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Qatar Stands Firmly with Palestinian Cause

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1996 - 2021 SILVER JUBILEE YEAR WISHING YOU ALL THURSDAY 13 MAY 2021 1 SHAWWAL - 1442 VOLUME 26 NUMBER 8621 www.thepeninsula.qa 2 RIYALS Amir to perform Amir exchanges Eid greetings with Arab and Islamic leaders Eid prayers QNA — DOHA of Afghanistan, H E Mohammad Ashraf bin Abdullah bin Zaid Al Mahmoud, on and Vice-Presidents of the brotherly at Al Wajba Ghani on the occasion of the blessed Eid the occasion of the blessed Eid Al Fitr, Arab and Islamic countries on the Amir H H Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Al Fitr, in a phone call H H the Amir which included his congratulations as occasion of the blessed Eid Al Fitr. praying area Thani exchanged cables of greetings, received last evening. well as from the Shura members. H H Prime Minister and Minister of with a number of their Highnesses and H H the Amir also received cables of the Amir responded with a cable of Interior H E Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa Excellencies leaders of Arab and Islamic greetings on this occasion from a thanks. bin Abdulaziz Al Thani exchanged cables QNA — DOHA countries, on the occasion of the blessed number of leaders of friendly Deputy Amir H H Sheikh Abdullah of greetings with Their Excellencies Eid Al Fitr. countries. bin Hamad Al Thani also exchanged prime ministers of Arab and Islamic The Amiri Diwan announced H H the Amir exchanged greetings Amir received a message from cables of greetings with Their High- countries on the occasion of the blessed that Amir H H Sheikh Tamim with President of the Islamic Republic Speaker of the Shura Council H E Ahmed nesses and Excellencies crown princes Eid Al Fitr. bin Hamad Al Thani will perform the blessed Eid Al Fitr prayer along with citizens at Al Wajba praying area today morning. The Amiri Diwan Qatar stands firmly wished that this blessed occasion be full of goodness and blessings for Qatar, Arab with Palestinian cause and Islamic nations. QNA — DOHA firmly and is acting responsibly to FM receives ensure Al Quds and Al Aqsa mosque Speaker of the Shura Council H E return to the Arab and Islamic World, phone calls from Ahmed bin Abdullah bin Zaid Al and establish an independent Pales- top officials on Mahmoud stressed that the State of Qatar tinian state based on the borders of under the leadership of Amir H H Sheikh June 4 of 1967 with East Al Quds as Palestine issue Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani considers the its capital. Palestinian issue its main cause, and stands He noted that Qatar strongly QNA — DOHA condemned the Israeli aggression and called on the international com- Deputy Prime Minister and munity to interfere and stop it. Minister of Foreign Affairs H Qatar is acting responsibly to ensure Al His Excellency said, at an emer- E Sheikh Mohammed bin Quds and Al Aqsa mosque return to the gency meeting of Arab Parliaments’ Abdulrahman Al Thani Speakers, organised by the Arab Inter- Speaker of the Shura Council H E Ahmed bin Abdullah bin Zaid Al Mahmoud received yesteray a phone call Arab and Islamic World, and establish addressing the emergency virtual meeting of Arab Parliaments’ Speakers, organised an independent Palestinian state based Parliamentary Union, that the Arab from Minister for Foreign Ummah is facing a decisive moment and by the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union, yesterday. Affairs of Finland H E Pekka on the borders of June 4 of 1967 with a grave challenge represented in how to Haavisto. During the call, they East Al Quds as its capital. protect Al Quds, Al Aqsa Mosque, and the the past day in a clear challenge to inter- the aspirations of the Arab people and reviewed developments in H E Ahmed bin Abdullah bin Palestinian people in the occupied terri- national law and disregard of the feelings honoring the struggle of the Palestinian Palestine, and the need for joint tories from the racist, inhuman, set- of millions of Arabs, Muslims, and people. action to reduce recent esca- Zaid Al Mahmoud tlement aggression exercised by Israel Christians. He added that the time for condem- lation in Jerusalem and Gaza. using its army, police, and settlers over The Speaker paid tribute to the Pal- nation and denunciation has passed, and Foreign Minister received a estinian people who are standing up to that now is the time of honest and serious phone call from the National protect Al Aqsa mosque, the Damascus work that protects Al Quds and supports Security Advisor in the United Gate, the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood, the struggle of the Palestinian people States of America, H E Jake Sul- and Gaza in the face of bullets. He called who are showing a heroic example of livan. They reviewed develop- for participants in the meeting to make defending