Collection of the Research Papers. EU-Eap Academy 2019

EU-EaP ACADEMY: SUPPORTING NEXT GENERATION OF SCHOLARS IN EUROPEAN STUDIES. Collection of the research papers of the participants of the EU-EaP Academy. (Kyiv, February 11-15, 2019). – Ukrainian Association of Professors and Researchers of European Integration. – Kyiv, 2019. – 230 p.

The materials of this publication are meant to foster junior scholars inquiry and discussion in the area of the European Union, European integration, and the EU–EaP relations. The researches are presented in various styles and formats of the academic writing, they bear multidisciplinary character. The views presented in the papers do not necessarily represent the views of the EU-EaP Academy Editorial Board. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this publication lies entirely with the authors.

This publication is prepared and supported by the Erasmus+ Programme – Jean Monnet Project 599865- EPP-1-2018-1-UA-EPPJMO-PROJECT:”EU-EAP ACADEMY: SUPPORTING NEXT GENERATION OF SCHOLARS IN EUROPEAN STUDIES”

The publication is placed at the https: http://aprei-project2018.com.ua/

CONTENT Alasgarova Gulnaz AZERBAIJANI LEGISLATION COMBATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: IS IT IN LINE WITH 2011 COE ISTANBUL CONVENTION? ...... 5 Balodis Janis THE TERRITORIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE CASE BETWEEN LATVIA AND BELARUS ...... 11 Boltachka Pavel TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EU AND BELARUS IN CONTEXT OF EaP...... 24 Corman Corneliu THE ROLE OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT IN THE EAST- WEST GEOPOLITICAL CONFRONTATION AND THE PROSPECTS OF ITS REGULATION...... 27 Davitashvili Gvantsa EUROPEANISATION CASE OF GEORGIA: BOTTOM-UP PERSPECTIVE ...... 37 Drapak Mykhailo THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL MINORITY IN ROMANIA AND SLOVAKIA: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ...... 40 Galaburda Mariia, Yakubchak Olga FOOD SAFETY CHALANGES IN UKRAINE: IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN FOOD LAGISLATION 49 Gigauri Shorena JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL STANDARDS 54 Gurbanov Ilgar NORMATIVE CONVERGENCE VERSUS BACKYARD PRESERVATION: COMPETING INTEGRATION TRENDS IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD ...... 61 Gvelesiani Zurab TRANSPLANTATION OF EU COMPETITION LAW TO GEORGIA ...... 69 Hakobyan Mher A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONING OF THE “EASTERN PARTNERSHIP” IN ARMENIA, GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA...... 83 Khachatryan Hasmik THE ROLE OF GEOPOLITICS IN THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP POLICY ...... 91 Kortukova Tamara LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMMON IMMIGRATION POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ...... 103 Kryvoruchko Mykhailo INTERREGIONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECT ...... 115 Lahanyak Olena LEGAL BASIS REGULATING THE ENERGY ACTIVITIES OF PIPELINES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION.... 124 Lucassen Okke IN BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC DETERRENCE133 Moțpan Carolina CIVILIZATIONAL- EUROPEAN IDENTITY DIMENSIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION. THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA ...... 152 Mustafayev Elmar EUROPEANIZATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE CASE OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT161 Razumei Halyna IMPLEMENTATION OF ІNTEGRATED CUSTOMS RISK MANAGEMENT IN UKRAINE ...... 164

Rusova Olga THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL CULTURE ON THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN UKRAINE, GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA IN THE POST-COMMUNIST PERIOD ...... 175 Sargsyan Arpine INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS: INTERRELATION WITH INTEGRATION, TRADE AND INNOVATION ...... 183 Shegirbayev Ozhet THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATION OF MONETARY UNION WITHIN EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION IN COMPARISON WITH EUROPEAN UNION ...... 192 Shevchenko Tetiana ACTIVITIES OF SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITIES AND AUTHORITIES ENSURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EU PRODUCT SAFETY LEGISLATION ON THE NON-FOOD MARKET ...... 203 Sholom Alina THE ROLE OF THE WTO AND RTAS IN GLOBAL INSTITUTIONALIAZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE SYSTEM, THE CASE OF UKRAINE ...... 213 Țaranu Ludmila LEGAL CONCEPTS ABOUT THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF THE NATURAL PERSON: COMPARATIVE QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION-REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA ...... 222

Gulnaz Alasgarova PhD, teacher Lecturer at the UNESCO Chair on Human Rights and Information Law; Vice-dean on int. affairs of the Law School Baku State University

AZERBAIJANI LEGISLATION COMBATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: IS IT IN LINE WITH 2011 COE ISTANBUL CONVENTION?

Objectives

This paper aims to develop an effective response to the challenges currently faced by law-enforcement bodies and other executive agencies in meeting the requirements of national legislation preventing domestic violence underpinning its due implementation. It is intended that the research findings will contribute to the development of a legislative framework. The aim of the research is to analyze the compliance of the national legislation with the European standards. The research project also intends to explore to what extent national legislation complies with the standards set up within the CoE and EU. These above aims raise the following core research objectives:  To identify legal provisions that may be currently found challenging or ambiguous or even hampering proper protection of domestic violence victims  To evaluate current legislation and its implementation by state agencies  To compare local legislation with European standards  To propose ways in which legislative loopholes as well as deficiencies may be addressed. The long-term goal of the project is to assess feasibility of wider application of national legal norms for ensuring protection against domestic violence to the possible extent and to offer new approaches to eliminate deficiencies in legislation and legal practice impeding effective struggle against domestic violence.

Background to the Research

The research topic is dedicated to the overview of the national legislation on combating domestic violence in the light of the 2011 CoE Istanbul Convention. Azerbaijan is the partner country in the Eastern Partnership initiative and one of the main priorities within the EaP is gender equality and non- discrimination. One of the targets to be achieved by 2020 is adoption of anti-discrimination legislation and its effective implementation 1 . Additionally, relevant legislation should be harmonized and Azerbaijan as well as other EaP countries is expected to ratify the Council of Europe Istanbul

1 JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Eastern Partnership - Focusing on key priorities and deliverables, 2016, p.6

Convention. 2Domestic violence legislation is planned to be adopted in all countries and effective referral mechanisms must be in place.3 In addition to the previously mentioned, EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement also lays down a framework for cooperation in protection and promotion of human rights.4 Azerbaijan has already adopted legislation in that sphere, namely Law on Prevention of Domestic Violence of 2010. However, Azerbaijan does not hurry to sign and ratify the Istanbul Convention and to bring its laws in conformity with the standards set by the abovementioned Convention.5 Compared to the Istanbul Convention, national legislation does not provide for proper and efficient protection of victims. According to the data provided by “WAVE” NGO, 2008 surveys show that during their lifetime 14% of women were victims of physical abuse in Azerbaijan and 4% of women experienced sexual violence within family units6. This data is surely is relative since many episodes remain latent. 36,1% (90 episodes) of overall 249 homicide episodes detected in 2017 were committed in a family or intimate relationship7. This data is surely is relative since many episodes remain undiscovered. 90 episodes of total 249 detected in 2017 were committed in a family or intimate relationship8.

Methodology

It is planned to use several legal research methodologies for achieving the overwhelming answers to the questions posed. For better insight of reasons underlying the issues, it is better to use interdisciplinary research of laws in question with the view to historical and social context. Another method to be used in my research is a comparative method which is useful to determine a better legal regime for my country. For taking a more in-depth analysis of the law or regulation and its application to a definite situation, a deductive model is also expected to be used throughout the paper.

2 Ibid 3 Ibid 4 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Communities and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the Other Part, 1999, art. 5 5 https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/210/signatures?desktop=true (last visited on 31.10.2018) Unlike Azerbaijan, the EU has signed the Convention. 6 Barbara Stelmaszek and Hilary Fisher, “WAVE- Country Report. Vienna, 2012 Reality Check on Data Collection and European Services for Women and Children Survivors of Violence: A Right for Protection and Support?,5, available at . 7 Crime Analysis for 2017, available at . 8 Crime Analysis for 2017, available at .

Discussion

The Law “On the Prevention of Domestic Violence” (hereinafter the Law) was finally adopted in 2010. However, flawless from the first sight, it contains some provisions contradicting European standards displayed in the 2011 CoE Istanbul Convention. For supporting this statement, I would like to mention some examples. Firstly, our legislation is not gender specific. Secondly, the Law indicates the state’s duty to “assist in normalisation of relations between parties and resumption of family affairs”9, thereby being contrary to its main objectives and reducing efficiency of measures against domestic violence. This provision can be interpreted as privileging mediation and reconciliation over the protection of women’s human rights.10 The main task of the criminal prosecution authorities is to punish the perpetrator and restore the rights of the victim, but not to assume a role of mediator in family relations. Within the research, I`d like to analyse the pros and cons of the national legislation in the lights of the Convention and other instruments available within CoE and supported by the EU. Legal measures taken by state agencies, namely actions towards combatting domestic violence episodes constituting criminal offense.

Domestic violence episodes constituting criminal offense

In order to ensure effective protection mechanism against domestic violence states should put in place a criminal legislation. Domestic violence should be recognized as a criminal act and law should be duly implemented for acknowledging effective struggle against domestic violence. Firstly, Azerbaijani legislation does not recognize domestic violence as a separate criminal offense. However, any episodes of domestic violence containing infliction of physical damage may fall under the Criminal Code. However, “such an enumeration of the range of criminal conduct employed by many perpetrators of domestic violence would underscore the breadth of violent crimes and fear- inducing or harmful conduct often committed but most importantly, it would be clear to those tasked with implementing the law that those crimes ordinarily ascribed to third parties can and do occur in the home and/or amongst persons who remain in a family, or similar relationship.”11

9 Article 7.4, Law on Domestic Violence 10 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo.Addendum, Mission to Azerbaijan. 25 April 2014., paragraph 64. 11 ODIHR Opinion of the Draft Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Domestic Violence, paragraph 15. Citing “Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence”, Advisory Committee of the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation Model Code Project of the Family Violence Project, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, California. 1994, page 3.

The Law Prevention of Domestic Violence provides the measures taken along with the criminal prosecution when considering complaints of domestic violence in the manner prescribed by the Criminal Procedural Code. The overwhelming list of duties are in line with international standards, however, the state’s duty to “assist in normalisation of relations between parties and resumption of family affairs”12 is contrary to the main objectives of the Law and reduces efficiency of measures against domestic violence. This provision can be interpreted as privileging mediation and reconciliation over the protection of women’s human rights.13 Practice shows that this practice is widespread among state agencies and even judges. For example, in one case, the judge repeatedly asked that the victim say the word “reconcile” for the court record, despite the victim’s apparent reluctance to do so.14 Provision on reconciliation impedes fight against domestic violence since it gives the opportunity for officials to terminate legal proceedings against the perpetrator, thereby posing a real threat to the safety of a victim. Criminal Code also provides for the possibility of release from a criminal liability in connection with reconciliation with victim of a person, who has committed a crime for the first time, not representing big public danger.15 83% of closed crimes16 in 2017 were minor crimes and crimes not posing great threat to public safety, it is highly likely that most of the domestic violence crimes are those not posing great threat to public safety. Deliberate causing of minor serious harm to health, deliberate causing of less serious harm to health fall under the umbrella of crimes not posing great threat to public safety. Most of the experienced physical violence covers beatings that result either in cuts, bruises, aches17 or eye injuries, sprains, dislocations, or burns.18 In comparison with the minor physical injuries, only 6.1 % of women received more serious injuries such as deep wounds, broken bones, broken teeth and etc.19 “One of the purposes of imposing criminal sanctions is to restrain and deter the offender from causing further harm”20. The state should not merely restore the violated rights of victims, but also to prevent a much more serious harm to be inflicted by the perpetrator. The ECHR highlighted that state`s

12 Ibid., (Art.7.4). 13 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo. Addendum, Mission to Azerbaijan. 25 April 2014., paragraph 64. 14 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], Domestic Violence Cases in the Justice System of Azerbaijan. Rule of Law and Human Rights Unit. OSCE Office in Baku, 2013. 15 Azərbaycan Respublikası Cinayət Məcəlləsi [AR CM] [Criminal Code] art. 73 (Republic of Azerbaijan) 16 Crime Analysis for 2017, op.cit. note 7. 17 Pursuant to The 2006 Demographic and Health Survey in Azerbaijan, 41.1% of surveyed have ever received cuts, bruises, aches. See 2006 Demographic and Health Survey in Azerbaijan, https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr195/fr195.pdf (last visited on 17 Oct. 2018) 18 Ibid 19 Ibid 20 Valiulienė v. Lithuania , no.33234/07,§ 85, ECHR 2013

obligation involves a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by law- enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions. It also extends in appropriate circumstances to a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.21 Hence, this provision taken together with the legal approach used in the Law, namely assistance in normalisation of relations between parties and resumption of family affairs only further emboldens the state agencies to neglect victims` complaints on domestic violence episodes. It is vital that willingness of a legislator to protect family units and assist in normalisation of relations between parties will not prevail over a victim`s physical integrity or safety. In this respect, contradiction in the Law itself since the legislator fails to find a fair balance between the aims pursued. Further, this provision does not comply with the requirements of the Istanbul Convention stipulating parties obligation to take the necessary legislative and other measures to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, punish and provide reparation for acts of violence covered by the scope of this Convention that are perpetrated by non‐State actors.22 Furthermore, we can mention the lack of gender perspective of the Law, adherence of national agencies to mediation rather than prosecution and punishment as main aspects hampering struggle with domestic violence. Deeply rooted patriarchal attitudes pertaining to cases of violence against women by police, judicial officers, other relevant civil servants as well as community leaders and families, contribute significantly to the underreporting of cases.23

Conclusion

After adoption of the Law on Prevention of Domestic Violence effective steps were taken to protect victims. However, the Law is gender-neutral disregarding needs of vulnerable groups such as women, IDP or migrant women, children and etc. On top of that, a provision on “the duty to assist in normalisation of relations between parties and resumption of family affairs” indeed hampers due protection of victims and reinforce stereotypes such

21 Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401/02, §.128, ECHR 2009 22 Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Art.5.2), 11.05.2011, CETS № 210. 23 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo. Addendum, Mission to Azerbaijan. 25 April 2014., paragraph 70

as submissiviness of women and their obligation to make compromises for normalisation of family relations. Additionally, domestic violence is not stipulated in Criminal Code as a circumstance aggravating punishment. Lack of shelters also impedes proper application of the national legislation. In conclusion, it is worth mentioning that adoption of the Law on Prevention of Domestic Violence was a breakthrough in protection of victims. However, gaps pointed out throughout the article reduce effectiveness of the Law. Enhancement of the national legislation will put it in line with the requirements and standards of Istanbul Convention. With regard to the implementation of the legislation and actual situation, there is a long way to go.

References

1. JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Eastern Partnership - Focusing on key priorities and deliverables, 2016 2. Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Communities and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the Other Part, 1999 3. https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/- /conventions/treaty/210/signatures?desktop=true 4. Barbara Stelmaszek and Hilary Fisher, “WAVE- Country Report. Vienna, 2012 Reality Check on Data Collection and European Services for Women and Children Survivors of Violence: A Right for Protection and Support?,5, available at . 6. The Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan “on the Prevention of Domestic Violence” dated 22 June 2010, №1058-IIIQ 7. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo.Addendum, Mission to Azerbaijan. 25 April 2014 8. ODIHR Opinion of the Draft Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Domestic Violence, paragraph 15. Citing 9. “Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence”, Advisory Committee of the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation 10. Model Code Project of the Family Violence Project, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, 11. California. 1994 12. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], Domestic Violence Cases in the Justice System of Azerbaijan. Rule of Law and Human Rights Unit. OSCE Office in Baku, 2013 13. Azərbaycan Respublikası Cinayət Məcəlləsi [AR CM] [Criminal Code] art. 73 (Republic of Azerbaijan) 14. 2006 Demographic and Health Survey in Azerbaijan, https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr195/fr195.pdf 15. Valiulienė v. Lithuania , no.33234/07,§ 85, ECHR 2013 16. Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401/02, §.128, ECHR 2009 17. Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, 11.05.2011, CETS № 210

Janis Balodis PhD student, Lecturer University of Latvia

THE TERRITORIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE CASE BETWEEN LATVIA AND BELARUS

Abstract

Cross border cooperation is an institutional and a political oriented cooperation between two or more administrative and sovereign units. In master thesis cross border cooperation was analysed as an institutional process of interstate cooperation and cross border cooperation between administrative units in Belarus – Latvia’s borderland. European integration and cross border cooperation are linked by 1) integrated economic space across the member states by Henk van Houtum, 2) the intersection between the history of European integration and the more general research field of border studies by Birte Wassenberg and 3) more gradual process and impact on border locations after the Second World war by Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, Charles van Marrewijk and Abdella Oumer. The theoretical approach of cross border cooperation includes - 1) the relation between core and periphery, 2) the division of exogenous and endogenous factors and 3) types of borderlands (alienated borderlands, co – existent borderlands, interdependent borderlands and integrated borderlands). Further theorethical concepts are drivers of cross-border co – operation (economic, political leadership, identity/cultural and geographical drivers). The theoretical approach of cross border cooperation, like cross border values and cross border values are linked with first hypothesis - the cross – border cooperation builds a stronger intergovernmental cooperation between Latvia and Belarus and second hypothesis - a part of the bilateral cooperation between Latvia and Belarus, the cross border cooperation has been looking as the tool, how to promote the cooperation in business, culture, education, environmental protection and tourism between Latvia and Belarus. The cross border cooperation forms between Belarus and Latvia are: 1) trade, 2) tourism, 3) environmental protection, 4) combsting against illegal immigration and 5) economic development. Cross border cooperation between Belarus and Latvia is significant for it’s importance of the European Neighbourhood policy (the ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (the EaP). Belarus and Latvia for the realization of cross border cooperation use European neighbourhood Policy instrument – the ENPI.

Keywords: European Neighbourhood Policy (the ENP), cross - border cooperation, Latvia, Belarus, borderlands

Literature Review

Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) is one of the tools of the EU policy towards its neighbours. Cross border cooperation between two or more countries includes aspects of borderland development, regional integration, economic development and social cohesion. Regional integration has a historical background. In this sense cross border cooperation is understand cooperation between border regions. Gregory; Martin and Smith (1994) are arguing, that ‘’borders is a form of boundary associated with the rise of the modern nation – state’’ and the establishment of an interstate geopolitical order Gregory (1994). The main problem is to analyse, how between two Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) regulation periods (2007 – 2013) and (2014 – 2020), cross border cooperation influenced the cooperation between the EU member states and European Neighbourhood countries. In this case, will be analyse the case study between Latvia and Belarus. A research problem is to compare cross – border cooperation concept to Europe’s integration, especially at borderland regions.

Methodology

Examining three hypothesis:

1. The cross – border cooperation builds a stronger intergovernmental cooperation between Latvia and Belarus, which is realized by the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, and this shows, how Latvian - Belarusian intergovernmental cooperation support the European Neighbourhood Policy. 2. A part of the bilateral cooperation between Latvia and Belarus, the cross border cooperation has been looking as the tool, how to promote the cooperation in business, culture, education, environmental protection and tourism between Latvia and Belarus. 3. The cross border cooperation at the municipal level, like the cooperation between Daugavpils and Vitebsk shows oriented cooperation policy, like the project “Daugavpils Vitebsk: cultural cooperation and development”. In this research will be used – 1) qualitative and 2) quantitative methodology. As a qualitative methodology will be used literature analysis and structural interviews with policy makers, members from civil society and diplomats. The interviews will be organized in Latvia and Belarus. Data will be collected be collected data from Latvia – Lithuania – Belarus cross border cooperation data basis. Results from the interview will be used as the data for qualitative analysis.

‘’Spatial data are those data which combine attribute information (e.g. name of the spatial object – for example villages, population density etc.) with location information (spatial coordinates) (georeferenced data)’’ . Spatial data will used to proof geographical integrity of cross border cooperation.

Results and Discussion

Cross – border cooperation and the ENP have two interactions, which are spatially linked. There are opportunities and challenges in the same time of cross – border cooperation in the are of the ENP. The two processes how cross border cooperation how make the interaction of the ENP are: 1. ‘’‘border confirming’ – is about confirming border areas of demarcation and division, in which borders are conceived as boundary lines, frontier zones or barriers that protect the Union and its citizens’’24. 2. ‘’‘border transcending’ – consists of a challenge to open EU borders and involves the transformation of the EU’s external boundaries into zones of interactions, opportunities and exchanges, with the emphasis on the transcendence of boundaries’’25. After the EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 the EU decided to establish stronger relationships with it’s eastern neighbours, like Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Programmes like PHARE, TACIS and INTERREG, which are attractive for members the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 1. Cross border cooperation as a political tool for the Eastern Partnership (EaP) Victoria Khasson says, that ‘’the EU’s relationship with its direct neighbourhood is increasingly conceptualised within the external governance approach, which is focused on the analysis of mechanisms and modes of interaction within the process of modification of boundaries existing between the EU and its direct proximity (e.g. geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional and cultural’’26. ‘’The EU has not forced any of the six EaP countries to abort their links with Russia and indeed continued dialogue with Armenia and Ukraine when they decided not to proceed with the AAs, as well as with traditionally sceptical Azerbaijan and Belarus’’27. Belarus membership in the Eastern Partnership is difficult and with lot of obstacles for further political development in to the EaP. ‘’Belarus also used to belong to it, but on 30 September 2011 the country resigned from membership in the Eastern

24 Bohdana Dimitrova, Remarking Europe’s Borders through the European Neighbourhood Policy, CEPS Working Document NO. 327, March 2010, p. 1. 25 Ibid, p. 1. 26 Viktoriya Khasson, Cross-border cooperation over the Eastern EU border: between assistance and partnership under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, in: East European Politics, 2013, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 328 –343. 27 Diana Potjomkina, A More Geopolitical Eastern Partnership: U - Turn or “The Lady’s not For Turning”?, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga, 2015, p. 7.

Partnership due to many political (non-democratic regime of the President Lukashenka) and economic (creating of the customs union with Russia and Kazakhstan) issues’’28.

2. The EU and Belarus partnership for cross border cooperation

Grigory Ioffe says, that “In March 1995, in Brussels, Lukashenka signed the Belarus – the EU agreement on partnership and cooperation”29. This is the start point of a political relationship between Latvia and Belarus.

Delegation of the European Union to Belarus says, that: ‘’The EU remains committed to a policy of critical engagement towards Belarus and highlights the importance it attaches to relations with the country and its people’’30. Beside of cross border cooperation important is also regional cooperation. Between the EU and Belarus, there exist three cross – border programmes31:

 Latvia – Lithuania – Belarus;  Poland – Belarus – Ukraine;  Baltic Sea programme; Cross – border cooperation programmes is important form of international cooperation of Belarus. Agreements, cooperation, negotiations and bilateral dialogue are those components, which are essential for the EU – Belarus cooperation in economic and social affairs.

Projects of European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-2013, which is for cross border cooperation programme Latvia – Lithuania – Belarus. The analysis of cross – border projects between Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus by it’s priority, shows integrity by different kind of projects and forms of cooperation.

3. Projects of European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-2013 Cross Border Cooperation Programme Latvia – Lithuania – Belarus

28 Daniel Butyter, Trade Development between the European Union and Members of the Eastern Partnership Programme. Example of Ukraine and Poland, in: Intellectual Economics, 2014, Vol. 8, No. 1(19), pp. 65 – 78. 29 Grigory Ioffe, Reassessing Lukashenka – Belarus in Cultural and Geopolitical Context, Houndmills, Palgrave McMillan, 2014, p. 89. 30Delegation of the European Union to Belarus, EU-Belarus Relations Fact Sheet, 2016, Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/eu_belarus/political_relations/index_en.htm (Conducted on 02.03.2016). 31 Giselle Bosse, From ‘Villains’ to the New Guardians of Security in Europe? Paradigm Shifts in EU Foreign Policy towards Libya and Belarus, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 440 – 461.

Figure 1: The number of projects between Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus for time period 2011 – 201332

The number of projects between Belarus, Lithuania and Latvia for period 2011 – 2013 is 57 projects (see: Fig.3). There is a positive progression of the number of projects of cross border cooperation between Belarus, Lithuania and Latvia, for example in 2011 was 14 projects, but in 2013 the number of projects was 27.

32 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-2013 Cross Border Cooperation Programme Latvia – Lithuania – Belarus, Projects by Priority and Measure, 2016, Available at: http://www.enpi- cbc.eu/go.php/eng/projects/659/2/179 (Conducted on 27.02.2016).

4. The number of cross – border projects in Latvia’s – Belarus borderland (in border counties)

Figure 2: The number of cross – border projects in Latvia’s – Belarus borderland (in border counties). The map is made by Janis Balodis using spatial data from geographical information data, which produced by Latvian Geospatial Data Agency.

Cross – border cooperation projects is not understand only from it’s geographical meaning of cross – border regions. That also shows, that the majority of cross – border projects are not done in the borderland between Belarus and Latvia. The institutions and responsible authorities in the borderland are more dependent from central administrative authorities – 1) regional government and 2) central government of county. The dynamics of cross – border projects in borderlands is hard to evaluate, because there is only data for the period 2007 – 2013. The cross - border projects for the period 2014 – 2020 is not finished yet.

Cross – border project location between counties are not homogenous, because they are different by their content and aim. In Daugavpils county are 15 projects. These projects were done in urban and rural areas. For example in Daugavpils were realized 8 cross – border projects, but in the county (Daugavpils county) were realized 8 cross border projects. All these cross – border projects were related with an economic development and tourism. The second county with highest number of projects is Kraslavas county. In Kraslavas county are 9 cross – border projects. Than follows Dagdas county with 7 cross border projects. In Dagdas county cross – border projects are related with social cohesiveness and social equality. In Zilupes county are 5 cross border projects. These cross border projects are related with civil construction works and educational projects. 5. Cross – border projects between Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus by it’s priority

Cross – border projects between Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus by it’s priority is divided in two parts. The first priority is related with the promotion of sustainable economic and social development. The second priority cross border projects are related with for addressing common challenges. The division of cross border projects is based on time limitation, have cross border projects will be realized. It is also based on the approach, have cross border projects can be funded by also with the finance from local municipalities. Other division is also related with geographical location, for instance, if project will be realized in particular planning region or planning district. Table 1: Cross – border projects, which are for promoting sustainable economic and social development33

Priority 1: Promoting sustainable economic and social development Number of projects

''Promotion of socio-economic development and encouragement of 8 business and entrepreneurship''34

''Enhancement of local and regional strategic development and planning''35 1

33 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-2013 Cross - Border Cooperation Programme Latvia – Lithuania - Belarus, Priority 1: Promoting sustainable economic and social development, 2016 ,Available at: http://www.enpi-cbc.eu/go.php/eng/PROJECTS_BY_PRIORITY_AND_MEASURE/1059 (Conducted on 27.03.2016). 34 Ibid; 35 Ibid;

''Improvement of cross border accessibility through the development of 2 transport and communication networks and related services''36

''Preservation and promotion of cultural and historical heritage, promotion 14 of cross border tourism''37

''Strengthening of social-cultural networking and community 9 development''38

Cross border projects by it’s first priority are 34 cross border projects.

The majority of cross – border projects are related with the preservation and promotion of cultural and historical heritage and as well the promotion of cross border tourism. The second largest type of cross border projects is ‘’strengthening of social-cultural networking and community development’’. The total number of cross – border projects to preserve and to promote a cultural and historical heritage are 14 cross – border projects Other types of projects are related with ‘’promotion of socio-economic development and encouragement of business and entrepreneurship’’. This is related with the cross – border projects, which are created for development social entrepreneurship.

Table 2: Cross – border projects, which are for addressing common challenges39

Priority 2: Addressing common challenges Number of projects

''Protection and sustainable development of environmental and 7 natural resources''40

''Enhancement of education, health and social sphere 11 development''41

36 Ibid; 37 Ibid; 38 Ibid; 39 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-2013 Cross - Border Cooperation Programme Latvia – Lithuania - Belarus, Cross – border projects, which are for addressing common challenges, 2016, Available at: http://www.enpi-cbc.eu/go.php/eng/PROJECTS_BY_PRIORITY_AND_MEASURE/1059 (Conducted on 27.03.2016). 40 Ibid; 41 Ibid;

''Improvement of infrastructure and equipment related to the 4 border crossing points''42

''Improvement of border management operations and customs 1 procedures''43

Cross – border projects, which are for addressing common challenges, are divided in 4 categories – 1) protection and sustainable development of environmental and natural resources, 2) enhancement of education, health and social sphere development, 3) improvement of infrastructure and equipment related to the border crossing points, 4) improvement of border management operations and customs procedures. This shows, how diverse are cross border projects between Belarus and Latvia and how it’s their impact for socio – economic conditions.

6. Political background of Cross Border Cooperation between Latvia and Belarus

Cross – border cooperation between Latvia and Belarus as an “imagined concept” was established during the time, when both countries were under Soviet occupation. Both countries are new democracies, which developed their cooperation as a typical political cooperation in post – soviet space. Latvia and Belarus experienced “learning democracy”, but the political discourse was different in Belarus. Cross – border cooperation in Latvia and Belarus was organized by “democratic centralism”, which was the principle of communist parties. These principles were:

1. ‘’The election of all party authorities’’44; 2. ‘’Decision – making by majority rule’’45; 3. ‘’Responsibility and accountability’’46; 4. ‘’The submission of the minority to the majority’’47; 5. ‘’The obedience of the subordinate echelons to their respective superiors’’48;

42 Ibid; 43 Ibid; 44 Sten Berglund and Jan Ake Dellenbrant, The New Democracies in Eastern Europe – Party Systems and Political Cleavages, Brookfield, Edward Elgar, 1994, p. 25. 45 Ibid, p. 25; 46 Ibid, p. 25; 47 Ibid, p. 25; 48 Ibid, p. 25;

But the concept cross – border cooperation between Latvia and Belarus started since 2004. The relationships between the EU and Belarus is characterized as ‘’a multi – faceted view of Belarus and its relations with the EU’’49. This was the period, when cross – border cooperation between Latvia and Belarus started as an institutional cross – border cooperation. European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-2013 Cross Border Cooperation Programme of Latvia – Lithuania – Belarus is divided in ‘four priorities’50: 1. ‘’Protection and Sustainable Development of Environmental and Natural Resources’’51; 2. ‘’Enhancement of Education, Health and Social Sphere Development’’52; 3. ‘’Improvement of Infrastructure and Equipment Related to the Border Crossing Points’’53; 4. ‘’Improvement of Border Management Operations and Customs Procedures’’54; In the period 2007–2013, cross-border cooperation for the EU’s external borders ‘’was incorporated into the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)’’55. This cross border cooperation programme was hope for stronger inter – regional cooperation, which will show political willingness for cooperation in regional level. The newest territorial project, which is visible example of cross – border cooperation between Latvia and Belarus is EUROREGION – The Country of Lakes. Euroregion “Country of Lakes” was established in 2014, when the main idea was establish the Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus Cross-border cooperation program’s project “THIRD STEP”, which was the aims was investments in three events of Euroregion “Country of Lakes”. These events were: 1. ‘’an investment forum Glubokoje (Belarus)’’56; 2. ‘’an environment forum Švenčionys (Lithuania)’’57; 3. ‘’a song festival “GOSTI” in the city of Rēzekne (Latvia)’’58;

49 Ann Lewis, The EU & Belarus – Between Moscow and Brussels, Federal Trust for Education and Research, London, 2002, p. 11. 50Cross Border Cooperation Programme – Latvia – Lithuania – Belarus, How Neighbours Created History, 2016, Available at: http://www.enpi-cbc.eu/go.php/lav/57_PROGRAMMAS_PROJEKTI___K_KAIMII_VEIDOJ/1151 (Conducted on 30.01.2016). 51 Ibid; 52 Ibid; 53 Ibid; 54 Ibid; 55 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Cross-border cooperation – benefiting from borders, 2011, Available at: http://www.aebr.eu/files/publications/CBC_Benefiting_from_Borders.pdf (Consulted on 09.01.2016). 56 Ibid; 57 Ibid; 58 Ibid;

‘’Euroregion “Country of Lakes” has good and stable future prospects. All that’s been proposed and accomplished is intended for mutual understanding, friendly neighborly relations and for the wellbeing of the inhabitants of the three countries – Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus’’59. ‘’The regions without significant development poles or development axes have lower economic performance and face a number of development barriers, like rural settlement, absence of technical (transport, communications) infrastructure, unfavourable age and education structure of the population and others. These are mainly rural areas’’60. ‘’The common problem of rural regions is the lack of job opportunities, insufficient technical infrastructure and level of services and last but not least also the adverse age and educational structure of the population. The existing concept of rural regions reflects the settlement structure rather than the economic performance of the territory’’61. ‘’The distance of the region from the main centres of the countries or from large markets has a decisive effect on its development potential. The inaccessibility of regionally disadvantages territories represents a barrier to their development in a similar way in which the central location of the region represents a significant potential’’62. “The EU’s response, as of 1997, has been to activate the PCA, to suspend bilateral relations at the ministerial level, and to freeze programmes of economic and technical assistance such as those under TACIS. Some small programmes for humanitarian aid, regional development, cross – border cooperation, nuclear safety, and the development of civil society organisations, have been allowed to continue”63.

59 Euroregion Country of Lakes, Vision and strategy for 2020, 2016, Available at: http://www.ezeruzeme.lv/about- us/vision-and-strategy-for-2020/ (Cobsulted on 20.01.2016) 60 Janis Balodis, Administrative Division of the Czechia: Economical and Development Transformal Processes, Available at: http://www.dukonference.lv/files/proceedings_of_conf/53konf/ekonomika/Balodis2.pdf (Conducted on 10.02.2016). 61 Vaclav Bizek; Jan Beneš and Mark Lizner. Report on environment of the Czech Republic in 1996, Prague, Ministry of the Environment of the Czech Republic, 1997, p. 54. 62 Martin Hampl. Geography of Societal Trasformation in the Czech Republic, Prague, Department of Social Geography and Regional Development Charles University of Prague, Faculty of Science. 63 Charles Pentland, Eastern Approaches: The EU Encounters the Former Soviet Union, in: Joan DeBardeleben, Soft or Hard Borders – Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005, pp. 45 – 68.

7. Forms and fields of cross border cooperation between Latvia and Belarus

Table 3: Evolution of the trans – border interactions64

Phases Social Economic Political

Informal contacts of Alienation and Phase 1 None the representatives of hostility authorities

Joint actions aimed at More or less peaceful quick profits (e.g. Phase 2 Spontaneous trade coexistance opening of new border check points)

Formalisation of Interdependence Co - Phase 3 Regular trade contacts (e.g. operation euroregions)

Productive co – operation

 Phase IV A: limited logistics;  Phase IV B: coordination and co – Joint actions aimed at operation of Trans – border long – term benefits Phase 4 commerce integration (joint investments, associations, spatial planning etc.) promotional institutions;  Pahse IV C: close co – operation and integration – integrated productive complex Analysing trans – border situation in cross – border context between Latvia and Belarus, there exist 4

64 Katarzyna Krok and Maciej Smetkowski, Cross – Border Co – operation of Poland after EU Enlargement – Focus on Eastern Border, Warsaw, Warsaw University – Centre for European Regional and Local Studies, 2006, p. 12.

phases of evolution of the trans – border interactions, which are divided between social, economic and political indicators (see: Tab.8).

At the first phase social indicator is hostility and alienation. This means how inter – cultural communication exists between Latvia and Belarus and their borderland municipalities, for example Dagda municipality (Latvia) and Saria (Belarus) inter – cultural cooperation, when both municipalities are organizing cultural festival.

Conclusion

The research question of master thesis is: “How cross – border cooperation can influence the integration and cooperation between Latvia and Belarus”. Cross – border cooperation as the tool of European integration is 1) dynamic, 2) complicated and 3) diverse. Cross border cooperation as the form of territorial cooperation is important for territorial integration. Institutions, common values, cooperation, synergy, unity and geographical space are elements for cross border cooperation.

References

1. Brakman Steven, Garretsen Harry, Charles van Marrewijk and Abdella Oumer, the border effect of eu integration: evidence for european cities and regions, abstract, 2010, p. 8. 2. Bufon Milan, Cross – Border Policies Vs. Spatial And Social (Re)Integration: Between Challenges And Problems, glasnik, vol. 16, no. 7, 2011, p. 41. 3. Butyter Daniel, Trade Development Between The European Union And Members Of The Eastern Partnership Programme. Example Of Ukraine And Poland, In: Intellectual Economics, 2014, vol. 8, no. 1(19), pp. 65 – 78. 4. Butulis Ilgvars., Feldmanis Inesis., Bleiere Daina., Zunda Antonijs and Strauja Anda. Latvija Otrajā pasaules karā (1939.- 1945.), rīga, jumava, 2008, p. 5. Celata Filippo And Coletti Raffaella. ‘’Discourses And Narratives Of Cross Border Cooperation And Regionalism In The European Union ’’, draft paper, 2012, pp. 1 – 12. 6. Gabbe Jens, Legal status of cross-border co-operation structures – past, present and prospects, Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), 2011, pp. 1 – 10. 7. Gasparini Alberto, ‘’Belonging and Identity in the European Border Towns: Self-Centered Borders, Hetero-Centered Borders’’, in: Journal of Borderlands Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2014, pp. 165 - 201.

Pavel Boltachka PhD student, Senior lecturer Belarusian State University

TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EU AND BELARUS IN CONTEXT OF EaP

Objectives

The general objective of the research is the analysis of the possibilities of economic engagement between countries and integration associations in the current conditions of development of political and integration processes. At the same time, in my opinion, at the present stage of the development of world economic relations, the greatest interest is represented by engagement of states on the platform within the framework of the structural associations (in particular, on the platform of the “Eastern Partnership”).

Research Methods

The research methods as interviews and documentary analysis were used at the research. Interviews with leading EU officials and experts in Brussels. Conversations with diplomats, high level officials and experts from Belarus and EAEU. Analysis of publications on the EaP theme from EU and EAEU-countries representatives. Analysis of CEPA.

The engagement of the Republic of Belarus and the EU within the framework of the “Eastern Partnership” is “on the table” for both sides. At the same time, a separate interest was also provided by the study of the experience of cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Armenia, taking into account the signing of the CEPA between the EU and the Republic of Armenia. The experience of the Republic of Armenia was chosen taking into account the fact that the Republic of Armenia, as well as the Republic of Belarus, is a member state of the Eurasian Economic Union. Representatives of the EU political institutions pointed to three key blocks of issues in the development of agreements between the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries: the political bloc, the economic bloc, the social bloc. At the same time, these blocks should be discussed simultaneously in the development of the relevant agreement. Initially, I believed that it was possible to hold a negotiation process for individual blocs (for example, economic). However, the position of the political elites of the

EU indicates that during the bilateral negotiations within the framework of the "Eastern Partnership", disregard for any bloc is impossible. With regard to the CEPA between the EU and the Republic of Armenia, attention should be paid to the "disappointment" of the EU with Armenia's accession to the EAEU. This "disappointment", in my opinion, is primarily due to the fact that initially the EU and Armenia agreed on the DCFTA project. However, in connection with Armenia's accession to the EAEU, it was necessary to reduce the format of cooperation to CEPA (that is, in essence, to exclude from the initial draft document issues that are regulated by the provisions of the EAEU legislation). On the other hand, the existence of a coordinated DCFTA project has made it possible to speed up the process of signing CEPA. A number of difficulties that arose during the negotiation process were due to the protection of intellectual property (for example, the use of the trade name "cognac"). Turning to the issue of the Republic of Belarus, it should be noted that all the interviewed persons noted the positive dynamics of the relations between the Republic of Belarus and the EU. At the same time, the majority of representatives pointed to the difficulties with political freedoms in the Republic of Belarus, which could negatively affect the further development of the relations between the EU and the Republic of Belarus. However, taking into account the above difficulties, representatives of EU political institutions do not exclude the possible cooperation of the EU and the Republic of Belarus within the framework of the "Eastern Partnership" in other forms than CEPA. I also support this position and I believe that, in order to diversify relations between the EU and the Republic of Belarus, we should actively negotiate at the economic track of bilateral relations. At the same time, a number of EU representatives take a rigid position on the political bloc of engagement issues and believe that as long as there is no movement on the political track, there can be no movement on the economic track. May be such rigid position due to the values that were laid in the basis of the formation and activities of the EU. I think, for my part, this issue requires further more detailed study. It should be noted, that in the opinion of representatives of EU political institutions membership in the EAEU has a negative impact on the development of relations between the states within the framework of the Eastern Partnership, since it limits the economic block of the negotiation process (taking into account the obligations of the EAEU member states within the framework of the EAEU). In general, on the issue of the EAEU as an integration association, it should be noted that in the EU (perhaps not all, but most political institutions), the EAEU is not seen in principle as an integration association from the point of view of the integration theory, but only as a political project of Russia, since the Russia is the dominant state in the region under consideration. However, having studied the experience, including the formation of integration associations of the world economy, I can, as an expert, note that each of the integration associations in the world has a dominant state / states that certainly affects the

activities of the integration association (for example, Brazil in MERCOSUR, Germany in the EU, etc.). Therefore, in my opinion, from the economic point of view, it is not entirely correct to view the EAEU exceptional as a political project of Russia.

Having studied a number of materials presented by the political and economic institutions of the EU, as well as information obtained during interviews with representatives of political and economic institutions of the EU, WTO, UNCTAD, I note that, in my opinion, information is presented one-sided (on the basis of information resources in Europe or populist resources of the EAEU countries). The reason, in my opinion, lies in the information vacuum. One of the solutions, in my opinion, is the active informing of the EU, WTO, UNCTAD and other countries and organizations on the activities of the EAEU, including the reflection of economic indicators (which will make it possible to form an objective opinion on the activities of the EAEU) by the EAEC (Eurasian Economic Commission) and the EAEU member countries. Perhaps my conclusions are quite critical, but, at the same time, I think they are fairly objective, because they are based on information received from both sides. In general, I believe that at present the EU has a number of internal problems: migration, BREXIT, as well as a terrorist threat. The presence of these problems on the one hand pushes out the issues of engagement process with the Republic of Belarus and the EAEU on a secondary position. However, on the other hand, the active cooperation of the EU and the Republic of Belarus (as a direct neighbor state) will also allow solving a number of EU internal problems (for example, "uncontrolled" migration).

References

1. Gotev, G. (2015): Juncker opens the door to EU-Eurasian Union rapprochement, Euractiv; https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/juncker-opens-the-door-to-eu-eurasian- union-rapprochement/. 2. Vasileva, A. (2018): Engage! Why the European Union Should Talk with the Eurasian Economic Union, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/wien/14540- 20181214.pdf. 3. Lee, M., D. Park, A. Abdon and G. Estrada (2013), “Economic Impact of Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis on Developing Asia”, ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 336; Asian Development Bank. 4. Korosteleva, E. (2013): “Belarus and Eastern Partnership: A national values survey”, Global Europe Centre Survey Brief; University of Kent. 5. Moiseev, I. (2017): Geopolitical handling of the “Eastern Partnership”, Conference Actual problems of international relations, http://elib.bsu.by/bitstream/123456789/169366/1/moiseev_2017_Actual_probl_IR_V4.pdf.

Corneliu Corman PhD student, Chief of section Ministry of Defence

THE ROLE OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT IN THE EAST- WEST GEOPOLITICAL CONFRONTATION AND THE PROSPECTS OF ITS REGULATION

Objectives

By proposing the respective research themes, we have set ourselves as an objective to bring our contribution to the study of the Transnistrian problem and the identification of a comprehensive, viable and definitive solution based on respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within the borders they are internationally recognized, in convergence with the strategic vector of European integration of the state. The purpose of the study is to: - identify the role of the Transnistrian conflict in the geopolitical confrontation on the East-West axis and assess the perspectives for its settlement. In order to achieve the proposed goal, we are going to carry out a complex analysis of the relationship "East-West geopolitical confrontation" and "Transnistrian conflict", the interests of the actors involved and the impact of the conflict on regional security. We are also going to investigate the process of conflict settlement at the present stage and evaluate its regulatory prospects in the light of the latest geopolitical changes at the regional level. To achieve this goal, the following research objectives were formulated: defining the term geopolitical confrontation, its peculiarities in the context of the configuration of an international security system; studying the historical premises of the conflict in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova; analyzing the peculiarities of East - West geopolitical confrontation in the Eastern European area; the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova in the context of the interests of the Russian Federation and the European Union; the particularities of the evolution of the process of settlement of the Transnistrian conflict in the last period. International effort to support the resolution of the conflict on the left bank of the River Nistru; opportunities and constraints in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict; the assessment of the perspectives of Transnistrian conflict settlement.

Literature Review

In the literature, the Transnistrian issue constituted from the moment of the outbreak of the conflict, the object of permanent research by historians, political scientists, specialists and representatives of state structures, trained in various forms in the process of negotiation and elaboration of models of conflict settlement . At the same time, investigations into the field of international security were the concerns of such specialists as B. Buzan, [4] H. Morgenthau, [19] M. Wight, [25] S. Hantington, [13] Z. Brzezinski,

[3] R Kaplan [16] and others. Concrete investigations of conflicts, security, and national interest have been elucidated in the work of such researchers as M. Harrishin [12], A. Miroiu. R. Ungureanu [27], P. Dufu [11] and others, which highlight the destabilizing factor in the region that regional conflicts play and emphasize the need for the cooperation of the states from Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe through the European and regional security structures in the Balkan peninsula and in the Black Sea basin. Among the researches of the Moldovan scholars, special attention was attributed to studies on state interests, national security and conflict as a form of divergence between states. The Moldovan researchers have referred to these areas both as a general approach and in view of their specificity in the context in which the Republic of Moldova is confronted with a conflict situation in the eastern part of its territory. These topics have been reflected in the work of researcher Iu. Pintea "The Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis on the National Security of the Republic of Moldova", which highlights the problems of making the national legislation more effective in the field of security in the light of the dangers and threats generated by the conflict in eastern Ukraine, as well as other problems faced by the Republic of Moldova. [21] Another important work that deals with the security of the Republic of Moldova is N. Tveatcov's monograph "Political Conflicts of the Republic of Moldova: Retrospectives and Opportunities", which analyzes the evolution of political conflicts in the Republic of Moldova. The author presents his / her own visions on how to solve political conflicts in the Republic of Moldova. [24] A valuable analysis dedicated to the elucidation of concrete areas of the proposed research problem is contained in the study "Aspects of the Transnistrian conflict", prepared by the Institute of Public Policy specialists. [20] The work includes a series of articles by some well- known specialists in the field, such as O. Nantoi "On the situation in the Eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova (1992-2000)", N. Chirtoaca "Legal analysis of the documents signed in the process negotiations on the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict", M. Garaz" Legal Assessment according to the International Law on Peacekeeping in the Transnistrian Conflict" and Iu. Pintea "The military aspect in the settlement of the conflict in the eastern part of the Republic of Moldova". We note that this work is accompanied by annexes, which come to substantiate the views expressed by the authors. Topics on the Transnistrian conflict can be found in the works of some researchers such as Gh. Cojocaru "Foreign Policy of the Republic of Moldova", [7] O. Serebrian "The geopolitics of the Pontic space" [23]. The "Transnistrian conflict after 20 years" study, prepared by IDIS "Viitorul", [22] I. Botan "Transnistrian settlement: a European solution", [2] Moldova - Transnistria. Joint efforts for a prosperous future"[8] and others. Authors such as V. Juc, V. Ungureanu, in their studies address the issue of the security of the Republic of Moldova in a wider context. They find a reconfiguration of international power relations that tells us that we find ourselves in a period of transition of the international relations system, accompanied by differences of a different kind, including confrontations

between global or regional actors that require the use of some sophisticated methods included by experts in the term "hybrid war". [14] At present, we distinguish the existence of numerous armed conflicts globally, with varying degrees of intensity (either hot or latent), with varying degrees of involvement (internal or interstate), of a long or recent occurrence that affects the environment international security. The Transnistrian conflict is included in the medium-term category, which tends to enter the category of long-term conflicts. In his researches, S. Kahn points directly to the fact that in the Balkan area, the geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation and the European Union are in conflict, even though the European Union is largely dependent on imported hydrocarbons from Russia. [15] Most local experts accept that the Republic of Moldova is in this arial area where the Russian Federation, as the successor to the Soviet Union, is trying to expand its influence throughout the Republic of Moldova, the action being an episode separately in a wider geopolitical confrontation on the East - West axis. The dynamics of the redistribution of the geopolitical interests of the great powers are in the process of reconfiguration, and the relative systemic stability has been shaken by the armed conflict in Ukraine triggered in 2014. The underlying problem lies in the fact that the Russian Federation is questioning the established and accepted configuration of world order, and the events in Ukraine have served as a premise and pretext for announcing new options. We find that even the great doctrines, such as Zb. Brzezinski, S. Huntington, or G. Friedman, have not been able to estimate Ukraine's evolution in 2014, given that they thought rationally, based on and in accordance with the post-bipolar global development laws they have they traced themselves, while the leadership of the Russian Federation acted irrationally, without taking into account the established prescriptions. H. Kissinger believes that the policy of the United States towards the Russian Federation must be designed in accordance with permanent interests, and not at all depending on the fluctuations of Russia's domestic policy: the Russian authorities will show a permanent geopolitical interest towards "immediate neighborhood." And the key issue is whether the Russian Federation's relations with the New Independent States should be treated as an international issue, subject to rules accepted by foreign policy and codified by international law, or as a result of Russia's unilateral decision. [17] Authors such as A. Lavric, O. Nantoi and V. Cibotaru are of the opinion that the events of 2014 in Ukraine, characterized by the annexation by Russia of the Crimean peninsula (in March 2014) and the start of the conflict in eastern Ukraine resulting in the loss of the government from Kiev to control the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, changed the geopolitical configuration in Eastern Europe. [18] When we refer to the Eastern European region - we are talking about a space that includes the six states of the European Neighborhood Policy - Eastern Partnership Program: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Three of these six states - the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine - have clearly expressed their intention of joining the European Union. After the signing of the Association

Agreements with the European Union (in 2014) by these three post-Soviet states, it can be seen that they are in a process of integration into the Western geopolitical space, except for the few areas not controlled by the governments of the respective states : Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Crimea and the two parts of the Lugansk and Donetsk regions. And author S. Cebotari finds that Russia is trying to oppose the European integration process of the three states by various means: imposing embargoes or restrictions on imports, higher prices for energy resources (primarily for natural gas), taxation more difficult conditions for emigrant workers in those states, military presence in separatist regions, etc., by trying to keep the three states in its sphere of influence. [5] This position of the Russian state is determined by its geostrategic interests, which preserve the influence in its immediate neighborhood. Although the Russian Federation denied its involvement in the conflict, it practically flagrantly violated the assumed neutrality and security guarantees of the Quadripartite Treaty of December 5, 1994. [1] Several international experts, such as R.Kaplan, G.Friedman, Iu.Chifu, have spoken out for greater international efforts to maintain security and stability in the Black Sea Basin, where the Republic of Moldova is located. They have warned of the growing influence of the Russian Federation on the states in the area, especially in the Republic of Moldova, on the territory of which there are important ethnic and linguistic groups potentially generating new instabilities. Publications on the expansion of Russian influence on the territory of the Republic of Moldova through the Transnistrian region were expressed by authors such as D. Dungaciu and Iu. Chifu. [6, 10] Thus, the Republic of Moldova continues to face a regional environment characterized by a high degree of insecurity, which generates many threats to its own security. The analysis of some dimensions of the theme proposed for research can be found in the collections of articles "Moldova on the Way of Democracy and Stability: From the Ex-Soviet Space to the World of Democratic Values", "The Evolution of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Moldova (1998-2008) such as: "The Conflict in Transnistria: the Truth as it Was", "Republic of Moldova in the context of the new architecture of regional security", but also in "International Studies. Moldovan Visions, "Moldoscopy", "Governance and Democracy" (review and synthesis magazine), "Security through Cooperation", "Public Administration", "Military Magazine", etc. Also, useful information for the proposed study can be found on the electronic pages of the Government of the Republic of Moldova, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, the periodicals of the local and foreign newspapers.

