JOURNAL

Spring 1990 Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Sidney J. Wise

Editor Col Keith W. Geiger

Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Dorothy M. McCluskie. Production Manager Steven C. Garst, Art Director and Illustrator

The Airpower journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think­ ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If repro­ duced, the Airpower journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL STRING 1990, Vol. IV, No. I AFRP 50 -2

Editorial 2 How to Get Promoted \laj Gen Dale O. Smith, USAF, Retired 4 Battlefield Air Support: A Retrospective Assessment Dr Richard P. Hallion 8

The US Air Force In Korea: Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air Power Maj Roger F. Kropf, USAF 3 0 A Kind of Deja Vu: Some Historical Perspectives on Cruise Missile Defense Capt George W. Cully, USAF 4 7 Air and Space Forces: The One Endures as the Other Emerges Harry F. Noyes III 6 2

Ricochets 3 Letters Net Assessment 7 3 Reviews of Current Literature Notams 8 7 Notices of Interest Contributors 88 EDITORIAL

rations. Now we must rethink the threat. Now That We’ve Won We must not become mired in a doctrine, a strategy, or an organizational structure that World War III has been overcome by world events. The potential removal of a threat in Europe does not mean that there are no other threats in ecent events in Eastern Europe have the world. It does mean that we must con created a strange possibility: World War sider what those threats are and how we 111 may be over! For the American military can best prepare for them. We must be R open-minded as we rethink the threat—and the changes in Europe have created two challenges: how to handle the changing we must use the best minds available. Soviet threat and how to deal with other The questions that we must answer are threats in the world around us. Within numerous. They must have honest answers. these two challenges lies an important Those answers must be given without re point to remember—world peace has not gard to sacred cows or “gold w-atches.” We suddenly broken out. cannot afford to develop a horse-cavalry Our first challenge is to remember that mentality, more concerned with preserving the Warsaw Pact military threat still exists. traditional turf than preparing for the fu Walls that are torn down rapidly can be ture. We must begin by asking the most rebuilt just as rapidly. The civilian world basic questions and building from the hears the peaceful rhetoric and assumes answers. The Air Corps pioneers were con that actions will automatically follow. The sidered to be among the most innovative military cannot afford to be that optimistic. and forward-looking of military officers— The threat in Europe appears to have sig visionaries who prepared for the future nificantly diminished in recent months. without being tied to the past. We need to But we must remember that the MiGs are approach our present situation with that still ready to fly and the tanks are still same positive and open type of thinking. pointed west. Their numbers have not yet Insurgency warfare, drug interdiction, diminished. increased airlift requirements, and many While we remain vigilant, we cannot more issues face us. We cannot simply afford to hide our heads in the sand. We force our traditional thinking on these new face very real changes in the future, and we issues. The role of space, of unmanned air must prepare to deal with them. Virtually vehicles, and of joint operations must not all of us‘serving in the military today, from be looked upon as threats to the Air Force the newest airman basic to our most senior but as opportunities to do our job more general officers, have lived with the Soviet efficiently. The way we answer these ques threat our entire lives, certainly our entire tions will determine how capable our mil adult lives. It has been a fact of life for itary is to face the challenges in the years to the last 40 years that the main threat was come. war with the Soviets in Europe. We based Throughout it all. the job of the Air Force our military planning and our operational remains to fly and to fight. But we must structure around it. The concern over the prepare now for the next war, not the last next European war dominated our thinking one. As Gen Sir Archibald Wavell reminds during the Korean War. It caused us to view us, "The ideal officer should be afraid of both the Korean and Vietnam wars as aber nothing, not even a new idea." MAK

2 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre equipment. There was a short delay, and I had spondence should be addressed to the Editor. some time to talk with him. I learned several Airpower Journal. Walker Hall. Maxwell AFB things. This “soldier” was not issued a helmet, AL 36112-5532. We r e s e r v e the right to edit the web belt, ammo pouch, canteen, or first aid material for overall length. pouch. He was not assigned a personal weapon and fired one only once a year, if at all. He knew nothing of even the most basic infantry tactics. He expected the SPs and the Army to defend AIR BASE DEFENSE PROBLEMS him. Worse than that, having lifted us and I recently read with interest an article in the Fall our equipment and being on an 8-to-5 work 1989 Airpower Journal entitled "To Protect an schedule, he decided that the job was finished Air Base" by Brig Gen Raymond E. Bell. Jr. It whether we were done or not. So he departed, caused me to reflect upon my recent experiences leaving us stuck 30 feet in the air! My impres in Panama during Operation Nimrod Dancer. I sion of most personnel I met (excluding forward deployed in May 1989 attached to Delta Com air controllers and pilots) was that they were pany. 1st Battalion. 61st Infantry (Mech.)—part technicians in uniform and not real soldiers. of the 5th Infantry Division (Mech.) at Fort Polk. My belief is that the Air Force is paying lip Louisiana. I would like to share my impressions service to base defense and is really expecting of air base defense that I gained there. the Army to take on this unglamorous mission. The Air Force is not serious about air base It is giving only paltry resources to those forces defense. Admittedly, the Air Force's primary it must have. Most Air Force personnel I met interest is in aircraft. However, it seems that if were highly intelligent, motivated, and capable some attention is not paid to base defense, there people, but when it came to base defense, we will be no aircraft to sortie. We received occa thought of them as prima donna fly-boys who sional visits from a high-ranking Air Force of were unwilling to stoop to this work and ex ficer who seemed to spend most of his time pected the lowly Army to do it for them. complaining about how our Ml 13 armored per It is obvious that the interests of the Air Force sonnel carriers were tearing up the grass. He did are and should be centered on aircraft. The not seem very interested in our defensive dispo article quite rightly stated that the air wing sitions. commander's mission is to generate as many The Security Police (SP) are impressive. I sorties as possible. The article also makes the think that the older SPs were primarily inter point that if the air base is not defended, there ested in law enforcement, and only the younger may be no aircraft to sortie. It’s apparent to me ones were interested in base defense (it's the that if the Air Force is serious about base de same way in the Army, where most military fense, it must realize that it is going to have to do police (MP) I have met really want to be police). it by itself in all but level III threat situations. An I think that the Air Force air base defense air base is a priority target for Soviet airborne, doctrine is deficient in organization, equipment, Spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units because it and command emphasis to support these im contains nuclear delivery means. Army units pressive men and women. It seemed to me while could be totally absorbed in heavy fighting. I was in Panama that the health of the grass was According to an MP officer I know, there are not more important than the security of the air base. nearly enough MPs for all the missions they Ground personnel other than SPs were unim have been assigned. The Air Force needs to pressive, in that the skills they had for ground place considerable command emphasis on base defense were negligible. Soon after our arrival at defense. Additionally, it needs to “heavy up" its Albrook Air Force Base, we were emplacing an forces. Compared with a Soviet airborne platoon observation device and required the assistance with three BMD armored personnel vehicles of the civil engineering squadron and its lifting equipment. Soon, a sergeant arrived with the (continued on page 721

3 M ai Gen Dale O. S mith, USAF, Ret ir ed

enerally, people feel that if they do a good job. promotion will be inevitable. Wrong. Most people do well in their work but never move out of their rut. They often see pro motions go to colleagues who don’t do as well as they. Why? What's the secret? GWell, to begin with, doing a good job is a valuable prerequisite to promotion, but it is only one of many prerequisites. Of course, if you can brighten your corner with an outstanding piece of work or some new and productive ideas, doing a good job will be prominent among the prerequisites and draw attention to you. So, the first thing von must do is to like your work and approach it with enthusi asm. 1 his may take some doing if, by chance, you have no enthusiasm for this type of work in the first place. But even a garbageman can find some positive values in what he is doing. If he dwells on the pluses and attempts to enhance them, he can find ways to improve his job. give better service, and develop pride and en thusiasm in his work. Remember to keep a positive, can-do attitude. No one likes a complainer, partic-

4 HOW TO GET PROMOTED 5

ularlv bosses. They have enough on their other target in mv Airman's Club on Ka- minds without having to listen to gripes. dena Air Base. However, if there is something seriously Virginia and I had arrived on Okinawa wrong that you can’t correct on your own, just before New Year's Day of 1958, and on be sure to let your boss know—but don't New Year’s Eve we visited the six clubs of complain. the division. Everyone was having a grand When I was a scrub football player prac time except the airmen. There were only a ticing blocks, a line coach overheard me couple of dozen of them in the Kadena say in frustration. ‘T just can’t do that." Airman’s Club, a fine facility built and Then I saw him looking at me with disap maintained with airmen’s dues of one dol proval. I was never promoted. 1 should lar a month. They were glumly drinking 3.2 have said. 'T'm going to learn how to do beer. Where were the 3.000 other airmen? that yet.” They were in the neighboring gin mills and In the subsequent half century. I have cathouses off base. learned much about promotion and. except The next day 1 revised the regulations for a number of mistakes and some acts of that governed conduct of the airmen’s clubs. God. might have made it to higher rank. I If the airmen were old enough to fight for learned about promotion through personal their country, they were old enough to have experience, observation, and service on a an open bar with good booze instead of the number of promotion boards. rotgut they were drinking in the village. Almost all officers believe they could Moreover, they could have money-making have become the chief of staff had it not slot machines like the officers and noncom been for some unfortunate event in their missioned officers had in their clubs. And careers. An unflattering effectiveness report instead of the girls of questionable charac made out by commanders who didn't ap ter and health they might pick up in town, preciate the officers’ sterling worth is the we would invite young Okinawan ladies usual cause. But many more unfortunate from good families to the club, calling for events block their paths to the chief’s office. them and delivering them home at mid A friend who was definitely brigadier ma night. terial hit the skids when his wife fell in That did it. The club was packed every love with a foreign national behind the iron night and made more money than it could curtain and tried to smuggle her lover into spend. It featured dance music from a 10- Austria in the trunk of a car. In Baguio, the piece orchestra and one-dollar steak din Philippines, a brigadier general’s wife had a ners nightly, together with frequent floor bidet installed in the guesthouse, and an shows. The club even bought a Lincoln unsympathetic reporter widely publicized Continental to raffle off weekly. The lucky it. The general, despite showing promise winner could have the Lincoln for a week for advancement, soon retired. with a liveried chauffeur and 50 dollars You may wonder why I didn’t become spending money. The airmen were having a chief. No? Well, even if you don’t. I’ll tell ball. you. I was doing pretty well as commander Well, you can imagine what that antago of the 313th Air Division on Okinawa until nistic Australian reporter made of this! an anti-American reporter from Australia When he was escorted through the club by visited. He had sullied my predecessor's a less-than-sympathetic local newspaper reputation by writing that his golf course man (they did an end run on my very cap took arable land from poor Okinawans able public relations officer), they couldn’t while in fact the golf course had been get into the “Key Club,” which had been carved out of the boondocks and provided reserved for airmen's wives. The reporter employment for many of the locals. This immediately assumed that something evil unscrupulous correspondent found an was going on behind that door. 6 A1RPOWEK J O U R N A L SPRING 1990

The Australian was a stringer for lime, Colonel Jones, the hottest pilot on the base. and his scurrilous article in its entirety was Colonel, this is Lt Joe Blow, one of the best published in that magazine, even though backseaters I’ve ever known.” no one checked the story’s authenticity. A It’s a compliment to use "sir" and “ma’am" national "scandal” resulted. The innuen because they show deference and respect dos painted the Kadena Airman’s Club as a and are pleasing to hear from time to time. den of iniquity—an Air Force-sponsored By all means, show deference and respect cathouse. to your bosses and superiors. Your boss This is not the way to get promoted. As should be the first to be notified of any Henry ("Light-Horse Harry”) Lee warned news and the first to be invited to any his son Robert E., "Avoid the appearance of function you plan. Don’t forget that the evil!” You can get into trouble that will dog boss’s spouse deserves equal, if not more, you the rest of your service if you stick your respect. It’s a compliment to recognize their neck out too far, as 1 did. Anyway, it’s my seniority at all times. This can be done with good excuse for not getting a third star. good manners and need not be construed as That’s how to avoid promotion. Now, kissing ass. what can you do to get promoted? My daughter-in-law told me that wives’ First of all, other people must consider clubs are now egalitarian—no special def you in a positive and favorable light. The erence is shown to wives of senior officers. drudge who does a good job will not have I hope she comes to realize that this prac this aura. But the person who has an opti tice cannot and should not be followed. In mistic outlook, pays attention to others, all human interchange, those who fail to and passes the time of day with them in a show deference to age, experience, senior cheerful and thoughtful way will develop a ity, and, yes, wealth are doomed to suffer “nice-guy” aura. A good reputation among from their rudeness. Just remember that your contemporaries as well as your juniors many people have worked hard and sacri and seniors is a sound stepping-stone to ficed much to reach their station in life. promotion. They deserve your admiration. Don’t strip To achieve this aura and draw attention them of their rank with vour attitude. It to yourself, you must follow a few rules. goes without saying that these people hold The lirst is to look for opportunities to the power, but, beyond that, showing that compliment. In almost any social inter you respect them for their achievement is change. it’s possible to find something that fundamental courtesy. warrants a sincere compliment. The stvl- The second rule is to show gratitude. ized exchanges of everyday life are loaded When you are promoted, give the credit with compliments: “I’m glad to have met to others, and thank them for their help. you." “It was nice talking with you." "It Never overlook a kindness done you. Al was nice talking with you too." “The plea ways show your gratitude by word or sure is all mine." You can dream up some deed. Because many people help you to get phrases of vour own. ahead, you should always recognize their Once, at a nightclub, Pete Croker and I help and thank them. You don’t have to be invited a show girl to'sit with us. We played accurate. They may not even realize they a game to see which one of us could pay her have helped you or done you a service. As more compliments. Before the evening was with compliments, look for opportunities out. she was walking on air. as proud and to show gratitude. happy as a debutante. Perhaps we overdid Yes. to be promoted you have to do more it, but it makes the point. than a good job. You have to be recognized Introducing someone is an ideal situation favorably, and the more favorably you're for giving compliments, because they are regarded, the more likely your promotion. indirect: “Joe, I’d like you to meet my boss, Practicing words and phrases that pursue I l o w TO G E T PROMOTED 7

this goal is a lifetime job. But when you practice it incessantly so that it becomes learn them well enough to use them habit habitual and automatic. Terms of endear ually and gracefully, they are sure winners. ment, for example, are compliments. Try And another thing, look for recreational them on your spouse or friend, and see opportunities with your bosses. That’s one what happens. A good relationship on the reason golf is so important. Such informal home front is the foundation for success in contact will allow you to compliment and the professional world. Accentuating the show gratitude. Obviously, it must be sin positive, controllable aspects of your life cere, but that's part of the art. And you may help you weather the negative, uncon don't have to wait until business opportu trollable events that inevitably plague us nities arrive. You can practice this art at all. home with equal success. In fact, you must

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• Enclose a check for $9.50 ($11.90 for international mail). • Spend a year enjoying four quarterly issues mailed to your home or office. BATTLEFIELD AIR SUPPORT A Retrospective Assessment

D r Ric h ar d P. H allion Air power was first used as a weapon during World War I. At the same time, a controversy arose—which continues to this day—over whether aircraft specifically designed for ground attack or “swing-role” fighter-bombers were better suited for battlefield air support.

