Issue No. 1273 July 21st, 2017 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Feature Item

“Strengthening Strategic Stability with Russia”. Written by Christopher Chivvis, Andrew Radin, Dara Massicot and Clinton Bruce Reach, published by RAND; July 5, 2017

This report analyzes trends in strategic stability between Russia and the United States, examines Russian views on the subject, and assesses current prospects for stemming the erosion of strategic stability between the two countries. Such prospects exist, but they would require a sustained effort and greater political will on both sides. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE234/RAND_PE234.pdf

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 2

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Table of Contents

US NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. The Nuclear Weapons Complexities 2. Dems urge 'transparent and inclusive' nuke policy review 3. Why The U.S. Must Get Rid Of Its Land-Based Nuclear Missiles 4. Defense Authorization Bills Advance US Missile Defense and Nuclear Weapons Priorities US COUNTER-WMD 1. The Pentagon's Next ICBM Intercept Test Will New Command and Control Missile Defense Technology 2. This new drug could help the U.S. survive a nuclear meltdown 3. Md. Dems resist Trump administration plan to close chemical, biological labs 4. Edgewood Chemical Biological Center Celebrates 100th Anniversary US ARMS CONTROL 1. The Nuclear Ban Treaty: How did we get here, what does it mean for the United States? 2. Sen. Tom Cotton Draws Red Line on Arms Control Treaty With Russia 3. CHOOSING A NEW OPCW HEAD 4. Russia worried over US attempts to call to question expediency of INF Treaty ASIA/PACIFIC 1. The U.S. and North Korea Race Against the Clock 2. China has buried nukes in Pakistan to attack India: Former Defence Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav 3. North Korea’s Yongbyon Facility: Probable Production of Additional Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons 4. A Chinese Spy Ship May Have Observed a THAAD Intercept Test, But That's Just Fine EUROPE/RUSSIA 1. No reason to question viability of INF missile treaty with US – top Russian diplomat 2. Chechnya's leader says Russia has a literal nuclear doomsday device — and it's automated 3. A farewell to traditional arms: Russia develops weapons for the future 4. Why Is Russia Aiming Missiles at China? MIDDLE EAST 1. The Iran Trap 2. Zarif: Iran to retaliate if JCPOA violated 3. Blacklisting Iran’s IRGC to cost US dear: Top commander 4. ISRAELI NUCLEAR SECRET-LEAKER SENTENCED FOR CONTACT WITH FOREIGNERS INDIA/PAKISTAN 1. Is India turning its nuclear focus toward China? 2. India firm on verifiable nuclear weapons reduction 3. Pakistan has taken constructive measures on nuclear safety: US State Department report 4. Centre justifies skipping talks for pact on nuclear arms ban

COMMENTARY

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 3

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

1. The US-Russian teamwork that kept nuclear weapons safe 2. Why Japan Should Go Nuclear 3. The nuclear-weapons-ban thing is not going away, prime minister 4. The Iran Nuclear Deal Has Been a Blessing for Israel Return to Top

US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IEEE Spectrum (Piscataway, NJ) The Nuclear Weapons Complexities By G. Pascal Zachary July 19, 2017 We can simulate many systems components, except the most unpredictable of all In a sign that nuclear weapons remain vital technologically and militarily, the U.S. government has launched a multidecade “modernization” program for the nation’s 4,571 nuclear weapons, at an estimated cost of up to US $1 trillion, $348 billion over the next 10 years alone. “An aging nuclear force…has forced the need for a modernization program,” the Defense Science Board declared last December after President Barack Obama gained rare bipartisan support. The aim is ambitious: to refurbish or replace every aspect of America’s land, sea, and air-based nuclear “triad,” and to deter any moves by Russia, China, and rogue states like North Korea to threaten the American homeland. The project is expensive. For instance, the U.S. Navy’s 14 nuclear submarines—each armed with up to 240 nukes—are slated for replacement. The planned Columbia-class sub is expected to consume about one-sixth of the Navy’s entire shipbuilding budget for the next 30 years (about $100 billion in total). Simulation of nuclear wars and warheads also means more money for the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories, where sophisticated computer models are built. Simulations are vital to predicting real-time performance, yet they are no panacea. Consider guided missiles—the Minuteman series—that sit in silos in North Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming. This year, the U.S. Air Force performed only three “live” tests, but only of missiles, not bombs. If the United States fields new and improved nuclear weapons, will the government be more likely to use them? Also of concern: “These modernized forces are more capable than the originals,” and thus the renovation could ignite a dangerous new arms race, the Arms Control Association asserts. Another risk of modernization is that a fully digital nuclear network might be more vulnerable to hackers. Communications systems for nuclear warriors were created in the 1950s and ’60s: In some missile silos, soldiers still pass around floppy disks. But while communicating with individual silos and submarines is cumbersome today, speedier, potentially hackable links between political decision-makers and weapons in the field could make unintended launches more likely. In a world of “improving” nuclear weapons, there are wider lessons. Because these systems can never be fully tested in advance (thanks to a multilateral test-ban treaty), how can we know how

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 4

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // much foresight is good enough? The human factor is also critical. Soldiers on subs or in missile silos, for instance, might choose to defy launch orders from political leaders they mistrust. Or nuclear warriors, who have grown accustomed to drills and rehearsals, may simply disbelieve when there’s a genuine crisis. Consider how on 11 September 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), charged with protecting the United States from nuclear missile attacks from a command center inside Colorado’s Cheyenne Mountain, failed to respond to even the hijacked airplane that struck the Pentagon. Soldiers (captured on tape recordings since made public) kept asking over and over, “Is this real-world or exercise?” They repeatedly assumed they were in a training simulation. Only after all four hijacked aircraft had crashed did NORAD receive authorization to shoot down any threatening aircraft in order to save lives on the ground. Uncertainty clouds the nuclear-weapons complex, and human performance represents perhaps the biggest unknown. Improving hardware may do no good unless it is accompanied by a similar emphasis on enhancing human software. Ultimately, humans will decide whether the human species has the capacity to manage powerful tools that can either protect or grievously harm us. http://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/military/the-nuclear-weapons-complexities Return to Top

The Hill (Washington, DC) Dems Urge 'Transparent And Inclusive' Nuke Policy Review By Rebecca Kheel July 19, 2017 Twenty-two Senate Democrats are calling for a "transparent and inclusive" process in the Trump administration’s ongoing review of the U.S. nuclear weapons policy. “As the world’s foremost nuclear power and the only nation to have ever used nuclear weapons in war, the United States has a unique responsibility to reduce the risk of their use,” the senators wrote Wednesday in a letter to Defense Secretary James Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Energy Secretary Rick Perry. “By conducting a transparent and inclusive nuclear posture review process that adheres to longstanding bipartisan principles, you will fulfill that duty while preserving U.S. national security interests.”

The letter was spearheaded by Democratic Sens. Ed Markey (Mass.) and Diane Feinstein (Calif.). In April, the Pentagon officially started the nuclear posture review, which was ordered by President Trump in January. It’s the first nuclear posture review since 2010. The review seeks “to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, effective, reliable and appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century threats and reassure our allies,” the Pentagon said in April. It is being led by the deputy Defense secretary and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will include interagency input. In a Senate hearing Tuesday, Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Paul Selva said he expects that it will take “several more months to complete” the review.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 5

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

In their letter Wednesday, the Democratic senators said it is particularly important for the State Department to provide input. “In particular, State Department bureaus with responsibilities for negotiating and verifying compliance with arms control agreements must be equal partners in the review process,” they wrote. In urging for the results to be public, they argued that failing to do so would fuel suspicion about U.S. nuclear intentions, “undermining strategic stability and U.S. extended deterrence guarantees.” The senators also urged for the review to uphold the 2010 New START Treaty, which set limits on the number of deployed nuclear warheads and launchers the United States and Russia are allowed. Trump has dismissed New START as one of former President Barack Obama’s “bad deals,” calling it a “a one-sided deal.” The senators further called for the review to continue efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and continue the moratorium on nuclear tests in place since former President George H.W. Bush’s tenure. “We must continue moving toward a future free from the threat of nuclear war,” Markey said in a statement accompanying the letter’s release. “U.S. nuclear policy should focus on reducing the role of nuclear weapons — relying on them only to deter nuclear attack on the United States and our partners and allies – and avoid any move that could lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons or increase the risk of inadvertent nuclear war.” http://thehill.com/policy/defense/342791-dems-urge-transparent-and-inclusive-nuclear- weapons-policy-review Return to Top

Foxtrot Alpha (New York, NY) Why the U.S. Must Get Rid of Its Land-Based Nuclear Missiles By Terrell Starr July 18, 2017 The Cold War is over. And so is the need for America’s land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Not only are the costs of maintaining 450 Minuteman-III missiles unsustainable, keeping them in the nuclear arsenal is hardly practical. Maintaining hundreds of outdated, budget-draining Minuteman-IIIs when the Pentagon has the more accurate, multi-dimensional Trident II that can be shot from Ohio-class submarines that are virtually undetectable makes little sense. It’s already estimated that modernizing America’s nuclear stockpile will cost taxpayers more than $1 trillion over 30 years. The U.S. Air Force wants to replace the current land-based ICBM force with newer missiles that are estimated to cost more than $100 billion, which is 60 percent greater than the figure the Defense Department set last summer. But scrapping the Minuteman-III will not only save money, it will show Russia, and other emerging nuclear powers like India and Pakistan that America is serious about non-proliferation. From both a financial, tactical and leadership standpoint, America and the rest of the world will be better off if Washington puts aside its political posturing and kill the land-based leg of its nuclear triad—the land, air and sea-based platforms America uses to launch its nuclear weapons.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 6

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

The idea would be met with fierce opposition, some of which would be understandable. Washington has long struggled to reign in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and Pyongyang’s ICBM test on the Fourth of July wasn’t encouraging. Former President Barack Obama was a vocal advocate of denuclearization early on in his presidency, but Congress never supported his efforts. The Kremlin certainly didn’t make Obama’s efforts easier by modernizing its own nuclear weapons program and violating New START. None of this is enough to justify keeping the Minuteman-III stockpile. If the Trump administration approached nuclear defense with a sober, non-partisan outlook, it would realize that land-based ICBMs are nothing more than dated, hollow symbols of American security that don’t offer the nuclear deterrent protection their advocates claim. Submarines All But Eliminate The Need For Land-based ICBMs One could argue that the U.S. should get rid of all its nukes, and indeed that would be the outcome in a perfect world. But until the United States and Russia negotiate a major nuclear weapons reduction, Washington still needs to maintain a powerful arsenal. Modernizing the weapons we do have is essential for maintenance issues alone. That said, America could get rid of many of them, starting with all of the Minuteman-III silos located in Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming. On a functional level, there is nothing a Minuteman-III can do that an Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) can’t. If we compare the SLBM Trident II with the ICBM Minuteman-III, it is fairly easy to see why keeping both makes little sense. The U.S. Navy currently has 18 Ohio-class submarines in its fleet, 14 of which are each capable of carrying 28 Trident IIs. One Trident has eight thermonuclear Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles, each carrying a 100- or 475-kiloton nuclear warhead. Once fired, the Trident II would travel towards its target at speeds of 17,500 mph before splitting into eight reentry vehicles. One silo of Trident IIs from one Ohio-class sub could rain up to 192 warheads on a target, easily taking out 24 cites. A horrifying thought, but undoubtedly effective. Phillp Coyle, a Senior Science Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, said that besides the Trident’s better guidance system that improves accuracy, they are constantly being built and improved upon. “If you give anyone in the military a choice between a Minuteman and a Trident, they would take the Trident,” he said. To put the power of the Trident II in context, the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (one of which was ironically nicknamed the “Little Boy”) had a yield of 15 kilotons and 20 kilotons of TNT, according to Live Science. Let’s say that President Donald Trump gives the OK to nuke Russia (unlikely for various reasons, I know, but go with me here) and the U.S. Navy fires every single missile from its Ohio-class subs; it would only take one minute to fire them. Moscow would have to figure out a way to stop the onslaught. The problem is that they couldn’t. No one could. Moreover, the Ohio-class subs carrying these civilization-killers are almost impossible to detect unless they surface. In 2009, the French submarine Triomphant and the United Kingdom’s HMS Vanguard crashed into each other. Neither of the crews made a mistake. The cause was the advanced deep-water submarine stealth technology, as The National Interest reports:

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 7

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

While an attack submarine is always on the lookout for other ships and submarines and often seeks to shadow those of foreign nations, a ballistic missile submarine just wants to be left alone and undetected under the ocean. Such submarines serve as a stealthy guarantor that any deadly attack on a home country could be reciprocated with a nuclear strike from a submarine-launched ballistic missile launched from underwater. While a hypothetical aggressor might hope to take out a nation’s ground and air-based nuclear forces with a preemptive strike, submarines concealed deep underwater across the globe would be impossible to reliably track down and destroy—at least not all of them, and only as long as they don’t broadcast their presence. However, one might think that two submarines passing close enough to scratch each other’s backs should be able to detect each other’s presence. However, modern subs have become very quiet, benefiting from tear-drop-shaped hulls, superior propellers and sound- absorbing anechoic tiles, among other technologies. “They’re so hard to track,” David Wright, Co-Director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, said. “Other nations don’t know where they are. And they can also launch their missiles from anywhere in the wide ocean whereas the ICBMs are fixed, well-known sites that have been there for decades. America’s adversaries know exactly where they are and if they want to attack them with very large nuclear weapons, even though they’re in harden silos, they could do that and be sure of hitting them.” So why the need for ICBMs if half of America’s nuclear arsenal can travel deep in the ocean virtually undetected? Some arms experts, like Tom Nichols and Dana Struckman, argue the deterrence effect of land-based ICBMs is severely under-estimated. In a co-authored column in The National Interest last year, Struckman and Nichols argued that Minuteman-IIIs are too valuable a deterrent to scrap:It’s a fair point, but one that over-estimates the Minuteman-IIIs’ geopolitical importance. The argument also doesn’t consider the rapid improvement of the Trident II that’s designed to phase out land-based ICBMs in the first place. During the Cold War, it was quite logical to invest in ICBMs because America’s submarine nuclear strike capability had not reached the operational capacity needed for intercontinental striking needs. The Trident I that was deployed in 1979, for example, had an operational range of 4,600 miles, which was proceeded by the UGM-73 Poseidon that had an operational range of 2,500 miles. Neither missile remotely had the kind of accuracy they do today, or the updated Ohio-class submarines. Speaking of updated submarines, the Navy is designing the new Columbia-class submarine that will be even more terrifying than the current Ohio-class. This is a good use of federal dollars, not spending billions of a leg of the triad whose deterrence justification died with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Funding Land-based ICBMs Is Financially And Politically Unsustainable The Congressional Budget Office wrote in 2015 that it will cost $26 billion to maintain the Minuteman-III stockpile over a 10-year period, which is $3 billion more than the 2013 estimate. The U.S. Navy is calling for the entire land-based ICBM force to be replaced with new Minuteman- IIIs. The service, which is fielding vendors, says the new generation of ICBMs will last well beyond 2070— at a cost of at least $100 billion. In 2014, RAND published a report stating that new Minuteman-IIIs will cost “almost two times—and perhaps even three times—more than incremental modernization of the current Minuteman III system.”