Methodology

In this study, we set out to conduct a research on the Transnistrian conflict in the Eastern districts

of the Republic of Moldova, approached in the context of tensioning relations on the East - West axis, which increasingly gains the face of a geopolitical confrontation among the major international political actors. The object of the research is the territory from the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova, outside the control of the constitutional authorities, where a separatist local administration has been established, which tends to separate the region from the rest of the territory of the internationally recognized state, to obtain recognition from the international community. Another element of the object of study is the presence in the respective territory of a foreign military contingent and military infrastructure elements (military depots with ammunition and weapons under the control of this foreign military contingent) without the consent of the host state. The questions to be answered in the proposed research project are:  What are the reasons for the administration in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova to promote a secessionist policy vis-à-vis the central authorities if they are founded and supported by the majority of the inhabitants of the Transnistrian region?  What is the motivation to maintain the foreign military presence in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova and whether this motivation coincides with the de facto role played by these foreign military troops in the region?  What are the peculiarities and specificities of this military presence in relation to the commitments made?  What are the factors preventing the withdrawal of the foreign military presence from the left bank of the River Nistru  What is the dependence between the evolution of the Transnistrian conflict settlement process and the tensioning of relations on the East - West axis?  What constraints are in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict?  What are the prospects for regulating the Transnistrian conflict? The hypothesis we have launched in this study suggests that the Transnistrian conflict is an extension of the geopolitical dispute between the major powers on the East-West axis, which does not allow a definitive solution to be identified because the main actors involved are in confrontational relations. Conflict settlement prospects are closely linked to the evolution of East-West relations. The scientific novelty: this study is based on the analytical and comparative approach of the role of the Transnistrian conflict in the context of the East-West geopolitical confrontation through the multidimensional research of the evolution of the situation on the left bank of the River Nistru in the context of transformations of the regional security environment which continues to affect the status of

neutrality and the European path of the Republic of Moldova. The research methodology included several research and empirical methods and techniques, which, combining different uses and interdisciplinary character. To achieve the goal of our study and to answer the above-mentioned questions, we will use our own research methodology, which is closely related to the valid universal principles of dialectics. We consider it important that the research that we intend to carry out on the role of the Transnistrian conflict in East-West relations is to address the issue in a general context of events rather than as an independent and out-of-context process. This implies applying the rationale of the scientific research methodology, such as the principle of inductive reasoning (from the private to the general one) which addresses the problem of the Transnistrian conflict as a special phenomenon in the context of geopolitical events taking place on a larger scale, which proliferate the regional environment security in the Eastern European area. We also apply the principle of deductive reasoning (from general to particular), with the help of which we propose that we estimate the role played by the Transnistrian conflict in the relations between major geopolitical poles on the European continent. In order to ensure the scientific success of the research, we resort to the principle of objectivity. Applying these judgments of the scientific research process has allowed us to establish a proprietary and appropriate methodology for the study, composed of both general research methods such as analysis and synthesis, induction, deduction and analogy, as well as particular methods such as historical, systemic method, mathematical-statistical method, web-based documentation, data recording method. Applying the method of analysis and synthesis, we are to define the term geopolitical confrontation, its peculiarities through the research of the specialized literature on this subject. Defining the notion of geopolitical confrontation will allow us to appreciate more precisely the character of the relations between the major geopolitical actors, formed in the post-Cold War period, either of cooperation or confrontation, the combination of which generates security or insecurity in the international, regional and national security environment. Making use of the same methods, is to identify the role of the state in international relations identified as "confrontation geopolitical" setting up an international system of security, which is a dominant factor in the generation and regulation of existing conflicts. In the data collection process, we aim to use data collection methods such as conversation and observation, which along with the analysis of video and audio documents will help us gather the data needed to confirm or deny the proposed study hypothesis. For a more in-depth research into the subject of the Transnistrian conflict, we wanted to study the eventual existence or lack of historical premises of this conflict. For this we will analyze the subject using the historical research method, which will allow us to carry out an objective observation of the evolution of the situation in the territory on the left bank

of the River Nistru, the dynamics of the events related to this territory. Using this method, we will determine whether there were any prerequisites underlying the current conflict in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova. In this way we will form a clearer picture of the present situation in the Transnistrian territory. Using the statistical method, we will analyze data on the content of the existing relations between the Transnistrian region with two major geopolitical centers on the European continent - the Russian Federation and the European Union. With the help of the respective method we aim to appreciate the data regarding the economic and social sector of the Transnistrian region, the external trade of the Transnistrian economic agents with the foreign partners, the dynamics of these exchanges, as well as the possible financial flows to and from the region, arriving in the region. The analysis of these data will allow us to identify the economic viability of the Transnistrian region and the sources of its existence. At the same time, we propose to use phenomenological and comparative methods to research the foreign interests for the Transnistrian region, with which to determine which parties engaged in the geopolitical dispute on the European continent manifest interests for the territory of the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova and especially which is the difference between these interests. Here we are referring first to the Russian Federation and the European Union. The research methodology also includes the use of the set of particular methods: the web-based documentation, the data recording method by which we aim to highlight the specifics of the Russian and European Union geopolitical interests in the territory of the left bank of the River Nistru. By combining these common ways with others, we are going to look into the prospects of settling the Transnistrian conflict in the context of the current situation in the region and the regional security environment.

Results and Discussion

Based on the research we have done so far, we have found the following:  the existence of historical premise of the Transnistrian conflict, which underwent the tension of the situation in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova in the period of its constitution as an independent state after the implosion of the Soviet Union. We refer to the ethnic factor that has experienced in the last three centuries a tendency to decrease Moldovan ethnicity in the territory of the left bank of the River Nistru, as a result of the rusification and colonization policies promoted by the Russian state;  the reasons stated by the representatives of the separatist administration in Tiraspol (such as the suppression of Moldovan nationalists by Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups on the left bank of Nistru, fear of the possible union of Moldova with Romania, etc.) are subjective and do not

reflect the true causes of the Transnistrian conflict, which has political and geopolitical origins;  in the Transnistrian region the conditions for the development of a democratic free society are not ensured, human rights and the pluralism of opinions are violated. This state of affairs leads to the violation of the rights of the Moldovan population in the territory of the left bank of the River Nistru, unlike the ethnic Russians on the right bank of the River Nistru, who benefit from them without any substantiated objections;  the existence of a strong political dependence between the leadership of the Transnistrian region and the Russian Federation, due to the presence of Russian military troops in the Transnistrian territory, the supply of energy resources to the region only by the Russian companies, the direct financial support provided by the Russian government to the Transnistrian inhabitants , the domination of Russian media in the Transnistrian information space, etc .;  the Russian military contingent, temporarily deployed in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova, exceeds its attributions under the 1992 ceasefire to respect strict neutrality towards the parties engaged in the military conflict, only participating in the peacekeeping operation in the Zone security and security of Russian military depots in the territory. Starting with 2016, Russian troops in the Transnistrian region flagrantly violate their attributions, engaging in a joint military training process with the Transnistrian armed forces;  the lack of withdrawal of the Russian troops by the Russian Federation from the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova in accordance with the international commitments assumed (the decision of the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999) and the demands of the constitutional authorities in Chisinau is due only to Russia's geopolitical interests and the tense nature of relations on the East-West axis and not the real situation in the territory. Considering that our study is at the intermediate stage, we will continue to address and investigate the issue of the existing constraints on the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and the prospects for regulating the Transnistrian conflict. At the same time, it is necessary to carry out further investigations on these issues, which undoubtedly have a direct influence on the security of the Republic of Moldova and the prospects of peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. These research are needed to develop recommendations and suggestions on how to streamline conflict resolution activity.

Conclusion

Based on studies conducted so far, we find that geopolitical changes in the Eastern European area continue to have a multidimensional impact on the regional security environment. The expansion of the European and Euro-Atlantic area to Eastern Europe has led to a number of

positive changes such as the free movement of people in the European Community space, increasing exports on the European market, attracting more and more funds into social and economic projects, increasing the quality of medical services, pre-school, school and university education, etc. At the same time, the enlargement of the European Union and NATO to the East has generated a reluctant reaction from the Russian Federation, which perceives this enlargement as a threat to its security. In response, the Russian Federation was involved in a direct political and economic confrontation with Western states to control the states of Eastern Europe (formerly part of the Soviet Union). Moreover, the rivalry in question generated a new armed conflict in Ukraine in 2014, backed by Russia, which is still ongoing. Our research so far allows us to assert that the Transnistrian conflict plays a secondary role in the geopolitical confrontation on the East-West axis, but that role is becoming more important after 2014, with the tension in the situation in Ukraine and destabilizing the regional security environment. This is confirmed by the latest events caused by the Black Sea navy incident near the Kerci Strait. The study highlighted a close link of political dependence between the leadership of the Transnistrian region and that of the Russian Federation. Even if the Tiraspol administration declares itself independent in adopting the decisions taken (it is taken into consideration by other international actors) and claims to express the will of all the inhabitants of the region, the analysis carried out shows us in a reverse situation. There is a direct dependence of the decisions taken in Tiraspol on the will of the Russian political class, especially the presidency of the Russian Federation, which expresses first the interests of the Russian state and less the interests of all the inhabitants of the region, especially Moldovan and Ukrainian ethnicities. This indicates that the negotiation of a definitive solution to the Transnistrian problem can not be achieved without the consent of the Russian party, which has the real control of the situation in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova. The settlement of the Transnistrian conflict can only be done within a balanced and proportionate formula of the expression of the interests of the great powers. And the current negotiating mechanism, in its official 5 + 2 format, is the optimal formula (based on the current situation), where the Republic of Moldova can identify the definitive solution of the given conflict, based on its national interest, related to the interest of the great powers. Given that the neighboring state of Ukraine is facing an armed conflict in the east of the country, a conflict that is likely to spread to other regions, including those on the border with the Republic of Moldova, the problem of settling the Transnistrian conflict becomes a pressing issue.

References

1. Agreement (1994) “Memorandum on security guarantees related to Ukraine's accession to the Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons signed in Budapest - 05.12.1994”, https://old.flot2017.com/file/show/ normative Documents/4860. 2. Botan, Ig. (2009) “ Transnistrian settlement: a European solution”, Chisinau. 3. Brzezinski, Zb. (2000) “ The Grand Chessboard”, Bucure^ti: Univers Enciclopedic, pp. 238. 4. Buzan, B. (2014) “ Peoples, States and Fear”, Bucure^ti: Cartier, pp. 215. 5. Cebotari, S. (2017) “ Geostrategic interests of the Russian Federation in the context of the formation of the new geopolitical architecture (1991-2016), Chisinau. 6. Chifu, Iu. (2018) “ Russia in war against the world, by all means", article published on ttps://deschide.md/ ro/stiri/editorial/37927/Iulian-CHIFU--Rusia-%C3%AEn-r%C4%83zboi- %C3%AEmpotriva-lumii-prm-toate- mijloacele.htm. 7. Cojocaru, Gh. (2001) “Foreign Policy of the Republic of Moldova”, Chisinau. 8. Collection (2009) “Moldova - Transdniestria: Joint efforts for a prosperous future”, Chisinau: The British Conflict Prevention Fund. 9. Document (1992) “ The ceasefire agreement in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova”, https://gov.md/ru/advanced-page-type/comisia-unificata-de-control. 10. Dungaciu, D. (2018) “ Pro-Moldova, ie pro-Russia. Chisinau slams Kiev under the protection of Moscow”, https://adevarul.ro/moldova/pohtica/pro-moldova-adica-pro-rusia-chisinaul- injunghie-kievul-obladuirea- moscovei -1_5ba892c8df52022f75c5ba06/index.html. 11. Dutu, P. (2013) “ Asymmetric Threats or Hybrid Threats: conceptual delimitations to substantiate national security and defense”, Bucure^ti, pp. 6-8. 12. Harishin, M. (1992) “ Situations of conflict in post-Soviet space”. pp. 272. 13. Huntington, S. (2007) “ Clash of civilizations”, Bucure^ti: Antet, pp. 324. 14. Juc, V. Ungureanu, V. (2015) “ Redimensioning the geopolitical interests of the great powers under the conditions of building the international post-war international system”, The Philosophy Magazine nr.4, pp. 7-22. 15. Kahn, S. (2008) “ The geopolitics of the European Union”. Chisinau: Cartier, pp. 176. 16. Kaplan, R. (2014) “ The revenge of geography”. Bucure^ti: Litera, pp. 480. 17. Kissinger, H. (2003) “Diplomacy”. Bucure^ti: Bic All, pp. 784. 18. Lavric, A. (2015) “Republic of Moldova in the new geopolitical configuration in Eastern Europe: risks, dangers, threats”. Chisinau: The materials of the international conference “The Republic of Moldova in the context of the new regional security architecture”, pp. 33-41. 19. Morgenthau, H. (2007) “ Politics among nations”, Ia§i: Polirom, pp. 650. 20. Nantoi, O. Chirtoaca, N. Garaz, M. and Pintea, Iu. (2001) “ Aspects of the Transnistrian conflict”, IPP, Chisinau pp. 43. 21. Pintea, Iu. (2014) “ Impact of the crisis in Ukraine on the national security of the Republic of Moldova”, IPP, Chisinau. 22. Report of a group of international experts (2011) “ Transnistrian conflict after 20 years”, Chisinau: IDIS „Viitorul”. 23. Serebrean, O. (2006) “ Geopolitics of the Pontic space”, Bucure^ti: Cartier, pp. 208. 24. Jveatcov, N. (2013) “Political Conflicts of the Republic of Moldova: Retrospectives and Opportunities”, Vol. 1. Monograph, Chisinau, pp. 123. 25. Wight, M. (1998) “ Power policy”, Chisinau: Publisher ARC, pp. 33-34.

Gvantsa Davitashvili PhD degree/researcher Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University

EUROPEANISATION CASE OF GEORGIA: BOTTOM-UP PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

Policy analyses have devoted a certain amount of attention to EU policies towards Georgia, and even more to the Eastern European countries and their integration processes with the EU. However, there is a considerable lack of knowledge about the role and actual impact of third noncandidate countries on their European Integration process. This research aims to contribute to the gap of Europeanisation theory and in this context brings the case of Georgia. In line with this objective, the research is dedicated to the analyses of the Europeanisation process beyond the formal borders of the EU. European integration processes of the Eastern European countries gain increasing importance, especially because of emerging security challenges on Eurasian continent. In this discourse, this research will provide an innovative understanding of Europeanisation and investigates its additional variables. Discourses of this research will be especially interesting for Europeanisation experts, as well as East European stakeholders. Regional and local dimensions of the research might be also in the interests of any scholar and expert, researching the Eastern European countries political, economic and security issues. Moreover, the hypothesis proposed by this research gains geopolitical importance due to the contradictory nature of the European and Eurasian integration projects. A newly developed approach of Europeanisation might also influence emergence and generation of new visions about the role and actor- ness of Eastern European non-candidate countries in their relations with the EU.

Objective

This research aims at developing the theoretical concept of Europeanisation vis-a-vis third noncandidate and neighbouring countries of the EU, also providing the empirical findings concerning the impact of domestic policies of Georgia on the process of Europeanisation. More specifically, research aims at:  Developing the theory of Europeanisation towards the non-candidate Eastern European countries of the EU;  Highlighting the importance of domestic political conditions of non-candidate Eastern European countries and inclusion of this issue in the discussion of Europeanisation;  Analysing mechanisms of Europeanisation and their actual impact to non-candidate neighbouring countries of the EU;  Defining the criteria of ‘bottom-up’ Europeanisation and its causality;

 Examining the case of Georgia pursuant to the ‘bottom-up’ context of Europeanisation The research should shed a light to the gap of the Europeanisation concept and involve into this debate the third states impact on this process. In addition to it, it may open a discussion about defining additional variables of Europeanisation beyond the one-side mechanisms of the EU.

Methodology

This research should synthesize theoretical and empirical findings, therefore it will incorporate literature of Europeanisation, as well as empirical analyses. Valuable works and substantive understanding of Europeanisation is provided by the scholarship (Schimmelfennig, 2010; Borzel and Risse, 2009; Radaelli, 2004; Lavenex, 2008). Beyond the ontological understanding of Europeanisation, this research should analyse direct mechanisms of Europeanisation in order to define the limits of existing theoretical framework. The research also involves into the debate increasingly important research provided by Borzel and Risse in terms of understanding the ‘misfit’ between the policies of the Union and the domestic policies, where the domestic policies, institutions and political processes appear as a necessary, however not sufficient condition for the changes on the domestic level (Borzel and Risse, 2009). The substantial understanding of Europeanisation as a two-way process constitutes a solid basis for our research, whereas the domestic structures do not appear as passive recipients of the EU impact (Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001). In other words, Europeanisation is approached as an interactive process that involves not only the top-down, but also bottom-up procedures. The research problematises process of Europeanisation, in terms of its comprehensive understanding as a process of interaction, where the third states appear as important actors of relations from the initial level of negotiations with the EU. This project does not create the alternative theoretical framework of the Europeanisation. It rather develops already existing theoretical framework of Europeanisation and aims at discovering the conditions and mechanisms of Europeanisation under which the process of Europeanisation functions. The empirical part of this research refers to Georgian literature regarding the economic and democratic developments. The publications of Georgian experts of political and economic sciences should be broadly explored. At the same time special attention should be given to Georgian legislation in order to provide evidence of the national democratisation.

Conclusion

The research debates the concept of Europeanisation and argues that non-candidate Eastern European countries are beyond the effective ‘top-down’ implementation mechanisms of

Europeanisation. Moreover, Georgian case proves the limited effect of leverage by its political history. Thus and thereof, this research implies additional criteria of Europeanisation to assess the process of Europeanisation of non-candidate Eastern European countries in a broader context. This research should build a theoretical framework, which helps to understand better the role of the non-candidate neighbouring countries of the EU in the Europeanisation context. It provides a comprehensive understanding of the ‘gaps’ of Europeanisation: on one hand by developing the theoretical framework and on the other, testing the theory pursuant to the case study of Georgia.

References

1. Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part (2014) Official Journal of the European Union L 261, Brussels, 30/08/2014. 2. Borzel, T. A. and Risse T. (2004) ‘One Size Fits All: EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’, paper prepared for the Workshop on Democracy Promotion, 4-5 October, Centre for Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University. 3. Borzel, T. A. and Risse T. (2009) ‘Conceptualising the Domestic impact of Europe’, prepared for K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanisation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chkhikvadze, I. (2013) ‘EU-Georgia Relations: Where it Stands and Where it Goes’, in K. Kakachia and Cecire (eds.), Georgian Foreign Policy: The Quest for Sustainable Security,Tbilisi: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: 53-63. 4. Cremona, M. and Hillion, Ch. (2006) ‘L’Union fait la force? Potentials and limitations of the European Neighbourhood Policy as an integrated EU Foreign and Security Policy’, EUI Working Papers, Law No.2006/39, Florence. 5. Gabrichidze, G. (2014) ‘Legislative approximation and application of EU law in Georgia’, in P. Elsuwege and R. Petrov (eds) Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union, New York: Routlage. 6. Lavenex, S. (2008) ‘A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration eyond Conditionality?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 15 (6): 938- 955. 7. Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009) ‘EU rules Beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European Politics’, Journal of European Public Policy, 16 (6). 8. Radaelli, C. (2003) ‘The Europeanization of Public Policy’, in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (2004 ed.) The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 27-56. 9. Risse, T. (2001) ‘Europeanization and Domestic Change. Introduction’, in M. Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds.) Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press: 1-20. 10. Schimmelfennig, F. (2009) ‘Europeanisation Beyond Europe’, Living Reviews in European Governance, 4 11. Schimmelfennig, F. (2010) ‘Europeanization beyond the member states’, ETH Zurich, paper for: Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften, Center for Comparative and International Studies.

Mykhailo Drapak PhD-student Department of Political Science and Public Administration Chernivtsi National University by Yuriy Fed`kovych

THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL MINORITY IN ROMANIA AND SLOVAKIA: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Interethnic understanding and political stability became the main objectives of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. These circumstances made Brussels open for negotiations with the first post-communist governments in the region regarding their aspirations to become part of United Europe. However, the need to revise the principles of ethnic policy and ensure the rights of national minorities has become a challenge for some of the candidate countries, especially Romania and Slovakia. At the same time, this challenge laid the foundation for the consolidation of the democratic forces of both countries, which eventually replaced the first Romanian and Slovak non- liberal governments. The fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe between 1980 and 1991 led to the emergence of a number of sovereign nation-states (independent in their political decisions from the USSR). Their governments faced the need for democratization and modernization of political, law enforcement, economic, social and other systems. In most states of the region, this aspiration has been identified with the choice of the European Union as the primary international strategic partner and a landmark for its development. In 1990-1995, the governments of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary expressed their intention to join this association. At the same time, the refusal of the communist model of administration and arrangement of public life in these countries was accompanied by a national renaissance, the development of nation-states. This process has been reflected in the formation of a new national identity, the instrumentalization of culture, the review of the official historical narrative, the reform of language and educational legislation (strengthening the role and protection of the national language). Such steps of the governments of the nation-states led to misunderstandings and even crises in relations between the states within the region of Central-Eastern Europe. Such processes were described by German sociologist and conflictologist Dieter Senghaas as «cultural battles». At the end of the twentieth century, it was symptomatic for the nation-states that reached sovereignty as a result of post-colonial revolutions, the destruction of empires, or the weakening of the geopolitical center [20, p. 482-483]. Such «cultural battles» with neighboring states or opponents within the country were carried out by the governments of all states of the region, but the most significant were the crises in the relations of Hungary with two states – Romania and Slovakia.

Given the crisis in the relations between the European Commission and the governments of Central European countries and the growing influence of the right-wing populist movements in the region (especially the aggressive rhetoric of the Prime Minister of Hungary, Victor Orban), we note the need to study the mechanisms for ensuring the rights of the Hungarian national minority in Romania and Slovakia through EU influence. We mean the study of the legal and institutional reforms that have helped to reach the consensus of Budapest with Bratislava and Bucharest on the eve of joining united Europe and their effectiveness in subsequent years. Thus, our study aims to determine the effectiveness of the European Union as an external arbitrator in resolving the political crises in Romania and Slovakia associated with the Hungarian national minority in these countries. We are also interested in the influence of Brussels on ensuring the rights of the Hungarian minority on the eve and for ten years after the accession of the countries to the European Union. We will compare different variables (for example, the EU decisions on aid to Romania and Slovakia and specific regulations in the field of the ethnic policy of these two states) and we will determine the degree of correlation between them. Therefore, for our research, we will use structural- functional, institutional and comparative methods. Such a study is relevant to Ukraine, which has been experiencing a crisis in its relations with Hungary since the adoption of the new Law on Education in September 2017. The Hungarian side threatens to block Kyiv's integration with the EU and NATO. Therefore, an assessment of the impact of the European Commission and the European Parliament on the situation is essential and timely. The goal set requires completing the following tasks:  to follow the genesis of the Hungarian national minority in Romania and Slovakia;  to determine which claims the Hungarian government had put forward to the Romanian and Slovak governments regarding the rights of the Hungarian national minority;  to find out what mechanisms for settling the controversy between Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary on the Hungarian national minority were proposed by the EU;  determine which legal and institutional arrangements for ensuring the rights of the Hungarian national minority were implemented by the parliaments and governments of Romania and Slovakia;  to explain the emergence of new contradictions regarding the rights of the Hungarian national minority in the relations between Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary;  to find out which mechanisms of the settlement of the situation require the ethnonational policy of Romania and Slovakia. Western researchers of social sciences rarely use the notion of «national minority». So Joe Feagin, who studied interethnic relations and social stereotypes in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century, uses the terms «racial group» and «ethnic group» to refer to minorities in society. In this case, the concept of «racial group» for a researcher has a negative connotation, since many prejudices of American society are associated with him. He defines it as «a social group that a person has defined as higher or lower than a person on the basis of real or imaginary physical characteristics, chosen subjectively» [7, p. 7]. Ethnic group Joe Feagin calls «a group that is socially different or separate from others or independently, primarily on the basis of cultural or national characteristics» [7, p. 9]. Sociologist Louis Wirth gave the following definition of the minority: «It is a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are distinguished among others in the society in which they live, within the framework of a differential and unequal agreement, which, as a consequence, consider themselves the object of collective discrimination» [16, p. 247]. Taking into

account the political and legal constituent of such a definition, Joe Feagin proposes to call the minorities «subordinate groups», while the public majority, recognized by the authorities, is a «dominant group» [7, p. 10]. Political scientist and philosopher Will Kymlicka insists on the need to separate the notion of «national minority» from the term «ethnic minority». He formulates the definition of a national minority as follows: «groups that formed full and functioning societies in their historic homeland before it or it's part was joined with another state». According to the researcher, such accession could take place both compulsorily and voluntarily. Will Kymlicka also notes that, despite the nature of the accession, national minorities usually responded to it by their rival nation building [21, p. 32-33]. This is since most of the national minorities in Europe have their national state in their historical homeland or part of it. Consequently, under the notion of «national minority,» we mean the social group that has formed (or participated in the formation) a complete society and a state operating in its historical homeland or part thereof, but which is resident in another state and is different by national identity from the dominant majority. Article D of the Constitution of Hungary imposes on the state, in particular, «responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders» [10]. This legal provision was the logical result of the «Trianon trauma» of the Hungarian nation and the relevant foreign policy that was provided by the country's leaders in the early 1990s. In 1990, the first prime minister of democratic Hungary, Jozef Antal, stated that «he wants to act as the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians by spirit and sentiment» [9, p. 29], which is significantly more than in ten million Hungary. This statement was supposed to give a signal to Romania and Czechoslovakia (the future state of Slovakia), which had the largest Hungarian national minorities. Anna-Milada Vachudova notes that in subsequent years, this led to Jozsef Antall's refusal to sign bilateral agreements on mutual recognition of borders with Romania and Slovakia. The Hungarian prime minister demanded that these states should guarantee the collective rights of the Hungarian minorities [18, p. 173]. Thus the relationship of Budapest closest neighbors depended on the policy on the Hungarians in these countries. At the same time, Antall assured the international community that Budapest respected the internationally recognized borders of the states [2, p. 267]. In 1992-1995, nationalistic parties became partners of President Ion Iliescu in Romania and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia. Anna-Milada Vachudova shows that at this time in both countries the authorities use anti-Hungarian (for Hungary as well as for the Hungarian national minority) rhetoric as a political capital to strengthen their own positions in society [18, p. 172]. The ambiguous position of the Hungarian government in the early 1990s, with the speculations of the official Bratislava and Bucharest on the ethnic theme, disturbed the governing bodies of the European Union (European Community). In 1991 in the Western Balkans, the first war in modern history began. Therefore, Brussels was concerned with the prevention of any ethnically-based conflicts in the post- socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe. This desire was also reflected in Council Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly [1]. The document contained a blurry requirement for the autonomy of national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. The EU Recommendation 1201 was immediately added to the list of criteria for the candidate countries for accession to United Europe. The question of the legal definition of the status of national minorities, as well as the issue of ensuring their rights, remains incompletely resolved both for international institutions and for the governments of most national states. It was also controversial for the creators of EU law. First of all, ensuring the rights of national minorities in the EU states is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations [19], the UN Charter [4] and the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [8]. These framework documents oblige all States of the United Nations to ensure the equal rights of all their citizens regardless of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or another opinion, national or social origin, property, civil status or another status. It prohibits any form of discrimination in public and private spheres, requiring governments to make equal access to education, employment, public authorities and other rights and freedoms for all minorities. These documents are ratified by an absolute majority of the states of the world. However, they relate to the provision of individual rights. UN framework acts do not regulate the collective rights of national minorities, as well as any other minorities in societies. EU law Researcher Guido Schwellnus proposes to distinguish between the principle of non- discrimination of national minorities (individual level) and the collective protection of national minorities (individual level and level of social groups): «If discrimination seeks to eliminate all obstacles to the enjoyment of equal rights and the full social integration of persons belonging to minorities, the special protection of minorities requires constant government action in support of a specific minority group in order to preserve its identity and prevent assimilation. Therefore, non-discrimination is a negative right, and the protection of minorities is the positive one». The researcher notes that the protection of minorities is a permanent right when non-discrimination is situationally responsive to eliminating the fundamental differences between the rights of citizens [22, p. 65-66]. Sociologist Joe Feagin gives the following definition of discrimination: «actions carried out by members of dominant groups or their representatives, that have a differential and harmful impact on members of subordinate groups». In this case, the researcher identifies four types of discrimination: isolate discrimination, small-group discrimination, direct institutionalized discrimination and indirect institutionalized discrimination [7, p. 14-15]. The principle of non-discrimination is aimed at preventing and punishing all of such acts. The introduction of special collective rights for national minorities is a daunting issue for the governments of the states, as it involves the delegation of a certain power to their representatives in various spheres: from educational and infrastructural aspects to political independence. Guido Schwellnus calls self-government, autonomy, self-determination as an example of such powers [22, p. 66]. Article 4 of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) declares that the EU «shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government» [15], and also requires all governments to respect fundamental human rights and freedoms in their decisions, including anti-discrimination laws. These principles are enshrined in the Rome Treaty establishing the European Community of 1950 [14]. A later document of the Council of Europe – the «Race Equality Directive» – banned the differentiated treatment of citizens of EU Member States because of their racial or ethnic identity [5]. Similarly, the European political community in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has declared the obligation of non-discrimination of representatives of national minorities in the member states [3, Article 21]. However, these documents also relate to the individual rights of citizens belonging to national minorities. Bruno de Witte, a researcher on European law and cultural diversity in Europe, notes that the EU legislature has not developed constitutive documents on the need to ensure the collective rights of national minorities. It does not provide all Member States with clear requirements for legislation in this area. Naturally, the countries of Western Europe do not provide collective rights of ethnic minorities [6, p. 7-8]. But in the early 1990s, they demanded that they are provided from the states of Central and Eastern Europe.

We need to return to Hungary's relations with Romania and Slovakia and the EU mediation in the early 1990s. In 1993, the Prime Minister of France proposed a framework document «The Stability Pact», which stipulated the signing by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe of bilateral agreements on good-neighborliness. These documents should also contain clauses on the obligation to adhere to international standards in the field of the protection of the rights of ethnic minorities, in particular, PACE Recommendation 1201 [1]. In 1994, in Hungary, Social Democrat Gyula Horn became prime minister, replacing the national-democratic government of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). The new Hungarian foreign minister, Laszlo Kovacs, said that his country's foreign policy would not contain a «sense of mission». Thus, the volume of Budapest's requirements regarding the rights of the Hungarian national minority in Romania and Slovakia is sharply decreasing. This opened the way for the signing of the Slovak-Hungarian and Romanian-Hungarian agreements on good-neighborliness and mutual recognition of borders in 1995 and 1996. Both documents contained provisions of PACE Recommendation 1201. However, as Anna-Milada Vachudova notes, either Vladimir Meciar or Ion Iliescu were not going to comply with the requirements of this recommendation, even though they put their signatures under it [18, p. 176]. It became clear when the Slovak parliament, controlled by the pro-Meciar People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), adopted a new language law. It affirmed the status of the Slovak language as a dominant one and obligated citizens to make all appeals to the state bodies in Slovak [17]. Jaroslav Mihálik and Juraj Marušiak note that even though the second document clarified the conditions for the use of languages in the state, it still contradicted the Copenhagen criteria for joining the EU [11, p. 137- 138]. Thus, in 1997, Slovakia left behind the negotiations on the accession to the EU, which Brussels started with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Although this was not only the issue of minority rights but also the excessive concentration of power in the hands of Vladimir Meciar and the use of its resource to support loyal elites. Ion Iliescu and the government of the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR), after Romania's accession to the Council of Europe, launched a massive media campaign against the Recommendation 1201 in the state media, considering it a precondition for the growth of Hungarian irredentism in the country. Anna-Milada Vachudova points to the paradoxical situation in which the then Romanian authorities fell: on the one hand, they accused the West of imposing Romanian norms, on the other, they used the political capital that came from the West in the form of dividends from the accession to the Council of Europe and IMF loans [18, p. 179]. Although Jonah Iliescu managed to avoid the EU's sharp reaction to his actions and the Brussels’ demarches for further European integration, his stay in power, like the prime-minister cadence of Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia, was going to end. Michael Shafir writes that neither the accusations of the Romanian Democratic Union of the Hungarians (UDMR) in separatism nor the persuasion of the ordinary Romanians that their economic survival is in danger because of integration with the West did not help him to Ion Iliescu and PDSR to win the 1996 election [12, p. 146, p. 153-154]. The first place in the parliamentary elections was won by the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR), and its leader, Emil Constantinescu, was elected as President of Romania. The creation of a new parliamentary coalition and government in Romania after the loss of power by Ion Iliescu, Anna-Milada Vachudova calls «revolution in the revolution». Because, in addition to the CDR and the Social Democratic Union of Romania (USD), UDMR entered it [18, p. 233]. Hungarian ethnic political forces never took part in the government of Romania: neither in the interwar period, nor in the times of Nicolae Ceauşescu, nor the first post-communist years.

According to Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, Vladimir Meciar was convinced of the EU's intention to take Slovakia to its ranks during the first wave of enlargement with the Czech Republic. So he underestimated the threats of Brussels to freeze the integration process. Therefore, Slovakia's non-admission to the negotiation process in 1997 was bad news for the Slovak society. The level of support for euro integration in it was one of the highest in Central and Eastern Europe [23, p. 47-48]. HZDS, however, took the first position in the 1998 parliamentary elections but eventually had to go into opposition. After lengthy talks, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDL), the Hungarian Community Party (SMK-MKP) and the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) formed a broad democratic pro-European coalition. Thus, for the first time in Slovak history, the Hungarian ethnic party has become a part of the executive power. Mikulas Dzurinda, SDK leader, as elected as Prime Minister. The task of his government was to intensify the negotiation process with the EU and the soonest entry of Slovakia into United Europe. Frank Schimmelfennig writes that the first promise with which the newly elected head of the Slovak government visited Brussels was the drafting of a law on the language of national minorities [23, p. 49]. The fate of the reformist governments of 1996-2002 has developed in different ways in two countries. The Mikulas Dzurinda party, in 2002, managed to strengthen its position and form a new government with the SMK-MKP, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and the Alliance of New Citizens (ANO). So after the recovery of the economy, anti-corruption measures and harmonization of approaches to the protection of the rights of national minorities, the government of Slovakia could concentrate on economic development, tax, medical and educational reforms. Anna-Milada Vachudova states that the re-election of Mikulas Dzurinda to the post of prime minister has had a positive impact on the relations between Brussels and Bratislava [18, p. 207]. In 2004, Slovakia became a member of the EU together with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. According to Michael Shafir, the Romanian-led reformist coalition led by the CDR was subjected to the «Romanian political tradition». Despite mutual understanding in the field of interethnic relations, the CDR, USD, and UDMR could not agree on the reform of the state apparatus, the tax system and other areas. Each fraction of the coalition insisted on its version of the reforms. In the end, it turned into a «chaos of hopelessness, and inter-fractional bidding» [13, p. 85]. Given the corruption scandals surrounding the CDR and the slow economic downturn in 1997-1999, this Romanian reformist government was doomed to the 2000 elections. The PDSR regains power. But, to the surprise of the nationalist forces, Ion Iliescu chose UDMR as one of the political partners. The former Romanian president no longer played an ethnic card for his purposes. How effective was the EU's influence on the stabilization of interethnic relations in Romania and Slovakia? Answering this question, Anna-Milada Vachudova claimed that without the pressure of civil society, both countries would not fully reach the Copenhagen criteria. It was especially felt in Slovakia. Support for EU accession in the Slovak society was one of the highest in Central Europe. Supported by Brussels, the «Third Sector» (association of civil society organizations) acted as a constructive opposition to the government of Mikulas Dzurinda. After all, the party of Vladimir Meciar could not assume this role [18, p. 240]. In Romania, the civil sector, as well as the electorate generally, was more passive in participating in the political life of the country. At the same time, almost all parties, supported by Romanian citizens, positioned the fulfillment of Brussels's requirements for joining the EU as a key national interest. Later they became hostages of their discourse when the conditions of European integration were replaced by a real political program. Although the very possibility of joining United

Europe at the end of the cadence of Ion Iliescu in 2000-2004 in Romania was no longer considered to be real [18, p. 244-245]. In the end, 2007, Romania became a member of the EU. So far, discussions about the motives of Brussels to accept Bucharest in the European community are not dying. After all, the European Commission for ten years of membership is preparing a report on Romania's unfulfilled conditions of integration. However, in the context of establishing a system for protecting the rights of national minorities and their involvement in the political life of Slovakia and Romania, the prospect of EU membership could be an important factor of the change in these countries. Regarding the consolidation of democratic forces and the creation of effective political coalitions with ethnic parties. Regarding security and stability throughout the region of Central and Eastern Europe. But real estimation of such influence will be provided by us in our research.

References

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Mariia Galaburda, Olga Yakubchak Associate Professor, PhD National University of Life and Environmental Science of Ukraine, Kyiv

FOOD SAFETY CHALANGES IN UKRAINE: IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN FOOD LAGISLATION

The objective of the study is defined within Erasmus + Jean Monnet Module “EU Food Safety Control” for promotion of European values and principles for better understanding of the applied system of European food safety assurance. It is comparative analysis of food safety legislations resulted from experience, traditions and practices of food safety control in the European Union member states and its application in Ukraine. The Association Agreement, with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as its integral part that have been applied since 1 January 2016, provides prerequisites for deepening of political association and gradual economic integration between the EU and Ukraine, based on shared values and principles. But the signed DCFTA are much more comprehensive than classic DCFTAs as result of not only focusing on opening markets for goods and services but also working on gradual approximation of Ukraine to trade and trade-related areas of the EU. One of the key condition of the DCFTA65 and AA66 is to facilitate trade in commodities covered by sanitary and phytosanitary measures, safeguarding human, animal and plant life or health. The key dimension of the DCFTA with Ukraine is regulatory approximation with the EU acquis because actual access to the EU market and reform very much depend on appropriate implementation and enforcement of the relevant legislation.67 The EU and Ukraine DCFTA means both sides will mutually open their markets for goods and services based on predictable and enforceable trade rules. The article is concentrated on a qualitative analysis of information collected through review of legislation and literature related to food safety control of EU and Ukraine for identifying major areas challenging food safety assurance in Ukraine.

65 EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Chapter 4 https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150981.pdf 66 ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part Chapter 4and Annexes https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/november/tradoc_155103.pdf 67 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement European Parliament resolution of 12 December 2018 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine (2017/2283(INI)) - P8_TA-PROV(2018)0518

Having the poor experience of market-oriented food law based on mutual recognition, that ended with food safety crisis’s and subsequent food safety scares, outbreaks of animal diseases and food scandals, including those over the fraudulent practices, EU took urgent protective measures68 following revision of legislative framework and organization of food safety in the EU central level and in the EU member states. Main principles of food law in matters of food safety in EU are laid down by Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 69 . The aim of this Regulation, usually called as General Food Law (GFL), is to protect human health and consumers’ interests in relation to food. The main principles of the GFL are risk analysis, precautionary principle, transparency. Risk analysis principle suggests policy supported by a sound scientific basis, with the functional separation of risk assessment and risk management as two of the three main components. The third component – risk communication implies interactive exchange of information and opinions throughout the risk analysis process. The EU GFL was completed with the so called “hygiene package”, which initially included four regulations. Two of them related to the food production and marketing for food business operators: Regulation (EC) No. 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs70 and Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 on specific rules on the hygiene of food of animal origin71. Rules of the Regulation No 853/2004 supplement those laid down by Regulation (EC) No 852/2004. They apply to unprocessed and processed products of animal origin. In most cases Regulation (EC) No. 853/2004 does not apply to food containing both products of plant origin and processed products of animal origin. However, processed products of animal origin used to prepare such food must be obtained and handled in accordance with the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 853/2004. Other two of the four hygiene package regulations are dedicated to official controls by competent authorities. Regulation 882/04/EC on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules72 and Regulation 854/04/EC laying down specific rules for the organization of official controls on products of animal origin intended

68 Bernd M.J. Van der Meulen The Structure of European Food Law// Laws - 2013, 2(2), pp.69-98; doi:10.3390/laws2020069 69 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and setting out procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1). 70 Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs (OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 1) 71 Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin (OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 55)

72 Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with food and feed law, animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1)

for human consumption 73 later were integrated with the EC Regulation 183/2005 laying down the requirements for feed hygiene74 and Regulations 2073/2005/EC75, 2074/2005/EC76 of 5 December 2005 and Regulation 2015/137577 to ensure a higher level of the food chain health and hygiene assurance. Currently the control is applied according to Regulations (EC) No 854/2004 and (EC) No 882/2004 that will be repealed by Regulation (EU) 2017/625 from 14 December 2019. With the purpose to align sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) legislation to the EU's in September 2015 the Law of Ukraine "On Basic Principles and Requirements for the Safety and Quality of Food Products" No. 1602-VII dated July 22, 2014 came into force. As well as European GFL it is the founding act of Ukrainian food and feed legislation. The Law transfers main principles of European food legislation with some respect to national agricultural husbandry, when significant part of products are connected to household production. It allocates the responsibilities of food and feed business operators (FBOs) and Competent Authorities (CAs), covers all stages of the food chain from production and processing to transport and distribution. The declaration of the primary legal responsibility for ensuring compliance with food law laid down by the FBOs is a novel for the Ukrainian food legislation and sometimes still not apperceived by both operators and consumers. The responsibility is achieved by ensuring compliance with Ukrainian food legislation that is relevant to FBOs activities and by performing their own controls. These controls are realized by the obligation of FBOs to develop, implement and apply permanent procedures based on the hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) principles. For the traceability purpose all FBOs must be able to identify from whom and to whom a product has been supplied ('one step back – one step forward' traceability) and to have systems and procedures in place that allow for this information to be made available to the competent authorities upon request. The Law as well as European Regulation does not require a link to be established between incoming and outgoing products or records identifying how batches are split or combined within a business to create particular products or new batches (i.e. internal

73 Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption (OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p. 206) 74 Regulation (EC) No 183/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 January 2005 laying down requirements for feed hygiene (OJ L 35, 8.2.2005, p. 1). 75 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2073/2005 of 15 November 2005 on microbiological criteria for foodstuffs (OJ L 338, 22.12.2005, p. 1). 76 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2074/2005 of 5 December 2005 laying down implementing measures for certain products under Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council and for the organisation of official controls under Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, derogating from Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council and amending Regulations (EC) No 853/2004 and (EC) No 854/2004 (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ L 338, 22.12.2005, p. 27–59) 77 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1375 of 10 August 2015 laying down specific rules on official controls for Trichinella in meat (OJ L 212, 11.8.2015, p. 7–34)

traceability). The same law provides the CA with legal powers to carry out official controls and with legal powers as regards controls on approved export establishments (including to the EU). The entry into force of the European norms and principles in the food safety legislation of Ukraine is kind of “revolution” in official controls relating to food, feed, both in relation to the radical legislative changes, previously created by a large number of vertical standards. The food safety system modification process involved also creation of a Single Food Safety Authority – the State Service for Food Safety and Consumer Protection (SSSFCP) in 2014 on the base of the State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service of Ukraine (SVPSU). The Agency officially started its work and perform functions in April 2016. But actually due to Moratorium on official controls, approved in 2014 by the Parliament of Ukraine, aimed at facilitating business and improving the economy, since 1 August 2014 official controls of establishments (including farms, slaughterhouses, cutting and processing plants, catering establishments) were only permitted if they were explicitly authorised in advance by the Cabinet of Ministers. Regional CA officials had legally limited authority for visiting food establishments. Therefore the system relied largely on the adequacy and effectiveness of the controls carried out by the FBO and official veterinarians of establishments. This resulted in dramatic growth of foodborne outbreak and food fraud cases in 2016-2018 as FBO considered this situation to be largely as "abcence of rules" and often did not implement Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) procedures, Good Hygiene Practices (GHP), procedures based on the HACCP principles, traceability system, etc. According to the data of Public Health Center of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine most cases of foodborne infections were connected to catering establishments. Thanks to the entry into force of the law on “State Control for food, feed, animal health and animal welfare” in April 2018 the SSSFCP finely resumed its official controls and veterinary checks during 2018. SSSFCP inspectors have somehow lost their competence, as they did not fulfill their direct duties for a long time. The lack of harmonised documented procedures (work instructions/SOPs/checklists) decreases the effectiveness of uniform and consistent controls of FBO. In 2017/18 out of 250 EU legal sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) acts were adopted 17 and more than 140 being in the process78. The Law on Feed Safety and Hygiene was adopted in January 2018 and should enter into force in January 2020. The Law on Food Information for Consumers was adopted risently, and the Law on Veterinary Medicines and Law of Ukraine on requirements for objects and materials that are in contact with food products remain to be adopted by the Parliament.

78 Association Implementation Report on Ukraine - Brussels, 7.11.2018 SWD (2018) 462 final https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35604/association-implementation-report- ukraine-joint-staff-working-document_en

A significant achievement was the adoption of Procedure for determining the frequency of implementation of State Control measures carried out by the State Service for Food Safety and Consumer Protection over the compliance of operators activity with the requirements of food, feed, animal health and welfare legislation and risk categorization criteria. At present time, this is the only legislative document that represents the risk-based approach, declared by Ukrainian Food Safety Law. In European food legislation there is precondition for application risk based approach. Taking in the account that risk assessment must be provided in an independent, objective and transparent manner, based on the best available scientific evidence the role of risk assessor at Union level is given to EFSA. This Agency make scientific and technical evaluations of different food and feed risks and produses cientific opinions and advice that form the basis for European policies and legislation. Anlike the European food safety system in which responsibility for risk assessment (science based) and for risk management (policy regulated) are kept separate Ukrainian Food Safety legislation does not provide such condition, making risk analysis process in Ukraine not transparent. Particular attention deserves definition of "competent authority", which must meet the requirements of the EU, as well as some other concepts. The State Service for Food Safety and Consumer Protection is subordinated to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy of Ukraine. Thus creating the situation when service that regulates the production of food products apply the official control. Critical evaluation of current situation and approaches in National food safety control, its impact and performance indicates some imperfection and shortcoming of compatibility due to the lack of clear and defined mechanisms for implementing identified policy that is essential for strengthening the system.

Shorena Gigauri PhD student, Deputy Head of Department High Council of Justice of Georgia

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL STANDARDS

Abstract

The independence of the judiciary is one of the cornerstones of the rule of law. Rather than being elected by the people, judges derive their authority and legitimacy from their independence from political or other interference. Consequentially, more than a dozen international conventions, regulations and protocols codify the standards of independence of domestic courts and judges. In accordance with Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights in determining whether a court may be considered to be "independent" both of the executive and of the parties to the case, regard must be had to the manner of appointment of its members and the duration of their term of office...79 It is clear from the existing international standards that the selection and appointment of judges plays a key role in the safeguarding of judicial independence and ensuring the most competent individuals are selected. It is also worth mentioning that the European Court of Human Rights did not require any “formal recognition” in law of the irremovability of the member during his/her term of office, it was sufficient that it was recognized in fact and that the other necessary guarantees are present. 80 Furthermore the Commission has held that regard must be had not only to the legal provisions but also to how these provisions are interpreted and how they actually operate in practice. 81 It should be emphasized that, the international judiciary like national judiciaries, cannot effectively perform its functions unless it enjoys the requisite independence and hence the trust of those subject to its jurisdiction.82 One must now consider which standards should be applicable to international judges: should existing national standards be adopted or should new standards be created? 83 While national court compliance with international standards is monitored and enforced by international courts, paradoxically these international courts may themselves fail to meet international human rights standards.84

79 ECtHR, Compbell and Fell v. UK, judgment of 28 June 1984, para. 78; ECtHR, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, judgment of 23 June 1981, para. 55; ECtHR, Belilos v Switzerland, judgment of 29 April 1988, para. 64; Mihailov v. Bulgaria, judgment of 21 July 2005, para 37; ECtHR, Engel v. Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976. 80 ECtHR, Compbell and Fell v. UK, judgment of 28 June 1984, para. 80. 81 ECommHR, Stieringer v Germany, Decision of 25 November 1996, para. 3 (6). 82 Gilbert Guillaume, Some Thoughts on the Independence of International Judges vis-à-vis States, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 2, Kluwer Law International. Netherland, 2003, p. 163. 83 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Donald k. Coffey, Legitimacy and Independence of International Tribunals: An Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights, Hastings International Law and Comparative Law Review, 2014, p. 278. 84 Jutta Limbach ET AL, Judicial independence: law and practice of appointments to the European Court of Human Rights, INTERIGHTS, 2003, p. 15.

Objectives

Regardless the significance of judicial independence is well materialized in international standards, the implementation thereof is still the question, inter alia on the level of international judiciary. Today, international courts and tribunals also matter and enabling international judges to do their jobs properly (independence) and their responsibility for what they do (accountability) is also at stake.85 To this end the objective of the research paper is to deal with the selection procedures and the terms of office of judges of the international/European Courts, such as European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the EU, ICJ and ICC.

International judiciary is probably the least well-known branch of international governance. International selection and appointment processes have attracted almost no attention outside a narrow circle of lawyers, officials and judges, who are directly involved.86 Therefore, less familiar is the process by which international judges are selected, raising profound issues as to the legitimacy and likely effectiveness of the international courts.87 This wide spread lack of knowledge should be of concern to anyone interested in the future of international law as well as of judicial independence.88

The problem is also that there is no consesus on explanation of judicial independance at international level. Yet international organisations, while devoting great energy to promoting the virtues of judicial independence at a national level, are curiously reticent about going on record to affirm the applicability of the principle in the international sphere, in their own sphere of action where they might have to observe constraints that they are keen to foist on national authorities. 89 Furthermore, international courts serve a function where the legal and the political are intimately conjoined", such that the work of international courts can never be entirely divorced from the world of international politics. 90 Therefore, the actuality of the topic is also derived from the fact that the selection procedure of international judges could be deemed as politicized, where the judicial candidates of international courts

85 Paul Mahoney, The International Judiciary – Independence and Accountability, Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 7, 2008, p. 313. 86 Ruth Mackenzie ET AL., Selecting International judges: Principle, Process and Politics, Oxford University Press, 2010, p.1. 87 Ruth Mackenzie ET AL., Selecting International judges: Principle, Process and Politics, Oxford University Press, 2010, p.1. 88 Ruth Mackenzie ET AL., Selecting International judges: Principle, Process and Politics, Oxford University Press, 2010, p.1. 89 Paul Mahoney, The International Judiciary – Independence and Accountability, Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 7 (2008), p. 317. 90 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Donald k. Coffey, Legitimacy and Independence of International Tribunals: An Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights, Hastings International Law and Comparative Law Review, 2014, p. 279, where the capacity of international courts to flourish depends on the support of the States.

are basically former ministers, advisors, diplomats or even the members of the Parliament, having no prior judicial experience. 91

Taking into account the fact that one unique model of judicial independence does not exist, while selecting judicial candidates from each country the legal culture of its population is also a matter in combination with the international standards. Therefore, judicial independence at international level requires permanent efforts from both the international organizations (the courts) and the countries as well. Furthermore, particular aspects of judicial independence in terms of judicial appointments, terms of office will be evaluated on the basis of legislative provisions and practical application thereof.

Hence the purpose of the research paper is to analyze how international guarantees of judicial independence are observed in case of selection of international judges on the basis of international standards, international acts and practical application thereof. Accordingly, the outcome of the research will be recommendations on reconstruction of the selection procedures in light of the democratic principles prescribed by international documents on judicial independence, since these courts effectively exercise public authority that requires a democratic perspective on the selection of their judges.

Literature Review

In order to carry out an in-depth research of international systems of judicial appointments, terms of office the research paper will rely on primary sources (legislation and case-law) as well as on secondary sources (books, scientific articles). To this end the research paper will deal with international and European documents governing the standards such as EU documents, Council of Europe documents: CCJE, the documents of the Committee of Ministers, the case law of ECtHR, etc; the statutes of international courts and the other documents adopted for the purpose of improvement of judicial selection procedure on international level. Particular attention will be also paid to the commentaries on Articles of the Statutes of international courts and the other scientific papers on Independence of International Judiciary by outstanding authors: Ruth Mackenzie, Philippe Sands, Eric A Posner, John C. Yoo, Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Zimmermann, Tomuschat, Oellers-Frabm, Paul Mahoney and others.

The authors deal with the problems of judicial selection and offer their own arguments: pros and cons. In conclusion overwhelming majority of commentators argues that in order to fulfil their mission

91 Dinah Shelton, Legal Norms to Promote the Independence and Accountability of International Tribunals, Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 27, 34 (2003), These persons may be considered as „legal Ambassadors”.

effectively international tribunals should indeed be independent by meeting the requirements of judicial independence.92

Methodology

In order to carry out an in-depth research of international systems of judicial appointments, terms of office the research will be based on comparative analysis. The research paper will comparatively analyze the criteria for judicial selection and application of these criteria in the selection procedure, the transparency of the procedure, and the decision making body. Some empirical research through interviews with relevant experts as well as observation of practical application thereof will be also used.

For the purpose of elaboration of recommendations of improved regulations the reports of working meetings, developed guidelines, the scholarly articles, international acts and practical application thereof will be analyzed and assessed in the research paper.

Results and Discussion

The results of the research are the following:

 Analyzing international acts on judicial independence (appointments and term of office);  Analyzing legislation of international/European courts on judicial appointments and term of office, How do states nominate candidates for the international courts; How do the election procedures for those courts operate in practice;  Demonstrating pros and cons of different models of judicial selection and term of office; Providing right recommendations for further improvement of legislation and practical application thereof for the international judges: what changes are needed to the nomination and election procedures?

To fulfill abovementioned objectives research paper has to answer some important questions:

 What are the best ways of implementation of international standards of judicial independence in the process of judicial selection at the international courts?  How should each country support the process of improvement of legislative basis and implementation of the mentioned aspects of judicial independence? Does the national legal culture have effect on successful implementation?  How to avoid not consecutive operations and complications from the implementation process?

92 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Donald k. Coffey, Legitimacy and Independence of International Tribunals: An Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights, Hastings International Law and Comparative Law Review, 2014, p. 276.

It is important to mention that besides analysing the above-formulated questions, the purpose of the researcher will be to find the most efficient solutions to them. Also, in the process of research, some new questions might emerge or the above-outlined questions might need to be slightly reformulated.

Conclusion

An independent international tribunal not only strengthens the legitimacy of the tribunal itself, but also strengthens the national legal system.93 Since judicial independence is inherent in the very notion of justice, there is no reason why it should not in its essentials, subject to appropriate adaptation, apply to the international judiciary as well. Furthermore, the relative fragility of international courts as institutions make the provision in practice of concrete guarantees of judicial independence all the more needed, however the international law currently lacks any express legislative safeguard in this respect.94 From all serious studies on the subject is a consensus that there are shortcomings and, correspondingly, considerable room for improvement, notably in order to reinforce the guarantees of judicial independence (as well as, of course, the professional quality of the candidates). The conclusion will be made in terms of judicial nomination and election procedure and the minimum standards thereof, the requirement of existence of an independent body and reasoning of adopted decisions.95 On the basis of in-depth research of judicial appointments, there will be formulated a comprehensive concept for the improvement of legislative and practical aspects of judicial independence and consequently, to carve out potentials for reform to improve the democratic legitimacy of international judges.

93 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Donald k. Coffey, Legitimacy and Independence of International Tribunals: An Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights, Hastings International Law and Comparative Law Review, 2014, p. 277, especially in countries of young democracy. 94 Paul Mahoney, The International Judiciary – Independence and Accountability, Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 7 (2008), p. 346. 95 Paul Mahoney, The International Judiciary – Independence and Accountability, Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 7 (2008), p. 327, “There have thus been calls for "greater publicity for international judicial vacancies, coupled with open and transparent national selection mechanisms" and for the adoption of minimum standards and uniform practices at international level. The need for the introduction of an element of independent assessment of the eligibility and suitability of the candidates at both the national and the international stages of the process has been urged (specifically in relation to the Strasbourg Court and most recently within the Council of Europe's

Parliamentary Assembly) - with, for example, the States being required "to establish an independent body to arrive at the list of nominees and to submit an account of their nomination procedures to the [international appointing body]" and, thereafter, the appointment by the international instance itself being made on the basis of an independent recommendation by qualified experts”.

