Baluchistan – Briefing Paper

1. Overview 2. History 3. Natural Resources 4. Groupings and Parties 5. The 2009 Baluchistan Package 6. Human rights 7. EU Role and Current Situation

1. Overview

Baluchistan is one of the poorest parts of south Asia and riven by conflict. The term ‘Baluchistan’ refers to two different areas - Pakistan’s largest and poorest province; and the wider geographic area that is regarded by Baluch nationalists as Baluchistan. The latter includes the Baluchistan province in the Southwest of Pakistan, the Sistan and Baluchestan1 province of south-eastern Iran, and the small Afghan region of Baluchistan. The great majority of the region’s inhabitants are Sunni Muslims. The biggest part of the Baluchistan region is in Pakistan (the province of Baluchistan) and its capital is Quetta. The section of Baluchistan that lies in Afghanistan includes the Chahar Burjak District of Nimruz province as well as the Registan desert in southern Helmand and Kandahar provinces. These parts have been part of Afghanistan since 1747. The governors of Nimruz and Helmand provinces in Afghanistan both are ethnic Baluch.

The focus of this background briefing is on Baluchistan as a province in Pakistan and political groups located there demanding different degrees of autonomy for the province or greater Baluchistan. However, it also includes some information about Sistan and Baluchestan, and, to a lesser degree, about the Baluch in Afghanistan.

Baluchistan, Pakistan’s biggest province, occupies around 43% of the country’s total area, but only accounts for around 5% of the country’s population. This figure was published in the last census held in 1998. It is difficult to determine the ethnic composition of the province as the 1998 census did not include the category of ethnicity.2 It seems clear, however, that the three largest ethnic groups in the province are Baluch, Pashtuns, and Brahui. Since 1979, Baluchistan has received millions of Afghan refugees which has altered the province’s ethnic

1 Also spelt ‘Sistan and Baluchistan’. 2 See Fair (2012:2). 1 composition. It is unclear how many refugees remain in Baluchistan and how many have acquired Pakistani citizenship. 3 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees there are around 1.6 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan as of July 2014.4

The conflict surrounding Baluchistan takes place on several different levels: there is a state- province conflict which has developed due to the fact that despite possessing large amounts of natural resources Baluchistan is the least developed and poorest province of Pakistan. Irrespective of ethnicity, many people in the province strongly criticize the lack of investment and demand greater autonomy, a larger share in revenues from projects exploiting the province’s natural resources, and more participation in politics.5

Another level to the conflict is the ethno-nationalist movement which leads many Baluch to demanding greater autonomy or even independence for either the part of Baluchistan which is in Pakistan or for a greater Baluchistan including the parts in Iran and Afghanistan. There are several parties and splinter groups pushing for different goals and different degrees of autonomy.

The Sistan and Baluchestan province in Iran is home to around two million Baluch with the great majority being Sunnis. There is little to no reliable data on the exact ethnic composition of the province or on its people. It is safe to say, however, that Sistan and Baluchestan lags behind the rest of the country in terms of poverty, life expectancy, and infant mortality.6 Some Baluch claim that this is due to the fact that they are Sunni Muslims in a majority Shia Iran. Other complaints are about the exclusion from “economic, political, administrative, military and cultural affairs in their homeland.”7

According to estimates, around the same number of ethnic Baluch lives in Afghanistan, with the majority living in Helmand, Nimruz, and Farrah.8

Lately, the Pakistani province of Baluchistan has been attracting attention due to its poor human rights record, forced disappearances, and violent insurgencies. Government reforms introduced in 2009 and 2011 with the aim of improving human rights have not met with success.

2. History

At the time of the British Empire in South Asia there were many princely districts in Baluchistan over which the British had varied levels of suzerainty. In 1884, Baluchistan was annexed by the British in order to establish a buffer zone between the British and the Russian empires and to “secure safe transit routes to Afghanistan.”9 Fair (2012:3) further writes that

3 Ibid. 4 UNHCR (2014). 5 Fair, 2012:3. 6 Zurutuza (16/05/2011). 7 Ibid. 8 Baluch (27/03/2013). 9 Khan, 2009. 2

“contrary to the claims of some contemporary Baluch nationalists, there was no historically stable, “autonomous” Baluch kingdom per se that covered the expanse of today’s Baluchistan.”10 However, under Nasir Khan, the sixth Khan (leader) of Qalat, most of the major Baluch tribes were organized under one military and administrative system in the mid 18th Century. Following his death the tribes again assumed power and control.11

