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A Comparative Framing Analysis of ISIL in the Online Coverage of CNN and Al-Jazeera Talal Alshathry Iowa State University

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A Comparative Framing Analysis of ISIL in the Online Coverage of CNN and Al-Jazeera Talal Alshathry Iowa State University Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Graduate Theses and Dissertations Dissertations 2015 A comparative framing analysis of ISIL in the online coverage of CNN and Al-Jazeera Talal Alshathry Iowa State University Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd Part of the Journalism Studies Commons Recommended Citation Alshathry, Talal, "A comparative framing analysis of ISIL in the online coverage of CNN and Al-Jazeera" (2015). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 14683. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/14683 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A comparative framing analysis of ISIL in the online coverage of CNN and Al-Jazeera by Talal Alshathry A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE Major: Journalism and Mass Communication Program of Study Committee: Dr. Raluca Cozma, Major Professor Dr. Daniela V. Dimitrova Dr. Robert Urbatsch Iowa State University Ames, Iowa 2015 Copyright © Talal Alshathry, 2015. All rights reserved. ii DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to my parents: Abdulrahman and Hussah for their love, endless support, and encouragement. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES ….……………………………………………………...……………………………………….. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ……………………………………………………………………………..………….. v ABSTRACT ………………………………………………………………………..………………….……………... vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM …….…………….…... 1 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ……………......... 4 Framing Theory …..…………………………………………………………………………….……… 4 Framing of terrorism ………………………………………………………………………………… 8 News sources ………………………………………………………………………………………........ 12 CNN ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 13 Al-Jazeera …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 14 Variables ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15 Hypotheses and research question …………………………………………………….……… 16 CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY ………………………….…………………………………………….…..….. 17 Population and sample ……………………………………………………………….…………….. 17 Intercoder reliability ....…………………………………………………………………………..…. 21 CHAPTER 4 RESULTS …………………………………….……………………………………………………. 23 CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ………………………………………………………. 28 News frames and sources …………………………………………………….………………….... 28 Implications ………………………………………………………..………………………………...…. 32 Limitations and directions for future research……………………….…………………... 33 REFERENCES ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 36 APPENDIX – CODE SHEET …………………………………………………………………………………… 42 iv LIST OF TABLES Page Table 1 Intercoder reliability coefficients .................................................................................... 21 Table 2 Differences in generic frames between CNN and Al-Jazeera …………………..... 24 Table 3 Top 5 most cited CNN sources .………………………………………………………………. 24 Table 4 Top 5 most cited Al-Jazeera sources ………………………………………….................... 25 Table 5 Differences in sourcing patterns between CNN and Al-Jazeera ………………… 26 Table 6 Differences in thematic/episodic framing between CNN and Al-Jazeera …… 27 v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my major professor, Dr. Raluca Cozma, whose expertise, understanding, and patience, added greatly to my graduate experience. Also, I would like to thank the other members of my committee, Dr. Daniela Dimitrova and Dr. Robert Urbatsch for their support. In addition, I would also like to thank my friends, colleagues, the department faculty and staff for making my time at Iowa State University a wonderful experience. In conclusion, I recognize that this degree would not have been possible without the financial assistance of King Saud University, my employer in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. vi ABSTRACT This study is a content analysis of how CNN and Al-Jazeera framed ISIL in their online news coverage from June to October 2014. A total of 154 stories were analyzed in order to determine the differences in the news framing and sourcing of ISIL (also known as ISIS). The websites’ original languages were used, respectively English (CNN) and Arabic (Al-Jazeera). The study found that CNN and Al-Jazeera relied heavily on episodic coverage. Also, the conflict frame dominated CNN coverage while Al-Jazeera used more responsibility and economic-consequences framing. Regarding sources, the study found that CNN cited more U.S. officials while Al-Jazeera relied more on other media. Keywords: ISIL, Framing, CNN, Al-Jazeera, Content Analysis, Episodic, Thematic 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The developments related to ISIL in Syria and Iraq since 2013 were caused by the Syrian civil war that entered its fourth year as of 2015 in addition to the unstable situation in Iraq. The political arena after the fall of the Al-Baath regime led to the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq in 2006, which evolved six years later under the pressure of the Syrian crisis to what is known nowadays as the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. On June 10th, 2014, the world woke up to the news of the fall of Mosel, the second largest city in Iraq, in the hands of ISIL’s fighters. Abu Baker Al- Baghdadi, the man who inherited the leadership of the Islamic State in Iraq in 2010, declared himself as Caliphate only three weeks after his group captured Mosel. The following step was to clear the borders between Iraq and Syria, signaling the geographical location of the so-called new state (Abbas, 2014). The emergence of ISIL cannot be understood away from the ongoing Syrian crisis. It’s, in fact, a major continuation development that resulted into the formation of an international coalition led by the United States and consisted of more than twenty countries. The coalition has started a military operation aiming to weaken ISIL and destroy it, as president Obama mentioned in his speech on September 10, 2014, as reported by the White House website (Hudson, 2014). This operation is conducted mainly via airstrikes on ISIL territories both in Iraq and Syria. Another announced goal of the operation is strengthening the moderate opposition in Syria in an effort to support it against both ISIL and Assad’s regime. 2 In the aftermath of taking control of Mosel and prior to the formation of the international coalition, the United States had started airstrikes on ISIL north of Iraq. The United States claimed its moves were meant to protect its interests in Kurdistan and to prevent ISIL from gaining more ground that might endanger Iraq’s unity. As a response, ISIL beheaded two U.S. journalists who had disappeared previously in Syria. James Feloy disappeared in November 2012 in the northern part of Syria, and was beheaded by ISIL in August 2014, in addition to Steven Sotloff, a reporter who was beheaded two weeks later. The fast development of the situation has challenged the foreign news media outlets in the world. Foreign correspondents cannot cover the crisis from the ground as both ISIL and the Assad regime have set restrictions. Moreover, the Committee to Protect Journalists has declared Syria the deadliest country for journalists for the past three years. In 2014, the committee on its website declared that 17 journalists were killed in Syria. Yet the number of the daily stories produced by the media outlets regarding ISIL is large, which arises several concerns about the credibility and sourcing of these channels. Among these media outlets are CNN and Al-Jazeera, which are both considered elite agenda-setters in their respective regions. Robinson (1999) suggests that with the so-called CNN effect, CNN’s 24/7 globe-spanning newsgathering operation challenges the traditional news cycle and sets the news agenda for journalists in the United States and occasionally accelerates foreign policy decision-making. Also, the role of Al-Jazeera on the global media arena became more prominent after 9/11 and its coverage of the war in Afghanistan showed that it “ began to set the visual agenda for American news coverage” (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003). This is a study of how the online versions of CNN and Al-Jazeera framed ISIL in their news coverage and what news sources they relied on to tell the story. The time period 3 under analysis starts in June 2014, when ISIL captured Mosel, and ends in October 2014, several weeks after the international coalition started its military operation in Iraq and Syria. This study is important for a number of reasons. First, the Middle East’s centralization effects on the world politically and economically. Second, the growing significance of online news alongside the need to fill the gap in the literature in this part cannot be ignored. Third, the topic under investigation is unique and has potentially far- reaching effects, and we need to assess the framing and sourcing of the news stories regarding ISIL considering the fact that there are many variances in naming and attributes. 4 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The ongoing issue of ISIL represents a major phase of the Syrian civil war that has entered its fourth year as of the writing of this study. There was no enough reason for the world community to engage militarily with this growing group in Syria except the sudden increasing role of ISIL and the spread of
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