Women's Economic Empowerment in Jordan, Oman and Tunisia

Women’s Economic Empowerment in Jordan, Oman and Tunisia

Humphrey School Capstone Report The Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs The University of Minnesota

Rayan Deeb Jonathan Tvedt Zhamin Yelgezekova

PA 8081 (009) / MDP 5200 Capstone Workshop Instructor: Dr. Robert Kudrle, Professor

Spring 2020

Table of contents

Abbreviations 4

List of tables and figures 5

Executive summary 6

Methodology and Theoretical Approach 8

Overview of trends across three countries 12 Labor force participation by gender 12 Ease of doing business 14 Legal Trends 15 Cultural Trends 17

Jordan 18 Structure of the economy 18 Population groups 20 Labor market 20 Laws about women 23 Women’s economic participation 25 Access to education 25 Access to capital 27 Women’s participation in formal employment 27 Mobility and Safety 28 Women’s entrepreneurship and participation in informal sector 29 Customs and culture 30

Oman 32 Structure of the economy 32 Physical structure and its settlement 32 Population groups 35 Labor market 36 Laws about women 38 Governmental decision-making system and Constitution 38 Women’s economic participation 41 Access to education 41 Access to capital 42 Women’s participation in the formal employment 43 2

Occupational health and safety 45 Women’s entrepreneurship and participation in informal sector 46 Customs and culture 48

Tunisia 52 Structure of the economy 52 Physical structure and its settlement 52 Population groups 53 Labor market 53 Laws about women 55 Governmental decision-making system 55 Women’s economic participation 61 Access to education 61 Women’s participation in formal employment 62 Mobility 64 Women’s entrepreneurship and participation in informal sector 65 Customs and culture 67

Common trends 69

List of references 72

Abbreviations

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination CEDAW against Women

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

EIU Economist Intelligence Unit

GAD gender and development

GDP gross domestic product

HRW Human Rights Watch

ICRW International Center for Research on Women

IFC International Finance Corporation

ILO International Labour Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

IRI International Republican Institute

MENA Middle East and North Africa

SDG Sustainable Development Goal

Ministry WFC Ministry for Women, Family Affairs and Children

NCA National Constituent Assembly

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAPFAM Pan Arab Project for Family Health

STEM science, technology, engineering and mathematics

UAE United Arab Emirates

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is a United Nations

WAD women and development

WID women in development

List of tables and figures

Table 1. The Freedom House: Women’s Rights in the MENA Region

Table 2. Employment by Gender and Sector in Jordan (2018) Table 3. Percentage of Wage and Salaried Workers in Jordan by Gender

Figure 1. Labor force participation by gender in Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia (% of female and male population in 2012-2016). Figure 2. Rates of unemployment in Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia by gender (% of female and male labor force in 2012-2016) Figure 3. Rates of youth unemployment in Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia by gender (% of female and male labor force in 2012-2016) Figure 4. Nationality of Working Population (%) in Jordan Figure 5. Labor Force Participation Rate by Sex (% of population ages 15+) Figure 6. Employment by industry, modeled ILO estimate.

Executive summary

Background

To develop greater insight into future programming in Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia, the

International Republican Institute (IRI) posed the following question: What legal, cultural, and existing economic barriers are preventing women from contributing to their respective national economies? This question was submitted as a research proposal to the University of Minnesota

Humphrey School of Public Affairs as a potential capstone project for Master’s degree-seeking students. The proposal by IRI was selected as the capstone project of three graduate students who were then commissioned to examine the existing literature, identify key themes to better assist

IRI in understanding the context of women engaging in their respective economies in the Middle

East and North Africa (MENA). The result is a comprehensive analysis of the local and national barriers in Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia that prevent women from engaging in their national economies, and developing a stronger sense of economic empowerment.

Purpose

The purpose of this analysis is to give IRI a better understanding of the cultural, social, and legal contexts in three countries in which potential programming can be implemented to promote women’s economic empowerment. The implementation of programs to assist women in the MENA region with economic empowerment is a long-standing issue, as instability, cultural norms, and legal barriers have formed to create a complex, multi-layered dynamic, which has historically prevented women from achieving total economic agency.

Methodology

The three person team developed a methodology to answer IRI’s question. The first step was a literature review. The beginning stage of step one consisted of each member researching existing literature via a thematic approach. For each country, one individual researched economic status-quos, one member researched the existing legal framework, and one individual researched cultural norms. Following an initial draft, this critical first step evolved into a country-by-country approach. For the following drafts, each member of the team researched all three of the aforementioned themes on an individual country basis.

The second step served as a comparative examination of trends and key themes across the findings from Jordan, Tunisia, and Oman. Thus, it entailed comparing and contrasting the legal, economic and cultural barriers and governance challenges across the three countries.

Findings

Key findings include widespread informal business practices by male counterparts in each country, serving as barriers for the upward mobility of women in their respective economies. In addition, while Tunisia, Oman, and Jordan saw liberalized social policies following the 2011 Arab Spring, many cultural institutions continue to reinforce traditionalist beliefs that prevent women from further economic engagement. Finally, legal barriers such as business ownership, property rights, and laws involving family dynamics heavily favored male empowerment in each economy, giving women an inherent disadvantage in their career outlook.

Methodology and Theoretical Approach

I. Methodology

The overarching question posed by the International Republican Institute (IRI) is the following: What legal, cultural, and existing economic barriers are preventing women from contributing to their respective national economies? The question has been posed to better inform

IRI on the needs of women workforces in Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia. Further, the question will allow IRI to assess the possibility of future programming entering these three countries to achieve higher levels of women’s participation in the economy.

This report will serve as a rigorous analysis of the barriers to women’s economic empowerment in Oman, Jordan and Tunisia. It will entail an in-depth research on legal, economic and cultural barriers and governance challenges that limit women’s economic participation.

To answer the question asked by IRI, we followed a following methodology that we developed as a team:

● Part I: Literature Review

The majority of the work done for this research is the completion of a literature review through examining the existing legal, cultural, and economic barriers that are preventing women from contributing more to their respective economies. The sources utilized in this literature review consist of books, legislation and governmental orders, organizational reports, academic and scholarly papers and news outlets.

● Part II: Comparative examination

This section will serve as a comparative examination of the barriers among the three different countries in order to analyze key trends in the MENA region. Thus, it will entail comparing and

contrasting the legal, economic and cultural barriers and governance challenges across the three countries.

II. Theoretical approach:

Women’s empowerment has become a prominent goal on the global agenda. The United

Nations puts Gender Equality as a transcending goal across all sectors on its Sustainable

Development Goals (SDGs) list (Goal 5). Targets on SDG Goal 5 include but are not limited to ensuring full participation of women in all spheres of life, giving them equal rights and access to economic resources and ownership, as well as promoting political decision-making power.

However, the interpretation of this movement and the definition of empowerment vary widely.

Scholars have developed multiple approaches such as women in development (WID), women and development (WAD), gender and development (GAD) and empowerment approaches.

WID approach is focused on increasing women’s access but is not accounting for gender relations

(Rathgeber, 1990). The WAD approach is built on previous WID but looks at this issue within the international structure and how it contributes to inequality (Rathgeber, 1990). GAD includes the relations between genders, and it aims at agency as a capability to advocate for women’s own rights and resources (Rathgeber, 1990). Empowerment, as a part of GAD approach, defines power as ability to access and manage different types of capital, and being able to affect ideologies, i.e. sets of beliefs and norms (Aminur Rahman, 2013). The last approach: GAD, specifically the empowerment aspect of it, will be a guiding principle of this research.

For the purposes of this research, we will operationalize women’s empowerment in accordance with the definitions from the World Bank (2012) and Kabeer (2012). The World Bank, after interviewing 2,000 women in 19 countries, has found that for them the most important features of a powerful woman are income generation and use of income, getting an education and participation in social networks. For example, women define being empowered as having 9

“confidence to manage the house independently,” the ability to run errands outside of the households such as paying bills, or making financial transactions outside of the household independently (World Bank, 2012).

Taking these perspectives into account, as well as previous scholarly work, their definition of gender equality includes the following:

“the accumulation of endowments (education, health, and physical assets); the use of those

endowments to take up economic opportunities and generate incomes; and the application

of those endowments to take actions, or agency, affecting individual and household well-

being.” (World Bank, 2012).

The notion of agency here includes management of resources, decision-making power and active participation in the decision-making processes, mobility, and freedom from the risk of violence.

Kabeer (2012) in her review for the International Development Research Centre argues that mere access to markets does not mitigate and might even reinforce inequalities if other socio- cultural barriers are not removed. She also refers to Kanbur (2009), who has found that enacted legislations alone will not make a positive influence unless they are enforced. So, it is necessary to go beyond the immediate economic context and include socio-cultural and legislative environments to understand what shapes women’s economic empowerment.

The framework by the International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) shows how access to capital (human, financial, social, material), as well as norms and institutions define women’s agency and economic advancement. Agency and economic empowerment also influence one another: agency over controlling resources and making choices allows for economic

advancement; more economic success increases women’s power and agency. We have used the

ICRW conceptual framework to discuss barriers to women’s economic empowerment.

An analysis into the existing economic barriers in Jordan, Tunisia and Oman reveal stark differences in the level of programming and inclusion efforts made by each country’s respective governments. Advocates and practitioners of the aforementioned WID framework have already long-questioned economic empowerment programs and their efficiency. Addressing women’s issues without considering the power relations and structural inequalities that initially led to their subordination, and hence limited their access to resources has not been a successful strategy

(Adnane, 2015). This still has not stopped international organizations from attempting to study, develop, and promote women’s participation and equality in the workforce.

In addition, describing women as a homogenous group, regardless of the lives they live in, is an incomplete strategy. Gender-sensitive policies in all fields have emerged as a stronger alternative than specific policies or projects directed only to women as a singular group (Adnane,

2015). Thus, it is important to keep in mind the intersectionality of women in the MENA region, and the impact of their multidimensional identities and the potential for different forms of discrimination in an economic analysis.

With that in mind, a broader overview of the participating countries paint very different pictures in terms of their standing economies, cultures and legal systems.

Overview of trends across three countries

Labor force participation by gender

Data show low economic participation of women in the formal employment sector when compared to men in Jordan, Oman and Tunisia. Across all three countries, no more than 30% of women older than 15 participate in the labor market. Conversely, at least 60% of men in each of the countries supply their labor for the production of goods and services (see Fig. 1).

Figure 1. Labor force participation by gender in Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia (% of female and male population in 2012-2016). Source of data: World Bank

According to the World Bank’s Gender Data Portal, the male employment in the MENA is more than twice as high as that of female: 17.7% of female labor force are unemployed compared to 7.8% of male labor force. This discrepancy between genders is echoed within Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia as well. In Oman, 13% of women who are in the labor force are unemployed, compared 12

to only 1.7% of male labor force (2018). In Jordan and Tunisia, women unemployment rates are similar: around 23%, whereas for men in both of these countries the unemployment rate is 13%

(see Fig. 2).

Figure 2. Rates of unemployment in Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia by gender (% of female and male labor force in 2012-2016). Source of data: World Bank

These gender discrepancies are observable in the unemployment rates of the young population in Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia. As one can see from Figure 3, the difference between genders is observable in all three countries: levels of unemployment for young women are at least

20%, reaching almost 60% in Jordan. For young men, unemployment rates range from 5% to 35% in all three countries.

It is noteworthy that across all countries, the levels of youth unemployment are significant: they range between 20% and 60% in Jordan and Tunisia. Oman presents an interesting exception: the rates of youth unemployment for all groups are significantly lower than those in Jordan and

Tunisia. Since Oman is an oil exporter, it provides more opportunities for employment.

