expulsions and crimes since he and the policemen in his OUP were implicated in them.2566
13. Vu~itrn/Vushtrria municipality
961. Vu~itrn/Vushtrria municipality is located in north central/east Kosovo. According to the 1998 Defence Plan for the Town of Vu~itrn/Vushtrria, the municipality was 95% Albanian, with 700 Serbs and Montenegrins living in the town.2567
962. Serb forces began building up in the area of Vučitrn/Vushtrria in late February/early March 1999. Special MUP forces arrived in the area from outside Kosovo.2568
963. On 28 or 29 March 1999, Serb forces launched an offensive from the Rashice/Ra{ica area outside the village of Gornja Sudimlja/Studime e Epërme in the Vučitrn/Vushtrria municipality, causing residents to flee.2569 Serb forces burned houses in Donja Sudimlja/Studime e Poshteme to prevent villagers from returning.2570
964. On 1 April 1999, Serb police expelled the Kosovo Albanian population of Vučitrn/Vushtrri town from their houses.2571
965. From 25 April until 6 May 1999, a large scale operation (the “Bajgora operation”) involving MUP, VJ and armed “non [iptars” took place in Vučitrn/Vushtrria municipality.2572 During this action tens of thousands of ethnic Albanian civilians were forcibly expelled, hundreds were imprisoned and tortured, and over one hundred civilians were murdered
966. On or about 2 May 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia broke through the front line in the areas of Lab/Llap and Meljenica, and advanced south attacking several villages, including Skrovna/Skromë, Slakovce/Sllakofc, Ceceli/Cecelija, Gornja Sudimlja/Studime e Epërme,2573 and Vesekovce/Vesekovc village. They forced villagers out of their homes, and burnt houses, shops, and mosques.2574
2565 See K58,T.7312–7313;K20,T.8507,8516 (closed session);P1281,pp.23–24,33–34,47(under seal). 2566 See e.g. Mir~i},T.13355,13366–13367,13369,13377–13378. 2567 D266, p.2. 2568 Ciaglinski,P832,pp.12 13. 2569 Gërxhaliu,P512,para.6;P513,pp.11,12. 2570 Gërxhaliu,P512,para.6;D70,p.2; T.3110. 2571 Kadriu,P515,pp.12 13. 2572 P969;P345;P959;P955,pp.57 63;P1040,pp.1,6. 2573 Kadriu,P515,p.14;P516.p.16;Gërxhaliu,P512,paras.11 12,25;P513,p.134;Xhafa,T.3082,3103,3116. 2574 Gërxhaliu,P512,paras.11 12;P513,p.134;Kadriu,P515,p.14;Xhafa,T.3082.
IT-05-87/1-T 232 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6313 967. Approximately 30,000 to 50,000 people formed a convoy and headed down the “Studime Gorge” road in the direction of Vučitrn/Vushtrria town.2575 Serbian forces advanced on the convoy from multiple sides,2576 and fired shells at them, pushing them south.2577
968. Late that afternoon, on 2 May 1999, the convoy arrived in Gornja Sudimlja/Studimja e Epërme, but due to the shelling could not move and were massed together in a large group.2578 The convoy was surrounded on all sides by Serbian forces.2579 Throughout the evening and night VJ, MUP, and paramilitary forces demanded money from the civilians, threatened and beat them,2580 killing those who did not give them money.2581
969. These forces murdered over 100 Kosovo Albanians on 2 May 1999.2582 Gërxhaliu heard forces saying that they had already killed about 50 people, and that they should continue until they reached 100.2583 When they were done, Gërxhaliu heard one Serbian male say, “Soldiers, let’s go back now. We have no fuel and it is clear up here. We have mopped up the terrain.”2584 Serb forces then ordered the refugees to proceed, and split the convoy in two parts.2585
970. On 3 May 1999, Serb forces led the refugees to an agricultural co operative near Vučitrn/Vushtrria town.2586 Policemen were on the road to the agricultural co operative,2587 where the refugees were housed in cramped hangars.2588
971. The following morning the refugees were taken out of the hangars. Police surrounded the area.2589 Kadriu recognised a local policeman from Vučitrn/Vushtrria police station, Dragan Petrovi},2590 and Xhafa recognized his deputy police commander, Simi}.2591 The police separated
2575 Xhafa,T.3047;P509,pp.16 18,33,39 40;P510,para.4; Kadriu,P516,pp.22,43;P515,pp.14 15; Gërxhaliu,P512, para.11;P513,pp.20 22,90, 94;T.3110,3111,3148,3159,3160,3167;D70,p.2;P514. 2576 Gërxhaliu,T.3168;Xhafa,T.3047. 2577 Kadriu,P515,p.16;Gërxhaliu,P512,para12;T.3112 3113;P514. 2578 Gërxhaliu,P512,para.12;P514;T.3112;Kadriu,P516,p.15;Xhafa,T.3048;P509,pp.17 18,22 23;P510,para.5; P511. 2579 Xhafa,P510,para.5. 2580 Gërxhaliu,P512,paras.15,18;T.3161,3162,3168;P513,pp.97,130;D70,p.2;Xhafa,T.3041,3048;P509,pp.23,44 45,47 48,63;P510,para.5;T.3040 3041;Kadriu,P516,p.16. 2581 Gërxhaliu,P512,para.18;D70,p.2. 2582 Xhafa,T.3094;Kadriu,T.3177 3178;P515,pp.21 24. See Annex C, Schedule I. 2583 Gërxhaliu,P512,para.21;D70,p.3. 2584 Gërxhaliu,P512,para.24;T.3102,3116. 2585 Kadriu,P515,p.16;Gërxhaliu, P513,p.93. 2586 Gërxhaliu,P513,p.92;Kadriu,P516,p.16;Xhafa,T.3054;P510,para.10;P511. 2587 Xhafa,P510,para.10. 2588 Kadriu,P515,p.16;Xhafa,T.3054;P510,para.10. 2589 Kadriu,P515,p.17. 2590 Kadriu,P515,p.17. 2591 Xhafa,P510,para.10;T.3055 3056,3094 3096.
IT-05-87/1-T 233 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6312 men from women, children and the elderly,2592 loaded the men onto trucks and drove them to the Smrekovnica/Smrakonica prison in Vučitrn/Vushtrria municipality.2593
972. At the Smrekovnica/Smrakonica prison, police severely beat the men with sticks and guns as they entered the prison. Kadriu saw Du{ko Janji}, Vu~itrn/Vushtrria police chief, and his deputy, Simi}, at the prison.2594
973. The men were kept in inhumane and overcrowded conditions.2595 Prisoners were regularly beaten almost every evening. Kadriu recognized two policemen from his village as amongst the forces beating them: Zoran Vukoti} and Sa{a Manojlovi}.2596
974. On or about 23 May 1999, many of the men were put on buses armed by the MUP, and escorted to the Albanian border.2597 In Žur/Zhur, close to the border crossing, the detainees were forced off the buses, beaten by the policemen, and then told to run to the border with their hands behind their heads. Their identification documents were seized before they crossed into Albania.2598
975. In July 1999, a French forensic team exhumed and autopsied the bodies of 93 victims of the convoy massacre of 2 May 1999 from a local cemetery in Gornja Sudimlja/Studimja e Epërme, in two grave sites (“L1” and “L2”).2599 In 83 cases, the bodies presented wounds inflicted by firearms, blunt or sharp weapons.2600 The two most common causes of death were injuries to the abdominal internal organs and skull brain injuries.2601 The French team found that in a number of instances, the overall appearance of the injuries sustained by the victims “suggest a shot fired from close or point blank range”.2602
Destruction of cultural property and religious sites
976. At least three mosques were destroyed or damaged in Vu~itrn/Vushtrria. The Market Mosque and its surroundings were set on fire and later bulldozed.2603 The Market Mosque was
2592 Kadriu,P515,p.17. 2593 Kadriu,P515,p.18;Xhafa,T.3055,3095;P509,pp.8, 55;P510,para.11;P511. 2594 Kadriu,P515,p.18;P516,p.18. 2595 Kadriu,P516,pp.21 22,43. 2596 Kadriu,P515,p.18;P516,p.19. 2597 Kadriu,P515,p.20. 2598 Kadriu,P515,p.20. 2599 Baccard,P1139,p.64;P1173,p.6,P1174,p.2. 2600 Baccard,P1139,pp.66,68;P1166,p.40. 2601 Baccard,P1139,pp.66,68. 2602 See e.g. P1172,p.4,6,13,15,20,22,24,26,32,36,38,40,43,45. See also P1171. 2603 Kadriu,P515,p.12;P1098,p.87;Riedlmayer,P1099,p.49;P1102,pp.1 2.
IT-05-87/1-T 234 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6311 “completely destroyed”,2604 and two more mosques, Gazi Ali Bey and Karamanli, were “lightly damaged”.2605
Forces of the FRY and Serbia perpetrated the crimes in Vu~itrn/Vushtrria municipality
977. VJ and MUP records demonstrate that the crimes perpetrated in Vu~itrn/Vushtrria were committed as part of organized and coordinated joint operations of the VJ and MUP acting to drive the Albanian population out of Kosovo. Documentary evidence and witness testimony demonstrate that expulsions and murders were committed during the course of these joint operations.2606
978. On 23 March 1999, pursuant to a Joint Command order, VJ and MUP forces conducted an operation in the Malo Kosovo area, north of Vučitrn/Vushtrria municipality.2607 Around this time, crimes and expulsions began taking place in the area. Soon after, on 28 to 29 March 1999, Serbian forces launched an offensive from the Rashica/Ra{ica area, causing locals to flee.2608
979. On 15 April 1999, the Joint Command ordered the 211th Armoured Brigade, the 15th Armoured Brigade, and the 58th Light Infantry Brigade, with the help of the “armed non Šiptar population”, to support the MUP in an action in the Bajgora Bare sector (the “Bajgora operation”).2609 This action began on 25 April and continued into early May 1999.2610 Lazarevi} issued an order on 4 May 1999 tasking PrK units to engage in an action with the MUP and armed non [iptars in the Bajgora Bare sector.2611
980. Lukić and Stevanovi} were informed about the completion of actions in Bajgora. On 11 May 1999, at a MUP Staff meeting, the Bajgora operation was declared a success, and PJP commanders reported on its completion.2612
981. The 125th okbr War Diary confirms that, after preparations and briefings on 22 and 23 April 1999,2613 beginning on 25 April units were engaged in the Bajgora operation, providing support to the MUP.2614 The diary also recorded that on 22 April 1999, a large number of refugees had arrived
2604 P1098, p.87. 2605 Riedlmayer,P1099,pp.34 35,49;P1102,pp.3–5;P1103,pp.1–6. 2606 D105. 2607 D105. 2608 Gërxhaliu,P512,para.6;P513,pp.11,12. 2609 P969. 2610 P959;P955,pp.57 63. 2611 P1040,pp.1,6. 2612 P345,pp.2,4. 2613 P959,pp.3 4,6. 2614 P959,pp.10,13,17,19,24,27.
IT-05-87/1-T 235 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6310 in the Vučitrn/Vushtrria area2615 and that on 30 April 1999 in the Bajgora region columns of refugees were being directed by the MUP.2616
982. The 15th okbr War Diary confirms that, on 21 April 1999, the unit began preparations for the Bajgora operation with the MUP, and were engaged in supporting the MUP in a siege on 24/25 April 1999.2617 The diary also records columns of refugees on 30 April 1999, and states that the MUP were engaged in “triage” and directing the columns.2618 Units were engaged in the Bajgora operation at least until 2 May 1999.2619
983. According to the Defence Plan for the Town of Vučitrn/Vushtria, about 150 non Albanians were organized in a local civilian defence, their strength estimated to be about two companies, armed with infantry weapons.2620 The plan envisaged placing the armed civilians under the command of the MUP,2621 and provided for co ordination with the VJ for fire support.2622
984. VJ and MUP units were the only units deployed in the area where the convoy massacre occurred. The 211th Armoured Brigade,2623 the 15th Mechanised Battalion,2624 the 58th Light Infantry Brigade,2625 and the 35th PJP Detachment2626 participated in the Bajgora operation. The 15th Armoured Brigade was deployed to the south east of where the convoy was attacked. The 211th Armoured Brigade was deployed to the north west. PJP units conducted a sweep operation from north to south of Vučitrn/Vushtrria municipality.2627 The column of refugees was encircled from every direction. These units controlled the area where the massacre occurred.
985. Witnesses identified police officers taking part in the expulsion and mistreatment of civilians.2628
986. MUP documents demonstrate that the MUP was responsible for the detention of Kosovo Albanians at the Smrekovnica prison. Two police reports, from 3 and 16 May 1999, signed by the Commander of the Vučitrn/Vushtrria police station, Ljubisa Simi}, report the detention of 830 to
2615 P959,pp.3 4. 2616 P959,p.24. 2617 P955. 2618 P955. 2619 P955. 2620 D266,p.3;P524. 2621 D266,pp.3,4,6. 2622 D266,p.5. 2623 P969,para.5.1. 2624 P969,para.5.2;P955,p.57. 2625 P969,para.5.3. 2626 P345,p.4. 2627 P969,para.5.1. 2628 Kadriu,P515pp.17 19;P516,p.18;Xhafa,P510,para.10;T.3055 3056,3094 3096. See P1288,p.4.
IT-05-87/1-T 236 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6309 887 individuals at the Smrekovnica prison, following a joint MUP VJ action in the Vučitrn/Vushtrria area.2629 Furthermore, a request dated 11 May 1999, stated that the Smrekovnica prison had an “enormous” amount of detainees and needed more supplies.2630 At the MUP Staff meeting of 7 May 1999, Kosovksa Mitrovica deputy SUP Chief Bogunović reported that, as a result of the Bajgora operation, 827 “terrorists” were being held at the Smrekovnica prison.2631
987. A letter from the Vučitrn/Vushtrria Municipal Council, dated 3 May 1999, sent a request for humanitarian aid for 30,000 refugees in the Donja Studimlja and Smrekovica villages. It further stated that there are already “25,000 [iptari” in Vučitrn/Vushtrria, and that they are unable to support them all.2632
988. Witnesses described the numerous forces that mistreated the civilians as VJ, MUP, and paramilitary.2633 Witnesses also saw civilians assisting MUP and VJ forces with the expulsions, and torching Albanian houses in Vučitrn/Vushtrria town.2634
14. Podujevo/Podujevë
989. On 28 March 1999, members of the Skorpions killed 16 civilians, two elderly men and fourteen women and children, from the Bogujevci, Duriqi and Llugaljiu families in Podujevo/Podujevë town.2635 Five children survived the massacre but sustained serious and multiple gunshot wounds.2636 The massacre took place within 30 minutes of the arrival of the Skorpions to Podujevo/Podujevë.2637
990. In March 1999, Saranda and Fatos Bogujevci, two survivors of the massacre, lived in a large family compound in Podujevo/Podujevë town. The compound contained three houses.2638 Shortly before the NATO air campaign commenced, some family friends, the Duriqis, moved into a house in the rear of the compound.2639
2629 P1351;P519. 2630 P518. 2631 P771,p.5. 2632 P520. 2633 Gërxhaliu,P512,paras.15 16,18,24;P513,pp.24 26,77,90 91,97,115 116,130;T.3115 3116;D70,p.2; Xhafa,T.3040 3041,3048;P509,pp.23,44 45,47 48,63;P510,para.5;Kadriu,P516,p.16. 2634 Kadriu,P515,p.12. 2635 See Annex C, Schedule L. 2636 S.Bogujevci,P373,paras.57,63;T.1899;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.51;T.1936. 2637 Ðorðević,T.9705;Trajkovi},T.9094. 2638 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.10;F.Bogujevci,T.1924–1925,1928,1949,1956;P384;P383,para.10. 2639 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.16;T.1881–1882;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.16;T.1925.
IT-05-87/1-T 237 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6308 991. The compound was located on the main road in the centre of Podujevo/Podujevë town, close to the police station.2640 To the right of the family compound was Selman Gashi’s family compound.2641
992. In the weeks before the NATO bombing, many Kosovo Albanian families moved from surrounding villages to Podujevo/Podujevë town due to clashes between the KLA and Serbian forces in the villages.2642 The Bogujevcis confined themselves to their house because there were many police and military vehicles passing through the main road.2643 There were also tanks just outside Podujevo/Podujevë.2644
993. The family heard rumours that Serbian forces were targeting and killing men, so the men of the family left the house and hid. The family believed that they would not be targeted if only women and children remained in the house.2645
994. On the morning of 28 March 1999,2646 Fatos saw a police vehicle pull up in front of the family compound and police or soldiers on the street.2647 For their safety, the family moved to the Duriqi house.2648
995. Upon arrival, there were 19 people in that house, 18 women and children and Hamdi Duriqi, a 70 year old man.2649
996. At around 9:00am, the families heard shooting and breaking glass.2650 They noticed four or five “soldiers” inside the compound, in front of the Duriqi house.2651
997. The families started leaving the house, but once outside, the “soldiers” stopped and searched them and the house. Shouting at them, the “soldiers” escorted the families through Selman Gashi’s courtyard with their hands up.2652 Fatos said that in referring to “soldiers”, he was not referring to
2640 S.Bogujevci,P373,paras.11,13; F.Bogujevci,P383,paras.11,13. See also F.Bogujevci,T.1924,1926;P384; S.Bogujevci,T.1893;P377. 2641 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.13;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.13. 2642 F.Bogujevci,T.1950. See e.g. F.Bogujevci,P383,para.16;S.Bogujevci,T.1881 1882. 2643 F.Bogujevci,T.1956–1957;P383 para.17;S.Bogujevci,P373,para.17. 2644 F.Bogujevci,T.1956–1957. 2645 S.Bogujevci,T.1880; P373,para.19;P375,pp.1–2;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.18;P381,p.2. 2646 S.Bogujevci,P375,pp.1–2;F.Bogujevci,P381,p.1;P383,para.26. 2647 F.Bogujevci,P383,para.26;P381,pp.1–2;T.1927. See also S.Bogujevci,P373,para.25;T.1913;P374,p.2. 2648 S.Bogujevci,T.1880;P373,para.26;P375,p.2;P374,p.2;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.27;T.1927–1928. 2649 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.26;T.1881;F.Bogujevci,P383,paras.25,27;T.1924; Indictment, Schedule L. See also, S.Bogujevci,T.1895–1896;P379,pp.6–8. 2650 F.Bogujevci,P383,para.28;P382,p.2. 2651 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.28;P375,p.3;P374,p.2. See also F.Bogujevci,P383,para.28. 2652 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.29;P374,p.2;P375,p.3;F.Bogujevci,P383,paras.28,30;P381,p.2;T.1929.
IT-05-87/1-T 238 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6307 the regular army or police.2653 The “soldiers” wore green camouflage uniforms.2654 Saranda said that the “soldiers” had a two headed eagle on their shoulders.2655
998. Goran Stopari}, a former member of the Skorpions, was deployed to Podujevo/Podujevë with the Skorpions on 28 March 1999. The unit had just arrived in Podujevo, and Stopari} was searching for accommodation with another Skorpion member, Milovan Tomi}.2656 From the back room of the house he had found, Stopari} observed members of the Skorpions pushing 19 ethnic Albanian civilians at gunpoint into the house’s backyard.2657 The group was comprised of one elderly male, 12 children, and the remainder were women.2658 Stopari} said the civilians “looked terrified”.2659
999. The Skorpions singled out Hamdi Duriqi. They told him to put his hands against the wall, searched him and took his plis.2660 They also searched others in the group,2661 but stopped searching when asked by Stopari} and Tomi}.2662
1000. A Skorpion member approached Shefkate Bogujevci, Fatos’s mother, and took some money from her. There was a shed or outbuilding behind the group and members of the Skorpions took Shefkate inside.2663 The rest of the group was taken to another neighbour’s courtyard.2664
1001. From the courtyard, the group, except for Shefkate, was taken to the street, facing the police station, where they stood in a column.2665 Stopari} said that he and Tomi} became concerned about what the Skorpion members intended to do with the civilians, so Stopari} sent the civilians out to the street to the commander of the unit, Slobodan Medi} (aka Boca).2666
2653 F.Bogujevci,P383,para.29. 2654 S.Bogujevci,T.1883;P373,para.40; F.Bogujevci,P383,paras.29,32;P381,pp.4–5; P382,p.5;T.1929,1932–1933; Stopari},T.2827;P493,para.42. See also Vasiljevi},T.5909. 2655 S.Bogujevci,P375,pp.6 7. See also Stopari},P493,para.41;T.2819. 2656 Stopari},T.2830,2864;P493,para.47,50. See also Trajkovi},T.9093–9094,D442,pp.1–2;P 86,p.1. See P496; Stopari},T.2825,2831. See generally Stopari},P493,para.51. 2657 Stopari},T.2825,2827;P493,paras.50 52;P40,p.31;P496. 2658 Stopari},P493,para.52. 2659 Stopari},P493,para.52. 2660 Stopari},P493,para.52;S.Bogujevci,P373,para.32;P375,p.3;P374,pp.2–3;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.30;P382,p.3. 2661 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.33;P375,p.3;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.31;P381,p.2;T.1929;Stopari},P493,para.52;P40,p.31. 2662 Stopari},T.2825 2826;P493,para.52;P40,p.31. See also F.Bogujevci,P383,para.31;P381,p.2;T.1929. 2663 S.Bogujevci,P373,paras.36 37;P374,pp.3,8;P375,pp.3,5;T.1892;P376;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.35;P381,p.2;P382,p.3. 2664 S.Bogujevci, P373,paras.37 38;P374,pp.3,8–9;P375,p.5;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.31. 2665 S.Bogujevci,T.1884,1893;P373,para.39;P374,p.3;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.35;P382,p.7. See F.Bogujevci,T.1924, 1926;P384. 2666 Stopari},P493,para.52;T.2814. See P496;Stopari},T.2826–2827;P493,para.51.
IT-05-87/1-T 239 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6306 1002. On the street, there were many soldiers and policemen, including PJP, SAJ, local policemen and Skorpion members.2667 These forces were breaking shop windows and looting.2668 On a map, Stopari} marked where the different forces were, using a colour code corresponding to the colour of their uniforms.2669
1003. A “soldier” approached Hamdi Duriqi, slapped him and pulled him out of the group.2670 Selman Gashi was also on the street, outside a nearby coffee house.2671 A “soldier” directed Gashi and Duriqi into the coffee house, following them inside.2672 Saranda and Fatos heard two shots from inside the coffee house and have not seen either man since.2673 Both men were older than 50.2674
1004. On a diagram, Fatos indicated where the coffee house was. He indicated that the group was standing between the path and the coffee house,2675 and so he could see it. On a map, Stopari} marked where “the man” was separated and taken into “some kind of catering facility”.2676 Both witnesses identified similar locations.
1005. The group was directed back into the courtyard from where they had come.2677 As they walked, the Skorpion members continued to shout.2678 On a photograph, Saranda marked the passage from the street by which the group returned to the courtyard.2679 On a diagram, Fatos marked the courtyard into which the group was directed.2680 Similarly, Stopari} marked the direction in which the women and children returned to the courtyard and where he was standing when they returned.2681
1006. Shefkate, who had been earlier separated from the group, was taken out of the shed and into the courtyard. She was crying: “They are only children”.2682 The Skorpions then took Shefkate and
2667 Stopari},T.2864;P493,para.49;P40,p.31;S.Bogujevci,T.1884,1910 1911;P373,paras.39,41,62;P374,pp.3 4,8;P375, p.6;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.35;P382,p.3. 2668 S.Bogujevci,T.1884;P373,para.42;P374,p.4;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.36;P381,p.2. 2669 Stopari},T.2827;P496. See generally Stopari},P493,para.51. 2670 S.Bogujevci,T.1885;P373,para.42;P374,p.4;P375,p.3;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.36;P382,pp.3,5. See Stopari},T.2810 2811;P493,para.54. 2671 S Bogujevci,T.1885;P373,para.43;P374,p.4;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.35. 2672 S.Bogujevci,T.1885;P373,para.43;P374,p.4;P375,p.3; F.Bogujevci,P383,para.36;Stopari},T.2827,2828; P493,para.54. 2673 S.Bogujevci,T.1885;P373,para.43;P374,p.4;P375,p.3;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.36;P382,p.7. 2674 F.Bogujevci,T.1931. 2675 F.Bogujevci,T.1924,1930–1931;P384. 2676 Stopari},T.2827–2828,2830;P496. See generally Stopari},P493,para.51. 2677 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.44; P374,p.4;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.37;P381,p.2;P382,p.3. See also Stopari},T.2828 2830; P496;P493,para.54;P40,p.31. 2678 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.44;P374,p.4;F.Bogujevci,P381,p.2. 2679 S.Bogujevci,T.1892;P376. 2680 F.Bogujevci,T.1924,1933;P384. 2681 Stopari},T.2829;P496. See generally Stopari},P493,para.51. 2682 S.Bogujevci,T.1885;P373,para.46;P374,p.4;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.39;T.1933.
IT-05-87/1-T 240 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6305 the group behind the house.2683 While she was walking, one of the Skorpions pushed Shefkate, and then shot her once in the back. She fell on the ground, and the same man shot her again and killed her.2684
1007. The Skorpions surrounded the civilians in the courtyard.2685 There were approximately 10 “soldiers” in the courtyard, with others coming in and out.2686 Saranda said that the “soldier” who shot Shefkate changed his weapon and started shooting at the group.2687
1008. Saranda described what happened next:
When he started shooting, I just leaned on the wall and just slided down and then it hit me on my right leg, the bullets, and then after a while the shooting stopped; and there was a sound from someone, the kind of sound where you’re struggling to breathe, and then the shooting started again. And then when the shooting started again, it hit me in my arm and in my back. And then after a while, the shooting stopped, and then it was quiet, so I wasn’t sure whether the soldiers were still there or had gone. And then I decided to lift my head up.2688
1009. Fatos gave a similar account of the shooting and said that the civilians “all fell on top of each other and just fell on the floor”.2689
1010. Saranda and Fatos identified some of the shooters as wearing a green camouflage uniform.2690 Fatos said that the “soldier” who separated Shefkate from the group and directed the group back into the courtyard was the “leader” because he gave orders.2691
1011. Stopari} heard the shooting with Tomi}, as they moved towards an alley leading to an adjacent street. He described it as “continuous and very loud”.2692 Seconds later, Stopari} and Tomi} ran back to the courtyard as the shooting ceased2693 and stopped just at the courtyard’s entry, from where they had a clear view of the courtyard.2694 Stopari} saw the bodies of the civilians whom he had seen earlier at the base of a wall.2695
2683 S.Bogujevci,T.1885–1886;P380;P373,para.46;P374, p.4;P375,p.4. 2684 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.46;P374,p.4;P375,p.4;T.1885 1886,1891; P376;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.40;T.1933 P381,p.2. 2685 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.47;P375,p.8;T.1890,1894–1895;P380;P379,pp.1,5; F.Bogujevci,P383,para.37;T.1934; Stopari}, P493,para.56;T.2834. 2686 S.Bogujevci,T.1891;P376;P373,para.47. See also Stopari},T.2833–2834;P493,paras.56–57. 2687 S.Bogujevci,T.1885 1886;P373,paras.47 48. See also P86,p.1;D442, p.2;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.42. 2688 S.Bogujevci,T.1887. See also S.Bogujevci,1890–1891,1894;P376;P373,para.48;P374,p.4;P375,p.4;P378. 2689 F.Bogujevci,T.1934. See also F.Bogujevci,P383,paras.42–45;P382,p.4;T.1935;P384. 2690 S.Bogujevci,P373,paras.59,62;P374,p.6;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.37;T.1932–1933. 2691 F.Bogujevci,T.1932–1933;P383,paras.33, 35;P382,p.5. 2692 Stopari},P493,para.55. 2693 Stopari},P493,paras.55–56;T.2832;P497. 2694 Stopari},T.2832;P493,para.55;P497. 2695 Stopari},P493,para.56;T.2834,2839.
IT-05-87/1-T 241 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6304 1012. Stopari} saw Sa{a Cvetan, Dragan Medi}, Dragan Borojevi} and Dejan Demirovi} facing the victims2696 in the courtyard and marked their positions on a map.2697 Stopari} believed that they were involved in the shooting2698 and that Dragan Medi}, Boca’s brother, ordered the men to kill the civilians because he was the highest ranked in the group.2699 The shooters left, without exchanging words with Stopari}.2700
1013. Saranda, Fatos and Stopari} all thought that more than one shooter perpetrated the massacre, from the nature of the injuries and the rapid fire of the shots.2701
1014. Fourteen civilians were killed in the shooting in the courtyard.2702 Only five children survived.2703 Saranda was shot in the arm 13 times, twice in the leg and once in the back and now has limited movement in her left arm.2704 Fatos was wounded in both legs with three bullets in one and two in another.2705
1015. The survivors were administered first aid2706 and taken to Pri{tina/Prishtinë hospital.2707 At some point one of the children, 9 year old Lirije Bogujevci, was sent to Belgrade for treatment.2708 Saranda’s father eventually learnt that the children were in the hospital and visited them.2709 The children remained in hospital until June 1999.2710
1016. The bodies from the massacre were buried in the outskirts of Podujevo/Podujevë.2711 An exhumation report from a grave site in Podujevo, conducted by the OSCE identified 19 bodies, including the people listed by Saranda and Fatos.2712 The British Forensic Team conducted
2696 Stopari},P493,para.56;T.2833 2834,2838;P497;P498. See also P41,pp.6–7. See generally Stopari},P493,para.51. 2697 See Stopari},T.2833,2838;P497;P498. See generally Stopari},P493,para.51. 2698 Stopari},T.2835;P40,p.32. See P41,pp.6–7. 2699 Stopari},T.2839. See also Stopari},P493,para.60. 2700 Stopari},P493,para.58;T.2839. 2701 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.60;P374,pp.6–8;P375,p.7;T.1888–1889;F.Bogujevci,P383,para.44;P382,p.6;P381, p.6; T.1934;Stopari},T.2831;P493,para.55. See P41,p.8. 2702 See Indictment, Schedule L. 2703 S.Bogujevci,P373,paras.57,63;T.1899; F.Bogujevci,P383,paras.51–52;T.1936. 2704 S.Bogujevci,T.1899;P373,para.58;P374,p.6. 2705 F.Bogujevci,P383,paras.48,50;T.1934–1935. 2706 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.52;P374,p.5;P375,p.4;T.1888,1914;F.Bogujevci,T.1944;P383,para.46;P382,p.4;P381,p.2; Stopari},T.2840;P493,para.59;Trajkovi},T.9094;P86,p.1;D442,p.2. 2707 S.Bogujevci,P373,paras.53–55;P374,p.6;P375,p.4;F.Bogujevci,P383,paras.49,51;T.1937,1944;P381,p.3. See also Trajkovi},T.9094;P86,p.1;D442,p.2. 2708 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.57;F.Bogujevci,T.1944. 2709 S.Bogujevci,P373,para.57. 2710 S.Bogujevci,T.1900,1914;P373,para.57;F.Bogujevci,T.1937. 2711 F.Bogujevci,P383,para.55;T.1937. 2712 P1150,pp.4–7. See S.Bogujevci,T.1899;P373,paras.26,63;F.Bogujevci,P383,paras.25,27,52.
IT-05-87/1-T 242 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6303 individual autopsy reports on eight bodies.2713 The general conclusion from the autopsies was that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds to the chest, neck and head.2714
15. Unscheduled Incidents
(a) ^uska/ Qyshk
1017. ^uska/Qyshk is located approximately three kilometres east of Peja/Pe}.2715 In May1999, the village consisted of approximately 2,000 residents, largely of Kosovo Albanian ethnicity.2716 Around 16 or 17 April 1999, VJ and MUP entered ^uska/Qyshk and set fire to a number of Albanian houses. They did not harm the Serbian houses.2717
1018. On 14 May 1999, Tahir Kelmendi a ^uska/Qyshk resident saw around eighty heavily armed VJ and MUP members enter ^uska/Qyshk.2718 Hazir Berisha, a local villager gathered with others in the center of ^uska/Qyshk.2719 The VJ and MUP surrounded them.2720 Men were separated from women and children.2721 Everyone was ordered to throw down their possessions, including identification documents.2722 Hazir Berisha had seen two of the perpetrators (Sre}ko Popovi} and Nenad Kastratovi}) before when they set fire to houses in ^uska/Qyshk in April 1999.2723 Neboj{a Mini} was also present.2724 On 14 May, Hazir Berisha did not know their names but learnt this later.2725
1019. The VJ and the MUP divided the 30 odd men into three groups.2726 Before that, Popovi} made a hand gesture that Hazir Berisha took to mean that “the men should be killed.”2727 They insulted the men by saying, “Where is NATO?” and “Where is the America?”.2728
2713 See P1142;P1145;P1146;P1147;P1148;P1149;P1141;P1143;P1144. 2714 P1142,pp.3–4;P1141,p.1;P1143,p.1;P1144;p.1;P1145,p.1;P1146,p.1;P1147,p.1;P1148,p.1;P1149,p.1. See also Baccard,T.7681–7682. 2715 Hazir Berisha,P796,para.5. 2716 Hazir Berisha,P796,para.5. 2717 Hazir Berisha,P796,para.10. 2718 Kelmendi,P803,paras.12 22,T.4765 4770. 2719 Hazir Berisha,P796,paras.22 23;T. 4611. 2720 Hazir Berisha,T.4611 4612. 2721 Hazir Berisha,T.4612;Kelmendi,P803,para.45;T.4721. 2722 Hazir Berisha,P796,paras.26,31 32;T.4612 4613;Kelmendi,T.4721. See also Abrahams,T.3984;P756,pp.56 57. 2723 Hazir Berisha,P796,para.72;T.4608 4609,4629,4655 4659;P797;P772 2724 Hazir Berisha,P796,paras47,73;P772;T.4612 4613,4616,4625. Mini} was identified as the man on the top row on the far right hand side of P772 wearing the police uniform and holding the Kalashnikov. The man on the bottom row on the far right of P772 was also with Neboj{a Mini} on 14 May 1999 (P772;Hazir Berisha,T.4610,4613). 2725 Hazir Berisha,T.4609,4656,4658 4659;P797;P772. 2726Hazir Berisha,P796,paras.43 47,50;T.4616 4617,4621; Kelmendi,P803, paras.46,54 55;T.4721 4723. See also Abrahams,T.3984;P756,pp.57,62. 2727 Hazir Berisha,P796,paras.43,47 48;T.4616 4617. 2728 Hazir Berisha,P796,para.51;T.4617.
IT-05-87/1-T 243 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6302 1020. The VJ and MUP directed Hazir Berisha’s group of about a dozen men to a house.2729 They started shooting; Hazir Berisha was hit in his leg.2730 A canister was thrown and filled the room with black smoke.2731 Hazir Berisha caught on fire.2732 He escaped through a window, hid and was eventually rescued.2733 Kelmendi heard and observed the murders from a distance.2734
1021. Approximately 41 men were killed in ^uska/Qyshk on 14 May.2735 Three men survived from each house.2736 On that day, other Albanians were killed by the same perpetrators in the nearby villages Pavla}/Pavlan and Saha}/Zaha}.2737
Forces of the MUP and the VJ were Responsible for the Crimes in ^uska/Qyshk
1022. On 13 May 1999, Vlahovi}, a police commander told refugees at a neighbouring village to go to ^uska/Qyshk because the police would be sending all ^uska/Qyshk residents to Albania.2738
1023. On 16 and 17 April and on 14 May 1999, the MUP wore blue camouflage police uniforms with a grey mixture of colours while the VJ wore both solid green and camouflage uniforms.2739 Hazir Berisha identified “Pucrani” as an active policeman in Pe}/Peja who was there on 14 May 1999. 2740 When shown P772, Brakovi}, a PJP commander recognized some men as policemen.2741 Brakovi} thought he recognised “Salipur,” a police officer affiliated with the Pe}/Peja SUP. The SUP Chief of Pe}/Peja was \or|evi}’s direct subordinate.
1024. Both Berisha and Kelmendi recognized the man wearing a cap as Salipur (or Saripuri or [alipur) and said he was a policeman.2742 Kelmendi knew Salipur as “Munja.”2743 Sharipul was known as a dangerous man and maltreated Albanians.2744
2729 Hazir Berisha,P796,paras.53 55;T.4617 4618. 2730 Hazir Berisha,P796paras.56 57;T.4618 4621. 2731 Hazir Berisha,P796,paras.60 61;T.4619 4621. 2732 Hazir Berisha,P796, paras.61 62;T.4619 4620,4665. 2733 Hazir Berisha,P796,paras.64 74;T.4619 4622,4666 4667. See also Kelmendi,T.4724,4730 4731,4739,4781 4782;P797. 2734 Kelmendi,P803,para.55 60,T.4723 4724,4731 4732. 2735 Hazir Berisha,T.4623;Abrahams,T.3983 3984;P756,p.70. 2736 Kelmendi,P803,para.57,T.4724,4731 4732. 2737 Hazir Berisha,T.4624,Abrahams,P756,pp.71 73;T.3983. For other murders at that time, see also Kelmendi,P803 paras.50 51,73 75;T.4714 4715,4725 4726,4733,4737,4740 4744,4780. 2738 Kelmendi,P803,paras.34 36;T.4716 4717,4720;4775 4776,4785 4787. See also Kelmendi,P803,paras.24 29,T.4719 4720;T.4771 4772. 2739 Hazir Berisha,T.4631,4640. See also D117,p.2. Hazir Berisha said that he did not know why D117 mentioned “paramilitaries” and that it was the police and the army in who were at Qyska/^uska that day: Hazir Berisha,T.4646 4650. 2740 Hazir Berisha,T.4627 4631;P772. 2741 P345,p.7;Brakovi},T.4185 4186;P772. 2742 Hazir Berisha,P772;T.4610,4626,4631; Berisha knew his name before 14 May and knew him to be a policeman. (T.4627).
IT-05-87/1-T 244 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6301 1025. Brakovi} knew of a unit called “Munja” in Pe}/Peja that was composed of policemen tasked with complex tasks in mid 1998 in the town of Pe}.2745 During a Joint Command meeting on 30 July 1998, \or|evi} stated that “Munja/Lightning will tomorrow proceed to Vu~ak near Ov~arevo”.2746 It is likely that the “Munja” participated in the ^uska/Qyshk massacre.
