Conflict Prevention in the OSCE
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Conflict Prevention in the OSCE An Assessment of Capacities J. Cohen October 1999 NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ‘CLINGENDAEL’ CIP-Data Koninklijke bibliotheek, The Hague Cohen, J. Conflict Prevention in the OSCE. An Assessment of Capacities / J. Cohen – The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. Clingendael-Study ISBN 90-5031-73-7 Desk top publishing by Birgit Leiteritz Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael Clingendael 7 2597 VH The Hague Phonenumber 31 - 70 - 3245384 Telefax 31 - 70 - 3282002 P.O. Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.clingendael.nl The Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael is an indepen- dent institute for research, training and public information on international affairs. It publishes the results of its own research projects and the monthly ‘Internationale Spectator’ and offers a broad range of courses and conferences covering a wide variety of international issues. It also maintains a library and documentation centre. © Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo- copying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyrightholders. Clingendael Institute, P.O. Box 93080, 2509 AB The Hague, The Netherlands. Acknowledgements I would like to thank a number of people for generously giving time to be inter- viewed during the preparation of this study. These include diplomats and officials in The Hague, London and Vienna in February 1998. In particular I am grateful to Walter Kemp for his hospitality during my stay in Vienna. My former col- leagues at the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations in The Hague and in the office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, were generous with their insights and I learned a great deal during almost two years of collabor- ative work in 1996 and 1997. Finally, I am grateful to Klaas van Walraven, Clem McCartney and John Packer who all read earlier drafts of this study and made many constructive comments challenging me to improve the quality of the work. I remain responsible for all errors and mistakes contained in the text. 5 1 Introduction The Development of the OSCE: Practical and Conceptual Underpinnings Since its inception the OSCE1 has been an inter-governmental forum to promote security in Europe by eliminating barriers. The OSCE has been a process in which diplomatic practices and the rules of international political behaviour have evolved, creating a web of obligations and interdependencies among a wide range of states. Throughout its existence the prevention of conflicts has been a significant structural component and philosophical underpinning of the OSCE. The prevention of conflict was central to the Helsinki Final Act. The result of a diplomatic conference con- vened in Geneva and Helsinki between 1972 and 1) In this study I will generally refer to the OSCE, the name assumed in 1995 as a result of a decision at the Budapest Summit in December 1994. According to the Budapest Decisions, Chapter I, paragraph 29: ‘the change in name from CSCE to OSCE alters neither the character of our CSCE commitments nor the status of the CSCE and its institutions. In its organizational development, the CSCE will remain flexible and dynamic.’ Budapest Decisions, Strengthening the CSCE, in Arie Bloed, ed., The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Basic Documents, 1993-95, The Hague, 1997, p. 156. 7 1975, the Final Act established basic principles for behaviour among the partici- pating states and of governments towards their citizens. The principles were spelt out in the so-called ‘Decalogue’.2 Most importantly the process provided an agreed set of standards for countries from a politically, culturally and ideologi- cally heterogeneous region, which at the time was riven by the bi-polarity of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War impelled the OSCE participating states to rede- fine the focus of the OSCE, both as an inter-governmental process and with regard to the rules and procedures that had evolved to govern its operation. Conflict prevention in the bi-polar Cold War world was primarily concerned with the problems of an accidental or inadvertent war: a form of military diplo- macy focused on crisis prevention. The 1990 Charter of Paris3 marked the transition from the OSCE’s role as a forum for negotiation in this confronta- tional era to an organisation for security through cooperation and the promotion of democracy. The optimistic tone of the Charter, reflecting the 1989-90 politi- cal watershed in Europe, was rebuffed by subsequent events in Europe, which saw instability and violent conflict become the characteristic experiences of parts of Central and Eastern Europe. The disintegration of multinational states, political and economic transitions towards democracy and the market economy, social trauma experienced in the wake of these processes, and the reemergence of nationalism, all served to make Europe a less stable region than it was when subject to its Cold War straightjacket. In the early 1990s, and especially in view of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, it became clear that the apparatus at the disposal of the CSCE for preventing or resolving conflicts was inadequate. The need to develop a more sophisticated conflict prevention capacity necessitated a strengthening of the political instruments and organs of the CSCE and a reconsideration of the types of intervention that would be feasible. This was necessary to address conflicts arising in the wake of the disintegration of multinational states which were generally of an 2) The ten principles are: sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; refrain- ing from the threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of States; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and funda- mental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; co-operation among States; and fulfillment in good faith of obliga- tions under international law. See Final Act of Helsinki, 1 August 1975, in Arie Bloed, ed., The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993, Dordrecht, 1993, pp. 143-149. 3) Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21 November 1990, in A. Bloed, 1993, op.cit., pp. 537-566. 8 ethno-political character, occurring within states, involving unrecognised politi- cal entities. The international community had only limited scope for action in such cases. The Budapest Summit Meeting in 1994, cast the OSCE as ‘a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management’,4 with a ‘flexible and dynamic’ approach.5 New mechanisms, procedures and political instruments have been established to facilitate this role. The emphasis has shifted from the regulatory mechanisms of inter-state conflict, based on military secu- rity issues, to a preoccupation with those factors that generate conflicts within states.6 This shift has encompassed an attempt to respond more flexibly but also more effectively (than the various formalised mechanisms allowed) to conflicts. To this end ‘second generation’7 instruments, the High Commissioner on Na- tional Minorities and the missions of long duration, were created. Both are new forms of international intervention into potential conflict situations, and as such change the relationships between the states involved. Despite the enhanced focus on early warning, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy, these concepts are not clearly defined in OSCE docu- ments or by OSCE practitioners.8 Preference is given to distinctions between short and long term, and light and deep conflict prevention.9 The avoidance of precision in the OSCE’s usage of the concepts possibly emanates from the politi- cal nature of the organisation. Max van der Stoel has stated that early warning and conflict prevention are not abstract goals in themselves but are modes of operation that are dependent upon the behaviour of political actors and in the 4) Budapest Document 1994, Budapest, 6 December 1994, Budapest Summit Declaration, ‘To- wards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era’, paragraph 8, in A. Bloed, 1997, op.cit., p. 146. 5) Budapest Decisions, Strengthening the CSCE, Chapter I, paragraph 29, in A. Bloed, 1997, op.cit., p. 156. 6) Jeannie Grussendorf, ‘Theory, the OSCE and Social Change’ in Issues in Peace Research: Theory and Practice, L.-A Broadhead, ed., forthcoming 1998. 7) Berthold Meyer, ‘Dispute Settlement Procedures and Crisis Management’, pp. 53-81 in Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti and Allan Rosas, eds., The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, The Hague, 1997, p. 80. 8) See the discussion of the imprecision of the definitions in Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in the Political Practice of International Organizations, Clingendael, 1996, pp. 9-11. 9) Rob Zaagman, ‘Some Reflections on OSCE Conflict Prevention and the Code of Conduct’, pp. 29-39 in Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 7, 1996, No. 2, p. 30 and Keynote Speech by Max van der Stoel, to the CSCE Seminar on Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy, Warsaw, 19-21 January 1994, in CSCE/ODIHR Bulletin, Spring/Summer 1994, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 7-13. 9 OSCE context of the participating states themselves.10 Concepts have been used as markers to facilitate political action and it has served the purpose of the OSCE to make them vague and inclusive signals that would not inhibit action. This is mirrored in the general interpretation of the security risks and factors that the OSCE has assigned to the generation of conflicts. These factors are grouped together without priority being established, and distinctions regard- ing background conditions, structural factors and proximate causes of violence are absent.