ORE than 70 years have passed Joint Chiefs of Staff (ICS) Publication since armed aircraft first at (Pub) 1, Department of Defense Dictionary tacked troops in what would of M ilitary and Associated Terms, defines now be considered close air close air support as “air action against Msupport (CAS) and battlefield air interdic hostile targets which are in close proximity tion (BAI) missions. An extraordinary to friendly forces and which require de amount of thought and discussion has re tailed integration of each air mission with sulted in numerous publications, papers, the fire and movement of those forces." But and symposia concerned with the issue of battlefield air interdiction is not so crisply battlefield support in virtually all its as defined. Traditional air interdiction (AI)— pects. Today, this continuing interest is again according to JCS Pub 1—is defined particularly significant, as the military ser as "air operations conducted to destroy, vices struggle to come to grips with the neutralize, or delay the enemy's military future of the CAS/BAI mission. potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such it is. how it is controlled, etc.—is still distance from friendly forces that detailed evolving.’’1 integration of each air mission with the fire With all these particulars in mind, it is and movement of friendly forces is not well to take a look at the CAS/BAI issue required." BAI, basically air interdiction from the perspective of over seven decades used to support close-in battle, is described of operations: we may postulate some points, in the following definition: "air interdic explaining them in greater detail: tion attacks against land force targets which have near-term effect on the operations 1. We hove always done wjhat are now or scheme of maneuver of friendly forces, delineated as CAS/BAI operations. CAS but are not in close proximity to friendly and BAI date to the First World War. speci forces, are referred to as battlefield air in fically to 1917, when the Royal Flying Corps terdiction.” As one Air Force general re (RFC, subsequently the Royal Air Force cently wrote. “Our concept of BAI—what [RAF]) began intensive and well-organized 10 A/RPOWER IOURNAL SPRING 1990

"trench strafing” (CAS) and "ground straf to prosecute air strikes with relatively light ing” (BAI) missions over the western front. losses, something that would not have Using modified bomb-carrying fighters such been possible in more densely defended as the S.E. 5a and Sopwith Camel, the RFC European or Mediterranean skies. In many undertook operations directly over the front cases, Kenney’s attackers were more fre and attacked second-echelon forces to a quently—and profitably—employed on air- depth of 30 or more kilometers behind the denial missions against Japanese airfields front. The Imperial German Air Service rather than on actual CAS- and BAI-style followed suit. Such activities by British, missions. For their part, the Navy and Ma German. French, and American airmen rine Corps refined a particular kind of CAS were commonplace in the ebb and flow of operation whereby CAS served as a sub the great offensives of 1918 and were exten stitute for the lack of available artillery. sively reported in the memoirs and docu Rooted in the Marines’ "small wars” expe ments of the time. BAI played a decisive rience of the 1920s-30s, this system (which role in the collapse of Turkish forces in tied Marine and Navy air units closely to Palestine during a brief and merciless air the ground forces they supported) proved campaign in the late summer of 1918. CAS/ both effective and a source of controversy BAI appeared in many of the interwar con in the postwar years. During the Second flicts of the 1920s and 1930s and, above all, World War, the "swing-role” fighter-bomber in the three great wars of the interwar years: reappeared in Allied and Axis service, com Abyssinia, Spain, and China. Spanish fight plementing and eventually replacing the ing was characterized bv extensive CAS/ specialized attack airplane as the major in BAI employment by both sides, culmi strument of air-to-ground battlefield attack.'* nating in the climactic fighting at the Ebro River in 1938.1 Korea witnessed an extensive range of CAS/BAI played a significant role in CAS/BAI activity. Further, the short but fighting during the Second World War, par savage Sinai campaign of 1956 (and the ticularly during the Nazi blitzkrieg, fighting subsequent 1967 and 1973 Middle East in the Western Desert, the Italian campaign, wars) witnessed decisive CAS/BAI opera the breakout across northern France, and tions, with the concentrated Israeli attacks fighting on the eastern front. Despite many upon Egyptian forces in the Mitla Pass false starts in the interwar and early war region of Egypt during the 1967 war offer years, it was only in 1943—after the bitter ing perhaps the best example. Far more experience of Kasserine and the exposure typical of post-World War II combat was of American airmen to the British Western the employment of CAS/BAI during the Desert air support system—that the United “limited" wars of the 1950s-80s, particu States first came to grips in a realistic larly Malaya (where it occasionally worked fashion with the problem of supporting well). Indochina (where it could not save ground forces by direct air attack. Field the French from defeat), Algeria (where it Manual 100-20, Command and Employ did. but other considerations dictated a ment of Air Power, sprang from this expe settlement), southern Africa (especially rience and governed the subsequent use of Dragon Rouge, the rescue of Belgian hos American tactical air support for the rest tages in Stanleyville, Congo). Southeast of the war. Though Gen George Kenney Asia (where it was a mixed bag), Morocco had worked on this problem the previous (where it proved costly to prosecute), the year (in New Guinea), the peculiarities of Falklands (where it had but limited im Southwest Pacific warfare generated circum pact), the Iran-lraq war (where BAI pre stances markedly different from the more dominated). and Afghanistan (where it first traditional form of warfare being waged in worked well and then fell apart in the face the North African and European theaters. of the growing shoulder-launched surface- In particular, low-level attackers were able to-air missile [SAM] threat).4 2. BAI operations have ahvavs been of more value—as well as more extensive— than CAS operations. By its very nature. CAS tends to be used only in extremis. Even a cursory analysis of battlefield-air- support operations from World War 1 on wards indicates that BAI has been the more dominant and prevalent. In limited-war sit uations. particularly in the absence of ma neuver or high-tempo combat, CAS has been more frequently employed, but even here it is often surprising how few sorties are actually devoted to the CAS mission. For example, an analysis of Air Force sor ties in South Vietnam through October 1966 revealed that only 3 percent were devoted to CAS missions; as one Air Force historian subsequently wrote, “many” oth ers fell into “a gray area between those missions that were clearly close air sup port in the traditional sense and those that would formerly have been called inter diction."'’ Interestingly, this gray area was termed direct support, a BAI euphemism dating to British experience in World War II.

Light flak proved devastating to ground-attack aircraft, such as this British Fairey Battle (below), hut fighter-bombers like the Hawker Hurricane (right) had more success wading it.

11 12 AIRPOXVER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

BAI operations clearly have been more “Gap” were primarily Army Air Forces useful in their impact upon maneuver land (AAF)-RAF combined-force BAI attacks; battle; the blitzkrieg, Western Desert cam they had a devastating impact upon Ger paign, Italian campaign, breakout across man forces. In the postwar years, there was France, and epic air-land battles of the little opportunity to examine battlefield air Russian front in 1943-45 were essentially support in the high-tempo environment of campaigns where BAI predominated. Lutt- a fluid, mechanized, total war; neverthe waffe planners emphasized assaulting less, the few cases that do exist offer con second-echelon forces, beginning in the lat firmatory evidence that BAI played a larger ter stages of the Spanish civil war and and more significant role than CAS. These continuing into the Second World War. So cases include the 1956, 1967, and 1973 did the Voyenno Vozdushnye Sily (VVS— Middle East wars as well as the tedious the Soviet army air forces). Both services Iran-lraq war (where the Iranians tended blended CAS operations at the front with to follow American—e.g., US Air Force— more numerous second-echelon attacks to a patterns and the Iraqi Air Force substituted depth in excess of 30 kilometers behind the French tactics for Soviet ones).'’ front. During the Normandy landings and This discussion is not intended to deni the subsequent consolidation phase, BAI grate CAS or to imply that there is no need by fighters and tactical bombers seriously for it; however, its use typically reflects hampered the arrival of German forces more desperate or peculiar circumstances— on the battlefield. British and American such as the fighting at “Bloody Ridge” on armored-column cover operations in sup Guadalcanal in 1942; "Hellzapoppin Ridge” port of the breakout and pursuit of German on Bougainville in 1943; the Naktong and forces across France varied between CAS Chosen Reservoir fighting in 1950; outpost, and BAI. but many were more clearly BAI operations, well beyond the range of Since the 1920s. the Soviets had successfully used ground-at friendly ground forces. Finally, the twin tack aircraft, such as these 11-2 Shturmoviks, hut abandoned battles of Mortain and the Falaise-Argentan them in the 1950s in favor of jet fighter-bombers. BATTLEFIELD AIB SUPPORT 13

column, and hamlet defense in Indochina and South Vietnam; and siege breaking at Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh (one suc cessful and one not). In all of these cases. CAS substituted for the lack of available artillery assets and often offset huge force disparities between opposing sides. But. as a rule, when mobile forces join combat (particularly in open country) BAI is em ployed more frequently—and decisively— than CAS.' 3. With rare exception, the strategic bomber has been of minimal value in bat tlefield air support. The notion of the stra tegic bomber majestically sweeping across a battlefield and releasing a hail of bombs has always had a certain glamour to it. but the peculiarities of strategic bomber opera tions have greatly limited its effectiveness. These include the need for establishing a bomber stream of some sort, the greater vulnerability of this kind of aircraft to en emy ground and air defenses, and the much greater coordination requirements for suc cessful strikes. Preinvasion B-17 and B-24 bombing strikes against Omaha Beach on the morning of the Normandy landings did little to dent coastal defenses: far more valuable were the 36 Allied fighter-bomber squadrons providing CAS to landing forces and the 33 others flying BAI missions fur German Stukas proved to he excellent CASIBAJ aircraft in ther inland. Operation Cobra, undertaken blitzkrieg, where their air superiority gave them freedom of immediately prior to the Saint-L6 break movement. Even in this environment, air-to-ground com through on 24-25 July 1944, illustrated munications problems often resulted in "friendly" casualties. both the strengths and weaknesses of using strategic bombers for CAS missions. It troop support but was noticeably cooler achieved its desired effect, devastating the towards medium bombers and. particu Panzer-Lehr division opposite the Ameri larly. “heavies." The group’s attitude was can VII Corps, but faulty planning, sloppy that heavy bombers had the potential to be execution, and ill luck resulted in friendly devastatingly effective but were prone to casualties from errant bombing that killed generate friendly casualties and thus neces over 100 GIs. wounded approximately 500 sitate the establishment of large safety others, and triggered bitter exchanges be zones between friendly and enemy forces— tween air and ground commanders. This constraints not conducive to good post- acrimony was due in part to the fact that strike exploitation of a battered foe.a one of the dead was Lt Gen Lesley J. Mc Post-World War II operations have been Nair. ‘commander” of the phantom “1st equally mixed. B-29s flew in a battlefield- Army Group.” At the end of the war. Gen air-support role (particularly at night, using Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group rated radar bombing) for allied forces in Korea fighter-bombers as particularly valuable for and seem to have had little actual impact 14 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 upon the ground situation, despite occa field operations is questionable, particu sional statements to the contrary. The larly when it is not synchronized with French unsuccessfully sought intervention ground maneuver warfare. Four examples by atomic-bomb-equipped B-29s during the exist from four separate conflicts that call debacle at Dien Bien Phu; the British em into question the efficacy of non-BAI inter ployed Lincoln bombers against the Mau diction: Operation Strangle (Italy, 1944); Mau in Kenya (without notable success); Operations Strangle and Saturate (Korea, and it fell to the United States to demon 1951—52); French interdiction efforts against strate that developments in precision guid Vietminh supply lines, 1952-54; and the ance and control techniques, when coupled long and arduous campaign against the Ho with a static situation, could result in prof Chi Minh trail network over a decade later. itable support of ground forces by B-52s Strangle in Italy never attained the degree during the siege of Khe Sanh. It is worth of supply denial to German forces that its noting, however, that all of these operations planners had hoped: as a purely “inter (whether undertaken or not) fell far more diction” effort, it failed. But strikes closer to under the rubric of BAI than of CAS and the front undertaken during the subsequent were undertaken in conflicts where both Diadem phase did hamper German mobil air and ground commanders greatly pre ity near the line of engagement—another ferred to employ smaller, more agile, and example of BAI effectiveness, as reflected operationally flexible aircraft—notably the fighter-bomber.9 The F-5J Mustang (shown here releasing napalm canisters) 4. “Classic” air interdiction has proven was designed as an air-to-air fighter hut was used for ground disappointing and of less significance than attack in Korea. The increasingly hostile ground-to-air threat either BAI or CAS: its impact upon battle took a high toll on aircraft used in this role. BATTLE HELL) AIH SUPPORT 15

in contemporary Nazi accounts and post war memoirs.10 The same could not be said of Korea’s Strangle, which, like its prede cessor. attempted to pinch off supplies coming down a peninsula. There, road strikes resulted in little more than expen sive earth moving at a prohibitive cost in killed and captured aircrews and lost or damaged strike aircraft. Saturate, its suc cessor. targeted the North Korean rail net work with somewhat better success but (given the nature of fighting at the front) still did not deny Communist forces the supplies necessary to continue fighting. An evaluation report, in fact, concluded that in January 1953 "the enemy was better sup plied. fed. and equipped than at any previ ous time."11 In Indochina (subsequently Vietnam), planners did not even have the advantages of geography—attacking across Night fighter aircraft often accomplished little, other than a peninsula—and. hence, the problems of harassment of the enemy, and sustained heavy casualties. interdiction were much more severe. The Night attack remains a weak link in CAS/BAI doctrine. French lacked resources to prosecute a campaign against supply routes from Com munist China, and the introduction of cesses air power enjoyed against the Viet increasingly intense antiaircraft assets re cong were achieved primarily via BAI and sulted in unacceptable loss rates of strike CAS, particularly when air action was syn and bomber aircraft. The successful capture chronized with ground maneuver.11 of Dien Bien Phu was due in great measure 5. The greatest recurring problem in bat to the successful transportation of large tlefield air support bus been effecting time amounts of supplies and equipment, cou ly and accurate strikes with satisfactory pled with equally successful “air denial" of communications, control, und coordina French ground-attack forces.1" In Vietnam, tion. Even in the First World War, ground the paucity of resources that afflicted the and air commanders complained about the French was not a serious problem for the problems of arranging and coordinating United States and its allies. In theory, vir air support missions. Col William (“Billy") tually the entire country was within 15 Mitchell, for example, went to great lengths minutes of tactical air power coverage, and to ensure the adequacy of communications CAS/BAI operations worked generally well. and identification procedures in his prepa But the diversity of route options enabled rations for the Saint-Mihiel offensive. Such Communist forces to counteract the intense problems continued in the postwar years. air campaign waged against them, and the The British and French “air control” expe increasing sophistication of their air de riences highlighted continuing problems in fense resources led to nagging and contin this area; the French, in fact, utilized air uous losses. Though air attack undoubtedly borne radio-equipped observers who func reduced the amount of supplies that got tioned essentially as forward air controllers down the trail, it never succeeded either in (FACs) beginning as early as the Rif War of stopping the flow or in generating losses so the 1920s in North Africa. Effective direct- extensive as to compromise the ability of control procedures first appeared in the the Vietcong to come to battle. What suc- Spanish civil war, thanks to the work of the 16 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