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 8

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

All of this for a leg of the triad that is tactically obsolete. Wright says the best way to deal with the aging Minuteman-IIIs and ease concerns of skeptics who still want to keep the land-based ICBMs is to continue modernizing them until they can be retired and dismantled. Or usable parts, like its engines, can be used for satellites and other civilian or military purposes. “Or you can say we’re just going to keep some of the silos around and, if we have to, we can take Tridents, put them in canisters and lower the canisters into the silos,” he said. “If you’re worried about the vulnerability of the submarines, it doesn’t matter if you have a Minuteman or a Trident in the silo.” Another problem building a new generation of nuclear Minuteman-IIIs is that they may trigger a new arms race, as former Defense Secretary William Perry wrote in the New York Times last year. Or, more critically, one miscalculation could trigger a nuclear war by mistake: If our sensors indicate that enemy missiles are en route to the United States, the president would have to consider launching ICBMs before the enemy missiles could destroy them; once they are launched, they cannot be recalled. The president would have less than 30 minutes to make that terrible decision. This is not an academic concern. While the probability of an accidental launch is low, human and machine errors do occur. I experienced a false alarm nearly 40 years ago, when I was under secretary of defense for research and engineering. I was awakened in the middle of the night and told that some Defense Department computers were showing 200 ICBMs on the way from the Soviet Union. For one horrifying moment I thought it was the end of civilization. Then the general on the phone explained that it was a false alarm. You can call back a bomber pilot or submarine, but you can’t call back an ICBM. The best bet is to let the current ICBM stockpile age out and dismantle them. Recycle any salvageable parts for other uses and save the American taxpayers a few billion bucks. Getting Rid Of Minuteman-IIIs Will Force Putin’s Hand Politically, there’s an argument for pouring cold water on any talk of eliminating a leg of the triad. Namely, Russian President Vladimir Putin. He’s bullying his neighbors in Eastern Europe and spending billions of rubles modernizing and expanding its own nuclear weapons arsenal. And earlier this year, Russia deployed a new kind of cruise missile Pentagon officials call the SSC-X-8 that violates a 1987 arms control treaty. It doesn’t help that NATO, an alliance he loathes, surrounds most of the western border of Russia. Ukraine and Georgia are making promising gains in securing membership in the future that would all but seal up the remaining southeast portion where alliance troops have yet to set foot. Consequently, Russia is undergoing its own triad modernization. Obama’s reset failed. While he was able to work with Putin’s predecessor, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, in 2010 to sign New START, Putin was less willing to play ball once he returned to the presidency in 2012. Trump, in all of his radioactive incompetence, doesn’t help either. When Putin asked Trump about New START during a phone call this spring, he didn’t even know what the treaty was. Worst of all, he has said little about his views nuclear non-proliferation publicly.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 9

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Even if Trump did have the intellectual depth and diplomatic acumen to negotiate nuclear peace treaties and debate the nuances of deterrence, Russia hawks would torch him. But there is a lot of room for hope. At one point, there were more than 70,000 nukes in the world as late as the mid-1980s before Ronald Reagan was able to work with Mikhail Gorbachev on landmark arms treaties that significantly reduced each nation’s stockpiles. Gorbachev’s 1990 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in large part to his work to end the Cold War peacefully. It cost him most of his political currency at home, but tough leadership often comes at the price of ignoring bitter partisanship that fails to see the bigger picture. Today, there are fewer than 15,000 nuclear weapons in the world, and America and Russia own the vast majority. If the Soviet Union and America could once overcome their Cold War differences, there is certainly room for a visionary U.S. or Russian president to set a similar tone for the 21st century. A change in the Soviet leadership changed what could have been a disastrous Cold War showdown. Leading up to the larger conversation about scrapping the nuclear Triad, the Trump administration could take the bold move of saying they will go down to 1,000 deployed weapons, much lower than the current New START limit of 1,550. Coyle says this would force Putin’s hand. “It’s silly for us to spend more money on this,” Wright said. “If the Russians want to continue spending the money on this, [tell them] knock yourself out. I just have to believe that Putin’s response to that would be, ‘Gee. It’s gonna look weird if we’re spending all of this money on systems and the U.S. feels like it can go down.” Small steps like these could lead to bigger steps like knocking off one triad leg. The reality is that America’s nuclear stockpile is far superior to Russia’s. A fleet of SLBMs can more than make up for a new generation Minuteman-IIIs Putin will clearly see as threatening. America should always maintain a robust nuclear deterrent, but the ultimate goal should be for Washington to demonstrate that its leadership is equally committed to creating a world without nukes. And that starts with scraping the Minuteman-IIIs. “Where do you stop,” Wright said. “How many different legs does it take before the deterrent is adequate?” http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/why-the-u-s-must-get-rid-of-its-land-based-nuclear-mis- 1796677582 Return to Top

The Daily Signal (Washington, DC) Defense Authorization Bills Advance US Missile Defense and Nuclear Weapons Priorities By Michaela Dodge July 19, 2017 Congress is currently deliberating the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018. The NDAA is an important tool for Congress as it offers it an opportunity to influence defense policy, as well as indicate its wishes with regard to armed forces and defense programs.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 10

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

How do the two versions of the NDAA measure up as far as missile defense and nuclear weapons policy goes? The House Armed Services Committee version establishes a whole range of nuclear weapons and missile defense policies that would advance U.S. nuclear security in the future. The NDAA provides for creative opportunities to address and respond to Russia’s violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. For example, the House-passed version of the NDAA provides funding for the development of active defenses against this class of systems, explores feasibility of modifying current and planned systems for intermediate-range missiles, and declares Russia in material breach of the treaty. The House Armed Services bill requires the Missile Defense Agency to develop a space-based sensor layer. Space is the best avenue for getting the best ballistic missile data, including survivability of sensors deployed there versus on land or at sea. The Senate Armed Services Committee version of the NDAA supports this requirement. It also establishes a space test bed for a ballistic missile intercept. The United States currently has a gap in its comprehensive layered ballistic missile defense architecture, and the NDAA provides for a first step in mitigating this gap. With an eye toward protecting Hawaii from the North Korean ballistic missile threat, the House version of the NDAA also takes an important step in ensuring current U.S. missile defense systems are all they can be. The bill requires the Missile Defense Agency to test the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor against a long- range ballistic missile target. Congress should also explore additional options for increasing ballistic missile protection of Hawaii, including an activation of the existing missile defense assets for the protection of the islands. The House version also contained a requirement for the administration to issue a strategy for the acquisition of a 360-degree sensor to better detect lower-tier threats such as cruise missiles by 2018, and achieve initial operating capability of the sensor by 2022. Such a sensor would be beneficial for the Department of Defense. But the timelines given are unrealistic, even in the most optimistic of scenarios, and this provision should be modified or eliminated. These are steps in the right direction. To a lesser degree, the Senate Armed Services Committee version echoes the House committee’s sentiments. The Senate Armed Services-passed version of the NDAA relieves the United States from a compliance obligation under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty should the president determine Russia remains in noncompliance with the treaty. While the White House objects to the language on the ground that it restricts its options, a forceful action addressing Russia’s violations is way overdue. Additionally, the law gives the president time to make the noncompliance determination regarding Russia. The bill also limits funding for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) implementation, as long as Russia remains in violation of its Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty obligations. This linkage is prudent, particularly considering Russia’s increases in its number of strategic deployed warheads under New START.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 11

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

The Senate Armed Services bill offers a strong endorsement of the Long-Range Standoff Weapon, a necessary program that would ensure U.S. bombers are capable of fulfilling a nuclear mission for decades to come. The Senate version also provides an opportunity for maintaining, improving, and expanding the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, currently the only system capable of meaningfully protecting the U.S. homeland from a North Korean ballistic missile threat. This is prudent policy considering North Korea’s recent long-range missile test. Both NDAA versions advance U.S. missile defense and nuclear weapons policy in important ways. Congress and the administration should support these efforts. http://dailysignal.com/2017/07/19/defense-authorization-bills-advance-us-missile-defense- nuclear-weapons-priorities/ Return to Top

US COUNTER-WMD

Scout Warrior (Minnetonka, MN) The Pentagon's Next ICBM Intercept Test Will New Command and Control Missile Defense Technology By Kris Osborn July 17, 2017 Northrop Grumman is working with the Missile Defense Agency to refine new command and control systems able to exchange time-sensitive information with an interceptor kill vehicle to improve its ability to guide toward an attacking enemy ICBM. The Pentagon’s next intercept test will incorporate new missile defense technology engineered to improve the likelihood that a Ground-Base Interceptor can succeed in destroying an approaching ICBM nuclear weapons attack. Northrop Grumman is working with the Missile Defense Agency to refine new command and control systems able to exchange time-sensitive information with an interceptor kill vehicle to improve its ability to guide toward an attacking enemy ICBM. The technology, which involves the integration of new components into data terminals and communications networks, is designed to increase reliability of the Pentagon’s Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and expedite the process through which sensors and data locate ICBM targets, Mark Thornton, Director of Missile Defense Systems Operating Unit, Northrop Grumman, told Scout Warrior in an interview. While a Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) travels into space to discern and destroy an ICBM, sensors and communications technology are needed to connect with the interceptor prior to engagement. While many of the details, sensors or RF technologies involved are, not surprisingly, unavailable for public discussion, there are a number of substantial cutting-edge improvements emerging quickly. “We are replacing the GMD coms network with upgrades and a compressed footprint. We are making changes rapidly to put new devices into the network,” Thornton explained.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 12

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Command and control upgrades to missile defense technology continue to emerge as a key priority in budget and spending deliberations, according to many senior Pentagon leaders. Given the North Korea threat, missile defense upgrades are progressing at a crucial time for the Pentagon’s Ground-Based midcourse defense. Following the completion of current Pentagon review of nuclear weapons, policy and defenses, there is a distinct possibility that funding for missile defense technology will continue to climb. In a recent appearance before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said additional decisions about prioritized missile defense spending will be made at the conclusion of the ongoing strategy review. Also testifying before HASC, Missile Defense Agency Commander Vice. Am. J.D. Syring specified that large portions of the more than a proposed $7.9 billion 2018 MDA budget would be to support “integration of interceptors, sensors and the command, control, battle management and communications system” for missile defense. As the industry deputy program manager for the GMD effort, Northrop is responsible for fire- control systems, command launch technology, command and control networks and a wide range of computer technology responsible for the launch of an interceptor. Northrop is teamed with Raytheon, which makes the Exo-atmospheric kill vehicle and Boeing, which engineers the Ground-Based Interceptor. Reducing the hardware footprint and accelerating processing speeds of GMD command and control systems is a key element of these upgrades. In total, modern computing technology has enabled Northrop engineers to compress nine racks of servers into a single rack. “You can do a lot more in a single box these days than you could do in a single system. There is more processing power and capability in smaller packages than when we built the system years ago. The machines that run the core of our system were the size of a refrigerator,” Thornton said. Having fewer hardware components on a GMD system - achieved through compression, smaller computing and data consolidation – is fundamental to improving the reliability of a Ground-Based Interceptor as it ignites and is guided into space. Northrop engineers are in the process conducting a wide range of simulation exercises and ground tests to prepare the new components for an upcoming MDA intercept test. The precise timing of the next test is not yet specified, however it is likely to be of great significance given that a Pentagon GBI succeeded in destroying an incoming ICBM target in space for the first time – just within the last few months. http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1791808-next-us-icbm-intercept-to-use-new- technology Return to Top

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 13

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

MarketWatch (San Francisco, CA) This New Drug Could Help the U.S. Survive a Nuclear Meltdown By Emma Court July 18, 2017 PLX-R18 aims to treat acute radiation syndrome, which can harm all of the body’s systems and lead to death After disaster struck at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, employees at the plant and first responders got incredibly sick — starting with nausea, vomiting and diarrhea and ending, for about 30 people, in death. In total, 134 people were confirmed to have acute radiation syndrome, according to a 2007 medical journal account, which results from the body being exposed to high doses of radiation in extreme scenarios like nuclear meltdowns or use of nuclear weapons. ARS injuries can be treated, but it’s a complicated endeavor and involves heavy use of resources like blood infusions that may be short in an emergency scenario. A severe ARS case could require a complex blood marrow transplant. It’s also hard to know if someone has or is going to get ARS. For example, though nearly 240 people were thought to possibly have the syndrome after Chernobyl, the diagnosis was only confirmed in 134 people. Today, more than 30 years later, we may be close to a simpler solution. An injection being developed by the Israeli company Pluristem Therapeutics Inc. PSTI, -1.67% appears to help the body rebound from radiation injuries. The therapy, like others Pluristem develops, uses cells from the placenta, or the organ that grows during pregnancy to support a baby’s development. (The cells are harvested after C-sections with the woman’s consent, Pluristem said, and then the company uses a process to dramatically expand the number of cells.) Once they’re injected, the placenta cells can detect bodily injuries and are able to help tissue rebound by secreting things like growth hormones, according to Dr. Arik Eisenkraft, Pluristem’s director of homeland security. The treatment, PLX-R18, could also possibly be used before there’s an ARS diagnosis, and unlike something like a blood marrow transplantation, no tissue has to be matched before use, he said. PLX-R18 works on red and white blood cells and platelets, the systems that ARS first works on through such things as bloody diarrhea. ARS can cause a much broader spectrum of damage, though, including to the gut and brain and, later, the kidneys and lungs. Because PLX-R18 bolsters blood components, including infection-fighting white blood cells, the hope is that the treatment can prevent those other, later effects too, Eisenkraft said. It could also be more cost-effective than current options. The cost of PLX-R18 “isn’t really comparable” to that of hospitalization, Eisenkraft said. Hospitalization is “really a tremendous effort with a lot of resources needed. If you can treat all of these victims instead of all that with a simple measure, this can really be dramatically cost- effective.” But there are some big cost caveats. The company doesn’t know how much the treatment will cost yet, Eisenkraft said, and the treatment is unlikely to be used alone, given how complicated ARS is.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 14

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

The National Institutes of Health has been conducting studies of PLX-R18, and a mid-stage clinical trial has been wrapped up. If the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services funds the next step — which Pluristem is waiting to hear about — the treatment will move into a large trial in non-human primates. The trial is essentially equivalent to a late-stage trial in humans, Eisenkraft said. (A human trial can’t ethically be performed because it involves radiation.) Should everything go as planned, an approval decision from the Food and Drug Administration could be expected somewhere around late 2018, he said. Still, when it comes to radiation damage, PLX-R18 won’t help with everything. The treatment doesn’t address radioactive materials like radioactive dust, which can also harm human health, for example. “We also must acknowledge our limits,” Eisenkraft said. “Probably there will be victims we won’t be able to help, unfortunately... But at least those that we can help will benefit from this technology and this advanced medical treatment.” Pluristem shares have dropped 18.2% over the last three months to $1.22 per share, compared with a 4.3% rise in the S&P 500 SPX, +0.54% http://www.marketwatch.com/story/a-placenta-cell-medication-could-help-the-us-get-through-a- nuclear-meltdown-2017-07-13 Return to Top

The Baltimore Sun (Baltimore, MD) Md. Dems Resist Trump Administration Plan to Close Chemical, Biological Labs By John Fritze July 13, 2017 Four Democratic members of the state's congressional delegation called Thursday for the Trump administration to reverse its plan to shutter two Maryland facilities that test and analyze biological and chemical threats, arguing their closure would put Americans at a greater risk of attack. In its proposed budget released in May, the administration recommended closing the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center at Fort Detrick in Frederick County and the Chemical Security Analysis Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Harford County to save $38 million next year. The $143 million Fort Detrick laboratory, which opened just seven years ago, has been used by the FBI to test substances in high-profile cases, including a letter sent to the White House in 2013 that contained the deadly compound ricin. The Aberdeen Proving Ground office was created in 2006. The Fort Detrick laboratory employs about 185 people and roughly a dozen people work at the Aberdeen site, officials said. "These actions are alarming and will put the American people at greater risk of a chemical or biological terrorist attack," the Democratic lawmakers wrote to President Donald Trump in a letter dated July 5 and made public Thursday. "We will vigorously oppose any attempt to close the doors of these facilities."

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 15

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

The Department of Homeland Security did not respond to a request for comment, but in a budget document made public earlier this year, officials wrote that the work conducted at both Aberdeen and Fort Detrick "can be replicated at other facilities." A May 24 letter from the Department of Homeland Security to Battelle National Biodefense Institute, the contractor that operates the Fort Detrick lab, praised the facility and said it had "led the charge in developing the science critical to the defense of the United States against biological terrorist threats." But the letter required the company to submit a plan for closing the laboratory by September, citing proposed budget cuts. It is not clear if a similar letter was sent to the agency at Aberdeen. Sens. Ben Cardin and Chris Van Hollen, as well as Reps. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger and John Delaney, also criticized the administration for beginning the process of closing the labs before Congress finishes its work on next year's spending legislation. Many Republicans have joined Democrats in opposing Trump's budget, and the proposal appears unlikely to advance. That leaves the real battle over the Maryland facilities with the annual appropriations process. An early version of that legislation would strip funding for the two sites, but it could be amended. Delaney, a Potomac Democrat, introduced an amendment to a defense bill to protect the Fort Detrick site from cuts. The House could vote on Delaney's measure as early as Friday. The Fort Detrick laboratory in particular appears to enjoy bipartisan support. Former Pennsylvania governor and Homeland Security secretary Tom Ridge, a Republican, noted in a statement that the administration's budget "provides no plan" for other departments to pick up the work if the facility is closed. The lab handles materials categorized as "biosafety level 4," the highest level of threat reserved for fatal viruses and substances that are susceptible to becoming airborne and for which there are no vaccines. Hemorrhagic fevers, such as the Ebola virus, are handled in the highest-level labs. Though security at the facility is intense and the work is largely shrouded in secrecy, The Baltimore Sun was granted a tour in 2013. The building is equipped with submarine-style air locks to control airflow and foot-thick concrete walls. Scientists wear full-body pressure suits and are monitored remotely as they work. The Chemical Security Analysis Center may be best known for Project Jack Rabbit, a 2010 initiative in which scientists studied the potential impact of chemicals like chlorine and ammonia — often transported by rail — in the event of an accident or attack. "They do serve a unique function for the protection of the United States," said Tom Albro, president of the Army Alliance, a nonprofit that advocates for Aberdeen Proving Ground. "There's no one [else] stepping up to do it." http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-trump-maryland-labs-20170713- story.html Return to Top

