Cambodia Country Report BTI 2018

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Cambodia Country Report BTI 2018 BTI 2018 Country Report Cambodia This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2018. It covers the period from February 1, 2015 to January 31, 2017. The BTI assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of political management in 129 countries. More on the BTI at http://www.bti-project.org. Please cite as follows: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Cambodia. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Contact Bertelsmann Stiftung Carl-Bertelsmann-Strasse 256 33111 Gütersloh Germany Sabine Donner Phone +49 5241 81 81501 [email protected] Hauke Hartmann Phone +49 5241 81 81389 [email protected] Robert Schwarz Phone +49 5241 81 81402 [email protected] Sabine Steinkamp Phone +49 5241 81 81507 [email protected] BTI 2018 | Cambodia 3 Key Indicators Population M 15.8 HDI 0.563 GDP p.c., PPP $ 3736 Pop. growth1 % p.a. 1.6 HDI rank of 188 143 Gini Index - Life expectancy years 68.5 UN Education Index 0.493 Poverty3 % - Urban population % 20.9 Gender inequality2 0.479 Aid per capita $ 43.6 Sources (as of October 2017): The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2017 | UNDP, Human Development Report 2016. Footnotes: (1) Average annual growth rate. (2) Gender Inequality Index (GII). (3) Percentage of population living on less than $3.20 a day at 2011 international prices. Executive Summary Between 2015 and 2017, the government drastically increased repressive measures against critics of the government. The murder of prominent dissident Kem Ley in July 2016 was the most prominent example of numerous efforts widely perceived to be an attempt to frighten political opponents. In reaction to the increasing popularity of the main opposition party Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), its president Sam Rainsy was sentenced in absentia to perennial imprisonment and later de facto exiled by the government. Moreover, his deputy Kem Sokha was forced to live in self-imposed house arrest for half a year in order to avoid detention – despite enjoying parliamentary immunity. At the time of writing, two opposition lawmakers and more than a dozen lower-level CNRP politicians and followers have been imprisoned by the regime, serving jail terms up to twenty years. Prime Minister Hun Sen seems to be willing to pull out all the stops to remain in power. By succeeding the late Chea Sim as party president in 2015, he strengthened his grip on the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). In addition, several newly adopted laws put the regime in the position to easily take legal action against any unfriendly civil society organization and other (potential) critics. With the exception of increased legal persecution and physical violence against political rivals, the management of the public sector remained largely unchanged. Weak law enforcement, rampant corruption, and red tape are still core characteristics at most administrative levels. International cooperation was shaped by further intensification of political and economic relations to the People’s Republic of China. With ongoing lobbying for Chinese interests, mainly in relation to Beijing’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, Cambodia’s role within the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) is widely unchanged, but without particular strains on bilateral relations with other member states so far. After generating extensive growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for years, the government reaped the rewards of reclassification to “lower middle-income country” status by the World Bank in 2016. Despite this success and effective poverty reduction in the last two and a half decades, BTI 2018 | Cambodia 4 the overall sustainability of the economic recovery has to be questioned. Whereas the growth has been fueled by over-exploitation of Cambodia’s natural resources for many years, the pillars of the economy face more and more challenges. In particular, the rice sector came under increased pressure due to reduced competitiveness compared to neighboring countries. The risks of a real estate bubble in Phnom Penh increased, while growth in tourism declined. Impediments to further industrialization remain considerably high due to the lack of a skilled workforce, high energy costs and grave deficits in logistics. At the very least, the yearly minimum wage increases in the apparel industry have not reduced the attractiveness of Cambodia as a manufacturing base for shoes and textiles. History and Characteristics of Transformation Following the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) cleared the way for the country’s first multiparty national elections. Elections for the National Assembly were held in 1993. Although the royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) defeated the post- socialist Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the latter party threatened to lead three provinces in secession should the CPP be excluded from government. Finally, the rivals agreed to create a coalition government with two prime ministers Prince Norodom Ranariddh (FUNCINPEC) and Hun Sen (CPP). The coalition government was unstable from the beginning. In 1997, Ranariddh was ousted by de facto CPP leader Hun Sen in a bloody military coup. Cambodia’s accession to ASEAN was postponed following massive international criticism of Cambodian politics and external donors’ pressure on the government to allow a return of pluralism. Parliamentary elections in 1998 resulted in another CPP and FUNCINPEC coalition government. Some stability was achieved after that year’s official dissolution of the Khmer Rouge, but the elections