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Home , Atlantic Wall, August 1942, Blondi, Dieppe Raid, Die Deutsche Wochenschau, Horst Boog

Canadian Military History

Volume 21 Issue 4 Article 2

2015

The German View of the

David Ian Hall

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Recommended Citation David Ian Hall "The German View of the August 1942." Canadian Military History 21, 4 (2015)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : The German View of the Dieppe Raid August 1942 The German View of the Dieppe Raid August 1942

David Ian Hall

ust before dawn on the morning Stacey, an historian in uniform on of 19 August 1942, a force of some Abstract: The ill-fated Dieppe Raid was the headquarters staff of Lieutenant- J a bitter and costly defeat for Canadian 6,000 soldiers and marines – mainly and Allied forces. Seventy years Andrew McNaughton, the Canadians but also slightly more than on the raid continues to command commander of a 1,000 British , 50 US both academic and popular interest. and the senior Canadian officer Rangers, and some Fighting French Contemporary commentators and in the , drafted troops – supported by 250 small some historians have argued that the explanations of the Dieppe raid for raid provided many useful lessons for naval craft and over 65 squadrons the successful landings the Canadian press. Within a fortnight of RAF fighters and light bombers in 1944. Very little, however, of the raid Stacey also completed attacked the French fishing port has been written about the German a lengthy official Canadian Army and casino town of Dieppe on the view of the raid. What did Hitler, the report justifying Dieppe as a vital , and the German people Normandy coast. Their aim was to learning experience.2 Later, in July think of the raid and its outcome? take and hold the German occupied How was it portrayed in the Nazi 1944, not long after the Normandy port for a day and then conduct an controlled media, and what impact landings, General Eisenhower orderly withdrawal. The amphibious did it have on German strategic wrote to Mountbatten and in his assault was planned and conducted thinking in the summer and autumn letter credited Dieppe with having of 1942? Drawing extensively on by Lord Mountbatten’s provided many useful lessons.3 contemporary German sources, this Combined Operations Headquarters, article demonstrates that the German The much lighter than expected and it was described as the largest view of the Dieppe raid differed Allied casualties on D-Day appear to raid ever attempted in history. It greatly from the more familiar Anglo- validate Eisenhower’s analysis. This was also the most costly in losses Canadian narrative. theme was expanded on in detail suffered. The Canadians lost 68 by Captain Stephen W. Roskill, the percent of their assault forces and and who was responsible. Relations author of the multi-volume official the British Commandos suffered 257 between Britain and her allies, most British history, The at Sea, 1939- casualties whilst the RAF lost 106 notably but also the United 1945. Roskill states that the Germans aircraft (the most lost in action on a States and the , were drew all the wrong lessons from single day during ) and the severely strained, and a historical Dieppe. By concentrating their anti- lost one destroyer and controversy began which to this day invasion defences on the main ports 33 of various types. continues to generate academic and along the Channel Coast, Roskill The overall casualty rate exceeded public interest. inferred, the Germans contributed 40 per cent, the highest in the war In an attempt to mitigate the greatly to the Allies’ successful for any major offensive involving the immediate bitterness and humiliation landings on the Normandy beaches.4 three services.1 The appalling nature of the disastrous undertaking, There is little if any evidence of the debacle led immediately to contemporary newspaper and radio to support Roskill’s hypothesis, searching questions and high level commentators as well as military particularly, in the German documents investigations in London and Ottawa analysts, and subsequently historians, and records of the Second World War. to determine what went wrong, why tried to see some good emerging In fact, very little has been written on the raid was such a costly failure, from the raid. Captain Charles Perry the German view of the Dieppe raid.

Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2015 21, Number 4, Autumn 2012, pp.3-15. 3 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 2

What did Hitler, the German General his Eastern Front generals) were Staff, and the German people think all affected by the sudden and of the raid and its outcome? How unexpected events of the Dieppe raid was Dieppe portrayed in the Nazi on 19 August 1942. Readily accessable controlled media, and what were the German primary sources, including consequences of the raid on German the Völkischer Beobachter (VB) 9 strategy in the summer of 1942? and other contemporary German These questions are the subject of newspapers, the Kriegstagebuch this article. des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (War Diary of the High Command Historiography and of the Armed Forces OKW), Die German sources Tagebücher von (Joseph Goebbels Diaries), Die Deutsche rian Loring Villa, the author of Wochenschau (The German Weekly BUnauthorized Action: Mountbatten News – newsreels played in German and the Dieppe Raid, lamented cinemas), and Hitler’s speeches, that “the literature on Dieppe is directives, proclamations, and nearly as extensive as that on the table talk, offer a rich history of the Normandy invasion—completely out interplay of these tensions and the of proportion to Dieppe’s military impact of the Dieppe raid on their importance.”5 He is certain that resolution by the autumn of 1942. had Dieppe been a success then it These sources also reveal that the would not have attracted the intense German reaction to and analysis of and enduring attention it has from the Dieppe raid is very different from generations of British and Canadian the more familiar Anglo-Canadian historians. The first book on Dieppe narrative. appeared less than five months after the raid and two more followed in Peterson is German, and he was a The threat of invasion quick succession in 1943. The three young boy living in when the and the , books were written by newspaper Dieppe raid took place in August – August 1942 journalists from Canada, the United 1942. His article focuses on three Kingdom, and the .6 days of intense coverage of the raid eginning in June 1941, with They were also privileged guests on in the Völkischer Beobachter, the official Bthe invasion of the Soviet the command ship during the raid, national newspaper of the Nazi Party. Union, Field Marshal Gerd von personally chosen by Mountbatten It is particularly revealing on the Rundstedt, commander-in-chief because they were “journalists who importance the Nazi media attached and from March were likely to turn out instant books.”7 to the personality of “the leader” in 1942 commander-in-chief in the Perhaps, then, because Dieppe was a conducting the war, hence the paper’s West, regularly voiced his concerns minor success for the Wehrmacht, biting criticisms of Churchill over the to Hitler over an Allied invasion in and because also lost strategic purpose and tactical failure the West.10 His warnings took on the war, the raid has not featured of the raid.8 This, however, is only a added importance with the failure of prominently in the German historical small part of the story, and it does in December narrative. Less understandable not deal with the larger tensions and led Hitler to order on 14 December is why the English language that existed in Germany during the the building of a new West Wall historiography has neglected the summer of 1942. Difficult decisions to defend the whole Atlantic coast. German side of the story despite over the allotment of increasingly These orders were followed in March some 70 years of detailed historical scarce resources, the perplexing 1942 with Führer Directive No.40, examination. Until now the only military complications thrown up which outlined the potential threat publication in English that examined by multiple and simultaneously of an invasion and the benefits to be the German perspective was Hans J. active theatres of operations, fears had from building strong defences Peterson’s article “The Dieppe Raid over wavering morale on the home to deter any “bold adventures.” in Contemporary German View,” front, and an increasingly fractious Hitler did not fear any serious risk which appeared in the American relationship between Hitler and of losing Western in 1942 but Review of Canadian Studies in 1983. his army generals (particularly he was concerned about Churchill’s https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/24 2 : The German View of the Dieppe Raid August 1942