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 16

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Global Biodefense (Seattle, WA) Edgewood Chemical Biological Center Celebrates 100th Anniversary Author Not Attributed July 18, 2017 A large stainless steel time capsule emblazoned with the logo of the U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) shared the stage with federal, state, and local officials and leaders within the DoD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program who spoke in celebration of ECBC’s 100th anniversary June 15. Speakers at the event also presented items to be placed in the time capsule for future generations. With a crowd of more than 500 invited guests and workforce members assembled beneath a pavilion at the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., ECBC Acting Director Eric Moore, Ph.D., noted that while ECBC’s mission lies in the research and development of technologies to defend U.S. warfighters from chemical and biological threats, it has been generations of ECBC scientists, engineers, technicians, and support personnel who have written the organization’s history. “All of the historical focus on technology is important, but what we’re celebrating today, in addition to the technology, is the people,” Moore said. “This is really a story about people. All of the equipment and the technology that we talk about – it’s the people who make that happen.” Following on that theme, Army Deputy Inspector General Maj. Gen. Leslie Smith, the Army’s senior Chemical Corps officer, told the audience, “I am in awe of what you do and the role you play in our nation. When the nation asks for your help, you deliver.” Another speaker, Jason Roos, Ph.D., deputy executive officer of the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological Defense, contributed an M50 protective mask for inclusion in the 12-cubic- foot time capsule, which will be opened 50 years hence. “This mask, and just about every other chemical biological defense technology we have fielded, was developed in collaboration with ECBC,” Roos said. Other speakers added commanders’ coins and proclamations to the time capsule collection. These items were in addition to a collection of technologies developed by ECBC scientists and engineers. These included the latest generation hand-held chemical agent detector used by Soldiers in the field, a second generation Tactical Biological Detector, the Joint Service Aircrew Mask, a newly developed decontamination solution known as DeconGel, a Chemical Reconnaissance and Explosive Screening Set, samples of forward-looking decontamination molecules called metal organic frameworks, and the ECBC flag flown aboard the ship on which an ECBC team destroyed 600 tons of Syrian declared chemical warfare material at sea in 2014. Also on display was a 10-foot high depiction of a statue of a Soldier in full chemical biological protective gear standing back-to-back with a scientist, which will be placed next to the ECBC headquarters building. Moore described the statue as symbolizing the profound partnership between the Soldier and the ECBC scientist in protecting the nation from chemical biological threats. At the conclusion of the ceremony, many of the attendees traveled to the ECBC Visitors Center to see a Field Deployable Hydrolysis System identical to the equipment used by ECBC operators to neutralize 600 tons of declared Syrian chemical warfare material aboard the MV Cape Ray, plus ECBC’s latest chemical biological surveillance system including an unmanned drone and an unmanned ground vehicle which work in concert with other sensors and a data integration system.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 17

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Visitors also toured a mobile laboratory used to perform analysis of chemical and biological samples close to their point of collection. Other dignitaries who delivered remarks at the event included Col. Raymond Compton, chief of staff of the U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command; Dale Ormond, principal director for research in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense; and Brig. Gen. William King, commanding general of the 20th CBRNE Command. ECBC was created by presidential proclamation in 1917, establishing the Gunpowder Peninsula in Harford County as the Edgewood Arsenal. It quickly became nation’s principal research and development resource for non-medical chemical biological defense. https://globalbiodefense.com/2017/07/18/edgewood-chemical-biological-center-celebrates- 100th-anniversary/ Return to Top

US ARMS CONTROL

War on the Rocks (Washington, DC) The Nuclear Ban Treaty: How Did We Get Here, What Does it Mean For the United States? By Rebecca Davis Gibbons July 14, 2017 Last week, Germany revealed that it had recently investigated whether it could legally fund the French and British nuclear weapons programs in exchange for their protection. In the United States, Gen. John E. Hyten, head of U.S. Strategic Command, announced in June that he wants U.S. nuclear weapons modernization plans accelerated. In stark contrast, over at the United Nations, more than 120 non-nuclear weapons states spent three weeks this summer finalizing a treaty banning the possession of nuclear weapons, adopting a final text on July 7. Advocates of the treaty argue nuclear weapons are inherently immoral. The United States and many of its allies reject that argument and contend the new treaty could undermine U.S. alliance relationships and weaken the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Based on interviews with nuclear ban campaigners and government officials, I explore how we arrived at this place of disjuncture on nuclear weapons. It is also important to assess common criticisms of the ban treaty and look ahead to the future of the disarmament movement. Three of the most commonly cited concerns are that it will damage the NPT, undermine U.S. alliance cohesion, and de-legitimize nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. While the first two critiques are often overstated, in the long term the ban treaty could help undermine public support for nuclear weapons and reliance on nuclear deterrence as a security strategy. How Did We Get Here? After the Cold War ended, many expected significant nuclear reductions; after all, the competition between the two superpowers was over. Both the United States and Russia were members of the NPT, which commits signatories to pursue negotiations on disarmament. And as many U.S. officials have repeatedly stated, the United States and Russia have pursued substantial reductions, having eliminated over 80 percent of their total stockpiles from Cold War highs. From the nuclear abolition movement’s perspective, however, a global stockpile of almost 15,000 nuclear weapons in 2017 remains far too large. Furthermore, ongoing nuclear modernization plans indicate that the states

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 18

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // possessing nuclear weapons plan to do so for decades to come. Anti-nuclear advocates have continued to press for disarmament, arguing that these weapons pose a grave threat to humanity. In 2000, NPT members agreed to a consensus document calling for “13 Practical Steps” toward nuclear disarmament. Participants considered agreement on these steps a major achievement, with “stronger language on nuclear disarmament and universal adherence than had ever been agreed to before.” George W. Bush announced in 2002 that the United States no longer supported all 13 steps. The 2005 Review Conference failed to achieve a consensus document, in part because of the Bush administration’s policy change. The perceived failure of the conference was “a wake-up call and a turning point” for the members of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, a non-governmental organization that won the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize. The group began to consider how to reinvigorate nuclear disarmament advocacy outside the NPT framework, and found inspiration in the success of the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel landmines. That treaty entered into force in 1999 without the participation of the United States, though U.S. policy has since shown the influence of norms established by the ban. In 2006, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War launched the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, an umbrella organization that would eventually bring together over 400 civil society groups with a shared vision for a world without nuclear weapons. Like the landmine campaign before it, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons would emphasize the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear use, rejecting the language of national security and nuclear deterrence used by states to explain their continued possession of these weapons. The goal of the campaign was to achieve a legally binding treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. It would succeed within 11 years, owing to the successful framing of the weapons as a humanitarian issue. Beginning in 2010, the humanitarian argument began to gain steam. Jakob Kellenberger, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, gave a speech recounting the devastating effects of nuclear weapons and arguing that no aid organization in the world has the capacity to address such a humanitarian emergency. The campaign continued with three international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in 2013 and 2014. With momentum from the conferences, nuclear ban campaigners went to the 2015 NPT Review Conference hoping for disarmament progress. The conference ended with parties unable to come together to approve a consensus document. Nuclear ban advocates felt that the energy for pushing disarmament forward was in their movement, not within the NPT process, while many non-nuclear weapons states continued to express frustration over the lack of progress. There appeared to be little hope that further nuclear reductions would occur in the near term between the United States and Russia, despite the apparent willingness of the Obama administration. With sentiments similar to the post-2005 Review Conference environment, disarmament advocates were skeptical of further reductions through the NPT process. In December 2016, 113 states channeled their frustration with slow disarmament progress into a U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for negotiations on a nuclear weapons ban. The first round of negotiations on the proposed treaty occurred in March 2017 and the second concluded on July 7, with 122 states voting to adopt a nuclear prohibition treaty. The treaty will open for signature on September 20, 2017. Will the Ban Undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty?

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 19

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Detractors of the nuclear ban treaty argue it will undermine the NPT, the 1968 treaty at the foundation of the global nonproliferation regime. For instance, Adam Mount and Richard Nephew argue that states may engage in “forum shopping,” leaving the NPT because they are members of the nuclear ban treaty. While this exodus would be concerning, the worry is likely overstated. The 115 states within Nuclear Weapons Free Zones have not left the NPT despite overlapping commitments. Moreover, the ban treaty requires signatories to adopt the same safeguards as NPT member states, the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (though the safeguards requirement could have been stronger and more consistent). Furthermore, many states are attached to NPT Article 4, which sets out the right of member states to access peaceful nuclear technology. If states left the NPT, they would jeopardize their ability to secure such technology from suppliers. Variations of this argument include calling the ban treaty negotiations a distraction and suggesting that the vast energy that brought about the treaty could have been more usefully channeled into more pressing nonproliferation and disarmament challenges. While that may be true, this argument assumes all the treaty proponents could have been motivated to focus their energy on issues other than the ban. But frustration with a lack of disarmament progress — and deeply held beliefs about the immorality of nuclear weapons — is what brought so many organizations together in the first place. Another NPT-related concern expressed by nuclear weapons states is that the ban treaty “may negatively affect the prospects for consensus at future NPT Review Conferences.” While there is certainly reason to worry about the prospect of reaching consensus at future conferences, this is in part because of deep-seated frustration with slow disarmament progress. The ban treaty reflects that frustration; it did not cause it. Future Review Conferences would find it difficult to reach consensus regardless of whether the ban treaty was in place. The NPT remains the most important institution for global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Observers are right to consider how the ban treaty would affect the health of the NPT. However, most of the criticisms ring hollow. The treaty is a result of a deep schism among NPT members. If disarmament is to be achieved, it will require nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states to work in tandem. Efforts like the State Department-initiated International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification will be important steps for engaging all parties on the very real challenges of future disarmament verification. NATO and the Ban Critics of the new treaty tell us it will undermine the cohesion of the NATO alliance. In fall 2016, for example, the United States circulated a memo (that was subsequently leaked) explaining how the proposed ban treaty would hurt the alliance. In the near term, however, NATO is likely to withstand this challenge. As NATO anticipated, the nuclear ban treaty includes prohibitions on many nuclear-related activities currently undertaken by the alliance. A NATO state that joined the treaty could not station U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil or be involved in the transport of weapons. It would not be able to have nuclear weapons in its ports or participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. Employing intense pressure, the United States was able to limit allies’ participation in the ban treaty negotiations. From NATO, only the Netherlands participated, as was mandated by its parliament. The Dutch were the only ones to vote against the treaty on July 7 (as opposed to abstaining), citing their NATO commitments. In addition to the success of U.S. lobbying efforts, NATO states are unlikely to join the treaty in the near term for several other reasons. Current governments of NATO countries seem unlikely to submit to domestic pressure surrounding the bomb. This stems from the political coalitions

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 20

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // currently holding power and the fact that, by and large, the ban is not a prominent issue among electorates. One possible exception is Norway, which holds elections in September. Oslo funded the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons for years and hosted one of the three humanitarian consequences conferences under a previous Labor coalition government; polls indicate a Labor coalition is favored to win in the fall. Perhaps the most important reason the ban treaty will not undermine NATO is insecurity stemming from recent Russian aggression. The German government underscored this dynamic by exploring protection from British and French nuclear weapons. Russian nuclear threats, violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and rejection of the Obama administration’s offer for additional negotiations on reductions have prompted many NATO states to view the alliance’s nuclear umbrella as increasingly vital to their security. For these reasons, it appears improbable that the ban treaty will have any effect on NATO cohesion in the short term. The ban campaign is still not widely recognized among most European populations, the governments have to be clear in their support of NATO commitments, and insecurity will likely make NATO continue to rely on nuclear weapons as part of its defense and deterrence posture. Looking Ahead The immediate worries about the treaty are unlikely to play out, but in the longer term, this milestone could challenge public perceptions about morality of possessing nuclear weapons. A common criticism of the ban effort is that that the treaty will not result in the elimination of a single nuclear weapon. In the near future, this is correct. Yet this criticism misrepresents the strategy of the nuclear ban campaigners. Advocates envision the treaty as an interim step to nuclear disarmament through its role in delegitimizing nuclear weapons and the doctrines of nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence. With the adoption of a legally binding treaty, negotiated at the United Nations, disarmament advocates will call attention to the illegitimacy of all nuclear weapons-related activities. As Beatrice Fihn, executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, explained in March, “We will identify what kind of behavior is now illegal, under this treaty, and start criticizing governments for doing those actions, even if they haven’t signed on to the treaty … It’s a long-term perspective. I think we will work to rally the public in countries.” Having the treaty in place provides the campaign with a tool to increase public awareness and spread its message about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The treaty allows citizens to ask their governments, “Why are we not members of this treaty?” Because most nuclear weapons states spend little time explaining to their populations the reasons why they possess nuclear weapons, it is plausible the humanitarian frame for nuclear weapons will, in the long run, become more relevant to the public (especially in democratic states with active civil society organizations). The humanitarian frame and the treaty could gain prominence as more states sign on to the treaty and pressure others to join. If one or several states under the nuclear umbrella join the treaty due to domestic and international pressure, it could help push other reluctant states in this direction, in what scholars call a “norm cascade.” The United States has significant influence on its alliance partners, but if the nuclear ban campaign becomes a popular movement within these countries, domestic pressure will compete with pressure from foreign governments – and the domestic constituency could win out. There is precedent for this: In the 1980s, public opinion in New Zealand favored rejecting visits from U.S. naval vessels due to concerns about nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapons. The U.S. visits became a topic in the 1984 election, and the winning Labor government subsequently prohibited U.S. naval visits.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 21

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

One way the ban movement could gain salience sooner would be an event that reminds people of the horrific effects of nuclear weapons, such as an accident involving a nuclear weapon or limited use. The nuclear ban campaign is small compared to the nuclear freeze movement in the 1980s, in part because there is less fear surrounding nuclear weapons. Were this to change, the campaign could become much more widespread. The newly adopted nuclear weapons prohibition treaty is unlikely to undermine the NPT or affect NATO cohesion in the near term, but it does reflect the deep division between states that rely on nuclear weapons and those that do not. In the long term, with sufficient pressure from domestic publics and non-nuclear weapons states, the treaty has the potential to bring about a changed narrative that could ultimately undermine the legitimacy of relying on nuclear weapons for national security. https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-nuclear-ban-treaty-how-did-we-get-here-what-does-it- mean-for-the-united-states/ Return to Top

The Washington Free Beacon (Washington, DC) Sen. Tom Cotton Draws Red Line on Arms Control Treaty With Russia By Natalie Johnson July 18, 2017 Cotton: Vladimir Putin has determined he gains more than he loses by violating INF commitments Sen. Tom Cotton (R., Ark.) is urging the Trump administration to withdraw from a landmark arms control pact with Russia unless the Kremlin comes back into compliance with the treaty. Cotton said Monday that President Vladimir Putin has determined he gains more than he loses by violating the commitments mandated under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, making it imperative that the United States increase the costs of cheating on the accord. The United States in February accused Russia of violating the 1987 treaty, which bans the testing, production, and possession of American and Russian land-based intermediate-range missiles, after Moscow deployed a prohibited cruise missile. The Obama administration first accused Russia of violating the treaty in 2014 when it tested the banned missiles, but Cotton said the former president never followed up "in any meaningful way." The Kremlin has denied any violations. "For the time being, it's probably best to try to preserve the INF treaty, but only if Russia comes back into compliance promptly and verifiably," Cotton said at an event hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. "Should they not do that, then obviously we should not remain in a treaty where we become literally the only country on earth that refrains from building a particular kind of weapons system." Cotton, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, introduced legislation earlier this year that would compel the Trump administration to develop new intermediate missiles within the prohibited range in response to Russia's breaches. The bill would also allocate $500 million in funding to develop new defense capabilities to counteract any advances made by the Kremlin, facilitate the transfer of intermediate-range missile

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 22

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // systems to U.S. allies in Europe, and pull federal funding from two other treaties with Russia that the Kremlin wants to keep in tact. Cotton said all four provisions were carefully crafted to abide by the treaty's commitments while sending a strong message to Putin that the United States is willing to walk away from the agreement unless Russia comes back into compliance. The Trump administration is currently assessing whether the United States should remain in the INF as part of a broader review of the nation's nuclear posture. The review, initiated by the Pentagon in April, will be the first such assessment since 2010. http://freebeacon.com/national-security/sen-tom-cotton-draws-red-line-arms-control-treaty- russia/ Return to Top

Arms Control Wonk (Washington, DC) Choosing a New Opcw Head By Andreas Persbo July 11, 2017 On Thursday this week, seven candidates hoping to replace Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü will present their candidacies to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). They have been asked by Ambassador Sheikh Mohammed Belal, the chair of the Executive Council, to focus on two pertinent questions: the priorities and future challenges of the OPCW and the management of the Secretariat itself. These questions are similar to those answered by Mr Üzümcü in his July 2009 presentation to the Council. He discussed the challenges of industry inspections, the Chemical Weapon Convention’s relationship with the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as National Implementation. Not knowing what was around the corner, Mr Üzümcü also highlighted the need for public diplomacy— the need to raise the organisation’s profile with the media and civil society. He got unexpected help. In 2013, the OPCW received the Nobel Peace Prize “for its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons.” The organisation is now in the public spotlight, and with that comes new challenges. Notwithstanding how candidates choose to address the work of the OPCW today, they are advised to remember that directorship requires vision, resolve, and sometimes hands-on leadership. This is especially true for the OPCW, the guardian of a treaty which—in Mr Üzümcü’s own words—bridges the “space in disarmament between passion and practicality, between sentiment and action, between noble ambition and concrete achievements.” One day, the war in Syria will be over, but the organisation and its mission will remain. Thursday’s presentations are strictly regimented; they should not exceed ten minutes (that’s around 1,400 words for the professional speaker). After that, each of the five regional groups will ask one question (not exceeding two minutes). The candidate has no more than three minutes to deliver an answer. While the schedule is not entirely set, the Council is likely to hear four presentations in the morning: Spain, Iraq, Hungary and Denmark. In the afternoon, the remaining three: Burkina Faso, South Korea and Lithuania. So who are the candidates? The council will first hear from Ambassador Fernando Arias Gonzalez of Spain. Mr Gonzales, a lawyer, is a relative newcomer to international security. He has served previously as the Permanent

