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Bulletin De Liaison Et D'information INSTITUT KUDE RPARD IS E Bulletin de liaison et d’information n°356 novembre 2014 La publication de ce Bulletin bénéficie de subventions du Ministère français des Affaires étrangères (DGCID) et du Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (FASILD) ————— Ce bulletin paraît en français et anglais Prix au numéro : France: 6 € — Etranger : 7,5 € Abonnement annuel (12 numéros) France : 60 € — Etranger : 75 € Périodique mensuel Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 13 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tél. : 01- 48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01- 48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: [email protected] Bulletin de liaison et d’information de l’Institut kurde de Paris N° 356 novembre 2014 • IRAK : ACCORDS ENTRE ERBIL ET BAGDAD SUR LE PÉTROLE ET LE BUDGET • ERBIL: ATTENTAT CONTRE LE GOUVERNORAT • SYRIE : LA POPULATION DE KOBANÎ VICTIME DE L’ÉTAT ISLAMIQUE ET DES MINES TURQUES • PARUTION : LE KURDISTAN IRAKIEN : DE LA TRIBU À LA DÉMOCRATIE IRAK : ACCORDS ENTRE ERBIL ET BAGDAD SUR LE PÉTROLE ET LE BUDGET oin de la ralentir, les d’Erbil espérait franchir le cap a par ailleurs confirmé que son difficultés de la guerre des 500 000 barils, trois nou - pays avait déjà été payé pour ces et l’instabilité générale veaux champs pétrolifères ventes et qu’ils attendaient enco - L de la région ont poussé devant être exploitables d’ici re le prix de la vente de dix les Kurdes à aller plus cette date. autres cargos. (Reuters) avant sur la voie de l’indépen - dance économique et la vente de Ashti Hawrami a assuré que les L’argent du pétrole kurde n'est pétrole en provenance du Kurdes n’avaient « aucun pro - plus envoyé à Bagdad, mais Gouvernement kurde n’a cessé blème pour vendre ce pétrole », déposé dans une banque turque, de progresser. Le 7 novembre, qu’il y avait même plus de ce qui a incité le nouveau Ashti Hawrami, le ministre en demande que ce qu’ils pouvaient ministre des Affaires étrangères charge des Ressources naturelles fournir. Entre 25 et 26 cargos irakien, Ibrahim Al-Jaffari, alors annonçait que les exportations avaient déjà quitté Ceyhan, et en en visite à Ankara, à demander à atteignaient presque les 300 000 novembre, le montant des ventes ce que ces sommes soient barils par jour vers le port de de pétrole s’élevait à 20 millions remises à l’Irak, en ajoutant qu’il Ceyhan, en Turquie (plus exacte - de barils. En janvier prochain, ce savait que cet argent « se trouvait ment 280 000 barils fin octobre, nombre devrait monter à 34 mil - entre des mains sûres ». Mais le de source officielle turque) et que lions, pour un montant de trois réchauffement des relations début 2015, le gouvernement milliards de dollars. Le ministre entre Bagdad et Ankara, très • 2 • Bulletin de liaison et d’information n° 356 • novembre 2014 détériorées sous le gouverne - constitution d’un fonds souve - Kurdes en matière de gestion et ment Maliki ne laisse pas prévoir rain kurde, alimenté par toutes d’exploitation de leurs res - un nouvel « ultimatum » de les recettes des énergies. Le pro - sources en hydrocarbures ? Car il Bagdad, comme c’était d’usage jet de loi a été ratifié à l’issue du est certain que l’année 2014 a été sous l’ancien cabinet. Le message Conseil des Ministres par le une rude secousse économique d’al Jaffari était plutôt d'assurer Premier Ministre Nêçirvan pour Erbil, soudainement qu’il n’y a aucune crise entre la Barzani afin qu’il soit approuvé confronté au gel des salaires de Turquie et l’Irak autour de la au Parlement d’Erbil. ses fonctionnaires (en nombre question du pétrole kurde, qui pléthorique) par Bagdad, et puis est essentiellement un litige Les activités de la nouvelle socié - à l’arrivée de centaines de mil - « interne » entre Erbil et le gou - té couvriront tous les secteurs du liers de réfugiés venant s’ajouter vernement central irakien. pétrole et du gaz, la signature aux Kurdes syriens, et enfin aux des contrats, l’extraction, l’inves - assauts de l'État islamique alors Mais quelles que soient les tissement, l’export et la commer - que leurs Peshmergas ne rece - « demandes » du gouvernement cialisation. Le Premier Ministre a vaient plus aucune solde et irakien, la Turquie n’est sans aussi indiqué que « cette société étaient sous-armés. Laissé à lui- doute pas près de se passer des peut devenir dans un certain même à la fois par Bagdad et ressources du Kurdistan en temps une société d’actionnariat Ankara, qui ne s’est guère obtempérant aux souhaits de dont tous les citoyens pourront empressé de lui porter secours Bagdad. Le 13 novembre, Genel acheter des parts. » devant la menace des Daesh, le