Canadian Military History

Volume 21 Issue 3 Article 3

2015

“You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944

R. Daniel Pellerin

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Recommended Citation R. Daniel Pellerin "“You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944." Canadian Military History 21, 3 (2015)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944 “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944

R. Daniel Pellerin

n 4 September 1944 British Histories of the battle have troops, with the help of the Abstract: This paper examines usually offered a brief chronology of O Canadian counter-battery work during Belgian resistance, captured the port events without providing much detail Operation Switchback, the battle of Antwerp intact. It was one of the to clear the Breskens Pocket, from into the Canadians’ preparations or largest and most important ports 6 October to 3 November 1944 the battle’s aftermath. For decades, in Western Europe, but it lay at the during the Battle of the . The the definitive account of Canadian end of the Scheldt Estuary whose Canadians achieved some success operations in Northwest Europe at isolating hostile batteries in the 50-kilometre length was controlled pocket, but predicted shooting was has been C.P. Stacey’s official army by the Germans. It was essential that too inaccurate to permanently silence history The Victory Campaign. In his the port be opened to shipping as them. In the planning stage, the treatment of the Scheldt battle, Stacey quickly as possible since the Allies Canadians had little knowledge of the emphasized strategic issues, and, in were facing a logistical crisis. Most Germans’ strength and dispositions particular, criticized Montgomery’s behind their defences north of the supplies still came over the original Leopold Canal. Throughout the failure to give the opening of Antwerp 2 D-Day beaches and had to be trucked battle, those involved in locating sufficient attention. Subsequent to the front, a distance of nearly 500 hostile batteries strove to overcome studies of the kilometres. The use of a large port challenges posed by the weather tended to focus on Operation was critical to the success of future and terrain. Operational research Infatuate, the capture of Walcheren conducted after the battle revealed operations. that predicted fire dispersed shells Island on the north shore of the From 13 September, while over an excessively large area, mostly Scheldt Estuary. In the three decades the British prepared for a narrow because of human error. Ultimately, following the war, the historiography armoured and airborne thrust the evidence challenges the idea of the clearing of the Breskens Pocket through the (Operation that the Allies won the Second World hardly went beyond Stacey’s official War by the “brute force” use of their 3 Market Garden), First Canadian superior artillery and air assets rather history. Army’s task was to clear the Scheldt than through skill and ingenuity. Stacey credited the Canadians’ Estuary. Operation Switchback was victory, at least in part, to their the battle to capture the “Breskens flooding programme presented generous artillery support and Pocket,” a virtual island bordered by serious obstacles. In addition to an the infantry’s ability to call in the Scheldt River, the Leopold Canal, inundated section in the west, a wide concentrations of fire quickly and the Braakman Inlet, and the North flooded band in the south ran almost readily.4 This view is consistent Sea. About 33 kilometres east to west to the Braakman, leaving only an with John Ellis’ observation in his and 18 kilometres north to south, the eight-kilometre stretch of traversable book Brute Force that the Allies had pocket was mostly below sea level. land along the Leopold. The flooded an overwhelming advantage over The terrain was not conducive to areas were under anywhere from Germany and Japan in economic mobile warfare. The only high ground several inches to four or five feet capacity, which translated into was found southeast of Knocke, as of water. The soil had turned to numerical superiority in artillery, well as some sand dunes on the south mud, making the area impassable to armour, aircraft and ships. Yet shore of the Scheldt. Worse, a German vehicles.1 according to Ellis, instead of using

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This air photo was taken on 6 October 1944, the first day of the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade attack across the Leopold Canal. It shows the sector assaulted by the Royal Montreal Regiment and the Regina Rifles. The effects of Canadian defensive artillery fire is evident, especially in Eede. The flooded ground north of the canal which affected movement is also visible. Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies Air Photo Collection 196/3047 & 3049

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/316 2 : “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944 Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2012 Mike by Map drawn

these assets to achieve a quick and predicted artillery fire was not nearly anything but a “blunt instrument.” decisive victory, commanders of as accurate as previously thought.6 The methods used to identify and the Western Allies, anxious to avoid This article examines the locate hostile batteries were effective, heavy loss of life, “seemed unable to application of predicted fire as long as atmospheric conditions impose their will upon the enemy techniques – counter-battery (CB) and the terrain cooperated. That was except by slowly and persistently work – during Operation Switchback. very rarely the case during the battle. battering him to death with a blunt It builds on Copp’s books and While the Canadians were mostly instrument.”5 This “brute force” thesis challenges Ellis’ thesis in Brute Force. successful in identifying and locating was largely based on generalizations The clearing of the Breskens Pocket hostile batteries in the Breskens and oversimplifications, not a was not a return to the voluminous Pocket, predicted fire was seldom detailed analysis of operational barrages of the First World War. accurate enough to permanently documents. Stacey’s contention that Switchback was an example of the destroy them. Nevertheless, the the Canadians owed their victory at Allies’ use of artillery in a precise and fire was close enough that it often the Scheldt to the infantry’s ability economical fashion. The artillery plan suppressed the enemy batteries to request immediate artillery fire on for the operation was not designed during crucial periods in the battle. prearranged targets was not seriously to blanket the enemy with fire, but contested until the appearance of Terry to engage specific targets when The Plan for Copp’s Montgomery’s Scientists. This needed. The Allies’ employment Operation Switchback edited collection, which reproduced a of sophisticated CB techniques, series of operational research reports and the creation of an efficient he plan for Operation Switchback written during the war, showed that communications system necessary Tmade CB work difficult. Canadian shells were dispersed over for these techniques, suggests While the plan was ambitious, large areas, which indicated that that artillery in Switchback was imaginative and allowed for large-

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scale artillery support, intelligence October, Brigadier J.G. Spragge’s 7th would provide direct support of the greatly underestimated the German Canadian Infantry Brigade would attacking infantry.9 strength in the Breskens Pocket, attack a dry section of the German The element of surprise was and the terrain offered little hope defensive line north of Leopold Canal critical for the success of Operation of gathering further intelligence where it diverged from the Canal de Switchback. Simonds’ plan called for through observation. Because the plan Dérivation de la Lys. The 7th Brigade a “silent” policy for the days before the demanded surprise, it eliminated any would be followed later by Brigadier attack; there was to be no preliminary preliminary counter-bombardment. K.G. Blackader’s 8th Canadian CB fire or even any registration With limited knowledge of the Infantry Brigade. The second phase shoots.10 The only bombardment German gun positions, the Canadian of the plan called for Brigadier J.M. allowed prior to the attack was from counter-battery staff and associated Rockingham’s 9th Canadian Infantry 4th Division’s field guns, which units faced a challenging task. Brigade to cross the Braakman in were to continue harassing fire to Directing the battle was amphibious Landing Vehicles, the east of 7th Brigade’s crossing Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, Tracked (LVTs, or “Buffaloes”), and point as a diversion until H-Hour, who was temporarily in command land in a relatively undefended area set for 0530 hours on 6 October. A of First while near Hoofdplaat on 8 October. This one-hour bombardment was to begin Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar would force the Germans to fight on at H minus 120 minutes. From H was in the United Kingdom two fronts and cut their escape routes minus 55 to H minus 25 minutes, a undergoing medical treatment. at Breskens and Hoofdplaat. Once short CB programme would engage In the meantime, Major-General the two bridgeheads were linked, the fixed batteries. Finally, another Charles Foulkes took Simonds’ place Canadians would advance westward bombardment programme would commanding II Canadian Corps. On to the coastal town of Knocke to clear run until H plus 150 minutes, after 2 October Foulkes filed his outline the rest of the pocket.8 which the infantry would call in for Operation Switchback, which was For a one-division operation, fire as needed. At H-Hour, the CB largely based on an earlier version the plan for Operation Switchback policy would be “active” – as soon devised by Simonds.7 The objective provided very generous artillery as a hostile battery opened fire, it was was twofold: to capture the Breskens support. The artillery formations to be engaged immediately. For the Pocket and clear the German coast allotted to the operation included whole day, the counter-battery officer artillery dominating the Scheldt, 2nd Canadian Army Group, Royal (CBO) had priority call on all heavy and to provide suitable areas for Artillery (AGRA) (two heavy and guns and two medium regiments. Allied artillery positions to support four medium regiments) on the left Twenty rounds per field gun, 50 per follow-on operations against the and 9th British AGRA (one super medium gun, and 50 per heavy gun strongly-held Walcheren Island. The heavy, two heavy, and four medium were allocated to CB tasks.11 task of clearing the pocket fell to 3rd regiments) on the right, plus the field Because there would be no Canadian Infantry Division under artillery from 3rd and 4th Canadian preliminary bombardment aside Major-General D.C. Spry. Divisions. Throughout the operation, from the timed programme, it was The innovative operation used the medium regiments, totalling 128 imperative to use observation to two spearheads to take advantage guns, would conduct most of the locate enemy artillery, mortars and of German weaknesses. First, on 6 CB fire while the field regiments machine guns. The 4th Division was