The Khan (leader) of Kalat had promised the British safe passage through Baluchistan. An attack on the British eventually provided them with a reason to seize the region. The western part of the territory (now Sistan-o-Baluchistan Province) was given to Iran and the northern part to Afghanistan. One part of the remaining area became “British Baluchistan,” and the rest was divided into the Khanate of Kalat and three principalities.12

At the time of partition in 1947, the princely states were forced to choose to join either India or Pakistan. ‘British Baluchistan’ joined Pakistan although many Baluch leaders were not in favour of an independent Pakistan. The Khan of Kalat wanted independence, which he declared one day after Pakistan became independent. However, the Khanate was subsequently annexed by Pakistan which is the foundation for some Baluch claiming that Pakistan is an occupying force (all Fair, 2012:4). This protest against the perceived annexation by Pakistan was called the first insurgency.

The 1955 ‘One United Scheme’ abolished all provinces in West Pakistan in an attempt to counterbalance the ethnically homogenous and politically powerful Bengalis of East Pakistan. The scheme was met by resistance among the Baluch.13 As a reaction to the scheme, the second insurgency lasted until around 1958 and was led by Nawab Nowroz Khan. 14 Contributing to the dissatisfaction was a dispute about royalties from natural gas in an area which was controlled by the Bugti tribe.15 In response to the resulting unrest the Pakistani military launched a campaign against the insurgents, capturing Nawab Khan and hanging some of his family members.16

Following the establishment of new military bases in Baluchistan by the Pakistan Army in order to better control the outbreaks, militants from the Mengal tribal area led by Sher Muhammad Bijrani Marri began a guerrilla campaign. The goal was to receive a share of the revenue generated from the Sui gas fields. The insurgency ended in 1969 with a ceasefire and the ‘One United Scheme’ was abolished by then President Yahya Khan. This also led to the recognition of Baluchistan as the fourth province of Pakistan in its current form.

The fourth insurgency began following the discovery of weapons in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad. The Pakistani authorities claimed in 1973 that the weapons were meant to be transferred to the Baluch in Pakistan and abolished the elected provincial government in Baluchistan. Martial rule was imposed and around 55,000 Baluch guerrillas were opposed by

10 Fair (2012:3). 11 Khan, 2009, Harrison, 1981. 12 Khan, 2009, Harrison, 1981, Fair, 2012. 13 Khan, 2009; Fair, 2012. 14 Harrison, 1981. 15 Fair, 2012. 16 Harrison, 1981. 3

80,000 troops dispatched by the central government. Several thousands of soldiers, militants, and civilians died. After General Zia ul Haq toppled Bhutto’s government, he introduced several development projects in order to appease the population in Baluchistan. Among them were measures to enhance road construction, expansion of power transmission, and building small dams. Under Zia it was also ensured that despite the discovery of gas deposits in Baluchistan around four decades earlier, Quetta received Sui gas for the first time.17 The army operations only ceased in 1978.

The dates of the different insurgencies are disputed. While some argue that the most recent insurgency began in 2004, Fair (2012) sees the beginning already in 1999, when Musharraf seized power and announced the development of Gwadar port and established two army cantonments in Baluchistan. Rashid (2014) claims the fifth insurgency began in 2003 ‘with small guerrilla attacks by autonomy-seeking Baluch groups who over the years have become increasingly militant and separatist in ideology.’18

The current, ongoing insurgency has seen a shift from attacks predominantly against Pakistani military to violence against non-Baluch living in Baluchistan in an attempt to counter what is felt as domination by foreigners.19 The Pakistani security forces are responding by targeting Baluch leaders and either killing or abducting them, which, in turn, leads to more young Baluch taking up arms.20 Grare quotes surveys that indicate that only a minority of Baluch favour independence despite the intractable situation.21

3. Natural Resources

Baluchistan is Pakistan’s largest province and at the same time the least developed. While it is resource-rich, hardly any of the royalties stay in Baluchistan. One of the main disputes between the Baluch and the central government is thus about the profits from exploitation of the natural resources in Baluchistan.