were destroyed by German Field Marshal Gerd von fire which started Rundstedt, commander-in-chief immediately. German counter- in the West, regularly voiced his concerns to Hitler over an Allied measures continue according invasion in the West. to plan.13

rash unpredictability and the Initial German difficulty of dislodging an news coverage invasion force if it managed to secure a foothold. More ot until 2030 hours than 75 percent of Germany’s Non 19 August was the military power was committed first official statement on the to the war against the Soviet British cross-channel attack Union and Hitler wanted broadcast to the German to minimise any serious people. The news was diversions in the West that reported in a Sondermeldung had the potential to delay (special bulletin) issued by the victory in the East. Hitler’s High Command of the Armed concerns seemed justified in Forces (OKW). The OKW early when German bulletin outlined the enemy intelligence warned that an forces that took part, their main Anglo-American decision on objective to form a bridgehead where and when the “Second around Dieppe, and the heavy Front” would be launched was casualties they suffered in imminent. This information their failed invasion attempt. reinforced Hitler’s resolve The report was factual and to build an impregnable Holocaust Museum WKS #90475 States United reasonably accurate, and the fortress line along the entire casualty numbers reported Atlantic coastline facing were actually lower than Britain. On 2 and 13 August, those confirmed later. But Hitler chaired two conferences on rather than jubilation. Hitler was because it was a special report it the Atlantic Wall at his advanced visibly pleased with the response differed slightly from the usual military headquarters, named of the German garrison in Dieppe regular daily situation reports issued Wehrwolf, at Vinnitsa, in the Ukraine. but also with the fact that the raid by OKW and included an assessment Reich Minister , General appeared to confirm his strategic of the attack along with speculation Hermann Reinecke, and a number view of the war in 1942. Churchill on Churchill’s motivation to mount of other and military had tried an audacious attack and it it at the behest of a desperate Josef experts were in attendance.11 had been thwarted with speed and Stalin. The bulletin concluded with conviction.12 a comforting summary of the day’s Immediate German reaction The German people first learnt events for the German people: “The to the Dieppe Raid, about the raid through the Norwegian enemy has suffered a decisive defeat. 19 August 1942 German Radio Service on 19 August His attempt at invasion served only at 1200 hours central European time political purposes and was contrary itler and his staff were busy (CET). A short message stated that: to all military common sense.”14 Hgrappling with the day to day The editorial comment offered events of the Caucasus campaign the British in the early hours of this by OKW was deliberate for two when news of the Dieppe Raid morning made a landing on the reasons: it was intended to heap more reached Führerhauptquartier (FHQ) French channel coast supported by on Churchill and the British Wehrwolf. Vice-Admiral Theodore considerable numbers of air and with their allies, and it was good for Krancke, who was at the FHQ, noted naval forces. The British who have public morale in Germany. Hitler and that the mood was calm and relaxed, landed and tanks met hard most of the generals viewed Dieppe and that the predominant attitude and successful resistance of the as a hastily concocted raid to fulfil a was one of confident satisfaction German troops. Several British tanks promise to Stalin to open a second

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In the immediate aftermath of the failed raid German soldiers comb through the debris of the battle searching for intelligence.

front. Field Marshal , raid, that it was a rash action by the The successful German defence head of OKW, and General Kurt British in response to severe pressure at Dieppe dominated the Friday Zeitzler, chief of staff to Field Marshal from Stalin to open a Second Front. edition of the Völkischer Beobachter Rundstedt, however, took a more Goebbels spent much of the afternoon and the front pages of all the other serious view, that it was an invasion with Hitler finalising the main themes newspapers in .17 It that had failed. Was it an invasion or for the press releases in the next was also the first time that Germans a raid? Was it an invasion that took day’s papers, discussing a recent were able to read about the raid Combined Operations HQ nine or opera performance of Turandot in in their local and national papers. ten months to prepare (as reported , and walking in the forest The headline in the VB was Die in the British papers) and ended nine around the FHQ with Hitler and his vernichtende Abfuhr von Dieppe! (The hours later with the enemy assault Schäferhündin “Blondi.” His diary Scathing Rebuff at Dieppe!) and the forces thrown back into the sea, or entry for the day numbered some leading articles addressed the main was it a raid hastily concocted four 30 pages or roughly 15,000 words, themes that Hitler and Goebbels had or five days after Churchill had drifting between his delight at once decided on in Vinnitsa: Churchill’s visited Stalin in ? Both lines again being in the Führer’s company invasion catastrophe, Stalin’s were developed in the following and a scathing critique of Churchill’s displeasure with his western allies, days with each reinforcing the military and political leadership. He and the folly of the Second Front. The other as confirmation of Churchill’s was certain that Churchill’s decision VB continued with much the same desperation and stupidity.15 to attack Dieppe was sheer madness coverage over the weekend, deriding Early in the morning on 20 and idiocy but it was the payment British military incompetence and August, Joseph Goebbels flew from required from Stalin. He was equally praising the “excellent strategy of the Berlin to FHQ Wehrwolf to confer with certain that the calamity on the Führer to block a two front war by Hitler on the media line to be taken beaches at Dieppe had dealt a double winning the war with Russia while in response to Dieppe. Goebbels blow to Churchill and the British, maintaining strong defences in the recorded the day’s events in his diary, damaging the former’s standing as west.”18 Dieppe was proof, if any noting first the excellent mood in the a war leader and the latter’s claim to was needed, that the cost of opening Führerhauptquartier. He shared the be a capable and equal partner in the a Second Front was prohibitive and Führer’s general assessment of the alliance with the US and the USSR.16 in 1942 well beyond the military https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/26 4 : The German View of the Dieppe Raid August 1942