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 23

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Representative of Spain to the United Nations, and is the present Permanent Representative to the OPCW. The second presentation will be delivered by Saywan Sabir Mustafa Barzani of Iraq. At 45, he’s one of the youngest candidates. He got his law degree from the University of Orléans in 1995. He has previously served as Iraq’s Permanent Representative to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and have served on the World Food Programme’s Executive Board Bureau. The third presentation will be delivered by someone with solid arms control credentials, Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary. He served as the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) from 2005 to 2013. Before that, he did two tours as the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and between those postings he served as Hungary’s representative to the CTBTO. Throughout the 1990s, Mr Toth was both involved in the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as chairing the effort to bring into being a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. He is the only candidate with experience of running a relatively large intergovernmental organisation. Ambassador Jesper Vahr of Denmark will then take the floor. He is presently serving as the ambassador to Israel, but has also represented his country to Turkey and Azerbaijan. In between posts, he’s served as the Director for Security Policy. His most notable position to date has been Chef de Cabinet to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (the equivalent rank is Assistant Secretary General). The fifth presentation will be by Professor Abdouraman Bary of Burkina Faso. He is the only scientist in the lineup and presently works for the UN Environment Programme as the Waste Regional Coordinator for the Africa Region. Mr Bary has two doctorates: one in Materials Science and one in Chemistry, both from the University of Caen. Previously, he has served as the head of Burkina Faso’s CWC National Authority, and so brings a practitioner’s perspective. The penultimate address will be from another international relations veteran, Ambassador Kim Won Soo of the Republic of Korea. After a long and distinguished national service—principally focusing on multilateral affairs—he was appointed UN Under-Secretary-General and Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs in 2015. From New York, he oversaw the activities of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigatory Mechanism (JIM) in Syria. Mr Kim holds a Bachelor of Law from Seoul National University in Korea and a Master of Arts from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Finishing the day, Ambassador Vaidotas Verba of Lithuania will take the floor. Mr Verba has been the project coordinator in Ukraine for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Before that, he was Lithuania’s Permanent Representative to the OPCW. Mr Verba holds a Master’s Degree in Law from Vilnius University. So who is it going to be? All candidates have their strengths and weaknesses. While there are two arms control heavyweights in the lineup, the final selection will be based on experience, vision, and (unavoidably) the political preferences of the Executive Council. Ambassador Belal will first try to identify a consensus candidate; a delicate task. All states are likely to critically scrutinise the candidate’s positions on the on-going verification mission in Syria. During consultations, powerful governments may lean on Mr Belal to encourage some individuals to withdraw (even though they may have majority support). A selection process of this kind could lead to the common

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 24

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // denominator candidate getting the job, and he (as no women are standing) would not necessarily be the most suitable leader. Balloting to iteratively eliminate candidates, a common practice in many other organisations, appears to be an action of last resort within the OPCW; and this is a shame. The head of the OPCW may—perhaps unavoidably—have to take difficult and unpopular decisions. It is important to elect a leader that does not shy away from this. At the same time, the Director-General must be able to serve all the members of the organisation, not just the few and powerful. This balancing act requires a person with experience, credibility and integrity, and I leave it to you, the reader, to draw your conclusions as to who that might be. http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1203576/choosing-a-new-opcw-head/ Return to Top

TASS (Moscow, Russia) Russia Worried Over US Attempts to Call to Question Expediency of INF Treaty Author Not Attributed July 19, 2017 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stressed that Russia has never sought frustration of the treaty Moscow is worried over Washington’s attempts to put to question the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) under a pretext of its alleged violation by Russia, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said in an interview with the Kommersant daily. He stressed that Russia has never sought frustration of the treaty. "That is why we are worried over the American side’s attempts to use invented pretexts to accuse Russia of alleged deviations from the treaty’s provisions and call to question its expediency," he said. "This is another topic we offer for discussion." "The Russian side has no reasons to call to question the viability of this treaty," the Russian diplomat stressed. "But we have a range of claims to the United States from the point of view its inadequate implementation of the treaty’s provisions." The United States accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty for the first time in July 2014. Since then, Washington has been repeating these accusations while Moscow has been categorically rejecting them. On July 8, 2017, an initiative was submitted with the US Congress to impose sanctions on Russia for violating the INF Treaty. On Monday, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov met in Washington with US Under Secretary Thomas Shannon. The talks agenda included issues of strategic stability, the Russian foreign ministry said after the meeting. The ministry stressed that Russia is ready to resume regular dialogue with Washington on these problems. http://tass.com/politics/956848 Return to Top

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 25

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

ASIA/PACIFIC

Stratfor (Austin, TX) The U.S. and North Korea Race Against the Clock Author Not Attributed July 14, 2017 North Korea demonstrated at least a rudimentary capability to launch a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile with its latest test of the Hwasong-14. At the extreme estimates of its range, the missile has the ability to strike parts of the western United States. More tests and developments will be necessary to increase the Hwasong-14's range, payload and re-entry system, and questions remain about North Korea's ability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon and make it rugged enough to mount on the missile. Even so, Pyongyang is clearly well on its way to realizing its goal of a long-range nuclear weapons capability. This is the second installment in a three-part series examining the implications of this development for the United States' relationship with North Korea. Read part 1 here. The United States and North Korea appear to be on a collision course. Their differing interests are reaching a point of irreconcilability, and each side sees in the other a significant threat to its national interests. To understand the rapidly shrinking timeline for a potential conflict between the two, we must first state a few assumptions about each country's view of the other. These assumptions are based on more than merely statements by individual leaders, which often are more about subjective desire than about objective reality. Instead, they are founded on a geopolitical analysis and intelligence study of the United States and North Korea drawing from assessments of history and strategic culture as well as studies of politics, economics and past behavior. Assumptions, of course, can be wrong and must be constantly tested; they also evolve over time, as circumstances and evidence change. But for now, these are our baseline assumptions about the key actors in the Korean crisis. The View from Pyongyang North Korea has long considered the United States, and not South Korea, its primary adversary. Pyongyang sees the long-term presence of U.S. military forces in South Korea as a direct, intentional hindrance to unification of the Korean Peninsula on its own terms. And when North Korea denounces joint exercises between U.S. and South Korean armed forces as practice for military action against it, it sincerely believes in the threat that it's decrying. North Korea has deterred the United States from military action for decades through a combination of political tactics and a robust military capacity that would create mass casualties for U.S. forces on the ground and for civilians in Seoul. Pyongyang, meanwhile, ensured that it never became enough of a threat that the cost of nonintervention would exceed that of intervention from Washington's point of view. Since the final years of Kim Jong Il's rule, however, North Korea's core leadership has reassessed its position. The government has begun to doubt that its frontline conventional weapons, even when supplemented with biological or chemical weapons, would deter U.S. military action or stop Washington from taking steps to overthrow it. A peace accord and nonaggression pact are no longer sufficient to guarantee the North Korean system's survival, a perception that has been reinforced again and again, most notably when the United States invaded Iraq despite the risks entailed. (Various so-called "color" revolutions, the Arab Spring uprisings, and the ouster and death of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi even after his country gave up its weapons of mass destruction program likewise put Pyongyang on edge.) North Korea's Artillery Concentration

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 26

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Under current leader Kim Jong Un, North Korea has drastically accelerated its nuclear and missile programs to try to develop a demonstrable capacity to strike at the continental United States with a nuclear weapon. The capability, from Pyongyang's perspective, would provide the only viable assurance that the United States would not work to overthrow the Kim administration through political, economic or military action. Pyongyang fully recognizes that the closer it gets to demonstrating the ability to strike the United States, the more pressure Washington will feel to stop the program, whatever the means. But the high cost of military action, which could rapidly expand beyond the Korean Peninsula, still keeps the United States from following through, as do political differences with its two regional allies, South Korea and Japan. China's objections have also deterred Washington from action. North Korea, then, is caught in a conundrum: It feels it needs a nuclear capability to deter interference in its government, yet it understands that developing its deterrent will increase the chances of intervention. As a result, Pyongyang relies on the complexities of the region and the costs of military action to keep the United States at bay long enough that it can realize its nuclear ambitions. It's a dangerous gamble, but one that North Korea's leaders feel is worth the risk, since capitulation is the only alternative. Washington's Perspective For the United States, North Korea has long been a secondary problem. Though the country is a perpetual source of potential regional instability, its neighbors, and its own economic limitations, always manage to keep it in check. North Korea's nuclear program presented Washington with one of its first major post-Cold War crises. But the United States avoided military action in 1994 through diplomacy, and in the years since, its general policy toward Pyongyang has been to manage the issue and put off conflict. Confronted with the price of military intervention, the United States preferred declaring moratoriums on Pyongyang's missile testing, isolating it financially and making the occasional diplomatic deal. Washington, after all, has always expected North Korea to collapse at any moment, so waiting a while longer has been the more logical policy. But in recent years, the U.S. view has started to change. Isolation, sanctions and stern statements from the United Nations have hardly slowed North Korea's drive toward a viable nuclear deterrent. Pyongyang no longer treats its nuclear and missile programs as bargaining chips to trade away in negotiations. And as its nuclear weapons development continues, nearing a point where the threat reaches the continental United States, moratoriums on testing are not enough. The sense is growing in the United States that Pyongyang's quest for nuclear capability is a crisis that can't be punted down the road any longer. A North Korea armed with missiles that can deliver nuclear weapons to the United States is a danger Washington cannot accept. Even if the U.S. government assumes that Pyongyang wouldn't start a war (an idea not everyone agrees with), questions remain over how it would use its new capability. North Korea could, for example, use it to constrain Washington's responses to regional moves or perhaps share its weapons technology with other "rogue" states, thereby significantly altering the global nuclear landscape. Given the pace of Pyongyang's missile tests, Washington sees that the window for taking one last shot at non-military action is rapidly closing. The United States wants to avoid war, but to do so, it feels it must make clear that it will use military action if necessary. Washington's airstrike against the Syrian government for allegedly using chemical weapons, recent ballistic missile tests and higher-profile military exercises on the Korean Peninsula were all meant in part to demonstrate that the United States is willing to resort to military action in the absence of a better option. The U.S. government is using the threat perhaps more to try to sway China and Russia than it is to change North Korea's behavior. From Washington's point of view, Beijing alone has the leeway to propose a nonmilitary solution to the

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 27

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

North Korean crisis. Not only is China Pyongyang's primary economic backer, but it is also keenly interested in keeping the North Korean system in place as a buffer at its border. From the Other Sides But the risk of intervention outweighs the risk of inaction for Beijing. China still considers instability in North Korea, or the political and military repercussions of trying to overturn the leadership there, a greater danger than Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. It continues to believe, moreover, that for all Washington's bluster, the United States wouldn't follow through on military action to stop North Korea's missile development because doing so would risk starting an East Asian war. For China, which already lives with a nuclear-armed North Korea at its border, not to mention a nuclear India, Pakistan and Russia, Pyongyang's growing capabilities are a problem, but not an unmanageable one. The United States poses a bigger risk to its strategic interests. At the same time, China's options to respond have dwindled as Pyongyang has steadily restricted Beijing's communications and influence with it. South Korea, too, has been coping with the North Korean military threat for decades. North Korea's nuclear program threatens South Korea, aimed as it is at the U.S. alliance structure. Nevertheless, Seoul understands that its national interests and those of Washington may diverge in the future, or at least not fully coincide. South Korea also foresees little danger of North Korea trying to reunify through force; U.S. support notwithstanding, Seoul's military capabilities have grown since 1950, and the international system is no longer conducive to military action on Pyongyang's part. In the event of another war between the two Koreas, China would be just as likely to intervene on the side of the South as on that of the North, if only to prevent the United States from getting involved. Seoul and Beijing are each interested in managing the situation and forestalling conflict rather than in resolving the issue immediately. The advancement in North Korea's ballistic missile range, though a paradigm shift for the United States, represented only a small change for the region's overall security. Consequently, South Korea and China are trying to convey through their remaining channels with North Korea that they are willing to delay a crisis to shield Pyongyang from potential military action. Their assurances may embolden North Korea, but for Seoul and Beijing alike, delaying a confrontation is the preferable path, especially since neither see much chance of a true compromise between Washington and Pyongyang. China, meanwhile, maintains a sliver of hope that Washington may eventually accept the reality in North Korea and adjust its behavior toward the government in Pyongyang accordingly, backing off from military threats in favor of dialogue and management. Russia and Japan each play a slightly smaller role and differ in their views of the situation. Moscow, which wants to avoid a war but lacks much clout with Pyongyang, is using the crisis to emphasize the threat Washington poses to international peace and stability. And Japan feels the change in North Korea's nuclear development perhaps more acutely than does South Korea. The missiles Pyongyang has been testing serve a more valuable military purpose aimed at Japan and the U.S. bases there than they do trained on South Korea, a country that has long been within the demonstrated reach of North Koreas' missiles. Tokyo sees the standoff with North Korea as an opportunity to fortify its position as the key U.S. ally in the region and to counter China's growing influence. In addition, the threat of Pyongyang gives the Japanese government further justification for its decision to lift the constitutional restrictions on the use of its armed forces. Population Density If these assumptions stand, a time is fast approaching when the United States won't be able to sit back and delay action anymore. Washington still has several options short of military action, but history has so far shown that the tactics are only temporary. Every deferral enables North Korea to

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 28

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // move closer to its goal of developing a long-range nuclear missile while reinforcing Pyongyang's notion that U.S. security guarantees are nonbinding and rarely outlast a single president. Whether each side's perceptions of the other are accurate matters less than whether North Korea and the United States believe them and make their decisions accordingly. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-and-north-korea-race-against-clock Return to Top

India Today (New Delhi, India) China Has Buried Nukes In Pakistan to Attack India: Former Defence Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav Author Not Attributed July 19, 2017 Speaking in Lok Sabha today, Samajwadi Party leader Mulayam Singh Yadav claimed to have knowledge of China burying nuclear weapons in Pakistan with the aim of attacking India. Samajwadi Party leader Mulayam Singh Yadav today claimed knowledge of China joining hands with Pakistan to attack India. Yadav, a known China hawk and a former defence minister, also said that the Narendra Modi government must reverse its position on Tibet and should support its independence. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, Mulayam Singh Yadav said that he has received information that China has buried nuclear weapons in an area inside Pakistan and plans to use these weapons to target India. Indian intelligence agencies "would know better", the SP leader hastened to add. Yadav's comments came against the backdrop of the ongoing military standoff in Doklam where for nearly a month now, soldiers from the Indian and Chinese armies have been engaged in an eyeball- to-eyeball face off. Yadav went on to denounce China as India's "biggest opponent" and said that India today is "facing a big danger" from Beijing. "China is India's biggest opponent. What has the government done? In Kashmir, the Chinese army has allied with the Pakistan army," Yadav said. "I have been cautioning the central government for years. China has joined hands with Pakistan. It has made full preparation to attack India." In a reference to the Dokalam standoff, Mulayam added that it was India's responsibility to protect Bhutan. China is trying to capture Sikkhim and Bhutan and Beijing's preparation to do that are on in full swing, Yadavn went on to say. India has a responsibility to protect Bhutan and Tibet, Yadav also said, adding that India made a mistake by recognising Tibet as part of China. The Modi government must change India's position on Tibet and must support its independence, Yadav added. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-buried-nuclear-weapons-in-pakistan-to-attack-india- says-mulayam-singh-yadav/1/1005789.html Return to Top

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 29

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

38 North (Washington, DC) North Korea’s Yongbyon Facility: Probable Production of Additional Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons By Joseph Bermudez, Mike Eley, Jack Liu and Frank Pabian July 14, 2017 Summary Thermal imagery analysis of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center indicates that from September 2016 through June 2017: The Radiochemical Laboratory operated intermittently and there have apparently been at least two unreported reprocessing campaigns to produce an undetermined amount of plutonium that can further increase North Korea’s nuclear weapons stockpile. This suggests batch rather than continuous processing of spent fuel rods from the 5 MWe Reactor during the period of analysis. Increased thermal activity was noted at the Uranium Enrichment Facility. It is unclear if this was the result of centrifuge operations or maintenance operations. Centrifuge operations would increase the North’s enriched uranium inventory; however, based on imagery alone, it is not possible to conclude whether the plant is producing low or highly enriched uranium. The thermal patterns at the probable Isotope/Tritium Production Facility have remained consistent, suggesting that the facility is not operational, or is operating at a very low level. This means, the facility is likely not producing tritium, which is an essential isotope used in the production of boosted yield nuclear weapons and hydrogen bombs. From December 2016 through January 2017, the thermal pattern over the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) was elevated. While that might indicate that the reactor was operational, the likelihood is low since the pattern does not appear in subsequent imagery over the last six months. It is possible that there are alternative explanations for the elevated pattern, for example, short-term activity at the ELWR such as the heating of pipes to prevent freezing. Regardless, any activity at the ELWR is cause for concern and bears continued monitoring. The 5 MWe Reactor has either been intermittently operating at a low-level or not operating. The notable exception to this was during December 2016 and January 2017 when thermal patterns suggests a higher level of operations. Analysis While commercial satellite imagery is now widely used to analyze important developments overseas, including in North Korea, thermal imagery can provide additional important insights. Landsat 7 imagery from September 2016 through June 2017 was used for this analysis, although heavy cloud cover precluded the use of imagery from last November and no night-time imagery was available for the entire time period of this study. A total of 19 images are available and of these, 10 were chosen with approximately one-month time intervals between them to provide a consistent periodicity for the analysis. Seven images were deemed too cloudy for analysis and thus weren’t considered. Developments noted at key Yongbyon installations were as follows: Radiochemical Laboratory: Examination of the thermal patterns associated with the Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing facility) show significant deviations from month to month. Concentrated heat patterns were observed with stronger temperature differences from the surrounding area between September to October of last year. The thermal patterns then returned to lower levels until

