Baluchistan – Briefing Paper

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Baluchistan – Briefing Paper Baluchistan – Briefing Paper 1. Overview 2. History 3. Natural Resources 4. Groupings and Parties 5. The 2009 Baluchistan Package 6. Human rights 7. EU Role and Current Situation 1. Overview Baluchistan is one of the poorest parts of south Asia and riven by conflict. The term ‘Baluchistan’ refers to two different areas - Pakistan’s largest and poorest province; and the wider geographic area that is regarded by Baluch nationalists as Baluchistan. The latter includes the Baluchistan province in the Southwest of Pakistan, the Sistan and Baluchestan1 province of south-eastern Iran, and the small Afghan region of Baluchistan. The great majority of the region’s inhabitants are Sunni Muslims. The biggest part of the Baluchistan region is in Pakistan (the province of Baluchistan) and its capital is Quetta. The section of Baluchistan that lies in Afghanistan includes the Chahar Burjak District of Nimruz province as well as the Registan desert in southern Helmand and Kandahar provinces. These parts have been part of Afghanistan since 1747. The governors of Nimruz and Helmand provinces in Afghanistan both are ethnic Baluch. The focus of this background briefing is on Baluchistan as a province in Pakistan and political groups located there demanding different degrees of autonomy for the province or greater Baluchistan. However, it also includes some information about Sistan and Baluchestan, and, to a lesser degree, about the Baluch in Afghanistan. Baluchistan, Pakistan’s biggest province, occupies around 43% of the country’s total area, but only accounts for around 5% of the country’s population. This figure was published in the last census held in 1998. It is difficult to determine the ethnic composition of the province as the 1998 census did not include the category of ethnicity.2 It seems clear, however, that the three largest ethnic groups in the province are Baluch, Pashtuns, and Brahui. Since 1979, Baluchistan has received millions of Afghan refugees which has altered the province’s ethnic 1 Also spelt ‘Sistan and Baluchistan’. 2 See Fair (2012:2). 1 composition. It is unclear how many refugees remain in Baluchistan and how many have acquired Pakistani citizenship. 3 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees there are around 1.6 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan as of July 2014.4 The conflict surrounding Baluchistan takes place on several different levels: there is a state- province conflict which has developed due to the fact that despite possessing large amounts of natural resources Baluchistan is the least developed and poorest province of Pakistan. Irrespective of ethnicity, many people in the province strongly criticize the lack of investment and demand greater autonomy, a larger share in revenues from projects exploiting the province’s natural resources, and more participation in politics.5 Another level to the conflict is the ethno-nationalist movement which leads many Baluch to demanding greater autonomy or even independence for either the part of Baluchistan which is in Pakistan or for a greater Baluchistan including the parts in Iran and Afghanistan. There are several parties and splinter groups pushing for different goals and different degrees of autonomy. The Sistan and Baluchestan province in Iran is home to around two million Baluch with the great majority being Sunnis. There is little to no reliable data on the exact ethnic composition of the province or on its people. It is safe to say, however, that Sistan and Baluchestan lags behind the rest of the country in terms of poverty, life expectancy, and infant mortality.6 Some Baluch claim that this is due to the fact that they are Sunni Muslims in a majority Shia Iran. Other complaints are about the exclusion from “economic, political, administrative, military and cultural affairs in their homeland.”7 According to estimates, around the same number of ethnic Baluch lives in Afghanistan, with the majority living in Helmand, Nimruz, and Farrah.8 Lately, the Pakistani province of Baluchistan has been attracting attention due to its poor human rights record, forced disappearances, and violent insurgencies. Government reforms introduced in 2009 and 2011 with the aim of improving human rights have not met with success. 2. History At the time of the British Empire in South Asia there were many princely districts in Baluchistan over which the British had varied levels of suzerainty. In 1884, Baluchistan was annexed by the British in order to establish a buffer zone between the British and the Russian empires and to “secure safe transit routes to Afghanistan.”9 Fair (2012:3) further writes that 3 Ibid. 4 UNHCR (2014). 5 Fair, 2012:3. 6 Zurutuza (16/05/2011). 7 Ibid. 8 Baluch (27/03/2013). 9 Khan, 2009. 