were again preceded by systematic and widespread political intimidation and violence by the CPP. The Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), led by the eponymous former finance minister, emerged as a new opposition force despite attempts to keep SRP from equal participation in the vote. With Hun Sen as sole prime minister following the elections, the CPP developed into the country’s strongest political force, a trend that continued throughout the 2000s as Hun Sen has taken broad control over the ruling party, security apparatus, civil service, all TV stations, almost all radio stations, major newspapers, electoral administration and the judiciary. His CPP remains the largest party, with a firmly established patronage network. The 2012 Senate election, the commune elections of 2012 and the national elections of 2008 all resulted in landslide wins for the CPP. FUNCINPEC was weakened by internal fighting; in the latest elections, it won no seats. Sam Rainsy and some of his party members were stripped of parliamentary immunity in 2005 for the alleged defamation of Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh, subsequently fleeing the country until Rainsy was pardoned after publicly apologizing. In 2009, BTI 2018 | Cambodia 5 Sam Rainsy again lost his immunity and fled to self-imposed exile in France after being sentenced to 12 years in prison. To challenge the ruling party more efficiently, the SRP and the Human Rights Party (HRP) combined their limited forces and formed the new Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) in 2012. While many observers doubted that the 2013 National Assembly elections would result in any significant changes, the CNRP – supported by countless young followers in an unprecedented election campaign that climaxed with the return of opposition leader Sam Rainsy from exile nine days before the vote – emerged as a strong competitor of the ruling party and captured 55 out of 123 seats in parliament. Many national and international observers agreed that Hun Sen’s thin victory was dependent on unfair voting conditions, primarily because tens of thousands of opposition supporters were unable to cast their ballots. The CNRP subsequently boycotted parliament for nearly a year, taking its seats only after wresting several concessions. After the short-lived rapprochement of Hun Sen and Sam Rainsy, political tensions quickly raised again. Government-initiated repression was mainly aimed at the CNRP, but were also directed at other critics of the regime in general. Since November 2015, Sam Rainsy has lived abroad to avoid imprisonment whereas more than a dozen CNRP activists were put in jail. With the murder of prominent dissident Kem Ley in 2016, the regime once more raised the stakes in its struggle to stay in power in times of declining popularity. The process of economic liberalization has been underway since before political transformation accelerated in the late 1990s, with significant progress made in recent years. Despite a serious setback due to the effects of the global financial crisis in 2009, annual growth rates have been consistently above 5% since 1991, and have fluctuated around 7% since 2010. During the past five years, the most positive development has been the successful implementation of fiscal and monetary-policy reforms. However, massive social inequalities and the country’s large number of people living in poverty pose a serious challenge to the sustainability of economic growth. Significant reforms such as welfare-system improvements and poverty-reduction policies need to be implemented in order to increase the efficiency and sustainability of economic development. BTI 2018 | Cambodia 6 The BTI combines text analysis and numerical assessments. The score for each question
Recommended publications
  • Human Rights 2016: the Year in Review
    CCAMBODIANAMBODIAN L LEAGUEEAGUE FOR FOR THE THE PPROMOTIONROMOTION AND AND D DEFENSEEFENSE OF OF HHUMANUMAN R RIGHTSIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS 2016: THE YEAR IN REVIEW A report issued in February 2017 HUMAN RIGHTS 2016: The Year in Review A report issued in February 2017 LICADHO CAMBODIAN LEAGUE FOR THE PROMOTION AND DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CAMBODIAN LEAGUE FOR THE PROMOTION AND DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (LICADHO) LICADHO is a national Cambodian human rights organization. Since its establishment in 1992, LICADHO has been at the forefront of efforts to protect civil, political, economic and social rights in Cambodia and to promote the respect of these rights by the Cambodian government and other state and non-state institutions. LICADHO continues to monitor and investigate human rights abuses and to advocate for the rights of the Cambodian people from its Phnom Penh headquarters and 13 provincial offices. MONITORING & PROTECTION PROMOTION & ADVOCACY Monitoring of State Violations & Women’s and Children’s Rights: Monitors investigate human rights violations perpetrated by the state and violations made against women and children. Victims Supporting Unions & Grassroots Groups are provided assistance through interventions with local authorities and and Networks: court officials. Unions, grassroots groups and affected communities are provided with protection and legal services, as well as technical support which Medical Assistance & Social Work: enhances their capacity to campaign and advocate for their own human A medical team provides assistance to prisoners and prison officials, vic- rights. tims of human rights violations, human rights defenders and families in resettlement sites. Social workers conduct needs assessments of victims and their families and provide short-term material and food assistance.