References

1. Shimon Shetreet, J. Deschenes (eds.), Judicial Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and Contemporary Challenges in Judicial Independence, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dodrecht/Boston, Lancaster, 1985; 2. Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, third ed. Oxford University Press 2014; 3. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Donald k. Coffey, Legitimacy and Independence of International Tribunals: An Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights, Hastings International Law and Comparative Law Review, 2014; 4. Geir Ulfstein, International Court and Judges: Independence, Interaction, and Legitimacy, International law and Politics, 2013-2014; 5. Zimmermann, Tomuschat and Oellers-Frabm, eds., The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2012; 6. Zimmermann, Tomuschat and Oellers-Frabm, eds., The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, ed., Oxford University Press, 2006; 7. Ruth Mackenzie ET AL., Selecting International judges: Principle, Process and Politics, Oxford University Press, 2010; 8. Paul Mahoney, The International Judiciary – Independence and Accountability, Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 7, 2008; 9. Michael Wood, The selection of Candidates for International Judicial Office: Recent practice, in Ndiaye and Wolfrum eds., Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007; 10. Marcelo G. Kohen, Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Through International Law: Liber Amicorum Lucius Caflisch, ed., Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007; 11. Daniel Terris, Cesare P.R. Romano and Leigh Swigart, The International Judge, Brandeis University Press, 2007; 12. Philippe Sands, Campbell McLachlan, Ruth Mackinzie, The Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 4, Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005; 13. Jutta Limbach ET AL, Judicial independence: law and practice of appointments to the European Court of Human Rights, INTERIGHTS, 2003; 14. Dinah Shelton, Legal Norms to Promote the Independence and Accountability of International Tribunals, Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 27, 34, (2003); 15. Ruth Mackenzie, Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, Harvard, International Law Journal, Volume 44, Number 1, 2003; 16. Gilbert Guillaume, Some Thoughts on the Independence of International Judges vis-à-vis States, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 2, Kluwer Law International. Netherland, 2003; 17. Eric A Posner and John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, California Law Review, 93, 73, (2005); 18. Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to professors Posner and Yoo, California Law Review, 93, 902 (2005).

International documents Rome Statute, International Criminal Court, (1998); Convention on Human rights and Fundamental freedoms, Council of Europe, (1950); International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute, UN, (1945);

Burg House principles, adopted by the ILA Study Group on the Practice and Procedure of International Courts and Tribunals, in association with the Project on International Courts and Tribunals, (2004); Council of Europe, Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the Selection of Candidates for the post of judge at the European Court of Human Rights, explanatory memorandum, 2012; Preliminary draft Report of the Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on “Nomination of candidates and election of judges to the European Court of Human Rights”, AS/JUR, (2008)34, 3 September 2008; The Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers of the COE on the long-term effectiveness of the ECHR control mechanism, CM 203, 15 November 2006; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1646, on Nomination of candidates and election of judges to the European Court of Human Rights, 2009; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1649, on Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights, 2004; Opinion No. 1 of the CCJE on standards concerning the independence of the judiciary and the irremovability of judges, 2001; Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted at the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of crime and the Treatment of Offenders in Milan 1985; Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice. Case-law ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 June, 1984; ECtHR, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, judgment of 23 June, 1981; ECtHR, Belilos v Switzerland, judgment of 29 April, 1988; ECtHR Mihailov v Bulgaria, judgment of 21 July, 2005; ECtHR, Engel v. Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976 ECtHR, Zand v. Austria, Commission Report, 12 October, 1978; ECommHR, Stieringer v Germany, Decision of 25 November 1996.

İlgar Gurbanov Researcher/Analyst, Research Fellow Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

NORMATIVE CONVERGENCE VERSUS BACKYARD PRESERVATION: COMPETING INTEGRATION TRENDS IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

Objectives

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, each of post-soviet republics (notably Eastern Partnership states) was tending to different directions of integration choosing different polar for their either security or economic needs. The EaP states while negotiating an Association Agreement (AA) had been exposed to tackle with the competing trends of Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. So far, certain of them signed AA, while others were stick to their individual partnership formats with the EU. The previous studies examined the EU-Azerbaijan bilateral relations in the context of energy/transport and human rights factors. Therefore, Azerbaijan’s motivation for economic alignment with the EU and cooperative ties the EEU members, amidst the evolving geopolitical picture of the South Caucasus region and beyond, is less focused area of research in the academic sector.

This paper will study Azerbaijan’s foreign policy behavior towards two competing integration trends (EU’s AA and EEU’s membership) in the eastern neighborhood – more in the sense of what are the genuine motivations and principles for the country’s FP alignment. This paper will outline how Azerbaijan was able to balance both integration unions, and did not affiliate herself to either of them. The paper will analyse: (1) the challenges, perspectives and shortcomings in the Azerbaijan's FP towards competing neighbourhood policies of both the EU and Russia-led EEU; (2) pragmatic approaches of the Azerbaijan's foreign policy towards competing neighbourhood policies of both the EU (normative convergence) and Russia (backyard preservation). In order to explain why Azerbaijan’s ‘security calculations’ usually prevails over the ‘normative alignment, the author studies Azerbaijan’s rationale for ‘strategic partnership’ with the EU instead of ‘associative one’, and for her distant stance towards the EEU.

Literature Review

The topic that will be presented is merely one of chapters of broader research paper. The paper will be prepared through the extensive analysis of literatures written on similar case of neighbouring South Caucasus states in order to make a comparative analysis with their relevant behaviours/motivations. The most of the literatures consulted are from the EU’s official documents, academic articles, books and working papers, as well as other online sources, such news websites, press releases, etc in Azerbaijani, Russian and English languages. As a supplementary source, the author also conducted several interviews and talks with practitioners and think-tank experts in several countries.

Methodology

It is difficult to analyze the EU’s behaviors as that of a single actor (since it is an organization with 28 member states with different foreign policy agendas), while it is more feasible to study foreign policy behavior of Azerbaijan as a single actor. Therefore, the author has used “small states’ foreign policies” and their “motivations for alignment” as a main study framework. In my research, I mostly focused on theories regarding the alignment policies of the small states. In order to explain the alignment strategy of EaP/South Caucasus states, I examined their “balancing” behaviours as a main foreign policy manoeuvre to withstand the threats to their sovereignty and the economic overdependence from powerful neighbours.

Results and Discussion

The changing geopolitics in the eastern neighbourhood makes it necessary to define whether term of “integration” or “partnership” dominates in the Azerbaijan’s foreign policy (FP), which seeks to mitigate regional security risks and to formulate cooperation with different actors. After gaining independence in 1991, the development of mutual pragmatic relations with the European Union (EU) became one of the main foreign policy directions of Azerbaijan with an aim to boost the development of national economy. Azerbaijan with rich hydrocarbon resources and its significant geopolitical positioning attracted the interest of the EU. Azerbaijan’s engagement in the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004) and the Eastern Partnership (2009) programs increased the mutual interaction of both sides in a number of areas. Since early 1990s, the EU supported Azerbaijan’s development through its technical and financial instruments at its disposal by exporting better practices and experiences on economic, political and regulatory reforms. This contributed to Azerbaijan's transition from “Sovietisation” to an independent state-building process and enabled the country to eradicate the “Soviet legacy” in its economy and institutional structures by embarking on a comprehensive reform policy. Whereas, the relations hitherto have been portrayed mostly by two - domestic (fundamental values) and external (energy supplier) - factors. Due to its geographical location in the crossroads of Europe-Asia air, land and maritime transport corridors, Azerbaijan is a noteworthy strategic partner for the EU in terms of realization of large-scale energy-transport projects. However, the geopolitical transformations in the eastern neighbourhood required to review and upgrade the bilateral relations between the EU and Azerbaijan through a new legal framework. Previous political turbulence in the bilateral relations, because of the EU's inward-looking temptations concerning the fundamental values and the lack of proportional support from the union on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, had undermined the EU's attractiveness for Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's FP reservations towards

pursuing a “deeper integration” with EU were also stemming from its concerns of prejudicing its economic and political relations with individual CIS countries. Azerbaijan rejected signing the Association Agreement (AA) as the agreement didn't reflect the country's economic and security needs, but the country proposed a tailor-made new agreement with the EU. However, the bilateral relations were regularly at odd due to lack of strategic insight and communication to hear each other's visions on delicate issues. On one hand, the EU praised the strategic importance of Azerbaijan for the energy security; on the other hand, Brussels was demonstrating adamant position on fundamental values. Another source of Azerbaijan’s dissatisfaction with the EU's is the union’s passive role on the NK conflict. Previously the EP demonstrated a clear stance in its resolutions on Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and on withdrawal of Armenian military forces from Azerbaijan's occupied territories, but this position has been gradually weakened. The EU prefers a balanced and strict diplomatic approach on the conflict without distinguishing between “who is occupied” and “who is occupying”. The attractiveness of the EU's structural foreign policy (SFP) in the eastern neighbourhood was perceived much softer due to the non-application of conventional use of force. Because, traditionally the recognition of SFP by partners was based on voluntary incorporation of the set of values. However, the EU's legitimate recognition and attractiveness by Azerbaijan was undermined due to the union's inward looking temptations through imposing its strict normative agenda. The past experience demonstrated the necessity of formation of the EU’s comprehensive external policy vis-à-vis Baku with the logical arrangement of the SFP by avoiding excessive EU-centric approach and “stick-carrot” combination. Because, the traditional wisdoms on “one-size-fits-all”, “more-for-more”, “less-for-less” and “value- based relations” did not prove successful in practice for Azerbaijan. Therefore, the EU's value-based SFP led to the temporary zero-sum game in the bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. Despite the cooperation in other areas, the EU-Azerbaijan relations had been shaped around the rhetoric of “energy cooperation” and “compliance with values”. The principle of “differentiation” and “principled pragmatism” (instead of single conceptual framework) will be the most fine-drawn approaches of the EU's coherent neighbourhood policy towards Azerbaijan conditioned with its economic potential, geographical circumstances, foreign policy reservations and priorities. Meanwhile Azerbaijan had to tackle the new integration wave of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) that was portrayed to be Russia-dominated. Russia is strongly advocating for the membership of Azerbaijan to the EEU due to latter’s energy, geographical, economic performance. The EEU is an integrated extension of the Customs Union (CU) and Single Economic Space (CES) created among Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which aims to institutionalize Russia’s economic influence in the former soviet space and defend this area from ‘backyard intrusion’ of other actors. Because, Moscow

acknowledges that the EU’s more favourable conditions for the EaP countries could restrict Russia’s traditional cooperation opportunities with them. The integration platforms created following the dissolution of the Soviet Union such as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organisation could not yield tangible political results in terms of keeping all former- soviet countries together, and their effectiveness remained mostly on the paper. Official Baku hitherto was able to balance both integration blocs (EU and EEU) and did not tie herself to neither of them by jeopardising her political and economic sovereignty. Azerbaijan could keep safe distance from both of them and showed no interest to ally with any of them in political terms. Baku, however, did not exclude maintaining pragmatic relations with both unions and their individual member states without compromising her economic sovereignty. Azerbaijan’s economic power generated from the oil/gas revenues and its productive individual partnerships with both EEU and EU members rendered the government self-confidence to manoeuvre and immune to seeking support from within the integration blocs. Baku neither signed the CIS Free Trade Agreement nor showed any interests for the CU/CES, but decided to stick to its own Customs Code when building trade relations with other CIS states. In the relations with Russia, Azerbaijan without joining the EEU was stick only to bilateral agreements improving close economic cooperation, despite the certain dissatisfactions in the relations. Azerbaijan was not willing to sacrifice its economic and political independence in the light of Azerbaijan’s extensive dialogue with the western energy companies for the realisation of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC). The accession to the EEU might be detrimental rather than beneficial for Azerbaijan’s economy and energy sector. According to the different surveys, the residents of Azerbaijan demonstrated the record level of negative stance among the post-soviet countries towards the integration with the CU/CES. Thus far, Azerbaijan had to balance between its commitments for domestic transformations and foreign policy reservations considering the external factors in the immediate neighbourhood. The EU in its turn should streamline Azerbaijan’s normative cohesion; otherwise the union’s passiveness leaves a room for the other powers. Because, Azerbaijan does not have a partner to ally with in her unique course of balanced foreign policy to resists the long-term implications of being exposed to influence. In this context, Azerbaijan, instead of pursuing a radical pro-European foreign policy or oscillating its foreign policy between the political poles, opted for a multi-vector foreign policy approach. This helped Azerbaijan to share the economic security burdens over its foreign policy. Even despite sometime depressed relations with the EU, Azerbaijan hitherto has shown no interest to join the EEU, which is deemed a mirror organization of the EU in the post-Soviet space. Pursuing more pro- Russia foreign policy would be in detriment of Baku’s strong ties with the EU and lead to the repetition of the "Armenian case" (mortgaging economic sovereignty to Russia) that official Baku acknowledges

very well. Azerbaijan understands that, neither pro-European stance, nor pro-EEU position is a rational foreign policy choice in terms of prejudicing its sovereignty and national security. However, Azerbaijan needs western advanced technology and investments for economic modernization and diversification, which unlikely can be provided by any of the EEU members. In the light of volatile oil prices, the EU will remain a vital partner for Azerbaijan in terms of benefiting from former's experience for economic diversification and development of non-oil sector. Nonetheless, instead of isolating Azerbaijan by strict statements, Brussels should continue to work closely with Baku for the country’s normative transformation in the areas of good governance. At the same time, the EU's position in regard to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to the fact of occupation, which has dealt a serious blow to Azerbaijan's sovereignty, should be more clear in accordance with international law and be rather operational, but not declarative.

Conclusion

Following the dissolution of the USSR, Azerbaijan's foreign policy is waving in between security priorities and normative transformation. Newly independent Azerbaijan had to diversify its foreign policy course in the many directions. Despite the successful cooperation with the EU in the energy domain and the EU’s contribution to Azerbaijan’s normative transition from soviet-style structures to well-governed institutions and economy through political-economic reforms, Baku could not receive the expected backing from Brussels on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict except the loud statements. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan managed tactically to balance between its energy/economic ties with the EU and economic/military cooperation with Russia. Azerbaijan’s transit potential for trade between Europe and Asia, essentially the implementation of the SGC provides a sufficient contribution to establishing strategic ties between the EU and Azerbaijan. However, the EU’s normative criticism was deemed by Azerbaijan as interference into the country’s domestic affairs. With the standoff between sides increased, Baku decided to seek more pragmatic partners, who were not seeking to impose a normative power and conditionality by demanding compliance with values in the bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. To sum up, Azerbaijan has structured its foreign policy over "the careful pragmatism" principles. The historical (USSR), religious (Muslim), ethnic/language (Turkish) and geographical (between Europe/Asia) factors granted Azerbaijan a diverse type of political identities. This makes it necessary to formulate pragmatic relations with all actors in/around the region rather than sticking to ideological patterns or ‘isolating’ itself through the absolute polarization by joining economic/military blocks. Azerbaijan’s cooperation both with the EU and Russia, as well as the EEU members is merely a pragmatic dimension of Azerbaijan's foreign policy. While the ties with the EU/EaP based on institutional cooperation with the EU institutions, in the case of the EEU/CU it is merely

intergovernmental, i.e. with separate cooperation with individual members. Azerbaijan appeared a unique country within the EaP that was able to keep balance simultaneously between the EU’s neighbourhood policy and Russia’s sphere of influence for backyard preservation.

References

1. Gurbanov, I. (2016) “Azerbaijan: Europeanisation Versus Real-Politics”, in the book of “Dilemmas of Europeanisation: Political Choices and Economic Transformations in the Eastern Partnership Countries”, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga, pp.95-123, http://liia.lv/en/publications/dilemmas-of-europeanisation-political-choices-and-economic- transformations-in-the-eastern-partnership-countries-534 2. Paul, A. & Gurbanov, I. (2017) “The Southern Gas Corridor: Heading into the Home Stretch?”, European Centre for Energy and Resource Security, King’s College London, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/eucers/newsletter/newslette r63.pdf 3. European External Action Service. (2018). EU report: Azerbaijan renews engagement and dialogue - EEAS - European External Action Service - European Commission. [online] Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37699/eu-report-azerbaijan- renews-engagement-and-dialogue_en [Accessed 26 Dec. 2018]. 4. European External Action Service. (2017). EU report: Azerbaijan renews engagement and dialogue. December 20. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/azerbaijan/37694/eu- report-azerbaijan-renews-engagement-and-dialogue_en [Accessed 16 December 2018]. 5. Euractiv. (2018). Elmar Mammadyarov : Azerbaijan’s EU relation is of strategic nature. October 16. Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-asia/interview/elmar- mammadyarov-azerbaijans-eu-relation-is-of-strategic-nature/ [Accessed 24 Dec. 2018]. 6. Mfa.gov.az. (2018). Speech by Mr. Elmar Mammadyarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan at the Eastern Partnership Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. October 15. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/909/5877 [Accessed 24 Dec. 2018]. 7. Mfa.gov.az. (2018). Statement by Elmar Mammadyarov Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan at the 15th Azerbaijan-EU Cooperation Council meeting. February 9. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/909/5466 [Accessed 16 Dec. 2018]. 8. European External Action Service. (2016). “A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy”, eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf 9. The Council of EU. (2016). EU to launch negotiations on a new agreement with Azerbaijan. November 14. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press- releases/2016/11/14/azerbaijan/ [Accessed 26 Dec. 2018]. 10. European Parliament. (2018). European Parliament recommendation of 4 July 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the negotiations on the EU-Azerbaijan Comprehensive Agreement. July 4. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2018- 0294+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN [Accessed 25 Dec. 2018]. 11. European Parliament. (2017). European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2017 on the Annual Report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. December 13. [Accessed 17 December 2018]. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2017- 0493&language=EN [Accessed 17 December 2018]. 12. European Parliament. (2018). European Parliament resolution of 12 December 2018 on the annual report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. December 12. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8- TA-2018-0513+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN [Accessed 17 December 2018]. 13. Bayramov, V. (2013) “Considering Accession to the Eurasian Economic Union: For Azerbaijan, Disadvantages Outweigh Advantages”, Caucasus Analytical Digest No. 51–52, p.17,

www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities- studies/pdfs/CAD-51-52-14-16.pdf 14. Cornell, S. (2014) “Azerbaijan: Going It Alone”, in S. Frederick Starr Svante E. Cornell (eds.), “Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, isdp.eu/content/uploads/2015/03/2014-starr-cornell- putins-grand-strategy-the-eurasian-union-and-its-discontents-1.pdf

Zurab Gvelesiani SJD degree in International Business law (Central European University, Budapest) Teaching Assistant, China-EU School of Law (Beijing, China)

TRANSPLANTATION OF EU COMPETITION LAW TO GEORGIA Flaws in the reform and what it teaches about the process of Europeanization

Abstract

Competition is an essential feature of a free market economy. Scholars claim and empirical studies manifest the beneficial effects of market competition.96 It is an engine that runs market efficiently, creates choice among the diversity of goods and services, ensures their high quality and competitive prices. Moreover, competition encourages care for consumers, efficient production and turns the economy into a stronger and competitive one in the global arena. Despite the widespread ideas about a self-regulating market, 97 the position supported in this research is that competition cannot be maintained naturally. So-called market failures make perfect, self- regulating competition98 unachievable. In order to avoid or correct market failures and ensure intense competition, state intervention in the market is necessary. For that purpose, competition law is one of the most widely used and effective legal mechanisms worldwide.99

'Smith, Wealth of Nations; Kovacic, “Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking. 14(1), 2000,” 43- 60. Dennis C Mueller, Alfred Haid and Jürgen Weigand, Competition, Efficiency, and Welfare: Essays in Honor of Manfred Neumann (Springer Science & Business Media 2012). David Rooney, Greg Hearn and Tim Kastelle, Handbook on the Knowledge Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 118; Phil Graham, Hypercapitalism: New Media, Language, and Social Perceptions of Value (Peter Lang 2006) 109; Nick Godfrey, ‘Why Is Competition Policy Important for Growth and Poverty Reduction?’, (OECD 2008); European Commission, ‘Benefits of Competition Policy’ accessed on Febr. 4. 2019.

Regarding the limitations of competition, see: Stucke, “Is Competition Always Good?, J Antitrust Enforcement,” 162-97. Rodriguez and Menon, The Limits of Competition Policy.

97 As Adam Smith claims in his seminal work The Wealth of Nations, market self-regulates itself, by the help of the "invisible hand, ” and there is no need for further intervention from outside. In the words of Smith, “Every individual [...] neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it [...] he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.” See: Smith, Wealth of Nations. Book IV, Chapter II, 456, [9]. 98 Perfect competition is not a real-life phenomenon, but a theoretical concept, acting as a “guiding star” and a reference, in order to explain certain business behavior. See: Bork, The Antitrust Paradox. A Policy at War with Itself., 98; Cseres, Competition Law and Consumer Protection, 46, 47; Steiner, Economics in Antitrust Policy, 60; Gordon, Antitrust Abuse in the New Economy.

99 Nagy, EU and US Competition Law, 1.

Georgia reintroduced competition law in its national system in 2012. At first glance there is nothing unusual about this reform and it seems in line with the international tendencies. Increased interested in antimonopoly and antitrust regulations is a universal phenomenon. There are more than 130 competition law jurisdictions worldwide and majority of them have been adopted in the last few decades.100 However, if we take a closer look at the Georgian reform it becomes evident that the adoption of competition law was not the result of embracing the global tendencies. It was even illogical and unexpected act from the Georgia government of that time. The latter had rather conflicting economic views and policies, trying to eliminate any kind of state intervention on the market and was striving to establish a laissez-faire system101 in order to attract foreign direct investments with the simplicity of the Georgian market rules.102 Evolution of Georgian competition law since early 1990s has been noticeably non-linear and extraordinary. Other than instability of Georgian governmental views and agenda, the EU has also played a significant role in this process. The EU is redesigning legal systems of not only its own member states, but it also pushes legal reformation and harmonization process beyond its borders.103 Cooperation with the EU brings numerous legal changes to its partner states. Considering the strong political will of those states to integrate closer with the EU their governments are often ready to implement any suggested reform, even when they disagree with them. Eventually this leads to conducting reforms for reform’s sake, without any genuine change, failing to achieve the targeted transformation. In order to prove the given statement this work focuses on 2012/2014104 competition law reform in Georgia, identifies its flaws and criticizes a ‘box-ticking’ attitude of the EU. The latter fails to track its recommended reforms beyond adoption of the suggested substantive laws and disregards their actual effective implementation and enforcement. In practice this means that good intentions of the EU might not always translate into positive outcomes. Background Georgia is one of the most active members of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). In June 2014, Georgia

100 Umut Aydin & Tim Buthe, Competition Law & Policy in Developing Countries: Explaining Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits, 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 1-36 (2016) 2

101 Laissez-faire is a theory developed by Vincent de Gournay within the Physiocratic movement, in France, in the eighteenth century. The doctrine was developed out of Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand theory and opposes interventionism on a market. In the early and mid-nineteenth century, the phrase became a synonym for free market economics. The title comes from a phrase: Laissez-faire, laissez-aller, laissez-passer that can be translated as: let do, let go, let pass. See: Mandal, Dictionary Of Public Administration, 25; Faccarello and Kurz, Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis Volume II, 89; Williams, The Enlightenment, 51.

102 Sarah Godar, Tato Khundadze, Achim Truger, Striving for Shared Prosperity A proposal for income tax reform in Georgia with the aim of reducing inequality and mobilizing resources for industrial development, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2018) 6. 103 For example, while the US antitrust law has much longer history, Gerber argues that nowadays, majority of competition law systems in the world resemble the European model. See: Mollers and Heinemann, The Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe, 431; Middleton, Rodger, and MacCulloch, Cases and Materials on UK and EC Competition Law, 14; Siragusa and Faella, “Trends and Problems of the Antitrust of the Future,” 1,2.

104 The initial version of Georgian competition law, (titled: Law on Free Trade and Competition) was adopted in May 2012. In March 2014, the law was renamed to Georgian Law on Competition and was heavily amended.

has signed the Association Agreement (AA), including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU and continues to strive for further political association and economic integration. Georgian citizens enjoy visa-free regime to the Schengen area since 28 March 2017. The EU is Georgia’s leading trading partner and the key political ally.105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113

105 EEAS. EU-Georgia relations, factsheet. Bruxelles, 10/11/2017 accessed on Febr. 4. 2019.

106 For more information, visit: < http://infocenter.gov.ge/eng-euinfo-georgia-history/#1> accessed on Febr. 4. 2019.

107 For more information, visit: < http://infocenter.gov.ge/eng-euinfo-georgia-history/#1> accessed on Febr. 4. 2019.

108 On 27 April 1999, at the accession ceremony of Georgia to the Council of Europe, the chairman of the parliamentary assembly, Lord Russel-Johnston, addressed to the Georgian delegation with the following words: “Georgia, welcome back home!” The late Prime minister of Georgia Zurab Zhvania delivered his historic speech, stating: “I am Georgian and therefore I am European.” For more information, see: Mestvirishvili and Mestvirishvili, “‘ I Am Georgian and Therefore I Am European: ’ Re - Searching the Europeanness of Georgia.” “Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, H.E. Mr. Grigol Vashadze at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.” Also, see: Saakashvili and Bendukidze, “‘Georgia, the Most Radical Catch-up Reforms,” 150.

109 At the campaign concert “We Choose Europe ” dedicated to signing the Association Agreement between Georgia and EU, Giorgi Margvelashvili, then president of Georgia, stated during his speech: “ All of us here today are united for a bright goal, which is not just the choice of some political union, neither is this the choice of any politician or a state official; this is not the choice made only by us; this is the choice made by our ancestors, who created this free country - Georgia, who built the freedom, freedom of soul, acceptance of others, tolerance, in the basement of the Georgian culture. That’s why, we are here not only for our choice, but for the choice made by our predecessors. ” See: “The President of Georgia Attends Campaign Concert ‘We Choose Europe.’” See also: Khaindrava, “Island Georgia.”

110 In January 2014, the Chair of Parliament of Georgia named Europeanization as Georgia’s dream. See: Usupashvili, “Georgia’s Dream: Europeanization as Democratic Consolidation.”

111 Bache and Jordan, “Britain in Europe and Europe in Britain,” 30.

112 Cseres, “Accession to the EU’s Competition Law Regime: A Law and Governance Approach,” 35.

113 What can be referred as the European project, started in 1950, with Robert Schuman's proposal to establish the ECSC.

However, a more direct ancestor of the EU can be the EEC, established in 1957. The same year was established Euratom. In 1967 so called the Merger Treaty was enacted, uniting the ECSC with the EEC and Euratom, forming the EC. In 1993, the EC was transformed into the EU. Despite changing names, increasing the number of Member States, expanding the territories and competences, all these communities are parts of the same

Even though EU-Georgian relations particularly intensified during the last decade it started much earlier, in the beginning of 1990s.11 As Georgia walked out of the ruins of the Soviet Union, it redefined its foreign policy and declared integration with the EU and Euro-Atlantic institutions as its objective.12 In addition to its geopolitical significance, approximation with the European family was and still is viewed as an issue of national identity13 and part of the process of “returning to the roots”.14

Since the early 1990s, active steps have been taken to establish close links with the EU. The cooperation has not been limited only to political, economic, legal or cultural cooperation, but has been multidimensional and can be named as the process of Europeanization.15 According to Bache and Jordan, this term entails the “reorientation or reshaping of politics in the domestic arena in ways that reflect policies, practices or preferences advanced through the EU system of governance” .16 In this complex process competition law has always played a particular role.

According to Cseres, competition law has long been “a significant mechanism and the most acute illustration for Europeanization.”17 There is a compelling reason why the EU dedicates such an exceptional attention to its competition policies. Already for more than 60 years, the EU has been striving for more economic integration.18 The internal market is the ultimate economic objective and the crown jewel for the EU;114 competition law, as a common economic policy for the union, is particularly suitable and efficient mechanism in this perspective. For decades EU competition law has been evolving, changing, growing substantially and expanding geographically. 115 Eventually, competition law is probably the best-developed field of EU law.116 If in the past the process had been limited within the borders of the EU,117 nowadays EU competition law has become a product of export. As a mechanism of Europeanization,118 it is actively used by the EU’s partner states, to harmonize with the acquis

process, with shared history. Therefore, when talking about the past of the EU, it automatically implies the EC and the EEC.

“EUROPA - The History of the European Union.”

114 European Commission - Statement, One market - one Europe, Brussels,

20/03/2018. accessed on Febr. 4. 2019.

115 Patel, Schweitzer, and Wilks, The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law, 11; Siragusa and Faella, “Trends and Problems of the Antitrust of the Future.” 1, 2

116 Bossong and Carrapico, EU Borders and Shifting Internal Security, 142. 117 Govaere et al., The European Union in the World, 373; Bellis (Firm), Competition Law of the European Community, 118; Dabbah, International and Comparative Competition Law, 180, 181. 118 Cseres, “Accession to the EU’s Competition Law Regime: A Law and Governance Approach,” 35.

communautaire, as a necessary preparatory step to integrate with the internal market. The practice of transplanting EU competition system is not only limited to the candidate states, but it also extends to other partner states. It is a preparatory phase necessary for gaining access to the single market. Therefore, it serves to elevate the national market regulation standards for the partner states, making them better prepared and more compatible with the EU’s internal market.119

Competition law reform in Georgia

In 2008 the EU mission highlighted the need to improve Georgia’s competition policy.120 As a priority area for a successful completion of negotiations on the DCFTA, the government was obliged to follow the EU recommendations. Eventually, in 2010 a Comprehensive Strategy on Competition Policy has been prepared and issued by the government.121 In May 2012, a new Law on Free Trade and Competition was adopted. The changes came fast and while these steps were significant, they were more formal reactions to the EU’s demands, rather than a genuine reform. Therefore, it was not surprising that the law was heavily criticized as incompatible with modern EU standards.122 The law was reformed in March 2014. In addition to renaming it as the Law on Competition, the substance was also heavily amended. The amendments solved some problematic issues of the 2012 version of the law and brought Georgian competition law closer to the EU standards.123 Although, it remained a simplified and downsized version of the EU model.124 Georgian law does not follow the EU model in every aspect. In the opposite, there are some significant deviations in the competences of the Georgian Competition Agency, in its enforcement powers and procedural rules.125

119 Czekus, “Motivations of the Common European Competition Policy and Lessons for the Western Balkans, European Perspectives,” 35. Meunier and Nicolaidis, “The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power.”

120 Center for Social and Economic Research, “Economic Feasibility, General Economic Impact and Implications of a Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Georgia,” 83-84.

121 Government of Georgia, Decree on the Approval of the Comprehensive Strategy in Competition Policy.

122 Ketevan Lapachi and Kutivadze, The Institutional Framework for Competition Regulation in Georgia, 30-31; Anderson and Kutivadze, “TI Georgia Recommendations for the Parliament on Competition Policy.” Transparency International Georgia, “Competition Policy in Georgia,” 1, 14.

123 Ketevan Lapachi and Kutivadze, The Institutional Framework for Competition Regulation in Georgia, 32-36.; 124 Zukakishvili, “Two Years after the Legal Transplantation in Georgia - the Best yet to Come,” 42.

125 For example, Georgian competition law establishes much lighter fines and penalties for infringers and shorter investigation period for the authority. The Agency is also significantly limited in procedural and enforcement competences. There is no a system for priority setting, in order to filter the cases. There are no individual exemptions from restrictive agreements. The rules on state aid are also not aligned with the EU model, allowing the authority to issue only recommendations, which are optional for the government. See:

Beyond the given procedural and enforcement differences, there is a much bigger and systematic problem that distinguishes Georgia from the EU model. While EU law recognizes the close connection between competition law and consumer protection and in the EU the given fields are developed, applied and enforced in a harmonious, cooperative manner, Georgia does not even have a functioning consumer law. More specifically, Georgia reintroduced competition regulations in 2012 and abolished already existent consumer law on the same year.126 While competition law was heavily amended in 2014, stressing the focus on consumer interests, no advancements have taken place in the field of consumer law. Competition law can successfully build its system, based on the assumption that consumers will act rationally, as long as consumer law effectively addresses their weaknesses. However, if consumer law entirely fails to deal with this task or, as in the case of Georgia, there is no consumer law at all, then the whole economic philosophy behind competition law, founded on rational choice theory crumbles and makes competition policies rather pointless. The current regulations of Georgia are illogical and do not fit either the EU approach or the economic rationale of the given legal bodies. Georgia uses an interventionist approach on the supply side of the market but favours a laissez-faire approach on the demand side. Georgia gives an extreme example of neglecting consumer protection while attempting to develop a competition law system. In this manner, Georgian transplant is an interesting phenomenon and a good reference to study interdependence between competition and consumer laws. Shortcomings of the Georgian reform well- demonstrates the vanity of any attempt to maintain a high level of competition on a market and enforce competition law effectively, without paying due attention to consumer rights protection.

Harmonization with the acquis communautaire - what the EUcan do better Analyzing the synergies between competition and consumer laws and their interdependent nature

Zukakishvili, “Two Years after the Legal Transplantation in Georgia - the Best yet to Come.” 43; “Sofia Competition Forum Newsletter.” 3; Law of Georgia on Competition. Art. 7, 12-15, 24, 25, 32, 33

126 In 2008, when the EU mission evaluated the country’s readiness for the DCFTA, together with the need for improving competition policy, it also indicated several other priority areas, such as the fields of product standardization and food safety. As a response to the assessment, Georgian government prepared action plans regarding product safety and standardization and food safety. Pursuant to these strategies, two new codes have been adopted by the parliament in 2012: the Product Safety and Free Movement Code and the Food Safety, Veterinary and Plant Protection Code. The new laws abolished several legal acts, including the law on the Protection of Consumers ’ Rights. Eventually, regulations regarding consumer rights protection have been vastly reduced and the field was left unregulated, except the rules of food safety. For more information, see: Todua, “Who Is Protected by the Georgian Government - Entrepreneur or the Consumer? - Democracy & Freedom Watch | Opinion | Democracy & Freedom Watch.”

can help to demonstrate the flaws of the Georgian reform and prove the necessity for introducing consumer law back to the national legislation. However, another important question raised in this work is to understand how Georgia ended up with such controversial regulations, especially when the whole process was closely watched by the EU. That is why while studying dynamics and challenges of the legal harmonization process, this work also discusses how adequately the EU promotes and manages such processes. An interesting fact about the 2012/2014 reform was that it was not the first time that Georgia introduced similar rules in the national system. Georgia was one of the first countries among the former Soviet and Eastern Block Member States to introduce antimonopoly regulations, already in 1992.127 In the 1990s, Georgia was a fragile, new-born state, facing challenges in every direction.128 However, an interesting feature was that in this period legal reforms in certain perspective were even more in line with the contemporary international and European tendencies than the current legal developments. This is particularly visible when examining how competition and consumer laws emerged together and developed hand in hand, for more than a decade. There was understanding that these two separate fields of law are actually interrelated so closely that it is impossible to advance one field, without developing the other as well. The Decree adopted in 1992 was dedicated to establishing a competitive environment on the market and protect the interests of consumers.129 The Anti-Monopoly Department was created within the Ministry of Economy, with the task to enforce the decree. It was given the competence to enforce both antimonopoly and consumer protection regulations.130 The tendency of bundling competition law and consumer protection provision together continued in the Constitution of Georgia, adopted in August 1995. Part 2 of Article 30 (currently Article 26 (4) of the Constitution prohibited monopolies and establishes guarantees for free competition and consumer rights protection,131 placing free competition

127 Udesiani, “Establishing Competition Policy According to the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between Georgia and EU,” 10.

128 Mikheil Saakashvili and Kakha Bendukidze, ‘Georgia, the Most Radical Catch-up Reforms’ in Anders Aslund and Simeon Djankov (eds), The Great Rebirth: Lessons from the Victory of Capitalism over Communism (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2014) 236; Lorenz King and Giorgi Khubua (eds), Georgia in Transition: Experiences and Perspectives (Peter Lang 2009); Burduli, “Economic Transitions in Georgia.”

129 Bedianashvili, Gogiashvili, and Pavliashvili, “European Integration and Institutional Aspects of Competition, Globalisation and Business, N1 - Special Edition,” 26.

130 Lapachi and Tivlisvili, “Georgia,” 383, 384.

131 "The State shall be bound to promote free enterprise and competition. Monopolistic activity shall be prohibited, except as permitted by law. Consumer rights shall be protected by law. " Constitution of Georgia Art. 30.2.

and consumer protection guarantees under the same provision in the Constitution, thus recognising that the two fields are interrelated. The existence of common links was once more stressed by the Law on Monopoly Activity and Competition, adopted a year later. 132 The law determined that its objective was to promote entrepreneurship and to create a legal framework to foster a competitive environment and protect consumer rights. The Law on Protecting Consumer Rights was adopted a few months earlier.133 By 1998, the Law on Advertising was also adopted, including provisions regarding consumer protection from misleading advertising. The Antimonopoly Service was also established, and the first article of its charter defined it as a monitoring-regulatory body, responsible for the enforcement of anti-monopoly, consumer rights protection and advertising legislation. Moreover, the initial antimonopoly law of Georgia was very clear about recognising consumer protection as one of its primary objectives, as stated in its first article.134 The authority was invested with broad competences to intervene on the market, in order to facilitate consumer rights protection. This approach lasted until 2005.135 In June 2005, the Georgian government took a U-turn, rejected the past developments and abolished the antimonopoly law, which despite its flaws was considered by the local and international experts to be quite progressive.136 The Antimonopoly Service was also shut down and a new authority, the Agency of Free Trade and Competition was established. The latter was a classic case of a symbolic authority that was neither supposed to lead any policy changes nor enforce the law. Such authorities are usually formally established, with limited personnel, resources and competencies.137 The Agency was set up to enforce a new law on Free Trade and Competition, adopted in 2005, a nominal law itself. It did not even contain basic competition law provisions, such as those sanctioning anticompetitive agreements, or abuse of dominance, or regulating mergers and acquisitions. The law was limited to

132 Law of Georgia on Monopoly Activity and Competition.

133 The Law on the Protection of Consumers’ Rights.

134 Law of Georgia on Monopoly Activity and Competition Art. 1(1).

135 Fetelava, “The Evolution of the Competition Theory and Antimonopoly Regulation in Georgia.” 135.

136 Bedianashvili, Gogiashvili, and Pavliashvili, “European Integration and Institutional Aspects of Competition, Globalisation and Business, N1 - Special Edition,” 27; Fetelava, “The Evolution of the Competition Theory and Antimonopoly Regulation in Georgia.”

137 Ehlermann and Atanasiu, Constructing the EU Network of Competition Authorities, 228, 229.

certain state aid rules. The personnel of the Agency amounted to seven employees.138 As a result of the reform, all effective legal state interventions and correction mechanisms were eliminated, marking the beginning of the Georgian laissez-faire experiment. It was obvious that the government of Georgia at that time had zero interest in establishing any kind of regulations which could have been viewed as even the slightest barrier for investors to enter the market and would make it a little bit more complicated to do business in Georgia.139 Still, following the recommendations of the EU the government which repealed the existing antimonopoly regulations seven years earlier, adopted the new competition law in 2012. The more non-coherent and irrational the governmental actions might seem, the more it demonstrates that European integration was the primary objective behind competition law reform and the changes were not determined to enhance the national market efficiency and competitiveness. That is why the government has not changed its policies in practice and the law remained unenforced for the next two years.140 Still the EU welcomed adoption of the substantive law and included it in the DCFTA Implementation report as a demonstration of Georgia’s devotion to the terms agreed with the EU.141 In 2014 Georgia successfully completed the negotiations and signed the AA and the DCFTA. The criticism of this ‘box-ticking’ approach does not apply solely to Georgia government but to the EU institutions as well. This does not mean the EU cannot apply external pressure to the governments to convince them about the necessity and suitability of certain reforms, but the efforts should also focus on actually raising the interest domestically and motivating the governments to conduct genuine reforms to deliver the aimed changes. Unfortunately, the Georgian case demonstrates that the EU simply pushes its agenda without investigating much about the readiness of the country to conduct radical reforms or the suitability of its suggested reforms to the existing policies and governmental views. Moreover, once the government of a partner state adopts the recommended law, the EU is easily satisfied with the

138 Solomon Menabdishvili, ‘For the Issue Related to the Definition of Key Terms of Provisions Prohibiting the Cartel Activities, Journal of Law, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, N1, 2015’ [2015] Journal of Law, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University 161.

139 Emerick and Jandieri, “Rose Revolution Shows the Results of Freeing Markets”; Bedianashvili, Gogiashvili, and Pavliashvili, “European Integration and Institutional Aspects of Competition, Globalisation and Business, N1 - Special Edition”; Morari, “Kakha Bendukidze: There Is Only One Way - Building a Free Economy”; “Georgia Reformer, Businessman Bendukidze Dies in London at 58”; “A Different Sort of Oligarch.”

140 The first case to be investigated by the new Competition Agency established in 2014 was regarding the cartel on the oil commodity market. See The Chairman of the Georgian Competition Agency, Order No 81 on the Car Fuel Commodity Market.

141 Ministry of economy and sustainable development of Georgia, “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) 2014-2017 Action Plan Implementation Report for 2015.”

existence of substantive law and ignores further procedural and institutional aspects, while the latter might have huge impact of the law enforcement process and the actual changes in the country.

Methodology The research aims to build on the existing scholarship to provide a comprehensive analytic framework and answer the questions that remain open and unanswered. This goal is attained by employing a combination of methodologies and bringing a new emerging jurisdiction into the discussion, in order to offers solutions which are not merely theoretical but have a paramount practical relevance. The research questions are answered by using comparative analysis methodology, observing legal and regulatory framework of Georgian and EU competition and consumer laws. The choice of jurisdictions is the most natural, as the study deals with legal transplantation process including the two jurisdictions and each of them deserves equal attention. Moreover, considering the economic nature of the given fields of law it is necessary to properly understand the economic rationale behind the legal regulations. For this goal economic analysis and historic reviews of the origins of market regulations will also be employed. The study also takes into consideration the geopolitical aspects of the legal harmonization process with the EU but still it remains to be a legal analysis, scrutinizing substantive, procedural and institutional aspects of competition and consumer laws.

Literature review

There is an exceptionally rich academic output that studies various aspects of competition and consumer laws from legal and economic perspectives, particularly in Europe. However, the questions regarding the synergies and interdependence of competition and consumer laws, raised in this proposal are still disputable. The most valuable sources for this study include the works by Cseres, Stuyck, Ioannidou, Lianos, Kovacic, Jenny, Lowe, Crane, Fox, Ottow, Svetiev, Suffrin. While competition and consumer laws are widely covered in academic literature and their mutually beneficial nature is commonly recognised, there are specific issues covered in this research that makes it innovate. Also, as Stuyck manifests, competition policy and consumer welfare have been vastly discussed by economists, but not by lawyers.142 Unlike EU law, Georgian competition and consumer laws are not well researched and it is possible to find only a few relevant short academic articles and dissertations, studying only some aspects covered

142 Stuyck, “EC Competition Law After Modernisation.” 6

by this study. A particularly interesting source is Fetalava’s dissertation.143 In his capacity of being a former Deputy Chief of the Antimonopoly Service, he provides a valuable first-hand insight into the daily operations of the authority. However, due to his professional relations, one might question the neutrality of some of his assessments. Other relevant sources include articles of Lapachi, 144 Menabdishvili,145 and blogs of the ISET Policy Institute, which often publishes behavioral analyses of consumer-related issues.146 At a larger scale, the work can serve as a critical analysis of the ongoing legal harmonization process with the EU might, a contemporary witness and chronic of the initial years of the reform. The study contains valuable information and analysis, which can be revisited and re- evaluated by interested scholars in the future. With regard to the legal harmonization process, it is not limited to Georgia, as at certain level all the EaP countries are harmonizing their national laws with the respective EU regulations. While the issue is widely discussed in political prism, not much is said in academic world. This kind of negligence and gap of study existed when in the beginning of XXI century the EU enlarged to the east and broadly changed the laws of Central and Eastern Europe.147 Eventually, this research gap led to many problems and mistakes in the newly accessed stated. The current legal harmonization process of the EaP countries is not similar to the EU enlargement, but in legislative point of view this is enlargement of EU law, as we witness establishment of EU-modeled legal systems in its neighborhood. The process deserves attention and it should not be neglected. In this case Georgian experience can serve as a good example and the drawn conclusions can have wider application.

143 Fetelava, “The Evolution of the Competition Theory and Antimonopoly Regulation in Georgia.”

144 Ketevan Lapachi and Kutivadze, The Institutional Framework for Competition Regulation in Georgia, ; Lapachi and Tivlisvili, “Georgia,” 383, 384.

145 Menabdishvili, “For the Issue Related to the Definition of Key Terms of Provisions Prohibiting the Cartel Activities , Journal of Law, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, N1, 2015.”

146 The ISET Policy Institute (ISET-PI) is a think-tank in Georgia, based at the International School of Economics of Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University accessed on Febr. 4. 2018

147 Frank Emmert “Introducing EU Competition Law and Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: Requirements in Theory and Problems in Practice " 642-643

Research Outlines References

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82 Research Outlines Mher Hakobyan Junior Researcher, Lecturer Yerevan State University

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONING OF THE “EASTERN PARTNERSHIP” IN ARMENIA, GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA

Objectives

The aim of the current study is to reveal the determinants of the establishment of the “Eastern Partnership” (EaP), its implementation results in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova and compare the parliamentary discourse of the EaP in the three countries. The objectives are as follow:  Study the main characteristics of the EU’s neighbourhood policy and principles of relationship- building with neighbouring countries;  Analyse the evolution of EaP and set out the conceptual and normative bases of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and EaP;  Analyse the peculiarities of cooperation between the EU and Armenia, Georgia and Moldova in the framework of the EaP;  Set out the key factors influencing on EaP implementation in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova;  Conduct a content analysis of the framework documents signed between the EU and the countries in question, i.e.: EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, EU- Georgia and EU-Moldova Association Agreements (AA), and set out their strengths and weaknesses.

Literature review

The EU’s policy of Europeanisation of neighbouring regions and conditionality as its primary tool is largely discussed by modern Western authors, including Radaelli [2000], Olsen [2002], Lavenex [2004], Schimmelfennig [2005], Sedelmeier [2004], Youngs [2009] and Wong [2011]. These authors view Europeanisation as a process of establishing certain principles, norms and values inside the EU and their export to third countries, which enables the EU to expand the borders of its external governance.

The role of ENP and EaP in the EU’s foreign policy and their geopolitical significance are thoroughly elaborated by Smith [2003], Emerson and Noutcheva [2005], Bretherton and Vogler [2006] and others. These authors view ENP and EaP as a means for the EU to promote its interests sometimes at the cost of the interests of partner countries. As argued by the authors, in the framework of the EaP, the EU puts forward extremely vast requirement and offers too little “compensation”, which decreases the attractiveness of the EaP. This is mostly relevant for countries aspiring an EU membership.

83 Research Outlines Another widely discussed topic is the interlinkages between the EU integration and external security. In their works, Nodia [2004], Helly [2007], Sasse [2009], Popescu [2011] and others state that the EU is not capable of playing and essential role for Armenia, Georgia and Moldova in terms of easing the conflicts. Therefore, low-to-no security guarantees shrinks the EU’s share in the foreign policy of the researched countries. Parallelly, the EU-Russia relations and Russia’s attitude towards the EaP are seen as major factors influencing the dynamics of the EU’s relations with post-Soviet countries. However, opinions are somewhat divided over this issue. Kakachia [2017], Delcour and Kostanyan [2015] and others consider Russia a destabilizing and deconstructive actor, while Trenin [2011], Dragneva and Wolczuk [2012], Samokhvalov [2014] and others view Russia as a balancing force for the EU, which in turn tries to promote its foreign policy interests through influencing small states.

The implementation of the EaP in Armenia is discussed by a number of authors. Giragosian [2014], Minasyan [2015], Terzyan [2016] and Ter-Matevosyan [2017] pay a specific attention to Armenia’s foreign policy U-turn and its causes, as well the preconditions to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Simão [2012] in turn views the issue not from the perspective of Armenia’s foreign policy, but rather of the role attached to Armenia by the EU. Most authors, including Tsuladze [2016], Bolkvadze and Lebanidze [2016], view the implementation of the EaP in Georgia in the scope of Georgia’s possible full membership to the EU and the proper compensation by the EU in response to Georgia’s progress. In case of Moldova, the most discussed topics are the country’s proximity to Russia and domestic differences over EU integration despite the sound implementation of the EaP. Bosse [2010], Shapovalova and Boonstra [2012] focus on the peculiarities of the EU’s policy towards Moldova. Korosteleva’s publication [2010] elaborates on Moldova’s domestic instability and its link to pursuing the Europeanisation agenda, while Hagemann [2013] discusses the role of Russia in Moldova’s foreign policy considering it an essential obstacle.

Methodology

The research entails a combination of methods including: document content analysis, process tracing and discourse analysis. The methods of document content analysis and process tracing have been used to study the evolution of EaP, set out the conceptual and normative bases of ENP and EaP and to analyse the bilateral institutional relations between the EU and the countries in question. For this purpose, the documents adopted/published by the European Commission, EU Council, European Parliament and other EU institutions, as well as framework agreement between the EU and the researched countries have been analysed.

The method of discourse analysis, specifically semi-structured in-depth interviews, has been used to study the views of parliamentary factions about the cooperation with the EU in the framework of EaP

84 Research Outlines thus ensuring a solid empirical basis of the research. Interviews were conducted with eleven representatives of parliamentary factions in the period between November 2017 and February 2018. The interviews were recorded upon respondent’s consent and cited anonymously upon respondent’s request. The interviews lasted 30-45 minutes. The interviews with parliamentarians in Armenia were conducted in Armenian, in Georgia and Moldova in Russian/English.

For case selection several factors have been considered, namely: geographical and demographic similarities of Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, their economic development scores, as well as the existence of ethno-political conflicts, which in some way conditions foreign policy orientation with physical security. Another criterion is the nature and depth of relations with the EU. In this regard, the three other EaP countries, Ukraine, Belarus and Azerbaijan, are less comparable with the selected cases. Despite the prioritisation if the cooperation with and membership to the EU by Ukraine, the latter is “out of race” since it bears an evidently higher significance for the EU than the selected countries due to its size of territory and population, volume of economy and most notably strategic geographical position for energy transfer. For Azerbaijan, the EU is a top direction for oil and gas export, hence the bilateral relations are built upon this area and hinder all-encompassing cooperation.

In case of Azerbaijan and Belarus, it is also vital to consider the existing authoritarian regimes which hamper the development of relations with the EU and hold the possible achievement of the cooperation levels that are already attained with Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. Moreover, no possible framework agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan/Belarus cannot include a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement since none of these countries are members of World Trade Organisation.

One cannot assert, that in the framework of this research Armenia, Georgia and Moldova are completely comparable cases, since there are many differences in their foreign policy and security agendas. Nevertheless, the existing commonalities provide a sufficient basis for a comparative analysis.

Results and Discussion

The first chapter of the dissertation is titled “Europeanisation as a basis for the EU’s neighbourhood policy”. The chapter presents the multifaceted nature of the concept of Europeanisation and theoretically discusses it in the light of the EU’s neighbourhood policy. It is shown that the EU employs Europeanisation as a conceptual framework in order to promote political transformation in third countries based on vertical relations. The chapter also defines the tools, levels and determinants of Europeanisation.

The second chapter is titled “The determinants of the functioning of Eastern Partnership in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova and current results”. The chapter discusses the bases for the three countries’ inclusion into the ENP, as well as the scope of cooperation according to the bilateral ENP

85 Research Outlines Action Plans. The study shows that until 2008 the EU has applied a similar policy towards Armenia, Georgia and Moldova trying to promote political transformation. However, no major political changes occurred in any of the countries. The chapter also presents the starting conditions of the EaP, the two ENP reviews in 2011 and 2015, the evolution of political and trade relations between the EU and the researched countries, the essence of bilateral framework agreements, their commonalities and differences.

The comparative analysis of the bilateral framework agreements shows that in the areas of democracy, human rights and political dialogue in general the three countries are treated equally. In the areas of economy/trade Georgia and Moldova obviously have more gains compared to Armenia. These two countries get mutual market access and elimination of almost all customs, while Armenia remains with GSP+ system and customs and gets mutual access to services market and joins the EU’s common airspace through the new aviation agreement. All three countries are enabled to participate in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy missions. In the security perspective, the wording is different. In the EU-Armenia CEPA, EU is set to continue supporting the OSCE Minsk Group in settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, while in case of Georgia and Moldova the term “secure environment in internationally recognised borders” is used, thus showing the EU’s clear approach based on Georgia and Moldova’s territorial integrity. The level of significance attached to individual countries by the EU is also reflected in the financial allocations for the period 2017-2020. In particular, the allocation for Armenia is around twice as less as the one for Moldova and more than 60% less than for Georgia.

This chapter also sets out the major factors influencing the implementation of the EaP, namely: Russia’s approach and counterinfluence, the EU’s limited resources to affect the settlements of ethno- political conflicts, the domestic policy environment in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, as well as internal divisions inside the EU over the significance attached to the EaP and the balance between the EU’s demand for reforms and the possible gains for individual countries.

The chapter concludes with an analysis of cases in accordance with the three models of Europeanisation proposed by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, namely: institutionalist, power-based and domestic. It is summed up that despite the multifaceted nature of Europeanisation, the power-based approach is to different extents applicable in the cases of Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. However, domestic influence is clearly affecting the EaP implementation in Moldova.

The third chapter is titled “The parliamentary discourse of the Eastern Partnership and the development perspectives”. The chapter presents an analytical overview of the in-depth interviews conducted with members of parliaments in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova in order to reveal their position on the EU’s place in their foreign policy and the geopolitical context of cooperation with the

86 Research Outlines EU. Afterwards, the chapter discusses the parliamentary views on future development of relations with the EU and the possible impact of domestic changes on the foreign policy agenda of the three countries.

Conclusion

The major conclusions of the study are as follow:

1. The EU’s primary aim for building partnership with neighbouring countries is securing its own external security while promotion of European values and economic cooperation mostly serve the primary purpose, which is proved by insufficient differentiation among the partner countries by the EU. Thus, the EU’s strive for a “more ambitious partnership” has been partly diminished.

2. The EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and EU- Georgia and EU-Moldova AAs set out similar areas of cooperation, namely political dialogue and security, justice, economy and trade, sectoral cooperation, etc. The basic difference of these documents is depth of foreseen trade links. The AAs with Georgia and Moldova include DCFTAs which allows free movement of goods, capital and services, while the EU-Armenia CEPA does not include a DCFTA due to Armenia’s membership to the EAEU. The implementation of these framework documents will also largely be influenced by the free movement of people, which is already in place with Georgia and Moldova, while relevant negotiations has not even started with Armenia.