Tlte P-47 Thunderbolt was the most successful Army Air Legion Condor. Subsequently, during the Forces fighter-bomber during World War II. Its dev astating Second World War, virtually all the major firepower was extremely effective in CAS/BAl. At right is a combatant nations developed particular air rare photo of a P-47 in action at night. support procedures, to a greater or lesser extent constrained or enhanced by the par ticular air-army doctrine being followed. bombers, supposedly “precision" weapons, American procedures were profoundly in proved notorious in this regard during the fluenced by the RAF’s experience in the Sicilian campaign. But the Germans expe Western Desert. Even so, battlefield coordi rienced it in Spain and in the blitzkrieg, as nation and communication proved diffi did the other Allies. Indeed, whenever a cult. When the British first began their ground war is fast-moving and fluid, the Western Desert campaign, the typical lag number of friendly casualties from air ac between a support request and the arrival tion greatly increases. This principle un of strike aircraft over the target was two and fortunately but understandably cultivates one-half to three hours. Needless to say. a mentality of “if it flies and is heading this tardiness vastly improved by war's our way, shoot at it.” which adds to the end. (In Vietnam, the average time from the fratricide problem. Saturation of communi eruption of a firefight to the first delivery of cations networks, problems with communi CAS was over an hour, but analysis re cations security, and the inability of air and vealed that up to 40 minutes of this time ground forces to talk on a common network was being lost by ground commanders de have likewise posed long-standing head laying their request for air support.14) aches. Examples abound from every war. In Identification of and communication be the Second World War. for example. Ger tween friendly air and ground forces have man air-ground operations as late as 1943— posed continuing problems. Air strikes on 44 suffered from the lack of a single radio friendlies were an all-too-common occur capable of handling air and ground mes rence in the Second World War (and ap sage traffic. The opening months of the peared in earlier and later wars as well, Korean War were as notable for the prob though not to the same degree); A-36 dive- lems encountered in communications be- BATTLEFIELD AIR SUPPORT 17

tween the various services as they were perience indicates, as would be expected, for the dismaying rapidity of the North that this phenomenon is particularly true Korean advance. Further, these communi of troops encountering air attack for the cations difficulties seriously hampered the first time. Numerous accounts from the quality of CAS and BA1 "target servicing.” First World War. interwar conflicts, Second Vietnam's early days were characterized by World War, and postwar conflicts attest to a similar problem afflicting FAC opera this aspect of air attack. Noise appears tions. Indeed, the FAC concept, which had to have a particular value as a "shock worked so well in Korea, had to be redis weapon" against troops. The shock value covered and restructured, initially using of a genuinely severe battlefield bombard Army O-ls transferred to the Air Force. ment—such as the Cobra bombing—is not Discussions with a wide range of Army and surprising. What is surprising, however, is Air Force officers indicate that significant how even a relatively insignificant strafing reservations about the efficacy of contem or two can tie up vast quantities of troops porary battlefield communication capabili even when their own air force has unques ties remain. Worse, the "experience" of tioned air superiority and is devastating the recent joint Army-Air Force training exer foe. (Such was the case with the Germans cises confirms that these feelings are not at Sedan [France] and to American forces without considerable foundation.1’ after D-day). That the Soviets are concerned 6. Troops exposed to air attack experi about the impact of air attack on morale ence serious psychological and morale is evident from the recent comments of damage that hinders their subsequent com a Soviet infantry-training platoon com bat performance. Ironically, civilian popu mander.1'’ As a rule, armies traditionally lations exposed to bombardment appear to fear an enemy air force more than they have strong resistance to morale break respect their oivn. In contemporary discus down. whereas fit. young fighting men at sions with “ground" and “air” people—re tacked on the battlefield often experience a gardless of the country—the ground officers shattering of morale that is out of propor generally have little faith in the abilities of tion to the actual strength of the attack. Ex their own air force to prevent an enemy air 18 A/RPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 BAI operations. Light flak took a high toll of ground-attack aircraft during the Spanish civil war, and, during the blitzkrieg, Ger man light flak devastated low-level attack ers, particularly in the Polish and French campaigns. Of course, later in the war, the Allies had their own opportunity to sup press enemy air attack, and the combina tion of radar-directed antiaircraft artillery (AAA) coupled with proximity-fused shells down to sizes as small as 40 millimeters (mm) was of particular value.1' The ground-to-air threat environment in creased in severity in the postwar years. Though conflicts such as Korea and In dochina were characterized as “limited,” they nevertheless took a high toll of air craft. For example, in April 1951 the Navy Observation aircraft such as this 0-1 often conducted forward air control in Vietnam. But the high-threat nature of most and Marine Corps lost 33 aircraft primarily modern combat eliminated these slow, light aircraft from the on CAS/BAI missions from light and me battlefield. dium AAA and small-arms fire. During the siege of Dien Bien Phu, the Vietminh force from devastating them and to under moved in heavy antiaircraft artillery forma take any sort of equally devastating attack tions and succeeded in inflicting air denial upon enemy ground forces. In sum, they upon the French; by May 1954, just before overemphasize the anticipated effective the collapse, French fighters and bombers ness of the enemy airforce, both in defend (let alone transports and liaison airplanes) ing its own airspace and in projecting could not operate over the valley without power across the front, and they minimize taking prohibitive losses.1” American fixed- the ability of their own air foreefs] to de wing aircraft losses in Southeast Asia fend them from enemy attack and to con (SEA), while not large in the context of the duct meaningful CAS/BAI against the entire SEA air effort, were certainly not enemy. inconsequential, and the introduction of 7. The ground-to-air environment has the shoulder-fired SAM during the 1972 always posed an ever-increasing threat to North Vietnamese spring offensive added battlefield air operations. Even in the First a new problem for tactical air planners. World War. battlefield attack missions took Whereas previously in limited wars air a high toll of attacking aircraft, particularly attackers could rely on older generations of as troops became seasoned and learned to warplanes or even light propeller-driven fire back. During the battle of Cambrai trainers converted as “strike" and FAC air (France), for example, ground-attack mis planes, the enhanced SAM threat essen sion loss rates never dropped below 30 tially drove such aircraft—including the percent, resulting in the essential destruc fabled Douglas A-l—from the sky. The tion of a fighter squadron in four days. 1973 Middle East war highlighted the Understandably, pilots expressed a marked deadly synergy of fixed-base and shoulder- preference for dogfighting, believing that it fired SAMs coupled with traditional AAA significantly enhanced their chances of sur and radar-directed multiple-barrel light vival. The proliferation of light flak in the flak. Out of an estimated 109 aircraft lost by world’s armies by the end of the 1930s had the Israeli Air Force (1AF) during the Octo a drastic impact upon subsequent CAS and ber war, 61 were lost on close support. BATTLEFIELD AIB SUPPORT 19

During operations early in the war. the IAF they defeated a combined-arms Soviet air had to rely on artillery suppression of mobile system using fixed- and rotary-wing enemy SAM defenses to allow its strike support and reversed a Soviet air superior aircraft to operate over the Golan Heights. ity that had permitted attacks against the The daunting efficiency of ground defenses Mojuhedin virtually at will. Allegedly, from cut both ways; Israeli gunners shot down September 1986 to mid-1987, the Soviets an estimated 101 Arab aircraft that were lost an average of one airplane or helicopter attacking troop positions—23 falling to per day to Afghani air defenders. In any SAMs and 42 to 20-mm ground fire.19 future high-intensity war, preventing attri More recently, experiences in Angola tion of one’s forces by air-to-air and ground- and Mozambique, in Morocco’s Polisario to-air threats will be a serious challenge to guerrilla war, in the Falklands (Islas Malv air commanders. Ground-to-air threats—in inas). and in Afghanistan have further con cluding fratricide from “friendly” fire— firmed the danger that the SAM poses to will obviously continue to pose a major attackers—particularly the small SA-7-/ headache for battlefield-air-support plan Redeye- Blowpipe- Stinger-class weapon. ners. Indeed, the era of some aspects of Stinger wallahs of the Afghani resistance battlefield air support—such as the orbiting inflicted air denial upon the Soviets. Thus. FAC—are probably gone forever.20 8. The fighter-bomber has ahvays per Good air-to-ground communications are essential in CAS operations but remain a problem area. Army and Air Force formed more satisfactorily in the CAS/BA1 coordination in the development of communications systems role than the special-purpose uttack air needs to be improved. plane. The fighter-bomber possesses the in 20 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 trinsic performance, flexibility, and safety to perform the CAS/BAI mission better than more specialized attack aircraft. Both the fighter and the attack airplane appeared in the “Great War,” and the performance disparity between them was slight. By war’s end, as discussed earlier, the bomb carrying fighter had appeared as an element of ground-attack warfare. After World War I, the performance disparities, size, and complexity of the specialized attack air plane grew so large that by 1939 such cralt were decidedly at a disadvantage to the fighter for the CAS/BAI mission. During that time, the ground-attack airplane had generally evolved into a twin-engine ma chine almost indistinguishable from con temporary medium bombers or, on the other hand, the specialized dive-bomber. Both proved vulnerable to opposing fight ers and the intense low-level flak that in The threat from the ground. Introduction of hand-held sur creasingly accompanied ground forces, just face-to-air missiles (SAMs) has proven deadly to CAS efforts. If not for SAMs, the Soviets would have enjoyed total air as both were incapable of undertaking the supremacy in Afghanistan. kind of "swing-role" missions that fighters could. By war’s end, both the Allied and Axis powers expressed a clear preference regard to other issues such as swing-role for the modified fighter-bomber (such as missions and survivability against sophis the P-47, Typhoon, FW-190G, and Yak-7B) ticated air-to-air and ground-to-air threats. for battlefield ground attack. In the United Even at the time of its creation, it had ques States’ case, this superiority was recog tionable survivability in a high-intensity nized not merely by the AAF. but by the war characterized by multiple air-to-air and Army ground forces as well. In the postwar ground-to-air threats. The current debate years, even the Soviet Union, which had over the CAS/BAI mission, the intense in operated specialized Shturmuvik (assaultl terest in upgrading aircraft such as the A-7 aircraft since the 1920s, abandoned them in and the A-10, and defense reform move favor of the jet fighter-bomber, beginning ment cries for a “mud fighter" all reflect the with the Su-7 Fitter/1 confusion that continues to plague the ac It is ironic, then, that the 1970s wit quisition of "attack” aircraft. A far better nessed the reintroduction of the “attack" approach than creating retreads and such airplane in US service—the A-10. It repre potential enemy ace makers as the pro sented a return to an older philosophy of posed “mud fighter" is the fighter-bomber, battlefield air power discredited by the ex which has worked since World War I. And periences of the Second World War. Borne in this respect, it is immaterial whether of a limited war need—replacement of the such aircraft have an "A" designation, such older A-l—the A-10 was, in one respect, as the A-16 variant of the F-16 or the A-18 an exasperated response to congressional half of the F/A-18. In previous decades we pressure to pacify the ground forces. Speci recognized that fighters had a dual-role fically, ground forces claimed they needed nature; we didn’t distinguish between “P"- an up-to-date, heavily armored, long-loiter. 47s and "A"-47s, nor between "F"-84s and high-payload bomb dropper, built without "A”-84s. Neither should we do so today. BATTLEFIELD AIH SUPPORT 21

