The Role of Internet News Reporting in Creating and Maintaining Popular Perceptions of the Contemporary Enemy in Afghanistan
By
Shareif Mahmoud, P.Eng, PMP
A Major Research Project submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In
CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT
Recommended:
Matthew A. Lauder, MA, MPhil Academic Supervisor
Accepted:
Fred Oster, PhD Program Head, MA Conflict Analysis and Management
Approved:
Alex Morrison, MSC, MA Director, School of Peace and Conflict Management
ROYAL ROADS UNIVERSITY August 2010
© Shareif Mahmoud, 2010
Library and Archives Bibliothèque et Canada Archives Canada
Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de l’édition
395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada
Your file Votre référence ISBN: 978-0-494-65928-1 Our file Notre référence ISBN: 978-0-494-65928-1
NOTICE: AVIS:
The author has granted a non- L’auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par télécommunication ou par l’Internet, prêter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non- support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. . The author retains copyright L’auteur conserve la propriété du droit d’auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author’s permission.
In compliance with the Canadian Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privée, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de thesis. cette thèse.
While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n’y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis.
Abstract
An exploration of the potential effects of enemy imagery in Canadian Internet news reports about the conflict in Afghanistan on the Canadian audience’s perception of the Canadian Forces contemporary enemy, the Taliban. This paper proposes a model for Internet emnification by integrating the results of a content analysis of Canadian Internet war reports with traditional systems thinking.
Table of contents The Role of Internet News in Creating and Maintaining Popular Perceptions of the Contemporary Enemy in Afghanistan
Abstract ...... i Table of contents ...... ii List of figures ...... iv List of tables ...... v
1.0 Background: Canada in Afghanistan ...... 6 1.1 The Taliban ...... 8 1.2 Canadians and the Taliban...... 15 2.0 Project overview ...... 19 2.1 Research questions...... 21 2.2 Operational terms...... 22 2.3 Hypothesis...... 24 2.4 Sponsor...... 25 2.5 Structure of the paper...... 26 3.0 Project media framework ...... 29 3.1 Canadian Internet news: war reporting on Afghanistan ...... 31 3.2 Media effects on audiences ...... 36 3.3 The dynamics between media and public opinion...... 43 3.4 The Internet as a source of news in Canada ...... 47 4.0 Quantitative research: enemy imagery in Canadian Internet news ...... 54 4.1 Methodology ...... 60 4.2 Data sources ...... 65 4.3 Quantitative findings ...... 70 5.0 Qualitative analysis: enemy imagery in Canadian Internet news ...... 82 5.1 Qualitative analysis: the contemporary enemy in Afghanistan ...... 95 5.2 Cross-lagged correlation interpretation ...... 101 6.0 Attribution Theory application to the problem space ...... 108 6.1 Attribution processes and enemy imagery ...... 111 6.2 Attribution and the process of enmification...... 116 6.3 Attribution and Internet war reporting ...... 122 7.0 MRP model...... 131 7.1 Defining the model problem space ...... 135 7.2 Identifying and modeling problem space systems ...... 138 7.3 Comparing the model to reality ...... 144 8.0 Recommendations ...... 149 8.1 Assumptions and an agenda of change ...... 150 8.2 Implementing change ...... 164 8.3 Conclusions ...... 175 References ...... 178 ii Appendix A: Content analysis protocol sheet ...... 192 Appendix B: Panel cross-lagged correlation results ...... 197 Appendix C: Problem space systems root fefinitions ...... 198
iii List of figures Figure 4-1. Quantitative collection method ...... 61 Figure 4-2. Public opinion question 1 – “Would you talk to the Taliban?”...... 68 Figure 4-3. Public Opinion Question 2 – “Do you support the Afghanistan mission?” ...... 69 Figure 4-4. Content analysis enemy imagery...... 72 Figure 4-5. Content analysis enemy themes by percentage identified ...... 77 Figure 4-6. Cross-lag correlation (CLC) example ...... 78 Figure 5-1. Contemporary enemy in Afghanistan in themes and words...... 100 Figure 6-1. Attribution process for IED strike against Canadian Forces ...... 113 Figure 6-2. Attribution process for acid attack against Afghan schoolgirls ...... 114 Figure 6-3. Attribution process for Taliban election threats...... 115 Figure 6-4. The role of attribution and enemy imagery in enmification ...... 118 Figure 7-1. Rich picture of MRP problem space ...... 136 Figure 7-2. Problematique: MRP problem space issues ...... 137 Figure 7-3. Canadian Internet reporting on Afghanistan War ...... 140 Figure 7-4. Online attribution of disposition to the Taliban ...... 141 Figure 7-5. Online enemy perception formation and hardening ...... 142 Figure 7-6. Model of Internet enmification...... 143 Figure 7-7. Model of Internet enmification revisited with media influence types ...... 147
iv List of tables Table 1-1. Insurgency strategy versus Taliban overarching goals ...... 13 Table 4-1. Measurements for quantitative collection method...... 62 Table 4-2. Content analysis sample events and enemy imagery ...... 70 Table 4-3. Internet media features identified from sample ...... 74 Table 4-4. Cross-lagged correlation results and quantitative Interpretation...... 80 Table 8-1. Mitigating the fundamental attribution error ...... 166 Table 8-2. Clarifying the insurgency ...... 167 Table 8-3. Creating space between the mission in Afghanistan and 9/11 ...... 168 Table B-1. Panel cross-lagged correlation results ...... 197 Table C-1. System 1 inputs, outputs and perspectives ...... 198 Table C-2. System 1 working definition ...... 198 Table C-3. System 2 inputs, outputs and perspectives ...... 199 Table C-4. System 2 working definition ...... 199 Table C-5. System 3 inputs, outputs and perspectives ...... 200 Table C-6. System 3 working definition ...... 200
v 1.0 Background: Canada in Afghanistan
On September 20, 2001, after the 9/11 attack against the United States, Canada's Minister of Defence, Art Eggleton, advised Governor General Adrienne Clarkson to authorize more than
100 Canadian Forces’ (CF) members, who serve on military exchange programs in the United
States and other countries, to participate in U.S. operations in Afghanistan (CENTCOM, 2010).
Canada is one of 12 founding members of the alliance between North American and European countries that was formed in 1948 (NATO, 2010). Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan later evolved to participation in the International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan (ISAF) in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001 under the authority of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO).
Afghan leaders attending the conference began the process of reconstructing their country by setting up a new government structure known as the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA). A
UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established ATA was also launched at this time to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and to support the reconstruction of
Afghanistan (ISAF, 2010).
Operation Athena is the CF component of ISAF in Afghanistan. The mission, commenced in 2003, has evolved over the years in response to the dynamic humanitarian and security challenges presented by its current area of focus, Kandahar province. Op Athena is the backbone of
Canada’s six priorities in Afghanistan and provides security and military expertise in the implementation of key development projects funded by the Canadian government. The mission has
6 resulted in the highest levels of combat and casualties seen by the CF since the Korean War1 and a shift from traditional peacekeeping to modern counterinsurgency warfare2.
Op Athena is currently under the direction of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command
(CEFCOM) and is by far its largest mission in terms of personnel, equipment, and budget 3. “Op
Athena has one over-arching objective: to leave Afghanistan to Afghans, in a country that is better governed, more peaceful, and more secure” (DND, 2010). The 2001 mission was based on the
Canadian government’s desire4 to participate in the collective NATO effort in Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S.
The formation of ISAF in 2001 was sanctioned by UN resolution 1386 although NATO did
not formally assume its command responsibilities in Afghanistan until 2003. The coalition force is
responsible for security and stability in all regions of Afghanistan and fulfils its mandate within the
sovereign Islamic state at the behest of its government (ISAF, 2010). The first phase of the
operation took place in Kabul, between 2003 and 2005, and was focused on the provision of support to Afghanistan’s first democratic election and governance structure in 2004 where Hamid
1 Canada suffered 516 casualties in the Korean War between 1950 and 1953 (VAC, 2010), compared to 147 as of June 2010 in the
mission in Afghanistan which commenced in December 2001 (CBC, 2010).
2 The NATO glossary of terms and definitions describes peacekeeping as a peace support operation following an agreement or
ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of
disruption is low (2010, 2-P-3). Conversely, counterinsurgency is defined as those military, paramilitary, political, economic,
psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency (2010, p. 2, C-17).
3 As of May, 2010, Joint Task Force Afghanistan was just over 2,800 in strength (DND, 2010). In October, 2008, Kevin Page,
Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer, predicted that the costs of the war could end up being between $14 and $18 billion at the
conclusion of the mission in 2011 (Campbell, 2008).
4 For a detailed account on the Canadian Government’s response to the attacks of 9/11, please see Backgrounder: Canada's Actions
Against Terrorism Since September 11 available from www.international.gc.ca.
7 Karzai was elected president (DND, 2010). Along with a renewed focus on humanitarian and development projects, the command structure of Op Athena reconfigured under ISAF Regional
Command (South) in 2005, and the CF contingent became known as Joint Task Force Kandahar.
The introduction of the Afghanistan Compact, the successor to the Bonn Agreement, in
2006 extended the mandate and operations of ISAF beyond Kabul to support the establishment of
Afghanistan’s governance and security institutions in provinces dominated by anti-government forces (GoC, 2009). The agreement also put in place a plan for the Afghan government to gradually accept complete responsibility for security maintenance within its borders with mentoring support from ISAF. The biggest threat to the Afghan government’s ability to maintain security and stability is the Islamic militant group known as the Taliban.
1.1 The Taliban
The Taliban, also known as "the Seekers", was formed in September 1994 in the southern
Afghan province of Kandahar by a group of graduates from Pakistani Islamic colleges, madrassas, on the border with Afghanistan (Global Security, 2005). The members of the movement are mostly
Pashtuns from Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan. As a result, the Taliban advocated an Islamic
Revolution in Afghanistan that proclaimed that the unity of Afghanistan should be re-established within the framework of Sharia (Islamic law). Its fighting ranks were mostly filled with former veterans of the war against Soviet forces although their vision of Afghanistan did not include a place for their former Mujahidin comrades (2005). A predominantly Pashtun group, the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in the fall of 1996 (CIA, 2010).
8 There has been a recent re-emergence 5 from hard-line Taliban supporters in opposition to the Government led by Karzai and supported by NATO. As a regional actor, the Taliban also threatens to destabilize Pakistan, where it controls areas in the northwest and is linked to a wave of suicide bombings and assassinations (BBC, 2009). The Taliban emerged in northern Pakistan following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in the early 1990s (2009).
The Taliban is understood to have first appeared in religious seminaries funded by Saudi
Arabia, where certain clerics promoted a hard line form of Sunni Islam, known as Whahhabism6.
The Taliban's vision of the region that spans Pakistan and Afghanistan was to maintain peace and security and enforce its own strict version of Sharia law7 (Global Security, 2005). In both
5 June 1, 2010. While Afghan President Hamid Karzai presided over the start of a special consultative peace gathering (Jirga),
Taliban forces fired rockets toward the meeting and three suicide bombers struck elsewhere in Kabul. The incident occurred as the
summer fighting season in Afghanistan got underway. A major US-led offensive into the southern part of the country was
imminent. The objective: To secure Kandahar. The city is nominally under the Afghan government's control. But over the last few
months, it has fallen under the influence of the Taliban (Tremonti, 2010).
Source: Sonia Verma, The Globe and Mail. Available on www.cbc.ca
6 Whahhabism is a strictly orthodox interpretation of the tenants of Sunni Islam that originated in the Arab Peninsula in the 13th
century. This purist form of Islam re-emerged as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established in the 1930s. The United States
blames Wahhabi Islam for fuelling terrorism. They note that fifteen of the hijackers who carried out the 9/11 attacks on US soil
were Saudi nationals. The architects of the Taliban are said to have been inspired by the Wahhabi ideal of a pure Islam, and when
they took control of Afghanistan, they established a state that was more far more conservative than Saudi Arabia.
Source: In depth Islam: Wahhabi Islam - Back to the basics (CBC, June 8, 2006) available on www.cbc.ca
7 Sharia law denotes an Islamic way of life, not just a system of criminal justice. It is a code of living that most Muslims adopt as part
of their faith. Some countries formally institute it as a part of their legal system, enforced by the courts; however, the way Sharia
law is applied from country to country can vary widely. Some more modern Arab states with courts with Islamic roots would view
Taliban Sharia law as harsh vigilantism.
Source: In depth Islam: Sharia law: FAQs (CBC, May 26, 2005) available on www.cbc.ca
9 countries, it has introduced or supported Islamic punishment systems that included public executions of convicted murderers and adulterers as well as amputations of those found guilty of theft. Men were required to grow beards and women had to wear burkas, a relgious garment that covers them from head to toe. The Taliban had also banned television, music, and cinema and had disapproved of adolescent girls going to school (BBC, 2009).
The group became the focus of the world’s attention after the attacks on the World Trade
Centre in September 2001. The group’s leader in Afghanistan, Mullah Mohammad Omar, was accused of providing a sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization who were blamed for the attacks. Soon after 9/11, the Taliban were driven from power in Afghanistan by a
U.S.-led coalition. Their leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, is still alive and hiding in Pakistan8.
The reclusive leader, and most of his closest associates, have evaded capture despite one of the largest manhunts in the world; he is still believed to yield the most influence within the resurgent
Taliban movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan9.
The resurgence of Taliban forces is most notable in the Southern and Eastern provinces of
Afghanistan, manned by Canadian and American troops respectively (Flynn, 2009). Since its
involvement in NATO ground operations, Canada has lost 147 Canadian soldiers, one diplomat,
two aid workers, and one journalist (CBC, 2010). Of the military personnel killed in action (KIA), over half were attributed to improvised explosive devices (IED) or land mines, the Taliban’s weapon of choice (2010). While averaging one assassination a day and a suicide bombing every second or third day, insurgents have increased the level of violence in Afghanistan and are
8 It is largely believed that Mullah Omar is hiding in Quetta, under the protection of the Pakistan intelligence service (ISI). Islamabad
regularly denies these claims (Sand, 2007).
9 Since 2001, Mullah Omar has led the Inner Shura, a now 18-member committee which controls all Taliban military, financial, and
information operations (Flynn, 2009).
10 becoming the greatest source of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, according to a United Nations report from Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released on June 16, 2010 (2010).
The shift to more complex suicide attacks demonstrates the growing capability of local
terrorist networks linked to Al Qaeda...Insurgents followed up their threats against the
civilian population with, on average, seven assassinations every week, the majority of
which were conducted in the south and southeast regions. (Ki-moon, 2010, p. 4)
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s recent quotation accurately summarizes the insurgency threat facing Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, Canada’s modern military is pitted against a foe that blends in seamlessly with the general public and is integrated with criminal and narcotic enterprises. Despite an increase in the numbers of foreign troops, particularly U.S. forces10, the Taliban has steadily extended its influence and has returned Afghanistan to levels of violence and instability not seen since the 2001
U.S. invasion (BBC, 2009). Canadian forces are, however, not facing the same foe they did at the start of the mission.
Currently, the Taliban is not the cohesive and homogeneous group it was before Western retaliation for the 9/11 attacks (Global Security, 2005). The contemporary Taliban is comprised of different elements with various degrees of dedication to the fight against foreign occupation. The more heterogeneous group is comprised of both dedicated (hardliners, Islamic fundamentalists) and non-dedicated elements (criminals, narco-traffickers, and disenchanted youth) (2005). It is, thus, difficult to attribute any particular observed pattern of behaviour to one Taliban disposition because of the now heterogeneous composition of the movement. In his book, Koran, Kalashnikov,
10 On December 1, 2009, President Barack Obama announced a surge of 30,000 US troops for the mission in Afghanistan as part of
his new strategy for winning the war (CBC News, 2009).
11 and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, Antonio Giustozzi traces the emergence of the neo-Taliban and its growth into a full-scale, and effective, insurgency (2007). The author describes an important difference between the old and the new Taliban in the title of his book:
“Where the old Taliban leadership clumsily relied on a rigid and doctrinaire interpretation
of the Koran and an unskilled use of rifles, the new Taliban has adopted flexibility in
implementing strict interpretations of Sharia law, when it suits their purposes, but more
importantly, has embraced new strategies and technologies—including computers—to
make their efforts succeed.” (Clark, 2007)
According to Giustozzi, the greatest successes of the neo-Taliban can be attributed to the following three factors (2007):
1. The leadership of the neo-Taliban exploited the political weaknesses of the new
Afghani government, especially in the relationship between the central and local
governments.
2. The neo-Taliban willingly adopted new strategies and tactics in fighting the Afghan
army, police, and its foreign supporters.
3. They have confronted an inconsistent and ineffective counterinsurgency strategy, one
that has changed almost every six months for the past several years.
This suggests that a successful counterinsurgency strategy by ISAF would require the mitigation of the above points of exploitation that could be accomplished through a strengthened and empowered Afghan government, the continued training and mentoring of Afghan army and police forces, and a consistent political and military approach on the part of the international community to counter the insurgency.
12 It is important in noting that the Taliban are not the only insurgent group operating in
Afghanistan and that, in fact, the insurgency is encompassing something greater than one particular group. In an unclassified briefing on the state of the insurgency in December 2009, ISAF’s director of intelligence identified over 10 active militant groups operating in and around ISAF area of operations in Afghanistan (Flynn, 2009, p. 2). Table 1-1 describes the current insurgency strategy as delineated between insurgency tactics and overarching Taliban goals (2009, p. 3).
Table 1-1
Insurgency strategy versus Taliban overarching goals
Insurgency strategy Taliban overarching goals
Increase base of support (continue to expand into west Expel foreign forces from Afghanistan and north)
Counter ISAF expansion and cause casualties, Undermine Afghan government authority and perceptions of especially coalition partners security
Undermine efforts of good governance Establish a Sunni state under Taliban Supreme Leader
Mullah Omar
Consolidate command and control, especially in the
South
Strengthen leadership and unity of effort throughout the country
Maintain momentum in the winter and increase aggressiveness
Increase influence around urban centers of Kandahar and Kabul
Note: From "State of the Insurgency: Trends, Intentions and Objectives," Major-General Michael Flynn, Director of
Intelligence, ISAF, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, December 2002
13 General Stanley McChrystal, NATO’s commander in Afghanistan, named three groups, including
the Taliban or Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), as the primary insurgent actors that operate in the
region (Reuters, 2009). The other two groups were the Haqqani Network (HQN) and the Hezb-I-
Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). The Taliban and the overall insurgency share interests as both aim to disrupt the Afghan government’s authority, to increase their span of influence from traditional bases of support and, to inflict casualties on foreign troops.
As the Canadian military shifted from its traditional role as international peacekeeper to major player in Afghanistan’s counterinsurgency war, a public disconnect emerged. Consistent support for Canadian internationalism and efforts to promote global peace has not translated into the same level of public support11 for military operations in Afghanistan (Anker, 2005). While polls show the majority of the public support the CF, other studies reveal that Canadians generally lack an awareness of the nation’s military operations (2005). As will be discussed, most Canadians do not possess a deep understanding of the Taliban nor are many aware of the diversity of actors and issues involved in the Afghan insurgency. It is, however, likely that Canadians still link the mission in Afghanistan to its 9/11 roots12. The notion of linking the mission in Afghanistan to the
attacks of 9/11 further complicates the question of whether or not Canada should be talking to the
Taliban as opposed to its current military strategy, which is calling for their destruction.
11 In June 2003, before the first CF deployment for ISAF in Afghanistan, only 43% of the Canadian public supported the operation
down from 55% support in February. The decline was perhaps in part due to the fact the collective realization that the mission was
more peacemaking then peacekeeping (Ekos, 2003).
12 This notion will be discussed in detail during the paper as a factor in the process of emnification of the Taliban, particularly in
chapter 7.
14 1.2 Canadians and the Taliban
Despite the predominance of other hot political issues, such as the environment and the
economy, the Afghan conflict has been a topic of debate with many Canadians13. As the number of
Canadian casualties grows, Canadians ponder the rationale behind the mission, Canada’s long- standing alliance with NATO, and whether or not Canada should engage the Taliban politically, rather than kinetically14. Support for the troops has unwavered as hundreds throng to overpasses on the Highway of Heroes to salute the fallen upon their final trip home. As the Canadian military engagement is nearing its conclusion in 2011, few Canadians are interested in extending the
commitment in support of the U.S.’s refocused strategy of pouring more resources into the region 15. One could imply that those Canadians who support the mission, but do not support negotiations with the Taliban, do so because of certain views and opinions they hold towards the
Islamist militant group. This assumption is grounded on two points. Firstly, while support for the mission has fluctuated and currently rests with the majority of Canada opposed to the mission, support for the Canadian Forces has remained steadfast16. Second, despite the Canadian public’s
13 In July, 2007 10% of Canadians felt that terrorism/the mission in Afghanistan was the most important issue facing Canada today.
From Strategic Council Most Important Issue Facing Canada Today (October, 2009).
14 Polls from Angus Reid (2006-2010), Ekos (2009) and the Strategic Council (2009) show divisive public opinion on the rationale
behind the NATO mission in Afghanistan and whether or not Canada should support negotiations with the Taliban.
15 According to an Angus Reid poll, conducted in April, 2010, only 36% of Canadians believe that the U.S. President’s new strategy,
which consists of shifting military resources from the Iraq to Afghanistan and refocusing on training and empowering Afghan
security forces, will be ultimately successful
16 Current data estimates that over 60% of Canadians do not support the military operation in Afghanistan (Angus Reid, 2010). This
is contrasted by a 2008 survey which asked Canadians if they thought their military and NATO “…were doing a good job in
Afghanistan,” of which 76% responded positively (Strategic Council, 2008) and a 2006 survey in which 73% of Canadians said
they “felt proud” of what Canadian Forces were doing in Afghanistan (Strategic Council, 2006).
15 support of Canadian troops, support for the future of the mission has waned as Canadians come to
realize the end to the mission will likely involve some form of political negotiation with the
Taliban17. When a group holds negative attributions towards another group, one could hypothesize
that they view this group as the enemy if these attributions are sufficiently negative. It is important to understand if there is a link between Canadians and their view on the Taliban as the enemy and whether or not it affects their support of the notion that Canada should talk rather than fight the
Taliban.
The majority of Canadians have never been to Afghanistan. Of the few Canadians who
have been to the Afghan state, even fewer have encountered a Taliban member. Yet Canadians are
exposed to the Taliban on a frequent basis through extensive media reports on the conflict. The
degree of media exposure is dependent on several factors that include: the individual interests and
opinions of both Canada’s military and humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan, the attitudes towards the Canadian government, Western religious beliefs, accessibility to media sources (radio, newspaper, television, and online), and audience consumption levels of news from these media sources.
Media reports on the conflict typically focus on storylines that are designed to grab the public’s attention. The results of a major coalition operation against the insurgency, aggressive acts on the part of the Taliban, such as suicide bombings and the use of IEDs, harassing Afghan government institutions and events such as elections (all events that are referred to as traditional war reporting) encompass the majority of events presented by the media to the public (Howard,
2006). Perhaps the most powerful stories that impact Canadian audiences are the reports of
17 A recent poll concluded that 8% of Canadians believed the outcome of the Afghanistan mission would be a decisive NATO
victory over the Taliban, 46% foresaw a negotiated political settlement with the Taliban, 13% foresaw Taliban defeat of NATO
and 33% were uncertain (Angus Reid, 2010).
16 Canadian Forces KIA and the repatriation of their remains18. The Canadian media’s representation of these events are but a subset of the actual activities that occur in Afghanistan on a daily basis.
The Taliban could, for example, be involved in food distribution programs in areas of Kandahar that it controls as per its mandate to continue population outreach and protection programs (Flynn,
2009, p. 6), but Canadians would be hard pressed to see that information in popular Canadian news sources19. Traditional war reporting focuses on negative events and reinforces perceptions of an already negatively perceived group (Ottosen, 2005). The news reports on these negative events contain images of the Taliban that are not favourable to Canadians and, over time, form an overall impression of the group in the conscience of the Canadian public.
This paper will explore how a group, that was previously unknown to Canadians before the
Afghan conflict, grew to become a perceived enemy during Canadian engagement in Afghanistan through persistent exposure to enemy imagery contained in news reports. The paper will argue that the process is gradual and occurs over time. This process of enmification is most often described in situations where adversarial groups are geographically close to the core conflict, such as in a civil war between rival political factions or a community dispute between minority and majority ethnic groups20. The paper argues that the broad reach of Internet media mitigates proximity from being a
18 A recent University of Toronto study argues that Canadians’ emotional response to the loss of Canadian soldiers and their
repatriation ceremonies galvanizes support for the kinetic aspect of the mission in Afghanistan (Fletcher and Hove, 2010).
19 Television is still the top source of news in Canada, with the Internet being the second most popular source of news, behind news
print (Veenhof and Lecavalier, 2007). From the Canadian Internet Project report, the most popular online media outlets consulted
by English speaking Canadians are CBC (23%), MSN (13%), and CNN (12%) (Zamaria and Fletcher, 2008, p. 169).
20 See “Enemies” a chapter from A.Tidwell’s Conflict Resolved? for a anthology of theories and perspectives of emnification and
how is has been most often discussed in the context of national and civil wars up until the end of the Cold War era in the early
1990s.
17 prerequisite for groups to be in conflict and view one another other as an enemy. The growth of
global media interconnectivity and news coverage in Canada has provided a virtual proximity21 between Canadians and the war in Afghanistan. Information from a variety of news sources available to Canadians is synthesized at an individual level to form a concept of the conflict and the enemy facing Canada. This may have real consequences on individual Canadian perceptions of the mission in Afghanistan and the Taliban.
21 In this context, the term virtual proximity is used to describe how the flow of information describing events in places where few of
the audience are, or ever have been, and involving personalities and groups they will most likely never personally encounter in
their lives. For example, the majority of civilian Canadians will never encounter or interact with a member of the Taliban in their
life.
18 2.0 Project overview
The objective of this major research project (MRP) is to explore the relationship between enemy imagery contained in Canadian media representation of the war in Afghanistan and
Canadian public’s popular perception of the Taliban. It would be impossible to capture all
Canadian news reporting on a widely reported subject such as Afghanistan for a fixed period of time because of the multitude of media agencies, mediums (newsprint, television, radio, and online), and reaches (local versus national22). Even narrowing the scope to a particular medium
(television, for example) and reach (national) over a short period of time (one month) would
require a team of researchers to capture and analyze all Canadian reports on the conflict. A sample
of Internet news on particular Afghan conflict events between specific periods of time presents
itself as a more reasonable option for a project that is limited to one researcher23. Canadians get their news from a multitude of sources that include television, newsprint, online and mobile sources (Veenhof, 2006).
In a system of media agencies (message senders) and audiences (message receivers), a multitude of purposive (direct) and non-purposive (indirect) messages from a multitude of news sources are encoded with their own distinct units of meaning (MacLean and Westley, 1978). These messages converge on a message receiver and are decoded as the individual integrates the newly obtained information into a working understanding of their world and perspective (1978, p. 41).
22 The Canadian Newspaper Association (CNA) lists over 15 Canadian media agencies with a significant online news presence. In
comparison, CNA lists over 70 active daily newspapers in Canada with an estimated readership that requires over 4 million papers
in daily circulation (2009) reaching almost 3/4 of Canada's adult population (2008).
23 In the context of this research project, the content analysis portion of the study will constitute the field (or action) research
component of the academic exercise. Hence, the term field research describes research of online media content in the field of
Canadian Internet news war reporting.
19 Most research on audience effects of enemy imagery have focused on newsprint (Ottosen, 1995)
and television (Hesse, Petra and Mack, 1997) as the source of news. With the increase in
prominence of Internet-based news sources, in both global and national spaces24, a gap is evident in the body of knowledge on enemy imagery and the process in which enemies are made. An extensive literature review completed as a component of the MRP concluded with the observation that the topic of enemy imagery in Internet news, and its potential effects on audiences, has been relatively unexplored. For these reasons, the MRP will examine the relationship between the levels of enemy imagery found in Canadian Internet news reports and public perceptions of the Taliban and the mission in Afghanistan.
It is important to stress the exploratory nature of this MRP and, as such, it is not the purpose of this study to prove direct relationships between variables but, rather, to better understand their levels of interrelatedness. Exploratory research often relies on secondary research such as reviews on available literature and data (Fico, Lacy and Riffe, 1998, p. 100). This MRP will leverage an exploratory research methodology to develop insights into the problem space and its related issues. Exploratory research is typically employed when a problem has not been clearly defined or previously researched. Exploratory research is also used to determine the best research design, data collection method, and analytical frameworks to help explain the problem space
(Gunter, 2000, p. 139). The results of exploratory research alone are not typically used for
24 The World Internet Project (WIP) 2009 report indicated that Internet news had reached its highest levels of adoption to date as a
source of reliable news globally. This observation was echoed in the Canadian section of the study (Canada Online!) where it was
reported that almost 80% of Canada’s Internet users rely on the Internet as a source of news (Zamaria et al, 2007, p. 170). The
Pew Research Center study, The New News Landscape: Rise of the Internet, reports that close to 60% of Americans get their
news from a combination of online and offline sources and that the Internet was behind only television as a source of news (2010,
para. 3).
20 decision-making purposes; however, they can provide significant insight into a given problem
space. The MRP aims to explore the effects on Canadian audience’s perception of the Taliban by
through an analysis of the enemy imagery in Canadian Internet news reports on the conflict in
Afghanistan. The research also aims to find and validate communication and conflict theories that could support and explain the study's hypotheses and help form recommendations for change.
2.1 Research questions
The MRP will use the war in Afghanistan and Canadian Internet reporting on the war as the subjects of its research focus. The primary and sub-research questions are presented below:
♦ Primary research question: What role does Internet news reporting play in the creation and
maintenance of enemy-perceptions in insurgency conflict?
♦ Sub-research question 1: Do Canadian Internet news reports on the conflict in Afghanistan
contain enemy imagery of the Taliban and, if so, what type and frequency?
♦ Sub-research question 2: Does the Internet, as a medium, contribute to the propagation and
hardening of Canadian perceptions of the enemy (enemy perceptions) and, thus, play a part in a
potential process of enmification?
♦ Sub-research question 3: What conflict theory could be integrated with other disciplinary
theory (sociology, psychology, and communication) to create a model for the process of
Internet enmification, and what would this model look like?
♦ Sub-research question 4: What existing and new strategies and theories could be used to
counter this model of enemy-making?
21 2.2 Operational terms
♦ Internet news: Any online news report, excluding blogs, co-located with the media website and
reader feedback posted in response to the news piece. Internet news may be either event-
oriented (driven by a specific event) or issue-oriented (driven by a need for discussion, analysis
or editorial commentary) (Kirat, 1997, p. 1). The rationale behind the delineation between the
news story and co-located blogs and user comments again boils down to research efficiencies
as some articles contain hundreds of reader comments.
♦ Enemy images: Textual and visual representations of an ‘other’ or adversary group ranging
from factual to severely distorted (Fabick, 2007, p. 73). The quantitative methodology section
will introduce the classification system which will be employed in the study in further detail.
♦ Framing: Closely related to the concept of imagery is the media practice of selecting and
amplifying certain aspects of a perceived reality (framing), making it more salient in a given
piece of communication. This technique sometimes combines text with images in a manner
that promotes a particular concept or ideology (Entman, 1993, p. 52). The MRP will consider
the use of framing by Canadian media agencies reporting on the conflict in Afghanistan to
build on themes that commonly appear in reports that mention the Taliban.
♦ Popular perception: A generally held attitude or viewpoint towards an idea posed by
institutions such as a government, the media, or an organization that specializes in public
poling. The concept of popular perception will be realized through the use of recent Canadian
public poll data on the topic of Afghanistan.
♦ Perception hardening: The organization of popular perception, over time, where characteristics
attributed to a common ‘out-group’ become part of the shared baseline understanding or view
of the group. This can lead to the construction of different and competing social realities both
22 within and between groups. As the quantitative methodology section will explain, this will be
operationalized 25 by examining the relationship between the appearance of enemy imagery and
the subsequent measurement of public opinion towards the Taliban.
♦ Emnification: The process by which psychological and social factors combine, over time, in
such a way that individuals or groups are transformed from ‘others’ to sworn enemies (Kelly
and Rieber, 1991, p. 38). Over time, and persistent exposure to enemy imagery, some
Canadians, far removed from the frontlines of conflict, may come to view the Taliban as their
enemy. The MRP will examine if there is evidence that this process exists and, if so, how it
works.
♦ Internet Emnification: A proposed process and the suggested outcome of this research study
that will explore the potential link between the process of emnification and the perpetuation of
enemy images over the Internet (Canadian consumption of Internet reports on the conflict in
Afghanistan) and contribute to the eventual formation of perceived enemies (the Taliban). It is
important to note that the process is not necessarily intentional and is more likely to be an
indirect result of media and audience system interactions. As the study will show, the
characteristics of the Internet as a source of the news distinguishes it from the process of
enemy-making in traditional news forms.
♦ Problem space: The conceptualization of a particular problematic situation or scenario that
includes the groups and institutions discussed, along with the perceived list of issues and
25 The term operationalized is used to describe the realization of an operational term within the specific context of the MRP,
including its methodology and its associated assumptions and limitations; for example, the concept of perception hardening will
be operationalized by certain assumptions to how Canadians would answer poll questions regarding the Taliban and whether or
not Canada should enter into negotiations. This is how the term perception hardening will be realized (or operationalized) within
this paper.
23 problems under consideration. In this MRP, the problem space includes Canadian audiences,
Canadian media (in particular, online news), Canadian audiences’ perceptions of the Taliban
and mission in Afghanistan, and the process of emnification of the Taliban insurgency.
♦ Systems thinking and analysis: A tool used to analyze real-world problem situations. Systems
thinking and analysis requires analysts and researches to delineate their perception of a
problem space into individual systems to help identify and compartmentalize problem-space
issues and potential areas of change before recommendations are made (Checkland, 2000).
♦ Complexity: A term used to describe and assess the level of intricacy and unpredictability
inherint in certain systems (Travis and Venable, 1998). A system is considered complex if it
cannot be easily described in terms of inputs and outputs with a high degree of certainty26.
♦ Implementation feasibility: The estimation of how acceptable a desired goal or outcome would
be within a given problem space. In order for a recommendation to be assessed as feasible in
this context, it must satisfy assumptions around the feasibility to achieve change in certain
aspects of the problem space.
2.3 Hypothesis
♦ Primary hypothesis: Canadian Internet news reports on the war in Afghanistan play a role in
the formation and maintenance of enemy-perceptions held by Canadians.
♦ Hypothesis 1: Canadian Internet news reports contain enemy imagery of the Taliban and the
presence of this imagery is related to the story reported on.
26 For example, a car engine or piece of electronics is generally stable and hence predictable in terms of transforming inputs into
outputs with a high degree of certainty. In contrast, audience and media interactions and outcomes are neither easily predicted nor
modelled, and hence would be considered complex.
24 ♦ Hypothesis 2: There is some correlation between the amount of enemy imagery contained in
Internet news reports and Canadian public opinion on the mission in Afghanistan and the
Taliban.
♦ Hypothesis 3: The Internet does play a role in the process of emnification of the Taliban from
the view of the Canadian public.
2.4 Sponsor
The MRP sponsor is Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Adversarial
Intent Section (AIS). In terms of sponsor benefit, DRDC-AI hopes the study will help to contemporize the concept of the enemy as portrayed in Internet news reports. The study also offers a refreshed view of enemy concepts that were developed during the height of the Cold War and are now applied to an asymmetrical adversary. This will be achieved by revisiting key enemy imagery and enmification concepts and reapplying them in the context of the post 9/11 strategic environment 27. The overarching goal will be to fill a gap created by the paradigm shift from Cold
War to Global War on Terrorism (GWOT28) threats to Canada and the different roles played by the
national media apparatus respectively during those different periods of history (McNair, 2007, p.
32). The study will explore how enemy imagery affects popularly-held Canadian opinions on the
27 In recent years, the Canadian public environment has been characterized by three major trends related to defence and security: a
consistently high level of public support for the CF, significantly greater concerns about emerging threats and global security since
9/11, and growing concerns about Canada’s defence capabilities (Anker, 2005, p. 27).