Anglo-Canadian Artillery Assets, Operation Switchback, 6 October 1944

Field Guns Medium Guns Heavy Guns Super Heavy Guns Formation Total 25-pdr 4.5-inch 5.5-inch 7.2-inch 155mm 8-inch 240 mm 3 Cdn Inf Div 72 72 4 Cdn Armd Div 72 72 2 Cdn AGRA 16 48 16 8 88 9 AGRA 64 16 12 1 2 95 Total 144 16 112 32 20 1 2 327 Source: WD, HQ 2 Cdn AGRA, October 1944: app. 1, RCA 2 Cdn Corps Op Instr No. 8, 5 October 1944, p.1.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/3 19 4 : “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944 Library and Archives PA 112364 112364 Canada PA Library and Archives

A 5.5-inch gun of the Royal Canadian Artillery in action south of Vaucelles, France, 23 July 1944. This medium gun was the standard artillery piece used for counter-battery fire during Operation Switchback.

tasked with establishing observation World War to apply scientific methods liaison with the Army Photographic posts along the whole Leopold front.12 in identifying and locating enemy Interpretation Section and assisted Nos.660 and 661 Air Observation Post batteries. The CBO was attached to the Air Liaison Officer in briefing (AOP) squadrons, Royal Air Force corps headquarters and responsible to pilots for artillery reconnaissance.18 (RAF) were available for observation, the commander, corps Royal Artillery CB intelligence summaries contained with individual flights assigned to (CCRA). His role was to compile and a review of CB operations and newly specified zones of responsibility.13 disseminate intelligence summaries identified hostile batteries. These of hostile batteries to divisional were normally filed and distributed Counter-Battery headquarters and artillery units. The at least weekly,19 but Ross and his Work in 1944 CBO was not a commander, but an staff did so almost daily during active adviser to the CCRA on CB policy operations. These summaries are he 2nd Counter Battery Officer’s and communications requirements.16 essential for understanding CB work TStaff was vital in the priority task During Switchback, the CBO of II during the Battle of the Scheldt. of engaging hostile batteries. The CB Canadian Corps was Lieutenant- The bulk of CB intelligence came staff sought to provide information Colonel J.H.D. Ross. He had his from the corps’ survey regiment, in about the location, strength, arcs own staff of about 30 men, including this case 2nd Survey Regiment, RCA. of fire and behaviour of the enemy staff officers and their clerks, and It consisted of two batteries, each artillery and to use that information a number of batmen, drivers and composed of an observation troop for to silence, or at least suppress, hostile orderlies.17 Acting CBOs (ACBOs), flash spotting, a sound ranging troop, batteries.14 Some of the techniques to usually captains, were assigned to and a survey troop. This structure emerge from the First World War for each division and were responsible was well-suited to work under corps locating hostile batteries continued to for the technical work, such as or to be assigned temporarily to be used during the Second, including analyzing shell craters and shell divisions.20 flash spotting, air observation, sound fragments, examining photographs, The British and Canadians ranging, espionage, and intelligence ordering bombardments for entrusted much of their CB work from locals and prisoners.15 divisional frontages, and contributing to sound ranging. The purpose of The British had adjusted material for intelligence summaries sound ranging was to locate hostile artillery organization and field and hostile battery lists. A special batteries where visual methods could communications early in the Second ACBO (Air) was responsible for not by tracing the sound made by 130062 Canada PA Library and Archives

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a firing gun or an exploding shell. sound, temperature does: for every Nevertheless, sound ranging The technique took advantage of degree Fahrenheit above 50, sound had several advantages over other the relatively slow speed of sound, travels one foot per second faster, CB techniques. It was quick and 1107.6 feet per second in still air at and the opposite for every degree could provide more information on 50 degrees Fahrenheit and 50 percent below 50. More importantly, wind the type of hostile battery than any relative humidity. Recorders could has a significant effect on the speed other survey method. It required measure to within 1/300 of a second, of sound, as sound waves travel faster only a single shot to identify and during which sound travels just over downwind of the source. Moreover, locate a hostile battery, and it had a metre.21 The principle on which when the wind travels faster along a particular advantage over visual sound ranging rested assumed that if the ground than it does higher in the methods such as flash spotting sound travels at the same velocity in atmosphere, it tends to direct sound whose effectiveness was limited by all directions, it will travel at the same upwards, making sound increasingly modern flashless propellants and speed between its source and any two inaudible on the ground as it travels concealment measures.26 points that are equidistant from it away from its source.23 Terrain is also The lack of natural observation (i.e. if the source is actually midway important as audibility can be poor points produced by the flat terrain of between the two points). But if the in valleys. Heavy bombardments western Belgium and the Netherlands source – the firing gun – happened to made it difficult to isolate discharges certainly favoured the defence be closer to one point, then the sound from particular batteries.24 In ideal and made CB work for Switchback would reach it sooner than the other conditions, the probable error in challenging. Until a tall structure point. Thus, using microphones at a locating a hostile battery at a range could be captured, the Canadians set distance apart, surveyors could of 1,000 yards by sound ranging determine the location of the enemy alone was at least 100 yards with 1944 gun by calculating the discrepancy methods.25 between the times at which the same sound reached two different points. In 1944, surveyors used five or six microphones spaced 1,000 or 2,000 metres apart in a straight line or a concave curve in front of enemy territory to create the sound ranging base.22 This technique was the most common method used in the Breskens Pocket to identify active German batteries. Of course, sound ranging was never straightforward because atmospheric conditions greatly affect the transmission of sound waves. While humidity has little influence on

A 5.5-inch gun firing in support of the Canadians.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/3 21 6 : “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944 Library and Archives Canada PA 142085 Canada PA Library and Archives

A German pillbox mounting a 105 mm gun in an armoured turret. This position was not destroyed by counter-battery fire and remained in action until captured by the Canadian Scottish and North Nova Scotia Highlanders near the end of the battle.

had no “vantage points from which to work quickly to fix the rest of the on the south bank of the West Scheldt artillery officers could observe and German batteries as soon as possible to hold the approaches to Antwerp.30 direct the fire of the guns.”27 A during the early days of the battle. By about 20 September 1944, further problem was that the German 100,000 men of the German Fifteenth batteries had been rather inactive in German Dispositions Army and thousands of vehicles and late September when 4th Division had in the Breskens Pocket artillery pieces had been evacuated held the area south of the Leopold across the West Scheldt, leaving 64th Canal, and few hostile batteries had lthough the Canadians had Infantry Division and some attached been identified and located before Aa clear idea of the German units to defend “Scheldt Fortress 3rd Division’s arrival.28 By 5 October, defences and the nature of the terrain South.”31 While Allied intelligence 2nd Survey Regiment managed to immediately across the Leopold of 64th Division’s forward positions establish two sound ranging and two Canal, the plan for Switchback was very good, there was no reliable flash spotting observation posts, the suffered from insufficient knowledge information on its reserves or its latter upon towers built by engineers. of enemy strength and dispositions in total strength in men or equipment. This preliminary CB work achieved the pocket. In September, intelligence According to Copp, Ultra (intelligence some immediate results: on 5 October predicted and then confirmed that derived from decrypted German alone, the Canadians identified 29 the Germans might take advantage signals) “provided little assistance active hostile batteries. All but three, of the Canadians’ inability to use when it came to questions of enemy however, were “unfixed,” which tanks in the area by holding the south strengths and dispositions, so much meant that their positions were not bank of the West Scheldt for as long depended on photo reconnaissance known with sufficient accuracy as possible. They had no intention and patrol reports.”32 On 5 October, to warrant bombardment without of falling back from the Leopold, the day before the attack, II Canadian further investigation.29 The CB staff determined to keep their own guns Corps’ counter-battery staff had and the survey regiment would have catalogued some 68 medium and