The threat from the sky. The adsanced sensor systems of the over the battlefield, particularly in situa AC-130 gunship make it a formidable battlefield air support tions where air power has been able to weapon in the low-intensity environment These sensors also offset disparities between opposing forces greatly reduce the possibility of accidentally firing on nearby on the ground. In US experience, the best friendly forces. examples are drawn from Korea and South east Asia. In Korea, the disparate nature of because making such distinctions helps Air Force and Navy-Marine CAS actually fuel the belief that there is something in seems to have furnished more complete herently desirable in a specialized attack battlefield coverage than if any one system aircraft for battlefield air support—a ques had predominated. The Navy-Marine sys tionable notion indeed. (Political realities, tem emphasized air support within 50-200 however, favor such separate designations; yards (45-183 meters), with air support having an “A” airplane clearly speaks of an substituting for the lack of artillery. The Air air service's commitment to its ground part Force envisioned CAS as seldom required ners.) The swing-role fighter is just that— closer than 1.000 yards (914 meters). Al a capable air-to-ground and air-to-air air though great controversy erupted over plane. Differentiating further can lead to which CAS system was better, what too dangerous dichotomy of thought between often was (and is) missed is that both air-to-air and air-to-ground warfare. Rather worked together quite effectively, with the than arguing over "F" or “A" airplanes, Air Force system furnishing more of the planners should be addressing more signif BAI side and the Navy-Marine system more icant topics, such as the desirability of of the true CAS side. Starting in the fall of incorporating vertical and or short takeoff 1952. the Navy’s Cherokee strikes together and landing (VSTOL) technology on future with a series of Air Force “air-pressure" fighter-bombers in light of the historic vul strikes resulted in intense US Air Force-US nerability of airfields to air-denial attack.22 Navy BAI operations that did much to 9. CAS and BAI have demonstrated a hamper Communist tactical mobility and tremendous beneficial synergy. Examples eliminate the supplies that North Korean abound where effective CAS and BAI, work and Chinese Communist forces had been ing together, have had a devastating effect able to accumulate behind the front. This 22 AIRPOiVER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

effort, when coupled with "traditional" there is usually only one side that has/uses CAS applied directly over the front in sup air power; there is a conscious desire to port of allied forces, helped prevent the minimize casualties and collateral damage; loss of territory prior to the signing of the and so forth. To consider what is more truce agreement in late July 1953. At Khe typical of high-intensity war, one should Sanh. intensive US Air Force-Navy-Marine look to the last extensive high-intensity Corps CAS/BAI strikes prevented a repeat conflict: the Second World War, particu of the Dien Bien Phu experience and, in larly the eastern and western front cam deed, enabled Khe Sanh to accomplish paigns of 1943-45. 24 what the French at Dien Bien Phu had tried 11. Nighttime CAS/BAI has been the and failed to achieve: create a magnet for most difficult and frustrating form of CAS/ the attraction, concentration, and destruc BAI to employ and has proven less signif tion of enemy forces. Massive and sus icant than daytime operations. Denying an tained CAS/BAI strikes, in conjunction enemy the ability to move freely at night with desperate ground fighting, blunted has been one of the most elusive goals of and then defeated North Vietnam’s 1972 military planners/5 Unsurprisingly, all- spring offensive/1 night air attack—and not just CAS/BAI 10. CAS/BAI experience from limited operations—has posed severe challenges. wars has only limited relevancy to high- Attempts to undertake what are now con intensity conflict. This observation, of sidered night CAS/BAI missions occurred course, is actually a subsidiary conclusion during the First World War, but, even so, of a larger one: limited wars themselves can night battlefield air attack remained more have but limited relevancy to larger and harassment than "serious” air war until the more intensive conflicts. The benign envi Second World War. During the Normandy ronment (benign compared to high-tempo, campaign, the RAF used Mosquito bombers multiple-threat modern war) of a limited as night interdictors, bombing under illu war generates its own dangerous limita mination from Mitchell flare ships: as the tions on thought and analysis. CAS/BAI threat from German night attackers dwin operations in such conflicts tend to be more dled in 1944-45, the AAF used modified static in nature and not characterized by P-61 night fighters for the same purpose. the loss rates, fog of war, and operational The Germans established specialized night constraints imposed in a high-intensity war ground-attack formations though their ac where every significant aspect of military tual combat contribution appears to have operations is usually up for grabs or in been minimal. The VVS flew night harass question for much of the time. In older ment missions using modified trainers wars—Indochina, Algeria, Vietnam, Africa, (largely crewed by women), presaging sim for example—such conditions were also ilar operations by the North Koreans during conducive to the operation of older, less the Korean War. sophisticated aircraft. Since the early 1970s, In Korea, US Air Force and Navy aviators however, the rapid proliferation of effective undertook extensive night interdiction and ground-to-air weapons has required that CAS operations. While such activity took a modern support aircraft for these “brush- heavy toll of Korean road and rail traffic, fire” conflicts be almost as sophisticated as casualties were high from combat losses those intended for, say, a NATO-Warsaw and operational accidents. (At one point. Pact conflict on the central front. Neverthe Fifth Air Force’s director of operations, Col less, limited wars—despite the changing George S. Brown, complained of ‘“ trading nature of technology—usually have a set of B-26’s for trucks in a most uneconomi other conditions that makes them largely cal manner.’”26) Night attackers typically irrelevant to more extensive conflicts. For flew single and multiship sorties, attacking example, there may be “sanctuary" issues: under flares dropped by transports or pa BATTLEFIELD A1B SUPPORT 23

trol bombers. They sometimes attacked erations by aircraft such as the lumbering CAS targets using blind bombing from ra gunships and necessitated complicated es dar beacons, illumination from battlefield cort and suppression of enemy air defense searchlights, or cues from tracer reference (SEAD) procedures. Night air attack in Viet firing from friendly positions. nam offered a mixed hag of results. On the In Indochina, the French found that the one hand, particularly during the early night effectively cloaked Vietminh forces days of the war when US ground forces from air attack. Vietnam featured extensive were few and the Vietcong posed a greater night operations, which were both a help challenge to hamlet defenders than they and hindrance to air attackers. In the early did later, air attack at night sometimes days of the war, darkness protected aircraft played a critical role in permitting a ham from antiaircraft fire: thus, such aircraft as let's defenders to hold out until daylight, the B-26. T-28. and AC-4 7/AC-119/AC-130 when the Vietcong would typically break could operate with relative impunity. The contact. On the other hand, effectiveness of night was an enemy, however, in that it hid night CAS/BAI was limited by difficulties the Vietcong from air observers, challeng ing the development of advanced sensor An F-80 attacks enemy vehicles in North Korea. In modern systems to permit detection of the foe. combat. BAI is a useful role for manned aircraft, hut deeper Eventually, the steady escalation of the interdiction may be better left to unmanned aircraft and enemy ground-to-air threat endangered op standoff weapons.

The A-10 (above) filled the need for a high-load-carrying aircraft that could remain in the target area for a long time, hut it may he too specialized for a high-intensity comhat environment. The A-7 (below) has proven to he an extremely effective CAS/BAI aircraft for many years. It pnn-ed itself again as recently as the 1989 Panama action, hut its perfor mance in a conventional conflict remains open to question. BATTLEFIELD A1H SUPPORT 25

not be available for use the next day for Notes missions that may be truly necessary. Fi 1. Merrill A. McPeak. "TACAIK Missions and the Fire Support Coordination Line.” Air University Review 36. no. 6 nally. aircraft employed on "traditional" (September-October 19851: 88-70. interdiction missions may well be much 2. L. W. Sutherland. Aces und Kings (London: John Hamil more valuable operating in a BA1 mode ton. c. 1920). 250-59: K. M. Cuttack. The Australian Flying Corps in the Western und Eastern Theaters o| War. 191*1-1918 rather than a deep-strike one. The traditional (Sydney: Angus and Kobertsou. Ltd.. 1942). 152 -67; II A fixed nature of deep-interdiction targets— Jones. The War in the Air. vol. 6 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, road and rail intersections, bridges, facili 1937). 218-35: Liman von Sanders. Fun/ /ohre TurKei (Berlin. Verlag von August Scherl. 1919). 352. 364-65: for general ties. and the like—is such that these may information on Great War battlefield air support, see Richard prove far better targets for autonomous P. Hallion. Rise of the Fighter Aircraft. 1914 1918 (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co.. 1988). 125-37. Kenneth smart or ‘ brilliant" weapons such as cruise Malcolm Murray. Wings Over Poland (New York: Appleton. missiles, standoff missiles, unmanned air 1932). 131, 244; Robert F. Karolevitz and Ross S. Fenn. Plight vehicles, and so forth. Certainly, history of Eagles (Sioux Falls. S.Dak.: Brevet Press. Inc , 1974). 145, 169-71; General Staff Branch. Army Headquarters India. The indicates the great degree to which these Third Afghan War, 1919: Official Account (Calcutta: Govern targets become flak traps. If deep interdic ment of India Central Publication Branch, 1926). 133; Elmer B. tion by piloted aircraft is genuinely re Scovill, "The Royal Air Force, the Middle East, and Disarma ment. 1919-1934" |PhD diss.. Michigan State University. quired. then it may best be undertaken by 1972): |ohri C. Slessor. The Central Blue: The Aulobiogrnphv low-observable systems. Thus, it may well of Sir John Slessor. Marshal of the RAF (New York; Praeger. 1957). 45-75. 120-31. 656-60; Paul Armengaud. "Les be in the Air Force’s best interest to rethink enseignements de la guerre Marocaine (1925-1926) en matiere its prioritizing of air missions so as to place deviation." Revue Militaire Franyaise. Januarv-March 1927 BAI on a higher priority level than deep and April-lune 1927; Maj Gen Ross E. Rowell. US Marine Corps, interview of 24 October 1946. in the files of the Marine interdiction and to relegate CAS to a lower Corps Historical Center. Washington Navy Yard. Washington. priority level, consistent with the recogni D.C.; Ross E. Rowell. “Aircraft in Bush Warfare." Marine tion of its use only in extremis. A suitable Corps Gazette 14. no. 3 (September 1929): 180-203; Neill rank ordering would thus be as follows: (1) Macaulay. The Sundino Affair (Durham. N.C.: Duke Univer air superiority. (2) BAI, 13) deep strike, and 14) CAS. Now. in an all-out war involving nuclear weapons—particularly nuclear ex changes between the superpowers—all of this goes out the window; likewise, Wash ington’s political realities may dictate oth erwise. In conclusion, this article has attempted to examine the issue of close air support and battlefield air interdiction from a vari ety of perspectives. It has not been in tended as the last word on or a definitive accounting of the CAS/BAI experience. It will have served its purpose if it generates an increased dialogue between those indi viduals within the operational, planning, doctrine, and acquisition communities who are, even now. confronting the challenge of future CAS'BAI warfare.

The F-16 is proposed as the nest swing-role fighter-bomber for CAStBA! Although cntirs would prefer a "mud fighter." history slu >w s that the multirole fighter has been more success ful in combat 26 A/RPOVVER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

sity Press. 1985), 81. 118. 166-67: Amedeo Mecozzi. "Origin! Pacific." Headquarters Marine Air Support Control Units. e svilupo deli'aviazione d'assalto," fievislu Aeronautica 11. Amphibious Forces. Pacific Fleet, 9 June 1945, files of the no. 2 (February 1935): 193-201. Pietro Badoglio, Lo guerru Marine Corps Historical Center; Michael L. Wolfert. "From d'Etiopiu (Milan. Italy: A Mondadori. 1937). 215: War Depart Acts to Cobra: Evolution of Close Air Support Doctrine in ment General Stall. Certain Studies on and Deductions from World War Two," Report No. 88-2800 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Operations ol the Italian Army in East Africa. October 1935- Command and Staff College, April 1988); AAF Evaluation May 1936 (Washington. D.C.: War Department General Staff, Board in the European Theater of Operations, The Effective 18 )une 1937). 47-48, Military Attache. Valencia. Spain. ness of Third Phase Tactical Air Operations in the European "Special Keport on Spanish Government Air Force." 21 Feb Theater, 5 May 1944-8 May 1945 (Dayton. Ohio: Wright Field. ruary 1937. in "Spanish War: Reports and Articles.” vol. 1. ed. February 1946): Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix: The Rise of Byron Q. lones. a typescript document in the library of the Soviet Air Power. 1941—1945 (Washington. D.C..: Smithsonian Military History Institute. Garlisle Barracks. Pa.. 5. 10; Arthur Institution Press. 1982). Ehrhardt. "Airplanes versus Ground Motor: Lessons Gained 4. Robert F. Futrell. The United States Air Force in Korea. from the Battle of Guadalajara." an Army War College trans 1950-1953. rev. ed. (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force lation of an article front IVissen und IVehr. July 1938. in Bvron History. 1983). 78-83. 106-7. 704-5; Richard P. Hallion. The Q. (ones. "Spanish War." vol. 3; Raymond L. Proctor, Hitler's Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War (Westport. Conn.: Green Publishing Go.. 1986). 41 54: Gerald J. Higgins, chief. Army wood Press. 19831; Henry |. Reilly. "The Aeroplane's Role in Support Center, to chief. Army Field Forces, letter, subject: Air Battle in Spain." The Aeroplane 56, no. 1457 (26 April 1939): Support in the Korean Campaign. 1 December 1950: William 515—18; S. V. Slvusarev, "Protecting China's Air Space." A. Gunn. A Study of the Effectiveness of Air Support Opera Soviet Volunteers in China. 1925 1945 (Moscow: Progress tions in Korea (Tokyo: Operations Research Office. General Publishers. 1980). 247 84; Hsu Long-Hsuen and Chang Ming- Headquarters Far East Command, January 1952): |ohn F. Kreis, kai. eds., History of the Sino-Japanese War 11937-1945) Air Warfare and Air Base Air Defense. 1914-1973 (Washing (Taipei, Taiwan: Chung Wu Publishing Go.. 1972). 199; ton. D.C,.: Office of Air Force History. 1988). 299-342; Aero Aleksandr Ya. Kalyagin. Along Alien Hoads (New York: Co space Studies Institute. The Accomplishments of Airpower in lumbia University East Asian Institute. 1983), 127-203, 233- the Malayan Emergency (1948- I960) (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air 35; Alvin D. Coox. Nomonhan: lapan Against Russia. 1939. University. May 1963): G. J. M. Chaussin. “Lessons of the War vols. 1 and 2 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, in Indochina." Interaviu 7 (1952): 670-75; French Supreme 1985). 397. 520. 683-89. 883. and 1069; Edward J. Drea, Command. Far East. Lessons from the Indo-China War. vol. 2 Nomonhan: /apanese-Soviet Tactical Combat. 1939 (Fort (translated edition at Military History Institute library); Lt Col Leavenworth. Kans.: Combat Studies Institute. US Army Com de Fouquieres. "Aviation Militarie F'ranyaise: I’Armee de I’Air mand and General Staff College. January 19811. 69-86; Georgi en lndochine de 1945 a 1954.” Forces Aerielines Francoises. Zhukov. The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (New York: Dela- July 1954. 142-50: A. H. Peterson et al„ Symposium on the corte. 1973). 147-89. Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional 3. Generaistab des Heeres, Kamp/erlebnisse aus dem Feld- Warfare: The Algerian War. Rand Report no. RM-3653-PR zuge in Polen. 1939 (Berlin: E. S. fvlittler & Sohn, 1941). 37-41. (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation. July 1963); Aero 76-86: Williamson Murray. Luftwaffe (Baltimore: Nautical & space Studies Institute. Guerrilla Wurfare and Airpower in Aviation Publishing Co., 1985), 28-^13: Heinz Guderian. Pan Algeria (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University. March 1965): J. zer Leader (New York: Dutton, 1952), 89 98; Peter Mansoor. Calmel. "Aviation Militarie Franchise: Activite de l'Armee de “The Second Battle of Sedan. May 1940." Military Review 68, I'Air en Algerie." Forces Aeriennes Francoises. May 1957, no. 6 (June 1988): 64 75; Kenneth A. Steadman, A Compara 924 27: Aerospace Studies Institute. The Employment of tive Look at Air-Ground Support Doctrine and Practice in Airpower in the Greek Guerrilla War. 1947-1949 (Maxwell World War II (Fort Leavenworth. Kans.: Combat Studies Insti AFB, Ala.: Air University. December 19641: Alan Rufus Wa tute. US Army Command and General Staff College. 1 Septem ters. "The Cost of Air Support in Counter-Insurgency Opera ber 1982): W. A. lacobs. "Air Support for the British Army. tions: The Case of the Mau Mau in Kenya." Military Affairs 37. 1939-1943." Military Affairs 46, no. 4 (December 1982): no. 3 (October 1973): 96 100: Fred E. Wagoner. Dragon Rouge: 174-82; Arthur Coningham. “The Development of Tactical Air The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo (Washington. D.C.: Forces." Journal of the United States Institute 9 (1946): National Defense University Research Directorate, 1980): 211-27: lames A. Huston. "Tactical Use of Air Power in World David R. Mots, Land-Based Air Power in Third World Crises War II: The Army Experience," Military Review 31. no. 7 (July (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press. |uly 19861: Bernard 1952): 166-68: Kent Roberts Greenfield. Army Ground Forces C. Nalty. Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh (Washington. and the Air-Ground Battle Team Including Organic Light D. C.: Office of Air Force History. 19731; Moyers S. Shore II. Aviation (Washington. D C.: Historical Section. Army Ground The Battle for Khe Sanh (Washington. D.C.: Historical Branch. Forces, 1948); W. A. Jacobs. “Tactical Air Doctrine and AAF G-3 Division. Headquarters US Marine Corps. 1969): House Close Air Support in the European Theater. 1944-1945," Committee on Armed Services. Close Air Support: Report of Aerospace Historian 27, no. 1 (March 1980): 35^19; Elwood R. the Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support and Close Quesada. "Tactical Air Power." Air University Quarterly Re Air Support: Hearing before the Special Subcommittee on view 1. no. 4 (Spring 1948): 37—45; Daniel R. Mortensen, A Tactical Air Support. 89th Cong.. 2d sess. (Washington. D.C.: Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support. Government Printing Office. 1966): Thomas C. Thayer, ed.. North Africa (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force History The Air War, vol. 5 of A Systems Analysis View of the and the Army Center of Military History, 1987); Observers Vietnam War, 1965-1972 (Washington, D.C.. Office of the Report. VIII Air Support Command, "Air Operations in Sup Assistant Secretary of Defense. The Pentagon. 18 February port of Ground Troops in North West Africa. 15 March-5 April 1975): Donald |. Mrozek, Air Power and the Ground War in 1943” (US Army Air Forces: VIII Air Support Command, Vietnam: ideas and Actions (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univer 1943). Military History Institute library: US Marine Corps, sity Press, lanuary 1988); David |. Dean. The Air Force Hole in Small Wars Manual. United States Marine Corps, 1940 (Wash Low-Intensity Conflict (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University ington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1940). sec. 9-23 to Press. October 1986): Jeffrey Ethdl and Alfred Price, Air War 9-29; John M. Mcjennett. "Report on Air Support in the South Atlonlic (New York: Macmillan. 19831; Earl II Tilford. BATTLEFIELD AIR SUPPORT 27