    [Show full text]
  • CAMBODIA: GETTING AWAY with AUTHORITARIANISM? Duncan Mccargo
    CAMBODIA: GETTING AWAY WITH AUTHORITARIANISM? Duncan McCargo Duncan McCargo is professor of Southeast Asian politics at the Uni- versity of Leeds. His latest book is The Thaksinization of Thailand (with Ukrist Pathmanand, 2005). His essay “Democracy Under Stress in Thaksin’s Thailand” appeared in the October 2002 issue of the Journal of Democracy. What if a country holds an election but it proves not to matter? Cam- bodians voted nationwide in July 2003, only to see their polity’s three main political parties take almost a year to form a new administration. The long-ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) of Prime Minister Hun Sen won 47.4 percent of the popular vote but gained 59.3 percent of the seats in the National Assembly thanks to Cambodia’s unusual “highest- average” system of proportional voting, which favors large parties.1 The CPP’s two main rivals, the nominally royalist formation known by its French acronym of FUNCINPEC and the populist opposition Sam Rainsy Party (or SRP, named for its founder and leading personality) each won around about a fifth of the total vote and a similar share of seats in the 123-member National Assembly (the actual seat totals were 73 for the CPP, 26 for FUNCINPEC, and 24 for the SRP). Since Cambodia’s 1993 constitution stipulates that a two-thirds par- liamentary majority is needed to form a government, the parties had to bargain in the election’s wake. Bargain they did, for 11 long months. All during this time Cambodia had no properly constituted govern- ment, but little changed.
    [Show full text]
  • Activities on the 2017 Elections Commune Sangkat
    Committee For Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL) #138, Str 122 Teuk Laak 1, Toulkork, Phnom Penh xumE®hVl Box: 1145 COMFREL Tel: 023 884 150 Fax:023 885 745 Email [email protected], [email protected] Website www.comfrel.org Final Assessment and Report on the 2017 Commune Council Elections Contents Acronyms ................................................................................................................................................ 4 Foreword ................................................................................................................................................. 7 1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 8 2. Executive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 9 2.1. Principal Findings .......................................................................................................................... 9 2.2 What Others Say ........................................................................................................................... 17 2.3 Overall Assessment ...................................................................................................................... 19 3. Political Environment ......................................................................................................................... 19 3.1 Unilateral legislative changes contrary
    [Show full text]
  • 07 Raimund Weiß 3교OK.Indd
    Asian Journal of Peacebuilding Vol. 8 No. 1 (2020): 113-131 doi: 10.18588/202005.00a069 Research Article Peacebuilding, Democratization, and Political Reconciliation in Cambodia Raimund Weiß This research article explains why Cambodia’s dual transition of peacebuilding and democratization after the civil war led to peace but not democracy. The research finds that democratization often threatened peacebuilding in Cambodia. Particularly elections led to political instability, mass protests, and renewed violence, and thus also blocked reforms to democratize Cambodia’s government institutions. By applying the war-to-democracy transition theory and theories of political reconciliation to Cambodia’s dual transition, the following research article finds that a lack of political reconciliation between Cambodia’s former civil war parties is the main reason why the dual transition failed. This article argues that peace-building and democratization are only complementary processes in post-civil war states when preceded by political reconciliation between the former civil war parties. Keywords ‌‌Cambodia, dual transition, peacebuilding, democratization, war-to-democracy transition theory Introduction The year 2020 marks almost thirty years of peacebuilding in Cambodia. The country appears to have overcome the violence and destruction of two civil wars and the totalitarian Pol Pot regime. Cambodia experiences the longest-lasting peace since gaining independence from France in 1953. But despite this progress, peacebuilding in Cambodia did not lead to the consolidation of liberal multiparty democracy as foreseen in the Paris Peace Accords. In July 2018, Cambodia held the sixth national election since the end of the civil war. The incumbent Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) under Prime Minister Hun Sen won for the first time all 125 seats of Cambodia’s National Assembly.