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heavy artillery pieces in the pocket.33 German Artillery Assets, Operation Switchback, Very little was known of the Germans’ 30 September 1944 coastal artillery positions, and in any case most of the German artillery Weapon Type Calibre Quantity Total 8.1 cm 38 was thought to be in the second line Mortar 39 of defence just behind the Leopold.34 12 cm 1 The garrison’s strength in men was 20 mm 8 estimated at no higher than 7,000 Quadruple 20 mm 8 men, only 2,000 of which were French 25 mm 6 thought to be infantry. “There have Antiaircraft 37 mm 15 65 been no indications that the enemy Twin 37 mm 3 has undisclosed reserves of any considerable strength in layback 40 mm 2 positions behind his present line,” 88 mm 23 according to an intelligence summary 3.7 cm 9 Antitank 13 from 7 October.35 The 64th Division 5.7 cm 6 was comprised of the 1037th, 1038th 7.5 cm 31 and 1039th Grenadier Regiments. Gun Czech 83.5 mm 5 37 In the days preceding the attack, 15 cm 1 intelligence placed 1039th Regiment Czech 80 mm 1 on the enemy’s left flank, 1038th in 10.5 cm 20 the centre of the line, and 1037th Howitzer 48 furthest to the west. The central and 15 cm 21 Soviet eastern sectors of 64th Division’s 6 front were believed to be reinforced (calibre unknown) with 500 men of 129th Anti-Aircraft Total 202 Regiment, equipped with 88 mm Source: A.G. Steiger, AHQ Report No.69, 30 July 1954, par. 205 and note. guns.36 The German position in the German sources, the actual number gathering, particularly by visual Breskens Pocket was stronger than of German troops left in the Breskens techniques, was again compromised the Allies realized. Generalmajor Pocket was about 11,000 following by poor weather in the last stage Knut Eberding’s 64th Division the exodus of most of Fifteenth of the battle, from 21 October to 3 had been selected to hold Scheldt Army across the Scheldt. Excluding November. Fortress South because, of all the anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, the During the first days of Operation divisions in Fifteenth Army, it was garrison had anywhere from 65 to 73 Switchback the Canadian infantry the strongest in equipment and guns of 75 mm or larger.39 This was a struggled to establish a bridgehead skilled men, especially compared substantially stronger force than the on the north side of the Leopold to those divisions that had seen Canadians estimated. Canal. The fire plan opened at 0330 action in Normandy. It had a full hours on 6 October, two hours before complement of artillery, including The Attack the infantry assault. The programme 203rd Naval Coast Artillery Battalion went according to plan, except and elements of the 204th, as well as rtillery activity during the at about 0420 hours when heavy ample ammunition and supplies.37 Abattle can be divided into three German shells hit the headquarters of On Walcheren, in positions that distinct phases. The first, from 6 to 13th Field Regiment near Zeebrugge, could fire into the Breskens Pocket, 14 October, saw extremely heavy “which provided an early reveille was the 810th Naval Anti-Aircraft bombardment from both sides while for many people and turned one Battalion at Flushing and, elsewhere the Canadian infantry made little vehicle into a reasonable replica of a on the island, the 202nd Naval progress. During the period from sieve.”40 Such occurrences were quite Coast Artillery Battalion. Historical 15 to 20 October, the slow infantry rare throughout the operation; the narratives written during and shortly progress continued but the German Germans never mounted concerted after the war placed the German guns were very quiet. This limited the CB efforts and preferred instead strength in the pocket on 6 October CB work that could contribute to the to shell the infantry bridgeheads. 1944 as high as 15,000 men.38 From Canadian advance. CB intelligence Canadian artillery units seldom

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reported enemy shells landing in had come from to reinforce had just been holes in the ground their lines. During the short CB 1038th Grenadier Regiment’s sector.43 from which German guns fired. programme before the attack, the As the morning progressed, there Limited visibility meant that the AOP Allies engaged 29 fixed batteries at a was also much more German shelling squadrons could identify only some ratio of 14 guns per hostile battery.41 than expected. The war diarist of of the enemy’s gun positions. Hence, At 0530 hours, the infantry of 23rd Field Regiment (Self-Propelled), by the afternoon, German guns were Spragge’s 7th Canadian Infantry RCA wrote, “apparently the Germans able to fire on the attacking infantry Brigade attacked across the Leopold have a lot more stuff over there than with impunity. At the very least, supported by flame-throwing we had thought. He has concealed with so much enemy shelling, the “Wasp” armoured vehicles. On the his strength very cleverly.”44 It was CB staff had more information with right, 1st Battalion, Canadian Scottish already becoming apparent that the which to locate German batteries: on Regiment secured a small bridgehead Canadians had underestimated the the first day of the operation, twelve at Oosthoek and Moershoofd, while German defences. new batteries were fixed, mostly by the Regina Rifle Regiment (with Lieutenant-Colonel Ross AOP, and five additional batteries the Royal Montreal Regiment considered the pre-zero hour CB were identified by sound ranging.45 replacing its “B” Company on the programme a success because the The Canadians held onto their left) struggled to establish a foothold German guns had remained quiet for tenuous bridgeheads in the face of across from Moerhuizen.42 Resistance the early morning. However, he made continued strong resistance. On 7 was stiff: there were simply more it clear in his intelligence summary October, most of the enemy shelling troops opposite the canal than for 6 October that determining the came from field and medium guns expected, including substantial effectiveness of CB fire during an located close to the Germans’ forward reserves. A company of 1st Parachute operation was almost impossible; defences at the Leopold. That day the Replacement and Training Regiment most of the hostile batteries identified CB staff identified 17 hostile batteries

Shells land in Breskens, 22 October 1944. Library and Archives Canada PA 138437 Canada PA Library and Archives