|r.. "Air Power Lessons." in Military' Lessons of the Falkland of the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine. Research, Islands War: Views from the United States, ed. Bruce W. and Education (AUCADRE) offers a provocative and insightful Watson and Peter M. Dunn (Boulder. Colo Westview Press. perspective in his "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in 19841. 37-50: Fred Barnes. "Victory in Afghanistan: The the Operational Art." Parameters 29, no. 1 fMarch 1989): Inside Story." Reader's Digest. December 1988. 87-93: Ronald 16-31. E. Bergquist. The Role of Airpower in the Irun-Iraq War 11. Futrell. USAF in Korea. 324-25. 441-42. 451, 471 73: (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press. December 1988); US Navy, commander in chief Pacific Fleet. Interim Evalua David Segal. The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis." For tion Report 5. Major Lessons. 1. 3 (one of six interim evalua eign Affairs 66. no. 5 (Summer 1988): 946—63: Timothy tion reports issued between 1950 and 1953). archives of the Weaver. "Afghan Air Force Proves a Threat to Guerrillas," Naval Aviation History Office. Washington Navy Yard Annex. Washington Post. 18 March 1989. A23. Washington. D.C.; Hailion. Naval Air War in Kurea. 137 50 5. lohn Schlight The War in South Vietnam: The Tears of 12. Chaussin. passim; Bernard B Fall. Hell in a Very Small the Offensive. 1965-1968 (Washington. DC.: Office of Air Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu (New York. Vintage Books. Force History. 19881. 215. 1966). 6. US 12th Army Croup. Battle Experiences, no. 38 (3 13. Schlight. 215-17. September 1944). 1-2. Military History Institute (MH1) library; 14. William Mitchell. Memoirs of World War I From Start to Omar N. Bradley and Air Effects Committee. 12th Army Finish of Our Greatest War (New York: Random House. 1960). Croup. Effect of Air Power on Military Operations. Western 236, 261: Sunderland. 1-3; “Colonel F'abre," La tactique au Europe (Wiesbaden. Germany: US 12th Army Group Air Maroc (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle & Cie. 1931). 195; Karl Branches of G-3 and G-2. 15 July 1945). 41—12; Max Hastings. Drum, "The German Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War" Das Reich: The March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division through (unpublished manuscripts) (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Univer France (New York: Jove Books. 1983). 218: Dwight D. Eisen sity. 1956). 198-202. copy in the archives of the USAF hower. Supreme Commander’s Dispatch for Operations in Historical Research Center. Maxwell AF'B. Ala.: Denis Rich Northwest Europe. 6 June 1944-8 May 1945 (Supreme Head ards and Hilary St. George Saunders. Royal Air Force 1939 quarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, n.d.). 43-44. MH1 li 1945. vol. 1. The Fight Avails (London: Her Majesty’s brary; AAF Evaluation Board. Effectiveness. 121: Rudolf- Stationery Office. 1954), 160-62; John Terraine. A Time for Christoph von Gersdorff. "The Argenlan-Falaise Pocket." Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War. 1939- Manuscript A-919. 5-6. and "Northern France: vol. 5 [Fifth 1945 (New York: Macmillan. 1985), 359: Schlight. 217 Panzer Army (25 July-25 August 44)]," Manuscript B-726. 15. Omar N. Bradley. A Soldier's Story (New York: Holt, 33-34. both issued by the Historical Division. Headquarters Rinehart and Winston, 1948). 150-52: Albert N. Garland et al US Army Europe, c. 1950-1954. in MHI library; Hilary St. Sicily and the Surrender of Italy (Washington. D.G.: Olfice of G. orge Saunders. Royal Air Force 1939-1945. vol. 3. The the Chief of Military History. 1965). 342. 403; Guderian. 113, Fight Is Won (London. Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 1954), F. W. von Melienthin. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employ 136. ment of Armor in the Second World War (New York: Ballan- 7 Riley Sunderland. Evolution of Command and Control tine Books. 1971), 7: Ernst Kupfer, "Schlachtflieger, Doctrine for Close Air Support (Washington. D.C.: Office of Panzerjagd. und Slorflugzeug im fahre 1943." Document no. Air Force History. March 1973), 10: John L. Zimmerman. The K113.3019-3, USAF Historical Research Center; Flugene M. Guadalcanal Campaign (Washington, D.C.: Historical Divi Greenberg. Signals: The Story of Communications in the XIX sion. Headquarters US Marine Corps. 1949). 65-89; Robert Tactical Air Command (Erlangen, Germany: Headquarters Sherrod. History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II XIX Tactical Air Command. 15 June 1945); Richard H, Kohn (Washington, D.C.; Combat Arms Press. 1952). 82-90: |ohn N. and J. Patrick Harahan. eds.. Air Interdiction in World War II. Rentz. Bougainville and the Northern Solomons (Washington, Korea, and Vietnam (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force D C.: Historical Section. Office of Public Information. Head History. 1985). 54-55; Preliminary Action Reports for the USS quarters US Marine Corps. 1948), 83-85. 90; Ernest II Giusti. Valley Forge (20 August 1950) and USS Philippine Sea (16 "Marine Air over the Pusan Perimeter." Marine Corps Gazette August 1950) in the Naval Aviation History Office archives, 36. no. 5 (May 1952): 18-27: Kenneth W. Condit and Ernest H. Washington Navy Yard Annex. Washington. D.C.; Schlight, Giusti. "Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir." Marine Corps 131-34. 160-65; Tim Cline. "Forward Air Control in the Gazette 36. no. 7 (July 1952): 18-25: Ernest H. Giusti and Korean War." Journal of the American Aviation Historical Kenneth W. Condit. Marine Air Covers the Breakout." Marine Society 21, no. 4 (Winter 1976): 257-62: Philip |. Dermer, Corps Gazette 36. no. 8 lAugust 1952): 20-27; Adm |ohn S. "JAAT Eagle 87," United States Army Aviation Digest 1-88-8 Thach. USN. Retired. US Naval Institute oral history memoir. (August 1988): 32-36. Nimitz Memorial Library archives. US Naval Academy. An 16. Vladimir Matiosov. “Engaging Aerial Targets.” Soviet napolis. Md . Schlight. 99-111, 193-205: Nalty. passim Military Review 12 (December 1988): 13: see also Stuart 8. John | Sullivan. The Botched Air Support of Operation Cloete. A Victorian Son: An Autobiography. 1887-1922 (New Cobra." Parameters 18. no. 1 (March 1988): 97-110; Eisen York: John Day. 1973), 288; John Bagot Clubb, War in the hower. Supreme Commander's Dispatch, 21-23. 38-39: AAF Desert: An RAF' Frontier Campaign (New York W. W. Norton. Evaluation Board. Effectiveness. 85-94: Bradley and Air Ef 1961), 236-42: Macaulay. 166-67; Military Attache. Valencia. fects Committee. 12th Armv Group. Effect of Air Power. Spain, "Special Report." 14; Joe Gordon and Leo Gordon. 26-15. 201-5. 212-15. “Seven Letters from Spain." and Ben Iceland. "The Big 9. For a contrary view, see Robert F. Futrell, "Tactical Retreat." in Our Fight: Writings by Veterans of the A bruham Employment of Strategic Air Power in Korea." Airpower Lincoln Brigade. Spain. 1936-1939. ed Alvah Bessie and loumal 2. no. 4 (Winter 1988): 29-41. Albert Prago (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987), 201. 10 F M Sallagar. Operation "Strangle" lltaly. Spring 1944). 227; Marc Bloch. Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence A Case Study of Tactical Air Interdiction. Rand Report no. Written in 1940 (London: Oxford University Press. 1949). R-851-PR (Santa Monica. Calif Rand Corporation, February 54-55; Fritz Bayerlein. "Panzer-Lehr Division (24-25 Jul 44)." 1972) For a differing (but not altogether contrary) view, see Manuscript A-902 (Historical Division, Headquarters US Eduard Mark A New Look at Operation STRANGLE." Mili Army Europe, n.d.), 1-4, Military History Institute (Mlit) tary Affairs 52. no. 4 (October 1988): 176-84 Price T. Bingham library: Alstair Horne. To Lose a Battle; France. 1940 (Boston: 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

Little. Brown and Co.. 1969). 332—35; Guderian. 100-105; Aircraft far Limited War (U). Rand Report no. RM-3534-PR Interview of Lt Gen Elwood Quesada, USAF, Retired. MH1 (Santa Monica. Calif.: Rand Corporation. March 1963) Senior Officers' Debriefing Program. 20, MH1 library (the (Secret): and the previously cited House Armed Services incident is also recounted in |ohn Schlight's "Elwood R Committee documents. Close Air Support: Report and Hear Quesada: Tac Air Comes of Age." in Makers United ing. of the 23. For examples, see Futrell. USAF in Korea; Hallion. States Air Force, ed. |ohn L. Frisbee (Washington. D.C.: Office Naval Air War in Korea; Naity; Shore; Mann; Harry G. Sum of Air Force History. 1987), 177 204. mers. Jr.. "Afghanistan and Vietnam: Wrong Equation, Wrong 17. S. Karpinski et al.. Destiny Cun Wait. The Polish Air Answer." Washington Times. 16 February 1989, FI; Bruce Force in the Second World War (London: William Heinemann Palmer. The 25-Vear War: America's Military Role in Vietnam Ltd.. 1949), 13-14; Richards and Saunders, 108 19: Terraine. (Lexington. Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1984). 120-21. 118-65: Horne. 239. 247-48; "Lieutenant-colonel Salesse." 157-60; Harry G. Summers. )r.. On Strategy: A Critical Anal L’Aviation de Chasse Francois en 1939-1940 (Paris: Editions ysis of the Vietnam War (Novato. Calif.: Presidio Press. 1982). Berger-Levrault, 1948). 90. 134 15; John A Doglione et al.. Airpowerund the 1972 Spring 18. Hallion. Naval Air War in Korea. 89; Fall. Hell in a Very invasion (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University, n.d.). Small Place, passim. 24. Saunders. 136: ). E. Johnson. Wing Leader (New York: 19. David K. Mann. The 1972 Invasion of Military Region I: Bailantine Books. 1967). 237: AAF Evaluation Board. Effec Foil of Quang Tri and Defense of Hue (Hickam AFB. Hawaii: tiveness. 89; Hardesty. 163-64; Sergei Rudenko. “The Gaining Headquarters Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Operations of Air Supremacy and Air Operations in the Battle of Kursk." Analysis, contemporary historical examination of current op in The Battle of Kursk, ed. Ivan Parotkin et al. (Moscow: erations (CHECO)/Corona Harvest Division. 15 March 1973); Progress Publishers. 1974). 193-95: and Ray Wagner. The Kreis. 325-38 Soviet Air Force in World War II: The Official History (Garden 20. Barnes. 91; Tilford. 46; Steven Zaloga. “The Soviet City. N.Y.: Doubleday. 1973), 172; and M. N. Kozhevnikov. Antidote to NATO Tactical Air," Armed Forces /ournul Inter The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the national. January 1989, 26-28: John Walker. "The Air Battle: Great Patriotic War. 1941 1945: A Soviet View, a 1977 Soviet The First Hours." NATO's Sixteen Nations 33. no. 5 (Sep study translated by the US Air Force as a volume in the Soviet tember 1988): 28-33. Military Thought series (Washington, D.C.: Government Print 21. Bradley and Air Effects Committee. 12th Army Group. ing Office, n.d.), 152-79. Effect of Air Power. 26-45, 201-15; lacob W. Kipp. Bar- 25. Saunders. 118-21: Bradley and Air Effects Committee. barossa. Soviet Covering Forces, and the Initial Period of War. 12th Army Group. Effect of Air Power. 45; AAF Evaluation Military History and Airland Battle (Fort Leavenworth. Runs.: Board, Effectiveness. 384-85: Futrell. USAF in Korea. 329-30; Soviet Army Studies Office, n.d.). Military History Institute Hallion. Naval Air War in Korea. 103-4. 146^19. 165-67: library: ar.d lacob W. Kipp. "Soviet 'Tactical' Aviation in the Frank Smyth. “Night Support: A New Weapon." Marine Corps Postwar Period: Technological Change, Organizational Inno Gazette 35. no. 11 (November 1951): 16-21: "Night Hecklers vation. and Doctrinal Continuity." Airpower Journal 2. no. 1 in Korea." Naval Aviation Confidential Bulletin 1-52 (August (Spring 1988): 10-12. 1952): 25-26: Adm Charles S. Minter, |r.. USN. Retired. US 22. George M. Watson. |r.. The A-10 Close Air Support Naval Institute oral history memoir. Nimitz Memorial Library Aircraft: From Development to Production. 1970-1976 (An archives. US Naval Academy. Annapolis. Md.: Chaussin. drews AFB. Md.: History Office. Headquarters Air Force 670-75; Schlight. War in South Vietnam. 99-102, 253. Systems Command, n.d.); see also R. Schamberg. Tactical 26. Futrell. USAF in Korea. 461.