(b) Pusto Selo/PustaSelë
1026. Pusto Selo/Pustaselë is a village in Orahovac/Rahovec municipality, located north east of Orahovac/Rahovec town.2747 On 31 March 1999, Serb forces in tanks entered Pusto Selo/Pustaselë.2748 They separated men from women and children, and took their valuables.2749 They sent the women towards Ratkovac/Ratkoc.2750
1027. The police told the remaining men to “[s]it down, kneel down, like you do in the mosque”2751 and look down at the earth that “belongs to Serbia”.2752 They beat the men and emptied their pockets of valuables, money and identification documents.2753 Beqir Krasniqi, a Pusto Selo/Pustaselë resident, heard the Serbian word for “execution” – “streljanje” – from one of the police radios.2754
1028. The police then marched the men to a nearby stream,2755 lined them along the river, and shot at them in smaller groups.2756 The police repeated this procedure four times.2757 Krasniqi was in the second group of men.2758 When the shooting started, bodies fell on top of Krasniqi.2759 After his group, Krasniqi heard two more rounds of fire.2760 Mazreku was in the last group of men.2761 At the
1. 2743 Kelmendi,T.4727,4745;P772. 2744 Kelmendi,T.4727 4728,4745,4750,4753,4785 4786;Hazir Berisha,T.4626,4671. Hazir Berisha’s testimony on whether Sharipul was present in Qyshk/^uska on 14 May is unclear. See Hazir Berisha,T.4610,4631,4653,4657. Berisha said that he knew that Salipur had been killed (T.4653). 2745 Brakovi},T.4187. See also P755,pp.14 22. 2746 P886,p.23. 2747 P823,p.16. 2748 Mazreku,T.6169 6170,6188,6192,6198 6199;P987,p.3;B.Krasniqi,P909,p.3;P908,p.3;D226,p.2. 2749 Mazreku,P987,p.3;T.6170 6171,6199;B.Krasniqi,T.6035,6073,6078,6081;P908,p.3;P909,p.3;D226,p.3. 2750 Mazreku,P987,p.4;T.6171;B.Krasniqi,T.6077;P908,p.3. 2751 B.Krasniqi,T.6035;P908,p.3;T.6029. 2752 B.Krasniqi,T.6063,6073;Mazreku,T.6171. 2753 Mazreku,P987,pp.3 4;T.6171;B.Krasniqi,T.6035,6078;P908,pp.3 4;D226,p.3. See also B.Krasniqi,T.6029. 2754 B.Krasniqi,P908,p.4;T.6036,6080. 2755 B.Krasniqi,T.6035 6036;P908,p.5;D226,p.3;Mazreku,P987,p.4. 2756 Mazreku,T.6172,6198;P987,p.4;B.Krasniqi,T.6035 6036,6080;P908,p.5;D226,p.3. 2757 Mazreku,T.6172 6174;P987,pp.4 5. 2758 B.Krasniqi,T.6080;B.Krasniqi,P908,p.5.;D226,p.3. See also Mazreku,P987,pp.4–5. 2759 B.Krasniqi,P908,p.5. 2760 B.Krasniqi,D226,p.3;P908, pp.5–6. 2761 Mazreku,P987,p.5.
IT-05-87/1-T 245 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6300 river, around 200–300 shots were fired. Mazreku fell down.2762 Krasniqi saw houses on fire.2763 106 men were executed,2764 and thirteen survived.2765
Forces of the FRY and Serbia were responsible for the crimes in Pusto Selo/Pustaselë
1029. VJ and MUP forces were responsible for the massacre.2766 Serbs who arrived on tanks and the shooters wore “grass green” or “[d]ark green, olive green” clothes.2767 “Policija” or Milicija” was written on their backs.2768 The Serbian flag and four “S” was worn on the sleeves.2769 Krasniqi gave various descriptions of the uniforms of the Serb forces in Pusto Selo/Pustaselë,2770 due to his difficulty in naming colours.2771 Despite the discrepancies in his description of uniforms, Krasniqi consistently testified that police “in uniform” were in Pusto Selo/Pustaselë and committed the massacre.2772 Krasniqi and Mazreku both testified that the Serb forces they saw were older than regular soldiers,2773 and entered Pusto Selo/Pustaselë in tanks, trucks and jeeps.2774
1030. Further, as already discussed elsewhere (Part IV, Section (C)(1)), there is overwhelming evidence confirming the presence of forces of the FRY and Serbia in the Orahovac/Rahovec municipality from the end of March until at least mid April 1999.2775
2762 Mazreku,P987,p.5;T.6174. 2763 B.Krasniqi,P908,p.6;T.6072;D226,p.3. See also D811,p.5. 2764 Mazreku,T.6175;P988,para.13;B.Krasniqi,T.6072;P908,p.7. 2765 Mazreku,T.6174 6175;P987,p.4,P988,para.13;B.Krasniqi,D226,p.3. See also B.Krasniqi,T.6035–6036;P908, pp.5, 7;6D2 (closed session),T.12189,12301. 2766 Mazreku,T.6172,6198;P987,p.4;B.Krasniqi,T.6035 6036,6080;P908,p.5. 2767 Mazreku,T.6170,6172,6193,6197–6198;P988,para.6. 2768 Mazreku,T.6170,6178 6179,6192 6193,6197–6198;P987,p.3;P988,paras.6 7. See also Mazreku,T.6194;P327. 2769 Mazreku,T.6194–6196;P318. 2770 See e.g., B.Krasniqi,P908,p.3;D225(MFI),pp.1,3. B.Krasniqi marked the blue camouflage pattern as the uniforms he saw in Pusto Selo/Pustaselë (B.Krasniqi,T.6030–6031;P910). 2771 B.Krasniqi,T.6023–6024. 2772 B.Krasniqi,T.6029. See also B.Krasniqi,T. 6036. 2773 B.Krasniqi,T.6043,6072;P908,p.3;P909,paras.21,23;Mazreku,P988,para.6. 2774 B.Krasniqi,T.6061;P908,p.8;Mazreku,T.6170,6192,6198;P987,p.3;P318. 2775 See e.g., P350;P1316;P1317;P970;P898; See also P1285;6D2,T.12444(closed session);P1548,p.2.
IT-05-87/1-T 246 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6299 V. RESPONSIBILITY PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 7(1) AND 7(3) OF THE STATUTE
A. Legal Elements of Article 7(1) mode of liability
1. Joint criminal enterprise (JCE)
1031. Participation in a JCE is a form of “commission” under Article 7(1) of the Statute.2776 A conviction under this mode of responsibility requires a finding that the accused participated in the JCE. The accused in this case did not physically commit any crimes but participated in the JCE as co perpetrator. For responsibility under JCE, the participant need not physically participate in any element of any crime, so long as the requirements of JCE responsibility are met.2777 Nor is the participant in a JCE required to be physically present when and where the crime is being committed.2778
JCE I
1032. The elements for the first form of JCE are:2779
• A plurality of persons;2780 • The existence of a common design, plan or purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute;2781 • The accused participated in the common design, plan or purpose through his acts or omissions;2782 • The JCE members shared the intent for the crimes in question.2783
Plurality of persons
1033. JCE liability requires a plurality of persons.2784 They need not be organised in a military, political, or administrative structure.2785 While the plurality of persons belonging to the JCE must
2776 Kvočka AJ,para.79;Vasiljevi} AJ,para.95. 2777 Kvočka AJ,para.99. 2778 Kvočka AJ,paras.112 113,276;Simba AJ,para.296. However, it may be taken as an indicator of a co perpetrator’s contribution. Simba AJ,para.296. 2779 Staki} AJ,para.64. See also Kvočka AJ,para.81;Vasiljevi} AJ,para.100. 2780 Staki} AJ,para.69 (referring to a plurality of persons that acted together in the implementation of a common goal). 2781 Staki} AJ,para.64 (referring to Tadi} AJ,para.227). 2782 Staki} AJ,para.64 (referring to Tadi} AJ,para. 227). 2783 Br|anin AJ,para.365 (referring to Accused’s intent to commit the crime and to participate in a common plan aimed at its commission); Kvočka AJ,para.82;Staki} AJ,para.65;Vasiljevi} AJ,para.97;Tadi} AJ,para.196. 2784 Staki} AJ,para.69 (referring to a plurality of persons that acted together in the implementation of a common goal).
IT-05-87/1-T 247 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6298 be identified, it is not necessary to identify by name each of the persons involved.2786 Depending on the circumstances of the case, it can be sufficient to refer to categories or groups of persons.2787
1034. Liability under JCE may exist even if none or only some of the physical perpetrators are members of the JCE.2788 What matters in a first category JCE is not whether the person who carried out the actus reus of a particular crime is a JCE member, but whether the crime in question forms part of the common purpose.2789 This is a matter of evidence.2790
1035. Where the principal perpetrator of a particular crime is not a JCE member, this essential requirement whether the crime is part of the common purpose may be inferred from various circumstances, including the fact that the accused or any other member of the JCE closely cooperated with the principal perpetrator to further the common criminal purpose.2791 To hold a member of a JCE responsible for crimes committed by non members, it has to be shown that the crime can be imputed to one member of the JCE, who – when using a principal perpetrator – acted in accordance with the common plan.2792 The existence of this link should be assessed on a case by case basis.2793 “Factors indicative of such a link include evidence that the JCE member explicitly or implicitly requested the non JCE member to commit such a crime or instigated, ordered, encouraged, or otherwise availed himself of the non JCE member to commit the crime.”2794 A link can also be established where the JCE member controls the hierarchical structure to which the physical perpetrator belongs;2795 or where a hierarchical structure used by the JCE member cooperates with the physical perpetrators.2796
Common Purpose
1036. It is necessary to prove the existence of a common plan, design or purpose among the JCE members which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute.2797 An explicit agreement among the JCE participants is not required.2798 There is no need for this
1. 2785 Staki} AJ,para.64 (referring to Tadi} AJ,para.227). 2786 Kraji{nik AJ,para.156. 2787 Kraji{nik AJ,para.156; Limaj AJ,para..99; Brñanin AJ,para. 430. 2788 Br|anin AJ,para.413.. 2789 Br|anin AJ,paras.410,418 419. 2790 Br|anin AJ,para.418. 2791 Br|anin AJ,para.410. 2792 Br|anin AJ,para.413. 2793 Br|anin AJ,para.413. 2794 Kraji{nik AJ,para.226. 2795 Martić AJ,para.181. 2796 See, Martić AJ,para.195. 2797 Staki} AJ,para.64 (referring to Tadi} AJ,para.227). 2798 Kraji{nik TJ,para.883.
IT-05-87/1-T 248 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6297 purpose to have been previously arranged or formulated; it may materialise extemporaneously and be inferred from the facts.2799 The common purpose can evolve over time so as to comprise additional (expanded) crimes.2800 This requires that the JCE members were informed of the crimes, did nothing to prevent their recurrence and persisted in the implementation of this expansion of the common objective.2801
Contribution
1037. The accused must have participated in the common purpose.2802 This participation need not involve the commission of a specific crime (for example, murder, extermination, torture), or be criminal per se, but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common purpose.2803 It is sufficient for the accused to have committed an act or an omission which contributes to the common criminal purpose.2804 Although an accused’s contribution to the JCE need not be necessary or substantial, it should at least be a significant contribution to the crimes for which the accused is to be found responsible.2805
Mens Rea
1038. In JCE I the co perpetrators possess the shared intent for the crimes in question.2806 This requires the common state of mind that the crime(s) should be carried out;2807 the commission of the crime must be the goal of the JCE members.2808 Such intent is different from motive and JCE members need not desire the criminal result or be enthusiastic about it.2809 Intent may be inferred from the circumstances,2810 such as from acceptance of the crime and continued contribution.2811 The inference that the JCE members were motivated by the requisite intent may be drawn even where those individuals are not precisely identified.2812 An individual’s conduct may be a relevant factor in establishing his or her intent.2813
2799 Staki} AJ,para.64 (referring to Tadi} AJ,para.227). 2800 Kraji{nik AJ,para.163 2801 Kraji{nik AJ, para.171. 2802 Staki} AJ,para.64 (referring to Tadi} AJ,para.227). 2803 Staki} AJ,para.64; Kraji{nik AJ,para.695. 2804 Kvo~ka AJ,para.187. 2805 Simba AJ,para.303; Br|anin AJ,para.430. In practice, the significance of the accused’s contribution will be relevant to demonstrating that the accused shared the intent to pursue the common purpose: Kvočka AJ,para.97. 2806 Tadi} AJ,para.228;Staki} AJ,para.65. 2807 Kraji{nik AJ, paras.200, 707. 2808 Brðanin AJ, paras.365, 431; Martić AJ, para.172. 2809 Kvočka AJ, paras.105 106, 416. 2810 Kvo~ka AJ,para.243. 2811 Kraji{nik AJ, para.200. 2812 See Krsti} AJ,para.34 (“Where direct evidence of genocidal intent is absent, the intent may still be inferred from the factual circumstances of the crime. The inference that a particular atrocity was motivated by genocidal intent may be
IT-05-87/1-T 249 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6296 JCE III
1039. Responsibility under JCE III is responsibility for crimes which were not included in the common purpose, but were nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the execution of the common purpose.2814
1040. The requisite mens rea for this form of JCE is twofold.2815 First, the accused must have the intention to participate in and contribute to the common criminal plan, design or purpose.2816 Second, it must have been foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or other members of the group, and it must be proved that the accused willingly took that risk.2817 This means that the accused was aware that such crime was a possible consequence of the execution of that enterprise and with that awareness, the accused decided to participate in that enterprise.2818 The crime must be shown to have been foreseeable to the accused in particular.2819
1041. When the accused, or any other member of the JCE, in order to further the common criminal purpose, uses persons who, in addition to (or instead of) carrying out the actus reus of the crimes forming part of the common purpose, commit crimes going beyond that purpose, the accused may be found responsible for such crimes provided that he participated in the common criminal purpose with the requisite intent and that, in the circumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or more of the persons used by him (or by any other member of the JCE) in order to carry out the actus reus of the crimes forming part of the common purpose; and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk: the accused, with the awareness that such a crime was a possible consequence of the implementation of that enterprise, decided to participate in that enterprise.2820
2. Ordering
Actus Reus 1. drawn, moreover, even where the individuals to whom the intent is attributable are not precisely identified” (references omitted, emphasis added)); see also Kordi} AJ,para.675 (inferring discriminatory intent on the part of the perpetrators, required for persecutions, and referring to Krsti}). 2813 Kvo~ka AJ,para.213. 2814 Kvo~ka AJ,para.83. 2815 Kvo~ka AJ,para.83. 2816 Kvo~ka AJ,para.83. 2817 Staki} AJ,para.65. 2818 Stakić AJ,para.87;Brðanin AJ,paras.365, 411;Bla{ki} AJ,para.33;Vasiljević AJ,para.101;Martić AJ, para.83;Krnojelac AJ,para.32;Prosecutor v. Karad‘ić, Case No. IT 95 5/18, App. Ch., Decision on Prosecution’s Motion Appealing Trial Chamber’s Decision on JCE III Foreseeability, 25 June 2009,para.18. 2819 Staki} AJ,para.65. 2820 Br|anin AJ,para.411.
IT-05-87/1-T 250 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6295 1042. The accused, as a person in a position of authority, instructed another person to commit an offence.2821
1043. It is sufficient that there is proof of some position of authority on the part of the accused that would compel the perpetrator to commit a crime pursuant to the accused’s order.2822 A formal superior subordinate relationship is not required.2823 The position of authority may be informal or of a purely temporary nature.2824
1044. The order does not need to be given in any particular form,2825 and does not necessarily have to be explicit in relation to the consequences it will have.2826 It is not necessary that the order be given directly to the individual executing it.2827 Physical presence at the scene of the crime is not required.2828 The order has to have a direct and substantial effect on the commission of the illegal act.2829
Mens Rea
1045. The accused acted with direct intent or with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime would be committed in the execution of that order.2830
3. Planning
Actus Reus
1046. The accused, alone or together with others, designed the criminal conduct constituting the crimes charged. The planning was a factor substantially contributing to the perpetration of the crimes.2831
1047. The existence of a plan can be proved by circumstantial evidence.2832
Mens Rea
2821 Kordi} AJ,para.28. 2822 Karera AJ,para.211; Semanza AJ,para.361. 2823 Kordi} AJ,para.28. 2824 Semanza AJ,para.363. 2825 Kamuhanda AJ,para.76; Krsti} TJ,para. 601. 2826 D. Milo{evi} AJ,para.267. 2827 Bla{ki} TJ,para.282. 2828 D. Milo{evi} AJ,para.290. 2829 Kamuhanda AJ,para.75; Kayishema AJ,para..186; Gacumbitsi AJ,paras.184 185. 2830 Bla{ki} AJ,para.42;Kordi} AJ,paras.29,30. 2831 Kordi} AJ,para.26. 2832 Bla{ki} TJ,para.279.
IT-05-87/1-T 251 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6294 1048. The accused acted with direct intent or with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime would be committed in the execution of that plan.2833
4. Instigating
Actus Reus
1049. The accused prompted another person to commit the offence.2834 The instigation was a factor substantially contributing to the conduct of the other person committing the crime.2835 The accused need not be present when the instigated crime is committed.2836
1050. It need not be shown that the offence would not have been committed without the participation of the instigator. It suffices to demonstrate that the instigation was a factor substantially contributing to the conduct of the person committing the crime.2837
Mens Rea
1051. The accused acted with direct intent or with the awareness of the substantial likelihood2838 that a crime would be committed in the execution of that instigation.2839
5. Aiding and abetting
Actus Reus
1052. The accused gave practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.2840
1053. The actus reus of aiding and abetting a crime may occur before, during, or after the principal crime has been perpetrated, and the location at which the actus reus takes place may be removed from the location of the principal crime.2841
Mens Rea
2833 Kordi} AJ,paras.29,31. 2834 Kordi} AJ,para.27. 2835 Kordi} AJ,para.27. 2836 Nahimana AJ, para.660. 2837 Kordić AJ,para.27. 2838 Kordi} AJ,para.32. 2839 Kordi} AJ,paras.29,32. 2840 Bla{ki} AJ,para.46. 2841 Bla{ki} AJ, para.48.
IT-05-87/1-T 252 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6293 1054. The accused knew that his acts assist in the commission of the crime of the principal perpetrator and was aware of the essential elements of the crime which was ultimately committed by the principal.2842 It is not necessary that the aider and abettor is aware of the precise crime that was intended and which in the event was committed, rather it suffices that he is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact committed.2843
B. Legal elements of Article 7(3) mode of liability
1055. Criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) requires: 1) the existence of a superior subordinate relationship with the superior’s “effective control” over the subordinate(s), 2) knowledge or reason to know that a crime is about to be or has been committed by a subordinate, and 3) a failure to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crime or punish the perpetrator.2844
1056. Superior responsibility under Article 7(3) “encompasses all forms of criminal conduct by subordinates, not only the ‘committing’ crimes in the restricted sense of the term, but all other modes of participation under Article 7(1).”2845 Applicable in both international and internal armed conflicts,2846 the scope of superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute extends beyond traditional “command responsibility” to both military and civilian superiors who possess authority.2847
1. Superior subordinate relationship
1057. For Article 7(3) liability it must be established that the accused was a de jure or de facto superior and that he had effective control over the subordinate who engaged in criminal conduct.2848
1058. A superior subordinate relationship is most obviously characterised by the hierarchical relationship that exists in a military structure on all levels,2849 but it does not require direct or formal 2842 Simi} AJ, para. 86. See also Mrk{i} AJ, paras.49, 60, (referring to the awareness of a probability); see also para.63; Bla{ki} AJ, paras.45, 50; Ndindabahizi AJ, para. 122 (referring to aiding and abetting a crime with awareness that a crime will probably be committed) Furund`ija TJ, para.246; Bla{ki} TJ, para.287 (both referred to in Bla{ki} AJ, fn.94), Br|anin TJ, para.272; Strugar TJ, para.350.). 2843 Bla{ki} AJ, para.50. 2844 D.Milo{evi} AJ, para.280; Ori} AJ, para.18; Nahimana AJ, para.484; Halilovi} AJ, paras.59, 210. 2845 Blagojevi} AJ,para.280. See also Nahimana AJ, paras.485 486; Ori} AJ, para.21. 2846 Hadžihasanović Superior Responsibility AD,paras.10 36,57. 2847 Čelebići AJ,para.196;Orić TJ,para.308, citing Čelebići TJ,paras.356,378;Aleksovski TJ,para.75;Aleksovski AJ,para.76;Kordić TJ,para.416;Stakić TJ,para.459. 2848 D.Milo{evi} AJ, para.280; Ori} AJ, para.18; Nahimana AJ, para.484; Halilovi} AJ, paras.59, 210; ^elebi}i AJ, paras.196, 198. 2849 See ICRC Commentary on Article 87 of Additional Protocol I, para.3553: “There is no member of the armed forces exercising command who is not obliged to ensure the proper application of the [Geneva] Conventions and the [Additional] Protocol. As there is no part of the army which is not subordinated to a military commander at whatever
IT-05-87/1-T 253 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6292 subordination.2850 Furthermore, there is no requirement that the relationship between the superior and subordinate be direct, immediate or permanent in nature;2851 superior responsibility can be triggered in cases of temporary command or re subordination of troops.2852
1059. The superior must also have “effective control” over the subordinates, meaning “the material ability to prevent or punish” the subordinates’ offences.2853
1060. Indicators of effective control are more a matter of evidence than of substantive law.2854 Such indicators are limited to demonstrating the power to prevent, punish, or initiate measures leading to proceedings against the alleged perpetrators.2855 The ability to initiate criminal investigations against the perpetrators may be an indicator of effective control.2856 The capacity to issue orders, and proof that the orders are actually followed, is yet another indicator.2857 More than one entity can wield effective control over a unit at a particular point in time.2858
2. Knew or had reason to know
1061. An assessment of the mental element required by Article 7(3) of the Statute should be made “in the specific circumstances of each case, taking into account the specific situation of the superior concerned at the time in question.”2859 To be held responsible under Article 7(3), it must be proved that a superior knew or had reason to know that a subordinate was about to commit a crime or had done so. This requirement is satisfied if information was available to the superior which would have
1. level, this responsibility applies from the highest to the lowest level of the hierarchy, from the Commander in Chief down to the common soldier who takes over as head of the platoon to which he belongs at the moment his commanding officer has fallen and is no longer capable of fulfilling his task.” 2850 Čelebići AJ,para.303. 2851 See Strugar TJ,paras.362 363. 2852 Strugar TJ,para.362,fn.1072, relying on ICRC Commentary on Article 87 of Additional Protocol I,p.1019 (para.3554), which provides that: “A commander may, for a particular operation and for a limited period of time, be supplied with reinforcements consisting of troops who are not normally under his command. He must ensure that these members of the armed forces comply with the Conventions and the Protocol as long as they remain under his command.” See also Blaškić AJ,paras.498 499; Deli} TJ, para.54. 2853 Čelebići AJ,paras.196,256;Čelebići TJ,para.377 378. 2854 Bla{ki} AJ,para.69,citing Aleksovski AJ,paras.73 74,^elebi}i AJ,para.206. 2855 Bla{ki} AJ,para.69,citing Aleksovski AJ,para.76. 2856 Halilovi} AJ,para.182. 2857 Halilovi} AJ,para.207. See also D.Milo{evi} AJ, para.280; Strugar AJ, paras.253 254. 2858 Aleksovski TJ,para.106;Blaškić TJ,para.303. 2859 ^elebi}i AJ,para.239.
IT-05-87/1-T 254 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6291 put him on notice – whether actual or inquiry notice – of offences by subordinates.2860 The same state of knowledge is required for both civilian and military superiors.2861
Actual notice
1062. Actual knowledge may be established through direct or circumstantial evidence.2862 In determining whether a superior had actual knowledge of the acts of his subordinates, the Chamber may consider factors such as the number, type and scope of unlawful acts, their timing, the number and type of troops and the logistics involved, the modus operandi of similar unlawful acts, the staff and officers involved, and the location of the superior when the acts were committed.2863
Inquiry notice
1063. Criminal responsibility attaches to a superior where information was available to him which would have put him on notice of the offences committed by his subordinates.2864 It is not required that the superior actually acquaint himself with the information.2865 A superior will be deemed to have reason to know when he possessed information sufficiently alarming to justify further inquiry.2866 This information may be general in nature, and does not need to include specific details about unlawful acts which have been or are about to be committed.2867 Examples of information that may put a superior on inquiry notice include the criminal propensity or violent or unstable character of subordinates, the level of their training and instruction, and the tactical situation.2868
1064. Knowledge of past crimes can also put a superior on notice of the risk of future crimes.2869 Moreover, where a superior fails to punish known past crimes, it “is likely to be understood by his subordinates at least as acceptance, if not encouragement, of such conduct with the effect of
2860 ^elebi}i AJ,paras.238,241 provide in part: “a superior will be criminally responsible through the principles of superior responsibility only if information was available to him which would have put him on notice of offences committed by subordinates” (emphasis added). 2861 Br|anin TJ, para.282; Krnojelac TJ,para.94; Musema TJ, paras.147 148. See Nahimana AJ, paras.791, 839 841. 2862 Hadžihasanović TJ,para.94,citing ^elebi}i TJ,para.386;Krnojelac TJ,para.94;Kordić TJ,para.427;Brñanin TJ,para.278;Strugar TJ,para.368. See also Deli} TJ, para.64; Bo{koski TJ, para.413. 2863 ^elebi}i TJ,para.386;Orić TJ,para.319. See also Deli} TJ, para.64; Bo{koski TJ, para.413. 2864 ^elebi}i AJ,para.241. See also Blaškić AJ,paras.62,64;Halilović TJ,para.67;Ori} AJ, para.52. 2865 ^elebi}i AJ,para.239. 2866 Strugar AJ, paras.298, 304; Hadžihasanović AJ,paras.28,261;^elebi}i AJ,para.232 (finding that “failure to conclude, or conduct additional inquiry, in spite of alarming information constitutes knowledge of subordinate offences”). 2867 See ^elebi}i AJ,para.238;Krnojelac AJ,paras.154 155,171;Blaškić AJ,para.62. 2868 Had`ihasanovi} TJ,paras.99 100. See also ^elebi}i AJ,para.238. 2869 Strugar AJ, para.301; Had`ihasanovi} AJ,para.30. See also Krnojelac AJ,para.172 (entering convictions under Article 7(3) for Krnojelac’s failure “to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the acts of torture committed subsequent to those inflicted on Ekrem Zeković and for having failed to investigate the acts of torture committed prior to those inflicted on Ekrem Zeković and, if need be, punish the perpetrators.”).
IT-05-87/1-T 255 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6290 increasing the risk of new crimes being committed.”2870 As such, it is relevant to the determination of whether a superior possessed information sufficiently alarming to put him on notice of the risk that subordinates might subsequently perpetrate similar crimes.2871 While a superior’s knowledge of and failure to punish his subordinates’ past offences is insufficient, in itself, to conclude that the superior knew that similar future offences would be committed by the same group of subordinates, this may, depending on the circumstances of the case, nevertheless constitute sufficiently alarming information to justify further inquiry under the “had reasons to know” standard.2872
3. Failed to prevent or punish
1065. The last requirement under Article 7(3) is that the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crime or to punish the perpetrators.
What measures are “necessary and reasonable”
1066. The “necessary and reasonable” measures to prevent or punish which a superior must take are those measures that are “within his material possibility,” to be evaluated on a case by case basis.2873 In essence, “it is a commander’s degree of effective control, his material ability, which will guide the Trial Chamber in determining whether he reasonably took the measures required either to prevent the crime or to punish the perpetrator.”2874 Generally speaking, “‘necessary’ measures are the measures appropriate for the superior to discharge his obligation (showing that he genuinely tried to prevent or punish) and ‘reasonable’ measures are those reasonably falling within the material powers of the superior.”2875
Duty to prevent or punish involves distinct legal obligations
2870 Had`ihasanovi} AJ,para.30. See also Strugar AJ, para.301. 2871 Had`ihasanovi} AJ,para.30 (Failure to punish known past crimes “is indeed relevant to the determination of whether, in the circumstances of a case, a superior possessed information that was sufficiently alarming to put him on notice of the risk that similar crimes might subsequently be carried out by subordinates and justify further inquiry”). 2872 Strugar AJ, paras.301, 304. 2873 ^elebi}i TJ,para.395;Blaškić AJ,paras.72,417. 2874 Blaškić TJ,para.335. See also paras.301 302;^elebi}i TJ,para.395 (“a superior may only be held criminally responsible for failing to take such measures that are within his powers. The question then arises of what actions are to be considered to be within the superior’s powers in this sense. As the corollary to the standard adopted by the Trial Chamber with respect to the concept of superior, we conclude that a superior should be held responsible for failing to take such measures that are within his material possibility.”). 2875 Halilovi} AJ, para.63, reiterated in Ori} AJ, para.177. See also Had`ihasanovi} AJ,para.33 (noting that Article 86 of Additional Protocol I requires superiors to take “all feasible measures within their power” to punish a breach of the laws of war). Article 87 adds the duty to “initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations […] and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof.”
IT-05-87/1-T 256 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6289 1067. A superior’s duty to prevent or punish does not permit a superior to choose in terms of alternatives, to either prevent the crimes or to await their commission and then punish.2876 The failure to prevent and the failure to punish “represent two distinct legal obligations, the failure of either one of which entails responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute.”2877
Duty to prevent
1068. In observing the duty to prevent, “the superior must intervene as soon as he becomes aware of the planning or preparation of crimes to be committed by his subordinates and as long as he has the effective ability to prevent them from starting or continuing.”2878 The superior must take steps to prevent as soon as he is on notice of possible crimes.2879 The superior must undertake all measures which are necessary and reasonable to prevent subordinates from planning, preparing or executing the crimes.2880 For example, beyond issuing routine instructions to observe the law, “a superior may have to give special orders aimed at bringing unlawful practices of subordinates in compliance with the rules of war”2881 and ensure their implementation.2882 A superior may further be required to investigate whether crimes are about to be committed,2883 to protest against or criticise criminal action,2884 to take disciplinary measures,2885 or to report to2886 and/or to insist that immediate action be taken before a superior authority,2887 even if the superior lacks the formal capacity or legal competence to perform such measures personally.2888 For instance, “[a]n obvious case of failure would be if a superior, despite awareness of the criminal activities of his or her subordinates, did
2876Orić TJ,para.326, citing Blaškić TJ,para.336;Strugar TJ,para.373;Blagojević TJ,para.793;Limaj TJ,para.527;Semanza TJ,para.407. See also Milutinovi} TJ, Vol.1, para.116; Deli} TJ, para.69; Bo{koski TJ, para.416. 2877 Hadžihasanović AJ,para.259. 2878 Orić TJ,para.328. 2879 Popovi} TJ,para.402. 2880 Orić TJ,para.565. 2881 Orić TJ,para.331, citing Strugar TJ,para.374 (referencing the Hostages case,11 TWC 759,p.1311);Halilović TJ,para.74;Bagilishema TJ,para.265. 2882 Orić TJ,para.331, citing Strugar TJ,para.378;Halilović TJ,para.74;Had`ihasanovi} TJ,para.153. See also Deli} TJ, para.73. 2883 Orić TJ,para.331, citing Strugar TJ,para.416;Halilović TJ,para.90. 2884 Orić TJ,para.331, citing Strugar TJ,para.374 (referencing High Command case,11 TWC 1,p.623);Halilović TJ,para.89. 2885 Orić TJ,para.331, citing Strugar TJ,para.374 (referencing Tokyo Judgement I,p.452);Halilović TJ,para.89. See also Deli} TJ, para.73. 2886 Orić TJ,para.331, citing Blaškić TJ,paras.329,335;Had`ihasanovi} TJ,para.154. 2887 Orić TJ,para.331, citing Strugar TJ,para.374 (referencing Tokyo Judgement I,p.448);Halilović TJ,para.89. See also Deli} TJ, para.73. 2888 Orić TJ,para.331.
IT-05-87/1-T 257 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6288 nothing,2889 for instance by simply ignoring such information.”2890 The duty to prevent includes a duty to suppress an unlawful act while it is being committed.2891
Duty to punish
1069. Additionally, a superior has to take all measures that are necessary and reasonable in order to ensure that crimes of subordinates are punished. For example, the superior must order or execute appropriate sanctions2892 or, if such action would be premature, “must at least conduct an investigation2893 and establish the facts2894 in order to ensure that offenders under his or her effective control are brought to justice.”2895 The obligation on the part of the superior is to take active steps to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice.2896 Reporting crimes to competent prosecutorial authorities is a reasonable measure that the superior could be required to undertake.2897 The superior is not required to personally conduct the investigation or dispense the punishment,2898 but must at least ensure investigation of the matter2899 and submit a report “to the competent authorities for further investigation or sanction.”2900 As with preventing crimes, “the superior’s own lack of legal competence does not relieve him from pursuing what his or her material ability enables him or her to do.”2901
2889 Orić TJ,para.331, citing Čelebići TJ,paras.772,774;Aleksovski TJ,para.117;Strugar TJ,para.416;Halilović TJ,para.90;Ntagerura TJ,paras.654 657. 2890 Orić TJ,para.331, citing Čelebići TJ,para.387. 2891 Deli} TJ, para.71; Hadzihasanovi} TJ, para.127; Strugar TJ, para.446. 2892 Orić TJ,para.336, citing Ntagerura TJ,para.650. 2893 Orić TJ,para.336, citing Kordić TJ,para.446;Brñanin TJ,para.279;Strugar TJ,para.378;Halilović TJ,paras.74,97,100. 2894 Orić TJ,para.336, citing Halilović TJ,paras.97,100. 2895 Orić TJ,para.336, citing Strugar TJ,para.378;Halilovi} TJ,para.98 (noting that Military tribunals established after World War II interpreted the superior’s duty to punish as implying an obligation for the superior to conduct an effective investigation and to take active steps to ensure that the perpetrators will be brought to justice.). 2896 Deli} TJ, para.74. 2897 Had`ihasanovi} AJ, para.154; Bla{ki} AJ, para.72. 2898 Orić TJ,para.336, citing Kvočka TJ,para.316;Halilović TJ,para.100. 2899 Orić TJ,para.336, citing Halilović TJ,para.97. 2900 Orić TJ,para.336, citing Blaškić AJ,para.632;Blaškić TJ,paras.302,335,464;Kordić TJ,para.446;Kvočka TJ,para.316;Stakić TJ,para.461;Brñanin TJ,para.279;Halilović TJ,paras.97,100. 2901 Orić TJ,para.336, citing Aleksovski TJ,para.78;Blaškić TJ,paras.302,335,464;Halilović TJ,para.100.
IT-05-87/1-T 258 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6287 C. Vlastimir ðorñevi}'s Individual Criminal Responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute
1. Ðorñević is responsible for the crimes charged in the Indictment as a member of the JCE
(a) Introduction
1070. Throughout the Indictment period, \or|ević was Chief of the RJB and was the “highest ranking officer” and “the number 2 man” in the MUP.2902 He also held key positions as Assistant Minister of the MUP and member of the MUP Minister’s Collegium.
1071. Throughout his membership in the JCE set out in the Indictment, \or|evi} significantly contributed to its implementation through his acts and omissions. In particular:
• as Assistant Minister of the MUP, Chief of the RJB and member of the MUP Minister’s Collegium, he commanded and controlled all RJB units and subordinate units in Kosovo, which perpetrated the crimes charged in the Indictment; • as a member of the Joint Command and Head of the RJB, he participated in the training and arming of non Albanian civilians and the disarming of Albanian villages; • he participated in the planning and co ordination of joint MUP/VJ combat operations; • he incorporated paramilitary groups into the MUP in Kosovo; • he concealed murders perpetrated during MUP/VJ actions in Kosovo; and • he created an environment permissive of criminal behaviour by MUP units.
1072. Through his participation in the MUP Collegium and the Joint Command, and as Head of the RJB, \or|evi} acted in concert with other JCE members to further the common purpose of maintaining control over Kosovo through various criminal means. Through his position of authority, \or|evi} commanded and controlled MUP units, including those in Kosovo, participated in planning and co ordinating joint MUP/VJ operations, and used MUP units to commit crimes.
1073. \or|evi} shared the intent of other JCE members to implement the common purpose through the commission of crimes and is therefore responsible pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute for the crimes committed during the campaign to modify the ethnic balance in Kosovo. Alternatively, should the Trial Chamber find that the crimes in Counts 3 to 5 were outside the common purpose, these crimes were natural and foreseeable consequences of the execution of the plan to modify the ethnic balance through deportation and forcible transfer. In deciding to
2902 Mi{i},T.14073;Vasiljevi},T.5933.
IT-05-87/1-T 259 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6286 participate in that enterprise, \or|evi} willingly accepted the risk that such crimes might be committed.
(b) \or|evi}’s position
1074. Ðorñevi} joined the Serbian MUP in July 1971.2903 On 11 September 1996, he was appointed Assistant Minister of Interior.2904 On 1 June 1997, upon his promotion to Lieutenant General, he became acting Head of the RJB.2905 On 10 July 1997, the President of Serbia promoted him to Colonel General,2906 the highest rank within the MUP. On 27 January 1998, MUP Minister Stojiljkovi} appointed \or|evi} Chief of the RJB, a position he held until 30 January 2001.2907
(c) \or|evi} commanded and controlled all RJB units in Kosovo
(i) \or|evi} headed the RJB
1075. \or|evi} was the highest ranking MUP officer and commanded and controlled MUP units and attached units engaged in combat operations. His authority to control the RJB is evident from his mandate under Article 54 of the Rules of Internal Organisation of the MUP.2908 \or|evi} confirmed that according to these rules, as Chief of the Department, he had authority and duty to control the RJB throughout Serbia.2909
1076. The RJB was the largest MUP Department. From at least July to October 1998 and throughout the conflict in 1999, the RJB had more than 14,000 personnel in Kosovo,2910 including members of special units PJPs and SAJ.2911 These personnel fell under Ðorñević’s authority.
1077. The RJB chain of command flowed from Stojiljkovi} and \or|evi} at the MUP HQ in Belgrade to the MUP Staff. The MUP Staff was the body in charge of co ordinating and managing the work of MUP units engaged in combat actions in Kosovo, and served as an intermediate command level between MUP HQ and SUPs in Kosovo.2912 Luki}, the Head of the MUP Staff and
2903 Ðorðević,T.9388;D393,p.1. 2904 Ðorðević,T.9394 9396;D394. 2905 Order on Agreed Facts,p.25;Ðorðević,T.9396;D395. 2906 Ðorðević,T. 9533 9534,9771;D421. 2907 Ðorðević,T.9396 9397;D396;D397;Order on Agreed Facts,p.25. 2908 P357,Art.54. 2909 Ðorðević,T.9788,9817,9823. 2910 P1038,p.2;P769,p.1;P87,p.7;P1509(MFI),p.4;\or|evi},T.10043. 2911 P1509,pp.4 5. 2912 Cveti},T.6597.