3. Through the CEPA both Armenia and the EU achieved major policy gains. For the first time, the EU visibly applied the 2015 ENP review and showed that the partnership-building with neighbouring countries is flexible and tailor-made and that limited partnership can replace the claim of absolute Europeanisation. In the meantime, although through the CEPA Armenia has not gained a DCFTA, it could complement the strategic partnership with Russia and member ship to the EAEU with a deepened relationship with EU and thus maintain a relative balance between the two powers avoiding a possible geopolitical clash.

4. The AAs with Georgia and Moldova serve as a strong basis for future cooperation with the EU. This is partly conditioned by the level of significance attached to existing conflicts. In Armenia’s European integration is largely seconded to security issues, while in Georgia and Moldova it apparently holds comparable weight. In the long term, the deep cooperation between the EU and Georgia/Moldova can lead to the EU membership which should not be excluded from the agenda since it will become a new incentive for both countries to stay committed to the EU-leaned foreign policy.

5. In the parliamentary discourse of Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, the cooperation with the EU is generally perceived as a stimulus for development. However, if in Georgia the European integration is viewed as an unequivocal path for the country, in Armenia and Moldova it enjoys large yet lower support. From the geopolitical perspective, the cooperation with the EU is largely influenced 87 Research Outlines by the ties with Russia. The parliamentary discourse in Georgia shows considerable support to unilateral foreign policy restricted to the EU, while in Armenia and Moldova balancing relations between the EU and Russia is of much higher significance. The study concludes that in Armenia and Georgia even possible power shifts will not lead to major foreign policy turn, while the 2019 parliamentary elections in Moldova is expected to notably influence the country’s foreign policy leaning it towards Russia.

88 Research Outlines References 1. Bolkvadze K., Lebanidze B., Building a Security Community in the EU’s Neighbourhood? Experiences from Georgia. In: Rieker P. (ed.), External Governance as Security Community Building: The Limits and Potential of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016, pp. 79-105. 2. Bosse G., The EU's Relations with Moldova: Governance, Partnership or Ignorance?, Europe- Asia Studies, 2010, Vol. 62, No. 8, pp. 1291-1309. 3. Bretherton C., Vogler J., The European Union as a Global Actor, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 2006. 4. Delcour L., Kostanyan H., Vandecasteele B., Van Elsuwege P., The Implications of Eurasian Integration for the EU’s Relations with the Countries in the post-Soviet space, Studia Diplomatica, 2015, Vol. 68, No. 1. 5. Dragneva R., Wolczuk K., Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry? Chatham House briefing paper, REP BP 2012/01, August 2012. 6. Emerson M., Noutcheva G., Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation, Herald of Europe, 2005, No. 2. 7. Giragosian R., Armenia’s Strategic U-Turn, ECFR Policy Memo, April 2014. 8. Hagemann C., External Governance on the Terms of the Partner? The EU, Russia and the Republic of Moldova in the European Neighbourhood Policy, Journal of European Integration, 2013, Vol. 35, No. 7, pp. 767-783. 9. Helly D., EU’s Influence in Its Eastern Neighbourhood: The Case of Crisis Management in the Southern Caucasus, European Political Economy Review, 2007, No. 7, pp. 102-117. 10. Kakachia K., Kakhishvili L., Larsen J., Grigalashvili M., Mitigating Russia’s Borderization of Georgia: a Strategy to Contain and Engage, GIP Policy Paper, December 2017. 11. Korosteleva E., Moldova's European Choice: 'Between Two Stools'?, Europe-Asia Studies, 2010, Vol. 62, No. 8, pp. 1267-1289. 12. Lavenex S., EU external governance in “wider Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, 2004, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 680-700. 13. Minasyan S., Armenia Keeps on Balancing Between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 377, August 2015. 14. Nodia G., Europeanization and (not) resolving secessionist conflicts, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 2004, No. 1. 15. Olsen J.P., The Many Faces of Europeanization, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2002, Vol. 40, No. 5, pp. 921-952. 16. Popescu N., EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts: Stealth Intervention, Abingdon: Routledge, 2011. 17. Radaelli C.M., Europeanisation: Solution or problem?, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 2000, Vol. 8, No. 16, http://www.eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf, last accessed: 15.04.2018. 18. Samokhvalov V., Russia, the Near Abroad and the West: Lessons from the Moldova- Transdniestria Conflict, Europe-Asia Studies, 2014, Vol. 66, No. 6, pp. 369-386. 19. Sasse G., The European Neighbourhood Policy and Conflict Management: A Comparison of Moldova and the Caucasus, Ethnopolitics, 2009, Vol. 8, No. 3-4, pp. 369-386. 20. Schimmelfennig F., The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, 2005, Vol. 5, No. 28. 21. Schimmelfennig F., Sedelmeier U., Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of European Public Policy, 2004, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 661-679. 22. Simão L., The problematic role of EU democracy promotion in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2012, Vol. 45, No. 1-2.

89 Research Outlines 23. Shapovalova N., Boonstra J., The European Union: From Ignorance to a Privileged Partnership with Moldova. In Kosienkowski M. and Schreiber W. (eds.), Moldova: Arena of International Influences, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012, pp. 51-79. 24. Smith K., European Union foreign policy in a Changing World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003. 25. Ter-Matevosyan V., Drnoian A., Mkrtchyan N., Yepremyan T., Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union: reasons for joining and its consequences, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2017, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 340-360. 26. Terzyan A., The evolution of the European Union’s conception in the foreign policy discourse of Armenia: implications for U-turn and the path beyond the Association Agreement, Eastern Journal of European Studies, 2016, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 165-184. 27. Trenin D., Russia and the New Eastern Europe, Russian Politics and Law, 2011, Vol. 49, No. 6, pp. 38-53. 28. Tsuladze L., Esebua F., Kakhidze I., Kvintradze A., Osepashvili I., Amashukeli M., Performing Europeanization – Political vis-à-vis Popular Discourses on Europeanization in Georgia, Tbilisi: Nekeri, 2016. 29. Wong R., Europeanization of Foreign Policy. In Hill C. and Smith M. (eds.), International Relations and the European Union, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 149-170. 30. Youngs R., Democracy promotion as external governance?, Journal of European Public Policy, 2009, Vol. 16, No. 6, pp. 895-915.

90 Research Outlines Hasmik Khachatryan Junior Researcher Junior Policy Analyst Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation

THE ROLE OF GEOPOLITICS IN THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP POLICY

Abstract

In the 1990s the collapse of the Soviet Union shifted the global and regional balance of power. Since the fragmentation of the Soviet Union a new system of balance of power (distribution of power) has emerged in the Eastern Europe. The transformed strategic environment has opened up room for the involvement of new actors-such as the EU, in the Eastern Europe. Since 2009 the EU's Eastern Partnership policy has been in place as a specific dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy addressed to the six former Soviet Republics-Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Azerbaijan. The Eastern Partnership policy has raised high interest and expectations among a great many of the Eastern partners. Meanwhile, Russia which used to hold a hegemonic position in the Eastern Partnership area, views the Eastern Partnership policy as the EU's geopolitical project aimed at undermining Russia's power and strategic interests in the former Soviet space. In this regard, the paper examines to what extent geopolitics serves as the core determinant of the Eastern Partnership policy.

Keywords: EU foreign policy, Eastern Partnership policy, geopolitics, stability, liberal order

Introduction

The research objectives

As a joint policy initiative of the EU and the six Eastern partners: Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Azerbaijan, the Eastern Partnership policy (EaP) was launched in Prague in 2009. Ever since the Prague summit, the policy has raised high interest and expectations among a good many of the Eastern partners. Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, which pursue the EU membership as the foreign policy strategic objective, tend to view the EaP as a stepping stone for membership. In the meantime, Armenia strives to enhance relations and develop close ties with the EU and hence has expressed strong interest in the policy. However, Russia which used to be a hegemonic power in the Eastern Partnership area, has perceived the EaP policy as the EU's geopolitical project designed to expand the EU's sphere of influence and to hinder Russia's core strategic interests. Russia's Prime Minister Medvedev has argued; “Some countries view the Eastern partnership as a partnership against Russia, we would not like this partnership to turn into a partnership against Russia, and I would not like to see the partnership lead to consolidation between countries with anti-Russia attitude”148. In the meantime, Foreign Minister Lavrov has stated, "We are accused of having spheres of influence. But what is the Eastern Partnership,

148 Natalia Zaslavskaya, “Russia's perception of the European Neighbourhood Policy: a constructivist explanation” in Sieglinde Gstohl, Simon Schunz (ed.), Theorizing the European Neighbourhood Policy, Abingdon, Routledge, 2017, p. 94-95. 91 Research Outlines if not an attempt to extend the EU's sphere of influence, including to Belarus”149. Furthermore, Russia has extended pressure and imposed costs on certain Soviet Republics aimed at derailing from the EU integration course. In this regard, the research focuses on the Eastern Partnership policy aimed at answering the research question – To what extend has the Eastern Partnership policy been driven by the long-term strategic objective of changing the geopolitical balance of power in the Eastern Partnership area in favour of the EU? To answer the research question, the study reflects on the main objectives the EU pursues in the framework of the EaP policy, brings the views from the Eastern partners and discusses the EU membership dilemma.

The research methodology

The studied research problem is related to the field of international politics. The timeframe of study is limited to the period from 2008 to 2018. When it comes to the research methodology, the triangulation method is used to guarantee the credibility and validity of the study. In accordance, the relevant data is collected from both primary and secondary sources;  secondary sources: the data is collected from books, journals, newspapers, publications by think tanks.  primary sources: highly structured standardized interviews are conducted based on purposive sampling. Hence, the interviews are conducted with the politicians in charge of the EaP policy at the European External Action Service and European Commission, policy experts focusing on the EaP policy at think tanks such as the European Policy Centre, EU Institute for Security Studies, academics focusing on the EaP policy. In agreement with interviewees the interviews are kept confidential. In addition, the interviews are complemented by document analyses. As far as the analyses of the collected data is concerned, the data is critically evaluated, i.e. crossed checked from the sources, to reveal constructed biases and guarantee accuracy and credibility of the study.

The EU's core objectives of the Eastern Partnership Policy

The strategic environment

"From Stettin In the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an "Iron Curtain” has descended across the Continent”150,

Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously declared in the speech delivered in Fulton, USA in 1946. The Fulton speech marked the formal beginning of the Cold War; a fierce geopolitical confrontation between the Western bloc led by the United States and the Eastern bloc (the Soviet Union and its affiliates) led by Russia. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War victorious, and as the world superpowers shaped the new bipolar World Order. The bipolar World Order characterised by tough geopolitical confrontation between the America led West and the Russia

149 Valentina Pop, EU expanding its “sphere of influence ”; Russia says, EUobserver, retrieved 25 April 2018, https://euobserver.com/foreign/27827. 150 The International Churchill Society, “The Sinews of Peace “Iron Curtain Speech”, retrieved November 10 2017, https://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/.

92 Research Outlines led Soviet bloc would dominate the international politics until 1988 when the national independence movements in Soviet Republics started to shake the foundations of one of the most powerful and influential empires of its time. Eventually, in 1991 Belavezha accords151 were signed marking the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union; the “Iron Curtain ” dividing the Western and Eastern Europe fell. The collapse of the Soviet Union shifted the global and regional balance of power. Since the fragmentation of the Soviet Union a new system of balance of power (distribution of power) has emerged in the Eastern Europe. The transformed strategic environment has opened up room for the involvement of new actors-such as the EU, in the Eastern Europe. Back in the 1990s the EU and the former Soviet Republics (Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Belarus) signed Partnership and Cooperation agreements. In 2004 the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and since 2009 the Eastern Partnership policy has been in place as a specific dimension of the ENP opening a new chapter in relations between the Eastern partners and the EU.

151 Presidential Library, The Belavezha accords signed, 8 December 1991, https ://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619792.

93 Research Outlines Democracy clause, economic integration and people to people contacts

“The Eastern Partnership is launched as a common endeavour of the Member States of the European Union and their Eastern European Partners founded on mutual interests and commitments as well as on shared ownership and responsibility.”152

2009 Eastern Partnership Prague Summit (photo: eu2009.cz)

As a specific dimension in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership policy is designed “to build a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased interactions and exchanges”153 and “to support those who seek an ever- closer relationship with the EU” 154 Accordingly, the promotion of democratic political model in the Eastern Neighbourhood constitutes one of the core objectives the EU pursues within the framework of the EaP policy “The Partnership is based on commitments to the principles of international law and to fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to market economy, sustainable development and good governance”155 156. To ensure the observance of the values in the partner countries, the EU insists on “more for more”

152 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 9 May 2009. 153 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Eastern Partnership, 3 December 2008. 154 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Vilnius, 28-29 November 2013: Eastern Partnership: the way ahead, 29 November 2013. 155 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Vilnius, op. cit., p. 6. 156 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit: Warsaw, 29-30 September 2011, 30 September 2011. 94 Research Outlines approach or incentives-based approach9, which means the EU will offer political and economic benefits to the partners committed to the implementation of reforms. The economic integration expected to deliver tangible benefits for both the EU and the Eastern neighbours, constitutes another core objective the EU pursues within the framework of the EaP policy. In this regard, the EU offers to conclude Association Agreement/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA) agreements allowing for a free trade option, “The AAs will include the goal of establishing a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) with each of the partner countries. DCFTAs will cover substantially all trade, including energy, and aim at the highest possible degree of liberalisation. They will contain legally binding commitments on regulatory approximation in trade-related areas” 157 158 . AA/DCFTA agreements have already been concluded with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, which pursue the strategic goal of expanding relations with the EU up to the point of membership. Given the high expectations, the countries would prefer the AA/DCFTAs to act as a preparation stage for the EU membership. In addition, Armenia and the EU have identified the areas of mutually beneficial cooperation striking Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in the sidelines of the EaP Brussels summit, which will open the room for enhancing relations. In line with democracy promotion and economic integration, the EU strives to promote people to people contacts11, to enhance mobility of the EaP citizens. In this regard, in the first place, visa facilitation and readmission agreements, and in the second place, visa liberalisation agreements are envisaged to be concluded with the Eastern partners. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine already benefit from visa liberalisation regime. The EU and Armenia have the visa facilitation and readmission agreement concluded and implemented, and the visa liberalisation option is envisaged to be available to Armenia as well as enshrined in the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement. Overall, generally speaking, the development of democratic political system, economic integration and enhancement of people to people contacts in the Eastern neighbourhood constitute the declared core objectives the EU pursues to achieve in the framework of the EaP policy. The Eastern Partnership Policy in geostrategic considerations of the Eastern partners and the EU

The aspirations of the Eastern partners

The Eastern partnership policy has raised high interest and expectations among a good many of the Eastern partners striving to enhance ties with the EU to a deeper level.

157 Commission of the European Communities, Communication, op. cit., p. 6. 158 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Brussels, 24 November 2017), 24 November 2017. 95 Research Outlines

Figure 1 EU and Eastern Partnership (source: Stratfor)

Georgia pursues the EU and NATO membership as the foreign policy strategic objective. From Georgias point of view, the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical orientation is a matter of national security; “Georgia aspires to become part of European and Euro-Atlantic structures, which will enable it to consolidate its democracy and strengthen its national security”159. Georgia views Russia as the major national security threat given the August 2008 war; “The military aggression by the Russian Federation in 2008, the occupation of Georgian territories, and the deployment of occupation forces in Georgian territories significantly worsened Georgia’s security environment”160, is enshrined in Georgia's National Security concept. Overall, from geopolitical perspective, Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration is expected to counterbalance, contain and deter Russia and to tackle the security issue.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, Ukraine also pursues the EU and NATO membership as the primary strategic objective of foreign policy. From Ukraine's point of view, in light of the 2014 Dignity revolution, the annexation of Crimea and conflict in the Eastern Ukraine, the EU and NATO membership goal gains renewed geostrategic significance, “Russian Federation having violated fundamental principles of international law, bilateral agreements, fundamentals of good neighbourhood and

159 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, National Security Concept of Georgia, retrieved 30 March 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.ge/MainNav/ForeignPolicy/NationalSecurityConcept.aspx?lang=en-US. 160 Ibid. 96 Research Outlines partnership occupied a part of Ukrainian territory- Autonomous Republic of Crimea and city of Sevastopol, and launched an aggression against Ukraine with the aim of preserving political and economic dependence of our state upon Russia”161, is enshrined in Ukraine's National Security Strategy. Overall, from geopolitical point of view, Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration is anticipated to counterbalance Russia's power and influence and to address the national security problem provided Ukraine views Russia as the key national security threat.

Moldova has also declared the EU membership as the foreign policy strategic priority and as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Tudor Ulianovschi has pointed out “the European integration path has reached the point of no return”162. In the meantime, the geopolitical landscape is rather complex given the unresolved Transnistria conflict, Russia's involvement in the peace process (the peace talks are held in 5+2 format involving Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, Moldova, Transnistria, as well as the US and the EU) and Russian troops deployed in Transnistria.

When it comes to Armenia, Armenia does not aspire for the EU membership, however strives to enhance and deepen relations with the EU. The complex geopolitical and security environment Armenia faces in the South Caucasus leaves its impact on its foreign policy course. Armenia faces complex and challenging geopolitical reality posing huge threat to its existence and national security. The two out of four neighbouring countries-Turkey and Azerbaijan have a hostile attitude towards Armenia and constitute a credible national security threat. Turkey denies and justifies 1915 Armenian Genocide committed by the Ottoman Turkey. In addition, during and in the aftermath of the Nagorno- Karabakh war Turkey has provided military, diplomatic and economic support to its Azerbaijani ally163. The attempt to normalise Armenia-Turkey relations culminating with the signature of Zurich protocols in 2009164 ended in failure once again proving Turkey's lack of interest in engaging constructively with neighbouring Armenia. In the meantime, Azerbaijan's policy of imperialism towards Nagorno-Karabakh constitutes huge source of tension threatening Armenia's national security165. Provided the security environment, Armenia views Russia as the security guarantor and counterbalance to Turkey. Hence

161 Government of Ukraine, National Security Strategy of Ukraine (Draft), retrieved 5 March 2018, http://www.niss.gov.ua/public/File/2015_table/Draft_strategy.pdf. 162 Georgi Gotev, Foreign Minister: Moldova wants normal economic relations with Russia, Euractive, retrieved 20 April 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/interview/moldova-would-still-like-to-have- normal-economic- relations-with-russia/. 163 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Bilateral Relations: Turkey, retrieved 30 March 2018, http://mfa.am/en/country-by-country/tr/. 164 Ibid.

165 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Republic of Armenia: National Security Strategy, 26 January 2007.

97 Research Outlines

Armenia strives to balance relations with the EU and Russia and not to alienate Russia while building close ties with the EU.

As far as Belarus (prioritizes close alliance with Russia) and Azerbaijan (close ally of Turkey) are concerned, the partners tend to treat the Eastern Partnership as a policy framework to build working relations with the EU. Overall, the strategic environment in the Eastern neighbourhood leaves its impact on the relations of the Eastern Partners with the EU. The Eastern partners have different levels of aspirations in relations with the EU and geopolitical considerations play an important part in it.

The EU membership dilemma

As it has been discussed, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova would be interested in a more ambitious Eastern Partnership policy with clearly stated membership perspective. As far as the EU is concerned,

the EU “acknowledges the European aspirations and European choice of certain Eastern partners166 however, the Union has seized to grant the membership prospect so far. In this sense, even the wording is not occasional; the six countries are referred to as the Eastern European partners or neighbours but not European states. The Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union enshrines,

“Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union".20

Hence, the reference as European states could indicate or at least would not eliminate an accession possibility for the aspirant countries.

The EU's approach is determined by many different factors. First and foremost, the EU's strategic landscape is far from being conducive for further enlargement. As identified in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the EU faces internal and external challenges. The internal issues such as “Brexit, rise of influence of populist anti-EU political parties”21 pose challenges to the EU. The external threats such as “terrorism and hybrid threats, irregular mass migration, violation of European security order in the East, instability and conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa pose risks to the EU's stability and security”22. Hence, the EU's focus will be on addressing the challenges, and the enlargement issue will fall short of dominating the EU's foreign policy agenda on the short to midterm basis. On the short to midterm basis, the EU rather insists on the implementation of the AA/DCFTAs and CEPA.

In the second place, the EU member states have divergent foreign policy priorities, interests and

166 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Brussels, 24 November 2017), op. cit., p. 7. 98 Research Outlines strategic culture, and hence the member states hold different views on the relations with the Eastern neighbours and the Eastern Partnership policy. Meanwhile, the EU foreign policy decisions are taken by consensus and there is a lack of consensus on the Eastern partners' membership issue. If the EU member states such as Poland, Lithuania argue for the membership prospect167, France168, the Mediterranean member states169 find the membership prospect quite problematic. Furthermore, in certain instances, the EU member states oppose the enhancement of ties with the Eastern neighbours. In 2016, the Netherlands, for example, held a referendum on the approval of the AA/DCFTA signed between the EU and Ukraine and 64% majority of the voters rejected the deal170 171. In the meantime, the Eastern Partnership policy falls short of constituting a core strategic interest for one of the leading influential EU member states- France, and for the Mediterranean member states. The strategic geopolitical and security interests of the states lie in the Southern neighbourhood and hence the states promote a greater focus on the Southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

In addition, it is important to mention that the EU-Russia relations have played a part as well. Up till 2014 Russia's annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the Eastern Ukraine, the EU and Russia had strategic partnership established27. The leading influential EU member states- France and Germany, and the Mediterranean member states held good relations with Russia, tended to prioritise relations with Russia provided the resulting economic and political benefits. Hence the EU would be inclined to take Russia's interests in the Eastern neighbourhood into consideration and to avoid undertaking steps- for example, granting membership prospect to the Eastern partners, which could be viewed by Russia as an attempt to undermine its interests in the former Soviet space.

Overall, the EU membership prospect have been found quite problematic and geostrategic

167 Joanna Kaminska, “Shifting EU Policy Eastward?”, in: J. Kaminska (ed.), Poland and EU Enlargement, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 141-186.

168 Nathalie Nougayrede, France and the Eastern Partnership: the view from Paris, Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved 5 March 2018,

http://www.ecfr.eu/artide/commentary_france_and_the_eastern_partnership_the_view_from_paris303

3#.

169 Silvia Francescon, Italy and the Eastern Partnership: the view from Rome, Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved 5 March 2018,

http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_italy_and_the_eastern_partnership_the_view_from_rome3034.

170 Dutch referendum voters overwhelmingly reject closer EU links to Ukraine, The Guardian, retrieved 10 March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/06/dutch-voters-reject-doser-eu-links-to- ukraine-in- referendum.

171 Council of the European Union, EU-Russia Summit (St.-Petersburg, 31 May 2003): Joint Statement, 31 May 2003. 99 Research Outlines considerations play an important part in it.

Conclusion

The Eastern Partnership policy (EaP) is designed to promote stability and resilience in the Eastern neighbourhood; in a way, to build a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, increased interactions and exchanges. The Eastern Partnership policy is determined by the EU's interest to engage constructively in the Eastern neighbourhood in support of the development of a security community, liberal democratic political and economic systems inspired by the success of its own model. The mentioned comes to demonstrate that the EU's policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood is not guided by the zero-sum game logic and is not directed against Russia's interests. The Eastern Partnership policy, in fact, has run in parallel to the EU-Russia strategic partnership and the EU gave due consideration to Russia's sensitivities. The EaP serves as a platform for mutually beneficial cooperation and win-win solutions, and hence the strong interest shown by the great many of the Eastern partners in the policy. Furthermore, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine which pursue the EU membership as the foreign policy strategic priority, would prefer the EaP policy to be more ambitious and strategic, i.e. a stepping stone for membership. Provided Russia's policy of coercion, Georgia and Ukraine would be interested in the increase of the EU's influence and power in the Eastern neighbourhood at the expense of Russia's power. Armenia, meanwhile, has divergent threat and risk assessments and faces different geopolitical landscape, and hence is interested in holding good relations with both the EU and Russia. As far as the EU is concerned, provided the geostrategic environment- the internal and external challenges the EU faces and divergent geopolitical interests of the member states, the enlargement issue falls short of dominating the EU's foreign policy agenda.

Overall, while the Eastern Partnership policy is not designed as a geopolitical project as such by the EU aimed at changing the balance of power in the EaP area, the geostrategic landscape the EU faces and which persists in the Eastern neighbourhood leaves its huge impact on the EU-EaP relations.

100 Research Outlines References

1. Antonio Missiroli (ed.), The EU and the world: players andpolicies post-Lisbon, Paris, EUISS, 2016. 2. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Eastern Partnership, 3 December 2008. 3. Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 9 May 2009. 4. Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit: Warsaw, 29-30 September 2011, 30 September 2011. 5. Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Vilnius, 28-29 November 2013: Eastern Partnership: the way ahead, 29 November 2013. 6. Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Riga, 21- 22 May 2015), 22 May 2015. 7. Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Brussels, 24 November 2017), 24 November 2017. 8. Council of the European Union, EU-Russia Summit (St.-Petersburg, 31 May 2003): Joint Statement, 31 May 2003. 9. Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities, Treaty on European Union, 1992. 10. Dutch referendum voters overwhelmingly reject closer EU links to Ukraine, The Guardian, retrieved 10 March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/06/dutch-voters- reject- closer-eu-links-to-ukraine-in-referendum. 11. European Union, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016. 12. Figure 1 Stratfor, The rising importance of Europe's Eastern Partnership, retrieved 25 March 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/rising-importance-europes-eastern-partnership. 13. Government of Ukraine, National Security Strategy of Ukraine (Draft), retrieved 5 March 2018, http://www.niss.gov.ua/public/File/2015_table/Draft_strategy.pdf. 14. Georgi Gotev, Foreign Minister: Moldova wants normal economic relations with Russia, Euractive, retrieved 20 April 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s- east/interview/moldova-would-still-like-to-have-normal-economic-relations-with-russia/. 15. Joanna Kaminska, “Shifting EU Policy Eastward?”, in: J. Kaminska (ed.), Poland and EU Enlargement, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 141-186. 16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Bilateral Relations: Turkey, retrieved 30 March 2018, http://mfa.am/en/country-by-country/tr/. 17. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, National Security Concept of Georgia, retrieved 30 March 2018, 18. http://www.mfa.gov.ge/MainNav/ForeignPolicy/NationalSecurityConcept.aspx?lang=en-US. 19. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, Polish-Swedish Proposal: Eastern Partnership, June 2008. 20. Nathalie Nougayrede, France and the Eastern Partnership: the view from Paris, 21. Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved 5 March 2018, 22. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_france_and_the_eastern_partnership_the_view _from_pari s3033#. 23. Natalia Zaslavskaya, “Russia's perception of the European Neighbourhood Policy: a constructivist explanation” in Sieglinde Gstohl, Simon Schunz (ed.), Theorizing the European Neighbourhood Policy, Abingdon, Routledge, 2017, p. 94-95. 24. Official Journal of the European Union, Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, 30 August 2014. 25. Official Journal of the European Union, Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement

101 Research Outlines between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part, 26 January 2018. 26. Official Journal of the European Union, Council Decision of 16 June 2014 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, 30 August 2014. 27. Official Journal of the European Union, Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, 29. September 2014. 28. Silvia Francescon, Italy and the Eastern Partnership: the view from Rome, Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved 5 March 2018, 29. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_italy_and_the_eastern_partnership_the_view_ 30. from_rome3034. 31. The International Churchill Society, “The Sinews of Peace “Iron Curtain Speech”, retrieved November 10 2017, https://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder- statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/. 32. Valentina Pop, EU expanding its “sphere of influence”; Russia says, EUobserver, retrieved 25 April 2018, https://euobserver.com/foreign/27827.

102 Research Outlines Tamara Kortukova PhD student Kyiv University of Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMMON IMMIGRATION POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Abstract

The study of legal regulation of the common immigration policy of the EU is relevant for Ukraine, especially in view of the European integration course. Migration is one of the important areas of cooperation between Ukraine and the EU. In particular, Article 16 of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU from 2014172 emphasizes on the strengthening of cooperation in the areas of migration, asylum and border management. As a result of the European immigration crisis that began in 2015, nowadays in the EU there are dynamic changes in the legal regulation of a common immigration policy. The European Migration Agenda173 was adopted in 2015, which differs significantly from the previous forms of cooperation within the framework of the 5-year programs. In 2016, the European Coast Guard Service was created in the EU and Frontex was transformed. It is planned to reform the Dublin system and adopt the new Dublin Rules IV. In addition to the internal dimension of cooperation between Member States in the field of immigration, the strengthening of EU cooperation with third countries, in particular, in the context of

172 ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: https://www.kmu.gov.ua/storage/app/media/uploaded- files/ASSOCIATION%20AGREEMENT.pdf

173 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS A EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european- agenda-migration/background- information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf

103 Research Outlines the EU-Turkey Statement174 from 2016, which is a new form of EU cooperation with third countries, is becoming increasingly relevant. Taking into account all of the above, the study of legal regulation of the common immigration policy of the EU is extremely relevant.

The aims and objectives

The aim of the study is to analyze the legal regulation of the EU’s common immigration policy. The objectives of the study are following:  to study the concept of forming a common immigration policy of the EU;  to find out the stages of development of the common immigration policy of the EU;  to define the principles and values in the field of the common immigration policy of the EU;  to analyze the influence of international law on the formation of a common immigration policy of the EU;  explore the contractual mechanism of the EU’s common immigration policy;  to define the role of the practice of the EU Court and the European Court of Human Rights in shaping the common immigration policy of the EU;  to find out the legal regulation of the integrated management system of the EU external borders;  to analyze the cooperation of the EU member states in the field of asylum;  to identify the main methods of combating illegal immigration in the EU;  to study the organizational and legal mechanism of regulation of cooperation of third countries and the EU in the immigration sphere;  to analyze the institutional mechanism of regulation of cooperation between third countries and the EU in the immigration sphere;  to identify other forms of EU co-operation with third countries in the field of common migration policy.

Literature Review

The issue of legal regulation of the EU’s common immigration policy is rather new. Some aspects of this problem were investigated by domestic and foreign scientists.

174 EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016 [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey- statement/pdf

104 Research Outlines Among foreign scholars, the issue of the impact of international law on the formation of a common immigration policy of the EU paid attention: A. Marik, D. Slokum, E. Gild, S. Martin, T. Konstantinides, T. Molnar; The issue of EU co-operation with third countries in the field of common immigration policy was given by such scholars as: A. Lutke, D. Gros, D. Lesly, S. Peers, S. Carrera; The issue of a new form of EU co-operation with third countries in the immigration sphere in the context of the EU-Turkey Statement on Migration Crisis Regulation from 2016 was given by A.Mebrid, A.Palm, G.Hog, J.Ripp, P.Siberg; The question of the role of the EU Court in shaping a common immigration policy was given by A. Lang, G. Labyal, M. Shein. Questions of the common immigration policy were also researched by domestic scientists, in particular, by this study: A. Ovsyuk, V. Ivashchenko, V. Kovalenko, V. Marmazov, V. Muraveva, V. Novik, V. Selnevova, Z. Makarouha, I. Serova, L. Grytsaenko, O. Malinovskaya, O. Polivanova, R. Petrov, Y. Shemshuchenko, and others. At the same time, there are no complex monographic works devoted to the subject of legal regulation of the common immigration policy of the EU.

Methodology

Determined by its purpose and objectives. In the process of research used as general and special methods of scientific knowledge. Among the general methods of scientific knowledge in the work, the following methods were used: dialectical, formal-logical, systemic-structural. The dialectical method of cognition allowed to analyze the main problems of the EU common immigration policy. Formally- logical helped to distinguish the periodization of the formation of a common immigration policy of the EU. Thanks to the system-structural method, the legal regulation of the EU’s common immigration policy has been investigated as an integral system and its organizational structure has been identified.

Results and Discussion

The EU’s common immigration policy is a set of EU measures and sources of law in the field of integrated management of the EU’s external borders; rules of entry, residence and return of third-country nationals, etc. At the same time, immigration is a process whereby third-country nationals come to EU Member States for further settlement and residence.

105 Research Outlines With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009175, the issue of a common EU immigration policy is becoming increasingly supportive. The area of freedom and security, which includes border checks, asylum and immigration, is turning from intergovernmental to supranational cooperation. Trends in the modern world reflect the manifestation of both communitarian and cosmopolitan approaches in the EU’s common immigration policy. D. Thym gives three arguments to confirm the cosmopolitan approach in the immigration sphere. Firstly, it is the protection of the rights of third- country nationals within the EU, exemplified by Directive 2003/86/EU on family reunification, where EU Member States under Article 4 of the Directive undertake to allow entry and residence circle members of families. Second, it is the goal of state policy. Given that human rights have little impact on economic migration, EU institutions have a great deal of discretion in developing EU rules and as an example of a cosmopolitan approach, the EU has chosen a flexible regime that facilitates the entry of highly skilled professionals. According to the Blue Card Directive 2009/50/EU, third-country nationals who meet certain qualifications have special rights to entry, family reunification and equal treatment. Thirdly, immigration processes are changing the European society. At the same time, values such as pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men influence the formation of a common immigration policy. In addition, although the EU does not have competence in matters of naturalization, that is, the process of granting a foreign national a nationality, however, there is a tendency for EU Member States to apply the ius soli principle, that is, the principle of acquiring citizenship at the place of birth rather than jus sanguinis, that is the principle of acquiring citizenship at birth, depending on the citizenship of the parents. Also, the proof of the cosmopolitan approach in the EU immigration policy is that certain rights are granted even to illegally employed third- country nationals, as enshrined, in particular, in Article 6 of Directive 2009/52/EU on sanctions for employers. 176 Moreover, Directive 2003/109/EU on long-term stays is also an example of a cosmopolitan approach to common immigration policy. On the other hand, the communitarian approach in the immigration sphere can be compared with the «closed EU club». In our opinion, the current trends in militarization and building of borders at

175 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: http://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT. 176 Thym D. EU Migration Policy and its Constitutional Rationale: a Cosmopolitan Outlook / Daniel Thym. // Erschienen in: Common Market Law Review. – 2013. – №50. – С. 709–736.

106 Research Outlines borders, in particular in countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, France, Hungary, etc.177, are the confirmation of the communitarian approach to regulating EU immigration policy with third countries. It is also necessary to agree with T. Balzac and S. Carrera, who point out that immigration, border and asylum issues are more controversial in shaping policies in this area. This is supported by national fears, ideological differences and competing political interests [c.4].178 The EU adheres to the multicultural model of a common immigration policy. In particular, the confirmation of this is that EU policy is aimed at attracting labor migrants, in particular, highly skilled. In addition, there is legal provision for the integration of immigrants. For example, the EU Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals from 2016179 laid down provisions for the integration of immigrants in the field of education, work, housing, medicine, etc. The Europeanisation of a common immigration policy takes place both in the internal and in the external sphere. In the internal sphere, the Europeanisation of immigration policy takes place as a result of the direct effect of EU law and the impact of the EU acquis on the rule of law of the EU Member States. Europeanization of a common immigration policy also takes place in the external sphere, the most striking example of which is the cooperation within the framework of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility180 of 2011 and the Statement between the EU and Turkey of 2016. Immigration issues, in particular the rules for entry, residence and stay of third-country nationals, have long been related to the sovereign powers of the EU Member States. This means that it is EU Member States who have defined the legal regulation of immigration policy. The formation of a common immigration policy for the EU has certain peculiarities at various stages of the existence of the EU.

177 Border fences and internal border controls in Europe [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/55249.pdf. 178 Balzacq T. Migration, orders and asylum trends and vulnerabilities in EU policy / T. BALZACQ, S. CARRERA. // Centre for European Policy Studies. – 2005. – С. 1 – 74. 179 Europe: Integration Action Plan of Third-Country Nationals launched [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/europe- integration-action-plan-of-third-country-nationals-launched. 180 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0743

107 Research Outlines In particular, it is possible to propose periodization, which reflects the most important legal changes in the EU immigration policy, namely: the first stage of the formation of a common immigration policy (1951-1992) is characterized by the regulation of immigration issues at the national and intergovernmental levels. The second stage (1992-2007) begins with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and continues until the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. A special for this period is the development of a common immigration policy of the EU and the transition of the regulation of immigration issues to a supranational level. The third period starts from 2009 and continues to the present. Also, the following principles in the field of common immigration policy can be singled out: solidarity, the principle of just responsibility, the principle of prosperity, the principle of security, and so on. The principle of solidarity is one of the most important in this area; its definition in the EU law can be proposed as follows: it is a fair distribution of responsibility based on honest cooperation and assistance in support of security and stability in the EU as a whole. Taking into account the existence of a legal mechanism for protecting values, enshrined in the EU constituent treaty, it can be argued that EU values are not merely declarative concepts, but legal rules to be followed by EU member states. At the same time, respect for EU values, in particular, in the field of common immigration policy, is a basic condition for building citizens’ confidence in the Union. The EU strictly adheres to the development of international law, in particular the principles of the UN Charter. The Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and the Protocol thereto have a direct impact on the EU’s common immigration policy. Regarding the impact of ILO conventions on the formation of a common immigration policy of the EU, it was examined that the EU norms have a priority over the norms of the ILO, therefore the impact is insignificant. The EU’s cooperation with IOM began in 1994, with organizations working together in many projects and are key partners for each other. Given the small number of EU member states that have ratified the Council of Europe Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, and given that the Guidelines for the Compulsory Return of Illegal Mentors have a soft law, the above-mentioned documents have little effect on the formation of a common EU immigration policy. That is, within the framework of the Council of Europe, the most important document promoting the development of common standards in the immigration sphere is the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedomsof 1950 and the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. The sources of the law of a common EU immigration policy are the external form of expression of the legal norms and principles adopted at the supranational level by the institutional mechanism of the EU, which can be classified as primary and secondary.

108 Research Outlines Primary sources of law create the legal basis for regulating a common immigration policy. Although certain issues, in particular, the definition of the reception of third-country nationals is within the competence of the Member States, it can still be argued that there is a common immigration policy. Since 1999, five-year programs have been created, such as the Tampere Program, the Hague Program and the Stockholm Program. In them, the goals, priorities, tasks in the immigration sphere were fixed. Such programs are acts of soft law, but, in the framework of their implementation, secondary law acts that are mandatory for EU member states are adopted, reflecting the effectiveness of such programs. Nowadays, the guidelines in the immigration sphere are defined in the European Migration Agenda from 2015. Structurally, it differs from previous programs. Also, unlike the five-year term of previous programs, it does not have an expiration date. Today the Schengen acquis has been codified in the framework of the European migration agenda; introduced a European travel document for the return of third-country nationals who are in the EU illegally; European Border and Coast Guard; as well as certain conditions for the entry and residence of third-country nationals for research, training, volunteering, pupil exchange and educational projects and au pair programs. In addition, the creation of a common EU list of safe third-country migrant backgrounds is being discussed, which is extremely relevant in the context of the European migration crisis. Although the European agenda is an act of soft law, its active harmonization in the field of immigration policy is under way, which only emphasizes its importance for the development of a common immigration policy of the EU. Given the fact that the EU’s common immigration policy began to emerge in the late 1990s, the activation of the EU Court in this area began with this period. To date, the EU Court plays an important role in the interpretation and support of the implementation of EU legislation in the field of immigration by the Member States of the EU. It manifests itself in a large number of issues that it considers and interprets, including in the area of border management; visa issues; questions on the return of third- country nationals who are illegally staying in the EU, etc. Therefore, given the recent tendencies in the work of the EU Court, it is impossible to talk about «judicial passivity» of the EU Court. In addition, it should be noted that, according to the Court of Justice of the EU 2/13 of 2014181, which considered the compatibility of a draft treaty providing for the EU to join the ECHR with the EU

181 OPINION 2/13 OF THE COURT (Full Court) 18 December 2014 [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0& part=1&mode=DOC&docid=160882&occ=first&dir=&cid=240894.

109 Research Outlines Treaties, the EU Court ruled that it was not compatible with The EU, and therefore the EU has not yet joined the ECHR in accordance with this opinion. However, the EU nevertheless attaches particular importance to the ECHR, and in Article 6 of the Treaty of the EU is established that «the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR form the general principles of the right of the Union»182. That is, the provisions of the ECHR are legally binding on the EU and are used as general principles of EU law. It can be argued that the practice of the ECHR also affects the formation of a common immigration policy of the EU. D. Thym notes that «the issue of entry, residence and deportation of foreigners is within the competence of the states, but the ECtHR nevertheless imposes certain restrictions. For example, in 1991, the ECtHR first recognized the deportation of a foreigner as a violation of his right to family life in accordance with Article 8 of the ECHR and also applied Article 3 of the ECHR on the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment»183. In addition, although the ECHR has not secured the right to asylum, it has in fact become an instrument for the protection of refugees, although, first of all, States parties have decided not to integrate the right to asylum in the ECHR. In the context of immigration and refugee issues, the following ECHR provisions are relevant: Article 3 of the ECHR is a central safeguard against the ill-treatment of countries of origin or transit from which persons are seeking asylum in European States; Article 5 guarantees the right to liberty and security; Article 8 of the ECHR protects the private or family life of immigrants and refugees; Article 13 of the ECHR concerns the procedure and judgments; Article 4 of Protocol 4 prohibits collective expulsion. In the context of Article 3, the ECHR prohibits the expulsion of persons to states where they are threatened with ill-treatment. That is, the ECtHR may consider whether the alien’s expulsion has caused the risk of ill-treatment, which is contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. According to Article 5 of the ECHR, migrants, including asylum-seekers, may be detained until the state gives them permission to enter the country or a permit to stay in its territory. Migrants may be deprived of their liberty only in accordance with the procedure provided for by law and this measure can

182 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: http://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT. 183 Thym D. RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE UNDER ARTICLE 8 ECHR IN IMMIGRATION CASES: A HUMAN RIGHT TO REGULARIZE ILLEGAL STAY? / Daniel Thyma. // International and Comparative Law Quarterly. – 2008. – С. 1–18.

110 Research Outlines only be applied for two reasons: to prevent unauthorized entry into the country or to expel. For example, in the case of Khalifa and others. against Italy, 2016184, the ECtHR ruled that unlawful detention of Tunisian asylum seekers had violated their rights enshrined in the ECHR With regard to Article 8, «firstly, the ECtHR notes the need to maintain a balance between the preservation of family unity and the maintenance of public order; and secondly, it consolidated the right to family reunification, which was recognized in the historic decision of Abdulaziz and others v. United Kingdom, 1985». 185 Article 13 guarantees the right to effective remedies, but can only be invoked if the applicant has a complaint under another provision of the ECHR, for example, a complaint about the existence of a risk of ill-treatment that violates Article 3 of the ECHR. For example, in the case of I.M. against France, 2012 on the deportation of a French citizen from the Sudan186, the ECtHR found that the five-day deadline for filing a petition for a political asylum and the 48-hour time limit for challenging a subsequent deportation decision were too short. These and other factors of the case have made the remedy practically ineffective, in violation of Article 13, and also Article 3 of the Convention. Interesting in the context of Article 4 of Protocol 4 is also the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy from 2012. It noted that the collective expulsion of persons from the territory subject to the jurisdiction of the state is prohibited. That is, it is necessary to carry out the identification procedure and to properly assess the individual circumstances of each person in the asylum seeker group. Otherwise, the expulsion will be considered collective. The reform of Frontex in accordance with Regulation 2016/1624 has necessitated an analysis of its activities in the context of new developments. In particular, it has been established that the new Regulation 2016/1624 contains the so-called «right to intervene», which applies without obtaining a

184 CASE OF KHLAIFIA AND OTHERS v. ITALY [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/dec/echr-judgment-Khlaifia-and-Others- v%20Italy-full-text.pdf.

185 Thym D. RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE UNDER ARTICLE 8 ECHR IN IMMIGRATION CASES: A HUMAN RIGHT TO REGULARIZE ILLEGAL STAY? / Daniel Thyma. // International and Comparative Law Quarterly. – 2008. – С. 1–18. 186 I.M. v France, Application No. 9152/09 [Electronic resource]. – Access mode: http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/ecthr-im-v-france-application-no-915209- 0.

111 Research Outlines prior request from a Member State only in extreme cases where a Member State does not comply with the measures recommended by Frontex and if the external control the boundaries of the Member State concerned are considered ineffective and threaten the functioning of the Schengen area. Although regular border control falls within the competence of EU Member States, Frontex, in order to ensure effective response, conducts joint operations. All operations carried out by Frontex can be divided into standard joint operations and joint rapid intervention operations. The technical means of border management are building walls. On the one hand, fences suspend the flow of illegal immigrants. On the other hand, the construction of walls leads to a certain violation of the rights of refugees. The EU’s common asylum policy is based on the principle of non-refoulement and the principle of asylum. Today, the only European asylum system is: Dublin III Rules; Qualification Directive 2011/95; Directive 2013/32/EU on a common procedure for the granting and deprivation of international protection; Directive 2013/33/EU on the conditions for admission of persons seeking international protection. In 2010, the European Asylum Agency was created, which, through support, facilitates the implementation by the Member States of asylum obligations. The entry into force of the Dublin IV Regulation should reinforce the principle of solidarity in the EU Member States through the creation of mandatory quotas for the redistribution of refugees. In turn, this will weaken the pressure on the border countries and will result in the equal distribution of refugees in the EU member states. The term «illegal migration» means a violation of law when entering or staying in the territory of a Member State. Countries located at the external borders of the EU most suffer from illegal immigration, in particular, Spain, Italy, Malta, Hungary. EU Member States have the right to restore border control within the Schengen area. Although this phenomenon is temporary and legally enshrined in the Schengen Borders Code, the growing dynamics of the restoration of border control at the internal borders of the EU violate the freedom of movement within the Schengen area. EU cooperation with third countries is an important part of a common immigration policy. In particular, P.Andraade notes that «the development of intensive cooperation with third countries is extremely important for responding to the many problems arising from migration» [c.17]187. By the same token, S. Lavenex adds that «against the backdrop of EU efforts to minimize illegal immigration to the EU, immigration control policy has become an important element in the context of EU cooperation with

187 GARCÍA ANDRADE P. EU COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES IN THE FIELD OF MIGRATION / Paula GARCÍA ANDRADE. // CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS. – 2015. – С. 1–144.

112 Research Outlines third countries»188. Comprehensive regulation of immigration issues in the EU is possible only in cooperation with the third countries. In other words, in the modern interdependent world, the external dimension of the EU immigration policy is as important as the internal one [c.122]189. The work also analyzed the EU’s cooperation with third countries in the framework of comprehensive agreements, such as the Association Agreements and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. In addition, EU co-operation with third countries in the field of joint immigration policy takes place within the framework of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobilization, in which the positions of the parties are agreed by adopting declarations, action plans, various programs, etc., although they have the character of soft law, but they determine the priorities and areas of cooperation. After analyzing the institutional mechanism of regulation of cooperation between the EU and third countries in the field of immigration, we came to the conclusion that it is rather branched out, disorderly and unsystematized. In our opinion, it is necessary to strengthen the institutional structure of the exchange of information between EU institutes and EU member states on the development of joint EU cooperation agreements with third countries. Having examined the issue, one can come to the conclusion that it is necessary to improve the interaction mechanisms and the cooperation of the EU acquis on cooperation in the field of immigration. Riznomanitnyy harakter, mnozhynnist instruments used for the development of the EU to third spivrobitnytstva krayinamy immihratsiyniy in the field, fuzzy distribution povnovazhen ta competence to determine the necessity of clearly vyroblenni institutional mechanism spivrobitnytstva EU to third krayinamy immihratsiyniy in the field. EU cooperation with third countries in the field of immigration policy is a new form of cooperation between the EU and Turkey, which is due to the fact that Turkey is the main transit country for migrants to the EU due to, in particular, the events of the Arab Spring. The paper analyzes the principle of the Declaration between the EU and Turkey regarding the settlement of the immigration crisis from 2016, as well as defines the concept of «first country of asylum», a «safe third country». If asylum seekers enter the EU through Turkey, they will be returned to Turkey, as it is considered a «safe third country». At the same time, Turkey should be responsible for asylum seekers who crossed the border of Turkey, as it is the «first safe country» to which they have fallen after leaving their country of origin. The

188 LAVENEX S. Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control / SANDRA LAVENEX. // West European Politics. – 2006. – №2. – С. 329 – 350. 189 Teodorescu L. Ambition versus reality: partnering with our neighbours on migration

/ Loredana Teodorescu . // European View. – 2017. – С. 121–130.

113 Research Outlines statement is evidence of cooperation in the EU based on the principle of solidarity, which has established a link between the EU and Turkey on migration issues.

114 Research Outlines Mykhailo Kryvoruchko Associate Professor, PhD Department of Accounting and Finance Cherkasy State Business-College, Ukraine

INTERREGIONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECT

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to develop an interdisciplinary methodological approach to analysis of interregional socio-economic convergence in the context of European integration from the institutional perspective. Based on analysis of theoretical and empirical studies in the areas of interregional disparities and institutional economics, the interdisciplinary methodological approach has been developed which implies reaching the following objectives: 1) to analyze interregional disparities in EU-members within the framework of neo-classical growth theory, 2) to examine regional dynamics using methodology of «core-periphery» theory («New Economic Geography»); 3) to research the presence of «resource abundance curse» phenomenon in the regional development in the EU-countries; 4) to examine the institutional dimension of interregional disparities; 5) to analyze position papers on the EU Cohesion Policy implementation to outline institutional challenges of the latter. Therefore, the research output allows one developing an interdisciplinary approach to analysis of institutional aspect of socio-economic convergence combines a quantitative (empirical) and a qualitative analysis. Introduction and Literature Review

The problem of interregional convergence among EU countries has been of a great interest, which is explained by the fact that European integration may accentuate the level of interregional differences in EU-members; this requires searching for an adequate mechanism to transit the integration process with fewer economic and social losses for territorial development. The multidimensional nature of interregional disparities implies an institutional approach to developing the model of interregional convergence in socio-economic development. Valuable and very interesting studies along this research line have been undertaken by Anders, Barro, Bevan, Bode, Coase, Havrylyshyn, Krugman, Lane, North, Sala-i-Martin, Tiffin, and others. These scholars have used different methodological approaches that include neo-classical analysis, «core- periphery» theory, institutionalism, «resource abundance curse» phenomenon. The outcomes of their studies serve as a solid ground for in-depth research on interregional convergence, which allows analysing this phenomenon from different perspectives. However, the issues regarding the regional dimension of institutional influence on the socio-economic development in the context of European integration have not been thoroughly covered in the economic studies.

115 Research Outlines Research into the institutional influence on economic development holds one of the prominent places in modern economics. The seminal works of R. Coase (1937) and D. North (1990) laid the groundwork for this line of research within the framework of new institutionalism. A cornerstone idea of the new institutional theory is an assumption that a market, unfriendly to political and legal environments increase the cost of transactions for economic agents, which has a negative impact on business activity. As a result, poorly developed institutions foster the existence and development of a black economy, an inefficient distribution of public resources, and grabber-oriented economic activity. A number of empirical studies indicate the presence of a significant correlation between indicators of institutional and economic development (see Bevan, Estrin, and Meger, 2004; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Gwarthey, Holcombe, and Lawson, 2004; Havrylyshyn and van Rooden, 2000). In addition, this approach illustrates a basic tenet of the «resource curse» phenomenon – the situation where a resource- rich country experiences a recession due to the functioning of market-unfriendly institutions (see Lane and Tornell, 1998; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier, 2006; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006; Kolstad, 2007). Wide usage of the new institutional approach demonstrates high theoretical and empirical value and importance in modern economic studies. This theoretical and methodological approach also formed the underlying basis applied to analyses of institutional change in the post-communist transition countries, including Ukraine (see Anders, 2001; Tiffin, 2006; Black and Tarassova, 2003).

Research Objectives and Methodology

A current paper aims at developing an interdisciplinary methodological approach to analysis of interregional socio-economic convergence in the context of European integration from the institutional perspective. Particularly, the research focuses on analysis of theoretical and empirical studies in the area of interregional convergence aiming at formulating research objectives to examine institutional dimension of interregional convergence in the EU member-states. The institutional nature of examined issue and its complexity determine the research framework that targets answering the following research questions within the scope of this study: 1. What research approaches could be applied in order to examine the interregional convergence with regard to its interdisciplinary dimension? 2. Does the empirical evidence on analysis of interregional development in Ukraine indicate convergent or divergent tendencies? 3. What methodological approaches could be applied to development of the research framework of the model of interregional convergence in Ukraine? How adequate and accurate would such model be?

116 Research Outlines 4. Could the same interdisciplinary methodological approach be applied to analysis of interregional convergence in the EU-members? 5. Taking into account that interregional convergence analysis is based on empirical (quantitative) basis, what type of qualitative analysis could be used to enhance the interdisciplinary nature of the research framework? Taking the above-mentioned research questions, the research methodology implies usage of theoretical and empirical evidence in the area of convergence as a methodological basis; whereas, the application of the method of analysis, systematization and generalization would allow one to formulate the core of a methodological approach to analysis of interregional convergence in the context of European integration.