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Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air Power

M ai Roger F. K ropf, USAF

HE North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) on 25 June 1950 found the US armed forces in a deplorable condition with little conventional capabil ity.1 The newly established United States Air Force had spent most of its limited Tbudget on strategic nuclear systems, ne glecting the tactical air forces. The Far East Air Force (FEAF), based in Japan, and its Fifth Air Force had conducted few joint exercises to practice air-ground coordina tion with the Eighth US Army in Korea The Joint Command (EUSAK).2 Within a month the NKPA drove Structure the United Nations (UN) forces to a small At the root of air power’s difficulties perimeter around the port of Pusan. Despite during the Korean War was the command the unprepared condition of the tactical air structure of the Far East Command (FEC) of forces, air power prevented disaster and Gen Douglas MacArthur, commander in complete defeat of the UN forces during the chief, Far East (CINCFE). In the words of initial NKPA invasion. Lt Gen Walton H. the official USAF history: Walker, the commander of EUSAK at the start of the war, stated. "If it had not been The Korean war was the first conflict to test for the air support we received from the the unified military forces of the United Fifth Air Force, we should not have been States. Although the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the Far East Command to pro able to stay in Korea."'1 While the USAF vide itself with a joint command staff ade was a major factor in helping to ensure the quate to ensure that the joint commander was independence of South Korea, there were fully cognizant of the capabilities, limitations, numerous errors committed by the US forces, and most effective utilization of all the forces including the Air Force, that resulted in under his command, the United Nations ineffective application of air power. Command/Far East Command operated for War is a complex endeavor, and the prob the first two and one-half years of the Korean lems encountered are often interrelated. war without a joint headquarters. Practically For example, the failure to develop a true all of the interservice problems which arose joint theater command structure in Korea during the Korean war could be traced to not only contributed to other problems but misunderstandings which, in all likelihood, would never have arisen from the delibera inhibited the development of solutions to tions of a joint staff. In the absence of the joint the problems. Additionally, problems in headquarters staff, the full force of United air-ground coordination led to degraded Nations airpower was seldom effectively ap close air support, and Air Force-Navy coor plied against hostile target systems in Korea.4 dination remained difficult through most of One of the lessons of World War II was the war. A true joint staff could have as the need for a joint command structure for sisted in the resolution of these problems. command of a theater. A joint headquarters,

Air interdiction had an important role in with expertise from all the services, over the war but was not always used effectively. sees the subordinate ground, air, and naval Finally, the USAF lost flexibility in em components, ensuring the most efficient, ploying its new jet aircraft when it ran into coordinated, and synchronized employ problems with the availability of air bases ment of the theater commander's resources/’ that had long, concrete runways for these aircraft. This article examines these problem ar eas of the Korean War. While the history of MacArthur's Command Structure a war that ended over 36 years ago cannot As CINCFE, MacArthur and his unified give us solutions to current problems, it can theater headquarters (usually referred to as provide perspective and insight into prob GHQ) actually had dual responsibility as lems and a basis for asking the right ques the unified theater headquarters and as the tions. headquarters of the ground component command (GCC). MacArthur’s GHQ was essentially an Army staff and had inade 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 quate representation of the Navy and Air Force.6 In the words of Maj Gen O. P. Weyland, investigating problems in Korea in October 1950: The GHQ staff of Cincfe [sic] is essentially an Army staff and cannot be considered a joint staff. With the exception of the Commander- in-Chief. few of the staff previously held com mand positions higher than that of the regiment or the division . . . very few. if any. of the GHQ staff previously had experience which included the tactical handling of air. The lack, of air representation has made it difficult to realize the most efficient and timely employment of air power in Korea.7 MacArthur never formed a GCC (Army Forces Far East, or AFFE), but initially kept X Corps (formed for the Inchon invasion) separate from the Eighth Army” and di rected both ground components from 700 miles away in Tokyo.9 When he finally placed X Corps under Eighth Army in De cember 1950, AFFE was still not formed. GHQ continued to perform this role. As a General MacArthur's insistence on personal control of result. MacArthur had all commanding Korean activities and the lack of a joint staff under his control generals report to him through his Army- resulted in significant problems in prosecuting the Korean air dominated GHQ.111 This essentially put the campaign. air and naval component commands under the ground component command (fig. 1). of trustworthies (some say sycophants) To make matters worse, MacArthur re known as the "Bataan Gang” and kept his mained isolated from his staff and did not theater headquarters far from the front.1" work closely with his principal subordi His first air commander. Lt Gen George nates and commanders. For example. Gen Brett, was ineffective and was relieved, but eral Walker did not have a close working his replacement by Gen George C. Kenney relationship with MacArthur and GHQ and resulted in the successful integration of air was visibly hostile towards MacArthur’s power into the campaign. MacArthur still chief of staff and future X Corps com had an Army staff instead of a joint staff, mander. Maj Gen Edward Almond.1' These but in Kenney he found an air commander traits were nothing new with MacArthur; whom he trusted and left alone to run the he had shown them during World War II. air campaign.11 The credit for MacArthur's successful use of air power in World War II must largely be credited to the forcefulness MacArthur’s World War II and exceptional abilities of General Ken Command Structure ney. MacArthur's stature and the Navy's suspi cions of him led to a division of responsi bility in the Pacific Theater in World War II. Problems of the Joint rather than a single unified command. Mac Command Structure Arthur, heading the Southwest Pacific In Korea, the command structure greatly Command, surrounded himself with a staff hindered the coordination of joint forces US AIR FORCE IN KOREA 3 a

and communication between forces. A typ improvement, he still took over as CIN- ical failure was in air targeting. Instead of CAFFE, continuing as commander of both having FEAF. the air component command, the theater and GCC.19 perform air targeting, GHQ formed the GHQ Target Group and tried to direct air opera tions from Tokyo.14 The Target Group, Air-Ground Coordination made up of GHQ staff officers, "lacked the experience and depth of knowledge for and Close Air Support targeting an air force. . . . [Tjhe [Target Group] effort was inadequate."1’ As an ex The Air Force also experienced major ample. 20 percent of the first 220 targets problems in air-ground coordination and designated were nonexistent, such as the close air support (CAS). Although lack of a rail bridges at Yongwol and Machari—two true joint command structure contributed towns without railroads at all.11’ A GHQ to these problems, there were major Air Target Selection Committee, which in Force and Army shortcomings that were cluded high-level USAF and US Navy per primary causes. Entering the war. FEAF’s sonnel. was formed to improve targeting. primary mission was the air defense of the The GHQ Committee did improve perfor Far East, especially Japan. It had conducted mance but was dependent on the FEAF minimal and unrealistic training in close Formal Target Committee, with Navy. Fifth air support with the Eighth Army.20 Air Force, and Far East Bomber Command representatives providing expert targeting. This FEAF Committee did not get full au Control of Close Air Support thority for air targeting until the summer of Initially, FEAF had only rudimentary tacti 1952. two years into the war.1 The overall cal air control capabilities. It sent two tac effect was the failure to fully integrate air tical air control parties (TACPs) to Korea power into the theater campaign. immediately to support the ROK troops, Another result of GHQ interference was but these were inadequately equipped and the hindrance of Eighth Army requests for not well trained. The old. worn-out jeep- air support early in the war. GHQ directed mounted radios of World War II vintage, the ground forces not to contact Fifth Air unable to take the beating of the rough Force for air support but rather to send all terrain, were constantly breaking down and requests through GHQ in Tokyo. This en were difficult to repair. The TACPs were tailed long and ponderous communications often unable to get to the front lines with links from EUSAK to GHQ to FEAF and working equipment, and, if they did, their finally to Fifth Air Force. As a result, in the unarmored jeeps and radios were ex early phases of the war it took about four tremely vulnerable to enemy fire. The re hours to channel requests for air support sult was an inability to get far enough from Eighth Army to Fifth Air Force, a forward to direct effective air strikes.21 Ad major factor inhibiting prompt and effec ditionally. the Army had failed to develop tive air support.18 adequate communication nets for tactical In a review of the command structure air requests and liaison, forcing the Army after taking over as CINCFE in the spring of to use (and to overload) the Air Force 1952. Gen Mark W. Clark recognized the tactical air direction network.22 The sum poor organization of the Far East Com total of these problems was a ploddingly mand. He formed and activated AFFE. the slow network that inhibited rapid response ground component command, in October to immediate needs for CAS. 1952, and it began functioning in January The total inadequacy of tactical air- 1953. While General Clark formed a true ground coordination and the initially per joint staff at FEC, which was an important missive air environment led FEAP’ to equip 34 AIRPOWEB JOURNAL SPRING 1990

Figure 1. Unified Far East Command Organization of Forces in Korea.

T-6 aircraft as airborne tactical air coordi Mosquitoes quickly led to saturation under nators, called "Mosquitoes.”2'i These Mos heavy usage. quitoes. along with such steps as assigning Although the tactical air control system TACPs to every regiment and setting up a was improved significantly, its continuing tactical air control net for Eighth Army, deficiencies were masked bv the decreasing improved Air Force CAS. Because such importance of CAS due to the improved slow, unarmed aircraft are very vulnerable organic firepower of the ground forces and in a high-threat environment, the improved the change from a fluid war of maneuver to Chinese defenses forced F’EAF to restrict a static front in the second six months of the Mosquitoes to within two miles of the war,25 a condition that lasted the rest of friendly lines by the summer of 1951.24 the war. FEAF shifted its emphasis to air Additionally, the very limited radios of the interdiction but continued to provide CAS; l/s AM FORCE IN KOREA 35