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 30

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

March 2017, when a distinct increase in thermal activity is observed that has continued through last month. These intermittent surges in thermal activity suggest North Korea has conducted batch rather than continuous processing of spent fuel rods from the 5 MWe Reactor. It is typical to allow the spent fuel rods to rest for a while in cooling ponds to both cool and allow less stable plutonium isotopes (PU-238, etc.) to bleed off. These reprocessing campaigns do not necessarily occur immediately after spent fuel rods are removed from the 5 MWe reactor. The June 2017 thermal activity coincides with an increase in activity noted in a March 2017 analysis based upon natural color imagery. Uranium Enrichment Plant: The thermal patterns at the Uranium Enrichment Facility were elevated during September and October 2016, then decreased in November 2016 and remained low until March 2017 when it increased slightly. It is unclear if the period of elevated activity from September through November was related to centrifuge operations or the maintenance activity that was observed during this period. Experimental Light Water Reactor: The same elevated thermal patterns over the 5 MWe Reactor observed in imagery during December 2016 and January 2017 also extended over the area of the ELWR. This was likely the result of steam being released into the air when the turbines adjacent to the 5 MWe Reactor were being run, operation of the 5 MWe Reactor itself, mid-winter heating of both structures, prevailing weather patterns, or some combination of the above. We cannot completely, however, eliminate the possibility that this elevated thermal pattern was the result of short-term activity at the ELWR itself—for example, heating the structure to prevent pipes from freezing, allowing ongoing internal construction work, or pre-startup testing. It is important to note that no other significant patterns of thermal activity were observed over the ELWR throughout the study period. Importantly, the ELWR did not operate at all from February through June 2017. Any activity at the ELWR is cause for concern and its operational status bears continued monitoring as it would be an indicator of North Korean ongoing intentions and capabilities. 5 MWe Reactor: The thermal patterns observed at the 5 MWe Reactor remain relatively consistent with those observed in the previous report indicating either intermittent low-level or no operation of the reactor. There was a notable deviation in the December 2016 and January 2017 images, suggesting a period of higher level reactor operation that lends support to a previous analysis based upon natural color imagery. Isotope/Tritium Production Facility: The thermal patterns at the probable Isotope/Tritium Production Facility have remained consistently low throughout the period under study, suggesting that the facility is not operational, or is operating at a very low level. http://www.38north.org/2017/07/yongbyon071417/ Return to Top

The Diplomat (Tokyo, Japan) A Chinese Spy Ship May Have Observed a THAAD Intercept Test, But That's Just Fine By Ankit Panda July 19, 2017 The United States is making little of the fact that a Chinese surveillance vessel watched a THAAD intercept test. That’s no surprise. A Chinese spy ship observed the United States’ first-ever test launch on July 12 of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor missile against an intermediate-range ballistic missile-

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 31

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // class target. According to CNN, which first reported the Chinese ship’s presence, the ship had “been sailing in international waters off the coast of Alaska for several days,” having arrived in the area before the THAAD test. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency had suggested that a THAAD test would take place soon in the first week of July, but did not specify a time for the test. The Chinese vessel was most likely a People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) Type 815 auxiliary general intelligence ship. Specifically, the vessel is most probably the PLAN Tianlangxing, with pennant number 854, which was reported days before the THAAD test to have transited the Tsugaru Strait, crossing from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean. The Tianlangxing is the lone AGI vessel with the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet and the most likely vessel to venture as far as the waters off Alaska. Japanese authorities protested the AGI’s entry into Japan’s territorial sea during its transit of the Tsugaru Strait. The United States, unsurprisingly, has not protested the PLAN vessel’s suspected surveillance of the coast and of the THAAD test as it was operating in international waters. U.S. officials told CNN that the vessel was operating approximately 100 miles off the Alaska coast, in international waters. The United States has long argued that, in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), military vessels should be allowed to conduct surveillance and other activities in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of other states. The EEZ is defined by the convention as the area ranging for 200 nautical miles from the baselines of a coastal state. The observation of the THAAD test by the PLAN vessel is not the first time that Chinese naval vessels have come to the Alaskan region. In 2015, five PLAN ships entered the Bering Sea and transited the Aleutian Islands lawfully, drawing a similarly measured reaction from the United States. More generally, in 2014, a Chinese Type 815 AGI surveilled activities at the Rim of the Pacific 2014 exercise, activity that was welcomed by Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, then the commander of U.S. Pacific Command. Locklear noted that the action was “an acceptance by the Chinese of what we’ve been saying to them for some time, [which] is that military operations and survey operations in another country’s EEZs, where you have national — your own national security interest, are within international law and are acceptable.” It’s unclear if the PLAN AGI specifically set out to Alaska in the second half of 2017 to monitor a suspected THAAD test. While the United States announced the test would come soon just days before it did, the first intercept test of THAAD against an IRBM-class target had long been baked into the Missile Defense Agency’s plan for this fiscal year. Accordingly, the vessel may have set out hoping to observe a test. Chinese sensitivities over THAAD’s technical capabilities are well-known given Beijing’s long-standing vociferous objection to the deployment of a THAAD battery on the Korean peninsula. The Chinese concern, however, is not with the interceptors, but the powerful X- band AN/TPY-2 radar that accompanies each THAAD battery. Either way, the United States won’t be making an incident of the observation of this latest intercept test by a PLAN AGI 100 miles off the coast of Alaska. For Washington, preserving the U.S. Navy and Air Force’s ability to freely surveil China — in the air and on the surface within the EEZ — means tolerating that same behavior from the Chinese armed forces. http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/a-chinese-spy-ship-may-have-observed-a-thaad-intercept-test- but-thats-just-fine/ Return to Top

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 32

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

EUROPE/RUSSIA

RT (Moscow, Russia) No Reason to Question Viability of INF Missile Treaty With US – Top Russian Diplomat Author Not Attributed July 19, 2017 The Russian deputy foreign minister has stated that Moscow has no intention of exiting the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, despite repeated cases of “inadequate observation” of the treaty by the US. “We have a whole set of claims against the United States concerning their inadequate observation of the INF treaty,” Sergey Ryabkov said in an interview with Kommersant daily. “However, we are committed to this treaty and we do not want it to be destroyed or slackened. This is why we are extremely concerned over the US side’s attempts to question the reasonability of maintaining it, presented under invented excuses and with mentions of false allegations that Russia attempts to violate the treaty’s provisions,” he added. The comments came after US media reported in late June that several Congress members insisted on exiting the INF treaty, justifying their position with allegations that Russia was not observing the agreement. In particular, Congressman Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) told the Politico magazine that he considered it irresponsible for the US to continue to adhere to a treaty when the only other participant had long moved on from it. More recently, Senator Tom Cotton, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, earlier this week proposed a way around the accord by urging Washington to provide its allies with the technology and assistance to build the very missiles banned by the accord. The INF treaty, signed by the Soviet Union and US in 1987, bans the testing, production and possession of land-based intermediate-range missiles by both Moscow and Washington. It enabled the scrapping of hundreds of nuclear-tipped missiles deployed in Europe amid the Cold War arms race. The missiles needed so little time to fly in case of an attack that both sides had virtually no chance to react to a launch warning, posing a grave threat of sparking a nuclear war by mistake. In February this year, Washington accused Russia of deploying a ground-launched cruise missile with a range exceeding the declared figure and banned under the treaty. Russia denied the accusation. Moscow earlier stated that the INF treaty is being jeopardized by the US drone program, and that the US global missile defense project itself uses weapons with a range exceeding the limits set by the agreement. Russia also says the same applies to the US AEGIS Ashore system being deployed to Eastern Europe. It uses the same launchers as the naval systems used to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles, giving the antimissile sites the capability to use such missiles and thus violate the INF. https://on.rt.com/8i5x Return to Top

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 33

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Business Insider (New York, NY) Chechnya's Leader Says Russia Has A Literal Nuclear Doomsday Device — And It's Automated By Alex Lockie July 20, 2017 Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya, gave a rare interview to a US outlet that aired Tuesday. In speaking to HBO's "Real Sports," he denied that gay people are humans, that they exist in his region, and that his government regularly detains or tortures them, despite ample reports to the contrary. He also made a troubling comment about his country's nuclear arsenal. Kadyrov, known for his forceful style of speaking, said: "America is not really a strong enough state for us to regard it as an enemy of Russia. We have a strong government and are a nuclear state. "Even if our government was completely destroyed, our nuclear missiles would be automatically deployed. We will put the whole world on its knees and screw it from behind." The New York Times points out that Russia built a system in the 1980s that could do what Kadyrov described, known as the Perimeter System. Essentially, if there were a nuclear attack to destroy the government of Russia — or anything a 1980s-era system would perceive as an attack — an automated system would empty Russia's missile silos in a counterattack. Bruce Blair, the former US nuclear officer who broke the story of the Perimeter System for The Times in 1993, told Business Insider that the system works when it detects nuclear explosions. Only a small crew, deep in a bunker, has a hand in the otherwise automated system, according to Blair. "One concern is that it's highly automated, and cyberattacks, for example, or other phenomena, natural or man-made, could set it off," Blair said. "It poses a risk of accidental nuclear attack by Russia." "This was designed to retaliate massively against the US. What the specific targets are in this plan no one really knows, but it can be safely assumed it's large-scale," Blair said, adding that it would destroy most Americans and most large US cities. The US requires the president to sign off on all nuclear strikes, with the aim of avoiding such catastrophes. If Washington were incapacitated by a nuclear strike, it's unclear whether it could respond. The US's nuclear weapons are code-locked, and, absent the president and a backup in the Pentagon, the US may not be able to respond. Moscow code-locks its weapons as well, but this system would allow it to retaliate even after a nuclear decapitation. http://www.businessinsider.com/kadyrov-russia-doomsday-device-nuclear-2017-7 Return to Top

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 34

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Russia Beyond the Headlines (Moscow, Russia) A Farewell to Traditional Arms: Russia Develops Weapons for the Future By Boris Egorov July 12, 2017 For the most part, weapons have for more than a century been centered on traditional scientific principles and heavy industries. Advanced modern societies, however, have now reached a critical point where a major leap forward, thanks to new technologies, is about to take place. Future wars will use weapons based on new scientific principles. Major powers, including Russia, are moving full steam ahead in developing such weapons. Radio-electronic weapons Radio-electronic weapons cripple enemy equipment with concentrated and powerful energy bursts. Such weapons could hit aircraft control systems and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and neutralize precision guided munitions with powerful microwave pulses. According to Russian developers, the gun is not science fiction and has been successfully tested. There are no analogues in the world, they claim. In fact, in 2014, a Russian Su-24 temporarily disabled the USS Donald Cook with the weapon when the snooping American ship got too close to Russian shores in the Black Sea. The weapon will be installed on Russia's sixth generation aircraft fighter currently being developed, but its main mission will be destroying UAVs from the ground. By blinding enemy electronics, radar and navigation systems a huge advantage can be gained early in battle. After that, victory can be secured by other means. In addition to blinding aircraft, tanks and ships, the weapon will be able to incite irrational fear and panic among enemy soldiers, which is what supposedly happened in the case of the USS Cook when American sailors were allegedly stricken with fear after it became clear that their ship was defenseless and had become a sitting duck. Railgun A railgun is an electromagnetic projectile launcher that might become a powerful weapon in future wars. With assistance from a force field, a railgun accelerates shells up to speed of 3 km/per second. This is close to orbital velocity (7.9 km/per second), which is the point at which different physical principles take over. At such speeds, a plastic 15-gram cylinder can penetrate aluminum plates several centimeters thick, and no tank armor would be able to withstand such a hit. The railgun is currently being tested in Russia. According to scientists, the main goal is to create compact high-powered generators because the railgun requires much energy to work effectively. Laser weapons Laser technology in the military is used primarily for location, targeting and navigation. But its use in combat is only a matter of time. Information about modern research into laser weapons in Russia is mainly classified. The military, however, will develop laser systems that can be mounted on vehicles, aircraft and ships. A-60 and MiG-35 jets will be equipped with a laser system for blinding enemy aircraft navigation systems. Such lasers, however, will not be similar to blasters from the Star Wars movies, military expert Dmitry Drozdenko told Radio Sputnik. In order to generate enough energy for the destruction of an entire plane, a huge device and much energy is required. The device would have to be so big that it just couldn't be installed on a plane, the expert added.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 35

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Research and development of combat laser weapons took place in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. First, laser pistols were designed for cosmonauts, but were not adopted by the military due to its inability to inflict serious damage. Still, the technologies in George Lucas’ trilogy are no longer the stuff of science fiction, and the U.S. is testing systems that can destroy enemy targets with laser beams. Lockheed Martin's Area Defense Anti-Munitions (ADAM) can terminate enemy missiles, UAVs and small boats at short ranges. No information, however, about similar developments in Russia is available. Acoustic, or sonic, weapons Such weapons use sound and cause fear, panic and terror among enemy soldiers. Even internal human organs can be damaged, leading to death. Information about the research of these weapons is classified, but it's known that both the U.S. and Russia are trying to create them. For example, acoustic bullets have been designed in both countries, but dissipation of the acoustic wave’s power reduce damage, and such bullets can be used only for short distances. The other problem with sonic weapons is creating a focused beam of sound or ultrasound on the enemy. If such a beam is not created, then the weapon could hit one's own troops by dispersing. Nowadays, sonic weapons are mainly used by American police during protests, such as LRAD (Long Range Acoustic Device). For the military, it's impractical due high energy consumption and short distances of effectiveness. Still, the military doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted in 2010 calls for the use of sonic weapons in future wars, and research in this field will continue. https://www.rbth.com/defence/2017/07/12/a-farewell-to-traditional-arms-russia-develops- weapons-for-the-future_801080 Return to Top

The Diplomat (Tokyo, Japan) Why Is Russia Aiming Missiles at China? By Guy Plopsky July 12, 2017 The placement of Iskander-M Brigades in Russia’s Eastern Military District reflects continued uneasiness about China. In early June 2017, Russian media reported that yet another Ground Forces missile brigade received the dreaded road-mobile 9K720 Iskander-M missile system (known in Russian military parlance as an “operational-tactical missile system,” or OTRK in short). The brigade in question is the 29th Army’s newly established 3rd Missile Brigade, based in Russia’s colossal Eastern Military District (MD). Formed in December 2016, this brigade was initially armed with the aging 9K79-1 Tochka-U tactical ballistic missile system, and became the Eastern MD’s fourth missile brigade to be re-equipped with the Iskander-M as part of the Russian Defense Ministry’s plan to phase out all Tochka-Us by 2020. The district’s three other brigades — the 107th, 103rd and 20th — received their Iskander-M OTRKs in 2013, 2015, and 2016, respectively. As a result, there are presently more Iskander-M brigades in the Eastern MD than any other district; Russia’s other three military districts (Central, Southern, and Western) currently house two Iskander-M brigades each. What, then, is the purpose of these four brigades?