IT-05-87/1-T 260 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6285 a JCE member, implemented the plans and policies adopted at the level of Belgrade. He reported to \or|evi} and Stojiljkovi}.2913
\or|evi}’s powers as Head of the RJB
1078. \or|evi}’s primary function was to ensure that the RJB fulfilled its mandate.2914 In order to do so, he had broad powers and his use of them is evidenced by:
• Deployment of police units to Kosovo to carry out anti terrorist operations.2915 Decisions to deploy PJP units were issued in the form of dispatches and were made by the MUP Minister or by a person authorised by him.2916 According to Cveti}, “as a rule, the authorised person was the head of the RJB.”2917 \or|evi} confirmed that such dispatches needed to be signed by an official in his position of authority.2918 Reports from SUPs to the MUP HQ in Belgrade confirm that \or|evi}’s instructions were complied with.2919 \or|evi}’s dispatches contained detailed instructions on the units, the number of personnel and amount of equipment to be deployed, and the municipalities in Kosovo to which these units were sent.2920 \or|evi}’s dispatches also contained instructions on the units being rotated out of Kosovo.2921
• Issuing orders containing tasks and instructions for the SUPs, MUP Staff and RJB special units in Kosovo. Several dispatches demonstrate his authority.2922 For example, on 18 February 1999, when the MUP was making plans to launch an offensive in the Spring, \or|evi} issued a dispatch addressed to all RJB units requiring them to update their defence plans and recruit to full capacity the 21st to 87th PJP detachments.2923 On 12 June 1999, following the signing of the Kumanovo agreement, \or|evi} ordered the withdrawal of all MUP units from Kosovo.2924
2913 See Part III, Section (A)(3)(b)(ii). 2914 See P357,Art.2. 2915 P131;P132;P134;P137;P138;P346;P713;P1188. 2916 Cveti},T.6649,6655 6656,6658. 2917 Cveti},T.6655. 2918 \or|evi},T.10058;P137.See also Keri},T.7773. 2919 Golubovi}, T.1669 1670;P355(issued in response to P133). See also Keri}, T.7782. The following dispatches were issued in response to RJB Dispatch 587 (P711): P1191;P1192;P1194;P1195;P1196;P1197;P1198;P1199. The following dispatches were issued in response to RJB Dispatch 218 (P713): P1482;P1483;P1484. 2920 Keri},T.7768;P1181;P356;P711;P137. 2921 Cveti},T.6658 6659. See P1182;P1183;P1184;P1185;P133;P135;P136;P139;P346;P712;P1189;P1190. 2922 \or|evi},T.9461(P132);Ðorðević,T.9628 9629 (P1202);T.9640(P1203);T.9640 9641 (D433);T.9653 9654(P715); T.9659 (D717). 2923 P356,item 1. 2924 P1209.
IT-05-87/1-T 261 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6284 • Setting up staffs within the RJB.2925 In order to better co ordinate the work of MUP units in Kosovo, \or|evi} formed the MUP Staff of KiM on 11 June 19972926 and renewed the Staff’s mandate on 15 May 1998.2927 On 11 June 1998, he appointed Luki} as Head of the Staff.2928
• Disciplining members of the RJB responsible for crimes. In his dispatch of 9 April 1999, \or|evi} authorised heads of organisational units to impose the disciplinary sanctions prescribed in the Decree on Internal Affairs During the State of War, for serious violations of employment obligations and duties.2929 In cases involving criminal offences—such as rape, murder or looting—SUP Chiefs, \or|evi}’s subordinates, were required to seek the authorisation from the MUP HQ in Belgrade before initiating criminal proceedings against the offender.2930
• Appointing and dismissing RJB personnel, including SUP chiefs and members of the MUP Staff.2931 \or|evi} was the only official, other than the Minister, authorised to issue decisions on the appointment and dismissal of staff.2932
(ii) \or|evi} continued to command RJB units in Kosovo after June 1998 and during the Indictment period
1079. \or|evi} claimed that pursuant to Stojiljkovi}’s decision of 16 June 1998 expanding the MUP Staff, Luki} became answerable directly to Stojiljkovi}, not to him, for MUP units involved in anti terrorist operations in Kosovo.2933 \or|ević insisted that he was not in charge of “a single policeman who was engaged in Kosovo in anti terrorist activities or on the defence of the country”.2934
1080. Stojiljkovi}’s 16 June 1998 decision did not divest \or|evi} of his powers as Head of the RJB nor modify the chain of command within the MUP.2935 On the contrary, the evidence proves that after 16 June 1998, \or|evi} continued to exercise command authority over RJB units,
2925 See P357,Art.10. 2926 D402. See also Ðorðević,T.9466 9467, 9469. 2927 D100; Ðorðević,T.9476. 2928 P760; Ðorðević,T.9553 9554. See also P57; Part III, Section(A)(3)(b)(ii). 2929 P1050; Cveti},T.6711 6712. 2930 Cveti},T.6708 6711,6757 6758;P50;P1049,Art.10. 2931 Cveti}, T.6774 6775. See e.g. P76;P77;P79;P80;P82;P140;P143;P144;P703;P1044;D405. 2932 \or|evi},T.10060. See also T.9737 9738. 2933 Ðorðević,T.9481 9482,9794 9795,9935,10059. 2934 \or|evi},T.10118. 2935 See Part III, Section(A)(3)(b)(i).
IT-05-87/1-T 262 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6283 including those in Kosovo. Luki} remained a member of the RJB and \or|evi}’s direct subordinate.
1081. \or|evi} played a key role in the implementation of the 1998 summer offensive. Following the meeting at Beli Dvor on 21 July 1998, where the Plan for Suppressing Terrorism was adopted, Stojiljkovi} called a meeting at the MUP HQ, which \or|evi}, Stevanovi} and Luki} attended, to discuss the tasks to be carried out by the MUP pursuant to the Plan.2936 \or|evi} testified that given the importance of the forthcoming task, Stojiljkovi} instructed both \or|evi} and Stevanovi} to be present during the execution of this task of fighting terrorism in order to "fulfil our obligations.”2937
1082. \or|evi} left for Pri{tina that same evening. He met with the PrK Commander and members of the political leadership in Pri{tina.2938 The next day, \or|evi} and Stevanovi} attended a MUP Staff meeting, at which SUP Chiefs and PJP commanders were present. \or|evi} and Stevanovi} briefed participants on the recently adopted Plan and issued instructions on the forthcoming tasks to be carried out by police units.2939
1083. That evening, \or|evi} also attended a meeting with the VJ and MUP leadership and senior political representatives in the province.2940 Again, the implementation of the Plan was the main topic on the agenda. When the MUP and the VJ began implementing the Plan, these meetings of the senior MUP, VJ and political leadership evolved into the daily briefings of the Joint Command. \or|evi} participated actively in these meetings.2941
1084. The notes of Joint Command meetings show \or|evi}’s hands on involvement and command over MUP combat actions from July to October 1998.2942 For example:
• On 26 July, \or|evi} directed: “Finish off Pri{tina Kijevo tomorrow, approach Mali{evo as soon as possible, put Crnoljevo, Suva Reka and Zborce on hold and move on to Junik and Rudnik”.2943 • On 27 July, \or|evi} addressed the details of the operation against Mališevo/Malishevë,2944 which was launched the next day. \or|evi} was in the field during this joint MUP VJ
2936 Ðorðević,T.9567 9569. 2937 Ðorðević,T.9568. 2938 Ðorðević,T.9569 9571. 2939 Ðorðević,T.9574 9575,9800 9801;Cveti},T.6627 6629;P768. 2940 P886,p.2;\akovi},T.7878 7881;\or|evi},T.9578. 2941 See Part III(A)(3)(b)(i). 2942 See e.g. P886,pp.9,12,14,19,23,27,29,57,60,69,95,101,105,108. 2943 P886,p.12. 2944 P886,pp.13 14.
IT-05-87/1-T 263 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6282 action.2945 That same day, when the action was completed, \or|evi} called via radio from Mališevo/Malishevë to a MUP Staff meeting in Pri{tina, attended by Stojiljkovi}, and said that Mališevo/Malishevë was “free.”2946 • On 12 August, \or|evi} ordered: “engage the 3rd and 4th Detachments around Lo|a and have them work on Friday; do Vo{ka and Slup and engage the army”.2947 The notes of the following day record that preparations of MUP detachments for the Vokša and Slup action were ongoing, with a VJ combat group as a support.2948 • On 23 August, \or|evi} updated participants on actions involving several PJP Detachments and the JSO, and instructed that “the Prizren and Belgrade companies and the SAJ […] proceed along the Dulje Rance direction”.2949 Trajkovi} confirmed that in this period the SAJ took part in an action along the Dulje Rance axis.2950 • On 22 September, following Pavkovi}’s comment about a misunderstanding regarding the engagement of the 1st and 8th PJP companies with the 15th Armoured Brigade in this action, \or|evi} reported: “These two companies have been engaged with one PJP detachment to close the route through Drvare with one company; two companies came out west of @ilivoda village”.2951 The PrK order of 19 September 1998 instructed the 15th Armoured Brigade to support the 1st and 8th PJP companies in this action.2952
1085. \or|evi} was on the ground in Kosovo throughout the implementation of the Plan,2953 and closely monitored the operations of MUP units in the field.2954 He testified that “In 1998, when the situation was most difficult, I was down there all the time”.2955 He described his role:
When I was in Kosovo, I was not merely an observer. On the order of the minister, it was my task to get involved and to provide assistance in the activities being carried out down there and to give my contribution to the success of the anti terrorist activity.2956
1086. Trajkovi} said that \or|evi} and Stevanovi} were frequently with SAJ units when they were in the field, “Their presence…was obvious”.2957
2945 Ðorðević,T.9597 9598. 2946 Cveti},T.6621,6644;P688,p.4. See also Cveti},T.6612. 2947 P886,p.41. 2948 P886,p.44. See also P1232,p.3. 2949 P886,p.57. 2950 Trajkovi},T.9067 9069; P886,p.57. 2951 P886,p.108. 2952 P1422,pp. 8 9. 2953 \or|evi},T.9515. 2954 Ðorðević,T.9853 9854. 2955 \or|evi},T.10031. 2956 Ðorðević,T.9790 9791. 2957 Trajković,T.9066 9067.
IT-05-87/1-T 264 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6281 1087. Towards the end of September 1998, approximately 1500 PJP troops conducted a large scale operation in the areas of Jablanica and Glo|ane.2958 While the operation was underway, \or|evi} visited \ecani and met with Decani OUP Chief Vukmir Mir~i}, who informed him that tens of thousands of civilians from some 20 villages had gathered in Istini}, north of Decani town.2959 \or|evi} approved Mir~i}’s proposal to send someone to Istini} to negotiate the peaceful surrender of the weapons.2960 After the villagers had handed in their weapons,2961 \or|evi} personally went to the village with Mir~i} and met with the elders.2962 As a result of the peaceful hand over, the police action was not “carried through as planned”.2963 Although \or|evi} denied that he put an end to the action,2964 that is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence. In his 2004 letter to the Nedelnji Telegraf, \or|evi} wrote that after the weapons were handed over, “I immediately stopped any further search of the terrain”.2965
1088. During the summer offensive, \or|evi} also spent time at the premises of the MUP Staff. He had an office in the same building.2966 Cveti} testified that both \or|evi} and Stevanovi} were often at the Staff in Kosovo during the period between 25 July and the end of September 1998.2967 Both also attended MUP Staff meetings during that period.2968
1089. \or|evi} acknowledged that he was fully familiar with the activities of the MUP Staff in the summer of 1998. He knew about the contents of the MUP Staff report that provided an overview of MUP “operations aimed at eradicating terrorist activities” in Kosovo in the summer of 1998.2969 \or|evi} was directly involved in these activities at the time: “All the activities of the staff were familiar to me, especially for the period when I was there myself”.2970 \or|evi} said that this document “faithfully represents the situation prevailing at the time and the events unfolding”.2971
1090. Luki} recognised \or|evi}’s authority as his superior. For example, reporting to the Joint Command with respect to the situation in Orahovac/Rahovec on 29 July 1998, Luki} stated: “the unit did not leave Orahovac as ordered by General \or|evi}”.2972 At a meeting on 4 September 2958 Ðorðević,T.9802 9803. 2959 Ðorðević,T.9622 9623;Mir~i},T.13263. 2960 Ðorðević,T.9623;Mir~i},T.13625. 2961 Ðorðević,T.9623,9803;Mir~i},T.13625. 2962 Ðorðević,T.9624 9625;Mir~i},T.13625 13266. 2963 Ðorðević,T.9622 9623, 9802 9804;D429. 2964 Ðorðević,T.9804. 2965 P1474,p.5. 2966 Ðorðevi},T.9585. 2967 Cveti},T.6622. 2968 \or|evi},T.9574 9575,9800 9801;P768;P770;Cveti},T.6621,6640. 2969 Ðorðević,T.9635,9637;D432. 2970 Ðorðević,T.9637;D432. 2971 Ðorðević,T.9637;D432. 2972 P886,p.19.
IT-05-87/1-T 265 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6280 1998, \or|evi} ordered Luki} to “return all inhabitants to the village by force tomorrow” and to search the terrain for weapons.2973 The following day, Luki} reported that \or|evi}’s instructions had been carried out.2974
1091. \or|evi} remained Head of the RJB in 1999 and continued to exercise his powers and play a strategic role in MUP operations in Kosovo. As explained in more detail below, he was at the Stimlje police station while the joint VJ/MUP action in Ra~ak was underway and monitored that action. He also attended the 17 February 1999 MUP Staff meeting, along with the senior leadership of the MUP, at which the RJB offensive to be launched in the spring was discussed. He made several trips to Kosovo in March and April 1999, and remained apprised of the situation on the ground. He also continued to attend Joint Command meetings in 1999, and participated in a meeting in Pri{tina on 1 June 1999 that dealt with MUP and VJ actions on the ground.
1092. During the Indictment period, \or|evi} deployed RJB units to Kosovo. From late February through mid March 1999, in preparation for the Spring offensive, \or|evi} issued numerous orders deploying PJP units to Kosovo.2975 The units remained on the ground throughout the conflict in 1999 and participated in the crimes charged in the Indictment.2976
1093. \or|evi} was also responsible for the use of the SAJ in Kosovo. SAJ Commander Trajkovi} testified that, in March 1999, he spoke several times with his “immediate superior” \or|evi} about replenishing the SAJ with additional men, and said that it was only natural that \or|evi} would be the first person he spoke to about this.2977 \or|evi} acknowledged that he knew most of the members of the SAJ.2978 As described in more detail below, \or|evi} deployed the Skorpions to reinforce the SAJ in Kosovo on two occasions in 1999.2979 In July 1999, \or|evi} issued a decision ending Trajkovi}’s tour of duty as SAJ Commander in Kosovo.2980
(iii) \or|evi} participated in high level strategic meetings
1094. \or|evi} was a member of the MUP Minister’s Collegium, the highest policy making body within the MUP. It was comprised of Minister Stojiljkovi} and his six Assistant Ministers2981— \or|evi} (Chief of the RJB); Markovi} (Chief of the RDB); General Nikola ^ur~i} (Deputy Chief 2973 P886,p.73. 2974 P886,p.75. 2975 See e.g. P356;P711;P137. 2976See Part IV, Section(C). 2977 Trajković,T.9087. 2978 Ðorðević,T.9732 (private session). 2979 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(f). 2980 Trajković,T.9056;P145. 2981 \or|evi},T.10030;Mi{i},T.14029–14030,14069.
IT-05-87/1-T 266 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6279 of the RDB); General Petar Zekovi} (Head of the Administration for Joint Affairs, Board and Lodging); General Obrad Stevanovi} (Head of the Police Administration), and General Stojan Mi{i} (Head of the Administrations for Alien Affairs, Travel Documents, Fire Fighting and Communications).2982
1095. The Collegium managed the work of the MUP.2983 Collegium meetings were held every Tuesday.2984 Stojiljkovi} presided over these meetings.2985 As in 1998, the Collegium met regularly during the conflict in 1999.2986
1096. The Collegium dealt with matters such as recruitment, reinforcement and replenishment of units, and logistical and procurement matters relevant to the engagement of units in Kosovo.2987 Through the Police Administration, the Collegium received requests from the MUP Staff on police units to be deployed to Kosovo or to be rotated back to Serbia, and acted on these requests to ensure that the MUP Staff received the forces and logistical resources required.2988 The Collegium also decided upon appropriate security policies, directing all organisational units and forces in the field.2989 Personnel related decisions were also made at the level of the Collegium.2990
1097. \or|evi} became a member of the Joint Command when it was established in July 1998.2991 \or|evi}’s role and the nature of his involvement in the Joint Command are reflected in the minutes of Joint Command meetings, where he regularly attended and participated.2992 All Joint Command members, including \or|ević, were kept informed at all stages of the operations.2993 Ðorñević remained a member of the Joint Command in 1999.2994 The role and authority of the Joint Command are discussed in more detail in Part III(A)(3)(b)(i).
1098. Throughout his tenure as Head of the RJB, \or|evi} represented the Department at high level co ordination meetings dealing with MUP operations in Kosovo. Other JCE members also participated in these meetings. For example:
2982 Ðorðević,T.9409;P263;Mi{i},T.14069,14082;D208. 2983 Mi{i},T.14021,14023,1427 1428,14078. 2984 Mi{i},T.14079 14080. 2985 Mi{i},T.14080,14145. 2986 Mi{i},T.14053,14079. 2987 Mi{i},T.14032,14040,14054,14086–14088,14090,14092,14907. 2988 Mi{i},T.14087 14090,14095. 2989 Mi{i},T.14083,14091. 2990 Cveti},T.6855. 2991 P886,p.2;\akovi},T.7878 7881;\or|evi},T.9577 9578. 2992 See e.g. P886, pp.9,12,14,19,23,27,29,57,60,69,95,101,105,108. 2993 See Part III, Section(A)(3)(b)(i). 2994 See Part III, Section(A)(3)(b)(i).
IT-05-87/1-T 267 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6278 • On 21 July 1998, \or|evi} was one of the senior MUP representatives present at a meeting held in Milo{evi}’s office in Belgrade where the summer offensive was planned. Other senior representatives of the MUP (Stojiljkovi}, Stevanovi}, Markovi} and Luki}), the VJ (Peri{i}, Samard`i}, Pavkovi} and Dimitrijevi}) and several state officials (Milutinovi}, [ainovi}, An|elkovi}) also attended. Milo{evi} informed those present that the SDC had decided to engage the VJ in Kosovo.2995 Pavkovi} presented a plan for a large scale joint MUP/VJ offensive on a map and the plan was approved.2996 • In August 1998, \or|evi} participated in two meetings at Beli Dvor in Belgrade, with the same members of the senior leadership.2997 The implementation of the Plan for Suppressing Terrorism was assessed, and Pavkovi} and Luki} submitted reports for the 3rd Army and the MUP.2998 • On 25 October 1998, \or|evi} headed the Serbian MUP team in the negotiations of the Clark Naumann Agreement, which included matters impacting the work of the MUP in Kosovo.2999 \or|evi} was the lead negotiator for the MUP and signed the agreement with US KDOM representative Shaun Byrnes at the end of these negotiations.3000 • On 29 October 1998, in his capacity of Chief of the RJB,3001 \or|evi} participated in the meeting of the Operations Inter Departmental Staff for the Suppression of Terrorism in Belgrade, where the implementation of the Plan for Suppressing Terrorism and the work of the Joint Command were discussed.3002 • On 27 November 1998, \or|evi} participated in a meeting in Belgrade chaired by Stojiljkovi}, and also attended by Markovi}, MUP Assistant Ministers, [ainovi}, and Luki}.3003 The “essence of the meeting” was a recommendation “to continue execution of anti terrorist actions aimed at suppressing terrorism in Kosovo” and to strengthen the police role in these actions by making it “more offensive in taking measures in the newly arisen situation.”3004
2995 \akovi},T.7916 7918,8048,9563 9564. See also P87,pp.3;P1361;P682. 2996 Ðorðević,T.9829,9874 9875,9563 9564,9566. See also P87,p.3. 2997 Ðorðević,T.9619 9620. 2998 Ðorðević,T.9620. 2999 Byrnes,T.8177;P1214,p.31. 3000 P836;Byrnes,T.8178,8230 8231.See also Byrnes,T.8180 8181. 3001 \or|evi},T.10153. 3002 P87. 3003 P689,p.3. 3004 P689,p.3.
IT-05-87/1-T 268 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6277 • On 5 January 1999, \or|evi} represented the RJB at a co ordination meeting on the situation in Kosovo at Beli Dvor. Milo{evi}, Milutinovi}, [ainovi}, Ojdani}, Stojiljkovi}, Pavkovi}, and Luki} were also in attendance.3005 • On 4 May 1999, \or|evi} attended a meeting in Milo{evi}'s villa in Belgrade at which the leaders of the police and military and civilian Serbian leadership were present.3006 Pavkovi} and Luki} provided an overview of the activities of VJ and MUP units in Kosovo.3007 • On 9 July 1999, \or|evi} was one of the senior MUP officers present at a meeting with the VJ leadership at the VJ General Staff.3008 Ojdani} called the meeting to resolve ongoing problems of insufficient co operation between the VJ and the MUP in dealing with crimes in Kosovo.3009
(iv) The Serbian military and political leadership, and internationals, recognised \or|evi} as the leader of the RJB in Kosovo
1099. Members of the VJ and the political leadership of the FRY, including Milo{evi} himself, recognised \or|evi}’s authority over the use of MUP units in Kosovo. At a meeting on 17 May 1999 at Beli Dvor in Belgrade, Milo{evi}, the senior VJ leadership and Markovi}, discussed the issue of paramilitaries in Kosovo and the presence of the Skorpions.3010 Milo{evi} instructed Markovi} to “sit down with Vlajko [Stojiljkovi}] and Ro|a [\or|evi}] and clear it up with them— their heads won’t be chopped off but Boca must answer”.3011 Vasiljevi}, who attended the meeting, understood Milo{evi} to be instructing Markovi} to relay this message to “those persons who bear the highest responsibility for the use of MUP forces [in Kosovo]”.3012
1100. In July 1999, Milo{evi} decorated \or|evi} with the Order of the Yugoslav Flag in the First Degree for his leadership of MUP units in Kosovo, commending \or|evi} for “the exceptional results achieved in commanding police units, for the courage, determination and discipline exhibited in discharging security tasks of combating terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija…”.3013
3005 \or|evi},T.10043,10152. 3006 Ðorðević,T.9743 9744. 3007 Ðorðević,T.9743;P1537;D443. 3008 \or|evi},T.10100;Vasiljevi},T.5720. 3009 Vasiljevi},T.5690,5718 5719,5722. 3010 Vasiljevi},T.5681. 3011 Vasiljevi},T.5681 5682,5684;P884,p.1. 3012 Vasiljevi},T.5688. 3013 P1506,p.1.See also Ðorðević,T.9779 9782.
IT-05-87/1-T 269 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6276 1101. Internationals dealt with \or|evi} as the Head of the RJB. During negotiations for the October Agreements, Byrnes understood Ðorñević to be leading the Serbian side, because \or|evi} was introduced in that capacity.3014 Byrnes said that Ðorñević “was clearly in charge” of the MUP negotiating team.3015
(v) Conclusion
1102. Given his significant involvement in operations in 1998 and continued involvement in 1999, the only reasonable inference is that \or|evi} remained actively involved in the command and control of RJB units, including those in Kosovo, throughout the Indictment period.
1103. Whether or not \or|evi} acted pursuant to an order from his superior in the government does not relieve him of criminal responsibility if those actions were taken in furtherance of the JCE. The fact that the plan emanated from higher levels of the government is part of the Prosecution’s case and is not inconsistent with his individual criminal liability for the part he played. In the same vein, if Stojiljkovi} were present to meet these allegations it would not assist him to claim that the orders originated from persons superior to him, for example, Milo{evi}.3016
1104. At the time relevant to the Indictment, \or|evi} and Stojiljkovi} managed the work of the MUP in Kosovo from the highest strategic level. Although they often went to Kosovo, neither needed to be based there to play his role. That was Luki}’s role. \or|evi} and Stojiljkovi} worked in tandem, as indicated by Stojiljkovi} in his dispatch of 24 March 1999: “…it is necessary to intensify the enforcement of measures that were ordered as per our dispatch number 312 of the 18th of February 1999…”.3017 Stojiljkovi} was referring to \or|evi}’s dispatch no.312,3018 in which he reiterated instructions on measures to be adopted that had been issued by Stojiljkovi} at a MUP Staff meeting of 17 February 1999.3019 The evidence shows that Luki} implemented these measures on the ground.3020
1105. \or|evi}’s authority is beyond dispute. His subordinates on the ground recognised his authority, as did other members of the Minister’s Collegium. His colleagues in the VJ and the senior political leadership recognised \or|evi} as one of the key figures in the MUP. The evidence in relation to \or|evi}’s powers and functions as Head of the RJB also reveals his key role in
3014 Byrnes,T.8230 8231. 3015 Byrnes,T.8178. 3016 See ICTY Statute, Art.7(4). 3017 P702, p.1(emphasis added). 3018 P356. 3019 P85,pp.2 3. 3020 See Part III,Section(A)(3)(b)(ii).
IT-05-87/1-T 270 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6275 planning, controlling and organising the work of the RJB units in Kosovo. \or|evi} worked closely with the leadership of the MUP, in particular Stojiljkovi}, Stevanovi} and Luki}, to co ordinate MUP operations with the VJ in Kosovo. He regularly represented the RJB at high level meetings with the leadership of the FRY and Serbia.
1106. The powers invested in the office of Chief of the RJB could not easily be superseded. \or|evi} testified that in October 2000 he refused to obey two orders of the Minister which envisaged the use of excessive force against Serbian civilians. As a result, the actions were not carried out.3021 On about 6 7 October 2000, Stojijlkovi}, Markovi} and Stevanovi} demanded \or|evi}’s resignation. \or|evi} refused to resign and remained in his post until early 2001.3022 This evidence demonstrates firstly, that \or|evi} was not a mere pawn of the Minister and, secondly, that while he occupied the post of chief of the RJB, his co operation or approval was required to use RJB units in security operations. \or|evi}’s claims that the Minister effectively divested him of much of his authority and power to control the RJB especially in the use of the units operating in Kosovo3023 were simply not credible.
(d) \or|evi} participated in training and arming non Albanian civilians and disarming Albanian villages
1107. As the Head of the RJB and a member of the Joint Command, \or|evi} played a significant role in the process of arming non Albanian civilians and disarming ethnic Albanians throughout Kosovo. Through his participation in the Joint Command, \or|evi} participated in the efforts of the FRY and Serbian leadership to carry out these processes, despite his awareness of the likelihood that criminal acts would be perpetrated. His active involvement in the implementation of this policy shows that he acted in concert with other JCE members to further the common purpose through criminal means.
(i) The arming of the non Albanian population
3021 \or|evi},T.9962;P1474,pp.8 9. 3022 K92,T.2783 2784 (closed session);\or|evi},T.9957 9958(closed session). 3023 \or|evi},T.9515,9587,9687 9688,9788 9789.
IT-05-87/1-T 271 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6274 1108. \or|evi} was involved in arming the non Albanian population in Kosovo. The decision to arm non Albanians was made at the highest levels of the government in Serbia and the FRY, with the participation of the MUP leadership.3024 The MUP Staff implemented this decision.3025
1109. The MUP Staff armed local non Albanian villagers and formed reserve police squads (RPOs).3026 On 30 June 1998, the MUP Staff sent a dispatch to all SUPs to assess the need for weapons for RPOs.3027 In the beginning of July 1998, SUPs began setting up RPOs.3028 By February 1999, the total number of armed non Albanians in Kosovo was about 60,000.3029 Ethnic Albanians did not receive weapons and were not included in RPOs.3030
1110. While \or|evi} accepted that the MUP organised and trained the RPOs,3031 he maintained that the MUP did not exert control over these squads nor manage their work.3032 According to him, the MUP simply provided logistics, training and equipment to members of these squads.3033
1111. The evidence shows that RPOs were under the general command and control of the MUP, which was also responsible for organising and training them:
• The MUP exercised authority over the appointment of RPO commanders.3034 On 10 July 1998, Luki} sent a dispatch to the commanders of several police stations in Kosovo, instructing them to organise the local defence with the newly formed RPOs, engage the RPOs, and carry out training.3035 At the 28 July 1998 meeting of the MUP Staff, Stojiljkovi} instructed those present: “Chiefs of reserve police stations should be from the respective villages”.3036 • The RPOs were responsible to the commander of the police station in their area, who in turn issued specific tasks to the RPO commander.3037
3024 Cveti},T.6663 6664;Ðorðević,T.9862,9901. 3025 Cveti},T.6713.See also P1052. 3026 Cveti},T.6634,6663 6664;\or|evi},T.9901. See P1054,p.1;P1052;P688,p.8;P975;P690,para.8;P689,pp.6,8; P1043,p.5;P770,pp.4 5;P85,pp.1,3. 3027 P1054,p.1;P1052. See Cveti},T.6836 6837;D267;D268;Halit Berisha,T.3417. 3028 P1054. See D432,p.6;P688,p.8. 3029 Cveti},T.6717;P1055,pp.6 7. See also P976;P1330,p.9;P87, p.10. 3030 Cveti},T.6719;\akovi},T.8137. 3031 \or|evi},T.9906 9907,9940. 3032 \or|evi},T.9908,9911,9919,9928,9939 9940. 3033 \or|evi},T.9907,9919,9939 9940. 3034 P1054,p.1;D270. 3035 D269;P1052.See \or|evi},T.9906 9907. 3036 P688,p.8. 3037 Cveti},T.6713. See e.g. D270,p.4;P1043,p.5. See also Halit Berisha,T.3417,3393;P599 pp.56 58;P600,p.13.
IT-05-87/1-T 272 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6273 • RPOs provided support to MUP forces during organized anti terrorist operations in the areas under their protection.3038 When engaged in actions with MUP units, RPO members were placed under the command of the MUP.3039 • The MUP Staff issued instructions regarding the use of RPOs. For example, on 2 December 1998, SUP chiefs were reminded to submit reports on the strength, weapons, training and activities of RPOs.3040 On 7 and 11 May 1999, Luki} ordered that members of the RPOs could only wear police or military uniforms when they were performing tasks as police or VJ reservists.3041 1112. \or|evi} claimed to have limited knowledge of the arming process, and that he was unaware that the VJ and the MUP co ordinated the arming and training of RPOs through the Joint Command.3042 Yet the evidence is overwhelming that \or|evi} was fully aware of the policy of arming the RPOs and sanctioned its implementation. The arming of non Albanians was an integral part of the 1998 Plan for Suppressing Terrorism.3043 The progress made in the implementation of this policy was discussed at Joint Command meetings, which \or|evi} attended. When confronted with evidence of these meetings, \or|evi} repeatedly denied having knowledge about the matters discussed.3044 \or|evi}’s denials are not credible, as evidence by numerous discussions during Joint Command meetings that he personally attended:
• On 29 July 1998, Luki} reported: “Weapons were distributed today in Vitina (1.100), Kosovoska Kamenica, training has not been conducted yet.”3045 • On 20 August 1998, Mini} said: “Recruit the Serbs in those villages and organise a meeting with the village commanders.”3046 • On 19 September 1998, Lazarevi} referred to the fact that “a plan for ^i~avica has been made”.3047 A PrK order issued that day instructed PrK units to support “territorially based MUP forces and the Serbian population” in the action around Mt Ci~avica.3048 The notes of subsequent Joint Command meetings indicate that \or|evi} was present when this action was discussed.3049 His intervention at the meeting of 22 September 1998 shows that he was
3038 See e.g. P969,p.1;P971,p.2. 3039 See e.g. D260,p.6. 3040 P689,pp.6,8. See also P764,p.3. 3041 P771, p.12;P345,pp.8 9;D111,para.19. 3042 \or|evi}, T.9903,9909,9913,9923 9925. 3043 P87,p.4; P1223;P1051. 3044 See e.g. \or|evi},T.9914 9916(P886, p.18);T.9921(P886,p.22). 3045 P886, p.22;\or|evi},T.9921. 3046 P886, p.55;\or|evi},T.9922. 3047 P886,p.103. 3048 P1422,p.5;\or|evi},T.9861,9863. 3049 P886, pp.105, 107 109.
IT-05-87/1-T 273 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6272 not only aware the action took place, but that he had detailed information about the axis of deployment for PJP units participating in the action.3050 • On 28 October 1998, Pavkovi} said: “We must bear in mind the use of armed people and how to include them in defending roads.”3051 • On 29 October 1998, at the meeting of the Operations Inter Departmental Staff for the Suppression of Terrorism in Belgrade, when the Plan for Suppressing Terrorism was discussed, Pavković expressly stated that the following task formed part of the Plan: “Arming the Serbian and Montenegrin people and establishing reserve police units to defend Serbian villages.”3052 Lukić reported that 12,500 reservists had undergone training in July and that in the final stages of the offensive, 14,500 men were trained.3053 \or|evi} attended this meeting3054
1113. \or|evi} knew that the policy of arming continued in 1999. He attended the 17 February 1999 MUP Staff meeting, where the report prepared by Pešić regarding RPOs in each municipality was discussed.3055 At the meeting, Luki} reported that RPOs in nearly all villages inhabited by Serbs were very active.3056
1114. This evidence demonstrates that \or|evi} was directly involved in discussions at a strategic level with other JCE members about the arming, training and use of RPOs and was fully aware of the ongoing process. He was aware of the number of RPOs formed by the MUP and of the total number of weapons distributed. He also knew that the MUP and the VJ co ordinated this activity through the Joint Command. It is inconceivable that he was, as he claims, not fully apprised of these matters and their significance. As Chief of the RJB, \or|evi} must have endorsed the implementation of the policy.
1115. Armed non Albanian civilians were used in actions by the MUP and the VJ. Cveti} explained how RPOs were engaged in these joint actions.3057 Numerous VJ and Joint Command combat orders state that the “armed non [iptar population” was “to be engaged” by the PrK and the MUP in carrying out operations on the ground. Among the tasks assigned to this entity were: reinforcing and assisting VJ and MUP forces in “crushing and destroying terrorist forces”, securing military facilities and communication routes, and defending areas populated with non 3050 See P1422, pp.8 9; P886, p.108. See also P87, p.5. 3051 P886, p.142;Ðorðević, T.9868 9869. 3052 P87, p.4. 3053 P87,p.7. 3054 Ðorðević, T.9872. 3055 P85; P1055,p.8. 3056 P85,p.1.
IT-05-87/1-T 274 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6271 Albanians.3058 The phrase “armed non Šiptar population” in these orders referred to groups of armed non Albanian civilians who were engaged in actions with MUP and VJ units.3059
1116. The use of armed non Albanian civilians in MUP and VJ operations in 1998 is further evidenced by VJ orders and reports.3060 A report of the 3rd Army Forward Command from 2 October 1998 analysed the positive experiences of joint MUP/VJ operations during the summer offensive and stated: “The distribution of weapons to citizens loyal to the FRY has made it possible for large scale resistance against the terrorists to be organised.”3061
1117. Discussions between Samard`i} and Ojdani} at the VJ Collegium meeting of 2 February 1999 in Belgrade confirm that there were plans to use the armed civilians in VJ MUP actions in 1999.3062 For example, the 16 February 1999 PrK plan for operations and co ordinated actions with the MUP in the regions of Malo Kosovo, Drenica and Mali{evo involved the use of the armed Serbs in Kosovo.3063 This plan was implemented through a series of Joint Command orders in March.3064
1118. Witnesses from different municipalities recounted that once the NATO bombing campaign began, the MUP and the VJ used armed local Serbs to carry out crimes against Kosovo Albanians and to expel them from their homes.3065
1119. \or|evi}’s claims that armed non Albanian civilians were not used in any joint MUP VJ actions are not credible.3066
(ii) \or|evi} participated in the disarming of predominantly Albanian villages
1120. \or|evi} was also involved in disarming predominantly Albanian villages. This disarmament was part of the 1998 Plan for Suppressing Terrorism.3067 While the MUP undertook the task of disarming Kosovo Albanians in the interior of the province, the PrK carried this out in
1. 3057 Cveti}, T.6672. 3058 See e.g. D343, p.5; P971, p.2; P889, p.4; P1328, p.2; P969, p.1; P767, p.2; P960, p.3; P350, p.2; D348, p.3. 3059 Cveti}, T.6634. See P969, p.1. 3060 See e.g. P1422, item 5.3; D340,p.4. 3061 D340, p.4. 3062 P1333, p.23. 3063 P889, p.4. 3064 P350 (Malo Kosovo, Vucitrn); D105; P971; P972 (Drenica); and P969 (Bajgora area Vucitrn/Kosovska Mitrovica). See also P85, p.1. 3065 See e.g. Bala, P420, p.7; T.2293 2294; Kadriu, P515, p.12; Ramadani, P306, pp.4 5, 18 19, 38, 43; M.Krasniqi, T.1057 1058; Zatriqi, T.3810; P672, p.6. 3066 \or|evi}, T.9862 9863,9869, 9902 9903. 3067 P87, p.4.
IT-05-87/1-T 275 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6270 the border belt.3068 As discussed above, \or|evi} described his involvement in negotiating the disarming of the ethnic Albanian village of Istini} in September 1998.3069
1121. Joint Command members monitored the progress of the disarming campaign in 1998,3070 as reflected in the notes of a Joint Command meeting of 19 September 1998,3071 and in the minutes of the 29 October meeting at Beli Dvor.3072 These disarming activities continued into October and November 1998. Several Joint Command Operative reports from October and November 1998 indicate that VJ and MUP units were collecting weapons “in Šiptar villages.”3073
(iii) By arming non Albanians and disarming ethnic Albanians, \or|evi} facilitated the commission of the crimes charged
1122. \or|evi} knew that ethnic tensions in Kosovo were running high in 1998 and 1999. The evidence establishes that the FRY and Serbian leadership was well aware of the highly charged nature of the ethnic tension prevailing in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, and of the real risk that ethnic Serbs would misuse the weapons being distributed.3074 As one of the most senior members of the MUP, it would have been obvious to Ðorñević that arming one ethnic group while disarming another in an atmosphere of mutual hostility and ethnic tensions would inevitably lead to crimes based on ethnicity. Despite his awareness of the risks associated with utilising armed civilians in the local defence, Ðorñević endorsed this policy and participated in its realisation.
1123. Armed local Serbs were incorporated into MUP and VJ units that committed the crimes charged in the Indictment. Specifically, they were utilised to forcibly expel the ethnic Albanian population from the province.