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by sound ranging, and another six to withstand the full force of German and 35 rounds for medium and heavy by flash spotting. All batteries that counterattacks for another day. In guns per day, respectively.53 had been fixed were engaged as soon the early hours of 9 October, with no Even though the Canadians as they fired, and sometimes the preliminary counter-bombardment, increased their ammunition Canadians tried to engage an unfixed the North Nova Scotia Highlanders expenditure, it was becoming clear by battery “for lack of a better target.” landed at Green Beach east of the 10th that their countermeasures The 3rd Medium Regiment, RCA and Hoofdplaat and the Highland Light were frustratingly ineffective. 3rd Super Heavy Regiment, RA each Infantry of Canada landed at Amber Ross noted that the Canadians had engaged one battery near Cadzand Beach immediately to the south. The achieved at least some success the to the west and were reportedly infantry met no German resistance. day before as the German forward successful.46 The next day, 8 October, The reserve battalion, the Stormont, batteries either were temporarily saw only light, but continuous, enemy Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders, silenced or were never heard from shelling. Thus far, artillery support landed later in the morning. Ross sent again.54 But the Germans had seemed to be effective. Headquarters, a detachment along with the brigade already begun to bring their reserves 2nd Canadian AGRA commended to coordinate CB work on the new forward, as three companies of 4th Medium Regiment, RCA in a front. By 0900 hours, the Canadians 1st Parachute Replacement and message stating that the “Infantry had created a bridgehead some Training Regiment had relieved is well pleased with Harassing Fire 1,500 yards deep pushing westward 1038th Grenadier Regiment by the – very good. You have shut up the beyond the main dykes. Alarmed, previous night.55 More German Jerries. The Infantry can rest a bit the Germans responded with intense batteries were active than ever. now.”47 The message was premature, artillery fire from the heavy guns at Furthermore, the coastal batteries, however, as enemy fire intensified Breskens and Flushing, “a visitation including two batteries at Cadzand in the evening. The survey regiment which made movement by our that were causing the most trouble, identified 13 active German batteries vehicles a somewhat precarious could not be engaged as effectively on 8 October, the majority by sound duty.”52 because the 5.5- and 4.5‑inch gun- ranging. Much of the enemy fire On the morning of 9 October, howitzers had maximum ranges came from the Cadzand area.48 while Rockingham’s 9th Brigade was of about 15,840 and 19,360 yards, That evening, from its position at busy consolidating its bridgehead respectively. The greater the distance Maldegem, 3rd Medium Regiment near Hoofdplaat, Ross met with from the target, the more diffuse the engaged a battery of four 9‑inch guns Brigadier E.R. Suttie (Commander, Canadian concentrations became. on the south shore of the Scheldt 2nd Canadian AGRA), both of whom The Canadian weapons were no from 2030 hours to midnight.49 The were headquartered at Eelvelde, match for the German 150 mm coastal 7th Medium Regiment, RCA also near Maldegem. Ross needed to guns firing from Walcheren, which engaged and silenced two hostile discuss some problems with counter- could hurl shells some 24,000 to batteries using air observation, but bombardment. Enemy artillery 26,800 yards.56 Thus there was very was then ordered to proceed north of activity on the Leopold had increased little the Canadians could do about Antwerp the next day to support 2nd dramatically overnight, and the the coastal batteries until the front Canadian Infantry Division.50 Canadian countermeasures were line moved forward. The pressure on the 7th Brigade not having much effect. Only 25 From 10 October, the Germans bridgeheads was supposed to have rounds had been allotted to medium shifted their artillery efforts to been eased by 9th Brigade’s assault and heavy guns per day for CB repelling 9th Brigade’s assault, which from scheduled to begin tasks, which was only enough to gave 7th Brigade some respite. The at 0130 hours on 8 October, but at engage hostile batteries known incessant German counterattacks the last minute that attack had to to be active and not enough to on the Braakman front translated be delayed by 24 hours. The 9th destroy them outright or to suppress into constant requests for defensive Brigade troops were transported positions that were only suspect. fire, which helped to halt attacks. in LVTs, and approached, out of Suttie discussed the matter with However, batteries around Breskens sight of the enemy, in the Ghent– Brigadier A.B. Matthews (CCRA, II and Flushing relentlessly pummelled Terneuzen Canal. The vehicles Canadian Corps), also at Eelvelde, 9th Brigade. The Canadians were very could not climb up at the damaged and later that morning Ross received busy with CB fire throughout the day, locks at Terneuzen, however, and word that the ammunition allotment firing 33 predicted concentrations, engineers had to construct ramps.51 to CB tasks had been increased to 50 some at a ratio of 20 guns per target. The men on the Leopold front had The several attempts throughout

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the day at silencing hostile battery increased German attention to the from where they had crossed. The YT near Breskens were unsuccessful Braakman bridgehead, 9th Brigade bridgehead was large enough for because the medium guns southwest had succeeded in taking pressure 3rd Division to move its remaining of Terneuzen were firing at near their from 7th Brigade. field artillery on that front to new maximum range.57 As 7th Brigade The first week of Operation gun areas on the opposite side of continued to fight forward from Switchback had seen important the canal.67 The two bridgeheads the Leopold Canal, Major-General setbacks and unpleasant surprises. became linked, and the entire eastern Spry decided to reinforce success by Progress on the Leopold bridgehead portion of the pocket was in Canadian reassigning 8th Brigade, which was was slower than planners had hands.68 After severe losses, most originally supposed to assist with the anticipated, but 9th Brigade’s German units were down to a third of Leopold attack, to bolster 9th Brigade. landing, even though a day late, was their original strength; they had also The bulk of the Canadian artillery a great success. started to withdraw forces from 4th assets involved in Switchback were During the second week, shelling Division’s front to the east. As far as also transferred to the northeast.58 from both sides steadily declined artillery was concerned, intelligence German artillery on the Leopold because of limited visibility in the estimated that the Germans still had front remained “virtually silent” on autumn weather. Consequently, CB 50 field, 30 medium, seven heavy and the 11th, while the German coastal work and counter-bombardment 30 heavy anti-aircraft guns, as well as batteries continued to shell the were less intensive than before. 35 other unidentified artillery pieces Braakman front.59 Some progress was finally made for a total of 152 guns of all types The fighting on 9th Brigade’s on the Leopold front, as engineers in the Breskens Pocket. This was front became increasingly vicious. finished constructing bridges at the largest number of German guns Brigadier Rockingham remarked on Strooibrug for tanks.63 Intelligence at holding the approaches to Antwerp, 12 October that the German artillery last acknowledged that the Germans but there were formidable artillery was very effective, against which had many more troops in the Breskens forces in the adjacent areas as well, the Canadians had little protection Pocket than it had first estimated. The 76 artillery pieces on Walcheren and in the flat polder country.60 By this Canadians had only been in contact 55 in South Beveland.69 time, it was clear to the Canadians with the forward troops of Eberding’s The strong, concrete-protected that the fighting in the Breskens 64th Infantry Division in that sector of coastal artillery positions at Breskens Pocket was as intense as that during the front before the operation, which and the Flushing batteries were the early days of the Normandy obscured the division’s reserves. notorious for shelling the Canadians, Campaign. German activity, Intelligence confirmed from 12 to 13 especially on 9th Brigade’s line of especially shelling and mortaring, October that the entire 3rd Battalion, advance along the south shore of was reduced along the Leopold, as 1st Parachute Replacement and the West Scheldt. The AOP aircraft only about 100 enemy shells were Training Regiment and Battlegroup patrolled the area regularly, which reported to land in that bridgehead Krause were in the pocket.64 Overall, made the German firing stop for a on the 12th, much less than during the 13th was a bad day for CB work. short time, but did nothing to damage the first days of the battle. But the The skies were clear enough for the guns or inflict casualties on the Braakman bridgehead experienced fighter-bombers to attack German crews.70 Photographs of Breskens and no less than 12 counterattacks guns and two houses that were Flushing, which had been heavily from 11 to 12 October as well as believed to be ammunition dumps bombed by the RAF over the previous intense artillery bombardment from in front of the Queen’s Own Rifles of days, suggested that at least half of positions near Breskens, Cadzand, Canada.65 But the cool temperature the batteries were destroyed. Three Flushing and South Beveland.61 and wind made it difficult to identify positions at Flushing had also been The 12th was a day of very intense active hostile batteries with sound demolished. CB work suggested counter-bombardment, with 52 CB ranging. The infantry called only for that the Germans had redeployed shoots. The 3rd Medium Regiment moderate artillery support, a total of their guns, as most of the firing fired an impressive 20 CB and 22 14 predicted shoots for the day.66 over the previous two days had harassing fire tasks, at 99 rounds By 14 October, the Canadians come from positions that had not per gun. On the same day the RAF fighting north of the Leopold against previously been located whereas conducted a major bombing mission, the ferocious German defence had known positions had been silent for with the heavy bombers attacking managed to secure a foothold in the some time.71 The Canadians’ newly Breskens and medium bombers southern edge of Eede, a kilometre consolidated major bridgehead and attacking Cadzand.62 Given the the Germans’ reallocation of their