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Soon after the battle Goebbel’s propaganda ministry released a packet of photographs which were widely distributed to media outlets. Top – “On the beach at Dieppe!”; Middle – “After the battle!”; Bottom – “They landed in German captivity! They fought in vain.”

capabilities of the Americans and the British. Goebbels was pleased with the newspaper reporting on Canadian Forces photo PMR 86-277 photo Canadian Forces the Dieppe raid and even more so by the public reaction. He noted in his diary that the “German people were filled with enthusiasm by the success achieved in halting the English attack at Dieppe,” and that “they feel secure that the defences in the west are strong.”19 The weekend ended with the first screening of a newsreel that showed the results of the Dieppe raid. Images of shattered tanks and landing craft shrouded in the smoke of battle filled the screen. The beaches were littered with the debris of beaten and demoralised soldiers: hundreds of discarded helmets, rifles and other weapons, and a few remaining

Canadian Forces photo PMR 86-295 photo Canadian Forces bodies of the dead that had not yet been removed for burial. Goebbels further noted in his diary that the newsreel footage was “proof of the English plan of attack on Dieppe and the large plans of the British and Americans.”20 Of equal importance, it was visual proof of the totality of the German victory. The propaganda value of the raid had been enormous but Goebbels was not content to let the story end with nothing more than triumphant boasting of a battle fought and won. He had read British and American newspaper reports of the raid and noticed that, in addition to prematurely and falsely declaring the invasion an overwhelming

Canadian Forces photo PMR 86-298 photo Canadian Forces success, they ignored the significant contribution made by the Canadians. It was time, he thought, to shift the focus away from the military conduct to the political consequences of the raid.21

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of guests from Berlin including sense of defensive security; it has Dieppe and the German leading members of the party and shown us, above all, that the danger view of the strategic senior military officers. On the exists, but that we are in a position direction of the war in evening of 26 August, Grand Admiral to counter it.”24 Hitler and his guests August 1942 Raeder was his special dinner guest. ended the evening by watching Die Raeder was at the FHQ for one of Deutsche Wochenschau (the German he Monday edition of the the few Führer’s Naval Conferences weekly newsreel). Earlier, Hitler TVölkischer Beobachter began with that were held in the spring and telephoned Goebbels in Berlin to an attack on Churchill’s subservience summer of 1942. Hitler and Raeder congratulate him on the “good to Stalin and the recklessness of discussed “the urgent necessity to success” this weekly news conveyed his military strategy to appease his defeat Russia” and how this would and he also noted how the images of Soviet allies. Goebbels himself wrote give Germany strategic depth to fight, Dieppe were so devastating for the a lengthy article that continued over if necessary, a lengthy naval war prestige of the English. Goebbels told two pages of the paper numerating against the Anglo-Saxon sea powers the Führer that the recent newsreels the political rather than the military until and America could be were in high demand in neutral reasons behind Churchill’s decision brought to the point of discussing countries because of their accuracy to attack Dieppe and “the idiocy peace terms. The successful summer and objectivity, which was lacking of Churchill bowing and scraping U-boat campaign in the North in Allied press releases.25 Hitler was before the Bolsheviks.” Other articles Atlantic, the navy’s crucial support very satisfied. amplified the dangerous game being for the war in Russia, and its future The weekly newsreel of 26 played by the “Bolsheviks and the ship building objectives were also August 1942 was 19 minutes long. It plutocrats” and the unseemly neglect main items on the agenda.23 The day’s began with an eight minute feature of the Canadians who did the fighting conference was productive and good on the Dieppe raid, using a map and the dying but were ignored in the natured and the evening dinner was taken from a captured officer to British and American reporting of the relaxed and sociable. Hitler was in explain the British plan and execution invasion. These themes continued a talkative mood. He held forth on of the raid, the successful defence to find column space in the VB for a range of subjects including Stalin by the German coastal garrison, the rest of August but stories on the and the industrialisation of Russia, and ended with large columns of fighting on the Eastern Front grew in remedies for high blood pressure, Canadian prisoners being marched size and importance. On 23 August the Peace of Westphalia and modern off the beach and through Dieppe into the advanced echelons of the Sixth Germany, fidgety bureaucrats, and captivity. Throughout the film report Army reached the just north the Dieppe raid. “The most important the cameras provided a panorama of Stalingrad. Successful advances result of the Dieppe raid from our view of the beach front revealing by German forces in the Caucasus point of view,” he said, “is the a large number of destroyed tanks and in Egypt were also reported and immense fillip it has given to our and landing craft, and hundreds of often included a photo collage on page three showing cheerful troops on the march to their next objective well supported by armour, artillery, and air power. The message was clear – the war in the East was being won and the defences in the West were formidable enough to prevent the British and the Americans from opening a Second Front.22 The mood in FHQ Wehrwolf

was excellent throughout the rest of PMR 86-257 photo Canadian Forces August. Hitler entertained a number

Piles of helmets, ammunition and grenades collected after the raid are displayed by the Germans for propaganda purposes.