Figure 3. Rates of youth unemployment in Jordan, Oman, and Tunisia by gender (% of female and male labor force in 2012-2016). Source of data: World Bank

Ease of doing business

There is a lack of recent comparable statistical data on the proportion of female employers and entrepreneurs in recent years, which does not allow for comparison between genders in these countries. In general, Jordan is one of the ten economies with the most notable improvement in

Doing Business 2020 (World Bank, 2019). It ranks 75th on the worldwide ranking on the ease of doing business, followed by Tunisia which ranks 78th. Oman ranks 68th, which precedes most countries in the MENA region. The countries fall in the same range, which makes Tunisia, Jordan and Oman in this dimension.

Jordan improved in the ease of doing business ranking primarily due to strengthened access to credit, making changes to banking regulations, and adopting electronic tax filing system (World

Bank, 2019). Oman accelerated property registration, improved regulations about investment protection, and increased supplies of electricity (World Bank, 2019). For the year 2020, Tunisia reduced fees for starting a business, facilitating the internal process of property registration and paying taxes through a risk-based tax audit system (World Bank, 2019). We will discuss the female entrepreneurship in each country further in the report.

Legal Trends

Tunisia, Jordan and Oman have all signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) but each country has made different reservations. Despite the labor codes and the CEDAW signatures, having societies free of gender discrimination has proven to be a challenge in Jordan and the overall Middle East and North Africa region.

Freedom House Scoring

The Freedom House scores MENA countries on several dimensions of women’s political and economic rights in the MENA region (Sinha, 2011). The scale ranges from 1 to 5, where 1 represents the lowest and 5 the highest level of freedom women have to exercise their rights. The five dimensions are the following: (1) non-discrimination and access to justice autonomy, (2)

security, and freedom of the person, (3) economic rights and equal opportunity, (4) political rights and civic voice and (5) social and cultural rights. These dimensions also comprise the definition of agency, so the ratings show the differences between the countries on the levels of women’s agency. The results of the ratings are conveyed in Table 1.

Tunisia has scored the highest on all dimensions whereas Oman has scored the lowest in the five dimensions. In these five dimensions, Jordan scores in between Oman and Tunisia.

Economic rights refers to the right to own property, open a bank account, take a loan, and enter into business and financial contracts. Jordan and Oman scored equally on the economic rights dimension, whereas Tunisia scores the highest out of all MENA states. According to this ranking,

Oman has the lowest level of freedom in the domain of women’s political rights and civic voice.

In the entirety of the MENA region, Tunisia scores the highest in all five dimensions, indicating that women have higher political and economic rights, according to Freedom House measures.

Table 1. The Freedom House: Women’s Rights in the MENA Region

Source: Sanja Kelly and Julia Breslin ed., “Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa” (New York, NY: Freedom House; Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010) Accessed online at http://www.freedomhouse.org on 03/12/2020

Cultural Trends

The overall culture in the MENA region is predominantly driven by Muslim culture.

Women’s economic empowerment in Jordan, Tunisia and Oman is hindered by discriminatory legal frameworks coupled with restrictive social norms that restrict women’s ability to penetrate into the labor force.

Jordan

Structure of the economy

Physical structure and its settlement

The Jordanian economy, as analyzed in the Heritage foundation’s 2020 Index of Economic

Freedom, shows an annual gross domestic product (GDP) of $44.4 billion, making it the 88th largest economy in the world by GDP. The economy has a total unemployment rate of 15.0%, and displayed a 2.0% growth in unemployment from 2018 to 2019 (Heritage, 2020). The Economic

Freedom Index lists Jordan as a moderately free economy, being held back by low scores in property rights and government integrity.

Over the last fifty years, regional external shocks and instability have also limited the economy of Jordan due to the volatility in the Middle East. Neighboring countries, Iraq and

Israel/Palestine, have limited trade possibilities for Jordan, which is already geographically limited in natural resources and highly dependent on outside trade partners (Fanack, 2020). Jordan is notably dependent on Iraqi oil and in foreign assistance for agricultural products, as the country is the fourth poorest in terms of water resources (Fanack, 2020). High-skilled Jordanian labor workers, who have high education levels or expertise in different domains, have been migrating to work in the Gulf region, which has profoundly contributed to the increase in the country’s secondary income. The Jordanian economy has been receiving one of the highest levels of remittances worldwide, which have been a prominent source of foreign exchange and income for

Jordan (Wahba, 2014).

Jordan also remains a politically stable nation in a highly unstable region, making it a “safe haven” of the Middle East. It has become a home to a high number of refugees. This led to increase in the foreign aid received from international actors. The Jordanian economy was unable to grow and catch up with the rapid increase of individuals and the expanding population. As of 2010, the neighboring refugee crises and the large inflow of refugees into Jordan have resulted in the decline of Jordan’s per capita income. In 2017, registered Syrian refugees residing in Jordan reached an all-time high at 657,000 (Ghazal, 2017), which has been substantially increasing ever since then.

These restrictions and geopolitical limitations have created an economy that is volatile with the regional instability surrounding it. With these barriers surrounding the general economy of

Jordan, the sectors with the most investment and growth are the industrial and construction sectors

(Fanack, 2020). With both of these sectors being male dominant, the female labor force shifted towards the informal sector (Fanack, 2020). The informal sector in Jordan involves mostly unregistered workers, those working from home or street vendors, who are mostly selling homemade goods or providing informal services (Fanack, 2020). The informal sector is preferred by women as they continue to face cultural barriers, in addition to the high income and sales taxes imposed by the government (Fanack, 2020).

Population groups

In December 2019, the Kingdom of Jordan reached an all-time high in its population, reaching 10.6 million people, with an annual growth rate of 1.4%. The Jordanian population consists of a diverse and heterogeneous society, where Jordanians make up the majority of the population (69.3%), following Syrians (13.3%), Palestinians (6.7%), Egyptians (6.7%), Iraqis

(1.4%) and Armenians and Circassian (2.6%) (CIA Factbook). Most Jordanians and non-

Jordanians predominantly live in urban areas and they are primarily concentrated in the northwest,

close to the capital of the country, Amman (CIA Factbook). The overall Jordanian population is young, where approximately 52% of the population are below the ages of 24, 40% of the population are between 25 and 54 years old and only 9% of the population are older than 54 years old.

As mentioned before, Jordan is home for numerous refugee populations, namely

Palestinians, Syrians and Iraqis. In 2016, Jordan received over 2.7 million people in the form of refugees coming into the country (Malkawi, 2016). The Kingdom of Jordan has not been receiving enough international support to deal with the repercussions of the high influx of refugees, despite the international funding, which has put a burdening pressure on its economy and labor market.

Labor market

The Jordanian labor economy has been highly affected by labor migration and brain drain, especially following the oil price increase in 1973 which led to Jordanians emigrating to work in neighboring Gulf countries (Wahba, 2014). A large number of Jordanians have migrated to work in Europe and North America. In the recent years, Jordan has been welcoming a number of unskilled migrants and refugees to work in the service, construction and agriculture sectors

(Wahba, 2014). There is an influx of men and women from Egypt, Iraq and Syria, who mostly work in labor-intensive sectors. It results in an interesting trend, where Jordan imports unskilled labour and exports skilled, educated labor. As indicated in Figure 4, foreigners constitute 8% of the Jordanian working population, where Egyptians make up the largest immigrant working group and “other Arab nationalities”, predominantly Palestinians, make up 46% of the working population.

Figure 4. Nationality of Working Population (%) in Jordan Source: JLMPS (2010)

The labor force participation rate in Jordan reached 39.3% and the unemployment rate dropped to 19% in November 2019 (CEIC, 2019). Women in Jordan struggle with a lack of economic opportunities, resulting in low labor force participation and entrepreneurship, as well as high unemployment (World Bank, 2019). In 2018, female unemployment was 23% whereas male unemployment was 13.3% (World Bank, 2018). Figure 5 shows women constitute 14% of the labor force participation in Jordan (World Bank, 2018). Table 2 shows that most female employment (83.5%) is in the services sector, 15.4% in the industrial sector and 1.1% in the agricultural sector. Both, males and females have the highest percentage of labor employment in the services sector. Table 3 which portrays the percentage of wage and salaried workers in Jordan 21

by gender indicates that 96.7% of female workers are wage and salaried workers whereas 83.4% of male workers are wage and salaried workers.

Figure 5. Labor Force Participation by Sex in Jordan (% of population) Source: World Bank (2018)

Table 2. Employment by Gender and Sector in Jordan (2018) Source: World Bank Gender data portal

Sector Percentage of Employment (2018)

Female Employment in Agriculture (% 1.1 of female employment)

Male Employment in Agriculture (% of 3.9 male employment)

Female Employment in Industry (% of 15.4 female employment)

Male Employment in Industry (% of 26.6 male employment)

Female Employment in Services (% of 83.5 female employment)

Male Employment in Services (% of 69.5 male employment)

Table 3. Percentage of Wage and Salaried Workers in Jordan by Gender Source: World Bank Gender data portal

Female Wage and Salaried Workers 96.7 (% of female workers)

Male Wage and Salaried Workers (% 83.4 of Male workers)

Laws about women

Governmental decision-making system and Constitution

Exploring the legal systems present in Jordan serves as the basis to understand national legal barriers to women’s economic empowerment. Although the Jordanian constitution states that all

Jordanians are equal before the law, there are certain laws and regulations that serve as barriers to women's level of agency (World Bank, 2013). According to the Jordanian constitution, Jordan has sharia courts and civil courts, where the codes of Muslim personal status law are applied through a system of sharia courts separate from the civil court system (Welchman, 2007). Sharia law is used as a basis for women’s rights in Jordan, such as the inheritance law where males inherit twice as much as females.

Jordan signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), however some reservations were made. Jordan has reservations on article 9, paragraph 2 along with article 16, paragraph 2 relating to women’s compensation after marriage dissolution. In accordance with the CEDAW, the labor code of Jordan prohibits all kinds of gender discrimination against women, but it does not explicitly prohibit 23

discrimination against women in the private sector (OECD, 2017). Despite the labor codes and the

CEDAW signatures, having society free of gender discrimination has proven to be a challenge in

Jordan.

When examining the professions of women in Jordan, it is of vital importance to note that women’s job opportunities are restricted by cultural nuances which are in turn translated into legal regulations. In Jordan, cultural norms about restricted jobs and unsafe workspaces are too broad, thus, significantly limiting the job opportunities for women (OECD, 2017). These restrictions include working night shifts, and the ILO committee has recommended that these restrictions can be limited only to the protection of maternity, and protection against directly hazardous conditions for both men and women (OECD, 2017). These restrictions have good intentions behind them, however, are considered outdated. Article 23 of the Jordanian constitution and Article 69 of the labor code dictate the sectors and economic activities that women are not able to pursue and the hours in which women are prohibited from working in (Husseini, 2010). Jordan imposes night work restrictions on women, where they are unable to work from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. (OECD, 2017).

Such restrictions may be viewed as a mechanism to protect Jordanian women from being subject to harassment, but this may also limit the types of jobs that women can work. Jordan also has sector restrictions for women, where only men are allowed to work in certain sectors such as mining and quarries, which may limit women’s job opportunities and bar them from being entrepreneurs in such sectors. Furthermore, male employees automatically receive pension benefits, whereas female employees do not (World Bank, 2013).