Energy a ainsi signé un nouvel Kurdistan d’Irak ne cache pas sa accord avec le GRK pour déve - Finalement, moins de dix jours volonté d’assurer le plus vite lopper et exploiter deux énormes après la rencontre Fouad possible son autonomie financiè - gisements gaziers qui pourraient Massoum - Massoud Barzani, le re, et de conforter son économie fournir la Turquie en gaz au GRK annonçait qu’un accord face à un climat politique et sécu - cours de l’hiver 2017-2018. Les avait été trouvé avec Bagdad et ritaire qui n’est certainement pas ressources des champs Miram et que le gouvernement central prêt d’être apaisé dans la région. Bina Bawi sont estimées à 11,4 avait accepté d’envoyer à Erbil trillions de pieds cube, et évalués plus de 500 millions de dollars Pour Gareth Stanfield, un expert à environ 2,6 milliards de dollars. en échange de 150 000 barils de de l’Irak de l’université d’Exeter, pétrole par jour, que le gouver - cet accord a été obtenu provisoi - Dans le même temps, les négo - nement kurde s’engage à fournir, rement le besoin urgent s'en fai - ciations entre Erbil et Bagdad ont selon son porte-parole Safeen sait sentir, à Bagdad comme à repris et le 5 novembre, à Erbil, à Diyazi. L’accord a été conclu à Erbil : « Les deux parties étaient l’issue d’une rencontre avec le Bagdad à la suite d’une ren - dans des positions de grande fai - nouveau président de l’Irak, le contre entre le ministre irakien blesse, et cette faiblesse commu - Kurde Fouad Massoum, le prési - du Pétrole, Adel Abdel Mahdi, le ne leur a permis de trouver ce dent du Kurdistan Massoud Premier Ministre kurde qui n’est qu’une solution palliati - Barzani a déclaré que leur objec - Nêçirvan Barzani et son Vice- ve » (Reuters). tif commun était de trouver Premier Ministre Qubad « une solution aux problèmes Talabani. Il a été qualifié de Les querelles ne sont en tout cas actuels entre les gouvernements « percée majeure » par le pas terminées et le 28 novembre, central et régional ». ministre irakien des Finances, les ministres kurdes du gouver - Hosyar Zebari, Kurde lui aussi, nement irakien ont menacé de Mais cette solution ne passera qui a indiqué que Bagdad allait boycotter le vote approuvant le certainement pas par un pas en recommencer de payer ses fonc - budget 2015 si Bagdad ne levait arrière des Kurdes dans leur tionnaires kurdes. pas le gel des paiements budgé - route vers l’émancipation écono - taires dus à la Région kurde. mique. Le 12 novembre, le gou - Ce n’est certes pas le premier vernement du Kurdistan a accord conclu entre les Kurdes et Après une première lecture du approuvé le projet de création les Arabes dans ce long litige, texte, il est apparu en effet que ce d’une compagnie d’exploitation tous n’ayant été que des compro - budget comprenait encore les et de production pétrolière qui mis provisoires, et pour la plu - sanctions financières à l’encontre ne dépendra pas du gouverne - part d’entre eux jamais appli - du Kurdistan, prise par l'ancien ment central, et dont les parts qués. Celui-là n’a pas non plus Premier Ministre. Normalement, seront vendues à des action - statué sur le fond : l’Irak accepte- la constitution irakienne octroie naires publiques, ainsi que la t-il ou non l’indépendance des 17% du budget total de l’Irak à la n° 356 • novembre 2014 Bulletin de liaison et d’information • 3• Région kurde, mais le gouverne - Finalement, un autre accord pré - pour exporter le pétrole de ment d’Erbil se plaint aussi de voit qu’Erbil livrera au port de Kirkouk vers Ceyhan. D'où leur n’avoir jamais reçu plus de 11%, Ceyhan 550 000 barils par jour à acceptation, bon gré mal gré, au temps où cette part était tout l’Irak, par le biais de la société d'un état de fait né de la chute de de même encore payée. d’État irakienne SOMO. En Mossoul aux mains du Daesh. contrepartie, le Kurdistan doit Quant aux Kurdes, l’améliora - Autre litige en souffrance depuis recevoir à nouveau son budget tion de leurs finances va leur des années : l’entretien et la solde initial mensuel, s’élevant à envi - permettre de payer les sociétés des Peshmergas, que Bagdad a ron un milliard de dollars. pétrolières qui forent et exploi - toujours laissé à la charge des tent le pétrole sur leur sol. Kurdes, ce que ces derniers ont Il est à noter que sur ces 550 000 aussi toujours dénoncé, les de barils par jour, 300 000 pro - Autre gain significatif pour Erbil: Peshmergas étant, dans la consti - viendront de Kirkouk et les 250 le gouvernement fédéral alloue - tution irakienne, mentionnés 000 restant de la Région kurde ra finalement une partie de son comme une des forces de défense dans ses frontières d’avant juin budget Défense aux Peshmergas, nationale irakienne.
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