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Alexander Hamilton: Constitutional Realist Michael P. Federici. The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. viii + 291 pp. $24.95, paper, ISBN 978-1-4214-0539-1. Reviewed by John G. McCurdy Published on H-Law (June, 2013) Commissioned by Christopher R. Waldrep (San Francisco State University) Since the dawn of the Republic, Alexander Founders series, this book should serve as an ex‐ Hamilton has held a precarious position in the cellent introduction to the complicated and some‐ pantheon of “The Founders.” For more than two times contradictory mind of the founder. In clear hundred years, politicians and scholars have prose that is accessible to students, scholars, and picked over Hamilton’s voluminous corpus both educated readers alike, Federici accomplishes the to praise and to bury the frst secretary of the unenviable task of unpacking the political philos‐ treasury. Simultaneously denounced as a monar‐ ophy of a man who never authored a work of sys‐ chist and praised as a republican, Hamilton has tematic thought. In part, this was because Hamil‐ routinely been marshaled into action both to at‐ ton’s life was tragically cut short at the age of tack and defend the growth of the federal govern‐ forty-nine and thus he never had a chance to re‐ ment, laissez-faire economics, and judicial ac‐ flect back on his life the way that John Adams and tivism. Any idea that Hamilton’s politics are the Thomas Jefferson did. stuff of esoteric arguments locked in the ivory Yet even had Hamilton’s life been spared by tower were put to rest nearly a decade ago when Aaron Burr, it is uncertain that he ever would the New York Historical Society’s exhibit “Alexan‐ have produced such a tome. In fact, this is where der Hamilton: The Man Who Made Modern Amer‐ Federici begins his analysis, arguing that Hamil‐ ica” elicited wide criticism for having a conserva‐ ton was a moral realist who believed that the tive tilt.[1] lessons of history were far more valuable to con‐ To make sense of Alexander Hamilton’s ideas structing a government than any abstract philoso‐ and their legacy, Michael Federici has authored phy. Accordingly, Federici is forced to read the The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton. largely public writings of Hamilton (such as The An entry in the Johns Hopkins University Press’s Federalist and other newspaper columns) in or‐ The Political Philosophy of the American der to construct his own framework of Hamilton’s H-Net Reviews political philosophy. The result is appropriately 35). Most importantly, Federici argues that Hamil‐ quite Hamiltonian as Federici draws on what his ton was “an ethical dualist” who believed that hu‐ subject called the “accumulated experience of mankind could not be made perfect (p. 39). This ages” to make his case (p. 50). Federici also draws put Hamilton at considerable odds with Jefferson on the considerable secondary literature on and Thomas Paine, whose idealism preached that Hamilton--most notably biographies by Forrest the popular will was infallible and thus should be McDonald and Ron Chernow--as well as writings unshackled from the tyranny of government. by contemporaries such as Thomas Jefferson.[2] Hamilton believed that government was neces‐ The result is largely satisfying. Attempting to sary to protect people from their own selfsh ends, “provide a balanced, nuanced view of Hamilton, a stance that Federici observes brought Hamil‐ one that may be messy but is more true to his po‐ ton’s political philosophy closer to that of Edmund litical ideas than any ideologically driven view,” Burke than that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Federici succeeds in placing Hamilton in his late- From the personal, Federici moves to Hamil‐ eighteenth-century context, often going to great ton’s philosophical anthropology and theoretical lengths to explain why present-day labels such as foundations of constitutionalism. In two substan‐ “nationalist” are ill fitted to his subject (p. 23). tial chapters, he expands on the nature of Hamil‐ The book is organized functionally, beginning ton’s “ethical dualism” and how this influenced with the man and his political philosophy writ his role in the shaping of the U.S. Constitution. Ac‐ large, before moving to the specific application of cording to Federici, Hamilton has long suffered Hamilton’s ideas and ending with a contrast of unfairly for a “pessimistic, dark, or cynical” view Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian philosophies. This of human nature (p. 63). However, Hamilton’s organization means that several points and exam‐ prescriptions for government followed neither ples reappear two and even three times, although Thomas Hobbes’s amoral realism nor Niccolò this may make the book more accessible as read‐ Machiavelli’s evil efficiency. Instead, Hamilton’s ers and teachers who want to sample a single sober realism was balanced by a refreshing opti‐ chapter can do so and still grasp the totality of mism. He opposed African American slavery as Federici’s argument. unjust and believed that some individuals could rise above their baser instincts and put communi‐ Following an effective