your rights, led by their right ments in Palestine. Foreign Min- sure they conclude the meeting with a to establish an independent state on the ister also received a phone call united position that would regain trust in borders of their territories that were from UN Special Coordinator for joint Arab work, that becomes the basis occupied in 1967. the Middle East Peace Process, H for a new way of working to face the arro- The Speaker of the Shura Council E Tor Wennesland. They Smoke and gance and crimes of Israeli occupation, concluded his speech by expressing hope reviewed developments in Pal- flames rise from a and support the Palestinian people that Arab parliaments can reach a position estine, and the need for joint residential tower beyond supportive words and that helps end that aggression against holy action to reduce recent escalation as it is destroyed statements. sites, and protects the Palestinian people in Jerusalem and Gaza. He stressed that the first step is Arab in the occupied territories from being Foreign Minister received by Israeli air strikes solidarity and forming a united Arab murdered, oppressed, terrorised and dis- a phone call from the Minister amid a flare-up of position with strong influence on the placed in a genocide and war crimes. of Foreign Affairs and Minister Israeli-Palestinian international community. He stressed The Shura Council delegation for Defence of Ireland, H E violence, in Gaza the importance of Arab parliamentary included members of the council, Hady Simon Coveney. They City. work in these difficult time, saying it will bin Said Al Khayarain and Saqr bin Fahd reviewed developments in have a big impact on meeting Al Muraikhi. SEE ALSO PAGE 6 Palestine. Public urged to follow precautions Children aged 12-15 eligible to receive vaccine during Eid celebrations THE PENINSULA — DOHA them against the virus but will “Global evidence is also for children aged 12 to 15 years give us the opportunity to have clear that the protection the to take the Pfizer vaccine comes FAZEENA SALEEM Sheikh Dr. Mohammed Al The Ministry of Public Health less restrictions in schools in the COVID-19 vaccines provide is shortly after Pfizer said that its THE PENINSULA Thani, Director of Public Health at (MoPH) has announced three future and may significantly lasting beyond 6 months which study of the vaccine’s use in par- MoPH said: “We urge everyone to changes to the national reduce the interruptions to the is very encouraging news for ticipants 12 to 15 years old found Eid Al Fitr celebrations begin fully adhere to the preventive COVID-19 Program including education system that we have everyone. The announcement that it was ‘safe and extremely today amid COVID-19 restric- measures during Eid prayer and to children aged from 12 to 15 years seen at times during the pan- extending the validity of the effective in preventing COVID-19 tions in the country. The avoid physical contact. We recall are to be offered the Pfizer- demic. It will also allow our vaccine from 6 months to 9 cases’, and the US Food and Drug Government Communications the Cabinet’s decision to prevent BioNTech vaccine in Qatar. younger people to have greater months should give everyone Administration approved the Office (GCO) and the Ministry of social gatherings and visits in The Ministry in a statement freedoms to socialise and par- much greater piece of mind,” Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Public Health (MoPH) have urged homes and majalis and allowing said that the validity for quar- ticipate in activities going said Dr. Al Khal. vaccine for 12- to 15-year-olds in the people to follow precautions only five fully vaccinated people antine exemption of all vaccines forward. Extending the opportunity the US. `P4 during the Eid holidays. to gather outdoors.” Dr. Hanadi administered in Qatar will be “It is vital that precau- Al Hamad, National Lead for extended from the previously tionary measures continue to Healthy Ageing on the Qatar approved six months to nine All people aged be followed during the blessed National Health Strategy has also months. Children Eid Al Fitr to ensure the safety emphasised on the importance The Ministry also confirmed aged from over 30 will be of our families and society and of following the list of restrictions that all people aged over 30 will 6 9 12 to 15 eligible to to support the ongoing efforts released by the Ministry. She also be eligible to receive the vaccine years are to receive the of the State of Qatar in limiting advised people to greet the after the Eid holidays. be offered vaccine after the spread of COVID-19,” said elderly without touching them Chair of the National Health 30 the Eid holiday. GCO on its Twitter account. and avoid elders giving gifts such Strategic Group on COVID-19 and the Pfizer- It also reminded people to as money to children.
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