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A 25-pounder gun and crew in the Scheldt, October 1944. Library and Archives Canada PA 142108 Canada PA Library and Archives

guns meant that the battle was Rodger (Chief of Staff, II Canadian locations of the German batteries entering a new phase. Corps) believed this to be an attempt there.75 to confuse the Canadian flash Meanwhile, the infantry had A Brief Respite spotters.73 That the Germans made made such impressive gains pushing the effort to mount such a deceptive the Germans westward that 9th he period from 15 to 20 October, tactic suggests that Canadian CB AGRA could move its guns across Tfollowing an initial period of work had made a difference. the Leopold.76 On the 19th, the intense bombardment from both On the morning of the 17th, bad weather made AOP shoots sides, was relatively quiet for the although the German coastal impossible, and predicted shoots artillery. German shelling was so batteries continued to fire, artillery engaged only four hostile batteries.77 light and visibility was so poor on and mortar fire inside the Breskens At midnight on 19/20 October, the 15th that Ross’ staff received Pocket “slackened off.” The the Germans withdrew to the line very little information from 2nd Canadians conducted only ten CB Breskens–Schoondijke–– Survey Regiment on active hostile shoots throughout the day, most of Sluis, a semicircle that curved to the batteries. Even the coastal batteries which were coordinated by the AOP North Sea. Behind it were all the guns fired infrequently on 16 October, and squadrons.74 On 18 October, while they could move.78 the Canadians therefore conducted the guns at Flushing continued to On 20 October, Spry contrived very few counter-bombardments.72 harass 9th Brigade, German shelling a plan to break the new German An intelligence summary from was at its lowest level since the line. He ordered the 7th Brigade, II Canadian Corps noted on 7th commencement of Switchback. More which had just been relieved by the Brigade’s frontage that while German important, 2nd Survey Regiment’s British 157th Infantry Brigade, to pass muzzle flashes were visible on 16 “A” Troop was finally able to through 9th Brigade and clear the October, sometimes no shells landed establish a flash spotting base to enemy northeast of Cadzand. At the in Canadian lines. Brigadier N.E. observe Flushing and pinpoint the same time, 8th Brigade was to take

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/3 27 12 : “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944 Library and Archives Canada PA 138067 Canada PA Library and Archives

Lieutenant-Colonel D.G. Crofton of the Canadian Scottish Regiment examines the wreckage of a German 155 mm gun near Breskens, 28 October 1944. German beach defences are visible in the background.

Oostburg, Sluis and Cadzand, then infantry captured more and more active. Heavy and medium bombers clear what remained of the pocket ground, but the late October weather retaliated against Flushing and between the Leopold and the coast.79 soon began to impede CB work Cadzand, respectively, and hostile The coastal batteries only lightly and air support. After the lengthy battery ZQ in Breskens was attacked shelled the Canadians. Intelligence period of minimal German artillery from the air five times. Despite its from a reliable source reported that activity, operations became more volume, the aerial bombardment the Germans manned their guns at intense on 21 October as the German had mixed results, as batteries in 0500 hours daily. To take advantage situation in the Breskens Pocket those cities were still identified of this opportunity to eliminate some became desperate. On that day, as active afterward.82 There was crews while they were still in the open, 9th Brigade launched attacks on only light shelling overnight until a counter-bombardment programme Breskens and Schoondijke.81 The Batteries Flushing North, Flushing fired against five hostile batteries, in attack toward Breskens was met West, Flushing East and Dishoek on addition to three predicted shoots.80 with heavy shelling, primarily from Walcheren opened fire on Canadian Flushing. But coordinating CB fire forces south of Breskens the next Endgame was difficult because the movement morning and again in the afternoon. 21 October–3 November of so many Allied guns to new Shells landed in the lines of 8th and positions closer to the front presented 9th Brigades. The Germans also still n the last period of the battle, communications problems. Enemy had active artillery in Cadzand, Ibetween 21 October and 3 artillery, especially from the Flushing which was difficult to locate with any November, artillery activity in the batteries, was heavy. However, certainty because of poor visibility Breskens Pocket escalated as the Allied air support was also very in the miserable weather and the

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dearth of observation points in preparation for the impending attack. Survey Regiment were at the mercy of the unrelievedly flat country. The Ten of the remaining batteries were the unfavourable weather. After the weather made AOP useless for several attacked by heavy bombers and first week of Switchback, identifying days, so counter-bombardment was fighter-bombers, but with limited and accurately locating hostile limited to predicted fire from 22 to success as some of them survived batteries was difficult. Clouds and 25 October.83 and were still active later in the day.91 rain hindered air support and wind Bad visibility continued into At 1800 hours on 31 October, interfered with sound. Fortunately, the 26th, though there was much the Germans’ 203rd Naval Coast the periods during which CB work more shelling than in previous days, Artillery Battalion reported that its was least productive were also those especially at Schoondijke. On the strength was down to six officers and in which the German artillery was left, after slow progress, 8th Brigade 86 other ranks. It had no operational least active. In other words, CB work captured Oostburg.84 The men of guns left.92 The job was almost over was effective when it was needed Battery Nieuwe Sluis evacuated and 3rd Division no longer needed the most. their gun positions and thereafter the immense artillery support it had fought as infantry.85 Counter- been allotted at the beginning of Aftermath and Analysis bombardment was again limited to the operation. The attention of First 18 predicted shoots.86 The weather Canadian Army, and indeed much he clearing of the Breskens Pocket slightly improved the next day, 27 of 21st Army Group, was on the new Tprovided important lessons October, which allowed for sound task at hand: the capture of Walcheren regarding CB fire. The large volume ranging to identify five new unfixed Island (Operation Infatuate). The of shells devoted to CB tasks made batteries. However, 202nd Naval week before, 9th AGRA had been it seem that counter-bombardment Coast Artillery Battalion’s batteries moved to support 52nd (Lowland) during Operation Switchback was at Domburg, Zouteland and Dishoek and 2nd Canadian Infantry Divisions overwhelmingly effective. However, on Walcheren were too distant to be on South Beveland.93 On 31 October, operational research revealed that located accurately.87 2nd Canadian AGRA and 61st and hostile batteries were only being The German shelling on the 28th 110th Field Regiments, RA were temporarily silenced. The experience was the heaviest it had been for a long reallocated to coastal positions of clearing the Breskens Pocket made time. The Canadians concluded that to support Infatuate, leaving 3rd it clear that while the Canadians may the Germans had been conserving Division with only its own field have been adept at locating hostile their ammunition until they realized artillery.94 From 1 November, while batteries, counter-bombardment that there was nothing to be gained the Canadian artillery moved into its through predicted shooting was by hoarding it any longer.88 The new positions to support the assault much less accurate than expected. last German artillery unit left in the on Walcheren, the infantry mopped How effective had CB methods pocket, 203rd Naval Coast Artillery up the remainder of the pocket. been? A study conducted by 3rd Battalion, fought on at Cadzand with Knokke, Heist-aan-Zee and Sluis Division after the battle stated two 150 mm howitzers and a troop of were all cleared. On 3 November, with that “difficulties of operation of gunners converted to infantry.89 The no German strongpoints remaining Flash Spotting and Sound Ranging next day, its commander reported in the Breskens Pocket, Operation in polder country” made CB dwindling supplies of 150 mm rounds Switchback was complete.95 information “unreliable,” though and that his unit was down to nine The clearing of the Breskens the final report did not elaborate.96 officers and 243 other ranks. Though Pocket had been a dreadful experience Certainly, the terrain of the pocket the situation was hopeless, the for all of the forces involved. The duel and the worsening autumn weather battalion was promised a shipment between Allied and German artillery had presented challenges to CB work, of ammunition that night and was had been intense. While the German especially during the final phase. But told that “the bridgehead was to guns were set on obliterating the Ross had extolled the effectiveness be defended to the last cartridge.”90 attacking Canadian infantry, the of sound ranging throughout the As far as Ross was concerned, CB Canadian guns aimed to suppress operation. Sound ranging undeniably work for Operation Switchback was and silence its opposite numbers. In had advantages over flash spotting practically complete since most of the end, it was a decisive victory for and aerial photography because it the known German batteries in the the Allies and a source of pride for the was less affected by poor visibility Breskens Pocket had been overrun. Canadians. CB work was an integral caused by the weather. Ross’ attention shifted to softening part of that victory, but the efforts However, 2nd CBO Staff’s German positions on Walcheren in of Lieutenant-Colonel Ross and 2nd intelligence summaries are slightly

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/3 29 14 : “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944 Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies Air Photo Collection 0228-4139 Military and Disarmament Studies Air Photo Laurier Centre for Strategic

A prepared, but unoccupied, German gun position outside the village of Retranchement was identified on Canadian defence overprint maps as early as 10 September 1944. The position was considered active on the eve of Operation Switchback and targeted by the predicted fire of 10 troops of 5.5-inch and 7.2-inch guns which fired 112 rounds at the target. An operational research report later determined that only 11 shells fell near the German battery. Aerial reconnaissance photos taken on 21 October show the position (above and closeup right). The large craters which straddle the position were left by an attack by medium bombers. The smaller craters left by the artillery are more difficult to discern on the air photo.