however, even with the static ground envi Besides being unable to stand up to ar ronment, CAS was not very responsive. In mor. the UN forces were consistently out- September 1951, the Marines, now inte maneuvered in the fluid situation as the grated into Eighth Army and without their NKPA drove down the Korean peninsula. own organic air support, were involved in The tendency of US forces to deploy near the heaviest fighting on the front. FEAF the roads and not take the high ground supported their need for CAS with an aver aided the enemy in their typical offensive age response time of 113 minutes.“b tactic of envelopment or double envelop Overall, the Army and Air Force failed to ment, cutting off the rear lines of commu find a satisfactory way to provide timely nication, disrupting the rear areas and often response and front-line control of air overrunning the artillery. In the first six strikes.2 This was finally revealed in the months of the war, US artillery was repeat last months of the war, when the Chinese edly overrun, with “scandalous” losses of mounted one last offensive and the Army field pieces.30 This added to the heavy needed CAS. The official Navy history dependence on CAS for firepower. noted that CAS was undoubtedly an important fac the close support request net clogged almost tor early in the war, as evidenced by the at once . . . strikes followed requests by as comments of Maj Gen William Kean, com much as 17 hours. Again . . . the control mander of the US 25th Division, after two system collapsed as JOC [Fifth Air Force Joint days of heavy fighting in September 1950: Operations Center] duty officers . . . rammed “The close air support rendered by Fifth aircraft in large numbers into the threatened Air Force again saved this division as they sectors. Once more . . . the main responsi bility [was put on] the Mosquitos [sic] which, have many times before."31 The official in the fluid situation, once more demon Army history also noted that strated their inability to keep track of friendly in the first month of the Korean War. close air positions and important targets.28 support was a vital factor in preventing the Clearly the ability to rapidly respond to North Koreans from overrunning all Korea, emergency needs for CAS was never estab and in gaining for the United States the mar lished in Korea. gin of time necessary to bring in reinforce ments and accumulate the supplies needed to organize the Pusan Perimeter . . . the U.N. Light Infantry and ground forces in Korea were receiving propor Close Air Support tionately more air support than had General Bradlev's Twelfth Army Group in World War The Army entered the war with a piece II.32 meal commitment of light infantry against an NKPA invasion backed by significant It should be noted that this “close air sup armor forces equipped with the powerful port" included what we now call battlefield T-34 tank. Normally, the Army uses organic air interdiction (BAI). Indeed, most tanks artillery and armor to provide close-in fire killed by air power were destroyed by BAI power. but it entered Korea with few tanks sorties, not CAS.33 and inadequate infantry and artillery anti tank rounds, having viewed Korea as un suitable terrain for tanks. Additionally, the Coordination with Naval Aviation ROK army was lightly armed, more a police The problems of air-ground coordination in force than an army.20 Although a buildup of the Korean War were compounded by the artillery and armor was rapidly made, the inability of FEAF to adequately communi initial use of light infantry against the ar cate and coordinate with naval (including mored NKPA forces in the first months of Marine) aviation. Although routine inter- the war led to the need for heavy air sup service problems were easily handled, doc port. trinal clashes over control of tactical air 36 AIRPOW'ER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 power between USAF and naval aviation and Army. This dedicated air support as were not solved in Korea.34 Again, the lack sumes air superiority and a limited geo of a joint command structure contributed to graphical front, with no requirement to these problems and the failure to com rapidly concentrate air power in other areas pletely resolve them. of the theater. These factors led to the Marines having aircraft on air alert for 5- to 10-minute response, while the Air Force Coordination of Close Air Support required them to be on call, with typical The Marines, in their amphibious role, response times of 40 minutes.3' Still, trou were essentially light infantry and lacked ble did not start until the Navy ran into the adequate organic artillery and armor. Their FEAF air-ground control network. The doctrine specified a dependence on CAS to need to check in with the Fifth Air Force within 50-200 yards. The Army preferred Joint Operations Center (JOC) in Taegu artillery for very close support and usually forced aircraft to fly within 10 or 15 miles used CAS farther from troops (beyond of the JOC for assignment to a controller, 1.000 yards), where ground controllers adding as much as 200 extra miles to sor were of limited use. In contrast to the ties. This greatly limited options and time prewar relationship between FEAF and on station.3” Eighth Army, Navv-Marine aviation trained Additionally, the Air Force 4- and 8- extensively and realistically with the Ma channel VHF radios on the T-6 did not have rine ground units. This resulted in very adequate capacity, especially compared effective Marine air-ground coordination with the better Navy 12- and 20-channel and CAS, with dependence on the Navy sets.39 Two of the T-6 channels were set to and FEAF for air superiority.3’ It seems no ground party frequencies, leaving two (or at coincidence that captured enemy troops best six) frequencies for working air con said they most feared, "the blue airplanes” trol. When a real need arose, JOC would of the Navy and Marines,36 swamp the sector, leaving the T-6s and Of course, the Marines had a major ad their few radio channels overloaded. Be vantage in that their brigade (eventually a cause of the limited frequencies and multi division) had its own dedicated Marine air ple flights, TACPs and Mosquitoes would wing, a concept too cost-prohibitive for the often all be on the same channel, causing much larger theater forces of the Air Force great confusion and inefficiency.40 An ac tion report from the aircraft carrier Philip pine Sea provides an example: For this vessel the subject of close support is a touchy one. The inability to establish good communications with any controllers has limited its effectiveness. There is apparently no such thing as radio discipline, if a pilot has something to say he just tries to cut out whoever is on the air. Too many tactical air controllers and different support flights are on the same channels. With the present ground situation as it is [that is, fluid] it is mandatory that the pilots be informed exactly as to their

The T-6 Mosquito forward air control aircraft was the mainstay of CAS air operations. Unfortunately, its limited communications and its vulnerability to ground fire hampered its effectiveness. US AIR FORCE IN KOREA 37

mission. In the past this has not been done operations, “including the targets to be hit and has resulted in inefficient use of aircraft and the area in which they operate.”45 from this vessel engaged in close support When Adm C. Turner Joy. Commander of operations.4' naval forces in the Far East (CONNAVFE), Compounding the situation, the poor pay- objected. Stratemever clarified that by con load and lack of loiter time of FEAF’s trol he meant "the authority to designate Japan-based F-80s often forced Navy air the type of mission, such as air defense, craft to hold while the F-80s made their close support of ground forces, etc., and to runs. Many times the Navy aircraft could specify the operational details such as tar not even make contact with the Mosqui gets, times over targets, degree of effort, toes. Navy captain John Thatch “just etc., within the capabilities of the forces couldn’t believe that communications involved.’’4'’ Again, he stressed that to get could be so bad [that] the pilots would the most out of air power resources. FEAF come back and say ’We couldn’t help. We needed operational control of all FEAF and wanted to. We were there and we couldn't NAVFE air resources to ensure deconflic- get in communication with people.’"4J tion of targets and effective coordination of all air efforts. The Navy still did not agree, but in an 11 July 1950 meeting, an agree Control of Naval Air Resources ment was made for FEAF to have coordina The question of unified command of all tion control over Navy air—a new term theater air power remained an Air Force- with different meanings to the Air Force Navy issue throughout the war. Lt Gen and Navy.4 George E. Stratemever. commander of FEAF, insisted on operational control of all naval aircraft operating out of Japan or flying over Korea. The Navy, however, al though mainly supporting the theater ground forces in Korea, also had responsi bility for control of the sea. sea lines of communication, fleet defense, and the de fense of Formosa. In light of these respon sibilities. the Navy was not willing to subordinate its air resources to an air com ponent commander. Rather than being un der the operational control of the theater commander, the Navy saw itself in a sup porting role.41 This fundamental doctrinal difference on control of theater air power never was satisfactorily resolved during the war, although an acceptable working rela tionship was finally established.44 General Stratemever felt that to coordi nate carrier and FEAF operations over Korea, he needed to control naval air

Fr* tactical air control parties existed in Korea. Their com munications gear was limited and often Jailed due to the conditions under which the TACPs operated. Just contacting CAS aircraft often proved impossible. 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

The Navy believed its air component had communications.49 One example of the in to support the sea campaign first. Although compatibility of the high-volume Air Force in Korea there was virtually no battle for communications with the limited Navy ca the sea, there was significant concern over pacity was a FEAF radio message in No a Communist invasion of Formosa, for vember 1950 that gave the air plan for one which the Navy was responsible. It inter day. Sent to the carrier task force, it re preted the term coordination control as quired over 30 man-hours to process.30 fitting its supporting force role and did not These problems were partially a result of accept it as meaning that naval air forces the bitter “unification” battles that resulted were under the operational control of the in the National Security Act of 1947. In the air component command. While this ar end, the Air Force had “won” complete rangement may satisfy short contingency responsibility for air interdiction. As a re operations, it hampered the long-term the sult, the Navy had no plans to use its air in ater air campaign.4” long-term land campaigns.51 The lack of To solve the coordination problems, training for interdiction and the major dif NAVFE requested and was given exclusive ferences in employing CAS hindered coor areas of operation for Navy air close to the dination and cooperation between the east coast of Korea, where the carriers op Navy and Air Force. As a result of the erated. This limitation of naval air power to interservice disputes after World War II, the a geographical area eliminated the capabil Navy had a deep-seated distrust of the Air ity to mass firepower at the most critical Force. It did not always make an effort to points in the theater, and caused the loss of cooperate with FEAF even when FEAF was flexibility in applying maximum air power eager to work jointly.52 Ultimately both on the most important targets. services must share in the blame for their Part of the problem in integrating naval failure to work together. air into the theater air battle was the large As the war progressed. Air Force-Navy amount of communications required by the cooperation did improve significantly. Co large, centralized FEAF system. Carriers operation was greatly aided by improved had limited communications capabilities, Navy representation at both the Fifth Air often operated under radio silence, and Force Joint Operations Center and the were unable to handle high-volume FEAF FEAF Targeting Committee, both of which became solid joint operations.Nonethe less. fundamental differences, especially in the control of air resources, were never completely worked out. Air Interdiction The Korean War had some unique factors that affected air interdiction (AI). including terrain and the Chinese sanctuary. It also provides examples of effective and ineffec tive air interdiction, demonstrating the im portance of integrating air interdiction efforts into the overall theater campaign.

Organic artillery support was the alternative to CAS. Few artillery pieces were located in Korea at the outbreak of the war, and many of those were abandoned during retreats, making air support essential to defeat the enemy. US AIR FORCE IN KOREA 39 Factors Affecting Air ment effective countermeasures such as us Interdiction in Korea ing camouflage, restricting travel to night, Korea favors air interdiction, being a 400- and deploying repair teams for rails, roads, nautical-mile long peninsula varying in and bridges.55 Finally, the static front that width from about 100 to about 300 nautical developed and the reduced need for ground miles. It is extremely mountainous, result maneuver limited the effectiveness of inter ing in over 85 percent of the terrain being diction. unsuitable for vehicles. At the time of the war. traffic was concentrated on the few Effective Air Interdiction roads and railroads of the existing network. The depth of most rivers varies from deep Initially, as UN forces retreated to establish (between March and September) to ford the Pusan perimeter, FEAF began conduct- able at other times. During winter many rivers (including the Yalu) freeze over.34 An important factor affecting interdiction was the sanctuary the UN extended to Chi nese territory, allowing buildup of vehicles and supplies in China. Additionally, the Communist soldiers needed few supplies by US standards; and they were able to use manpower to carry supplies and to imple

Interservice doctrinal conflict hindered performance in the field during the entire Korean War. The Marines used dedi cated air assets (right) to support thei r ground units. They also operated significantly closer to friendly forces, making them more effective. However, naval air support was often made ineffective due to the cumbersome reporting requirements of the Far East Air Forces control system. Reliance on jet aircraft needing long, concrete runways meant that these F-80 aircraft (below) were staged out of Japan for Korean opera tions. This resulted in little loiter time and light bomb loads.

MSB* *'«* 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 ing air interdiction to cut the lengthening bombers was very effective in interdicting NKPA supply lines. In combination with enemy ground forces en route to the battle long lines of communication and heavy field in what is now called battlefield air ground fighting, interdiction greatly re interdiction (BAI).59 However, interdiction duced the fighting capability of the NKPA alone did not lead to victory. It was the and resulted in extreme shortages of men combination of this continual air interdic and virtually all supplies.r>6 The bombing tion with ground maneuver (the Inchon of bridges is usually emphasized in this AI landing), and ground offensives (the Eighth campaign, but AI in the form of armed Army’s breakout from Pusan) that resulted reconnaissance, usually by naval and FEAF in the rout and destruction of the NKPA.60 fighter-bombers, had the major impact. This theater-level integration of interdic Fighters roamed the roads and rails, look tion into the campaign was the key to suc ing for lucrative targets and strafing and cess. rocketing trains and convoys. For example, Besides helping destroy the NKPA. air on 10 July 1950, an F-80 discovered a interdiction made another significant con convoy backed up behind a downed bridge tribution to the UN effort. When the Chi and called in additional air. A combination nese Communist Forces (CCF) intervened of F-80s, F-82s, and B-26s destroyed 117 in the war late in November 1950, the trucks. 38 tanks. 7 half-tracks, and killed restrictions on CCF maneuver created by numerous soldiers. ” From the enemy sol interdiction allowed Eighth Army to break dier's viewpoint, the effect was devastating. clear and retreat to prepared defenses. For One prisoner described such an attack: “En nearly three weeks, the Eighth Army was route from Kwangung area the 8th [NKPA] out of contact while air interdiction sorties division was attacked many times by air hammered the CCF.61 craft and lost ten 76mm. field guns, three Throughout the war, AI forced the enemy 122mm. howitzers. 20 tanks, and 50 trucks to travel at night, limiting his maneuver, loaded with ammunition and equip the distance he could travel, and the avail m e n t.’'' This is similar to the experiences ability of his supplies, thus reducing the of World War II, such as at Normandy, CCF's capability to mount or sustain offen when armed reconnaissance by fighter- sives.62 Nevertheless, air interdiction made a significant contribution to victory only when it was combined with maneuver of ground forces as an integral part of the theater campaign. Unsuccessful Air Interdiction Despite these successes, the Air Force and Arinv demonstrated their incomplete un derstanding of AI bv conducting Operation Strangle in isolation from significant ground maneuver over a period of 10 months from August 1951 to May 1952. The operation was a systematic attempt to cut off the enemy in the front lines from their supplies through the sustained exercise of air inter-

Targeting of North Korean supply trai ns (left) and marshalling yards (opposite page) destroyed a good deal of North Korea's rail system. However, failure to coordinate this effort with ground activity significantly decreased its effectiveness. needed to maneuver and offen the totake maneuver needed the gro tion. since the UN was unwilling to commit UNthe wasunwilling since tion. incomplete understanding of understanding air interdic incomplete an effort demonstrated This unrealistic.64 obvious that these expectations were obvious thatexpectations these shorten his supply lines."6’ It became soon shorten his lines."6’ supply borderin toorder to the Manchurian closer forced voluntarily forcedto voluntarily withdraw his t Army ground offensive or he would be that he could easily be routedthatbveasily he could anEighth sothe weaken "would campaign enemy tem. They believed that this interdiction thatinterdiction this tem. believed They a plan to destroy the railroadenemy sys fordeveloped targets. moreFEAF effective reached its objectives and itsreached Lookinghalted. objectives faded inas theeffectiveness offensive efforts the road-interdiction successful, offensive in the summer of 1951. Initially Initially inthe offensive summer 1951. of effort in conjunction effortwith an in Eighth conjunction Army vr Strangle diction. followed aroad-interdiction und forces (and take take (and und forces the casualties) the casualties) roops roops for aviation engineers to build and main and to build for engineers aviation tain suitable runways. The official USAF official The runways. tain suitable of in jet war.aircraft need for long, The reinforced concrete runways resulted in resulted runways concrete reinforced with the runway requirements experience pacts on air operations and requirements requirements and pacts onair operations in im major air with basing, inflexibility sive6^—key elements in integrating in integrating insive6^—key air elements terdiction into As a the theater terdiction campaign. USAF official history notes: history official USAF The Korean War Korean prolonged The first was the greatest.66 ground situation was fluid, the fighting in fighting the was fluid, ground situation tense. tense. andthe needs were logistical enemy's for an interdiction campaign was when the the waswhen campaign forinterdiction an AsWorldin was War the time case best the II, Air Basing Problems Air Basing US AIR FORCE IN KOREA FORCE AIR US 41 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

history notes, “In two years of war in Korea The F-51 Mustang was brought out of mothballs to relieve the no single factor had so seriously handi need for an aircraft with significant loiter time. Because the F-51 did not need long, concrete runways from which to capped Fifth Air Force operational capabil operate, it could he based in Korea, close to the front lines. ities as the lack of adequate air facilities.