The major contested projects are the Saindak or Sandak copper mine and the Gwadar/Gwador Port development, both developed by Chinese companies. In both the Saindak copper mine and the Gwadar deep sea port, the contract determines that the Chinese government receives 50% of the proceeds, the central Pakistani government receives 48% and the remaining 2% goes to the provincial government in Baluchistan.22 In both cases, none of the construction contracts went to Baluch companies and most of the jobs were given to Punjabis and other non-Baluch.23 In the eyes of many Baluchs, the projects are attempts to “further colonize the province by Punjabis and other patrons of the military and bureaucracy.” (Fair, 2012:6). As a consequence of the construction project at Gwadar, the population is expected to increase

17 Khan, 2009, Fair, 2012:5. 18 Rashid (22/02/2014). 19 Also compare Rashid (22/02/2014). 20 Ibid. 21 Grare (2013:23). 22 Fair (2012:6). 23 Ibid. 4 rapidly from its 70,000 inhabitants before. This increase is mainly due to the increasing presence of non-Baluch who are involved in the construction project.

Protests against the Gwadar Port construction led to several attacks on Chinese personnel involved in the project. The most prominent case was an attack on 3 May 2004 when three Chinese engineers were killed.

4. Groupings and parties

The main Baluchistan independence groups are the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), the Baluch Liberation Front (BLF), and the Baluch Republican Army (BRA) all of which are divided in their goals and means to achieving them.

The Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) is a currently active ethno-nationalist organization. According to the national Baluch media network, the organization became publicly known in 2000 after they claimed responsibility for a series of bombings of markets and railway lines.24 Initially, the BLA had exclusively targeted Pakistan’s security forces (Grare, 2013:14). There are different claims regarding the founding year of the organization, some trace back the BLA’s roots to 1973.25 The BLA is in favour of an independent greater Baluchistan, including the parts inhabited by Baluchs in Iran and Afghanistan.26

The exact number of BLA activists is unknown, however, the Pakistani military estimate that there are around 3,000 fighters active in the insurgency.27 Despite its goals for greater Baluch independence, the BLA has mainly focused its activities on issues with the central government.28 It has claimed responsibility for six major attacks and several smaller ones.29 The majority of the BLA activists are from the Bugti and the Marri tribe, and disenfranchised, politicised youth from Quetta and other towns.30

It is assumed that Mir Balaach Marri was the BLA’s leader until his death in 2007. Due to its clandestine nature, the leadership of the organization is difficult to determine. Another key figure was probably Akbar Khan Bugti, until his death in 2006. There is speculation about his grandson, exiled Baluch nationalist Brahamdagh Bugti, or Mir Balaach Marri’s brother, Hyrbyair Marri, currently leading the BLA. 31 The BLA has been considered a ‘Proscribed Terrorist Organisation’ by the UK government since 2006.32 It has not been considered as such by the EU or the US.33

24 Baluchmedia.com (14/05/2011). 25 Tahir (03/04/2008). 26 See Baluchmedia.com (14/05/2011) and also Tahir (03/04/2008). 27 Brown et al, 2012:14, Tahir (03/04/2008). 28 Mapping Militant Organizations (Stanford University), 2012. 29 Mapping Militant Organizations (Stanford University), 2012, GTD (2013). 30 ICG (2006:12). 31 Mapping Militant Organizations (Stanford University), 2012, Grare (2013:5). 32 Government of the UK (27/06/2014). 33 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland (2014). 5

Also in favour of a “greater” Baluchistan independence is the Baluch Republican Party. It is also assumed to be led by Brahamdagh Bugti (currently in exile in Switzerland) since the killing of his grandfather, Akbar Bugti, by the Pakistani army in 2006. The BRP does not engage in any sort of political dialogue, and asks for intervention from the international community to halt a “genocide.”34

The Baluch Republican Army (BRA) is a Baluch nationalist armed militant group and presumed to be the militant wing of the Baluch Republican Party35 According to Grare, the BRA is also assumed to be led by Brahamdagh Bugti.36

Another group is the Baluch National Movement, which also advocates the independence of a ‘greater’ Baluchistan, but refuses to participate in the political process. The military is assumed to be responsible for the death of its leader, Ghulam Mohammed Baluch, in 2009. This was condemned by the UN.37

The National Party is led by incumbent Chief Minister of Baluchistan, Abdul Malik Baluch. It is a ‘moderate, centre-left Baluch nationalist party that claims to represent the middle class. It was formed in 2003.’38 It boycotted the elections in 2008 as a sign of protest against the military operation which was conducted in Baluchistan at that time. Abdul Malik Baluch has been Chief Minister of Baluchistan since June 2013. As head of the weak provincial government he is not in a position to change much unless the violence between Baluch and the Pakistani security forces ends.39