Results and Discussions

A rigorous foundation for the reduction of interregional disparities as a research topic was laid in the 1950s: the pioneering studies undertaken by R. Solow (1956) and T. Swan (1956) laid the groundwork for the neo-classical economic growth theory. Further development of the convergence model was connected with the seminal works done by R. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992). These scholars are considered the creators of a simple and straightforward approach to the analysis of the economic systems convergence, which was based on the econometric testing of the assumptions of a negative correlation between the dynamics of the output (income) growth rate and its initial absolute value. Nowadays the neo-classical approach has a wide application in studies on cross-country and interregional convergence and divergence, in different countries’ unions and associations, particularly, in the European Union. This research venue is closely related to the studies, in which the interregional disparities (which are very high) in Ukraine are analyzed in the context of European integration. The research findings indicate the presence of a strong divergence in the level of available (disposable) income – (see Kryvoruchko, 2015a); another important conclusion that has been derived from the empirical analysis is a strong dependence of regional development on abundant natural resources, i.e., the more a region extracts and exports mineral resources, the better is its economic performance (see Kryvoruchko, 2015b). Therefore, there has been created a situation where public policy in regional affairs was influenced by particular interest groups, which were competing for the access to the mineral deposits, while ignoring the crucial factors of socio-economic development, such as productivity, social justice, and welfare. A separate study examines institutional influence on the interregional disparities in socio- economic development in Ukraine (see Kryvoruchko, 2015c). The research methodology was based on the new institutional approach and application of regression analysis: three empirical models consisting

117 Research Outlines of the coefficients of variation of gross regional product per capita, available income per capita, salary per employee in place of dependent variables, and institutional governance indicators in place of independent ones, were tested on a linear correlation. The empirical evidence indicated that the correlation between the variation of available income and institutional governance was insignificant, despite that there was a strong and significant correlation with gross regional product and salary. The preliminary assumption on the negative sign of regression parameters did not come true; therefore, the research conclusion stated that the positive nature of institutional influence on the interregional disparities in Ukraine could be explained by the resource-oriented structure of Ukrainian economy: overall economic growth leads to speeding-up of economic development of the leading regions, which in turn, causes deepening interregional disparities. Following the «core-periphery» theoretical and methodological framework (see Krugman, 1991; Bode and Mutl, 2010; Bosker, Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm, 2010; Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm, 2006), research has been undertaken in order to estimate the presence of either interregional convergence or divergence in Ukraine. The empirical evidence indicated a positive correlation between industrial market size and the level of available income per capita leading to the conclusion concerning the presence of interregional divergence in Ukraine (see Kryvoruchko, 2015d). Understanding that the major issues in the regional development in Ukraine are institutional in nature, there has been developed an institutional model of interregional convergence in socio-economic development. Its methodological framework (see Kryvoruchko, 2016a) implies examining how the industrial and resource orientation of regional economy influences the institutional factor of regional development. The choice of variables indicating such a factor has been made in order to research two dimensions of institutional environment changes, namely social and structural ones; crime rate and innovation market size has been chosen respectively as indicators to evaluate the two dimensions mentioned above. The institutional model of interregional convergence also implies examining the influence of social and structural factors of regional development on the socio-economic development on the regional level, the level of interregional disparities, and the institutional environment on the national level. Empirical testing of correlations within the institutional-social convergence model indicates surprisingly positive correlations between industrial and resource orientation of a regional economy and the crime rate; crime rate as a determinant factor fosters socio-economic development on the regional level, reduces interregional disparities in wage level, and reflects the public’s negative perception of government accountability in Ukraine. The controversial nature of such factors such as the crime rate’s impact on the convergence model leads to a reconsideration of the role of the crime rate; this indicator could be used in place of the institutional indicator on the national level along with other institutional indicators within the structural framework of version of the institutional model.

118 Research Outlines Empirical correlation testing within the institutional-structural convergence model indicates a positive influence of the industrial (but not the resource) orientation of a regional economy on the innovation market size; the innovation market size as a determinant factor has a positive impact on socio- economic development on the regional level; in addition, the innovation market size reduces interregional disparities in the level of disposable income per capita, and reflects a positive public perception of the control of corruption and government effectiveness as well as reducing the crime rate on the national level. Empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that the developed convergence model is adequate and accurate. The research outcome indicates the importance of structural reforms rather than social changes in order to reduce interregional disparities in Ukraine, to foster socio-economic development on the regional level, and to improve overall institutional environment in Ukraine. This conclusion complies with the evidence that an innovation-driven economy is more favorable for interregional convergence than the resource-oriented one (see Kryvoruchko, 2016b). Generalization of the analysed studies allows one using their methodologies in order to examine the institutional mechanism of interregional convergence among EU countries. The EU-members differ by the structure of their national economies and the level of interregional disparities, which is the focus of the research to be undertaken. The following research objectives would be achieved in order to examine the interregional disparities in socio-economic development with respect to the complexity of this issue: 1. To analyze interregional disparities in EU-members within the framework of neo-classical growth theory, i.e. using β- and σ-analysis. 2. To examine regional dynamics using the methodology of «core-periphery» theory («New Economic Geography»), which is based on researching the correlation between wage/income level, interregional migration, and industrial market size. 3. To research the presence of the «resource abundance curse» phenomenon in the regional development in the EU-countries by analyzing the correlation between regional growth rate and the share of mineral resources in the regional export/import. 4. To examine the institutional dimension of interregional disparities by analyzing influences of institutional governance and doing business indicators on the coefficient of variation of socio- economic development indicators. The proposed methodology could be applied to all EU-members or the groups of EU-countries with similar socio-economic characteristics, though there remains some flexibility. Cross-country and cross-regional correlation analysis would be used as the research method along with single/multiple time series regression analysis.

119 Research Outlines An important component of institutional approach to interregional divergence in the context of European integration is analysis of the EU Cohesion Policy. The European Commission is implementing the Cohesion Policy aimed at reducing disparities within EU member-states and their regions. The EU Cohesion Policy has been of a great interest to the scholars researching interregional cohesion in the context of European integration (see Bachtler, Mendez, and Wishlade, 2016; Dudek, 2014; Mendez and Bachtler, 2015). Regardless of the progress in socio-economic convergence, good institutional governance remains an important challenge for the EU Cohesion Policy implementation effectiveness (see European Commission, 2017). In order to widen the scope of the empirical research on institutional governance’s influence on interregional cohesion in the context of European integration, one should analyze political positions (position papers) on the Cohesion Policy implementation to bring a qualitative component into the research. Position papers are the documents published by the EU member states’ national governments and research institutions as a response to the European Commission’s call for consultations regarding different issues. Methodological basis for the analysis of position papers implies a research background in political agenda of European Union from the perspective of institutional development and decision-making (see Kreppel, 2002; Madeliene, Kreppel, Plechanova, and Verdun, 2015).

Conclusions

The research outcome indicates that within the scope of this paper there has been developed an interdisciplinary methodological approach to analysis of interregional socio-economic convergence in the context of European integration. Having answered the research questions, one has come to the following conclusions: 1. There are different research approaches that could be applied to analysis of the interregional convergence with regard to its interdisciplinary dimension. Particularly, the neo-classical, core- periphery, resource abundance, and institutional governance methodological approaches allow outlining different aspects of interregional convergence. 2. Overall, the empirical evidence on analysis of interregional development in Ukraine indicate divergent tendencies. Another important conclusion is a strong dependence of regional development on abundant natural resources. 3. Neo-classical, core-periphery, resource abundance, and institutional governance methodological approaches could be applied to development of the research framework of the institutional model of interregional convergence in Ukraine. Empirical evidence indicates that the developed model is adequate and accurate. 4. The same interdisciplinary methodological approach could be applied to analysis of interregional convergence in the EU-members. The EU-members differ by the level of economic development

120 Research Outlines and interregional cohesion; therefore, one would expect different empirical output within the proposed framework of analysis. 5. In order to enhance the interdisciplinary nature of the research framework, in addition to empirical (quantitative) analysis, the analysis of position papers on the EU Cohesion Policy could be added to the research framework as its qualitative component. Position papers are the officially published documents that express a view (position) on the EU Cohesion Policy implementation challenges and perspectives. Therefore, the combination of classical and non-classical methodological approaches to the interregional analysis provides multidimensional foundation for examining potential challenges of European integration to the regional development. The proposed methodological approach implies following two research lines. The first one is related to the institutional framework that is to be applied to analysis of institutional governance and interregional convergence within the EU countries. The second one is related to studying political positions on institutional aspects of the EU Cohesion Policy implementation. Following these two research lines allows combining quantitative and qualitative methods as well as enhancing the interdisciplinary nature of the developed research methodology.

121 Research Outlines References

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122 Research Outlines 22. Kryvoruchko, M. (2015a). Doslidzhennja mizhreghionaljnoji konverghenciji v rivni zhyttja naselennja Ukrajiny [A Study on the Interregional Convergence in the Living Standards of the Population of Ukraine]. Aktualjni problemy ekonomiky, vol. 8, issue 170, p. 302-307. (in Ukrainian) 23. Kryvoruchko, M.Yu. (2015b). Resursna orijentovanistj eksportu ta importu jak faktor socialjno- ekonomichnogho rozvytku reghioniv Ukrajiny [Resource-Oriented Exports and Imports as a Factor of the Socio-Economic Development of the Regions of Ukraine]. Biznes Inform, vol. 9, p. 112-122. (in Ukrainian) 24. Kryvoruchko, M. (2015c). Institutional Influence on the Interregional Disparities in the Socio- Economic Development in Ukraine. International Journal of Economics and Society, vol. 1, issue 1, p. 10-13. 25. Kryvoruchko, M.Yu. (2015d). Analiz mizhreghionaljnoji dyferenciaciji socialjno- ekonomichnogho rozvytku v Ukrajini v ramkakh «Novoji ekonomichnoji gheoghrafiji» [Analysis of the Interregional Disparities of the Socio-Economic Development in Ukraine within Framework of the «New Economic Geography»]. Biznes Inform, vol. 3, p. 50-55. (in Ukrainian) 26. Lane, P., Tornell, A. (1998). Voracity and Growth – Harvard Institute for International Development, Development Discussion Paper № 654. 27. Madeline, H., Kreppel, A., Plechanova, B., Verdun, A. (eds.) (2015). Decision Making in the EU before and after the Lisbon Treaty – London and New York, Routledge Press, 195 p. 28. Mehlum, H., Moene, K., Torvik, R. (2006). Institutions and the Resource Curse. The Economic Journal, vol. 116, p. 1-20. 29. Mendez, C., Bachtler, J. (2015). Permanent Revolution in Cohesion Policy: Restarting the Reform Debat. EoRPA Paper 15/4, paper prepared for the 36th meeting of the EoRPA Regional Policies Research Consortium at Ross Priory, Loch Lomonside, 4-6 October 2015. 30. North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance – Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 164 p. 31. Robinson, J., Torvik, R., Verdier, T. (2006). Political Foundations of the Resource Curse. Journal of Development Economics, vol. 79, p. 447-468. 32. Solow, R. (1956). A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 70, issue 1, p. 65-94. 33. Swan, T. (1956). Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation. Economic Record, vol. 32, p. 334-361. 34. Tiffin, A. (2006). Ukraine: The Cost of Weak Institutions. IMF Working Paper №06/167.

123 Research Outlines Olena Lahanyak PhD student Ivan Franko National University of Lviv

LEGAL BASIS REGULATING THE ENERGY ACTIVITIES OF PIPELINES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Abstract

The research aims to outline an overview of legal regulation of the pipeline transportation systems within the boundaries of the European Union. The pipelines have become an efficient mechanism for transportation of fossil fuels for export their operation demands a well-elaborated legal regulation. Since the early nineties, the EU institutions adopted a set of acts regarding conduits aimed at cumberless fuel transition, creation of a unified fuel market and the liberalization of the pipeline networks. The EU institutions have also unleashed a number of projects on fossil fuel transportation via the pipelines and enacted instruments that regulate requirements to the pipelines network operation in the boundaries of the European Union.

Keywords:EU transportation law, EU energy law, pipeline transport functioning, EU Gas Directives.

Introduction

The urgency of the research topic is due to the constant expansion of the pipeline network and the increase in the number of export routes for its transportation as well as the unregulated, at the same time, separate issues of the operation of pipeline transport, both in international law and within the framework of the European Union's legal system. In the qualitatively new conditions of the Ukrainian economy, the role of its energy sector is growing. The advantages of pipeline transport include possibility of a continuous rhythmic supply of large volumes of oil and gas in the shortest possible time, which eliminates the need to create large reserves of hydrocarbon raw materials at the end of the pipeline. In addition, pipelines are shorter than other modes of transport, and the pipeline can be located between two points, located practically at any distance from each other, thus, oil losses when delivered by pipelines are less than those for transportation by other modes of transport. Pipeline systems, especially trans-boundary pipelines, now become intergovernmental projects and require a unified approach to the norms of construction, operation, ecology, in order to comply with the only international legal requirements and standards [1, p.9]. Aspects of the trade and economic cooperation of the states, as well as the level of interaction between them, mutual trust and the political climate in general, play an important role in the successful resolution of pipeline transport issues. That is why the issue of international legal regulation of the operation of pipeline transport is extremely

124 Research Outlines important for Ukraine.

Aims and objectives of the study

The main aim of my research is to determine, on the basis of international legal documents and doctrine and also through analysis of the basic legal acts of the European Union, the role of pipeline transport in creating conditions for the development of cooperation among the states in the energy field, to analyze the specific problems, related to the transit of energy resources, as well as to identify the main trends in the development of the fuel and energy complex, the oil and gas sector, and the pipeline infrastructure. In order to achieve the goal of the dissertation, the definition of such tasks as the analysis of the basic legal acts concerning the international legal regulation of relations in the field of pipeline transport, as well as the regulation of such relations within the framework of the European Union law is envisaged; definition of international legal regime of pipeline transport; assessment of the value of the principles of law in regulation of relations in the field of pipeline transport; as well as the study of international legal aspects of the activities of a number of international organizations related to the regulation of the operation of pipeline transport, as well as the European Union.

Object and subject of research

The object of the study includes the international legal acts, the legal acts of the European Union, and the domestic legal acts of Ukraine regulating the operation of pipeline transport. The subject of the study is a comprehensive analysis of the regulatory and legal regulation of relations associated with pipeline transport.

Literature review

The sources of research include the Law of Ukraine "On Transport", the Law of Ukraine "On Pipeline Transport", Directive 2003/55 /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal market of natural gas, repealing Directive 98/30 / EC, Directive 2012 / 27 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125 / EC and 2010/30 / EC and repealing Directives 2004/8 / EC and 2006/32 / EC, the European Energy Charter, the Barcelona Convention on Freedom transit, and other laws and by-law acts within the framework of domestic law, international law, and the law of the European Union. A number of lawyers and legal scholars conducted their respective treatises on regulation of operation of pipelines both in the European Union and abroad. The theoretical basis of the research is the scientific positions, the works of domestic and foreign scientists (Chizhmar Y.I., Shatrov V.G., Oprisko V.F., Brus V.S., Brown E.D., Shubert S.R., Korinevich AA, Feldman D.I., Boguslavsky M.M.,

125 Research Outlines etc.). Although, with regard to the specifics of legal regulation of pipeline transport in the EU, it seems that this concept has not been directly reflected in domestic legal literature. In the course of writing the dissertation, the use of both general scientific and special legal methods is foreseen.

Discussion European transport law by its very nature is a multifunctional, integrated inter-sectoral normative formation of the system of law, located in its secondary structure, with leading roles of civil law - in the intraregional realm and administrative law - in the interstate space [1]. The transport law of the European Union is considered as the union of complex inter-branch functional legal institutes of maritime, rail, water, air, motor transport and pipelines law in a set of legal norms, which regulate, by means of a balanced combination of private law and public law, heterogeneous social relations that are formed in the process of transporting their functions. A balanced combination of private law and public law principles through its peculiarities requires special legal regulation. In its essence, the pipeline transport within the European Union does not belong to the classical modes of transport; therefore, it is classified as a special category with its own peculiarities. The definition of pipeline transport can be found in EU Regulation (EU) No 555/2012 of 22 June 2012 amending Regulation (EC) No 184/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 January 2005 on Community statistics concerning balance of payments, international trade in services and foreign direct investment. In accordance with these regulations, "pipeline transport includes international transportation of goods by pipelines, such as transportation of crude oil and transit products, water and gas" [2]. Pipelines are the cheapest way of mass transportation of homogeneous liquid and gas cargoes occurring in regular traffic flows. The average distance of the transfer of raw materials through pipelines rarely exceeds several hundred kilometers, although some pipelines reach more than five thousand kilometers. Moreover, pipeline transport is highly effective, insensitive to atmospheric conditions, it easily displaces other modes of transport and has a high degree of reliability. In addition, pipeline transport - in comparison with other modes of transport - does not affect the natural environment. A noticeable conflict can occur only during the construction or operation of this mode of transport. Today, pipelines in the European Union's law relate to artificial transport routes with great functionality. In fact, for a long time, only water was supplied through pipelines. Reforms of the 19th and 20th centuries, in turn, led to the development of the oil refining industry and the development of oil pipelines. The second half of the twentieth century was already characterized by the creation of networks for the transfer of natural gas [2, p.23]. Such rapid development of pipeline transport functionality has led to the fact that in highly developed countries, pipelines have become the basis for the distribution of carbon and natural gas for the needs of the population, and in recent years, pipelines have begun to service chemicals (eg, ammonia, acids), milk and even beer.

126 Research Outlines The analysis of legal norms regulating the pipeline transport in the EU requires the elaboration of the most important stages of the formation and development of this type of transport. Formally, the first steps of the EU towards the formulation of energy policy can be considered to be the conclusion of two sectoral agreements: the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Union (ECSC) in 1951 between France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Agency Energy (Euratom) in 1957 [3]. However, the real contribution of the two Communities to ensuring energy security in the EU was minimal: in the policy of the ECSC, social measures went to the forefront, while nuclear energy continued to develop on the basis of national programs. At the beginning of its operation, the European Union needed a well-developed transportation network to support trade and create new jobs and favorable conditions for economic development. Transport networks have become an important part of the supply chain and formed the foundations of the economy in all EU member states, which has contributed to the efficient distribution of goods and people's movement [2, p.23]. Transport has become the basis of the European integration process, as it is closely linked to the creation of an internal market that promotes economic growth. In general, transport should have secured three of the four freedoms necessary to form a common market, enshrined in the Rome Treaty of 1957 - the freedom of movement of people, goods and services. It is thanks to the pipeline transport that the principle of freedom of movement of goods has been secured, in particular the free movement of raw materials, most of all oil and gas. Thus, for the first time, the question of transport policy in the EU was covered by the Rome Treaty of 1957 (Article 74 - 84), which became the legal basis for the implementation of a common transport policy. Immediately after ratification of the Treaty of Rome, in December 1958, the tenth session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance took place in Prague, where a decision was made and an agreement was reached on the construction of a pipeline for the supply of crude oil from the USSR to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany and Hungary. The construction of the proposed 5327-kilometer pipeline initially began in 1960 [7, p.335]. Each country was supposed to supply all the necessary building materials, machinery and equipment. In 1962, the first supply of oil reached Czechoslovakia, in September 1963, Hungary, in November 1963, Poland, and in December 1963, Germany. The entire pipeline was completely commissioned in October 1964, without violating the principles enshrined in the 1957 Rome Treaty. Interesting is the fact that this pipeline still operates, becoming the largest network for the transportation of Russian oil throughout Europe. In the early 1970's, for the first time, there was a practical need for the development of EU legislation on energy security issues. Up to this stage, the development of the legislation on regulating pipeline transport in the EU included just the formation of the primary focus of the "external dimension", which has gained momentum against the background of an unprecedented high dependence of member

127 Research Outlines countries on imported oil (almost 70%). At the Paris Summit of the EU in October 1972, security of energy supply from third countries was for the first time included among the new areas of EU common action [1]. There was also formulated the key idea of the operation of pipeline transport in its current form: ensuring reliable and uninterrupted power supply on acceptable economic conditions. Thus, the first phase of the formation of the right of pipeline transport of the EU - from 1950 to the 1980's, which immediately preceded the launch of the implementation of relevant practical measures, consisted of the legislative work of the European Commission, which affected the problems of operation of pipeline transport only in the tangential [5]. The activities of the European Commission, at this stage, with the exception of the above-mentioned decision of the Paris Summit, have not yet been directed at regulating the operation of pipelines, focusing only on certain aspects of the activity of this mode of transport. In the mid-1980s, the European Commission launched an ambitious project to provide a fully integrated internal market. The plan was enshrined in the Single European Act, signed in 1986. In 1984, the EU Member States adopted a Declaration on the Joint Establishment of a Dynamic European Economic Area, which outlined possible ways of cooperation, in particular in the area of supply of raw materials through pipelines. On November 1, 1993, the Treaty on European Union (also known as the Maastricht Treaty) entered into force, covering the EC and the creation of a modern European Union. The EU was aiming to make a significant step towards not only greater economic integration but also closer political cooperation [2, p.24]. The Maastricht Treaty contained provisions that led to the creation of the euro area, in which the participants have a common currency - the only central bank (the European Central Bank or the ECB), as well as the general monetary policy (but there is no single fiscal policy, and Member States retain control over national costs and taxation, under certain conditions, aimed at supporting budget discipline). In this context, the adoption of the Transit Directive 91/296 / EEC is highly important, adopted by the Council of Europe in 1991, which envisaged the unimpeded transit of goods, in particular with the attraction of pipelines within the EU. Despite the fact that this Directive was mainly aimed at creating a single energy market within the EU, it has become an extremely important step for legal regulation of the legal regulation of pipeline transport in the EU. After the collapse of the USSR, the issue of energy transfer through pipelines has gained a new meaning. As a result, in 1994, the EU Commission launched a new oil and gas pipeline project aimed at analyzing and regulating the status of regional pipelines in the EU, Central Asia and the Caucasus [7]. This project aimed to develop and implement a decent institutional framework for interstate transport and oil and gas transmission. Under this project, an "umbrella agreement" was introduced, which covered the institutional framework of the interstate network of oil and gas transportation, which was carried out through pipelines [5, p.11]. It came into force in December 1998 in view of its publication in

128 Research Outlines the 10 states of the CIS. At the same time, the Energy Charter Secretariat within the framework of the transit working group has made significant progress in strengthening the international legal regime of transnational pipelines, which has become a concerted step for codification of the legal norms relating to pipeline transport within the EU [2, p. 23-24]. In addition, the European Union adopted a new socio-economic strategy that envisaged large-scale structural reforms in the field of regulating pipelines [4, pp. 18-19]. As a result, great importance was attached to the liberalization of the EU's pipelines, which aimed at creating a single competitive gas market throughout the EU by demolishing the relevant national markets and giving all European consumers the opportunity to choose raw materials suppliers on their own. It was planned to reduce the cost of "blue fuel" for end users and thus increase the attractiveness of their operation by legal entities of this most efficient and environmentally least harmful fossil fuels. All unfulfilled commitments have led to an increase in the overall competitiveness of the EU economy. When analyzing the development of legal regulation of the operation of pipelines within the EU, it is important to take into account the fact that EU legislation in the field of pipelines is an integral part of the EU energy legislation and therefore this analysis is impossible without proper analysis of the legal regulation of the EU energy sector. It is obvious that such an analysis will not be complete without reference to the European Energy Charter, which is a multilateral document of the general order, which creates the general legal framework for the fiscal transportation of fossils in pipelines. Currently, this agreement is one of the most important legal acts on the exploitation of pipelines in the EU, given that 54 states have approved the European Energy Charter [10, p. 32]. Although this act focuses on Member States [10, p. 3-4], he also has external signers. For example, Japan became the 46th state to ratify this agreement. In addition, aspects of transit of pipelines are covered by an additional document, namely the Protocol to the European Energy Charter [10, p. 2]. Currently, this act is, of course, the only fully developed instrument that formulates the set of multilateral principles of international operation with regard to the existing and foreseeable infrastructure of pipelines intended for transit. Given the legal regulation of pipeline transport in the EU, it should be noted that the Protocol to the European Energy Charter contains, among other issues, provisions for the formation of tariffs for transit and inhibition of unauthorized extraction, as well as several criteria for the accession of third countries to existing pipelines The European Union. In addition to the foregoing, one should also mention the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was signed in 1997 [11, p. 1-2]. This protocol has become a leading legal act in the EU legislation on climate change since it has defined quantitative obligations for the limitation and reduction of pipeline leaks in each individual state priority [11, p. 38- 43]. In this context, Decision No 1364/2006 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 laying down guidelines for transEuropean energy networks repealing Decision No

129 Research Outlines 96/391 / EC and Decision No 1229/2003 / EC is of great importance in this context. This decision defines a list of projects that are subject to EU regulation No. 2236/95 and shares all EU pipeline transport projects in three categories: first, they are projects of mutual interest and apply to electric and gas pipelines networks mentioned in the EU Decision, fulfilling the stated goals and priorities [12, p. 17- 18]. Such projects should reflect complete economic viability. The economic viability of the project is estimated by analyzing costs and profits from the standpoint of ecology, security of delivery and territorial unanimity [12, p. 39]. Projects of mutual interest are given in Annexes II and III of Decision No. 1364/2006 / EC. Secondly, these are priority projects selected from the category "mutually beneficial" [12, p. 47]. To be plausible in the EU, they must have a grave impact on the proper functioning of the internal market, the safety of the transport and / or disposal of renewable energy. The priority projects mentioned in Annex I of the Decision are the first to receive EU financial assistance. Thirdly, some priority projects that are transboundary and those that have an impact on cross-border incoming capacities are announced by projects of pan-European magnitude [12, p. 54]. Projects listed in Annex I to the Decision, identified as "pan-European projects", are of paramount importance for providing EU financial assistance under the trans-European budget networks. Special attention is paid to their financing from other budgets. The so-called "Gas Directives" also played a major role in regulating the operation of pipeline transport in the EU. For example, the existence of the developed pipeline infrastructure has become a major component of ensuring the security of gas supply in accordance with EU rules. Moreover, according to the Second Gas Directive, the need to combine pipeline infrastructure, including the capacity of articulation pipelines, was aimed at promoting a constant supply of gas. In addition, the Second Gas Directive also regulated the issue of monitoring the reliability of operation of pipeline networks by monitoring demand, namely on the national market by authorized state authorities. Consequently, it is clear that the Gas Directives have become an important source of legal regulation of pipeline transport in the European Union [8]. Moreover, the plan for the implementation of Directive 2009/73/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on common rules for the internal market for natural gas and Regulation (EC) No. 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to natural gas transmission networks becoming one of the most important legal acts for the analysis of the legal regulation of the operation of pipeline transport within the European Union. In this context, it may be important to analyze articles 338, 341 and annex XXVII to the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union and its member states, as they cover areas of mutual cooperation in the context of pipeline networks [5]. The purpose of the development of the implementation plan was to create the main legal, organizational, financial and economic principles of the functioning and development of a competitive natural gas

130 Research Outlines market, integration into regional and European natural gas markets and the introduction of rules for functioning of the natural gas market with the involvement of pipelines [1, p. 85-86].

Conclusions

In general, following the difficult path of its formation and development, the EU pipeline transport law still remains an area that requires further development and improvement as there is still no clear legislative regulation of this transport sector. In the historical context, one of the most negative factors in the reformation of pipeline transport networks within the European Union was inefficient public administration in this area [6]. In particular, in accordance with international obligations regarding the implementation of the Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, the functions of the operator of the pipeline system should have been attributed to a separate legal entity that would operate separately from other areas and independently from other participants in the gas market [8, p. 46]. In addition to the introduction of general managerial functions, this Directive enabled the EU State concerned to maintain public pipelines in connection with defined national interests. In addition, inefficient government included the purpose of transporting oil, petroleum products, natural gas and oil, and their distribution, as well as other substances that could be transported through pipelines. To sum up the inferences, the pipeline transportation policy within EU is considered in the context of achieving the most important goal proclaimed at the European Council in Lisbon - to make the EU the most competitive economy in the world while preserving the European social model and following the concept of sustainable development [5]. The legal regulation of the pipeline transport functioning is mainly focused on the Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and European Council concerning the common rules for the internal market in natural gas repealing the Directive 98/30/EC, the Directive 2012/27/EC of the European Parliament and the European Council on the energy efficiency amending the Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EC and repealing the Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC, the European energy Charter, and the number of other legal acts applicable to the pipeline transport. Therefore, in compliance with the forgoing legal acts, it appears apparent to conclude that the EU's pipeline networks are aimed at reducing the risks associated with the high dependence of the EU on external energy supplies, by limiting demand for it, making sure that energy prices match real costs, encouraging energy conservation and energy-saving technologies, and promoting the use of renewable energy resources.

References

131 Research Outlines 1. Colangelo, M., & Zeno-Zencovich, V Introduction to European Union transport law (09. 2016, Second Edition). RomaTrE-Press (Rome, Italy), 559 p. ISBN: 978-88-97524-82-3. 2. Haghighi, S. Energy security: The external legal relations of the European Union with major oil and gas supplying countries. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007. -23-28 p. 3. Hooper, B., Kramsch, O. (Eds.). Cross-border governance in the European Union. Routledge, 2004. - 119 p. 4. Lise, W., Hobbs, B. F., & Van Oostvoorn, F. (2008). Natural gas corridors between the EU and its main suppliers: Simulation results with the dynamic GASTALE model. Energy Policy, 36(6), Available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ S030142150800058X 5. Lissek, U. (2016). Regulation of Nord Stream 2: Rule of law, equal treatment and due process-A view from the project developer. CEPS Commentary 15 November 2016. Available at: https:// www.ceps.eu/system/files/ ULissikNordstream2.pdf 6. Pichugin S.F. (2004). Probabilistic calculation of the buried petroleum and gas pipelines / S.F. Pichugin, P.Y. Vynnykov // Conference reports materials. Problems of energy and nature use. 108 - 115 p. 7. Richardson, T. (1997). The trans-European transport network: environmental policy integration in the European Union. European Urban and Regional Studies, 4(4), 333-346 p. 8. Williams, P. A. (2015). Energy and Trans-European Networks- Energy (TEN-E). The Europeanization of Turkish Public Policies: A Scorecard, 78, 46. 9. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at [hereinafter TFEU]. 10. Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference, as opened for signature in Lisbon on 17 December 1994 and corrected by the Protocol of Correction of 2 August 1996. 11. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; adopted at COP3 in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997. 12. Decision No 1229/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 laying down a series of guidelines for trans-European energy networks and repealing Decision No 1254/96/EC.

Okke Lucassen

132 Research Outlines PhD student Institution University of Kent’s Brussels School of International Studies

IN BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

Abstract

The Russian Federation has expanded its foreign policy instruments in recent years to include a broader range of tools, both military and non-military for times of peace and war. The implications of this pivot in Russian foreign policy is often referred to in terms such as Hybrid Warfare, Cross-Domain Coercion, New Generation War, or the Gerasimov doctrine. Examples of this turn include the annexation of Crimea, the use of paramilitary groups (such as the Wagner Group), and foreign election tampering. The present paper contributes to the growing literature on contemporary Russian foreign policy by dissecting what the Russian Federation has named 'Strategic Deterrence' (сдерживание стратегическое) as a part of its foreign policy strategy. Whilst established theories of foreign policy strategies such as Hybrid Warfare have been adapted to better fit the contemporary Russian model, the notion of Russian Strategic Deterrence is best understood through its conceptualisation as a uniquely Russian take on contemporary foreign policy. This paper provides an analysis on how Russian perceptions of Western expansionism have influenced the Russian conceptualisation of Strategic Deterrence, and how the Russian concept of Strategic Deterrence is distinct from seemingly similar and commonly interchanged concepts such as Hybrid Warfare.

Keywords: Russia, Strategic Deterrence, Hybrid Warfare, EU, NATO

Introduction and relevance

Western analysts, politicians, governments, and academics view Russian efforts such as foreign election tampering, the intervention in Ukraine, and the use of disinformation as emblematic foreign policy objectives. Whilst such initiatives are indeed an indication that the Russian Federation is willing to ramp up its efforts to protect its interests through non-conventional means, this paper will argue that such efforts are manifestations of a wider strategic change in Russian foreign policy. As such, contemporary Russian foreign policy should be analysed within the framework of Russia's pivot towards 'Strategic Deterrence.' Such Strategic Deterrence (сдерживание стратегическое) in the Russian conceptualisation of foreign policy includes a broad scope of methods to protect its interests through nuclear, nonnuclear, military, and non-military tools. The comprehensive nature of Russian Strategic Deterrence distinguishes it from the classical Western understanding of strategies of deterrence as they were popularised in nuclear and military terms by authors such as Brodie (1958) and Schelling (1960). Whereas classical Western foreign policy as a domain has remained largely separate from the military realm, contemporary Russian foreign policy has increasingly integrated and formalised military tools in

133 Research Outlines its foreign policy toolset. Modern concepts such as Hybrid Warfare, Cross-Domain Coercion, and New Generation War have been developed to more adequately reflect these developments, yet they too have been conceptualised as variations on classical strategies of deterrence. Precisely because these iterations are rooted in the Western understanding of a clear delineation between foreign policy and military doctrine, they are unable to acknowledge its dual nature. Consequently, these concepts remain inadequate tools with which to analyse modern foreign policy of the Russian Federation. This paper aims to contribute to improving the understanding of modern Russian foreign policy as an intrinsically hybrid agenda. It does so by first giving a brief historical overview of how the Russian Federation developed a perception that the West has been utilising similar non-conventional tools to achieve its foreign policy objectives in the shared Euro-Russian neighbourhood following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and consequently explores the specific Russian conceptualisation of Strategic Deterrence. This two-part analysis of Russian perceptions of Western foreign policy and Russia's pivot in foreign policy, culminating in its contemporary conceptualisation of Strategic Deterrence, serves as a foundation to better understand contemporary Russian foreign policy decision-making and the implications for the affected regions. The resulting understanding should be utilised to further analyse Russian Strategic Deterrence and its current and future applications in the Russian sphere of interest. To better understand Russian Strategic Deterrence is to better understand Russian reactionary policy to perceived European expansionism. A failure to overcome this mutual distrust between the West and Russia could lead to further escalation. Ideally, improved mutual understanding could lead to more inclusive and neighbour- friendly policy on the behalf of the Russian Federation, the West, and all those caught in between.

Russian Perceptions Of Western Tools Of Manipulation In The Post-Soviet Space

The Cold War had ended, the Iron Curtain had fallen, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union heralded a new era. The former Soviet Republics were reinventing themselves as newly (re)established independent nation-states. The majority of these new states190 were quick to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), ostensibly191 signalling a continuation of close ties between the former Soviet republics, and with the Soviet Union's successor state of the Russian Federation taking on a leading role. Yet, Russia had lost its role as a superpower on the global theatre. In its successive iteration, the Russian Federation had lost a vast amount of territories, energy resources, influence, and its economy contracted by 43 percent of real GDP (Brzezinski, 1997; Trenin, 2011). It had to reinvent itself from a

190 With the exception of the Baltic states.

191 As became clear over time, the Commonwealth of Independent States did not transform into an entity akin to the Union of Sovereign States, but instead became what Putin called a "vehicle for civilized divorce" (Trenin, 2011).

134 Research Outlines pan-Slavic, communist, anti-capitalist union to a new political entity that both accommodated the new world order, and yet was consistent with its own constituency that was historically defined through and by empire before (ethno-)nation. The Russian Federation recognised that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was due to internal shortcomings. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the focus of Russian policy was therefore on internal reforms, during which the EU under the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht took a leading role in strengthening the new Soviet successor states through supporting domestic reforms in these countries. The resulting normative hegemony by the EU established an asymmetric EU-Russian relationship of cooperation vis-a-vis the post-Soviet space (Casier, 2016). Whilst the post-Soviet Republics welcomed Western reforms, the Russian Federation perceived this as an increasingly assertive and expansionist EU-NATO agenda and a threat to Russian interests in the shared Euro-Russian neighbourhood (Casier, 2016; Trenin, 2011).

NATO Intervention in the Kosovo War

A key event of pivoting NATO-EU foreign policy and Russian perceptions of such policy was the NATO intervention in Kosovo 1999 during the Yugoslav wars. NATO had been a defensive military alliance, yet now it conducted an offensive campaign in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Moreover, NATO ignored Russian protests and bypassed the need to obtain authorisation from the United Nations' Security Council, where the Russian Federation could have vetoed any resolution. The Western and Russian historical recollection of the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia could not be more contrasting. Where the West felt morally obligated to stop Serbian genocidal campaigns against Albanians in the heart of Europe, Igor Ivanov192 described NATO itself perpetrating "genocide against the Yugoslav [i.e., Serbian] peoples" and supporting Albanian terrorism (Mendeloff, 2008). Russia was at this time engaged in the Second Chechen War and feared the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia was setting a precedent for further Western mingling in the domestic affairs of sovereign foreign states. When NATO adopted a new version of The Alliance's Strategic Concept in 1999, it further reinforced the Russian perception of increased Western assertion. The new version of the Alliance's Strategic Concept formalised NATO's ability to station and deploy NATO forces outside of its member states' territories (NATO, 1999). Indeed, a popular Russian statement during the time was that "the difference between Serbia and Russia was that the latter had nuclear weapons, and thus was safe from Western invasion." (Trenin, 2011). The Russian Federation perceived the West's actions eastward as a building threat and saw the institutions that promised to safeguard sovereignty and security fail. The UNSC was unable to deliver upon its promise to prevent illegal wars of aggression against sovereign nation-states, NATO was

192 Igor Ivanov was Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs during the NATO intervention in the Kosovo war. He served as Russian foreign minister from 1998 to 2004.

135 Research Outlines repurposing from a defensive alliance to an aggressive coalition, and Eastern European states displayed to be willing coconspirators for access to the West. Following their 1997 invitations at the Madrid Summit, the former Soviet satellite states of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland officially joined NATO in 1999. The Madrid Summit proclaimed: "NATO Enlargement will continue to apply with regard to future aspirants, regardless of their geographic location. No European democratic country (...) will be excluded from consideration." (Madrid Declaration, 1997). The extent of eurocentrism in Eastern Europe revealed itself when Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine refused the establishment of an air corridor to Russia in its attempt to reinforce peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia (Trenin, 2011). After four years of unsuccessful Russian military counterbalancing in Yugoslavia, the Russian Federation was forced to abandon its peacekeeping mission and relinquish the Balkans to the Western {i.e., EU-NATO) sphere of influence. The Russian Federation was unable to assert its military, economic, and political interests in the shared Euro-Russian neighbourhood. Instead, it saw its own influence in the region decline whilst the West's increased. The EU henceforth took on an increasingly leading role in reforming and integrating the eastern states of Europe. The Yugoslavia affair became the first major point of contention over foreign policy between the Russian Federation and the more assertive and Eastern-European orientated incarnation of the European Union.

Russian-Western Competition in the Shared Euro-Russian Neighbourhood

Despite improved cooperation between Russia and the US post-9/11 in Afghanistan in their collective fight against the Taliban, relations between the Russian Federation and the West deteriorated as competition increased in scale, scope, and intensity starting around 2003 (Casier, 2016; Trenin, 2011). Whilst aspirations of the then newly inaugurated president Putin to join NATO in the years 2000-2002 were unsuccessful, the bilateral relations under the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) were transformed into the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) on 28 May 2002193. Yet, domestic revolutions in the shared Euro-Russian neighbourhood and increased NATO and EU expansionism further deteriorated relations between Russia and the West, with both reinforcing its negative perceptions of the other. The Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine both saw Kremlin-friendly authorities replaced by pro-Western regimes, which announced their intents to become NATO members in the future (Simon and Spero, 2010). The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland had already acceded to the NATO alliance in 1999, and on 29 March 2004, they were joined by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Consequently, they all acceded to the European Union a mere 33 days

193 Through the NRC, member states would henceforth have their own respective bilateral relations over NATO issues with Russia on more equal terms (Trenin, 2011).

136 Research Outlines later.194 The West hailed the Colour Revolutions and the expansion of European norms and values through institutional means as prime examples of the effectiveness of its democratic principles and leading role in creating institutional, political and economic reforms in the newly established independent states. Yet, Russia perceived such practices as Western expansionism at best and Western coups appealingly disguised as democracy at worst (Cadier, 2014;Casier, 2016; Trenin, 2011). The Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the subsequent ousting of Yanukovych, who had been personally and publicly strongly endorsed by Putin, was especially perceived by Russia not as a local uprising aimed at the neglectful and corrupt authorities, but rather as a United States-led initiative to actively reduce the influence of Russia in the shared EuroRussian neighbourhood, or even worse, a possible practice exercise in later overthrowing the Russian government and installing a Western puppet regime (Trenin, 2009). The NATO intervention during the Yugoslav war had signalled to the Russian Federation that the sovereignty of independent nation states only goes as far as it falls within the Western paradigm of what constitutes acceptable governance of their respective constituencies whilst simultaneously revealing the vastly altered geopolitical loyalties on the European theatre. If adversaries of the West would step out of line, it was not shy to utilise military tools through NATO to pursue its foreign policy objectives. The Colour Revolutions and the mass expansion of both NATO and the EU in the eastern direction additionally signalled that the Western sphere of influence was to be extended not only by military means in the face of what the West would label as oppression, but also through non-military tools such as political incentives and destabilising mechanisms, as well as economic support and coercion, regardless of the traditional regional delineation of Western or Eastern interests and ideology. Russia was unable to counteract such measures as it was both reinventing itself as a nation-state whilst trying to reestablish the Russian Federation as a regional and global superpower, still reforming its reeling economy throughout the 1990s and early 2000s195. Yet even after the 2004 expansions of the EU and NATO, the West doubled down on its efforts to continue its success of reforming its European neighbours and increasing its influence in the region. Traditional foreign policy instruments that the EU had previously used to great effect had to be modernised to mitigate the effects of expansion fatigue and to address the Russian interests in potential associate member states that were already members of the CIS. As such, the European Neighbourhood

194 With the exception of Bulgaria and Romania who were not yet deemed ready for EU membership. They eventually acceded in 2007.

195 The Russian economy would only recover to pre-1990 levels by 2007, right on time for the global financial crisis to make its entry. The 2008 financial crisis hit Russia especially hard due to its dependence on oil revenues (Trenin, 2011).

137 Research Outlines Policy (ENP) was established in 2004 to improve the economic and political integration of associate countries through administrative, economic, and political reforms in the domestic domain. When the conditions of agreed reforms would be met, the associate countries and the EU would sign bilateral agreements in the realm of 'the three M's: Markets (sectorial access to the EU's internal market), Mobility (visa liberalisation), and Money (financial aid and loans) (Cadier, 2014). Yet, the ENP was unable to continue the EU's foreign policy successes in its near neighbours. The ENP could by design only provide limited rewards for the egregiously costly reforms that it demanded. An adapted196 and more regionally focused iteration was introduced with the 2009 launch of the Eastern Partnership. The Eastern Partnership provides a forum to discuss agreements on the three M's with the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Russia had witnessed the ever-increasing encroachment of the EU into the Russian spheres of interest. Now, the Eastern Partnership brought Western hegemony too close for comfort. If Russia were to continue competing with the West over their shared sphere of interest and retain an equitable share, Russia would need to "master the Western tools of legitimising the political processes in the post-Soviet space" (Frolov, 2005). The Russian adaptation to the modern competition with the West over interests in the shared Euro-Russian neighbourhood through non-conventional means is what has culminated in the Russian concept of Strategic Deterrence.

Defining Strategic Deterrence

Strategic Deterrence versus Hybrid Warfare in Russian foreign policy

Previous sections have shown how the Russian Federation had come to perceive Western foreign policy as expansionist, utilising both military and non-military tools to exert control over what used to be strongly Russian-influenced regions. The Russian Federation has in reaction conceived of its own comprehensive foreign policy strategy, referred to as Strategic Deterrence. I define Strategic Deterrence in Russian foreign policy as follows: Strategic Deterrence in Russian foreign policy is the collective of instruments, using soft and hard power, by employing (dis-)information, cyber, economic, military, and political tools, both offensively and defensively, continuously regardless of peace- or war-time, in pursuit of deterring violent conflict, de-escalation (or early cessation) of military conflict, or stabilising military-political situations in (potential) adversary (coalitions of) states of interest, on favourable conditions for the Russian Federation.

196 Amongst other changes, political components were removed. Crucially, the EaP was not a stepping stone towards EU membership. (Cadier, 2014; Naumescu, 2016).

138 Research Outlines This rather broad and vague definition is comprised of consistently recurring elements in Russian literature, political commentary and official doctrine, as well as Western academia, expert analyses, NATO doctrine, and media (Bartles, 2016; Bruusgaard, 2016; Cadier, 2014; Carter, 2016; Gerasimov, 2017; Lavrov, 2014). The specific definition as it is given and used throughout this paper is based on the definition given by the military-encyclopaedic dictionary of the Russian Ministry of Defence, complemented by the analyses of Adamsky's (2015) Cross-Domain Coercion and Bruusgaard's (2016) Strategic Deterrence. Other concepts such as Hybrid Warfare, New Generation War, the Gerasimov197 doctrine, and (Russian) brinkmanship refer to seemingly similar tool sets. Both the Russian Federation and Western governments have deployed instruments in these toolsets. Yet, the terminology of Hybrid Warfare et al. are mostly used in reference to Russian foreign policy. This paper opts to use the term Strategic Deterrence instead of Hybrid Warfare or any of the variations on this type of doctrine. Before elaborating on the conceptualisation of Strategic Deterrence, it is prudent to explain why the term Hybrid Warfare is deemed to be inadequate when referring to Russian foreign policy and is as such not used in this paper. Russian officials perceive Hybrid Warfare to be more of a Western concept and strategy than it is a Russian one, exploited during Western campaigns such as the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia and the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Such campaigns bypassed the requirement to obtain a mandate from the UN Security Council where any Western interference would have been vetoed by Russia (Bartles, 2016;Trenin, 2011). As discussed previously, the Russian and Western perspective on the Kosovo intervention vary widely. Where the West lauds the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia for strong-arming genocidal parties into ending mass atrocities, Russians perceive the campaign as an illegal Western military operation against a sovereign state engaged in counter-terrorism operations that were unfairly portrayed as having excessive collateral damage. Not only did it set a possible precedent for Western actors to become involved in a sovereign state's internal affairs and border integrity, it led to the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Russian perception is that the West has refined its foreign policy strategy to wage 'just wars' by creating a false pretext through employing nonmilitary tools. Such strategy supposedly employs a multi-step cross-domain approach:

197 Named after Valery Gerasimov (Валерий Герасимов), Russian General, current Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, and first Deputy Defence Minister of the Russian Federation. It should be noted that MarkGaleotti, who coined the term, apologised for labelling his mis-conflation of military strategy and political foreign policy instruments as the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'. See his article in Foreign Policy (2018): https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov- doctrine/

Whilst Galeotti has reiterated that there is no grand military strategy for creating local cleavages as a prelude to an invasion a la Crimea, the absence of what he named the Gerasimov Doctrine does not exclude the very real comprehensive foreign policy strategy of Russian Strategic Deterrence.

139 Research Outlines

(1) Create a political opposition through Western state propaganda, the internet, social media and NGOs —> political dissent, insurgency and social strife —> authorities cannot maintain order —> security deteriorates

(2) Support insurgents, deploy special forces and Private Military Companies (PMCs) —> further destabilise the country —> authorities react with force to maintain security

(3) With the false pretext of regime violence against the country's civilians impose sanctions —> reduce capabilities of authorities & enhance public dissent

(4) Government collapses under internal and external pressure —> deployment of military under guise of 'peacekeeping'

(5) Install new government that is friendly to the West

Figure 1. Russian perception of multi-step plan as a part of Western Hybrid Warfare strategies. (Bartles, 2016; Frolov, 2015; Gerasimov, 2013).

Such perceptions of Western foreign policy strategy as a pretext to a justified conduct of war are common in Russia and former Soviet Republics (Bartles, 2016). The overall image it paints of Western interventionism fits the Russian narrative of counterbalancing European expansionism through alternative means. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov echoed a similar sentiment when he spoke at the XXII Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy in 2014 on Russian development and the contention between the EU and the Russian Federation over Ukraine and Crimea198. In his speech, he highlighted the use of American non-military tools to change the Ukrainian regime, referring to it as a hybrid war strategy. 'It has become fashionable to argue that Russia is waging a kind of "hybrid war" in Crimea and in Ukraine. It is an interesting term, but I would apply it above all to the United States and its war strategy - it is truly a hybrid war aimed not so much at defeating the enemy militarily as at changing the regimes in the states that pursue a policy Washington does not like. It is using financial and economic pressure, information attacks, using others on the perimeter of a corresponding state as proxies and of course, information and ideological pressure through externally financed non-governmental organisations. Is it not a hybrid process and not what we call war? It would be interesting to discuss the concept of the hybrid war to see who is waging it and is it only about "little green men"'. (Lavrov, 2014)

198 Lavrov, S. (2014, November 22). Remarks by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the XXII Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy. Retrieved December 2, 2018, from: http://valdaiclub.eom/a/highlights/remarks_by_foreign_minister_sergey_lavrov_at_the_xxii_assembl y_of_the_council_on_foreign_and_defence/

140 Research Outlines It is clear that Russia perceives Hybrid Warfare as a Western construct and a Western tool to influence foreign states seldom using the term. The Russian Federation prefers to reserve it to discuss either Western war strategy or whenever the West uses the term 'Hybrid Warfare' in reference to Russian foreign policy (Adamsky, 2015; Gerasimov, 2017). The various definitions of Hybrid Warfare all have their own idiosyncrasies, yet all are based upon or utilise Western conceptualisations of strategies of war. Using such Western lexicon to describe, understand, or analyse Russian conduct can lead to misrepresentations, misunderstandings, misleading results, and counterproductive intelligence. Many authors have attempted to either adapt the Hybrid Warfare definition or to coin a new definition that fits the Russian modus operandi better, yet such concepts tend to be too narrow or too broad (Adamsky, 2015; Bruusgaard, 2016). Russian Strategic Deterrence as part of Russian foreign policy is rooted in Russian history, linguistics, and military doctrine just as Western ideas on Hybrid Warfare have developed within its own historical context. As such, Russian usage of what in English is called 'deterrence' can encompass a wide variety of meanings with its respective idiosyncrasies based on context199. Due to the limited scope of this paper, such intricate matters will not be discussed at length. In order to prevent the continuation of using Western lexicon to describe Russian foreign policy, and in order to use the very terms the Russian Federation itself uses in reference to its tools, the present paper uses the term Strategic Deterrence.

Aspects of Strategic Deterrence

As laid out in the definition previously, Russian Strategic Deterrence encompasses a wide range of tools from different domains. The non-military domains are specifically mentioned within the definition of the military-encyclopaedic dictionary as examples of tools that are not part of the more classical military options that are mentioned under their own respective domain." Such military tools include military exercises, peacekeeping operations, deployment of regular troops, and reconnaissance missions200 201. Of note is that grey operations such as supporting insurgent troops, deploying special ops, or the use of PMCs are absent from the Russian doctrine definition, even though the Russian

199 See for example (Adamsky, 2015) and (Bruusgaard, 2016). 200 Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, military-encyclopaedic dictionary (2015). Available at: http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details_rvsn.htm?id=14206@morfDictionary

201 The examples that are mentioned in the Russian military-encyclopaedic dictionary definition also include options such as showcasing nuclear capabilities. Despite the importance of nuclear deterrence and its capability to complement non-nuclear deterrence (see Adamsky (2015)), it does not fall within the scope of this paper. It should be noted that the Russian concept of устрашение (ustrashenie; literally: intimidation) is more closely associated with both nuclear capabilities and foreign deterrence strategies. The focus of this paper remains on non-nuclear, military and non-military Strategic Deterrence in Russian foreign policy.

141 Research Outlines Federation has extensively deployed such tools in Ukraine and Syria. The definition as conceptualised and used by the Russian federation is so broad that hardly any military or non-military operations would not fall within the scope of Strategic Deterrence. The inclusive and expansive nature of the definition is intended to create a most comprehensive and flexible toolset for the Russian Federation to utilise as a complementary202 deterrent to nuclear deterrence capabilities. By having a versatile and flexible range of options for non-nuclear, military and non-military Strategic Deterrence, the Russian Federation is able to quickly adapt to the changing needs and interests. This idea is reflected in Gerasimov's ideas on modern warfare (2013) when he quoted Soviet military scholar Aleksandr Svechin: "It is extraordinarily hard to predict the conditions of war. For each war, it is necessary to work out a particular line for its strategic conduct. Each war is a unique case, demanding the establishment of a particular logic and not the application of some template." The Russian doctrine of Strategic Deterrence as a part of its foreign policy aims to accomplish just that: an expansive toolset that can employ specific instruments as its respective conduct of strategy demands. Defining characteristics that distinguish Russian Strategic Deterrence both from Western conceptualisations of deterrence strategies and Hybrid Warfare are:

1. Universality: The pursuit of deterring all types of security203 threats;

2. Continuousness: Through the employment, to a greater or lesser extent, of Strategic Deterrence both in peace- and war-times; 3. The blending of the logics of deterrence and coercion: Employing both methods of coercion and deterrence regardless of peace- or wartime, thus emphasising the need to demonstrate the capability of coercion to strengthen the impact of deterrence;

4. The coordinated employment of instruments across all domains204.

Both in its methods and in its identification of threats, Russian Strategic Deterrence is all-inclusive. It seeks to prevent, deter, de-escalate, and terminate any possible threats to the interests of the Russian Federation, whether they are military, political, economic, financial, diplomatic or otherwise. This aspect of universality enables Russian Strategic Deterrence to be used reactively to any foreign (in-)action that

202 And indeed the (threat of) non-nuclear deterrence is strengthened by the availability of nuclear capabilities (and its respective deterrence options). (Adamsky, 2015).

203 Broadly defined as to include economic, political, financial threats etc.

204 Adamsky refers to this as the Cross-Domain Coercion strategy of Russian Strategic Deterrence, yet the all-encompassing reach of the instruments engaged by the Russian Federation validates the designation of 'all- domain' rather than 'cross-domain' (Adamsky, 2015; Bruusgaard, 2016).