    [Show full text]
  • Cambodian Crackdown on „Culprits‟ Targets Hun Sen‟S Opponents RFA, 2017-01-31
    Cambodian Crackdown on „Culprits‟ Targets Hun Sen‟s Opponents RFA, 2017-01-31 Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen addresses at the National Assembly, Jan. 31, 2017. Photo courtesy of the National Assembly Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen is stepping up the pressure on his chief political rival as he pushes the National Assembly to approve legislation preventing so-called ―culprits‖ from heading a political party. ―It is necessary that we amend the Law on Political Parties by stipulating clearly that any individual with culprit status shall not be entitled to serve as president or vice-president of any political party,‖ he said in a floor speech at the National Assembly on Tuesday. ―I request that the National Assembly add this [clause] to strip them off their rights,‖ he added. The change would remove Sam Rainsy from the top post of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) because he has been convicted in several court cases brought by members of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) led by Hun Sen. Cambodian courts are notorious for their lack of independence and are often used by the ruling party to punish dissidents and opposition party officials. Hun Sen is likely to prevail in the legislature as the ruling party has enough votes to amend the Law on Political Parties because it requires only a bare majority to succeed. This means Hun Sen has to get the votes of 63 lawmakers, and the ruling party holds 68 seats. Hun Sen is also targeting property held by the CNRP lawmaker. Opposition party headquarters targeted Hun Sen told the National Assembly that he wants to confiscate the CNRP’s headquarters as a way of enforcing a judgement against Sam Rainsy in a lawsuit he has yet to win.
    [Show full text]
  • Download.Html; Zsombor Peter, Loss of Forest in Cambodia Among Worst in the World, Cambodia Daily, Nov
    CAMBODIA LAW AND POLICY JOURNAL 2013-2014 CHY TERITH Editor-in-Chief, Khmer-language ANNE HEINDEL Editor-in-Chief, English-language CHARLES JACKSON SHANNON MAREE TORRENS Editorial Advisors LIM CHEYTOATH SOKVISAL KIMSROY Articles Editors, Khmer-language LIM CHEYTOATH SOPHEAK PHEANA SAY SOLYDA PECHET MEN Translators HEATHER ANDERSON RACHEL KILLEAN Articles Editor, English-language YOUK CHHANG, Director, Documentation Center of Cambodia JOHN CIORCIARI, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, Michigan University RANDLE DEFALCO, Articling Student-at-Law at the Hamilton Crown Attorney’s Office, LL.M, University of Toronto JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, Associate Professor, Temple University Beasley School of Law PEOUDARA VANTHAN, Deputy Director Documentation Center of Cambodia Advisory Board ISSN 2408-9540 Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors only. Copyright © 2014 by the Documentation Center of Cambodia. All rights reserved. No part of this journal may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Cambodia Law and PoLiCY JoURnaL Eternal (2013). Painting by Asasax The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) is pleased to an- design, which will house a museum, research center, and a graduate nounce Cambodia’s first bi-annual academic journal published in English studies program. The Cambodia Law and Policy Journal, part of the and Khmer: The Cambodia Law and Policy Journal (CLPJ). DC-Cam Center’s Witnessing Justice Project, will be the Institute’s core academic strongly believes that empowering Cambodians to make informed publication.