The Baluchistan National Party (BNP), led by Akhtar Mengal, is a major nationalist party that controlled the provincial government before 2002 but boycotted the polls in 2008. The party was formed in 1996. In 1997, Akhtar Mengal was elected Chief Minister but then stepped down in 1998.40 Considered a moderate organization, it calls for an increase in Baluchistan’s share of revenue from provincial resources, but, until recently, it demanded only wide autonomy for the province, with the authority of the federal government limited to defence, foreign affairs, and the currency. Members have been killed by the authorities, and the party now calls for a referendum on self-determination. Following Akbar Bugti’s death in 2006, the BNP quit the parliament.41

The Baluch Student Organization was formed in 1967. It is a leftist organisation which was formed as response to the government of Pakistan’s armed intervention against the second Baluch insurgency in the early 1960s.42 According to Grare, ‘it is considered the middle-class entry point into the nationalist movement and is composed of four different factions that support the BLA, the Baluch National Movement, the National Party, and the Baluchistan

34 Grare (2013:6). 35 TRAC (2014), Grare (2013:6). 36 Grare (2013:6). 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 See Rashid (2014). 40 Dawn.com (16/04/2013). 41 Dawn.com (16/04/2013). 42 Paracha (03/02/2012), also see Grare (2013:6). 6

National Party.’43 The four different factions are BSO (Awami), BSO (Azad), BSO (Mengal), and BSO (Pajjar). BSO Azad is the most radical faction which openly advocates armed struggle against the Pakistani government in order to establish an independent Baluchistan. The BSO Pajjar is the splinter group with the largest number of student followers and is also the most mainstream in its goals. 44 The different splinter groups of BSO cooperate occasionally against extremist right-wing Islamic groups, such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, or Jundallah.45

Recently, there has been a shift from targeting only the Pakistani army to targeting non- Baluch living in the Baluchistan region in order to drive them away. The spectrum of the groups and parties above shows that they are deeply divided on what degree of autonomy is desirable, on whether they pursue Baluch independence, and on whether they engage in the political process. In addition, it should be kept in mind that Baluchistan is a large province with low population density, which also hampers cooperation. Looking at the different groups active in Baluchistan it can be seen that there is a lack of unity in the movement and a lack of a common goal.

Outside of Pakistan there has been a new movement surfacing in the Iranian Sistan and Baluchistan province: the Jaish ul-adl (Army of Justice). It is assumed that it was established in 2010 after the capture of Jundallah’s46 leader and is thus its successor. It is considered to be the most organized militant group in Iranian Baluchistan. Most of the ten leaders of Jaish ul- adl are former influential members of Jundallah (‘Soldiers of God’).

In terms of ideology, Jaish ul-adl refuses claims to have a separatist agenda. It claims to defend Sunni Muslim rights in predominantly Shia Iran. All members of the group are Sunnis and ethnic Baluchs. There are similarities between Jaish ul-adl’s ideology and that of the Taliban and al-Qaeda and Jaish ul-adl considers itself part of the international Islamic jihad. Most of the group’s senior members were trained in al-Qaeda military camps in Waziristan to use roadside bombs, car bombs and suicide vests.

The group’s main source of finance is the kidnapping of wealthy Iranian Shia civilians who they bring to Pakistan. The ransom accounts for the main part of their budget. If ransom is denied, hostages are normally killed. In the past two years the Iranian regime has taken measures to try and block this source of finance by pressurising the hostage families not to pay. That has resulted in the killing of many hostages. Sometimes they receive money from Baluchis in the Gulf but this is limited. Other group members try running small businesses in the Gulf and Pakistan which is also not successful.

Jaish ul-adl has managed to spread its influence much further than Jundallah. They mobilized many small groups and non-active Baluch militant individuals and conducted political

43 Grare (2013:6). 44 Paracha (03/02/2012). 45 Ibid. 46 Jundallah is also sometimes spelt as Jundullah or Jund’ullah. 7 marriages to expand influence in certain parts of Baluchistan. There might be thousands of supporters, but the number of active fighters is estimated to be around 300.47

Relations with the Taliban of Afghanistan have improved in comparison to those between Jundallah and the Taliban, which could turn them into a potential source of fighters. Jaish ul- adl’s military operations mainly target Iranian border police and security forces in the border area and not civilians. No suicide attacks have been launched yet.48

Yet another group in Sistan and Baluchistan is Ansar al-Furqan. It was formed in late 2013 as a merger of the Harakat Ansar Iran (HAI) group and another Sunni group active in Sistan and Baluchestan, called Hizbul-Furqan.49 Judging from its media releases, HAI seems to have connected its cause with wider Sunni and Jihadist causes, as opposed to Jundallah and Jaish-ul Adl.50 Both groups hold several twitter accounts and facebook pages and also distribute information in English.