142 Research Outlines possibly threatens Russian interests. Although the element of universality expands the possible scenarios for the implementation of Strategic Deterrence, it simultaneously obscures the specific conditions that should trigger a distinct instrument of the deterrence toolset205. As a result, Russian Strategic Deterrence assembles all possible forms of adversities into a single realm of threats to Russian interests. By conflating all possible threats to Russian interests, regardless of intensity, into the category of security threats, the distinction between peace- and wartime becomes blurred. Whereas classic Western policy-making is based upon a clear delineation of policy options based on the condition of war or on the condition of peace, Russian Strategic Deterrence actively and purposefully clouds this distinction. Non-nuclear, nuclear, military and non-military instruments of deterrence could and should be employed under Russian Strategic Deterrence as to complement to each other's strengths and weaknesses, both in peace- and in war-time as the Russian military- encyclopaedic dictionary specifically emphasises. Russian Strategic Deterrence is to be employed continuously to prevent, deter, de-escalate and terminate hostilities, "up to massive use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction in a large-scale war" (Russian Ministry of Defence, military-encyclopaedic dictionary, 2018). Continuousness then is the second distinct aspect of Russian Strategic Deterrence. The blending of all potential threats to Russian interests into a single domain of security threats, and the blurring of the line between war and peace consequently leads to the possibility to utilise instruments of both coercion and deterrence in a simultaneous matter. When there is but a single domain of threats to Russian interests that is, without deliberation for a delineation between war and peace, contracted into a single obscure tempus, strategies of deterrence become more interwoven with strategies of coercion. Russian Strategic Deterrence does not distinguish an escalation of hostilities as a failure of deterrence, but rather as a condition in which more coercive instruments need to be employed to improve the effectiveness of instruments of deterrence. As such, the logic of deterrence becomes dependent on the demonstration of coercive capabilities (Bruusgaard, 2016). The interwoven logics of coercion and deterrence then seem to signal that as the impact of employed deterrence instruments decreases, the need to demonstrate the coercive capabilities (/.e„ alternatives) increases. The demonstration of capability and willingness to utilise coercive measures serves as a deterrent by showing the readiness to escalate hostilities and by doing so attempts to de-escalate and deter, bordering on brinkmanship (Gareev, 2009). Whilst such an entanglement of strategies of deterrence and coercion may in theory complement and strengthen each other, and within its own definition is consistent as defensive instruments, coercively

205 This theoretical quagmire is not practically resolved within Russian doctrine or academia, as there is hardly any deliberation by Russian theorists on the uses, triggers, or impacts of non-military tools of deterrence. The lack of practical instructions on non-military strategic deterrence tools may be due to the military vocations of the Russian theorists in question (Bruusgaard, 2016)

143 Research Outlines tainted instruments of deterrence may be perceived by external actors not as indeed deterrence, but rather as intimidation or provocation, leading counterproductively to further escalation. The fourth and last distinguishing aspect of Russian Strategic Deterrence is a logical consequence from its first aspect of universality: its utilisation of instruments of deterrence across all domains. Russia perceives threats (i.e., interests) across all domains (cyber, diplomatic, informational, economic, military, political, etc.) within a single realm of security threats, and thus instruments across all those same domains are considered simultaneously and in conjunction. In the conduct of Russian Strategic Deterrence, each tool is considered in relation to the added and combined benefit on the use of a different tool that may or may not be in the same domain but still within the comprehensive design of the toolkit. Central to optimising the utility of tools from all domains is the use of informational instruments, integrating the instruments across the other domains (Adamsky, 2015). The use of informational instruments refers to tools such as the dissemination of (dis-)information, creating or leveraging local (military) support, and creating a public image of defense rather than offense or intervention (Adamsky, 2015; Gerasimov, 2017; Lanoszka, 2016). Such efforts include (digital) sabotage, discrediting of foreign leadership, manipulating local cleavages, and mobilising local populations against foreign authorities. The alleged Russian hacking efforts aimed at influencing elections in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States, as well as its related online troll armies could be considered to fall within the scope of informational instruments (Cerulus, 2017; Greenberg, 2017; Stelzenmuller, 2017). Such informational efforts are complemented by various other military and non-military instruments such as the deployment of Precision-Guided Munitions, special (covert) operations,17 economic sanctions, political isolation, and disruption of diplomatic relations (Adamsky, 2015; Bartles, 2016; Lanoszka, 2016).

144 Research Outlines Figure 2. The conduct of modern warfare. Graphic from Gerasimov (2013); English translation provided by Bartles (2016).

The Russian understanding of modem warfare is that non-military measures and military tools are utilised in a 4:1 ratio (Gerasimov, 2013; Bartles, 2016). For the effective use of any tool in the toolkit, all other tools from all other domains should be considered in conjunction with the already deployed instruments. It is the Russian understanding that the waging of modern warfare is done on all fronts, at all times, simultaneously. An extreme simplification of the Russian concept of Strategic Deterrence would be akin to: In response to any threat [i.e., threat to Russian interests], at all times, regardless of domain, expanding and contracting the deployment of any and all means as deemed necessary.

A Brief Example Of Russian Strategic Deterrence Implemented In Ukraine

The case of Ukraine is of paramount pertinence for Russian Strategic Deterrence. Ukraine has long been regarded as "a little Russia," closely interlinked with the identity and the fate of the Russian people (Trenin, 2011, p74). The administration of Crimea itself was transferred to the Ukrainian Republic in 1954, marking the 300th anniversary of Ukraine being integrated into the Russian Empire (Calamur, 2014). Whilst it was a mostly symbolic move during Soviet times,206 it reinforces the Russian official narrative that Ukraine is not a 'proper' state and that the Ukrainian territories are quintessential Russian. As much was reflected in Putin's words to George W. Bush: "You don't understand, George, Ukraine is not even a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is in Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a gift

206 Especially since the strategically important city of Sevastopol, which functioned as the headquarters for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, was still administered by Moscow (Trenin, 2011).

145 Research Outlines from us." (Gaddy and Hill, 2015, p360). It is then no surprise that Ukraine is one of the prime examples207 where the concept of Russian Strategic Deterrence has been implemented. Whilst the demarcating events of the Maidan revolution and the annexation of Crimea are prime events that have been latched on to by analysts and media, the foundations on which Russian Strategic Deterrence was employed in Ukraine had been laid long before. As previously mentioned, Putin had publicly supported the 2004 election campaign of Yanukovych. The nullification of the rigged elections was perceived by the Russian Federation to be a Western coup disguised as democracy (Cadier, 2014). When Yanukovych assumed the Presidency in 2010, he was not the pro-Russian strongman that the Russian Federation would have liked to see in power. Indeed, Yanukovych intentionally tried to obfuscate the geopolitical orientation of his regime in an attempt to strengthen its bargaining position vis-a-vis Russia and the EU (Cadier, 2014; Gnedina and Sleptsova, 2012). Whilst Yanukovych ultimately rejected the Association Agreement with the EU, instead opting for a financial deal with the Russian Federation, he did not join the Eurasian Customs Union despite Russia's urging to do so (Cadier, 2014). The case of Ukraine displays the distinct aspects of Russian Strategic Deterrence. The aspect of universality is evident through the Russian perception that the post- Yanukovych Western-orientated regime change under Poroshenko was a threat to Russian security (i.e., interests), not of a military nature or a direct challenge of Russian influence in the region, but rather through political association with Western adversaries {i.e., the EU and NATO). Whilst the efforts to both reinforce the strategic interests of Russia in Ukraine and to deter (further) Western association were expanded following the Maidan revolution, the Russian Federation had engaged in similar practices in earlier years. Irredentism in Crimea resurged in 2008 following the Bucharest NATO summit in April when the possibility of Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for Ukraine and Georgia was discussed. When the MAPs had been reviewed and declined in December, consequentially the movements in Crimea ebbed, and completely disappeared when Yanukovych assumed his presidency of Ukraine in 2010 (Trenin, 2011). Such instances highlight the continuousness

207 Other earlier examples of Russian use of strategies of deterrence could include Russian support of Yanukovych around the time of the Orange revolution, the prelude to the Russo-Georgian war, and the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Whilst analyses of Russian strategies of deterrence would certainly be interesting, the concept of Strategic Deterrence as it is discussed in this paper had not been officially defined and designated in Russian doctrine, nor do such analyses fall within the scope of this paper. Indeed it has been argued that Georgia became a point of reference for the Russian Federation as to how the West would react to more coercive tactics. See for example Allison (2014); Freedman (2014); and Gaddy and Hill (2015). Others such as Cadier have argued that Russia's military intervention in Georgia serves as a counterexample as "this conflict had in itself little repercussions on EU-Russia relations." (Cadier, 2014, p79).

146 Research Outlines of the use of non-conventional and nonmilitary tools in Russian Strategic Deterrence, scaled up and down in size according to need. After Russia was unable to achieve its foreign policy goal of increasing political and economic integration with Ukraine through political means (by incentivising Yanukovych and pressing him to join the Eurasian Customs Union), it quickly resorted to more coercive methods by leveraging local 'ethnic' cleavages208 in the East of Ukraine and Crimea to create local instability, deploying special and covert ops in Crimea, and eventually annexing the peninsula (Cadier, 2014; Bruusgaard, 2016). By simultaneously employing coercive and deterrent instruments under a single strategy of deterrence is indeed a conflation of the very logics of coercion and deterrence itself. The fourth and final aspect of instruments being utilised across all domains is already evident from the various tools mentioned in the previous paragraph. Extra attention should be given to the leading and uniting role of informational instruments. During the Ukraine Crisis and the annexation of Crimea, a disinformation campaign was launched by the Russian Federation to obscure reporting on and from Crimea and Ukraine (Giles, 2015). Examples include Russian media barraging the domestic and international public with allegations of neo-fascism and neo-Nazism in the new Poroshenko government (Economist, 2015; Frum, 2014; Shushter, 2014; Yuhas, 2014; Snyder, 2014), and actively causing confusion by sowing disinformation on the circumstances of the downing of flight MH17.209

208 The Russian Federation conflates Russian-speakers to be ethnic Russians, thus reinforcing the idea that Russia is defending the security and interests of Russians in foreign countries. This in turn contributes to the Russian narrative of legitimising interventionist methods to protect Russians abroad. See figure 3 below how the current conflict in the East of Ukraine correlates to the demographic map of languages.

209 The Russian Ministry of Defence, and affiliated news agencies such as RT, have at different times alleged that MFI17 was shot down by a Ukrainian aircraft, or by a Ukrainian BUK missile. Sometimes the same outlet would disseminate contradicting information on a single day. For a more extensive overview see for example: Toler (2018).

147 Research Outlines

Figure 3. Demographic map of native languages in Ukraine. Map from the Economist (2015)

Conclusion

This paper has analysed how Russian perceptions of Western foreign policy towards the shared Euro-Russian neighbourhood have affected the conceptualisation of Russian foreign policy in its doctrine of Strategic Deterrence. The West's (i.e., EU and NATO) transformative and normative impact through its foreign policy instruments on the post-Soviet Space should not be understated, as is showcased both by the pivot of formerly Russian-orientated countries towards the West, as well as the Russian perceptions and reactions to such developments.

The Russian perception that the West has been using non-conventional strategies of deterrence, coercion, and expansion in the late 90s and throughout the 21st century has made a deep impact upon the adaptation of Russian doctrine, its foreign policy and its conceptualisation of Strategic Deterrence. The NATO intervention in Kosovo was perceived as a watershed moment, indicating offensive capabilities in the shared sphere of interests to which the Russian Federation has adapted its foreign policy strategy by integrating military and non-military instruments into a single toolset to be utilised under the umbrella term of Strategic Deterrence. Russian Strategic Deterrence employs a collective of instruments from a wide variety of domains including: cyber, diplomatic, (dis-)information, economic, legal, ideological, military, political, scientific, and technical tools. The Russian Federation utilises these tools both offensively and defensively, continuously regardless of peace- or war-time. The aim of using these instruments is ostensibly to deter, de- escalate and cease violent conflict, or in the absence of violent conflict between the adversary and the Russian Federation to stabilise military-political situations in (potentially) adversary (coalitions of) states of interest. The four distinct aspects of Russian Strategic Deterrence:

148 Research Outlines universality, continuousness, blending of the logics of deterrence and coercion, and the utility of instruments across all domains were all present in the implementation of the Russian Strategic Deterrence in Ukraine during and following the Ukraine crisis of 2013. The comprehensive nature of Russian Strategic Deterrence has intentionally obscured the concept of strategies of deterrence itself, increasing the difficulty to distinguish these aspects of Russian foreign policy from alternative instruments such as military operations. As such, it becomes ever-more paramount for academics, citizens, governments, politicians, and policy-makers to study the intricacies of Russian perceptions and the conceptualisations of foreign policy. By working towards a greater understanding of the disparity in experiences between the West and Russia, we can identify the antagonistic turns in foreign policy doctrine over the last three decades, with the aim to collectively create more integrative policy for the peoples of the EU, Russia, and those caught in between.

Discussion

Current developments in Russian foreign policy are watched closely by governments, media, and academics around the world. Yet in reference to what the Russian Federation has labelled Strategic Deterrence, the most prevalently used term remains FHybrid Warfare. While this paper has discussed the historical context in which the concept was conceived, it does not take an explicit stance as to whether the communities at large should adopt the term Russian Strategic Deterrence over any other. Should foreign governments adopt the term Strategic Deterrence, they would lend gravitas to the concept itself and by extension might legitimise the policies pursued as a part of this foreign policy strategy. On the other hand, experts that deal with Russian foreign policy should be familiar with the term and the context in which it was conceptualised to better understand decision-making by the Russian Federation. Ideally, this paper is able to give experts better insight as to how modern Russian foreign policy strategy has been developed and encourages analysts to examine current Russian foreign policy through the lens of Strategic Deterrence.

149 Research Outlines References

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151 Research Outlines Carolina Moțpan PhD student, University lecturer Moldova State University, Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences

CIVILIZATIONAL - EUROPEAN IDENTITY DIMENSIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION. THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Abstract

Globalization has not only given rise to an accelerated flow of goods and services around the world, but has also fostered an increase in the movement of people across borders. This new era of mobility has created opportunities for societies throughout the world, as well as new challenges. The intensity and volume of migration flows change over time. These changes can affect the development of national economies. Thus, countries have to explore the diversity, causes and motives of migration flows, its historical formation, and influencing factors. Present theories should pay more attention to such vital aspects of migration problems as political instability, ethnic composition, historical influence, working environment, and life quality. The article’s aim resides in theoretical-conceptual analysis of the civilization-European identity dimensions in the context of the contemporary migration and analytical investigation of their interdependence in the case of the Republic of Moldova. The targets are: the analysis of historiography of the contemporary migration in the European integration process; conceptual approach of the civilization-European identity dimensions in the context of the contemporary migration; formulation of methodological approaches of the civilization-European identity dimensions in the European integration process.

Literature Review

At European level the issue of migration is of long standing. For almost twenty years, the EU has been building the foundations of a comprehensive migration policy, which has gone hand in hand with the realization of people freedom of movement. Scholars began to examine and study the tendencies of the international migration processes. In this regard, some scientific researchers (R. Talwar, P. Li, R. Lucas, G. H. Hanson) focus on the analysis of the present model of migration flows which interact. The article of H. De Haas “The internal dynamic of the migration processes: a theoretical investigation” presents the impact of the migration on the development in different times. According to the author, present theories regarding the internal dynamic of the migration processes are characterized by some fundamental lacks. These theories cannot explain why the majority of initial migrations do not lead to a network of migrants. A. Portes, in the article “Migration and social change: Some conceptual

152 Research Outlines reflections”, states that migration leads to changes in both host- countries and countries of origin, but it has no impact on the social changes and fundamental values modifications in the receiving countries.

At the beginning of the XXI-st century, in the European academic medium, as well as in that Romanian and Moldavian, began to appear some applicative scientific researches. (K.F. Zimmermann, M. Kahanec , E. Benedetti, J.Bijak et al., R. Cucuruzan, D.-L. Constantin , E. Burdelnii). These scholars examine the tendencies of the migration processes in the European Union, their distinctive features, the impact of the migration on the society development, especially on the economy, the consequences of these processes for both host-countries and origin countries. The European institutions have elaborated a great number of directives, decisions and strategies for regulating, directly and indirectly, the migration policies in the EU. Through the most important programs can be mentioned Tampere Programme (1999) that introduces common policy in asylum field; Haga Programme (2005) for strengthening freedom, security and justice in European Union, followed by the Programme for Solidarity and Management of the Migratory Flows for the Period 2007-2013 (2006); Global Approach of Migration (GAM) adopted by Council of Europe in 2005 and 2006, which refers to all the migration stages with regard to the benefits of the legal migration and to policies against illegal migration and human trafficking. The IOM has taken into consideration the transformation of the international migration processes that under the impact of globalization, creates opportunities, increases the existent problems and generates new challenges. In this way, the experts of this organization have as a goal the implementation of the expertise and analysis results of the present international migration tendencies in its policies and practices. As a result, in the Report regarding global migration, published in 2010, the IOM analysts offer some self-evaluation tools of the future scenarios which demonstrate the necessity of an integrated and comprehensive regulating approach of the international migration issue. History has shown how migration has enriched the European continent both economically and culturally. It will continue to do so. The question of how much migration will take place is very uncertain because migration flows are difficult to predict. Some migration factors are relatively constant, such as demographic trends and economic inequality. Others vary across time, sometimes cyclically, like the sectoral mismatches of labor demand and supply. One set of forecasts to 2052 by Bijak et al. (2008) foresees the stabilization of East– West and South–North intra-European flows, and an increasing role, therefore, for extra European flows in overall population change. Particular pressure will be put on Central and South-Eastern European countries, both as transit spaces to the West (as we are witnessing today) and as new migration destinations. In their ‘base’ or medium scenario, Bijak et al. (2008) predict net immigration already by 2020 for all EU countries except Bulgaria and Romania.

153 Research Outlines As far as civilization is concerned, it is identified a number of times, in a very ambiguous way with culture, whereas culture has a narrower significance than civilization. The term originates from the Latin word civis, which has several interpretations. It means citizen, townsman. Its major elements are the order, the scale of values and the identity, that the community considers exemplar and important. Identity is the bearer of culture, which cultivates, preserves, cherishes, develops and keeps together through its cohesive force the societies and cultures, reuniting in a civilization. It also denotes the differentiation of groups of people based on the specificities of tribe, race, and nationality. Civilization is the most expanded culture in space and time; sets of cultures, which claim to belong together on the basis of identification aspects, are held and attracted in a system. It is the biggest unit belonging together culturally. A civilization, as opposed to simpler societies, is a composite society. Everyone lives in some sort of society or culture, but not all of them live in a civilization. S. ESTÓK conceives civilization in the following way. “Cultures making up a civilization organize themselves in a unified system. Their development through different historical eras makes them special and differentiates them from other civilizations. Their geographical confinement and region separates them from other peoples”210. This is most strikingly expressed through religion. According to the author, civilization is a worldview, an ideology that can be traced back to many centuries. It is characterized by values and norms, institutions and ways of thinking, which are sets of values of primary importance that are supposed to be passed on from generation to generation. He considers civilization being a specific correlative system of ideologies, customs, structures and cultures. At the same time, man creates and shapes civilization through his sense of identity and identification and his socialization. The process of mankind’s history and development proceeds parallelly, interweaving and merging into invisible unity on the timeline of history, in the dimension of space and time and in the continuum of expanse. Samuel P. Huntigton (2006) claims that the history of humankind is identical to the history of civilizations, its development can be described by its concept. It spans over generations, from ancient Sumerian and Egyptian civilizations to Christianity and Islam. Respectively, civilizations do not stem from ideas; instead they emerge as a result of the pressure of factors with important elemental powers reviving great efforts. At the same time, a civilization does not have a definite delineation. It is characterized by long historical continuity, and although its form and composition changes, its life span is quite extended. Empires emerge and collapse but civilizations remain; they survive political, social and ideological turmoil.

210 ESTÓK S. Boundless dimensions of civilization AARMS 7(4) (2008) 605

154 Research Outlines When it comes to European identity, definitely we have to refer to historical base on which it is constructed. Historically, Europe has many roots that create what can be called political history and cultural identity Europe. The European Union (EU) has a rich history and a unique organization based on the rule of law, democracy and human rights. Ethnic, cultural, religious and historical are undoubtedly the most important factors of the European identity. European identity means a strong commitment to the individual, social cohesion, and solidarity. This concept includes in itself a country that respects human rights, and is based on tolerance and the rule of law, on a cultural heritage that is a common experience that enabled the creation of a cultural family. According to Ritzen J. et al.(2016), a citizen’s national identity is a complex notion if it is considered as an exclusive set of characteristics which define a person as an X-lander, where all X- landers exhibit the same set, while the "foreign" Y-, Z- and other -landers have a different set. Some say therefore that territorially defined identity, such as a national identity, does not exist. Others stress that identity is often charged from an adversary perspective, “by indication of what ‘we are not’ and by excluding what ‘they are not’” (Banús, 2007). We advance that there is such a thing as an "emotional" attachment, a pride to being part of a geographic group, a nation, based on culture, on values and indeed on language. The belonging to a group is in itself exclusive. However, it is not only in culture that an emotional attachment to Europe can be found. It is also in a long-gestated tradition of humanistic values that includes issues such as the concepts of human rights, freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of the media. The author states that European identity cannot take its clues from national identity, neither in form nor in substance. The same holds true for national identity versus regional or local identity, for example, for being a Rhinelander versus a German, or a Sicilian versus an Italian. The European identity may be found in the same way as the national identity: in a common cultural European heritage, in the cultural practices of celebration and ritualization, in shared (civic) values, in the shared history and in the consciousness of its citizens. Identity is often misunderstood as a rational element, while it is rather emotional: belonging to something and being proud of that. European identity means to promote European unity, a common culture and a positive sense of European identity via the public discourses of the EU and member states. Historical images of Europe as a whole, the key documents of European unification, the EU constitution, media discourses about Europe can provide powerful collective images of orientation towards Europe.

155 Research Outlines Methodology

As a whole, research on European identity has employed methodological approaches embracing positivistic and interpretative epistemological assumptions about what constitutes knowledge in the social sciences, qualitative and quantitative methods and within each of these categories a striking range of research designs. Relevant quantitative approaches principally examine the impact of European identity on support for European integration (for example, McLaren, 2002, Carey, 2002, Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005, de Vries and van Kersbergen, 2007). This research question emerged from a long standing interest in explaining variation in attitudes towards European integration, but which until the late 1990s tended to focus on variables tapping into utilitarian and economic consequences of integration at the expense of identification (Gabel 1998, Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, but see also Inglehardt, 1970 on ‘cognitive mobilisation’, Inglehardt et al, 1991 on ‘political values’ and Franklin et al, 1995 on ‘support for government’). In different ways, more recent studies have shown that European identity matters in explanations of support for the EU. McLaren, for instance, argues that ‘while self-interest plays an important role in shaping attitudes towards the EU’, attitudes are also ‘based in great part on a general hostility to other cultures’211 (2002, p. 564). Quantitative methods have been employed to address a variety of related questions about identity. Fligstein, for instance, asks why some people across Europe are likely to adopt a European identity while others are not (2009, p. 113). Using Eurobarometer data on national and European identification ‘in the near future’, Fligstein shows that those who identify with Europe tend to be more educated, have higher incomes, be owners, managers, professionals, or white collar workers, young, male and left-wing politically (2009, p. 140-1). Exploring Deutsch’s argument that positive interaction produces common identity, Fligstein also examines social interaction indicators from Eurobarometer data, which show that European identifiers share a similar profile to those most likely to speak second languages and travel to another European country (2009, p. 142-5). Moreover, data on the nature of Europe-wide associations formed between1959-1993, suggested that educated and the middle and upper classes have taken the opportunity afforded by work and pleasure to create new patterns of association. Meinhof (2004) focuses on identity construction observed in everyday life narratives of families. She employs ethnographic semi-structured interviews data, using indirect methods of questioning and photographic images to permit ‘informants’ to spontaneously articulate negative and positive markers of identity about themselves and cross-border neighbors.

211 McLaren L. Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?, The Journal of Politics, 64: 2, 551-566. 2002

156 Research Outlines Favell (2009) examines the impact of immigration in Europe on identity, including the impact of free movement of persons in the EU, using ethnographic studies of would-be cosmopolitans living forms of Europeanised life, [in] highly Europeanised spaces in cities like London, Amsterdam, Brussels, Berlin and Barcelona. With respect to the attitudes and opinions of Europeans about cultural heritage, investigating their personal involvement, interest, and the perceived importance and values they attach to Europe’s cultural heritage, a small snapshot of the findings can be found on the Eurobarometer website. According to Eurobarometer data the vast majority of Europeans (84%) feel that cultural heritage is important to them personally, and 90% believe that it is important to their country. There is also a strong feeling that cultural heritage is a crucial part of European identity, with 80% believing that it is important to the EU as a whole.

 Many Europeans are proud of the history and culture within their local communities; 82% take pride in historical monuments or sites, works of art or traditions from their region or country. Also, 7 in 10 agree that they take pride in a historical monument or site, work of art or tradition from a European country other than their own.  The majority (70%) claimed that living close to places with remarkable examples of Europe's cultural heritage can give people a sense of belonging to Europe.  Cultural heritage is clearly at the heart of our everyday lives, with 7 in 10 Europeans (71%) living close to a historic monument or site, and over half (51%) being personally involved in some form of cultural heritage. Moreover, 71% also believe that living near places of importance to Europe’s cultural heritage can improve their quality of life.  A large majority of Europeans (88%) believe that Europe's cultural heritage should be taught in schools, as it is highly relevant for our history and culture.

Discussion

Historical images of Europe as a whole, the key documents of European unification, the EU constitution, media discourses about Europe and so on can provide powerful collective images of orientation towards Europe. Identity maintenance and transformation is a biographical process, with the individual’s perspective being formed in part out of the sum of the influence of their past experience and their subjective perception and processing of this past. As previous studies of European identity have demonstrated (Robert Miller, Fritz Schütze 2004) this study does not expect to find that an overarching European identity is supplanting national or regional identity. Rather, the general finding is likely to be that if European identity is evolving it is developing through national, regional or other types of identity with ‘Europe’ seen through the lens of

157 Research Outlines nation or locality. Robert Miller,et al. (2004) consider that the methodological approaches utilized in European identity will provide a deeper understanding of the evolution of collective identities. European identity will provide a more specific, systematic and concrete understanding concerning contemporary European identity formation and use it to test claims about collective identities in Europe. These claims concern the changing bases of identification linked with the development of European institutions and social policies. They also concern the ways in which people make sense of themselves as individual actors and the new forms of reflexivity, self- construction and relationships emerging as traditional political and community commitments are being replaced by so-called ‘identity politics’.

Conclusions

Migration has become a crucial issue for Europe, one that is likely to dominate policy and political agendas for many years to come. Migration is also increasingly presented, both in public and expert discourse, as a challenge requiring coordinated European responses, involving both Member States and the European institutions. The European Union is a geopolitical conglomerate in which there is a permanent population movement and consequently the cultural and ethnic contacts are more and more intense. Migration and cultural heritage – the latter defined generically as a strategy for managing ethnic diversity – are closely related. A large majority of Europeans take pride in their cultural heritage, whether it is located in their region or country, or in another European country. As far as identity is concerned, it is important to point out that each culture defines itself in relation to other culture. People who feel they belong to the same culture have these feelings because they rely on general common norms. European identity is about people and will continue this way. It is a process that recognizes the existence of differences between individuals, which recognizes diversity and embrace the concept of citizenship, balancing the rights and duties it entails. It continues to have the foundations on European values like respecting human rights and promoting the encouragement of economic and political integration. European identity means a very strong commitment to the individual, social cohesion and solidarity.

158 Research Outlines References 1. Banús E. Educate European Identity. Journal of Social Science Education, Volume 6, Number 1, pp. 57-67. 2007 2. Benedetti E. EU migration policy and its relations with third countries: Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and Moldova. In: EU Migration Policy and its Reflections in Third Countries : Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine. ISCOMET Institute for Ethnic and Regional Studies. 2012 pp. 7-75 3. Bijak J. et al Population and labor force projections for 27 European countries 2002-2052: impact of international migration on population ageing. In: Eur J Population, 23(1). 2007 4. Bijak, J., Kicinger, A. Kupiszewska, D. and Kupiszewski, M. Long-term migration scenarios for Europe, 2002–2052, in C. Bonifazi, M. Okólski, J. Schoorl and P. Simon (eds) (2008) International Migration in Europe: New Trends and New Methods of Analysis. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 129–151. 5. Brochmann G. Is Immigration a Threat to the Traditional Welfare States of Western Europe? In: Migration Policy Institute, 2003, University of Oslo, Policy Brief Number 4, 18 p. 6. Burdelinîi E., Vremiș M. et al Profilul Migrațional Extins al Republicii Moldova, Organizația Internațională pentru Migrație (OIM), Chișinău, 2013 [The Extended Migrational Profile of the Republic of Moldova, International Organization for Migration] 7. Carey S. Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration? European Union Politics, 3: 387–413, 2002 8. Constantin D-L et al Fenomenul migraționist din perspectiva aderării României la Uniunea Europeană. In: Proiect PAIS II. Studiul nr 5. Institutul European din România. București. 2004[The Migration Phenomenon from the Perspective of Romania Aderation at the European Union] 9. Cucuruzan R. Migrația și mobilitatea forței de muncă din România în contextul integrării europene. EFES. Cluj-Napoca, 2009 [Migration and Labor Force Mobility of Romania in the Context of the European Integration] 10. De Haas H. The internal Dynamics of Migration processes: A Theoretical Inquiry. In: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2010, 36(10), pp.1587-1617. 11. De Vries C. and van Kersbergende K., Kees Interests, Identity and Political Allegiance in the European Union, Acta Politica, 42, 307–328. 2007 12. Eichenberg E. and Dalton R. Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration, International Organization, 4:7, 507-34. 1993 13. ESTÓK S. Boundless dimensions of civilization AARMS 7(4) (2008) 605 14. Fligstein N. Who are the Europeans and how does this matter for politics? in Checkel J.T. and Katzenstein P.J. (eds) European Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 2009 15. Franklin M., Van der Eijk C.and Marsh M. Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government: Public Support for Europe in The Wake of Maastricht, Western European Politics 18:1, 01-7. 1995 16. Gabel M. Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories, The Journal of Politics, 60: 2, 333-354. 1998 17. Hanson G.H. The Economic Consequences of the International Migration of Labor. In: Annual Review of Economics, 2009, nr.1, pp. 179-207 18. Hooghe L. and Marks G. Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?, PS: Political Science and Politics, 37: 415–20. 2004 19. Hooghe L.and Marks G. Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration, European Union Politics, 6 (4): 419–443. 2005 20. Huntigton S. P. A civilizációk összecsapása és a világrend átalakulása, Európa Kiadó Budapest, 2006 ISBN: 963 07 8036 4, p. 50. [The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order] 21. Inglehart R. Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity, Comparative Politics 3: 45–70. 1970 22. Inglehart R., Rabier J.R and Reif K.The Evolution of Public Attitudes toward European Integration: 1970-86 in. 1991 (eds.) Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion (London: Macmillan) 23. Li P. World Migration in the Age of Globalization: Policy Implication and Challenges. In: New Zeeland Population Review, 33/34, 2008, pp. 1-22 159 Research Outlines 24. Lucas R.E.B. International Labor Migration in a Globalizing Economy. In: Carnegie Papers, 2008, number 92, Trade, Equity, and Development Program 25. McLaren L. Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?, The Journal of Politics, 64: 2, 551-566. 2002 26. Meinhof U. Europe Viewed From Below: Agents, Victims and the Threat of the Other, in R. Herrmann, T. Risse and M. Brewer (eds) Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield). 2004 27. 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160 Research Outlines Elmar Mustafayev PhD student, junior researcher and teacher Lecturer and Coordinator of Political Science and International Relations Department

EUROPEANIZATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE CASE OF NAGORNO- KARABAKH CONFLICT

Abstract

One of the main topics that dominate the EU-Eastern Partnership (EaP) agenda is the peaceful resolution of the frozen conflicts. Six unresolved conflicts in the eastern neighborhood of the EU requires the active engagement from Brussels in order to avoid the splash of instability and influx of refugees. The Nagorno- Karabakh conflict as the oldest and the most complicated conflict among these six has involved two EaP countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and threats the regional stability and security. Especially after the April battles of 2016, which has clearly showed that it is not a frozen conflict, the peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has come to the forefront of international attention. This research work studies whether the mechanisms of Europeanization can pull the political resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict out of the dead-end and compares it with the experience of the EU in resolution of conflicts in western Balkans.

Novelty of Study

Although the notion of Europeanization has been a dense research theme for the students working on Europeanization of EU member states and candidate countries, it is a relatively new academic debate for the students studying the influence of EU on neighboring countries. Research works on the process of Europeanization in Azerbaijan in this regard is one of the less studied themes. Even notwithstanding the popularity of studies on conflict resolution, the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict via the mechanisms of Europeanization and its comparative analysis with the resolution of conflicts in Western Balkans have never been studied.

Objectives

 To understand the similarities and distinct features of the EU's engagement between the conflicts of Western Balkans and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict  To find out whether it is possible to achieve the political resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict via the mechanisms of Europeanization Literature Review & Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of the research employs four external mechanisms of Europeanization – conditionality, socialization and persuasion, lesson drawing, and passive enforcement – in conflict

161 Research Outlines resolution (Noutcheva, et al., 2004; Schimmelfenning & Sedelmeier, 2005; Popescu, 2004; Tocci, 2007; Börzel & Risse, 2012). In addition to mechanisms of Europeanization, the research touches upon the tailor-made approach of the EU to the resolution of the conflicts in member-states and candidate countries, and the countries in the direct neighborhood of the EU.  The EU supports one common state idea and offers two-tier system of federal governance;  The EU finds the arguments of one of the conflicting parties groundless and isolates it;  The EU recognizes the seperation (Emerson, 2004).

Methodology

Regarding the methodology of this work, theoretical and empirical analysis of a qualitative method is picked because it is considered best suited to the study of Europeanization. Indirect observation and analysis of official documents, bilateral and multilateral agreements, binding and advisory resolutions, speeches will be examined through the qualitative content analysis.

Arguments

The research work argues that in comparison to the conflicts in Western Balkans, EU is lack of ambitious strategy in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Passive engagement of EU in peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict deprives it from being an actor as it did in former Yogoslavia. Unlike Western Balkans, EU did not set neither positive nor negative conditionality mechanism in exchange to concessions in peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Failure to set positive and negative conditionality and equal treatment of the aggressor state and victim of occupation has diminished the validity of Europeanization process in the South Caucasus countries. EU's unwillingness to offer attractive incentives to EaP countries diminishes the likelihood of Europeanization process to facilitate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. Besides, it weakens the domestic actors lobbying for increased competences of the EU in peace negotiations. Furthermore, in the case of western Balkans, the EU did not face strong opposition to its increased role in the peacebuilding process. The EU and its member-states assisted the US within the NATO block in military intervention and later took the leading role in building the long-standing peace in the region. In this regard, the South Caucasus is way complicated than the western Balkans. Increased engagement in the region might further deteriorate the relations between the EU and Russia which have been damaged after the war in Georgia and illegal annexation of Crimea. The only mechanism of the Europeanization currently applied by the EU in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is passive enforcement. Despite its non-binding nature, the reports and resolutions of the EU Parliament, supporting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and calling Armenia and Azerbaijan to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict complying the UN Security Council resolutions,

162 Research Outlines constitute full-fledged sources of international law. Also, statements of the President of the European Council and the EU High Representative (HR) reaffirming the EU’s support for territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan contribute to the passive enforcement in conflict resolution.

163 Research Outlines Halyna Razumei PhD in Public Administration, Associate Professor, Department of Public Governance and Customs Administration, University of Customs and Finance

IMPLEMENTATION OF ІNTEGRATED CUSTOMS RISK MANAGEMENT IN UKRAINE

Introduction

Customs administrations operate in a complex environment of constant change. They are required to respond to the promotion of economic development and to comply with regional, national and international obligations. Like any organization Customs faces internal and external uncertainties that affect its ability to achieve its goals. According to the international standard ISO 31000 (2018) «Risk management – Prіncіples and guіdelіnes on іmplementatіon» the effect of uncertainty on an organization’s objectives is risk. All directions of activity in every organization involve risks, and the State Fiscal Service of Ukraine (hereinafter – SFS) is no exception. Thus, efficient management of customs risks is one of the most strategic tasks of the SFS. Risk Management was recognized by all customs administrations as a new philosophy of customs control, which helps to be a maximum effectively used resource at the border for fast goods movement, transport and passengers with the providing safety of the society within it. So implementation of risk management in customs context should based on an experience of private and public sector in developed countries.

Aims and Objectives

The aim of this paper is to analyze the features of implementation the risk management methodology in the customs affairs of Ukraine, taking into account international standards and requirements of the EU legislation, and to develop the proposals for the implementation of the integrated customs risk management model based on quality, knowledge and change management for both compliance and trade facilitation.

Literature Review

The main basis for customs risk management researches is the international agreements, conventions and other legislations in the international trade and customs affairs, the international standards and methodological papers in this field and also case study of different countries to choose the best experience. The issue of implementation of customs international standards in national legislation and specific mechanisms for its implementation were studied in the works of domestic and foreign customs theorists

164 Research Outlines and practitioners: I. Berezhnyuk, O. Borysenko, V. Chenstov, W. Czyżowicz, O. Egorov, L. Gellert, J. Jansson, T. Jedynak, L. Ivashova, Yu. Kunev, I. Kveliashvili, A. Mazur, L. Prus, A. Voytseschuk, D. Widdowson and other researchers. The papers of H. Hablo, O. Komarov, V. Naumenko, I. Nestoryshen, P. Pashko, S. Tereshchenko and others were devoted to problems of organization and improvement customs risk management in Ukraine, institutional and legal aspects of its implementation and mechanism of automation, analysis of foreign experience in this field. Despite the importance of these studies, they emphasized only on the separated parts of risk management system, leaving without consideration the integrated approach to its implement. Therefore, all this resulted in the choice of theme of this paper.

Methodology

To achieve the object of the research, we used the integrated application of general scientific and special methods, in particular: methods of analysis and synthesis – for considering normative and theoretical sources regarding the risk management application in the customs authorities activity; comparative analysis – to study foreign experience of implementing customs risk management and a systematic approach – during the analysis of risk management as a system in the customs authorities of Ukraine. Structural-functional analysis and abstract-logical methods determined the factors of customs risks. Using the method of modeling we developed the innovative model of integrated risk management in the activity of customs authorities of Ukraine.

Results and Discussion

The functional role of Customs includes the demands of the international community to the customs administrations in the twenty first century and the conventional mission of Customs: «to develop and implement an integrated set of policies and procedures that ensure increased safety and security, as well as effective trade facilitation and revenue collection» (World customs organization (hereinafter – WCO), 2008, p. 5). The most powerful techniques used by Customs agencies to deliver their mission are risk management and audits proclaimed the main methods of customs control in the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (hereinafter – Kyoto Convention) (WCO, 1999). These techniques allow Customs agencies to assist the vast majority of economic operators who wish to be compliant, and enables them to concentrate their resources on controlling the smaller number who represent the greatest risk to a country. As recognized Jeacocke and Kouwenhoven (2017, p.28), data analytics – for example, automated selectivity rules – has become increasingly important in enabling these techniques. According to chapter 6 «Customs control» of Kyoto Convention (1999) risk is defined as the

165 Research Outlines potential for non-compliance with Customs laws. So all customs administration must use risk management system in their customs formalities. However, Widdowson (2003) noted that risks to the achievement of organizational goals not only include the potential for non-compliance with customs laws, but also the potential failure to facilitate trade, which is revealed in the process of customs service delivery to trading community. This statement was confirmed in the SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (WCO, 2007) which provides a model for administrations and governments wishing to develop security measures to facilitate and secure global supply chains. The SAFE Framework bases on four core elements, two of which are directly related to the risk management system: 1. the harmonization of advance electronic cargo information on inbound, outbound and transit shipments; 2. the requirement that each country that joins SAFE commits to employing a consistent risk management approach to address security threats; 3. the requirement that on request of the customs administration in the receiving nation, the customs administration of the sending nation performs an outbound inspection of high-risk containers and cargo using non-intrusive detection equipment; 4. the benefits that Customs authorities will provide to businesses that meet minimal supply chain security standards and best practices, including enhanced trade facilitation for legitimate trade and AEO concept. The SAFE Framework, based on this core principles, rests on tree pillars ‘Customs to Customs’, ‘Customs to Business’, ‘Customs to other government and inter-government’, each of which involves a set of standards that are consolidated to guarantee ease of understanding and rapid international implementation. The Risk Management Systems is a key element of the pillar 1 of the SAFE Framework that should include a mechanism for validating threat assessments and targeting decisions and implementing best practices. According to the SAFE Framework (WCO, 2007, p. 13) the Customs administration should establish a risk-management system to identify potentially high-risk cargo and/or transport conveyances and automate that system. Adherence to the principle of risk-oriented management by the borders much depends on effectiveness of intercommunication between customs administrations, with business communities and other state and intergovernmental agencies, namely realization of the three backbones of Framework security standards and trade facilitation. The WCO develops more detailed implementing provisions for the risk management: the Risk Management Guide (WCO, 2003); the Global Information and Intelligence Strategy, the Standard risk

166 Research Outlines assessment methods, A general indicator of high risk (WCO, 2005) and the Risk Management Compendium (WCO, 2011). The Compendium is comprised of two separate but interlinked volumes. Volume 1 sets out the organizational framework for risk management and outlines the risk management process. Volume 2 deals with risk assessment, profiling and targeting tools that inform selection criteria for identifying high-risk consignments, passengers and conveyances for Customs intervention. Аfter taking the WCO Risk Management Compendium in 2011 the customs administrations over the world should implement the principles of international standard of integrated risk management ISO 31000 in their own risk management system. That methodology must allow them to achieve the balance between trade facilitation and regulatory control. Continuing development of main modern principles of customs affairs, the WCO has dedicated last years of customs administration development with annually slogans ‘Digital Customs: Progressive Engagement’ (2016), ‘Data Analysis for Effective Border Management’ (2017) and ‘SMART borders for seamless Trade, Travel and Transport’ (2019). That statements are noted to the implement both information and communications technologies and innovation in customs control procedures, digital solutions and services. Dr Kunio Mikuriya (2017), Secretary General of the WCO, stated that data analysis plays the critical role in modernizing customs administrations to improve border management. During this process, a proper feedback mechanism will be essential so as to enhance the efficiency of risk management engines. The World Trade Organization (hereinafter – WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement (hereinafter – TFA) sets out the obligations relating to risk management in Article 7, sub-paragraph 4, which provides that each WTO member shall: 1. to the extent possible, adopt or maintain a risk management system for customs control. 2. design and apply risk management in a manner as to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or disguised restrictions on international trade. 3. concentrate customs control and, to the extent possible other relevant border controls, on high risk consignments and expedite the release of low risk consignments. It may also select, on a random basis, consignments for such controls as part of its risk management. 4. base risk management on assessment of risk through appropriate selectivity criteria. Such selectivity criteria may include, inter alia, HS code, nature and description of the goods, country of origin, country from which the goods were shipped, value of the goods, compliance record of traders, and type of means of transport (WTO, 2013, pp. 8-9). In the European Union the using of customs risk management is established in the Union Customs Code and EU Customs Blueprints. Therefore much attention is paid to customs risk management in the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, and Ukraine (2014).

167 Research Outlines Provisions of Association Agreement chapter 5 ‘Customs and trade facilitation’ set that EU and Ukraine respective trade and customs legislation shall be stable and comprehensive. Besides provisions and procedures shall be proportionate, transparent, predictable, non-discriminatory, impartial and applied uniformly and effectively and shall inter alia: apply modern customs techniques, including risk assessment, post clearance controls and company audit methods in order to simplify and facilitate the entry and release of goods. The Ukraine also has own experience of using risk management principles into its customs control formalities since 2005. The implementation of the customs risk management system in Ukraine took four stages: the initial (preparatory) stage (1999-2005), the stage of formation (2005-2009), the stage of improvement (2009- 2012) and the stage of integrated development (commenced with 2012). Each stage is characterized by certain achievements in the fields of legislative, organizational and information provision. The key point in introducing the customs risk management methodology in Ukraine was approved Concept of the creation, implementation and development of a system for analysis and risk management in 2005. According to the Concept, the customs authorities of Ukraine during customs control should be guided by the principle of selectivity and, as a rule, be limited to the forms of customs control that are sufficient to ensure compliance with the customs legislation of Ukraine. In 2005 the the Department of Risk Analysis and Audit was established in the structure of the State Customs Service of Ukraine. In 2006 the creation of an automated risk analysis and management system (hereinafter – ARAMS) began. Further the risk management system was developed and improved, integrating into the system of general management of the customs authorities. ARAMS provides automated data comparison within particular transactions, matching them with programmed algorithms (that is, risk profiles). Where potential risks of a breach of customs law are identified, the customs inspector is automatically given the list of customs formalities (forms of customs control) which must be applied in order to further assess the identified risks (Komarov, 2016, p.40). To adjust the risk evaluation there is an opportunity to take into account the previous positive or negative operation history of foreign economic activity participants. Thus, it is possible to reduce the probability of ineffective ARAMS operations for a particular legal entity, carrier, and so on. Komarov (2016, p. 39) recognizes, that it is not appropriate to rely solely and exclusively on the application of an automated system of risk management. Such a system is only one of the instruments for risk analysis and evaluation which helps to check relevant electronic documentation. At the same time, the importance of such automated systems should not be underestimated. Thus, we define the risk management system as a set of instruments of automated, manual and combined customs controls, based

168 Research Outlines on the principle of selectivity within the scope of customs control required to ensure compliance with customs law. At the legislative level the use of risk management systems during the selection of customs control forms was defined in 2012 in chapter 52 ‘Risk Management System’ of the current Customs Code of Ukraine. So, the 2012 edition of the Customs Code of Ukraine is designed in accordance with the Kyoto and Istanbul Conventions, the International Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier Controls of Goods and the Customs Code of the EU as well as the WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade. It provides for flexibility and tailored solutions to enable relevant risk management and administrative strategies to be implemented. The biggest problem was the inability to effectively manage risks at the central level, therefore, since 2012, the regional risk management and risk analysis at the border checkpoints began to develop. Considerable attention is also paid to the timely updating of the risk profiles to maintain a balance between regulatory control and trade facilitation. In order to comply with the provisions of the Customs Code, in 2015 the Order of risk analysis and assessment, development and implementation of risk management measures for determination of forms and scope of customs control was adopted by Ministry of Finance of Ukraine. This Order is developed for the purpose of ensuring selectivity of customs control by application of risk management system with use of information technologies and defines the peculiarities of application the ARAMS, which has been integrated into the Ukrainian customs database ‘Inspector’. Also this Order differentiated the concepts of fiscal risks and not fiscal (security) risks. To speed up customs formalities at the state border of Ukraine, when analyzing and assessing risks, preference is given to the approach whereby non-fiscal risks, as well as risks of non-delivery of goods to customs of destination or their replacement are mainly analyzed and assessed at the checkpoints across the customs border there. In the customs of destination during the customs control and clearance of goods, fiscal and non-fiscal risks are checked. Fiscal risks are meant risks, the identification of which are aimed at preventing the minimization of the payment of taxes and fees, customs and other payments in the implementation of foreign economic operations. Non-fiscal (security) risks are the risks, the identification of which are aimed at ensuring the protection of national security, life and health of people, animals, plants, the environment, and the interests of consumers. The Ukrainian customs administration apply such instruments of risk management as risk indicators and profiles, orientation, random selection and methodical recommendations. Creating a software module ‘The risk profile designer’ in 2015 allows the customs officers in regional customs to fill their risk profiles independently with the indicators relevant to the regional threats. In addition, after the launch of the Single Window system in 2016, it was possible to integrate

169 Research Outlines the information systems of different controlling authorities, allowing the creation of interagency risk profiles. In 2017 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted the development the Strategy for the Development of a Risk Management System in the Field of Customs Control for the Period up to 2022 and the action plan for its implementation. According to it the Department of Targeting and Customs Risk Management was created in 2017 to enhance coordination and increase the effectiveness of the risk management system in the regions. Nowadays the perspective of development Ukrainian ARAMS is the implementing the National Customs Enforcement Network (hereinafter – nCEN) of WCO and the European transit system, the New Computerised Transit System (hereinafter – NCTS) to enhance the effectiveness of national customs risk management. The nCEN software will enable the SFS to efficiently collect, store, analyze and disseminate law enforcement intelligence at the national level in order to enhance the operational capabilities of the SFS Customs, as well as to improve risk profiling at the strategic, tactical and operational levels. This includes schematising the risks and groups of goods, routes and trading companies that are potentially exposed to the violation of customs rules. The use of nCEN will facilitate a more active exchange of information between customs authorities at the regional and international levels, enhance cooperation between all sectors of the border. The nCEN consists of three independent databases. The principal database of national seizures and offences comprises data required for analysis, as well as means of conveyance, routes, and the possibility to view photos depicting exceptional concealment methods. Two supplementary databases contain information on suspect persons, methods of conveyance and business entities of interest to Customs, thereby facilitating a structured investigation process Since 2009, in the territory of the European Community, all transit operations under the TIR Convention was necessarily carried out using the European Customs Information System NCTS which will process the declaration and control the transit movement. In our opinion, integrated risk management as an integral part of the customs authorities activity will allow not only to effectively implement the initiated state reforms, but also to create a sound basis for the development of the customs system as a modern innovation-oriented institution. Therefore, the introduction of integrated risk management in the activities of the Ukrainian customs authorities, should begin, first of all, with the formation of a risk-taking culture, which should increase the managerial competence of customs officials. The main element of the risk management culture is to bring the general attitude to risk and related organizational values and priorities to the attention of the employees involved in the decision-making process at all levels of management. Equally

170 Research Outlines important, the goal is to maintain a sufficient level of competence for managers of all key areas of risk assessment and management. According to Risk Management Compendium (WCO, 2011) the maturity model of risk management is assessed in relation to the main characteristics (culture, process, infrastructure) and based on five different levels of risk management maturity: naive, conscious, defined, managed, included. Establishing a risk maturity model is important as it allows a common baseline to be established against which risk management practices can be benchmarked. Administrations should define and design a model that fits their unique context. We can assess the maturity of risk management in the customs authorities of Ukraine at the level of ‘risk defined’, because the application of this methodology is already some extent standardized with the high-level management of the policy, processes and degree of risk acceptance. However, despite the transition to the stage of integrated development of the risk management system, officials of the customs authorities of Ukraine will have to make significant efforts in implementing the necessary changes aimed at introducing an integrated risk- management, which will cover all areas of their business activities and should become the basis of the customs authorities management. Taking into account the international experience and domestic practice of applying customs risk management, we propose the following steps that will promote the implementation of integrated risk management in the customs authorities of Ukraine: 1. introduction of risk management in the organizational culture of customs authorities and bringing it to the level of strategic planning; 2. dissemination of risk management awareness among officials of the customs authorities of Ukraine and support of senior management of the process of its implementation; 3. construction of the risk register for the customs system in general and each customs authority separately; 4. determination of respondents for each individual type of risk and their promotion system, formation of risk managers competencies in managers of different levels of management; 5. integration of risk management with the quality management system of the customs authorities of Ukraine in order to effectively achieve its main objectives; 6. introduction of annual reporting on the effectiveness of risk management and review of the risk register of customs authorities in Ukraine. Besides, implementing of integrated risk-management according to the standard ISO 31000 should be done on the basis of such technologies as: 1. Change management. Changes are related to both external and internal conditions of customs and border control, especially trends and methods of violations of legislation in this field.

171 Research Outlines 2. Knowledge management. The rapid growth of information is as a risk and as an ability for customs administrations. The risk is related to the increased complexity of information management in the context of its effective collection and conversion into the accessible form for quality decision-making. 3. Quality management. The quality customs services for business community and citizens, providing quality control of compliance with law with cross-borders, needs an adherence to standards of quality control to ensure both internal support of the customs and border authorities and realization of processes at the border by them. It should be noted that the use of these technologies should be periodically benchmarked. Benchmarking plays a significant role in the implementation of quality management and risk management systems, provides an opportunity to determine their own advantages and weaknesses, find directions for change and ways of innovation development. In the customs authorities it will be useful to apply the following types of benchmarking: - international - borrowing of successful foreign experience and best achievements of customs administrations of the world; - regional - studying the best practices in customs management in Ukraine, taking into account the specifics of foreign economic activity in the regions - the zones of activity of separate customs authorities; - process or substantive - analysis and consideration of the best achievements in the implementation of customs formalities and innovations in management processes. By using different types of benchmarking in relation to an object, subject or method of comparison, customs officials receive an instrument that allows formalizing the transfer and adaptation of advanced managerial experience. In addition, benchmarking is at the same time an educational tool for an organization that provides a continuous process of research and education, and also provides continuous and steady performance enhancements.

Conclusion

Besides, the implementing of integrated risk management according to the standard ISO 31000 should be done with the technologies of change, knowledge and quality management based on wider using of the European and national IT platform and interagency cooperation for development of regional risk management and establishing of interagency risk profiles. The proposed model will help to solve the permanent problem – rapid changes of internal and external environment, technologies, customs bodies’ tasks, expectations of stakeholders – and to achieve of an expected result - effective and efficient satisfaction of all the interested parts’ demands in accordance with the stable customs system functioning and adopting the innovations into the professional activity of customs officers.