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 36

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Whereas the task of Iskander-M OTRKs being deployed in Russia’s Western MD is to hold U.S. and allied forces in the Baltics and Poland at risk, the systems stationed in the Eastern MD appear to primarily serve a different purpose: strengthening both Russia’s conventional and nuclear deterrence against China. Indeed, while an Iskander-M system stationed in Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast allows Russia to target a wide range of NATO military assets, including the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Poland, an Iskander-M stationed in Russia’s Far East has very limited ability to threaten U.S. forces deployed in the region. According to Russian sources, the Iskander-M’s 9M723-series of quasi-ballistic missiles have a range of 400-500 kilometers (250-310 miles), while the 9M728/R-500 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) — frequently erroneously referred to as the Iskander-K — possesses a range of under 500 km. This largely restricts the Iskander-M to targets on Japan’s Hokkaido Prefecture, leaving key U.S. military assets, including the AN/TPY-2 BMD radar in Japan’s Amoroi Prefecture and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea, beyond the system’s reach. A possible exception is Misawa Air Base in the east of Aomori Prefecture; however, targeting this facility would require deploying the Iskander-M to the southern tip of Kunashir Island in the Kurils. In this regard, the Kremlin no longer permanently bases missile brigades within close proximity to Japan as it did during the Cold War (the USSR maintained a missile brigade on the southern section of Sakhalin Island in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk). The two Iskander-M brigades in Russia’s Far East — the 107th and 20th — are based in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and Primorsky Krai, respectively. Both of these regions border China. The latter region also encompasses Russia’s 17 km (10.5 mile) land border with North Korea, suggesting that the primary purpose of the two far eastern brigades is containing China and responding to contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, the basing locations of the Eastern MD’s other two Iskander-M brigades likewise point to a focus on China; the 103rd Missile Brigade is stationed in Russia’s Republic of Buryatia, which borders Mongolia, while the newly formed 3rd Missile Brigade is based in Gorny (once known as Chita-46) in Zabaykalsky Krai — a region that borders China’s Inner Mongolia Province. Though the Kremlin has been careful not to voice long-term concerns about China, perhaps the most telling examples of Moscow’s continued uneasiness regarding the growing military might of its neighbour have been large-scale Russian military exercises held in the Eastern MD. As Dr. Roger N. McDermott, senior fellow in Eurasian military studies at the Jamestown Foundation, concludes in his analysis on the large-scale Vostok (“East”) 2014 exercise involving some 100,000 personnel, “Vostok 2014, much like its earlier incarnation in 2010, contains strong evidence that the Russian General Staff continues to consider China a potential threat to Russia.” Given the persisting concern, basing Iskander-M OTRKs in regions bordering China’s Northern Theater Command is a logical move from Russia’s perspective. Indeed, the system’s ability to deliver a wide range of cluster munitions makes it particularly suitable for use against People’s Liberation Army (PLA) armor and infantry in the event of an armed confrontation. Furthermore, the Iskander-M is also able to deliver various non-cluster warheads with a relatively high degree of accuracy — a capability which Russian officials have repeatedly praised the system for, including during military exercises in the Eastern MD. Reporting to Russian President Vladimir Putin on the launch of Iskander-M quasi-ballistic missiles during Vostok 2014 (which took place from a test range in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast), Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that “Iskander-M units hit two targets at a distance of 200 km (124 miles),” adding that “[t]he combat crews demonstrated outstanding practical skills, including precision in hitting targets.” Similarly, in August 2016, Russia’s Defense Ministry boasted that a missile launched by an Iskander-M unit from the Jewish Autonomous Oblast during a military exercise scored a “direct hit” against a simulated

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 37

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // target some 300 km (186 miles) away in the neighboring Amur Oblast. The participation of the Iskander-M and other advanced strike systems in these and other military exercises across Russia appears to reflect Moscow’s understanding that precision-strike capabilities must play a greater role in future military operations against both non-state and state actors, including China, which has been actively bolstering its own precision-strike capabilities. At the same time, the Iskander-M’s ability to deliver nuclear payloads reinforces Russia’s nuclear “de-escalation” doctrine, which aims to deter an adversary from engaging in hostilities by threatening to retaliate with a limited nuclear strike. Given Russia’s eroding conventional military superiority over the PLA, nuclear weapons, particularly non-strategic systems such as the Iskander- M, are likely to play an increasingly important role in deterring China. Indeed, as Dr. Alexei Arbatov and Major General Vladimir Dvorkin (Ret.) observe in a 2013 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report, “it may be assumed that Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, as well as some of its non-strategic nuclear weapons, do serve a mission of containing China.” Commenting on Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine, which states that “[n]uclear weapons will remain an important factor for preventing the outbreak of nuclear military conflicts and military conflicts involving the use of conventional means of attack (a large-scale war or regional war),” the two experts conclude that “[i]n terms of military logic, to mention a regional war in such a context can only suggest a hypothetical conflict with China.” Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine reiterates the 2010’s statement on the use of nuclear weapons, indicating Moscow continues to adhere to this line of thought. All of the above notwithstanding, Iskander-M brigades in Russia’s Eastern MD merit close watch by the United States given the possibility of missiles with longer ranges being fielded with this OTRK that would enable it to hold U.S. assets in the region at risk. Such missiles would also fail to comply with the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which bans ballistic missiles and GLCMs with ranges of 500-5,500 km (310-3,417 miles). In fact, Russian officials have previously stated that the range of the Iskander-M’s R-500 GLCM could be extended if deemed necessary. Moreover, it is possible that an upgraded GLCM for the Iskander-M is already under development or operational. However, it should be noted that even if such a GLCM does exist, it remains unclear whether its range exceeds 500 km and whether it is affiliated with a new Russian GLCM that allegedly violates the INF Treaty (dubbed SSC-8 by NATO). Recent developments further support the possibility of Russia extending the Iskander-M’s reach (if it hasn’t done so already). In April 2017, the director general of Russia’s Rostec Corporation, Sergey Chemezov, noted that “a modernized variant of the Iskander-M OTRK will be presented after 2020.” Though Chemezov did not provide additional details, a meeting held between the head of Russia’s Missile and Artillery Troops and representatives of Russia’s military industry a month later shed further light on the potential improvements to the system. According to Russia’s Defense Ministry, the meeting discussed the question of developing new missiles with improved range and accuracy for the Iskander-M. Should Moscow introduce new longer range missiles for the Iskander-M (and/or for a new road-mobile missile system) in its Eastern MD, they will strengthen Russia’s position vis-a-vis China, which fields both ballistic missiles and GLCMs with greater ranges than those currently in use with the Iskander-M. However, the deployment of such missiles will also have serious implications for regional stability. http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/why-is-russia-aiming-missiles-at-china/ Return to Top

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 38

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

MIDDLE EAST

Slate Magazine (Washington, DC) The Iran Trap By Fred Kaplan July 18, 2017 Trump is stuck with Obama’s nuclear deal. And his efforts to undermine it can only help Tehran. President Donald Trump is having, even by his standards, a very bad week. On Monday alone, quite apart from the continuing Russia scandal, he found himself blocked from fulfilling his dreams and campaign promises to repeal the two landmark achievements of the Obama years—the Affordable Care Act and the Iran nuclear deal. In the former, Senate Republican leaders couldn’t muster enough votes, even within their own party, for an alternative plan that was drawn up in secret and would snatch health care from more than 20 million Americans. In the latter, Trump was met with—and, at first, tried to resist—an unpleasant surprise: The Iranians, it turns out, are in full compliance with the accord’s quite stringent terms. The deal, which Trump and other critics had denounced as dangerous and unworkable, is working. Shortly after the deal was signed in July 2015 by Iran and six other nations (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China—plus Germany), the U.S. Congress passed a bill requiring the president to report every 90 days on whether Iran was keeping its end of the bargain. Monday was the most recent 90-day deadline. In June, as the deadline approached, the White House was dealt a crushing blow by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has been monitoring the deal under the most intrusive inspection regime ever negotiated in an arms-control accord. The IAEA concluded—in its own detailed, point-by-point report on the matter—that the Iranians have so far followed the accord to the letter. The deal required Iran to reduce the number of centrifuges in its reactors by two-thirds; to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 97 percent; to destroy the core of a heavy-water reactor that might have produced plutonium bombs; and to allow IAEA inspectors to enter, monitor, and take measurements not only at “known” nuclear facilities but also at “suspect” covert sites. The agency’s findings of Iran’s compliance with these and other requirements: check, check, check, and check. At an hourlong meeting on Wednesday, Trump’s top security advisers—Secretary of State Rex Tillerson; Secretary of Defense James Mattis; Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, the national security adviser; and Gen. Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—unanimously told the president he had no choice but to certify that Iran was in compliance. But, according to a story by Peter Baker in the New York Times, Trump spent 55 minutes of the meeting telling his advisers “he did not want to.” Over the next several days, the advisers crafted what they presented to Trump as a tough new policy: He would sign the certification but also stiffen U.S. sanctions against Iran for its development of ballistic missiles, support of terrorism, and violation of human rights. In fact, though, the advisers were craftier than Trump knew. Under the nuclear deal, the U.S. and the five other signatories agreed to lift sanctions that they had imposed on Iran for its nuclear activities, which had previously been in violation of United Nations resolutions. However, the deal explicitly stated that the sanctions that had been imposed on Iran for other nefarious activities could stay in

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 39

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // place. In other words, the advisers’ proposal, which Trump accepted, was no new policy, not even much of a shift. It is allowed for in the nuclear deal—and the United States, along with other countries, have been imposing sanctions on Iran, under those other criteria, for years. McMaster seemed to keep up the rhetorical ploy on Monday in a conference call with reporters, telling them that Iran had breached “the spirit” of the nuclear deal and “has been walking up to violating the letter” of it as well. Like many American soldiers who fought in Iraq, McMaster is deeply suspicious of Iran, but he has also read the agreement’s text, so his words here can only be seen as disingenuous. For the text was composed so precisely that there is no distinction between its “spirit” and its “letter”; the only way of violating the former is to violate the latter. So, yes, Iran continues to do things that we don’t like, but those things—testing missiles, financing terrorists, oppressing internal critics, expanding its influence across the Middle East—were not covered by the accord, and deliberately so. Iran’s impending nuclear threat was seen as the urgent danger; wrapping talks over that threat into some “grand bargain,” which would settle all of our differences, was seen as a fool’s errand and a distracting delay. Analogies were drawn to the U.S.- Soviet nuclear arms-reduction treaties signed during the Cold War. Those treaties said nothing about Moscow’s communist ideology, its oppression of dissidents, its occupation of Eastern Europe, or its support for developing countries’ revolutionary movements. But the treaties were valuable nonetheless for staving off the danger of nuclear war. It’s true that Obama and some of his aides hoped that the nuclear deal with Iran might alter Tehran’s policies over time—in part by drawing the country into the global economy after decades of isolation, in part by strengthening the domestic leverage of President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who had initiated the overture to the West and are thought to be more Western-leaning than the mullahs who presently rule Iran’s politics. However, Obama also said, publicly and privately, that the deal was a good deal—for the security of the United States and its allies, including those in the Middle East—whether or not Iran changed its broader outlook. Which would be worse, Obama would ask: an aggressive Iran with nuclear weapons or an aggressive Iran without nuclear weapons? To critics who complained that the deal prevented Iran from going nuclear for just 10 years (though actually it blocked some critical paths to a bomb for 15 and 25 years), Obama would ask: Would you rather leave Iran with the ability to build a bomb in one year, which it possessed when the deal was signed? “They might cheat” remained the critics’ only substantive line of attack. And even Trump has been forced to admit that, at least for now, they’re not cheating. There is no “spirit” of the deal that the Iranians are violating. And as for McMaster’s claim that they’re “walking up to violating the letter” of the deal, that’s just another way of saying that they’re not violating its letter. They may be doing everything up to the limits of what the deal allows—but, again, those limits fall far short of what Iran needs to get remotely close to acquiring a nuclear weapon. Meanwhile, if Trump is worried about Iranian expansion (a legitimate source of worry), he seems oblivious to the fact that his own policies have worsened the trends. By denouncing Qatar as a leading financier of terrorism (thus succumbing to sweet-talking pressure from the Saudis and an info-war hacking campaign by the UAE), Trump drove Qatar’s emir—who, yes, had been playing all sides in the sectarian wars but had also been hosting the largest U.S. air base in the Middle East— into the arms of … that’s right, Iran. By aiding the Saudis in their vicious air war over Yemen and killing many more civilians than Obama had in his own abetting, Trump has helped legitimize Iran’s support of the rebels. By failing even to attempt a politico-diplomatic settlement to the civil wars in Iraq and Syria (even as the military campaigns against ISIS are succeeding), he has solidified Iran’s political control of Baghdad. (In fairness, though, Iran’s growing influence in Iraq was an almost an

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 40

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // almost inevitable consequence of the power vacuum left by President George W. Bush’s 2003 invasion.) Trump also made a terrible mistake when, during the NATO summit in May, he tried to persuade European allies to stop their trade and financial transactions with Iran. By doing this, the United States accomplished the dubious feat of being the first power to violate the Iran nuclear deal. For instance, in the accord, the United States and European Union pledge to “refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this [agreement].” They also agreed on “steps to ensure Iran’s access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy.” Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister who is visiting New York, argued explicitly on Monday, at a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations, that Trump has violated the nuclear deal. The multinational commission that periodically reviews compliance with the deal is meeting in Vienna this Thursday. It shouldn’t be a surprise if Iran’s delegates use the occasion to file a formal complaint against the United States. The complaint isn’t likely to amount to much. Trump’s lobbying in Europe had no effect. Western firms have begun to sign contracts in areas of commerce the nuclear deal allows, and American firms would be loath to grant foreign competitors a leg up to appease Trump’s pique. It is a devastating sign—not only of how poorly Trump understands foreign policy but also of how inadequately his vaunted deal-making skills translate to international politics—that an American president is being outflanked so easily by an Iranian foreign minister. It’s a sorrier sign still that the Iranian foreign minister is in the right. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2017/07/trump_is_stuck_with_the_ iran_deal.html Return to Top

Tehran Times (Tehran, Iran) Zarif: Iran to Retaliate if JCPOA Violated Author Not Attributed July 18, 2017 Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has warned the Donald Trump administration that Tehran has the option to abandon limits on its nuclear program in case the nuclear agreement, officially called the JCPOA, is violated. “If it comes to a major violation, or what in the terms of the nuclear deal is called significant nonperformance, then Iran has other options available, including withdrawing from the deal,” Zarif told The National Interest on Monday. The nuclear deal was signed between Iran and the United States, Britain, France, Germany, China, Russia and the European Union on July 14, 2015. The UN Security Council approved a resolution on July 20, 2015, endorsing the agreement. It took effect on January 16, 2016. “As we’ve said in the past, we wanted that agreement to be the foundation and not the ceiling. But in order for that to serve as a solid foundation, we want to make sure that the obligations by all sides have been fully and faithfully implemented. And if we get that, then we have an opening to further progress,” he said.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 41

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Zarif: We either win together or lose together On the regional situation, Zarif said, “We don’t see the situation in our region as a winning or losing battle. It’s a situation where the initial U.S. invasion of Iraq has led everybody to lose. Because we believe that the situation in today’s world is so interconnected that we cannot have winners and losers; we either win together or lose together.” Zarif also said that Shias, Sunnis and Kurds are all important segment of Iraqi society with whom Iran needs to have relations. “Iran has rushed to the aid of the Iraqis, not just the Shias, but everybody. For us, the Shias, the Sunnis, the Kurds—all of them are an important segment of Iraqi society with whom we need to have relations.” Citing an example of Iran’s help to Iraqis when Daesh invaded Iraq in 2014, the foreign minister said, “We went to the support of the Kurds: when they had been invaded by ISIS, we were the first to go to Erbil to secure it and to rescue it, basically, from a Daesh occupation.” He added there are certain countries in the Middle East who have been “consistently” supporting terrorism. “You have countries in the region who have consistently supported extremists… Some countries consistently supported the wrong groups—these are the same countries from whose nationals, almost 94 percent of those engaged in acts of terror, came—so we are talking about a consistent record on their side and a consistent record on the Iranian side.” He added that Iran does not seek to exclude Saudi Arabia from the security calculus of the Middle East region. “We believe that Saudi Arabia is an important part of that security, as we believe that other countries in the region should be an important part of that security understanding.” http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/415196/Zarif-Iran-to-retaliate-if-JCPOA-violated Return to Top

PressTV (Tehran, Iran) Blacklisting Iran’s IRGC to Cost US Dear: Top Commander Author Not Attributed July 19, 2017 A top Iranian commander has warned against the repercussions of Washington’s possible designation of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, saying the move would cost the US dear. IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Ja’afari said in the northeastern city of Mashhad on Wednesday that the US bases in the region would be insecure if Washington blacklisted the IRGC or imposed sanctions on Iran over its defense program. “If the US seeks to pursue sanctions against [Iran’s] defense [program] and the IRGC, before that it should move its regional bases 1,000 kilometers away from Iran and it should know that it has to pay a high price for its miscalculation,” warned the top commander. Underlining the significance of missile capabilities in promoting the country’s deterrence power, Ja’afari said that the IRGC was expanding the production of its missiles that could successfully hit

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 42

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // targets with pinpoint precision, just as they did during a recent attack on the positions of Takfiri terrorists in Syria. Last month, the IRGC fired six medium-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles at Daesh bases in Syria’s Dayr al-Zawr, which killed more than 170 Takfiri terrorists, including a number of commanders and senior elements, and inflicted heavy damage on their equipment and systems. The missile attack came after gunmen mounted almost simultaneous assaults on Iran’s Parliament and the Mausoleum of the late Founder of the Islamic Republic Imam Khomeini on June 7. The Daesh Takfiri terrorist group claimed responsibility for the assaults, which killed 17 people and injured over 50 others. “Iran’s missile power in air, sea and on land is rapidly increasing, and this is an inalienable principle for us,” the IRGC commander added, stressing that Iran’s missile might is not up for negotiations. Ja’afari said that the enemy regards a new war as harmful to its interests as all military and warmongering acts of the enemies in the region have backfired so far. On Tuesday, the United States slapped new economic sanctions against Iran over its ballistic missile program. Iran has recently made major breakthroughs in its defense sector and attained self-sufficiency in producing important military equipment and hardware. The Islamic Republic says its military power poses no threat to other countries and is merely based on the doctrine of deterrence. US officials have also said that President Donald Trump's administration was considering a proposal that could lead to categorizing the IRGC as a terrorist organization. http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2017/07/19/529014/Iran-US-IRGC-sanction-missile-Trump Return to Top

The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem, Israel) Israeli Nuclear Secret-Leaker Sentenced for Contact With Foreigners By Yonah Jeremy Bob July 10, 2017 The former nuclear technician at the Negev Nuclear Research Center in Dimona previously served an 18-year prison sentence for revealing information about Israel’s atomic program in 1986. The Jerusalem Magistrate’s Court gave Israeli nuclear-secrets leaker Mordechai Vanunu a two- month suspended jail sentence on Monday for violating the conditions of his previous release, having met with foreigners in recent years. The court’s suspended sentence would require that Vanunu only serve the two months in prison if he commits another similar violation in the next three years. He was also sentenced to 120 hours of community service on Monday as a result of his January conviction on the charges. The former nuclear technician at the Negev Nuclear Research Center in Dimona served an 18-year prison sentence for revealing information about Israel’s atomic program in 1986. After his release from jail in 2004, Israeli defense authorities barred Vanunu from traveling abroad or speaking with foreigners without approval, alleging he has more details to divulge on the Dimona atomic reactor.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 43