(e) \or|ević planned and co ordinated joint MUP/VJ combat operations
1124. Ðorñević also participated in planning and co ordinating joint MUP/VJ combat operations in 1998 and 1999. During the 1998 summer offensive, \or|evi} was intimately involved in the Joint Command that directed and implemented the Plan for Suppressing Terrorism.3075
3068 D338;P886, p.82; D244; D432, p.7. 3069 Ðorðević, T.9802 9804. See Mir~i}, T.13263–13270. 3070 See e.g. P886, pp.39 41, 43, 48 49, 54 55, 66, 70, 73, 75, 78, 84, 87, 89 90, 93, 97, 99 100, 103, 120. 3071 P886, p.103. 3072 P87,pp.4 5. 3073 P1220,p.5; P1218,p.6; P1399,p.8; P1219, p.4. 3074 P902,p.16;D523, p.16; P85, p.3. 3075 See Part III, Section (A)(3)(b)(i).
IT-05-87/1-T 276 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6269 1125. As described elsewhere in this brief, the MUP and the VJ worked in close co ordination pursuant to Joint Command orders. This close co ordination was a common feature of MUP and VJ forces carrying out operations in Kosovo in 1998. Such co ordination was also necessary during the Indictment period to implement the common plan. Through his participation in the Joint Command, Ðorñević used the MUP to commit crimes.
1126. As in 1998, \or|evi} remained directly involved in MUP combat activities in Kosovo in 1999. This is evidenced by his hands on involvement in the joint MUP/VJ action in Ra~ak/Reçak on 15 January 1999. This was a planned and co ordinated action.3076 \or|evi} was at the Stimlje police station at the onset of the operation and the events confirm his authority over, and knowledge of, planned MUP actions.
1127. The Ra~ak/Reçak action began very early on the morning of 15 January and involved several MUP and VJ units.3077 K86, a police officer from the Stimlje police station, testified that when he arrived at the police station in Stimlje before 7:00am, he noticed that the full complement of men employed in the police station, had been summoned. There was also one platoon of PJP standing in the schoolyard of the village. K86 did not recognize any of the men; they were not from Uro{eva} area.3078 The Uro{eva} SUP Chief, Bogoljub Janicevi}, and the Chief of the Uro{eva} police department, Radomir Miti}, were at the Stimlje police station, but the commander of the station, Branko Mladenovi}, was not.3079 Janicevi} told K86 that “their men were doing Ra~ak/Reçak”.3080
1128. Around 8:30 9:00am, \or|evi} arrived at the police station escorted by a guard.3081 K86 recognised \or|evi} because he knew him from television, and his colleagues concurred that it was \or|evi}.3082
1129. \or|evi} went to the office where Janicevi} and Miti} were and stayed there for about one hour. During that time, \or|evi} received two phone calls from Nikola [ainovi}.3083 He had called on the civilian telephone line, introduced himself and asked to be put through to \or|evi}. For the first phone call, K86 went upstairs to the commander’s office, told Janicevi} that there was a phone
3076 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(e). 3077 Miti}, T.12758 9;K86, T.5123(closed session);Maisonneuve, P851, paras.33,47;T.5470 5471; P864. 3078 K86, T.5124 (closed session). See also T.5202 5203(closed session). 3079 K86, T.5125(closed session). 3080 K86, T.5126 (closed session). 3081 K86, T.5127(closed session). 3082 K86, T.5237(closed session). 3083 K86, T.5127 (closed session).
IT-05-87/1-T 277 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6268 call for \or|evi}, and was told to put the call through. For the second phone call, K86 put [ainovi} through directly.3084 The conversations were not long.3085
1130. \or|evi} testified that he was not at the Stimlje police station on 15 January 1999. He said that he arrived in Pri{tina on the morning of 15 January as part of a high level government delegation from Belgrade. The delegation attended a meeting at the MUP Staff.3086 After lunch, Goran Radosavljević, a member of the Staff, informed Dor|evi} in passing that there had been an action in the village of Ra~ak/Reçak and that in that action, terrorists were killed.3087 \or|evi} claimed that he knew nothing about the planning of the action,3088 and stated that it was planned by the MUP Staff and the Uro{evac SUP and that KVM had been duly notified about it.3089 KVM witnesses, however, testified that they had not been notified of this action.3090
1131. \or|evi} stated that after concluding his official business in Pe} on 16 January, he went on a ski trip to Mt. Kapoanik and was there when William Walker gave a press conference calling the Ra~ak/Reçak action a massacre.3091 According to \or|evi}, he visited the Stimlje police station on 18 January 1999, when judicial authorities conducted an on site investigation into the incident.3092 However, K86, who was on duty at the police station on 18 January 1999 and accompanied the on site team that investigated the incident,3093 said that \or|evi} did not return to the police station after 15 January.3094
1132. This significant alleged contradiction was never put to K86 by the Defence in cross examination, in accordance with Rule 90(H)(ii). He was therefore never afforded an opportunity to comment on this Defence position, or to address its feasibility.
1133. Defence witnesses Miti} and Mladenovi} sought to support \or|evi}’s position that he was not at the Stimlje police station on 15 January. Their testimony was neither credible nor reliable. Miti} was at the Stimlje police station with Janicevi} that morning, monitoring the action.3095 He stated that Janicevi} kept in radio contact with units participating in the action,3096 that the fighting
3084 K86, T.5128 5129, 5131(closed session). 3085 K86, T.5131(closed session). 3086 Ðorðević, T.9665; D437. 3087 Ðorðević, T.9666 9667; D437. 3088 Ðorðević, T.9667. 3089 Ðorðević, T.9667 9668. 3090 Drewienkiewicz, T.6504; P864; P869. 3091 Ðorðević, T.9669 9671. 3092 Ðorðević, T.9672 9673. 3093 K86, T.5190,5194,5212 5213(closed session). 3094 K86, T.5191(closed session). 3095 Miti}, T.12678. 3096 Miti},T.12683.
IT-05-87/1-T 278 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6267 continued all day,3097 and that he had information “that there were fatalities”.3098 Nonetheless, Miti} claimed that he did not know there had been a massacre in Račak/Recak. He stated that police only conducted an on site investigation on 18 January 1999 because the incident received great attention from KVM and the top leadership.3099
1134. Miti} repeatedly denied that \or|evi} was at the Stimlje police station on 15 January,3100 claiming that he only saw \or|evi} there on 18 January when the on site investigation took place.3101 He also denied that \or|evi} had any involvement in the planning of the action.3102 Even when confronted with Janicevi}’s detailed testimony in the Milo{evi} case3103 about \or|evi}’s participation in planning the action on 12 January and his presence at the Stimlje police station on 15 January, Miti} maintained his denials.3104 Miti} stated that perhaps Janicevi} “confused the dates” regarding \or|evi}’s presence at the police station and \or|evi}’s presence at a meeting at the MUP Staff when the action was planned.3105 KVM representative Maisonneuve confirmed that Janicevi} was involved in planning this action and commanded the MUP units involved.3106 Given Janicevi}’s direct involvement in the Ra~ak/Recak action, Miti}’s explanation that Janicevi} simply confused the dates is not plausible. Miti} tailored his evidence to help \or|evi}.
1135. Mladenovi} was not at the Stimlje police station when \or|evi} visited the station, so he was in no position to know what took place there. Initially, Mladenovi} was quite precise in putting himself at the Stimlje police station at around the time when K86 said that \or|evi} was there.3107 Mladenovi} claimed that he and the men arrived at Stimlje at 8.30am. However, he also said that he set off from Uro{evac at around 8:30am.3108 He eventually accepted that he could not remember when he set off from Uro{evac.3109 Mladenovi} conceded that it was possible that \or|evi} could have come and gone from the police station before he arrived.3110 Mladenovi} also stated, “If the witness if witness K 86 saw him, well, I guess that he knows what he saw.”3111
3097 Miti}, T.12683 12684. 3098 Miti}, T.12683. 3099 Miti}, T.12687 12688. 3100 Miti}, T.12738 (private), 12802 12803. 3101 Miti}, T.12659 12660, 12738 (private). 3102 Miti}, T.12797 12798, 12806. 3103 P1555. 3104 Miti}, T.12802 12803. 3105 Miti}, T.12798, 12802 12805. 3106 Maisonneuve,T.5474 5475; P869, pp.7 8. 3107 Mladenovi}, T.12591 (private). 3108 Mladenovi}, T.12492. 3109 Mladenovi}, T.12589 90 (private). 3110 Mladenovi}, T.12593 (private). 3111 Mladenovi}, T.12593 (private).
IT-05-87/1-T 279 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6266 1136. A month after the Ra~ak/Reçak action, on 17 February 1999, \or|evi} participated in a MUP Staff meeting where operations to be carried out by the MUP in the spring were discussed.3112 Lukić reported on a plan to carry out three mopping up operations in the Podujevo, Dragobilja and Drenica areas. Stojiljkovi} told those present that “Within two or three days of an attack, we have to put our plans in motion and use the time to mop up the territory from terrorists.”3113
1137. In preparation for this offensive, \or|evi} deployed additional PJP units to Kosovo from late February to mid March 1999.3114 The offensive planned in February 1999 by Ðorñević and other JCE members was implemented down the VJ and MUP chains of command in late March 1999 through a series of Joint Command orders. Many of the crimes charged in the Indictment were committed in the course of this offensive.
(f) \or|ević used paramilitary groups and volunteers
1138. \or|ević significantly contributed to the JCE by engaging paramilitary groups and volunteers to commit crimes against ethnic Albanian civilians. \or|evi} approved of their use to supplement MUP units in Kosovo. One notorious group was the Skorpions unit, which was incorporated into the SAJ and deployed to Kosovo with \or|evi}’s approval. On 28 March, members of the Skorpions massacred civilians in Podujevo. The unit was disbanded and returned to Serbia proper. Some weeks later, \or|evi} approved its redeployment to Kosovo. The unit remained in Kosovo until May and participated in “cleansing” actions with PJP units.
(i) Prior to the commencement of the NATO campaign Stojiljkovi} and \or|evi} prepared for the introduction of paramilitaries and volunteers in to the MUP
1139. At the 17 February meeting of the MUP Staff, Stojiljković said: “approach and engage volunteers carefully, linking their engagement through the reserve police force when assessed as necessary”. The following day, \or|evi} issued Dispatch 312, setting out the tasks Stojiljkovi} outlined, which were to “carry out the necessary checks, compile lists and establish complete control over volunteer and paramilitary units and their members.”3115 Pursuant to this dispatch, all SUPs had the duty to establish whether there were members of paramilitary formations in their
3112 P85. 3113 P85, pp.1,3. 3114 See e.g., P356; P711; P137. 3115 P356,para.7; Cveti},T.6681.
IT-05-87/1-T 280 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6265 territories who had fought in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and, if there were any volunteers in their area, they were to record and control them.3116
1140. In line with his role of implementing policy in Kosovo, on 17 March, at a MUP Staff meeting, Luki} instructed SUP chiefs to retain volunteers who arrived in Kosovo, since such men were to be engaged in MUP operations once the war began.3117 On the eve of the NATO bombing, Stojiljkovi} issued a dispatch that reinforced the measures ordered in Dispatch 312.3118 Stojiljkovi} instructed: “You shall register all volunteer and paramilitary units and their members and keep them under control in case that you might need to engage them.”3119 The incorporation of volunteers and paramilitaries in the police was unlawful.3120
(ii) \or|evi} approved and facilitated the use of the Skorpions unit in Kosovo in 1999
a. \or|evi} reinforced the SAJ with the Skorpions
1141. \or|evi} played a key role in the incorporation of the Skorpions into the MUP. SAJ Commander Trajkovi} testified that prior to his deployment to Kosovo in 1999, he spoke several times with \or|evi} about replenishing the SAJ with a combat group.3121 His evidence to this extent is confirmed by \or|evi}.3122 Around 25 March, Trajkovi} called \or|evi},3123 who told him that a combat group in Prolom Banja was ready to join the SAJ.3124 Slobodan Medi} (aka Boca), the unit’s commander, was in contact with Milan Milanović (aka Mrgud), the former Assistant Defence Minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK).3125 Trajkovi} said that Milanovi} had liaised with \or|evi} to incorporate reservists into the SAJ.3126 \or|evi} and Milanovi} were close friends who socialised frequently.3127 K92 corroborated Trajkovi}’s account that he had liaised with \or|evi}, not Trajkovi}, to locate men for the SAJ.3128 K92 informed \or|evi} that Medi} had
3116 Cveti}, T.6678. 3117 Cvetić, T.6692. 3118 P702;Cveti},T.6680. 3119 P702, para.5(emphasis added). 3120 Cveti},T.6675,6678; Simovi},T.13702;Mi{i},T.14111 14112,14115. 3121 Trajković,T.9087. 3122 Ðorðević,T.9695 9697. 3123 Trajkovi},T.9090. 3124 Trajković,T.9087 909o. 3125 Trajković,T.9111.See K92,T.2714,2727 (closed session). 3126 Trajkovi},T.9111. 3127 Ðorðević,T.9698 (private session) ;K92,T.2730 2731(closed session). 3128 K92,T.2727 2729 (closed session).
IT-05-87/1-T 281 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6264 gathered over 100 volunteers from Novi Sad and the surrounding areas3129 and that the group had been in Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem.3130
1142. Both former Skorpion member Stopari} and Vasiljevi} confirmed Milanovi}’s involvement in re grouping the Skorpions.3131 Stopari} said Milanovi} “was always there” escorting the Skorpions to their field points such as Biha} and Trnovo.3132
1143. Following these contacts with Trajkovi} and Milanovi}, \or|evi} approved the engagement of the Skorpions with the SAJ.3133 A few days after their initial conversation, \or|evi} called K92 and told him that the men could join the SAJ reserve force under Trajkovi}, that buses from the Novi Sad SUP would be organised to pick them up and that Trajkovi} would meet them in Kosovo.3134
1144. \or|evi} sought to minimise his role by claiming that the group was recruited by Trajkovi} and Milanovi}.3135 His testimony on this point is not credible in light of the unchallenged evidence of Trajkovi} and K92. Similarly, defence witnesses Zoran Simovi}, the Belgrade SAJ Commander, and Radoslav Stalevi}, the Pri{tina SAJ Commander, both testified that Trajkovi} told them that he found the “reservists” for the SAJ through Milanovi}.3136 Neither Simovi} nor Stalevi} participated in any meetings between \or|evi}, Trajkovi} or Milanovi} regarding the engagement of the reservists, yet both seemed to have a detailed recollection of these discussions.3137 Stalevi} and Simovi} aligned their evidence in order to support \or|evi}.
1145. The Defence never gave Trajkovi} the chance to address these claims. He was never, in fact, cross examined about the Skorpions at all.
b. The re grouping of the Skorpions
1146. As Assistant Defence Minister of the RSK,3138 Milanovi} had formed the Skorpions in the early 90s to secure the oil fields in the Krajina and had recruited Medi} as their commander.3139 The
3129 K92,T.2731,2796 (closed session). 3130 K92,T.2761,2796 (closed session). 3131 Stopari},P493,para.40; Vasiljevi},T.5666. 3132 Stopari},T.2818. 3133 P86,p.1;D442, p.1. 3134 K92,T.2731,2733,2735 (closed session). 3135 Ðorðević,T.9697 9699 (private session),10104(private session). 3136 Simovi},T.13581 13582,13606,13705 13706,13712; Stalevi},T.13776. 3137 Simovi},T.13580,13582,13705 13706;Stalevi},T.13705,13776 13777,13818. 3138 Ðorðević,T.9698(private session).See Trajković,T.9111;K92,T.2714,2716(closed session). 3139 Stopari},T.2859;P943,paras.14,19;P495,p.6.See Trajkovi},T.9086 9087,9111; K92,T.2716 2721,2724(closed session);P492(under seal);Vasiljevi},T.5667.
IT-05-87/1-T 282 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6263 original unit was disbanded around 1996 after participating in the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts.3140
1147. Some days before the NATO bombing, Medi} visited Stoparić in [id to persuade him to join the old Skorpions unit that was being reformed and would be attached to the SAJ.3141 Stopari} was assigned to enlist volunteers who wished to join the Skorpions.3142
1148. On 24 March 1999, approximately 120 volunteers left [id in buses.3143 Many had no experience in fighting and were untrained.3144 Stoparić said this was the first time that untrained volunteers would operate alongside the SAJ.3145 The buses travelled to Belgrade,3146 escorted by Milanovi} in his BMW.3147
c. \or|evi} ordered the deployment of Medi}’s unit to Kosovo with the SAJ
1149. \or|evi} attempted to downplay his role in deploying the Skorpions to Kosovo with the SAJ. \or|evi} said that Stojiljkovi} was responsible for engaging reservists with the SAJ,3148 and after he gave his approval, \or|evi} had informed Trajkovi} and the Police Administration of the Minister’s decision.3149 \or|evi} tried to place himself outside the chain of command for SAJ units in Kosovo and said that the reservists entered Kosovo, without his approval, pursuant to a MUP Staff decision.3150 This is contradicted by the evidence of Trajkovi} and K92.
1150. It is clear that \or|evi} had the authority to deploy the Skorpions to Kosovo and to attach them to the SAJ. Trajkovi} said that he discussed the engagement of additional men with \or|evi}, his direct superior, and said that it was only natural that \or|evi} would be the first person he spoke to about this.3151 In the report Trajkovi} prepared for \or|evi} in May 1999,3152 Trajkovi} stated that the RJB Chief (\or|evi}) and MUP Staff approved the engagement for the SAJ of 128 reservists, commanded by Slobodan Medi}. The reservists were then put on the roster of SAJ
3140 Stopari},T.2861;P493,paras.23 25; K92,T.2725 2726(closed session). 3141 Stopari},P493,paras.34 35. 3142 Stopari},P493,para.36;T.2855 2856. 3143 Stopari},T.2817;P493,paras.38 40. 3144 Stopari},P493,para.39. 3145 Stopari},P493,para.39;P495,pp.16 17. 3146 Stopari},P493,para.41;T.2817. 3147 Stopari},P493,para.40;K92,T.2736 2737(closed session). 3148 Ðorðević,T.9697 9698,9700 (private session),10114 10115. 3149 Ðorðević,T.9698,10114. See also \or|evi},T.9700 9701(private session). 3150 Ðorðević,T.9701 9703,10115 10116. 3151 Trajković,T.9087. 3152 Ðorðević,T.9713,10114.
IT-05-87/1-T 283 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6262 reservists on 25 March.3153 The reservists could not have been put on the SAJ roster without \or|evi}’s consent.3154
1151. Simovi} sought to support \or|evi}’s position that it was the Minister who decided on the engagement of the unit and that \or|evi} simply conveyed the Minister’s decision to Trajkovi}.3155 Simovi}’s testimony on this point is, at best, no more than speculation; these decisions were made at a level well above his rank. More generally, Simovi} was an untrustworthy witness in many areas. For example, he initially said that he left Podujevo on 28 March to attend a funeral in Belgrade but later admitted that the funeral did not take place on that day.3156
d. \or|evi} knew he was deploying a notorious paramilitary unit
1152. \or|evi} knew that he was deploying a paramilitary unit to join the SAJ. During a phone conversation with Trajkovi}, \or|evi} told him that the combat group contained experienced or partly experienced combatants, who had been at the fronts in Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem.3157 K92 testified that he had informed \or|evi} that these volunteers had come from this area.3158
1153. All parties involved were aware that this was a paramilitary unit. Both Trajkovi} and Simovi} knew that the men attached to the SAJ in March 1999 were the Skorpions. Trajkovi} said that the unit was called the Skorpions because its leader, Slobodan Medić, was previously the commander of the Skorpions unit that had been active in Slavonia, Baranja, Western Srem and Bosnia.3159 The symbols and emblems of the Skorpions appeared during the same period.3160 Trajkovi} explained that the group was even referred to as the Skorpions in internal MUP lists for the payment of per diems and other expenses.3161 Simovi} stated that he learned the reservists were referred to as the Skorpions from his conversation with Trajkovi}.3162
3153 P86,p.1;D442, p.1. 3154K92,T.2748,2750(closed session).See also K92,T.2731,2733,2735 (closed session);Vasiljevi},T.5681 5682,5688;P884,p.1. 3155 Simovi},T.13573 13574,13581–13582,13605 13606. 3156 Simovi},T.13591,13612,13614,13657 13661. 3157 Trajković,T.9090. 3158 K92,T.2761,2796 (closed session). 3159 Trajković,T.9086 9087,9099;P86,p.1;D442, p.1. 3160 Trajković,T.9087;K92,T.2723(closed session). 3161 Trajković,T.9099. 3162 Simovi},T.13606–13607.
IT-05-87/1-T 284 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6261 1154. Stopari} was surprised that the Skorpions would be joining the SAJ because the SAJ were an elite anti terrorist unit.3163 The Skorpions were deployed to Kosovo as a group under Medi}’s command. They were retained as a group and not dispersed into detachments. The Skorpions were identified by others and identified themselves as a separate unit.3164 The Skorpions uniforms had the SAJ patch/insignia (the sword with the 4S’s) on one arm and the Skorpions patch/insignia on the other arm.3165
1155. Initially, K92 said that \or|evi} did not know Medi}3166 but also said that he just assumed that they did not know each other.3167 In a statement of 29 June 2005, K92 said that \or|evi} had called him requesting men for Kosovo and asked K92 to gather Medi}’s men for this.3168 suggesting that \or|evi} knew or knew of Medi} and his Skorpions unit. When this statement was put to K92 to refresh his memory, he said that he was not 100 per cent certain of his recollection on this point, but acknowledged that “there is a high degree of probability that one’s memory was better then than now”.3169
1156. K92 said that when he contacted \or|evi}, he was unaware that the group had committed crimes.3170 As a close friend of \or|evi}, and having originally formed the Skorpions and supported them over the years, K92’s denials are unsuprising.
1157. Despite \or|evi}’s denials,3171 it is clear from the accounts of both Trajkovi} and K92 that \or|evi} knew the men’s background. Having played such a vital role in their incorporation into the MUP, the inescapable inference is that \or|evi} knew that the men were the Skorpions and their antecedents.
1158. A preliminary background check would have disclosed the criminal antecedents of many of the Skorpions. On 8 May, Lieutenant Colonel \urovi}, Deputy Chief of Security for the PrK, informed Vasiljevi} that serious crimes involving paramilitary formations were being committed in
3163 Stopari},T.2854;P493,para.39. 3164 Stopari},P495,p.101. 3165 Stopari}, P493, paras.11, 41; T.2819. 3166 K92,T.2735 2736,2761(closed session). 3167 K92,T.2795 (closed session). 3168 K92,T.2801(closed session). In a statement of 29 June 2005, at paragraph 44, K92 said: “I did not contact anybody from the MUP, but a few days after Slobodan Medi} called me, General Vlastimir \or|evi}, head of the Public Security, called me and told me that they had problems in Kosovo and that he needed men. He asked me if I could gather Slobodan Medi}’s men so that they could go to Kosovo. I replied that I would call Medi}. A few days later I contacted \or|evi} and told him that he could count on the Skorpions”. K92, T. 2801(closed session). 3169 K92,T.2801 2802 (closed session). 3170 K92,T.2765(closed session). 3171 Ðorðević,T.9709 9710,9715,10102 (private session),10108.
IT-05-87/1-T 285 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6260 Kosovo.3172 Vasijlevi} tasked \urovi} to prepare an investigative report, which he delivered four days later. \urovi} informed Vasiljevi} that a paramilitary group led by Boca Medi}—the Skorpions—had been deployed to Kosovo as part of the SAJ commanded by Trajkovi}.3173 The report stated that the Skorpions had been deployed in the former Yugoslavia and that among them were persons who had criminal records.3174 Their general reputation was that they had “criminal types in their ranks, problematic people…”.3175
1159. \or|evi}’s claims that he did not know that the Skorpions were a notorious paramilitary group are not credible.3176 Had he requested a background check of the men, he, like Vasiljevi}, would have known that Medi}’s men included criminals. This information was readily available given that Vasiljevi} was able to obtain it within four days.
1160. \or|evi} was in fact well aware that Serbian paramilitary and volunteer groups, like the Skorpions, were “as a rule a front for criminal interests”. He himself had explicitly warned SUP Chiefs of this in his dispatch of 29 April 1998.3177
1161. Both Simovi} and Stalevi} testified that, in 1999, they were unaware of any criminal offences committed by the unit.3178 It is equally unsurprising that the MUP commanders, including \or|evi}, would deny knowledge that the unit included persons with criminal records. The credibility of this denial must be weighed in light of Vasiljevi}’s testimony that this was well known within VJ security circles.
1162. Based on what K92 told him about the circumstances in which these men had been mobilised, given that Medi} had gathered volunteers for the purpose of being incorporated into the SAJ, and bearing in mind that it was unlawful to engage volunteers in the MUP, \or|evi} had clear notice that some, if not all, of these men were unsuitable for the police. That he permitted their incorporation into the SAJ without ensuring that these checks were made suggests that he knew— and intended—that they would be involved in activities other than legitimate operations. The SAJ was the most elite special force of the RJB,3179 yet many of these recruits had no experience in fighting and were untrained.3180 K92 confirmed that “the persons did not attend any training”.3181
3172 Vasiljevi},T.5662. 3173 Vasiljevi},T.5663,5665 5667. 3174 Vasiljevi},T.5666. 3175 Vasiljevi},T.5667. 3176 Ðorðević,T.9710,9715,10108 3177 \or|evi},T.9545;P709. 3178 Simovi},T.13596,13693–13696,13699;Stalevi},T.13789. 3179 \or|evi},T.9695;Stalevi},T.13839 13843. 3180 Stopari},P493,para.39. 3181 K92,T.2805 (closed session).
IT-05-87/1-T 286 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6259 \or|evi} made no inquiries as to whether these men received training in accordance with Article 29 of the Law on Internal Affairs.3182
e. The Skorpions were deployed to Kosovo in late March 1999
1163. On 25 March, the Skorpions arrived on buses from [id to the police football stadium outside Belgrade.3183 Uniformed policemen distributed uniforms to the men.3184 The men, escorted by Milanovi},3185 were transported to the SAJ base in Prolom Banja on about 26 March,3186 where they remained for two days.3187
1164. On 26 March, Trajkovi}’s jeep hit a mine and his driver, Radovan Aleksi}, was killed and Trajkovi} injured. While he was in hospital, Trajkovi} learned that Simovi} and \or|evi} had agreed to introduce the unit.3188 On 27 March, Simovi} went to Prolom Banja to arrange for the deployment of the Skorpions.3189 On 28 March, Simovi} escorted them in buses from Prolom Banja to Podujevo/Podujevë.3190 Along the way at \avolija Varo{, Medi} outlined the mission: to “clear up the other half” of Podujevo/Podujevë that was not under Serbian control.3191
f. Upon arriving in Podujevo/Podujevë, the Skorpions killed a group of civilians
1165. Upon their arrival in Podujevo/Podujevë on 28 March 1999, members of the Skorpions shot and killed a group of 16 civilians: two elderly men and fourteen women and children. Five children survived the massacre but sustained serious multiple gunshot wounds.3192
1166. Simovi} called \or|evi} to inform him about the incident.3193 Trajkovi} learned about the massacre on 28 March while at the hospital in Pri{tina.3194 The reservists committed the killings during the first 30 minutes that they were in Podujevo/Podujevë.3195
3182 K92,T.2803,2805 (closed session). See P66,Arts.27,29. 3183 Stopari},P493,para.41;P495,p.78;K92,T.2736 2738 (closed session). 3184 K92,T.2737 (closed session); Stopari},P493,paras.41 43. 3185 Stopari},P493,para.43. 3186 Stopari},P493,para.44;P86, p.1;D442, p.1. 3187 Stopari},P493,para.45. 3188 Trajković,T.9091 9092 3189 Simovi},T.13585 13587,13738,13748 13749. 3190 Trajkovi},T.9092;Simovi},T.13586 13587,13600,13738–13739,17348.See Stalevi},T.13783 13784. 3191 Stopari},P493,para.46. 3192 See Part IV, Section(C)(14). 3193 Ðorðević,T.9703 9704. 3194 Trajković,T.9093. 3195 Ðorðević,T.9705;Trajkovi},T.9094.
IT-05-87/1-T 287 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6258 1167. The VJ was also informed about the massacre. Stojanovi}, the Chief of Security of the PrK Command, ordered that the incident be investigated in full. 3196
g. The Skorpions were under SAJ command by the time they arrived in Podujevo/Podujevë
1168. Like Simovi} and Stalevi}, \or|evi} testified that at the time of the massacre, the Skorpions had not been technically attached to the SAJ as reservists.3197 These claims were not supported by the evidence or the circumstances of these events.
1169. In what appears to be an attempt to distance himself from the killings, Simovi} claimed that Medi}’s men were never attached to the SAJ and were therefore not under his command.3198 Simovi} insisted that he had no authority over the reservists.3199 He was unable to provide an answer when asked repeatedly by the Trial Chamber who could issue orders to these reservists. 3200 Similarly, Stalevi} could not provide an answer to the question of who could issue orders to the “reservists”.3201 Simovi} and Stalevi}’s evasiveness was little more than an attempt to deny responsibility for the crime committed by the Skorpions under their command. Given the command structures within the MUP, it is not plausible that the Skorpions would have been deployed to Kosovo with the SAJ without first being placed under the command of the SAJ.
1170. By the time the Skorpions had arrived in Podujevo/Podujevë, they had been incorporated into the SAJ. As the most senior commander on the ground,3202 Simovi} was their commander. Simovi}’s authority is evident from the fact that he ordered them to return to Prolom Banja.3203 The following statements demonstrate that he considered the Skorpions his subordinates:
• “I told the members of my unit, I ordered them, to send back all the Skorpion members on the buses and to send them to Prolom Banja, and […] if there were any members of the reserve force of the Serbia MUP, then certainly that order would have applied to them too because I, as a senior officer, […] could order subordinates”.3204
3196 Stojanovi},T.11777–11778. 3197 Ðorðević,T.9705. 3198 Simovi},T.13742,13747. 3199 Simovi},T.13619,13644–13646,13718 13720,13748 13749,13753. 3200 Simovi},T.13718–13721,13749–13753. 3201 Stalevi},T.13909 13910. 3202 Simovi},T.13649 13650. 3203 Simovi},T.13588. 3204 Simovi},T.13670 (emphasis added).
IT-05-87/1-T 288 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6257 • In both his interview and testimony before the Prokuplje Court in 2002 (P1590/P1591), Simovi} indicated that he ordered the Skorpions and Medi} to return to Prolom Banja.3205 When confronted with his prior statements in the \or|evi} case, Simovi} eventually conceded that he had given this order to “all those who were there, members of the reserve force”.3206
1171. Stalevi} confirmed that the men were returned to Prolom Banja on Simovi}’s order.3207
1172. Stopari} similarly testified that Simovi} ordered Medi} to return the reservists to Prolom Banja within half an hour of the massacre.3208 In total, the Skorpions were in Podujevo/Podujevë for less than one hour.3209
1173. After deciding to return the unit, Simovi} informed the MUP Staff and \or|evi}.3210 Trajkovi} and Stalevi} confirm this.3211 The massacre committed by the Skorpions was, however, not reported in the MUP Staff’s daily bulletin of important events of 28 March 1999 sent by the Staff to the MUP Minister and \or|evi}.3212
h. At Prolom Banja, the Skorpions were disarmed and disbanded
1174. Once the Skorpions returned to Prolom Banja, \or|evi} issued an order for the unit to be disarmed and sent home. Acting on \or|evi}’s orders, Trajkovi} and Milanovi} travelled to Prolom Banja to arrange this.3213 Trajkovi} told the men to return their weapons and said that they were going back to Belgrade.3214 According to Stopari}, the Skorpions turned in their weapons, but retained their uniforms, and left.3215 Medi} gave a speech at Prolom Banja. He said: “What did they expect, we are at war, people get killed in war”.3216
i. In April 1999, \or|evi} redeployed the Skorpions to Kosovo
3205 P1591,p.3;P1590, p.3. 3206 Simovi},T.13669 13670.See also Simovi},T. 13617. 3207 Stalevi},T.13785,13820 13821. 3208 P86,p.2;D442,p.2;Trajković,T.9094 9095;Stopari},P493,para.59. 3209 Stopari},T.2840 2841;P493,para.60. 3210 Simovi},T.13588 13589,13673 16375,13723,13753. 3211 Stalevi},T.13785;Trajkovi},T.9094 9095. 3212 D296. 3213 Trajković,T.9095 9096,9112 9113;Ðorðević,T.9706 9707,9709,10112. See also K92,T.2738 2741(closed session). 3214 Trajković,T.9096.See also P86, p.2; D442, p.2;Ðorðević,T.9706 9707. 3215 Stopari},P493,para.62;T.2844. 3216 Stopari}, P493,para.61;T.2842.
IT-05-87/1-T 289 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6256 1175. Shortly thereafter, in April 1999, \or|evi} redeployed the Skorpions to Kosovo and re attached them to the SAJ. Despite his denials,3217 \or|evi} eventually conceded that he redeployed the Skorpions to Kosovo:
Later he [Trajkovi}] told me, I need them [reengaged reservists for the SAJ]; I will guarantee for them. I asked him, How many? He said, 100. I obtained an approval from the minister. I engaged the administration in charge of sending the reservists down there. He made the selection. He takes charge. And now you're holding me responsible.
All right, I may be responsible, but what I know is that he [Trajkovi}] provided guarantee for their re engagement. And I know, based on the testimony we heard here from one of the reservists, is that they carried out their job extremely professionally, and they didn't commit any crime. …3218
1176. Trajkovi} had met with Ðorñević and Milanović in Belgrade to discuss strengthening the SAJ.3219 They decided to redeploy the reserve force once again.3220 Trajkovi} assured \or|evi} that “for as long as I remained there, there would be no further incidents”.3221 In his May 1999 report, Trajkovi} wrote that the MUP Staff and “Chief of Department” approved the redeployment.3222 Trajkovi} was unsure who issued the order for redeployment but was informed about the re engagement by Ðorñević in the second half of April.3223
1177. K92 said that shortly after the unit was withdrawn, Medi} called him and said, “Wish me luck, I’m in Kosovo again”.3224 Medi} said that he had been called by the MUP, who told him that people were needed in Kosovo.3225 K92 accepted that Trajkovi} was subordinated to \or|evi} and reported to him.3226 He said that the unit could not have been returned to Kosovo without \or|evi}’s authorisation.3227
1178. Vasiljevi} corroborated Trajkovi}’s evidence. At a meeting of the VJ leadership in Belgrade on 16 May 1999, Pavkovi} stated that General \akovi} had had a discussion with “Boca”, who told him that the group had arrived in Kosovo following \or|evi}’s orders and that the MUP would collect the group and send them to those areas where the situation was the worst.3228
3217 Ðorðević,T.10109 10110,10116 10117. 3218 Ðorðević,T.10113 (emphasis added). 3219 Trajkovi},T.9101. 3220 Trajković,T.9101 9102;P86;D442. 3221 Trajković,T.9101,9105 9106. 3222 P86,p.2;D442,p.2. 3223 Trajković,T.9106. 3224 K92,T.2744 (closed session). 3225 K92, T.2746 (closed session). 3226 K92,T.2746 (closed session). 3227 K92,T.2747 (closed session). 3228 Vasiljevi},T.5673 5674;P1595 states: “We also have verified information that Major General Milan \akovi}, operative officer in the command of the 3rd Army, recognised in this group a certain Slobodan Medi}, aka Boca, and
IT-05-87/1-T 290 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6255 1179. Following \or|evi}’s approval to re engage the Skorpions with the SAJ, 108 members of the original group of 128 were redeployed to assist the SAJ.3229 Medi} was again placed in charge of them.3230
1180. All of the men involved in the Podujevo/Podujevë killings, except for Sa{a Cvetan, were redeployed.3231 Trajkovi} stated that although they redeployed members who had committed the crime, they did not realise this at the time.3232 Simovi} claimed that the police had the duty to screen the men before they were redeployed and that he knew procedures were underway, but could not say if the men had actually been screened.3233
1181. In the context of the crimes that he knew were being committed in Kosovo, returning this violent paramilitary group is evidence of \or|evi}’s intention to contribute to the implementation of the common plan. He would have been well aware that he was returning some of the perpetrators of this horrendous crime. \or|evi} did not ensure that the men who committed the massacre within minutes of arriving in Podujevo/Podujevë were not sent back. He could not responsibly rely solely on Trajkovi}’s assurance when he was aware that none of the shooters had been charged.
j. Once redeployed to Kosovo, the Skorpions participated in “cleansing” ethnic Albanian villages
1182. After the Skorpions were disarmed, Stopari} and the other Skorpions had returned to [id.3234 Boca’s men visited them in [id about 10 days later,.3235 The next day, the men were redeployed to Kosovo in two buses.3236 On 26 April, the Skorpions arrived at the SAJ forward command in Kosovo Polje.3237 Stopari} observed many PJP units in Kosovo Polje and recognized PJP members from Kragujevac.3238
1. asked him what sort of task had brought him there, to which the other replied that he had come by order of the MUP General Rodja". (P1595 is a supplement to a report to the 3rd Army Command from the field dated 16 May 1999). 3229 Trajković,T.9102; Ðorðević,T.9708,10116. 3230 P86,p.2;D442,p.2. 3231 Stopari},T.2844;P495,p.17. 3232 Trajkovi},T.9109. 3233 Simovi},T.13680 13681. 3234 Stopari},P493,para.63. 3235 Stopari},P493,para.63. 3236 Stopari},P493,para.64;T.2844. 3237 P86,p.2;D442,p.2;Simovi},T.13594,13678. 3238 Stopari},P493,para.65.
IT-05-87/1-T 291 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6254 1183. Around 28 or 29 April, the Skorpions and PJP units were transported to Jezerce in Suva Reka municipality.3239 The units commenced operations to drive the KLA out and seize villages (“cleaning”).3240 Under the SAJ’s command, and along with active duty members, they engaged in operations in the Jezerce Mountain sector.3241 They remained in Kosovo until 9 May.3242
1184. The Skorpions participated in joint actions, along with PJP units, that were aimed at preventing Kosovo Albanians from returning to their homes.3243 After the Skorpions took a village they would withdraw.3244 Then the PJP in the rear guard would enter the village and set fire to the houses.3245 Stopari} said: “Once the Albanians left and we’d take control of the terrain, they would come back from the forest after two days. I presume if you set somebody’s house on fire that they have no place to go to or to go back to. I think that's the only reasonable conclusion”.3246
(g) \or|evi} played a leading role in the concealment of the crime of murder
1185. \or|evi} played a leading role in actively concealing the evidence of widespread murders committed by the forces of the FRY and Serbia against Kosovo Albanians. Over the course of the Indictment period, he co ordinated the clandestine burial of multiple truckloads of bodies that were systematically exhumed from across Kosovo and driven hundreds of kilometres to the grounds of the 13 Maj Centre in Batajnica, outside of Belgrade. The remains of more than 800 Kosovo Albanian victims, from across Kosovo, were eventually exhumed from that site. Over the same time period, the MUP was similarly concealing the bodies of Kosovo Albanian victims at another SAJ base in Petrovo Selo, located in north eastern Serbia. This was undoubtedly part of the same operation. While \or|evi} was acting to conceal these shipments of bodies, murders were still being committed in Kosovo by the forces of the FRY and Serbia, and these crimes were systematically concealed through the mass transport of the bodies.