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discarded helmets, weapons, and Not surprisingly, Goebbels too the evacuation in 1940, were other equipment. Regardless of was pleased with the newsreel, cited as portents of the catastrophe whether it was a raid or an invasion especially the music.27 The shift from that befell the British and Canadians the film images could not be denied; the success at Dieppe to an impending at Dieppe. In two substantive it was an unmitigated disaster for the victory in Russia was also picked up articles all the main themes of the British and their Canadian allies who by the newspapers. Leading articles VB’s previous coverage on Dieppe provided the main body of troops in the Völkischer Beobachter reported were revisited: Churchill’s military for the attack. The next two features on the large number of Soviet aircraft naivety and strategic subservience to were very short scenes of the concrete and tanks that had been destroyed Stalin, the poor planning and tactical and large coastal guns and the thousands of prisoners who incompetence evinced in the execution that were part of the Atlantic Wall and were taken from an army that had lost of the invasion attempt, and English were followed by scenes of workmen its will to fight. TheVB reported 261 willingness to let Canadians die in from the German Labour Front and Soviet tanks destroyed in ten days of a fiasco. The British and American busy building bigger fighting and over 2,500 Soviet aircraft press brazenly and falsely claimed and better defences on the Channel destroyed since the end of July. this raid was a successful invasion coast. The newsreel ended with the There were numerous photo spreads, of France whilst contemptuously longest and most important story presented as always on page three, ignoring the significant Canadian of the week, the summer offensive visual proof of German success and contribution and sacrifice. Very little in southern Russia. This was the sacrifice in Russia and North Africa. new information was provided in key to winning the war and the film In an article recounting in detail the the Dieppe articles but there was showed happy and well fed German great tank battle and victory over the accurate and substantial detail on soldiers advancing deep into the at Kalatsch at the end of the full plan of the operation, the Caucasus – the Schwerpunkt of the July, it was noted that the Russians order of battle, intercepted radio campaign – routing the remaining were using women as infantry. This reports made by the landing forces forces of the Red Army. There was surely was a sign that the end was throughout the day, and the enemy’s very little narration throughout the near.28 losses. Extensive excerpts from newsreel. The viewer was left to Dieppe was a feature story for the OKW’s official and final report on make his or her own judgements on last time in the Sunday, 30 August Dieppe were also published, citing these extraordinary events based on edition of the Völkischer Beobachter. the main reasons for the attack’s the images viewed and the rousing The VB headline read: Das war failure – insufficient fire support, score of martial and patriotic music Churchills Invasionskatastrophe! (This failure to deploy airborne troops to that accompanied the film. It was was Churchill’s invasion catastrophe!) “hold the ring,” an overly detailed truly Wagnerian in scale and scope, Churchill’s failings and his personal plan and inflexible execution, and the and the uplifting images of the film responsibility for earlier military amateurish way the British waged attested to the imminent prospect of misadventures, such as the Gallipoli war. Other than the details provided, a great German victory.26 campaign in the First World War and OKW’s final report was not dissimilar to the special bulletin issued on 19 August, although it did caution that any future Anglo Saxon invasion, if one was attempted, would be “better and more robust and not necessarily at a port.”29 Dieppe was important to Hitler and the German people because it was proof that the “west wall” guaranteed the safety of Europe from an Anglo-American attack coming from the sea. The Wehrmacht was Canadian Forces photo PMR 86-320 photo Canadian Forces therefore free to concentrate its

Canadian prisoners are escorted away from the beach, Dieppe, 19 August 1942.

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maximum effort on defeating the Red Army and ending the war in the East. This was the theme that the Völkischer Beobachter as well as other German newspapers emphasised in a growing number of articles at the end of August and into . On 30 August, the VB reported that two Soviet attacks at Rzhev and Kaluga had collapsed with the Red Army suffering heavy losses. The war was just days away from reaching its third anniversary and despite a few challenges and testing moments the Wehrmacht had achieved a series of outstanding successes as two contrasting maps of Europe in 1939 and 1942 published in the VB clearly demonstrated. Again, the message to the VB’s German readers was clear – stay focused, continue to work diligently towards victory, and have faith in the Führer – this was the formula for protecting Germany from a two-front war and completing a historic victory.30 In addition to the newspapers, Goebbels also ensured that the weekly newsreels played their part in maintaining public morale and confidence in both the Führer extensive coverage from the culture ugust had been a wretched and the German war effort. After re- and music writers at the VB and in Amonth for the Allies but the watching on 31 August the 26 August all the other national and regional fortunes of war turned against Hitler newsreel that covered the Dieppe newspapers.32 and the Wehrmacht in September. raid and the offensive in southern August ended, however, with On the Eastern Front the combined Russia, the minister for propaganda Field Marshal , German-Finnish attack to cut the expressed his unreserved joy that it newly promoted after his triumph Murmansk railway and prepare conveyed the perfect sense of destiny at Tobruk in June, and the Afrika for the capture of Leningrad had of a German victory, just like in the Korps resuming the offensive in failed and by early September the film “Der Groβe König.”31 Egypt. From the start of the battle Russians had seized the initiative Optimism about a bright future everything went wrong. Rommel’s in the north. Army Group Centre was also conveyed in less serious forces lacked ammunition and fuel, was having a difficult summer, too, ways in the pages of the Völkischer the RAF maintained control of the suffering serious disturbance from Beobachter. On both 30 and 31 August air throughout the battle, and lacking heavy partisan activity in its rear there were a number of articles any element of surprise the combined areas.34 The summer offensive in covering the third round of the German-Italian offensive quickly the south was also not proceeding football cup final. The favourites ground to a halt on 2 September. according to plan. On 20 August to win the cup were Schalke 04 but Rommel informed the OKW that two Soviet armies launched a major it was München 1860 that stole the he was breaking off the attack and counterattack against the Italian headlines with a thumping 15:1 withdrawing from Alam el Halfa. Eighth Army near Serifimovich victory over SS-Straβburg. August By 5 September the battle was over on the Don River, delaying the was also the season for the Richard and the Axis forces were back at their German Sixth Army’s assault on Wagner festival in Bayreuth and starting positions.33 Stalingrad.35 In the Caucasus, Field the annual gala music festival in Marshal ’s Army Group Salzburg, both of which received September winds of change A fell considerably short of Hitler’s

