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Al-Qa`Ida and Hamas: the Limits of Salafi-Jihadi Pragmatism

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Al-Qa`Ida and Hamas: the Limits of Salafi-Jihadi Pragmatism FEBRUARY 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 2 Al-Qa`ida and Hamas: al-Qa`ida does not want to cooperate disavowal), and Islamic land. In al- with “moderate” Muslims who are Qa`ida’s view, the leadership of Hamas The Limits of Salafi-Jihadi willing to use the electoral process to violated these unchanging constants, Pragmatism create a state—a statement that seems took itself outside the religion of Islam, reasonable, given the timing of the split. and therefore could no longer expect By Mary Habeck A further explanation for the tensions help from other Salafi-jihadis. between al-Qa`ida and Hamas, however, in 2006, the salafi-jihadi world was is necessary.5 Tawhid rocked by a surprising controversy: al- After Hamas won a decisive victory Qa`ida’s second-in-command, Ayman al- Understanding the reason for the in the January 2006 elections for the Zawahiri, issued a rebuke to Hamas for conflict from al-Qa`ida’s perspective has Palestinian Legislative Council, al- participating in the secular government implications for determining possible Qa`ida abruptly changed its earlier in Palestine. By the end of 2007, after 12 future actions by its followers. The supportive messages for the group.6 separate statements criticizing Hamas, leaders of al-Qa`ida rejected an obvious In early March, al-Zawahiri issued a Usama bin Ladin announced that Hamas ally for their jihad in Hamas, showing stern warning to the Hamas leadership, had “lost its religion,” a declaration that the limits of cooperation between al- cautioning them that taking power was mirrored in combat between Salafi- Qa`ida and other ideologically similar was only valid when it was used to jihadi militants aligned with al-Qa`ida groups. Al-Qa`ida also criticized the establish God’s rule on earth through and Hamas fighters on the streets of pathway to power taken by Hamas— implementing Shari`a (Islamic law). Gaza.1 During the next two years, both participation in an electoral process. Any other form of government would be the war of words and physical clashes Al-Qa`ida reaffirmed its commitment a different religion.7 Bin Ladin reiterated expanded until the conflict culminated the warning a month later, supporting in a gun battle over a Gaza mosque in “Al-Qa`ida and other the objectives of Hamas while stating July 2009. Although Hamas defeated that it was impermissible to participate their al-Qa`ida-affiliated, Salafi-jihadi Salafi-jihadi groups hold in “polytheistic councils.”8 In December, rivals, some observers believe that this a few core principles al-Zawahiri’s tone was more combative, was only the first round in an ongoing bluntly asserting that Hamas should war. upon which they will not never have participated in the elections compromise even if a more at all as long as there was a secular, There are multiple explanations for the rather than Islamic, constitution in friction between Hamas and al-Qa`ida. pragmatic course promises Palestine.9 In March 2007, al-Zawahiri The fact that al-Qa`ida and its Salafi- to lead to success.” declared that the Hamas leadership, in jihadi followers are independent from signing the Mecca agreement, was now Hamas’ control and have attempted to lost; “doctrinal deviation,” he said, “has subsume the Palestinian question might facilitated behavioral deviation.”10 be enough to explain the conflict.2 to fighting and stated through its It is also possible that the conflict is actions that it is not amenable to a The abrupt change in al-Qa`ida’s view between al-Qa`ida’s vision of a global more peaceful and stealthier method for of Hamas is striking and tied explicitly jihad versus Hamas’ local jihad.3 seizing control of a region or country. to the participation of the Palestinian This seems a possible explanation for The incident shows, in fact, that al- group in the elections. Yet what was it Hamas’ actions, but too weak to explain Qa`ida and other Salafi-jihadi groups about the elections that caused so much why the conflict was started by al- hold a few core principles upon which consternation on the part of al-Qa`ida’s Qa`ida-inspired groups.4 It may be that they will not compromise even if a more leaders? Al-Zawahiri was quite clear pragmatic course promises to lead to in his first statement that the failure 1 Usama bin Ladin, “The Way to Contain the Conspira- success. of Hamas to apply Shari`a, one of the cies,” al-Sahab, December 2007. 