Canadian Military History Volume 21 Issue 3 Article 3 2015 “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944 R. Daniel Pellerin Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation R. Daniel Pellerin "“You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944." Canadian Military History 21, 3 (2015) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944 “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944 R. Daniel Pellerin n 4 September 1944 British Histories of the battle have troops, with the help of the Abstract: This paper examines usually offered a brief chronology of O Canadian counter-battery work during Belgian resistance, captured the port events without providing much detail Operation Switchback, the battle of Antwerp intact. It was one of the to clear the Breskens Pocket, from into the Canadians’ preparations or largest and most important ports 6 October to 3 November 1944 the battle’s aftermath. For decades, in Western Europe, but it lay at the during the Battle of the Scheldt. The the definitive account of Canadian end of the Scheldt Estuary whose Canadians achieved some success operations in Northwest Europe at isolating hostile batteries in the 50-kilometre length was controlled pocket, but predicted shooting was has been C.P. Stacey’s official army by the Germans. It was essential that too inaccurate to permanently silence history The Victory Campaign. In his the port be opened to shipping as them. In the planning stage, the treatment of the Scheldt battle, Stacey quickly as possible since the Allies Canadians had little knowledge of the emphasized strategic issues, and, in were facing a logistical crisis. Most Germans’ strength and dispositions particular, criticized Montgomery’s behind their defences north of the supplies still came over the original Leopold Canal. Throughout the failure to give the opening of Antwerp 2 D-Day beaches and had to be trucked battle, those involved in locating sufficient attention. Subsequent to the front, a distance of nearly 500 hostile batteries strove to overcome studies of the Battle of the Scheldt kilometres. The use of a large port challenges posed by the weather tended to focus on Operation was critical to the success of future and terrain. Operational research Infatuate, the capture of Walcheren conducted after the battle revealed operations. that predicted fire dispersed shells Island on the north shore of the From 13 September, while over an excessively large area, mostly Scheldt Estuary. In the three decades the British prepared for a narrow because of human error. Ultimately, following the war, the historiography armoured and airborne thrust the evidence challenges the idea of the clearing of the Breskens Pocket through the Netherlands (Operation that the Allies won the Second World hardly went beyond Stacey’s official War by the “brute force” use of their 3 Market Garden), First Canadian superior artillery and air assets rather history. Army’s task was to clear the Scheldt than through skill and ingenuity. Stacey credited the Canadians’ Estuary. Operation Switchback was victory, at least in part, to their the battle to capture the “Breskens flooding programme presented generous artillery support and Pocket,” a virtual island bordered by serious obstacles. In addition to an the infantry’s ability to call in the Scheldt River, the Leopold Canal, inundated section in the west, a wide concentrations of fire quickly and the Braakman Inlet, and the North flooded band in the south ran almost readily.4 This view is consistent Sea. About 33 kilometres east to west to the Braakman, leaving only an with John Ellis’ observation in his and 18 kilometres north to south, the eight-kilometre stretch of traversable book Brute Force that the Allies had pocket was mostly below sea level. land along the Leopold. The flooded an overwhelming advantage over The terrain was not conducive to areas were under anywhere from Germany and Japan in economic mobile warfare. The only high ground several inches to four or five feet capacity, which translated into was found southeast of Knocke, as of water. The soil had turned to numerical superiority in artillery, well as some sand dunes on the south mud, making the area impassable to armour, aircraft and ships. Yet shore of the Scheldt. Worse, a German vehicles.1 according to Ellis, instead of using Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2015 21, Number 3, Summer 2012, pp.17-34. 17 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 3 This air photo was taken on 6 October 1944, the first day of the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade attack across the Leopold Canal. It shows the sector assaulted by the Royal Montreal Regiment and the Regina Rifles. The effects of Canadian defensive artillery fire is evident, especially in Eede. The flooded ground north of the canal which affected movement is also visible. Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies Air Photo Collection 196/3047 & 3049 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/316 2 : “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944 Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2012 Mike by Map drawn these assets to achieve a quick and predicted artillery fire was not nearly anything but a “blunt instrument.” decisive victory, commanders of as accurate as previously thought.6 The methods used to identify and the Western Allies, anxious to avoid This article examines the locate hostile batteries were effective, heavy loss of life, “seemed unable to application of predicted fire as long as atmospheric conditions impose their will upon the enemy techniques – counter-battery (CB) and the terrain cooperated. That was except by slowly and persistently work – during Operation Switchback. very rarely the case during the battle. battering him to death with a blunt It builds on Copp’s books and While the Canadians were mostly instrument.”5 This “brute force” thesis challenges Ellis’ thesis in Brute Force. successful in identifying and locating was largely based on generalizations The clearing of the Breskens Pocket hostile batteries in the Breskens and oversimplifications, not a was not a return to the voluminous Pocket, predicted fire was seldom detailed analysis of operational barrages of the First World War. accurate enough to permanently documents. Stacey’s contention that Switchback was an example of the destroy them. Nevertheless, the the Canadians owed their victory at Allies’ use of artillery in a precise and fire was close enough that it often the Scheldt to the infantry’s ability economical fashion. The artillery plan suppressed the enemy batteries to request immediate artillery fire on for the operation was not designed during crucial periods in the battle. prearranged targets was not seriously to blanket the enemy with fire, but contested until the appearance of Terry to engage specific targets when The Plan for Copp’s Montgomery’s Scientists. This needed. The Allies’ employment Operation Switchback edited collection, which reproduced a of sophisticated CB techniques, series of operational research reports and the creation of an efficient he plan for Operation Switchback written during the war, showed that communications system necessary Tmade CB work difficult. Canadian shells were dispersed over for these techniques, suggests While the plan was ambitious, large areas, which indicated that that artillery in Switchback was imaginative and allowed for large- Published18 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015 3 Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 3 scale artillery support, intelligence October, Brigadier J.G. Spragge’s 7th would provide direct support of the greatly underestimated the German Canadian Infantry Brigade would attacking infantry.9 strength in the Breskens Pocket, attack a dry section of the German The element of surprise was and the terrain offered little hope defensive line north of Leopold Canal critical for the success of Operation of gathering further intelligence where it diverged from the Canal de Switchback. Simonds’ plan called for through observation. Because the plan Dérivation de la Lys. The 7th Brigade a “silent” policy for the days before the demanded surprise, it eliminated any would be followed later by Brigadier attack; there was to be no preliminary preliminary counter-bombardment. K.G. Blackader’s 8th Canadian CB fire or even any registration With limited knowledge of the Infantry Brigade. The second phase shoots.10 The only bombardment German gun positions, the Canadian of the plan called for Brigadier J.M. allowed prior to the attack was from counter-battery staff and associated Rockingham’s 9th Canadian Infantry 4th Division’s field guns, which units faced a challenging task. Brigade to cross the Braakman in were to continue harassing fire to Directing the battle was amphibious Landing Vehicles, the east of 7th Brigade’s crossing Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, Tracked (LVTs, or “Buffaloes”), and point as a diversion until H-Hour, who was temporarily in command land in a relatively undefended area set for 0530 hours on 6 October. A of First Canadian Army while near Hoofdplaat on 8 October. This one-hour bombardment was to begin Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar would force the Germans to fight on at H minus 120 minutes.