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expectations. Maikop was taken in concerned with the wider strategic nor the weekly newsreels covered mid-August but the retreating Soviet aspects of the war whilst the army the high command crisis in early forces destroyed the oil refineries. high command increasingly focused September opting instead to publish Chronic shortages in ammunition on the tactical problems on the glowing accounts of victories in and fuel, a common problem for Eastern Front. Disagreements on the the west and on the Eastern Front. all German armies in the summer deployment of reserve forces and Goebbels was pleased with their and autumn of 1942, slowed Army overstretched military resources had efforts in raising German morale Group A’s advance to a crawl and soured relations between Hitler and but he was equally uneasy with the left the rich oil fields of and General Halder, chief of staff of the unrealistic expectations they created Baku agonizingly out of reach. On 1 Army, in August. The unexpected of an impending victory. It was September, List was summoned to and furious argument with Jodl, important, he noted in his diary on FHQ Wehrwolf to report in person on perhaps his most loyal and trusted 11 September, that “we must keep his lack of progress. List’s meeting general, changed Hitler’s relationship everything into perspective so as not with Hitler went reasonably well with the army for good. He no longer to fall into a trap.”40 Worrying signs considering the circumstances. Hitler trusted the generals to carry out of disillusionment with the war and restated Army Group A’s objectives his orders and his interaction with with Hitler’s leadership were already and expressed his willingness, “if them became more distant, painfully apparent, the most serious being the necessary to postpone the offensive formal, and as brief as possible. From Weiβe Rose student resistance group to next year if Baku was captured.” September to the end of the war in Munich. Munich was the capital of List flew back to his headquarters at Hilter’s military briefing conferences the Nazi movement, and the spiritual Stalino with renewed purpose and were recorded to prevent any further centre of Hitler’s power. Nonetheless, vigour. A few days later advanced misinterpretation of his orders. Hitler between June and , the forces of Army Group A entered also never appeared in the mess or Weiβe Rose published and distributed Novorossisk, a key port, but ate with his generals again. Hitler’s four highly critical leaflets in Munich they could not hold it against fanatical displeasure with his generals did not and other German cities, calling on Soviet resistence. Hitler’s patience end with his mere cessation of social fellow Germans to resist the Nazis was at an end and on 7 September interaction. On 9 September, List and work towards helping the Reich’s he despatched General , was dismissed and Hitler took over enemies win the war. Their activities chief of operations at OKW, to List’s command of Army Group A himself. were serious enough to warrant headquarters “to press once more Rumours of other senior command the attention of the Reichsführer SS for the advance to be speeded up.” changes spread like fire through .41 Jodl returned to FHQ Wehrwolf the the FHQ. Purportedly, Keitel was to Hilter flew to Berlin on 27 same night and made his report. He be relieved by Kesselring and Jodl September for a busy week of political told Hitler that List was adhering by Paulus, commander of the Sixth and public engagements.42 On 28 strictly to his instructions and that he Army. Halder too was told by Keitel September he spoke to 12,000 officer (Jodl) agreed with the field marshal’s on 9 September that he also would candidates and newly commissioned course of action. Hitler was furious shortly be replaced. In the end only officers in the army, navy, , and accused Jodl of siding with List Halder was relieved of his command. and Waffen SS. The German News and the army against him. Tensions On 24 September Hitler dismissed Bureau broadcast a brief summary of between Hitler and his generals had him without further promotion or his speech at the Berliner Sportpalast: escalated throughout August but they any other form of recognition. The reached boiling point in September. next day General Kurt Zeitler was In rousing words, the Führer afforded General , deputy appointed chief of staff of the Army.37 the young men an insight into the chief of operations at OKW, recorded After 7 September, Hitler accepted great history of Germany, which is in his memoir that Hitler’s rage the fact that the Eastern army needed being crowned in the mighty fateful with Jodl “produced a crisis which a rest and it would spend a second struggle of our days. After referring shook Supreme Headquarters to its winter in the east before resuming to the high duties that are imparted to foundations, the like of which was the decisive attack the following an officer as the head of the soldiers not to be seen [again] until the last spring.38 What exasperated Hitler was entrusted to him in the struggle, the months of the war.”36 a growing certainty that his generals Führer concluded his address by At issue was the conflicting were not telling him the truth and expressing his absolute certainty of opinions between Hitler and his that they were failing to conduct the victory and his unshakable trust in army generals over the course and campaign as he had ordered.39 Not the superior fighting qualities of the direction of the war. Hitler was surprisingly neither the newspapers German soldiers.43 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/212 10 : The German View of the Dieppe Raid August 1942