172 Research Outlines References

1. Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (2014). Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/association_agreement_ukraine_2014_en.pdf. 2. Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2017). Order from 27 December, 2017, No. 978. On approval of the Strategy for the Development of a Customs Risk Management System in the Field of Customs Control for the Period up to 2022. 3. Customs Code of Ukraine (2012). Кyiv: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 4. International Organization for Standardization (2018). International standart ISO 31000:2018 ‘Risk management – Guidelines’. Retrieved from https://www.iso.org/iso-31000- risk-management.html. 5. Jeacocke, S., & Kouwenhoven N. (2017). Cognitive computing for Customs agencies: improving compliance and facilitation by enabling Customs officers to make better decisions. WCO News, 82, 28-30. Retrieved from https://mag.wcoomd.org/uploads/2018/05/WCO_news_82.pdf. 6. Komarov, O. (2016) Risk management systems in Customs: the Ukrainian context. World customs journal, V.10, N. 1, 35-44. Retrieved from http://worldcustomsjournal.org/archive/volume-10-number-1-march-2016/ 7. Mikuriya, K. (2017). ‘International Customs Day 2017. Data Analysis for Effective Border Management’. Retrieved from http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/international-customs- day/previous-editions/icd-2017.aspx. 8. Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (2015). Decree from 31 July, 2015, No. 684. On approval of the Order of risk analysis and assessment, development and implementation of risk management measures for determination of forms and scope of customs control. 9. Official Website of the State Fiscal Service of Ukraine. Retrieved from http://sfs.gov.ua. 10. Pashko P. V. (2009) Mytna bezpeka (teorija, metodologhija ta praktychni rekomendaciji) [Customs security (theory, methodology and practical recommendations)]. Odesa: Plaske. (in Ukrainian) 11. Razumiej, G., & Razumiej M. (2017) Tendencje rozwoju zarządzania ryzykiem w celnictwie ukraińskim. Monitor Prawa Celnego i Podatkowego, 3 (260), 101–106. Retrieved from http://monitorc.pl/art/3538/ tendencje_rozwoju_zarzadzania_ryzykiem_w_celnictwie_ukrainskim_. 12. Razumiej, G., & Razumiej M. (2018) Struktura Państwowej Służby Skarbowej Ukrainy w kontekście zarządzania ryzykiem celnym. Monitor Prawa Celnego i Podatkowego. Retrieved from: https://monitorc.pl/art/3701/ struktura_panstwowej_sluzby_skarbowej_ukrainy_w_kontekscie_zarzadzania_ryzykiem_celny m. 13. Risk management: an upgraded version of the nCEN now available (2016). WCO News, 80, 14- 15. Retrieved from https://mag.wcoomd.org/uploads/2018/08/wco_news_80.pdf. 14. State Customs Service of Ukraine (2005). Decree from 27 May, 2005, No. 435. On approval of the Concept of the creation, implementation and development of a system for analysis and risk management. 15. Using the New Computerised Transit System (NCTS) to move goods (2018). Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/guidance/using-the-new-computerised-transit-system-to-move-goods- across-the-eu-and-efta-countries. 16. Widdowson, D. (2003). Intervention by Exception: A Study of the use of Risk Management by Customs Authorities in the International Trading Environment: A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. University of Canberra. Retrieved from: http://customscentre.canberra.edu.au/storage/ Intervention_by_Exception.pdf 17. WCO (1999). International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (as amended). Retrieved from

173 Research Outlines http://www.wcoomd.org/Topics/Facilitation/InstrumentandTools/Conventions/pf_revised_kyot o_conv/Kyoto_New. 18. WCO (2003). Risk management guide. Brussels: WCO. Retrieved from: www.adb.org/documents/events/2005/trade-facilitation/wco-risk-guide- eng.pdf. 19. WCO (2007, update 2018). SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade. Brussels: WCO. Retrieved from: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/frameworks-of- standards/safe_package.aspx. 20. WCO (2008). Сustoms in the 21st century. Enhancing Growth and Development through Trade Facilitation and Border Security. Retrieved from http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.Publicfiles/PDFandDocuments /AnnexII-Customs in the 21st Century.pdf. 21. WCO (2011). Risk Management Compendium. Retrieved from http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/instruments-and- tools/compendiums/rmc.aspx. 22. WCO (2016-2019). International Customs Day. Retrieved from http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/international-customs-day.aspx. 23. WTO (2013). Trade Facilitation Agreement. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/desci36_e.htm.

174 Research Outlines Olga Rusova PhD in Political Sciences Head of Department for International Cooperation and Communication Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL CULTURE ON THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN UKRAINE, GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA IN THE POST- COMMUNIST PERIOD

Abstract

Reflecting the geopolitical situation in the region of Eastern Europe and Eurasia — the collapse of the Soviet Union and socialist camp, forced such states as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to draw their new internal and external policy lines, adopting them to the drastically changed political environment. In order to understand the ways how they were elaborating and conducting, the given project propose to explore the concept of “political culture” and its impact on the democratization processes within three countries. The political culture of a state is as a very contradictory system, where the elements of past, present and future are dynamically balanced. It also can encompass ideologies, rules, morals, archetypes, traditions, financial ties, laws, etc. The political culture is distinct in conservatism, soaking up the features of the traditional political life from the distant eras. At the same time it is very sensitive to the shifts in public life, especially to those, which are revolutionary. The mass political culture, in its turn, can consist of the numerous subcultures, demonstrating the differences in the world perception of population in various regions, certain ethnic and social groups. This study is an attempt to understand the construction of the social order in the indicated states at the crossroads of several systems of classification, dealing with the factors, which form the political culture in a certain spatio-temporal location. The political culture is considered as an interlink between citizens, policies and state, syncretizing international relations, sociology, political and cultural studies in a single project. Subsequently, it seems challenging, but invaluable for the research outcomes.

Novelty and relevance

The relevance of the chosen topic resides in the research questions which it raises. The democratization is an ongoing process in all three countries. Despite the fact that Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia are suffering from the similar problems, the transformation of their political regimes from totalitarian to democratic, flows in a different way. In view of this, the primary goal is to indicate these similarities and differences, through the prism of the formed political culture, it’s correlation degree with the traditional liberal values and propensity for democratization.

175 Research Outlines The content of the research paper is strictly connected with the most pressing issues and challenges, which these states are experiencing today - a backlash of fight against corruption, a tycoonization of governmental institutions, an ideological weakness of the political parties, etc. In the meantime, the exploration of the “political culture” as a social practice exposes both, the internal reasons of democratization slowdown in the selected countries and the estimation of the Eastern partnership initiative progress on the whole. The research paper demonstrates what positive effect it has on the implementation of democratic reforms and at the same time highlights the central shortcomings of the program. But the scientific inquiry in the chosen direction is also important not only for Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, but also for the other EaP states. Especially when the EU is experiencing the identity crisis and the project “United Europe” is under the threat of the dissemination of nationalist ideas, it’s rather hard to find the compelling argument to join the European integration process.

Research objectives

1. To analyze the state of political culture in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, tracking the major trends of its evolution and observing how the behavioral models are being constructed or deconstructed by the actors involved in the political processes; 2. To define the interdependence between the terms “political culture”, “political consciousness” and “political ideology”. It is essential not only for the research of the Moldovan, Georgian and Ukrainian internal political discourse, but also helps to explain why these states prioritize some certain foreign policy directions (Europeanization VS cooperation with Russia); 3. To evaluate if the participation of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in the Eastern partnership program is preconditioned by their political culture codes and to what extent it is connected with the speed of state reforming; 4. To study out whether the phantom borders concept can be applicable to Moldovan, Georgian and Ukrainian cases. In the spotlight will be placed a reappearance of these borders in different forms of social action (formation of political preferences, tendency to dissemination of nationalist sentiments, voting patterns) with a reference to their historical and geographical origin.

Literature review

A preliminary literature review shows that political culture emerged as a term in the scientific discourse relatively late, at the beginning of the 20th century and became a popular subject of research in political sciences in the second half of the 1950’s. Later this notion was used as an instrument to explain the transformation and democratization processes in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism, of course, in combination with the traditional approaches of G. Almond and S. Verba.1 Among those authors who devoted their works to this topic were I. Bernik and B. Malnar,2 176 Research Outlines S.Whitefield,3 B. Wegener,4 V. M. Stefek,5 J. Kopstein,6 A. D. J. Marszałek-Kawa, P. Wawrzyński and A. Ratke-Majewska,7 Andrew C. Janos,8 R. Rose,9 M. Banaś 10 and many others. Their studies were primarily focused on the role of political culture in democratic transitions and whether the old cultural patterns really changed rapidly in terms of political and socio-economic reforms. Certainly, in the course of study there is used scientific literature, concerning the development of political culture in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia individually, highlighting those aspects of the chosen topic, which are align with the research questions and objectives. In this context should be mentioned the works of V. F. Ion,11 K. Dawisha and B. Parrott,12 Charles King,13 Shalva Giorgadze,14 D. Beachain and F. Coene,15 S. Dundua, T. Karaia and Z. Abashidze,16 Z. Shatirishvili.17 Exploring the national historiography, the significant contribution to the research of the political culture under the conditions of democratic state-constituting, did such Ukrainian scientists as I. Derzhko and I.Parubchak.18 Among the authors who consider the political culture as an integral characteristic of the state building process are Zh. Derkach 19 and L. Nagorna.20 The problems of the political culture nurturing among the Ukrainian citizens within the existing political system are considered by the following scholars — E.Golovacha,21 J.Onyschkiv 22 and V. Nagornij.23 Today the national development of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova as a subject of research, draws the attention of many scholars. But what is missing from the past studies, is a well-structured analysis of the political culture particularly within this triangle. This project purposes to clear up if there are any similarities between the national components of the political culture in these three countries, or if the differences are so substantial, to compare and categorize them. For this reason the historical background, geographical location and boundaries, behavior patterns and political identity — all these factors are taken into account in this study case. Such a comprehensive approach helps to realize the full potential of the topic.

Methodology and data used

The primary research methods are literature review and systems theory. On the one hand, the political cultures of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine are going to be treated as separate units (micro- systems), distinguishing their key components, which interact at multiple levels. But on the other, a special attention will be given to the fact that the political culture as a collective concept is constantly under the strong influence of its environment (human, technical and economic factors), which quite often configurates the relationships between the considered subjects. Relying on such understanding of the systems approach, will be developed a further scientific research of political culture dynamics, its new characteristics, functions and abilities to be modified in length of time. In the course of research will be also used “fresh” data, received on the basis of social surveys, EaP programming documents, including “20 Deliverables for 2020” and the bilateral EU Association

177 Research Outlines agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. This theoretical nuanced evaluation is premised on the weakness of the eastern dimension of the EU foreign policy course, particularly after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of military operations in Donbas region. These events were perceived as a failure of the EaP and gave a fundamental understanding to the EU member-states that the program should be revised at least in the short run. The strengthening of deep and sustainable democracy as its core point is not only ambiguous in contents, but also hardly fitting in the diversity of political culture in the six partner countries. And even more-for-more approach is too general, while there is a strong need to specify the relations with each participant, elaborating a clear agenda for action.

Results and Discussion

The notion “political culture” is a socially induced phenomenon, because it consists of such categories as believes, convictions, norms, shaping up by the community on the basis of its unique historical experience. But in such cases there is always a possibility for manipulations with the interpretations or rather misinterpretations of some historical events, which are essential for understanding and promotion of certain social constructs. They can be modified under the particular circumstances, but it takes a lot of time in order to replace them with the new ones. It demands their revision, what is extremely difficult, taking in account that a part of them was formed in the course of several centuries. It is also highly important how these categories become perpetuated and resonate with a society, predefining the political behavior of their carriers. Another fact of interest is that how the elements of political culture determine the freedom degree in these countries nowadays. The process of post-communist transformation in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova hasn’t been finished yet. For this reason the conflicting combination of political values and attitudes of the several historical time intervals makes their political culture ideologically mixed-up and fragmentary. A post-Soviet ethos, as a number of the distinct mindsets, still is one of its main characteristics. The traditions of political indifference (passivity), etatism and egalitarianism, became a formidable obstacle on the way to “absorption” of the democratic values by the mass consciousness and resulted in the establishment of so called “imitation democracy” as a political regime. However, this term is not always applicable to studies of politics in transition, where forms of government as well as legal arrangements are ill-defined and may change rapidly. Also this kind of perception of “political regime” and the reconsideration of notion “democracy” by itself, might be useful for analysis of the following issues: (1) whether or not the results of the transition processes in the post-Soviet Union really are a ‘point of arrival’, or just a halfway house in the long journey of democratization; and (2) what are the causes and consequences of various outcomes of transitions within the post-Soviet area.24 The most part of democratization theories assumes the rule of law “by default”, but not in the case of the former Soviet republics. The Soviet legacy has developed a sustainable dominance of informal

178 Research Outlines institutions both on the level of policy-making and in the everyday life of ordinary citizens.25 It should be mentioned that the permanent pressure, which is exercising on people from the side of these informal institutions (lobbies, oligarchs) can have an opposite effect. Instead of preserving the status quo, it can trigger a change in political culture, provoking the social unrests (“Maidan” in Ukraine, Rose Revolution in Georgia and Twitter Revolution in Moldova). But it may be a unique opportunity to create the new components of political culture. A general precondition for the development of democratic political culture is an institutional structure that permits a widening of democracy. The society is dominated by power and role relations, rules of making decisions, the way of governing must encourage engagement, tolerance and honest competition, and also allow for the voice of those in a minority or weaker position to be heard. 26 The more stable a given society is, the more one needs democratic political culture to make economic and political institutions function normally. However, the constitution making process in the Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia was crafted within the ‘flexible’ institutional framework, providing only weak incentives for the elites to follow rule-bounded behavior, and encourage informal patterns of decision- making under the existing regimes.27 This kind of superficial changes led to the originating of so-called “modernization syndrome”, when the adherence to the democratic values is declared, but the systematic transformations of the main spheres of public life are not implemented. The well-known british professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent Richard Sakwa wrote about the “mismodernization” as a distinct feature of Soviet development (“perestroika”), but it also can be used to process of state building in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine especially in the last decade of XX century.

Conclusion

Post-Soviet culture is produced and consumed in the wake of a fearsome political shift, restructuring people’s understandings of the world. For that moment Soviet ideology was exhausted and economy found itself in stagnation, what gave a rise to such issues as borders, ethnic divisions and the military conflicts, which broke out across the post-Soviet space (and post-Socialist one too, if to look into a matter on a larger scale). The peculiarities of national development of the three chosen countries lies in the fact that none of them have been a “great power”, they almost all the time were balancing between the several geopolitical poles, and their territories belonged to the different states. As a result in the political culture of these nations is deeply enrooted the psychological “marginality”, determined by their location at the crossroads of West and East. Trying to survive and ensure their security, the Ukrainians, Moldavians and Georgians had and still have to manoeuvre between the national interest of the regional actors. Therefore, there are so many subcultures within our societies, which look to the values of the neighboring

179 Research Outlines countries, sometimes causing damage and slowing down the development of their own political culture. In such a way can be explained the contra directional orientation of the foreign policy course, which was rather typical for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova after gaining the independence (multi-vector policy of L. Kuchma and V. Voronin). The essence of this phenomenon is in the struggle of two positions, whose representatives are prone to attach a greater importance to own resources (people) or to rely on the external forces during the crisis situations (“color revolutions”). Marginality is observing in the national ideas of our countries. For example, the Ukrainians in the course of centuries were striving to be independent. So, this is one of the basic mental stances, which stimulates them to fight against the existing order of things. But the culture in whole and political culture in particular, being a long period of time under the foreign oppression and destruction, acquired the inferiority complex, a very formal perception of social values and norms, conformism and a tendency to political mimicry. In the final count it can be concluded that the Ukrainian political culture is deformed and its above-mentioned characteristics sometimes push out the components of national mentality. Thus, today Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine face a need to reach the political and cultural coherence. It’s not just a problem to eliminate the elements of Russian subculture, embedded in the social structure of the three state, but to elaborate the new moral, historical, religious and nation unifying narratives, avoiding an appeal to the populist rhetoric of right- or left-wing spectrum. Because this will be a road to chaos and creation of new dividing lines in time when we need to consolidate our efforts.

180 Research Outlines References

1. Almond, G. and Verba, S. The Civic Culture. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1965. 2. Bernik, I. and Malnar, B. Political culture in post-communist Europe: radical cultural chance of adaptation on the basis of old cultural patterns, Aldershot, 2003. 3. Whitefield, S. Political Culture and Post-Communism, Political Science, 2005. 4. Wegener, B. Political Culture and Post-Communist Transition — A Social Justice Approach: Introduction, Social Justice Research, 2000. 5. Stefek, M. Post-Communist Central-East European Political Culture in the Era of Neoliberalism, Eastern journal of European studies, 2014. 6. Kopstein, J. Postcommunist Democracy: Legacies and Outcomes, Comparative Politics, 2003, 231 - 250. 7. Marszałek-Kawa, J., Wawrzyński, P. and Ratke-Majewska A. The Politics of Memory in Post- Authoritarian Transitions, Volume Two, Cambridge scholars publishing, 2017. 8. Janos, Andrew C. East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2000. 9. Rose, R. Understanding post-communist transformations: A bottom up approach, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2009. 10. Banaś, M. Culture, politics, political culture – interconnections and bridges. Regime to access: https://ruj.uj.edu.pl/xmlui/bitstream/handle/item/39420/banas_culture_politics_ political culture_interconnections_and_bridges_2016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowe=y. 11. Ion, V. F. Competing identities the construction of national identity in the Republic of Moldova, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2013. 12. Dawisha, K., Parrott, B. Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 13. King, Ch. The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the politics of culture, Stanford CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1999. 14. Giorgadze, Shalva. The influence of political culture in political elite: the case of post-soviet Georgia, Budapetst: Central European University, 2015. 15. Beachain, D. and Coene, F., Go West: Georgia’s European identity and its role in domestic politics and foreign policy objectives, Nationalities Papers, 2014, 923 - 941. 16. Dundua, S., Karaia, T. and Abashidze, Z. National narration and Politics of Memory in post- socialist Georgia Salome, Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, 2017, 222 - 240. 17. Shatirishvili, Z. National narratives and new politics of memory in Georgia, Crisis in the Caucasus: Russia, Georgia and the West, New York: Routledge, 2013, 391 - 399. 18. Derzhko, I. and Parubchak, I. Transformation of the political culture in the democratic state. Regime to access: http://kbuapa.kharkov.ua/e-book/putp/2013-3/doc/4/09.pdf. 19. Derkach, Zh. Political culture as an integral characteristic of the formation process and development of the state, Kharkiv, 1999. 20. Nagorna, L. The political culture of the Ukrainian people: historical retrospective and current realities, Kyiv: Stylos, 1998. 21. Golovaha, E. Main trends and stages: Transformation of the Ukrainian society: from perestroika to «orange revolution, Sociology: theory, methods, marketing, 2006, 33-51. 22. Onyshkiv, Y. The problem of political culture in Ukraine today. Regime to access: http:www.muv.cpe.org.ua/articles/item_6. 23. Nagornij, V. Essential problems of the political culture of Ukraine, Political management, 2006, 83 - 94. 24. Gel'man, V. Post-Soviet Transitions and Democratization: Towards Theory - Building. Democratization, Vol. 10, no 2, 2003, 87 – 104. 25. Ledeneva, A. Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchanges, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

181 Research Outlines 26. Vihalemm, P., Lauristin, M. and Tallo, I. Development of Political Culture in Estonia, in Lauristin, M.; Vihalemm, P. (ed.), Return to the Western World: Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transformation, Tartu: Tartu University Press, 1997, 197 - 210. 27. Fish, M. S. The Executive Deception: Superpresidentialism and the Degradation of Russian Politics’, in Valerie Sperling (ed.), Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance, Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000, 177 –192.

182 Research Outlines Arpine Sargsyan PhD Student Armenian State University of Economics Gyumri branch

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS: INTERRELATION WITH INTEGRATION, TRADE AND INNOVATION

Competitiveness is a dynamic concept. Since everybody competes, almost, with everybody else, it forces each economic actor in a country to rethink its role and responsibilities accordingly. Probably, the most difficult hurdle is to overcome a classical approach to economic affairs, which traditionally emphasizes exports, tangible goods, and basic infrastructure. J.M. Keynes underlined the importance of breaking away from the past when he stated "The real difficulty lies not in developing new ideas but in escaping from the old ones."

Competitiveness is one of the most broadly used terms when talking about strengths and weaknesses of a firm, a certain sector of economy, a party, region or state. In its broader sense, competitiveness is used to indicate the ability to achieve certain overall outcomes, such as a high standard of living and economic growth. National Competitiveness as one of the cornerstones in evaluating a country’s economy, its potential, is a concept used to define a country's ability to grow, to compete with other countries for human capital, investments, and other resources. The competitiveness of domestic products at the regional or global market is one of the cornerstones of a country’s international competitiveness. In this regard, the assessment and analysis of the competitiveness of a country’s international trade becomes an important issue. Thus, development and diversification of the export potential of the country is viewed as one of the most important directions of the international trade policy of the given country. Therefore, another important task is the specialization of the country in the most efficient and competitive segments of the economy. The above- mentioned circumstances embody the fact, that the role of quantitative assessment of potential competitive advantages is important, as it allows determining to what extent certain factors influence on the formation of export capacity in the country. The main objective of the study is to determine the role of export competitiveness in the process of competitive advantages formation of a country. This study mainly focuses on quantitative analysis based on the calculation of Balassa index, determining the extent to which a country has a comparative advantage in producing and exporting certain goods.

183 Research Outlines The practical significance of the study lies in the fact that its main findings and conclusions arising from it can be used in assessing the export competitiveness of not only individual countries or groups of countries. The outcomes and implication of the research can be used to improve the competitiveness of goods and services in the global market.

One of key issues of any government is ensuring high living standards for its citizens and maintaining it. The implementation of this issue depends on labor productivity, quality of goods and services produced within the given country, as well as the efficiency of production and regulation processes. The issue of maintaining sustainable economic growth and continuously improving country’s national competitiveness are strongly interrelated. Competitiveness is a multidimensional and dynamic category, which is the main driver force of market economy and economic development. Competitiveness is defined as the ability of a firm, an economic sector or the entire economy to have sustainable development, high levels of wages and income, economic welfare and at the same time, stay open for international markets. Recent developments of international economic relations and especially increasing interdependence of economies, formation and development of financial and commodity markets raise the imperative of improving an economy’s international competitiveness.

International competitiveness is a rather controversial and elusive concept. It has gained acceptance and attracts the attention of both academics and policymakers worldwide. Within the context of trade in goods and services in global markets, the concept of international competitiveness refers to a nation securing and maintaining a trade advantage vis-a-vis the rest of the world212. Due to the fact that international competitiveness is multidimensional, and the concept of competitiveness, unlike

212 Bobirca and Miclaus, 2011 184 Research Outlines comparative advantage, has not been defined rigorously in the early economic literature. Thus, a large number of concepts of the given phenomenon has been proposed in the economic literature. Undoubtedly, the concepts competitiveness and comparative advantage are inextricably linked in the real-world conduct of international trade. That is the reason that a large number of researchers use the term competitiveness synonymously or in a similar way as comparative advantage, others view it as an economywide characteristic. With this regard, the distinctions between competitiveness and comparative advantage may seem trivial on the surface but the two concepts are fundamentally different. In certain cases, an economy may experience a loss in competitiveness while maintaining its comparative advantage. Moreover, a country can be competitive without having a comparative advantage.

Many international organizations, research groups, as well as individual researchers analyze the issues of assessment and improvement of the level of international competitiveness. There are various approaches in assessment of the level of competitiveness (i.e. Global Competitiveness index, IMD World competitiveness yearbook, The Harvard Institute’s assessment of competitiveness for International Development (HIID), etc.). There is a strong interrelation between integration issues and the task of maintaining not only regional, but also international competitiveness. Thus, the idea of my research is to define these interrelations between the chain “economy-trade-competitiveness-integration-policy”, analyze the impact of the mentioned phenomena on each other and propose certain solutions and implications for the practical application of a united policy to improve current situations and resolve imperative issues.

Various international organizations, research groups and individual researchers focus their work towards the assessment of the interrelation between certain factors and competitiveness. With this regard, the most useful method to assess how these concepts are interrelated is the correlation-regression analysis. Thus, assessing the particular nation’s engagement and role in international trade they first try to determine the figures and indicators representing its export and import. Ultimately, the aim of trade is sustainable economic growth, continuous development of national economy, which leads to prosperity and poverty reduction. For the purpose of determining indicators that have significant influence in formation of a country’s competitive advantages, we have made regression analysis of the many indexes related to trade, integration, innovation and competitiveness. This goal is implemented through the thorough analysis of various indexes assessed by many international organizations. Thus, for measuring the interrelation between indexes, we have taken the sample results for 30 countries. The dependent variable is The Global Competitiveness index (results for 2017-2018). As

185 Research Outlines variables that influence on international competitiveness we have assessed the Global Innovation index and enabling trade index. It must be noted, that depending on the purpose and scope of the research we can include as many variables as needed. Thus, in order to determine the strength of relationship between the observed indexes, we have measured the coefficient of correlation between X factor (global innovation index) and Y factor (global competitiveness index). The data collected for 30 countries observed213 are presented in the table below. Table 2: The relationship between the global competitiveness and enabling trade indexes.214

Country X Y X*Y Azerbaijan 30,58 4,69 935,14 22,00 143,42

Argentina 61,40 5,85 3769,96 34,22 359,19

Armenia 51,83 5,19 2686,35 26,94 269,00

Australia 53,10 5,25 2819,61 27,56 278,78

Austria 32,00 3,95 1024,00 15,60 126,40

Canada 58,70 5,39 3445,69 29,05 316,39

China 50,93 4,85 2593,86 23,52 247,01

Croatia 38,90 4,42 1513,21 19,54 171,94

Czech 46,96 4,54 2205,24 20,61 213,20

Denmark 32,09 4,27 1029,77 18,23 137,02

Estonia 41,99 4,59 1763,16 21,07 192,73

Georgia 39,80 4,19 1584,04 17,56 166,76

Great Britain 53,65 5,35 2878,32 28,62 287,03

Greece 35,65 4,19 1270,92 17,56 149,37

Hungary 38,85 4,02 1509,32 16,16 156,18

Iran 41,74 4,33 1742,23 18,75 180,73

Italy 31,50 4,35 992,25 18,92 137,03

Kazakhstan 28,01 3,90 784,56 15,21 109,24

213 We have selected countries from different development levels- trying to include not only developed, but also developing and poor economies. 214 Data source` World economic forum https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2017- 2018 http://reports.weforum.org/global-enabling-trade-report-2016/ 186 Research Outlines Kyrgyzstan 60,89 5,51 3707,59 30,36 335,50

Moldova 36,84 3,99 1357,19 15,92 146,99

Poland 67,69 5,86 4581,94 34,34 396,66

Russia 37,62 4,11 1415,26 16,89 154,62

Singapore 50,98 4,77 2598,96 22,75 243,17

Slovenia: 52,54 5,00 2760,45 25,00 262,70

Switzerland 38,76 4,64 1502,34 21,53 179,85

Tajikistan 58,69 5,71 3444,52 32,60 335,12

Turkey 45,80 4,48 2097,64 20,07 205,18

Ukraine 38,34 4,36 1469,96 19,01 167,16

USA 34,39 4,28 1182,67 18,32 147,19

Vietnam 28,16 4,14 792,99 17,14 116,58

TOTAL: 1318,38 140,17 61459,13 665,06 6332,16

In the first stage of the research we have calculated the parameters of regression (means, dispersion, standard deviation etc.) with the use of the following formulas;

1. Means

∑ 푋  푋̅ = 푖 푛 ∑ 푌  푌̅ = 푖 푛 ∑ 푋 푌  푋푌̅̅̅̅ = 푖 푖 푛

2. Dispersion

∑ 푋2  푆2(푋) = 푖 − 푋̅̅̅2̅ 푛 ∑ 푌2  푆2(푌) = 푖 − 푌̅̅2̅ 푛

3. Standard deviation  푆 (푋) = √푆2(푋)

 푆 (푌) = √푆2(푌)

187 Research Outlines In the second stage we have calculated the R correlation coefficient using the following formula; 푋푌̅̅̅̅̅ − 푋̅ ∗ 푌̅ 푟 = 푥푦 푆(푋) ∗ 푆(푌)

Application of the above-mentioned formula to the data presented in the Table 2 showed the following results;  푋̅ = 4,68  푌̅ = 4,65  푋푌̅̅̅̅ = 22,01  푆2(푋) = 0,42  푆2(푌) = 0,30  푆 (푋) = 0,65  푆 (푌) = 0,55

 푟푥푦 = 0,81 The correlation coefficient (R) measures the strength and direction of a linear relationship between two variables. The value of R changes between +1 and –1. The value of R is interpreted as follows (According to Chaddock scale) 215;

Table 2: Chaddock scale

Thus, the results witness that there is a high positive correlation between competitiveness and global innovation indexes, hence the indicators used in the GII are applicable for measuring competitiveness in a given country. And the government policy aimed at improving innovation potential will influence on the country’s international competitiveness as well.

As already mentioned, the method presented above can be applied for other indexes and countries as well, depending on the purpose and scope of the research. Thus, in order to assess the interrelationship

215 N. Potekhina, Y. Shulinina , N. Kuzmina , L. Potalisina , I. Sannikova // Correlational-regression Analysis Application for the Forecast of the Specialists with Higher Education Requirement in Russian Economy // International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues ISSN: 2146-4138, 2016, 6(2), 617-620 available at http: www.econjournals.com 188 Research Outlines between integration/ trade and competitiveness we have made the same analysis using the Global enabling trade index. The process of assessment is the same as described above.

With this regard, stabilized and focused competitiveness improvement policy will lead to a more stable economic growth and development, which, in turn, will help improving wellbeing and prosperity of the nation.

Innovation case

The above-described methodology has been applied to assess the interrelation between the Global competitiveness and innovation indexes. The results of the assessment are presented below;

 푋̅ = 43,95  푌̅ = 4,67  푋푌̅̅̅̅ = 211,07  푆2(푋) = 117,39  푆2(푌) = 0,34  푆 (푋) = 10,83  푆 (푌) = 0,58

 푟푥푦 = 0,912 Here we see a stronger correlation, which means, that innovative potential and its factors have greater influence on competitive advantages and particular factors of competitiveness. For the model formed to measure the correlation of the Global competitiveness and innovation indexes, we have made a significance test (Fisher's significance) with the help of the formula below.

푅2 푛−푚−1 퐹 = * 1−푅2 푚

푘1 = (푚) ; 푘2 = (푛 − 푚 − 1) The result of the test is F=141,02, which shows that the model is statistically significant.

Conclusion To sum up, competitiveness embodies the ability of a state to reach a qualitative growth and development. As one of the most important fundamentals of economic development, economic competitiveness refers to the ability to create and maintain comparative advantages in various segments

189 Research Outlines of economic activity, to improve basic infrastructures and institutions that boost economic growth and development. Thus, the concept of economic competitiveness, its assessment and analysis is becoming more important during recent years. In this article we have tried to make an «at a glance» analysis of different approaches and methodologies used by various international, national organizations, research groups and individual researchers. The relevance of Economic competitiveness is demonstrated by application of the following principles in practice. 1. Clarify the interrelation and coordination of the state's policies in various areas, i.e. economic, social, international cooperation, environmental, etc.; 2. Create and develop an attractive and mutually beneficial investment environment to bring an increasing amount of not only FDI, but also portfolio investments in strategic sectors of its economy; 3. Promote innovative potential and the practical application of the latter in economic development; 4. Invest in research and development (R&D) to preserve scientific and technological progress; 5. Improve qualitative features of products/services presented in international markets; 6. Improve infrastructures, etc.

 The methods discussed in the article can be applied for any country, for a certain period of time. Their practical application will give reliably true data on the country’s performance in the global marketplace.  The findings, methodological approaches introduced in the article provide a useful basis for making appropriate policy recommendations for fostering competitiveness. For creating and maintaining basis for sustainable and high levels of competitiveness achieving the required legislative and institutional framework, market liberalization and a stable macroeconomic environment are necessary. They are conditions for ensuring continued economic growth, the achievement of sustainable development.  The most outstanding advantage of the research is that it is useful for evaluating social, political or economic policies in a given country, thus its results can be applied in the process of policymaking.  Another distinguishing feature is that it allows us to add more indicators to existing ones and make the research broader - depending on the purposes and given circumstances.

190 Research Outlines References 1. Balassa, B. (1965), ‘Trade liberalization and “revealed” comparative advantage’, The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies 33: 92–123. 2. Bobirca, Ana and Miclaus, Paul-Gabriel (2011). A Multilevel Comparative Assessment Approach to International Services Trade Competitiveness: The Case of Romania and Bulgaria. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol:1. No:1. 3, 1-6 3. Li-ping, Wang (2009). Comparative Advantage Theory and Its Revelation to China’s Foreign Trade. International Conference on Management and Science (MASS). September 20-22, 2009. Beijing. China. 1-4 4. Hinloopen, J., and C. van Marrewijk (2006), "Empirical relevance of the Hillman condition for revealed comparative advantage: 10 stylized facts," Applied Economics 40: 2313-2328 5. Sargsyan Arpine (2017) Variety of Approaches in Assessment of Global Competitiveness. Int J Econ Manag Sci 6: 479. doi: 10.4172/2162- 6359.1000479, available at; https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/variety-of-approaches-in-assessment-of- globalcompetitiveness-2162-6359-1000479.pdf 6. Sargsyan Arpine (2018) Assessment of Global Competitiveness: Methodology And Its Implication For EU and EEU, proceedings of the 27th International Scientific Conference on Economic and Social Development, ISSN 1849-3327 / print ISSN 1849-6628, ISSN 1849-7535 7. Sargsyan, Arpine. (2018). Trade competitiveness: approaches of assessment (The case of Armenia). Research in International Business and Finance. 10.14303/jribm.2018.021., (ISSN: 2251-0028) Vol. 5(1) pp. 98-107, Available online http://www.interesjournals.org/JRIBM DOI: http:/dx.doi.org/10.14303/jribm.2018.021 8. Sargsyan, Arpine. (2018). Export competitiveness: Assessment through the Balassa index (the case of Armenia). 10.20944/preprints201806.0253.v1. 9. Velloso, J.P.R. (1991) International competitiveness and creation of an enabling environment. In Haque, I. (ed) International competitiveness: Interaction of public and private sectors, Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 10. Uchida, Yuichiro and Cook, Paul (2004). The Transformation of Competitive Advantage in East Asia: An Analysis of Technological and Trade Specialisation. Centre on Regulation and Competition Working Paper Series. No:63. June 2004. 7. 1-32

191 Research Outlines Ozhet Shegirbayev MPA, MIR Deputy Director Foreign economic cooperation department, Ministry for Investments and Development of Kazakhstan

THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATION OF MONETARY UNION WITHIN EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION IN COMPARISON WITH EUROPEAN UNION

On March 29, 1994 the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev during a visit to the Moscow State University announced the concept of the Eurasian integration in the form of a Eurasian Union (EEU). This concept implied the formation of voluntary, equitable organization, sharing the political and economic development of the post-Soviet states that would bring the CIS-countries to the strong positions in the world (Sidorovich, A., 2009). Around 20 years after the collapse of the USSR the first real steps to reintegrate post-soviet area have begun. The huge development started with the creation of Customs Union in 2010 which included Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia – Common Economic Space (CES) in 2012 and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015. Later on Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the EEU. For a moment there are plans for creation common industrial, oil-gas, agricultural and transport policies within the EEU – that means that regulation will be delegated to the supranational institution – Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) (Eurasian Economic Integration, 2017). CU and CES mean the free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital for members of these associations, the EEU, in its turn can be considered as a valid economic union, in a manner of European Union on its first stages of development. According to Vladimir Putin, EEU is a tighter Integration form based on the new values, political and economic basis – transition in the borders of the CU and CES for a closer coordination of economic and monetary policy (Putin, V., 2011). Nevertheless that this union in the procedure of its formation, there are a lot of plans for its future but in this work we will consider the issue of possibility of creation of common currency within EEU. At the first stages the issue of common currency introduction was announced just as a theoretical possibility in a long-run. President N.Nazarbayev in his article, published in "Izvestia", noted an importance for the development of integration in all major areas of the economics and discussed a possibility of creating a single currency of the Eurasian Union in future, as it was in European Union (Nazarbayev, N., 2011).

192 Research Outlines In 2014 the President of Kazakhstan N.Nazarbayev proposed to consider the issue of creating a single currency "Altyn". Vladimir Putin in 2016 noted that this issue should be considered in the future. Furthermore in 2016 Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation Maxim Oreshkin announced plans to introduce a common currency within EEU after 2025 (www.mk.ru, 2017). Simultaneously in 2016 the Vice Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan Aaly Karashev insisted that in the near future EEU-countries should consider the introduction of a common currency. Deputy of the National Assembly of Armenia Hrant Bagratyan also stated the need to introduce a single currency by saying: "The issue of currencies is very acute, and I do not think that he can tolerate until 2025” (www.rg.ru, 2016). In the end of 2018, the idea of common currency creation within the EEU was voiced again, but this time the initiative came from the National Payment Council of Russia. This organization proposes that this currency will be exclusively electronic, and will be limited to clearing operations (offsets) in the framework of cross-country trade. The reciprocal obligations of the countries participating in the EEU to pay for the goods supplied to each other will be transformed into a new payment instrument. In this case, account balances resulting from clearing can be converted into real money. The exchange rate of the common currency will depend on the exchange rate of the national monetary units of the EEU- members in relation to each other, as well as on the contribution of each country to the total trade turnover of the Union. According to the Deputy Minister of Finance of Russia, A.Moiseev, the introduction of such a currency will facilitate calculations in the face of the risk of external sanctions (www.iz.ru, 2018). Mr.Moiseev also noted that, conceptually, this currency will resemble the European ECU (1979- 1998), which preceded the emergence of the euro. According to experts, the introduction of electronic currency will help the EEU participants to move towards a gradual abandonment of the dollar (www.zakon.kz, 2018). At the same time this idea also has opponents in the person of Belarus, for example, President of Belarus Mr.Lukashenko in an interview with Bloomberg noted that currently there are more serious questions for Eurasian integration (www.vlast.kz, 2017). Except it Chairman of the Board of the National Assembly of Belarus, Mikhail Myasnikovich, in his turn, explained that the issue of the common currency is, above all, a measure of value: “In order for it to be unified, economic conditions must be unified. It doesn't matter what will be depicted on this currency”(www.regnum.ru, 2018). There are also some alertness amongst kazakh experts, for instance Dosym Satpayev recommended to avoid extensive growth of the CU in breadth as it showed the EU, and to do intensive balancing economic level of all participants. At his opinion, it will help to avoid problems arising from the European Union (Satpayev D., 2011).

193 Research Outlines Nevertheless there is no work in the public access which would look through the possibility of Monetary Union creation within EEU. In this regard this work is devoted to look through different positions and perspectives on the issue of creating a common currency of EEU, and mainly from the perspective of creation of Optimum Currency Area. The theoretical part of this paper will focus the benefits and threats of monetary union creation. The Methodology will look closer to the notion of Optimal Currency Area and other views on the necessary prerequisites for the successful integration. The Application part of this work will look through experience of European Union in this area and possibility of common currency creation within EEU.

Theoretical Framework

Bella Balassa (1961) in his classical work distinguishes five main forms or stages of the development of integration processes according to which the European Union was forming:  Free trade zone;  Customs union;  Common market;  Economic and monetary union;  Political union. The European Union was developed on this basis, starting from Coal and Steel community which was one of the platforms for future EU; it then developed to the one of the most successful integration communities in the world, the highest point of which was in 1999 when the euro was introduced. Vladimir Putin(2011) and Nursultan Nazarbayev (2011) in their articles in "Izvestia" also refer to the experience and the example of the EU, stressing that the Customs Union will be built by the same scheme by taking into consideration all the gaps and problems of EU. Moreover, Vladimir Zemlyakov notes the importance of the experience of the European Union in the formation of the new association, as yet; no union took a step as far as the EU, in the sphere of introduction of common currency in particular. He notes that, the creation of single currency within CU is possible, and successful experience of EU would be valuable, because at the moment it is the only example of such a successful integration (Zemlyakov, V., 2013). But first of all, there should be clarity in the issue of benefits and possible losses of common currency introduction. Paul De Grauwe (2016) from Oxford pointed out in his “Economics of Monetary Union”, monetary union brings certain benefits which called - monetary efficiency gains (MEG), which include:  More transparent pricing system that makes price comparison of international goods and services easier – that leads to the facilitation of price convergence to a certain extent;

194 Research Outlines  Elimination of transaction costs in terms of commissions and other payments to financial intermediaries for converting currencies – that leads to enjoying of firms by higher output and increasing consumption by consumers;  Elimination of the risks from uncertainty in the movement and volatile swings of the exchange rates – that makes cost of production more predictable in terms of imported raw materials and minimize the transaction costs, reduction of the risk premium for trade and investment, increasing firms confidence and certainty in setting the final price of their exported goods and services and planning their long-term production, thereby increasing investment;  Increasing trade flows and intensify intra-regional trade and investment flows.  Generating new jobs in growing economy sectors, etc. The costs of of Monetary union is called economic stability losses. One of the main of these possible loses is the lose of monetary independence, economic misbalances, etc. Agenor (2001) Pointed out that one of the risks is the threat of volatility, abrupt reversals in capital flows, lack of access to financing for small countries, loss of macroeconomic stability, pro-cyclical movements in short-term capital flows. Also Agenor stated that huge problems can appear in the countries with the weak banking system, because it can lead to a moral problems with deposit insurances (Agenor, 2001). Except it, the geopolitics theorists, R.Blackwill & J.Harris (2016) using the example of rising role of Chinese renminbi propose that the strengthening of currency of one huge hegemon in the region can affect the political preferences of smaller players. Their main point is that the increased role of the renminbi in exchange transactions within South-East Asian region increased the Chinese dominance within the region by giving Chinese government tool to impact those countries by using renminbi exchange rate. As it can be seen, there are rational pros and cons of common currency creation in theory, however there also should be some prerequisites which will allow the MU creation. In this regard in the next part we will look through the Optimum Currency Area, as one of the most of the most important criteria’s at which countries can create MU.

Methodology

As it was pointed out previously one of the most important criteria’s at which countries can create Monetary Union is that they have to form Optimum Currency Area, which according to Frankel (2003): a region that is neither so small and open that it would be better-off pegging its currency to a neighbor, nor so large that it would be better-off splitting into subregions with different currencies. Even to the extent that corner solutions are appropriate for given countries, the optimal geographic coverage for a common currency is likely to be intermediate in size: larger than a city and smaller than the entire planet.

195 Research Outlines At the same time Frankel states that these countries have to be highly integrated with each other with respect to trade and other economic relationships. In general he defines the following OCA criteria: Openness, Labor mobility, Fiscal cushions, Symmetry, Political willingness to accept neighbors’ policies. Some other authors puts other conditions for OCA:  Symmetry of shocks across countries – by Mundell (1961)  Openess of the economies – by McKinnon (1963)  Well-diversified economies – by Kenen (1969) So, as it can be seen from those lists of preconditions and criteria of successful formation of OCA and later on Monetary Union the political factor is not the most important, rather it one among the equals. However it’s not quite right to propose that if all other conditions meet each other, countries will create Monetary Union, it depends on countries willingness and their incentives. One of the best examples is example of East Asian countries which well integrated economically and financially, but separately those countries are significantly unique and have different preferences (Chow & Kim, 2003). Another example is CFA Frank Zone - these countries are well correlated between each other on the issue of inflation-shocks, their ability to conduct stabilization policies, but nevertheless, due their structural differences, creation of Monetary Union would be too costly to them (Xiaodan Zhao, 2008). So, as it can be concluded in this part, countries which are directed to create a Monetary Union have to be ready to form OCA, and be well-prepared for the introduction of common currency, the financial systems must be stable, there should be strong trade-economic ties between countries and strong incentive to create Monetary Union. In the next part all listed criteria will be applied to the current situation in EEU.

Results And Discussion

In this part we will look through current Status Quo in the EEU-region, is there are prerequisites to form OCA. While EU had more than 50 years of formation, EEU in its turn try to form all the necessary integration structures within 15 years. European countries had a huge rational willingness for integration. As Kauppi states one of the reasons for EU integration was incentive of France and Germany to prevent the possible third world war (Kauppi, N., 2003). Because of it the European Coal and Steel Community, and after that European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were created. On this basis the Economic union were established and on the basis of these structures later on the Common currency zone was formed (Euro Zone). In 1985 the Single European Act of 1987 which identifies around 300 measures that completed the creation of Single Market was adopted (“European single market”, http://www.politics.co.uk). At the same time Common European Parliament and other political 196 Research Outlines structures were created. And as a result European Union today is one of the major players on the world arena. Spillover effect can be seen during the formation of EU. As it was already shown, the different organizations were created one by one and as a result, these organizations created a foundation for a deeper integration both on economic and political levels. Starting from the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 it led to the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation which was the base for further establishment and development of the “European Nations” (Snyder I., 2013). Since 1979 the European Monetary System creation started, which aimed to limit the changes in exchange rates between the countries, so a country couldn’t let its own currency to be appreciated or devaluated too greatly in comparison with its neighbors (www.thenewfederalist.eu, 2018). At contrary, EEU-region doesn’t have such history of supranational institution formation. Starting from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia did not intend to reintegrate with former post-soviet republics (Babak, V., 2010). According to Graham Smith during 1991-1993 Russia had a Western orientation in its foreign policy and made intensive steps to liberalize the economy in the Western manner. It in particular had the several reasons: such as obtaining donor countries from the west, and receiving and takeover of experience in the development and implementation of the principles of conducting a market economics in Russia. Local conditions and unpreparedness of personnel were not taken into consideration, and as a result, this policy led to economic problems and finally was frustrated. When it turned out that Russia could not adapt such a rapid introduction of radical market reforms, and moreover the amount of aid did not meet the needs of Russia, Russian politicians realized that the help of West is not enough to stabilize the situation inside the country (Malcolm, N.&Pravda, A.,1996). So, since 1993 Russian Government became more interested in rebuilding relations with its nearest neighbors, who could create some threat for the southern regions of Russia due to their internal socio- economic problems (Smith, G., 1999). However the 90-s were the period of instability. And as it was already described the real integration institutional building started since 2007. The first decade of the independence was quite difficult for all the EEU-countries, Kazakhstan and Russia were struggling with economic and political instability; Kyrgyzstan was building the democratic island in the Central Asian region; Armenia had its own political problems. Situation slightly changed in the new century: high oil and gas prices made a huge stimulus to Kazakhstani and Russia economies; Kyrgyzstan was making its own policies, depending on Russia, China and US due to the start of Afghanistan War. Simultaneously Russia and Belarus were forming the Union State. So, during the formation of first stage of integration – Customs Union – politically only Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia were ready for integration.

197 Research Outlines Then creation of CES and EEU created incentives to smaller countries to join this union (mainly because the decisions within Eurasian Economic Comission can be made only on the basis of consensus) - as current Chairman of Eurasian Economic Comission Mr.Sarkissyan stated during International School of Eurasian Integration at October 2018 “Who could propose 10 years ago that small Armenia would be able to regulate the actions of such huge country as Russia”. So, as it can be seen that different countries within EEU have different incentives for integration: Kazakhstan and Belarus has no choice but to look for ways to cooperate with Russia due to its large border; Kyrgyzstan and Armenia are looking for benefits they can get from the bigger partners. Moreover, each country saw the EEU as a possibility for development of its own industrial sectors and a huge export-possibility for its own producers. Looking through the economic side disproportion is obvious: Russian part of GDP of EEU is around 86%, 10% belongs to Kazakhstan, and 4% left belongs to Armenia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. Except it the difference between the “richest” (Russia) and “poor” (Kyrgyzstan) countries is about seven times (EBD, 2017). Moreover each country within EEU have different GDP level. While the general GDP of EEU for 2017 was around 1.8trln.USD, the difference between its members is huge (www.eurasiancommission.org): 1. Armenia – 11.5 bln.USD; 2. Belarus – 54.4 bln.USD; 3. Kazakhstan – 162.9 bln.USD; 4. Kyrgyzstan – 7.6 bln.USD; 5. Russia – 1.5 trln.USD.

This difference can be seen also in trade numbers between the EEU-embers. The general turnover of EEU in 2017 was 54.7bln.USD., in particular (www.eurasiancommission.org): Armenia – Belarus - 41,6 mln.USD; Armenia – Kazakhstan - 10,5 mln.USD; Armenia – Russia – 1.8 bln.USD ; Kyrgyzstan – Armenia 1,9 mln.USD;

Belarus – Kazakhstan 693,5 mln.USD; Belarus – Kyrgyzstan 130,5 mln.USD; Russia – Belarus 32 474,6 Bln.USD;

Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan 785,3 mln.USD; Kazakhstan – Russia 17.1 bln.USD; Kyrgyzstan – Russia 1.6 bln.USD;

The trade with third countries is bigger than the trade within the EEU itself, that leads to the idea, that inner economic ties within the EEU are quite strong enough for the moment, except for the trade with the Russian Federation.

198 Research Outlines In the financial sphere IMF report of 2016 states that Central banks of CA and Caucasus main monetary policy was to achieve price stability, that is actually difficult task after the devaluation but nevertheless feasible. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia took different Exchange rate policies, however de-facto they differ from what they state officially. Another important finding of IMF is the huge differences in the Current balance of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. The same differences can be seen in financial sector: in 2013 Kazakhstan was ranked 69th in terms of the financial development, whereas Kyrgyzstan ranked 139th place (Sviridzenka, 2016). As it was stated before, the main OCA criteria’s are: Openness, Labor mobility, Fiscal cushions, Symmetry, Political willingness to accept neighbors’ policies, symmetry of shocks across countries, well-diversified economies. And it can be seen, that EEU-countries are not applicable to create OCA, as far as their economies are not well-diversified; there is no united political willingness to introduce common currency; economies of each EEU-members are quite different in their GDP; the trade relations between EEU- members are not strong enough. Except it, there is still around 66 barriers which limits the trade relations development within EEU (www.24.kg). That’s imbalance also lead us to the threats of Monetary Union, at which the strongest economy will be dependent on the weakest. According to the financial integration approach, EEU-countries are going to face the Impossible Trinity: free capital movement or independent monetary policy or fixed exchange rate regime. So, absence of united political willingness of EEU-members and differences in economies in EEU- countries proves that EEU-members doesn’t form OCA, that’s lead us to the point that normally- functioning Monetary Union cannot be created in EEU in the short-run.

Conclusion

As it was stated before to create the Monetary Union states have to fulfill some of the criteria, such as to be highly integrated with each other with respect to trade and other economic relationships. In this work it was shown that each of EEU-members has its own political-preferences within the EEU, the trade between the countries except for Russia is very different, so there is no strong economic ties between EEU-members. The biggest economies of EEU are Russia and Kazakhstan which are mainly based on the export of raw-materials that is also is not the best option for the Union in perspective. So, to create the Montary Union of EEU several steps should be undertaken: First of all, to create the common currency it’s important to dismiss the misbalance in trade between the EEU-members.

199 Research Outlines Secondly, it should be clear that introduction of common currency (even electronic) will create one new tie to the biggest player within EEU, that can somehow affect the bilateral relations with third countries. Thirdly, there should be independent expertize which will look through it issue and give the rational answer: is there is such need in common currency for EEU at all?

200 Research Outlines References

1. Sidorovich, A. (2009). For the 15th anniversary of the Eurasian idea of Nursultan Nazarbayev. Life-affirming power of Eurasianism, Retrieved from http://www.zakon.kz/137513-k-15-letiju- evrazijjskojj-idei.html 2. Customs Union of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus (2011). Retrieved from http://www.zp.kz/25/26.html 3. Eurasian Economic Integration: numbers and facts, quarterly journal, 1st half 2017 4. Putin, V. (2011). New integration project for Eurasia – future which is being born today, Retrieved from: http://izvestia.ru/news/502761 5. Nazarbayev, N. (2011). Eurasian Union: from Idea to the history of future, Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/504908 6. https://iz.ru/822709/dmitrii-grinkevich/slilis-v-edinoi-valiute-eaes-sozdast-obshchie-dengi-dlia- raschetov 7. https://www.zakon.kz/4949946-strany-eaes-sozdadut-edinuyu.html 8. https://www.mk.ru/economics/2017/08/02/oreshkin-rasskazal-o-planakh-vnedreniya-edinoy- valyuty-eaes.html 9. https://rg.ru/2016/04/08/sergej-naryshkin-nazval-logichnym-obedinenie-eaes-i-evrosoiuza.html 10. https://vlast.kz/novosti/lukashenko_edinaja_valjuta_v_eajes_vopros_ne_segodnjashnego_dnja- 10398.html 11. https://regnum.ru/news/1916021.html 12. Satpayev D. (2011). Customs Union without skeletons in the closet. Retrieved from http://newskaz.ru/comment/20110629/1641223.html 13. Bella Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, 1961 14. Zemlyakov, V. (2013). Eurasian Economic Union: another page is turned…, Retrieved from http://www.eurasec.com/evrazijjskie-novosti/1617/ 15. Paul de Grauwe, P. (2016). Economics of Monetary Union, 11th ed., Oxford University Press. 16. Pierre-Richard Agenor, Benefits and Costs of International Financial integration: Theory and Facts, World Bank, Blackwell publishing, 2003 17. Robert Blackwill & Jeniffer M.Harris, War by other means: geoeconomics and statecraft, the Wylie Agency (UK), Ltd, 2016 18. Jeffrey A. Frankel, Experience of and Lessons from Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging Economies, NBER Working Paper No. 10032 October 2003 19. Mundell, R.A. (1963). Capital mobility and stabilization policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates, Canadian journal of economic and political science, 29(4), 475-85. 20. McKinnon, R.I. (1963). Optimum Currency Areas, The American Economic Review, 53(4): 717- 725. 21. Kenen, P.B. (1969). “The theory of optimum currency areas: an eclectic view”, in: Mundell & Swoboda (eds.), Monetary problems of the international economy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 41-60. 22. Hwee Kwan Chow & Yoonbai Kim, A common currency peg in East Asia? Perspectives from Western Europe, Journal of Macroeconomics, 25(2003) 331-350, 2003. 23. Xiaodan Zhao, Three Essays on regional economic integration and exchange rate regimes, University of Kentucky, 2008. 24. Kauppi, N. (2003). Bourdieu’s political sociology and the politics of European integration, Universitet of Helsinki. 25. Barnier M. (2012). European single market, Retrieved from http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/european-single-market 26. Snyder I. (2013). Neofunctionalism and the European Union, Retrieved from http://www.personal.psu.edu/iks5014/blogs/la101/neofunctionalism-and-the-european- union.html

201 Research Outlines 27. Babak, V. (2010). Central Asia: Problems of post-soviet integration, CA & CC Press, Retrieved from http://www.ca-c.org/journal/09-1997/st_03_babak.shtml 28. Smith, G. (1999). The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. New Series, Vol. 24, No. 4. 29. Malcolm, N. & Pravda, A. (1996). Democratization and Russian foreign policy, International affairs, vol.72, #3, Ethnicity and international relations. 30. Eurasian Economic Union, report prepared by Eurasian Bank for Development, 2017 31. http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_stat/econstat/Documents/Stat _Yearbook_2018.pdf 32. http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_stat/econstat/Documents/Stat _Yearbook_2018.pdf 33. http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_stat/tradestat/tables/extra/Pa ges/2018/11.aspx 34. https://24.kg/ekonomika/102056_veaes_naschitali_66barerov_vtorgovle/ 35. Mark Horton,, Hossein Saminei, Natan Epstein, Kevin Ross, Exchange Rate: Developments and Policies in the Caucasus Central Asia, International Monetary Fund, report of 2016 36. Svirydzenka, K. (2016). Introducing a new broad-based index of financial development, IMF Working Papers 16/5, International Monetary Fund.