Left: This figure shows a plot of the artillery shells directed at the German battery. It was found that the mean point of impact (MPI) was 102 yards past and 78 yards to the right of the target. Only 11 shells of 112 fired fell with a 100 yard box centred on the target. Report No.24, “Accuracy of Predicted Shooting,” in Terry Copp, ed., Montgomery’s Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe, 1944–1945 (Waterloo, ON: LCMSDS, 2000), pp.311-23.

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misleading with respect to the value for the bombardment on Saturn the enemy simply moved its guns of sound ranging. A careful statistical was 36 minutes to the right and to another location? Or had the analysis of the hostile battery lists and 228 yards short of the target. Only battery run out of shells? Visual CB intelligence summaries indicates one dummy gun at Saturn was hit confirmation that a hostile battery that although sound ranging was the in the entire experiment, and that had been destroyed was often needed most frequently successful method of hit was by a single shell fragment. to consider it permanently silenced. identifying active German batteries, In other words, on average, shells Thus, operational research conducted by itself it rarely provided enough not only missed Jupiter and Saturn, after a battle was the only way to information to fix a battery. Of they did so by a wide margin in both assess the effectiveness of counter- 197 fixed batteries listed in the bearing and range. Worst of all, an bombardment. counter-battery documents from 5 error at the command post meant Wallace’s examination of the October to 4 November, 74.6 percent that a quarter of the rounds directed accuracy of CB fire in the Breskens appeared as “fixed” for the first time at Mars landed over 1,000 yards Pocket was nothing short of as a result of aerial photography, not past the target. Unfortunately, the groundbreaking. No.2 ORS examined sound ranging. A further 2.5 percent report was not completed until after aerial photographs of five hostile were fixed by AOP. Sound ranging the Battle of the Scheldt. The study batteries engaged on 6 October. accounted for only 5.1 percent of yielded no general conclusions as it Hostile battery history sheets batteries listed as “fixed” for the was meant to be supplemented by confirmed that the pre-zero counter- first time.97 In other words, while future experiments.98 Nevertheless, it bombardment programme was the sound ranging could identify and showed that the slightest errors could first time each of these batteries roughly locate a hostile battery, produce wildly inaccurate results in had been fired upon. They had aerial photography was required in a bombardment. not been engaged again between order to gain enough information By autumn 1944, concentrations H-Hour and the time at which the about it before it could be engaged. were getting larger and units were photographs were taken or affected Conversely, aerial photography using ammunition from different by the engagement of any other could only be used when the weather production lots as well as uncalibrated battery.100 The study found that shells permitted. Therefore, in the Breskens guns, and it was suspected that had fallen over a large area, typically Pocket, no single counter-battery predicted shooting was inaccurate. 1,000 yards square. Only about 4.4 technique could pinpoint hostile The question of accuracy was crucial. percent of shells landed within 100 batteries by itself. No.2 Operational Research Section yards square of the target, meaning it How accurate was the Canadian (ORS) could do little work in autumn would take over 2,000 shots to cause CB fire during the battle? One method of 1944, in part because the fighting 100 of them to fall into an area of was through operational research was a continuous struggle with few 100 yards square. Wallace attributed which had already revealed some large set-piece battles. However, this dispersion to errors in sight very important lessons about artillery Major J.G. Wallace, one of the artillery testing and command post work. by the time of Switchback. There experts in No.2 ORS, did manage to Meteorological work, survey and were already some serious doubts conduct an important examination of calibration only accounted for minor in 1944 as to the accuracy of artillery the accuracy of predicted fire in which errors in the fall of shot.101 fire. The 3rd Medium Regiment, RCA he focused on CB fire. There were few A report compiled after the war, participated in a simulation in April suitable battlefields on which to base using data from Operations Wellhit 1944 to test methods of measuring the study. The Breskens Pocket was (Boulogne), Switchback and Veritable the accuracy of artillery fire and the logical choice because “little if any (Rhineland), confirmed Wallace’s determine the causes of inaccuracies. firing had taken place beforehand, conclusions. Only 5 percent of shells The experiment involved firing on and where the distribution of shells could be expected to land within three dummy targets, codenamed could be examined soon after firing, 100 yards square of a hostile battery. Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, and without any danger of its being Though CB fire could still have a measuring the discrepancies between confused by subsequent fighting.”99 neutralizing effect on the enemy, each shell crater and the targets. The The inherent problem with even a heavy bombardment could study produced some interesting counter-bombardment was produce only temporary results.102 results. The mean point of impact ascertaining its effectiveness while Operational research seriously of the 48 rounds fired at Jupiter was a battle was still in progress. If an challenged the Allies’ perception one degree 33 minutes to the right enemy battery ceased to fire, was of the accuracy of artillery, not just and 27 yards long of the target. it because friendly artillery had during Switchback, but predicted fire Similarly, the mean point of impact successfully destroyed it, or had in general. Either more shells would https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/3 31 16 : “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944