28 In a sign of the times, on February 24, 2004, the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) announced the criteria for the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT) medal. Besides previous mention in Presidential speeches and by other senior administration, the war on
terror was not formally recognized as an actual war in the U.S. until that point: “In consideration of new military roles in a post-
Sept. 11th environment, the department developed these awards for military members to provide flexible and tangible recognition
for those serving in the current war against terrorism, a war that spans the globe and includes many diverse campaigns” (DoD,
2004).
25 mission and perceptions towards the Taliban. This is of interest to DRDC-AI as it falls within the information problem-space, now a key aspect of the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan
(Dixon, 2005, p. 38). Through a comprehension of how Canadian public support for the mission and perception of the adversary fluctuates in response to the sensory information provided by enemy imagery, DRDC can better understand the psychological and socio-cultural context of modern asymmetrical warfare. Special thanks go the AI team for their time and collaboration on the project.
2.5 Structure of the paper
♦ Chapter 1 – Introduction to Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan and background on the
Taliban, the contemporary foe currently facing Canadian Forces in Op Athena.
♦ Chapter 2 – Overview of the project, research questions, operational terms, hypothesis, and
methodology.
♦ Chapter 2 – Media will discuss Canadian Internet news coverage of the war in Afghanistan and
how it shapes public perception and opinion. The notion of media effects will be considered to
form a proposed framework of multi-source communication (Maclean and Westley, 1957)
from which the study will model the system interactions between Canadian media and public
opinion on the mission in Afghanistan and the Taliban. Finally, Canadian Internet news
reporting trends and adoption rates29 will be presented in order to assess the current levels of
Internet news consumption in Canada.
29 As an emerging source of news, the growth and current state of Internet consumption in Canada will be examined through the use
of findings from studies by the Canadian Internet Project (CIP) (2009), Statistics Canada (Veenhof, 2006) and the Pew Institute
Internet and American Life Project (2010).
26 ♦ Chapter 3 – Quantitative analysis will introduce the action research component of the MRP. A
database of enemy imagery contained in Internet news reports on key events in the Afghan war
will be developed. The sample will be limited to pre-selected Canadian news agencies; the
rationale behind the selection of agencies, events and methodology will also be discussed.
Enemy imagery will be classified as being either situational or dispositional as defined by
Ottosen (1995). A view of Canadian public perception towards the mission and the Taliban
will be constructed through a composite of polling data from multiple sources. The chapter will
conclude with an application of the cross-lagged-correlation (CLC) exploratory method to
provide an initial assessment of the level of interrelatedness between the presence of enemy
imagery and subsequent public opinion on the mission and adversary.
♦ Chapter 4 – Qualitative analysis will build upon the numerical analysis from the previous
chapter and present a discussion on the themes found in the content analysis. A clearer picture
of the contemporary enemy will be constructed through an application of the findings in
Chapter 3. The rational behind the cross-lagged correlation will be discussed in detail and the
results of the CLC 30 will be interpreted and integrated into a bigger picture view of the
problem-space.
♦ Chapter 5 – Application of conflict theory Heider’s Attribution Theory (1959) and the
Fundamental Attribution error (Ross, 1977) will be discussed and applied to the problem-
30 In the quantitative section of the paper, cross-lagged correlation (CLC) results will be considered in raw form and ordered in
significance numerically (i.e. the more positive or negative the result, the more positive or negative potential relationship between
variables exists). In the qualitative portion of the paper, the meaning of these positive and negative potential relationships will be
examined in greater detail and their validity challenged.
27 space. It will be shown that the three stages of attribution31 are a driving factor in the process of
Internet emnification, where situational and dispositional enemy imagery trigger reinforced
negatively perceived enemy dispositions.
♦ Chapter 6 - Model will focus on the creation of a model to describe the process of Internet
enmification. The model will explain the complex system of enemy imagery, Internet news
reports, attribution processes, online Canadian audiences, and negative enemy perceptions
towards the Taliban. The results of the quantitative, qualitative, and conflict application
chapters will be integrated into a conceptual model using traditional systems thinking and
analysis.
♦ Chapter 7 – Recommendations will explore how to counter the process of emnification, in
general and over the Internet, by applied concepts such as peace journalism (Nohrstedt and
Ottosen, 2008, p. 10) and perception management to the MRP problem-space. Through a
completion of the systems analysis of the problem space, areas of change will be identified and
a strategy to counter the process of emnification of the Taliban by the Canadian Internet media
will be proposed.
♦ Appendix A: Content analysis design and protocol sheet
♦ Appendix B: Cross-lagged-correlation calculations
♦ Appendix C: Problem space systems root definitions
31 Attribution is a three-step process through which one group perceives another as a causal agent. The three steps are (1) perception
of the action, (2) judgement of the intention, and (3) attribution of disposition (Griffin, 1994, p. 138).
28 3.0 Project media framework
The role of the media and its interaction with the Canadian public is central to this major
research project (MRP). The goal of this chapter is to create a framework from which the media
will be considered in this study, a tool needed to integrate the Internet, the Canadian media, and its
audience as actors in a larger systems view of the problem space. Furthermore, public opinion is
additionally shaped as a result of the interaction between the media, the Internet, and the Canadian
audience. This study proposes that news on the mission in Afghanistan affects the opinion
Canadian audiences have on the war and the Taliban. The following key assumptions will be
developed with regards to the discussion and analysis of the media as a system:
Canadian Internet war reporting: Canadian Internet reporting on the mission in
Afghanistan is predominantly traditional war journalism (Howard, 2006) which tends to be dichotomized and describes parties in a conflict in terms of winners and losers (Ottosen, 2005).
War journalism is not the only reporting framework that can be employed by Canadian media agencies in the course of how they cover the conflict in Afghanistan; however, the assumption will be made that Canadian media agencies use a more war-oriented frame of reporting than conflict/peace oriented (i.e. peace journalism32) in the coverage of the Afghan conflict.
Media effects on audiences: Several frameworks33 attempt to explain the relationship between media messages and its effect on audiences. One aspect that varies between frameworks is
32 Peace journalism is a set of journalistic practices to cover war and conflict that emerged in the 1970s and was developed by
Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung (Lee and Maslog, 2005, p. 311). Essentially, Galtung proposed that journalists adopt a more
peace/conflict (solution oriented) perspective on reporting rather than a war/violence perspective (victory oriented).
33 Including the bullet theory (Severin, 1992), Lazerfield’s two-step flow (1950), powerful effects model (Littlejohn, 1999) and
limited effects model (Klapper, 1960).
29 the assumption as to what amount of effect the media has on its audiences. The limited effects
model will be used in this study. The model acknowledges that the media play a role in the creation
of audience effects but within a complex environment of factors and influences (Klapper, 1960, p.
8). According to this model, mass media is considered a contributing agent rather than the sole
cause of audience effects. In this regard, the study proposes that Canadian Internet news on the war
in Afghanistan is a factor in an audience’s formation of perceptions of the conflict and the enemy.
Assumptions on how multiple sources of news are received and integrated by audiences will be
made through reference to Maclean and Westley’s (1978) conceptual model for communication
research. This is needed in order to consider how Canadian audiences form opinions and
perceptions on the Afghan mission and the process of news consumption from new (Internet) and
traditional (newsprint, radio, television) sources.
The dynamics of the media and public opinion: The relationship between the media and how it helps to form public opinion will be discussed. The study assumes that the media play a role in order to set the public agenda. This notion is important to the MRP as it applies to the level of public engagement and interest in Canada’s role in Afghanistan34 as manifested by Canadians’ consumption of reports on the mission’s military, humanitarian, and diplomatic developments.
Consonance, the unified picture of an event or issue that is developed between different sources of news (Severin et al, 1992, p. 252) and audience selective attention (Freeman and Sears, 1971 and
Klapper, 1960), will be examined as they apply to formation of a unified Canadian view of the
Taliban as an enemy that faces Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.
34 In 2007, approximately 10% of Canadians thought terrorism and the war in Afghanistan were the most important issues facing
Canadians today compared to approximately 3% in 2009 (Strategic Council, 2009).
30 The Internet as a source of news in Canada: The Internet is an important source of news to
Canadians (Veenhof, 2006, p. 23). Rather than displacing traditional news platforms, such as
television, newsprint, and radio, studies show35 that audiences are augmenting online news along with their traditional sources and patterns of news consumption. The credibility of the Internet as a news source will be compared to traditional news sources. Finally, certain aspects of the Internet will be considered as they relate to the evolving online news environment in Canada.
The study proposes that the integration of new and traditional news platforms influences
Canadian audience perceptions of current events. Terrorism and the war in Afghanistan have been on the Canadian public agenda since the attacks of 9/11 (Strategic Council, 2009 and McNair,
2007). Ultimately, the study argues that the enemy imagery that underlies the reports on the war in
Afghanistan affect the Canadian perspective on the mission and result in a shift in focus from the fight with the Taliban to potential talks with the Taliban.
3.1 Canadian Internet news: War reporting on Afghanistan
Operation Athena in Afghanistan is not the first war to include Canadian Forces that has been followed by Canadians from home. Canadians fought alongside allied states against the
Germans in World War I, II, and in the Korean War. The First (WWI) and Second World Wars
(WWII) were the second and third major conflicts that Canada participated in (Library and
Archives Canada, 2009). In both conflicts, Germany fought and lost against Great Britain, France,
Russia, and the United States. While WWI was more of a war between states and empires, WWII was a war of ideologies including fascism, communism, and democracy (Zuljan, 2000). In this
35 The Canadian Internet Project (CIP) report Canada Online! (Zamina and Fletcher, 2008), World Internet Project (WIP) Project
Highlights (2009), Statistics Canada Internet usage by group (Veenhof, 2006), and Pew Institute The New News Landscape: Rise
of the Internet (2010) have all presented data that suggest that news audiences are complimenting traditional forms of news with
online forms.
31 sense, the enemy shifted from imperialistic (Kaiser) to fascist (Hitler). From the first to second half of the 20th century, a shift in contemporary enemy occurred from Hitler’s Nazis (Germany) to Cold
War Communist (Russia, China, Cuba, and East Germany). The mention of foreign states in conjunction with discussions on adversaries is important as countries are often linked to enemies and threats in the process of war reporting. A further shift occurred near the start of the 21st which was initiated by the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In the eyes of the media, the enemy was no longer Communism as the attention of the world focused on the threat of terrorism, particularly, Islamic fundamentalist-inspired terrorism (McNair, 2007, p. 32). The Canadian
Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act, Section 2c defines terrorism as:
Activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of
acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political,
religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state. (2004)
Islamist fundamentalist-inspired violence is a type of religious extremism and, in terms of media attention, the most high profile form of terrorism (CSIS, 2008). Other forms of terrorism include state-sponsored, domestic (special interest groups advocating issues such as anti-abortion legislation and the environment) (2008). It was, however, Islamic fundamentalist-inspired terrorism that was responsible for the attacks against the heart of Western capitalism on 9/11; hence this threat receives the highest level of counter-terrorism attention in Canada36. As an
example of how prominent terrorism has become in the Canadian media, CBC Digital Archives
War and Conflict section lists terrorism alongside the World Wars, the Korean War, and Vietnam
War, all significant and enduring conflicts in Canadian history (CBC, 2009).
36 CSIS dedicates most of its counter-terrorism resources to religious extremism, which the Government of Canada considers to be
the most serious threat to the safety of Canadians.
32 Historically, Canadian mass media has used traditional war reporting in its coverage of
Canadian involvement in conflicts (Howard, 2006). This style of reporting focuses on the casualties and violence of war and is oriented to name victors and losers of combat (Ottosen,
2005). The Canadian media has covered all major conflicts that Canada has been involved in, including WWI, WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War (CBC, 2009). Using Google News, researchers can easily access Canadian newsprint reports dating as far back as the assassination of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria (the incident widely regarded as the trigger for WWI). News reports on Canada’s involvement in NATO missions in the Balkans during the 1990s were primarily covered by traditional media forms as the Internet was still in its infant stages. Around
9/11, the Internet emerged as source of news37 that has matured over the last decade and throughout the course of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan (WIP, 2009). While a newer form of news, traditional (or conventional) journalistic practices of mass media organizations are extended to their online counterparts38, including the traditional aspects of war reporting. It is important to consider this notion when the sources of news available to the Canadian audience is examined.
Canadians are daily inundated with information from a variety of news sources; lately,
Afghanistan has been at the forefront of news reports (Strategic Council, 2009). Despite the overwhelming amount of information available on the conflict, many Canadians only possess a
37 The Internet was originally developed by the U.S. military as a means of allowing a group of computers to share information over
distances (CBC, 2007). The first message "lo" was transmitted on October 29, 1969. In 1990, the first browser system was
developed and named the World Wide Web (www) along with the script for creating text on web pages, Hypertext Markup
Language (HTML). In 1992, the first audio and video broadcasts were made over the Internet and it emerged as a new form of
news. In 1995, CBC website was launched as its traditional forms of television and radio news began being complemented by
online components (2007). As of 2007, nearly 75% of Canadians have or regularly use the Internet (World Bank, 2007).
38 For example, the journalistic practices of National Post newspaper are also applied to news pieces found online at
www.thenationalpost.ca, the online version of its publication.
33 general understanding of the conflict in Afghanistan39. Individuals have different appetites for
news, and not all people who consume news do so from the same sources or on the same topics;
for example, 51% of Canadians thought the war in Afghanistan has received “the right amount of
attention by the media in Canada” while 15% felt it received too much attention and 22 % felt too
little coverage was provided (Angus Reid, 2010). Canada’s role in the Afghan conflict is reported in newspaper articles, radio news updates, television evening news, and a host of Internet forms including online newspapers, news agency websites, blogs, and news feed formats like Really
Simple Syndication40 (RSS). News agencies such as CBC and CTV41 have created special sections on their websites dedicated to the war that integrate content from television and radio broadcasts with other text, audio, and video content. These special news sites allow frequent news followers to subscribe to free services that automatically e-mail or download updates to their personal and work computers along with mobile smart-phone devices. While the website names suggest the goal of covering Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, a majority of the content is ultimately focused on the war between Afghan President Karzai’s NATO-supported government and the insurgent groups who challenge him. Those who read online news reports on the conflict are sometimes invited to post their comments on the story, and this often creates a healthy debate on Canada’s role in Afghanistan and whether or not Canada should shift from a military towards a negotiation- based approach with the Taliban; for example, a report on acid attacks against Afghan schoolgirls
39 Almost 60% of Canadians feel they have a clear understanding of what the war in Afghanistan is all about (Angus Reid, 2010).
40 RSS feeds deliver new content to individuals on topics they are interested in. RSS provides a convenient way to syndicate
information from a variety of sources, including news stories, updates to a Web site or important bulletins. Most people take
advantage of some form of feed-reader software to monitor updates to RSS feeds (Microsoft, 2007).
41 See CBC Canada in Afghanistan and Crossroads Afghanistan available on www.cbc.ca and CTV Canada in Afghanistan
www.ctv.ca/afghanistan.
34 in November, 2008 is one of six articles on the incident on the CBC’s website. The report contains
an image of an Afghan girl in pain, web links to related articles and an embedded video from CBC
television news. This particular story was heavily commented on by readers who left 249
comments (2008). Although the Taliban denied involvement in the incident, some related Taliban
activities are mentioned throughout the articles. This created an opportunity for Canadian audiences to attribute the incident to the Taliban regardless of whether they were in fact responsible for the heinous crime. As a result, this negative attribution ultimately affects many
Canadians’ perceptions of the Taliban and does not support an environment in which Canadians
would choose to talk to the Taliban, rather than engage them in combat.
An important aspect of the media analysis framework for this study has been established by
a recognition that Canada’s media typically uses traditional war reporting in its coverage of the
conflict in Afghanistan. This reporting style was examined in closer detail during the action research phase of the project that included a content analysis of Canadian Internet news reports on the war in Afghanistan, the results of which will be presented later in the paper. As war reporting typically includes significant enemy imagery (Ottosen, 2005), the level of effect and influence the media has on audiences must be considered. This component of the study’s media framework will be discussed next.
35 3.2 Media effects on audiences
A more detailed discussion on the interaction between Canadians and Internet media requires the use of some fundamental communication concepts on message reception, processing, and effects so that the study’s framework of media consideration is properly grounded in contemporary mass communications theory. It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the historical debate as to whether media consumption produces powerful or minimal effects on message receivers; however, some assumptions will be outlined below and constitute the study’s assumptions on the interaction between Canadian media and audiences. From the spectrum of potential media effects, influence and opinion-formation will be given special focus. Key media- effects paradigms will be touched upon, which ultimately lead to the choice of the limited-effects model as the approach selected to consider the effects of Internet news coverage of the Afghanistan war on Canadian audiences.
In terms of audience, Canada can be considered either a mass society or community. This distinction is important because of the differences in interpreting communication dynamics. The mass society view of the audience describes them as an undifferentiated mass that can be moulded by the media while the community view suggests that audiences are discriminating members of small groups who are influenced by their peers and community leaders (Littlejohn, 1999, p. 335).
An example of a community-based theory of mass communication is the two-step flow hypothesis of information diffusion and influence (Lazarsfeld, 1948). This theory was proposed in 1940 by
Lazarsfeld, one the foremost communication theorists of the 20th century. The result of his famous study on election campaign formed his theory on mass communication effects. In this study, he showed that few people were directly influenced by mass media coverage of the campaign
(Severin and Tankard, 1992, p. 248). According to the theory, certain influential persons in society,
36 known as opinion leaders, receive information from the media and pass it on to their peers
(Littlejohn, 1999, p. 339). In terms of influential persons within a society, audiences can be
described as being either active or passive. The passive-audience view suggests that people are
easily influenced in a direct manner by the media, whereas the active-audience view suggests that
people make more active decisions about information they receive from the media (p. 337). For the
most part, mass communication theories consider audiences passively with differing schools of
thought on effects (limited versus powerful).
Theory on mass communication effects has evolved over the 20th century with differing schools of thoughts that alter in predominance. The bullet theory (also referred to as the magic bullet theory and hypodermic needle theory) was popular in the first half of the century (Littlejohn,
1999, p. 349). This concept argued that all media messages had a strong, universal effect on
audience members exposed to them (Severin et al, 1992, p. 247). The popularity of the theory was
further reinforced by WWI and WWII in a propaganda war between Hitler’s Nazi Empire and
Western allied forces. The Institute of Propaganda Analysis was created out of a fear that the Nazi
information campaign could significantly influence the opinions of Americans (p. 247).
Subsequent research on mass communications eventually displaced the validity of the bullet theory
and labelled it too simple to explain the complex system interaction between media messages and
audiences (Bauer, 1964 and Bail-Rokeach, 1976). The bullet theory is one of many powerful-
effects theories that argue that media messages have a powerful effect on audiences. Research on powerful-effects theories did not, however, yield results that support their validity (Bail-Rokeach,
1976 and Noelle-Neumann, 1974). During the 1950s, the two-step flow hypothesis became popular as academics turned to a more realistic model which proposed minimal audience effects. This was, however, shortlived because of a shift in paradigms. Later, theorists started to agree that the
37 complexity of system interaction could not be modelled by such a simple and linear models such as
Lazerfield’s two-step flow. From Theories of Human Communication:
Research more recent than the Lazarsfeld study has shown that the dissemination of ideas
is not a simple two-step process. A multiple-step model is now more generally accepted.
Research has shown that the ultimate number of relays between media and final receivers is
variable. (Littlejohn, 1999, p. 341)
This shift that occurred around the 1960s formed a more holistic school of thought on media effects that took other variables into consideration besides the linear, unidirectional message sender
(media) and receiver (audience). In a review of literature on mass communication effects, Klapper
posited that media messages are not a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects but rather
a contributing factor in complex process of social cognition (Klapper, 1990). Similarly, Bauer
discounts the hypodermic-needle theory through his observation that audiences are difficult to
persuade and form opinions in an obstinate fashion (Bauer, 1964, p. 319).
Many variables interact with the audience and form effects that include group and interpersonal factors and audience selectivity. The theory of selective exposure suggests people will more often than not select information consistent with their attitudes and beliefs (Freedman and Sears, 1971, p. 209). Selectivity is an important concept in the MRP as it (1) acts as a filter from which audiences decide what news information is and is not important to them and (2) helps guide audiences integration of news information with new, forming, and existing perceptions on events, personalities, and groups. To build on the previous example, it is possible that Canadian audiences actively chose not to consider the fact that Taliban spokesmen had denied Taliban involvement in the acid attack against the school girls. Contrasting this example with another, the study argues that Canadian audiences actively pay attention to and consume news reports
38 describing Canadian Forces’ KIAs during the course of the mission in Afghanistan (Fletcher and
Hove, 2010). This is significant as news reports on Canadian’s casualties almost always contain
enemy imagery of insurgents, including the Taliban, according to the results of the MRP content
analysis.
The amount of influence that the media wields directly or indirectly on audiences is a
subject of debate amongst many. Research and theory based on Katz and Lazarsfeld’s notion that
audience behaviours may be influenced by the media was controversial and often criticized
(Bertrand and Hughes, 2005, p. 97). In his article, Media Sociology: The Dominant Paradigm,
Todd is highly critical of the approach that cites the following deficiencies:
1. Assumes commensurability of modes of influence; that is, media and personal influence
are equivalent.
2. Assumes influence can be measured in discrete incidents, which denies the power of the
structure in which media and society operate.
3. Assumes consumption of media (and the values and ideas embedded within) is
analogous to the purchase and consumption of goods.
4. Models attitude and opinion changes as if they are dependent variables that are
manipulated by the independent variable media exposure.
5. Assumes conclusions derived from research on one medium (radio) could be applied to
another (television) (Gitlin, 1978, p. 207).
While some of these limitations can never be fully reconciled within this field of research, the selection of the limited effects model and an approach to consider audience influence in multi- information source environments will attempt to address the concerns sufficiently in the case of this study.
39 The limited-effects model is perhaps the most widely accepted contemporary theory on mass communications (Littlejohn, 1999 and Severin et al, 2003). In his book, The Effects of Mass
Communication, Klapper presents two generalizations:
Mass communication ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of
audience effects, but rather functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and
influences. These mediating factors are such that they typically render mass
communication a contributory agent, but not the sole cause in a process of reinforcing the
existing conditions (Klapper, 1960, p. 8).
The mediating factors referred to by Klapper include selective processes 42, group processes and
norms, and opinion leadership. Although the limited-effects model takes a more integrated view of
media effects than the powerful-effects and bullet theories, it is still criticized as being simplistic and linear (cause-to-effect) (Littlejohn, 1999, p. 349). Mass communication theorist Noelle-
Neumann (1974) argues that contemporary communication theorists believe that the media does indeed have powerful effects, although they lack the empirical data to sufficiently support their view. She also speculates that academic journalists who supported the limited-effects model did so in order to portray the media as a neutral disseminator of information rather than an influencer (p.
349). Notwithstanding these views, this paper will consider mass communications effects on public opinion by adopting the limited-effects model for the following reasons:
1. It is a more realistic model of media-audience interactions in comparison to powerful-
effects theories, including the bullet theory.
42 Selective processes include selective perception, exposure and retention (Klapper, 1960). Through these processes and depending
on the situation, audiences decide whether or not to actively or passively consume news information according to preferences and
existing perceptions and opinions.
40 2. It assumes the media does have some affect on audiences and, thus, has a role to play in
the forming of public perception and opinion; however, it does so in modest manner
grounded by empirical research. (Klapper, 1960)
3. Finally, there is compatibility between the limited-effects model and other theories that
will be applied in later sections of the paper such as Maclean and Westley’s (1957)
conceptual model for communication research and Attribution Theory.
The conceptual model for communication research developed by Maclean and Westley
(1957) was designed to handle a range of communications research questions that ranged from interpersonal to mass communications. The framework consists of three nodes: A - the communicator (media agency), B – the receiver (the public) and C – the channel (radio, television, newspaper, Internet). X represents events and objects that have been abstracted into transmissible form (messages). The relation A-X can be described as A’s opinion of X and similarly B-X describes the audience’s opinion of event/object X (1978, p. 43). When A communicates a message about X to B these messages may contain A’s opinion of X. An example of how this model can be applied to Internet reporting on the conflict in Afghanistan:
Node A: The Communicator– Canadian media agencies (CBC, CTV, National Post, etc.)
Node B: The Receiver – The Canadian audience
Node C: The Channel – The Internet
Node X: The Event – IED strike kills Canadian solider
According to the model, Canadian media agencies (A) report on an IED strike against Canadian
Forces (X) and disseminate the news to Canadians (B) through the Internet (C). If this opinion sharing is done on purpose to create influence, the message is said to be purposive, in the absence
41 of this intent, the message is said to be non-purposive (p. 41). “Individual news stories are the
consequence of news reporter judgement, interactions with purposive and non-purposive sources,
and decisions about style, structure, emphasis, and language” (Fico et al, 1998, p. 7). The particular
utility of this model to the MRP is in its interpretation of how audiences handle and integrate
information from multiple messages and a multitude of sources. Canadians obtains news
information from a variety of traditional and new media (Veenhof and Lecavalier, 2007, p. 23).
There is no scientific method to delineate the process of opinion-forming in environments where
audiences are exposed to multiple messages from multiple sources of information (Gitlin, 1978, p.
207). Rather than attribute changes in opinion to individual messages internalized through the process of communication, this model assumes a complex process of opinion formation where units of influence from different messages and other environmental and historical stimuli combine to form opinions and attitudes. For the purpose of this study, influence will be considered as discrete, immeasurable incidents that occur during the consumption of news items. To extend the previous example, Canadian media agencies’ (A) view of the IED incident (X) is passed on to
Canadian audiences (B) and, as a result, a unit of influence A-X is transmitted from the media to the audience. The study argues that multiple units of influence, such as the one just described, converge on Canadian audiences physically removed from the frontlines of the war to ultimately help form and reinforce perceptions on the mission and the enemy. This notion is important to this research project as it not only considers the audience interaction between multiple sources of news influence on a particular event or topic (ACBC-X, ACTV-X, ACNN-X etc. where C is the Internet) but also multiple channels of news influence (ACBC-X, ACTV-X, ACNN-X etc. where C is the television, radio and newsprint). Maclean and Westley’s treatment of audience message reception along with
the limited-effects model provide further structure to the framework from which the rest of the
42 MRP concepts and hypotheses about the effects of Internet news on popular opinion will be built
upon.
3.3 The dynamics between media and public opinion
The framework from which media-audience interactions will be considered would not be complete without an approach to the media’s relationship with society and public opinion. This aspect of the framework is necessary in order to bridge the concepts of enemy imagery contained in media reports and their potential effects on public perception and opinion. The study argues that, over time, Canadian audiences came to view the Taliban as Canada’s contemporary enemy in
Afghanistan partly due to perception of the Taliban constructed by the Canadian media. While media messages may not consistently affect public opinion, there is stability in the media’s role in setting the public agenda (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). According to Littlejohn, public opinion is defined as:
An understanding on the part of people in an ongoing community concerning some affect
or value-laden question which individuals as well as government have to respect at least by
compromise in their overt behaviour under the threat of being excluded or losing one’s
standing in society (Littlejohn, 1999, p. 343).
Public opinion is closely related to popular perception, a key concept to the MRP that will be realized by opinion polls. The Canadian public have opinions on the mission in Afghanistan and the Taliban along with other topical social issues such as the economy and healthcare (Strategic
Council, 2009). These opinions are reflected in national public opinion polls that leverage sampling and statistics to estimate Canada’s opinion and views on topics of interest. In practical terms, mass media plays a major role in shaping and representing public opinion on a range of topics and issues since the average person’s direct observation of events and issues is limited to a
43 small percentage of what is being reported on. Consequently, Canadians have opinions and
perspectives on issues that they would ordinarily have no direct interaction or experience with in
the absence of mass media, such as Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.
The concept of agenda-setting (also known as agenda-setting theory) was introduced by
McCombs and Shaw in the Journal of Public Opinion (1972). According to the professors of journalism, while mass media may have limited influence on the direction and intensity of attitudes and opinions, it does, however, influence the salience and organization of issues within the public domain (1972, p. 177). In a study on the role of media in the 1968 presidential campaign in Chapel
Hill, North Carolina, 100 undecided voters were surveyed both before and after the campaign. The results of the study showed a strong correlation between the undecided voter’s opinions on key issues with those reflected in the election media campaign. Subsequent research on agenda-setting theory provided further evidence for the cause-and-effect chain of influence that was previously challenged by critics. A more holistic view of agenda-setting considers how the public agenda affects the media. From a soft systems 43 perspective, the media, public, corporate, and policy
(government) agendas interact and thus affect each other. Field research on the agenda-setting function of the media can be accomplished by parallel analyses of media coverage and public awareness of specified topics using survey data in which audience exposure to media is also measured (Gunter, 2000, p. 192). Correlation surveys of self-reported media exposure and opinions
43 Soft systems are social constructs that are identified through the observation of human activities and used to help model conflicts
and other problematic situations. In contrast to hard systems, soft systems may not display predictable relationships between input
and output variables. Solutions to problems in these systems do not easily present themselves as they typically involve layered and
multifaceted issues (Travis and Venable, 1998). For a detailed description of soft systems and the soft systems methodology, see
Checkland’s Soft systems methodology: a thirty year retrospective in Behavioural Science in System Research 17(1) (2000) and
Soft Systems Methodology in Action (1999).
44 about topics, combined with parallel content analyses of media coverage, could be used to measure
opinion and belief cultivation in relation to media consumption (p. 192). The limitation of both of
the aforementioned methods is a lack of variable control and continuity. Outside of a controlled
environment, changes in perceptions cannot be measured empirically as a function of media
content exposure because of the uncontrolled variables and modes of influence presented by the
real world (Bertrand et al, 2005, Gunter, 2000 and Fico et al, 1998). Controlled experiments on agenda-setting and opinion cultivation could also be used to measure these effects; however, these methods are beyond the scope of the quantitative method of this research project because of the cost, time, and human subjects that would be required to implement the approach. Furthermore, a lack of sufficient data and the costs associated with running controlled experiments are two challenges in conducting long-term agenda-setting and public opinion studies in general (Bertrand et al, 2005, p. 201). Chapter 4 will introduce the cross-lagged-correlation (CLC) method which is used in exploratory research (Harackiewicz and Kenny, 1979) and agenda-setting studies (Rosoga,
1980). CLC will be applied in this research project to measure the potential relationship between enemy imagery in Canadian Internet news reports on the war in Afghanistan and public opinion on the mission and the Taliban.
News stories reported by different media agencies eventually converge to form an aggregate view of an event or issue from the perspective of the audience. Consonance is the unified picture of an event or issue that can develop and is often shared by different newspapers and magazines (Severin et al, 1992, p. 252). Consonance plays a role in offsetting audience selective exposure by explaining that news stories eventually converge, offering the same message in different places; for example, a news brief on a Canadian solider killed in action in Afghanistan would more or less carry the same message whether it appeared on the CBC national evening news
45 (television), Globe and Mail (newsprint), or Toronto Star’s homepage (online). Regardless of the
medium, the individual message receiver would take away the same basic information: (1)
Canadian solider killed by (2) improvised explosive device (IED) that was (3) most likey as a
result of insurgent or Taliban44 actions and (4) Canadians greive the tragic loss. Since there is no other message to select, an impression is created where most people would look at the event in the same way that the mass media have presented it (p. 253). Consonance is however not an invariable rule and has exceptions. In The Langauge of the News, Marting Conboy describes newspapers as interpretive communities. In these communities of media consumption, distinct language, and framing techniques are used to describe events and issues. In his view, newspapers form virtual communities of opinion: “More than any news media form, the newspaper has an explicitly normative role in how we see the world” (2007, p. 12). As previously discussed, the notion of community implies audience interaction (receiving and sending messages). In newsprint form, this may take the form of letters to the editor and publishing results of readership polls. As will be discussed, more newspapers have transitioned to an online format that better suits the needs of their audience. Modern news audiences enjoy the accessibility, timeliness and interactivity of provided by online versions of newspapers. According to marketing consultatnt John Zarwan:
Newspapers are clearly migrating to the web. Although all research shows the majority of
newspaper readers are still turning to the traditional print edition, it is clear that the shift
away from paper to computer screens is steadily increasing. The Internet allows the reader
a variety of sources – some of which come from traditional news outlets – far beyond what
44 Chapter 3 (quantitative) and 4 (qualitative) will discuss how in the absence of facts that prove the Taliban are indeed responsible
for some hostile activity, news reports utilize the term ‘insurgent’ or ‘miltant’ in place of Taliban. Chapter 5 (conflict theory
application) will discuss how through the process of attribution, the Canadian public link the behaviours of unamed actors
(insurgents, militants) to the Taliban by default.
46 print can provide. People do not want to wait for their news, and they do not want it to be
out of date. (2006, p. 14)
Finally, with the availability of a paperless source of news, more Canadians are turning to the
Internet as an environmentally friendly source of news (McEwen, 2009). These emergenging
audience needs and how they are satisfied by Internet news media will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.
3.4 The Internet as a source of news in Canada
The emergence of new media has changed the landscape of information sharing in Canada and the rest of the world. “The Internet, technology and media influence and shape the behaviour, attitudes and daily lives of Canadians like no other cultural, social, political or economic element in society” (Zamaria, Charles and Fred Fletcher, 2007, p. 19). The United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) 1999-2000 World Communication and
Information Report explains how convergence and globalization have resulted from the growth and adoption of digital technologies, most notably over the Internet (Yoon, 1999, p. 94). Convergence
(not to be confused with consonance) refers to the dismantling of boundaries between new and traditional media types as audiences rely on a mix of both to obtain news. It also refers to the internationalization of news agencies (national to world news coverage, for example BBC World
News). The two trends describe the Internet as the news platform of the future with its ability to integrate information from different traditional sources (streaming of television in video form, radio in audio, and articles and documents in print). Other emerging Internet media trends listed in the UNESCO report include:
1. The 24-hour news cycle wherein news programming is by definition incomplete and
continuously being updated.
47 2. Instant Journalism which describes the race to be first on-air with stories (sensationalism)
rather than presenting events in a more thoughtful form (analytical).
3. Reduced costs as a result of consonance that also result in declined source credibility
4. Decline in the accuracy of information reported, in particular, by untrustworthy sources.
5. Participatory Journalism where audiences, sources, and reporters come together to produce
news stories in a collaborative fashion (webcasts, discussion blogs, and reader comments
co-located with online articles) (2000, p. 99).
Interestingly, the above observations were made nearly a decade ago when the Internet was in its infancy as a source of news and news agencies had only begun to tap into its potential as a complimentary form of content to traditional forms of news (CBC, 2009). These same agencies capitalize on the reduced costs associated with Internet news dissemination as their content is simultaneously managed centrally while available to geographically dispersed audiences
(McEwen, 2009). Online news costs less to produce and, according to U.S. audiences, is quicker to access and search in comparison to newsprint45 (Ahlers, 2006 p. 32). “Declines in the circulation numbers of newspapers and the ratings of the nightly television network news indicate why so many industry watchers are predicting the demise of the traditional news media” (p. 30). While newspaper circulation has indeed declined over the last decade, it has recently stabilized and there is no indication that newsprint will disapear completely as a form of news (Zarwan, p. 14, 2006).
45 There is a discontinuous cost differential between hosting an electronic newspaper versus the capital, labour, and material
(newsprint) costs of printing a newspaper. The cost of producing the first copy remains equal between media forms, but online
media has a near zero marginal cost for each additional copy (duplication), whereas newspapers and newsmagazines have a
significant marginal cost for each additional copy. Television, like the Internet, has a duplication cost near zero (Ahlers, 2006 p.
32).