1186. When two separate refrigerator trucks full of bodies surfaced in rivers on opposite sides of Serbia in April of 1999, \or|evi} played a principal role in the operations to re conceal them. He ordered that bodies from a truck found in the Danube be removed and transported to the 13 Maj Centre. He also oversaw the burial of bodies found in a truck floating in Lake Peruča} in a mass grave on site.
3239 Stopari},P493,para.67. 3240 Stopari},P493,para.67;Stopari},T.2874. 3241 P86,p.2; D442,p.2;Stalevi},T.13894. 3242 P86,p.2; D442,p.2. See Ðorðević,T.9708 9709. 3243 Stopari},P493,para.68;T.2888 2889. 3244 Stopari},P493,para.68. 3245 Stopari},P493,para.68. 3246 Stopari},T.2888 2889.
IT-05-87/1-T 292 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6253 1187. These large scale operations to conceal bodies had to be organized and approved at a high level. The MUP had to co ordinate systematic operations to transport the bodies away from massacre sites, to temporarily bury the bodies, and then to unearth these bodies, load them into trucks and transport them out of Kosovo. The burial sites in Serbia had to be pre selected, and high level clearance, equipment, manpower and funding were required to bury the bodies in these mass graves. \or|evi} significantly contributed to the JCE by providing these resources and by directly overseeing the transport and burial operations. As the Chief of the RJB, \or|evi} was also the superior officer and the contact person for the SUP Chiefs and other senior MUP officials tasked with overseeing these concealment operations on the ground. The concealment of these bodies, and the cover up of the serious crimes they would have evidenced to local observers and to the international community, was a substantial contribution to the JCE.
(i) The Refrigerator Truck in Bor/Kladovo
1188. On 5 April 1999, a refrigerator truck containing bodies was found floating in the Danube River in eastern Serbia near the village of Tekija.3247 After preliminary steps were taken by the nearby Kladovo OUP, Bor SUP Chief Caslav Golubovi} was contacted and briefed about the discovery and the steps that had been taken thus far.3248 Golubovi} contacted \ordevi} in Belgrade at approximately 21:00 on 6 April and sought instructions on how to proceed. Golubovi} briefed \or|evi}, informing him of everything he had been apprised of.3249 This included the information that there were 20 30 human bodies in the refrigerator truck and that the bodies were of men, women and children. Golubovi} told \or|evi} that the bodies were dressed in civilian clothing and that many of the bodies were dressed in the billowing pants normally worn by Kosovo Albanians.3250 Golubovi} also told \or|evi} that the truck itself appeared to be from Kosovo.3251
1189. Ten or fifteen minutes after this conversation, \or|evi} called back and gave Golubovi} instructions that the bodies should be retrieved and buried in the immediate vicinity.3252 He told Golubovi} that this incident was to remain confidential.3253
1190. Pursuant to \or|evi}’s instructions, Golubovi} organized for the bodies to be removed and buried that night.3254 As they worked, it became apparent that there were approximately 50 more
3247 Radojković,T.1764 1765. 3248 See supra para.557. 3249 Golubovi},T.1662,1740;P353,p.8;\or|evi},T.9720. 3250 Golubovi},T.1662,1735 1736;P353,p.14;\or|evi},T. 9721,9979. 3251 \or|evi},T. 9721. 3252 Golubovi},T.1725;P353,p.10;Ðorðević,T.9722. 3253 Ðorðević,T.9721 9722. 3254 Golubovi},T.1742,1713;P352,p.3.
IT-05-87/1-T 293 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6252 bodies in the truck than they had anticipated. Golubovi} phoned \or|evi} at about 22:30 and explained that they would not be able to finish by morning.3255 \or|evi} instructed Golubovi} to instead load these bodies into a new truck and have them transported to Belgrade, and ordered that the refrigerator truck in which they had been found be destroyed.3256
1191. The workers managed to load about 30 of the bodies into a truck.3257 At this point, Golubovi} called \or|evi}. \or|evi} told Golubovi} that this first shipment of 30 bodies should be transported to Belgrade.3258 Golubovi}’s driver, Ljubinko Ursuljanovi}, drove this first lorry towards Belgrade, with two policemen escorting him.3259 Golubovi} was later telephoned by a person from the Ministry who asked for the truck’s license number and the driver’s mobile number, so that Ursuljanovi} and the lorry could be met en route and escorted to the final destination.3260
1192. When Ursuljanovi} returned the next day, he told Golubovi} that a Volkswagen Golf had escorted him through Belgrade and that the truck was taken over by other persons “on the way to Novi Sad”.3261 Six or seven days later, the SUP Bor was called and told that the truck was available to be picked up. Ursuljanovi} went and retrieved the truck from a MUP parking lot.3262
1193. Golubovi} asked \or|evi} to secure a truck so they could use it the next day to transport the remaining bodies to Belgrade3263 When the truck arrived, these 53 bodies were loaded and transported to the SAJ centre in Batajnica.3264
Continuing the Coverup
1194. Pursuant to \or|evi}’s orders, once the bodies had been removed and transported to Belgrade, Golubovi} arranged to have the refrigerator lorry destroyed.3265 After an unsuccessful attempt to destroy the truck by setting it on fire, it was demolished with explosives.3266 \or|evi} plainly acknowledged that this order was unlawful.3267
3255 Golubovi},T.1663,1735,1743 1744;P353,p.12 13. 3256 Ðorðević, T.9726;Golubovi},T.1744;P353,p.15. 3257 Radojković,P359,pp.17 19; Golubović, P353, pp.15 16. 3258 Golubovi},T.1744,1747;P352,p.4;P353,pp.15 16. 3259 Golubovi},T.1747,1758 1759;P352,p.4;P353,pp.15 17;P403, p.1. 3260 Golubović,P352, p.4;P353,pp.16 17. 3261 Batajnica is between Belgrade and Novi Sad– see P2. 3262 Golubović,P353,pp.17 18;P403, p.1. 3263 Golubović,P352,p.2; P353,pp.18 19. 3264 Golubovi},P353, pp.18 19;K93,P1064,pp.2 3,7(under seal);P1065,pp.3–4(under seal). 3265 Golubovi},T.1715,1755 1756;P353,pp.19 20;Ðorðević,T.9726. 3266 Radojković,P359,pp.23 24;T.1783;Golubovi},T.1755 1756;P352,p.4;P353,p.20. 3267 \or|evi},T.10002.
IT-05-87/1-T 294 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6251 1195. \or|evi} also instructed Golubovi} that the case was not to be made public or reported by the media.3268 The Negotin District Public Prosecutor, Krstimir Nestorovi}, later told the Working Group that the case had been declared some kind of a “secret” and that the public was not to be informed of anything. Any investigative proceedings were to be halted. These instructions came from the highest level in Belgrade, which at that time was the Minister and \or|evi}.3269
\or|evi} Oversaw the Funding for the Operation
1196. \or|evi} also approved and oversaw the funding for this cover up. After asking \or|evi} on 7 April to provide him with money so he could pay the workers, Golubovi} received 10.000 dinars about 4 7 days later, which he distributed.3270 The workers were paid from the MUP's special expenses fund.3271 Slobodan Borisavljevi}, \or|evi}’s Chef de Cabinet, told the Working Group that \or|evi} instructed him to cover the operational expenses for the whole operation.3272 The paperwork evidencing these payments was approved and signed by \or|evi} on 19 and 22 April.3273 These documents show that this concealment operation was given a codename: Dubina II.3274 Despite having signed and approved the documents, \or|evi} claimed that he was “not familiar with the name at all”.3275
Assessing \or|evi}’s False Claims
1197. \or|evi} made a number of specific claims with respect to the re concealment of these bodies that were neither reliable nor consistent with the evidence. i) \or|evi} did not consult with the Minister before ordering the bodies to be buried onsite
1198. \or|evi} claimed that the Minister had ordered him to tell Golubovi} that the bodies should be buried on site and stated that he “didn’t issue any orders until the minister was informed”.3276 This assertion is inconsistent with his letter to the Nedeljni Telegraph, dated 18 June 2004, in which he stated that immediately upon learning about the bodies, he himself “proposed that the complete
3268 P352,p.4;Golubovi},T.1710;P353,pp.20 21. 3269 K84,T.2005 2006(closed session). 3270 Golubovi},T.1667;P353,p.22. See also Radojković,P359,pp.17 19;\or|evi},T.9984. 3271 P387,p.3. 3272 K84,T.2006,2025(closed session);P389,p.1;\or|evi},T.9982 9983. 3273 P391;P392;K84,T.2030;2033 2036(closed session). See also P393, signed by Borisavljevi}. 3274 See e.g. K84,T.2191(closed session). 3275 \or|evi},T.9984. 3276 \or|evi},T.9721,9824.
IT-05-87/1-T 295 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6250 criminal processing be conducted there”, and only informed the Minister afterwards.3277 \or|evi} struggled to explain these discrepancies in cross examination.3278 ii) There was Never any Intention to Autopsy or Properly Process these Bodies
1199. The claim that \or|evi}, the Minister3279 or anyone else intended for the bodies to be autopsied or properly processed is fundamentally inconsistent with the nature of the actual operations. Neither the municipal or district prosecutor, nor any investigating judge, had been at the site when the bodies were being unloaded – at night. There was no forensic assistance at the scene. Moreover, \or|evi} had initially ordered Golubovi} to bury these bodies at the site, and only later decided that they should be loaded onto another truck.3280 These steps were fundamentally inconsistent with any lawful handling of a truck full of human remains. The secrecy that \or|evi} demanded at the time, and the ongoing concealment operation at Batajnica that he co ordinated over the next two months, make clear that \or|evi} was only interested in keeping this operation concealed. iii) \or|evi} did not remove himself from this operation
1200. \or|evi} testified that he removed himself from dealing with the bodies after Golubovi} had followed his orders to load them into the first truck and have them driven to Belgrade. He stated that he told the Minister: “Do as you like. I don’t wish to take part in this whole matter any longer.”3281 These claims are neither credible nor internally consistent. The suggestion that \or|evi} withdrew at this point and that the Minister acted on his own to communicate with the truck drivers and determine “what the final destination was going to be” is inconsistent with the evidence that immediately thereafter \or|evi} proceeded to oversee the burial of these very bodies in Batajnica.3282 Indeed, the very choice of this location – the SAJ’s 13 Maj Centre – suggests \or|evi}’s involvement itself. In light of \or|evi}’s continuing actions, there are only two plausible options: that \or|evi} organized the delivery of the bodies to Batajnica himself, or that he acted in concert with the Minister to do so.
1201. \or|evi} also claimed that immediately after he conveyed his instructions to Golubovi} on how to proceed, he told the Minister that they should establish a commission or group to investigate
3277 P1474,p.7;\or|evi},T.9967 9968. 3278 Ðorðević,T.9824 9828. 3279 See P1474,p.7;\or|evi},T.9967 9968. 3280 Golubovi},T.1745 1746. 3281 Ðorðević,T.9727 9728. 3282 \or|evi},T.9727. See section infra paras.1217 1229.
IT-05-87/1-T 296 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6249 the matter.3283 In light of \or|evi}’s overall actions, this claim is absurd. Just days later, \or|evi} was involved in the burial of bodies from another refrigerator truck found in Lake Peruča}. In the two months that followed, he then co ordinated the burial of hundreds of additional bodies in mass graves in Batajnica. Even when an actual commission was set up in 2001, after the concealment operations were reported in the press, \or|evi}’s co operation was limited to say the least.3284
1202. It would appear that \or|evi}’s position, as with other issues, evolved in order to place all of the responsibility for his actions onto the Minister. In any case, the Indictment charges that \or|evi} and the Minister participated together, along with several other key political, military and MUP figures, in committing these crimes. The participation of the Minister, or of any of the other co perpetrators, does not negate \or|evi}’s individual criminal responsibility.
(ii) The Refrigerator Truck Incident at Lake Peruča}
1203. When the human cargo of another refrigerator truck washed up in Lake Peruča}, \or|evi} also oversaw efforts to conceal those bodies by burying them onsite along the banks of the river.
1204. In mid April of 1999, the Chief of the Uzice SUP, \or|e Keri}, received a telephone call from Slavko Petrovi}, Chief of the Bajina Ba{ta OUP.3285 Petrovi} told Keri} that a number of dead bodies were floating in Lake Peručac.3286 After confirming the report, Keri} called \or|evi} and informed him of this “extraordinary event”.3287 Keri} and \or|evi} had known each other for about 15 years.3288 Keri} sought further instructions from \or|evi} concerning what he should do next and whether they should inform the investigating judge and prosecutor.3289 \or|evi} instructed Keri} not to inform anyone, and to “conduct additional checks”.3290
1205. \or|evi} ordered that Zoran Mitričevi}, Chief of the U`ice Crime Police, should be sent to the site with a group of inspectors.3291 \or|evi} told Keri} that he should keep him (\or|evi}) informed and receive instructions about what to do afterwards. Sometime later, Mitričevi} telephoned Keri} and informed him that the number of bodies was growing and that a container had surfaced. He told Keri} that there were male and female bodies and that they were mostly dressed 3283 Ðorðević,T.9723 3284 K84,T.2020 2021,2714 2175(closed session);K92,T.2790(closed session). 3285 Keri},T.7755,7817. Keri} testified that he received the telephone call “about two weeks” before he was transferred to his new post. He was transferred to that post on 1 May 1999 (T.7754), thus further suggesting that he received the telephone call in the middle of April 1999. 3286 Keri},T.7755 7756. 3287 Keri},T.7756 7757,7818;Ðorðević,T.9728. 3288 \or|evi},T. 9990. 3289 Keri},T.7756 7757,7819 7820. 3290 Keri},T.7757,7819 7820;Ðorðević,T.9728,9991. 3291 Keri},T.7756 7757.
IT-05-87/1-T 297 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6248 in civilian clothes.3292 Keri} telephoned \or|evi} and informed him about what was being found. He asked \or|evi} for further instructions. \or|evic instructed Keri} that they should speak “a little later”.3293
1206. \or|evi} testified that at this point he went to see the Minister and conveyed the information to him. According to \or|evi}, the Minister “didn't comment, he didn't give me any instructions; and didn't ask me to pass them to anyone.” \or|evi} claimed that it was his belief at this time that the Minister “was going to settle this matter with someone else,” and that he therefore just left the Minister’s office.3294
The Bodies were Buried Onsite
1207. As instructed, Keri} called \or|evi} again about an hour later. Keri} testified that \or|evi} told him that, “it was necessary to take measures to remove the bodies from the lake, to engage a number of officers and civilians for this purpose, and that these bodies should be buried in a mass grave near Lake Peručac dam.”3295
1208. Keri}’s testimony that \or|evi} ordered him to bury the bodies on site is inconsistent with D316, a transcript of an interview that Keri} gave on 8 June 2005 to Judge Dilpari} of the Belgrade District Court. In that interview, unlike the evidence he had provided to the Tribunal and the signed statement he provided to the Working Group in 2001, Keri} did not state that \or|evi} had ordered the burial of the bodies, but stated that he and Mitričevi} had buried them on their own in the absence of clear instructions.3296 Keri} nonetheless insisted during his evidence in \or|evi} that he was instructed by \or|evi} to bury the bodies on site.
1209. The issue of whether \or|evi} directly ordered the burial of the bodies is addressed in more detail below, as are more general attempts by \or|evi} to downplay his knowledge and involvement in this episode. Notwithstanding these denials, it is clear that on the uncontroverted evidence of both Keri} and \or|evi}:
a) Keri} informed \or|evi} about the truckload of human bodies when it was discovered;3297
3292 Keri},T.7757 7759,7763. 3293 Keri},T.7759;Ðorðević,T.9728. 3294 Ðorðević,T.9728 9729. 3295 Keri},T.7759. 3296 Keri},T.7841 7864;P1212. 3297 \or|evi},T. 9995.
IT-05-87/1-T 298 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6247 b) \or|evi}, Keri}’s superior, was in regular communication with Keri} throughout the time in which the bodies were being dealt with and had issued him orders and expected him to report back; c) Keri} informed \or|evi} that the bodies had been recovered from the water and then buried onsite, near the dam;3298 d) The burial of these bodies in Lake Peruca} was unlawful, and \or|evi} was aware of this;3299 and e) \or|evi} maintained this cover up, while at the same time acting to conceal truckloads of other bodies coming from Kosovo.
Assessing \or|evi}’s Limited Denials
1210. \or|evi} largely confirmed Keri}’s account and admitted his knowledge and involvement with respect to the discovery and subsequent re concealment of the bodies onsite. However, he sought to downplay his involvement in several respects: \or|evi} denied telling Keri} to send Zoran Mitri~evi} or anybody else to the scene, claiming that this was “for him to decide”;3300 \or|evi} testified that he only had two conversations with Keri}. The first occurred when Keri} informed him about the incident and \or|evi} told him to check what it was about. The second occurred when Keri} conveyed to \or|evi} what else was found in the lake;3301 \or|evi} testified that he never instructed Keri} to bury the bodies, and that Keri} did so on his own and simply conveyed this information to \or|evi}.3302
1211. \or|evi}’s denials of involvement and knowledge are not credible in the context of these events. \or|evi} was not only SUP Chief Keri}’s superior but Chief of the entire RJB. Keri} and \or|evi} agree that Keri} called \or|evi} seeking instructions on what to do about this significant issue. This was consistent with the operative chain of command. \or|evi} also admits that upon being informed of the existence of these bodies, he ordered Keri} to “investigate it and to call me later”.3303 In short, up until the moment that the bodies were actually buried, \or|evi} was issuing orders to a subordinate, seeking to gather more information with respect to what should be done. This is precisely what one would expect, given their respective ranks within the MUP hierarchy. \or|evi}’s position – that having already issued such instructions he suddenly became a passive bystander as Keri} buried the bodies on his own – strains credulity. Perhaps more importantly, it makes even less sense that a subordinate like Keri}, who was in ongoing direct communication with
3298 \or|evi},T. 9995;Keri},T.7759 7760. 3299 \or|evi},T.10002. 3300 \or|evi},T. 9991 9992. 3301 Ðorðević,T.9729 3302 Ðorðević,T.9992,9995. 3303 Ðorðević,T.9728,9991.
IT-05-87/1-T 299 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6246 the Chief of the Department about what was clearly a highly sensitive matter, would act in any manner that was not in keeping with the wishes of his superior.
1212. In the overall context of the events taking place in April of 1999, \or|evi}’s limited denials of knowledge and responsibility are less probable still. \or|evi} admits, as outlined above, that he had just issued orders to another SUP Chief, Golubovi}, with respect to what to do with another refrigerator truck full of bodies that had surfaced in another river. Both \or|evi} and Golubovi} testified that \or|evi} first ordered that the bodies should be buried onsite, and only later (when onsite burial proved unfeasible), ordered that they be loaded into new trucks and transported once again.3304 Having just dealt with a remarkably similar incident involving a refrigerator truck, where the first approach was to order the local SUP Chief to bury the bodies onsite, it makes little sense to suggest that when the same issue arose at Lake Peruča}, \or|evi} was this time largely a passive observer who checked in only occasionally while that SUP Chief buried the bodies on his own initiative.
1213. In any event, it is clear on both Keri} and \or|evi}’s accounts that having completed the act of burying these bodies, Keri} reported directly back to \or|evi}. \or|evi} undertook none of the actions required of a superior commanding officer who was aware of and personally involved in the concealment of another truckload of human bodies. To the contrary, he continued to act to conceal these bodies, along with the other shipments and burials that he was co ordinating throughout this period.
\or|evi} Instructed Keri} Not to Contact the Investigative Judge or Prosecutor
1214. \or|evi}’s intention to conceal the evidence of these crimes was evident throughout his dealings with the bodies found at Lake Peruča}. It was also apparent in his instructions that Keri} not inform the investigating judge or prosecutor.
1215. Keri} explained that after Mitričevi} told him that the number of bodies was increasing and that there were a number of bodies in the trailer, he (Keri}) had asked \or|evi} for a second time whether he should inform the investigating judge. \or|evi} told Keri} not to advise either the investigating judge or the prosecutor. This was contrary to standard procedure.3305
3304 Golubovi},T.1725;P353,p.10;Ðorðević,T.9722. 3305 Keri},T.7761 7762.
IT-05-87/1-T 300 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6245 1216. Keri} obeyed \or|evi}’s command, noting that if he had not complied he would have been subject to disciplinary proceedings from \or|evi}.3306 It may be noted that, in all of his accounts, including in his statement to Judge Dilpari} addressed above, Keri} was consistent that \or|evi} had instructed him not to inform the investigative judge.3307 \or|evi} sought to deny that he had instructed Keri} not to inform the investigative judge, but his testimony was evasive.3308
(iii) The Concealment of Bodies at the 13 Maj Centre in Batajnica
1217. \or|evi} co ordinated the burial of hundreds of bodies in mass graves at the 13 Maj Centre in Batajnica, the training ground for the SAJ, which was under his de facto and de jure control. \or|evi} admitted that the Minister had placed him in charge of the SAJ, and that even for some 10 years prior to that the SAJ had been under his “direct leadership”.3309
1218. In early or mid April (see below), \or|evi} contacted K87 at the 13 Maj Centre. \or|evi} knew most of the members of the SAJ and knew K87 by name. He called K87 personally and instructed him to report to his office the next day at 9 a.m. As instructed, K87 met with \or|evi} the next day. \or|evi} told him that there were two trucks at the 13 Maj Centre containing bodies and instructed him to bury them on site. \or|evi} told K87 that the bodies were “victims of the NATO bombings” and that they should be buried “temporarily”, claiming that the bodies would be exhumed, identified and given a proper burial after the war.3310
1219. \or|evi} provided K87 with specific instructions with respect to the location and method of burial. These instructions reflected a thorough knowledge of the present layout of the Centre and forethought into where the bodies would best be concealed. He directed K87 to bury the bodies “behind the firing range”, noting that this would be the most convenient place for burial because the earth had already been disturbed.3311 \or|evi} concluded the meeting by explaining that the matter should not be discussed.3312 As they were leaving his office, they met the Minister who was passing
3306 Keri},T.7811. 3307 D316,pp.3 4. It should be noted that when the Defence asked Keri} to read this portion aloud[T.7843], the translation used in court differed significantly from the English translation of D316 itself. In particular, Keri} read it as stating: “Since the number of bodies went up I believe that we should not inform either the investigating judge or anybody else. I informed Mr. Krivokapic, the investigating judge…” Given the context, it appears that this was an error in translation. In any case, the translation of the original makes clear that it was \or|evi} who had insisted that the investigating judge not be contacted. 3308 See \or|evi},T.9993. 3309 \or|evi},T.9821. 3310K87,P1414,para.13(under seal);Ðorðević,T.9731 9732(private session),9978. See also K88,P370,para.17(under seal); Trajković,T.9116 (private session). 3311 K87,P1414,para.17(under seal);P1416,p.5. 3312 K87,P1414,para.15(under seal).
IT-05-87/1-T 301 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6244 by and \or|evi} told the Minister that, “this was the man who was supposed to wrap up the whole matter”.3313
When did the Bodies First Arrive in Batajnica?
1220. Both K87 and \or|evi} provided rough estimates with respect to when the bodies first arrived at Batajnica. K87 testified that he received the initial call from \or|evi} approximately a month after the commencement of the war, between the middle and end of April 1999.3314 \or|evi} claimed that he learned from the Minister “Shortly after the event at Peruča}” that the trucks containing bodies had been brought to Batajnica.3315 K88 provided more specific dates: he described discovering the bodies after attending Radovan Aleksi}’s funeral in early April 1999 and remembered that he was told about \or|evi}’s order to bury the bodies on “The Thursday before Good Friday in 1999”.3316 It can safely be concluded that truckloads of bodies arrived at Batajnica on or about 7 8 April. On 7 April, the bodies from Tekija were loaded into a first truck, which left for Belgrade. The second truck left shortly after the first.3317 Ursuljanovi}, the driver of the first truck, reported that he passed through Belgrade and that the truck was taken over “on the way to Novi Sad”, which is consistent with it being taken straight to Batajnica.3318 K93, who drove the second lorry, testified that he drove his truck directly to Batajnica.3319 This evidence is consistent with K88’s evidence – in 1999, Good Friday fell on 9 April and the “Thursday before” was thus 8 April.
The Arrival and Burial of Bodies
1221. Acting on \or|evi}’s instructions, K87 and other MUP members buried these bodies at the 13 Maj Centre.3320 Shortly after these first shipments were buried, \or|evi} arranged for the concealment of additional shipments of bodies.
1222. \or|evi} was clear in his testimony that he issued orders to K87 to bury the bodies from these additional trucks and that K87 “followed the orders”. \or|evi} stated that he called “the officer” (K87) and conveyed orders for bodies in two or three more trucks to be buried, following the same procedure he had initially sent out. He also confirmed his awareness that the job had been
3313 Ðorðević,T.9731;Trajković,T.9116(private session). 3314 K87,P1414,para.12(under seal). 3315 \or|evi},T.9729 9730. 3316 K88,P370,paras.14 17(under seal). 3317 Golubovi},T.1666 1667,1735,1744. 3318 Golubovi},P353,pp.17 18;P403,p.1. 3319 See e.g. K93,P1064,p.3(under seal). 3320 Evidence with respect to the initial burials is outlined in Part III, Section(B)(5)(d).
IT-05-87/1-T 302 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6243 done. As \or|evi} put it, rather succinctly: “I called the officer, related that to him, and he did the job.”3321
1223. Two MUP drivers, Bogdan Lipova} and Dragan Ba{anovi}, were involved in transporting bodies to Batanica,3322 and participated extensively in the burial operations at the 13 Maj Centre.3323 Lipova} was \or|evi}’s personal driver. Ba{anovi} was the driver for Assistant Minister Zekovi}, who tasked K93 to collect corpses on several occasions.3324 \or|evi} claimed that he was not aware that Lipova} and Ba{anovi} were involved in the operations to transport bodies, and to bury bodies in Batajnica.3325 Given \or|evi}’s role, Lipova} and Ba{anovi}’s extensive involvement, and \or|evi}’s relationship with Lipova} in particular, this is not a credible denial.
While \or|evi} was Concealing Bodies at Batajnica, Crimes were Continuing
1224. Evidence from a variety of sources outlines further MUP massacres, and subsequent operations to conceal the bodies evidencing these crimes, that took place after \or|evi} had begun concealing these shipments of bodies. Civilians were murdered by police at the end of April in Meja/Mejë and their bodies were transported and temporarily buried. In large scale MUP operations running through May and into June of 1999, these bodies were systematically exhumed once again and transported out of Kosovo to the 13 Maj Centre, where \or|evi} arranged for their concealment in mass graves.3326
1225. \or|evi}’s ongoing role in concealing the evidence of these large scale murders, as they continued to occur, enabled and encouraged the crimes to be committed without local or international observers learning about them or intervening.
It Was \or|evi} Who Ceased the Operations at Batajnica
1226. While the concealment operation was ongoing, K87 met with \or|evi} in his office and asked him to stop bringing bodies to the Centre, explaining that he was uncomfortable with the disposal process. After this discussion, the bodies stopped arriving.3327 \or|evi} confirmed that
3321 \or|evi},T.9732 9733,9978. 3322 K93,P1062,pp.28–29(under seal). 3323 K88,P370,paras.19,24(under seal);P371,pp.9 11(under seal);K87,T.14176. 3324 \or|evi},T.9988. 3325 \or|evi},T.9989. 3326 See Part III, Section(B)(5)(iii). 3327 K87,P1414,para.25(under seal).
IT-05-87/1-T 303 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6242 K87 had contacted him and “expressed his dissatisfaction with the situation”, although he again claimed that he was only conveying the Minister’s orders.3328
Trajkovi}’s Conversations with \or|evi}
1227. Comments that \or|evi} made to Živko Trajkovi}, the SAJ Commander, suggest further that the concealment of bodies in Batajnica was part of a larger high level plan, and that \or|evi} was the one responsible for overseeing the concealment operations. Trajkovi} spoke to Ðorñević on two occasions about the burial of bodies in Batajnica. At the beginning of June 1999, Trajkovi} asked \or|evi} why they had chosen to bury the bodies at the SAJ base. Ðorñević replied that the decision had come from high up, stating something like, “This was the decision of people who are much more important than both you and me, and don't ask too many questions about this.” Trajkovi} understood that this was a state secret and that the decision had been taken at a high level. When Trajkovi} asked what had happened, \or|evi} responded, "What can I tell you? All of my brave generals put their heads into this buried their heads into the sand and they left it to me to finish this part of the work."3329
1228. \or|evi} confirmed that he had expressed his “dissatisfaction with the way things were being dealt with” to Trajkovi}. However, he then denied that he had said “anything of the sort” of what Trajkovi} had described. When asked once again, directly, whether he had told Trajkovi} that the decision to bury the bodies had been made from a “very high level”, \or|evi} stated: “I didn't use those words. I said that there was someone above me who decided about it, and I did what I did and that's why I'm here.”3330 \or|evi} acknowledged that the burial of these bodies in mass graves was unlawful.3331
1229. Trajkovi}’s second conversation with Ðorñević took place at the Ministry’s Head Office in June 1999. They spoke about the potential of exhuming the bodies and moving them elsewhere. Ðorñević said that the time would come for this to be done and that Trajkovi} shouldn’t raise the issue anymore. \or|evi} said that when the time was right, Trajkovi} would be informed about what should be done with the bodies.3332
(iv) Bodies Concealed at Petrovo Selo
3328 \or|evi},T.10000. 3329 Trajković,T.9124 9126. 3330 \or|evi},T. 10000 10001(emphasis added). 3331 \or|evi},T.10002. 3332 Trajković,T.9125,9128.
IT-05-87/1-T 304 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6241 1230. Over the same time period as the Batajnica operation, the MUP was also concealing the bodies of Kosovo Albanian victims at another SAJ base in Serbia, in Petrovo Selo. K93, who drove the trucks with the bodies from Tekija to Batajnica, also drove truckloads of bodies from Kosovo to Petrovo Selo, where they were buried in two mass graves.3333 The mass graves at Petrovo Selo and Batanica were components of the same plan to conceal the evidence of large scale crimes.
1231. \or|evi}’s knowledge and involvement in both operations can be inferred from the obvious similarities, and the basic overlap, between the Petrovo Selo concealment operations and the operations that \or|evi} was directly co ordinating in Batajnica. The circumstances surrounding K93’s participation in transporting human remains to Petrovo Selo – the use of a SAJ base as the final destination for concealment, the way the orders were conveyed to him, the provision of his escort, his contact when in Kosovo – are in material respects similar to the circumstances regarding his transportation of bodies from Kosovo to the 13 Maj Centre. On one occasion, after dropping a shipment of bodies at Petrovo Selo, K93 then drove the empty truck to the 13 Maj Centre, “because they needed it”.3334 The links between the two operations, and the obvious co ordination suggested by the transfer of equipment and the overlapping use of personnel, make it readily apparent that this was part of the same operation.
1232. \or|evi} also exercised effective command and control over the police personnel attached to the SAJ base in Petrovo Selo. \or|evi} accepted that in July 1999 he had instructed MUP officer Sreten Popovi} to collect the three Bytyqi brothers, who were serving sentences for misdemeanors in Prokuple, and transport them to the SAJ training centre at Petrovo Selo. \or|evi}’s orders were complied with and the task was carried out.3335 Although \or|evi} is not criminally charged for the deaths of these brothers, and the Prosecution makes no submission in this regard, it is relevant and probative that in 2001 their remains were found in one of the mass graves at Petrovo Selo, along with the remains of a number of Kosovo Albanian victims mentioned in the Indictment.3336
1233. \or|evi} was also involved with Luki}, his direct subordinate, in subsequent cover up discussions with K93, who drove bodies to both Petrovo Selo and Batajnica. When the news media began to publicize the operation to transport bodies, K93 went to see Luki} at his office to ask what he should do. While K93 was there, \or|evi} arrived. The men discussed the situation and it was suggested that “it wouldn’t be a bad idea” if K93 went to work in Bujanovac, an area some 360 3333 See Part III, Section(B)(5)(f). 3334 K93,P1064,pp.3 4(under seal);P1065,p.3(under seal). 3335 \or|evi},T.9973 9975. \or|evi} once again claimed he was acting in accordance with a decision of the Minister. 3336 P815,pp.31 35;K84,T.5225 5226(closed session).
IT-05-87/1-T 305 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6240 kilometers from Belgrade, where he could “rest and collect” himself. K93 agreed to go away.3337 The obvious intention was to continue the cover up by removing K93 from the area. Given Luki}’s role in the Petrovo Selo operation and \or|evi}’s well established involvement in Batajnica, and in light of K93’s role in driving bodies to both Batajnica and Petrovo Selo, this meeting provides further evidence of \or|evi}’s knowledge and participation in the Petrovo Selo operations.
1234. In his \or|evi} testimony, K93 sought to dilute this evidence in relation to \or|evi}, stressing that \or|evi} was only in Luki}’s office for a few minutes.3338 He also initially stated that it was Luki} who suggested that he go to Bujanovac,3339 contrary to his testimony in Milutinovi}, in which he had stated: “Mr. \or|evi} came in to the office in Belgrade, and they discussed it with me and we all agreed that I should go to Bujanovac”.3340 However, K93 ultimately confirmed that all three of them, \or|evi} included, had agreed that he should go to Bujanovac.3341 \or|evi} confirmed that this conversation took place. His testimony with respect to the content of the discussion was evasive, however, and his claim that he simply “came there as a pensioner to take care of some of my own business” is not credible.3342
(v) \or|evi}’s flight
1235. In May 2001, the Serbian media started to publish reports on the discovery of hundreds of corpses at Batajnica. The fact that bodies had been found in the Danube was being circulated in the press, and \or|evi} knew that he had played a significant role in the concealment of bodies.
1236. When he was questioned by the MUP Working Group investigating these events, \or|evi} responded: “What happened, happened. What can I tell you?”3343 When the Working Group sought to interview him again, they could no longer locate him.3344
1237. \or|evi} left Belgrade around the time the bodies were discovered in Batajnica.3345 He remained a fugitive until he was caught and brought before this Tribunal in 2007.
3337 K93,P1062,pp.86–87(under seal);T.6908 6909,6913(closed session). 3338 K93,T.6910,6913,6914(closed session). 3339 K93,T.6910 6911(closed session). 3340 K93,P1062,pp.92(under seal). 3341 K93,T.6913(under seal). 3342 \or|evi},T.9990. 3343 K84,T.2020 2021(closed session). 3344 K84,T.2021,2174 2175(closed session). 3345 K92,T.2790(closed session).
IT-05-87/1-T 306 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6239 (h) \or|evi} created an environment permissive of criminal behaviour
1238. \or|evi} contributed significantly to the JCE by creating an environment permissive of crimes committed against the Kosovo Albanian population. As one of the most senior members of the MUP, \or|evi} had a duty to protect the safety of the civilian population. As the Head of the RJB, he had several powers available to him in order to guarantee that his units on the ground complied with the law, or at least to make it significantly more difficult for the crimes charged to have been committed. In light of his knowledge of the gravity and widespread nature of the crimes, \or|evi} had a duty to try everything within his powers to impede the perpetrators. He should have followed up on allegations of crimes and ensured that crimes were adequately reported, investigations were initiated and perpetrators were punished. In deliberately omitting to do so despite his knowledge of the crimes committed by his forces in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, \or|evi} encouraged and legitimized crimes committed against Kosovo Albanians. He also failed to take any steps to restrain the use of excessive force by the MUP that led to widespread crimes against civilians in 1998. He did not dissociate himself from the heavy handed tactics used by the MUP in 1998 and, instead approved of them by re deploying the same units in 1999.
1239. Notably, hundreds of police officers were also involved in operations to conceal bodies throughout the Indictment period. They participated in a variety of capacities, from personally removing bodies after massacres, to subsequently re exhuming bodies, to securing the sites of concealment operations. The practice of concealing the evidence of such crimes would have been well known to MUP forces in Kosovo, and would no doubt have significantly permeated the institutional culture. These actions to cover up the slaughter of Kosovo Albanian civilians, sanctioned at a systemic level within the MUP, inevitably fostered a strong culture of impunity amongst the forces on the ground. \or|evi}’s extensive actions in sanctioning and participating in these operations significantly contributed to the creation of an environment where such crimes would not only be permitted but systematically covered up.
(i) \or|evi}’s knowledge of crimes
1240. \or|evi} knew that the heavy handed tactics employed by the forces of the FRY and Serbia in operations in 1998 led to the commission of crimes against the ethnic Albanian civilian population. Throughout the Indictment period, he continued to engage MUP units in the same activities. As set out below, \or|evi} demonstrated his approval of such crimes and his intent to commit them in 1999.
(i) Knowledge of crimes in 1998
IT-05-87/1-T 307 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6238 1241. \or|evi} was fully aware of the indiscriminate and excessive use of force by the forces of the FRY and Serbia during operations against the KLA in 1998, and knew that this resulted in the massive displacement of the Kosovo Albanian population through the perpetration of widespread crimes against Kosovo Albanians. He was aware that if these same forces were deployed in the same theatre of operations, they would continue to commit such crimes in 1999. He had specific knowledge of: (a) MUP operations on the ground; (b) widespread destruction and looting; (c) killings; (d) large scale displacement of civilians; (e) and complaints of internationals.
a. Knowledge of MUP operations on the ground
1242. \or|evi} was comprehensively informed about the situation on the ground. As he described: “I knew every village, every hamlet, every path and every road, and I knew the circumstances there.”3346 \or|evi} was in Kosovo in 1998 when the Plan for Suppressing Terrorism was planned and implemented.3347 He was directly involved in the planning process and in ensuring that day to day operations were conducted by MUP units in accordance with this Plan. He regularly attended Joint Command meetings, where the implementation of the Plan was co ordinated.3348
1243. \or|evi} closely monitored MUP operations during the 1998 summer offensive. He attended the MUP Staff meeting of 22 July 1998, at which the implementation of the “Global Plan” was discussed.3349 He also attended MUP Staff meetings on 1 September 1998;3350 in late September, when the summer offensive was coming to an end,3351 and on 5 November 1998, when the implementation of the October Agreements by the MUP was discussed at the presence of Milutinovi}, Stojiljkovi}, and other senior members of the MUP.3352
1244. \or|evi} toured MUP units in the field during the large scale MUP actions in 1998.3353 In his 2004 letter to the Nedelnji Telegraf, he wrote: “From the first day until the completion of the operations, I was always with my officers and policemen, and with them, we liberated roads and entered the main strongholds of the terrorists.”3354
3346 \or|evi},T.10118. 3347 \or|evi},T.9515,10031. 3348 See Part III, Section(A)(3)(b)(i). 3349 P768;Cveti},T.6640. 3350 Cveti},T.6621. 3351 Cveti},T.6621. 3352 Cveti},T.6620 6621;P770, p.3. 3353\or|evi},T.9622,9862 9863;Mir~i},T.13263 13264,13331;^ankovi},T.13989 13990;Cveti},T.6621,6644; Stalevi},T.13790 13791. 3354 P1474,p.4.