Women in Jordan are protected from termination of their work contract when they are pregnant and the maternity leave is about 10 weeks in the private sector and 13 weeks in the public sector (OECD, 2017). The length of maternity leave in Jordan is generous compared to other

MENA countries, which may serve as an advantage for Jordanian women. Since Jordan does not 24

offer men paternity leave, this may incentivize public and private sectors to be more inclined to employ men due to the lower costs associated with hiring men. On the other hand, the labor code in Jordan requires the private sector to provide childcare facilities when employing a certain number of women (OECD, 2019). Providing childcare may increase women’s incentive to participate in the economy since in the absence of nurseries, some women may opt out of the workforce to stay home and take care of their children. On a similar note, since 2017, “the

Government of Jordan has enacted reforms related to flexible work arrangements, employer- provided child care and the removal of restrictions to women working in certain sectors and during certain hours (World Bank, 2019).” However, proper enforcement mechanisms by government agencies are needed to ensure that such reforms empower their intended beneficiaries.

As for women’s political participation, Ad-Dustour Arabic daily newspaper in Jordan stated that the Jordanian parliament established a quota in the new electoral law to allocate more seats for women (Ad-Dustour, 2019). In 2010, the female quota in the Jordanian parliament increased from 6 to 12 seats (UNDP, 2012). In 2016, the number of allocated seats for women has increased to 15, which has resulted in women consisting 15.4% of the Jordanian parliament (Ad-

Dustour, 2019).

Women’s economic participation

Access to education

Ever since the 1980’s, Jordan has been substantially investing in health and education, which has in turn enhanced females’ general wellbeing (World Bank, 2013). Female school enrollment has increased and their health indicators have also improved. By 2012, women in

Jordan had reached almost 100% literacy rates (OECD, 2017). Yet, as of 2016, only 16% of women

participate in the labor force (OECD, 2017).The increase in investment in health and education and the spike in female school enrollment rates have not translated to an increase in female political and economic participation. Thus, Jordan represents an enigma in the relationship of economic participation and education. According to a survey conducted by the World Bank, the more education a woman has, the more likely it is she will be unemployed.

Jobs that require higher levels of skill and education are predominantly occupied by men

(World Bank, 2013). For example, women graduate with business, administration or law degrees at a similar rate as men, however the male-to-female participation in these sectors is 3:1 (World

Bank, 2013). Economic empowerment for Jordanian women then is less about their outlook in gaining an education, and more focused on the cultural norms that prohibit women from obtaining high skilled jobs. Thus, this increased level of unemployment has encouraged greater time spent in the household and not increasing production in the labor market. Women in Jordan often get an education in fields such as humanities rather than technical fields, which may not necessarily be what the job market is demanding. The World Bank (2013) argues that “in Jordan there is a clear disconnect between the skills and education that women acquired and the skills requested by employers, particularly in the private sector”.

Jordanian women who have experienced high rates of education, with significantly less economic participation, have seen an influx in programs into the country to promote economic empowerment and inclusion for young women (International Finance Corporation, 2017). The influx in programming is aimed at more vocational and applicable educational experiences for women up to age 24 (IFC, 2017). While empowerment in economic activity will be important for

Jordanian women going forward, so too will be the efforts to increase savings capabilities.

Currently, according to the results of the survey done by the International Finance Corporation,

76% of female respondents did not have bank accounts with a large gap between working women 26

(44%) and non-working women (90%) (IFC, 2017). This gap is potentially due to cultural norms around financial transactions, which typically involve the patriarchal head of the household.

Women have the right to open bank accounts in Jordan, but little to no efforts have been made to foster women’s financial inclusion in Jordan.

Access to capital

Women having access to capital serves as an asset to become more economically independent. In Jordan, control over business assets is typically a more restricted aspect of the economy. To begin with, Jordan’s strict cultural ideals hinders women from owning business assets. Women, unmarried, and under 30 require a male guardian to be in assistance to make even basic business and banking transactions, severely limiting a woman’s potential to start a business or become economically independent from a younger age (Adnane, 2015). Furthermore, Jordan does not allow women to own businesses solely, unless a complicated administrative procedure is conducted (Adnane, 2015). Further, married women in Jordan cede control of economic assets to their husbands, thus leading Jordan to have the lowest economic participation in the MENA region, despite the highest literacy rate for women among the prospective countries (Adnane, 2015).

Access to a livable income is another foundational aspect of a given economy. For women in

Jordan, however, this is a seldom possibility.

Women’s participation in formal employment

Women’s economic participation in Jordan remains among the lowest in the world (World

Bank, 2014). “Even within the MENA region, where countries have some of the world’s lowest female labor force participation rates, Jordan’s participation rate lies in the bottom half, below the regional average of 25 percent” (World Bank, 2014). Although women primarily work in the

public sector, data shows that women still do not have a higher representation at the senior level in the public sector (UNDP, 2012).

The results of the labor force survey show that there is low economic participation of women in business ownership (World Bank, 2019). Only 2% of firms have women in the top management positions, and 19% are co-owned by women (World Bank, 2019). Women business owners in Jordan face one primary issue: balancing work and family duties which is dictated by gender roles perpetuated by social norms (IFC, 2007). When surveying 444 women entrepreneurs in Amman, Karak and Irbid, it was apparent that most women had a business partner and in half of these cases, their business partner was often their husband (IFC, 2007). Thus, family members often interfered with women’s businesses and finances (IFC, 2007). Businesses were small in size, on average employing 7.5 full-time employees and 3.98 part-time employees (IFC, 2007).

Mobility and Safety

In Jordan, public transportation is “often inadequate and unsafe, particularly for women traveling alone in rural areas,” in addition, “women tend to spend much less time traveling than men: only five percent travel more than 60 minutes to work compared to 15 percent of men,”

(World Bank, 2018). Unsafe public transport is a deterrent for many women looking for employment in the country (Ait Ali Slimane, 2019). In Jordan, high threat of sexual harassment makes public transportation unsafe for women, especially for traveling alone in rural areas. The lack of safe transport options hinders women from employment opportunities. In order to overcome these challenges, Jordan has developed a Code of Conduct for the transport sector to expand coverage, quality and safety of service, yet more attention needs to be given to the actual implementation of this Code of Conduct (Ait Ali Slimane, 2019).

Women’s entrepreneurship and participation in informal sector

Jordan is one of the ten economies with the most notable improvement in Doing Business

2020 (World Bank, 2019). Jordan strengthened access to credit by providing credit scores to banks and lenders and by introducing “a new secured transactions law, amending the insolvency law, and launching a unified, modern, and notice-based collateral registry (World Bank, 2019).” Jordan also adopted electronic tax filing, which eased the process of paying taxes. Furthermore,

Bloomberg identified the capital of Jordan, Amman, as the Silicon Valley of the Middle East in

2012, primarily due to its stable environment and its suitable infrastructure (Caputo et al., 2016).

However, in Jordan, “the share of full-time employed women in entrepreneurial activities is as low as 5%” (Hattab, 2012). Even though married women in Jordan are more likely to be unemployed, fifty percent of women engaged in entrepreneurial activities in Jordan are married women (Hattab,

2012). Women living in urban areas in Jordan are also more likely to engage in entrepreneurial activities, where 91% of the women who are entrepreneurially active in Jordan reside in urban areas (Hattab, 2012). Furthermore, Forty percent of women entrepreneurs in Jordan range between the ages of 25-34 (Hattab, 2012). Business women in Jordan have stated that they have a limited access to credit (Hattab, 2012). Women entrepreneurs in Jordan face several challenges when applying to bank loans. Women in Jordan have claimed that males often receive a “more favourable treatment” (Hattab, 2012). Furthermore, “female entrepreneurs who wish to obtain financing from banks often need the co-signatures of male family members and this often discourages them from applying (Caputo et al., 2016)”. On the other hand, efforts have been made by Jordan to make entrepreneurship more accessible through passing the ‘home business’ law. It

aims “to encourage people operating their business informally from home to register legally as a formal home-based enterprise (Sheghel Bayti ).”

Customs and culture

Similar to other countries in the MENA region, gendered laws along with restrictive social norms and gender roles hinder women’s economic empowerment in Jordan. The gendered legal restrictions and social norms in Jordan limit the choices acceptable for women, reinforce each other and, in turn, impact women’s agency in society (World Bank, 2013). When discussing the cultural norms and institutions of Jordan, it is important to highlight the influence of Muslim religious beliefs on the women’s position in the society. The OECD report (2017) divides agency in the households of MENA into two categories: reciprocity and obedience. In Jordan, if a husband considers a wife to be disobedient, he can discontinue financial support. If there was prior consent for the wife's employment or she has been working prior to marriage, then the husband cannot take consent back without strong evidence of harm (OECD, 2017). However, there are often restrictive social norms stemming out of religious and non-religious factors, which are reinforced by families, the overall society along with the informal institutions (World Bank, 2013).

While women’s participation in the MENA labor force increases throughout the 15 to 29 age bracket, a noticeable decline begins after the age of 30 in Jordan (OECD, 2017). Interestingly, these trends are driven by women with the highest levels of education. In Jordan, only 14.8% in

2015 positions on the executive level are occupied by women (OECD, 2017). The reasons can be two-fold: women might drop out at younger ages due to the family responsibilities or there are no career pathways for women to reach executive levels (OECD, 2017). In Jordan, fathers or other guardians have the final decision-making power about their daughters’ traveling, residence or

education until the age of 30, which can be extended if daughters are considered “untrustworthy”

(OECD, 2017).

When looking into Jordanian opinion pieces about women’s role in the economy, it is apparent that a part of the Jordanian society perceives that Jordanian women have stormed the labor market due to the efforts of the Jordanian government (Al Abadi, 2018). However, women’s primarily role is still perceived to be care work (Al Abadi, 2018). Furthermore, married women tend to opt out of joining the workforce and the Jordanian labor force grapples with a 24% ‘marital- status gap’, meaning that women in Jordan who were never married are 24% more likely to be in the labor force than women who are married (World Bank, 2013). According to the Jordanian society, women are perceived to be less productive than men which places restrictions on women’s ability to enter the job market. Females in Jordan prefer working in ministries since the available jobs at ministries, such as teachers and nurses, are socially acceptable for women (UNDP, 2012).

Thus, the most socially acceptable job for women is working in the public sector, which restricts women from entering the private sector and becoming entrepreneurs (World Bank, 2013).

Additionally, the private sector is often preferred by men, primarily due to its generous salaries and benefits. Such generous benefits and salaries are associated with men, maintaining their social standing as the primary breadwinners, especially since women in Jordan are financially dependent on their guardians and parents at a younger age and their husbands at an older age (UNDP, 2012).

Oman

Structure of the economy

Physical structure and its settlement

The physical economy of Oman is impacted greatly by the country’s geographic makeup.

The country is still sparsely populated throughout the interior, where a dry, hot desert makes up the geographic landscape (CIA Factbook, 2020). The CIA Factbook reports concentrated populations in both the north of the country around and in the Al Hagar Mountains, in the capital city of Muscat, and in the far south in the city of Salalah (CIA Factbook, 2020). This population divide has made Oman increasingly urban, with 86.3% of the entire population residing in a major metro area, with a 5.25% annual increase in urbanization (CIA Factbook, 2020). With the economy being largely divided by an inhospitable desert, fresh water transportation has been a major undertaking of the Omani economy. The Fanack Water report indicates over 3,000 channels of aflaj, the name of the irrigation network for freshwater within Oman, have been built since the

1970s (Water.Fanack, 2020). These channels distribute 552 MCM of fresh water per year, mainly to arable land.

While transportation infrastructure for water has been built across the nation, the movement of people is more varied. Oman does not have any rail systems within the country, leaving the public transportation to small, low-capacity buses that boast cheap ticket prices for its passengers

(CIA Factbook, 2020). This lack of a major rail system leaves individual transportation to just car- owners, where two express-grade highways allow transportation of vehicles across the country, connecting the major northern and southern populations (CIA Factbook, 2020). For individuals 32

who do not own a car, flight is the primary method of transportation between the far north and the far south.

