Cambodia and Major Powers 173 CHAPTER 10 – Conclusion 199
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Table of Content EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 CHAPTER 1 – Civil and Political Rights 5 PART 1: Repression of Political Opposition 6 PART 2: Persecution of the Memorialization of Kem Ley 24 PART 3: LANGO and CSO Freedom 28 CHAPTER 2 – Media and Press Freedoms 40 PART 1: The Media Landscape 44 PART 2: Laws and Policies 48 PART 3: Criminalization of Press and Journalism 58 CHAPTER 3 – Labor Rights and Politics 71 PART 1: Key Policy Issues for Labor 72 PART 2: Trade Union Law 75 PART 3: The Tripartite National Council on Minimum Wage 80 PART 4: Right to Strike 84 PART 5: Status of Legal Prosecution of Unionists 97 PART 6: International Brands and Labor Associations 103 PART 7: Remedying Violence Against Unionists – Remembering Chea Vichea 106 CHAPTER 4 – The Legislative Branch 108 CHAPTER 5 – The Judicial Branch 118 PART 1: Lack of Justice 120 PART 2: Legal Reform 124 PART 3: Legal Aid 130 CHAPTER 6 – The Executive Branch 135 CHAPTER 7 – Democratic Elections 148 PART 1: 2019 Sub-national Elections 148 PART 2: 2019 Voter Registration 155 CHAPTER 8 – The EU and EBA Status 158 CHAPTER 9 – Cambodia and Major Powers 173 CHAPTER 10 – Conclusion 199 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Democracy in Cambodia was assessed on how to decline in 2019. The ruling party consolidated its hegemony over the political system, and there were no significant improvements in liberal pluralism. As outlined in this report, important reforms occurred in different areas; however, reforms were not sufficient in any areas to meet the standards of an established democratic system. Improvements were made to laws, but there are still significant problems with existing legislation. Moreover, Cambodian politics has long been characterized by the disjuncture between laws and their implementation. As such, there is not a solid basis for an expectation that the reforms will endure in the long-term. The massive surveillance and detention of former members of the opposition party demonstrate that dissent is has become progressively less tolerated What is more, the discourse on internal enemies and the threat of a ‘coup’ show how with the transition from competitive authoritarianism to a hegemonic party system, the Cambodian state shows increasingly totalitarian tendencies. It conclusively demonstrates that if any real popular challenge arose to ruling party domination, then the state would quickly turn to the tactic of large-scale violence. The security services remain wholly loyal to and controlled by the ruling party, and the PM has increased the centralization of power in his person. In the area of civil and political rights, intimidation and a sense of insecurity of the public has amply expanded, following several months of massive arrests and proclamations that anyone supporting the opposition would be arrested and the Cambodian people no longer able to express support for a political party based on free choice or express their sentiments in public space. The right to assembly has been for some time violated (since 2017), and it continues to be and continues to be violated, as public gatherings are generally banned. In terms of respect for political rights, Cambodia has declined to the lowest level in the post-UNTAC period. Personal security of an individual is violated on the basis of public participation and expression, result in a climate of fear. The basis of regime legitimacy is economic growth, which has been significantly aided by the services and advisory support of a vast number of IOs, INGOs, and NGOs. However, because of low capacity, corruption and nepotism, and a high level of impunity, the benefits of economic growth have not effectively distributed to the majority of the population. The resulting tensions will become increasingly evident as Cambodia 1|Page transitions to a middle-income country. Multiple smaller opposition parties have not shown any real capacity to muster popular support, and have dedicated at least some of their efforts to criticizing the former major opposition party. The institutional mechanism for minor party competition, the Supreme Consultative Council (formed after the transition to a one-party state in 2018) has enabled a modicum of debate over policies but shown no real capacity to critically engage the government on issues such as the concentration of power in the executive, corruption, or the militarization of public space under pretenses of responding to threats to national security. As for the former opposition party, its members were subjected to increased levels of intimidation, detention, and violence not seen since the 1993 election, where the ruling party lost the vote but refused to concede power. Fragmentation of the former opposition party has increased. Following mass repression and the failure of mass solidarity around the return of CNRP leaders living in exile, it appears to have lost its potency for political impact. Although media freedom exceeds that of neighboring states such as