IT-05-87/1-T 308 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6237 1245. \or|evi}’s statements at Joint Command meetings show he possessed detailed information about MUP operations. For example, the notes of 1 August 1998 record \or|evi} reporting: “All preparations for tomorrow’s operations have been completed (launching of the third phase). The detachments will attack Rastavica and Prilep from the direction of Crnobreg tomorrow. A tank is needed in Prilep and Glo|ane.”3355 At the meeting of 22 September 1998, \or|evi} showed his knowledge of specific companies, stating: “These two companies have been engaged with one PJP detachment to close the route through Drvare with one company; two companies came out west of @ilivoda village”.3356
1246. \or|evi}’s detailed knowledge of MUP/VJ operations made him aware of criminal activities occurring in that territory.
b. Knowledge of widespread destruction and looting
1247. \or|evi}’s presence and active participation at Joint Command meetings illustrates his knowledge of crimes in Kosovo in 1998. For example:
• On 24 July, Gaji} reported that “after Orahovac there has been uncontrolled looting of ethnic Albanian houses”.3357
• On 26 July, Gaji} reported: “Bakali has accused Milo{evi} of conducting ethnic cleansing in Orahovac”.3358
• On 7 August, Šainović pointed out that “The needless torching of houses causes the biggest political damage and this may result in pressure being exerted on the country.”3359
• On 12 August, Minić ordered, “The torching of houses must stop.”3360
• On 7 September, Ðorñević warned that “We must reduce the use of artillery. We must take measures against persons who torch houses subsequently.”3361
3355 P886,p.27. 3356 P886,p.108.See P1422,pp.8 9. 3357 P886,p.8. Absences were recorded at the beginning of each meeting. While \or|evi} is not recorded as having spoken at this meeting, he is also not recorded as being absent. It can thus be inferred that he attended. 3358 P886,p.11. 3359 P886,p.36. 3360 P886,p.42. 3361 P886,p.82.
IT-05-87/1-T 309 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6236 • On 21 September, Šainović stated that tasks should be carried out in a disciplined manner in order to prevent the torching.3362
1248. In the field, \or|evi} observed and reported to the Joint Command on arson damaged homes.3363 He knew that MUP units were involved in torching and looting Kosovo Albanian homes and property.3364 \or|evi} testified that the position of the MUP leadership and the commanders on the ground was that “such negative conduct was to be prevented.” He admitted his awareness, however, that, “Unfortunately, it wasn't done each and every time.”3365
1249. Throughout August and September 1998, PJP units were observed forcibly expelling Kosovo Albanians from their villages, destroying property and torching villages almost daily.3366 Lukić, \or|evi}’s subordinate, was directly informed of such activity by Byrnes.3367 Byrnes appealed to Lukić to stop the police from forcing Kosovo Albanians villagers from their homes.3368 However, the complaints were not addressed, and the excessive use of force by police continued.3369 Given that \or|evi} was in Kosovo at the time directing operations and was in regular contact with Luki}, Byrnes’ complaints would have reached him.
c. Knowledge of killings
1250. From early 1998, \or|evi} knew that civilians were murdered in MUP operations. He confirmed his own role in the attack on the Jashari compound in March 1998, stating that pursuant to Stojiljkovi}’s order, he and Jovica Stani{i} headed the Staff that planned “a co ordinated action” against the Jashari compound in early March 1998.3370 The SAJ and the JSO were involved in this action.3371 \or|evi} acknowledged that the MUP knew that “there were also a number of civilians in the area”3372 and that his police forces killed civilians in the attack.3373 In fact, 58 ethnic Albanians were killed, including 18 women and 10 children.3374
3362 P886,p.107. 3363 \or|evi},T.10093 10094. 3364 \or|evi},T.10094 10095.See P1474,p.5. 3365 \or|evi},T.10094 10095. 3366 Byrnes, P1214,pp.14,22 23,25 26. 3367 Byrnes, P1214,p.25. See P1214,pp.14 15. 3368 Byrnes,P1214,pp.21 24,26. 3369 Byrnes,P1214,p.26. 3370 See also Cveti},T.6747 6748. 3371 Cveti},T.6616;Trajkovi},T.9060 9061;Crosland, P1400,para.28;T.9156. 3372 Ðorðević,T.9541. 3373 Ðorðević,T.9541. 3374 P741,p.36.See Stojanovi},T.11874 11875;Trajkovi},T.9061.
IT-05-87/1-T 310 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6235 1251. \or|evi} knew that the joint VJ/MUP action in Gornje Obrinje/Abria e Epërme led to civilian deaths. At the Joint Command meeting of 26 September 1998, both Luki} and Pavković reported on the completion of the MUP/VJ action in Donje Obrinje/Abria e Poshtme and Gornje Obrinje/Abria e Epërme.3375 After news of a massacre of civilians at Gornje Obrinje/Abria e Epërme reached the international media, and the ECMM referred the matter to the ICTY,3376 authorities in Belgrade requested that the incident be investigated.3377 At the Joint Command meeting of 4 October 1998, Šainović referred to the need “launch an investigation into Obrinje.”3378
d. Knowledge of the large scale displacement of civilians
1252. Joint Command members also discussed the refugee crisis stemming from the VJ and MUP actions.3379 For example:
• On 31 July 1998, following \or|evi}’s report on recent actions, [ainovi} noted that “refugees are the biggest problem and the media should report that the [iptars are returning home. If we could only have footage of them returning home.”3380
• On 2 August 1998, Pavkovi} reported that “there were very many refugees in the direction of Lau{a village”.3381
• On 26 August 1998, Radovi} reported that 16,000 to 17,000 people took refuge in Albania and 40,000 people took refuge in Montenegro.3382
• On 20 September 1998, An|elkovi} reported that “there are around 15,000 refugees near Novo Selo and Beri{a.”3383
• On 21 September 1998, [ainovi} stated that one of the problems was the “humanitarian catastrophe”.3384
3375 P886,p.112.Although \or|evi} is not recorded as having spoken at this meeting, he is also not recorded as being absent from the meeting. It can thus be inferred that he attended. 3376 Kickert,T.2586;P485,p.3. 3377 Abrahams,T.3960,4021.See also P886,p.116. 3378 P886,p.119. 3379 P886,pp.26 27,28,31,33,56,62 64,76,81,95,99,101,103 104,105. 3380 P886,p.26. 3381 P886,p.28. 3382 P886,p.63. While \or|evi} is not recorded as having spoken at this meeting, he is also not recorded as being absent. 3383 P886,p.105. 3384 P886,p.107.
IT-05-87/1-T 311 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6234 1253. \or|evi} knew that as a result of combat activities, “civilians were leaving their homes and going to areas that they believed were safer”.3385 He was aware that the international press and some international representatives were concerned about the displacement of civilians.3386 Specifically, he was aware that international organisations were “condemning the Serb forces, saying that it was allegedly their activities that caused a lot of harm and suffering to civilians, forcing them to leave their homes”. He accepted that there were situations where this was true.3387
1254. \or|evi} claimed that he took measures to persuade refugees to return home.3388 More accurately, however, notes of Joint Command meetings reveal that the MUP used force to return refugees to their villages. At the meeting of 4 September 1998, \or|evi} instructed Luki} to “return all inhabitants to the village by force tomorrow” and to search the terrain for weapons.3389 The following day, Luki} indicated that “the activities have been realised the return of civilians, combing of the terrain”.3390 Two days later, \or|evi} ordered that one company was to go to the Sedlari sector and force the people to return to their villages.3391
1255. \or|evi} explained these passages of the Joint Command notes by saying that he had “merely launched an initiative”, the gist of which was that whenever MUP units came across refugees, they were to tell them to return home. He denied that the MUP used force to return refugees to their villages3392 or that the internationals complained about how this was done.3393
1256. \or|evi}’s testimony is contradicted by US KDOM representative Shaun Byrnes, who explained that he repeatedly complained to the MUP about the use of unnecessary force in handling refugees. For example, Byrnes reported about the excessive use of force by the MUP in September 1998, when MUP special forces conducted a sweep operation against the KLA in a number of Albanian villages in the Peć/Peja area, driving villagers from their homes.3394 Once the international press began reporting on this action, the MUP sent forces to the area and “effectively herded” the refugees onto police buses, transporting them back to their villages.3395 Byrnes’ team photographed this event and reported that the civilians were terrified to be forced against their will onto MUP
3385 \or|evi},T.9810. 3386 \or|evi},T.9810 9811,9814. 3387 Ðorðević,T.9614. See P886,p.73. 3388 \or|evi},T.9810 9811,9814. 3389 P886,p.73. 3390 P886,p.75. 3391 P886,p.79. 3392 \or|evi},T.9814 9815. 3393 Ðorðević,T.9810;P1214,pp.26 28;D429. 3394 Byrnes,P1214,pp.26 28. 3395 Byrnes,P1214,p.28.
IT-05-87/1-T 312 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6233 buses by members of the police. When Byrnes complained to Lukić about the unnecessary force used, Lukić cynically replied that it was “a humanitarian operation.”3396
1257. When the KVM was set up in Kosovo, members of KVM received reports that MUP units were employing excessive force during actions. This was reported to Luki}.3397 Given \or|evi}’s role and the well established reporting procedures in place at the MUP, KVM’s complaints would have reached \or|evi}.
e. Knowledge of allegations levelled against the MUP by the international community
1258. \or|evi} knew of the allegations of excessive force levelled by the international community against forces of the FRY and Serbia in Kosovo in a UN Security Council (SC) Resolution of 31 March 1998, which “condemned the use of excessive force by the Serbian police against civilians”.3398
1259. Foreign media publicly and prominently condemned the excessive use of force by the forces of the FRY and Serbia in 1998 that resulted in violence against civilians. MUP officials in Belgrade were well aware of these allegations. For example, in relation to the MUP action on the Jashari compound in early March 1998, the MUP in Belgrade released a communiqué on 5 March 1998.3399
1260. By mid August 1998, \or|evi} knew that a UN SC resolution condemning the use of force by the MUP and the VJ was imminent. \or|evi} was present at the Joint Command meeting of 12 August 1998, for example, when Mini} reported that the Minister of Foreign Affairs “lead a dogged battle during the night for the Security Council to adopt the most lenient resolution”.3400
1261. \or|evi} said that he was familiar with the UN SC Resolution adopted on 23 September 1998 regarding “the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army”.3401 He said it preceded the political negotiations aimed at preventing “the escalation of further activity in the territory of Kosovo by Serb forces” and also terrorist activity.3402 Given \or|evi}’s involvement in these negotiations in October 1998 as Head of the MUP delegation, he would have
3396 Byrnes,P1214,pp.28 29.See also D429 and P886,p.86. 3397 P1005;Drewienkiewicz,T.6356 6358. 3398 \or|evi},T.10095;P1074. 3399 D424. 3400 P886,p.41. 3401 \or|evi},T.10095 10096;D160. 3402 \or|evi},T.10095 10096. See Part III, Section(A)(2)(c).
IT-05-87/1-T 313 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6232 been comprehensively informed of the position of the international community regarding the use of force by the MUP in Kosovo.
1262. Human rights organisations condemned the actions of MUP and VJ forces in Kosovo in 1998. On 20 July 1998, HRW sent requests to the VJ, the MUP and the Serbian Secretary for Information on human rights violations in Kosovo.3403 In October 1998, HRW documented a series of crimes perpetrated by members of the VJ and the MUP against the Kosovo Albanian population in Drenica.3404 HRW also conducted an investigation into the massacre of civilians at Gornje Obrinje/Abria e Epërme in late September 1998.3405 The findings of this investigation were published in February 1999 and distributed widely to the press, including the FRY media.3406 HRW’s distribution list also included various entities within the Serb and Yugoslav government, including the Serbian MUP.3407
(ii) Knowledge of crimes in 1999
1263. \or|evi} knew that the common plan could only be implemented by the use of force, and he had detailed knowledge that crimes were being committed pursuant to the common plan. Information was available to \or|evi} through various channels: his observations on the ground; the reporting systems within the MUP; his meetings with senior MUP, VJ and civilian leadership; the media, and the complaints of the international community.
a. Knowledge of MUP operations
1264. The evidence establishes that \or|evi} was in Kosovo in January, February and March 1999, when the Spring offensive was planned, and in April 1999, during its implementation. He was travelling to Kosovo when the large scale crimes took place in the province. In fact, he was in Pri{tina/Prishtinë and Uro{evac/Ferizaj in mid April during the massive expulsions.
1265. \or|evi} continued to be involved in MUP operations in Kosovo during 1999. He monitored the Račak/Recak action from the Stimlje Police Station on 15 January 1999 and reported its outcome to [ainovi}.3408 He knew that the on site team investigating the incident found 40
3403 P742;P743;P744;P745;P746;P747;P748;Abrahams,P739,pp.2 3;T.3943 3948;P740,pp.30 32. HRW received no response to their requests for information: T.3945;P738,p.5. 3404 P753;Abrahams,P741,pp.26 34;T.3942 3943. 3405 Abrahams,T.3949 3952. 3406 Abrahams,T.3950;P753,p.3. 3407 Abrahams,T.3937 3940,3943,4078 4079;P741,p.3;P740, p.26. 3408 See supra paras.1124 1137.
IT-05-87/1-T 314 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6231 bodies at the mosque in Račak/Recak and that KVM Head William Walker had called the action “a civilian massacre”.3409
1266. \or|evi} made several trips to Kosovo between February and June 1999, which allowed him to follow the situation on the ground first hand:
• On 17 February 1999, \or|evi} attended a MUP Staff meeting where Luki} presented the RJB plan to conduct three large scale “mopping up” operations in the Podujevo/Podujevë, Dragobilja and Drenica areas.3410 • On 8 March 1999, \or|evi} participated at a MUP Staff meeting where the overall security situation in Kosovo and the implementation of measures in the defence plan were discussed.3411 At the time, the MUP and VJ had intensified the activities on the ground and were conducting “mopping up” operations in Ka~anik3412 and Vucitrn.3413 • On 16 April 1999, \or|evi} took part in a meeting at the MUP Staff with Stojijlkovi} and TEC President Zoran Andjelkovi}.3414 • On 18 April 1999, \or|evi} met with Luki} and other MUP Staff members at the MUP Staff. He also met with the Pri{tina and Uro{evac SUP chiefs at their respective SUPs.3415 That afternoon, he met with Pavkovi}, Lazarevi} and \akovi} at the premises of the PrK staff. Luki} and Stevanovi} also attended this meeting.3416 • On 1 June 1999, \or|evi} was present at a Joint Command meeting in Pri{tina, also 3417 attended by [ainovi}, Pavkovi}, Lazarevi}, Stevanovi}, and Luki}. • On 10 June 1999, \or|evi} attended a meeting in Pri{tina about the implementation of the Kumanovo agreement concerning the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo.3418
1267. When in Belgrade, \or|evi} attended weekly meetings of the MUP Minister’s Collegium, where the situation on the ground in Kosovo was discussed. \or|evi}’s claims that the Collegium never discussed anti terrorist operations in Kosovo3419 are not credible. Even Mi{i} had to accept that in view of the extremely complex security situation in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, the situation
3409 Ðorðević,T.9670 9672. 3410 P85,p.1. 3411 Cveti},T.6682 6684. 3412 Drewienkiewicz,T.6407;P996,para.192;P844,p.7;P1029,pp.51,67.See also Ciaglinski,T.5259 5260. 3413 Drewienkiewicz,T.6374 6375;P996,paras.190 191;P844,p.7;P1029,p.52. 3414 \or|evi},T.9735. 3415 \or|evi},T.9737 9738. 3416 \or|evi},T.10020. 3417 See supra paras.302 307. 3418 \or|evi},T.9760 9761,10022 10023. 3419 Ðorðević,T.9419 9420
IT-05-87/1-T 315 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6230 in the province was one of the priorities at Collegium meetings.3420 He agreed that the replenishment and number of police units engaged in combating terrorism in Kosovo was discussed at these meetings.3421
1268. More generally, it is inconceivable that the MUP Minister’s Collegium would discuss the security situation in the province, with detailed information on the number of police units in the field, but knew nothing about the operations these units were conducting. In 1998 and in 1999, the conflict in Kosovo was the most important security related situation involving the MUP. Collegium members therefore must have been fully informed of operations on the ground.
1269. \or|evi} also knew about the situation in Kosovo through the MUP reporting systems. During the Indictment period, the MUP had well functioning reporting systems in place. The Duty Operations Centre at the MUP HQ provided a means for senior MUP officials to remain informed of the activities of field headquarters and units.3422 SUPs were under an obligation to forward reports to the MUP Staff and Operations Centre.3423 The Operations Centre then forwarded the information to the Analyses Administration, which compiled a summary of events and incidents for Serbia,3424 and distributed these reports to the senior leadership of the Ministry.3425 The MUP Staff also sent daily bulletins to the MUP HQ.3426
1270. In his dispatches, \or|evi} regularly reminded RJB units to report all events of security interest to the Operations Centre at the Ministry HQ.3427
1271. \or|evi} also received oral reports from his subordinates about the activities of MUP units in Kosovo.3428 Trajkovi} said that when he was in the field, he would normally use his mobile phone to communicate important information to other MUP officers.3429 Trajkovi} described calling \or|evi} in late March 1999 from his mobile phone to ask about obtaining additional men for the SAJ.3430 When testifying before a Belgrade Court on 26 June 2009, \or|evi} acknowledged that “Everything that was happening in the organs of the interior was for the most part brought to my
3420Mi{i},T.14086. 3421 Mi{i},T.14032,14040,14054,14086–14088,14090,14092,14907.See also Mi{i},T.14095. 3422 P357,Art.17. 3423 See e.g. Cveti},T.6723: he testified that everything that happened in the territory of the SUPs was reported to the Ministry and the MUP Staff. 3424 Mi{i},T.14044. 3425 See e.g. D275;Cveti},T.6845 6846. 3426 See Part III, Section(A)(3)(b)(ii). 3427 See e.g. P1203;P356. 3428 See Part III, Section(A)(3)(b)(ii). 3429 Trajkovi},T.9090 9091. 3430 Trajkovi},T.9090.
IT-05-87/1-T 316 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6229 attention through regular channels or in some other way."3431 He later clarified that by regular channels, he meant “by telephone or somebody coming personally and conveying whatever it is they had to convey.”3432
b. Knowledge of large scale displacement
1272. By early April 1999, Ðorñević was aware of the numbers of Kosovo Albanians fleeing Kosovo.3433 Lukić’s daily dispatches to the MUP in Belgrade provided a daily count of the increasing number of Kosovo Albanian refugees fleeing the province.3434 On 1 May 1999, Lukić reported that a total of 715.158 persons “belonging to the [iptar national minority” had left the territory.3435
1273. During his trips to Kosovo, \or|evi} was in a position to observe the situation on the ground first hand. While at the Uro{evac SUP on 18 April 1999, the SUP Chief briefed \or|evi} about the situation on the ground and told him “that movement was noted of civilians, primarily by train to Macedonia, because the railway line goes through Uro{evac”. 3436 \or|evi} testified that this information was not new to him, as he had heard about the large scale departure of the population while in Belgrade.3437
c. Knowledge of killings
1274. From the onset of the conflict, \or|evi} knew of specific crimes committed by his subordinates. He was directly informed about the massacre of women and children in Podujevo on 28 March 1999 by the Skorpions, a unit he had just integrated into the SAJ and deployed.3438 \or|evi} asked Trajkovi} to prepare a simple report about the incident in mid May,3439 but took no further measures to ensure that the perpetrators of this massacre were punished. \or|evi} knew of the criminal propensity of this unit, and knew they were likely to commit serious crimes. However,
3431 P1508,p.5. 3432 \or|evi},T.10086 10087. 3433 P718,p. 5.See \or|evi},T.10089. 3434 See e.g. P718,p.5;P697,p.6;P719,p.6;P720,p.5;P721,pp.5 6;P698,p.4;P722,p.4;P723,p.3;P699,p.5. 3435 P694,p.8. The exhibit says, in error, “Between 24 April and 30 April 1999 […]”. P701,p.5 indicates that the period in question is that between 24 March and 30 April 1999. 3436 \or|evi}, T.10021. 3437 \or|evi}, T.10021. 3438 Ðorðević, T.9703 9705. See Part V, Section(C)(1)(f)(ii). 3439 Trajković,T.9106 9107(in relation to P86);Ðorðević,T.9713,10113 10114.See D442;P86.
IT-05-87/1-T 317 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6228 he re deployed the unit to Kosovo in April 1999, where it participated in “clearing up” operations with PJP units, during which the homes of Kosovo Albanians were burnt down.3440
1275. Throughout the conflict, \or|evi} had reliable information that MUP units in Kosovo were killing Kosovo Albanian civilians. He participated in concealing truckloads of victims’ bodies at different mass grave sites in Serbia proper. He knew that these were the bodies of murdered Kosovo Albanians,3441 and thus that unlawful killings of civilians were taking place in Kosovo.
1276. In the course of seeking to place the responsibility for dealing with these bodies onto the Minister, \or|evi} made a number of significant admissions with respect to notice.3442 He stated, for example, that the Minister,
made it known to me that he was fully behind it; that certain incidents had happened down there; and that something should be done in order to prevent the revelation of the finding of these bodies because of the whole NATO campaign and bombing. And he also added that no further measures should be undertaken in order to establish the true facts, that is to say to establish the origin of the bodies and how they were killed.3443
1277. \or|evi} ultimately accepted that he knew these were victims of illegal killings:
Q. Didn't you at least suspect that Mr. Stojiljkovi} wanted these bodies concealed because they resulted from irregular activities of persons that he was responsible for, that is the police?
A. Well, of course I had I suspected that the people came to harm in the activities at Kosovo, but I couldn't know how that happened, whether we're speak talking about crimes or bombing or something else, but everything indicates what you're assuming, but those were my assumptions, too, that those were bodies of persons who had lost their lives under circumstances I was unfamiliar with then, and I could suppose that they had been killed in one or more of many ways.3444
1278. Even accepting \or|evi}’s claims that he initially knew nothing about how these bodies ended up in trucks in the first place, as truckloads of bodies began arriving from Kosovo, \or|evi} was given clear notice of crimes that were obviously occurring on a truly alarming scale. From the very nature of this evidence, \or|evi} would have been aware that these murders were not isolated incidents, but systematic killings committed by the forces deployed on the ground. \or|evi} acknowledged that his role was neither proper nor lawful.3445
1279. \or|evi} claimed that he did not have information about the perpetrators, but these bodies were coming from Kosovo, where his men were deployed and actively engaged in operations.
3440 Stopari},P493,para.68. 3441 See Part III, Section(B)(5). 3442 Ðorðevic,T.9723. 3443 Ðorðevic,T.9723 9724. 3444 \or|evi},T.10008(emphasis added). 3445 \or|evi},T.10010.
IT-05-87/1-T 318 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6227 \or|evi} accepted the possibility that the police could be responsible for these murders.3446 Given the circumstances, this inference was inescapable.
1280. In his testimony, \or|evi} ultimately acknowledged his responsibility in the concealment of the crime of murder. He stated: “I am ashamed of my deeds, and I believe that the Court's decision will be adequate, and I will be held responsible for what I did”.3447
d. Knowledge of crimes at high level meetings in Belgrade
1281. The issue of serious crimes being committed by VJ and MUP members was discussed at a meeting with the FRY and Serbian military and civilian leadership on 4 May 1999 that \or|evi} attended.3448 Milutinovi}, Stojiljkovi}, Ojdani} and the most senior VJ and MUP officers, and senior politicians, were present.3449 Pavkovi} and Luki} briefed the gathering about the security situation in Kosovo.3450 According to a press report about the meeting, information was presented that the MUP and the VJ had dealt with numerous cases of violence, killings, pillage, and other crimes, and had arrested several hundred perpetrators whose crimes were a great danger to the civilian population.3451
1282. Several sources corroborate this account of the 4 May 1999 meeting: • Serbian media reported that Milo{evi} held a detailed meeting on 4 May with army and police heads to discuss the security situation in Kosovo, including numerous cases of crimes against civilians.3452 • Two days after the meeting, Lukić issued a formal order to MUP personnel to familiarise themselves with the contents of an article from Politika, dated 5 May, and to adhere to its directions.3453 He further directed SUP chiefs and PJP and SAJ commanders to take “all measures in the forthcoming period to prevent paramilitary formations and individuals from committing acts of violence, killing, raping, looting and other criminal acts… against civilians”.3454
3446 \or|evi},T.10011. 3447 \ro|evi},T.10006. 3448 Ðorðević,T.9743, 10144. 3449 Ðorðević,T.9743 9744. 3450 Ðorðević,T.9743. 3451 P1537,p.1. 3452 P1537;D443. 3453 D443. 3454 D443,p. 2.
IT-05-87/1-T 319 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6226 • The statements made by Šainović at the MUP Staff meeting of 7 May confirm the accuracy of the press accounts.3455
e. Knowledge of crimes from the international community and the media
1283. On 27 May 1999, the initial ICTY indictment against Milo{evi}, Milutinovi}, [ainovi}, Ojdani} and Stojiljkovi} was made public.3456 This indictment contained detailed allegations about serious crimes —such as deportation, murder, and rape— committed by MUP forces across Kosovo. This put \or|ević on direct notice that forces under his command were alleged to be responsible for war crimes against ethnic Albanian civilians.
1284. Given the extensive publicity the indictment received in the media, \or|evi} would have been made aware of it soon after 27 May. He would have also been aware of the specific charges levelled against Stojiljkovi} and the MUP. \or|evi} stated that he learned about the indictment related to Kosovo but had no information about its contents. Despite the fact that Stojiljkovi} was in the neighbouring office, \or|evi} said that they never discussed the indictment and that he did not read it.3457 However, Mi{i}, who worked in the office next to \or|evi}’s, heard about the indictment from the press and said that he informally discussed it with Stojiljkovi}.3458 Although Mi{i} and Stojiljkovi} did not discuss the specific charges within the indictment,3459 Mi{i} presumed that the indictment included charges for crimes committed by MUP forces in Kosovo during the war in 1999 because the foreign press and the media reported this.3460 This information would have also been available to \or|evi}.
1285. Both domestic and international press covered the 1999 Kosovo conflict extensively. For example, on 5 April 1999, the New York Times ran a story on the killing of the Berisha family by Serbian police in Suva Reka.3461 On 7 April 1999, the same newspaper published an article on the killing of roughly one hundred people by Serb forces in the village of Mala Kru{a.3462 On 17 July 1999 Vreme magazine reported:
In the three months of war, almost 700.000 of the Albanian residents were deported from Kosovo. Many of their houses were burnt and looted. The investigation by international experts who are working on several mass graves in Kosovo at the moment should show how many of them were killed and in what way 3463… 3455 P771,p. 4. 3456 P42. 3457 \or|evi},T.10076 10078;P42. 3458 Mi{i},T.14136 14137. 3459 Mi{i},T.14136–14139,14143. 3460 Mi{i},T.14137. 3461 P1514. 3462 P1515. 3463 P1516,p.1.
IT-05-87/1-T 320 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6225 There is no ... doubt now: The state military, police, and paramilitary forces committed horrible crimes in Kosovo.3464
1286. \or|evi} claimed that he followed Serbian, but not foreign, media during the war,3465 and that he was not familiar with the Vreme article or with any crime committed.3466 He stated that he only heard about such crimes for the first time during his trial before this Tribunal.3467 His position that he did not know of specific allegations of MUP crimes is wholly incredible given his high profile position at the time and the widespread media coverage of the conflict.
2. \or|evi} shared the intent to carry out the common plan
1287. \or|evi} shared the intent to carry out the common plan and thus intended for the crimes to occur. His actions, including controlling MUP units engaged in combat operations, and his participation in the MUP Minister’s Collegium, the MUP Staff and the Joint Command during the commission of the crimes, demonstrate that he intended to modify the ethnic balance in Kosovo through criminal means, which included the commission of the crimes charged in the Indictment.
1288. In light of his involvement in Kosovo in 1998, when excessive and disproportionate force was used by the FRY/Serbian authorities resulting in the displacement of approximately 230,000 Kosovo Albanians, \or|evi} would have been well able to predict the repetition of this situation should he deploy MUP units to Kosovo in 1999. Despite \or|evi}’s knowledge of the widespread crimes being committed in the territory of Kosovo by members of the MUP and the VJ, he continued to instruct the MUP to engage in additional joint operations with the VJ in Kosovo.
1289. Moreover, although he had the power to do so, as Head of the RJB and a high ranking member of the MUP, he deliberately refrained from intervening against the perpetrators of crimes. By organising the concealment of the crime of murder, and by repeatedly failing to use his position of authority to prevent his subordinates from committing crimes or to punish those who had perpetrated crimes, he demonstrated his approval of these crimes. In contrast to his extensive knowledge of crimes in Kosovo, \or|evi} took no action against the perpetrators.
1290. The only reasonable inference is that \or|evi} had the intent to forcibly displace the Kosovo Albanian population by means of forcible transfer, deportation, murder and persecutions (based on forcible transfer, deportation, murder, sexual assault and wanton destruction and damage to religious sites) and thereby ensure continued control by the FRY and Serbian authorities over the 3464 P1516, p.2. 3465 \or|evi},T.10078. 3466 \or|evi},T.10071 10072. 3467 \or|evi},T.10084.
IT-05-87/1-T 321 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6224 province. He shared this intent with other members of the JCE, such as Milo{evi}, Stojiljkovi}, Ojdani}, [ainovi}, Pavkovi}, Luki} and Lazarevi}.
1291. In the alternative, if any of the crimes are found to fall outside the common purpose of the JCE, his knowledge of the events in 1998 shows that he was aware that such crimes were at least a possible consequence of the implementation of the common purpose to modify the ethnic balance through a campaign of deportations and forcible transfer during 1999. In 1998, \or|evi} played a central role in planning, organising, and directing the work of MUP units in Kosovo. He was also intimately involved in the Joint Command, the body that oversaw and implement joint MUP/VJ operations during the summer of 1998. When the common plan was implemented, \or|evi} knew that joint MUP/VJ operations in 1998 had led to the use of excessive force and widespread crimes against civilians. He nevertheless re engaged the MUP with the VJ in an offensive of far greater scale in 1999, which involved the use violence and terror to displace Kosovo Albanians. In so doing, \or|evi} accepted the risk that these forces might commit crimes such as murders and persecutions (based on forcible transfer, deportation, murder, sexual assault and wanton destruction and damage to religious sites) to forcibly displace Kosovo Albanians.
3. Other forms of participation under Article 7(1)
(a) \or|evi} is responsible for aiding and abetting the commission of crimes
1292. In the alternative to his liability as a member of the JCE, \or|evi} is responsible for aiding and abetting the commission of crimes under Article 7(1) of the Statute. \or|evi} provided practical assistance, encouragement and moral support to the perpetrators of crimes. \or|evi} knew of the commission of widespread crimes by the forces of the FRY and Serbia and was aware that he was assisting the commission of such crimes.
1293. \or|evi} provided moral support and practical assistance to the perpetrators of deportation, forcible transfer, murder, persecutions (based on forcible transfer, deportation, murder, sexual assaults and the wanton destruction or damage of religious sites). He contributed by deploying PJP units to Kosovo to participate in joint operations with the VJ during the NATO bombing and by furnishing them with equipment. He also incorporated paramilitaries into the MUP to participate in these operations. He armed local Serbs and ordered their engagement with the MUP in 1999. He participated in the planning of the joint operations conducted by the MUP.3468
3468 See Part V, Section(C)(1).
IT-05-87/1-T 322 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6223 1294. \or|evi} played a leading role in co ordinating large scale operations to conceal the evidence of widespread murders committed by his forces against Kosovo Albanians during the two month period from early April.3469 While \or|evi} was acting to conceal shipments of bodies to Batajnica murders were still being committed in Kosovo by these forces. Operations to quickly and surreptitiously transport bodies require organization and pre planning. When bodies were moved, concealment measures were often known in advance.3470 Across Kosovo, forces on the ground sought to conceal the evidence of civilian massacres by burning the bodies3471, hiding them in wells3472, dynamiting them en masse,3473 or most effectively, removing the bodies from the crime sites entirely and burying them in another location.3474 The perpetrators of the murders – the forces on the ground and those who commanded them – at Meja/Mejë, \akovica/Gjakove municipality on or about 27 or 28 April3475 knew that systematic actions were being taken to conceal the evidence of murder. Knowing that the bodies would be taken care of provided substantial support to the perpetrators.
1295. Further, despite his awareness of crimes, \or|evi} refrained from taking any measures at his disposal to ensure adequate investigations of serious crimes by the MUP. His failure to take adequate measures to investigate crimes enabled and encouraged MUP forces to continue their campaign of terror, violence and displacement with the VJ.3476 He therefore substantially contributed to the commission of these crimes.
1296. \or|evi} knew that the MUP and the VJ were responsible for serious criminal acts against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in 1998.3477 He thus knew that excessive use of force, including deportation, forcible transfer, murder, persecutions (based on forcible transfer, deportation, murder, sexual assaults and the wanton destruction or damage of religious sites) were probable once he ordered the MUP into Kosovo in 1999 and that his conduct would substantially assist the commission of the crimes.
1297. \or|evi} was aware of the general campaign of forcible displacements conducted by the VJ and the MUP throughout Kosovo during the NATO bombing. He was also aware of the broad
3469 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(g). 3470 When members of the MUP massacred members of the Berisha family at a pizzeria in Suva Reka/Suharekë, for example, civilian protection workers were on the scene within 15 20 minutes and two trucks were promptly brought to the scene, which police ordered to be loaded with bodies (K83,T.389 392). 3471 See Part IV,Section(C )(15)(a), Qyshk/^uska. 3472 See Part IV,Section(C )(11)(a), Kotlina/Kotlinë. 3473 See Part IV Section (C )(1)(d), Mala Kru{a/Krusë e Vogel. 3474 See Part III Section (B)(5). 3475 See Part IV Section (C)(8)(d),Meja/Mejë. 3476 See Part V Section (C )(1)(g). 3477 See Part V Section (C)(1)(h)(i).
IT-05-87/1-T 323 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6222 discriminatory context of the conflict. The combination of his general knowledge of the widespread displacement of Kosovo Albanians in the course of MUP operations combined with his specific knowledge of locations of those operations3478 show that he knew of the campaign of terror, violence deportation and forcible displacement being carried out by MUP and VJ forces against Kosovo Albanians.3479
1298. In relation to murders and persecutions (based on sexual assaults and the wanton destruction or damage of religious sites), \or|evi} knew that it was probable these crimes would be committed by MUP units during joint MUP/VJ operations in 1999. He was fully aware of the high ethnic animosities in Kosovo. Based on his own observations in the field, he was aware that MUP forces torched civilian homes and villages during their operations in 19983480 and were likely to engage in similar behaviour if redeployed in 1999. Through his participation at the meeting in Beli Dvor on 4 May 1999, he was aware of allegations of sexual violence involving members of the MUP.3481 That sexual violence is probable is not only consistent with common sense but also with the recent history in the former Yugoslavia. \or|evi} knew that a campaign of violence and terror was being carried out by joint MUP/VJ forces against Kosovo Albanians and that MUP members would probably commit these violent crimes against vulnerable ethnic Albanians when forcibly expelling them from their homes. He knew that destruction of property and sexual assault were probable consequences of this campaign. Being aware of the discriminatory nature of this campaign of violence, he must have been aware that such crimes would probably be carried out with the same discriminatory intent.
1299. When involved in the concealment operations, \ordevi} was aware that further killings would probably occur and that his involvement in the concealment would support the perpetrators.
(b) \or|evi} is responsible for planning, ordering and instigating
1300. The facts set out above also establish the criminal responsibility of \or|evi} on the basis of planning and ordering under Article 7(1) of the Statute. These facts, combined with \or|evi}’s failure to discipline MUP officials who committed crimes, establish the criminal responsibility of \or|evi} on the basis of instigating. Despite his knowledge of the crimes committed by MUP units during the Indictment period, \or|ević failed to take substantive measures to prevent his subordinates from committing further crimes, or punish them for the crimes they had committed.
3478 See Part V, Section(C )(1)(2). 3479 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(i)(ii). 3480 See Part V, Section(C )(1)(i)(i)(b). 3481 See Part V, Section(C )(1)(i)(ii)(d).
IT-05-87/1-T 324 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6221 D. Vlastimir ðorñević’s Individual Criminal Responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute
1301. The evidence establishes that \or|evi} is liable as a superior under Article 7(3) for the crimes charged in the Indictment that were committed by members of the RJB.
1. Superior subordinate relationship
1302. As Assistant Minister of the MUP and Chief of the RJB, Ðorñević exercised de jure and de facto authority over all RJB units in Kosovo, including PJP units and the SAJ.3482
1303. As Chief of the RJB, \or|evi} had effective control over his subordinates. He had the material ability to prevent crimes from being committed as well as to punish crimes. He had the authority to enforce discipline among members of MUP units,3483 which included the authority to establish appropriate investigating bodies or commissions.3484
1304. Ðorñević had the power to issue orders to subordinate officers, including Luki}, members of the MUP Staff and PJP commanders in Kosovo.3485 SUP Chiefs were subordinate to Ðorñević and under the principle of subordination they were obliged to comply with his orders.3486 If SUP Chiefs did not comply with his orders, \or|evi} had the power to discipline them. He could also reassign or remove them from the MUP.3487 Based on the principle of subordination, SUP Chiefs were duty bound to report to him.3488 \or|evi} had the authority to enforce this obligation to report.3489
1305. \or|evi} had the authority to demand specific information. For example, on 21 December 1998, \or|evi} sent a dispatch to the SUP Chiefs and the MUP Staff ordering the prevention of “the crimes and violations that could be committed through the use of firearms and may contain elements of violence, especially murder, robbery, aggravated theft, the stealing of vehicles and so
3482 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(c). 3483 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(c)(ii). See also Vasiljevi},T.5679,5681 5682,5684;P884,p. 1. 3484 See P357, Arts.2,10. \or|evi},T.9723 (“Then I proposed that I myself would set up such a group to investigate the situation”.). 3485 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(c)(i) (iv). 3486 Keri},T.7811. 3487 Keri},T.7811. 3488 Ðorðević,T.10050. See also, Part III, Section(A)(3)(b)(ii)(d). 3489 Keri},T.7811.