The Omani economy is similarly situated to Jordan’s in terms of the country’s annual growth of 2.1% and has been labeled “moderately free” by the Heritage foundation’s Economic

Freedom Index (Heritage, 2020). The categorization of “moderately free” has been steady, if not remarkable, for Oman over the past 25 years, according to the Heritage foundation. The government’s inability to develop a non oil economy has been the primary factor holding the country back from achieving a more free economy (Heritage, 2020). Wealth distribution within the country is also well regulated, with Oman owning a GINI ratio of 30.1, making it one of the most evenly distributed countries in the region in terms of household wealth (World Bank, 2018).

The GDP of Oman is significantly greater than Jordan and Tunisia, with a total GDP of

$79.5 billion, compared to $44.4 and $40 billion for Jordan and Tunisia, respectively. Per capita,

Oman’s GDP is $16,535 as of 2020, compared to $5,549 for Jordan, and $3,749 for Tunisia

(Fanack, 2020). Unlike Jordan, Oman contains a healthy supply of natural resources, with strong oil and gas resources, which generate 68% and 85% of government revenue, respectively (Fanack,

2020). The oil industry has seen significant investments in research and development and have produced new oil recovery techniques to further boost production, to the point where oil now makes up 20% of the country’s GDP (BusinessLiveMe, 2019). The oil and natural gas industries tend to be heavily dominated by male laborers, however the Sultanate has pursued a development plan that focuses on diversification, industrialization, and privatization, with the hopes of reducing the oil industry’s dominance in GDP (Fanack, 2020). The diversification and change in the makeup of the oil industry as of 2019 could mean new outlets of employment for the Omani labor force.

Oman also relies heavily on the agricultural and fishery sectors to sustain economic activity outside of oil, which maintained the entirety of the country before the sustained oil industry blossomed in 33

the 1960s and 70s. Many financial incentives are given to laborers in these industries to maintain sustainability and to achieve some diversification in the volatile oil market (Fanack, 2020). Moving forward, the government of Oman has placed an emphasis on enhancing the tourism, shipping and logistics, manufacturing, and aquaculture industries (BusinessLiveMe, 2019). While the hopes for diversification of the Omani economy are for the future, the present economy of Oman still has a level of fragility not seen by its Gulf neighbors. The importance of oil, and the volatility of the product have resulted in Oman having a less stable economy overall.

While surpassing Jordan, Oman has fewer resources to draw on than many other Gulf Coast countries, and its foreign exchange reserves and sovereign wealth fund assets are together worth

50% of the country’s GDP (Dudley, 2020). This strong foreign reserve and sovereign wealth fund displays Oman’s awareness of its internal economic volatility with so much of their economy depending on the prices of oil alone. The aforementioned oil and gas reserves do not provide enough revenue to cover the government’s large infrastructure spendings, and emphasis on the construction industry, despite Oman taxing the oil companies at a 55% rate (Dudley, 2020). These figures represent a government that has been building and growing beyond its capabilities. While this is a potential boost to the short-term economy, the long-term economy could suffer as a result of the increased debt. Per a 2020 report, the debt-to-GDP ratio for Oman was 5% in 2014, to now

60% of the total GDP of the country in 2020 (Dudley, 2020). While this is a short-term analysis, the monitoring of the national debt has become an important task for the Oman Sultanate. This increased spending is also compounded by the lack of economic assistance the country has received from its closest neighbors. Oman has seen increased liberalization in the social conduct of the country, and neighbors like Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are not as supportive of their independent positions on social conduct (Dudley, 2020).

Finally, Oman has its currency pegged to the US Dollar as its largest export is oil, which is priced in dollars (Kharusi, 2016). The aforementioned fragility of the economy, however, has made keeping exchange rates stable more of a challenge. A 2019 report by the World Bank indicated that Oman will continue to face economic issues in the coming years, as structural and fiscal reforms from the fragile economy may slow, thus hurting the confidence of outside investors

(World Bank, 2019).

Population groups

The participating groups making up the economic activity in Oman are heavily split between nationals and foreign workers of the country. Between these groups, the gender divide shows the public sector of Oman being made of 47% women, while the private sector has seen a large increase in female workers, from 13,383 Omani women workers in 2003, to 35,248 in 2012, making up 22% of the private sector workforce (Fanack, 2020). This is a large increase from previous reports prior to 2011. The most prevalent industry for women in Oman is banking, retail and travel (OECD, 2017). Law and real estate are rising private sectors for women in Oman and have seen significant growth since 2012 (Fanack, 2020). Women have also entered the formal sector in retail, education and as nurses (Fanack, 2020). These positions are, however, mostly occupied by foreign women, primarily from India, Bangladesh, and nearby Gulf Coast countries

(OECD, 2017). The population of foreigners in Oman still weighs the economic activity of native- born Omanis down, with an estimated 1.7 million foreign workers working in the country as of

2018. This number is a 3.4% decrease since last being measured in December, 2017 (Arab News,

2018).

Women in Oman, much like in Jordan, are heavily involved in the informal sector, however the sector’s relevance is increasingly limited, especially in the interior of the country where

infrastructure does not allow for industries to flourish at similar rates as the urbanized parts of

Oman. The lack of transportation, and a generally smaller population creates a barrier for these interior informal businesses to grow (Heritage, 2020). Nationalization policies in both the private and public sectors have promoted Omani women in entering the workforce and participating in the national economy, however. With women’s economic possibilities being given more attention since the Arab Spring of 2011, and the Sultan ordering 50,000 jobs be created strictly for nationals, more opportunities from women to enter both private and public sector jobs are available (Middle

East Online, 2014).

It is also important to note that the public and private sectors have seen a large influx of female workers aged 20-29 entering the workforce, possibly as a result of the increased levels of education permitted by the younger generation of Omani women (Fanack, 2020). This increase in young women joining the workforce coincides with the modest increase in women managers in the economy. Omani women holding top management and middle management positions in the country saw a 50% growth from 2008 to 2012 (Middle East Online, 2014). Though this increase still represents a small number, and a small percentage of the total population of upper and middle management workers. Because Omani education for women is still in a state of development under the current Sultan, Haitham bin Tariq, further monitoring will be needed to see if this upward trend of women in education, and consequently higher management positions continue.

Labor market

The makeup of the Omani labor market has changed significantly since the country’s oil boom of the 1970s, and the attraction of migrant workers has had a heavy influence on the country’s economy. Oman attracts migrant workers from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Egypt, and total migrant stock now comprises 41% of population and 54% of the total work force in the

country (CIA Factbook, 2018). While only comprising over a third of the total population, the expatriate and migrant workforce now occupy over half of the labor market in Oman. However, the Sultanate is notably focused on creating more Omani jobs to employ the increasing number of nationals entering the workforce, what they call the “Omanisation Policy” (Fanack, 2020).

Omanisation refers to measures taken to increase job opportunities to the growing Omani native population while restricting employment for expatriates. The Omanisation Policy has caught hold of the labor market in the public sector, creating a Sultanate and government workforce comprised of an increasing number of Omani nationals, but the policy has not been as effective in the private sector (UKessays, 2017). This may be due to the benefits held by native public sector workers, such as lifelong employment, better working conditions, and shorter working hours than those seen in the private sector (Al Hasani, 2015). Oman’s workforce was also heavily influenced by the 2011

Arab Spring, which saw some governments in the Middle East move toward a more social policy- driven focus (Fanack, 2020). During the pivotal Arab Spring, after protests about the difficulty in finding employment and the redistribution of resources were being corrupted by the ruling elite,

Sultanate labor market policy began to take aim at migrant and expatriate workers (De Bel-Air,

2018). In addition, xenophobic sentiment took hold of the Arab Spring uprisings due in large part to the privileges foreign businesses were receiving from the Sultan (De Bel-Air, 2018 ). The result of this uprising was a stark decrease in unemployment amongst the national Omani labor force, from 15% in 2011 to 5% in 2013 (De Bel-Air, 2018). Bans on hiring of foreign workers in the private sector were imposed in the last decade, and a six-month freeze of expatriate recruitment in the private sector was implemented in 2013 (De Bel-Air, 2018). As of 2017, around 11% of expatriate workers were involved in highly-skilled positions in the private sector, men and women alike (De Bel-Air, 2018).

However, these changes did not last long, and young Omani nationals entering the labor market in 2018 have had difficulty finding work, across both genders. In 2017, 54,000 Omanis were reported to be looking for work, among them were 33,000 recent university graduates, comprising a disproportionately large section of the unemployed in Oman (De Bel-Air, 2018).

Like other Gulf Cooperation Council nations, Oman’s labor market is challenging and has seen growing unemployment, making career changes and recruitment very difficult (UKEssays, 2017).

Laws about women

Governmental decision-making system and Constitution

The constitution of Oman and the decision-making body influence the economic outlook of the women of Oman, heavily. Government decisions come from the Sultan, Oman’s absolute monarch, who serves as both head of state and of the government. The Sultan will appoint a cabinet, however, the individual Sultan serves as the leader of the armed forces, as the prime minister, as the head of the department of defense, and handles all foreign affairs. As an absolute monarchy, decision-making capabilities start and end with the Sultan with input from a limited cabinet (US Department of State, 2019). The current Sultan of Oman is going through a transitional phase. The previous Sultan, Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al-Said had been in a battle with cancer before passing in January of 2020 (Dudley, 2020). The handpicked successor of Sultan Qaboos, Haitham bin Tariq Al-Said, a cousin of Qaboos, took office on January 10th of 2020. The new Sultan comes from an economic background, being the chairman of the Omani 2040 committee, which was developed to enhance economic diversity in the coming decades, moving away from an economy pegged so closely to the oil market (Dudley, 2020).

Despite the change in Sultans, the government operating as an absolute monarchy has created gaps in Oman’s domestic and social policy, with few voices being present in decision- making processes. Thus, according to Human Rights Watch (2017), women in Oman face high levels of discrimination, where “the Personal Status Law discriminates against women on matters such as divorce, inheritance, child custody, and legal guardianship.” For instance, women can lose child custody if they remarry, and men continue to hold guardianship of the child, regardless of whether they have custody. The Personal Status Law is in accordance with Oman’s interpretation of the Sharia law and the Omani government has not taken steps to eliminate these forms of discriminatory laws. As mentioned in the Human Rights Watch report on Oman in 2017, the

United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women in its 2017 review of Oman concluded that Oman has made “very little progress in removing discrimination from marriage and family related law and practice, while numerous forms of discrimination remained in the Personal Status Law.’”

As for women’s property rights, women in Oman have the right to own and sell their property as stated in Article 11 of Oman's Basic Law, which promulgates that "Private property is protected. No one shall be prevented from disposing of his property within the limits of the Law

(Deeb, 2005)." However, according to Deeb (2005), women’s property in Oman is considered to be a domestic issue and authorities “hardly ever intervene” to implement this article. On a similar note, women also have the legal right to enter into business, however the intersection of law and culture is also witnessed here, where such business decisions in Oman are traditionally made by consultation with the family and the head of household (Deeb, 2005). Similarly, article 12 of the

Basic Law states that all citizens have the right to engage in the work of their choice, yet a woman’s profession is agreed upon with her guardian, husband or male family members in Oman (Deeb,

2005). Furthermore, women in Oman have the right for maternity leave, but they are discriminated 39

against within employment contracts (Deeb, 2005). Maternity leave is a guarantee by the state of up to 50 days of paid leave (UN Human Rights Watch, 2019). Women also face legal barriers from

Sultanate-created laws about the assembly of people in the country. According to the Omani Penal

Code, the assembly of 10 or more people could be charged with breaching public security or the public order and come with a penalty equivalent to $1,300 USD and up to one year in prison

(UNHCR, 2019). While this law affects both genders, the UN Human Rights Watch reports that the internal security services of Oman continue to specifically target pro-reform and feminist activists. With this in mind, the assembly of 10 or more women could be classified as a breach in public security by the same internal security services. The same HRW report indicated views expressed by women via social media were also punishable crimes if they were aimed at insulting or criticizing the Sultan. The crime of “undermining the prestige of the state,” was revised in the penal code’s 2018 revision, which increased the maximum prison sentence for social media slander against the Sultan from three years, to now seven years in prison. The internal security services’ heavy monitoring of feminist activity and social media slander has created a hostile environment for women to express their views via social media when they contradict the prestige of the state, as determined by the same internal security services operating for the Sultan.