48 In comparison to television and radio, the greater potential impact of the Internet is attributed to its speed, reach, and interactivity as a channel of communication. In terms of timeliness and communicability, the faster and farther a news agency can project its message, the better. Both the 24-hour news cycle and instant journalism trends speak to timeliness and accessibility traits of the Internet as a source of news and its role to form public opinion. Stories introduced first online often set the agenda for mainstream media, including news websites and pundit blogs (Berenger, 2006). It is the interactivity of the Internet that distinguishes it from static mediums (Ottosen, 2008, p.9). In the article, War Journalism in a Threat Society, Ottosen and
Nohrstedt argue that the Internet is creating a more globalized public sphere of opinion as opposed to us-or-them dichotomies that tend to form in national news circles (p. 8). In comparison to standard two-dimensional newsprint that can only be consumed in one manner, reading, the
Internet allows the news receiver to comment, share instantaneously, and cross-reference with other related stories and media types (CBC, 2009). This does not imply that all online news readers interact with news websites in this manner but the difference in comparison to traditional forms still stands. Participatory journalism46 is an example of the level of interactivity that can be achieved in online news platforms. While traditional forms of news offer some level of interactivity (i.e. television interview, radio call in, and newsprint letter to the editor), they cannot
46 In September 2005, BBC World News focused a day on broadcasting from Afghanistan. As part of this coverage, a BBC reporter
took a laptop and satellite phone into the village of Asad Khyl, where about 300 families in rural farming conditions. Many lived
in huts after the Taliban destroyed their homes. BBC reported what an ordinary day was like for them, and allowed those who
came to BBC’s website site to question them directly. A global conversation formed as questions were asked by people in
Azerbaijan, Switzerland, the United States, Korea and Japan, among many other places. Questioners wanted to know about their
lives, their families, their concerns, and their view of the world. These conversational links created a unique cultural connection
(Sambrook, 2005).
49 effortlessly interconnect journalists and breaking news to global audiences like the Internet can
(Sambrook, 2005).
Canadian audiences want accurate news, particularly on important issues such as the economy, the environment, and security against terrorism (Angus Reid, 2010). In this regard,
Canadians desire informative and accurate news reports in both traditional and online forms to inform them on Canada’s Afghan engagement. The credibility of the Internet in as a new medium for information has been a popular research theme in recent years (Choi et al, 2006). In this regard, the UNESCO report findings (circa 2000) that indicate news credibility had declined with the introduction of the Internet as a source of news is indeed outdated. Inaccuracy and bias due to the lack of editorial and gate keeping rules traditionally held by reputable media agencies have been suggested as primary reasons as to why information on the Internet is vulnerable to perceptions of incredibility. There is some merit to this opinion with regards to general information available on the Web, but not for most reputable news organization websites (2006). Americans who follow both traditional and online news sources actually judged the Internet to be a more credible medium in comparison to traditional news sources with their online counterparts, such as CNN with
CNN.com (Rainie, Fox, & Fallows, 2003). The prominence of online news credibility may be explained by a brand name “halo effect” as a result of associations with existing print and television news organizations (Choi et al, 2006). If people evaluate The National Post as highly credible, they tend to rate nationalpost.ca as credible as well (2006). Source credibility is one of ten characteristics 47 of Internet war reporting that will be discussed later in the paper as it relates to the
47 The other characteristics of Internet news reporting in times of war that enable processes of attribution and enmification to occur
include consonance, convergence, ubiquity, agenda-setting, interactivity, transferability, portability, participatory and
personalization. These characteristics are discussed in detail in chapter 6 of the paper.
50 creation of a facilitating environment for negative dispositions and perceptions to form towards
enemy groups.
According to World Bank statistics, nearly three-quarters of Canada’s population use the
Internet (World Bank, 2007). Over the past decade, it has evolved to become a significant source of information and entertainment for Canadians (Veenhof and Lecavalier, 2007, p. 23). The
Internet has changed the way that individuals rely on information, and has influenced their use of traditional media (p. 23). A Statistics Canada study posed the question “are Internet users tuning out traditional media?”
While few Canadians had Internet access and went online to gather news information in the
mid-1990's, today many use the Internet to access online newspapers, reports, discussion
forums and even blogs. In 2005 for example, about 62% of home Internet users - or 38% of
Canadian adults overall - went online to view news or sports information (Veenhof and
Lecavalier, 2007, p. 23).
According to this study, the Internet has not displaced traditional media forms in Canada significantly. The study’s findings showed that regular Internet users did not consume less traditional forms of media (television, newsprint) which suggests that the integration of Internet may in fact be increasing Canadian’s appetite for news information.
The Pew Research Center study, The New News Landscape: Rise of the Internet, reports that close to 60% of Americans get their news from a combination of online and offline sources and that the Internet was behind only television as a source of news (2010, para. 3). This is a recent and significant development as previous studies in Canada (Keown, 2007 and Veenhof, 2006), the
United States (Ahlers, 2006), and Australia (Nguyen and Western, 2006) also agreed that online news consumption was in fact complimentary to the consumption of traditional offline news
51 sources. The synergy between audience consumption of new and traditional media forms is an
important concept that will be integrated in the media framework used for this study. The concept
implies that Canadians compliment traditional forms of news like television, newsprint, and radio
with online news sources for updates on Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. Thus the media
framework of the study must recognize that news obtained by audiences on an event in the war,
such as an IED attack, may come from one or multiple sources of news from the same (i.e. two
different websites) or different platforms (i.e. website and television). As previously discussed,
different messages presented by individual news reports on an event present discrete units of
influence that are integrated into an overall impression and opinion of an event. In the context of
this study, both traditional and new media influence Canada’s popular perception of the war in
Afghanistan and the Taliban as it reported by Canada’s media.
A framework has now been established for the study’s treatment of the media and its interaction with Canadian audiences. The pillars of this framework are as follows:
♦ Canadian Internet war reporting: Canada Internet reporting on the mission in Afghanistan is
predominantly traditional war journalism (Howard, 2006) and, hence, describes parties in
conflict in terms of winners and losers while focusing on the violent aspects of conflict
(Ottosen, 2005).
♦ Media effects on audiences: The limited-effects model will be used in this study as it strikes a
balance between the notions of media influence and external environmental factors inherent in
perception formation. This realistic model acknowledges that the media plays a role in the
creation of audience effects but does so in a complex environment of factors and influences
(Klapper, 1960, p. 8). According to this model, mass media is considered as a contributing
agent rather than the sole cause of audience effects. Maclean and Westley’s conceptual model
52 for communication research provides an explanation of how Canadian audiences integrate
information and influence from a variety of sources and form opinions and perceptions as a
result of this integration (1978).
♦ Media and public opinion: The study assumes that the Canadian media plays a role in setting
the public agenda. Consonance (Severin et al, 1992, p. 252) helps to explain how audiences are
presented with reports on news events in Afghanistan in a consolidated and harmonious
manner that creates an opportunity for a unified public opinion on the mission and the enemy
to form amongst Canadians. Selective attention (Freeman and Sears, 1971 and Klapper, 1960)
will be used to explain the process in which Canadians form and maintain enemy perceptions
of the Taliban in the course of their online news consumption.
♦ The Internet as a source of news in Canada: This research study assumes that the Internet is a
credible and complimentary source of news to Canadians. Studies in the United States (Pew,
2010 and Ahlers, 2006), Canada (Keown, 2007 and Veenhof, 2006), and Australia (Nguyen
and Western, 2006) show that audiences are augmenting online news along with their
traditional sources of news. The credibility of Internet news reports on the conflict in
Afghanistan are due in large part to the halo effect of their associations to traditional, brand-
name media organizations (Choi et al, 2006).
The framework developed in this chapter will be used to frame later discussions in the paper that involve the media and its role of forming and shaping public opinions and perceptions of the contemporary enemy facing Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.
53 4.0 Quantitative research: Enemy imagery in Canadian Internet news
The following chapter documents the application of quantitative action research methods to collect and analyze data from a content analysis of Canadian Internet news articles on the war in
Afghanistan. The design of the quantitative research method is based on Rune Ottosen’s study,
Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process, in which he identifies changes in enemy images in three Norwegian daily newspapers through a comparative analysis of four international conflicts
(1995). In a later study by Ottosen, he analyzes the Norwegian media image of the war in
Afghanistan through a comparative analysis of Norway’s two leading daily newspapers and television news stations (2005). These two studies will be discussed as a basis for this study’s quantitative methodology. The techniques used to collect data from the study’s content analysis will be introduced along with the MRP sources of data. Public opinion data, collected from various national polling organizations, will be aggregated and used to create a timeline of Canadian attitudes towards the mission and the Taliban. In the final section, enemy imagery data collected from the content analysis will be compared against public opinion data on two specific questions related to the mission and the Taliban.
The goal of this portion of the study is to determine if there is mathematical evidence of a potential relationship between enemy imagery contained in Canadian Internet war reports on the
Afghanistan conflict and the perception and opinion of Canadians on the mission and the Taliban.
To achieve this result, the cross-lagged correlation technique will be applied in an exploratory manner to see if there is any indication of relationship between the two variable series in a cause- to-effect manner before a discussion on the quantitative methodology in detail, the choice of enemy imagery framework used in the study will be explained.
54 The concept of enemy imagery is central to this study and, therefore, requires proper definition. Enemy imagery is textual and visual representations of an ‘other’ or adversary group that ranges from factual to severely distorted (Fabick, 2007, p. 73). In the text, Enemy Image: A
Resource Manual on Reducing Enmity, Psychologists for Social Responsibility (PsySR) further qualify enemy imagery as:
The psychological fuel for war typically characterized by distorted representations of one’s
adversary. Often enemies are depicted as thoroughly diabolical, aggressive, and
untrustworthy. Exaggerated representations of adversaries are generated at the
preconscious level in all of us through selective attention and memory, double standards,
self-fulfilling prophecies, and ignorance. (Fabick, 2007, p. 73)
The PsySR description clearly links enemy imagery to the cognitive audience tendancy of selective attention and describes it as a factor in the process of emnification. In contrast, Zur defines the term with more emphasis on dehumanization, citing stereotyping, externalization, and cognitive bias as the catalysts for distorted images of the ‘out’ group:
An enemy image is a representation of the enemy. It can be affective or cognitive; it can
derive from the actions of the enemy or from the perceptions of the perceiver. In other
words an image of "the enemy" can be accurate or biased, imaginary or real. More often
than not, it is both (Zur, 1991, p. 349).
As per Zur’s definition, instances of dehumanizing imagery of both the Taliban and insurgents were identified in the MRP content analysis and will be discussed in detail. By combining both Zur and PsySR’s definitions of enemy imagery, it is apparent that enemy imagery is often described in terms of some enemy theme (i.e. diabolical, aggressive, untrustworthy, inhuman, etc.). For the purposes of this study, groups of enemy images with some common themes will be referred to as
55 enemy themes. The most widely accepted list of enemy themes is found in Sam Keen’s Faces of
the Enemy (Rieber, 1991). Keen’s archetype of the enemy suggests that all forms of enemy
imagery will fall into one or more of the following categories: stranger, aggressor, faceless, enemy
of God, barbarian, greedy, criminal, torturer, rapist, beast (or other inhuman form), worthy
opponent, and abstraction (1986, p. 17-72). In addition to Ottosen’s design and distinction between
types of enemy imagery, Keen’s categorizations will be used in the study to classify enemy themes identified in the study’s content analysis of Canadian Internet articles that report on the war in
Afghanistan.
Rune Ottosen is a professor of journalism at Oslo University College in Norway who has been involved in research on the issue of war coverage in Norwegian media for many years
(Carpentier et al, 2005). Ottosen is also a member of TRANSCEND48 - a Peace and Development
Network chaired by Johan Galtung, the founder of peace journalism (Lee and Maslog, 2005, p.
311). Along with Galtung, Ottosen promotes peace journalism as an alternative to traditional war journalism (Ottosen, 2005). His writing on Norwegian war reporting is extensive and spans coverage of the Cold War, Gulf Wars, and War in Afghanistan 49. Two of his studies are of particular interest to this study as they focus on content analyses of conflict coverage, a goal of this research project:
Norwegian newspaper coverage of four international conflicts: In this research project,
Ottosen followed four international conflicts across three leading Norwegian daily newspapers.
The conflicts included the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, martial law in Poland in 1981, and martial law in Romania in 1989 (Ottosen, 1995). In the paper,
48 For more information on TRANSCEND, please visit http://www.transcend.org.
49 For a detailed list of Professor Rune Ottosen’s research and publications, please visit http://home.hio.no/~rune/english.htm.
56 Enemy Images and the Journalistic Process, Ottosen describes how Norway’s ‘traditional enemy,’
the Soviet Union, ceases to exist and is replaced by a new enemy linked to Islam, all from the
results of a content analysis on a sample of 915 articles over a ten year period (2005, p. 97).
Ottosen demonstrates this shift in enmity through a contrast of the differences in enemy imagery identified between pairs of events; for example, in comparing the amount of Soviet Union enemy imagery contained in newspaper articles describing the instances of martial law in two former
Warsaw Pact nations, Poland (1981) and Romania (1989), Ottosen was observing almost no Soviet
Union enemy imagery in the more recent event (Romania) which was supporting his hypothesis that the Norwegian media’s mention of Norway’s traditional Soviet enemy was disappearing from the daily newspaper landscape at the time of the second event in 1989 (2005, p. 102). In comparisons of the Polish and Romanian conflicts, Ottosen points out that while the threat of
Soviet intervention was palpable during the crisis in Poland, a totalitarian regime led by Ceausescu was the focus of Norway’s enmity during the Romanian conflict (2005, p. 103). In his comparison between the coverage of the Iraqi invasions of Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990), Ottosen made two key observations: the first, as the mention of a Soviet enemy faded from daily Norwegian newspapers, a new Islamic enemy had emerged (1995, p. 109). Second, according to Ottosen, while coverage of the 1980 Iraqi invasion of Iran contained mention of both Saddam Hussein and the Ayatollah Khomeini, it was indeed the Ayatollah who was the focus of Islamic enemy imagery contained in the sample of news articles (1995, p. 104). In the subsequent coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Ottosen identifies a shift in enemy imagery towards Saddam Hussein
(1995, p. 106). He explains the demonization of Hussein to be the result of a change in the West’s strategic environment where Hussein, who had once been aligned with the United States, became vilified by way of his decision to invade Kuwait, an ally of Saudi Arabia and the United States
57 (2005, p. 106). While Ottosen did indeed observe a shift in enemy imagery in the study’s pair of
events, he did stop short by saying that the results of his study should not be used to develop a
“replacement theory” (i.e. that the Muslim enemy image had replaced the enemy image of the
Soviet Union) because, in his view, this type of theory would require research of newspaper
coverage spanning a times of peace and war unlike his study which only focused on conflict events
(1995, p. 110).
Norwegian media image of the war in Afghanistan: In a more recent work, Ottosen examines the framing of media coverage of the war against terror in Afghanistan with special emphasis of the coverage of the Norwegian military presence in Afghanistan (Ottosen, 2005, p.
95). In his study, Ottosen tackles two research questions:
a. How was the start of the war on terror covered by the media in October, 2001?
b. In what context was the Norwegian military presence covered?
Ottosen explains the significance of these research questions through the notion that the media
framing of an event, to a large extent, decides the framing of the public debate (2005, p. 98). In
contrast to the previous study discussed, Ottosen used both newsprint and television sources of
news for his content analysis. Ottosen went on to create different frame types50 from which the sample news items would be categorized in order to provide quantitative results to answer the first research question. Data for the second research question was generated through qualitative analyses of news articles identifying instances in which the Norwegian military is viewed as either
“evil-doers” or “good-doers” (2005, p. 100); for example, in the reporting of incidents involving
50 The frame types from which the articles were categorized included U.S. hatred (the U.S. deserved the 9/11 attacks), U.S. critical
(understanding why the U.S. launched the war on terror but believe that diplomacy, not military action is the key to the conflict
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban), U.S. friendly, Norwegian angle (what is Norway’s role and implication in the war) and Neutral
(Ottosen, 2005, p. 99).
58 the Norwegian military in which collateral damage was occurring in the form of Afghan civilian
casualties or property, the military were being labeled as ‘evil-doers’, depending on the sentiment
of the article. In the reporting of a positive news item discussing the Norwegian military’s
involvement in community reconstruction and development, the media are found to be labelling
them as ‘good-doers.’ The conclusion of quantitative and qualitative analysis of the sample group
found the Norwegian media coverage of the war in Afghanistan to be U.S.-friendly; in fact, one newspaper (Aftenposten) was found to be slightly more pro-U.S. than the other (VG) (2005, p.
108). With regards to the second research question, Ottosen found the Norwegian media to be a steadfast supporter of the country’s military that continues to be labelled as ‘good-doer’s even in instances in which their actions accidentally result in Afghan civilian casualties (2005, p. 108).
The design of this study’s content analysis is indeed inspired by Ottosen’s work. In
Ottosen’s summary report of his 1995 study of Norwegian newspaper coverage of four international conflicts, Ottosen described the process of quantitative and qualitative analysis of enemy imagery. He delineated enemy imagery as being either situational or dispositional (1995, p.
101). Situational images were described as the presentation of concrete hostile actions in plain factual form while dispositional images were described as negative perceptions of a group suggesting the expectation of hostility (1995, p. 101). Ottosen’s delineation between situational and dispositional enemy imagery creates a border between reporting based on fact (analytical) and what he refers to the “journalistic danger-zone” (1995, p. 101). Situational enemy imagery used in news reporting on the conflict of Afghanistan would read like this: Insurgents ambushed a
Canadian security patrol in the Zhari district using small arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades.
Dispositional enemy imagery goes beyond descriptions based on pure facts: There is no end in sight to the surge of Taliban hostility over the holy month of Ramadan and NATO forces are
59 bracing for further attacks. While the first example is a purely objective statement of fact, the
second suggests further aggressions from one of the groups and even concludes that the insurgents
are, in fact, the Taliban. This study will argue that the presence of enemy imagery, particularly
dispositional imagery, in Canadian Internet news reports on the conflict in Afghanistan, does play a
role in the creation and maintenance of enemy perceptions of the Taliban from the perspective of
the Canadian audience. For the purposes of the MRP content analysis, Ottosen’s classification
method of enemy imagery was chosen because of its ease of translation into coding exercises,
simple categorization (only two types of imagery), and that it had been applied previously on a
larger scale on more than one occasion for content analyzes of newsprint war reporting.
4.1 Methodology
Klaus Krippendorff, author of Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, defines content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from text to the contexts of their use.” Effective content analysis studies are “reliable (replicable), valid, objective and systematic” (1993, p. 18). These parameters were taken into consideration in the design of this study’s content analysis.
Figure 4-1 describes the process of enemy imagery identification and classification from the sampling of Internet news agency reporting on selected key events in the Afghan conflict. An initial group of three events was selected, and this was later augmented by two more in order to increase the sample size to a total of 135 articles51.
51 Another positive: This also increased the amount of data points for correlation with public opinion from 3 to 5.
60
Figure 4-1. Quantitative collection method
The selection of events was made at the start of the quantitative research process through
various Afghanistan conflict timelines indexed by significant incidents52 in Canada’s involvement
in Afghanistan. Early in the design process, the decision was made to employ non-probability
purposive sampling rather than probability or convenience sampling techniques. Probability sampling would have entailed random selections of Internet articles on the conflict, while convenience sampling is dictated by availability of samples (i.e. the sample is whatever is available) (Fico et al, 1998, p. 85). Typically, non-probability techniques are employed if there is a challenge in collecting content (p. 87). This was not exactly the case in this MRP. In order to maximize the sample sizes at particular instances of time, the decision was made to focus on significant events in the conflict timeline, hence, the choice of purposive sampling.
The database of collected articles, totalling 135, were coded for use of enemy imagery
based on an augmented form of Ottosen’s Norwegian newspaper study on enemy images and the
journalistic process (Ottosen, 1997, p. 100). In addition to collecting data on enemy imagery, the
MRP content analysis will collect data on Internet features of online war reports such as links to
52 The significant incidents include key operations involving Canada, Canadian Forces casualties and repatriation ceremonies, among
other frequently occurring events included in CBC, CTV and National Post timelines on Canada’s involvement in the conflict in
Afghanistan.
61 related articles and video, and where applicable, an enemy theme will be identified. The decision to
expand on Ottosen’s method was made since the sample size used in the MRP (135 articles) is
significantly smaller than the close to 1000 articles reviewed in Ottosen’s studies in 1995 and 1997
which employed teams of article coders.
Table 4-1
Data observed for quantitative collection method
News form Appearance of enemy imagery Type of enemy imagery Internet media features
Brief Enemy images present? (y/n) Situational Reader comments
Report Who is the enemy? Dispositional Related articles
Editorial-style Use of visuals Enemy theme Embedded video
In-depth/analysis Embedded audio
Email/sharing
Table 4-1 summarizes the data observed and collected from the review of each sample article. The first group categorizes the articles as news reports (or briefs), editorial-style commentaries, or in- depth analyses. The next grouping identifies the use of textual enemy imagery, which may or may not be supported by visuals and denotes who is being referred to as the enemy. The third group categories the type of enemy imagery based on Ottosen’s situational and dispositional classes and considers the enemy theme presented in the article as adapted from Keen’s enemy archetypes
(1986, p. 15). The addition of Keen’s enemy themes to the quantitative analysis will allow for another view of the Canadian media representation of the Taliban, in addition to the view created by the data collected on enemy imagery. Articles that contained sufficient enemy imagery were coded for enemy theme based on the following choices: the enemy as an aggressor, oppressor, worthy opponent, inhuman, criminal, barbaric, weak, and stupid. A description of these categories and theme indicators are described in Appendix A. In actual fact, more variables were observed
62 than was required for the core analysis of this study but this extra data (i.e. reader comments, co-
location of visuals, audio, video, and sharing functionality) could be used for future follow-up research and analysis on Internet war reporting. The use of enemy imagery was not present in every sample and, thus, not all articles contained sufficient enemy imagery required to identify an enemy theme. There is a subjective aspect to content analysis and, as a result, different coders may come up with different results. This subjectivity can be partially mitigated through the use of teams of coders who follow detailed protocol sheets and periodically spot-check one another
(Krippendorff, 1993 and Fico et al, 1998). A noted limitation of this study’s content analysis is that it used only one coder. In order to minimize this limitation, quality control techniques, including second and third reviews, were employed. The detailed coding protocol sheet for the content analysis is contained in Appendix A. Summary enemy imagery levels collected from the sample events were compared with Canadian public opinion data on the mission in Afghanistan and the
Taliban in an exploratory fashion.
In order to explore the integrated limited-effects communication models discussed in the previous chapter (media), the next stage of quantitative analysis involved the correlation of audience exposure to enemy imagery to shifts in popular opinion and attitudes towards the mission and the Taliban. It is important to note that the desired outcome of the comparison is not to attempt to prove an actual cause and effect relationship between the two variables. As previously discussed, communication and social cognition processes are too complex to feasibly propose such a direct linkage. The purpose of the comparison is exploratory and aimed at detecting any potential merit in further research and investigation. The cross-lagged correlation (CLC) technique is used to explore the causal relation between two variables measured at different instances of time (t=1, t=2). It is often used in media-effect studies where closed experiments are not feasible due to cost
63 and test subject limitations (Severin et al, 1993, p. 212). In the absence of live test subjects, CLC is an acceptable method to measure the agenda-setting function of media (Fico et al, 1998, p. 140).
Basically, analyses of media content at t=1 and t=2 are correlated to public agenda data in a time- lagged manner (i.e. media agenda at t=1 is correlated to public agenda at t=2 and vice-versa to compute c1 and c2). In terms of agenda-setting, CLC suggests that if c1 is greater than c2, then media has some effect on public agenda (more so than the reverse relation) (p. 140). CLC does present some obvious methodological limits; most notably, it does not account for other potential variables that may have an effect. CLC has been criticized as an imperfect method to prove causal inferences across multivariable panel data; therefore, it is important to apply it properly and within the proper research context (Rogosa, 1980, p. 245). Kenny and Harackiewicz propose two assumptions that must be satisfied before CLC can be applied (1979, p. 372). First, the two variables must be measured in a synchronous fashion (i.e. at the same instances of time). Second, the variables must be represented by the same structural equations over different points of time. In the case of this study, we must assume the same media effects model applies to the audience over different points of time. For the exploratory purpose of this quantitative analysis, it is assessed that the criteria for applying CLC is satisfied with some acceptable margin for error. Specifically, there is some variability in days and sometimes weeks between the measurement times for enemy imagery and public opinion datum (i.e. the time between t=1 and t=2 cannot be consistent for all correlations). In all instances, the order of correlation was still maintained and the data series were aligned as close as possible given the different sources of data.
The proposed methodology presents several strengths and limitations. While the design of the content analysis took Krippendorff’s desired characteristics into consideration, only one coder was used, and this injects a level of subjectivity into the coding results. In comparing single and
64 group-based coding exercises, the group-based approach offers more variability in coder responses
(i.e. one coder may code an article as having 3 instances of enemy imagery and an overall them of
the enemy as an aggressor while another may identify 4 instances of enemy imagery and an overall
theme of the enemy as a inhuman). At the conclusion of a group-based content analysis, the
findings can be examined summarily for agreement. In the instances where coders come up with
different results, the specific data can either be removed or averaged out. The single-coder scenario
does not offer the same convergence to collected data other than that offered by second and third
reviews of previous results. The notion of using a team of coders was discussed with the MRP
committee, but it was decided for quality control reasons to limit the article collection and coding
to one person.
In order to mitigate instances of error, second (and in some cases third) reviews were
carried out in order to ensure consistency in enemy imagery measurements across the five sampled
events. In order to explore the potential relationship between enemy imagery contained in
Canadian Internet news reports and public opinion on the war in Afghanistan and the Taliban, CLC
will be used to correlate data in time-lagged manner (i.e. enemy imagery at t=1 and Canadian opinion on the war and Taliban at t=2). The next section will discuss the MRP data sources in further detail.
4.2 Data sources
The primary source of information for the study was the selected sample database of articles that report on the Afghan conflict. The selection criterion for the news agencies was as follows: First, the media outlet had to be Canadian or one that is regularly followed by Canadians.
From the Canadian Internet Project report, the most popular online media outlets consulted by
English speaking Canadians are CBC (23%), MSN (13%), and CNN (12%) (Zamaria and Fletcher,
65 2008, p. 169). Second, the news source had to be available online. Third, samples of the agency’s news reporting on the conflict in Afghanistan must be available and accessible for the timeframes of the selected key events. The selection of media outlets to sample was one of the most critical research designs considerations. It is not the intention of the study to attempt to select the most influential media agency but rather the most representative and thorough in terms of coverage of
Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the units of audience influence MSN or CNN may have in comparison to the CBC or CTV is impossible to ascertain. The goal of the exploratory technique is to collect a sample from the system of international reporting on the conflict. As
Canada's national public broadcaster and one of this country's largest cultural institutions, the CBC was a natural first choice. MSN was viewed more as a social network that features entertainment and social news rather than as a news organization and, hence, was not be a suitable candidate for content analysis. CNN is a widely used source of online news in Canada, but the decision was made to focus strictly on Canadian content as the goal of the study was to examine the Canadian media’s representation of the war and the enemy in Afghanistan. In the end, the most important criteria became sample availability. Some of the agencies mentioned above charge a fee to access articles archived past a certain date53. The story of Nichola Goddard’s death at the front lines of the
conflict (Event 1 - May 16th, 2006) was used as an initial sample since it was a heavily reported on event in the earlier portion of the proposed content analysis timeframe of 2006 to 2009. Google
News Archives was used to filter and isolate results from a short list of Canadian news websites.
The CBC, CTV, and National Post were ultimately selected. After a cross-referencing multiple conflict timelines54 of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan for sample availability, two event
53 Some media outlets charge for access to archived material as recent as 2007; less than 3 years old.
54 CBC, CTV, National Post, Toronto Star.
66 selections were made: Event 4 100th Canadian soldier killed in action (December 5th, 2008) and
Event 5 insurgent violence leading up to Afghan National Election (August, 2009). After an interim review with DRDC on the status of the quantitative collection process, the decision was made to expand the event list by two stories that (1) did not involve Canadian casualties and (2) focused more on Afghan on Afghan violence versus Afghan on Canadian violence. This decision was made in order to observe if there was any difference in the media representation of the Taliban when the victims of their reported on actions were Afghans rather than Canadians soldiers. The decision to focus on stories that featured violence was not a conscious one as most news items on the conflict contain mention of violent activity. The final two events were selected: Event 2
Kandahar prison break (June 15th, 2008) and Event 3 Acid attack on Afghan schoolgirls
(November 12th, 2008). The results of the content analysis of the selected events will be presented in the next section. The significance of these events to Canadians and discussion as to why they displayed different amounts of reporting and enemy imagery will be discussed in the following chapter (qualitative).
Secondary sources were relied on for Canadian public opinion data on the mission in
Afghanistan and the Taliban. The decision to use secondary sources for the public perception/attitude portion of this research was made for two reasons. First, it was decided to keep the study as theoretical and exploratory as possible. Rather than spend time and financial resources on a national survey, the decision was made to leverage existing data from reputable polling firms.
Secondly, by conducting surveys on perceptions towards the mission and the Taliban, the research scope would naturally be including questions ascertaining test subject media exposure, leading to a more experimental than exploratory research design. The premise of this portion of the quantitative analysis is to explore if exposure to Internet war reports have some relation to the subsequent
67 public perception of war-related issues, which include support for the mission itself, and the adversary who faces Canadian soldiers. A review of public polling organizations55 was conducted to identify sources of secondary data and candidate polling questions that could be used for correlative analysis. The following two survey questions were identified:
Public Opinion Question 1: Should Canada talk/negotiate with the Taliban?
Public Opinion Question 2: Do you support the mission in Afghanistan?
The rationale behind selecting Q1 was that it was the only question that mentioned the Taliban directly. Other questions that mentioned the Taliban indirectly explored Canadian’s perceptions of the Canadian Forces’ handling of detainees and combat against insurgents. Using Angus-Reid polling data from March, 2008 to October, 2009 and Strategic Council data from October, 2006 to
May, 2007, a three-year trend on Canadian attitudes towards talking to the Taliban was amassed:
Figure 4-2. Canadian public opinion question 1 – “Would you talk to the Taliban?”
Note: Adapted from Public Opinion: War in Afghanistan, Angus Reid (2009) and Views of Canadian
Armed Forces Troops in Afghanistan, Strategic Council (2006).
55 These polling organizations include Angus-Reid, Ekos, and Strategic Council.
68 Q2 was selected out of data availability and was meant as more of a general, control question to be
used for comparison between correlative analyses. Similarly, the use of data from Angus-Reid and
the Strategic Council, a three-year trend was put together for Canadians’ support of the mission:
Figure 4-3. Canadian public opinion question 2 – “Do you support the Afghanistan mission?”
Note: Adapted from Public Opinion: War in Afghanistan, Angus Reid (2009) and Views of Canadian
Armed Forces Troops in Afghanistan, Strategic Council (2006).
In order to perform a cross-lagged correlation against enemy imagery data collected in the content
analysis, multiple data series of comparable length were required. Situational (s) and dispositional
(d) enemy imagery data observed at the time of a sampled event (t=1) were matched with time-
lagged positive and negative responses to Q1 and Q2 (t=2) in panel fashion in order to capture several correlations. The correlations were also computed in reverse to detect potential relations in the reverse time order. The positive results of the correlation between enemy imagery data contained in Canadian Internet news reports and subsequent Canadian public opinion on the
Afghan mission and the Taliban show that there is some relationship between these variables.
69 4.3 Quantitative findings
The following section will present the quantitative findings of the study. The results of the content analysis will be summarized with particular focus on the observed amounts of enemy imagery in each of the sample events mentioned above. The enemy themes identified in the analysis will be reviewed along with the results of the cross-lagged correlation with Canadian public opinion data.
Table 4-2
Content analysis sample events and enemy imagery
Sample Enemy Situational Dispositional Event Date Short description Total (N) images (s) (d)
Nichola Goddard first 1 17-May-06 27 22 39 1 40 female killed in action
2 15-Jun-08 Kandahar prison break 16 15 62 3 65
Acid attack on Afghan 3 12-Nov-08 9 9 22 1 23 schoolgirls
100th Canadian killed in 4 05-Dec-08 33 24 54 9 63 action
5 22-Aug-09 Afghan election violence 50 49 49 33 186
Total 135 119 330 47 377
Table 4-2 presents the summary results of the content analysis. A total of 135 articles (N)
were collected based on five queries against the sample events. Of the total sample size, 119
articles displayed either situational or dispositional enemy imagery (88%). Out of a total of 377
instances of enemy imagery were observed, almost 9 out every 10 were categorized as situational.
The results suggest that the media agencies’ reporting style was generally grounded in fact and
concrete observation. This factual and analytical style of reporting showed minimal amounts of
70 speculation, stereo-typing, and generalization, a typical indication of dispositional enemy imagery
(Ottosen, 1995). Characteristic instances of situational enemy imagery were evident, including descriptions of Taliban attacks against Canadian Forces using small arms fire and IEDs and examples of Taliban harassment of the local population, such as preventing the female population from receiving education or voting in the national election. Most of the reporting on the events observed was consistent in terms of amounts of situational imagery (s) in comparison to event sample sizes (N) with the exception of event 2 (prison break) which displayed a significantly higher amount (almost four times the sample size). This is perhaps attributed to the impact of the event where Taliban forces launched a highly sophisticated and successful raid on a local
Kandahar prison in June, 2008, and freed almost 1000 prisoners, many of which were detained
Taliban fighters (CBC, 2008). Use of dispositional enemy imagery was only identified with significance in events 4 and 5. In reporting on the 100th Canadian casualty, some indication of perpetual aggression was reflected by the reporting agencies in the form of 9 instances of dispositional imagery. In the review of reporting on violence leading up to the 2009 National
Afghan election, 33 instances of dispositional imagery were noted. This could be due in part to speculation over further attacks and harassment by the Taliban in their efforts to disrupt the election process.
From the sample, there is an obvious difference in reporting frequency when comparing events that are describing Afghan on Canadian violence versus Afghan on Afghan violence. The sample sizes of events that directly involved Canadians (1, 4, and 5) were significantly greater in comparison to the stories that did not involve Canadians directly (2, 3). This indicates that the
Canadian media focuses more resources on stories that actually involve Canadians, whether it is a report on a casualty in the case of events 1 and 4 or article on Canada’s role to support the Afghan
71 governance processes (5). Further comparisons along these lines would need to be reviewed in
order to properly assess the presence of this type of trend.
Event 1 and 4 sample sizes were comparable and were 27 and 33 respectively. These two
stories signified milestones in Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan. Captain Nicola Goddard was
the first Canadian woman56 killed in a combat operation. In addition, the announcement of the
100th casualty received significant attention by the Canadian press and caused a spike of political
criticism over the mission. Subsequent Canadian support for the mission dipped from 40% to 35% after the grim milestone was reached and Canadians thought lesser of the notion of negotiation with the Taliban (42% to 36%) (Angus Reid, 2009).
Figure 4-4. Content analysis enemy imagery by type, media agency and sample event
As a source, the CBC and CTV turned the most results in terms of articles based on the sample events. Figure 4-4 depicts the results of the study by media agency and event. The National
Post, a newspaper that posts portions of its daily publication online, did not present any results for the first two events and did not register significantly until the later part of 2008. A general upward trend of sample size is observed in Figure 4-4 as the reporting timeframe progresses towards 2009.
Because purposive sampling was used in the selection of the articles (i.e. the story selections were
56 Captain Nichola Goddard was the first female combat death since the Second World War and the first ever female to die in
frontline combat in Canadian history (CBC, 2006 and Globe and Mail, 2006).
72 not random), one cannot simply argue from the above data that there is an upward trend of Internet
news reporting on the war as reporting levels are inherently dependent on the type of story reported on. In other words, if random sampling was used for this study, and a random sample of enemy imagery data from articles that spanned some specified timeline were collected, then, if the supporting data existed, an observation on enemy imagery trends could be made. As previously discussed, reporting levels of Afghan on Afghan violence (events 3, 4) were significantly lower than Afghan on Canadian violence (1, 2, 5); in fact, CTV did not even register any results for event
3 where Afghan school girls were attacked with acid by suspected Taliban assailants. As the study did not include interviews with the media organization included in the scope of the content analysis, the rationale behind the amount (or lack of) reporting on particular incidents can only be speculated upon. In this case, based on the data collected, the observation is made that Canadian media found stories that involve Canadian casualties more newsworthy than those that report on
Afghan casualties (i.e. acid attack).
Table 4-3 summarizes the data collected on Internet media features contained in the sample of articles used for the content analysis. Reader comments were totaled, but the contents were not analyzed in detail due to sheer volume. This decision was difficult as an overarching goal of the study is to examine if public opinion on the mission and the enemy is, indeed, affected by the articles making the reader comments on the articles an excellent source of primary information.