IT-05-87/1-T 325 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6220 on”.3490 In this dispatch, he requested certain information and set deadlines for receipt of this information.3491
1306. \or|evi}’s dispatch dated 9 April 1999 further illustrates his disciplinary authority. In this dispatch, \or|evi} set out certain disciplinary procedures. He informed SUP Chiefs about the recently adopted Decree on Internal Affairs During the State of War, which regulated the duties of MUP superiors to investigate and conduct preliminary proceedings against subordinates who had breached the law.3492 Pursuant to his authority emanating from this decree, he authorised heads of organisational units to impose the disciplinary sanctions prescribed in the decree for serious violations of employment obligations and duties.3493 \or|evi}’s dispatch was implemented by Assistant Minister Petar Zekovi}.3494
1307. SUP Chiefs who were subordinate to \or|evi} played a key role in the MUP disciplinary procedure. In order to discipline an insubordinate policeman, his immediate superior, for example, the unit commander or OUP Chief would inform the respective SUP Chief.3495 The SUP Chief would then request the prosecutor to initiate disciplinary proceedings after which the prosecutor would submit a request to the court.3496
1308. Crimes committed in connection with official duties, including war crimes and crimes against humanity would constitute a breach of duty and provided grounds for disciplinary action.3497 If the alleged breach of discipline was a criminal offence, the SUP Chief was required to inform the MUP HQ and request approval that criminal proceedings be initiated against the offender.3498 Simultaneously, a disciplinary procedure would be instigated and the perpetrator would be suspended until the completion of the procedures.3499 Upon approval from the MUP HQ,3500 the SUP Chief would submit a criminal report and a motion for disciplinary action to a disciplinary
3490 P717,p.1; \or|evi},T.9659. P1479 is \or|evi}’s order of 24 December 1999 to the SUP Chiefs on points for drawing up a report on the work done in 1999. At p.3, he requested information on crimes rates including the number and categories of crimes and perpetrators. 3491P717,p.4. See also P1203. This is a dispatch from \or|evi} dated 7 October 1998 in which he orders the SUP Chief and the MUP Staff to "Report all events and incidents of security interest to the operations centre and the work lines at the Ministry headquarters immediately." 3492 Cveti},T.6711 6712;P1050. 3493 P1050,p.2. 3494 D262/P1480; \or|evi},T.9752. 3495 Cveti},T.6704,6708,6852;\or|evi},T.9522 9523;Brakovi},T.4117 4118. Brakovi} said that when a PJP member had to be disciplined the company commander would report the incident to the appropriate SUP Chief. The company commander could not take disciplinary action himself. 3496 Cveti},T.6704;Miti},T.12725. 3497 P66, Arts.50 57. See also \or|evi},T.9516 9518;Cveti},T.6743. 3498Cvetić, T6708,6711,6757 6758;See P1049, Arts.8 10; P66,Arts.50 57; See e.g. P1434,P1435 P1437,P1546. 3499 Cveti},T.6709. 3500 Cveti},T.6757,6758. Cveti} stated that his requests for disciplinary proceedings in cases of serious violations were never denied.
IT-05-87/1-T 326 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6219 prosecutor.3501 Criminal proceedings were not a substitute for disciplinary proceedings: both proceedings needed to be conducted.3502
1309. During the Indictment period, a functioning justice system existed to enforce the law within the MUP. MUP disciplinary courts were in place to establish both disciplinary responsibility and an internal system of justice.3503 As the civilian court system functioned normally during the relevant period, MUP perpetrators should have been prosecuted under the regular criminal law system for crimes committed in Kosovo.3504 Various legal procedures were thus in place, allowing for efficient investigations and prosecutions.3505
1310. The Law on Internal Affairs established a framework for disciplining MUP officials who breached their professional duties.3506 The Decree on Disciplinary Responsibility regulated the duties of MUP superiors to investigate and conduct preliminary proceedings against subordinates who had breached the law.3507 Together with the Law on Internal Affairs, the Decree on Disciplinary Responsibility created the legal mechanisms for enforcing discipline in the MUP.
1311. On 24 March 1999, the Decree on Internal Affairs During the State of War was issued following the Declaration of War.3508 The Decree simplified the disciplinary system by authorising the head of a sector of the MUP (i.e. Ðorñević or Marković) or a person designated by him to discipline MUP personnel for certain breaches without resort to the usual procedures.3509 According to \or|evi}, this decree made disciplinary proceedings more urgent by abbreviating certain procedural actions and superiors could immediately discipline subordinates.3510 As Chief of the RJB, \or|evi} had responsibility to ensure the functioning of the disciplinary proceedings and courts.3511
3501 Cveti},T.6704 6705,6708 6709,6852;P1049, Art.10. 3502 Cveti},T.6711. See also Cveti},T.6852;D282. 3503 See also Brakovi},T.4118. 3504 See e.g. P50, Arts.47 48. Cveti}, T.6708. Marinkovi} testified about her work in Kosovo thus indicating that the judicial system was functioning (T.12942 12952) See also D874 D886. 3505 Marinkovi}, T.12906. See also T.12898,D855. Pursuant to P200, provided certain conditions were met, the investigating judge was able to expedite the conduct of certain investigative activities without authorisation from the public prosecutor. See also, Keri},T.7821;Panteli},T.12163. 3506 P66, Arts.14, 23. 3507 P1049,Arts.11 33. See also Panteli}, T.12160 12162;\or|evi},T.9518 9519;Cveti}.T.6710 6711,6757 3508 P47. 3509 P47, Art.9; See also \or|evi},T.9521;Miti},T.12725 12726;Panteli},T.12099 12102. 3510 \or|evi},T.9521. 3511 Cveti},T.6712.
IT-05-87/1-T 327 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6218 2. Knew or had reason to know and failure to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or to punish
(a) Failure to prevent
(i) Ðorñević had reason to know of and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent crimes committed by his subordinates in 1999
1312. \or|evi} knew that the excessive force used by the forces of the FRY and Serbia during operations in 1998 led to the commission of crimes against the ethnic Albanian civilian population.3512 In light of his knowledge of the widespread nature of the serious crimes such as murder and destruction committed by his units in 1998, \or|evi} should have ensured that crimes were adequately reported, investigations were initiated and perpetrators punished. By deliberately failing to do so, \or|evi} encouraged and gave legitimacy to crimes committed against Kosovo Albanians in 1999. He did not restrain the MUP’s heavy handed tactics that led to the widespread crimes against civilians in 1998. Instead he supported them by redeploying the same units in 1999 that followed the same pattern of engagement. By not punishing and removing perpetrators of crimes from units he was redeploying, \or|evi} failed to take reasonable and necessary measures to prevent the commission of crimes in 1999. Thus, Ðorñević had reason to know that similar crimes would be committed by his subordinates in 1999.3513 Therefore his failure to punish resulted in his failure to prevent the crimes in 1999.
1313. Specifically, \or|evi} knew that policemen who killed civilians by using excessive force during MUP operations in 1998 went unpunished. The massacres of the Jashari and Delijaj families in March and September 1998 underline this failure. By not taking punitive measures, \or|evi} tacitly approved their criminality and failed to prevent further killings of civilians in 1999.
1314. In March 1998, the police attack on the Jashari compound resulted in 58 people being killed, 28 of whom were women, teenagers and children. \or|evi} played a key role in this operation.3514 \or|evi} claimed that judicial organs carried out an on site investigation.3515 Even if an investigation was undertaken, no disciplinary action was initiated against the policemen.
3512 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(i)(i). 3513 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(i)(ii). 3514 See Part III, Section(A)(2)(b)(iii). See also supra paras.104 105. 3515 \or|evi},T.9541 9542. See also, P741,p.38.
IT-05-87/1-T 328 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6217 1315. Similarly, MUP units that were involved in the massacre of the Delilaj family in Gornje Obrinje/Abria e Epërme in September 1998 went unpunished.3516 This was a joint MUP VJ action that resulted in the killing of 21 members of the Delijaj family, 11 of whom were women and children.3517 In December 1998, an on site investigation was attempted but it was never completed. 3518
1316. As was the case with the Jashari incident, \or|evi} knew that his subordinates were allegedly involved in the killing of women and children in Gornje Obrinje/Abria e Epërme. He made no effort to ensure that the incident was investigated. While on site investigations fall within the purview of the judiciary, this does not absolve \or|evi} of his responsibilities as a MUP commander.3519 By \or|evi}’s own admission, the RJB was responsible for “determining criminal liability after anti terrorist actions”.3520 He did nothing and as such failed to prevent crimes against civilians in 1999.
1317. The criminal conduct of the 37th PJP detachment 4th Company (Ni{ Detachment) in 1998 and 1999 further illustrates \or|evi}’s failure to prevent crimes.3521 In July 1998, \or|evi} ordered the dispatch of this unit to Kosovo.3522 \or|evi} knew that crimes were being committed during the summer offensive which had resulted in widespread destruction.3523 In particular, this unit participated in the summer offensive where it committed crimes.3524 However, murders, looting and rapes committed by the unit remained unpunished. Only two members of the unit were arrested in 1999.3525
1318. In March 1999, \or|evi} re deployed the unit to Kosovo.3526 Given its prior conduct, and the impunity it had enjoyed, it is no surprise that the unit continued to commit crimes in 1999. In
3516 See Part V Section (C)(1)(h)(i)(c). Kickert,T.2586;P485,p.3. 3517 Abrahams,T.3949 3950;P753,pp.11,37;P740,p.12. See also P891,p.3. 3518Marinkovi},T.12992 12993,13117 13118l;Kickert,D61;T.2593,2637 2638,2648,P478,p.5;P479,pp.41 43,50,93 95,104 106;P489;P490. 3519 Cveti},T.6711. See also Cveti},T.6852;D282. 3520 \or|evi},T.9543 9544. 3521 K79,P1259,pp.34,36,38 40,43 44,52,54 55,69 (under seal);P1260,pp.30,32,34 36,39,48,50 51.See also photos of burning villages and houses taken in Kosovo during the month of September 1998 (P1261,P1262,P1263) (under seal). 3522 P133. See Cveti},T.6658 6659;P139;P131. 3523 P886,pp.8,11,36,42,82,107. Although \or|evi} is not recorded as having participated in the discussions on 24 July or 7 August, it is assumed that he is present as he is not recorded as being absent. 3524 Supra fn.3523. 3525 K79,T.8290 (private session). 3526 P711.
IT-05-87/1-T 329 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6216 April 1999, the unit expelled civilians in the village of Ljubizda (Prizren municipality).3527 It also murdered civilians.3528
1319. Ðorñević failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent these crimes committed by his subordinates in 1998. Such measures included implementing orders to obey the law and ensuring compliance with them, and imposing disciplinary sanctions on members of the MUP who breached the law. Policemen who had committed crimes should have been disciplined and removed from Kosovo.
1320. In relation to the incidences set out above, at the very least, Ðorñević should have insisted that the relevant SUP Chiefs took steps to investigate. Ðorñević could also have requested reports from SUP Chiefs and inquired into disciplinary proceedings initiated against policemen who had committed these crimes against civilian, including killing women and children as a result of the excessive use of force. When initiating criminal proceedings, SUP Chiefs were required to inform the MUP HQ in Belgrade and to request their approval.3529 SUP Chiefs also had to conduct disciplinary proceedings alongside criminal proceedings.3530 As his subordinates, SUP Chiefs were duty bound to implement Ðorñević’s orders.3531
1321. Having had these measures available to him3532, Ðorñević should have ensured that steps were taken to punish the crimes committed in 1998. Instead, \or|evi} engaged the same units (including the policemen who had committed crimes) and employed the same tactics during the Indictment period. By persisting with this pattern of engagement, \or|evi} failed to prevent the commission of crimes in 1999. He redeployed units to Kosovo in 1999 where they committed the crimes charged in the Indictment.
(ii) \or|evi} had reason to know of and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent crimes committed by the Skorpions
1322. Members of the Skorpions murdered 16 civilians in Podujevo/Podujevë on 28 March.3533 The Skorpions were \or|evi}’s subordinates and he facilitated their deployment to Kosovo in
3527 K79,P1259,pp.78 79 (under seal);P1260,pp.70 71. 3528 K79,P1259,pp.72,94 95 (under seal);P1260,p.64,86 87. 3529Cvetić.T.6708 6709,6710 6711;6757 6758;See P1049,Arts.8 10;P66, Arts.50 57. See e.g. P1434,P1435,P1437,P1546. 3530 Cveti},T.6711. See also Cveti},T.6852;D282. 3531 Keri},T.7811. 3532 See supra paras.1304 1307. 3533 See Part IV, Section(C)(14).
IT-05-87/1-T 330 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6215 1999.3534 \or|evi} approved their incorporation into the RJB, as members of the SAJ.3535 The Skorpions were a notorious paramilitary group.3536 From as early as April 1998, \or|evi} was aware that such groups were “as a rule a front for criminal interests” and had even warned SUP Chiefs of this.3537 Thus he had reason to know that the Skorpions would commit crimes in 1999.
1323. Having had notice of the criminal propensities of the Skorpions, \or|evi} failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent crimes committed by the Skorpions. At the very least, \or|evi} must have known that some members of the Skorpions were unsuited for police duties in a war zone, and that at a minimum, background checks should be performed. He should have insisted that the men be screened before being sent to Kosovo. This basic step would have informed him that some members of the Skorpions had criminal pasts. Vasiljevi}, former Head of the VJ Security Administration was able to obtain this information from the VJ counter intelligence group.3538 According to Vasiljevi}, their general reputation was that they had: “criminal types in their ranks, problematic people [...]”.3539 As Chief of the RJB, \or|evi} could have obtained information on the Skorpions. He did not.
1324. \or|evi} also did not inquire whether these men received training in accordance with the law.3540 These men were being incorporated into the SAJ, the most elite special force of the RJB,3541 with some of the best trained men in the RJB, yet many members of the Skorpions were untrained with no fighting experience.3542 Having failed to request background checks, \or|evi} sent an untrained paramilitary group reputed to have criminals within its ranks to fight in Kosovo. By deploying them with disregard to their suitability for their tasks, \or|evi} put civilians in Kosovo at risk when he had a duty to protect them. Within minutes of arriving in Podujevo/Podujevë, they opened fire and killed elderly men, women and children.
1325. Having murdered civilians, the Skorpions were initially removed from Kosovo by the SAJ commander, Simovi}.3543 However, upon \or|evi}’s approval, they were later returned to
3534 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(f)(ii). Ðorðević,T.9697 9699 (private session),10104 (private session),10115. See also K92,T.2736 (closed session).See also P86,p.1;D442,p.1 3535 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(f)(ii). 3536 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(f)(ii)(d). 3537 \or|evi},T.9545;P709. 3538 Vasiljevi},T.5663,5667. 3539 Vasiljevi},T.5667. 3540 K92,T.2803,2805 (closed session). See Art.29 of the Law on Internal Affairs (P66). See also Arts. 27. 3541 Stopari},P493,para.39;\or|evi},T.9695. 3542 Stopari}, P493,para.39;K92,T.2805 (closed session). 3543 Simovi},T.13588. See also T.13720–13721,13753.
IT-05-87/1-T 331 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6214 Kosovo.3544 They then participated in joint actions with PJP units that resulted in the burning of Kosovo Albanian homes in order to prevent their return.3545
1326. Given his knowledge of the criminal propensities of his subordinates, Ðorñević should have taken proactive measures to investigate allegations of crimes committed by MUP members. He had sufficiently alarming information available to him to justify inquiry. He failed to do so and deployed units to Kosovo that committed crimes. Hence, he failed to prevent the crimes committed by his subordinates in 1999.
(b) Failure to punish
(i) Ðorñević knew about the Podujevo/Podujevë massacre and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to punish the crime
1327. The perpetrators of the Podujevo/Podujevë murders were members of the Skorpions who had been incorporated into the RJB as members of the SAJ.3546 They were \or|evi}’s subordinates and he had the material ability to punish them.3547 \or|evi} had specific notice that his subordinates had committed this crime.3548 Simovi}, the Commander of the Belgrade SAJ who was present at the crime scene informed \or|evi} that that some members of the Skorpions had murdered women and children.3549
1328. As Chief of the RJB, \or|evi} was responsible for ensuring that necessary and reasonable measures were taken to punish the members of the Skorpions involved in the murders they had committed in Podujevo/Podujevë on 28 March 1999. He failed to do so. The massacre was not investigated properly. Instead, it was covered up and the perpetrators were not punished until several years after the crime.
1329. \or|evi} claimed that he was satisfied that the incident was investigated at the time. He testified that although there were many problems in uncovering the truth, eventually the whole incident was processed.3550 However, as discussed below, the massacre in Podujevo was not adequately investigated and appropriate steps were not taken to punish the perpetrators.
3544 Ðorðević,T.10113. See PartV,Section(C )(1)(f)(ii)(i). 3545 Stopari},P493,para.68. See PartV, Section(C )(1)(f)(ii)(j). 3546 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(f)(ii)(c). 3547 Ðorðević,T.9697 9699,10104 (private session), 10115. See also K92,T.2736 (closed session). 3548Ðorðević,T.9697 9699,10104 (private session), 10115. See also K92,T.2736 (closed session). 3549 \or|evi},T.9703 9705,10052. Simovi},T.13588 13589 (“I also informed the head of sector, Mr. Vlastimir Djordjevic, in Belgrade, because I could not reach my own Commander Trajkovic on his cell phone.”) See also Simovi},T.13723; See Part V, Section(C)(1)(f)(ii)(f). 3550 Ðorðević,T.9705.
IT-05-87/1-T 332 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6213 1330. On 28 March, Simovi} told \or|evi} that the OUP had been notified about the incident and that operational actions were taken to detect the perpetrators of this crime.3551 However, Simovi} did not participate in the investigation on 28 March because he left for Belgrade on that day.3552 He also ordered that the Skorpions be returned to Serbia.3553 Simovi} informed \or|evi} about his departure and as such, \or|evi} was aware that the most senior MUP officer present at the crime scene had left after the incident without taking adequate steps to investigate or discipline his men.3554
1331. Simovi} claimed that he did not cover up any crime because when he learnt about the incident, he alerted the competent authorities that took all investigative measures required.3555 However, immediately after the killings occurred, Simovi} sent the prime suspects − the Skorpions − back to Prolom Banja, thereby obstructing a proper investigation. Simovi}’s sending away of the perpetrators and hasty departure from the scene without commencing any investigation is astounding. His conduct at the scene of this horrendous crime was clearly inadequate and this must have been clear to \or|evi}.
1332. Simovi} insisted that by notifying the OUP about the massacre, he had discharged his duties.3556 However Simovi} did not know what “further steps” the OUP took, or whether the investigating judge arrived after he left Podujevo.3557 In response to the proposition that when he left Podujevo/Podujevë, no investigating judge nor prosecutor arrived, he said: “I don't know”.3558 Despite not participating in the investigation, leaving the crime scene, and not knowing what steps were taken, he maintained that the police officers took the “necessary follow up steps” and informed an investigating judge.3559 His position is best encapsulated in the statement: “I know that measures were taken to conduct all investigative measures, but after I left for Belgrade, I don’t know what transpired”.3560 Moreover, when he returned to Kosovo some days later,3561 Simovi} did not contact anyone about the incident,3562 and thus did not keep himself informed about the
3551 Ðorðević,T.9705. 3552 Simovi},T.13615,13689,13723. 3553 Simovi},T.13588. See also T.13720–13721,13753. 3554 Simovi},T.13649 13650. 3555 Simovi},T.13652–13653. 3556 Simovi},T.13588,13615 13618,13622–13623,13648–13649,13652–13653,13658,13670,13673,13682,13723. 3557 Simovi},T.13590,13618,13654,13677. 3558 Simovi},T.13654. 3559 Simovi},T.13588,13615,13618,13620,13652 13654,13590 13591. 3560 Simovi},T.13677. 3561 Simovi},T.13591,13677 13678. 3562 Simovi},T.13621.
IT-05-87/1-T 333 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6212 investigation. Similarly, Stalevi}, another SAJ commander, did not ensure that the men would be questioned in Prolom Banja.3563
1333. \or|evi} failed to adopt any reasonable measures available to him to ensure that his subordinates, took any steps at all to investigate the incident and to identify the perpetrators. On the contrary, he acceded to Simovi}’s sending away the perpetrators from the scene without any investigation and worse, later he ordered Trajkovi} to disband and disperse them without ensuring that any investigations were conducted and the offenders apprehended.3564
1334. On 29 March 1999 \or|evi} received the MUP Staff Daily Bulletin for Kosovo for 28 March 1999 which made no reference to this serious crime.3565 The incident should have been listed under the “Serious Crimes” heading.3566 \or|evi} himself said: “These reports must include crimes committed in the territory”, and that the SUPs were duty bound to report to the MUP Staff and Ministry in Belgrade.3567 However, he was unable to explain why these multiple murders had not been reported up. He said: “Why this report does not include that information I cannot explain. I don't know why it is left unmentioned here”.3568 Neither could he explain the steps he took to rectify this serious failure of reporting.
1335. If the incident was being investigated by the SUP and the OUP, it should have been recorded in the Bulletin. This omission must have alerted \or|evi} to the fact that the Podujevo/Podujevë massacre was not being properly reported and investigated. Yet \or|evi} did not even inquire as to why this was the case. He did not contact his subordinates to demand an explanation for this alarming omission which indicated that a horrific crime committed by his subordinates was being overlooked without proper investigation. He took no steps to discipline the SUP Chief who was responsible for this omission or to demand that they conduct an investigation and report to him.3569 Having thus been alerted to the possibility that no investigations were being carried out by the responsible SUP or OUP, he failed to adopt any necessary and reasonable measures or any measures at all to ensure that the perpetrators were apprehended.
1336. \or|evi} maintained that “the information about this crime was received and the service reacted”.3570 Yet, as explained above, the immediate reaction of the service was the departure of the
3563 Stalevi},T.13884. 3564 Ðorðević,T. 9706 9707 (“I issued an order for this reserve force to be sent home”). See also Trajković,T. 9096. 3565 D296;Ðorðević,T.10050. Simovi},T.13674. See PartV, Section(C )(1)(f)(ii)(h). 3566 D296, item 5. See also Simovi}, T.13674. 3567 Ðorðević,T.10050. See also Part III, Section(A)(3)(b)(ii)(d). 3568 Ðorðević,T.10052. 3569 Ðorðević,T.10051. 3570 Ðorðević,T.10052.
IT-05-87/1-T 334 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6211 most senior officer (Simovi}) from the crime scene and the removal of the perpetrators, thus impeding the investigation.
1337. Stopari} a Skorpion member present at Podujevo/Podujevë, confirmed that the massacre was not investigated. He testified that when the Skorpions returned to Prolom Banja, no one questioned them about the Podujevo/Podujevë massacre. No one was arrested or taken into custody and no internal investigation was carried out.3571 Stopari} and other squad commanders unofficially asked their men whether they had taken part in the incident. Stopari} believed that this unofficial investigation was “obstructed by the commander”, Boca, because his brother, Dragan Medi}, was involved in the massacre. He said: “Therefore, it was possible that our investigation revealed who those involved were, but that is where it stopped. Nothing else happened.”3572 Stopari} believed that Dragan Medi} ordered the men to kill the civilians in the courtyard in Podujevo/Podujevë.3573 However, Dragan Medi} was not even questioned about the killings at that time.3574
1338. The investigation that eventually did follow was a token affair. On 30 March, an investigating judge conducted an on site investigation. \or|evi} could not explain why it took judicial authorities more than 24 hours to carry out the crime scene investigation.3575 According to Vasiljevi}, the corpses of the victims lay in the courtyard for three days.3576 In addition, the report of the on site investigation conducted on 30 March produced by an investigating judge was meagre. It contained no information about the perpetrators despite it being known that the Skorpions were the prime suspects. The report merely referred to the bodies of the victims found on site.3577
1339. In mid May, a month and a half after the massacre, \or|evi} asked Trajkovi} to prepare a report about the deployment of the Skorpions to Kosovo.3578 However, his purpose in requesting the report was not to investigate the crime and find the perpetrators.3579 The report made no mention of any steps taken by the MUP to investigate the incident or to detain the perpetrators.
1340. It was only on 23 May that the Podujevo/Podujevë OUP eventually filed criminal reports against members of the Skorpions [asa Cvetan and Dejan Demirovi} almost two months after the incident. During this time, the SAJ commanders on the ground, Simovi} and Stalevi}, did not
3571 Stopari},T.2843 2844;P495,pp.101 103. 3572 Stopari},T.2869;P495,p.18. 3573 Stopari},T.2839. 3574 Stopari},T.2844. 3575 Ðorðević,T.9706;D441. See Trajković,T.9097;Vasiljevi},T.5916,5736 .Vasiljevi} said that he later learned that due to road conditions, the investigation, while delayed, took place three days after the incident. 3576 Vasiljevi},T.5916,5736. 3577 D441. 3578 Trajković,T.9106 9107. See also P86. 3579 Ðorðević,T. 9713,10113 10114. See D442;P86.
IT-05-87/1-T 335 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6210 investigate the incident. Indeed Simovi} said that he did not know about the criminal reports and subsequent investigation in late May because he did not take part in it.3580 Thus, two months after the incident, the SAJ commanders’ disregard for this massacre persisted.
1341. On 24 May, the District Court in Prokuplje issued a decision to investigate and detain Cvetan and Demirovi}.3581 They were arrested at the end of the 1999 conflict, but were released some 10 or 20 days later. No one was brought to justice for the Podujevo/Podujevë massacre until several years after the end of \or|evi}’s tenure.3582 Judicial proceedings against four other members of the Skorpions − @eljko \uki}, Dragan Borojevi}, Dragan Medi} and Miodrad [olaja − were only initiated in April 2008, some nine years after the massacre.3583 Until then, they had not been held accountable for the killings of 28 March in Podujevo.
1342. Aside from these judicial measures, no internal disciplinary measures were taken by \or|evi} with the sense of urgency that a crime of this nature demanded. Instead of being detained and questioned, the prime suspects were initially sent away and even disarmed and disbanded on his orders. \or|evi} could have ordered his subordinates to ensure that the suspects were at least taken into custody for questioning after the incident.3584 Nevertheless, he merely requested and forwarded reports weeks after the incident. In the circumstances, this was not reasonable. Consequently, no internal MUP investigations or disciplinary actions were carried out at that time or during the remainder of \or|evi}’s tenure as RJB Chief which ended on 2001.
(ii) Ðorñević knew that his subordinates had committed murders and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to punish them
1343. Apart from the Podujevo/Podujevë massacre, \or|evi} failed to punish hundreds of murders that were committed by his subordinates in Kosovo. From early April and continuing over a period of approximately two months, \or|evi} co ordinated the concealment of truckloads of human corpses in mass graves in Serbia proper.3585 \or|evi} admitted that he participated in the concealment of bodies and that he was aware that these were bodies of victims of crimes.3586 Rather
3580 Simovi},T.13688 15689. 3581 P1592 and P1593. 3582 Stopari}, P493, paras 83 88;T.2835,2845 2849;P495,p.21. See Trajković,T.9097 9098;K92 (closed session), T.2742 2743. The Trial Chamber in Belgrade stated, “The Court fully accepted the statement of the witness Stopari} from the main hearing of 10 December 2003. This statement is clear and convincing and is, most importantly, consistent with the statements of the children – injured parties.” P40, p. 33. 3583 P1594. 3584 See supra paras.1304 1307. 3585 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(f). 3586 Ðorðević,T.10008 (“Well, of course I had I suspected that the people came to harm” in the activities in Kosovo).
IT-05-87/1-T 336 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6209 than punishing his subordinates who had perpetrated the murders, he assisted them by concealing these bodies.
1344. Contained in these trucks, as \or|evi} was well aware, were the bodies of Kosovo Albanian civilians.3587 \or|evi} knew that these were the bodies of Kosovo Albanian civilians that had been killed during joint operations involving his subordinates.3588 During joint operations, at the very least, his subordinates assisted in these murders. The obvious and inescapable inference is that these bodies were the evidence of widespread criminal acts in Kosovo. \or|evi} himself accepted that he was aware of the possibility that the perpetrators were police officers.3589 Evidence in regard to the several murder sites such as Suva Reka/Suharekë, Bela Crkva/Bellacërka, Mala Kru{a/Krusha e Vogël and Milo{ Gili}/Millosh Giliq Street, Pusto Selo/Pustaselë and Qyska/^uska indicates that the perpetrators of these massacres included policemen or armed persons attached to the police who were \or|evi}’s subordinates.3590 Some victims of the massacres at Suva Reka/Suharekë, Izbica/Izbicë and Meja/Mejë were identified from among the human remains found in the mass graves in Serbia proper.3591
1345. \or|evi} testified that his suggestion to Stojiljkovi} that a commission be set up to investigate the origins of these bodies was not taken up.3592 As Head of the RJB, \or|evi} was aware that he himself had a legal obligation to arrange for a proper investigation of these bodies. He had a legal duty to punish his subordinates who were responsible for murders. He made no attempts to fulfill this obligation and admitted that he failed to do so. He said: “I should have acted accordingly […] I didn't act that way, although I assumed that there may have been a crime involved and that the procedure wasn't regular and fair, but I didn't.”3593 These bodies were not autopsied and processed in any way. In this context, he accepted that “the Court’s decision will be adequate, and I will be held responsible”.3594
3587 Golubovi},T.1735 1736;P353,p.14;\or|evi},T. 9979. \or|evi} was also told that the truck in Bor stated clearly on its side that it was from Kosovo;\or|evi},T. 9721. 3588 See Part V, Section(C) (1)(g)(i). 3589 Ðorðević,T.10011. When it was put to him that he must have been aware of the possibility that policemen had committed these murders, he said: “Well, that's a mere assumption, whether it was the police or anybody else. I can't know who committed those crimes. Possibly the police…We saw here in the proceedings that there were really some gruesome situations. Who had committed those misdeeds and crimes. In some circumstances the perpetrators were police officers”. 3590 See Part IV, Section(C)(4)(a), Section(C)(1)(b), Section(C)(1)(d), Section(C)(8)(b), Section(C)(15). 3591 See Part III, Section (B)(5). 3592 \or|evi},T.9723 9724. 3593 Ðorðević,T.10010. 3594 \or|evi},T.10006,9723 9724. See also T.10002.
IT-05-87/1-T 337 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6208 1346. Instead of fulfilling his duty to investigate the murders, \or|evi} took a range of steps to ensure precisely the opposite — that the murders were concealed as comprehensively as possible. For example:
He gave an unlawful order to Golubovi} to destroy the first refrigerator lorry after the bodies were transported to Belgrade.3595 He instructed Golubovi} that any information about the case was to be suppressed and not made public.3596 The Negotin District Public Prosecutor was instructed by the highest level in Belgrade to stop investigations and the case was declared a “secret” and closed.3597 When the second truck of bodies surfaced in Lake Peruca}, he instructed Keri} not to inform the investigating judge.3598 He gave an unlawful order to Keri} to bury the bodies in Lake Peruca}.3599 He ensured that other individuals who participated in these illegal operations were remunerated.3600
1347. In respect to murders involving perpetrators from the RJB, and having regard to the admissions made, \or|evi} knew or had reason to know that murders of Kosovo Albanians were being committed by his subordinates in Kosovo and that, as he acknowledged, the situation “required a full check and that all the facts needed to be established”3601 and “a commission or a group” be set up to investigate it. 3602 Having failed take any measures, he is liable under Article 7(3) for these murders.
1348. \or|evi} was aware of these murders in addition to wide scale persecutory and inhumane acts that were being committed against the Kosovo Albanians by his subordinates and he not only failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish these crimes but also attempted to cover them up. This attitude was apparent at a meeting of the leadership of the VJ and MUP on 9 July 1999. The meeting was attended by Stojiljkovi}, \or|evi}, Stevanovi}, and Luki}
3595 \or|evi},T.10002;Golubovi},T.1715,1755 1756;P353,pp.19 20; \or|evi},T.9726. 3596 P352,p.4;Golubovi}, T.1710;P.353,pp.20 21. 3597 K84,T.2005((closed session). 3598 \or|evi} told Keri} not to advise either the investigating judge or the prosecutor. This was contrary to standard procedure (Keri} T.7761 7762). Keri} explained that he obeyed \or|evi}’s command, despite his knowledge of what the law required him to do, because, “according to the principle of subordination we were obliged to respect and comply with orders from the ministry and senior officials” He noted that if he had not complied, he would have been subject to disciplinary proceedings or would perhaps have been removed or reassigned from the Ministry. \or|evi} as the Chief of the Public Security Department, had this power. (Keri}, T.7811). 3599 \or|evi},T.10002. 3600 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(g)(i). 3601 \or|evi},T.9723 9724. See also T.10002. 3602 \or|evi},T.9723. See also T.10002.
IT-05-87/1-T 338 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6207 and VJ Generals Ojdani}, Farka{, Gaji}, Krga and Vasiljevi}.3603 Stojiljkovi} praised the successful work of the MUP, and said there were only 13 MUP members who had committed crimes, and procedures had been initiated accordingly in each case.3604
1349. The figure of 13 MUP perpetrators was grossly low. \or|evi} knew this did not accord with the general information he had available on the scale of the crimes in Kosovo.3605 The Indictment in the Milo{evi} et al case alleging widespread and systematic crimes such as rape, murder and deportation committed in Kosovo by the police and army had became public by this stage.3606 This alone should have alerted him that urgent measures were required. An obvious step would have been to request reports from SUP Chiefs about the specific crimes alleged. \or|evi} did nothing.
1350. A letter from the MUP to the OSCE dated 12 May 2003 highlighted the very limited investigations and prosecutions for MUP crimes against civilians.3607 An OSCE report noted that for the prosecution of war crimes in Kosovo during and following the 1999 conflict the MUP “has largely investigated crimes committed by KLA soldiers and only a few cases where potential perpetrators were Serbian police or security forces”.3608 Policemen were investigated for crimes such as aggravated theft or concealing stolen items.3609
1351. \or|evi} remained in the role of Head of RJB until 30 January 2001.3610 At no time after the Indictment period did he take steps to punish crimes committed in Kosovo by his subordinates. When asked:
Did you, Mr \or|evi} at any time set up a commission or a body specifically charged with responsibility to investigate the allegations of crimes committed by the police in Kosovo during 1999?
He replied:
No, I did not establish any commission or body.3611
1352. Ðorñevi} exercised effective control over MUP units operating in Kosovo during the Indictment period. He knew or had reason to know that his subordinate units were committing widespread crimes against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. He received clear, specific
3603 Vasiljevi},T.5720. See also \or|evi},T.10100 10101. 3604 Vasiljevi},T.5725 5726. 3605 See Part V, Section(C)(1)(i)(ii). See also Vasiljevi},T.5728;\or|evi},T.9743,10144;D443.P1537. 3606 P42. See also \or|evi},T.10084. 3607 P725. 3608 P726, p.13. 3609D18;D418;D805; D19; 6D2,T.12334,12244 12445,T.12335 12337 (closed session). See also Miti}, T.12733 12734. 3610 \or|evi},T.9396 9397;D396;D397;Order on Agreed Facts,p.25. 3611 \or|evi},T.10095 10096.
IT-05-87/1-T 339 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6206 and continuing notice of the criminality of MUP units. Against this backdrop of widespread criminality, he had a duty to investigate these allegations. Ðorñević, however, failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to stop such criminal activity or to punish the perpetrators. He is therefore responsible under Article 7(3) of the Statute for the crimes charged in the Indictment.
VI. SENTENCING
1353. \or|evi} committed crimes whereby thousands of Kosovo Albanians were killed, thousands suffered serious abuse and injury and over 800,000 were expelled from their homes and the province. These crimes were committed on the basis of the ethnicity of the victims. Many of the victims have disappeared and remain missing. It is likely that thousands of survivors will never achieve full closure of these horrendous events.
1354. \or|evi}, occupying high leadership positions, did not allow himself to be restrained in this massive and brutal campaign by the fact that the entire world was watching or by the opprobrium being expressed by leaders of the world community. Having regard to the high level of leadership of the accused as well as the scope of the crimes, lengthy prison sentences would be warranted if the accused was held liable under Article 7(1) or Article 7(3). The Prosecution submits that in order to give due consideration to the victims of these heinous crimes and to send a clear message that the international community is determined to deter ethnic cleansing, justice requires a sentence ranging from 35 years to life imprisonment.