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Besides the conviction for violating his unique release conditions, Vanunu was acquitted in January of two other charges: giving an interview and revealing more classified information with Channel 2 in September 2015 and moving his residence without approval. Vanunu was arrested in September 2015, emerging from a court hearing telling the awaiting press that he charged State Attorney Shai Nitzan with “abusing him.” The 2015 arrest and investigation were ordered by the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), which is also responsible for monitoring the conditions of his parole. Vanunu’s interview with Channel 2 in September 2015 was his first interview with a Hebrew- language Israeli media outlet since his arrest in 1986. In the portion of the interview which was aired on television, Vanunu talked about his motivations for revealing the information and his struggles and anger with Israeli authorities, but he did not discuss the substance of the information itself. On the air, Vanunu told Channel 2 that his decision to photograph sensitive nuclear facilities at Dimona and reveal information that Israel had kept secret until that point was motivated by his desire to “inform the citizens of the Middle East, the world, and the State of Israel.” The former technician said that he had gradually adopted left-wing views during his employment at Dimona, and that he was horrified at “the danger” of Israel’s nuclear weapons program. Vanunu was jailed as a traitor in 1986 after discussing his work as a technician at the Dimona nuclear reactor facility with Britain’s Sunday Times newspaper, an interview that led experts to conclude that the facility had produced fissile material for as many as 200 atomic warheads. Israel, meanwhile, holds the official position of neither confirming nor denying possession of nuclear weapons. Vanunu denies that he poses a security risk, but says he will pursue anti-nuclear activities and wants to live abroad. http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Israeli-nuclear-secret-leaker-sentenced-for-contact-with- foreigners-499271 Return to Top

INDIA/PAKISTAN

Deutsche Welle (Bonn, Germany) Is India Turning Its Nuclear Focus Toward China? By Murali Krishnan July 14, 2017 India's nuclear policy is now believed to be placing a greater emphasis on China instead of focusing on archrival Pakistan. But this is not to be mistaken as a shift in the nation's nuclear doctrine, say experts. A recent report by two top American experts that India's nuclear strategy is targeting China has drawn mixed responses from Indian experts and academics who maintain there is no cause for alarm about the country's nuclear position despite the changing geopolitical situation.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 44

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Published in the July-August issue of the digital journal After Midnight, the article claimed that India is busy developing a missile, which can target all of China from its bases located in southern India. It also said that while modernizing its atomic arsenal, India has produced around 600 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, which is sufficient for 150-200 nuclear warheads. China, India and Pakistan are all pursuing new ballistic missile, cruise missile, and sea-based nuclear delivery systems. Like China, India's nuclear doctrine is based on the no-first-use (NFU) concept backed by a policy of assured massive retaliation. "China appears to have maintained a measure of ambiguity on whether its 'no first use' pledge will be applicable to India. An unambiguous clarification on this issue has to be sought from China," argues Gopalaswami Parthasarthy - popularly known as G Parthasarthy - a former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan. Shift in focus India's NFU policy, which was adopted in 2003, states that any nuclear attack on the country and its forces anywhere shall result in unmitigated retaliation against the aggressor. So when the US experts claimed that India's nuclear modernization program was placing increased emphasis on its future strategic relationship with China, it came as no big surprise. "I think India's focus has shifted to China sometime back, which is why India is focusing on acquiring long-range missiles and nuclear missile submarines," Rajesh Rajagopalan, a professor in international politics specializing in nuclear weapons and disarmament, told DW. "But possibly not to antagonize China, India has so far not built ICBM-range missiles," he added, referring to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which are guided ballistic missiles with a minimum range of 5,500 kilometers primarily designed for nuclear weapons delivery. "ICBM development will probably happen now. But I don't think warhead numbers indicate anything regarding who the target is," the expert said. Rajagopalan argued that the number of nuclear warheads cited in the article suggested a dramatic increase and there were no indicators of such a change. Strained ties "I think India is fast-tracking its nuclear development program because of China. Yes, we are bullish because fears have shifted and our ballistic missile development program is progressing at a feverish pace," Happymon Jacob, Associate Professor of Disarmament Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, told DW. For nearly a month now, Chinese and Indian border troops have confronted each other close to a valley controlled by China that separates India from its close ally Bhutan, and gives China access to the so-called Chicken's Neck, a thin strip of land that connects India to its remote northeastern regions. Beijing alleges Indian troops crossed into a region known in China as Donglang, called Doklam in India, early in June and obstructed work on a road on the Himalayan plateau. "When tensions escalate, this article appears. Look, research work is different from reality. As far back as in May 1998, when we conducted a series of five nuclear bomb test explosions, the former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee told then US president Bill Clinton that China was a threat. This is sensationalism, its fundamentals are shaky," says defense expert Pravin Sawhney, editor of FORCE, a magazine on national security.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 45

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Srikanth Kondapalli, a China expert, believes India's focus in the nuclear arena is moving away from Pakistan toward China but the shift "has not yet happened." "This is a speculative report. As part of the India-US nuclear deal, we agreed to place 60 percent of our nuclear plants under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards with the remaining 40 percent left for military purposes. So India has to generate nuclear weapons from these 40 percent assets," Kondapalli told DW. Deterrence or arms race? The report by the US experts states that the two-stage, solid-fuel, rail-mobile Agni-2 missile, which can deliver a nuclear or conventional warhead to targets more than 2,000 kilometers away, is probably targeted at western, central, and southern regions of China. "Obviously this can only generate 'minimal' nuclear deterrence. However, the 'credible' portion of India's nuclear policy suggests that it has to make preparations. Hence, the solid propellant Agni missiles," adds Kondapalli. According to the Arms Control Association (ACA), India is estimated to have at least 520 kilograms of plutonium, enough for 100-120 nuclear devices, described as a "credible minimum deterrent." By comparison, China has enough fissile material for between 200 and 250 devices. Unofficial estimates reckon that China currently has 270 nuclear warheads. India has built its own "triad" of land, sea and air forces, all equipped with nuclear weapons, says the ACA. "If any nuclear adversary including China attacks India, nuclear weapons are, of course, meant to deter and retaliate. That is why India's nuclear doctrine recommends triad capability," Chintamani Mahapatra, an academic, told DW. India has always promoted itself as a responsible nuclear weapons state and New Delhi has made it evident that nuclear weapons are indeed the weapons of last resort. But observers say the arms race is nevertheless on. http://www.dw.com/en/is-india-turning-its-nuclear-focus-toward-china/a-39698420 Return to Top

Live Mint (New Delhi, India) India Firm on Verifiable Nuclear Weapons Reduction By Elizabeth Roche July 19, 2017 According to Gopal Baglay, given that India had not participated in the negotiations and abstained from voting on the treaty, ‘India, therefore, cannot be a party to the Treaty, and so shall not be bound by any of the obligations that may arise from it.’ India continues to attach priority to and remains committed to universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament, foreign ministry spokesman Gopal Baglay said on Tuesday against the backdrop of New Delhi’s abstention from negotiations and a vote on adopting a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons at the UN.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 46

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Noting that India did not participate in the negotiations on a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons which were concluded in New York on 7 July, Baglay said that besides India, “none of the other states possessing nuclear weapons participated in the negotiations”. Nearly two-thirds of UN states agreed on 7 July to the treaty to ban nuclear weapons after months of talks, which were boycotted by the US, Britain, France and others who instead pledged commitment to a decades-old Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 and is aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. The treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons will enter into force 90 days after 50 countries have ratified it. It was adopted with 122 votes in favour, one against and one abstention. US ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley, British ambassador Matthew Rycroft and French ambassador Francois Delattre said in a joint statement that their countries do “not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party” to the treaty, Reuters reported. The three nations are among almost 40 countries that did not join the talks. According to Baglay, given that India had not participated in the negotiations and abstained from voting on the treaty, “India, therefore, cannot be a party to the Treaty, and so shall not be bound by any of the obligations that may arise from it.” “India believes that this Treaty in no way constitutes or contributes to the development of any customary international law,” he said. Reiterating India’s commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, Baglay said, “India believes that this goal can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework.” “In this regard, India supports the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention in the Conference on Disarmament, which is the world’s single multilateral disarmament negotiation forum working on the basis of consensus,” Baglay said. http://www.livemint.com/Politics/38QnqKqlc7PgFy2nUMRraM/India-firm-on-verifiable-nuclear- weapons-reduction.html Return to Top

Geo TV (Karachi, Pakistan) Pakistan Has Taken Constructive Measures On Nuclear Safety: US State Department Report By Waseem Abbasi July 19, 2017 The United States on Wednesday acknowledged that terrorism has reduced in Pakistan in 2016 for the second straight year and the country has taken constructive measures on nuclear safety and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). However, in its annual 'Country Report on Terrorism' for 2016, the US State Department kept Pakistan in the list of countries which have safe havens for terrorist. The report added that the Pakistani military and security forces undertook operations against groups that conducted attacks within Pakistan such as Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) Pakistan.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 47

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

“While terrorist-related violence in Pakistan declined for the second straight year in 2016, the country continued to suffer significant terrorist attacks, particularly against vulnerable civilian and government targets,” the report said. The report included Pakistan among over a dozen countries where terrorist safe havens exist. These countries include Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Columbia, Somalia, Philippines, Libya and Egypt. The report appreciated the fact that throughout 2016, the Government of Pakistan administered an Exit Control List (ECL) intended to prevent terrorists from traveling abroad. It further said Pakistan continued military operations to eradicate terrorist safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata), although their impact on all terrorist groups was uneven, it added. “To combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) trafficking, Pakistan harmonised its national control list with items controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and continued to harmonise its control lists with other multilateral regimes, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group,” the report said. According to the State Department, Pakistan improved upon legal and regulatory cooperation, industry outreach, and non-proliferation awareness for the Strategic Export Control Division and Pakistani Customs. It says Pakistan also delivered technical trainings to licensing and enforcement officials for the proper detection, interdiction, and identification of dual-use commodities that could be used to create WMDs. “Pakistan was a constructive and active participant in the Nuclear Security Summit process and in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and worked to strengthen its strategic trade controls, including updating its national export control list,” the report said. However, the report criticised Islamabad for not doing enough against the Afghan Taliban. "Pakistan did not take substantial action against the Afghan Taliban or Haqqani, or substantially limit their ability to threaten US interests in Afghanistan, although Pakistan supported efforts to bring both groups into an Afghan-led peace process," the State Department said. The department acknowledged that Pakistan's National Counter-terrorism Authority had published its own list of banned organisations in November 2016 which placed JuD in a separate section for groups that are "under observation" but not banned. While not a ban, this allows the government to closely scrutinize the activities of such organisations. https://www.geo.tv/latest/150177-pakistan-has-taken Return to Top

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 48

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

The Times of India (New Delhi, India) Centre Justifies Skipping Talks for Pact on Nuclear Arms Ban Author Not Attributed July 19, 2017 The government has justified its decision to not participate in negotiations for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, saying this treaty did not in any way constitute or contribute to the development of any "customary international law". This comes even as the government reiterated that India remained committed to "universal, non- discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament". The treaty, the first multilateral legally-binding instrument for nuclear disarmament, was adopted last week at the UN in New York. The negotiations for the treaty were concluded earlier this month under UNGA rules of procedure pursuant to a December 2016 resolution on which India had abstained, said the government. None of the other countries possessing nuclear weapons had participated in the negotiations. "These negotiations were conducted under UN General Assembly rules of procedure, pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution 71/258 of 23 December 2016. India had abstained on this Resolution and provided a detailed Explanation of Vote," said MEA spokesperson Gopal Baglay. In its Explanation of Vote, India had said it was "not convinced" that the proposed conference could address the longstanding expectation of the international community for the comprehensive instrument on nuclear disarmament. "India, therefore, cannot be a party to the Treaty, and so shall not be bound by any of the obligations that may arise from it. India believes that this Treaty in no way constitutes or contributes to the development of any customary international law,'' said Baglay. India and other nuclear-armed nations —the US, Russia, Britain, China, France, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel — had not participated in the negotiations. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/centre-justifies-skipping-talks-for-pact-on-nuclear- arms-ban/articleshow/59657681.cms Return to Top

COMMENTARY

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago, IL) The US-Russian Teamwork That Kept Nuclear Weapons Safe By Siegfried Hecker and Paul White July 13, 2017 “Nuclear weapons stink when taken apart,” a Russian nuclear weapons engineer told his audience. The year was 2000, and he spoke to a group of Russian and American experts who were attending a workshop in Sarov, the Russian Los Alamos, on how to safely dismantle nuclear weapons. The engineer was right: Nuclear weapons being disassembled smell like rotten eggs or a high-school chemistry lab gone bad. They can contain high explosives, organic substances, uranium, plutonium, and many other materials. Over the years, these materials interact, outgas, corrode, and are subject

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 49

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // to irradiation, producing a foul smell. Hardly anyone outside the room would have had any reason to be aware of this, so the engineer’s words inspired knowing nods, and acted like a wink or a secret handshake: The Russian and American nuclear scientists in the room shared a common bond. It was a strange phenomenon. Until just 10 years previously, the experts’ respective governments had been adversaries. But Russian and American nuclear scientists shared ties that no one else in the world could appreciate. Working far apart, they and their forebears had ushered into existence the world’s most destructive weapon, the atom bomb. They had worked to improve it, manage it, and make sure it was reliable. Now, they were trying to keep nuclear weapons safe from accidents and secure against theft and sabotage as the two superpowers downsized their arsenals. The scientists and engineers knew something that few others understood: That the most dangerous time in a typical nuclear weapon’s life cycle is not when it is being created, transported, or readied for launch. Rather, it is when it is being taken apart. Corrosion, changes in the sensitivity of chemical high explosives, outgassing of various compounds, radiation damage, and dimensional changes all challenge the skills of weapons engineers and scientists. The experts in the room might once have been one another’s opponents in some sense, but many on each side had intimate knowledge of weapons disassembly—who else could better understand what their counterparts were going through? An urgent problem. The story of how the United States and Russia worked together to address weapons safety had begun years before, and represents a remarkable tale of once-mortal- adversaries cooperating on matters that took them right to the edges of their respective countries’ most sensitive nuclear secrets. It started with the disastrous Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in April 1986. After briefly denying it had occurred, Moscow reached out to the international nuclear community for help mitigating the tragic consequences. Washington assisted quickly and effectively. Years later, Russian nuclear weapon scientists told their American counterparts (including the authors of this column) that the Chernobyl accident had happened because the Soviet Union was isolated. That is, Russian nuclear reactor designers, engineers, and operators had not had the opportunity to learn from their international peers. The weapon scientists assured us that the safety of nuclear bombs had always been much more rigorous. Yet the memory of the Chernobyl tragedy, and the enormous increase in the number of weapons being moved and disassembled, made Russian nuclear scientists keen to discuss concerns and safety practices with American counterparts. The end of the Cold War all but eliminated immediate fears of a nuclear war. In an ironic twist of fate, though, it dramatically increased the risk of nuclear accidents and the potential for theft or diversion of nuclear weapons and materials. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia had to transport unprecedented numbers of weapons from former Soviet republics to Russia for dismantlement. No one was as sharply aware of the risks as Russia’s nuclear weapons personnel. In the wake of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives launched by George H.W. Bush and Mikhail S. Gorbachev in September and October of 1991, which promised transparency and dialogue on safe warhead transportation and storage, the Russians gave voice to their concerns. In Washington in November 1991, Viktor N. Mikhailov, later Russia’s minister of atomic energy, specifically requested help with weapon safety and security, as well as help storing the huge excess of fissile material that would result from the accelerated dismantlement of his country’s nuclear stockpile. The US Congress responded to these requests promptly by way of the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction legislation. The scope and timing of the Nunn-Lugar efforts matched the urgency of Russian requests. To deal with security concerns related to the surge in warhead transportation, the United States cooperated to develop accident-resistant transportation containers. It provided armored Kevlar blankets to

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 50

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // shield warheads and warhead containers from terrorist bullets, and smart rail cars that enabled secure monitoring of warhead shipments. Washington also helped meet the new storage requirements (resulting from increased dismantlement rates) by providing containers and technical and financial support for the construction of a state-of-the-art fissile material storage facility at the Mayak site in Russia. These Nunn-Lugar-sponsored efforts, managed by the US Defense Department and supported by the US national nuclear labs, were a good beginning, but the Russian nuclear weapons experts wanted to do more to mitigate the dangers. The extraordinary number of nuclear weapons returning from the field and waiting to be disassembled included some past their certified lifetime. During one of the first meetings of Russian and American nuclear experts at Los Alamos in December 1992, Rady I. Ilkaev, the deputy scientific director of the Russian national nuclear lab VNIIEF, proposed direct, unclassified consultations on nuclear weapon safety. The Russians not only sought bilateral technical cooperation, but also believed that Russian- American teamwork would demonstrate an unparalleled level of transparency about nuclear safety, which would help reassure their own citizens and a worried world that remembered the Chernobyl tragedy all too well. Ilkaev and his Russian colleagues took advantage of the lab-to-lab scientific collaborations that blossomed during the early 1990s to explore much closer cooperation on safety—an approach that resonated strongly with their US lab counterparts. Yet no government agreements were in place to allow such cooperation. So two tracks were pursued in parallel: The governments prepared for formal negotiations, while simultaneously allowing the labs to exchange sensitive but unclassified nuclear-weapon safety and security concerns and practices. This sharing took the form of symposia called the Security Technology Exchanges. Four such symposia were held between October 1993 and March 1994, two in each country, at which American and Russian scientists, engineers, and government officials compared experiences on a range of topics. Subjects included analyzing nuclear risk; mitigating risks posed by hazardous materials; understanding the response of engineered systems to abnormal environments; and communicating the content of technical documents. One of the most important topics discussed in these symposia and later exchanges was human reliability. The economic and political crisis resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union severely strained one of the foundations of nuclear weapon safety: people. One of the authors of this piece (Paul C. White) recalls that at a July 1993 planning meeting in Ekaterinburg, his Russian counterpart asked, “What do you do when you can no longer count on people to do what they’re supposed to do—to obey the rules?” Although the Russians’ confidence in the loyalty and patriotism of their nuclear workers remained high, they expressed concern that the fraying of the decades-old system of authority could give rise to insider threats. A mutual strategic interest. These symposia opened doors, established a foundation for building trust, and nurtured professional and personal friendships that endure to this day. They also helped pave the way for government negotiations on the Weapons Safety and Security Exchange agreement, or WSSX, which the US energy secretary and Russian minister of atomic energy signed in December 1994. It entered into force in June 1995. In a March 1996 directive, US President Bill Clinton stated that cooperation on weapons safety and security was necessary to facilitate other US policy objectives, such as getting Russia to agree and comply with a true zero-yield Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Clinton authorized lab-to- lab collaboration between the three Russian and three US nuclear weapons labs, with the goal of sustaining the scientific competence of those responsible for the two countries’ respective nuclear