Hitler was still ruminating over effort in the east and concomitantly his show down with Halder and a victorious campaign in Russia the generals in his headquarters at was the best way of preventing an Vinnitsa in the Ukraine. He was invasion in the west. certain that the army’s tactical and Hitler returned to his FHQ in technical skills were not enough Vinnitsa on 4 October to oversee the to complete the difficult task of capture of Stalingrad and the final vanquishing the Russians. The army, phase of operations in the Caucasus and in particular the General Staff, before the winter break.49 Germany’s he believed, “must be inspired by autumn operations, however, did not the fervour of belief in National proceed according to Hitler’s grand Socialism.”44 The following day predictions so confidently made at Library and Archives Canada PA 130023 Canada PA Library and Archives Hitler met in secret with his western the end of September in the Berliner commanders, telling them that the Sportpalast. Instead, matters became next invasion attempt in the West progressively worse. On 23 October would rely far more on air power. He the British resumed the offensive in cautioned them not to be complacent: North Africa at El Alamein. Then on 8 “We must realise that we are not alone November the British and Americans in learning a lesson from Dieppe. The invaded French North Africa, landing British have also learned. We must in Morocco and Algeria in the first reckon with a totally different mode Hitler cautioned his generals in major combined Anglo-American of attack and at quite a different September: “We must realise that we operation of the war. Eleven days are not alone in learning a lesson from place.” Their continued vigilance Dieppe. The British have also learned. later the Soviets initiated Operation and the Atlantic Wall now had a vital We must reckon with a totally different Uranus, a strategic counter offensive role. He reassured them: “If nothing mode of attack and at quite a different aimed at destroying German forces happens in the next year, we have place.” in and around Stalingrad. The , won the war.”45 as Sir Arthur Bryant so eloquently On 30 September, Hitler was back listeners by telling them that they concluded at the end of the first at the Berliner Sportpalast giving a could look back and be content with volume of his history of the Second major speech at the Volk rally opening the last three years. He recounted the World War, had turned.50 the third Kriegswinterhilfswerk (Winter long list of substantial achievements Relief Appeal).46 It was a long speech and even the difficulties of the Conclusion covering the entire course of the war previous winter, which had been from the beginning to the ongoing overcome with calm determination here are many misconceptions operations in the west and the east. and led to reorganised and renewed Tabout what the Germans knew Hitler combined a glorification of efforts to complete a historic victory. about an invasion attempt in the ’s military achievements He concluded his speech by restating before the Dieppe raid and how they with a mocking, sarcastic attack current and future objectives. reacted to it afterwards. Most do not on Churchill and Roosevelt, First, Stalingrad would be taken, stand up to rigorous examination emphasising the idiocy of the recent completing the isolation of Moscow of the documentary evidence. Well invasion attempt at Dieppe, and by cutting the Russian capital off before August 1942, Hitler and the the unpredictability of the western from the Volga, the last arterial German High Command were aware allies, stating “you never know with route of strategic importance, and of the increasing threat of an invasion these lunitics and constant drunks thereby denying the Russians grain and they undertook specific measures what they will do next.”47 Then from the Ukraine and oil from the to address it from . he reassured his audience that the Caucasus. The armed forces would As this article has demonstrated, the German army would take Stalingrad then hold what they had attained Dieppe raid was a tactical, not an and that no matter when and where in the west and the Mediterranean operational or a strategic, surprise. Churchill decided to invade next until the following spring when It did not cause either Hitler or “he can consider himself fortunate if the offensive in the east would be the German High Command any he stays on land for nine hours!” – a resumed. Russia, he asserted, was undo panic. Russia was their main direct reference to the Wehrmacht’s the key to either victory or defeat. effort, both before and after the raid, recent success defending Dieppe.48 A strong defence in the west was throughout 1942. For clear political Hitler bolstered the morale of his essential to safeguarding the main and strategic reasons the raid was