Vietnam and Thailand, it is normal practice for online commentary and press coverage to be criminalized. Most evident, critical commentary of the PM and high ranking officials is treated as ‘incitement’ and criminal ‘insult’ by both the police and the courts. Journalists continue to face threats, especially when covering illegal or abusive natural resource extraction and corruption. Complaints leading to defamation charges are also common. Although the press law sets out protections for journalists, they are often prosecuted under the criminal code. At the same time, even though the PM and Minister of Information have exhorted freedom of the press to make critical commentary or coverage of the government, they have made it clear that only ‘constructive’ criticism will be tolerated, with the decision as to what meets that criteria residing in the person of the PM and the courts which are controlled by the executive. In terms of labor rights, unionists and workers continue to face repression and threats of legal harassment, and demonstrations and strikes are still frequently criminalized. Reforms to the Trade Union Law have found to be insufficient to protect worker’s rights to association. Additionally, workers continue to face a litany of problems ranging from poor working conditions, lack of access to healthcare, lack of implementation of existing laws related to salary (or bonuses, and severance pay). Child labor continues to be a major problem in the informal economy and persists in certain sectors of industry. There has not been significant progress addressing gender discrimination and violence against women in the 2|Page workplace. Alarmingly, there are some indications that despite increased rhetoric to resolve the issue, that rates of human trafficking have increased. There has been no policy initiative advanced to provide suffrage for migrants living abroad. The legislative branch does still not function to ensure oversight of the executive. It has become a forum for cultivating clientelism in support of the executive. Decisions on the process and content of legislation have almost entirely shifted to the Council of Ministers which is under the strict supervisory direction of the PM. Given that the public has little choice in parliamentary elections (as existing opposition parties lack public trust, capacity, and resources), polls for the parliament are more a way for the ruling party to manage promotions and oversight over intra-party loyalty through the administration of the party list. The judicial branch has been essential to the deployment of ‘lawfare’ which has ushered the transition from competitive authoritarianism to a hegemonic party system. Politically motivated cases are typical, and prosecutions often proceed and lead to convictions without any actual basis in a due process such as convincing evidence. Moreover, it is very common that pre-trial detention be used to incarcerate the accused for long periods of time (months or even years) without an actual conviction. Often charges that were issued years earlier taken up by the courts in prosecutions at a later date. This allows the judiciary to serve as a constant threat and tool for long-term intimidation to those who are alleged to have committed crimes even if there was no basis for the accusations. Lastly, despite frequent declarations of judicial independence, the courts are clearly under the control of the executive who uses them at will as a mechanism to punish critics and opposition political figures. The areas where the executive branch continues to be most capable of good governance pertain to macroeconomic management, such as budgeting, avoiding excessive borrowing, and tax collection. The executive has shown no disposition to real substantial reforms that would support a separation of powers or an increase in liberal pluralism. Essential reforms that did occur in 2019 were almost certainly made out of an attempt to appease the EU and prevent the loss of EBA trade status. There is an overlap between the government, the ruling party, and the military, which is evident in military rule systems. The security services continue to operate most effectively as a tool to eliminate criticism and political competition, rather than support for the rule of law. As a result, public trust in the security services remains low, and fear remains high. The areas where the executive continues to fall far below the standards of established democrat 3|Page government are high levels of impunity, urban development planning, corruption, agricultural development, and natural resource management. The quality of Cambodian elections continues to decline. The 2019 poll was predictable given that sub-national administrations were selected by an electorate composed entirely of the ruling party local-level officials. As such, elections in Cambodia have taken on a ritualistic character to provide a hue of democracy to an otherwise authoritarian political system. Advances made with the voter list and voter registration procedure following the 2013 national elections, for the most part, continue to be in place.