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The German View of the Dieppe Raid August 1942 Canadian Military History Volume 21 Issue 4 Article 2 2015 The German View of the Dieppe Raid August 1942 David Ian Hall Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation David Ian Hall "The German View of the Dieppe Raid August 1942." Canadian Military History 21, 4 (2015) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : The German View of the Dieppe Raid August 1942 The German View of the Dieppe Raid August 1942 David Ian Hall ust before dawn on the morning Stacey, an historian in uniform on of 19 August 1942, a force of some Abstract: The ill-fated Dieppe Raid was the headquarters staff of Lieutenant- J a bitter and costly defeat for Canadian 6,000 soldiers and marines – mainly and Allied forces. Seventy years General Andrew McNaughton, the Canadians but also slightly more than on the raid continues to command commander of First Canadian Army a 1,000 British Commandos, 50 US both academic and popular interest. and the senior Canadian officer Rangers, and some Fighting French Contemporary commentators and in the United Kingdom, drafted troops – supported by 250 small some historians have argued that the explanations of the Dieppe raid for raid provided many useful lessons for naval craft and over 65 squadrons the successful Normandy landings the Canadian press. Within a fortnight of RAF fighters and light bombers in June 1944. Very little, however, of the raid Stacey also completed attacked the French fishing port has been written about the German a lengthy official Canadian Army and casino town of Dieppe on the view of the raid. What did Hitler, the report justifying Dieppe as a vital Wehrmacht, and the German people Normandy coast. Their aim was to learning experience.2 Later, in July think of the raid and its outcome? take and hold the German occupied How was it portrayed in the Nazi 1944, not long after the Normandy port for a day and then conduct an controlled media, and what impact landings, General Eisenhower orderly withdrawal. The amphibious did it have on German strategic wrote to Mountbatten and in his assault was planned and conducted thinking in the summer and autumn letter credited Dieppe with having of 1942? Drawing extensively on by Admiral Lord Mountbatten’s provided many useful lessons.3 contemporary German sources, this Combined Operations Headquarters, article demonstrates that the German The much lighter than expected and it was described as the largest view of the Dieppe raid differed Allied casualties on D-Day appear to raid ever attempted in history. It greatly from the more familiar Anglo- validate Eisenhower’s analysis. This was also the most costly in losses Canadian narrative. theme was expanded on in detail suffered. The Canadians lost 68 by Captain Stephen W. Roskill, the percent of their assault forces and and who was responsible. Relations author of the multi-volume official the British Commandos suffered 257 between Britain and her allies, most British history, The War at Sea, 1939- casualties whilst the RAF lost 106 notably Canada but also the United 1945. Roskill states that the Germans aircraft (the most lost in action on a States and the Soviet Union, were drew all the wrong lessons from single day during the war) and the severely strained, and a historical Dieppe. By concentrating their anti- Royal Navy lost one destroyer and controversy began which to this day invasion defences on the main ports 33 landing craft of various types. continues to generate academic and along the Channel Coast, Roskill The overall casualty rate exceeded public interest. inferred, the Germans contributed 40 per cent, the highest in the war In an attempt to mitigate the greatly to the Allies’ successful for any major offensive involving the immediate bitterness and humiliation landings on the Normandy beaches.4 three services.1 The appalling nature of the disastrous undertaking, There is little if any evidence of the debacle led immediately to contemporary newspaper and radio to support Roskill’s hypothesis, searching questions and high level commentators as well as military particularly, in the German documents investigations in London and Ottawa analysts, and subsequently historians, and records of the Second World War. to determine what went wrong, why tried to see some good emerging In fact, very little has been written on the raid was such a costly failure, from the raid. Captain Charles Perry the German view of the Dieppe raid. Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2015 21, Number 4, Autumn 2012, pp.3-15. 3 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 2 What did Hitler, the German General his Eastern Front generals) were Staff, and the German people think all affected by the sudden and of the raid and its outcome? How unexpected events of the Dieppe raid was Dieppe portrayed in the Nazi on 19 August 1942. Readily accessable controlled media, and what were the German primary sources, including consequences of the raid on German the Völkischer Beobachter (VB) 9 strategy in the summer of 1942? and other contemporary German These questions are the subject of newspapers, the Kriegstagebuch this article. des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (War Diary of the High Command Historiography and of the Armed Forces OKW), Die German sources Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels (Joseph Goebbels Diaries), Die Deutsche rian Loring Villa, the author of Wochenschau (The German Weekly BUnauthorized Action: Mountbatten News – newsreels played in German and the Dieppe Raid, lamented cinemas), and Hitler’s speeches, that “the literature on Dieppe is directives, proclamations, and nearly as extensive as that on the table talk, offer a rich history of the Normandy invasion—completely out interplay of these tensions and the of proportion to Dieppe’s military impact of the Dieppe raid on their importance.”5 He is certain that resolution by the autumn of 1942. had Dieppe been a success then it These sources also reveal that the would not have attracted the intense German reaction to and analysis of and enduring attention it has from the Dieppe raid is very different from generations of British and Canadian the more familiar Anglo-Canadian historians. The first book on Dieppe narrative. appeared less than five months after the raid and two more followed in Peterson is German, and he was a The threat of invasion quick succession in 1943. The three young boy living in Berlin when the and the Atlantic Wall, books were written by newspaper Dieppe raid took place in August June 1941 – August 1942 journalists from Canada, the United 1942. His article focuses on three Kingdom, and the United States.6 days of intense coverage of the raid eginning in June 1941, with They were also privileged guests on in the Völkischer Beobachter, the official Bthe invasion of the Soviet the command ship during the raid, national newspaper of the Nazi Party. Union, Field Marshal Gerd von personally chosen by Mountbatten It is particularly revealing on the Rundstedt, commander-in-chief because they were “journalists who importance the Nazi media attached Army Group South and from March were likely to turn out instant books.”7 to the personality of “the leader” in 1942 commander-in-chief in the Perhaps, then, because Dieppe was a conducting the war, hence the paper’s West, regularly voiced his concerns minor success for the Wehrmacht, biting criticisms of Churchill over the to Hitler over an Allied invasion in and because Germany also lost strategic purpose and tactical failure the West.10 His warnings took on the war, the raid has not featured of the raid.8 This, however, is only a added importance with the failure of prominently in the German historical small part of the story, and it does Operation Barbarossa in December narrative. Less understandable not deal with the larger tensions and led Hitler to order on 14 December is why the English language that existed in Germany during the the building of a new West Wall historiography has neglected the summer of 1942. Difficult decisions to defend the whole Atlantic coast. German side of the story despite over the allotment of increasingly These orders were followed in March some 70 years of detailed historical scarce resources, the perplexing 1942 with Führer Directive No.40, examination. Until now the only military complications thrown up which outlined the potential threat publication in English that examined by multiple and simultaneously of an invasion and the benefits to be the German perspective was Hans J. active theatres of operations, fears had from building strong defences Peterson’s article “The Dieppe Raid over wavering morale on the home to deter any “bold adventures.” in Contemporary German View,” front, and an increasingly fractious Hitler did not fear any serious risk which appeared in the American relationship between Hitler and of losing Western Europe in 1942 but Review of Canadian Studies in 1983. his army generals (particularly he was concerned about Churchill’s https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/24 2 : The German View of the Dieppe Raid August 1942 were destroyed by German Field Marshal Gerd von artillery fire which started Rundstedt, commander-in-chief immediately. German counter- in the West, regularly voiced his concerns to Hitler over an Allied measures continue according invasion in the West. to plan.13 rash unpredictability and the Initial German difficulty of dislodging an news coverage invasion force if it managed to secure a foothold.
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