be required or measures would have sound ranging worked in identifying economical application of firepower. to be taken to improve the accuracy of an active German battery, aerial Such methods do not resemble the each shell in future operations. photography was almost always clumsy tactics presented in John Ellis’ In the end, the inaccuracy needed to engage it. Unfortunately, “brute force” thesis. of artillery compromised the photo-reconnaissance aircraft could effectiveness of counter-bombardment only operate in good weather and during Operation Switchback. sound ranging was most effective Notes Artillery fire undoubtedly hurt the in clear, calm weather. Yet in the all Germans’ morale and impeded too rare occurrences of favourable Special thanks to Professor Geoffrey Hayes their movements, but certainly the conditions, the two methods (University of Waterloo), who supervised this project. Portions of this article were presented experience in the Breskens Pocket produced invaluable information on at the 22nd Military History Colloquium, showed that it was too inaccurate the location, size and behaviour of Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and to destroy a hostile battery or German batteries. That the Canadians Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS), Waterloo, ON, 5–7 May 2011. neutralize it for very long. Despite had known so little about the German the disappointing performance of reserves and coastal positions before 1. War Diary (WD), General Staff (GS), HQ, artillery in terms of accuracy during the battle made the success of CB 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, October 1944, Appendix 5, Lieutenant-Colonel the battle, operational research work an even greater achievement. J.D. Mingay (General Staff Officer, helped commanders understand In the end, the Allied counter-battery 3rd Canadian Infantry Division), 3rd why errors were so prevalent and methods proved to be invaluable Canadian Infantry Division Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No.45, 2 October gave clues as to how they could be during Switchback. 1944, p.1; Library and Archives Canada remedied. Operational research alone As Major Wallace discovered in (LAC), Record Group (RG) 24, vol.10,907, could not achieve victory: it was up his study of the battlefield, counter- file 235C3.013 (D3): Major J.R. Martin (Historical Officer, 3rd Canadian Infantry to gifted field commanders to use its bombardment by predicted shooting Division), “Battle Narrative, Operation lessons to the Allies’ advantage to suffered from severe limitations. ‘Switchback,’” 25 Jan 1945, para.2. 2. C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian bring a speedy and welcome end to The primary culprits for the wide Army in the Second World War, vol.3, The the Second World War. dispersion of shells were errors at the Victory Campaign: The Operations in North- command post and in sight testing, West Europe, 1944–1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1960), pp.358–361, 386–389, 425. Conclusion not calibration or meteorology. 3. See R.W. Thompson, The Eighty-Five Survey mistakes were responsible Days: The Story of the Battle of the Scheldt rior to Operation Switchback, only for marginal errors. Given the (London: Hutchinson, 1957); L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, vol.2, The Defeat Pthe Canadians had little limitations of CB work during quiet of Germany (London: HMSO, 1968), intelligence concerning German periods and in poor weather, as chaps.4–5.; and J.L. Moulton, Battle for strength, dispositions or locations of well as the inaccuracy of predicted Antwerp: The Liberation of the City and the Opening of the Scheldt, 1944 (New York: hostile batteries beyond the forward shooting, artillery accounted for a Hippocrene Books, 1978). defences. This was a serious handicap less substantial role in the Canadian 4. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, p.400. for counter-battery efforts. Because victory at the Scheldt than historians 5. John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (New York: the German batteries were relatively have previously realized. Viking, 1990), pp.xvii–xix. Ellis paid slight silent before the battle, the Canadians The Canadian struggle for attention to the actual Scheldt fighting, the Breskens Pocket was not an but he concurred with Stacey’s contention had only fixed a small number. Once that the Canadians were sluggish because the battle was underway, the CB exercise in “brute force.” Despite Montgomery had misallocated so many organization had to contend with the large number of artillery units resources to the Ruhr enterprise (p.406). 6. Terry Copp, ed., Montgomery’s Scientists: poor visibility from the worsening devoted to Switchback, planners Operational Research in Northwest Europe, autumn weather, a lengthy period had never meant to use artillery 1944–1945 (Waterloo, ON: LCMSDS, of German inactivity and the lack of as a “blunt instrument.” Instead, 2000), pp.26, 49. See also Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in natural observation posts on the flat artillery was employed as flexibly Northwest Europe, 1944–1945 (: terrain. as possible for attacks on precise University of Toronto Press, 2006), The battle exemplified the targets. The diligence of Lieutenant- pp.290–291. 7. C.P. Stacey, “Canadian Participation in weaknesses of specific counter- Colonel J.H.D. Ross and 2nd Survey the Operations in North-West Europe, battery techniques. Careful analysis Regiment, RCA shows that the Allies 1944, Part VI: Canadian Operations, 1 shows that sound ranging was not used highly developed methods to October–8 November: The Clearing of the Scheldt Estuary,” Canadian Military precise enough to accurately locate enable the artillery to silence German Headquarters (CMHQ) Report No.188, German guns. Regardless of how well guns with the most intelligent and 7 April 1948, Directorate of History

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and Heritage, Department of National 26. Ibid., paras.3, 107. 41. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, Defence (DHH), para.104. 27. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944, Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM 8. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944: Appendix 2, Brigadier N.E. Rodger (Chief No.18, 7 October 1944. Appendix 27, Major-General C. Foulkes of Staff, 2 Cdn Corps), 2 Cdn Corps ISUM 42. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, pp.393–395. (Acting General Officer Commanding No.64, 7 October 1944, part 1. Quotation 43. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944, 2 Cdn Corps), “Operation ‘Switchback’ from Stacey, CMHQ Report No.188, Appendix 2, Rodger, 2 Cdn Corps ISUM Outline Plan,” 2 October 1944, pp.1–2. para.121. No.64, part 1. At the time, the Canadians always 28. WD, GS, HQ, 3rd Canadian Infantry 44. WD, 23 Field Regiment (SP), RCA, 6 mistakenly referred to the Braakman Division, November 1944, Appendix 19a, October 1944. Inlet as the Savojaards Plaat, which “Op Switchback – Study Period: Notes on 45. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, really only applied to the shoal at the Polder Fighting,” 20 November 1944, part Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM mouth of the inlet (Stacey, The Victory 1, para.15(a). No.18. Campaign, p.365n). For a detailed study 29. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, 46. Ibid., Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB of air support for Operation Switchback, Appendix 5, Lieutenant-Colonel J.H.D. ISUM No.19, 8 October 1944. Includes see Mike Bechthold, “Air Support in Ross (CBO, 2 Cdn Corps), 2 Cdn Corps quotation. the Breskens Pocket: The Case of First CB ISUM No.17, 6 October 1944, 1; WD, 2 47. Quoted in WD, 4 Medium Regiment, Canadian Army and 84 Group Royal Air Svy Regt, RCA, 1–5 October 1944; Artillery RCA, 8 October 1944. Force,” Canadian Military History 3, no.2 Training, vol.3, 11/44, para.22(b). 48. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, (Autumn 1994), pp.53–62. 30. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, Sep 1944, Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM 9. WD, HQ, 2 Cdn AGRA, October 1944, Appendix 2, Rodger, 2 Cdn Corps ISUM No.20, 9 October 1944. Appendix 1, Brigadier A.B. Matthews No.53, 14 September 1944, part 1; and 2 49. WD, 3 Medium Regiment, RCA, 8 October (CCRA, 2 Cdn Corps), RCA 2 Cdn Corps Cdn Corps ISUM No.57, 22 September 1944. Operation Instruction (Op Instr) No.8, 1944, part 1, p.2. 50. WD, 7 Medium Regiment, RCA, 8 October 5 October 1944, pp.1–3. 3rd AGRA (2 31. For a detailed account of the German 1944. heavy regiments, less 2 batteries of 155 evacuation across the Scheldt, see S.J. 51. CWM, 20000005-001: 21 A Gp, para.19. mm guns) had been tentatively allotted de Groot, “Escape of the German Army 52. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944, in Foulkes’ plan, but was subsequently across the Westerscheldt, September Appendix 2, Rodger, 2 Cdn Corps ISUM reallocated. 1944,” Canadian Military History 6, no.1 No.65, part 1, p.1; WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, 10. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944, (Spring 1997), pp.109–117. October 1944, Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Appendix 27, Foulkes, pp.1, 3. 32. Copp, Cinderella Army, p.89. Corps CB ISUM No.21, 1; Stacey, The 11. WD, HQ, 2 Cdn AGRA, October 1944, 33. Calculated from WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, Victory Campaign, pp.396–397. Quotation Appendix 1, “Notes on Planning,” 29 October 1944, Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn from Stacey, CMHQ Report No.188, September 1944, p.1 and Matthews, Corps CB Hostile Battery (HB) List No.16, para.140. pp.2–4. 5 October 1944, pp.2–3 and amdt. 53. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, 9 October 1944. 12. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944, 34. WD, GS, HQ, 3rd Canadian Infantry 54. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, Appendix 27, Foulkes, Appendix A, p.2. Division, October 1944, Appendix 5, Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM 13. WD, HQ, 2 Cdn AGRA, October 1944, Mingay, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division No.21, 10 October 1944, p.1. Appendix 1, Matthews, p.3. ISUM No.45, p.3. 55. WD, GS, HQ, 3rd Canadian Infantry 14. United Kingdom, War Office, Artillery 35. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944, Division, 9 October 1944; WD, GS, HQ Training, vol.3, Field Gunnery, Pamphlet Appendix 2, Rodger, 2 Cdn Corps ISUM 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944, Appendix No.11, “Counter Battery Duties, 1944” No.64, part 1; Canadian War Museum 2, Rodger, 2 Cdn Corps ISUM No.65, 9 (London: HMSO, 15 April 1944), para.2; (CWM) 20000005-001: 21 A Gp, “Clearing October 1944, part 1, p.1. Brigadier-General A.G.L. McNaughton, of the Scheldt Estuary,” n.d., para.11. 56. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, vol.2, “Counter Battery Work,” Canadian 36. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944, p.362n and C.P. Stacey, Official History Defence Quarterly 3, no.4 (1926), p.380. Appendix 2, Rodger, 2 Cdn Corps ISUM of the Canadian Army in the Second World 15. McNaughton, pp.382–383; Shelford No.63, 5 October 1944, part 1, p. 2 and War, vol. 1, Six Years of War: The Army in Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire- Appendix D. The Germans expressed Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Power: The British Army Weapons and their artillery calibres in centimetres, Queen’s Printer, 1957), p.545. Theories of War, 1904–1945 (1982; repr., not in millimetres as in Anglo-American 57. WD, HQ, RCA 3rd Canadian Infantry Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, armies. For consistency, all calibres are Division, 10 October 1944; WD, 2 CBO 2004), pp.109–111; G.W.L. Nicholson, expressed here in millimetres. Staff, RCA, October 1944, Appendix The Gunners of Canada: The History of the 37. A.G. Steiger, “The Campaign in North- 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps ISUM No.22, 11 Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, vol.1, West Europe: Information from German October 1944, p.1. 1534–1919 (Beauceville, QC: L’Éclaireur, Sources, Part III, German Defence 58. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, p.397; WD, 1978), pp.312–317. Operations in the Sphere of First GS, HQ, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, 16. McNaughton, pp.380–381; Artillery Canadian Army (23 Aug–8 Nov 44),” October 1944, Appendix 10, Mingay, 3rd Training, vol. 3, 11/44, section 10. Army Headquarters Report No.69, 30 Canadian Infantry Division Op Instr 17. Artillery Training, vol.3, 11/44, App.1. July 1954, DHH, para.203; Denis Whitaker No.1, 10 October 1944, p.2; WD, HQ, 2 18. Ibid., sections 11–12. and Shelagh Whitaker, Tug of War: The Cdn AGRA, 10 October 1944; WD, HQ, 19. Ibid., paras.98, 180. Allied Victory that Opened Antwerp, 2nd ed. RCA 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, 9 20. Ibid., section 15. (Toronto: Stoddart, 2000), p.271. The 64th October 1944. 21. United Kingdom, War Office, Artillery Infantry Division remained under LXVII 59. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, Training, vol.6, Survey, Pamphlet No.5, Corps until 14 October, when it was Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM “General Principles and Practice of Sound placed directly under Fifteenth Army’s No.23, 12 October 1944; WD, GS, HQ, 3rd Ranging, 1944” (London: HMSO, 1 April command (Steiger, para.218). Canadian Infantry Division, 11 October 1944), paras.5, 9. 38. See, for example, LAC, RG 24, vol.10,907, 1944. 22. Ibid., paras.5–6. Each pair of adjacent file 235C3.013 (D3): Martin, para.15, and 60. Cited in Stacey, CMHQ Report No.188, microphones comprised a “sub-base.” Stacey, CMHQ Report No.188, para.112. para.146. 23. Ibid., paras.18–21. 39. Steiger, para.205 and note. 61. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944, 24. Ibid., sec.26. 40. WD, 13 Field Regiment, RCA, 6 October Appendix 2, Rodger, 2 Cdn Corps ISUM 25. Ibid., paras.115–116. 1944. No.67, 13 October 1944, part 1.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/3 33 18 : “You Have Shut Up the Jerries” Canadian Counter-Battery Work in the Clearing of the Breskens Pocket, October–November 1944

62. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, 78. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944, 94. WD, HQ, RCA 3rd Canadian Infantry Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM Appendix 2, Rodger, 2 Cdn Corps ISUM Division, 31 October 1944. No.24, 13 October 1944; WD, 19 A Field No.71, 21 October 1944, part 1, pp.1–2. 95. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 399–400. Regiment, RCA, 12 October 1944; WD, 79. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, pp.397–398. 96. WD, GS, HQ, 3rd Canadian Infantry 3 Medium Regiment, RCA, 12 October 80. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, Division, November 1944, Appendix 19A, 1944. Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM “Op Switchback – Study Period: Notes on 63. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, p.395. No.32, 21 October 1944. Polder Fighting,” part 1, para.15(b). 64. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944, 81. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, p.398. 97. Statistics compiled from data in WD, 2 Appendix 2, Rodger, 2 Cdn Corps ISUM 82. Steiger, para.227; Stacey, CMHQ Report CBO Staff, RCA, Oct–November 1944, No.67, part 1, p.2. No.188, para.157; WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM 65. Bechthold, p.58. October 1944, Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Nos.17–46, 6 Oct–4 November 1944 and 66. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, Corps CB ISUM No.33, 22 October 1944. Appendix 6, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB HB Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB 83. Steiger, para.228; WD, 2 CBO Staff, List Nos. 16–22, 5–23 October 1944. ISUM No.25, 14 October 1944; WD, HQ, RCA, October 1944, Appendix 5, Ross, 2 98. LAC, RG 24, vol.20 339, file 952.013 (D43): RCA 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, 13 Cdn Corps CB ISUM Nos. 34–37, 23–26 “Study of Accuracy of Artillery Fire – October 1944. October 1944; WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, Preliminary Trials,” Army Operational 67. WD, GS, HQ, 3rd Canadian Infantry October 1944, Appendix 2, Rodger, 2 Cdn Research Group (AORG) Report No.217, Division, October 1944, Appendix 12, Corps ISUM No.72, 23 October 1944, part 28 November 1944, pars.2–8, 14–29, 30(d). Mingay, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division 1; WD, HQ, RCA 3rd Canadian Infantry 99. Copp, Montgomery’s Scientists, p.48. Op Instr No.2, 14 October 1944, p.1. Division, 22 October 1944. 100. “Accuracy of Predicted Shooting,” AORG 68. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, p.397. 84. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, p.399. Report No.24, n.d., para.2, found in Copp, 69. Steiger, para.218; WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn 85. Steiger, para.232. Montgomery’s Scientists. Corps, October 1944, Appendix 2, Rodger, 86. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, 101. Ibid., paras.11–14. 2 Cdn Corps ISUM No.68, 15 October Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM 102. LCMSDS, RG 1, file 00088: C. B. Lax, 1944, Appendix D. No.38, 27 October 1944. “A Summary of Wartime Counter- 70. WD, HQ, RCA 3rd Canadian Infantry 87. Ibid., Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB Bombardment Results,” AORG Report Division, 14 October 1944. ISUM No.39, 28 October 1944; WD, 14 No.2/50, Mar 1950, paras.22, 24. 71. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, Field Regiment, RCA, 27 October 1944; Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM Steiger, para.233. No.26, 15 October 1944. 88. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, 72. Ibid., Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM ISUM Nos.27–28, 16–17 October 1944. No.40, 29 October 1944. 73. WD, GS, HQ, 2 Cdn Corps, October 1944, 89. Steiger, para.234. Appendix 2, Rodger, 2 Cdn Corps ISUM 90. Ibid., para.235. No.69, 17 October 1944, part 1, p.2. 91. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, 74. Ibid.; WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM R. Daniel Pellerin is a PhD candidate 1944, Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB No.41, 30 October 1944. in the Department of History at the ISUM No.29, 18 October 1944. 92. Steiger, para.239. University of Ottawa. An alumnus of the 75. Ibid., Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB 93. LAC, RG 24, vol.10,907, file 235C3.013 2007 Cleghorn Battlefield Study Tour, he ISUM No.30, 19 October 1944. (D3): Martin, Appendix B, “Artillery holds undergraduate degrees in business 76. WD, HQ, RCA 3rd Canadian Infantry in Operation Switchback: Account by administration and history from Wilfrid Division, 19 October 1944. Brigadier P.A.S. Todd, DSO, OBE, ED, Laurier University. He completed his MA 77. WD, 2 CBO Staff, RCA, October 1944, CCRA 2 Cdn Corps (formerly CRA 3rd in history at the University of Waterloo Appendix 5, Ross, 2 Cdn Corps CB ISUM Canadian Infantry Division) Given to in 2009. No.31, 20 October 1944. Historical Officer 9 Dec 44,” para.7.

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