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 51

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // stockpiles. His statement was remarkable for declaring that maintaining the expertise of Russian nuclear weapons scientists—America’s Cold War adversaries—was now a US strategic interest. Although WSSX was an agreement between governments, the nuclear labs provided the driving energy and remained the centers of engagement for all related activities. Over the life of the agreement, which was renewed for five years in 2000, the two sides organized dozens of technical interactions, including symposia, joint studies, workshops, and exchanges of technical papers. The participants completed more than 100 collaborative projects on far-reaching and mutually beneficial topics. Among them were projects on accident response, responding to wildfires near nuclear facilities, and safety during warhead dismantlement. When Americans shared their experience of using a well-known industrial solvent—DMSO, or dimethyl sulfoxide—instead of mechanical methods to remove high explosives that had bonded to metal weapon parts, a Russian participant stood up and declared, “you have just given us a gift!” Such “gifts” were exchanged reciprocally to improve warhead disassembly on both sides. The discussions on responding to wildfires would also prove mutually beneficial. It wasn’t just technical staff from Los Alamos and Sarov who got to participate in exchange visits. So, too, did the fire departments of the two cities. In May 2000, Los Alamos experienced a devastating fire that burned more than 400 residences and 30 percent of the lab’s real estate, and threatened facilities that housed high explosives, plutonium, and tritium. In 2010, Sarov had to battle a peat fire at the boundary of its nuclear complex. Los Alamos experienced another serious wildfire in 2011. The WSSX exchanges allowed experts to learn new ways of looking at similar problems, unquestionably benefiting each country’s handling of the safety and security of its nuclear weaponry. In the book Doomed to Cooperate, one Russian nuclear safety expert said the exchanges led his country to adopt new federal regulations on nuclear weapons safety and emergency response. Sadly, the WSSX agreement was not extended in 2005. The end of this remarkable period of cooperation came at the hands of governments, not scientists. Washington imposed more legal and bureaucratic strictures on joint projects, and veered away from prioritizing nuclear safety to promote an agenda of arms control and transparency. Moscow became increasingly resistant to the presence of US technical personnel at its nuclear facilities. During the last three years, as relations between the US and Russian governments have seriously deteriorated, virtually all nuclear cooperation has ended. Nuclear safety has become more challenging as the designers and engineers who developed the weapons in today’s arsenals retire, and the experience of nuclear testing fades into distant memory. The older generation has passed on as much experience as possible to the younger engineers— particularly the idea that ensuring nuclear safety is a never-ending job. The WSSX projects demonstrated that cooperation has great safety benefits, and can be accomplished without jeopardizing either side’s nuclear secrets. The scientists and engineers on both sides are prepared to resume cooperation. The bonds they forged endure, reflecting a unique like-mindedness, a sort of simpatico professional relationship (or sympatiya in Russian) that helped make scientific engagement such a success and the world a safer place. http://thebulletin.org/us-russian-teamwork-kept-nuclear-weapons-safe10947 Return to Top

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 52

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Commentary Magazine (New York, NY) Why Japan Should Go Nuclear By Michael Rubin July 17, 2017 The ace in the hole. As North Korea develops nuclear weapons and tests ballistic missiles that could potentially hit the United States, the U.S. response has so far been ineffective. President Trump has responded both with rhetorical bluster and coddling of the North Korean leader. He and deployed carrier strike groups off the Korean peninsula. He has sought to work through China. Other senior statesmen, long-time Korea hands, and former nuclear commanders have argued that Trump should curtail the bluster and engage in dialogue. While Trump’s policies have yet to bring North Korea to heel, that is no reason to embrace the failed policies of the past. Nor have U.S. efforts to ameliorate let alone resolve the North Korean threat through China proved productive. In my book, Dancing with the Devil, a history of US negotiations with rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran, I trace how American diplomats have long sought to use China as an intermediary with North Korea, giving China a number of diplomatic and trade concessions, including access to sensitive technologies, to keep Beijing onboard. A quarter-century of this approach without any resolution suggests either China is unable or, more likely, unwilling to resolve the problem. In effect, China has engaged in an elaborate game of good cop-bad cop posturing. Chinese trade with North Korea, meanwhile, is now at record levels. During his campaign for the White House, Trump suggested that Japan (and South Korea) might need nuclear weapons, before reversing himself against the backdrop of criticism from across the political spectrum. When it comes to Japan, he may not have been wrong. Japan is already nuclear weapons-capable: All it would need to do is assemble a bomb it already knows how to make and has the material to do so. There is Japan’s historical antipathy toward nuclear weapons based on its status as the only country against which nuclear weapons were used in military conflict, but that anti-nuclear consensus is not as strong as some outsiders assume. Frankly, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Japan is the only thing that really gets Chinese officials to stand up and take notice. History may not mean much in the U.S. mindset, but the historical animosity between China and Japan rivals anything coming out of the Balkans in sheer depth, especially after the atrocities of the 1930s and 1940s. China clearly does not want a nuclear rival in East Asia; it is already uncomfortable with India having nuclear weapons. And turning a blind eye toward nuclear proliferation is not a decision that should be taken lightly. Every country that goes nuclear (India and Pakistan, for example) or which the international community by default allows (North Korea and Iran, after the sunset clause) erodes the threshold for the next state which might decide to acquire nuclear weapons. Diplomatically, encouraging a nuclear Japan might also have second order effects as it emboldens Japanese ultranationalists, although some of the concern about this voiced in the nonproliferation community seems overblown. Regardless, when it comes to North Korea, there is no choice but to play hardball. The United States and its East Asian allies have tried diplomacy with North Korea, only to have North Korea cheat on the Agreed Framework. Both Republican and Democratic presidents and secretaries of state have tried to work through Beijing, again without success. What should frustrate diplomats is that China could do much more to compel Pyongyang to stand down, but does

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 53

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 // not believe it in its interest to assert that pressure. Simply put, Trump and Tillerson should make clear to Beijing that, unless they bring North Korea’s nuclear program to a full stop, the United States will not stand in the way of a revision of the limits Japan’s post-war constitution put on its military and its nuclear doctrine. Indeed, as China becomes ever more aggressive, not only by proxy through North Korea but also in the South China Sea and in Sikkim, a firmer response that goes to the heart of China’s security concerns is important. After all, while Western diplomats see talks and negotiations as ways to find a win-win solution, all indications are both Pyongyang and Beijing see diplomacy as an asymmetric warfare strategy meant to distract adversaries while consolidating military gains and capabilities. Only if Beijing and Pyongyang step back from the brink might Washington and Tokyo reconsider. If Japan reaps diplomatic rewards and concessions from China, all the better. After all, why shouldn’t the pattern of incentives in response to proliferators go both ways? https://www.commentarymagazine.com/politics-ideas/japan-go-nuclear/ Return to Top

The Hill Times (Ottawa, Canada) The Nuclear-Weapons-Ban Thing Is Not Going Away, Prime Minister By Cesar Jaramillo July 19, 2017 Canada's opposition to the nuclear weapons ban treaty has degraded its reputation on disarmament, at home and abroad. Dear Mr. Trudeau, You recently dismissed this year’s multilateral process to negotiate a legal prohibition of nuclear weapons as “useless.” I’m afraid you were misinformed: it was anything but. Since no one from your government attended these historic negotiations, I’d like to share a few reflections related to the proceedings. You see, despite the absence of an official government delegation, several Canadians did participate—myself included. Let me fill you in. Did you know that the unprecedented diplomatic undertaking you consider useless involved not just a majority of the world’s nations? For innumerable civil society organizations; current and former diplomats; humanitarian agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross; academics and scientists from all continents; and survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—all deeply invested in this process—the July 7 adoption of a nuclear weapons ban treaty was the most consequential nuclear disarmament development in decades. As with the land mines treaty effort, in which Canada was a global leader two decades ago, the growing global movement to ban and eliminate nuclear weapons is deeply rooted in an unequivocal recognition of the indiscriminate, catastrophic humanitarian consequences of their use. While land mines still exist, their explicit prohibition has become an integral and necessary element of the framework for their elimination, and the normative bar against their mere possession has been forever raised. Despite your boycott of the nuclear ban treaty negotiations, Canada, too, stands to benefit from a strengthened global norm in rejection of nuclear weapons.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 54

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

Prime minister, the nuclear disarmament landscape was dramatically altered a few days ago in New York, as newly-emboldened voices from all corners of the planet established a ban of the most dangerous weapons on Earth. Please know that those voices will not be quelled, whatever the position of outliers. They will be heard at conferences of states parties to the nuclear non- proliferation treaty, at sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, at the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Canada’s absence was noted and questioned, just as our selling Canadian military goods to human- rights pariah Saudi Arabia has been noted and questioned. The weight and credibility of Canada’s hard-earned disarmament and arms control credentials have taken a substantial hit, abroad and at home. Were you aware that many of the most knowledgeable Canadians on nuclear disarmament have profound concerns about your government’s handling of this file? This is not an overstatement: you can ask around. Apprehension about Canada’s stand, and the arguments used to justify it, is shared by Canadian civil society experts, academics, former ranking diplomats, and a host of prominent citizens. Nearly a thousand recipients of the Order of Canada continue to call for urgent Canadian leadership on nuclear disarmament. Instead Canada, like most other NATO member states, boycotted the conference—just as the U.S. had asked. And even though Canada presents itself as a responsible non-nuclear weapons state, it continues to embrace NATO’s overt nuclear deterrence doctrine as a valid security policy, effectively legitimizing the weapons held by its nuclear-armed allies. Now those allies are engaged in a multibillion-dollar modernization of their nuclear arsenals. How can this not be seen as contrary to the goal of nuclear abolition? How can the placement of U.S. nuclear weapons on the territories of NATO members in Europe be compatible with the transfer prohibitions of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty? Do you really believe that proliferation concerns will ever be fully allayed while nuclear states and alliances obstinately cling to their arsenals? NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy is clearly out of sync with the views and expectations of most states. Why can’t Canada work with its allies, and engage would-be adversaries, to formulate security arrangements that do not pose an existential threat to human civilization? As a NATO member state, it is surely Canada’s prerogative to raise such issues within the alliance—and to expect to be heard. Ban advocates are fully aware that a legal prohibition is not tantamount to abolition. The need for complementary efforts is undisputed. Canada’s continued work on a fissile materials treaty, for instance, is undoubtedly important. But it is not sufficient. Quite simply, it falls short of current multilateral expectations. Without a cohesive link to a broader, credible move toward complete nuclear disarmament, this effort reflects neither the gravity of the nuclear threat nor the urgency of abolition. Although Canada has repeatedly claimed that the process that resulted in the ban treaty did not take into account the current international security environment, a growing global majority sees this line of argument as a deliberate delay tactic. If the security environment is not ripe for nuclear disarmament now, when will it be? This much is certain: the value of the process that resulted in the adoption of the nuclear ban treaty at the United Nations earlier this month goes far beyond the legal prohibition itself. It is ultimately an ongoing political struggle of the highest order.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 55

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

States with nuclear weapons will only disarm—if they ever do—when they so choose. That odious reality is well understood. But no longer will they control the prevailing narrative of nuclear weapons. For a vast majority of nations, these already-illegitimate instruments of mass destruction are now and forever unambiguously illegal. The door has been left open for outliers to join the treaty, which opens for signatures on September 20. Please, prime minister, think very carefully about Canada’s position on nuclear disarmament. Reflect on the groundbreaking, audacious political statement issued at the United Nations this month by most nations, in an open challenge to the express desires of the most powerful states on Earth. More than 30 years ago, your father led our country in renouncing the placement of U.S. nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. It was a bold move. We need that boldness now. So read the signs of your time and take up the nuclear disarmament torch. This is your moment, Mr. Trudeau. But will you seize it? http://www.hilltimes.com/2017/07/19/nuclear-weapons-ban-thing-not-going-away-prime- minister/114220 Return to Top

Foreign Policy (Washington, DC) The Iran Nuclear Deal Has Been a Blessing for Israel By Carmi Gillon July 13, 2017 Two years on from the signing of the agreement to curtail Tehran’s nuclear program, Israel and the region are safer than ever from the threat of mullahs with a bomb. During my time as director of Israel’s General Security Service, the Shin Bet, I was among those responsible for maintaining my country’s security in a tumultuous and dangerous region. It was my job to consider every threat and every challenge. Among the most serious threats that I worried faced Israel was the possibility of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. That was one danger I knew we could never accept. Now, as the world marks the two-year anniversary of the adoption of the nuclear agreement with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon is more remote than it has been in decades. Thanks to the agreement, Iran’s nuclear program has been defanged and all its pathways to a bomb blocked. While no agreement is perfect, this achievement must not be underestimated. For decades, leaders and experts in Israel and among our allies contemplated the drastic steps we might have to take to restrain or destroy Iran’s nuclear program. That included potential military operations that might have triggered a major escalation and cost many lives — with no guarantee of achieving their goal. Through the JCPOA, the major world powers came together to ensure — without a single shot being fired — that Iran dismantled key nuclear infrastructure and submitted itself to thorough monitoring and inspection. Two years later, the results are in, and they show the effort has been a clear success.Two years later, the results are in, and they show the effort has been a clear success.

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 56

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed that Iran has complied with the terms of the agreement. It has dismantled and removed two-thirds of its centrifuges. It has reduced its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98 percent, shipping over 25,000 pounds out of the country. The core of its Arak reactor, which could have allowed Iran to produce weapons-grade plutonium, has been removed and its shell filled with concrete. Perhaps most importantly, Tehran has provided inspectors with unprecedented access to its nuclear facilities and supply chain. In the face of this success, even some of the agreement’s most vocal critics have grudgingly accepted its positive impact. In April, President Donald Trump’s administration certified to Congress that Iran continues to be in compliance with the JCPOA. In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, after leading a vociferous international campaign against the agreement, now remains mostly silent on the subject. And while the majority of my colleagues in the Israeli military and intelligence communities supported the deal once it was reached, many of those who had major reservations now acknowledge that it has had a positive impact on Israel’s security and must be fully maintained by the United States and the other signatory nations. Of course, Iran remains an extremely dangerous regime and a bad actor across the Middle East. Its support for terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and regimes like that of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad continue to contribute to regional chaos and present a major threat to Israeli security and U.S. interests. Israel and its allies must remain extremely vigilant and active to counter the Iranian threat. But it is for precisely these reasons that the nuclear agreement is so important. By ensuring that such a dangerous regime can never possess nuclear weapons, the deal makes it easier for Iran to be confronted for its other malign behaviors. The Trump administration’s primary international accomplishment, for instance, has been to enlarge the coalition of moderate Sunni Arab countries who are threatened by Iran’s territorial ambitions. If Iran had been protected by a nuclear umbrella, it would have been impossible for countries such as Egypt, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia — as well as Israel and the United States — to array themselves so staunchly against Tehran. Key sanctions on Iran’s support for terror, human rights violations, and ballistic missile programs also have remained in place. And while Iran’s hardliners retain key positions of power, the willingness of the international community to pursue tough diplomacy has helped empower more moderate Iranian leaders. President Hassan Rouhani, a strong proponent of the agreement, was re-elected in May despite the opposition of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Rouhani understands and fears the consequences of major military confrontation – and his election serves as an important indicator that much of the Iranian people prefer a path of compromise and increased dialogue with the West over recklessly pursuing nuclear ambitions and conflicts. As a guardian of Israel’s security, my job was to prepare for the worst — while searching always for bold and proactive measures to head off disaster and stop threats in their tracks. The nuclear agreement is a good example of the kind of solutions to which I aspired. It has neutralized a major threat to the world, while ensuring that the United States and its allies have the tools, the information, and the leverage that they need to confront the Iranian danger and make the region, and the world, a safer place. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/13/the-iran-nuclear-deal-has-been-a-blessing-for-israel-jcpoa/ Return to Top

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 57

// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1273 //

ABOUT THE USAF CUWS The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation - counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. Return to Top

twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 58