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portrayed in the German media invasion in the west. Russia was the 9. The Völkischer Beobachter (VB) was the official national newspaper as a failed attempt at opening the key to both – victory and preventing of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Second Front. Hitler encouraged this a successful invasion. When D-Day Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP), the National approach even though he knew that finally came on 6 June 1944, Hitler Socialist German Workers’ Party, before 1933, and the major daily newspaper Dieppe was little more than a badly and the Germans had already, by of the Nazi regime until the collapse executed raid at a time when the Allies their own logic, lost the war. of the Third Reich in May 1945. Many were going through a severe military contemporary German newspapers published during the Second World and political crisis. The propaganda War have been digitised and are freely value of the raid was immense and Notes available online through the digital it was embraced wholeheartedly. newspaper archive provided by the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. See Goebbels used every facet of his . 1 T. Murray Hunter, Canada at Dieppe also Berliner Börsen Zeitung, Das Reich, state controlled media empire to (Ottawa: , Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter heap ridicule on the Western Allies 1982), pp.39-41; and Brian Loring Villa, Allgemeine Zeitung, Hamburger Anzeiger, Unauthorized Action. Mountbatten and the and the Köningsberger Allgemeine Zeitung for their military incompetence Dieppe Raid (Oxford: Oxford University for regional coverage of the Dieppe Raid and their abysmal failure to end Press, 1989), pp.1 and 7. For a detailed and its wider strategic importance. and personal account of the Dieppe Raid the isolation of the Soviet Union 10. Field Marshal see Denis and Shelagh Whitaker, Dieppe. responding to questions on the time as German forces continued their Tragedy to Triumph (London: Leo Cooper, and place of an Allied invasion in advance in southern Russia. The 1992). Air operations are examined the West asked by Sir Basil Liddell in detail in Norman L.R. Franks, The Hart. See B.H. Liddell Hart, The German Dieppe Raid also proved useful to Greatest Air Battle: Dieppe, 19th August Generals Talk (: Harper-Collins Hitler and the Nazis in their efforts to 1942 (London: Kimber, 1979) and the Publishers Inc., Perennial edition 2002. bolster public support for the war and role of intelligence is expertly addressed First published in 1948), p.229. in John P. Campbell, Dieppe Revisited. A 11. See H.R. Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s War strengthen morale on the home front. Documentary Investigation (London: Frank Directives 1939-1945 (London: Sidgwick German newspapers, specifically the Cass, 1993). and Jackson, 1964), pp.110-116; David M. Völkischer Beobachter, and newsreels 2. The National Archives, Kew, United Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Kingdom [TNA], PREM 3/256 Prime Clashed. How the Red Army Stopped Hitler hailed the Führer’s strategic brilliance Minister’s Private Office Operations (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press in avoiding a two-front war whilst Papers, Jubilee Operation, August of Kansas, 1995), p.148; , the bulk of the German armed forces 1942-; TNA, DEFE 2/551 Hitler’s Table Talk 1941-1944. His Private Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid, Conversations. Introduction and Preface strained every sinu to complete 1942; Villa, Unauthorized Action, pp.17-18; by H.R. Trevor-Roper, translated by their historic mission in Russia. Less C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945. Norman Cameron and R H Stevens (New An Official Historical Summary obvious at first was how the raid (Ottawa: York: Enigma Books, 2000), pp.624-626; The King’s Printer, 1948), p.86. For a and David Irving, Hitler’s War (London: and the Nazi interpretation of it scholarly assessment of contemporary Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1977), exacerbated the differences between coverage of the Dieppe raid in the pp.407-8. Canadian Press see Timothy Balzer, “‘In Hitler and some of his Eastern Front 12. Horst Boog, , Reinhard Case the Raid Is Unsuccessful …’ Selling Stumpf, and , Germany and generals, most notably Halder, over Dieppe to Canadians,” The Canadian the Second World War Vol.VI. The Global the course and direction of the war. Historical Review 87, no.3 (September War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 2006), pp.409-430. pp.439-441; and David Irving, Hitler’s The ongoing pressures in concluding 3. Villa, Unauthorized Action , p.17. War, fn, p.409—Dieppe debacle, p.860. the campaign at Stalingrad and in 4. Captain S.W. Roskill, The 1939- 13. TNA, DEFE 2/329 Jubilee Operation, the Caucasus led eventually to a 1945, vol.II. The Period of Balance (London: Part IV–German Propaganda 1942-1943, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956) German Broadcast Reports on the Dieppe complete breakdown between Hitler p.250. Raid, 19 August–12.00 hrs. and his generals in September 1942. 5. Villa, Unauthorized Action, p.18. 14. Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der The generals demanded more men 6. Mountbatten’s “three chosen journalists” Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab) were A.B. Austin, British correspondent Band II: 1.Januar 1942-31. Dezember 1942. and more resources at a time when of the London Daily Herald; Wallace Erster Halbband und Zweiter Halbband, resources were limited and strategic Reyburn, Canadian correspondent of the Zusammengestellt und erläutert von pressure on a number of fronts – the Standard; and Quentin Reynolds, Andreas Hillgruber (Frankfurt am Main: American . See: A.B. Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, , the air war, Austin, We Landed at Dawn (London: 1963), 1 Vol., A, pp.127-128. All German the Mediterranean, and the defence Victor Gollancz, 1943); Wallace Reyburn, translations have been made by the Rehearsal for Invasion: an eyewitness story of the West – all demanded Hitler’s author unless otherwise noted. of the Dieppe Raid (London: Harrap, 1943): 15. General Günther Blumentritt responding attention and more of the Nazi and Quentin Reynolds, Dress Rehearsal: to questions on the German reaction to the war machine’s severely stretched the Story of Dieppe (London: Angus & Dieppe Raid asked by Basil Liddell Hart. Robertson, 1943). See Liddell Hart, The German Generals resources. Most importantly, the 7. Villa, Unauthorized Action, p.23. Talk, p.229; TNA, DEFE 2/329 Jubilee Dieppe raid did not alter German 8. Hans J. Peterson, “The Dieppe Raid in Operation, Part IV–German Propaganda strategic thinking about the conduct Contemporary German View,” American 1942-1943, Main themes of German Review of Canadian Studies 13, no.1, pp.65-78. broadcasts and print media, 20-30 August of the war or defence against an