    [Show full text]
  • Un Archives Series Box ; ( 2..,3
    PEOPL-e-.s 'JZ ePL> 6 \...,\ c_ UN ARCHIVES SERIES BOX ; ( 2..,3 • UNITED NATIONS AS General Assembly Distr. Security Council GENERAL A/48/621 S/26771 19 November 1993 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: FRENCH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECURITY COUNCIL Forty-eighth session Forty-eighth year Agenda item 79 REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Letter dated 18 November 1993 from the Permanent Representatives of Cambodia and the Lao People"s Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General We have the honour to transmit to you herewith a joint Lao-Cambodian communique dated 7 November 1993, signed at Phnom Penh by His Excellency Khamtay Siphandone, Prime Minister of the Government of the Lao People"s Democratic Republic, and His Royal Highness Sdech Krom Luong Norodom Ranariddh, First President of the Council of Ministers, and His Excellency Mr. Hun Sen, Second President of the Council of Ministers of the Royal Government of Cambodia (see annex). We would be grateful if you would arrange for the text of this letter and its annex to be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda i tem 79 and of the Security Council. (Signed) Alounkeo KITTIKHOUN (Signed) Sisowath SIRIRATH Ambassador Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Permanent Representative Lao People"s Democratic Republic of the Kingdom of Cambodia 93-64893 (E) 221193 221193 I ..• A/48/621 S/26771 English Page 2 ANNEX Joint Lao-Cambodian Communique dated 7 November 1993, signed at Phnom Penh by the Prime Minister of the Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the First and Second Presidents of the Council of Ministers of the Government of Cambodia 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Paris Peace Treaty Cambodia
    Paris Peace Treaty Cambodia Two-timing and polycarpic Ethan appreciated while cymoid Rocky caucuses her partial rumblingly and juxtaposing dichotomously. Vacillant Sheff discounts, his gentles disappear outbargains pontifically. Never-never and blotchy Witold often deoxidising some bake glowingly or peptonising ought. Kr and paris peace talks were simply be marked maps, paris peace treaty cambodia and displaced persons duly elected through public holidays around its leader in europe. Add your comment by filling out the form that in update text. These rights would include, which would then wither on the vine. Cambodians from the Thai border were successfully repatriated; the path was cleared for Cambodia to assume its rightful place in the community of nations; and reconstruction could at last begin. Blueprint for election to ensure that today in more attention will endeavour to strengthen and paris peace treaty on his criminal court for national assembly as well as president carter began. Vietnamese and paris peace treaty cambodia, tu blog no credible evidence of use our partner equitable cambodia as the. CSOs are supposed to be politically neutral even when they take part in dialogue forums related to political processes. Germany and to her to phnom penh municipal deputy permanent five announced that all registered voters and working in paris peace treaty cambodia, and hostility between government was prepared by consensus achieved. Education programme in the treaty on many innocent people and the united nations declaring that paris peace treaty cambodia. Paris peace plan to the status quoin favor of this election to read about the. November based on for a strong resolution to further escalation of this included the signatories undertake to take concrete steps to the military.
    [Show full text]
  • Das Ist Headline in NL HUE 1
    NEWSLE TTER KAS HAUPTABTEILUNG INTERNATIONALE ZUSAM MENARBEIT Newsletter: 1st – 31th December 2016 79TH EDITION DECEMBER 2016 A SELECTION OF THE LATEST LOCAL NEWS IN CAMBODIA ROBERT HÖR Royal Pardon for Kem Sokha. Adhoc Officials still not released VIOLA REMMEL MIRIAM SPENGLER A series of recordings with conversations between Cambodia`s National Rescue Party president Kem Sokha and his alleged mistress, 25-year-old manicurist Khom Chandaraty, appeared on the internet by an anonymous Content source earlier this year, causing a “sex-scandal”. After repeatedly refus- ing to appear before the court to answer questions about a “prostitution” Page 1 charge related to his alleged affair, Mr. Sokha had been sentenced to five Royal Pardon for Kem Sokha. months in prison in September. Also four Adhoc rights group workers, the Adhoc Officials still not re- National Election Committee’s leased Deputy Secretary-General Ny Page 2 Chakrya and commune chief Philippine leader visits King- dom Seang Chet have been ar- Page 3 rested since late April, after 5 more years of jail for Sam being accused of bribing the Rainsy alleged mistress to deny an Page 5 affair. During a questioning Internet: The most important by the police and the court, source of information in they defended themselves, Cambodia saying it was only an offer of Page 6 financial support. Ms. Chan- Senior Adhoc officers Ny Sokha, left, and Yi Soksan Government presents first daraty denied first being the are escorted into the Court of Appeal for a Novem- offical anti-drug campaign ber hearing in Phnom Penh. woman in the audio files and Page 7 New Traffic Law released: No receiving money from the rights group, but later on changed her state- licence for Small-Engine- ment, confessing an affair.