Furthermore, in Oman, the labor laws are influenced by religious practice and restrict women from work that can be specified as “harmful to the health or hard works”, which includes night shifts (Kemp and Madsen, 2013). CEDAW also serves as an outside influencer to Omani laws regarding women. Oman has made several reservations to the convention, however. The most prominent reservations include all provisions of the Convention that are not in accordance with the Islamic sharia along with article 9, paragraph 2, which provides that countries shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children.

Women’s economic participation

Access to education

Omani women consider education as the guaranteed route to better work and employment

(Kemp and Madsen, 2013). However, there are not enough jobs on the market for university graduates (Kemp and Madsen, 2013). There is also informal segregation in occupations. Surveys conducted with Omani girls and boys have shown that conventional views on women roles are dominant. Girls and boys similarly underlined that women’s role is a homemaker and mother due to their selfless nature, whereas men financially support, govern and control the household, since they “naturally” are better at controlling emotions (Al Sadi and Basit, 2017). At the same time, Al

Sadi and Basit (2017) acknowledge that girls and boys perceive notions of gender equality as

Western-imposed, and are in objection in order to preserve national, familial and religious identities. Al Sadi and Basit argue that patriarchal misinterpretation of Islamic values, which can be interpreted as egalitarian, gives little space for exploration of gender equality (2017).

Omani women face similar challenges in high-skilled positions. However, unlike women in Jordan, Omani women have not seen the same level of educational attainment. Throughout the

1970’s and 1980’s the country only established three modern schools for students, each one admitting classes of 100 males each year (Chatty, 2000). This history of male-dominated education gave women an inherent disadvantage in the prospects of economic empowerment. Women were confined to home schooling methods, if education was achieved at all (Chatty, 2000). While educational reform took place throughout the later half of the 1980’s until the present time, female attendance in primary school is still at just 49% as of 2007, seeing modest increases year after year

(Zereovec and Botenbal, 2011). However, these modest increases over time have led to more equity in terms of secondary education received in the country. As of 2017, the ratio of women- 41

to-men enrolled in secondary education was 1.37 to 1 per an Omani Times article by Gautam

Viswanathan (2017). This shows that the government’s increasing allowance of women in different forms of education and in post-secondary education have resulted in a high amount of women taking advantage of new educational opportunities. In addition, while private sector engineering positions are overwhelmingly occupied by men, women now make up 52% of new engineering students per the same Omani Times article (Viwanathan, 2017).

Access to capital

Women having access to capital allows entrepreneurship and highly-skilled positions to become available to more women in the country. In Oman, social media is one of the main tools that female entrepreneurs use in their business. It is used for information and resource-sharing, as well as marketing (Ghouse et al., 2017).

More recently, technology became more available to Omani women through their domestic

Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, an administration that was once the Oman Women’s

Association (Chatty, 2000). The ministry has made business technology more available to Omani women in their entrepreneurial endeavours, but the usage of this technology is highly monitored by the men that now govern the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (Chatty, 2000). This business- related technology is typically mobile phones and laptop computers.

Economic balance and the need for sustainable growth in Oman led the country’s federal government into developing the Sixth Plan of Oman, an economic roadmap for future developments and policies to maintain their fragile economy. Among the policies to be enacted by the Sixth Plan are the liberalization of interest rates, and capital to new businesses (Al Hasani,

2015). This includes woman-owned businesses, lowering the barrier of entry for new woman- owned endeavours, and potentially promoting more young women to enter the broader economic sphere.

Women’s participation in the formal employment

Women are crucial to Oman’s continued economic growth. Since the 1970s, when workforce participation among women increased heavily, economic growth has been seen in conjunction with this increase of women entering the labor market (Kharusi, 2016). As reported in 2008, women made up 26.67% of the total labor force (Al Hasani, 2015). The private sector of

Oman has seen large influxes of female participants, from 3,632 female workers in 1995, to 51,848 in 2016 (Kharusi, 2016). The female participation in the private sector now comprises 24% of the total work force. The World Bank reports that the problem with women in the economy of Oman is not, “the inability to get into the workforce or women’s desire to opt out,” indicating that barriers to entry may not be the issue in the economic engagement of women (World Bank, 2018). Rather, hiring practices or informal decision-making processes by businesses may be to blame for women not being able to secure a wider range of positions, thus increasing their total economic participation. Economic participation by women may be met with a stronger glass ceiling than neighboring countries as a result. While Oman has a handful of women in corporate leadership roles, female board members only hold 0.01% of positions among major corporations in the country (Kharusi, 2016). This lack of corporate power among women has created a gender power- gap. While women are increasingly involved in economic participation, their influence and career outlooks are not as diverse as that of their male counterparts, who hold 99% of board member positions at 70% of the total private sector workforce. This is reflected in the wage gaps between

men and women in the country. As of 2020, women who worked in the private sector were earning

12% less than men on average (Salaryexplorer, 2020).

In addition to being in direct competition with male counterparts, women in Oman face the unique obstacle of also competing against a large population of foreign workers. Many corporations in Oman are foreign-based, with the largest employers in the private sector being companies from Greece, Egypt, India, and the US. Consequently, the preference for workers from these foreign countries may make employment harder for women with some of Oman’s largest employers, given the abundance of foreign workers in Oman (Al Hasani, 2015). With private sector competition and career outlooks not being favorable to Omani women, the majority of women in the labor force work in the public sector, where they comprise 47% of the public workforce (World Bank, 2018). In a study conducted in 2000, women’s participation in the labor force often came in lower level public positions, such as in administration or clerical positions (Al

Hasani, 2015). From the same study, private sector participation by women in Oman were in nursing or teaching positions, roles that are culturally linked to women in the country (Al Hasani,

2015).

A study done on women’s working preferences in Oman in 2015 revealed that participants indicated that they felt motivated to enter the national economy, but expected not to last long, as the desire to start a family necessitated maternity leave (Al-Hasani, 2015). Further preferences indicated that women did not wish to work unreasonably long hours, which they felt was “men’s work” (Al-Hasani, 2015). While economic participation may be increasing and in more diverse sectors, cultural stigmas may still drive women away from certain positions and career paths that demand longer working hours, or unfixed schedules.

Occupational health and safety

Omani work culture is highly subject to Islamic culture of which the country is heavily influenced by. Consequently, while equality is often outlined as a major principle of workplaces in Oman, informal business practices, such as interpersonal relationships, managerial practices, and hiring processes that try to exclude maternity leave, have negatively affected the careers of

Omani women (Kemp & Madsen, 2014). According to interviews of Omani women conducted by

Al-Hasani, women in Oman face obstacles in terms of workplace attire. One Omani woman noted that some businesses will choose who may be unveiled from the culture’s traditional hijabs, and those who must keep the veil on throughout the day (Al-Hasani, 2015). The interviewee also noted that she believed recruitment and promotion in the private sector was dependent on a woman’s physical appearance (Al-Hasani, 2015). This report indicates the potential for a power dynamic that works heavily against the empowerment of women in private sector positions in Oman.

The aforementioned Omanization seen throughout the country has had a heavy impact on the workplace environments of many Omani women. Workplaces are being financially incentivized to hire national workers. Thus, it has become part of many work cultures to encourage employers to recruit and properly manage local Omani workers, including women (Al-Lamki,

1998). While the specific advantages of Omanization for women compared to men may serve as a gap in information, the Sultanate seeking to advantage employers for such hiring practices only serve to improve the career and working environments of women in the country.

Aside from workplace environments for women, there are cultural restrictions about traveling or living away from family as well, which limits the possibility of job-related migration

(Kemp and Madsen, 2013).

As previously mentioned, Oman’s extensive infrastructural shortcomings have hindered the possibility of greater working conditions for women, predominantly in the interior of the country where conditions are at their worst.

Women’s entrepreneurship and participation in informal sector

In recent years, since the promises of job employment in the public sector are obsolete, there is a shift towards employment in the informal private sector (OECD, 2017). Business ownership is a foundational aspect and fundamental right in an equal economy. However, countries in the MENA region often have strict legal or cultural norms that forbid or discourage such practice by women. In many countries, the vast amount of legal and administration work to start a business can be overwhelming. Per Adnane’s study, women are more likely to be discouraged and intimidated by domestic requirements, large administrative procedures, and the time needed to get a business started (Adnane, 2015).

In Oman administrative procedures to gain business ownership are run entirely through men in the Sultanate. Omani women have been seen as totally subordinate to their male counterparts in nearly all economic aspects since nation-building measures were slowed in the late

1980s (Chatty, 2000). This occurred after vast government reforms encouraged those who left

Oman to be educated overseas to return home, now with more liberal economic laws in place to encourage growth and makeup for lost years of economic turmoil during the old Sultanate government (Chatty, 2000). It was not until a later five-year plan enacted by the nation’s government in 1996 that women were again encouraged to take a greater role in the economy

(Khan, Gosh, Meyers, 2005). Women are now able to own businesses in Oman, however role models and pathways, or existing proven methods, to successful entrepreneurship remain an issue

(Khan et al.)

Omani women face the challenge of infrastructural issues in the realm of earning a livable income. As previously mentioned, much of the interior of the country does not have proper transportation infrastructure, with the country containing no transnational rail system, thus, women attempt to earn wages through creating art, or hand-made goods. This form of income generation can lead to a livable wage and from the safety and security of one’s own home. However, the formation of a governmentally recognized non-profit, or outside help permitted by the Sultanate to assist these women and receive international grants was rejected by the central government

(Chatty, 2000).

For women entrepreneurs in rural Oman, family support is also one of the most important contributing factors to staying in business. Most of the female-owned businesses in rural Oman are in the informal sector. It goes beyond farming, and is mostly concentrated in arts and crafts such as clothing, handicrafts, beauty products (Ghouse et al., 2017). Business in these spheres requires little initial investment but also does not promise growth (OECD, 2017). The majority of the female-owned businesses are aiming for stability rather than growth (Ghouse et al., 2017).

Similar to female entrepreneurs in Tunisia, women in Oman heavily rely on family support and social capital to sustain their enterprise. Women prefer parents over spouses as support for their business, it is not clear why such preference exists (Ghouse et al., 2017). However, there is a fear of putting family resources at risk if the business fails (OECD, 2017). In a survey by Ghouse et al.

(2017) women frequently pointed to gender bias as a barrier to their entrepreneurship.

Additionally, access to information and mentorship is limited, so women are going through the process of trial and error in starting their businesses. Access to finance to start business and continue its growth is lacking as well (Ghouse et al., 2017). Some women have benefitted from governmental support and assistance, and are big supporters for such programs (Ghouse et al.,

2017). Ghouse et al. (2017) recommend increasing access to finance, training, networking and mentorship opportunities.