202 Research Outlines Tetiana Shevchenko Deputy Directo Chief of the Legal Administration of the Department for Communal Property of the Odessa City Council Candidate of Science of Law on specialty International Law

ACTIVITIES OF SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITIES AND AUTHORITIES ENSURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EU PRODUCT SAFETY LEGISLATION ON THE NON-FOOD MARKET

It is commonly known that the EU was established by concluding agreements between sovereign states, and today, the consent of all Member States remains a single rule of recognition in important cases. The EU having established its own internal market is indebted to international law, in particular to law of international treaties in many of the circumstances. The EU internal market develops through the conflict between the national and global dimension of legal integration. The synthesis of a great number of types of markets that interact with each other proceeds on the EU modern internal market, but in our opinion, the consumer market – the market of consumer goods and services is the main of them. Despite numerous publications in the field of legal regulation of market relations in the EU, many issues related to the development of legal regulation of market surveillance on the consumer market of non-food goods due to the high dynamics of relations and rapid technological progress remain unresolved for today. The study of these issues in the legal plane is very important and requires a reasoned scientific research. An understanding of the EU authorities’ competences in these field is important for further study of market surveillance and conformity assessment in the EU. In accordance with the EU requirements, market surveillance should be institutionally separated from the conformity assessment function. A successful security policy on the EU consumer market is based on effective and efficient market surveillance. The Member States’ efforts aimed at identifying and eliminating dangerous products from markets provide an opportunity for proper implementation and viability to the political structure. This position is useful not only for European consumers, since companies-manufacturers also require equal conditions for innovations and welfarism [1]. Market surveillance was defined as an important tool for ensuring the implementation of the New Approach Directives, in particular through verification measures of the conformity of products with current directives, the application of measures to bring

203 Research Outlines nonconforming products into conformity with the requirements, and also through the application of sanctions where appropriate [2]. The purpose of the paper is differentiation of the EU competences by market surveillance authorities and authorities ensuring the implementation of product safety legislation. The methodological tool of the study was selected taking the purpose and tasks, as well as the subject and object of scientific research into account. Formal-logical and formal-legal methods made it possible to carry out an analysis of legal norms on market surveillance on the consumer market of the EU and Ukraine, allowed to identify disadvantages of current legislation in the analyzed field and to explain the conclusions and proposals for its improvement. At the appropriate time, strengthening and protecting the welfare of European consumers was identified as a promising step of the EU consumer policy for 2007-2013 “Empowering consumers, enhancing their welfare, effectively protecting them” [3]. Market surveillance has become an important tool for achieving the goals of this strategy. The most important change brought about by the New Legislative Framework to the legislative environment of the EU was the introduction of a comprehensive policy on market surveillance. This has considerably changed the balance of EU legislative provisions from being fundamentally oriented at setting product related requirements to be met when products are placed on the market to an equal emphasis on enforcement aspects during the whole life-cycle of products [4]. It should be noted that market surveillance in the EU is an important component of international market surveillance. One of the five regional commissions – the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), which includes the Working Party (WP.6) on regulatory cooperation and standardization policies, has been active in the United Nations structure since 1947. The Advisory Group on Market Surveillance (MARS Group), which became a forum for discussions of representatives of government agencies, international organizations, national consumer protection authorities, and market surveillance experts, has been established in 2002 within the framework of the work of the mentioned group, under the aegis of a permanent intergovernmental group of experts, advising national governments on standards policy, technical regulation, conformity assessment procedures, market surveillance, and other related issues. The international market surveillance group – Ex-MARS is actively established today [5]. At a meeting of the MARS Group, held in Geneva (Switzerland) since 26 till 27 September 2016, a representative of the European Commission briefed the members of the meeting on a program document on cross-border cooperation adopted in February 2016, which presented a typical form of cross-border cooperation between market surveillance authorities of the European Union for the purpose of the implementation of effective surveillance within the single market, despite the fact that the law enforcement powers of individual market surveillance authorities are limited by the national borders of the country.

204 Research Outlines The General Market Surveillance Model (GMSM) has been developed since 2007 and has been used by experts/authorities to design their market surveillance programs and plan market surveillance actions. It should be noted that the results of the project implemented by PROSAFE in the period since 2006 till 2009 have a great significance in the process of improving the mechanism of market surveillance in the EU. PROSAFE (Product Safety Forum of Europe) is a non-profit professional organisation for market surveillance authorities and officers from throughout the EEA (European Economic Area). Its primary objective is to improve the safety of users of products and services in Europe. PROSAFE has been established by market surveillance officers from various countries throughout Europe. The first meeting of the group was held in 1990, since then, most EU and EFTA countries have been represented at meetings in order to ensure a high level of transparency. The PROSAFE Charter contains the guiding principles for this organisation and its members. At the PROSAFE General Assembly Meeting in May 2016, held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, the draft Charter has been agreed upon by all members. As from 2006, PROSAFE has taken the initiative to coordinate a number of Joint Actions between various market surveillance organisations. The project “Enhancing Market Surveillance through Best Practice” (EMARS) (2006-2009) was implemented with the financial support of the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection, as well as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and a number of European countries [6] and EMARS II (2009-2011) was of great importance in improving the methods of the market surveillance mechanism. The project was aimed to increase the safety of products for consumers and the effectiveness of market surveillance with minimal load for industry. European market surveillance cooperation is carried out through informal groups of market surveillance authorities, named as Administrative Cooperation (AdCos) groups now. The members of these groups are appointed by the Member States and represent national competent market surveillance authorities by sectors. They meet several times a year to discuss market surveillance issues in the field of their competence and to ensure efficient, comprehensive and consistent market surveillance. Their main objectives are: to achieve the correct and uniform application of the legislation provisions within the single market; to increase the efficiency of market surveillance for the single market; to establish appropriate communication links between national governments and the Commission; to set up and coordinate joint market surveillance activities at cross-border; experience exchange, strengthening cooperation in the filed of conformity assessment practice and individual cases. European legislation defines market surveillance as the activities carried out and measures taken by public authorities to ensure that products comply with the requirements set out in the relevant Community harmonisation legislation and do not endanger health, safety or any other aspect of public interest protection (chapter 1, article 2 of the Regulation No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council) [7].

205 Research Outlines Market surveillance aims to ensure the same level of citizen protection within the internal market, as well as a uniform regulatory framework for economic entities [7]. Ways of supplying products to the EU internal market require the coordination of market surveillance outside the national borders of the Member States. Such cooperation prevents the appearance of dangerous products that have been abandoned on the market of one EU Member State, on the internal market of the EU through other means of access to this market. Thus, market surveillance guarantees citizens an equivalent level of health protection and safety within the territory of the single market of the EU, despite the origin of products, and leads to increasing the effectiveness of EU legislation that requires the protection and other public interests and achievement of objectives of the EU [8]. EU competence in the field of market surveillance on the consumer market consists essentially in legislative activities, in the establishment of uniform rules and regulations at the European level that act directly (the regulation as an act of unification), or according to which the Member States of the EU are obliged to bring their national legislation to conformity with harmonized EU legislation (directives as acts of harmonization). EU legislative activities in the field of market surveillance on the consumer market, as well as in other fields are primarily implemented by its legislative institutions – the European Parliament and the Council, which, in turn, may entrust the European Commission as the executive body of the EU with taking additional measures in the form of executive or delegated acts [9]. EU legislative activities are being implemented by its institutions by adopting legislative acts that regulate public relations in the field of market surveillance on the internal market. In this regard, it should be noted that the term “legislation” is applied in the EU in a broad and narrow sense [9]. In a broad sense, the term “legislation” is applied to all secondary EU law. The term “legislation” has been applied in EU documents only in a broad sense before entry into force of the amendments to the founding treaties under the Treaty of Lisbon. As a result of the amendments, the interpretation of the term “EU legislation”, which meant not all secondary law, but only legislative acts, was changed. The term “legislative acts” was primarily included in the founding treaties by the Treaty of Lisbon, and in accordance with Article 289 of the TFEU it means a legal act of mandatory legal force adopted by the European Parliament and the Council under the ordinary or special legislative procedure [10]. The horizontal component of market surveillance in the EU establishes the general principles of market surveillance, while the vertical (or sectoral) component establishes the rules of market surveillance for certain product types [11]. General product safety is established by Directive 2001/95/EC [12]. It also defines the responsibilities of the Member States on market surveillance for the provision of consumer product safety. General product safety is also established by the EU resolutions on the implementation of the “New Approach” directives. The general terms and conditions for placing products on the EU internal market, the performance of conformity assessment and accreditation works and the market surveillance

206 Research Outlines mechanism are outlined in Regulation (EC) No 764/2008 [13], Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 [15], Decision No 768/2008/EC [14] of 9 July 2008. The European Commission develops and supports a general system for archiving and information exchange on internal market surveillance and on any non-conformity of goods with harmonized legislation of the EU and the Member States by the use of the electronic system. The system reflects notification and information provided for by Art. 22 of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 [15]. In accordance with this article, if a product presenting a serious risk has been made available on the market, Member States shall notify the Commission of the identification of the product, the origin and the supply chain of the product, the related risk, the nature and the duration of the national measure taken and any voluntary measures taken by economic operators. The RAPEX system provided for in Article 12 of Directive 2001/95/EC is effective and efficient in the field of non-food goods [12]. At the same time, coordinated EU market surveillance requires a complete information exchange on national measures in this field that is not provided for in this system. Access to RAPEX shall be open to applicant countries, third countries or international organisations, within the framework of agreements between the Community and those countries or international organisations, according to arrangements defined in these agreements. Any such agreements shall be based on reciprocity and include provisions on confidentiality corresponding to those applicable in the Community (par. 4, Art. 12 of Directive 2001/95/EC) [12]. IT systems facilitate information exchange between different systems, such as RAPEX, ICSMS, CIRCA, etc. There are often situations when different systems require entering identical data in different formats. In order to avoid duplication, it is planned to develop of a compatible IT system that will provide interaction with existing applications. In particular, the ICSMS is an IT tool that provides for a comprehensive communication platform between all the market surveillance authorities. [16]. It should be noted that ICSMS is not only a mechanism for reliable exchange of information between authorities, but also a platform for implementing market surveillance policies [4]. The ultimate role of ICSMS is to help the European Union to fulfil one of its major political objectives; i.e. to ensure reliability and coherence in the implementation and enforcement of the European legislation) in order for operators and citizens to benefit from the original intention of full access to the Internal Market. The system allows access to information, namely: test results, economic operator information, risk assessments, accident information, measures taken by surveillance authorities for joint, rapid and effective dissemination of information not only among the authorities, but also the public [4]. At the appropriate time, the development of a new platform ICSMS-AISBL was started with the EU financial support [17]. ICSMS will be developed further to collect, store and exchange information and best practices among all the actors directly concerned. This will include eventually the publication

207 Research Outlines of test results, results of joint actions, guidelines and guidance for training of market surveillance authorities, case studies, statistics and overall information on market surveillance for products. ICSMS consists of internal and public areas:  the internal area is destined only for authorized users: market surveillance authorities, customs authorities and the EU. It contains all available information (product description, test results, measures taken);  the public area is destined for consumers, users and manufacturers. The information which is visible to the public provides only the data, which reference the product [18]. The current focus is to create synergy between GRAS-RAPEX and ICSMS, despite they have very distinct functions and are therefore kept separately. In addition, data related to accidents and injuries caused by unsafe products should feed into the market surveillance efforts [19]. Today, the synergy between ICSMS and RAPEX allows users to create RAPEX message projects based on data already partially available in ICSMS. The additional data required to complete the RAPEX alert message must be added manually through the dash [19]. The Commission will examine the feasibility of a public Consumer Product Safety Information Database, which could include a platform for complaints and injuries. It will take into account the achievements made by EUROSAFE, OECD and other relevant tools available in this area. The current measures for market surveillance and product safety control, cooperation at the EU level include:  operational information system (RAPEX) is an alert system that facilitates the rapid exchange of information between EU countries and the European Commission;  general information support system (ICSMS) for information exchange, which includes best practices, results of joint actions, information on monitoring programs on the national markets of the Member States;  protective measures that oblige EU countries to notify about any actions taken by them that restrict the free movement of a product, since it is a hazard or otherwise does not meet the requirements;  functioning of administrative cooperation groups (AdCos);  European Commission financing of common actions carried out by national authorities of the Member States;  regular contacts and policy discussions with national representatives in the Internal Market Expert Group for products. In reference to Ukraine, Chapter 3 “Technical barriers to trade” (articles 53-58) Title IV “Trade and trade-related matters” of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine define the obligation of parties to strengthen and improve technical cooperation by adapting Ukrainian legislation in

208 Research Outlines this field to the “aquis communautaire”, in particular through reforming market surveillance activities that will further facilitate the development of business and support the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The Protocol on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA Agreement) will be added to the Agreement as an integral part for free movement of Ukrainian goods on the internal market of the EU without additional conformity assessment procedures, after the relevant Ukrainian sectoral and horizontal legislation, institutions and standards have been fully aligned with those of the EU [19]. In accordance with the schedule of legislation approximation, Ukraine should approximate its horizontal legislation during 1 year since the date of entry into force of the Agreement (before 2017), and sectoral legislation that covers 27 sectors – during 2-5 years since the same date (2017-2020). The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine (Ministry of Economic Development of Ukraine) is responsible for the implementation of obligations of Ukraine on horizontal legislation harmonization, and central executive authorities carrying out functions of technical regulation in certain areas are responsible for sectoral legislation (CMU Resolution dated 16.12.2015 No 1057) [20]. Thus surveillance activity in Ukraine is currently in a state of active adaptation to international legal norms and regulations of EU law and bringing to conformity with the principles and practices that are applied in European and international law enforcement. The determined direction is implemented by adopting a number of laws of Ukraine, namely: “On state market surveillance and control of non-food products”, “On general safety of non-food products”, “On liability for damage caused by a product defect”, etc. and due to the institutional separation of market surveillance from the conformity assessment function. In order to implement the institutional separation of market surveillance from the conformity assessment function in Ukraine, quality infrastructure of the European sample, which includes National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine (NAAU), National Standardization Authority (SE “UkrNDNC”), State Service of Ukraine for food safety and consumer protection, etc. is being developed.

209 Research Outlines References

1. Kunieva M. Standartyzatsiia, metrolohiia, sertyfikatsiia [Standardization, Measurement Science, Certification]. Rynkovyi nahliad. Praktychni metody nahliadu za rynkom – Market surveillance. Practical methods of market surveillance. (n.d.). csm.kiev.ua. Retrieved from http://www.csm.kiev.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1317:2012-04-10-10- 58-06&catid=41:2009-10-16-12-08-07&Itemid=56&lang=uk [in Ukrainian]. 2. Zakhyst prav spozhyvachiv v Yevropeiskomu Soiuzi ta Ukraini 2007. Analitychnyi zvit. [Consumer rights protection in the European Union and Ukraine 2007. Analytical report]. Spilnota spozhyvachiv ta hromadski obiednannia. Spilnota spozhyvachiv ta hromadski obiednannia Spilnyi proekt Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu ta Prohramy rozvytku Orhanizatsii Obiednanykh Natsii [Consumers and public associations. Consumers and public associations. General draft of the European Union and Development Programme of the United Nations Organization]. (n.d.). consumerinfo.org.ua. Retrieved from http://www.consumerinfo.org.ua/upload/iblock/377/ConsumerProtectionReport- ua.pdf [in Ukrainian]. 3. Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee: EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013 - empowering consumers, enhancing their welfare, effectively protecting them COM (2007) 99 final. (n.d.). eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex-%3A52008AE0259. 4. “Blakytna nastanova” iz vprovadzhennia pravyl Yevropeiskoho Soiuzu shchodo produktsii [The “Blue Guide” on the implementation of rules of the European Union on products]. (n.d.). knteu.kiev.ua. Retrieved from https://www.knteu.kiev.ua/file/MTc=/db801a8e0a18da8685b2f55f7bcbb392.pdf [in Ukrainian]. 5. Doklad Konsultativnoi hruppy po nadzoru za rynkom (Hruppy MARS) o ee deiatelnosti i o 14-m zasedanii v Zheneve (26-27 sentiabria 2016 h.). [Report of the Advisory Group on Market Surveillance (MARS Group) on its activities and the 14th meeting in Geneva (26-27 September 2016)]. (n.d.). unece.org. Retrieved from https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trade/wp6/documents/2016/ECE_CTCS_WP.6_2016_12 R_MARS_report.pdf [in Russian]. 6. Best practice techniques in Market Surveillance. (n.d.). prosafe.org. Retrieved from http://www.prosafe.org/index.php?option=com_zoo&task=item&item_id=1490&Itemid=270. 7. Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products

210 Research Outlines and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (Text with EEA relevance). eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX-%3A32008D0768. 8. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European economic and social committee 20 actions for safer and compliant products for Europe: a multi- annual action plan for the surveillance of products in the EU. (n.d.). eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013DC0076. 9. Arabei Y.A. (2014). Pravovye aspekty deiatelnosti Evropeiskoho Soiuza v oblasti zashchity prav potrebitelei [Legal aspects of activities of the European Union in the field of consumer rights protection]. Extended abstract of Candidate’s thesis. Moscow [in Russian]. 10. Kashkin S.Y. (Eds.). (2008). Evropeiskii Soiuz: osnovopolahaiushchie akty v redaktsii Lissabonskoho dohovora s kommentariiami [The European Union: fundamental acts as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon with comments]. (A.O. Chetverikov, Trans). Moscow: INFRA-M [in Russian]. 11. Boroda M., Tatarevskyi O., Shevliakov I., Basalyha R. et al. (2011). Rynkovyi nahliad v Ukraini: reformy na shliakhu do yevropeiskoho rynku. Dokumenty z analizu polityky ta planuvannia instytutsiinykh zmin [Market surveillance in Ukraine: reforms on the way toward the European market. Police analysis and institutional changes planning documents]. Kyiv: Optyma [in Ukrainian]. 12. Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general product safety (Text with EEA relevance). eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved from http://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32001L0095. 13. Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (Text with EEA relevance). eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX-%3A32008D0768. 14. Decision No 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC (Text with EEA relevance). eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX-%3A32008D0768. 15. Regulation (EC) No 764/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 laying down procedures relating to the application of certain national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another Member State and repealing Decision No 3052/95/EC (Text with EEA relevance). eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008R0764.

211 Research Outlines 16. Information and Communication System on Market Surveillance. (n.d.). ec.europa.eu. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/internal-market-for- products/icsms/index_en.htm. 17. Session on ICSMS of the expert group on the Internal Market for Products, BRUSSELS 7TH JUNE 2013 – MINUTES. ec.europa.eu. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/5465/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native. 18. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European economic and social committee 20 actions for safer and compliant products for Europe: a multi- annual action plan for the surveillance of products in the EU. (n.d.). eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013DC0076. 19. Uhoda pro asotsiatsiiu mizh Ukrainoiu ta Yevropeiskym Soiuzom [Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine]. (n.d.). kmu.gov.ua. Retrieved from http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=248387631 [in Ukrainian].

212 Research Outlines Alina Sholom PhD student, Senior teacher V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University

THE ROLE OF THE WTO AND RTAS IN GLOBAL INSTITUTIONALIAZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE SYSTEM, THE CASE OF UKRAINE

Abstract

Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) more than 20 years ago, developing countries have sought to gain special recognition and treatment within the multilateral system in order to solve their structural and systemic problems. However, the impact of global institutionalization within the WTO on member-countries’ foreign trade remains debatable. Ukraine's accession to the WTO has been a long process, which allowed to harmonize Ukrainian legislation in accordance with international standards. However, many institutions have been reformed only formally, 10 years later the advantageousness of terms of accession is still debatable, as Ukraine's accession to the WTO occurred against the backdrop of the global financial crisis and inner problems. Almost the same fate has befallen the ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. The national legislation has been further adjusted in accordance with the EU institutional framework, but the institutional gap, impeding economic development, stays put.

Aims and objectives

The aim of the research is to evaluate the impact of the global institutionalization within the WTO on the foreign trade of Ukraine and prove the importance of a deeper integration with the EU.

Literature review

The importance of institutions for economies has been noted by T. Veblen [18]. However, only in the second half of the XX century economists attempted to formulate an exhaustive definition of an institution and to qualitatively evaluate their influence. Summarizing the theoretical conclusions, R. Matthews [10] in his article emphasized the importance of institutions, but pointed out that it is not possible to assess their impact on the economy because they are very complex structures. M. Olson [12] turned to institutions to explain the difference between the poor and rich countries. A. Greif [7] attempted to make a qualitative evaluation of institutions’ influence on country’s foreign trade. In his opinion, institutional changes determine the efficiency, volume and geographical distribution of trade flows.

213 Research Outlines The first attempt to make a quantitative evaluation of the influence of institutions on foreign trade was made by J. Anderson in 2000 [2]. He considered the difference between real international trade volumes and predicted and explained its existence by the influence of factors such as the development of institutions, access to information, imperfect contract execution, risk and non-diversified risks. J. Anderson's further research focused on the qualitative influence of informal institutions. The impact of institutions on economic growth received much more study than their impact on foreign trade. The study of an impact of institutions on economic growth was undertaken by such scholars as R. Hall, K. Jones [8, D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, S. Robinson [1], D. Rodrik, D. Sabramanyan, D. Trebbi [15], D. Piazolo [14] and others. E. Brezis and T. Verdir considered joining the EU as an external ‘anchor’ that stimulates the development of the national institutional framework [4]. O. Babetska-Kukharchuk notes that WTO memvership or even the whole process of its acquisition can be considered such an ‘anchor’ [3]. A. Rose, D. Vinkop [16], A. Subramanyan, S. Wai [17], O. Babetska-Kukharchuk, M. Morel [3], D. Li and C. Wu [9], M. Persson, F. Wilhelmsson [13], T. Drautsburg, I. Melnikovska, R. Schweickert [6], are among the scholars who explored the role of membership in the GATT/WTO system and the development of the national institutional environment.

Methodology

In order to evaluate the quantitative effect of global institutionalization within the WTO on foreign trade, most studies use a gravity model with different variables. But the above-mentioned scientists do not focus on the role that the WTO accession as an external anchor for national institutional framework development and therefore foreign trade increase, especially as applicable to Ukraine, merely touching upon this subject, and its evaluation. Our empirical strategy is also based on the well-known gravity equation. It fits the purpose well, because qualitative variables do not always clearly represent institutional changes, which occur in countries due to the process of their accession to the WTO and RTAs’ ratifications. In our study, the transition from qualitative to quantitative characteristics of the influence of global institutionalization on country’s foreign trade is carried out according to the following algorithm:  assessment of the foreign trade sector of the country;  a qualitative evaluation of the influence of global institutionalization within the WTO on foreign trade of the country;  selection and evaluation of factors influencing foreign trade of the country;  assessment of institutional factors;  construction of a gravitaty model;

214 Research Outlines  assessment of the average European institutional variables;  comparison of Ukrainian and European institutional variables;  calculation of the impact of improvement of Ukraine’s national institutional framework to the European level on the growth of foreign trade. According to the gravity equation, bilateral trade (variable ‘Trade’) depends on a variety of factors, such as:

 market size of country i (variable ‘GDPi’);

 market size of country j (variable ‘GDPj’);

 distance between two countries (variable ‘Dij’);

 bilateral exchange rate volatility (variable ‘VOLij’);  national institutional framework of the country i;  national institutional framework of the country j;

 both countries are WTO-members (variable ‘WTOij’) or RTA-members (variable ‘RTAij’). All this factors contribute to the bilateral trade growth, that is the natural logarithm of exports of the country i from the country j. The market size of the country i (and j respectively) is measured as the natural logarithm of country’s real GDP per capita in PPP. The ‘Distance’ variable entails not only transportation costs, but cultural differences and historical ties, and is measured as the distance between capital of the country i and the capital of country j. Bilateral exchange rate volatility is calculated as a standard deviation of the ratio of the monthly exchange rate over its yearly average. The role of of the global institutionalization within the WTO manifests itself in the national institutional framework development. In order to measure the institutional framework in both countries a few indicators can be used, such as:  EBRD Transition Indicators;  Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom;  World Bank Governance Indicators;  Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum;  Global Enabling Index of the World Economic Forum;  World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index;  World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index;  World Bank Logistics Performance Index;  Freedom in the World of the Freedom House;  Corruption Perception Index of the Transparence International;  KOF Index of Globalization.

215 Research Outlines Having considered all advantages and disadvantages of all the indicatiors, we have chosen to use the Index of Economic Freedom (variables ‘Inst’), which consists of 12 subindexes, which influence the institutional setting of economic growth [19], the Global Competitiveness Index, namely ‘Institutions’ pillar of its Basic requirements subindex (variable ‘CompInst’) [20], and the World Bank Governance Indicators (variable ‘WGI’), which consists of 6 subindexes [21]. ‘WTOij’ is a dummy variable, which equals 1, if both countries are WTO-members. ‘RTAij’ is also a dummy variable, which equals 1, if both countries belong to some regional trade agreement. Thus, in practice the gravity equations look as follows: 1. On the basis of the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom:

12 푘 ln 푇푟푎푑푒 = 푎0 + 푎1 ln 퐺퐷푃푖 + 푎2 ln 퐺퐷푃푗 + 푎3 ln 퐷푖푗 + 푎4푉표푙푖푗 + ∑1 푏푘 퐼푛푠푡푖 + 12 푘 ∑1 푏푘 퐼푛푠푡푗 + 푎5푊푇푂푖푗 + 푎6푅푇퐴푖푗 (1.1) 2. On the basis of the Global Competitiveness Index of the WEF: ln 푇푟푎푑푒 = 푎0 + 푎1 ln 퐺퐷푃푖 + 푎2 ln 퐺퐷푃푗 + 푎3 ln 퐷푖푗 + 푎6푉표푙푖푗 + 푎7퐺퐶퐼푖 + 푎8 퐺퐶퐼푗 +

푎9푊푇푂푖푗 + 푎10푅푇퐴푖푗 (1.2) 3. On the basis of the World Bank Governance Indicators: 6 푘 ln 푇푟푎푑푒 = 푎0 + 푎1 ln 퐺퐷푃푖 + 푎2 ln 퐺퐷푃푗 + 푎3 ln 퐷푖푗 + 푎4푉표푙푖푗 + ∑1 푏푘 푊퐺퐼푖 + 6 푘 ∑1 푏푘 푊퐺퐼푗 + 푎5푊푇푂푖푗 + 푎6푅푇퐴푖푗 (1.3) In order to calculate the percentage of country’s exports growth due to the convergence of Ukrainian institutions to the European level, we use the following equation:

∆푇푟푎푑푒 = exp (푎 ∗ (퐼푛푠푡퐸푈 − 퐼푛푠푡푈푘푟) − 1, (1.4)

де InstEU – a certain average European institutional variable;

InstUkr – a certain average Ukrainian institutional variable.

Results and Discussion

The model is constructed on the basis of the countries, that have been trade partners of Ukraine for the last 20 years. Thus, the original sample consists of more than 3500 cases. However, due to the lack of necessary data, the model includes 1915 cases. Alternatively, we evaluate the model which consists of 1381 cases and includes importers of Ukrainian products, that have been trade partners of Ukraine for the last 20 years. All the variables, besides institutional framework in the country i, ‘VOLij’ and government spending in the country j, are significant at 5% level. Positive impact have variables, such as real GDP per capita in PPP in both countries, some factors of the national institutional framework (namely property rights, government integrity, trade freedom and financial freedom), being a WTO– or some RTA- members.

216 Research Outlines The model utilized all available data from the World Integrated Trade Solution's statistical database of the World Trade Partners, as the State Statistics Service of Ukraine does not provide data for the period between 1995 and 2001. The official website of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine contains information on Ukraine's trade partners in 2016-2017 years, but they have not been used in the model, since the data of previous years contained on the website of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine do not correlate with World Bank’s data. Therefore, the modeling was performed on the basis of World Bank’s data on foreign trade of Ukraine in 1995-2015. According to the results, Ukraine's national institutional framework has no impact on its import,

‘WTOij’ and ‘RTAij’ are significant variables. We had to exclude ‘Inst_3’ (government integrity), ‘Inst_6’ (fiscal health) and ‘Inst_8’ (labor freedom) from the model, because the Heritage Foundation does not provide enough data on them. The variables, such as volatility (immediately after the inclusion of institutional variables), and Inst_5, i.e., government expenditures, became insighificant. All institutional variable, apart from ‘Inst_5’ (public expenditure), are significant. Positive influences are institutional variables, such as property rights (‘Inst_1’), judicial efficiency (‘Inst_2’), trade liberty (‘Inst_10’) and financial freedom (‘Inst_12’). WTO and/or some RTA membership of both countries also positively affects by foreign trade of the country. The similar results are obtained from the usage of the second and third equation. In that case, all the variables, besides ‘VOLij’ and national institutional framework of the country i, are significant at 5% level. Thus, the results of the calculation within the framework of the first equation show that Ukraine's foreign trade can increase by 106% as the result of the convergence of its national institutional framework to the EU average. However, despite the fact that WTO membership indirectly affects all areas of the national institutional environment, it directly affects trade liberty only. However, unlike M. Morel and O.Babetskaya-Kukharchuk [3], we take into account institutional factors that negatively affect foreign trade. Due to the interconnectedness of all institutional factors, convergence of only certain spheres of Ukraine's national institutional environment to the EU-average level is not possible. In the case of Ukraine, as well as many other countries, the WTO membership, as well as the EU Accession Agreement, can be an external anchor for national institutional framework improvement. Thus, we can measure the impact of the institutional improvement on exports volumes of developing countries. In order to do so, we compare the qualitative differences between subindexes of Index of Economic Freedom of Ukraine and EU, as well as between ‘Compinst’ of Ukraine and EU. It allowed us to estimate the expected growth of exports due to the improvement of Ukrainian institutional framework to the EU-level. The estimation in the frame of the first equation suggest that one can expect the growth of volume of Ukrainian exports by 207 per cent (including 2% due to the growth of trade freedom to the EU-level),

217 Research Outlines in the frame of the second equation – by 71 per cent. The difference can be explained by the differences in the methodology of these indexes’ calculation. However, the accession to the WTO alone can gradually increase the exports of the country by 198 per cent according to the first equation (95 per cent according to the second), ratification of the RTA – by 326% (148%). Thus, both accession to the WTO and ratification of RTAs have positive direct impact on the bilateral trade, as well as indirect in the form of improvement of country’s institutional framework. The general assessment of the growth of foreign trade due to the convergence of Ukraine's national institutional environment with the EU in the third model is 281%. However, WTO membership directly affects corruption only, that is, it can stimulate the growth of foreign trade by 37%. We also construct three gravity models for Ukraine as an exporter. They include all those countries that have imported Ukrainian products in the last 20 years. They show that Ukraine's national institutional environment has no effect on the growth of its exports. Nevertheless, its exports is positively influenced by the following areas of the national institutional framework of the partner country, such as the tax burden of the partner country (‘Inst_4’), its public expenditure (‘Inst_5’) and freedom of business (‘Inst_7’), negative – judicial efficiency. A similar situation is observed when constructing a gravity model based on the data of Ukraine as an exporter using the ‘Institution’ pillar of the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Index. According to the results of the third model it is evident that the institutional variables, such as quality regulation (‘WGI_4’), voice and accountability (‘WGI_1’) and corruption control (‘WGI_6’) have negative impact on the increase of Ukrainian exports. Thus, the reduction and prevention of corruption in the partner countries of Ukraine leads to their reorientation to more developed countries. According to the results of the gravity modelling, it is clear that the national institutional environment of Ukraine does not affect the increase of its exports. An interesting observation is that the more developed the institutional framework of the partner country, the less it exports to Ukraine, which undoubtedly hinders the development of the institutional framework of the latter. It should be noted that accession to the WTO is not a significant variable for Ukraine as an exporter, which is connected both with the specifics of its accession to the WTO against the backdrop of the global financial crisis and the fact that the national institutional framework was reformed in the process of accession prior to the official membership of Ukraine in the WTO. However, this does not explain the fact that all three models using the database of Ukraine as an exporter show that the national institutional framework of Ukraine and its development has no effect on the growth of its exports, while in other countries almost all institutional variables are significant. The fact that control over corruption negatively affects Ukraine's exports is also unexpected. However, all this can be explained, if we only remember that according to D. North institutions are a set of formal and informal rules [11], but all the institutional variables used in the study make it possible to measure practically only changes in formal

218 Research Outlines rules. Therefore, we agree with D. Rodrik that ‘the actual change of tariff regimes is only a small part of the process’ [15] of the national institutional framework improvement. The most informal behaviors are particularly relevant for Ukraine, since the differences between them and formal rules are extremely important. This explains the difference in the results of the gravity modellinig on the basis of the data of Ukraine as an importer and Ukraine as an esporter. Therefore, the gravity modelling proves that in the process of joining the WTO, the national institutional framework of Ukraine was also reformed only formally. This also applies to the fight against corruption, which further exacerbates the negative impact of the formal reformation of the national institutional environment and does not allow the transformation of formal institutions built on EU standards into generally accepted rules of behavior. The successes or failures of the WTO member countries are largely determined by the strength and quality of the institutions for implementation and for the strengthening of which radical reforms should be undertaken. Moreover, trade reform is only a catalyst for the improvement of the national institutional framework and, as a result, it gives impetus to economic growth. The effect of accession to the WTO is positive only for countries that have indeed undergone a radical reformation of their national institutional framework by increasing its effectiveness.

Consclusion

Gravity modelling proved that the sccession to the WTO can contribute to the growth of foreign trade in countries, particularly in developing countries. However, it was found that the national institutional environment of Ukraine has no effect on the growth of its exports, and control over corruption only worsens the situation. It should be noted that the reduction of corruption in the partner countries of Ukraine leads to their reorientation of their trade flows to more developed countries. We can conclude that in the process of joining the WTO, the national institutional framework of Ukraine was reformed only formally. This also applies to the fight against corruption, which further exacerbates the negative impact of the formal reformation of the national institutional environment and does not allow the transformation of formal institutions built on EU standards into generally accepted patterns of behavior. Further research should be focused on the possibilities of transformation of the formal ‘rules of the game’ into the ‘behavioral patterns' in the context of Ukraine’s WTO-membership and the evaluation of its impact on exports increase.

219 Research Outlines

220 Research Outlines References

1. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth. Handbook of economic growth, 1, 385-472. 2. Anderson, J. E. (2008). Trade and informal institutions. Handbook of International Trade. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 279-293. 3. Berenda, S., Shkonda, S. (2018). The role of WTO Dispute Settlement System in international and national institutional framework: the case of Ukraine. International Journal of Economics, Commerce & Management, 1 (6), 78-98. 4. Babetskaia-Kukharchuk, O., & Maurel, M. (2003). Accession to the WTO and EU enlargement: what potential for trade increase? CERP Discussion Paper, № 3944. 5. Babetskaia-Kukharchuk, O. A. (2005). On measurement of institutions in trade, growth, and investment studies. Экономический журнал Высшей школы экономики, 9(4). 6. Drautzburg, T., Melnykovska, I., & Schweickert, R. (2008). Which membership matters? External vs. internal determinants of institutional change in transition countries (No. 1421). Kiel Working Paper. 7. Greif, A. (1992). Institutions and international trade: Lessons from the commercial revolution. The American Economic Review, 82(2), 128-133. 8. Hall, R. E., & Jones, C. I. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others?. The quarterly journal of economics, 114(1), 83-116. 9. Li, D., & Wu, C. (2004). WTO and Growth: A Cross Country Event Study. 10. Matthews, R. C. (1986). The economics of institutions and the sources of growth. The Economic Journal, 96(384), 903-918. 11. North, D. (1990). Institutional Chande and Economic Performance. 12. Olson, M. (1996). Distinguished lecture on economics in government: big bills left on the sidewalk: why some nations are rich, and others poor. Journal of economic perspectives, 10(2), 3-24. 13. Persson, M., & Wilhelmsson, F. (2007). Assessing the effects of EU trade preferences for developing countries. The European Union and Developing Countries: Trade, Aid and Growth in an Integrating World. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 29-48. 14. Piazolo, D. (1999). Growth effects of institutional change and European integration. 15. Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development. Journal of economic growth, 9(2), 131-165. 16. Rose, A., & van Wincoop, E. (2001). National Money as a Barrier to Trade: The Real Case for Monetary Union", American Economic Review. 17. Subramanian, A., & Wei, S. J. (2007). The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly. Journal of international Economics, 72(1), 151-175. 18. Veblen, T. (2017). The theory of the leisure class. Routledge. 19. Index of Economic Freedom (2017). Retrieved November 10, 2018, from: https://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2017/regions/2017_IndexOfEconomicFreedom_EUROPE. pdf 20. The Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018 (2018). Retrieved November 10, 2018, from: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2017- 2018/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2017%E2%80%932018.pdf 21. The official site of the World Trade Organization (2018). Retrieved November 10, 2018, from: http://wto.org 22. World Bank Group (2018). Retrieved November 10, 2018, from: http://worldbank.org/

221 Research Outlines Ludmila Țaranu Doctor in Law, University lecturer Alecu Russo State University, Balti

LEGAL CONCEPTS ABOUT THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF THE NATURAL PERSON: COMPARATIVE QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION-REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Abstract

The EU-EaP Academy it represents a perfect opportunity for me to improve my professional abilities, enhance leadership skills and create long-lasting contacts with peer professionals from around the world. The Institute of Legal and Political Research of the Academy of Sciences has been a focus of my professional for several years already. After successfully defending my PhD, I have started to teach in several Moldovan universities. Having in my background 7 years of practical experience in the Moldovan Civil Service Office, I started to pass over my knowledge to students. During this period, I am delighted to bring my contribution and make students eager to discover new and interesting areas. Also, during the activity within the system of civil status offices I have had the occasion to be a part of the national work groups on diverse domains: Diaspora 2025 and migration; the asylum in the Republic of Moldova, the decrease and the avoiding of stateless cases; the issuing of identity acts to the victims of human trafficking, etc. Due to the fact that during my doctoral research I have been studying the importance of the individualization of the physical person both within family and society, I consider that this exchange experience form would offer me the opportunity of identifying of new mechanisms of defeating the problem of documentation of the population. I have chosen this subject deliberately since it is well known the fact that the competent EU bodies also confront the problem of illegal emigrants, as it is the case of persons who have got touristic visas but exceeded the term of unlawful stay in the EU. After the participation within the EU-EaP Academy I intend to come with new ideas and proposals of tools that follow to be implemented by the bodies of the local public administration from the Republic of Moldova, in order to promote a policy in this regard and the solving of the problem of non-documentation of the population. The aims followed after the realization of the present study are the following ones:

222 Research Outlines • the accomplishing of a research, an essential one, of the institution of the identification attributes of the physical person, orienting towards the individualization of the natural person by name, domicile, civil status; • the interpretation of the civil status institution both as a right and an indispensable obligation for each natural person; • the analysis of the current legislation provisions and of the doctrinaire concepts, starting with the legal sources of regulation, the process of the evolution of the legislation, the role of the competent bodies. The research of the described aims, determine us to establish the proposed objectives that consist in the following: • to analyse the name, domicile and civil status as being indispensable attributes of the natural person, regulated by more national and international normative documents; • to specify and expose minutely „the civil status” under two aspects: as a mean of the natural person identification and as certificates issued by the civil status bodies; • to examine the role of the civil status bodies at the registering of the civil status documents that are proofs at the identification of the natural person. Within doctrine, the institution concerning the individualization of the natural person has been researched by the local authors: N. Roșca, V. Cebotari, I. Trofimov, L. Chirtoacă; Romanian authors: Beleiu, P. Pețu; autori francezi: G. Cornu, A. Colin, H. Capitant, J. J. Lemouland, D. Fenouillet; Russian authors: O. A. Krasavcikov, V. А. Reasențev, О. Hazova. The scientists I. Reghini, Ș. Diaconescu and P. Vasilescu claim that the need of creating of the concept of the natural person has been imposed due to the fact that the juridical relations have been and are established not just between individuals, but also between groups of individuals, accordingly, between structures created and organized by men with the aim to be able to realize their participation at the legal relations, no matter who created and make them216. Thus, every human being disposes of means no matter the race, sex, profession, ethnic or social origin. The authors Ș. Rauschi and Gh. Popa express their opinion on this subject in the following way: „While the name and domicile are subjective rights (with personal non-patrimonial character) by which a person is individualized and identified (within family, society), the civil status appears as a complex of legal relations (also with non-patrimonial character) by which it is defined the position within family and society of a natural person”217.

216 Reghini I., Diaconescu Ș., Vasilescu P. Introducere în dreptul civil. Ed. a II-a. Cluj Napoca: Sfera Juridică, 2008. p. 82. 217 Răuschi Ș. Popa Gh. Drept civil. Teoria generală. Persoana fizică. Persoana juridică. Iași: Ed. Junimea, 2000. p. 207. 223 Research Outlines The participation of the natural persons to the juridical relations of the civil law implies an identification of each one in part. The identification of the natural person in the juridical relation means its individualization with the help of some attributes or elements of identification established by law218. As a separate and unusual acceptance we admit the concept given by S. Lukasevici, according to which new elements in the system of the natural person individualization there can be: e-mail address, digital fingerprints, hand form, the placement of the veins on the external side of the palm, retina219. We should admit that in the legal doctrine there is a special interest in the quality of the natural person that is recognized to all human beings, regarded individually, as members of the society, who have the possibility to participate at the civil legal relations. In such a way, at present, any human being has the quality of the law subject; every person has the quality of a natural person. In this regard we notice that every natural person originates from a distinct family, being registered under its family name, and during the lifetime would continue his/her participation at diverse juridical relations, either under the name obtained at birth or the changed one, as a result of marriage accomplishing or cessation, by adoption or the modification of the name or/and of surname, and others. The theoretic-scientific investigations of the registration of the identification attributes of the natural person by the civil status bodies do not constitute a distinct study in the local literature, fact that determined us to get preoccupied with the detailed analysis of this matter which we consider to be an up-to-date one. It is undoubtedly that among the main tasks that we can attribute to the civil status bodies there are the civil status registrations, regarded as legal operations transposed in the civil status registers, these ones being directly related to the identification elements of the natural person. Our task is to research these institutions, to fill in the doctrinaire gap, to formulate and to examine the most important aspects. We expose to investigation a series of legal acts which denote significant aspects from the biography of every natural person: birth and death, marriage and divorce, marriage cancelation, paternity establishment, adoption and modification of name and/or surname. Each of these ones, (except the modification of name and/or surname) reveals the appearing or cessation of some rights and obligations. For instance, on the basis of family legislation, with the birth of the child the parents get rights and obligations for education and maintenance; from the marriage establishing – mutual rights and obligations of the spouses, etc.

218 Țaranu L. Atributele de identificare a persoanei fizice în societate și familie. În: Mat. ale conf. șt. cu part. intern. „Rolul științei și educației în implementarea Acordului de Asociere la Uniunea Europeană”. Ediția I. Chișinău, 05 februarie 2015. Universitatea „Constantin Stere”. Iași: „Vasiliana 98”, 2015. p. 515. 219 Лукашевич C. Автореферат диссертации на соискание ученой степени кандидата юридических наук. Система средств индивидуализации физических лиц как субьектов гражданского права. Казань: Издательский центр Ульяновского Государственного Университета, 2014. с. 8.

224 Research Outlines The natural person disposes of the legal capacity in its quality of the subject established by law. The identification of the civil relations of the individual is evident from the birth moment and goes through a series of modifications until the cessation of the relations by death, all these actions being regulated both for the state and social purpose. It should be mentioned that the evolution of the human rights has been deeply influenced in the XX-th century by philosophic, sociologic, psychological and psychoanalytic movements that enriched the concepts about the natural person. A really significant step was realized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights when the abstract individual was opposed to a person as a clear reality, both carnal and spiritual. This revival has been realized in the approach of the natural person that treats the existence of the person, her rights and identification. In this regard, art.2 from the Declaration stipulates the fact that „Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”220. From the international settlements we will underline art.7 point 1 from the Convention on the Rights of the Child according to which „The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents”221. The author O. Hazova studied the rights of the European family, which, in her affirmation, at the moment, as a whole means a diverse image both by form and content. In six states there have been adopted separate codes which contain norms concerning the legal-family relations in exclusivity, as it was in the Soviet period. At the same time, in four states, and namely: Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, legal-family relations have been included as chapters or distinct parts in the Civil Codes, as it is used in the countries with the system of continental law. As a result of the realized reforms, the norms of the family law from the pos-Soviet countries have been updated with liberal norms (such as the freedom of accomplishing of the matrimonial contract)222. In this regard, at the analysis of the scientific literature of the related domain, for the period of the last five years, we find out that we did not identify in the RM a work that would have approached especially aspects related to the name, domicile and civil status of the natural person, these subjects being studied in diverse contexts, without emphasizing the legal nature, legal characters or their

220 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly,on 10 December 1948, as Resolution 217, at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, France. The Republic of Moldova acceded on 28 July 1990. 221 Convention on the Rights of Child. Adopted by the General Assembly, on 20 November 1989, as Resolution 44/25, in New York. The Republic of Moldova acceded on 12 December 1990. 222 Хазова О. Журнал Государства и Права. Семейное право на постсоветском европейском пространстве: основные новеллы законодательства о браке и разводе. Москва: Наука, 2011. p. 32-35. 225 Research Outlines conceptual categories. Taking into account these reasons, in this work there are underlined theoretic approaches and general tendencies in the RM in the field of civil status. At the same time, considering the increased tendency of population migration towards EU, the fixing of the according attributes in the content of the civil status documents makes possible the evidence and at the same time, the realization of a statistic survey of the facts and events produced in the life of the natural person. That would reflect both the importance and the essence of the civil status records and the peculiarities of the activity of the competent bodies to register civil status acts. Taking into account that the citizens of the RM issue civil status documents abroad, of a special relevance is the establishment of collaboration relations between the states. The realizing mechanism are the international treaties that the RM is a part of; accordingly there is achieved the recognition of the civil status documents issued abroad by the procedure of their transcription in the registers of civil status of the RM, having a sole aim – the protection of the personal rights of the natural person. We mention that, in accordance with art.4 par. (7) from the Law Nr. 100-XV from 26 of April 2001 concerning the civil status acts, „The registration and transcription of the civil status acts of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova who live outside the country’s territory is realized by the diplomatic missions and the consular services of the Republic of Moldova, in accordance with its legislation”. The respecting of these personal rights is mutual – by the provisions of art.10 par. (1) from the Law Nr 100/200, „The foreign citizens who live or reside temporarily in the Republic of Moldova can require the recording of the civil status acts under the same conditions as the citizens of the Republic of Moldova”223. This is due to the fact the RM is a part of a series of European treaties and conventions, fact that makes possible the assurance of the respecting of the natural person rights who are in the European space, in the matters related to their documentation. The mentioned above, have determined us to emphasize the fact that the citizens of RM need to register the civil status acts both on the territory of the state RM and abroad, this situation being available also for the foreign citizens and stateless ones. More than this, according to art 13 from Law Nr. 100/2001, the civil status acts issued to foreign citizens and to stateless by the competent bodies of the foreign countries, in accordance with the laws of those countries, are recognized as available in the Republic of Moldova after their super-legalization, if the international treaties do not stipulate differently. At the same time, according to the provisions of the article nr 154 of the Family Law „Foreign nationals, stateless persons with the place of residence of the territory of Republic of Moldova, in family relationships, possess the same rights and obligations as the citizens of the Republic of Moldova“224.

223 Law of the Republic of Moldova on civil status acts Nr. 100-XV from 26 of April 2001.

224 Family Code of the Republic of Moldova Nr. 1316 from 26 of October 2000. 226 Research Outlines In this context, it is important to mention that the text of the legal documents of the Republic of Moldova, in comparison with of the European states, one may find specific aspects of regulations of the most important Civil Status institutions: birth, marriage, divorce, death of the natural persons. Nevertheless, the competent institutions of Moldova tend to approach the international standards considering public service granting at a high level. As a proof to this tendency, according to the Government Decision nr 176 by 22 March 2011 „With regard to the approval of the Methodology of the Elaboration of the strategic development programmes of the central public administrative authorities“, a special interest is represented by the approval of the Strategies Development Programme of the Civil Status Services for the period of 2016- 2020225. We should mention that this programme is an innovative one in our country and was implemented with the help of the United Nations Development Program which is Moldova’s partner in its progresses in European integration and a supporter of the discussion about the human rights. The main task of the Program is to maintain a continuous and positive tendency to reform he Civil Status Service considering the provision of operative and accessible service to the citizens through the cultivation of values: professionalism, integrity, impartiality, an orientation towards the citizen, transparency, cooperation and continuous perfecting. Following we may underline that the methodological basis used during the present work included: the study and the deep, evaluating and selective analysis of the specialty bibliography, research studies and reports, electronic information sources, scientific articles and publications, critical analyses and of the practical results of numerous conferences, national and international seminars in the field of the studied matters.

Results and Discussion

The focusing on the modality of the Civil Acts registration through the filling the identification attributes of the natural persons make it possible to emphasise the importance and the role of the Civil Status Services in this area. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned information we may mention that the study of current procedures makes it possible the analyses both of the statistical analysis about numbers of the unregistered population, as well as of the category of citizens who break the law. During this year, according to the statistical data provided by the State Population Registry of Republic of Moldova (accessed at 30.06.2018), there were 584 stateless who obtained the citizenship; 390 individuals who became stateless because they lost the citizenship; 708 persons having expired

225 Government Decision of the Republic of Moldova Nr. 176 from 22 of March 2011, „The Methodology of the Elaboration of the strategic development programmes of the central public administrative authorities“.

227 Research Outlines identity acts for stateless; 1877 individuals with undefined citizenship; 8702 citizens of Republic of Moldova with a old ex-Soviet passport (the 1974 version). During the realization of these activities I got involved in solving of actual situations interfering by the offering of legal consultations in order to resolve these problems. From my experience I can conclude that in a great part these problems are confronted by special categories of social vulnerable persons from the rural areas, here there are included the persons of Roma people ethnicity who do not take the responsibility to get legalized with identification acts. Thus, I consider it necessary the identification of these categories of persons at the local level, and namely through the implication of local public administration representatives, accordingly by the outreach of the society and the dissemination of the information about the documentation modality of these groups of subjects. Due to the fact that the University of Balti opened a Legal University Clinic which offers free legal consultations for the individuals marginalized in rights, I consider that other activities will be imposed such as lectures, group works, and workshops in fields of civil and family law. In this way we will create a multidisciplinary territorial community team and we plan to increase the number of the voluntary activities of the above-mentioned Clinic, through their participation in the identification of the individuals with document problems and through the case-study of various situations and the guiding of those individuals to benefit from the public services respectively. In the Republic of Moldova, especially in rural areas, we can identify the problem of non- documented population with the means of identity and civil status papers. Quite often these situations appear due to an irresponsible attitude from the side of the parents in the case of not declaring the birth of a child or in situations then the birth delivery happens at home, without being attended by a doctor for medical investigations, thus leading to an impossible identification de jure and de facto of the concrete individual. There is a lack of awareness about the importance to keep the legal provisions, and about the rights which a concrete individual might possess. Only in cases of major necessity or in critical situations (for example: travelling abroad for medical treatment), the undocumented individuals apply for the civil services, but, depending on the complexity of the issue, the process could last longer. In order to avoid such situations and to guide the individuals to the timely resolving of the problems and the identification of free of charge possibilities, because socially vulnerable families are implied, there is a necessity for primary legal assistance to the members of the community.

Conclusion

Thus, following the undertaken analysis, we may conclude that the participation in the EU-EaP Academy represents a positive motivation for making a change in our society, a project to help our

228 Research Outlines people, especially the socially vulnerable layers of the society. This Program would inspire me to identify creative solutions and the taking up of certain ideas in the overcoming of this phenomenon. The total documenting of the population will lead to a considerable strengthening of the lawfulness and gives a possibility for obtaining of exact data about registered population, the regulation of migrating processes, the performing of the voting rights and contributes to the search of individual who try to avoid the legal institutions etc. Taking into account that this is a project to help people, the taking over this experience would offer me the possibility to apply successfully all the theoretic knowledge in the practice domain and to identify creative solutions for being closer to the citizens marginalized in their rights. I consider that a solid and tailored educational system is the back bone of every society. Bright and inspiring professors with excellent knowledge and skills are a source of enthusiasm and inspiration. Unfortunately, the Republic of Moldova, due to brain-drain lack well prepared professors. In my capacity of university lecturer in Balti University I would appreciate very much to get to know the European working model, the excellent results of which are well-known. I believe that I could learn a lot and also be able to implement in my daily work some practices, attitudes and methodologies.

References

1. Reghini I., Diaconescu Ș., Vasilescu P. Introducere în dreptul civil. Ed. a II-a. Cluj Napoca: Sfera Juridică, 2008. 692 p. 2. Răuschi Ș. Popa Gh. Drept civil. Teoria generală. Persoana fizică. Persoana juridică. Iași: Ed. Junimea, 2000. 329 p. 3. Țaranu L. Atributele de identificare ale persoanei fizice în societate și familie. În: Mat. ale conf. șt.cu part. intern. „Rolul științei și educației în implementarea Acordului de Asociere la Uniunea Europeană”. Ediția I. Chișinău, 05 February 2015. Universitatea „Constantin Stere”. Iași: „Vasiliana 98”, 2015. 515-518. 4. Лукашевич C. Автореферат диссертации на соискание ученой степени кандидата юридических наук. Система средств индивидуализации физических лиц как субьектов гражданского права. Казань: Издательский центр Ульяновского Государственного Университета, 2014. 20 с. 5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, on 10 December 1948, as Resolution 217, at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, 6. France. The Republic of Moldova acceded on 28 July 1990. 7. Convention on the Rights of Child. Adopted by the General Assembly, on 20 November 1989, as Resolution 44/25, in New York. The Republic of Moldova acceded on 12 December 1990. 8. Хазова О. Журнал Государства и Права. Семейное право на постсоветском европейском пространстве: основные новеллы законодательства о браке и разводе. Москва: Наука, 2011. 128 p. 9. Law of the Republic of Moldova on civil status acts Nr. 100-XV from 26 of April 2001. 10. Family Code of the Republic of Moldova Nr. 1316 from 26 of October 2000. 11. Government Decision of the Republic of Moldova Nr. 176 from 22 of March 2011, „The Methodology of the Elaboration of the strategic development programmes of the central public administrative authorities“.

229 Research Outlines

The publication contains the articles of the participants of the EU-EaP Academy held in Kyiv on February 11-15, 2019. The event was supported by the Erasmus+ Programme – Jean Monnet Project 599865-EPP-1-2018-1-UA-EPPJMO-PROJECT:”EU-EAP ACADEMY: SUPPORTING NEXT GENERATION OF SCHOLARS IN EUROPEAN STUDIES”

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