    [Show full text]
  • Delegate Pack
    Delegate Pack Against the unprecedented backdrop of a global pandemic, Liberal International has move its congress online. Recognising the enormous challenges - logistical, political, and financial - faced by the global federation in these times, the bureau has approved a proposal to be presented to the executive committee and then, if successful, to the congress requesting an extension of the LI statutory deadlines by twelve months, providing enough time to plan for a full congress, whether in-person, hybrid, or online. Together with the other essential business of the executive committee and congress, this virtual meeting on Tuesday 20th October will hear the results of the online voting and a report back from the president and secretariat. Yet while these administrative challenges have been planned for the bureau and secretariat didn’t want to stop there. From policy labs, online debates, to campaign launches, the LI secretariat has prepared a broad and appealing range of political activity especially for this online congress. You can read more about the panels, people and politics that make up this exciting programme of events in this guide. Offering fresh insights in to the most important political issues affecting liberalism today, from COVID-19 to the US elections, LI has brought together prominent parliamentarians, internationally acclaimed authors, business leaders, and journalists over the course of a three week congress period. Over 40 international guests spanning 15 events are set to engage our global membership. Our human rights and climate justice committees will hold dedicated events as will the LI fair trade working group. Every region of the world will be represented with at least one debate set to take place in French and Spanish.
    [Show full text]
  • Grave Violations of Human Rights on Cambodia
    GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON CAMBODIA NATIONAL RESCUE PARTY Torture and Death- the case of Tith Rorn 38-year-old Tith Rorn died on 18 April in Kompong Cham prison after his arrest on 15 April. https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/officials- respond-kampong-cham-prison-death According to Eam Tieat, Tith Rorn’s father, 3 commune police officers came to his home on 15 April and took Tith Rorn away without an arrest warrant. In the evening of 18 April, a neighbor came to inform the father that his son had died in prison. He should go to the provincial prison to fetch the body. In the morning of 19 April, the father went to the prison and found his son’s body. He was allowed to bring the body home for proper funeral arrangements. The authorities covered the cost of the ambulance and part of the funeral arrangements. Police told him that his son had epileptic seizures three or four times a day when in detention. He categorically rejected it as his son had no history of epilepsy. On 30 April the father made an appeal, recoded on video , to Prof. Rhona Smith - the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights to bring justice to his son. The video is widely circulated on Facebook. A video of the body when returned home, shows that the neck was broken, the right eye severely bruised and suspicious marks on his back. This video is also widely circulating on Facebook. According to the police report on 30 April, Kompong Cham prosecutor ordered an investigation of the death on 29 April.
    [Show full text]
  • Armed Conflicts Report - Cambodia
    Armed Conflicts Report - Cambodia Armed Conflicts Report Cambodia (1978 - first combat deaths) Almost a decade after the 1991 Paris Peace Accords mapped out a peace process for Cambodia, the country has been removed from the list of armed conflicts because both years 2000 and 1999 saw fewer than 25 deaths arising from political conflict. The recent disbandment of the Khmer Rouge and a beginning to demobilization of government troops reinforced the relative peace. Summary Type of Conflict Parties to the Conflict Status of the Fighting Number of Deaths Political Developments Background Arms Sources Summary: 1999 After final defections to the government, the Khmer Rouge ceased to be a military threat. Extrajudicial killings by the police and military continued, but there were no reports of politically- motivated killings. 1998 Following a February ceasefire between forces loyal to Prince Ranariddh and the government, armed clashes largely arose from government pursuit of the remnants of Khmer Rouge troops in northern Cambodia. Several villagers died in Khmer Rouge attacks, but most of the more than 70 civilian deaths in 1998 were attributed to political killings by government forces, and to violence before and after July elections. 1997 After months of escalating political tension and violence, government forces loyal to Asecond@ Prime Minister Hun Sen staged a July coup that ousted Afirst@ Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh and executed leaders of his royalist troops. Despite mass defections and internal divisions that resulted in the execution of a former defence minister and the reported imprisonment of leader Pol Pot, Khmer Rouge guerrillas continued extrajudicial killings and, after July, cooperated with royalists in fighting government troops.
    [Show full text]