The amount of work that would have been required to collect and analyze all the reader comments proved to be too much for this study and the decision was made to rely solely on the polling data to calculate affects on public opinion. An increase in reader comments was observed as time progressed; however, again, due to the sampling method chosen for this study, one cannot conclude from this data that there is a general upward trend of online reader commenting. A total
73 of 4733 comments were observed from the five events – nearly 1000 per story. The significance of these totals cannot be ascertained without a comparison of audience feedback on other Canadian issues of interest, such as the economy or the environment. The most commented on story was the
Afghan elections; however, this event also had the largest sample size (50). The ratio of reader comments to sample size (n) was fairly consistent with the exception of event 2 (prison break) and event 3 (acid attack on Afghan school girls). While relatively under-reported in comparison to the other events, these two stories did receive a noticeably larger amount of proportional feedback from Canadians.
Table 4-3
Internet media features identified from sample
Sample Reader Related Sharing Event Date Short description Visuals Video Audio (N) comments articles (email)
Nichola Goddard 17-May- 1 first female killed 27 n/a 6 33 3 37 22 06 in action
15-Jun- Kandahar prison 2 16 939 5 4 0 42 8 08 break
Acid attack on 12-Nov- 3 Afghan 9 691 4 3 0 18 6 08 schoolgirls
05-Dec- 100th Canadian 4 33 1110 3 35 0 71 14 08 killed in action
22-Aug- Afghan election 5 50 1993 20 113 0 190 36 09 violence
Total 135 4733 38 188 3 358 86
74 Of the 135 articles sampled, only 38 visuals related to the enemy were identified. Of the visuals observed, most contained images of repatriation ceremonies (deaths caused by the enemy 57) and wreckage and carnage after IED or suicide bomb attacks (destruction caused by the
enemy). Only one actual image of a Taliban fighter was observed. These numbers could potentially
be explained by a shortage of available images of the enemy or a lack of willingness by the
Canadian media to display images of the enemy. It could also be, in part, because the
contemporary enemy in Afghanistan does not actually wear a uniform. Besides donning more
black attire and growing longer beards, Taliban fighters are good at blending in with the local male
Pashtun population (Global Security, 2005). This creates a challenge for Canadian media to present visuals of the enemy that do not appear to distinguish the enemy (i.e. the Taliban) from the general male population. Due to the low amounts of visual data collected from the content analysis, no further significant observations were made.
The appearance of embedded video (188) was significantly higher than similar totals for
audio clips (3). Stories that directly involved Canadians (1, 4 and 5) presented significantly higher
video totals than stories that did not involve Canadians. This could be explained by the previously
discussed observation that more media resources are allocated to coverage of stories that involve
Canadians; for example, the 2009 Afghan election was covered extensively by the CBC evening
news (The National) which generated the 35 video clips identified during the collection process.
The ability for readers to share the articles with other readers and also link to other related stories was also observed. Certain online news sites, including the CBC, display statistics on how many times an article has been recommended by one reader to another. Through a collection of this data
57 Not all repatriation ceremonies are as a result of Canadian Forces casualties caused by Taliban and insurgent attacks as the Forces
have also suffered loses in Afghanistan due to vehicle accidents and friendly fire incidents (CBC, 2010).
75 across multiple news sites, one could prove this unique and interactive aspect of online news. In
total, 358 related article links were identified and 64% of the articles provided quick sharing
functionality via e-mail and other social media networks (Facebook, Twitter, etc.). The ability to quickly access related stories is a distinguishing feature of Internet news when compared to traditional news. Psychologically, individuals are more apt to choose information that strengthens
and supports their preconceptions, biases, ideologies, and core beliefs (Berenger, 2006). By sharing online news items reporting on Taliban activity, audiences help in forming a shared baseline understanding of the group that is consistent with the media’s dispositional portrait.
From the list of enemy themes described in Appendix A, the content analysis identified the enemy theme of aggressor to be the most prevalent in the sample. Figure 4-5 shows the summarized results of the enemy theme identification. Of the articles assessed, 42% assessed as having a theme58 were categorized as depicting the Taliban as aggressive opponents. Enemy imagery that described attacks against Canadian and other foreign troops aligned with this theme.
The second most prevalent theme (23%) was that of oppressor. This was particularly evident in events 3 (acid attack) and 5 (election) as Taliban forces were depicted as trying to prevent the local female population from receiving an education and participating in voting processes. Many images of the Taliban as an organized and sophisticated foe were identified in event 2 (prison break) and resulted in the theme of worthy opponent (11%). The surprise and effectiveness of the attack raided suspicions over connections between the local police chief responsible for the prison and his chief of intelligence, who was later fired over the incident (CBC, 2008). The same reporting also contained many associations between the Taliban and the prisoners they broke out of jail, which suggests they were all involved in the same criminal enterprises.
58 See Appendix A for theme criteria.
76
Figure 4-5. Content analysis enemy themes by percentage identified
There were instances where the enemy was referred to as a ‘pest’ or ‘insect’ that needed to be
rooted out which formed an inhuman theme (9%). Finally, a few articles displayed the barbaric theme. The weak and stupid themes were lumped together as the categories are comparable and the results low. The biggest limitation of the enemy theme data is the subjectivity of 1) determining that a theme is indeed present and 2) categorizing the theme based on a predetermined list of possible selections. The variability caused by this subjectivity is further increased because only one coder was used. To limit the amount of inherent subjectivity in the results, the decision was made to limit identification of enemy themes to articles that presented at least two to three pieces of enemy imagery.
The final exercise of the quantitative analysis was the panel correlation between the enemy imagery levels and Canadian public opinion on two questions on the Afghan mission and the
Taliban. A panel correlation is the cross correlation of several variable series in a matrix form. In this study, there was interest in observing the correlations in a staggered time manner; hence, cross- lagged correlation was used. The variables observed in the CLC are situational (s) and dispositional (d) imagery levels and the positive and negative responses to public opinion questions
77 1 (Would you talk to the Taliban?) and 2 (Do you support the mission?). For the panel correlation,
16 individual cross-lagged correlations were computed:
2 (s, d) x 2 (Q1, Q2) x 2 (positive response, negative response) x 2 (t=1, t=2) = 16
The final portion of the above formula is the time calibration for cause and effect observance which is toggled back and forth between the enemy imagery and public opinion variables. Figure
4-6 illustrates an example CLC where the levels of dispositional enemy imagery (d) are cross-lag correlated with the negative response to Q1.
Figure 4-6. Cross-lag correlation (CLC) example
The difference between t=1 and t=2 varies across correlations from 2-4 weeks due to data
limitations, but this is not considered significant to exploratory objective of the calculations since
the factor of audience absorption and synthesis time frames will not be considered in this study. In
order for the CLC to be valid, t=2 must simply be greater in time than t=1. The observational
result of the above example is a strong positive correlation (r=0.82) between dispositional imagery levels (d) at t=1 and negative response to public opinion question 1 (Q1N) at t=2. In other words, dispositional imagery has a strong positive relation to subsequent public attitude towards not talking to the Taliban. The reverse (or cross) correlation toggled the time values for d and Q1N and resulted in a weak negative correlation (r=-0.36). For the purposes of the study, only CLC with r
78 greater than 0.5 or less than -0.5 were considered for further analysis and discussion. To cross this threshold suggests some positive or negative relation between variables that warrants further investigation. The entire panel of 16 cross-lagged correlations is presented in Appendix B. Out of the group, 6 CLCs suggested strong positive or negative relations between imagery and public opinion variables. These six results, along with their initial quantitative interpretation, are presented in Table 4-4. Four out of the six highlighted correlations involve the dispositional enemy imagery variable which suggests a potentially stronger relation between dispositional enemy imagery and public opinion than the relations between situational enemy imagery and public opinion. Extending the example presented in Figure 4-6, the interpretation of the CLC between D
(t=1) and Q1N at t =2 is that dispositional imagery has a strong positive relation to subsequent public opinion toward talking to the Taliban. The second strongest correlation is a negative (-0.80) between Q1P (question 1, positive response) at t=1 and situational imagery levels at t=2. This
CLC suggests that public attitude toward talking to the Taliban has a strong negative relation to subsequent amount of situational imagery; in other words, the more likely Canadians want to
negotiate and deal with the Taliban, the lesser subsequent levels of enemy imagery. Again, these
observations are strictly relational observations and not meant to argue causality. These two
examples highlight the potential system interaction between the media and the audience in both
time and directions of influence (media influencing audience and audience influencing media).
79 Table 4-4
Cross-lagged correlation (CLC) results and quantitative interpretation
CLC Finding
Enemy Time Public opinion CLC Interpretation imagery direction question and response
D > Q1 “no” 0.82 Dispositional imagery has strong positive relation to
subsequent public attitude toward not talking to the Taliban
S < Q1 “yes” -0.80 Public attitude toward talking to the Taliban has a strong
negative relation to subsequent amount of situational imagery
D > Q1 “yes” -0.70 Dispositional imagery has negative relation to subsequent
public attitude to talking to the Taliban
S < Q1 “no” 0.63 Public attitude toward not talking to the Taliban has positive
relation to subsequent amount situational imagery
D > Q2 “yes” -0.59 Dispositional imagery has some negative relation to public
support for mission
D > Q2 “no” 0.51 Dispositional imagery has some positive relation to public
attitude against mission
From the highlighted findings in Table 4-4, only two of the CLCs correlated with public opinion question 2 (support for the mission). Both of these correlations were the lowest two of the top 6
CLCs (-0.59 and 0.51) and just barely passed the threshold mark for further exploration. Their interpretation can be summarized as follows: Dispositional imagery at t=1 has some positive relation to (0.51) to public attitude against the mission and, inversely, some negative relation
(-0.59) to public support for the mission.
80 The content analysis of Canadian Internet news reports on the conflict in Afghanistan fulfilled the action research component of this major research project. The primary goal of the quantitative analysis was to address the first sub-research question:
Sub-research question 1: Do Canadian Internet news reports on the conflict in Afghanistan contain enemy imagery of
the Taliban and if so, what type and frequency?
Through an enhanced version of Ottosen’s newspaper study methodology, data on Taliban and insurgent enemy imagery and themes were collected from a sample of articles that report on five key events in Canada’s timeline in Afghanistan. The rationale behind the sampling method
(purposeful) and choice of Canadian sources (CBC, CTV and National Post) were explained in detail. From the 135 articles in the sample group, 119 contained some enemy imagery. Almost half of the articles presented an enemy theme of which the enemy as an aggressor was the most prominent. Using poling data on Canadian public opinion of the mission in Afghanistan and the notion of entering into talks with the Taliban, cross-lagged correlation (CLC) was used in showing the positive relationship between enemy imagery identified in news reports at t=1 and subsequent public opinion on the mission and the Taliban at t=2. The most compelling finding was the strongly positive relationship between amounts of dispositional enemy imagery identified in the
Internet articles and subsequent public opinion to not engage in talks with the Taliban. As will be discussed, the observation that enemy imagery has some positive relation to Canada’s willingness to talk to the Taliban is significant in the consideration of the enmity held by Canadians towards the enemy in Afghanistan.
81 5.0 Qualitative analysis: Enemy imagery in Canadian Internet news
This section of the paper will build upon the quantitative analysis and present a discussion on the enemy themes and enemy imagery identified in the study’s content analysis of Canadian
Internet news reports on the conflict in Afghanistan. The qualitative analysis of the sample events was organized into three sections:
Use of enemy imagery in each sample event: Each sample event will be discussed and analyzed in detail through a contrast of the reports from different sources and highlights of material electronically linked to particular news stories; in particular, the use of situational and dispositional enemy imagery will be examined for each sample event and explanations for the presence of the imagery will be offered. These explanations will include a discussion as to why the use of enemy imagery differs in reports of Canada-Afghan violence (i.e. Taliban attack of Canadian soldiers)
versus Afghan-Afghan violence (i.e. Taliban attack of Afghan security forces or civilians).
A view of the contemporary enemy: A more detailed view of the contemporary enemy will be constructed through an analysis of the prominent enemy themes identified in the content analysis. Through an integration of the data collected on enemy themes during the content analysis, an image of an aggressive, oppressing, and sophisticated insurgent Taliban enemy emerges. The destructive actions of this enemy are reported on by Canada’s media to a Canadian audience far removed from the front lines of the battle. The MRP argues that the persistent exposure to this enemy image has led the majority of Canadians to not look favourably to the prospect of negotiations with the Taliban.
Interpretation of cross-lagged correlation results: Finally, the rationale behind the cross-
lagged correlation will be discussed along with the exploratory benefit of the results yielded in the
study. The strong results of the CLC show a positive relation between enemy imagery in Canadian
82 Internet news and public opinion on the mission in Afghanistan and perception of the Taliban. The
most significant finding is the positive relationship between the amounts of dispositional enemy
imagery contained in Canadian Internet news reports and the subsequent negative response to the
notion of talks with the Taliban and, to a lesser extent, support of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan.
Event 1: Captain Nichola Goddard, first female killed in combat (May 16, 2006)
Captain Nichola Goddard, of 1st Royal Canadian Horse Artillery based in Shilo, Manitoba,
became the 17th Canadian to die in Afghanistan since Canada’s involvement commenced in
200159 (CBC, 2006). She was also the first female combat death since the Second World War and the first ever female to die in frontline combat in Canadian history (CBC, 2006 and Globe and
Mail, 2006). Goddard hailed from Calgary, was 26, and married with no children (CTV, 2006).
While she served with Task Force Afghanistan, she was attached to the 1st Battalion Princess
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (1 PPCLI) Battle Group. From the CTV Internet news article, entitled “Canadian Captain killed in Afghanistan firefight:”
Brig.-Gen. David Fraser, commander of the multinational brigade based in Kandahar, said
Goddard was killed in action at 6:55 p.m. local time (10:25 a.m. ET) about 24 kilometres
west of Kandahar city in the Panjwai region." Our hearts, our prayers and our sympathies
go out to the family of Nichola Goddard," said Fraser as he stood in front of a Canadian
flag at half-mast. "There was a firefight out there and sometime during the firefight she was
killed. It's a hard day but it's also a day of achievement," added Fraser, saying there were
59 While Operation Athena commenced in 2003 and is the current mission of Canadian Forces in Kandahar, Afghanistan, Canada
was in fact initially involved in the Afghanistan conflict in 2001. Shortly after the attacks of 9/11, Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2),
Canada’s elite commando unit, was engaged in battle with US Special Forces against al-Qaeda and Taliban in Pakistan and
Afghanistan (Woods, 2010).
83 "significant" Taliban casualties in the battle and a number of Taliban members were
captured. (CTV, 2006)
The majority60 of the enemy imagery identified in the content analysis of the Goddard killed in action (KIA) news story was situational and revolved around descriptions of her death in combat. The fact that she was the first female to die in frontline combat made the event unique and significant. From the sample of articles analyzed, much of the reporting focused on the circumstances of her death and the attribution of the event to Taliban insurgents. Plain and factual imagery was used to describe the attack against Goddard’s armoured vehicle by rocket propelled grenade as she served as forward observation officer of a firefight between Canadian and Afghan forces and the Taliban. For the most part, descriptions of the enemy were generic and did not go into much detail61.
A large portion of the reporting was dedicated to describing the human aspect of the news
event to Canadians through focusing on Nichola Goddard as a person. Subsequent reports on
Goddard’s story focused on her widow, who later accepted her Memorial Cross and Sacrifice
Medal posthumously (Davis, 2006 and PMO, 2009). The visuals presented on Internet news pages
that covered this story were either of Goddard in uniform, brandishing a confident smile or of her
casket during various stages of her repatriation ceremony starting in Kandahar airfield and ending
in Canadian Forces Base Trenton. As a milestone event in the timeline of Canada’s engagement in
Afghanistan, this news story sparked debate over the mission. Several related articles on the
60 Only one instance of dispositional enemy imagery was identified in the content analysis of the Internet news coverage of Captain
Goddard’s death in combat.
61 Nothing specific about the insurgent attacker was identified within the sample of 27 articles covering or mentioning Captain
Goddard’s KIA other than the fact that it was a male insurgent who had used a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG) to attack
Goddard as she performed her Forward Observer Officer (FOO) duties in battle.
84 conflict that contained mentioned of Goddard were included in the content analysis. Two CBC
related articles focused on the parliamentary decision to extend the mission by two years and
debate over whether Canada was involved in a war or a peacekeeping mission (CBC, 2006). In the
case of the former, the attacks of 9/11 and the security of North America were mentioned as
primary drivers behind the mission itself. The justification for an extension of the mission deadline was presented as Canada’s desire to see the job of reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan through to completion. In another article, Gordon O’Connor, then Minister of Defence, linked the death of Taliban to progress in Canada’s reconstruction objectives in Afghanistan. O’Connor noted, “As more enemy fighters are killed, more reconstruction work can be accomplished”
(2006). From a passive audience perspective, the notions of the mission in Afghanistan, 9/11, the goal to distinguish the Taliban, and the sacrifice of Goddard’s death (all of which are mentioned in the article) are all associated. A more active audience would not necessarily link these pieces of information together and would compartmentalize the relationship between 9/11 and Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. By definition, the active audience would further deconstruct the notion that there is no other option but to kill the Taliban if Canada’s mission is to be successful.
As previously discussed, the Canadian news audience cannot be summarily categorized as either active or passive, thus, the majority audience response is assumed to be some balance of the two characteristic audience types. Through a consideration of how active or passive the Canadian audience is, one can make some assumptions as to how it handles news information on the conflict, integrates the information into existing perceptions of the enemy in Afghanistan, and forms or reinforces an opinion as to whether or not Canada should pursue a more political solution (i.e. negotiation) in Afghanistan or continue along with the NATO endeavour to destroy the Taliban.
85 Event 2: Kandahar prison break (June 15, 2008)
In this critical event in the mission’s timeline, Canadian Forces were called in to secure
parts of Kandahar after a well planned Taliban attack of the city’s main prison (Saraposa62). It is estimated that over 1,000 prisoners, approximately 350 being Taliban militants, escaped in the process (CTV, 2008). From the CTV online article “Jailbreak frees over 1,000 into Kandahar’s
Streets,” situational enemy imagery is used to describe how the event unfolded:
The jail's main gate was hit with a tanker truck full of explosives shortly after 9:30 p.m.,
prison chief Abdul Qabir told The Canadian Press. The bomb also destroyed an outpost full
of police officers, killing them all. Qabir did not know how many had died. Soon after, a
suicide bomber detonated his explosives near the back of the prison, that blasted a hole
though the wall. Rocket fire could be heard throughout the city late into the night.
According to the Taliban, the attack was carried out by 30 fighters on motorcycles and two
suicide bombers. (2008)
From the sample of Internet articles analyzed, the reporting on this story focused on three primary aspects of the event: (1) the sophisticated nature of the attack and planning on the part of the Taliban; (2) the direct fallout and consequences of the prison break on the local population, and
(3) Canadian Forces and Afghan security forces’ tactical reaction to the attack and escape of
Taliban prisoners. Although dubbed a “small splash in the pond” by then Chief of Defence Staff
62 Sarposa prison is the largest detention in Kandahar province and is located in the outskirts of Kandahar City. The prison houses
both common criminals and captured Taliban militants detained during fighting with Canadian, NATO and Afghan security
forces. Although Sarposa is the largest prison in southern Afghanistan, due its relative lack of security, most high-value Taliban
prisoners are kept at Afghanistan’s main prison, Pol-e-Charkhi in Kabul, or at the U.S. detention facility at Bagram. Canada
invested $1 million in improvements in the prison before the attack and subsequently pledged another $4 million to help rebuild it.
Source: CBC (2008, June 14). Insurgent attack frees hundreds from Kandahar prison. Retrieved from www.cbc.ca
86 General Rick Hillier (National Post, 2008), the event marked a major setback in Canadian Forces’
progress to stabilize the region as an influx of Taliban and other insurgent, criminal elements
flooded local villages:
Hundreds of Taliban fighters took over several villages near Kandahar Monday, prompting
fears of an attack on the city and the redeployment of NATO and Afghan forces to meet the
threat. Mohammad Farooq, the government leader in the Arghandab district of Kandahar
province, said around 500 Taliban fighters moved into his district just past nightfall and
were holding at least three villages (CBC, 2008).
Most of the enemy imagery identified in this sample group of Internet articles was situational descriptions of the well-coordinated Taliban attack and subsequent skirmishes in local villages with Canadian and Afghan security forces. Slightly higher amounts of dispositional imagery were identified in this sample group in comparison to the previously discussed Captain
Goddard KIA news story. The higher amounts of dispositional enemy imagery were explained by the international media attention the Taliban attack received which, in turn, created a reporting environment where future attacks of a similar nature were speculated on; for example, the CBC article, “Taliban fighters take villages near Kandahar after jailbreak,” contained two instances of dispositional imagery that described fear and rumour of a renewed and consolidated push by the
Taliban into Kandahar city (CBC, 2008). This study argues that, from the perspective of the
Canadian audience who follow events online, the use of dispositional imagery helps to create the expectation of further violence by the Taliban with their newly liberated comrades. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, the worthy opponent and criminal enemy themes were apparent in the sample group of articles. Some visuals were noted in the Internet coverage of this news event. The principal focus of the visuals was images of the demolished prison after the bomb and mortar
87 assaults. This served to reinforce the seemingly aggressive and destructive actions attributed to the
Taliban attack.
Event 3: Acid attack on Afghan schoolgirls (November 12, 2008)
Both Events 2 and 3 were selected in order to complement the original sample group of three
articles that focused on Canada’s role in Afghanistan. As with the prison break, the acid attack
story was an example of Afghan on Afghan63 violence. Three out of eight schoolgirls on their way
to class in Kandahar City were seriously burned when two men on a motorcycle threw acid on them. Six of the eight were taken to hospital and one was blinded as a result of the incident
(National Post, 2008). Both Afghan and Canadian officials condemned that attack and while the
Taliban were widely attributed to the incident, a spokesman denied involvement in the attack
(CBC, 2008). In the CBC Internet news article, “Afghan schoolgirls burned by acid in attack by men on motorcycle,” The head of Canadian land forces and Canada’s ambassador to Afghanistan both commented on the incident:
"This story will spread through Afghanistan and the Taliban, our foe, will not win any
friends by the tale of two young thugs scattering acid on two young girls trying to get an
education," (Lieutenant-General Andrew) Leslie said.” There’s no upside for them on this,
so it's an act of desperation." Canada's ambassador to Afghanistan, Ron Hoffman, said the
increasing attacks were desperate acts of rebellion against progress. (CBC, 2008)
63 It should be noted that no further information on the attackers was offered in terms of place of origin (i.e. Afghanistan or Pakistan)
or ethnicity (Pashtun or Pakistani), so another way to frame this incident would be Insurgent on Afghan violence, or if one would
assume the Taliban were indeed responsible, Taliban on Afghan violence. For the purposes of this study, the main aspect of
including this event in the content analysis is the lack of Canadian involvement in the event itself.
88 A follow-up article on the recovery of the injured school girls and their eventual return to class featured a resilient statement from one of the victims and one of her schoolmates:
“Whoever threw this acid poison at us, these people should be hanged. We don't want to
forgive those people.” Students and teachers at the school said they won't be intimidated.
A student named Aqila said she wants to come to school. "I'm not scared. I want to be a
doctor, and if we don't come to school, then I'd have to stay home and do nothing," she
said. (CBC, 2008)
From the sample group used in the content analysis, the use of enemy imagery was almost exclusively limited to the situational type. Factual descriptions of the heinous attack against the unarmed school teenage girls were complemented with visuals of them hospitalized and in pain.
One related National Post article on Canadian and U.S. foreign policy on Afghanistan featured a mention of the acid attack incident by Peter McKay, Canada’s Minister of Defence, who compared al Qaeda’s racist denunciations of Barack Obama to the alleged involvement of the Taliban in the acid attack incident:
Mr. MacKay said the al-Qaeda message is "no different than the acid that they [italics
added] splashed both figuratively and literally on their own people, the allies and anyone
dedicated to peace and security in their country. Targeting innocent children who want
nothing more than to be able to go to school and get an education -- it's pure intimidation of
the most medieval kind," said Mr. MacKay, who has often spoken fondly in public about
his interactions with Afghan children, particularly girls who were barred from school
during the Taliban's five-year rule that ended in 2001. (National Post, 2008)
The above quotation from a high ranking Canadian official links the Taliban to al-Qaeda, and consequently to 9/11 as previously discussed.
89 A dominant theme of the Taliban as oppressors of freedom and education of women was observed in the content analysis. This theme was further reinforced by mention of pre-9/11 Taliban regimes’ outlaw of education for women.
Event 4: 100th Canadian Forces casualty (December 5, 2008)
Three Canadian soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb, which raised the Canadian death toll in the mission above the 100 mark. As with many of the previous deaths, the latest casualties came from an improvised explosive device (IED). The three soldiers from 1st Battalion, Royal
Canadian Regiment, based in CFB Petawawa, Warrant Officer Robert John Wilson, Corporal
Mark Robert McLaren, and Private Demetrios Diplaros, were killed instantly by a massive blast that launched their armoured vehicle into the air and left a deep crater in Highway 1, one of
Afghanistan's most dangerous highways (National Post, 2008). Along with the Goddard KIA story, this event marked a grim milestone in Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan. It also renewed public debate on the mission and Canada’s approach in terms of how to deal with the Taliban insurgency.
The timing of the event was significant as the tragic 100th KIA milestone was reached just three weeks before Christmas and after a three-month lull in fatalities (CBC, 2008). While there was no direct evidence contained in the articles that covered this event that the Taliban had purposefully planned and executed the attack before the 2008 holiday season to maximize the damage to
Canadian Forces morale, the effects of the attack echoed that of a well-planned and sophisticated psychological operation.
The Canadian milestone is expected to revive debate about the country's role in
Afghanistan, though soldiers at Petawawa were focused solely on the individual deaths. In
the recent election campaign, (Prime Minister) Harper vowed to withdraw Canadian troops
90 from Afghanistan in 2011 and said Canadians didn't have an appetite to keep soldiers
stationed there any longer. (CBC, 2008)
Internet news coverage of the event also contained comments from senior Canadian military
officials who attempted to downplay the significance of the milestone: "Already there is talk of
numbers and milestones," Brigadier-General Denis Thompson, then commander of the Canadian
battle group said. "There is no distinction for us between the first and the last. Unfortunately, the currency of warfare is people's lives" (National Post, 2008). Another commander noted that
“there's no difference for me from number 100 or number 10 or number 75...they've all sacrificed their lives for Canada and Afghanistan" (2008). From the content analysis of this news event, a subtle war of words was observed between the views expressed by the military and the different views presented by the Canadian media who portrayed the milestone as significant and tragic.
The content analysis of the sample group showed a strong presence of situational enemy imagery along with a moderate amount of dispositional imagery. The situational imagery focused on the
Taliban use of IEDs and descriptions of the associated destruction and death inflicted on the three
Canadian soldiers by their weapon of choice. Dispositional enemy imagery highlighted the volatility and dangerousness of the particular area in which the three soldiers were killed. This imagery created the expectation of future hostility on behalf of the Taliban as displayed by the following three examples:
1. Soldiers had been expecting an insurgent attack, called ‘contact’ in army jargon, during the
Pashmul patrol. "It's a bad place," said (Corporal) Denis Toroptsev, who carried a machine-gun
on the operation. "We're getting contact every time we're in there" (National Post, 2008).
2. There continues to be a presence, certainly of the IED bomb-making factories — they have not
let up [italics added] (CBC, 2008).
91 3. …the kaboom of IEDs that kill more civilians than troops; the ever-present [italics added]
threat of a resurgent Taliban that hides behind and amidst those civilians (Toronto Star, 2008).
From the content analysis, it was observed that a significant portion of the reporting of this story
was dedicated to the loss of Canadian life as illustrated by the detailed coverage of the repatriation
ceremony and the individual funerals for each of the three soldiers. A fair portion of the Internet
news articles were accompanied by visuals of the soldiers’ caskets and Canadians who lined
overpasses of Highway 401 to pay their final respects to the fallen. Some images of individual
funeral processions, along with very personal comments from surviving family members, were
identified in the later portion of the sample group. These combined images and statements create
an image of death and loss of Canadian life. The death and loss is, of course, attributed to the
mission in Afghanistan and the Taliban.
Event 5: Afghan National election violence (August 11-24, 2009)
The lead-up to the 2009 Afghan National election was a tense period for Afghanistan and
NATO countries that worked with the Afghan government and security forces. The event represented a crossroads in Afghanistan’s short democratic history, as insurgent forces threatened and harassed the local population in an effort to disrupt the elections. During the two-week period leading up to the election on August 22, 2009, Taliban fighters were clashing with Afghan security and NATO forces using a mix of small arms, grenades, and suicide bombers. At the height of the violence, NATO estimated that approximately 48 attacks were occurring daily (CBC, 2009). As
Canada was responsible for Kandahar, the historical place of Taliban origin, it faced the greatest challenge in terms of security provisions for Afghan officials and locals throughout the polling process due to the amount of Taliban insurgent activity expected to occur in their area of
92 responsibility. As the election was a national event, it required NATO’s full support across all of its areas of operations across Afghanistan. Canadian media coverage of the election violence was not limited to Kandahar province and included reports from all over Afghanistan, including the eastern region protected by U.S. troops and the capital city, Kabul.
In terms of enemy imagery, Internet news coverage of Afghan election violence presented significant amounts of both situational and dispositional enemy imagery. It should be noted that, like the previous events discussed, the amounts of situational imagery were also larger in comparison to the amount of dispositional imagery identified in the sample group of articles that covered the election violence news story. In the CBC Internet article, “Kandahar governor urges
Afghans to vote,” instances of situational and dispositional enemy imagery were used in the coverage of a brazen Taliban attack of a polling station in bank located in the capital city, Kabul:
Armed men took over a branch of the Pashtani Bank early Wednesday in the Jadi Maiwand
area of Kabul. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident, which is the third major
attack to rock the capital in recent days. The Taliban have vowed to disrupt Thursday's
election and have told voters they risk being caught in an attack if they go to cast ballots.
(CBC, 2009)
The first phrase of the excerpt describes aggressive action carried out by the Taliban militants as they seized a voting station in broad daylight and disrupted the voting process for local villagers.
The second phrase indicates an expectation of future hostility on the part of the insurgents as they vow to disrupt the democratic process sponsored by NATO. In comparison to the content analysis of the other sample events, this event contained the highest levels of dispositional imagery as reports contained threats by Taliban militants as communicated by website and spokesmen. “A
Taliban website claimed Wednesday at least 20 suicide bombers are imbedded in the capital and
93 militants are closing in on roads across the country” (CBC, 2009). In another example of
dispositional imagery, a rumour is spread about the Taliban that threatens to cut off voters’ fingers
and thumbs marked with indelible ink 64:
Rumours have circulated that villagers with indelible ink on their fingers -- a fraud
prevention method to deter repeat voting -- could be attacked, or even have their fingers
chopped off. A Taliban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, has denied that militants would cut
off fingers. But the Taliban is a loose collection of militant leaders, and individual
insurgents could still carry out such attacks. (CTV, 2009)
In addition to the reports on threats of and actual incidents of violence perpetrated by the
Taliban and other anti-government forces, reports on the event focused on the fragility and lack of
apparent security that has plagued international development efforts since the start of the NATO
mission. The shadowy everywhere but nowhere theme of the enemy was further reinforced as
Afghan and Canadian Forces scrambled from incident to incident in support of the electoral process. Some of the reporting focus was also dedicated the suspected fraudulent behaviour on behalf of the incumbent Karzai government.
From the content analysis of the sampled Internet articles, a war of words seemed to develop between Canadian and Afghan officials who support the election and their opponents, the
Taliban, who killed 26 people over a blitz of 73 attacks on election day (CBC, 2009). As previously seen in the content analysis of the 100th KIA news story, senior Canadian military officials downplayed the significance of the event:
64 Indelible ink was used as a control and security precaution to prevent multiple voting by local participants.
94 Brig.-Gen Jonathan Vance, the commander of Canada's Task Force Kandahar, said election
day was an "utter failure" for the insurgents. "As anticipated, the insurgency did attempt to
disrupt the election. They were unsuccessful across the board," he said. (2009)
In terms of enemy themes, two were prominent in the analysis of the sample group for this event:
(1) The enemy as an aggressor; and, (2) The enemy as oppressor of democracy.
5.1 Qualitative analysis: The contemporary enemy in Afghanistan
The following section will discuss the enemy themes identified in the content analysis. The four most dominant themes will be presented in order of prevalence within the article sample group. In a shift away from the independent events described in the previous section towards a more holistic perspective, a contemporary view of the enemy, as portrayed by Canadian Internet news, will be constructed. The set of enemy themes used for categorization purposes in the content analysis was adapted from Sam Kean’s Faces of the Enemy (1986) and is operationalized within the protocol sheet in Appendix A. As discussed in the quantitative design of the study, more than one instance of enemy imagery should be present in a single piece of news in order for a theme to be present. Furthermore, if more than one instance of enemy imagery is identified, the group of imagery must portray some similar characteristics in order for a theme to be present; for example, an Internet news article brief that only mentions an IED strike and attributes it to the Taliban does not present a theme as only one action or behaviour on the part of the Taliban is mentioned. On the other hand, an article that mentions a recent IED strike along with preceding strikes that happened the month before along with other actions could sufficiently form an enemy theme; however, the process of identification still contains an aspect of subjectivity65. This distinction is similarly
65 It is not proposed that the aggregate view of the Taliban presented at the end of this section is the view held by all Canadians but
rather the view presented to the Canadian Internet news audience as observed from the results of the MRP content analysis.
95 important to note when interpreting the results of the cross lagged correlation between enemy
imagery levels and subsequent Canadian public opinions towards Afghanistan and the Taliban.
The most frequently used enemy theme identified in the content analysis was that of aggressor. This theme was present in all five sample events, with the exception of one66. In articles where this theme was identified, the Taliban were portrayed as hostile, attacking, violent, destructive, provoking, and antagonizing. The aggressor theme was most prevalent in the prison break, 100th KIA, and election violence observed sample events. A nominal amount of the theme was also identified in the Nichola Goddard KIA news story. Aggressive actions on behalf of the
Taliban, or insurgents and anti-government forces suspected to be the Taliban, were often realized via situational enemy imagery of IED strikes, automatic rifle ambush, and rocket-propelled grenade attacks. These instances were sometimes compounded by dispositional imagery suggesting the likelihood of further aggressive behaviour. The combination of situational and dispositional imagery displaying aggressive actions was most notable in the 2009 Afghan National
Election event where a war of words between Karzai, NATO military officials, and the Taliban set the stage for a historical crossroads in Afghanistan’s short democratic history. When the 100th KIA milestone had been surpassed, the Taliban were portrayed as having aggressively inflicted the greatest amount of Canadian Forces casualties since the Korean War. While downplayed by military officials, the Canadian media highlighted the significance of the event and recognized the ultimate price paid by Canada for its engagement in Afghanistan and conflict with the Taliban. The theme of aggressor was often identified alongside the oppressor enemy theme.
The second most prevalent enemy theme identified in the content analysis was that of the
Taliban as oppressors. This was most strongly manifested in situational imagery that depicted the
66 The aggressor theme was not identified in event 3 – Acid Attack on Afghan Schoolgirls.
96 Taliban’s harassment of the population throughout the election voting process. Taliban spokesmen
and websites carried warnings to cut off the fingers marked with indelible ink (a security
precaution to avoid fraudulent voting). This sample group contained the highest levels of total
enemy imagery as the Taliban launched a blitz of attacks across Kabul and Kandahar in an effort to
spoil the election. From the content analysis, the Taliban appear to be against democracy and
freedom as idealized by the Canadian media. Taliban oppression of women was most strongly
personified by the schoolgirl acid attack news story. Although the Taliban did deny involvement in
the barbaric incident, one could argue that it will continue to be associated with them and will
become a part of their historic denial of equal rights and education for women.