2 Yet the Hamas leadership did not initially confront the A study of the fundamentals of al- 6 See, for example, Khalid al-Hamadi, “Interview with global Salafi-jihadis active in Gaza and in fact allowed the Qa`ida’s faith might help policymakers Nasir Ahmad Nasir Abdallah al-Bahri (Abu-Jandal): group to grow for some time—perhaps as long as three better understand when the group is Part Eight,” al-Quds al-Arabi, March 26, 2005; “State- years—before taking decisive action. See “Abbas Says al likely to take a stand upon principle ment From Al Qaida On The Martyrdom Of Shaykh Qaeda in Gaza,” Washington Times, March 2, 2006; Ali rather than take the realist route that Yasin,” www.jihadunspun.com, March 24, 2004; “Full Waked, “Al-Qaeda Affiliate Burns Coffee Shop in Gaza outsiders might predict. The clash with Text: ‘Bin Laden Tape,’” BBC, April 15, 2004. Strip,” Israel News, October 8, 2006. Hamas has been so intense because it 7 “Al-Zawahiri Urges Hamas to Ignore Deals With Is- 3 Kim Cragin, “Al Qaeda Confronts Hamas: Divisions is based on al-Qa`ida’s commitment to rael,” al-Jazira, March 4, 2006. in the Sunni Jihadist Movement and its Implications for not one, but four key elements: tawhid, 8 Usama bin Ladin, “Oh People of Islam,” al-Sahab, U.S. Policy,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32:7 (2009): jihad, al-wala’ wa’l-bara’ (loyalty and April 2006. pp. 576-590, has a sophisticated discussion of the con- 9 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Realities of the Conflict Between flict. Cragin concludes that al-Qa`ida’s ideological com- Ladin, and Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, see www.nefafoun- Islam and Unbelief,” al-Sahab, December 2006. mitments to global jihad and against democracy explain dation.org/miscellaneous/nefaabuabdullah0609.pdf. 10 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Palestine is Our Business and the conflict, although she does not delve into from where 5 Jake Lipton, “The War of Words between Hamas and the Business of Every Muslim,” audio statement, March these two commitments spring. al-Qaeda,” The Washington Institute for Near East Pol- 11, 2007. See also “Interview with Shaykh Ayman al- 4 For this claim of a relationship with Mullah Omar, Bin icy, June 28, 2007. Zawahiri,” al-Sahab, May 5, 2007. 5 FEBRUARY 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 2 pillars of tawhid according to the `aqida Jihad al-Qa`ida’s messages to Hamas is that (tenets of belief) of Salafi-jihadis, meant Al-Qa`ida’s conclusion that Hamas had the fight in Palestine is the business that they were no longer following the abandoned tawhid was but one of the of the entire Islamic community, not religion of Islam. Within the context of charges leveled against the group. From the prerogative of one group, and that al-Qa`ida’s particular interpretation of the time of the election, al-Zawahiri and Hamas needs to carry out the jihad with the religion, known as Salafi-jihadism, other al-Qa`ida leaders also warned all honest fighters (including al-Qa`ida it is entirely consistent. Hamas not to succumb to U.S. pressure fighters).19 Hamas should not, as al- to stop violent resistance against Israel. Zawahiri said, isolate the mujahidin Tawhid, the belief that there is only one God There were two reasons provided for inside from the mujahidin outside.20 and He alone should be worshipped, is continuing the armed struggle. First, There should be one battle, with all the the core of Islam.11 Salafi-jihadis believe al-Zawahiri warned that “every way mujahidin fighting as one community, a correct adherence to the principle of other than jihad will only lead us to under one religion, and against one tawhid includes a literal obedience to all loss and failure,” since attempting to enemy.21 More practically, jihad in laws ordered upon man in the Qur’an free any place occupied by the infidels Afghanistan, Iraq and other theaters and sunna. To rule by anything other through elections would never liberate was jihad for Palestine, and if Hamas than what Allah has revealed, they so even “one grain of sand,” but would limited the war to its small region, the frequently argue, is an act of apostasy. simply smother the jihad and keep out enemy would surround and cut them Only God is sovereign and only He can the mujahidin.16 Far more importantly, off.22 legislate or make laws. Following this he quoted `Abdullah `Azzam to show line of reasoning, democracy is a foreign that jihad had been commanded by God Al-wala’ wa’l-bara’ religion and a form of polytheism. Any and was an individual duty on every The vision of a global jihad was Muslim who supports or engages in Muslim in places such as Palestine that related to the third principle that the democracy, including elections under were occupied by the unbelievers.17 Hamas leadership had abandoned: an a democratic system, has therefore left allegiance to other Palestinians above true tawhid and become an apostate.12 Al-Zawahiri’s use of the term “individual the overall Muslim community.
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