The degree of cooperation between different groups is not clear. While some experts presume rather close ties between ethnic Baluch in Pakistan and Iran, others fear that better relations could be built as a reaction to the mistreatment of Baluch on both sides.51

5. The 2009 Baluchistan Package

On 24 November 2009, the Baluchistan Package (Aghaaz-e-Huqook Baluchistan, ‘The Beginning of Right in Baluchistan’) was presented to the Parliament. It sought to address a number of concerns in the province of Baluchistan and proposed reforms regarding the constitution, administration, economy, and political issues.52

Regarding the constitution, one proposal was to consider “various amendments in the constitution, including on provincial autonomy, [which] should be immediately addressed”. Other proposals included the release of political workers, establishing a ‘political dialogue with all major stakeholders in the political spectrum of the province’, and the return of exiles. The killing of Akbar Bugti in 2006 and other Baluch leaders was also to be examined.

Regarding the missing persons, the reform package suggested to set up a commission. ‘The commission should be headed by sitting member of the superior judiciary from Baluchistan, including the federal defence, interior ministers and the home minister of the province. The proceedings of such a commission shall be held in camera.’

The federal paramilitary Frontier Corps was proposed to take over a new Cantonment at Sui, replacing the armed forces. The role of the Frontier Corps (FC) is disputed within Baluchistan

47 According to article by Asian Affairs, May 2014. 48 Information about Jaish ul-adl taken from Asian Affairs, May 2014. 49 Paraszczuk (21/12/2013), also see IHS Jane’s 360 (27/05/2014). 50 Rehman (2014:4). 51 See Rehman (2014:5). 52 According to translation 39 reforms, in other sources it says 61. 8 and comprised of mainly non-Baluch. It is also believed to play a role in human rights violations and in the forced disappearance of Baluch.53

Regarding the distribution of royalties of contracts, the provincial government of Baluchistan is now proposed to receive 15% instead of 2% as before. ‘Due representation should be given to the province’ on boards of several companies, such as Sui Southern Gas. An equivalent to 10% of the net profits of successful finds in the province should be spent on development projects in the area by the federal government.

Proposals for more participation in the decision making process are also made in the field of mega project: All of them are ‘to be initiated with the consent and approval of the provincial government.’

The package further promises the immediate creation of five thousand additional jobs in the province. Of the federal government’s 30% shares in the Sandak Project, 20% are supposed to be given to the province. In already existing agreements such as Sandak and Rekodic, ‘the federal government may reconsider the agreements concerning the sharing of income, profits or royalty between the federal government and the provincial government.’ There is no obligation to reconsider this proposal.

While the package was praised by many Pakistani politicians and ministers, it was criticized by many Baluch for not being comprehensive enough. According to Mir Suleman Dawood Khan, the current Khan of Kalat, the government had not consulted Baluch nationalist parties. Military operations in the province had not been addressed according to National Party Senators, and the NP leader Habib Jalib said it had not given the Baluch a constitutional guarantee.54

There is little information on the actual results following the introduction of the package. According to The Express Tribune, in 2011 just 15 of the reforms had been implemented.55 It remains unclear whether and to what extent these reforms were successfully carried out. Most analysts doubt any positive impact of the reforms. It is also not clear in many cases who will carry out the reforms.