IT-05-87/1-T 340 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 30 June 2010 6205
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PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6183
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: =-' !+ 7+#@ 5+G! @" H 2%%; & : #+G1$2$ 2 )0=-' : / .# '-# +."+# #+" +5 '-,".7# + "-'-, "-3 : ! "+ 0'"#- 7+ A #' !: 5+G! @" H . + + !="+ 3 2 2& : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 ) : <'70'"#- 7+ A #' !: 5+G! @" H . + + '73 2 2& : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 ) : 7' 5+G! @" H A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 2 2& !+ 7+#@ 2 ) : '7 5+G! @" H A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 2 2& !+ 7+#@ 2 )
IT-05-87/1-T 16
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6182
! " #
: '#0'"#- 7+ . A #' !: 5+G! @" H + + '#3 1%%; : #+G1$2$ *2& 21 )& 2 2& 2 & !+ 7+#@ %%; 1 * )&2 ) : + E '-0'"#- 7+ 5+G! @" H . + + E '-3 A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 2 2& !+ 7+#@ 2 ) : -' 5+G! @" H A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 2 2& !+ 7+#@ 2 ) : B++ 5+G! @" H A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 2 2& !+ 7+#@ 2 ) : +- - 5+G! @" H A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 2 2& !+ 7+#@ %%; *& 2 )
IT-05-87/1-T 17
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6181
! " #
A!(8 = 0 #- 7+ . A #' !: 5+G! @" H + + A!3 2 2& : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 ) A!(A'7.-0- 7+ . 5+G! @" H + + A'7 -A!3 A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 2 2& !+ 7+#@ 2 ) A!(A -0 #- 7+ . 5+G! @" H + + A!3 A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 2 2& !+ 7+#@ 2 ) A!(+ '0 #- 7+ . A #' !: 5+G! @" H + + A!&'"#- 7+ . 2 2& : #+G1$2$ + + +'3 !+ 7+#@ 2 ) !:"'7 A #' !: 5+G! @" H 1%%; & : #+G1$2$ 2 & !+ 7+#@ 2 2 !: - A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 2& : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 )&
IT-05-87/1-T 18
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6180
! " #
!: E" 7 5+G! @" H A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 1%%; &2 & !+ 7+#@ 2%%; & 2 2 !: '# 5+G! @" H A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 2 2 !:=+- A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 2& : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 ) !:! " # 5+G! @" H A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 1%%; &2 & !+ 7+#@ 2 2 !: 7 - A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 2& : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 ) !: + E '-0'"# A #' !: 5+G! @" H - 7+ . + + E '-3 1%%; : #+G1$2$ &2 & !+ 7+#@ 2 2
IT-05-87/1-T 19
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6179
! " #
@@ "'0 #- 7+ A #' !: 5+G! @" H . + + @3 2 2& : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 ) @:+7'" A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 1%% ; 2$21& 21 1& 2 )0A #' !: '# :+7'" @ .-+.# +-'-+ +".-6' + '-# + #"++#."'-# + . +3&!+ 7+# @ 2 ) @ +6' A #' !: 2 2& !+ 7+#@ 2%%; &2 ) 0 +6' @ / 6' + '-# + /.. #+"+5 '-, ".7# + "-3 - - A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 )
IT-05-87/1-T 20
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6178
! " #
"+- A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 "' A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 +6'7 A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 "'7 A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 :+# - 5+G! @" H !+ 7+#@ : #+G1$2$ 2 ) :'- !+ 7+#@ 2 ) :"'# -0'"#- 7+ . A #' !: 5+G! @" H + + :"'#.-3 2 & : #+G$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 4 ' A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 )
IT-05-87/1-T 21
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6177
! " #
4 7 " A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 40.-. <'<3 !+ 7+#@ 2 ) %&%$*$+ , # - !.!* /01213*4//5 +# 6 # 7 ,4 ? '0'"#- 7+ . A #' !: 5+G! @" H + + ,E'3 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 <'<0'"#- 7+ . A #' !: 5+G! @" H + + <'<3 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 ) 7 ' 0'"#- 7+ . A #' !: 5+G! @" H + + 7 E 3 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 7+# A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2
IT-05-87/1-T 22
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6176
! " #
!+ 7+# A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 !+-#." 5+G! @" H A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 2 & !+ 7+#@ 2 !=# "0'"#- 7+ . A #' !: 5+G! @" H + + !'# "3 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 ) '#0'"#- 7+ . A #' !: 5+G! @" H + + '#3 2 & : #+G$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 + # A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 +? # A #' !: 5+G! @" H 1%%; : #+G$2$ 221&21 1&2 ) 0A #' !: '#+? # .-+.# +-'-+ +".-6' + '-# + #"++#."'-# + . +3&!+ 7+# @ 2
IT-05-87/1-T 23
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6175
! " #
'# A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 ' A #' !: 5+G! @" H 1%%; : #+G)$2$ 2$21&21 1&2 ) 0A #' !: '# ' .-+.# +-'-+ +".-# #/ 6' + '-# +#"++# ."'-# + . +3& !+ 7+#@ 2 7' A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 )
IT-05-87/1-T 24
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6174
! " #
++" A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ 21 )& !+ 7+#@ 2 ) -' A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 +F+# A #' !: 5+G! @" H 21 )& : #+G1$2$ 2 & !+ 7+#@ %%; *& 2 ) '- - 5+G! @" H A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 2 & !+ 7+#@ 2 B+ ' A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 B++ A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 ) C +" A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 )
IT-05-87/1-T 25
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6173
! " #
C 8'# A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 C + A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 & : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2 ) >A4"'7 5+G! @" H A #' !: : #+G1$2$ 2 2& !+ 7+#@ 2 >A4 '7 5+G! @" H !+ 7+#@ : #+G1$2$ 2 >A4 7 ' 5+G! @" H !+ 7+#@ : #+G1$2$ 2 >A4 7'# 5+G! @" H !+ 7+#@ : #+G1$2$ 2 >A4=+- 5+G! @" H !+ 7+#@ : #+G1$2$ 2 >A4E <'70'"#- 7+ A #' !: 5+G! @" H . + + <'73 2 2& : #+G1$2$ !+ 7+#@ 2
IT-05-87/1-T 26
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6172
! " #
>A4C + 5+G! @" H : #+G$2$
$%& $'& (!!
; 7 A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 : #+G1$2$
; = + A #' !: 2 ; B' " A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 : #+G1$2$
!+ 7+# A #' !: 5+G! @" H 21 )& : #+G1$2$ 2 2 : ' A #' !: 5+G! @" H 2 2 : #+G1$2$
: -' A #' !: 1%%; 0- 7+"23& 2 2 PRENKAJ, Anton A #' !: 21 )& 2 2
IT-05-87/1-T 27
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6171
! " #
@'6. + A #' !: 21 )& 2 2 (AA@ '7 ,E' A #' !: 21 )& 2 2 (AA@ 7 ': ' A #' !: 21 )& 2 2 (AA@ 7'# 7 ' A #' !: 21 )& 2 2 (AA@C + '7 A #' !: 21 )& 2 2 E8 < "+ '- A #' !: 5+G! @" H 21 )& : #+G1$2$ 2 @ E#'7 A #' !: 5+G! @" H 21 )& : #+G1$2$ 2 "+ '- <'7 A #' !: 5+G! @" H 21 )& : #+G1$2$ 2 + 7' A #' !: 21 )& 2
IT-05-87/1-T 28
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6170
! " #
+F+# A #' !: 21 )& 2 B' "4 ' A #' !: 5+G! @" H 21 )& : #+G1$2$ 2 ZYLFIU, Cene Magjun A #' !: 21 )& 2 2 HAJDARI, Liman A #' !: 21 ) + # A #' !: 5+G! @" H 1%%; : #+G1$2$ 221&2 )0A #' !: '# + # .-+.# +-'-+ +".-# #/ 6' + '-# +#"++# ."'-# + . +3 :+"8' A #' !: 5+G! @" H 1%%; : #+G1$2$ 221&2 )0A #' !: '# :+"8' .-+.# +-'-+ +".-# #/ 6' + '-# +#"++#
IT-05-87/1-T 29
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6169
! " #
."'-# + . +3
' A #' !: 5+G! @" H 1%%; : #+G$2$ 221&2 )0A #' !: '# ' .-+ .# +-'-+ +".- # #/ 6' + '-# + #"++#."'-# + . +3 ! AA +E ' A #' !: 1%%; 221&2 )0A #' !: '# +E '! AA .-+.# +-'-+ +".-# #/ 6' + '-# +#"++# ."'-# + . +3
IT-05-87/1-T 30
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6168
! " #
@ <7' A #' !: 5+G! @" H 1%%; : #+G1$2$ 221&2 )0A #' !: '# <7' @ .-+.# +-'-+ +".-# #/ 6' + '-# +#"++# ."'-# + . +3 @ 'E A #' !: 1%%; 2 21&2 ) 0A #' !: '# 'E @ .-+. # +-'-+ +".-# # / 6' + '-# + #"++#."'-# + . +3 +#.- !+ 7+#@ 2%%; 0 +#.- / 6' + '-# + /.. #+"+5 '-, ".7# + "-3
Schedule D
IT-05-87/1-T 31
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6167
! " #
"'7 =-' 5+G 8 +6 21& * & ) : #+G1$2$ 2*&2 *$ ) $& * $) $0#" -5"' # "++"#.!( +? ''#2/ '5 5.""+ .- #.. " 3& = "+#+ * #'- = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 ) ; ) 1&*& : #+G1$2$ =-' "# 2% 2% ) =-' 5+G 8 +6 2 $ ) 2 & : #+G1$2$ 1$2 & = "+#+ )$ * * 8 ' = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 *&; ) 2& : #+G1$2$ =-' +'7 % = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 1& - 5+"# '-+ 0)*2 *&=-' : #+G1$2$ 2 2$ & 2 *3& )1$12 * 1$*
IT-05-87/1-T 32
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6166
! " #
E " 9 %22:% = "+#+ ; )*$) &*& =-' & ) *& '# ; 22 & 2& : '- = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 ;) &*& : #+G1$2$ =-' :."+-#'- = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 0:." -#'- 3 *& : #+G1$2$ =-' :"' .- ) = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 1&2 -E "=#.# +#" -60)1 ; )* ; ) 1; : #+G1$2$ )$ & 1$1*3 2&*& * & =-' * 2
.- = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 *&=-' : #+G1$2$ ".- = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 ; )&*& : #+G1$2$ =-'
IT-05-87/1-T 33
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6165
! " #
4 #'7+ = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 ; )*$)*2; ) $ : #+G1$2$ ) 2&2)1& *=-' 4 #'7+ 9% % = "+#+ - .#/. - #.# + + *&=-' 0*1&* 2& 2 *1$* 3&** & ) * 4 #7'"+04 #7'" 3 2*I = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 ))& - .##.# + + - *&=-' : #+G1$2$ )& & 5 +#0#/. .##.# + 1*&2 * 1& 5 +#3, - .##.# + +# 1)$11 * 2 +,0)1 )$*3 )$ 1
4 #.- 9%*% = "+#+ - .#/. - #.#.". ; )*$) )1$)1 0*&* & )1 )*)) $) 2& 2 *1$* 3&** *&=-' & ) * 4 ." 04 ."'E+3 = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 ; &*&: #+G1$2$ =-'
IT-05-87/1-T 34
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6164
! " #
E'-0 E '-3 I = "+#+ 2 2$ - 5+"# '-+ 0)*2 ; ) 2$) ) $& )1$12& 2 *3 *&=-' 1 7 ' 1% )* =-' 5+G 8 +6 )& * 20=-' * & : #+G1$2$ )2& ; & = "+#+ )1& 22)*3 * )*& 2&2 )$
- 7 2% 2% ) =-' 5+G 8 +6 2 $ ) * * : #+G1$2$ 1$2 & *&) *& )$ * & = "+#+ 1 &*
- 7 =-' 5+G 8 +6 ) & * & : #+G1$2$ 1 ) & & = "+#+ 1 &* 8 0 8+3 I * =-' 5+G 8 +6 1 * & : #+G1$2$ = "+#+ ; ) 2&*
IT-05-87/1-T 35
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6163
! " #
+". '- 0". '- +3 I ) = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 1)2 * ; ) $ : #+G1$2$ )$))2)$ $1 ) 2&*& 2 =-' 7+# = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 *& : #+G1$2$ =-' @ #"'-0@ #"'73 = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 *&=-' : #+G1$2$ A'"'E+0A'"'+3 I = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 12&2 - .##.# + + *&=-' : #+G1$2$ *$ & 0)1 ) $3 * *& &.+ . *0+# > # +8'5#'7 ; 11$11) / 5 ""='-, ##'7+. + # $ 3& * 2
IT-05-87/1-T 36
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6162
! " #
! E '- 0! '- 3 I ) = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 1) * ; ) $)1)*2 : #+G1$2$ 2 )$ $1 ) &*& ))2)$2 =-' !+"'# 0!+"'#+3 2% 2% ) = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 2 $ ) 1 2& : #+G1$2$ 1$2 & *& )$ * =-' &) ) !+8 +0!+8 = +3 = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 *& : #+G1$2$ =-' !' "'E+ 2 = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 * * - .#/. - #.# + + *& : #+G1$2$ 2 1*$ 2 - -+560)*2 2 3 =-' * &
!'" # =-' ; 5+G 8 +6 ) 22)*&2 $1& : #+G1$2$ & $2 @ %& = "+#+ *
IT-05-87/1-T 37
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6161
! " #
! ' =-' 5+G 8 +6 & ) * & : #+G1$2$ 2&2 & ) & 1$1 * 1& & * 2 @ %21& = "+#+ 1 )&* +'E+0 'E+ '+3 =-' 5+G 8 +6 & : #+G1$2$ = "+#+ * +? # = "+#+ ; ) )1$)1 ) $) &*& =-' & ) *& '# ; 22 & 2& +? 7+ '- $ = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 2 & * * ; )1) $) & : #+G1$2$ 2& *& &2 =-' $ & ) *
IT-05-87/1-T 38
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6160
! " #
+ .- )1I )1 = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 * ) 1 ; ) &*&: #+G1$2$ 2 )$ 0# +- 7+' =-' 1 '-5.""+5# = '- '5 #+ + .- +? #3
'# + #+ = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 ; ) $ : #+G1$2$ ))1 & *& =-' + # 9%229% = "+#+ - 5+"# '-+ 0**& ; )1 * & &2 )* ) &*& *1$* 3 =-' & ) *& '# ; 22 )& 2& +"'-+0 '"'-+3 = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 ;G) $)&*&: #+G1$2$ =-'
IT-05-87/1-T 39
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6159
! " #
.' 0'"#- 7+ . 2I 2 = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 1 $)& ) - 5+"# '-+ 0)1 + + .'E+3 *& : #+G1$2$ 2 & $13 =-' *$* * & )$ @ %
B++ I = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 ) & ) - .#/. - #.# + '-+ ; )*2$)*))*1$)** : #+G1$2$ )& & 0)*2 23 ) ) )&*& 11&2 * & =-' )2$) *2$ * 2 *
B ."E -0'"#- 7+ = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 . + + B ."'E -B ."' -3 *& : #+G1$2$ =-' - 0'"#- 7+ . 2% 2% ) =-' 5+G 8 +6 2 $ ) 2 + + -+3 & : #+G1$2$ 1$2 & = "+#+ )$ * * + ' +0 + 'E + 'E+3 = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 *&=-' : #+G1$2$ * 2 $1&
IT-05-87/1-T 40
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6158
! " #
$%& $'& (!!
+-50+-5'+-+3 I = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 22 * * - 5+"# '-+ 0)*) *& : #+G1$2$ 2 2*$ ))2$)))3 =-' ) " -'#'0" -'#3 2) = "+#+ 5+G 8 +6 2 * * .' +, - .#/. - *& : #+G1$2$ 2 22$ 0)*2 2 13 =-' 21 " % % =-' 5+G 8 +6 2 ) $ & '# : #+G1$2$ 1$1 $ & ; 22 2$ * 22 2)& 2$1& 1@ $*& 2&@ 2 ; 2$222)$ )2& = "+#+ ; ) 2
Schedule F A +# A'"'A( 5+G<'5 ) : #+G $2$
! - A'"'A( )
IT-05-87/1-T 41
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6157
! " #
- A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * 2$ & ) : #+G2$2$ 09! 21 .#'5+. : + ."#3 0 - +"+ 3 2
E" 7 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 2*$ & ) : #+G2$2$ 2
E" 79 A'"'A( E" 7 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * 2$ & 2 : #+G2$2$ 2 2
" '7 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 *$ 2 : #+G2$2$
4 < ' A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * 22$ & ) : #+G2$2$ 2 2)
< ." E < ! # : 5+G<'5 * $ $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ 2 2 ; 1&A'"'A( & 2
IT-05-87/1-T 42
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6156
! " #
7' ." A'"'A( 5+G<'5 12$ 7' & 1 : #+G2$2$ 1)
@; ' '7 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 ) : #+G2$2$
@; E " A'"'A( 5+G<'5 : #+G2$2$
!:+7 !' <'7;$ 5+G<'5 1! =; : #+G2$2$ )1 )1)*& &A'"' A( 2 !! 7+# $* !' <'7;$ 5+G<'5 2 ) * ! #' +, - .#/. - #. 1! =; : #+G2$2$ 22& # +5 +#0)*2 213 )*1& & 0 +- 7 A'"'A( #.? +"# 2 + ."# - +"+ 3 1
! "+ '-0'"#- 7+ !' <'7;$ 5+G<'5 . + + " ." " '-3 1! =; : #+G $2$ )**& & A'"'A( 2 :@ - A'"'A(
IT-05-87/1-T 43
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6155
! " #
::'" -.":'" - $ A'"'A( 5+G<'5 )1*)1 * ) : #+G2$2$ 2 & 1
: B '.": B ! # : 5+G<'5 $ ' $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ 1 ; 1&A'"'A( & 1 : B E" 7 $2 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * - .#/. - #.# + + )& : #+G2$2$ 2 & 0)*2 213 1
: B < 0'"#- 7+ ! # : 5+G<'5 1$ . + + E <3 $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ 11 ; 1&A'"'A( & 1 :(9! '.":(! ' A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * : #+G2$2$ 2 :( 7 ' A'"'A( 5+G<'5 & : #+G2$2$
IT-05-87/1-T 44
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6154
! " #
: '.": ' ! # : 5+G<'5 * )2$ $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ 2 )) ; 1&A'"'A( & ) : 9+-0 #- 7+ . ! # : 5+G<'5 )$ + + : &'"#- 7+ $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ ) . + + 9+-+3 ; 1&A'"'A( & ) : E"'<.": ! # : 5+G<'5 * ) $ E"'< $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ 2 ) ; 1 $11 1*)&A'"'A( & : 7+# ! # : 5+G<'5 $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ ; 1&A'"'A( : ! " #.": ! # : 5+G<'5 * ) ! " # $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ 2 ; 1&A'"'A( & ) : '7 : " #+70 #- 7+ ! # : 5+G<'5 . + + : &'"# $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ - 7+ . + + #+73 ; 1&A'"'A( & 2$ ) )
IT-05-87/1-T 45
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6153
! " #
: +.": $ ! # : 5+G<'5 ) * - .#/. - #.# + + +0'"#- 7+ . + + $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ 2& - #" -60)*2 ))3 3 ; 1&A'"'A( 1 $4+" "= ; * &
: @8 0 3 !' <'7;$ 5+G<'5 * 1! =; : #+G $2$ 2 )*1& & A'"'A( ) : @+ 0 3 !' <'7;$ 5+G ".E+ 1! =; 0 "'5 3: #+G )*)& & - +5''+ A'"'A( ) : @:'" - : @ +? + 0'"#- 7+ $% $1 !' <'7;$ 5+G<'5 1 . + + +? ." +,E+3 1! =; : #+G2$2$ )1&A'"'A( ) 2 *$ ! ! 7 #."@: $)1 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * ! 7+# : #+G2$2$
IT-05-87/1-T 46
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6152
! " #
4;A 0'"#- 7+ . $22 A'"'A( 5+G; "'J+8 5 * + + E" 3 0 "'5 3 : #+G - +5''+
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: ' A'"'A( 5+G<'5 ) : #+G $2$
!+ 7+#0 #- 7+ . $% $) A'"'A( 5+G<'5 2 $) * - .#/. - #.# +-+56 + + 3 : #+G2$2$ 1$ ))& 0)*2 21 * )* 2$)3
A; '#'0 #- 7+ . $)0 . !' <'7;$ 5+G<'5 )1)* * - .#/. - #.# + + + + A;&'"#- 7+ . $3 1! =; : #+G $2$ ))& 0)*2 $))23 + + E'#." '#3 )*1& & * A'"'A( ) C4+E< A'"'A( 2 (; <'" $* A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * &!' <'7 : #+G2$2$ )1& ;$1! = ; )*&
IT-05-87/1-T 47
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6151
! " #
(;+"'7 $ A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * - .#/. - #.# +5 +# &!' <'7 : #+G2$2$ )& 0)*2 213 ;$1! = ; )*& (; ' # A'"'A( 5+G<'5 : #+G2$2$ (; " #+7."(; A'"'A( 5+G<'5 #+7 : #+G $2$
(;; '" A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * : #+G $2$ )
(;! 7+# A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * 2& : #+G $2$ )
(; '6 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * &! # : #+G2$2$ )1 : $1 4+" "=; 1 1*) (; +F+#03 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 ) : #+G2$2$
(;B+ ' A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * ) : #+G2$2$ )
IT-05-87/1-T 48
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6150
! " #
4+-+ A'"'A( 5+G<'5 : #+G $2$
;AA+F'" A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * 2 : #+G)$2$
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@A!:+# A'"'A( 5+G<'5 2 : #+G $2$
@(;(( %@(;( A'"'A( 7% 7+ 2 @(;(( %@(;( " '7 !' <'7;$ 5+GB.E-'6+ 1! =; 0 "'5 3 )**& & : #+G - +5''+ A'"'A( 2 @(;(( %@(;( E<+" $ !' <'7;$ 5+G<'5 * 0'"#- 7+ . + + E<'"3 1! =; : #+G $2$ & )1*$1 &:2 &A'"'A( 2
IT-05-87/1-T 49
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6149
! " #
@ :+ ' A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * 2 : #+G $2$ 2
@ ! # ." A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * @ ! # + 2 : #+G $2$ 2
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A( 7'0 #- 7+ . $2) A'"'A( $ 5+G<'5 )1)11 * + + ."L3 4+" "=; : #+G $2$ & *)$****& & A( "0 #- 7+ . $ A'"'A( $ 5+G<'5 )1)1 * + + A( ."A(L&'"# 4+" "=; : #+G $2$ & - 7+ . + + H "." *)$****& "'3 &
IT-05-87/1-T 50
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6148
! " #
A( + 7 -06+3 $2 A'"'A( $ 1 * ! #' +'"+ "7'-E "'+ 4+" "=; & 0)* $23 *)$****& & !( ' A'"'A( 5+G<'5 : #+G $2$
! A .6. 03 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * ) : #+G $2$
! A+F'" A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * : #+G $2$ ! A <." E < $) A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * * : #+G $2$ &
! A -0'"#- 7+ ! # : . + + -3 $14+" "= ; 1&A'"'A( ! A '# A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * : #+G2$2$
! A '7 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 : #+G $2$
IT-05-87/1-T 51
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6147
! " #
! A!+ 7+#."! A A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * ! 7+# : #+G $2$
! ;4 -0 #- 7+ A'"'A( 5+G<'5 . + + ! ;43 : #+G $2$
( !<+7 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * &!' <'7 : #+G $2$ 1 ;$1! = ; )*1& ( !4 #7'"."( ! $ ! # : 5+G<'5 )*) * 4 #7'" $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ 1& ; 1$&A'"' A( ( !+#+7."( ! ! # : 5+G<'5 * #+70 #- 7+ . + + $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ 1 ( !3 ; 1&A'"'A( & !' <'7;$ 1! =; )*1$** ( !! ""+7 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * &!' <'7 : #+G2$2$ 1 ;$1! = ; )*1& @ E <'#0:3
IT-05-87/1-T 52
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6146
! " #
AA@ '# A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * : #+G $2$ 1
A7 E 0 #- 7+ . ! # : 5+G<'5 + + 9A."9A&'"# $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ - 7+ . + + 7 ' ." ; 1$1&A'"' 7 E 3 A( A +? + 0 #- 7+ . ! # : 5+G<'5 * 1*$ + + 9A."9A&'"# $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ 1 1 - 7+ . + + +? + +,E+ ; 1&A'"'A( - +? 3 & !' <'7;$ 1! =; )*2& A!+# 0 #- 7+ . $)I $ ! # : 5+G<'5 * * 1$ !.# ". +, - .# + + 9A."9A3 *0++ $14+" "= : #+G2$2$ 1& * /. - #.# + + - 3 ; 1&A'"'A( # ." ?0)*2 2*3 B 7<."B A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * 7<'0'"#- 7+ . + + 2& : #+G $2$ 1 7+<3 9 7 -0 #- 7+ . A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * + + 93 : #+G$2$ 1
! '#0 #- 7+ . A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * + + !3 : #+G $2$ 12
IT-05-87/1-T 53
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6145
! " #
C! E." C A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * ! E+ : #+G $2$ 1)
:! # ." : A'"'A( 5+G<'5 ! # ) : #+G2$2$
<+7 A'"'A( ) A=+- A'"'A( 5+G<'5 : #+G2$2$
A "'< ! # : 5+G<'5 $14+" "= : #+G $2$ ; 1&A'"'A( A 0+<+F 3 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 2 & 1& : #+G2$2$ !' <'7;$ 1! =; )1*)*& &:1 A! E." A! E+ A'"'A( 5+G<'5 *$ & 1 : #+G2$2$
A '0 "'<3." A ! # : 5+G<'5 * 1 ' $14+" "= : #+G $2$ 11 ; 1&A'"'A( &
IT-05-87/1-T 54
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6144
! " #
A=7+" A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * )$ & : #+G $2$ 1*
A '7 ! # : 5+G<'5 * $14+" "= : #+G $2$ 11 ; 1&A'"'A( & A'E" <." A A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * E"'< &!' <'7 : #+G2$2$ 11 ;$1! = ; )*1& 4 '6 A'"'A( 2& '6 * ;+F'"."; A'"'A( 5+G<'5 +F'" : #+G $2$
'< >A 7." >A 7+ A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * : #+G $2$ *
; " '7 A'"'A( 5+GB.E-'6+ * 2 0 "'5 3 * : #+G)$$
IT-05-87/1-T 55
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6143
! " #
;! -' A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * 2 : #+G2$2$ *
;! 7 ' $2 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 )12)1) * 2 : #+G $2$ *& ; 7'#0 ."++""+ #. $03 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * 7'#" '73 : #+G2$2$ *& ; 7 ."; A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * 7+ : #+G $2$ *
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; +"+7+#0'"#- 7+ $2 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 . + + +"7+#3 ) : #+G $2$
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IT-05-87/1-T 56
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6142
! " #
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IT-05-87/1-T 57
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6141
! " #
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! '7 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * : #+G2$2$ 22
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9;@E7.-+ A'"'A( $ 4+" "= ; *2**$* : B9 E <'# 6+0 # $2 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * - 7+ . + + : B93 ) : #+G2$2$ 2 & 1
IT-05-87/1-T 58
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6140
! " #
: .'E+0 #- 7+ . $ I A'"'A( 5+G<'5 ))1 * $ + + : (.": 3 & : #+G $2$ 2& 1
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A;+"'7+ A'"'A( A!@ E# < ! # : $14+" "= ; 1 @ 4 ."'7 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 2 : #+G$$
!A+"'7+ $) A'"'A( 5+G<'5 * ) : #+G $2$ &
( ! 'E+0'"#- 7+ A'"'A( 5+G<'5 . + + ' +3 ) : #+G2$2$
IT-05-87/1-T 59
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6139
! " #
;@E7 -+ A'"'A( 5+G<'5 : #+G $2$
A 0 73 A'"'A( 5+G<'5 : #+G $2$
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A +- ! # : $14+" "= ; 1 <'<0+3 $ A'"'A( * 1& ; " '7 A'"'A( 5+GB.E-'6+ * 2 0 "'5 3 * : #+G)$$
; '6 ! # : $14+" "= ; 1
IT-05-87/1-T 60
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6138
! " #
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C!A+5'"0'"#- 7+ A'"'A( 5+G<'5 . + + +F'"3 : #+G2$2$
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IT-05-87/1-T 61
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6137
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IT-05-87/1-T 62
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6136
! " #
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IT-05-87/1-T 63
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6135
! " #
B! - +0 .6-./- :"+-9@ - 5+"# '-+ 01 $ N: 'N3 1 1& -' 3 (C * &A <'7 B * ) B '"'-+ -'(C - 5+"# '-+ 01 $ * &A <'7 3 B * ) B " '- -'(C - 5+"# '-+ 01 $ * &:"+- 3 9@2$ $ ; 1)2&1 1&A <'7 B * ) B :."'- :"+-9@2$ $ - 5+"# '-+ 01 $ ; 122& 3 1 22& -' (C * &A <'7 B * ) B 4+#'E+ :"+-9@2$ $ - 5+"# '-+ 01 $ ; 1))& 3 1 & -' (C * &A <'7 B * ) B ! "',.- :"+-9@2$ $ - 5+"# '-+ 01 $ ; 122& 3 1 22& -' (C * &A <'7
IT-05-87/1-T 64
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6134
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B '# :"+-9@2$ $ - 5+"# '-+ 01 $ ; 12 1)2& 3 1 1& -'(C * &A <'7 B * ) B ' - :"+-9@2$ $ - 5+"# '-+ 01 $ ; 122& 3 1 2& -' (C * &A <'7 B * ) B ;"'-, :"+-9@2$ $ - 5+"# '-+ 01 $ ; 12 1)2& 3 1 1& -'(C * &A <'7 B * )
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IT-05-87/1-T 65
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6133
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6 $1; 5+G!+E %!+E+ )$1 : #+G*$)$
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IT-05-87/1-T 66
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6132
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IT-05-87/1-T 67
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6131
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IT-05-87/1-T 68
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6130
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IT-05-87/1-T 69
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6129
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IT-05-87/1-T 70
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6128
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IT-05-87/1-T 71
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6127
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IT-05-87/1-T 72
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6126
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IT-05-87/1-T 73
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6125
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IT-05-87/1-T 74
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6124
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IT-05-87/1-T 75
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6123
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IT-05-87/1-T 76
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6122
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IT-05-87/1-T 77
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6121
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IT-05-87/1-T 78
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6120
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IT-05-87/1-T 79
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6119
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IT-05-87/1-T 80
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6118
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IT-05-87/1-T 81
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6117
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IT-05-87/1-T 82
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6116
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IT-05-87/1-T 83
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6115
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IT-05-87/1-T 84
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6114
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IT-05-87/1-T 85
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6113
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IT-05-87/1-T 86
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6112
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IT-05-87/1-T 87
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6111
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IT-05-87/1-T 88
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6110
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IT-05-87/1-T 89
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6109
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IT-05-87/1-T 90
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6108
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IT-05-87/1-T 91
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6107
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IT-05-87/1-T 92
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6106
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IT-05-87/1-T 93
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6105
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IT-05-87/1-T 94
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6104
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IT-05-87/1-T 95
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6103
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IT-05-87/1-T 96
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6102
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IT-05-87/1-T 97
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6101
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IT-05-87/1-T 98
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6100
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IT-05-87/1-T 99
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6099
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IT-05-87/1-T 100
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6098
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IT-05-87/1-T 101
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6097
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IT-05-87/1-T 102
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6096
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IT-05-87/1-T 103
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6095
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IT-05-87/1-T 104
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6094
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IT-05-87/1-T 105
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6093
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IT-05-87/1-T 106
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6092
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IT-05-87/1-T 107
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6091
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IT-05-87/1-T 108
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6090
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IT-05-87/1-T 109
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6089
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IT-05-87/1-T 110
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6088
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IT-05-87/1-T 111
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6087
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IT-05-87/1-T 112
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6086
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IT-05-87/1-T 113
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6085
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IT-05-87/1-T 114
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6084
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IT-05-87/1-T 115
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6083
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IT-05-87/1-T 116
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6082
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IT-05-87/1-T 117
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6081
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IT-05-87/1-T 118
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6080
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IT-05-87/1-T 119
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6079
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IT-05-87/1-T 120
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6078
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IT-05-87/1-T 121
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6077
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IT-05-87/1-T 122
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6076
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IT-05-87/1-T 123
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6075
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IT-05-87/1-T 124
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6074
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IT-05-87/1-T 125
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6073
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IT-05-87/1-T 126
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6072
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IT-05-87/1-T 127
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6071
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IT-05-87/1-T 128
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6070
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IT-05-87/1-T 129
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6069
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IT-05-87/1-T 130
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6068
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IT-05-87/1-T 131
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6067
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PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6066
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IT-05-87/1-T 133
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6065
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(BQL +- 04'"#- 7+ %&- " - ) 2) .#.," . - .#/. - #.# + + . + + +- 3 ( 9."+-'5 (BQ * $*& +- - 5 +#0) 3 "+ ."#0 %2%; 1 )* (BQ )3$. = &2*2 ) 0"', #3 - ' - 7+" &) & ".# +" +#'7 4 #.(BQ (BQ 2 2 ) 0 +#32* & ++ . " - (BQ %2%; 1
IT-05-87/1-T 134
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6064
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(BQL +#'704'"# %)& " - ) 2) .#.," . ! #' +, - .#/. - - 7+ . + + +#'73 *$ (BQ *2$)& +#'7 #.# + + .7+- - . =- 7+" %2%; * ** (BQ +,0) 3 1 &2*2 * 0 +#3 - ' )1 &2*) ".# +" +- 2&2* 2 (BQ )&) & 0"', #32* 4 #.(BQ & ++ . 2 2 ) " - (BQ %2%; 1& .#.," .7 " +/ '5 /+"+. - /'# +#'7P. = ) )& ++ . " - (BQ 2*2
IT-05-87/1-T 135
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6063
! " #
(BQL+ ' +04'"# %1& " - ) 2) .#.," . ! #' +, - .#/. - #. - 7+ . + + + ' +3 $ (BQ $ & + ' + # +5 +# - + 8' . =- 7+"1 %2%; * ) (BQ 0) 3 &2*2 ) 2* *& ++ ) &2* . " - )&) & (BQ 4 #.(BQ %2%; 2 2 )
AAA4+< "'E+04'"# %& " - ) 2) - .#/. - #.5 +# - 7+ . + + 4 <"'E+." 1$ (BQ 1$1& 0)1 3 4+< "'+3 . =- 7+" %2%; & 1 2*2 & 1 2*) & 2* )& ) &4 #. (BQ 2 2 ) AAA+'+ %& " - ) 2) ! #' +, - .#/. - #. *$ (BQ 1*$)& # +5 +# + 8' - +# +, . =- 7+" %2%; & *2 0) 3 2*2 & 1)1 * ) &4 #. (BQ 2 2 ) : 7 0'"#- 7+ . 1$ " - 1)* + + 7+."7 & #- 7+ . =- 7+" (BQ ) . + + : Q.":."'<+3 2*2 & ) &4 #. (BQ 2 2
IT-05-87/1-T 136
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6062
! " #
: 4'#-+#+04'"#- 7+ 1$ " - 1) $ . + + 4+#-+#+& #- 7+ . =- 7+" (BQ . + + : Q.":."'<+3 2*2 & ) &4 #. (BQ 2 2 : : '- 0 #- 7+ . *$ " - *1 + + : Q.":."'<+3 . =- 7+"1 (BQ 1 2*2 & ) &4 #. (BQ 2 2 : ""04'"#- 7+ . )$ " - ) + + "+"& #- 7+ . . =- 7+"2 (BQ $22 + + : Q.":."'<+3 2*2 & 2*) & 2* )& ) &4 #. (BQ 2 2 : !'7.< 0 #- 7+ $ " - 2$ . + + : Q.":."'<+3 . =- 7+" (BQ 2* 2*2 & ) &4 #. (BQ 2 2 : E'.-04'"#- 7+ $ " - ) . + + '.-& #- 7+ . =- 7+"* (BQ )2 . + + : Q.":."'<+3 2*2 & ) &4 #. (BQ 2 2
IT-05-87/1-T 137
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6061
! " #
$%& $'& (!!
+ 7 -0 #- 7+ . $ " - $ + + L3 . =- 7+"(BQ 2 %2%; & 2*2 *& 2*) ) & 2* 2& ) *&4 #. (BQ %2%; 2& 2 *& 2 2 1 : 7 '04'"#- 7+ $ " - 2$ . + + 7 'E & #- 7+ . =- 7+") (BQ 2) . + + : Q.":."'<+3 %2%; & 2*2 *& 2*) )& ) *&4 #. (BQ %2%; 2& 2 & 2 2 1& ." - ;( Q %2%; * ; "'< )$ )*$ . =- 7+" )$1
IT-05-87/1-T 138
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6060
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4A4+"'< 1$ 1* . =- 7+"2 *2$* ; + '7 1$ 11$ . =- 7+" 1*1
IT-05-87/1-T 139
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6059
!" #$%&'()*+!,!-+!)%)*& #$%& .!)/0.1&& #$%& 1()11 )!% &)/!!" !#.*3,)*& 4/)1%" 5#$*6 + ( 7 78 94:+ 6;6< ! " # ! $ %&' () *%+ ' ()
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ IT-05-87/1-T 6058
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6057
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PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ IT-05-87/1-T 6056
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6055
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PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ IT-05-87/1-T 6054
! "#$% && ! ' ( "#$% && )* + , , - . . - / 0 1 ! 2 3 "# 45 "$ 4 6 % , . 0 3 & + & + ! 0 % 117 ! ' ! % 1% ( % - () 83 (! % 9 . : ( % ;, : 8 : , 8 /
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PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ IT-05-87/1-T 6053
(* 3 < +& 9 + 8 . + , 2 +! 9 . : +* ,=+ 9 < =/ B 9 +. 9 ! . *& / + . *&+ < :+) )9 + < 9 *+ < ;: 9 9 * / < * * < . ;* & 2. + . * . * . , ,. 9 . : ) ' 08 ; / 9 ! . A '08 , ")( B #A. * ")( ' #A / *C 9+8. . , "* (DE B # + * 8 . 2 / ' . 9 8 ,C 8 ; , ( - + =, ( % : , / + ) ) G , & ,, + . ( , ,. ,5
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PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ IT-05-87/1-T 6052
+ , 9: ( , : ( %): , (0 / , , , & , + , 2 3 , , , % , 0 3 0 0 2 ,) :;/ G : , , 0 -I + / 9 ) / ' )" / ' 4 / , .( !: )% : 3 .( !% .( ,3 .1 . , . . 0 +
3
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ IT-05-87/1-T 6051
*! * / % !! ! / %23!%! 2! 35 )3 67869:6
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4
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ IT-05-87/1-T 6050
% # 'J 0( $( =( JJ % ' 11 0% ( # 'J0(1 ($L(0 0JJ % K, 11$ 0 1 0% 0 1 'J 0( K(&=(0 0J % 1+ $ , 1 , . , - # 2& 'J0( + 1( &(& J + % 7 % 11L , 1 0% . , - # 2& 'J 0(1( &(0 0JJ% K. 117 , 1 % . , - # 2& 'J 0(1( &( JJ% 11$ , % 34 , 'J 0(1( $( JJ % 78 11& , 0% 34 , 'J 0(1( $(0 0JJ % 7' 11K , % 34 , 'J 0(1( $( JJ % 78 11& 2 %-+ 2 'J0( K(K=$ JJ + . 0 + %- 2 K% 11 2 0% 2 6 - 'J0( K( = ( 0 0JJ % 72 11 2 % 2 6 - 'J0( K( = ( JJ % &+ 11 2 0% #82 'J0(11(L (0 % &, 117 2 0% 2 'J 0( &( K(0 0JJ % K. 11 2 % 2 'J 0( &( K( JJ % &, 11L 2 % ( 2 'J 0( $(LL( JJ % 11 2 0% ( 2 'J 0( $(LL(0 0JJ % 11 2 8 0% 2 2 ( & 'J0( $(L1=(0 0JJ % ' 11 2 8 % 2 2 ( & 'J 0( $(L1=( JJ % $2 11K
5
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ IT-05-87/1-T 6049
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
6
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ IT-05-87/1-T 6048
JJ % &% 117 2 # % ! 2 # 'J0( (K ( JJ % , 11K 2 % 0 ] 2 'J0(1(& ( JJ % 2 11 2 @ # % B_#2 @ # =& (- 'J 0( K(( JJ % " # % 11 # 0% 4 # 'J 0( 7(L( 0JJ % 7' 11 < # % 0 < # ! D @ E- , < - 'J 0( (K ( JJ % $ ' 11& < & -% .## < & - 'J 0(1(&( JJ % 7% 11& < 0% _< .## #& 3 # ;# #E 'J 0( ( 7(0 0JJ % , K2 11 3# - 0% % 3# - 'J0( &( 1(0 0JJ % , K. 11L 3#& % @ 3#& 'J0(1(&7( JJ & ' 11&
7
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ 6047
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PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/ IT-05-87/1-T 6046
PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc4d01/