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1942; and Horst Boog, et al., Germany and on 3 at the Ufa-Palast am the White Rose (New York: Little Brown the Second World War, vol.VI, p.441. Zoo in Berlin and cost a staggering RM and Co., 1986); and Frank McDonough, 16. Joseph Goebbels, Die Tagebücher von 4,779,000 to make at a time when the Sophie Scholl. The Real Story of the Woman Joseph Goebbels, edited by Elke Fröhlich entire German film industry made an Who Defied Hitler (Stroud, Gloucester: The and published on behalf of the Institute annual net profit of between RM 50 and History Press, 2009). für Zeitgeschichte (München: K G Saur, 80 million. This part historical and part 42. Franz W. Seidler and Dieter Zeigert, 1993-2008). Tiel II: Diktate 1941-1945 Band propaganda film portrayed Frederich II Hitler’s Secret Headquarters: The Führer’s 5: Juli-September 1942, edited by Angela as an early example of a great dictator, Wartime Bases, from the Invasion of France Stüber (1995), Entry for 20 August 1942, focusing on his heroic struggle and how to the Berlin Bunker (London: Greenhill pp.344-373. through his genius and strength of will Books, 2004), p.120. 17. Völkischer Beobachter, Norddeutsche he turned defeat into victory during the 43. Max Domarus, The Complete Hitler: A Ausgabe, Berlin [VB], Freitag, 21 August Seven Years War after dismissing his Digital Desktop Reference to His Speeches 1942, pp.1-2. In addition to the VB see incompetent generals and taking personal and Proclamations 1932-1945, vol.IV the Berliner Börsen Zeitung, Das Reich, command of the army. The comparison 1941-1945 (Wauconda, Illinoi: Bolchazy- Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter between Frederich and Hitler was both Carducci Publishers, Inc. 2007), pp.2670-1. Allgemeine Zeitung, Hamburger Anzeiger, deliberate and obvious. Goebbels was 44. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, and the Köningsberger Allgemeine Zeitung, delighted that Hitler’s generals did not p.258; W. Erfurth, Geschichte des Deutschen 21 August 1942. like the film and that they were ‘aware of Generalstabs (Göttingen, Musterschmidt 18. VB, Sonntag, 23 August 1942, leading the sharp criticism made in the film of the Verlag, 1957), p.281; and A Heusinger, article by von Wilhelm Weiβ, Zum Kapitel general’s defeatism.’ For a detailed plot Befehl in Widerstreit (Tübingen and “Zwei-Fronten-Kreig,” pp.1-2. summary and the political context of the Stuttgart: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag 19. Goebbels, Die Tagebücher von Joseph film in the Third Reich see Rolf Giesen, Hermann Leins, 1950), p.210. Goebbels, 21 August 1942, pp.376-377; 22 Nazi Propaganda Films. A History and 45. National Archives and Records August 1942, pp.381-382; and 27 August Fimlography (Jefferson, North Carolina: Administration, Washington, DC. 1942, pp.407-408. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, [NARA] Microfilm Series T – Records of 20. Goebbels, Die Tagebücher von Joseph 2003) pp.143-150, 198-199. German Field Command Armies. Record Goebbels, 23 August 1942, p.391. 32. VB, Sonntag 30 August 1942, pp.5 & 8; of Hitler’s secret speech to Western 21. Goebbels, Die Tagebücher von Joseph and Montag 31 August 1942, p.4; for Commanders, 29 September 1942, First Goebbels, 23 August 1942, pp.386-388. regional coverage of the 1942 Bayreuther Army War Diary, Annexes T312/23/9706 22. VB, Montag 24 August 1942, pp.1-2. Kriegsfestspiele see the Bayreuther et. seq. (Microcopy T312/Roll 23/Pages 23. Brassey’s Naval Annual, Führer Nachrichten, 8-16 July 1942; and for the 9706 onwards) as cited in David Irving, Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939-1945, Salzburg Festival see the Berchtesgadener Hitler’s War, pp.410 & 860. trans. Anthony Martienssen (London: Anzeiger and the Salzburger Volksblatt, 5-30 46. Adolf Hitler’s “Meine deutschen Greenhill Books, 1990), pp.288-293. August 1942. Volksgenossen und –genossinnen” speech 24. Hitler, Table Talk, 26 August 1942, p.663. 33. I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean at the Berliner Sportpalast, 30 . Goebbels, Die Tagebücher von Joseph and Middle East, vol.III. September 1942. For the full text of this speech see Goebbels, 25 August 1942, p.399; See also 1941-September 1942: British Fortunes Reach Domarus, The Complete Hitler, vol.IV, TNA, DEFE 2/329 German Propaganada their Lowest Ebb (London: Her Majexty’s pp.2672-2685. – “The British Defeat at Dieppe,” Reports Stationery Office, 1960), p.388; Walter 47. Domarus, The Complete Hitler, vol.IV, from comparing German and Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters p.2674. Allied newspaper coverage of the war. 1939-45 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 48. Ibid. 26. Die Deutsche Wochenschau, Mittwoch, 26 Ltd., 1964), pp.252-253; and , 49. Seidler and Zeigert, Hitler’s Secret August 1942. Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (London: Headquarters, p.120. 27. Goebbels, Die Tagebücher von Joseph Penguin Books, 2000), pp.534-535. 50. Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide 1939- Goebbels, 27 August 1942, p.409. 34. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1943: based on the War Diaries of Field 28. VB, Dienstag 25 August 1942, pp.1-3; pp.253-255. Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke (London: Mittwoch, 26 August 1942, pp.1-3, in 35. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, Collins, 1957). particular see article by Dr. Wilhelm pp.121-122. Koppen, “Der Kaukasus und Europa,” (in 36. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, which he explains why this is the decisive p.256. See also Kershaw, Hitler, pp.531-4. campaign of the war); and Donnerstag, 37. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 27 August 1942, pp.1-2. It was the Red pp.257-259. Army’s crushing defeat at Kalatsch that 38. Horst Boog, et al., Germany and the Second led Josef Stalin to issue his famous Stavka World War Vol.VI, p.1056. Order No.227, “Not one step back,” on 28 39. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, July 1942, see Horst Boog, et al, Germany p.252; and fn.14 (Lieutenant-Colonel David Hall is a Senior Lecturer in the and the Second World War, vol.VI, pp.1022- Scherff’s War Diary, 31 May and 3 June Defence Studies Department, King’s 1025; and Glantz and House, When Titans 1942), p.616. College London, based at the Joint Clashed, p.121. 40. Goebbels, Die Tagebücher von Joseph Services Command and Staff College, 29. VB, Sonntag, 30 August 1942, pp.1-2. Goebbels, 11 September 1942, p.478. Shrivenham, United Kingdom. He 30. VB, Sonntag, 30 August 1942, pp.2-3: 41. For the importance and impact of the has a D.Phil. in modern history from see also Das Reich, Deutsche Allgemeine Weiβe Rose in the summer and autumn the University of Oxford, and he has Zeitung, and the Köningsberger Allgemeine of 1942 see Ulrich Chaussy, Christiane published on a number of air power and Zeitung, 27-30 August 1942. Moll, Britta Müller-Baltschun, and Franz Second World War topics in Canada, the 31. Goebbels, Die Tagebücher von Joseph Josef Müller in co-operation with Inge UK, and the USA. His current research Goebbels, 31 August 1942, p.426. The Aicher-Scholl, Die Weiβe Rose (München: is on “Hitler and Wagner: Nationalism, German film Der Groβe König (The Great Weiβe Rose Stiftung, 2006). See also Romanticism, and the short march to King), directed by Veit Harlan and Inge Scholl, The White Rose. Munich war from the Meistersingers’ Meadow,” a starring Otto Gebühr (Frederich II), 1942-1943 (Middletown, Connecticut: study of the Bayreuth Festival during the Kristina Söderbaum, and Gustav Fröhlich, Wesleyan University Press, 1983); Third Reich, which has been generously was an epic biography of Frederick the Annette Dumbach and Jud Newborn, funded by the British Academy. Great, Prussia’s Great King. It premiered Shattering the German Night: The Story of

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