In letters to the newspaper Dawn, some readers criticized the lack of permanent contracts for new teaching positions created as part of the package as well as delays in payment which discouraged Baluchs to continue in their positions.56

In an attempt to reform province-state relations, the 18th Amendment to the constitution in 2010 introduced a shift towards greater devolution of powers from the centre to the provinces. Despite the rewriting of the National Finance Commission (NFC) award in favour of the provinces, it has been criticized that provinces have not enough taxation power to efficiently run the issues being transferred to them.57 Kugelman (2012) agrees with this assessment and

53 See HRW 2011, Abbas, 2007. 54 Unless stated otherwise, all the above has been taken from translation of the Baluchistan Package by Hamid. 55 Gishkori, Zahid. 07/03/2011. 56 Dawn.com (03/11/2011), Dawn.com (11/07/2012). 57 See Fair, 2012:11; for the full text of the bill see CFR (19/04/2010). 9 writes “Provincial governments need more revenue to support their new responsibilities, but Pakistan’s abysmal rates of tax revenue collection effectively prevent this from happening”, calling the 18th Amendment a ‘lost opportunity’.58

6. Human Rights

Most of the victims of enforced disappearances are males between 25 and 45, the majority of who are allegedly part of Baluch nationalist parties and movements, such as the BRP, BNF, and others.59 According to Human Rights Watch, the Frontier Corps assisted or carried out the abductions in 16 cases out of 45, most of which were reported between 2009 and 2010.60

Numbers vary as to how many people have disappeared in Baluchistan with figures ranging from a few hundred to several thousands.61 On 17 January 2014, 13 bodies were discovered near Khuzdar of which two were identified shortly after as men who had disappeared four months earlier.62 In protest at the disappearances, the families of those missing completed a long march from Karachi to Islamabad.63

In June 2011, 41 disappeared persons were reported to have returned home. There has been an investigation by the Supreme Court on which hardly any information is available.

Of the forced disappearances, the victims sometimes reappear and sometimes are found dead. Many are never heard of again. Other incidents are targeted killings that often aim at Baluch political leaders. One of the most prominent cases of targeted killings is that of Akbar Bugti, suspected leader of the Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLA) and former Chief Minister of Baluchistan, which sparked protests in the province. Another one is the killing of three leaders of BNM, BNF and Baluch Republican Party in Turbat in 2009 (‘Turbat Killings’). The three were abducted and found dead, among them was Ghulam Mohammed Baluch, president of the Baluch National Movement.

While most disappearances and targeted killings are suspected to be carried out by the Pakistani army or assisted by the Frontier Corps, the BLA in its initial stages also targeted attacks at the Pakistani security forces.64

Other targeted killings have been aimed at the Hazara Shia minority in Baluchistan. Human Rights Watch estimates that there were 450 killings of Shia in 2012 and of another 400 in 2013.

The International Voice for Baluch Missing Persons is an organization based in Sweden with the goal of bringing together activists, families of disappeared, and the U.N. Working Group

58 http://www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Asia/Pakistan/Publications/Decentralisation-in-Pakistan-the-lost- opportunity-of-the-18th-amendment. 59 HRW, 2011:3. 60 Ibid. 61 For a comparison see Grare (2013:13). 62 Rashid (22/02/2014). 63 Rashid, ibid. 64 See Grare (2013:13). 10 on Involuntary and Enforced Disappearances and related U.N. bodies to protest against enforced disappearances in Baluchistan.65

There was a UN mission 2012 which seems primarily to be an attempt to raise awareness of the issue of enforced appearances.66 Additionally, the UK and US have expressed concerns over the human rights situation in Baluchistan at the 19th session of the UNHRC.67 In March 2014, an UNPO Conference took place in Geneva highlighting human rights issues in Baluchistan.

Pakistan claims that India has supported some Baluch groups with arms but has failed to deliver any evidence. India does not seem to take a prominent position in defending human rights in Baluchistan.

EU Role and Current Situation

The EU has played only a limited role in Baluchistan. Since 2012 the EU has been supporting vocational training (TVET) in Northern Baluchistan. In October 2012, Noordin Mengal and Nasser Boladai, representatives of the Baluch in Pakistan and Iran, paid a visit to the EP.68 The EP also held two events on Baluchistan in 2013. According to the Pakistani newspaper ‘The News’, attendees at the event ‘Baluchistan: Destiny Denied’ in October 2013 expressed ‘solidarity with Baluch nationalists’. 69 There was a visit of representatives of the Baluchistan’s People’s Party to the European Parliament the same year. In March 2014, the EU delegation met with long march representatives.

The stalemate thus looks like continuing for some time as none of the parties appears interested in a compromise solution.

65 http://www.bygwaah.com/modules/content/index.php?id=1. 66 Grare (2013:22). 67 Ibid. 68 http://theBaluchhal.com/2012/10/02/Baluch-leaders-seek-european-parliaments-help-to-end-violence/. 69 The News International (20/10/2013). 11

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