introduction, Federici ty before self-interest. Such a hopeful view of hu‐ begins his exploration of his subject with a brief manity was critical to Hamilton’s faith that a “nat‐ biography of Alexander Hamilton. Federici essen‐ ural aristocracy” would emerge to guide the re‐ tially recaps a familiar story of Hamilton the bas‐ public (p. 54). tard son of broken West Indian family who made his way to New York City on the eve of the Ameri‐ In addition to challenging the view of Hamil‐ can Revolution. Hitching his wagon to George ton as a pessimist, Federici also works effectively Washington’s star, the ambitious Hamilton rose in to dismiss the old canard that Hamilton was a the ranks of the Continental Army and the Wash‐ monarchist. He demonstrates Hamilton’s consis‐ ington administration before leaving to devote tent allegiance to republicanism before examin‐ himself to the organization of the Federalist Party ing the sources historians have cited as “proof” of and the promotion of its policies, only to be Hamilton’s monarchism, effectively explaining gunned down in an unfortunate duel with vice away each one as misconstrued or ill informed. president Aaron Burr. Federici illuminates Hamil‐ Nevertheless Hamilton’s ethical dualism meant ton’s “impatient enthusiasm” which made him a that he distrusted the masses to always make the busy author and attracted powerful enemies (p. right decision on their own. In particular, he 2 H-Net Reviews feared that “a momentary lower passion” might the security of the nation demanded otherwise. As “overwhelm the dictates of reason and virtue” (p. a result, Hamilton the treasury secretary appears 76). Hamilton thus opposed direct democracy and far more moderate that many have assumed. For sought to interject elements of “permanence” into example, we learn here that Hamilton supported the Constitution such as an unelected judiciary assuming state debts after the Revolutionary War, and senators for life (p. 130). Such is not to say but railed against inflated national fnancial obli‐ that Hamilton did not trust the people; in fact, he gations. Federici also pushes back against the idea demanded broad suffrage for the House of Repre‐ that Hamilton sought to make law by judicial fat, sentatives. Rather, Hamilton desired a mixed con‐ contending that “his judicial theory has little in stitution that was as balanced as his view of hu‐ common with modern judicial activism, because man nature. it remained largely inconsistent with the original Having established Hamilton’s views writ meaning of the Constitution” (p. 218). large, Federici focuses in on a few debates and, in All told, The Political Philosophy of Alexander the process, clears up a number of popular mis‐ Hamilton is an effective investigation of an ex‐ conceptions about Hamilton. Although a propo‐ tremely consequential man and his ideas. Highly nent of a strong and energetic national govern‐ accessible, this volume should prove useful to ment, Hamilton did not seek to abolish the states those who seek a general introduction to Hamil‐ or even to make them dependent upon the nation. ton’s politics as well as decided scholars who have Instead, Hamilton believed that power had to be traced the conflicting historiography of this properly divided between the nation and the founder. states so as to prevent future tyrannies. For this If there is something missing here, it is that in reason, Federici dismisses the label “nationalist” seeking to place Hamilton solidly in the eigh‐ for Hamilton. Arguing that “the rise of totalitari‐ teenth century, Federici runs the risk of anachro‐ anism, fascism, certain types of authoritarianism, nism. Federici is correct that Hamilton did not and imperial democracy” has so radically support the modern welfare state, judicial ac‐ changed the meaning of nationalism, he suggests tivism, or twentieth-century forms of nationalism. that by the modern definition of nationalism, However, because these ideas did not exist when Hamilton may actually have been “one of the frst Hamilton died in 1804, the relevance of arguing antinationalists, because he recognized that na‐ for their absence in Hamilton’s writings is some‐ tions are not the ultimate measure of goodness or what dubious. Conversely, if Federici is arguing justice” (pp. 182-183). Hamilton did seek to knit that Hamilton’s logic cannot be extended to en‐ the states together into a tighter union--which did compass these ideas, this oddly assumes that necessarily require that they relinquish some of Hamilton’s philosophy would not have changed their power--but localities were essential to a bal‐ over time in accordance with circumstances. In ance of power. this, it is unfortunate that Federici does not ex‐ By the same logic, Federici also rejects efforts plain how Hamilton’s reasoned and thoughtful to make Hamilton a hero of either laissez-faire advocacy of an active (and uniquely American) capitalism or the modern welfare state, arguing federal government was adopted and expanded that “his view of human nature would not have on by the likes of Henry Clay, Abraham Lincoln, allowed either the faith in economic anarchy sug‐ and Franklin Roosevelt.
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