Customs and culture

According to an executive at the Omani Alizz Islamic Bank, Aisha Al Kharusi, the two

“biggest culprits” in women advancing economically are not economic policies or finding a job, but rather “the cultural mindsets and behaviors - at companies and among women themselves,”

(Kharusi, 2016). These two culprits may well be in effect in Oman, where women are continuously getting access to higher education and can vote, yet have a very low representation in the government: 1.2% in Majlis al Shura, the primary consultative council in the Omani government

(Al Subhi and Smith, 2019). While the majority of Omanis would like women’s representation in the government, the movement toward total parity is not being expressed. Al Subhi and Smith

(2019) have found that it is due to the tribal institutions. Informal tribal institutions are usually gatekeepers to a representation in public sector leadership. Since the district is limited to few representatives, these places are usually given to men (Al Subhi and Smith, 2019). Interestingly, older generations of Oman remember that women used to be more involved in community-level tribal and political discussions in villages (Al Subhi and Smith, 2019). It has also been found that women in Oman are more supportive of women’s representation than men, however, do not have knowledge of local politics and are not engaging in discussions about it (Al Subhi and Smith,

2019). There needs to be increased quotas for women’s representation in the public offices to increase “social acceptability of women in the council,” increase active citizenship through civic education with focus on women’s representation, and programs to equip women in running for office (Al Subhi and Smith, 2019). Increases in the numbers of tribal representatives will also help in boosting support for women in office. 48

Outside of government representation, Oman’s culture is heavily influenced by the traditional Arab and Islamic social systems, though these have seen changes in the last fifty years.

The transforming nature of Omani family structures has given women more economic and educational opportunities, while still seeing barriers in terms of traditional Islamic practices within educational and economic institutions.

To begin, Islamic cultures are historically conservative and do not adhere to changes from outside cultures frequently (Al Hasani, 2015). While this was true for Oman, revolutions in both their political system and economic ties to western culture have changed attitudes since the 1970s.

Omani women were previously strictly tied to domestic roles and obligations, as gender roles in

Islam adhered to the stereotypical ones found in Western culture, in that men were to be the breadwinners, and women were to be primary caretaker within the home. Women in Islamic culture are heavily tasked with bringing up large families (Al Hasani, 2015). Modern attitudes and the advancements of communication technology in Oman have exposed Omani women to diverse cultures which have influenced day-to-day life. This exposure to outside cultures, namely the western ties created via trade, communication enhancements, and expanded tourism, have been named as factors that have started changing attitudes to the place of women in society.

Women have taken it upon themselves to advance their position in the Omani cultural system, as they have begun to lobby for participation in decision-making, and against glass ceilings placed on their career outlooks (Al-Barwani & Albeely, 2007). In addition, the introduction of women’s conventions by outside lobbyists have been successful in changing women’s attitudes

(Al-Barwani & Albeely, 2007). While many changes have occurred to promote women’s place in society, the traditional ties of Islamic and Arab social systems still remain largely intact, which have kept women out of the aforementioned governmental decision making positions, and in board member positions with Omani corporations. For example, while women are entering more diverse 49

career fields by changing stereotypes that women cannot work in banking, finance, etc. they are still barred from the same promotional opportunities seen by their male counterparts, as male superiors, who widely hold older, Islamic traditionalist views of women, tend to favor men in managerial positions (Pocock, 2005). While culture is changing in favor of women, the movement and lobbying efforts have not taken hold on all male counterparts who maintain strong ties to traditional Islamic views of society.

Traditional culture then, provides a significant barrier to women’s economic participation.

Omani traditional culture, a social system that many male counterparts still hold on to, insists that women in Oman should only work and serve other women (Al Hasani, 2015). Therefore, traditional culture allows Omani women to work, but in very limited capacities that reinforce the idea that the role of a woman is more closely connected to the internal development of starting and raising a family in the domestic sphere. Further, traditional Omani culture has heavy ties to the broader Arab culture found throughout the Middle East. Arab culture refers to the cultures of countries whose native language is Arabic (Golley, 2004). It is important to distinguish this, as arab, and Muslim are not synonymous , as it is often misconstrued in Western cultures. A key distinction in the specific Arab culture is the emphasis on family and tribal kinship (Golley, 2004).

The absence of widespread political organizations for a large part of Arabic history led individuals to identify closer to their own families and regional tribes (Golley, 2004). These strong familial ties hold in modern Omani culture, where family identity is much stronger than one’s individual identity and self-actualization (Golley, 2004).

The social expectations arising from traditional culture are also strong among men and women in Oman. Cultures are created by a set of expectations in a given society and are reinforced daily by the individuals of that society. Thus, the emphasis on domestic roles for women have been reinforced by the patriarchal structure of the culture with many Omani women for the entirety of 50

their upbringing, giving traditional cultural expectations a strong hold. Only with strong changes in society, like the movement in the country throughout the 1970’s have cultural expectations shifted. While more women have entered the economy, and in differing job fields, many, especially the older generations, hold on to strong traditionalist beliefs (Al-Hasani, 2015).

Tunisia

Structure of the economy

Physical structure and its settlement

Tunisia saw weak real GDP growth over the past few years: 1.6% annually (average during

2015-2019, Economist, 2019). Arab Spring and unrest in neighboring Libya slowed down economic recovery in Tunisia (World Bank, 2019). Political instability and powerful trade union movement limit the effectiveness of economic policies like deregulation and private-sector investment, supported by the IMF (Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 2019).

Tourism and manufacturing of textiles and garments are major sectors of the economy.

There is a relative growth of other manufacturing over the past few years driven by the demand from the EU, like electrical appliances and household appliances (Ayadi and Mattousi, n.d.). In

2017, Tunisia’s top three exported products were electrical machinery, textiles and clothing, and oil and minerals, with France, Italy and Germany as Tunisia’s top trading partners (globalEDGE, n.d.). Agricultural sector has significantly decreased its prevalence over the years, contributing only 10% to the GDP in 2018 (World Bank). Consistent with the high levels of out-migration,

Tunisia receives a growing amount of personal remittances: 800 millions (current US$) in 2000 compared to 1,902 millions (current US$) in 2018 (World Bank).

Prior to the COVID-19 crisis and its negative impact on tourism, it was projected that the economy of Tunisia would modestly recover from continued tourism (World Bank, 2018).

However, negative effects of COVID-19 on tourism combined with pre-existing pressures such as

high rates of inflation, political instability, fiscal and external deficits would roll-back Tunisia’s modest economic recovery over the past few years (EIU, 2019).

Population groups

11.7 million people populate Tunisia, with 1.1% average population growth (IMF, 2017).

70% of the population resides in urban areas, with the majority living in the northern part of the country (CIA Factbook). Tunisia has a relatively young population, with around 40% being under age of 24 (CIA Factbook). There is a gender parity in the population as well (CIA Factbook).

Tunisia sees considerable out-migration of the population. The net migration over 2015-

2018 was negative, showing larger rates of outmigration relative to the immigration, on average

100,000 people annually (World Bank). People emigrated from Tunisia to fill construction and manufacturing sectors in Europe, and more recently Gulf countries’ oil sector (CIA Factbook).

Labor market

Having a young population in the volatile economic situation, Tunisia has a high unemployment rate. In 2011, during the Arab Spring, the unemployment rate skyrocketed from

13% to 18%. It has stabilized and remains around 15% since 2014, which is the 11th highest unemployment rate in the world (Statista, n.d.). This is a particularly alarming rate considering already low labor force participation: only 50% of the population participates in the labor market overall. The rates of unemployment are high even for those with secondary education, with 40% of unemployed having at least low secondary education (Statista, n.d.). The rate of economic participation is even lower for women: only 28% of the female working age population participates in the labor market (World Bank, 2018).

Figure 6. Employment by industry, modeled ILO estimate. Source: World Bank Gender data portal.

As Fig. 6 shows, women are mostly employed in services (55.3%), followed by industry

(33.4%). More than 80% of employed women are wage and salaried workers. 72% of pharmacists,

42% of medical professionals, 31% of lawyers, and 40% of university instructor positions were held by women (Hina, 2015). Women in agricultural labor are mostly workers or helpers, doing unpaid work, whereas farms are managed by men: brothers or spouses (Bouchoucha, 2018).

The political instability and uncertainty (explained further) have generated the need for a strong and widespread informal sector, where an estimated 35 to 42% of the Tunisian labor force works, according to the Fanack economic analysis group (2020). As previously mentioned, Tunisia ranks 78 out 190 countries on the ease of doing business. This indicates that there are barriers to engaging in formal entrepreneurship, pushing people towards the informal sector (World Bank, n.d.). The informal workers primarily run small street shops, but domestic services like cooking and cleaning also supply valuable income for many Tunisians, primarily the women. Fanack

(2020) estimates nearly half of the country’s GDP comes from the informal work done in Tunisia.

Laws about women

Governmental decision-making system

Tunisia was a French colony until 1956. After becoming independent, Tunisian parliament outvoted hereditary rule, and the country became a republic with Habib Bourguiba in power for three decades (BBC, 2020). Bourguiba promoted secular ideas, especially focusing on women’s emancipation. He was followed by Ben Ali, who ruled the country for almost three decades before getting ousted during the Arab Spring movement that started in Tunisia.

After the Arab Spring, Tunisia made the significant strides in increasing political freedoms and strengthening democratic institutions. The Assemblée des représentants du peuple is now a permanent, elected legislature body (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). By constitution, a president appoints a prime minister, who then has most power over the government. However, there is a high level of political fragmentation due to the contestation of newly emerging parties, including modern Islamist party Hizb al-Nahda and secular Tahya Tounes. The political fragmentation stalls the economic recovery of the country (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019).

Greater inclusion and representation in the government was one of the driving forces behind the 2011 revolution (Arfaoui and Tchäicha, 2014). Women’s representation in government has doubled in Tunisia from 1986 to 2004 (Bouchoucha, 2018). The representation of women in parliament has increased from 26.7% (2013) to 31.3% of seats (2014 - 2018) (World Bank). It doubled in the City Councils to 27.4%. In the National Constituent Assembly (NCA), a permanent legislative body, 28% of the seats are occupied by women. Tunis, the capital of the country, also recently elected its first woman mayor, Souad Abderrahim, who previously served in NCA

(Vagianos, 2018).

There is also the Ministry for Women, Family Affairs and Children, which strategizes to ensure better childcare support and compensation, as well as investment credit lines established for women entrepreneurs (UFM Secretariat, n.d.). In 2012, it also reinvigorated the inactive campaign to stop violence against women, which was first initiated in 2008 (Arfaoui and Tchäicha,

2014). The Ministry is responsible for efforts against gender-based violence and discrimination, which will be discussed in more detail later.

Tunisia has made greater progress in women empowerment, but there still are paternalistic patterns, which are believed to ensure more political stability and are used to gain more power by the current incumbents in governmental offices, who are mostly male (Arfaoui and Tchäicha,

2014). The electorate of Tunisia is more likely to choose their leaders based on the historical status quo (Benstead et al., 2015). Historically, the Tunisian leadership was strongly associated with secularism and was predominantly male. It is culturally believed that women are less corrupt but are stereotyped to be less competent, not have a political stance, and lacking qualities of effective leaders (Arab Barometer survey data Waves 1, 2, and 3, as quoted in Benstead et al., 2015). Thus, both religious and secular groups are more likely to support secular male, who look more like all past leaders of Tunisia. The secular-religious dichotomy is important, as well. Religious groups are more likely to support the religious candidate, regardless of the candidate’s gender, and vice versa for secular groups (Benstead et al., 2015). The important implication of this study is not cultural stereotypes, but rather a historical past that makes one or another person seen as a leader.