Some of the news events contained situational enemy imagery of sophisticated, well-
planned Taliban assaults. Other events contained descriptions of the under-matched insurgents’
capability to wage war against modern foreign armies. These descriptions portray the Taliban as a
worthy opponent who is, at times, daring, resourceful, calculating, strategic, and effective. In this context, the identification of a group as worthy should not be confused with the literal meaning of the word (fully deserving, moral, having good qualities) but, rather, that the group is in fact equally matched and worthy to engage in battle with. In particular, the Taliban displayed their prowess in
the damaging assault of Saraposa prison. From the content analysis, the event was represented by the media as well-planned, effective, and a force multiplier of their manpower in the surrounding area. It is also suspected that they had inside assistance from double-agents working in the prison, another sign of a sophisticated and resourceful foe. The insurgent fighters engaged with Captain
Nichola Goddard’s unit appeared intelligent enough to know that her observations and communication back to artillery units made her a high-value target. The Taliban seemingly took the initiative by pushing the number of Canadian Forces fatalities in the mission over the 100 mark
97 just before the holiday season, maximizing the psychological impact of the event to the Canadians serving in Afghanistan and those following the conflict from home. Finally, the Taliban displayed their cohesion by acting on their threats to create havoc during the 2009 National elections by launching close to an average of 50 attacks a day during the two-week period (CBC, 2009).
From the content analysis of the sample group, the Taliban were, at times, depicted as inhuman. This theme was identified in instances where the Taliban were displayed as acting with great cruelty and lacking humanity. In this context, this theme was strong in the acid attack news story as the Taliban were portrayed as ruthless and without conscious as they assaulted innocent schoolgirls who attempted to obtain an education. This theme is echoed in the following quotation from then Task Force Afghanistan commander, Brigadier-General Denis Thompson:
During my short time in Kandahar province, a female civilian member of our task force
was set on fire, a man has had his eyes gouged out in front of his family, children have
been used as suicide bombers against the security forces, a busload of young men have
been executed in cold blood and young girls have had acid thrown in their face on their
way to school. (CTV, 2008)
The theme is also present in instances where the Taliban are described in an inhuman manner, such as in their comparison to animals or insects. The presence of this theme is noteworthy as Kean indicates a certain level of mutual hate between groups is required in order for inhuman descriptions to appear in news and propaganda (1986, p. 60). According to his “sanctions for extermination” concept, eradication of an enemy group is justified by enabling propaganda comparisons to insects and animals (1986, p. 60). One should again be careful with judging the significance of these observations as the categorization of themes is, again, a very subjective process; for example, one CBC Internet news report on the Saraposa prison break said that NATO
98 would have to “root” and “chase out” escaped Taliban militants (National Post, 2008) which
potentially created an image of the insurgents as rodents or insects that need to be exterminated. A
National Post article related to the acid attack also contained a grim quote from a recent al-Qaeda
message from their second in command, Ayman al-Zawahri, "Be aware that the dogs of
Afghanistan have found the flesh of your soldiers to be delicious" (National Post, 2008). Although
al-Zarwahri’s quote appears on the surface to be an example of self-inflicted de-humanization, it is most likely in reference specifically to the Taliban, and in doing so, a comparison of the group to dogs. A CTV online news report on the election violence of 2009 contained the following quote from a local witness of recent Taliban attacks: "Once again they've killed children, women, innocent Afghans. They are not human. They are animals. You can see for yourself the destruction of this enemy" (CTV, 2009). In the case of quotations that contain dehumanizing remarks towards the Taliban, this study argues it is irrelevant whether the dehumanizing language is that of the
Canadian media directly (i.e. journalistic discourse) or quotations of others implicated in the conflict (al-Qaeda, local witnesses) because it is the presence of dehumanizing imagery that is most important to the consideration of audience perceptions of the Taliban as being inhuman.
99 Figure 5-1. The contemporary enemy in Afghanistan in themes and words
Figure 5-1 presents a summary view of the contemporary enemy in Afghanistan as described by the results of the content analysis. The enemy is a fluid entity that is represented by many themes, not all of which are necessarily negative. The themes observed in this study are rose coloured and appear in order of prominence from left to right. The circle in the middle of diagram captures some of the terms used to identify the enemy with Taliban as the most common in red followed by insurgent and other closely related terms in yellow. Peripheral to the central group of this analysis (the Taliban), is al-Qaeda, another Islamic fundamentalist movement linked to the
Taliban and the attacks of 9/11. While al-Qaeda has arguably not been active in Afghanistan since
2001 (Global Security, 2006), mention of the terrorist organization was observed on multiple occasions during the content analysis sample period between 2006 and 2009. The elements of al-
Qaeda and some of the shared themes and common terms between the two groups are indicated in blue. From the perspective of Canadian audiences, the association between the Taliban and al-
Qaeda is significant for two reasons. First, in 2002, Canada was one of the six countries named by
Osama bin Laden, spiritual leader of the movement, as targets of future al-Qaeda operations, primarily in response to US and NATO military occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq (Day, 2008).
Canada is, of course, a founding member of NATO and a central player in the counterinsurgency, most notably in Kandahar province. Second, as the 10th anniversary of 9/11 approaches, the memory and consequences of the attack still linger in many Canadian minds67. In fact, 24
Canadians perished in the strike against western democracy (Toronto Star, 2007) and Canada still
must cope with the changing security environment that resulted from the attack (Anker, 2005, p.
67 In July, 2007, 10% of Canadians felt that terrorism and the mission in Afghanistan were the most important issue facing Canada. It
is generally acknowledged that Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan was a direct result of the attacks of 9/11.
From Strategic Council Most Important Issue Facing Canada Today (October, 2009).
100 27). Nearly a decade has passed since the al-Qaeda vow to strike on Canadian soil was made. The
threat of future al-Qaeda aggression against Canada is uncertain and the topic of global terrorism is currently not on the top of the public agenda with the rise of other contentious issues, including the state of Canada’s economy, healthcare system, and the environment68; however, it is very possible that some Canadians still view al-Qaeda as the enemy. Through a process of attribution, the mere mention of al-Qaeda in the same breath as the Taliban reinforces the negative enemy image of the
Taliban and indirectly connects them to the attacks of 9/11. This is significant as the association between groups could be a sufficient catalyst to progress the process of enmification forward so that a group once viewed as a threat or aggressor is eventually viewed as an enemy.
5.2 Cross-lagged correlation interpretation
The final section of this chapter will present an interpretation of the cross-lagged correlation results between the observed enemy imagery and subsequent public opinion variables.
Of the six highest correlation findings, the four oriented in a linear cause and effect sequence
(enemy imagery at t=1, and public opinion at t=2, where t=time) will be analyzed in detail. The decision to narrow the scope of discussion to this particular sequence was made in order to align the qualitative analysis to the study’s research questions which are oriented in the same sequence.
Dispositional imagery at t=1 displayed strong correlative results with subsequent public opinion variables. Conversely, situational imagery seemed to correlate stronger with preceding public opinion data (an inverse relation from a timing perspective). One could say that the dispositional imagery acted more independently then the seemingly dependent situational imagery variable. The
68 Since Jan, 2009 the economy (including the issue of unemployment) has dominated the majority (61%) of Canadian’s attention as
the most important issue facing Canada today.
From Strategic Council Most Important Issue Facing Canada Today (October, 2009).
101 analysis will be grouped by question and type of enemy imagery, for a total of four analytical comments. The explanations will be framed within the context of the process of enmification of the
Taliban through Canadian Internet news.
Public opinion question 1: Should Canada negotiate with the Taliban?
Public Safety Canada maintains a list of entities associated with terrorism (PSC, 2010).
While the Taliban are absent from the list of terrorist entities, al-Qaeda is present. As previously discussed, the well-known link between these organizations often leads to the sharing of similar negative perceptions. The Unites States’ motto not to negotiate with terrorists is now somewhat challenged as the realization sets in that the Taliban cannot simply be eradicated from their place of origin69. Another solution that is desirable is one that will cover the two requirements of wrapping up the NATO engagement in the next couple years along with ensuring that Afghanistan is left secure and stable under the leadership of an empowered Karzai government. This boils down to a matter of interpretation on how one views the Taliban, either as terrorists, insurgents, oppressors, or freedom fighters. This is further complicated by the composition of the Taliban, which is by no means uniform. If NATO decides to participate in a political solution with the Taliban, the first step would be a willingness to engage in dialogue and recognize the organization as political entity.
The significance of this polling question is that it gauges the Canadian appetite for a recognition of the Taliban as more of a stakeholder70 than as an enemy combatant. By observing a negative shift in this public willingness to speak to the Taliban, over time, the study is proposing this shift may in
69 Forty-six percent of Canadians believe the outcome of the NATO mission in Afghanistan will include a negotiated political
settlement with the Taliban (Angus Reid, 2010).
70 In peace journalism, actors are described as stakeholders in problems and issues that have resulted in conflict as opposed to war
journalism which refers to actors as combatants engaged in battle (Lee and Maslog, 2005, p. 311).
102 part be due to the previous and accumulated observation of enemy imagery in Canadian news
reports, including imagery consumed online. This process of enemy-making is gradual as negative
perceptions form and reinforce over time. Some of the CLC findings will provide insight as to how
the process can be countered in both online and traditional media channels.
CLC Finding 1: Dispositional enemy imagery has strong positive relation to subsequent public attitude toward not
talking to the Taliban (Q1)
This finding implies that higher amounts of dispositional enemy imagery contained in news reports at t=1 are positively related to Canadians’ unwillingness to work with Taliban to find a political solution to the conflict. The inclusion of dispositional rather that situational imagery is an important aspect of this finding. Situational imagery describes the Taliban in battle with Canadian
Forces in factual form and most often includes mention of IEDs and other violent tactics. On the other hand, dispositional enemy imagery speculates on future aggression on the part of the Taliban and through the implication that future hostilities are imminent, reduces optimism for alternative resolutions to the conflict, such as negotiation. Taking this finding one step further, one could argue that the more likely Canadians are to reply negatively to this question, the more likely they are to view the Taliban as their enemy. As the observance of imagery and public opinion variables were made in a sequential manner by employing CLC, one could further argue that the presence of dispositional imagery suggests a progression in the process of making the Taliban an enemy from the perspective of Canadians.
CLC Finding 2: Dispositional enemy imagery has a negative relation to subsequent public attitude to talking to the
Taliban (Q1)
Essentially CLC Finding 2 has the same qualitative results as CLC Finding 1. The only
difference is the observance of the subsequent relation between dispositional imagery and the
103 positive response to Q1. Logically, the findings are the same as the negative relation to a positive
response is the same as the positive relation to the negative response. In terms of correlative
validity, the fact that the two logically equivalent correlations were equally strong reinforces the
significance of the CLC results. In a sense, two important data points from the quantitative analysis
form one larger, single data point. In terms of inclination to speak with the Taliban, the majority of
Canadians have been steadily against the idea since January, 2008. A spike in the negative
response to Q1 was observed weeks after the 100th Canadian casualty, and according to the last data points observed, continue to rise towards an all time high (Angus-Reid, 2009). From the data sources, Canadian’s willingness to negotiate with the Taliban is at an all time low (Strategic
Council, 2009 and Angus Reid, 2009). In a complex system where audiences, media and imagery interact, dispositional imagery appears to have some role in hardening this opinion.
Public opinion question 2: Do you support the mission in Afghanistan?
The CLC results for Q2 were not as strong as Q1. This poling question was included in the correlative analysis since data along the similar period of consideration was available and as such was used as more of a control measure to compare with the CLC results of Q1. Since none of the correlative results were contradictory (a sign of an unstable variable comparison), the inclusion of
Q2 served this controlling purpose. Unlike Q1, it is difficult to rationalize public opinions associated with Q2 with the concept of enmity. Whether or not Canadians view the Taliban as their enemy is most likely independent of their support for the mission in Afghanistan. From the observed data, the majority of Canadians do not support the mission and this position has been stable since the summer of 2008 (Angus-Reid, 2009). Before this point, a small spike in the positive response made the supporters the majority. This spike occurred two weeks after the
104 Nichola Goddard KIA event. Perhaps the spike was due to Canada’s collective resolve to finish the
mission successfully after paying with the tragic cost of Captain Goddard’s life71.
CLC Finding 3: Dispositional enemy imagery has some negative relation to public support for mission (Q2)
This finding implies a negative relationship between the variables of dispositional enemy
imagery of the Taliban and public support for the mission in Afghanistan. Currently, over 60% of
Canadians do not support Canada’s mission in Afghanistan (Angus Reid, 2010). One interpretation of the weak public support for the mission is a lack of optimism on behalf of the Canadian public for a successful outcome. If one considers the Taliban to be their enemy, this would imply that the criteria for success would include victory over them. As indicated from the results of the content analysis, the presence of dispositional imagery in reporting on the mission typically involves indications of further hostility and aggression on the part of the Taliban. This could create an implied message to the Canadian audience that the war is far from over and that a victory against the Taliban is not attainable72. The realization that a decisive victory over against the Taliban is most likely not attainable and the assumption that dispositional imagery exasperates this notion, explains the negative relationship between the dispositional enemy imagery and subsequent support for the mission in Afghanistan (Q2).
CLC Finding 4: Dispositional enemy imagery has some positive relation to public attitude against mission (Q2)
As with the second comment for Q1, this finding is the logical compliment of its predecessor. In other words, dispositional enemy imagery has some positive relation to public
71 Fletcher and Hove argue that Canadians’ emotional response to the loss of Canadian soldiers and their repatriation ceremonies
galvanizes support for the mission in Afghanistan (2010).
72 Currently, only 8 % of Canadians believe the NATO mission in Afghanistan will end in a decisive victory over the Taliban (Angus
Reid, 2010).
105 attitude against the mission (i.e. negative response to Q2) which is logically equivalent to a
negative relation to public attitude in support of the mission. The presence 73 of this finding further reinforces the validity of the CLC results. As the correlative findings for Q2 were not as strong as
Q1, the increased validity is nominal and one can conclude that the variables observed and conclusions drawn are stable.
CLC Finding 5: Public attitude toward talks with the Taliban has a strong negative relation to subsequent amount of
situational imagery
CLC Finding 6: Public attitude toward not talking to the Taliban has positive relation to subsequent amount situational
imagery
Findings 5 and 6 suggest a relationship between public opinion and subsequent situational enemy imagery levels contained in Canadian Internet news reports on the Afghan conflict. This is the opposite sequential direction of the four previously discussed findings. One explanation for these findings is the argument that the interaction between media, audience, and enemy imagery includes some feedback or reflection of public opinion towards the Taliban and the mission in the subsequent amount of situational imagery contained in online news reports on the insurgency.
While an interesting notion worthy of further investigation, this line of inquiry will not be considered further in this study as the focus of this project is to explore media effects on audiences, not audience effects on the media. Furthermore, the first four findings and the sequential orientation of their timing is more aligned with the study research questions. There is also no logical conclusion available to explain why the correlation results for situational imagery were
73 In the absence of this logical equivalent, one would conclude that an error may have occurred in the application of CLC as logical
statements with the same meanings resulted in different correlative results. This was not the case in this study’s application of
CLC.
106 stronger in the reverse time direction as the strongest results of the dispositional imagery
correlative findings.
Going back to the MRP primary and secondary research questions, some further insight has
been gained through the incorporation of the qualitative analysis.
Primary Research Question: What role does Internet news reporting play in the creation and maintenance of enemy-
perceptions in insurgency conflict?
Canadian Internet media coverage of the war in Afghanistan contains enemy imagery and themes. Through the consumption of this news, a lexicon of identifiers for the other group is formed (i.e. insurgent, Taliban, anti-government forces) and associations to like groups are made
(i.e. al-Qaeda, terrorists). The qualitative findings of the content analysis argue that dispositional enemy imagery contained in Internet news reports have some positive relation to subsequent public opinion toward the Taliban. This was further realized by the notion that the Canadian public is less likely to support negotiation with a group perceived to be their enemy.
Sub-research Question #2: Does the medium of the Internet contribute to the propagation and hardening of enemy
perceptions and thus play a part in a potential process of enmification?
The selected sample events were analyzed for use of enemy imagery. This analysis was
based on a content review of Canadian Internet news reports which augmented traditional reports
with visuals, video, and links to share and access other related war reports. Over time, Canadians’
perceptions towards the Taliban have increasingly become negative. The observed CLC results
between dispositional enemy imagery and subsequent public opinion towards the Taliban suggest
that the Internet news reports may play some role in a process hardening enemy perceptions over
time (enmification).
107 6.0 Attribution Theory application to the problem space
The following chapter will apply a fundamental conflict theory covered within the graduate program in conflict analysis and management to the MRP problem space. Heider’s Attribution
Theory (1959) will be used to explain the central process of attribution that is enabled by enemy imagery in Canadian media coverage of the war in Afghanistan and drives the emnification of the
Taliban. Along with needs theory (Burton, 1990) and Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner,
1979), attribution theory was often applied as a framework for conflict analysis within the curriculum that lead up to the program’s final research project. The chapter will commence with a brief introduction to Attribution Theory as proposed by Fritz Heider. Then, a closely related concept, the Fundamental Attribution Error (Ross, 1977) will be introduced as an explanation as to how Canadian news audiences transfer situational factors surrounding reported Taliban actions to the Taliban’s disposition. Attribution will then be examined within the context of situational and dispositional enemy imagery identified in the study’s content analysis of Canadian Internet news reports on the conflict in Afghanistan. It will be argued that attribution plays an underlying role within a process of enmification of the Taliban by the Canadian media. This argument will be made through a deconstruction of the conflict events examined in the content analysis into stages of attribution and identification of potential audience cognitive responses to news events that contain enemy imagery of the Taliban. Through the application of Attribution Theory, the conclusion is made that both situational and dispositional enemy imagery contained in Canadian
Internet news reports likely leads Canadian audiences to make dispositional attributions towards the Taliban74. As will be discussed, perception hardening, selective inattention, and the cumulative
74 It will be further argued that this attribution to Taliban disposition likely occurs whether or not the Taliban were indeed involved in
the reported on events or not.
108 effects of audience exposure to enemy imagery over time are all related to the central concept of
attribution. Finally, it will be argued that the process of attribution is accelerated and amplified by
the new media effects of the Internet. This will lead to the final outcome of the MRP, a model of
Internet enmification.
Fritz Heider was an Austrian psychologist who taught at the University of Kansas (Griffin,
1994, p. 137). In 1958, he published The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations where he solidified two well-known concepts: Balance Theory and Attribution Theory (Heider, 1959). Heider’s work essentially founded the modern field of social cognition (Manusov, 2002, p. 143). An icon of social psychology, his book on social perception had many readers and caused an increase of experimental research in the 1960s and 70s (Stanton Rogers, 2003, p. 146). Heider argued that social perception followed many of the same rules of physical object perception, and that the basic elements of object perception were also found in social perception (Heider, 1957, p. 56). Given biases in object perception sometimes lead to errors (i.e. optical illusions, mistaken visual identification), one might expect to find the same biases in social perception to similarly lead to errors (i.e. underestimating the role social factors and overestimating the effect of personality and attitudes on behaviour) (1957, p. 56). The most influential idea in his seminal work was the notion of how people view the causes of behaviour, and the explanations they make for it. Heider called these linkages between causes and behaviours, attributions (1957, p. 255).
Attribution Theory suggests that people have a tendency to give causal explanations for others’ behaviour, often by crediting either the situation or the person’s disposition. Heider’s theory has two complimentary aspects as it proposes a way in which a person associates causality to both their and other’s actions; for example, one driver who follows another on a single-lane road may attribute the leading driver’s swerving along the road to either situational factors (i.e. road
109 conditions, weather, vehicle) or dispositional factors (i.e. driver ability, careless driving style).
According to Attribution Theory, the subsequent action the following driver may take is dependent
on whether they attribute the leading driver’s swerving to situational or dispositional factors. If the
following driver attributed the swerving to situational factors, they would most likely undertake a
tolerant action such as slowly driving around the swerving car. If the swerving was attributed to
dispositional factors, the following driver may react with an intolerant action such as speeding past
the swerving car while simultaneously shooting an unfavourable look to the other driver. In the
context of social perception, Attribution Theory describes how people come to explain (or make
attributions) about the behaviour of others and themselves. Behaviour is attributed to a disposition
(i.e. personality traits, motives, and attitudes), or situations (i.e. external circumstances, social norms, peer pressure, accidents, weather, and other acts of God). Heider first made the argument that people tend to over-account internal dispositional causes over situational causes. This phenomenon later became known as the fundamental attribution error75 (Ross, 1977). Dispositions
are enduring traits used to stereotypically describe personalities and groups (Ottosen, 1991, p. 93).
If a group becomes associated with a particular trait, there is an expectation from a social
perception context for this group to continue to behave in a similar and consistent manner. This
expectation can be positive in the case of a hero (expectation of more heroic behaviour) or negative
in the case of an enemy (expectation of more hostile behaviour). This can be applied to the results
of Chapters 3 and 4 where the Taliban were aggressively portrayed by the Canadian media
according to the content analysis of sample Internet articles. According to Heider’s theory,
75 The fundamental attribution error is also referred to as correspondence bias as people often see behaviour as corresponding to
dispositional traits more often than they should (Myers, 1994, p.61).
110 Canadian audiences would arguably be committing the fundamental attribution error by solely
attributing Taliban actions to their disposition to aggressiveness.
Attribution is a three-step process through which one group perceives another as a causal agent76. The three steps are summarized below as related to the previous driving example (Griffin,
1994, p. 138):
1. Perception of the action (Following driver sees the leading driver swerving)
2. Judgement of the intention (Following driver perceives the swerving as intentional)
3. Attribution of disposition (Following driver convinced leading driver is either reckless or a
poor driver)
As will be discussed, the incremental organization of attribution helps to explain how it fits into an
overarching and more long-term process of enmification. To this end, it will be argued that
accumulated exposure to enemy imagery over prolonged periods of time result in hardened
perceptions of an adversarial group.
6.1 Attribution processes and enemy imagery
Attributions towards persons and groups are made by those observing actions in both an active
and passive manner. In the case of a more passive audience, the attributions are made on a more
subconscious level, while in the case of a more active audience, judgements, and attributions are
made after a thoughtful consideration of available information and past behaviours (Littlejohn,
1999, p. 337). Both descriptions are extreme and neither can be used to feasibly describe an entire
76 In the context of this discussion, the term causal agent is used to describe a group which is causing something to occur. Referring
to Gryphon’s example, the offending driver caused the following driver some discomfort by swerving ahead of them.
111 nation77. The assumption can be made that the Canadian audience is a mix of both passive and active audiences. The following section will extend the qualitative analysis of Chapter 4 through an application of Attribution Theory to the review of enemy imagery identified within the MRP content analysis. Through Heider’s theory of attribution, it will be argued that enemy imagery of the Taliban (i.e. both situational and dispositional) result in Canadian audience attributions toward the Taliban’s overall disposition. In other words, Canadian audiences may be experiencing the fundamental attribution error by attributing actions reported by the Canadian media to the
Taliban’s disposition. Through reference to the three stage process of attribution introduced in the previous section, a general sequence of events is proposed:
1. Perception of the action (Canadians exposed to suspected Taliban actions via media)
2. Judgement of the intention (By assessing the information presented to them within the news
article, Canadians judge if actions were intentional)
3. Attribution of disposition (Based on previous knowledge of Taliban and circumstances)
Through a review of this process with respect to three of the sampled news events from the content analysis, one can estimate subsequent attributions made by Canadian news audiences and predict the same flow of attribution when the audience is presented with new media reports that describe suspected Taliban actions. In other words, an estimate as to whether or not Canadian audiences would be more or less likely to attribute the reported actions of the Taliban to the group’s disposition (i.e. enemy traits of aggressiveness, oppressiveness, etc.) or situational circumstances
(i.e. accidental, actions taken in the heat of battle, self-defence, etc.).
77 By definition, active and passive audiences are idealized concept. In this regard, no audience is ever purely active or passive in its
consumption of news (Littlejohn, 1999, p. 337). Hence, in terms of audiences, no country, including Canada, could ever be
labelled as entirely active or passive.
112
Figure 6-7. Attribution process for IED strike against Canadian Forces (December 5, 2008) Note: Adapted from An Introduction to Attribution Processes, Shaver (1983)
The estimated attribution process for the 100th Canadian Forces casualty news event is displayed in Figure 6-1. At the far left, enemy imagery of the event (an IED strike against a CF convoy) triggers a three stage process of attribution. During stage 1, Canadian audiences are directly exposed to the fallout of the attack via international and Canadian media coverage of the event on television, radio, newsprint, and the Internet. Canadian media outlets attribute the attack to Taliban insurgents and, thus, largely mitigate a critical audience assessment during this initial stage of attribution. Similarly, the Canadian media and audience judge that the attack was intentional and, hence, preclude the possibility to attribute the incident to situational and environmental factors (i.e. freak accident, weather). Finally, audiences calculate the motive of the
Taliban’s actions. Was this action taken under coercion or duress? Was the IED attack a defensive action taken in the heat of combat? The logical answer to both questions is no as the attack was clearly a calculated offensive manoeuvre. The result of the final stage is the attribution of the hostile action to the Taliban disposition of aggressiveness against Canadian Forces operating in the region.
113
.
Figure 6-8. Attribution process for acid attack against Afghan schoolgirls (November 12, 2008)
In the previously discussed news event, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the carefully timed attack against Canadian Forces that drove the total number of Canadian casualties above the
100 mark weeks before the holiday season (CBC, 2008). This was apparently not the case in the acid attack news story as Taliban spokesmen attempted to distance their organization from the incident that horrifically injured eight unarmed schoolgirls (CBC, 2008). Following the chain of audience judgements from step one to three, it is argued that the actions of this event were ultimately attributed to the Taliban disposition of being an oppressor of women. The alleged
Taliban action in this news event was particularly inhuman and barbaric in terms of enemy themes.
The critical audience assessment of whether or not the Taliban were indeed involved in the incident is overshadowed by the visceral imagery of the victims of the attack. In particular, the reasoning behind the use of acid as a weapon speaks to the dispositional attribution. Acid was most likely chosen to permanently disfigure the schoolgirls so that they may serve as an example to other girls who may contemplate disobeying the Taliban. This arguably tips the balance of
114 audience logic and reasoning towards a quick attribution of the incident to the Taliban disposition
of oppression of women regardless of their public denials of involvement.
Figure 6-3. Attribution process for alleged Taliban threats to cut of thumbs of voters (August 17, 2009) Similar to the previous example, Figure 6-3 describes the estimated attribution process
related to the reported threat made by the Taliban during the 2009 Afghan National Election to cut
off the thumbs of those found to have been marked with indelible ink (proof of voter participation).
From the sample article database, the unconfirmed rumour was reported by both CBC (2009) and
CTV (2009). The rumour was also reported by other Canadian and international media 78 outlets during the coverage of the widespread election violence in August, 2009. Through the integration of information presented to them by trusted sources, audiences judge whether the rumour should be included in their overall impression of the Taliban. Discounting the possibility that the threat was indeed a baseless rumour, a result of miscommunication on the part of the Taliban, or the result of coercion (highly unlikely), a dispositional attribution is again made. In this case, the incident is
78 Using Google News Advanced Search, the rumour that the Taliban were threatening to cutoff potential voters fingers during the
2009 national Afghanistan elections was identified in several international (The New York Times, Telegraph and Guardian) and
national news websites (Canoe, Canada.com and the Globe and Mail).
115 attributed to the Taliban’s disposition to oppress democracy and freedom. This is consistent with
the results of the content analysis that identified the enemy theme of oppressor as a common trait
for the Taliban as described by the Canadian media.
An important observation is made after a consideration of the three proposed attribution
processes discussed above. In each instance, regardless of the individual presence of situational or
dispositional enemy imagery, it is argued that the majority of audiences would end up on the far
top-right of each flow; in other words, the majority of Canadian audiences would make a
dispositional attribution to a negative Taliban trait (i.e. aggressiveness, oppressiveness, etc.) after a
consideration of the information presented in Canadian news coverage of the events.
6.2 Attribution and the process of enmification
The following section will continue to discuss the role of attribution within a larger and
more long-term process of enmification of the Taliban by the Canadian media. It should be noted
that this process is more phenomenal than intentional79 and is a result of a complex interaction between conflict actors (Canadian Forces and the Taliban), the Canadian media, and its audience.
After further critical analysis of the fundamental attribution error argument presented in the previous section, two particular enmification sub-processes will be presented, as they relate to the process of attribution, selective inattention, and perception hardening. It will be argued that the synergy between the tendencies to filter out new information that is inconsistent with one’s preferred understanding80 of reality and the reinforcement provided by prolonged exposure to enemy imagery set the stage for enemy perception cultivation and maintenance. The effects of
79 It is proposed that the process of Internet emnification happens randomly rather than purposefully and is a result of the interaction
between Internet and attribution process phenomena.
80 With respect to the audiences tendency to selective inattention in which they selectively pay attention to information consistent
with their existing opinion and beliefs and discount information inconsistent with their view of reality (Heider, 1958, p. 211).
116 these two processes will be considered in the context of Canada’s involvement in the conflict in
Afghanistan (now in its 10th year) and their cumulative effects over time.
In the example attribution processes previously presented, it was argued that most audiences would, in fact, traverse the higher decision flow (yes-yes-yes) and ultimately lead to an attribution to enemy disposition. The tendency to divert from the no response, which is tantamount to a situational attribution, is what is commonly referred to as the fundamental attribution error
(Ross, 1977). In order to assess the validity of this conclusion, some arguments against the argued
Canadian audience tendency to attribute actions reported by the Canadian media to the Taliban’s disposition are as follows:
1. Uncertainty over information or source reliability – In two of the three discussed examples, it
was uncertain if the Taliban were indeed involved in the hostile actions reported by the
Canadian media or if the perpetrators were one of several armed groups operating in the area.
A significant portion of the articles examined in the content analysis were observed to report
on an incident before the Taliban had claimed responsibility and, in those instances, would
use generic descriptors such as ‘insurgents’ or ‘militants’ to identify the perpetrators81. This
would be followed by descriptions of confirmed past Taliban actions. This subtle observation
would presumably only be identified by a more active audience. This suggests the Canadian
media tends to create the impression with Canadian audiences that all conflict events include
some Taliban involvement in one form or another.
81 This was the case for the CBC and CTV reports on the schoolgirl acid attacks and election finger-cutting threats. In both events,
the Taliban denied involvement.
117 2. The Taliban (then) and the Neo-Taliban82 (now) – The Taliban are no longer the cohesive and
homogeneous group they were before Western retaliation for the attacks of 9/11 (Global
Security, 2005). The contemporary Taliban is comprised of many different elements with
varying levels of dedication to the fight against foreign occupation. This more heterogeneous
group is comprised of both dedicated (hardliners and Islamic fundamentalists) and non-
dedicated elements (criminals, narco-traffickers, and disenchanted youth). It is, thus,
difficult to attribute any particular observed pattern of behaviour to one Taliban disposition
because of the now heterogeneous composition of the movement.
Figure 6-9. The underlying role of attribution and enemy imagery within a process of enmification
The central role of attribution, within a larger and more long-term process of enmification, is captured in Figure 6-4. The vertical axis describes the significance of negative perception towards an adversarial group. The level of negative perception is used in this context to realize the concept of enmity (i.e. the more negative the perception, the more a perceived enemy a particular group is from the perspective of the perceiving group). In this particular example, it is proposed
82 For more detail on the differences between the original Taliban and Neo-Taliban movements, please refer to Koran, Kalashnikov,
and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, by Antonio Giustozzi (2007).
118 that the level of enmity gradually increases over time. The random dotted pattern that anchors the
plotted area represents the enemy imagery of the Taliban contained in Canadian media reports of the conflict in Afghanistan. Note that at this level of consideration, to distinguish between situational and dispositional enemy imagery is inconsequential. As in reality, the amount of enemy imagery fluctuates randomly over time, although it is in part a reflection of the reported actions of the Taliban. The red arrows angled toward the right of the figure represent the aggregated dispositional attributions made by the perceiving group (Canadian audience) over time. These dispositional attributions outweigh and outnumber the contrasting situational (or environmental) attributions are depicted by black, downward angled arrows. The decision to orient the situational attributions downward was made simply for illustrative purposes to contrast with the dispositional attributions. One should not interpret the downward angle of the black arrows to somehow mean that situational attributions counter negative perceptions held toward an adversarial group over time. It is, however, important to stress the dominance of the dispositional attributions (larger arrows, more frequent) as they represent the realization of the fundamental attribution error on the part of the Canadian audience. Over time, these dispositional attributions accumulate and drive the level of negative perception higher. This explains the underlying and driving role of attribution within the process of enmification.
Two sub-processes that further support the process of enmification are also explained by
Attribution Theory. It is argued that these processes play a more custodial than developmental83 role in the maintenance of enemy perceptions:
83 In the context of this study, it is argued that the processes of selective inattention and perception hardening play a more significant
role in the maintenance of enemy perceptions rather than in the development of new enemy perceptions.
119 1. Selective Inattention: According to Heider, people have a strong tendency to maintain a state
of balance or consistency among their cognitions (Heider, 1958, p. 211). One consequence of
this tendency is that people’s explanations of events are made to be consistent with their
existing beliefs. Research has, in fact, demonstrated that the expectations and stereotypes
audiences hold towards other groups bias the way people test hypothesis, interpret evidence,
and recall events, with the result that those expectations are confirmed (Sandel et al, 1989, p.
92). This can lead to the phenomenon of selective inattention, where people tend to ignore or
discount image-inconsistent information. In the case of Canadians who follow the conflict in
Afghanistan, it is argued that the majority of the audience experiences some level of selective
inattention. However, it is difficult to test this hypothesis as the Canadian media almost
exclusively limits its mention of the Taliban to negatively attributed events and actions; for
example, not one of the 135 articles reviewed in the content analysis contained any positive
mention of the Taliban nor made any suggestion that they were a group that possessed any
redeemable qualities84. It is, however, argued that selective inattention did play some role in
the previously discussed attributions of actions toward the Taliban, despite their own denials.
It is argued that those who discounted their spokesmen’s denials of involvement in both the
acid attack and election threat incidents have selectively tuned out the claims as they are
inconsistent with present perspectives held toward the Taliban.
2. Perception Hardening: This study argues that, over time, selective inattention and prolonged
exposure to enemy imagery lead to the long-term maintenance of enemy perceptions held
84 This observation is also consistent with the study’s assumption that Canadian media agencies adopt a more war journalism than
peace journalism orientation in their coverage of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan. According to Galtung’s
definition, peace journalism is more solution oriented and would entail the coverage of both sides of the conflict, including any
stories that reported on positive aspects of the Taliban (Lee and Maslog, 2005, p. 311).
120 toward a particular adversarial group. Perception hardening explains the organization of
popular perception, over time, where characteristics attributed to a common out-group
become part of the shared baseline understanding or view of the group. This may lead to the
construction of different and competing social realities both within and between groups. In
extreme situations, such as the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, a
dichotomy forms where the actions of one’s own group are viewed as altruistic in contrast to
the identical actions taken by an adversarial group are viewed as self-serving
(Bronfenbrenner, 1961, p. 46). Over time, these perceptions become rigid and inflexible. This
study argues that Canadians’ perceptions toward the Taliban and the mission in Afghanistan
have been hardened for some time now85. A majority of the population have been against
direct negotiations with the Taliban since 2008 (Angus Reid, 2009). It is argued that this
attitude held by the majority of Canadians is further reinforced by the consistent exposure to
enemy imagery provided by Canadian media coverage of the conflict in both traditional and
online forms.
Perception hardening and selective inattention are two enabling and maintaining attribution processes that are supporting the process of enmification. As will be discussed, these attribution processes synergize with the online format of Internet news to create a process of Internet emnification.
85 Currently, over 60% of Canadians oppose the mission in Afghanistan (Angus Reid, 2010) and this has been the majority public
opinion in Canada since July, 2008 (Angus Reid, 2009 and Strategic Council, 2009). Since January, 2008 the majority of
Canadians have been opposed to the notion of talking to the Taliban (Angus Reid, 2009 and Strategic Council, 2009).