2 “contrary to the claims of some contemporary Baluch nationalists, there was no historically stable, “autonomous” Baluch kingdom per se that covered the expanse of today’s Baluchistan.”10 However, under Nasir Khan, the sixth Khan (leader) of Qalat, most of the major Baluch tribes were organized under one military and administrative system in the mid 18th Century. Following his death the tribes again assumed power and control.11 The Khan (leader) of Kalat had promised the British safe passage through Baluchistan. An attack on the British eventually provided them with a reason to seize the region. The western part of the territory (now Sistan-o-Baluchistan Province) was given to Iran and the northern part to Afghanistan. One part of the remaining area became “British Baluchistan,” and the rest was divided into the Khanate of Kalat and three principalities.12 At the time of partition in 1947, the princely states were forced to choose to join either India or Pakistan. ‘British Baluchistan’ joined Pakistan although many Baluch leaders were not in favour of an independent Pakistan. The Khan of Kalat wanted independence, which he declared one day after Pakistan became independent. However, the Khanate was subsequently annexed by Pakistan which is the foundation for some Baluch claiming that Pakistan is an occupying force (all Fair, 2012:4). This protest against the perceived annexation by Pakistan was called the first insurgency. The 1955 ‘One United Scheme’ abolished all provinces in West Pakistan in an attempt to counterbalance the ethnically homogenous and politically powerful Bengalis of East Pakistan. The scheme was met by resistance among the Baluch.13 As a reaction to the scheme, the second insurgency lasted until around 1958 and was led by Nawab Nowroz Khan. 14 Contributing to the dissatisfaction was a dispute about royalties from natural gas in an area which was controlled by the Bugti tribe.15 In response to the resulting unrest the Pakistani military launched a campaign against the insurgents, capturing Nawab Khan and hanging some of his family members.16 Following the establishment of new military bases in Baluchistan by the Pakistan Army in order to better control the outbreaks, militants from the Mengal tribal area led by Sher Muhammad Bijrani Marri began a guerrilla campaign. The goal was to receive a share of the revenue generated from the Sui gas fields. The insurgency ended in 1969 with a ceasefire and the ‘One United Scheme’ was abolished by then President Yahya Khan. This also led to the recognition of Baluchistan as the fourth province of Pakistan in its current form. The fourth insurgency began following the discovery of weapons in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad. The Pakistani authorities claimed in 1973 that the weapons were meant to be transferred to the Baluch in Pakistan and abolished the elected provincial government in Baluchistan. Martial rule was imposed and around 55,000 Baluch guerrillas were opposed by 10 Fair (2012:3). 11 Khan, 2009, Harrison, 1981. 12 Khan, 2009, Harrison, 1981, Fair, 2012. 13 Khan, 2009; Fair, 2012. 14 Harrison, 1981. 15 Fair, 2012. 16 Harrison, 1981. 3 80,000 troops dispatched by the central government. Several thousands of soldiers, militants, and civilians died. After General Zia ul Haq toppled Bhutto’s government, he introduced several development projects in order to appease the population in Baluchistan. Among them were measures to enhance road construction, expansion of power transmission, and building small dams. Under Zia it was also ensured that despite the discovery of gas deposits in Baluchistan around four decades earlier, Quetta received Sui gas for the first time.17 The army operations only ceased in 1978. The dates of the different insurgencies are disputed. While some argue that the most recent insurgency began in 2004, Fair (2012) sees the beginning already in 1999, when Musharraf seized power and announced the development of Gwadar port and established two army cantonments in Baluchistan. Rashid (2014) claims the fifth insurgency began in 2003 ‘with small guerrilla attacks by autonomy-seeking Baluch groups who over the years have become increasingly militant and separatist in ideology.’18 The current, ongoing insurgency has seen a shift from attacks predominantly against Pakistani military to violence against non-Baluch living in Baluchistan in an attempt to counter what is felt as domination by foreigners.19 The Pakistani security forces are responding by targeting Baluch leaders and either killing or abducting them, which, in turn, leads to more young Baluch taking up arms.20 Grare quotes surveys that indicate that only a minority of Baluch favour independence despite the intractable situation.21 3. Natural Resources Baluchistan is Pakistan’s largest province and at the same time the least developed. While it is resource-rich, hardly any of the royalties stay in Baluchistan. One of the main disputes between the Baluch and the central government is thus about the profits from exploitation of the natural resources in Baluchistan. The major contested projects are the Saindak or Sandak copper mine and the Gwadar/Gwador Port development, both developed by Chinese companies.
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