Since most Tunisian leaders in the past have been secular males, this culturally “prescribed” type of candidate is more electable than others. This has important policy implications. Since it is not cultural beliefs and stereotypes that drive electoral behavior, but historical past, then institutional interventions are a sound solution. The top-down solutions like increased quotas for females in the

government might reverse this trend. It gives a chance to women to be seen as effective leaders, thus, in the long-term changing electoral behavior.

There are, however, active women’s rights groups and advocates for women’s rights, which support the wider inclusion of women, gained after the 2011 revolution. There are advocates like

Amel Grami, Olfa Youssef, and Ikbal Gharbi, Sana Ben Achour, Salwa Charfi, and Raja Ben

Slama, who provide moderate interpretation of Islamic texts to strengthen female voices in religious and public spheres (Arfaoui and Tchäicha, 2014). Women’s groups support wider representation of women in the NCA, including Meheriza Laabidi, Vice-President of the NCA.

They work on removing discriminatory and gendered language from legislative documents like the new constitution. For example, they successfully removed the language that framed women’s civic role as complementary (Arfaoui and Tchäicha, 2014).

As mentioned before, Tunisia has the highest levels of freedom of women in the MENA region, according to the Freedom House ranking. The Tunisian constitution grants Tunisian women equal rights along with the 1956 reform of the Family Law in Tunisia and allows Tunisian women to enjoy more legal and political rights than anywhere in the MENA region (Sinha, 2011).

The government of Tunisia has also made changes to legislation that provide legal grounds for protection against discrimination (OECD, 2017). However, practical enforcement and protection of women against discrimination is still a challenge in practice.

Institutions in the post-colonial societies “combine the values and principles associated with Islam but also adapt and integrate the indigenous habits and customs of people (Muslims and non-Muslims) in a given society” (Megahed and Lack, 2011). Colonial influence on women’s emancipation has evoked different reactions across states, especially after transitioning to independence. Women emancipation in some countries was seen as a Western concept, and was 57

rejected due to the backlash against European-imposed values during post-colonial times, including women emancipation (Megahed and Lack, 2011). In the case of Tunisia, France had made a little interference with the politics of Tunisia. Feminist ideologies, hence, were not rejected since there was no such backlash after independence.

As mentioned before, Bouguiba promoted secular ideas, which allowed for more emancipation of women in comparison to other countries of the MENA region. Tunisia abolished

Sharia courts in 1956 and since then has had a secular legal system based on French civil law.

Beginning in the 1950s, changes were made to the traditional cultural norms about family structure, gender roles, abortion laws, which allowed for greater gender equality. Tunisia’s Code of Personal Status is now considered to be a model of secularism in the MENA region as it bans polygamy, extrajudicial divorce and allows women to file for divorce.

Tunisia also has signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Countries of MENA have made reservations to

CEDAW, arguing that it leads to interference in internal politics. Reservations allow countries to disregard certain articles of CEDAW. Tunisia initially has made reservations as well, but on April

23, 2014, the United Nations received Tunisia’s decision to withdraw all of its reservations to the

CEDAW treaty, marking Tunisia as the first country in the MENA region to remove all reservations (Human Rights Watch, 2014). This means that Tunisia should now conform to all international standards in eliminating all kinds of gender discrimination. Tunisian government have also adopted new constitutional legislation for protection against discrimination. However, in practice, the effective enforcement of these international standards remains to be a challenge in

Tunisia.

The Code of Personal Status still has articles that do not allow for effective protection of women against gender-based violence. It delineates an institution of dowry, stipulating that the 58

husband may not enforce sexual relationship if he has not paid the dowry. This means that under this law marital rapes are allowed if the dowry has been paid.

The aforementioned Ministry for Women, Family Affairs and Children (Ministry WFC) has made efforts in enacting legislation that protects women against gender-based violence and discrimination. The multi-actor collaborative efforts between the Ministry WFC, NGOs and activists resulted in the enactment of Law 58, which was lauded as a progressive initiative in North

Africa by Human Rights Watch (Boukhayatia, 2018). Law 58 on paper provides protection of women against physical, economic and psychological abuse, as well as harassment in public

(Boukhayatia, 2018). However, assessment of the law after enactment has shown implementation issues. There are logistic barriers such as distance to the district offices to file a complaint or office closures at night when most cases of violence occur. Unclear bureaucratic process and lack of staff in the offices significantly slows down the process, de facto dissuading women from filing the complaint (Boukhayatia, 2018).

Technically, men and women have equal access to divorce for both men and women. In practice, a husband has to find strong evidence of the wife's disobedience, whereas a wife filing for a divorce is culturally and legally considered a sign of marital discord (Bowen, 2017). A reciprocal approach to marriage has been taken, where spouses have duties to treat one another kindly, co-manage their household together, and jointly decide on issues that are related to their family (OECD, 2017). Indeed, 43% of Tunisian women consider their decision-making power has increased in comparison to their mothers’ generation (Bouchacha, 2018). At least a third of married women discuss their children’s education, decisions about having another child, and children’s health with their spouses.

On the other hand, the requirement from a husband to financially support a wife still holds true (OECD, 2017). This leads to the discrimination in wages. Since men are expected and required 59

to be the main ‘breadwinners’ of the family, employers have legal and cultural grounds to choose men for the already limited opportunities for employment. These wage disparities can then continue to be used as a tool to preserve marriages, even if legally women have equal access to divorce (OECD, 2017). Chekir and Arfaoui (2011) find that ancestral patriarchal traditions still hold true in Tunisian society, where fathers have the biggest authority in the household. In addition,

Tunisia’s inheritance laws continue to be based on Sharia law, according to which daughters can inherit half of the inheritance received by sons (Powell, 2017).

The labor codes of both Tunisia prohibit all kinds of gender discrimination against women.

In practice only a third of women control their access to work, and 63% of young women said they would need family’s permission to work in Tunisia (Bouchoucha, 2018). Similarly to other countries in the MENA region, Tunisia imposes night work restrictions on women, where they are unable to work from 10 p.m. to 7 a.m. as preventive measures. Short maternity leave periods remain to be the obstacles for married women that wish to participate in formal employment.The length of maternity leave is 30 days in the private sector and 60 days in public sectors, which is a short time period compared to other countries in the region (OECD, 2017). The age when women leave the job market in Tunisia has increased from 25 in 1990 to 30 in 2010 (Bouchoucha, 2018).

However, the age when most people in Tunisia start to gain senior positions is usually after 35.

Women, who have a double shift working and taking care of the household, leave the job market before they get the opportunity to step up their career ladder or join labor unions (Chekir and

Arfaoui, 2011). The parental leave only includes mothers, whereas fathers in the private sector only have 1 day (civil servants - 2 days) of leave following the birth (ILO, 2011). This exacerbates cultural expectations of women taking the role of a caretaker for children, sick or elderly, thus, limiting the time they could commit to economic activities (Chekir and Arfaoui, 2011).

Clear legislative norms about discrimination on the basis of gender in recruitment, occupation and employment are lacking (OECD, 2017). Women are under the threat of repercussions, such as being fired, when they make attempt to file complaints about workplace sexual harassment (Chekir and Arfaoui, 2011). There are also cases of blatant gender-based discrimination in employment, where employers use loopholes in the legislation to prioritize men for employment (Chekir and Arfaoui, 2011). For example, there are recruitment exams for men only to get employed at certain positions like mailman (Chekir and Arfaoui, 2011). As mentioned in the economic overview of the country, textiles is one of the main industries that contribute to the GDP of the country. However, textile and clothing industry employers use legislative loopholes that allow them to discharge employees, mostly women, on the basis of economic redundancy

(Chekir and Arfaoui, 2011). While anti-discriminatory protections exist in the law of Tunisia, there’s not enough awareness about available resources and procedures if people face discrimination at work, which explains why no complaints have been filed yet (OECD, 2017).

Women’s economic participation

Access to education

The Government of Tunisia remains committed to achieve gender parity and access to education. In 2002, The Tunisian Education Act provisioned access to education for all. Tunisian literacy rates are at 91% among women 15 and 24, and women comprise nearly 60% of all students enrolled in higher education in the country (Population Reference Bureau). In 2008-2009, 98% of eligible females compared 97.4% of eligible males enrolled to pre-university level (Megahed and

Lack, 2011). In Tunisia, a PAPFAM survey has shown that both young men and women think that

everyone should get a university degree. These perceptions show up in data as the proportion of women in secondary and university are higher than that of men (54% and 60.4%, respectively).

Tunisian women are not far behind most Western countries in their pursuit of education. However, as Bouchoucha (2018) has found, women choose conventionally feminine areas of study, such as health, education, arts, humanities, and social sciences. Their representation in STEM is rising, but remains comparatively lower. Even when girls choose typically male-dominated areas of study, this change is not reflected in higher employment in these sectors (Jeddi and Malouche, 2015). It results in a self-reinforcing loop, where women continue to train for professions with higher female representation (Jeddi and Malouche, 2015).

Women’s participation in formal employment

Attainment of university education by women has still only led to an employment rate of

30% (Hina, 2015). The low rates of employment are linked to generally high levels of unemployment for all citizens due to the economic and political instability. The youth of Tunisia are willing, despite the unemployment, to queue for jobs in a large but highly competitive public sector (Pfeifer, 2016). Economic volatility combined with a young population significantly limits the job opportunities for young Tunisians. Quantitative study by Kriaa and Bouhrari (2018) has found that women with university degrees need 24 months to find a job. This transition period is shorter for men, but it still takes 20 months on average for them to secure a job (Kriaa and Bouhrari,

2018). Authors cite networking as a significant factor of success in getting hired, which shows that people with larger social capital have a higher chance of landing a job (Kriaa and Bouhrari, 2018).

At the same time, the majority of existing job opportunities require low skilled labor, and university graduates, most of whom are women, cannot find employment in those areas. Thus,

32.9% of women with higher degrees were unemployed in 2010, which is twice as high as men

(15.8%). Only 26.8% of the working population of Tunisia are women, they also are accepting job positions lower than that of men. Women employed in low skilled labor, mostly domestic work, are usually teenage girls from low-income families without opportunities for continued education.

They were found to be at higher risk of gender-based violence as well (Arfaoui and Moghadam,

2016).

Men work in a wider variety of sectors, whereas two thirds of the female labor force is employed in healthcare or education services, public administration, textiles and agriculture (Jeddi and Malouche, 2015). These sectors are prone to instability in times of economic and environmental shocks (Jeddi and Malouche, 2015). Just as in the areas of study, they are less represented in engineering and architecture: less than 35% of professionals in these fields are women. There is more gender parity in fields like veterinary emergency (35.9% of employees), physical sciences (45.9%), information technology (47.4%), mathematics and statistics (49.4%)

(Jeddi and Malouche, 2015). However, the women who are present in these sectors comprise only

25% of the overall female labor force (Jeddi and Malouche, 2015; Chekir and Arfaoui, 2011).

As mentioned before, the textile and clothing industry is one of the biggest employers in the private sector of Tunisia. In 2002, more than 30% of the active female workforce were wage and salaried workers in this sector (Chekir and Arfaoui, 2011). However, the textile and garments industry has been shrinking, and women suffered layoffs and increasing unemployment (Chekir and Arfaoui, 2011). Women are particularly vulnerable to such layoffs due to the legislative loopholes discussed previously.

In general, women of Tunisia, like in the rest of the world, experience wage gaps that are attributable to gender discrimination. Their labor is undervalued due to the social expectations and other responsibilities that are in competition with economic activities, like housekeeping and caretaking (Jeddi and Malouche, 2015). Women are also underrepresented in leadership positions 63

in civil service, as well. Only 11% of director generals (leadership positions in Tunisian governmental agencies) are women (Chekir and Arfaoui, 2011). Other women in civil service occupy lower level clerical positions (Chekir and Arfaoui, 2011). As mentioned before, women are dominating health and education public sectors but only 4% of women are in ministerial positions (Chekir and Arfaoui, 2011).