121 6.3 Attribution and Internet war reporting
The example attribution processes discussed did not specify the source of information (i.e. type of news media) that informed Canadians on the conflict events in Afghanistan and, as argued, for some portion of the audience, triggered dispositional attributions to the Taliban. While it is assumed that the units of influence from traditional and new media sources are commensurate86,
this study requires a closer examination of the interaction between the Internet and the process of
attribution in order to better explain the process of Internet emnification. In order to distinguish between the potential attribution processes that can be triggered by news learned through traditional forms, the study must consider the features of online news that distinguish it from other forms. First, the credibility of the Internet, as a source of news information will be considered. It will be demonstrated that online news reported by trusted media organizations with well- established traditional news forms are considered just as credible a source of information as traditional news sources (i.e. National Post newspaper and National Post online). The characteristics of new media will be discussed with particular focus on their informative role during times of war. The qualities of convergence, ubiquity, interactivity, and transferability will be discussed as they relate to online war reporting. It is argued that these unique characteristics amplify the attributing processes triggered by enemy imagery, and, thus, plays a role in the initiation and reinforcement of enemy perceptions.
A source of information must be perceived as credible in order for the process of attribution
to occur (Sundar, 1999). As a factor that underlies audience evaluation of news, the concept of
86 This assumption was made in chapter 2 (project media framework) where Maclean and Westley’s theory on multisource communication (1978) was used to consider how Canadian audiences form opinions and perceptions on the mission in Afghanistan in the process of consuming news from new (Internet) and traditional (newsprint, radio, television) sources.
122 credibility has been defined primarily in three ways: message, source (or organization), and media
(or channel) credibility (1999). The study by Sundar, entitled “Effects of Source Attribution on
Perception of Online News Stories,” showed that news stories that possess quotations from those
intimately related to the news event carry the most credibility (1998, p.55). The study further
showed that the calculation of source credibility was equal between traditional and online forms of
news. Conversely, Sundar also argued that online news sources that did not employ proper source attribution were taken less seriously than similar news items contained in traditional media forms
(p. 64). In other words, audiences will not weigh as much credibility to the information in the absence of source attribution.
In another study by Choi, Watt, and Lynch, source credibility during times of war was tested from the differing perspectives of those who opposed and supported the 2003 war in Iraq
(2006). Results from their study showed that opponents of the war perceived the Internet as less aligned with a pro-government position and, thus, more credible than did neutrals or supporters87.
This is consistent with the previously discussed preference of news audiences to pay more attention
and favour sources of news that present information consistent with their existing views and
beliefs. According to Choi et al, the Internet had developed into a major channel for news during
the 2003 Gulf War (2006). While one-quarter of online users typically obtained news from the
Internet, in 2003, more than three-quarters of online Americans made use of the Internet in connection with the war in Iraq, according to a Pew Research Institute survey (Rainie, Fox, &
Fallows, 2003). According to that survey, the most popular sources of news were branded news websites that are maintained by newspapers and television networks. People reported that the main
87 The study also argued that the added credibility of the Internet was also as a result of the war opponents’ perception that traditional
media channels were more aligned and influenced by government and thus had to manage the image of the war constructed by
their coverage (Choi, Watt and Lynch, 2006).
123 reasons for using the Internet to get news were for source variety, rapid updates, and different news
points of view (2003). The credibility of the Internet as a new medium to receive news on current events has been a popular research theme in recent years (Choi et al, 2006). Inaccuracy and bias due to the lack of editorial and gate keeping rules traditionally held by reputable media agencies have been suggested as primary reasons why information on the Internet is vulnerable to perceptions of non-credibility. There is some merit to this opinion with regards to general information available on the Web but not for most reputable news organizations' websites (2006).
Americans who follow both traditional and online news sources actually judged the Internet to be a more credible medium in comparison to traditional news sources during the Iraq war with their online counterparts, such as CNN’s website, CNN.com (Rainie, Fox, & Fallows, 2003). Raine et al argued that this judgement was explained in part by the ability of the online news sources to reference other credible online sources and provide more up to date and current news in comparison to traditional sources (2003).
The prominence of online news credibility may be explained by a brand name or halo
effect, arising from its relationship with existing print and television news organizations. If
people evaluate The New York Times as highly credible, they tend to rate NYTimes.com
as credible as well. (Choi et al, 2006)
As discussed in Chapter 1, the choices of Internet sources for the content analysis were primarily based on sample availability. The aforementioned ‘halo effect’ reinforces the validity of the selections as CBC.ca, CTV.ca, and National Post online are all Internet mirrors of well-established traditional media organizations. The Pew Internet and American Life Project recently conducted a study on the rise of the Internet as a news source. One key finding was that the average online consumer regularly turns to only a few websites. Most news consumers use traditional and Internet
124 sources for news; however, online, audiences tend to limit their sources to trusted websites (Pew,
2010). Audiences chose these sites, in part, based on their preferences and the level to which they
identify with the general values and ideals of the news organization (Zamaria et al, 2008). This stacks the odds for occurrences of attribution as audiences tune in to receive information that is most likely already consistent with their current beliefs and opinions.
The final section of this chapter will focus on the characteristics of the Internet as a source of news during times of war. These characteristics will be discussed in terms enemy imagery, attribution and enmification of the Taliban by the Canadian media. A total of ten new media qualities are presented below. The selection of these particular communication traits was made with respect to alignment with the study’s research questions:
1. Consonance: This concept is defined as the unified picture of an event or issue that develops,
over time, to the point where it is reflected by different news platforms (Severin et al, 1992,
p. 252). It is argued that consonance assists and enables the process of attribution that occurs
between enemy imagery contained in Canadian Internet news reports and existing negative
perceptions held towards the Taliban. The rationale behind this argument is straightforward
as enemy images contained in one media platform (television) are reinforced by similar
imagery contained in another (radio, newsprint, Internet), which creates an environment
poised for subsequent attributions involving an other or enemy group.
2. Convergence: Refers to the gradual dismantle of boundaries between media types as audiences
evolve to rely on a mix of traditional and new media forms to obtain news (Yoon, 1999, p.
94). It also refers to the internationalization of news agencies (national to world news
coverage, for example, BBC World News). According to the concept of convergence,
Canadian audiences rely on a mix of media forms to obtain news and this mix of sources has
125 become less bound by national borders as time passes. Although outside the scope of this
MRP, an interesting follow-up research question to this study could compare the
representation of the Taliban across the media organizations of other NATO countries (US,
UK, Netherlands, Denmark) with that identified in the Canadian media space. Convergence
suggests a comparable and globalized contemporary view of the Taliban would be found
across the group of nations. Convergence also speaks to the speed and reach of Internet news
along with the following characteristic.
3. Ubiquity - This is defined as the state of being everywhere at once or seeming to be
everywhere at once. The exponential growth of cyberspace and its ability to satisfy both the
needs of casual and dedicated online news followers make information and analysis available
to people more than ever before (Berenger, 2006). The increasingly omnipresent nature of
the Internet and online news has changed the way audiences receive news on active conflicts.
News consumers have moved from one-computer households to work and personal laptops,
smart phones, and communal Internet access points in hotels and other metropolitan hotspots.
This perpetual connectivity represents massive amounts of potential information to Canadian
news audiences. Over time, online news follows are exposed to enemy imagery of the
Taliban in the course of the coverage of daily Canadian news events, including the conflict in
Afghanistan, whether they actively chose to tune in to the story or not.
4. Agenda Setting: While contemporary research has been relatively unsuccessful in its ability to
prove an effective relationship between the media and the public, they have been able to
show that the media does play a role in how the public agenda is set (McCombs and Shaw,
1972, p. 177). Stories introduced first online often set the agenda for mainstream media,
including news websites and pundit blogs (Berenger, 2006). Ironically, search engines such
126 as Google, Ask, and Yahoo are used in newsrooms to fact-check stories and collect
background information (2006). As previously discussed, the first step of the process of
attribution is the perception of actions taken. The concept of agenda-setting suggests that
online news agencies help set the public agenda with respect to the mission in Afghanistan
and current perceptions of the Taliban. In 2007, approximately 10% of Canadians thought
terrorism and the war in Afghanistan were the most important issues facing Canadians today
(Strategic Council, 2009). It is feasible that this judged significance is due in part to
traditional and online coverage of the conflict.
5. Credibility – As a news source, it was discussed that Internet news attributes its credibility
from its associated parent organizations (i.e. CBC.ca/news and CBC news radio and
television). It is important to stress the higher level of credibility associated with established
media organizations in comparison to the Internet, in general, which includes personal blogs,
messaging boards and social media websites. These unofficial sources of news do not follow
the same practices of source attribution and journalistic due diligence as their professional
counterparts and, hence, due not command the same level of credibility.
6. Interactivity – The interactive characteristic of the Internet may be what most sets it apart from
traditional media. Any Canadian with access to news websites reporting on the conflict in
Afghanistan may express their views88. In contrast, traditional mass media still struggle with
the problem of feedback; for example, newspapers and magazines encourage letters to the
editor, but few readers actually submit one in their lifetime (Berenger, 2006). A CBC article
reviewed in the content analysis entitled, “Afghan schoolgirls burned by acid in attack by
men on motor cycle,” contained links to a related CBC video report and links to six related
88 This expression of views is usually within some form of mediated or edited context, such as a moderated message board or blog.
127 articles. This gives online audiences the option to instantly learn more about the newsworthy
events in the conflict. The integration of other reports on Taliban activity potentially hardens
pre-existing enemy perceptions with video and imagery that consistent with perceived enemy
dispositions.
7. Transferability: Continuing along with the previous example, in addition to the close to 500
readers who were commenting on or recommending the news story, a countless number of
readers were sharing the news story with others via e-mail, Twitter, Facebook and other
social media sites. Psychologically, individuals are more apt to choose information that
strengthens and supports their preconceptions, biases, ideologies, and core beliefs (Berenger,
2006). By sharing online news items reporting on Taliban activity, audiences are helping to
form a shared baseline understanding of the group that is consistent with the media’s
dispositional portrait.
8. Portability: Online audiences take their news with them and access it in on the go. Thirty-three
percent of cell phone owners now access news on their cell phones (Pew, 2010). The
accessibility of news on personal communication devices such as laptops, cell phones, and
smart phones, in a sense, represents the last mile of convergent news platforms. Canadians no
longer rely on newsprint, access to the radio or television for news on ongoing conflicts. This
expands the windows of time in which Canadians can absorb enemy imagery of the Taliban
and build upon pre-existing negative perceptions. The further integration of personal mobile
devices and the news is further complimented by the following characteristic.
9. Participatory: Thirty-seven percent of internet users have contributed to the creation of news,
commented about it, or disseminated it via postings on social media sites like Facebook or
Twitter (Pew, 2010). In terms of reader feedback, the CBC article reporting on the acid
128 attacks contained links to 249 comments are posted on the same webpage as the article, with
the first five comments in view to stimulate further review and commenting (CBC, 2008).
The CBC article was recommended by 130 people; that is, they signed into their website
accounts and rated the article in terms of newsworthiness. Interestingly, although the Taliban
officially denied involvement in the incident in this and subsequent reports on the acid
attacks, the term ‘Taliban’ appears several times through a quick scan of the reader
comments. The mention of the Taliban in the reader comments suggests their association of
the acid attack to the enemy group. This is an extreme example of attribution as the
information that triggered the process did not conclusively prove Taliban involvement.
10. Personalization: Savvy online news consumers customize and aggregate their news view
with notifications and personalized websites such as iGoogle. The use of a customized
website such as iGoogle allows Internet users to create their own homepage that may include
news feeds from a variety of news sources that interest them. This is again related to the
theme of audience selection of favourite and trusted sources of information that are more
likely than not generally present information consistent with their existing views and
opinions. Canadians can now create custom homepages that flash updates of Taliban
activities in the course of their conflict with Canadian Forces. During the course of the MRP,
anecdotal observations showed that an integrated iGoogle homepage with BBC, CBC and
Top Stories ‘gadgets’ frequently contained mention of both Afghanistan and the Taliban.
The characteristics of the Internet help define its informative role during times of war. The qualities of convergence, ubiquity, interactivity, and transferability amplify the effects of attribution triggered by enemy imagery and, thus, play a role in the initiation and reinforcement of enemy perceptions. Canadian audiences are becoming more web savvy and are using both
129 traditional and new media news sources. The influence of traditional media still outweighs the growing influence of the Internet as a source of news, though online news is unique. The modern online Canadian war report comes complete with related articles, video, comments, and the ability to share instantaneously with others. It was argued that the characteristics of interactivity, transferability and personalization create an environment fertile for attribution.
Sub-research Question #2: Does the medium of the Internet contribute to the propagation and hardening of enemy perceptions and thus play a part in a potential process of enmification?
Selective inattention to information inconsistent with currently held opinions helps to maintain perceptions towards an enemy group. Over time, enemy imagery hardens perceptions; however, this may not necessarily be the case for a more active audience. As a news source, the Internet potentially is exasperating these attribution-enabling processes by providing seemingly endless amounts of enemy imagery and information supporting pre-existing enemy perceptions and attitudes.
Sub-research Question #3: What conflict theory could be integrated with other disciplinary theory (cultural and communication) to create a model of the process of Internet enmification and what would this model look like?
Through the results of the content analysis, Attribution Theory has been discussed as an underlying factor in the process of enmification. There is a possibility that the enemy imagery identified in Canadian Internet news articles helps to trigger a process of attribution. In this process, reports on Taliban actions lead to dispositional attributions of enemy traits, such as aggression and hostility.
130 7.0 MRP model
This chapter will focus on the creation of a model to describe the potential process of
Internet enmification. The outcome of this section of the MRP will be a model that will explain the complex system of enemy imagery, Internet news reports, attribution processes, online Canadian audiences, and negative enemy perceptions towards the Taliban. The results of the quantitative, qualitative, and conflict application chapters will be integrated into a conceptual model using systems analysis principles89. Systems analysis (also referred to as systems thinking) will be used
to identify and describe the following systems within the MRP problem-space:
1. Canadian Internet reporting on the war in Afghanistan
2. Online attribution of disposition to Taliban
3. Online enemy perception formation and hardening
These subsystems form the basis for the study’s model of Internet emnification that will be
introduced and discussed in this section of the paper. The systems analysis of the problem space
will commence with a summary view of the problem space using a problematique and rich
picture90. This will be followed by proposed descriptions of the identified problem space sub-
systems. These descriptions will then be used to create conceptual models of the sub-systems that
89 These systems analysis principles include some aspects of Peter Checkland’s Soft System Methodology (SSM), which was the
preferred systems-thinking framework applied within the program in conflict analysis and management at Royal Roads
University.
90 A Problematique is a graphical technique used to brainstorm as many perceived problems and issues as possible within a problem
space. The outcome of using this tool is an improved understanding of the problem situation and some preliminary indications of
its relevant systems. A Rich picture is another graphical tool used to map the major components, actors and issues that interact
within a given problem space. These tools are used to collect initial thoughts and impressions on a problem space (Checkland,
2000).
131 will explain the inputs, outputs, and transformations that occur within the process of Internet emnification.
Systems thinking is a tool used to analyze real-world problem situations (Checkland, 2000).
In its simplest form, systems thinking requires analysts and researches to delineate their perception of a problem space into individual systems. Essentially, the problem-solving tool uses concepts from systems engineering as applied to real-world physical problems that are clearly defined and offer optimal solutions grounded in science or logic 91. Systems thinking can be applied to both soft
(i.e. problems which involve psychological, social and cultural issues) and hard (i.e. problems
which involve resource sharing, financial, and geographic border issues) problems (Travis and
Venable, 1998). Each problem space considered through systems thinking may present both hard and soft aspects; for example, an application of systems thinking to a border dispute between Israel and Palestine would involve hard (border, land ownership) and soft (cultural, enmity) issues and systems to consider. Systems thinking can be applied to a wide range of problem scenarios including business, community, and international environments as it offers a flexible array of tools to consider a spectrum of human problem scenarios (Checkland, 2000). Thus, as a tool, systems thinking will be useful as it gradually adds some conceptual structure to the empirical (qualitative analysis) and theoretical (qualitative analysis and Attribution Theory application) components of this study. Its flexibility will be exploited to help explain the role played by the Internet in the process of making enemies of the Canadian Force’s foe in Afghanistan, the Taliban.
The stages of systems analysis that will be applied in this chapter and are described below
(Travis and Venable, 1998):
91 By applying the same analytical techniques from physical systems approaches to human problems and organizations, the term soft
system was coined (Checkland, 2000).
132 1. Define the problem space: The aim of this initial stage is to explore the problem situation and
develop clearer pictures of the situation and factors that influence the situation. In an action
research setting, the outcome of this stage is information and data collected about the situation
used for initial analysis.
2. Express the problem situation: A rich picture will be used to describe the MRP problem
space. Rich pictures are free-form visual tools used to provide an idea of the organization and
climate of a situation and identify major stakeholders and perspectives. This stage of analysis
also calls for a problematique of the situation which is used to map the issues related to the
problem scenario.
3. Formulate root definitions and relevant systems: The desired outcome of this step is the
identification of relevant systems within the problem space. Systems are deemed relevant if
there is some indication that they have a purpose and play some role in the problem scenario.
Root definitions are statements that define the systems. The acronym CATWOE92 is used to
help construct root definitions:
Clients – The beneficiaries /receivers/victims of the purposeful action
Actors – The persons/groups doing the actions
Transformation – The purposeful activity described as an input, throughput and output
Worldview – The point of view that makes the system meaningful
Owner – The persons or group that make, break or change the system
Environmental factors – External constraints in which the system operates within
92 The CATWOE acronym for constructing definitions of problem space systems is used from Checkland’s Soft System
Methodology (SSM) (Travis and Venable, 1998).
133 4. Build conceptual models - Conceptual models of the systems identified in stage 3 are
constructed based on their root definitions. The aim of this step is to better understand the
transformative processes of each system. Systems thinking will be used to construct a model
of the perceived problem space without ideological assessments on the problem space93.
5. Compare models to reality – This step will be used to compare the conceptual models
constructed in stage 4 with the reality of the problem space. The desired outcome will be
identifying the strengths and limitations of the model before moving on to the final two stages
of SSM (policy recommendations and change) in the final chapter of the MRP.
There are benefits and limitations with respect to the decision to apply systems analysis in the MRP. On the positive side, it offers the flexibility to consider the study’s problem space which is not without its aspects of ambiguity in a more structured manner. To explain the interaction between Canadian audiences, media, and their perceptions of the Taliban is a complicated task that requires systematic consideration of multiple issues, institutions, and stakeholders. On the negative side, some aspects 94 of the methodology applied in this chapter are designed for a collaborative setting where various perspectives can be compared and integrated. Applying the methodology in a group setting was not an option for this study due to time, personnel and budget constraints; hence, it was applied in a singular fashion. In order to help simulate the effect of collaboration, several of the steps were applied in a repetitive and iterative fashion over time until a final refined outcome
93 In other words, the proposed models are not derived with some idealized situation in mind (i.e. no judgement as to the goodness or
badness of enemy imagery of the Taliban, nor the related positive and negative effects of emnification). The models will attempt
to represent reality as closely as possible.
94 For example, root definitions are typically developed in a group setting (Checkland, 2000).
134 was settled upon over time95. After careful consideration, the decision was made that there was enough positive benefit in the form of structuring the space that justified the use of systems thinking in this project, even if it was only applied in a singular fashion.
7.1 Defining the model problem space
The first stage of the systems approach, define the problem space, was completed during the prospectus stage and action research phases of the study. During the prospectus phase, the concept of Taliban enemy imagery in Canadian Internet news reports was explored as a problem space with academic advisors, research sponsors (DRDC), and program supervisors (RRU). The action research aspect of the inquiry was satisfied by an eight week content analysis of Canadian online war reporting. Clearer pictures of the situation and factors that influence the situation were proposed and tested against correlative analysis between enemy imagery data and polls on
Canadian opinions on the Taliban and Afghanistan. Finally, the study’s research questions were considered within the context of the problem space in an unstructured view96.
95 While this was an attempt to mitigate the loss of not performing certain aspects of the systems methodology in a group setting, it is
uncertain if repetition was in fact an effective method for simulating the collaborative benefits of a group setting (i.e. different
perspectives, sharing of ideas, brainstorming and discussion in a group).
96 The problem-space was explored empirically, using numerical and correlation calculations between enemy imagery and public
opinion data before considering the problem qualitatively and with the use of conflict theory (i.e. adding structure to the problem
space).
135
Figure 7-10. Rich picture of MRP problem space
In the second stage of the systems approach, a rich picture (Figure 7-1) was created in order to describe the problem space. In the case of this application, an initial systems view from the prospectus stage of the study was revisited. The goal of the rich picture is to capture, in an unstructured manner, what one perceives to be the issues with a given situation. It must also include all major stakeholders to the situation and, if possible, represent their perspectives. From
Figure 7-1, the primary actors in the problem space are the Taliban, the Canadian media, the
Internet, the Afghanistan war (a system in of itself), and the Canadian Internet news audience. It is important to note the distance of the Afghan war from the other elements in the diagram. As previously discussed, this study argues that the physical distance between Canadians and the war is partially closed by the Internet. Although information gleaned by Internet news reports will never replace the real experience of Canadian soldiers, diplomats, aid workers, and journalists who may have the rare opportunity to experience the conflict in person, the Canadian media does provide
Canadians with a representation of the war and the enemy. The characteristics of speed, interactivity, reach, and ubiquity are indicated in the rich picture as diverging arrows that potentially factor into a process of enmification of the Taliban. The rich picture is anchored by the popular perceptions of Canadians, which is balanced on one end by the Canadian media
136 (representation of the war and the Taliban) and the conflict on the other end (the war and the
Taliban unfiltered). As previously discussed, this study assumes that the Canadian audience is composed of both active and passive groups. This audience has been exposed to over a decade of
Taliban enemy imagery both in traditional and new media forms. The MRP hypothesis is that this
exposure has some positive relation to subsequent opinions and perceptions held towards the
Taliban. The red bar in the centre of the picture indicates this central concept. After the summary
view of the problem space has constructed, the next step in the inquiry is to consider what may the
problems and issues with this situation.
A problematique (Figure 7-2) was used as a technique to brainstorm some of the perceived problems within the problem space.
Figure7-11. Problematique: MRP problem space issues
The central issue of consideration is the potential relationship between Canadian Internet
news and Taliban enmity – all other sub-issues and problems considered within the MRP must be,
in some manner, related to this core relationship for the issues to be of relevance to the study.
Decreasing sized circles of lesser relevance and linkage to the central research question in a
137 concentric manner indicates the secondary and tertiary issues. All of the issues described in this
stage of the systems analysis are essentially captured within the primary and secondary research
questions with the exception of one97 additional concept. This is the notion that further support for the military operation against the Taliban negates the possibility of a political solution and, hence, produces a more intractable conflict situation. The issue of public support for the defeat of the
Talban is critical in order to help understand the dynamic of Canadian audience response to questions on support of the mission and negotiation with the Taliban. The goal of this study to better understand the process of emnification enabled by enemy imagery contained in Internet news reports through the construction of a better understanding of this key Canadian audience dynamic. The primary aim of using a tool, such as a problematique, is in better understanding the
Canadian audience’s view of the problem space. In this respect, the tool served its purpose and could be used for further collaborative sessions on the subject of enmity and the Internet. After a consideration of the problem space in an unstructured manner, the following stage of the inquiry involved the creation of definitions and conceptual models to describe the problem space in a structured way.
7.2 Identifying and modeling problem space systems
The objective of the next portion of the systems methodology is the identification of relevant systems within the problem space and the development of conceptual models of the
97 Similarly, the concept of Islamaphobia (xenophobic attitudes towards Muslims) was considered as a sub-topic of this study during
the prospectus stage of the project but the decision was made to scope out this question as well as it would have proven to be a
study of its own.
138 systems. The rich picture and problematique discussed in the previous section will be used as a
starting point. Root definitions developed using the CATWOE acronym will be used to describe
the following three systems:
1. Canadian Internet reporting on the war in Afghanistan
2. Online attribution of disposition to Taliban
3. Online enemy perception formation and hardening
The result of this process will be an initial model of Internet enmification, which will be compared against reality in the final section of the chapter. Systems will be identified by observing the interactions between actors in the problem space and by grouping these actors into logical purposeful groups. Systems will be identified and discussed that are relevant to the research and study of the problem space; for example, a system that includes the elements of Canadian war reporting, the Internet, and the war in Afghanistan, would be considered a system worthy of further consideration in the study, whereas a system that explained the decline of Canadian newspaper readership would not, as that potential system is not of direct benefit to the study’s research questions. This process is started through the definition of potential98 inputs and outputs. These inputs and outputs are further qualified by the perceiving group, as there could be more than one frame of reference from a conflict stakeholder standpoint. As the focus of the MRP is on Canadian perceptions of the Taliban, the systems analysis will be oriented towards the perspective of the
Canadian news audience. A summary of each system, along with its root definition, will be presented while the detailed descriptions of the inputs, outputs, perceptions and CATWOE working definition are contained in Annex C.
98 The term potential is used to describe the outputs because this stage of systems identification is not meant to empirically prove a
dependent relationship between causal variables.
139 The first system: Canadian Internet reporting on the conflict in Afghanistan. Its root definition is presented below (the result of the CATWOE working definition):
The system of Canadian media agencies that use various reporting techniques to collect
information on events in the conflict of Afghanistan, then produce informative online
reports for consumption by Canadian audiences as constrained by standard journalistic
principles and the availability of the Internet to potential audiences.
Figure 7-12. Canadian Internet reporting on Afghanistan war
The first system is described pictorially in Figure 7-3. The Afghan conflict is the source of
events that are reported on by the Canadian media, which produces reports on the war that are
consumed by Canadian audiences. The information used to produce these reports ranges from
factual to speculative to false. The assumption is made that the majority of information used by
reputable Canadian media agencies is factual. Canadian audiences physically separated from the
conflict receive information on the war from traditional and online sources of news (Veenhof,
2006, p. 23). In the online form, news is received via the Internet to audience devices such as
personal laptops, workstations, cellular phones, and smart devices (BlackBerry, iPhone). As
demonstrated from the content analysis, these online news reports contain enemy imagery of the
Taliban. In some reports, the term ‘insurgent’ is used if Taliban involvement was unconfirmed or
140 they denied involvement. 99 While the assumption was made that the Canadian media uses factual information to the best of their ability, there is still a potential for mistaken audience dispositional attributions to be made towards the Taliban.
Figure 7-13. Online attribution of disposition to the Taliban
The second system: Online attribution of disposition to the Taliban is described in Figure 7-
4. Its root definition:
The process of Canadian online audience perception of suspected Taliban actions,
subsequent judgement of intent, and attribution to situational or dispositional factors as
potentially accelerated and amplified by Internet characteristics of interactivity, speed, and
ubiquity.
Using Heider’s theory of attribution to elaborate on the interaction between problem space actors, Canadian news audiences and the Internet are the core of this sub-system. In a three-stage
99 As was the case in the Afghan schoolgirl acid attack and rumours they had threatened to cut off the fingers of voters during the
2009 national elections.
141 process that follows the stages of attribution, hostile Taliban actions (i.e. an IED attack) are first perceived by Canadian news audiences in the form of an Internet news article. Next, a judgement of hostile Taliban intent is made (i.e. the IED attack was intentional). It is also suspected that at this juncture (perception > judgement), the first associations are made by the audience who link actions of unknown perpetrators, or ‘insurgents,’ to the Taliban before the fact is actually established, if ever at all. The end result of the coverage of hostile actions is an ultimate attribution to Taliban disposition, regardless of the types of enemy imagery (situational or dispositional) contained in the article. This process is anchored and facilitated by the Internet as information is passed quickly and efficiently to, and amongst, audiences via e-mail, mobile devices, and social media sites.
The third and final sub-system identified, online enemy perception formation and hardening, is described in Figure 7-5. Its root definition is as follows:
The integration of attributions to potentially form new or reinforce existing enemy
perceptions of the Taliban as affected by recent events in the war presented online and
accumulated exposure of enemy imagery over time.
Figure 7-14. Online enemy perception formation and hardening
This sub-system is closely related to the last one, as its inputs (attributions) are the outputs of the previous sub-system. This system implies that attributions help to shape perceptions. In the
142 case of this study, the focus has been on the negative enemy perceptions of the Taliban that have
developed over a decade of media representation of the war and the enemy. It is observed that this
particular system would appear the same regardless of the particular form of news (i.e. Internet
versus television) as it involves more internal audience processing. In reality, audiences either do
or do not have an opinion or perception of the war. These perceptions of the Afghan mission may
or may not contain perceptions of the Taliban specifically. In the event where a perception does
indeed exist, and is negative, enemy imagery and attributions reinforce and harden these negative perceptions.
In order to better understand the transformative properties of the observed systems, an aggregate model of the enmification process was developed.
Figure 7-15. Model of Internet enmification
From the CATWOE working definitions in Appendix C, the observed transformative (T) processes of each of the sub-systems was considered in terms of inputs and outputs:
T1 – Using information on events to create informative news items presented online that may or may not have
some effect on Canadian’s popular perception of the war.
T2 – Perception of information of suspected Taliban activity are used to formulate judgements of Taliban
intentions which ultimately lead to situational or dispositional attributions.
T3 – Integration of situational and dispositional attributions to potentially form new enemy perceptions or to
harden pre-existing enemy perceptions.
143 Figure 7-6 conceptually models the overall transformation process through a linkage of the individual processes. Outputs from one system become inputs of another as the three sub-systems identified are integrated into one overall model of Internet emnification.
7.3 Comparing the model to reality
The final section of the chapter will critically examine the MRP model of Internet enmification through its comparison to the reality of the problem space. This comparison is required in order to test the ability of the model to explain what happens in reality. This can be done either by comparing the structured (conceptual model) and unstructured (rich picture) descriptions of the problem space or by simply comparing the model of the problem space to an observer’s perception of reality (Travis and Venable, 1998). The later technique will be applied in this paper in order to test the hypotheses of the study 100. Strengths and limitations of the model will
be discussed, which will lead to adjustments based on gap analysis to improve the model. The goal of this stage of the analysis is to set the stage for an agenda of recommendations and change that will be presented in the final chapter of the MRP. Some strengths of the initial model of Internet enmification presented in Figure 7-6:
1. Incorporates MRP concepts of the Internet, enemy imagery, perception hardening, and
enmification. The model also satisfies the study’s primary and third sub-research
100 The major research project’s hypotheses:
Primary Hypothesis: Canadian Internet news reports on the war in Afghanistan play a role in the formation and maintenance of
enemy-perceptions held by Canadians.
Hypothesis 1: Canadian Internet news reports contain enemy imagery of the Taliban and the presence of this imagery is related to
the story being reported on.
Hypothesis 2: There is some correlation between the amount of enemy imagery contained in Internet news reports and
Canadian’s public opinions on the mission in Afghanistan and the Taliban.
Hypothesis 3: The Internet does play a role in the process of emnification of the Taliban from the view of the Canadian public.
144 question101 by organizing the above concepts with a core theory to the conflict management
program (attribution). Furthermore, the study attempts to describe the role played by the
Internet in each step of a process of enemy making, where audiences (Canadians) are far
removed from the enemy (the Taliban) and the conflict itself (Afghanistan).
2. Illustrates the MRP concept of perception hardening which incorporates the observation
that enemy imagery may have cumulative effects on an audience’s enemy perceptions, over
time, which would lead to the formation of new enemy perceptions or reinforcement of pre-
existing ones. It is further observed that the Internet as a source of enemy imagery would
not exclusively influence this process.
3. Encourages self-reflection and critical analysis: The model is the culmination of a period of
individual reflection on the problem space and its three primary elements: the concept of
enmity, Internet news, and the conflict in Afghanistan. Through the experience of systems
modelling, a greater capacity to assess and analyze scenarios in an unbiased and logical
manner was developed. This capacity was essential to the successful integration of the
concepts and theories into a model that explained the problem space. Through a critical
examination of the study’s research questions, assumptions, and choice of systems, a
deeper understanding of the problem space was achieved and a model created to explain
the process of Internet emnification.
Some weaknesses and areas for improvement of the initial model:
101 Sub-research Question #3: What conflict theory could be integrated with other disciplinary theory to create a model of the process
of Internet enmification and what would this model look like?
145 1. Only considers the Internet as a source of news and influence in the process of
enmification. One cannot consider the process of enmification along a single line of
influence. In reality, Canadian audiences rely on a mix of traditional and online sources of
news 102. This observation will be used to refine the model in the final section of the paper.
2. Internalized sub-systems: Two of the sub-systems are internalized from an audience
cognition standpoint and, thus, do not offer physically measurable characteristics. While
amounts of enemy imagery can be calculated in definite amounts by way of content
analysis, attribution, perception, and enmity are not as easily quantified. This resulted in a
more theoretical than empirical discussion on the process of Internet emnification; for
example, the concept of perception hardening contains both mass communication and
psychological aspects. While the mass communication concepts can be discussed and
considered at the group conflict level, the psychological processes of changes and
reinforcement of perception is considered more at the individual level. The discussion of
perceived conflict and enmity at the individual level was necessary for this study, although
it was slightly more granular than the level of research typically encouraged within the
RRU program in conflict analysis and management.
3. Single observer: A richer understanding of the problem space would have been achieved in
a team setting whereby multiple participants’ perceptions of the situation could have been
integrated. A more comprehensive conceptual model of the problem space would have
been achieved in a team research setting. Further research efforts on enmification could
102 Studies in Canada (Keown, 2007 and Veenhof, 2006), United States (Ahlers, 2006) and Australia (Nguyen and Western, 2006) agree that online news consumption is in fact complimentary to the consumption of traditional offline news sources.
146 leverage group methodologies103 in group settings through an encouragement of group
self-reflection on the problem-space’s critical issues.
4. Not based on true field research: While the collection and coalition of Canadian Internet
news articles was a rewarding experience, it does not compare to actual field research. The
observation from this study is that archival action research is appropriate for concepts and
issues that require deep consideration. It does too, however, place the observer far from the
actual happenings of the problem-space. Some desirable activities for follow-up research
would include direct observation of Canadian audiences and measurement of news
consumption (type and quantity) and subsequent attitude and opinion measurement. It is,
however, noted that these types of closed experiments require time, capital and subjects that
were beyond the scope of this MRP.
After a critical review of the model and its process of development, an adjustment is made to address the observation that the model did not take multiple sources of media influence into consideration:
Figure7-16. Model of Internet enmification revisited with media influence types
103 For example, an application of Checkland’s Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) would require a full team effort and collaborative
setting (2000).
147 The updated model includes traditional media as a source of influence in the bottom left of Figure
7-7. This configuration is more appropriate for comparison to reality, where humans and their
communication systems integrate multiple lines of influence in processing messages received
(Maclean and Westley, 1978, p. 43).
At the completion of the creation of a conceptual model of Internet enmification, a review of the
study’s third sub-research question and progress towards the MRP goals is required. It is observed that the Internet plays a role in a process of enmification of the Taliban by the Canadian media as perceived by online Canadian audiences. The concept of perception hardening was discussed to this end as Canadian enemy perceptions of the Taliban exist or do not and thus can be created or reinforced. These two ideas were incorporated in the MRP model building exercise.
Sub-research Question #3: What conflict theory could be integrated with other disciplinary theory to create a model of
the process of Internet enmification and what would this model look like?
All of the critical MRP theories and concepts, including enemy imagery, perception hardening, attribution, enmification, and the Internet were incorporated into a model that used systems thinking. This required the creation of a rich picture and problematique of the problem space. These products were used to identify sub-systems that were later conceptually modeled and amalgamated.
148 8.0 Recommendations
The final chapter of this paper is dedicated to the formulation of recommendations based on an analysis of the conceptual model of Internet emnification developed for this major research project. The recommendations will be based on a response to the forth and final sub-research question of the study – What existing and new strategies and theories could be used to counter the emnification of the Taliban as conceptualized by the MRP model? While the previous chapter focused on explaining what was occurring in terms of emnification, this chapter will focus on countering the process of emnification within the context of this study and in the following manner:
1. Assumptions on a feasible outcome: Before recommendations can be made on how to
counter Internet emnification, a feasible outcome must be defined and some assumptions
made in terms of likelihood of acceptability within the problem-space. As will be
discussed, the criteria for success will be improving the Canadian Internet news audience’s
willingness supporting negotiations with the Taliban. In order to judge the feasibility of this
outcome, assumptions are made with respect to the Canadian public’s attitudes towards the
Canadian media, the Canadian Forces and the mission in Afghanistan.
2. Identifying issues and areas of concern: Issues and areas of concern identified in the
process of systems analysis and modelling of the problem space will be discussed in detail.