Mobility

These cultural expectations add another barrier to already existing disadvantages in employment that exist for the rural population of Tunisia. Location plays a key role in ensuring transition from studies to work for both young males and females (Kriaa and Bouhrari, 2011).

Young men and women who reside in urban areas experience shorter and easier transition to employment compared to their rural counterparts (Kriaa and Bouhrari, 2011). Cultural norms suggest that women should remain closer to home, severely limiting the environments in which women can work (CEDAW). Bouchacha (2018) categorized married women into groups based on their attitude towards women’s ability to migrate. Tunisian women are obliged to live with their husband in the location that he has chosen, which might limit their mobility and choices for jobs

(OECD, 2017). Educated women from the most developed areas of Tunisia (Tunis, Monastir,

Sousse, and Ben Arous), married to educated men, continue to work in marriage, think that women should be able to decide who to marry, and accept women migrating abroad and living alone while single. Women who are less educated but are of the same education level as their spouses, living in Gafsa, Sfax, Tozeur and Bizerte, accept migration of their daughters, but only under certain conditions. Finally, a third group of women with little education, no employment, and much younger than husbands do not accept such migration.

Women’s entrepreneurship and participation in informal sector

Due to the high competition for scarce wage and salary employment, Tunisians shift towards engaging in entrepreneurship. Businesses ownership and the ownership of economic assets is legal for women in Tunisia. Similar to trends in other countries of MENA, women entrepreneurs in Tunisia do not aim for growth but for stability, their businesses are smaller than those owned by males. At the same time, their enterprises are bigger than women-owned SMEs in the region, employing 19 people on average (Drine and Grach, 2010). Women’s enterprises are small and undercapitalized, which poses an obstacle in accessing capital from formal financial institutions (Drine and Grach, 2010). Women also have lower information about government supported programs for entrepreneurs, which puts them at disadvantage in benefitting from them

(Drine and Grach, 2010).

Women entrepreneurship is a comparatively recent trend, which began in the 1970s (Drine and Grach, 2010). Since then, the number of women-owned small-to-midsize enterprises (SMEs) has increased to 13% in 2006 (Drine and Grach, 2010). The majority of women have businesses in non-durable manufacturing and services (Drine and Grach, 2010). Majority of women-led businesses are arts and crafts, for example producing beauty products, clothing, pastries, wedding decorations (Baranik et al., 2017). In recent years, more women entrepreneurs started their businesses in typically male-dominated spheres such as telecommunications, finance and real estate (Drine and Grach, 2017). More than a half are a part of the informal sector. Since the use of formal financial institutions by women-owned SMEs is low, female entrepreneurs are highly reliant on family funds (Drine and Grach, 2010). Field study by Baranik et al. (2017) also has found that marriage status and social capital (wasta) is critical for female entrepreneurs in Tunisia.

Being married and having husband’s support in continuation and growth of the business also

increases commitment to be entrepreneurial and not exit the market (Baranik et al., 2017). Women who are married benefit from access to resources, such as financial benefits, information, and networking. In other cases, wasta through the extended family and close friends helps Tunisian female entrepreneurs to achieve success in business. It can be compared to nepotism, where

“pulling strings” allows for more success in business than merit. Baranik et al. (2017) recommend that social capital of women should be cultivated from other means than family and friends, for example, through providing platforms for women networking and group-based training.

Group-based training will also be beneficial for gaining knowledge and skills needed for starting up and running a business. A study by Drine and Grach (2010) shows that 64% of surveyed female participants find the idea of a business start up appealing but majority of them consider that they lack necessary skills and ability for that. Majority of respondents wanted to study accounting and financial management (Drine and Grach, 2010). This also explains low participation in high- tech industry entrepreneurship: women have less information and knowledge about information technologies and network infrastructure (Drine and Grach, 2010). Some platforms for entrepreneurship training already exist, and women are better informed about them. However, according to surveys, high financial costs, concentration of training in few regions, and lack of specific programs pose a barrier to women’s participation (Drine and Grach, 2010).

Based on these findings, there are a number of policy implications and program interventions, which can better support women entrepreneurs. Expanding financial support to include small enterprises will provide greater access for women to support their SMEs.

Information campaigns about available resources, training opportunities, targeting women entrepreneurs, will increase their awareness and participation. Creating platforms for networking and group-based training will increase women entrepreneurs’ access to social capital. These initiatives will decrease dependence on family social and financial capital, allowing for greater 66

independence of women entrepreneurs. For example, Entr@crush, online platform for young

Tunisians, provides e-learning courses on entrepreneurship, as well as matches potential donors with entrepreneurs. Notably, this initiative was founded by a young woman, Hayfa Sidiri, Tunisian blogger and activist (UN Women, 2017).

Customs and culture

Increased access to education and professional life is associated with postponed marriage and decreased childbirths in Tunisia: the average marriage age for illiterate women is 21.2 years, and it is 24.3 years for women with secondary education (Bouchoucha, 2018). 65.5% of women of reproductive age in Tunisia have used any method of contraception (World Bank, n.d.). As a result, the number of children per woman has significantly declined from 7.2 in 1956 to 2 in 2009, which is comparable to the fertility rates in developed countries. Culturally, the conjugal unit model with two children (couple with children living separately from extended family) is becoming more dominant (Bouchoucha, 2018).

The abortion legislation of 1973 allows for abortions up to the first three months of pregnancy (Megahed and Lack, 2011). In practice, there are barriers in accessing abortion services, which include systemic barriers such as ineffective referrals within healthcare system, service delays, as well as individual such as lack of partner support or financial resources (Hajri et al.,

2015). The root causes of the structural barriers is a misinterpretation of the abortion law, either intentionally or due to the lack of provider training (Hajri et al., 2015).

Tunisia’s public sector has seen a resurgence of Islamic conservatism. The Tunisian government recently allowed wearing headscarves and beards in the photo identifications.

Headscarves that do not cover the face (hijabs) are allowed in public spaces like universities and schools. This has become a source of dissatisfaction for secular liberal parts of society, which see 67

it as a threat to society’s liberalism rather than inclusivity. Pioneer feminists of Tunisian society argue that the Islamic resurgence is a threat to the achievements for female emancipation in the past century (Tchäicha and Arfaoui, 2012). The Code of Personal Status legislation and its major influence on women’s emancipation has affected the lives of that generation of women. However, as Tchäicha and Arfaoui (2012) have found in their qualitative study, the impact of this legislation is not a part of collective memory of younger generations and does not have the same level of importance.

There is also a juxtaposition between traditions and laws and their effect on women’s position in the society. Respondents in Tchäicha and Arfaoui’s (2012) qualitative study argue that laws on women’s emancipation of Tunisia are stifled in patriarchy. There are anecdotal examples of subtle ways that keep women’s position as subordinate. For example, one woman works in a company, where women are not allowed to have checkbooks. Others bring up examples where the brothers and fathers are not expected to help in the house as opposed to women (Tchäicha and

Arfaoui, 2012). These existing cultural norms limit women’s equality in the public spheres and within the household.

Common trends

All three countries have suffered from economic volatility after the Arab Spring and continuous conflicts in neighboring countries. This resulted in political instability in Tunisia, and economic instability in all three countries. Oman is highly dependent on the oil prices, which also puts it at risk due to the volatility of oil prices, whereas Jordan and Tunisia are reliant on the external sources of capital from international aid and remittances, respectively. The populations of all three countries are young, and have high levels of educational attainment, including secondary education. However, due to the regional economic and political instability levels of unemployment are high for Jordan and Tunisia. The levels of unemployment are even higher for women, despite their levels of high educational attainment. The combination of two factors: high competition for wage and salaried jobs and culture-based discrimination in employment disproportionately puts women at a disadvantage. By law and culturally, males are expected to be main providers for the family. Men also do not take parental leave, which is beneficial for employers. So, in the context of already limited employment, men are prioritized for hiring.

Those women who participate in the labor market are restricted by the legislation in the number of occupations and work schedules, with reasoning that long hours or night shifts are hazardous. In Oman this limitation goes further, as women’s occupation has to be agreed upon by her male guardians or husband. Transit to work is also a barrier for all three countries, as the options for safe public transportation and independent mobility for women are limited. While local legislations and ratified international conventions are put in place, the loopholes in the legislation exist. In Tunisia, for example, employers use the loopholes to prioritize men for the work as a postman. Women, who are being discriminated against, have insufficient information about self-

advocating, filing a complaint. Filing complaints or reporting cases of violence are lengthy and bureaucratic, dissuading people from undergoing the process.

The combination of economic, cultural and legal barriers results in self-selection of women. They choose regarded as ‘feminine’ areas of study like humanities, social studies, healthcare and education, and these sectors in the labor market are also predominantly female.

However, the high proportion of women employed in these sectors is only represented in clerical positions within government or firms. The top management positions in private sector or positions of higher authority in government are predominantly male in all three countries. Women also agree on lower wages or lower positions than their male counterparts.

There is also a lack of social acceptability of female leadership in government. Surveys conducted in Tunisia have shown preference for secular males as political leaders. Males also gain the majority of electorate’s support in Jordan and Oman. The lack of representation of women in political leadership is a self-reinforcing, negative loop. Electorate tends to support status quo, and status quo for all three countries has been a male leadership. Inherent power dynamics also do not allow for development of clear channels for career growth or role models.

Due to the lack of employment opportunities in all three countries, the labor force has shifted its activity towards the informal sector, mostly due to the barriers to starting a business and taxes. Across all three countries, rates of female ownership of businesses are low compared to men. The women who manage to start and run a business do not aim for growth but stability. They also are highly reliant on social capital that comes from their husbands, family and friends. This is due to the low participation of women in public spheres of life, limited platforms for networking beyond their kin. It is exacerbated by legislative barriers in accessing capital in Jordan and Oman, where simple banking transactions require the presence of male guardian. Access to capital is, as a result, limited in Jordan and Oman, which is why businesses are often co-owned by husbands. 70

This impedes a woman’s ability for independent ownership of a business, and dissuades younger generations of female entrepreneurs from starting a business. Women also lack technical skills and platforms for information sharing about business opportunities and resources. Occupied with competing family responsibility, women cannot access lengthy entrepreneurship training, which are also predominantly delivered in urban areas.

Maternal leave in Jordan and Oman is generous both in terms of time and payments, but it is comparatively less so in Tunisia. While fathers have an option for parental leave for a few days, extended parental leave is not an option for fathers. There is a negative feedback loop between discriminatory legislation and cultural norms, which puts a burden of caretaking on women. Due to this competing responsibility of family caretaking and unpaid household work, women in all three countries exit the labor market early, around 30 years old. Early exit from the labor force does not allow women to compete for positions in leadership, higher wages, and representation in labor unions.

The family realm, which is of high importance to Arabic culture, is also regulated by discriminatory legislation. Tunisia has achieved greater progress in eradicating the family laws that put women into subordinate positions in the household, ensuring egalitarian responsibilities between husband and wife, equal access to divorce, capital and property. This is not the case for

Jordan, where married women cede control of assets to their husbands, can be legally punished for disobedience, or women under 30 who are unmarried have to be assisted by a male guardian to make even simple banking transactions. Even in more progressive Tunisia, outdated laws such as the dowry institution still exist on a legislative basis. Culturally in all three countries, males

(fathers, brothers, husbands) are key authority figures in the family.

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