These issues include the Canadian audience’s tendency towards attribution of hostile
actions to Taliban disposition, the Canadian media practice to not properly distinguish
between the reported actions of the Taliban and other insurgent groups operating in
Afghanistan, and the direct and indirect association the Taliban with other enemy groups.
149 3. Proposing an agenda of change: Using the desired outcome of increasing the Canadian
audience’s willingness in supporting talks with the Taliban as a goal and taking into
consideration the assumptions made regarding proposing a feasible outcome, an agenda of
change can be developed that is addressing the issues. The proposed areas of change
include the mitigation of fundamental attribution errors in the process of consumption of
Internet war reports on the mission in Afghanistan, a clarification of104 the insurgency, and
the creation of space between the mission in Afghanistan and the War on Terrorism.
4. Initial plan of action: An initial plan of action for influencing and countering Internet
enmification of the Taliban will be presented. This initial plan will include a scope of
action and discussion on the necessary resources, potential strategies, and impacts to
current systems required to create change. The three key strategies include moving beyond
traditional war journalism practices, shaping and managing Canadian audience perceptions
of the Taliban, and countering enmity by using the Internet.
The final section of the chapter concludes the paper and presents the study’s conclusions
through a reconciliation of the research findings with the research hypotheses.
8.1 Assumptions and an agenda of change
In Chapter 6 of the MRP, a model of Internet enmification of the Taliban was developed and critically discussed in terms of strengths and weaknesses. After a minor adjustment was made through the incorporation of traditional media as a source of influence, the model was ready to be used as a tool to consider potential changes to the problem space. From the problematique created in the previous chapter, three key issues or problems were identified as areas of focus to improve
104 In the context of these recommendations, the term clarify is used to indicate the improvement and clarification of the audience
understanding of the insurgency in Afghanistan.
150 the problem space. The term ‘improving’ is used to describe an alternate and achievable outcome in which Canadians hold less enmity towards the Taliban and, hence, would be less opposed (or more willing) to talks with the Taliban. This criterion for success is chosen based on the MRP
assumption that an eventual political solution that involves the Government of Afghanistan, the
Taliban, and NATO countries will be required in order to end the war. In an recent online New
York Times op-ed entitled “The Taliban is hitting but not winning,” NATO Secretary-General
Anders Fogh Rasmussen declared that “there would be no D-Day in Kandahar” (2010). As NATO prepares for a spring offensive aimed at delivering a blow to the “heart of the Taliban,” a recent spike of IED and suicide attacks has caused concern that the imminent offensive may have, in fact, galvanized the insurgency (Verma, 2010 and Aspell, 2010). Some think tanks, including the
Hamburg-based Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, have criticized NATO’s strategy of trying to soften the Taliban before entertaining a political settlement: “They clearly favour the policy adopted by President Karzai, who - they say - appears to be moving away from a strategy of bombing the Taliban to one in which he is willing to talk with them” (Hessler, 2010). In a video recently posted on Al-Jazeera’s news website, the Taliban claimed to be in the midst of launching their own, counter spring offensive geared at inflicting casualties to foreign troops105 (Al-Jazeera,
2010, May 23). It is this cyclic nature of insurgency warfare that leads to the study’s assumption that the most likely outcome is for NATO, including Canada, to join the Karzai government in open negotiations with the Taliban. It is further assumed that one pre-condition for this to occur is
105 In a video posted on Al-Jazeera.net (Taliban vows 'summer offensive') on May 23, 2010, a Taliban spokesperson announced that
his organization had now begun its "summer offensive" and will increasingly hit foreign troops. Codenamed Al Fatah (victory),
the operation anticipates a planned summer offensive by NATO forces in Kandahar, aimed at driving the Taliban from their
traditional heartland. The video was posted two days after a Taliban rocket attack on Kandahar Airfield that wounded an
unspecified number of NATO troops (Al-Jazeera, 2010, May 23).
151 that Canadians need to support the Government decision to talk to the Taliban106. The state of the
insurgency in Afghanistan, the debate as to whether NATO should shift to a more political solution
to deal with the insurgent groups, and Canadian opinions of that strategy were the factors taken
into consideration throughout the identification of the areas of improvement discussed in the
recommendations.
Areas of improvement are considered within a broader context of achievable changes to the
problem space. To this end, potential changes will be examined in terms of what can be feasibly implemented within Canada; in other words, what changes can be reasonably applied within the
dynamic of Canadian media Internet war reports, audience consumption of these reports, and their
modifying effects on perceptions and enmity held towards the Taliban. In this respect,
consideration of feasibility acts as a gap analysis between a conceptually pursued outcome and
what is realistically possible in the given environment.
In this study, feasibility of changes to the problem space will be based on the following assumptions:
Canadians and the Canadian Forces: The majority of Canadians respect the men and women in uniform who serve, represent, and protect Canada overseas – while at great risk to their safety107. This respect and admiration is mirrored in the Canadian media’s generally positive
106 An April, 2010 Angus Reid poll concluded that 8% of Canadians believed the outcome of the Afghanistan mission would be a
decisive NATO victory over the Taliban, 46% foresaw a negotiated political settlement with the Taliban, 13% foresaw Taliban
defeat of NATO and 33% were uncertain. While it is conceivable that the Government could decide unilaterally (i.e. without the
consultation or support of the Canadian public) to enter into negotiations with the Taliban, the study assesses that action of this
nature would be viewed unfavourably by the Canadian public, and hence, the likelihood of the Canadian Government following
this course of action is assessed as very low.
107 In a 2006 poll conducted by Strategic Council, 83% of Canadians said they were proud of the Canadian Forces (2006).
152 representation of Canada’s armed forces in action. While the majority of Canadians oppose the
mission (Angus Reid, 2010), they are proud of the Canadian Forces and support the troops
(Strategic Council, 2006). Canadians feel comfortable with the notion that Canada should play a role to help resolve international security and peace problems (Angus Reid, 2006). This explains the initially high levels of support for the mission108 that has since declined to all time lows (38% in support) (Angus Reid, 2010). From the Canadian audiences’ perspective, Canadian soldiers are the heroes and the Taliban are the villains. Hence, it is assumed that a significant portion of the
Canadian news audience would, for example, resent a positive news piece on the Taliban that highlights the movement’s positive aspects, particularly the good they do for local Afghan communities 109. Somehow, Canadians will need to learn more about the Taliban beyond stories of
IED and suicide bombing attacks in order to collectively choose to support talks with the group.
Canadian news audience preferences: Canadian audiences want accurate news, particularly on the Canadian Government and issues that face Canada, such as the economy, the environment, and security against terrorism (Angus Reid, 2010). In this regard, they desire informative and accurate news reports in both traditional and online forms to notify them on Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan. Conversely, Canadian media agencies have an appetite for reporting on events in which the public may have concern with the type or amount of information shared by Government
(i.e. government transparency) because the coverage of these events stimulate public debate and
108 The mission was initially perceived as more peacekeeping (70%) than counterinsurgency (36%) by the Canadian audience
(Strategic Council, 2006).
109 Alternatively, it is further assumed that a smaller portion of the Canadian population would welcome an objective analysis of the
Taliban that presents both positive and negative aspects of the movement. Canadian Reporting on the positive aspects of the
Taliban movement, in particular, community relations and development could also clash with the positive news pieces on
Canadian Forces development efforts in Afghanistan (i.e. competing images of “the good guys”).
153 are, hence, determined to be newsworthy. As an example, Canadians were displeased with how the current Government handled the Afghan detainee scandal110 in which it was shown to be aware of the torture of insurgent detainees transferred from Canadian custody to Afghan security forces
(CBC, 2010).
Canadian news audience knowledge of the mission in Afghanistan: The majority of
Canadians have only a basic familiarity with the mission in Afghanistan and are not particularly
familiar with the conflict issues and its actors, including the Taliban and other insurgent groups111.
This does not necessarily imply that Canadians do not care about the mission or are not aware of the risk and sacrifice made by Canadian soldiers who have (or are serving) in the mission. “I was
overwhelmed by the public's response at all of my speaking engagements,” said former Deputy
Commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan), Colonel Jamie Cade at the end of his tour between
May 2008 and February 2009 (Morel, 2009).
Canadians of all ages have a real thirst for knowledge concerning Canada's mission in
Afghanistan. While they feel the bad news is well reported in the media, they sense there is
more to the mission but don't fully understand what is happening overseas. (Morel, 2009)
From the 2006 Strategic Council survey report on Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, “The
Afghanistan initiative is capturing the attention of Canadians, but it is also clear they know very little about the specifics, environment, our commitment, and dangers of the mission” (Strategic
Council, 2006). It is assumed that most Canadian’s primarily consider the mission in terms of its
22 The majority of Canadians (53%) feel the Government provides too little information to the public about the mission in
Afghanistan. 27% feel the Government provides the right amount (Angus Reid, 2010).
111 In 2006, during “intense media coverage” of Canada’s combat mission in Kandahar, 89% of Canadians were “highly aware of
Canadian troops in Afghanistan” (Strategic Council, 2006).
154 human cost, particularly that of Canadian soldiers112. This is explained, in part, by Canadian
media’s use of traditional war reporting in their coverage of the mission in Afghanistan, which
focuses on the casualties and costs of warfare and, thus, helps to shape Canadian concerns and how
they understand the conflict.
Canadian media agencies and conventional journalism: Canadian media agencies are modern, world-class news organizations that follow standard practices of journalistic integrity and sourcing. Their news reporting style is generally objective, informative, and consistent with
Canadian values and norms113. Consequently:
Conventional journalism training and development generally contains little or no reference
to the wisdom of five decades of academic and professional study of conflict. Conflict
analysis theory and skills are still not considered mainstream journalism prerequisites or
practices. (Howard, 2006)
The absence of conflict theory and analysis from conventional journalistic practice is likely because traditional coverage of conflicts does not discuss the root issues of the conflict with a
112 A recent University of Toronto study argues that Canadians’ emotional response to the loss of Canadian soldiers and their
repatriation ceremonies galvanizes support for the kinetic aspect of the mission in Afghanistan.
113 From Getting to know Canada - The Canadian Way of Life, Canadian values and norms include: 1. Fairness, tolerance and respect: Canadians want fairness and justice for themselves, their children and their families.
2. Diversity and cooperation: Canadians understand the value of cooperation.
3. Equal opportunity: Canadians believe in equality. Each person is equal before the law and is treated equally by the law.
4. Civil rights: Canadians appreciate their rights and freedoms, which apply equally without regard to such considerations as a
person’s age, gender, race, ethnicity, colour, religion, mental or physical disability or sexual orientation.
5. Environmental responsibility: Canadians are especially conscious of their natural environment and the need to both respect
and protect it for the future (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2007).
155 focus towards some resolution, and instead tends to focus on the negative aspects of the conflict
(i.e. civilian and military casualties). Whatever recommendations or strategies for change proposed
must take into consideration the assumption that Canada’s media is an independent system in of
itself that cannot be directly controlled or manipulated in order to achieve some desired outcome.
Canadian news audience consumption of traditional and online news: While there is increasing adoption of the Internet as a news source, Canadian audiences are consuming news in both traditional and online forms (Zamina and Fletcher, 2009); hence, a complex mix of media influence 114 shapes their perceptions of the mission and the enemy. Thus, any approach considered to counter Internet emnification would also need to be accompanied by countermeasures of enemy- making in traditional news forms as well.
From the MRP problem-space, three areas of focus were identified that will be considered
in proposing a strategy to influence the process of enmification of the Taliban by the Canadian
media:
Attribution of hostile actions to Taliban disposition: It was previously argued that enemy
imagery contained in Canadian Internet news reports, regardless of it being situational or dispositional, likely results in Canadian audience attributions to Taliban disposition. In the case of an enemy group, the disposition typically contains negative traits, such as aggression, hostility, and oppressiveness. This study is proposing that this fundamental attribution error is occurring in a cyclical fashion, iteratively forming and reinforcing enemy perceptions (i.e. perception hardening).
The process of attribution is the heart of the MRP model of enmification and, hence, requires attention if one wishes to counter the enemy-making process. Internet war reporting provides an
114 The complexity presented by the mix of traditional and new media forms was addressed in the third chapter of the paper where a
media framework was established in order to help explain the combined effect on audiences from consuming war news from both
old and new media sources.
156 environment for Canadian audiences to quickly and efficiently traverse the stages of attribution
(perception > judgement > attribution). The characteristics of Internet war reporting115 help drive the process of attribution forward. In an instant, a news headline is read online – “Canadian soldier killed by insurgent IED” (perception), followed by an assessment of hostile intent to inflict harm to
Canada (judgement), and, finally, a dispositional attribution (Taliban aggression). In the same moment, the article could be shared with others directly (e-mail) or indirectly (Twitter) that offer a similar opportunity for audience attribution. If the process of enmification of the Taliban is to be countered, the fundamental attribution error that occurs amongst Canadian audiences must be mitigated.
Every insurgent a Taliban: The MRP content analysis observed that Canadian Internet war
reports do not sufficiently distinguish between the Taliban and other insurgent groups involved in
the conflict. This arguably has led to Canadian audience perceptions that all hostile activity
reported by Canadian media is due to the Taliban. It is assumed that the majority of Canadian
audiences are not particularly familiar with the conflict and that there are numerous insurgent
groups active in Afghanistan. The Canadian Forces’ area of operations, Kandahar, is the place of
origin116 of the Taliban and is of tremendous spiritual importance to their movement (Global
Security, 2005 and Fathers, 2001). While the Taliban do indeed publicly take credit for some of
115 Characteristics of Internet war reporting include consonance, convergence, ubiquity, agenda setting, credibility, interactivity,
transferability, portability, participatory and personalization.
116 The Indian farming town of Deoband is the spiritual home of the particular brand of Islam practiced by the Taliban. Dar-ul-
uloom, a renowned religious and academic center in the Islamic world, gave birth in the 19th century to the Doebandi movement,
a “regenerative brand of Islam” which quickly spread across India and central Asia. It was adopted two decades ago as a way of
life by some tribal Afghans along the border with Pakistan. “As the Taliban, they imposed their version, which draws heavily from
their own austere tribal traditions, on a nation exhausted after years of civil war.” (Fathers, 2001)
157 their successful attacks, they have also denied involvement in certain incidents throughout the
conflict timeline, which include the schoolgirl acid attacks. A further observation from the content analysis on the use of the terms ‘insurgent’ at the opening sections of news reports on war followed by mention of past suspected and confirmed Taliban attacks. The interchangeable use of the terms insurgent and Taliban in this manner by Canadian war reporting can be compared to crime reporting. In national and local Canadian news reports on allegations of criminal activity, reporters carefully use adjectives such as suspected, alleged, and accused to acknowledge the presumption of innocence before guilt is proven. According to the results of the study’s content analysis, Canadian war reporting follows the same rule: the use of a generic term such as ‘insurgent’ before Taliban involvement is confirmed in the course of reports on the conflict in Afghanistan. This practice is typically followed up by subsequent reports which may or may not confirm the Taliban involvement117. The fact remains that the Taliban are not the only insurgent actor in the conflict. In addition to other Islamic based militant groups, foreign fighters and criminal enterprises are also a party to the violence (Jones, 2007, p. 2).
Linking the Taliban to other enemies: It was observed in the MRP content analysis that
Canadian war reporting contains enemy imagery linking the Taliban to other enemy groups (al-
Qaeda), states (Iraq, Iran), concepts (terrorism), and events (9/11). If one desires to counter the process of Taliban emnification, they must help Canadian audiences consider the group separately
117 The practice of using generic terms (i.e. insurgent, militant, gunmen) before confirming Taliban involvement was most notable in
the content analysis of the schoolgirl acid attack incident. For example, the first two CBC reports on the incident entitled, “Afghan
schoolgirls burned by acid in attack by men on motorcycle” (November 12, 2008) and “Hundreds of Afghan students stay home
following acid attack” (November 13, 2008), referred to the attackers as “two men on a motorcycle.” A subsequent report on the
incident describing the arrest of ten individuals who reportedly confessed to the crime referred to the individuals as “Taliban
militants.” This was contrary to the information provided by Taliban spokesmen who denied involvement in the incident (“10
arrested in Afghan schoolgirl acid attack,” November 23, 2008).
158 from other negatively perceived entities. In his 2002 State of the Union address, President George
W. Bush described how the U.S. simultaneously routed al-Qaeda 118 and decimated the Taliban in their offensive in Afghanistan (2002). In the same speech, he declared that the states of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were aligned with terrorist groups and, thus, formed an “axis of evil, arming to threaten the world” (2002). This historic speech temporarily galvanized the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT), which culminated with the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Popular support for the war eventually plummeted upon the revelation of U.S. claims that Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime had weapons of mass destruction were unfounded (Zunes and Gershman, 2006). Regardless of initial rationale, the U.S. was now engaged in two pronged assault against terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran borders Afghanistan and Iraq and its leadership regime, under President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard, have been accused of supporting insurgents in both
U.S. areas of operation119 (Vogt, 2010 and Miglani, 2010). This accusation was most recently asserted by U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates last visit to Afghanistan. In his address to
NATO troops he indicated that Iran was, "playing a double game" in Afghanistan, wooing the
Afghan government and undermining U.S. and NATO efforts by helping the Taliban (CBS, 2010).
Almost a decade after the “axis of evil” speech, the states of Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran are still negatively associated with one another. Furthermore, Afghanistan and Iraq are arguably still linked
118 On the 8th anniversary of 9/11, while reporting on the status of the Afghanistan mission in The Hague, General Stanley Chrystal
commented that he saw no signs of a major al-Qaida presence in the country, but claimed the terror group still maintained close
links to insurgents (Corder, 2009).
119 May, 2010 - In a press conference in Kabul, General Stanley McChrystal, former head of NATO operations in Afghanistan,
indicated that while Iran had generally assisted the Afghan government in fighting the insurgent group, “there is, however, clear
evidence of Iranian activity - in some cases providing weaponry and training to the Taliban - that is inappropriate” (Vogt, 2010).
This is balanced by the observation that Iran’s interference in Afghanistan has been insignificant in comparison to its accused role
in supporting the Iraq insurgency (Miglani, 2010).
159 with 9/11 as they represent, in part, the fallout and U.S. retaliation that followed the attacks. It is
assumed that in its reflection on Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, the Canadian audience
remembers al-Qaeda and 9/11 as the catalyst. Currently, Canadian Forces are at war in Southern
Afghanistan with the Taliban. In this sense, 9/11, al-Qaeda, Afghanistan, and the Taliban are intrinsically linked in Canadian war reporting and, consequently, in the mind of Canadian audiences. These associations may never dissolve completely; however, it is argued that they constitute a roadblock to countering the process of enmification of the Taliban.
In order to address the areas of focus discussed, the following changes to the MRP
problem-space are proposed along with an assessment of feasibility for implementing these
changes in Canada:
Mitigating the fundamental attribution error by creating an environment where Canadian audiences are more critically examining conflict events and are not necessarily attributing all actions to a hostile Taliban disposition. It is assessed that this approach would require Canadian media agencies to cover both the Canadian Forces and Taliban view of the war in order to present the conflict’s situational and dispositional factors from both sides. This would entail more
Canadian war reporting that goes into greater detail as to the Taliban rationale for engaging NATO and how the Taliban and their Afghan supporters are feeling towards foreigners, in general. This is assessed as feasible within a Canadian media context as analysis and commentary on the Taliban perspective is available to Canadian news audiences; however, this Taliban view is available to the same extent and frequency as compared to news of specific events such as major offensives or casualties120. The assessment of feasibility is further supported by the notion that a portion of the
120 A rare example of a more holistic view of the Taliban presented by the Canadian media: Talking to the Taliban, a recent research
project by The Globe and Mail. During the research project, a native Afghan interviewer coached by a veteran Canadian journalist
160 Canadian audience already rely on news sources such as Al-Jazeera, which presents a more
objective view of the Taliban, in addition to the use of mainstream Canadian news sources. By augmenting the tradition of embedding journalists with Canadian Forces units operating in
Afghanistan with the perspective of the Taliban, the Canadian audience are gaining a more well- rounded understanding of the conflict actors and issues. This endeavour would require further collaboration between Canadian and foreign media agencies in order to help mitigate the risk of kidnapping 121 that could occur in the process to gain more in-depth information and access to the
Taliban.
Clarifying the insurgency: The goal of this change is to improve the Canadian audience
understanding and knowledge of the mission and insurgency in Afghanistan. This improvement
would include cultivating awareness amongst Canadians that the Taliban are not the only insurgent
group in Afghanistan acting against Canadian Forces and that the insurgency is a complex, multi-
actor system (Reuters, 2009). By shifting from a traditional form of war reporting to one that is presenting the war as a conflict rather than combat, Canadian media can be participating in promoting a deeper audience understanding of the conflict issues and actors. This would require
Canadian media to present more information on the insurgency in Afghanistan, specifically, the actors in Southern Kandahar province and the Canadian Forces area of NATO responsibility. The
Canadian audience needs to understand that the Taliban is one of several groups operating in the
gained unprecedented access to insurgent groups in five districts of the province and conducted over 40 interviews with fighters
answering a standardized list of questions. This report is available from www.theglobeandmail.com/talkingtothetaliban
121 Reporting outside the wire in Afghanistan can be extremely dangerous. In October 2009, CBC journalist Melissa Fung was
kidnapped by "bandits" (unaffiliated with the Taliban) while reporting from a refugee camp in the outskirts of Kabul (CBC,
November 8, 2008). In November 2009, Canadian journalist Beverly Giesbrecht was kidnapped in Pakistan by Taliban militants
while working on an Al-Jazeera documentary on the insurgency in Afghanistan (National Post, March 20, 2009).
161 region and the factors that lead to engagement with Canadian Forces are complex and dependent
on more than the Taliban122. It is too simplistic to assume that these insurgent groups act as one cohesive unit. The Taliban alone presents a challenge as they are comprised of both traditional and neo-Taliban contingents (Global Security, 2005). In terms of feasibility, the greatest challenge to this approach is audience interest. If the mission in Afghanistan is not on the top of the public agenda, there is little chance Canadians would desire further information on the conflict and its actors.
Creating space between the mission in Afghanistan and the War on Terrorism through the gradual movement beyond 9/11 and other enemy personalities, groups, nations and concepts often mentioned along with the Taliban requires the gradual dissociation of the Taliban from other negatively and emotionally charged events and groups, such as 9/11 and al-Qaeda. From the sample of articles collected for the content analysis, a small number (~3.5%) contained mention of either al-Qaeda or the September 11th attacks against the U.S. in 2001. While the percentage from this study is small, the persistent existence of the linkage is what is most important. Then Canadian
Defence Minister, Gordon O’Connor, linked the Canadian mission in Afghanistan to the attacks of
9/11 and even indicated a vengeful Canadian motive for the engagement in a speech to
Conservative supporters and military personnel:
When the Taliban or al-Qaeda came out of Afghanistan, they attacked the Twin Towers
and in those twin towers, 25 Canadians were killed. The previous government and this
government will not allow Canadians to be killed without retribution. (Ottawa Citizen,
2007)
122 A 2009 Reuters report quoted General Stanley McChrystal, NATO’s commander in Afghanistan, naming three groups, including
the Taliban or Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), as the primary insurgent actors operating in the region. The other two groups were the
Haqqani Network (HQN) and the Hezb-I-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) (2009).
162 As the 10th anniversary of 9/11 approaches, there is no indication the images of the attacks will fade from the American conscious. As neighbours and close allies, Canada and the U.S. have a shared history that includes losses on 9/11 (O’Malley, 2003). As a result of the attacks, Canadians and Americans live in an era of heightened North American security and protection. The threat of
terrorism has been at the top of the Canadian government’s defence concerns and has driven
security budgets and measures to new heights (Gillespie, 2008). Canadian coverage of the Afghan
mission is typically organized in the international news sections of Canadian news websites,
newspapers, radio, and television broadcasts along with other security related news that includes
coverage of the U.S. mission in Iraq, foiled terrorist plots in North America and Europe, and the
nuclear threat posed by Iran and North Korea. The organization of international news, which
clusters news on the Afghan war with other news of security threats from other groups and states, helps the audience create its association to a wider and more encompassing enemy of global terrorism. As the Canadian combat mission in Afghanistan approaches its end in 2011, it is uncertain how feasible it is to create space between the Afghanistan mission and 9/11 in reality. In this respect, it is assumed that there will always be a historic linkage between the Canadian mission in Afghanistan and 9/11.
The three areas of focus – attribution to Taliban disposition, assumption that all insurgents are Taliban (and vice versa), and the linkage between the Taliban and other enemy groups, present the greatest opportunities to influence the process of enmification as modelled in the MRP. Before proposing courses of action to improve the situation, a review of what would be considered culturally feasible change among Canada’s media and audiences was required. Finally, some proposed areas of change were presented along with an assessment of feasibility for implementation in Canada. In terms of strategy, mitigating the fundamental attribution error,
163 clarifying the insurgency, and creating space between the mission in Afghanistan and 9/11 will be the goals of the strategies presented in the MRP.
8.2 Implementing change
The final section of the recommendations will use systems thinking to propose an agenda of change. The problem-space issues of focus, potential areas of change, and its associated feasibilities will be integrated into a list of desirable attitudinal and behavioural changes. The term
‘desirable’ is used to describe changes that result in the outcome one hopes to achieve. In this context, the desired outcome is to counter the process of emnification. The impacts and effects of the proposed changes to the problem-space systems identified in Chapter 7 will be considered.
Finally, some strategies will be proposed on how to achieve this change. The outcome will be a proposed plan of action to counter Internet emnification of the Taliban in Canada. The study will use some direct observations from the content analysis combined with the results of literature review of enemy imagery and related media studies as a source of strategy ideas. More specifically, selected aspects of peace journalism, perception management, and the Internet will be integrated to create the seeds of an implementation strategy.
Tables 8-1, 8-2, and 8-3 summarize desired changes in audience behaviour, the potential impacts and effects to problem-space systems, and strategies to achieve these effects by each category of proposed change. The desired outcome of these impacts and effects is to counter
Taliban emnification by Canadian war reporting on the conflict in Afghanistan. The three-pronged approach of mitigating the fundamental attribution error, clarifying the insurgency and its actors, and creating space between the conflict and its 9/11 roots will be the basis of the proposed strategy for countering emnification. The changes proposed were chosen as they align with identified points
164 of influence in the MRP model, that is, points that could potentially be exploited in order to manipulate (or counter) the process of enemy-making. Unless indicated by the prefix ‘Internet,’ the strategies indicated apply to both traditional and online forms of reporting on the Afghan conflict.
It will be argued that by complimenting traditional Canadian war reporting with some aspects of peace journalism, presenting more information on the Taliban, and using the Internet to stimulate debate on Canada’s approach in Afghanistan, the process of countering enmification can be set in motion.
165 Table 8-1
Desired change: Mitigating the fundamental attribution error
Desired change Desired attitudinal and behavioural Impacts and effects on current system Strategies
change
Mitigating the Further consideration of situational 1. Reduction in instances of negative Presents a more holistic image of the Taliban by not
fundamental factors in process of attribution judgement of Taliban actions limiting reporting to hostile activities
attribution error Avoid reporting on unconfirmed (Acid attack) and
Reduced consideration of 2. Reduction in attribution of reported actions confirmed (Saraposa Prison) Taliban activities in the
dispositional factors in process of to Taliban disposition same articles
attribution
3. Mitigation of perception hardening driven by Internet: Avoid linking articles of insurgent activities
dispositional attributions (unconfirmed Taliban) with articles that described
confirmed activities
Internet: Integrate national (CBC) and foreign (Al-
Jazeera) media representations of the Taliban by
utilizing integrated news sites, like Google News
166
Table 8-2
Desired change: Clarifying the insurgency
Desired change Desired attitudinal and behavioural Impacts and effects on current system Strategies
change
Clarifying the Creating the understanding that 1. Reduction in instances of attribution - Not all Shift the perceived goal of the mission from
insurgency 1. The Taliban are not the only hostile insurgent activity reported online is destroying the Taliban to talking to the Taliban
insurgent actor in the conflict attributed to the Taliban Focus on the conflict as the problem rather than the
Taliban as the problem
2. The insurgency is a part of a 2. Reduction of negative perception of Taliban
complex conflict situation with many and Taliban actions Cultivate audience understanding that enmity is
actors and issues. It is not simply reciprocal and leads to intractability in conflict
Canada vs. the Taliban 3. Mitigation of perception hardening driven by More expert commentary on the insurgency,
enemy imagery by improving audience’s proposing solutions other than kinetic military
knowledge of the Taliban operations, such as talks
Internet: Further reporting and audience interactivity
encouraging debate on whether Canada and NATO
should talk to the Taliban
167 Table 8-3
Desired change: Creating space between the mission in Afghanistan and 9/11
Desired change Desired attitudinal and behavioural Impacts and effects on current system Strategies
change
Creating space Understanding that 10 years after 1. Reduction in enemy imagery linking Consider the conflict in its current state (insurgency)
between the mission 9/11, the conflict in Afghanistan has Afghanistan insurgency to other negatively rather than focus on causes and the past (retaliation for
in Afghanistan and taken on a meaning of its own perceived groups and states (al-Qaeda, Iraq, 9/11).
the 9/11 Iran)
Move away from the argument that wars fought
2. Improvement of audience understanding and overseas (Afghanistan) protect Canada from potential
consideration of the current conflict factors, attacks at home, like 9/11
actors and events
Create distance between insurgents (Taliban) and
3. Create a more nuanced audience terrorists (al-Qaeda) since Canada does not talk with
understanding of insurgency and terrorism, and terrorists
why they are distinct concepts
Internet: More expert commentary and audience
interactivity encouraging debate on Canada’s
engagement in Afghanistan , 10 years later
168 The strategies to achieve the desired changes in the MRP problem space are discussed in greater detail:
Beyond traditional war journalism: Canada Internet reporting on the mission in
Afghanistan is predominantly traditional war journalism (Howard, 2006). “War journalism tends to be very dichotomized: you have one party that is going to win and another which is going to lose”
(Ottosen, 2005). War journalism is not the only reporting framework that can be employed by
Canadian media agencies in reports on the conflict in Afghanistan; for example, peace journalism is a set of journalism practices to cover war and conflict that emerged in the 1970s and was developed by Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung (Lee and Maslog, 2005, p. 311). Essentially,
Galtung proposed that journalists adopt a more peace/conflict (solution oriented) perspective on reporting rather than a war/violence perspective (victory oriented). Some aspects of peace journalism could be gradually introduced in the Canadian online news stream. This could add balance to the Canadian media representation of the war and the Taliban and ultimately move from a victory orientation towards a solution orientation for Canadian coverage of the conflict. Most of these approaches would involve some collaboration between academic institutes and media organizations as traditional war reporting is the current standard in the Canadian media landscape.
Some reporting strategies inspired by the notion of moving away from traditional war reporting:
1. Focus on the conflict in Afghanistan as the problem rather than the Taliban as the problem
and by doing so, focus on the conflict issues rather than perceived adversarial issues
inherent in the conflict space.
2. Consider the conflict in its current state (insurgency) rather than focus on causes and the
past (invasion, retribution for 9/11).
169 3. Cultivate audience understanding that enmity is reciprocal and leads to intractability in
conflict.
4. Avoid reporting on unconfirmed (Acid attack) and confirmed (Saraposa Prison) Taliban
activities in the same article.
5. More expert commentary on the insurgency, proposing solutions other than kinetic military
operations, such as talks between NATO, the Afghan government, and the leaders of the
insurgency, including the Taliban.
Shaping and managing perception: Canadian media organizations provide Canadian audiences with news and information on the Afghan conflict. As most Canadians are not domestically or internationally involved in the mission, and are not physically near the conflict, they ultimately depend on information contained in news reports to form opinions and perceptions on the mission and the Taliban. As the MRP content analysis observed, Canadian Internet reports on the conflict contain enemy imagery of the Taliban of both a situational and a dispositional nature. This study argues that negative perceptions of the Taliban form, over time, from consistent exposure to enemy imagery of the conflict (IED attacks, Canadian KIAs) and mention of other enemy groups, states, and concepts. Some small changes in the way Canadian media organizations report on the conflict in Afghanistan could help to create a less negative perception of the Taliban.
It is the assumption of the MRP that this perception management could lead to Canadian audiences being more favourable to alternative solutions than the current kinetic strategy, such as negotiation with the Taliban. Some of these strategies would include:
1. Present a more holistic image of the Taliban (origins, ethos) by not limiting reporting to
hostile tactical activities (IED attacks, suicide bombing).
170 2. Shift the perceived goal of the mission from destroying the Taliban (victory oriented) to
talking to the Taliban (solution oriented).
3. Move away from the perception that wars fought overseas (Afghanistan) protect Canada
from potential attacks at home, like 9/11.
4. Create distance between insurgents (Taliban) and terrorists (al-Qaeda) since Canada does
not talk with terrorists.
Countering enmity using the Internet: While Internet war reporting characteristics may indeed create an environment ripe for dispositional attribution and perception hardening, some of these characteristics could also be used to counter the process of enemy making. The most notable characteristic to distinguish between traditional and online news forms is that of interactivity. If
Canadian media agencies leveraged interactivity, they can present more information to Canadians on the conflict, the Taliban, and alternatives to war. Some strategies for countering the process of enmification that would utilize the online features of news reports:
1. Integrate national (CBC) and foreign (Al-Jazeera) media representations of the Taliban by
utilizing integrated news sites, like Google News123.
2. Further reporting and audience interactivity encouraging debate on whether Canada and
NATO should talk to the Taliban.
3. More expert commentary and audience interactivity encouraging debate on Canada’s
engagement in Afghanistan, 10 years later.
123 This particular recommendation is directed towards the Canadian audience as opposed to Canadian media organizations.
171 4. Avoid linking articles of insurgent activities (unconfirmed Taliban) with articles that are
describing confirmed activities.
Through a consideration of the desired audience behavioural changes and their associated
problem-space system impacts, a three-pronged strategy was proposed to counter the process of
enmification as defined by the MRP model. The strategy included introducing some changes to
traditional Canadian war reporting by adopting concepts from peace journalism. The concept of
perception management and shaping was also identified as a potential strategy to present alterative
views of the Taliban with the ultimate goal of softening the Canadian audiences’ position on
speaking to the Taliban as an alternative to war. Finally, some recommendations that pertain
specifically to Internet war reporting were made that include more careful use of the terms
insurgent and Taliban, which stimulate debate on Canada’s current approach in Afghanistan and
the link of news materials electronically. Through a consideration of the assumptions on
Canadians’ attitudes towards their military, knowledge of the mission in Afghanistan, and the
Taliban, consumption of traditional and online media coverage of the conflict, the strategies
proposed are assessed to be feasible in terms of implementation within the problem space;
however, it should be noted that it is impossible to define with absolute precision what can be
feasibly implemented in reality. One can only estimate this constraint in planning and observing the end result in practice.
This final chapter of the paper presents recommendations on how to counter the research project’s model of Internet emnification of the Taliban by the Canadian media, and, in particular, focused on answering the last sub-research question of the major research project:
172 Sub-research Question #4: What existing and new strategies and theories could be used to counter the model of enemy- making?
Through an application of the results of systems modelling, a strategy for countering the
Internet emnification of the Taliban was proposed. The desired goal of the manipulation was to improve Canadians’ willingness to support an outcome to the mission in Afghanistan that would include talks with the Taliban (i.e. a more political than military solution to dealing with the
Taliban insurgency). This was accomplished through a calculation of assumptions on what would be achievable within the study’s problem space, which at its core, is the interaction between the
Canadian news audience and the Canadian media. Thus, it was determined that any proposed recommendations to counter the Internet emnification of the Taliban would have to be assessed as feasibly implementable within assumptions on the Canadian public’s general attitudes towards the
Canadian Forces, knowledge of the mission and insurgency in Afghanistan, and consumption of traditional and online news on the conflict as Canada’s combat mission approaches an end.
After the selection of a desired outcome (an increased Canadian willingness to talk to the
Taliban) and formulation of assumptions, against which recommendations must be judged as feasible to implement within the problem space, areas of focus were identified from which an agenda of change could be developed. These areas of focus include the Canadian audience’s tendency towards attribution of hostile actions to Taliban disposition, the Canadian media practice to not properly distinguish between the reported actions of the Taliban and other insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, and the practice of direct and indirect associations with the Taliban and other enemy groups. Using the desired outcome of increasing the Canadian audience’s willingness supporting talks with the Taliban as a goal towards striving towards and taking into consideration the assumptions made with regards to proposing a feasible outcome, an agenda of change was
173 developing, countering the process of emnification of the Taliban. The proposed areas of change included the mitigation of fundamental attribution error in the process of consumption of Internet war reports on the mission in Afghanistan, clarification of the insurgency, and creation of space between the mission in Afghanistan and the War on Terrorism.
An initial plan of action to influence and counter Internet enmification of the Taliban was presented, which was designed to bring about the discussed desired changes to the problem space.
This initial plan included a scope of action and discussion on the necessary resources, potential strategies, and impacts to current systems required to create change. The three key strategies include moving beyond traditional war journalism practices, shaping and managing Canadian audience perceptions of the Taliban, and countering enmity by using the Internet. It is the recommendation of this study that these strategies would form the core of a larger, more comprehensive program for changing public perception of the mission in Afghanistan and the perceived contemporary enemy, the Taliban.
174 8.3 Conclusions
The conclusions of the major research project are presented as they relate to the project’s research questions and hypotheses.
Primary research question: What role does Internet news reporting play in the creation and maintenance of enemy-
perceptions in insurgency conflict?
Primary Hypothesis: Canadian Internet news reports on the war in Afghanistan play a role in the formation and
maintenance of enemy-perceptions held by Canadians.
Canadian Internet reporting on the war in Afghanistan contains situational and dispositional
enemy imagery of the Taliban. Through a process driven by attribution, situational, and dispositional enemy imagery of events in the mission ultimately result in dispositional attributions towards the Taliban. This process of emnification influences Canadian news audiences’ willingness to support the notion of talking to the Taliban through a mix of traditional and online news sources.
Q1: Do Canadian Internet news reports on the conflict in Afghanistan contain enemy imagery of the Taliban and if so,
what type and frequency?
H1: Canadian Internet news reports contain enemy imagery of the Taliban and the presence of this imagery is related
to the story being reported on
From the content analysis of 135 Canadian Internet articles that covered the war in
Afghanistan, 119 (88%) contained either situational or dispositional enemy imagery. In total, 377 instances of enemy imagery were identified, for an average of almost three images per article.
From the cross-lagged correlations, two of the most significant findings related to the positive relationship between enemy imagery and subsequent public attitude towards talking to the Taliban:
1. Dispositional imagery has strong positive relation to subsequent public attitude toward not
talking to the Taliban (0.82).
175 2. Dispositional imagery has a negative relation to subsequent public attitude toward talking
to the Taliban (-0.70).
Q2: Does the medium of the Internet contribute to the propagation and hardening of enemy perceptions and thus play
a part in a potential process of enmification?
H2: There is some correlation between the amount of enemy imagery contained in Internet news reports and
Canadian’s public opinions on the mission in Afghanistan and the Taliban.
H3: The Internet does play a role in the process of emnification of the Taliban from the view of the Canadian public.
The correlative findings between enemy imagery in Internet news reports and subsequent public opinion towards the Taliban124 suggest that Internet news reports plays some role in a process that hardens enemy perceptions over time (enmification). As a news source, the Internet enables attribution processes through its provisions of consistent and readily available amounts of
enemy imagery and information that supports pre-existing enemy perceptions and attitudes toward
an enemy group. The characteristics of Internet as a source of news, which include consonance,
convergence, ubiquity, agenda setting, credibility, interactivity, transferability, portability,
participatory, and personalization, help explain the role of the Internet in the process of
emnification of the Taliban by the Canadian media. It is, however, important to note that the
emnification of the Taliban does not occur in Internet news alone, and it is, rather, a mix of influence from traditional and online coverage of the mission in Afghanistan that shapes the
Canadian audience’s overall perception of the enemy.
Q3: What conflict theory could be integrated with other disciplinary theory to create a model of the process of Internet
enmification and what would this model look like?
124 As judged by the response to the poling questions, “Would you talk to the Taliban?” (Angus Reid, 2009) and “Should the
Canadian Forces and NATO negotiate with the Taliban?” (Strategic Council, 2009).
176 Attribution Theory was discussed as an underlying factor in the process of enmification.
Enemy imagery in Canadian Internet news articles helps to trigger a process of attribution. In this
process, reports on Taliban actions lead to dispositional attributions of enemy traits, such as
aggression and hostility. Using systems analysis, a conceptual model of Internet emnification was
developed by organizing key problem-space actors (Canadian media, audience) and concepts
(enemy imagery, attribution, perception hardening) into sub-systems forming a conceptual model
of Internet emnification125.
Q4: What existing and new strategies and theories could be used to counter this model of enemy-making?
A strategy was proposed to counter Internet emnification of the Taliban. This strategy
focuses on modifying Canadian audience-media interactions by mitigating the fundamental attribution error, clarifying the insurgency, and creating space between 9/11 and the current mission in Afghanistan. The proposed strategy includes moving beyond traditional war reporting by adopting some aspects of peace journalism, managing audience perceptions of the Taliban, and exploiting the characteristics of Internet news to a counter-emnification strategy126.
125 This model was further refined by including the notion that Canadian audiences rely on a mix of traditional and online sources for
news.
126 Example: Using the website of a Canadian news agency with a robust Internet presence such as CBC, to host a moderated web
discussion on the positive and negative aspects of pursuing a political solution with the Taliban in Afghanistan.
177 References
Ahlers, D. (2006). News consumption and the new electronic media. The Harvard International
Journal of Press/Politics Vol. 11(1) pp. 29-52.
Al-Jazeera (2010, May 23). Taliban vows ‘summer offensive. Retreived from http://aljazeera.net
Angus Reid. (2010, April). Public opinion: war in Afghanistan: support for Afghanistan mission
falls markedly in Canada. Toronto, Canada.
Angus Reid. (2009, December). Public opinion: War in Afghanistan: Canadians reject sending
more soldiers to Afghanistan. Toronto, Canada.
Anker, L. (2005). Peacekeeping and public opinion. Canadian Military Journal. Vol. 6(2)
(Summer) pp. 23-32.
Aspell, T. (2010, May 23). Spring offensive in Afghanistan? NBC News. Retreived from
http://worldblog.msnbc.com
Ball-Rokeach, S.J and DeFleur, M.L. (1976). A Dependency model of mass-media effects.
Communication Research Vol. 3(3) pp. 3-20.
Bauer, R. (1964). The obstinate audience: the influence process from the point of view of social
communication. American Psychologist Vol. 19(5) (May) pp. 319-328.
Berenger, R.D. (2006). War in cyberspace. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication Vol 12
(1), article 9.
Bertrand, I. and Hughes, P. (2005). Media Research Methods: Audience, Institutions, Texts. New
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2009, October 20). Who are the Taliban? Retreived
from: http://www.bbc.co.uk
178 Bronfenbrenner, U. (1961). The mirror image in Soviet–American relations: A social
psychologist’s report. Journal of Social Issues Vol. 16 (3) pp. 45-56.
Burton, J. W. (1990). Conflict: Human Needs theory. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Bush, G. W. (2002, January 29). State of the Union address. Retrieved from:
http://archives.cnn.com
Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC). (2010, June 7). In the line of duty: Canada’s casualties.
Retreived from http:/www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC). (2010, March 5). Canada wanted Afghan prisoners
tortured: lawyer. Retreived from http:/www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC). (2009). CBC News 2.0: The Future of news in an age of
social media. Retrieved October 23, 2009 from http://www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) Digital Archives. (2009). Terrorism. Retrieved June
24, 2010 from http://archives.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). (2009, August 20). Afghan voter turnout low, officials
say. Retreived from http://www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). (2009, August 19). Kandahar governor urges Afghans
to vote. Retreived from http://www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). (2008, December 14). Roadside blast claims 3 N.B.-
based soldiers in Afghanistan. Retreived from http://www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). (2008, December 5). Afghan 3 new deaths in
Afghanistan push Canadian toll to 101. Retreived from http://www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). (2008, November 17). Afghan girls returning to school
after acid attack. Retreived from http://www.cbc.ca
179 Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC). (2008, November 12). Afghan Schoolgirls Burned by
Acid in Attack by Men on Motorcycle. Retreived from http://www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC). (2008, November 8). Abducted CBC journalist released in Afghanistan. Retrieved from http:/www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). (2008, June 15). 20 Arrested after Afghan Prison
Break. Retreived from http://www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). (2008, June 16). Taliban fighters take villages near
Kandahar after jailbreak. Retreived from http://www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). (2007). In Depth: The Internet. Retrieved June 24,
2010 from http://www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). (2006, May 30). In Depth - Canada's Military: Women
in the Canadian military. Retreived April 10, 2010 from http://www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). (2006, May 17). Canada's stay in Afghanistan
extended by 2 years. Retreived from http://www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). (2006, May 31). Afghan mission not war, O'Connor
says. Retreived from http://www.cbc.ca
Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC). (1999, July 27). Canada Calls for Volunteer Soliders.
Retreived from CBC Digital Archives http://archives.cbc.ca
The Canadian Newspaper Association (CAN). (2010). About newspapers. Retrieved from
http://www.cna-acj.ca
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). (2004). Terrorism. Retrieved June 24, 2010 from
http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca
180 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). (2004). The CSIS Act. Retrieved June 24, 2010
from http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca
CBS News. (2010, March 8). Gates Warns Iran Over Afghan “Double Game.” Retreived from
http://www.cbsnews.com
CBS News. (2009, December 1). Obama Lays Out New Afghanistan Strategy. Retrieved from
http://www.cbsnews.com
Carl von Ossietzky University. (2008) Caricutures as historical sources. Retrieved October 23,
2009 from http://www.history-on-line.eu
Central Command, United States (CENTOCOM). (2010). Coalition countires: Canada. Retrieved
June 20, 2010, from http://www.centcom.mil
Checkland, P.(2000). Soft systems methodology: a thirty year retrospective. Systems Research
and Behavioral Science. Sysrem Research 17(S1), S11-S58.
Checkland. P. (1999). Soft Systems Methodology in Action. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). (2007). Getting to know Canada - The Canadian way of life. Retrieved from http://cic.gc.ca
Clark, M. T. (2008). Review of Koran, Kalashinkov, and laptop: The Neo-Taliban insurgency in
Afghanistan by A. Giustozzi. Retreived June 19, 2010 from http://www.asmeascholars.org
Conboy, M. (2007). Language of the News. London: Routledge
Corder, M. (2009, September 11). McChrystal: No Major Al-Qaeda Signs in Afghanistan. The
Huggington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com
CTV News. (2009, August 25). 30 killed in huge southern Afghan blast. Retreived from
http://www.ctv.ca
181 CTV News. (2009, August 17). Threat of violence looms over Afghan election. Retreived from
http://www.ctv.ca
CTV News. (2008, December 5). 3 Canadian soldiers killed, Afghan death toll hits 100. Retreived
from http://www.ctv.ca
CTV News. (2008, June 13). Jailbreak frees over 1,000 into Kandahar's streets. Retreived from
http://ctv.ca
CTV News. (2006, May 17). Cdn. captain killed in Afghanistan firefight. Retreived from
http://www.ctv.ca
Day. S. Hon. (2008, May 7). Remarks by the Minister of Public Safety at the Conference Board of
Canada’s Public-Private Sector Summit on Critical Infrastructure Security. Retreived from
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca
Davis, K. (2006). Memerial Cross awarded to husband of Capt Goddard. The Maple Leaf. Vol. 9
(21) (May).
Department of Defense (DoD). (2004, February 26). News Release: DoD announces criteria for
Global War on Terrorism medals. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov
Department of National Defence (DND). (2010). Operation ATHENA. Retrieved February 18,
2010, from http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca
Dixon, J. M. (2005). Canada and Information Operations. Canadian Military Journal. Vol. 6(3)
(Autumn, 2005) pp. 33 – 42.
Eckhardt, W. (1991) Making and breaking enemy images. Security Dialogue Vol. 22 pp. 32-36.
Fabick, S. (2007) Two psychologically based conflict resolution programs: enemy images and us
& them. Journal for Social Action in Counseling and Psychology Vol. 1 pp. 72-81.
182 Fathers, M. (2001, September 21). At the Birthplace of the Taliban. Time in partnership with CNN. Retrieved from: http://www.time.com
Fico, F. G., Lacy, S. and Riffe, D. (1998). Analyzing media messages: Using quantitative content
analysis in research. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Fletcher, J. F. and Hove, J. (2010). Emotional determinants of support for the Canadian mission in
Afghanistan: a view from the bridge. Retreived from: http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca
Flynn, M. (Major General). (December 22, 2009). State of the insurgency: trends, intentions and
objectives. Retrieved from: http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca
Freedman, J. I. and Sears, D. O. (1971). Selective exposure to information: a critical review. In
D.Roberts and W.Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass Communication (pp. 209-
234). Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
Harackiewicz, J. M. and Kenny, D. A. (1979). Cross-lagged panel correlation: practice and
promise. Journal of Applied Psychology Vol. 64(4) pp. 372-379.
Gillespie, B. (2008). Security matters: The 9/11 effect: has $24 billion made Canada safer?
Retreived May 23, 2010 from: http://www.cbc.ca
Gitlin, T. (1978). Media sociology: the dominant paradigm. Theory and Society Vol. 6(2)
(September) pp. 205-253.
Giustozzi, A. (2007). Koran, Kalashinkov, and laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in
Afghanistan. New York, NY: Columbia Universtiy Press.
Global Security. (2006). Al-Qaeda. Retreived from: http://www.globalsecurity.org
Global Security. (2005). The Taliban. Retreived from: http://www.globalsecurity.org
The Globe and Mail. (2008, October 9). Afghan mission’s spirallying cost hits campaign.
Retreived from http://www.theglobeandmail.com
183 The Globe and Mail. (2006, May 18). 26-year-old officer becomes the first Canadian woman yet to
die in combat. Retreived from http://www.theglobeandmail.com
Government of Canada (GoC). (2009). Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan: Canada and the
Afghanistan Compact. Retrieved February 18, 2010, from http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca
Griffin, E. (1994). A first look at Communication theory. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Gunter, B. (2000). Media research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Incorporated.
Heider, F. (1959). The psychology of interpersonal relations. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Hesse, P.etra and Mack, J.ohn E. (1997) The World is a Dangerous Place: Images of the Enemy on
Children’s Television. In R.Rieber, The Psychology of War and Peace: The iImage of the
eEnemy (pp. 131-153). New York, NY: Plenum Press.
Hessler, U. (2010, May 18). German peace institutes criticize NATO Afghanistan strategy.
Retreived May 30, 2010 from: http://www.dw-world.de
Howard, R. (2006). The Canadian Journalism Project: The case for conflict-sensitive journalism.
Retreived on June 5, 2010 from: http://www.j-source.ca
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). (2010). Afghanistan: History. Retrieved February
18, 2010, from: http://www.isaf.nato.int
Jones, S. G. (2007, December 10). The State of the Afghan insurgency. Testimony presented
before the Canadian Senate National Security and Defence Committee. Retrieved from:
http://www.rand.org
Keown, L.A. (2007). Keeping up with the times: Canadians and their news media diet. Canadian
Social Trends No. 83 (March) pp. 12-18.
Klapper, J. T. (1960). The effects of mass communication. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
184 Krippendorff, K. (1993). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications Inc.
Lazarsfeld, P. F., Berelson, B. and Gaudet, H. (1948). The people’s choice. New York, NY:
Columbia University Press.
Library and Archives Canada. (2009). First and Second World Wars. Retrieved June 24, 2010
from: http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca
Littlejohn, Stephen W. (1999). Theories of Human Communication (6th ed.). Belmont,
CA:Wadesworth Publishing Company.
MacLean, M. S. and Westley, B. H. (1978) A conceptual model for communications research. In
R.Carter and S.Tubbs, Shared Experiences in Human Communication (pp. 37-43).
Rochelle Park, NJ: Hayden Book Company.
Manusov, V. (2002). Attribution and interpersonal communication: out of our heads and into
behaviour. In J. Monohan and D.Roskos-Ewoldsen, Communication and Social Cognition:
Theories and Methods, New Jersey, NY: Publishers Mahwah.
McCombs, M. E. and Shaw, Donald L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public
Opinion Quarterly Vol. 36 (2) (Summer) pp. 176-187.
McEwen, E. (2009, December 28). End of the road for print media. Chatham-Kent Daily Post.
Retrieved from http://ckdp.ca
McNair, B. (2007) Images of the enemy: post 9/11 reprise. Media Development Vol. 4 (December)
pp. 32-36.
Microsoft Corporation. (2007). RSS: Really Simple Syndication. Retrieved June 25, 2010 from:
http://www.microsoft.com
185 Miglani, S. (2010, May 30). Taliban Training In Iran: McChrystal Says 'Clear Evidence' Of Inappropriate Iranian Activity. Retreived from: http://www.reuters.com
Mitchell, C.R. (1981). The Structure of international conflict. New York, NY: Macmillan Press
Limited.
Morrel, B. (2009, May). Former commander and deputy of Joint Task Force Afghanistan engage
Canadians. Retreived from http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca
Myers, D. G. (1994). Exploring social psychology. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
National Post. (2009, March 20). Canadian says Taliban captors plan to behead her. Retrieved from http://ww.nationalpost.com
National Post. (2008, December 4). Three Canadian soldiers killed in Afghanistan. Retreived from
http://www.nationalpost.com
National Post. (2008, November18). MacKay hopes Obama can help drum up more troops for
Afghanistan. Retreived from http://www.nationalpost.com
National Post. (2008, November 12). Afghan schoolgirl blinded by acid throwers. Retreived from
http://www.nationalpost.com
National Post. (2008, June 16). Kandahar falls silent as attack threat looms. Retreived from
http://www.nationalpost.com
National Post. (2008, June 14). Massive Afghan jailbreak ‘a small splash in the pond,’ says Hillier.
Retreived from http://www.nationalpost.com
Nguyen, A. and Western, M. (2006). The complementary relationship between the Internet and
traditional mass media: the case of online news and information. Information Research
Vol. 11(3) (April).
Noelle-Neumann, E. (1974). The spiral of silence: a theory of public opinion. Journal of
Communication Vol. 24(2) (June) pp. 43-51.
186 Nohrstedt, S. A. and Ottosen, R. (2008) War journalism in the threat society: peace journalism as a
strategy for challenging the mediated culture of fear? Conflict and Communication Online
Vol. 7(2) pp. 1-17.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2010). Frequently Asked Questions. Retreived June
20, 2010 from http://www.nato.int
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2010). Glossary of Terms and Definitions. Retreived
June 20, 2010 from http://www.nato.int
O’Malley, Martin. (2003). Canada and the U.S. after 9/11. Retreived May 23, 2010 from
http://www.cbc.ca/canadaus/omalley1.html
Ottawa Citizen. (2007, January 21). Canadian troops in Afghanistan as 9/11 ‘retribution.’
Retrieved May 23, 2010 from http://www.canada.com
Ottosen, Rune. (2005, March 18). Peace journalism as a counter strategy. From N. Carpentier, I.
Debruyne, E. Fraenkel, J. Lynch, J.P. Marthoz, E. Neefs, R.Ottosen, G. Terzis, M.
Thornton, and F. Voets. Media Representations of War and Conflict Workshop. Retrieved
from: http://www.warandmedia.org
Ottosen, R. (2005) The Norwegian media image of the war in Afghanistan: peacekeeping or
aggression? Conflcit and Communication, Nordicom Information Vol. 1 pp. 95-109.
Ottosen, R (1995) Enemy images and the journalistic process. Journal of Peace Research Vol. 32
(January) pp. 92-112.
Pew Institute. (2010). The new news landscape: rise of the Internet. Retrieved March 13, 2010
from http://pewresearch.org
Public Safety Canada (PSC) (2010). Currently listed entities. Retreived March 13, 2010
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca
187 Rainie, L., Fox, S., and Fallows, D. (2003). The Internet and the Iraq war: how online Americans
have used the Internet to learn war news, understand events, and promote their views. Pew
Internet & American Life Project. Retrieved from http://www.pewinternet.org
Rasmussen, A.F. (2010, May 24). The Taliban is hitting, but not winning. The New York Times and
International Herald Tribune. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int
Reuters. (2009). Insurgency in Afghanistan: Who are they? Retrieved May 23, 2010 from
http://www.reuters.com
Rogosa, D.. (1980). A critique of cross-lagged correlation. Psychological Bulletin Vol. 88(2)
(September) pp. 245 – 258.
Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: distortions in the attribution
process. In L.Berkowitz, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (pp. 173–220).
Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Sambrook, R. (2005). Citizen journalism and the BBC. Nieman Foundation for Journalism at
Harvard Reports (Winter 2005).
Sand, B. (2007, January 18). Islamabad denies Mullah Omar sheltered in Pakistan. Retrieved from:
http://www.globalsecurity.org
Sandel, G. N., Goethals, G. R., Ferrari, L. and Worth, L. T. (1989). Value-guided attributions:
maintaining the moral self-image and the diabolical enemy image. Journal of Social Issues
Vol. 45(2) pp. 91-118.
Shaver, K. G. (1983). An introduction to attribution processes. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Severin, W. J. and Tankard, J. W. (1992). Communication theories: origins, methods, and uses in
the mass media (3rd ed.). White Plains, NY: Longman Publishing Group.
188 Smith, G. (2010). Talking to the Taliban. The Globe and Mail. Retreived on June 25, 2010 from: http://theglobeandmail.com
The Strategic Council. (2006, March). Perceptions and views of Canadian Armed Forces troops in
Afghanistan. Toronto, Canada: Gregg, Kelly, Sullivan and Woolstencroft.
The Strategic Council. (2009, October). Most Important Issues Facing Canada Today: A Report to
the Globe and Mail and CTV. Toronto, Canada: Gregg, Kelly, Sullivan and Woolstencroft.
Sundar, S. (1999). Exploring receivers' criteria for perception of print and online news. Journalism
& Mass Communication Quarterly Vol. 76 (2) pp. 373-386.
Sundar, S. (1998). Effect of source attribution on perception of online news stories. Journalism &
Mass Communications Quarterly Vol. 75 (1) pp. 55-68.
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) The social identity theory of inter-group behaviour. In S.
Worchel and L.W. Austin, The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA:
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
Toronto Star. (2008, December 6). Canadian troops mark a tragic milestone. Retreived from
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/afghanmission/article/549499
Toronto Star. (2007, September 12). Canadians who died in 9/11 attack honoured. Retreived from
http://www.thestar.com
Travis, J. and Venable, J.R. (1998). An introduction to soft systems methodology. Retrieved 20
April 2007 from: http://royalroads.ca
Tremonti, A. M. (2010, June 2). The Current, Part 2: Kandahar - Interview with John Burns,
chief foreign correspondent for the New York Times. Retrieved from: http://www.cbc.ca
United Nations (UN). (2010, June 16). Security Council Report of the Secretary-General
pursuant to paragraph 40 of resolution 1917 (2010). Retreived from:
http://unama.unmissions.org
189 Veenhof, B. (2006). Are Internet users tuning out traditional media? Statistics Canada Innovation
Analysis Bulletin Vol. 8(3) (December) pp. 23-25.
Verma, S. (2010, May 14). Taliban bombings target Kandahar, NATO strategy. The Globe and
Mail. Retrieved from: http://www.theglobeandmail.com
Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC). (1998). Valour Remembered: Canadians in Korea – Outbreak of
War. Retreived from: http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca
Vogt, H. (2010, May 30). Taliban training in Iran: McChrystal says 'clear evidence' of inappropriate Iranian activity. The Huggington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com
Woods, A. (2010, April 25). Canada’s elite commandos and the invasion of Afghanistan. The
Toronto Star. Retrieved from http://www.thestar.com
World Bank. (2007). Data Finder: Internet users (per 100 people). Retrieved on November 21,
2009 from http://datafinder.worldbank.org
World Internet Project (WIP) (2009). World Internet Project Report highlights – 2009. Retrieved
from http://www.worldinternetproject.net
Wright, R. K. (1997). Enemy images in the United Nations-Iraq and East-West conflicts. In
R.Rieber, The Psychology of War and Peace: The Image of the Enemy (pp. 59-69). New
York, NY: Plenum Press.
Yoon, C. S. (1999). Impact on the media. In G.Bartagnon and Y.Courrier, World Communication
and Information Report 1999-2000 (pp. 93-103). Paris: United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Publishing House.
190 Zamaria, C. and Fletcher, F. (2008). Canada online! the Internet, media and emerging
technologies: uses, attitudes, trends and international comparisons. Toronto: Retrieved
from Canadian Internet Project website. Retrieved from: http://www.ciponline.ca
Zarwan, J. (2006). Newspaper trends and issues. Canadian Printer (April/May 2006) pp. 14.
Zur, O. (1991). The love of hating: the psychology of enmity.” History of European Ideas 13(4),
345-369.
Zunes, S. And Gershman, J. (2006, January 3). The U.S. invasion of Iraq: not the fault of Israel and
its supporters. Retrieved from Foreign Policy in Focus. Retrieved from: http://www.fpif.org
191 Appendix A: Content Analysis Protocol Sheet
(i) Reporting agency:
a. CBC
b. CTV
c. National Post
d. Other (if other, please include name of media agency)
(ii) Date:
a. DD-MMM-YY
Example: 14-JUN-08
(iii) Form:
a. Brief
Description: A short article typically used to communicate breaking news, typically not
exceeding three to five short paragraphs (200-300 words).
b. Report
Description: A detailed account of a news story that usually includes references to other
related and previously reported events; typically five to ten paragraphs (500-1000
words).
c. In depth analysis
Description: An in depth analysis of a particular issue (versus single event reporting)
that typically exceeds 1000 words. Analytical reports of this nature are usually found in
thematic sections of news websites dedicated to large news topics (See In Depth:
Afghanistan on CBC as an example).
192 d. Editorial style
Description: An opinionated article similar in style to newspaper editorials but in online
form that typically showcase the opinion and journalistic views in a narrative tone.
Editorial style articles are typically comparable in length to reports and in depth
analysis but tend to mirror web blogs in format and tone.
(iv) Appearance of enemy imagery
a. Are enemy images present in the article (y/n)?
Description: After an initial scan of the article, the coder should indicate whether or not
any enemy imagery is present. This brief tasks precedes the subsequent task of
distinguishing between situational and dispositional enemy imagery as per (iiv)
b. Who is the enemy?
Description: If there is a positive response to (a), the coder will indicate what terms are
used to describe the enemy. From a pre-test of Canadian Internet news reports, the
following examples are noted:
i. Taliban
ii. Insurgents
iii. Fighters
iv. Islamic fundamentalists, terrorists
v. Militants
vi. Anti-Government Forces
Note that the coder may encounter variants of two or more of the above terms (i.e. Islamic
militants or Taliban forces).
193 c. Use of visuals (y/n)
Description: If there is a positive response to (a), the coder will indicate if the article contains
visuals (static or video) of the enemy identified in (b) or conflict-related images related to
engagement with the enemy. Images that do not fall into one or both of the two descriptions
will not receive a positive response.
For illustrative purposes, the following examples of visuals and scores are provided:
i. Known Taliban personality - positive response
ii. Vehicle wreckage post IED strike - positive response
iii. Repatriation ceremonies of Canadian casualties - positive response
iv. Canadian Forces personnel on patrol - negative response
v. Afghan National Army in training - negative response
(v) Type of enemy imagery (situational s, dispositional d)
Description: Categorization and quantification of enemy imagery as per Ottosen’s
classification of system:
i. Situational: Concrete hostile actions described in plain factual form.
ii. Dispositional: Negative perceptions of a group suggesting the expectation of
aggressiveness and hostility.
The following examples of enemy imagery categorization are provided:
a. Insurgents ambushed a Canadian security patrol in the Zhari district using small arms
fire and rocket-propelled grenades – situational.
b. There is no end in sight to the surge of Taliban hostility over the holy month of
Ramadan and NATO forces are bracing for further attacks – dispositional.
194 c. Local villagers said they had been visited by Taliban fighters the night before who
threatened to punish them if they cooperated with coalition forces – situational.
d. Some insurgency experts predict that anti-government insurgents will continue to
harass and use cowardly tactics while waiting out the departure of foreign troops –
dispositional.
(vi) Enemy theme:
Description: Articles with multiple enemy images can present an enemy theme. The following
list of enemy themes was adapted from Sam Keen’s Faces of the Enemy:
a. Aggressor – Hostile, attacking, violent, destructive, provoking, antagonizing.
b. Oppressor – Threatening, discriminating, intimidating, dominating, source of worry,
totalitarian.
c. Worthy opponent – Daring, resourceful, calculating, strategic, effective.
d. Inhuman – Showing great cruelty and lack of humanity, not seeming to be human,
being described or compared to animals or insects.
e. Criminal – Engaging in illegal activities, profiting from narcotics, law breaking, wanted
for arrest by civil authorities, associated with crime and penitentiary.
f. Barbaric – Extremely cruel or brutal, uncivilized, unsophisticated.
g. Weak – Lacking in resources, defeated, an unworthy opponent, resorting to cowardly
tactics.
h. Stupid – Unintelligent, unsophisticated, moronic, asinine.
(vii) Internet media features:
a. Reader comments (y/n and quantification)
195 Description: Identification whether or not the online article accepts reader comments that are co-
located with the story for potential viewing by other readers. In addition to the yes/no
indication, the coder will quantify the amount of reader comments posted to date.
Example: reader comments – yes, quantity - 246
b. Embedded video
Description: Identification of embedded video co-located with the story for potential viewing by
readers. In addition to the yes/no indication, the coder will quantify the number of videos
available with the article.
Example: embedded video – yes, quantity - 2
c. Embedded audio
Description: Identification of embedded audio co-located with the story for potential viewing by
readers. In addition to the yes/no indication, the coder will quantify the number of audio files
available with the article.
Example: embedded audio – yes, quantity - 4
d. E-mail/sharing
Description: Identification of the ability of readers to share the article via the Internet with others,
typically by e-mail but also by other social media means (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, etc.)
Example: e-mail/sharing – yes
196 Appendix B: Panel cross-lagged correlation results Table B-5
Panel cross-lagged correlation results
D = Dispositional Imagery and S = Situational Imagery as percentage of total enemy imagery (* highlighted in Table 4-4) CLC-1* r = 0.82 CLC-2* r = -0.70 CLC-3 r = 0.29 CLC-4 r = -0.41 D(t1) Q1N (t2) D(t1) Q1P(t2) S (t1) Q1N (t2) S (t1) Q1P (t2) E1 3% 36 E1 3% 62 E1 81% 36 E1 81% 62 E2 5% 49 E2 5% 35 E2 94% 49 E2 94% 35 E3 5% 46 E3 5% 42 E3 100% 46 E3 100% 42 E4 17% 52 E4 17% 36 E4 76% 52 E4 76% 36 E5 22% 56 E5 22% 28 E5 98% 56 E5 98% 28
CLC-5 r = 0.24 CLC-6 r = -0.16 CLC-7* r = 0.51 CLC-8* r = -0.59 S (t1) Q2N (t2) S (t1) Q2P (t2) D (t1) Q2N (t2) D (t1) Q2P (t2) E1 81% 44 E1 81% 48 E1 3% 44 E1 3% 48 E2 94% 58 E2 94% 36 E2 5% 58 E2 5% 36 E3 100% 54 E3 100% 40 E3 5% 54 E3 5% 40 E4 76% 58 E4 76% 35 E4 17% 58 E4 17% 35 E5 98% 56 E5 98% 37 E5 22% 56 E5 22% 37
r = 0.50 r = -0.48 r = 0.19 r = -0.18 CLC-9 S (t2) Q2N (t1) CLC-10 S (t2) Q2P (t1) CLC-11 D (t2) Q2N (t1) CLC-12 D (t2) Q2P (t1) E1 81% 41 E1 81% 55 E1 3% 41 E1 3% 55 E2 94% 54 E2 94% 41 E2 5% 54 E2 5% 41 E3 100% 59 E3 100% 34 E3 5% 59 E3 5% 34 E4 76% 54 E4 76% 40 E4 17% 54 E4 17% 40 E5 98% 56 E5 98% 37 E5 22% 52 E5 22% 43
r = 0.63 r = -0.80 r = -0.36 r = -0.09 CLC-13* S (t2) Q1N (t1) CLC-14* S (t2) Q1P (t1) CLC-15 D (t2) Q1N (t1) CLC-16 D (t2) Q1P (t1) E1 81% no data E1 81% no data E1 3% no data E1 3% no data E2 94% 54 E2 94% 41 E2 5% 54 E2 5% 41 E3 100% 49 E3 100% 34 E3 5% 49 E3 5% 34 E4 76% 46 E4 76% 42 E4 17% 46 E4 17% 42 E5 98% 51 E5 98% 34 E5 22% 51 E5 22% 34
197 Appendix C: Problem space systems root definitions
System 1: Canadian Internet reporting on conflict in Afghanistan
Table C-6
System 1 inputs, outputs and perspectives
Inputs Potential Outputs Canadian Perspectives
Factual information Enemy Imagery In support of the war
Speculated information Perceptions Against of the war
False information Opinions Neutral towards the war
Table C-7
System 1 CATWOE working definition
Element Observation
Clients Canadians with varying perspectives and opinions towards the war in Afghanistan
Actors Canadian media agencies with online reporting platforms
Transformation Using information on events to create informative news items presented online that
may or may not have some effect on Canadian’s popular perception of the war
Worldview Canadian media’s representation of the conflict in Afghanistan to Canadians
Owner Canadian media
Environmental factors Journalistic ethics and due diligence, Availability of the Internet to potential
audiences and level of adoption
System 1 root definition:
The system of Canadian media agencies that use various reporting techniques to collect information on events in the conflict of Afghanistan, then produce informative online reports for consumption by Canadian audiences as constrained by standard journalistic principles and the availability of the Internet to potential audiences.
198 System 2: Online attribution of disposition to the Taliban
Table C-8
System 2 inputs, outputs, and perspectives
Inputs Potential Outputs Canadian Perspectives
Perceptions Dispositional attributions Taliban are the enemy
Judgements Situational attributions Taliban are not the enemy
Uncertain or neutral
Table C-9
System 2 CATWOE working definition
Element Observation
Clients Canadians with or without perspectives and opinions towards the Taliban who follow the
conflict online
Actors Online audiences and media organizations
Transformation Perceived information of suspected Taliban activity is used to formulate judgements of
Taliban intentions which ultimately lead to situational or dispositional attributions
Worldview The stages of attribution as described by Heider (1959) realized over the Internet
Owner Online audiences and media organizations
Environmental factors Tendency to assume all hostile activity is attributable to the Taliban, The ability to share and
comment on Internet news reports on the war quickly and virtually without limit over email,
sharing and social media
System 2 root definition:
The process of Canadian online audience perception of suspected Taliban actions, subsequent judgement of intent and attribution to situational or dispositional factors as potentially accelerated and amplified by Internet characteristics of interactivity, speed, and ubiquity.
199 System 3: Online enemy perception formation and hardening Table C-10
System 3 inputs, outputs, and perspectives
Inputs Potential Outputs Canadian Perspectives
Dispositional attributions Newly formed enemy perceptions Taliban are the enemy
Situational attributions Reinforced enemy perceptions Taliban are not the enemy
Uncertain or neutral
Table C-11
System 3 CATWOE working definition
Element Observation
Clients Canadians with perspectives and opinions towards the Taliban who follow the conflict online
Actors Primarily online audiences with some role played by media organizations (mostly an internal
process/system)
Transformation Integration of situational and dispositional attributions to potentially form new enemy
perceptions or to harden pre-existing enemy perceptions
Worldview The online process of enmification of the Taliban as driven by the underlying process of
attribution
Owner Primarily online audiences with ownership by media organizations (mostly an internal
process/system)
Environmental Recent events in the conflict timeline, duration of Canadian engagement and associated persistent factors exposure to enemy imagery, current Canadian attitudes towards the war
System 3 root definition:
The integration of attributions to potentially form new or reinforce existing enemy perceptions of the Taliban as affected by recent events presented online in the war and accumulation of enemy imagery exposure over time.
200