though the P-47 was preferred because of Aircraft Performance and its toughness and survivability, there were Runway Capabilities simply not enough of them available/0 In The Air Force was moving into the jet age its stead, the F-51 could still carry signifi in 1950. Unfortunately, there were no long, cant ordnance, had a long loiter time, and reinforced runways in Korea, and only four could operate from primitive runways.71 in Japan, to support the Air Force’s new jet As the front moved early in the war, the aircraft.69 Flying from Japan, the F-80 was older planes were flexible enough to use at the edge of its range, had virtually no primitive runways reinforced with metal loiter time, and initially had no bomb racks matting, while those jets that had moved to carry bombs and napalm. Typical ord from Japan to Korea were tied to a few large nance consisted of .50-caliber guns and fields—with major consequences when rockets. At one point, an entire squadron they fell into enemy hands. For example, averaged only 441 pounds of bombs dropped when Seoul fell again in January 1951, per day over a 17-day period.69 Although FEAF lost the large jet air bases at Kimpo modifications to the F-80 were rapidly and Suwon. In anticipation of a possible made, the USAF still pulled hundreds of evacuation of Korea by all US forces, jets World War 11-vintage F-51s out of mothballs were also moved to Japan from Pusan, for air-ground missions. F-51s and P-47s Taegu, and other bases. The F-86s were were both considered for the mission. Al back in Japan, where they no longer had the US AIR FORCE IN KOREA 43

range to provide air superiority and protect gistic effects of well-coordinated ground, the Eighth Army from air attack. The only air, and naval forces. air power available for CAS and AI were From an Air Force perspective, the key to F-51s, B-25s. and B-26s operating out of the jointness is for all USAF officers to under primitive Korean airfields, thus greatly re stand the application of air power in depth, ducing FEAF capabilities. 2 and to understand the basic nature of naval, space, and land warfare. Above all, they should understand that war is not won by Aviation Engineer Capabilities air, space, land, or sea power alone but by FEAF was consistently short of aviation the synergistic efforts of highly coordinated engineer units—the troops who build and joint forces. To create synergies, all officers repair runways.73 The need for reinforced must have the in-depth understanding that runways to handle jet aircraft required sig only comes from studying the history of nificantly more time and effort than run war. ways for older aircraft. Runways required Korea provides a good example of the 4.5 engineer battalion-months to build as importance of integrating air interdiction compared to 1.5 in World War II. 4 These efforts into the overall theater campaign figures are deceptive, however, as large and maneuver of ground forces. Any mis engineering units could rapidly construct understanding of how air interdiction fits runways suitable for forward operations of into a theater campaign can lead to further fighter-bombers in World War II. For exam vain efforts such as attempting to shut ple, in the Normandy landings, an emer down the Ho Chi Minh trail or current gency landing field was completed by 2115 attempts to interdict drug traffic. Air inter hours on the day of the landing. A transport diction field was built and operating three days does, indeed, make its contribution by either after D-day. and in 16 days, five fighter- destroying enemy forces or delaying and dis bomber groups were operating out of Nor rupting their movement; however, in order for mandy airfields. Within 24 days, nine either effect to contribute fully to the success airfields were completed with seven more ful outcome of a campaign, air interdiction under construction. 1 In comparison, it and ground maneuver must by synchronized took from June to December 1952 to build so that each complements and reinforces the the new 9,000-foot concrete jet runway at other. Synchronization is important because Osan-ni.76 it can create a dilemma for the enemy that has no satisfactory answer. His dilemma is this: if he attempts to counter ground maneuver by moving rapidly, he exposes himself to unac Conclusions ceptable losses from air interdiction; yet if he employs measures that are effective at reduc The problems that hindered the effective ing losses caused by air interdiction, he can use of air power by the fledgling United not maneuver fast enough to counter the States Air Force in the Korean War should ground component of the campaign. Thus, lead us to reflect on what might go wrong in regardless of the action the enemy chooses to a future war and to ask questions about our take, he faces defeat.7' capabilities today. This is exactly the type of understanding In one key area, the organization of joint joint officers must have. With the emphasis commands, Korea clearly demonstrated on supporting the AirLand Battle, all offi that a theater commander must properly cers must understand that the integration of organize and staff his command structure. interdiction into the theater campaign is The failure to do so will result in ineffi essential. ciency and inability to harness the syner In the Korean War, the Air Force faced 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 problems in air-ground coordination be air power in Korea. General Momyer details cause of the need for CAS created by the how we were unable to solve the issue commitment of inadequately equipped again in Vietnam, resulting in the ineffi light infantry forces against a superior, ar cient system of “route packages.” As he mored foe. Today there remain many unre stated: solved issues in CAS, and we may en The route package system . . . prevented a counter similar problems in a major theater unified, concentrated air effort. . . . The war. One question that has been raised is same issue arose in the Korean War, and my the ability of Air Force CAS/BAI doctrine to present fear is that our continuing failure to support the Army AirLand Battle doctrine, settle this issue may be exceedingly costly in especially in a European environment. Do some future conflict. . . . Any arrangement we need to return to the successful organi arbitrarily assigning air forces to exclusive zation and command and control of tactical areas of operation will significantly reduce air forces that supported the Army in World airpower’s unique ability to quickly concen War II?78 trate overwhelming firepower wherever it is Another question is the future of airborne needed inost.a:i forward air controllers (FACs). Will the Air We still have problems working jointly Force lose all its corporate knowledge of with the Navy. Although some progress has airborne FAC operations and have to rein been made in joint maritime air operations, vent the airborne FAC again, as was done in such as B-52s equipping, flying, and train Korea and Vietnam? '1 Additionally, will ing for maritime missions, it is debatable the OA-IO be a satisfactory aircraft for this whether we have made any significant mission and for keeping the corporate progress on the issue of unified command knowledge alive?80 Today, much of the emphasis is on a new and control of Navy and Air Force theater CAS/BAI aircraft, but it would seem that air resources. Without seriously addressing the airframe itself is not as decisive an issue this issue, the United States could again as some of these other, less glamorous ones. face degraded effectiveness of air power in Before the Korean War. we had inadequate joint operations. joint training in air-ground coordination. Throughout most of the Korean War. the Recently, an Army major who has been an first jet war, the lack of adequate airfields armored battalion S-3 told me that in three was a limiting factor in FEAF’s air war. This years his battalion had never controlled a raises questions about our dependence on close-air-support strike. Is it likely that in a large airfields today, especially in light of war things will work out if they are not those areas of the world, such as the Middle practiced intensely in peacetime training? East and the Pacific, with vast expanses The excellent training provided at the US between airfields. Moreover, these airfields Army National Training Center (NTC) gives require enormous time and resources to us insight into problems that arise in train build and are attractive targets. ing. such as air-ground communications. This leads to questions about our capac Joint Air Attack Team operations, insuffi ity for movement and mobility in war. For cient experience with ground laser designa example, do we need aircraft for CAS, BAI. tion for aircraft weapons, and inadequate and other missions that can operate out of ground FAC equipment.81 Do we have quickly built, rugged forward operating lo enough good training such as the NTC pro cations, where they are more responsive, vides today? can carry heavier payloads, have longer Problems in coordination of naval and loiter times, and can fly high sortie rates in Air Force aviation and fundamental doctrin support of ground forces without aerial al differences on the control of air resources tanker support? Airfields were a limiting contributed to ineffective employment of factor in a war with total air superiority; US AIR FORCE IN KOREA 45

with today’s threat, airfield survivability in today from overdependence on large and operability clearly need more attention airbase facilities and the lack of adequate as factors in the tactical air war equation engineer units to support a theater war. and as considerations in future aircraft de When the Korean War opened, the US velopment and acquisition. Additionally, military had limited conventional capabil we need to expand responsibility for de ities. Air power was crucial in the early fense to all base personnel.83 Can we afford days of the war in preventing the total to cut low-cost but high-payoff programs defeat of UN forces. Nonetheless, numer such as F-16 mock-up decoys? Should we ous problems resulted in less than optimal find funding for other innovative but low- application of the available air resources. cost ideas such as barrage balloons?84 Problems with the joint command struc Finally, since we are so reliant on a few ture. air-ground coordination, Air Force- runways, do we have adequate aviation Navy cooperation, air interdiction, and air engineer units for runway construction and base availability all give us some insight repair? In World War II. the Ninth Air Force into similar issues today. Peacetime is the alone had 20.000 aviation engineers.83 Ko time to ensure that we will not be caught rea revealed a glimpse of the danger we are with similar problems again.

Notes 1 For an overview of the deterioration of US military 21. Ibid.. 80. capabilities following World War II. see chapter 1 of Clay 22. Ibid.. 107-8. Blair s The Forgotten War: America in Korea. 1950-1953 (New 23. Ibid., 80-83. York Times Books. 198"). 290. Blair states. ' By June 25. 1950. 24 Ibid.. 463. Ham Truman and Louis Johnson had all but wrecked the 25. James A. Field. Jr,. History of United States Naval conventional military forces of the United States Operations in Korea (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing 2. Kussell F Weigley. The American Way of War (Bloom Office. 1962). 393. ington Indiana University Press. 1977). 384. 26. Futrell. 465-68 3. Ibid.. 384-85. 27. Ibid.. 707-8. 4. Robert F. Futrell. The United States Air Force in Korea, 28. Field. 455. revised edition (Washington. D.C.. Office of Air Force History. 29. Blair. 44. 57. 61. 77-78. For an account of the inade 1983), 693. quacy of the troops and equipment ot the initial deployment 5. William B Reed. ed.. Condensed Analysis of the Ninth of US forces to Korea, see Blair, chapter 4. Air Force in the European Theater of Operations, new imprint 30 Blair. 576. Throughout his book. Blair recounts numer (Washington, D C Office of Air Force History. 1984). 96-97. ous instances of UN forces being outmaneuvered and losing 6. William W Momyer. Airpower in Three Wars (Washing significant amounts of artillery and equipment in the first six ton. D C Government Printing Office. 1978). 52-54 months of the war. 7. O P. Weyland. ‘ Some Lessons of the Korean War." 31. Roy E. Appleman. South to the Naktorig. North to the unpublished memo by Mai Gen Weyland (Maxwell AFB, Ala., Yaiu (Washington. D.C.: Center of Military History. 1961). 476. Air University Library. 10 October 1950). 32. Ibid.. 256. 8. Matthew B Ridgway. The Korean War (New York: Dou 33. Edmund Dews and Felix Kozaczka, Air Interdiction: bleday, 1967), 42. Lessons From Prist Campaigns (Santa Monica. Calif.: The 9. Ibid . 42: Futrell. 44-15. Rand Corporation. September 1981), 59. 10 Blair. 33. Ridgway. 142 Ridgway is especially critical of 34. Field. 385. MacArthur s tendency to cultivate the isolation that genius 35. Richard P Hallion. The Naval Air War in Korea (Balti seems to require, until it became a sort of insulation (there was more: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co., 1986), 42—16. no telephone in his personal office in Tokyo), | which] de 36. Ibid.. 50. prived him of the critical comment and objective appraisals a 37 Futrell, 120-23. commander needs from his principal subordinates." 38. Field. 390 11. Blair. 36 39. Hallion. 44-45. 12. Ronald Spector. Eagle Against the Sun: The American 40. Field. 389-91.455. War with Japan (New York: Free Press. 1985). 144-46. 41. Hallion. 45. 13. Ibid.. 226-27 42. Ibid.. 45-46. 14. Futrell. 45. 43. Momyer, 57 59. 15. Momyer. 54 44 Field. 385. 393: Momyer, 57 -59. 16. Futrell. 52. 45. Futrell. 49. 17. Momyer. 54. 46 Ibid.. 50 18. Futrell, 45. 47. Ibid 19 Ibid.. 490-91 48. Momyer. 57-59. Momyer makes the point that "the 20 Ibid . 2. 61. support arrangement is essentially tailored for a highly 46 AIRPOH'ER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 planned operation of a few days. In a brief operation the 78. Lt Col Price T. Bingham, "Air Power and the Close-in support relationship may effectively harmonize the efforts of Battle” (paper presented at the Air War College symposium on two or more forces. However, large operations extending over Air Support of the Close-in Battle. Maxwell AFB. Ala.. 1987). a long time require the more dependable, authoritative rela 5^19. In his symposium presentation on "Air Power and the tionship of operational control or command. Thus with naval Close-in Battle", Lt Col Price T Bingham points out that "the forces committed to the continuing air campaign in Korea, and conditions that we could face in a war with the Soviets are with no threat from an opposing fleet. FEAF's argument for much more similar to those confronting Ninth Air Force in operational control made sense." Essentially the same prob World War II than those we experienced in Korea and Viet nam." (p. 40) He advocates a return to tactical air commands, lem arose in Vietnam with the same inadequate solution the equivalent of an Army corps, to provide unity of command (pp.89-99) for tactical forces in support of the corps. The symposium 49. Futrell. 49. summarized some of our current problems. "At the various 50. Field, 387. levels of Army and AF organizations that control the CAS, 51. Ibid.. 111. BAI. and defensive counter air missions, command, control, 52. Ibid.. 392-93. and communications is considered a significant problem area. 53. Field, 393; Momyer. 59. For example, should defensive counter air and airspace con 54. Dews. 43. trol be handled by Control and Reporting Centers (CRC) or 55. Ibid.. 58. Control and Reporting Posts (CRP) subordinate to Tactical Air 56. Blair. 239. Control Centers (TACC). BAI planning and control are han 57. Futrell. 91. dled by TACC. usually located in the rear with the air 58. Ibid., 175. component commander. CAS planning and control are more 59. Reed. 24. decentralized and handled by Air Support Operations Centers 60. Futrell. 700-701: VVeigley, 387. (ASOC) at Army corps level. CAS (A-10s) are employed at 61. Futrell. 261. battalion level but Army attack helicopters are employed at 62. Gregory A. Carter. Some Historical Notes on Air Inter the brigade level, so Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) coordina diction in Korea (Santa Monica. Calif.: The Rand Corporation. tion is difficult since air assets are tasked without common 1966), 5; Futrell, 171; Momyer. 170. interface. Coordination among all these levels is critical but 63. Futrell. 440-41. they will likely be disrupted in major conflict . . . therefore, 64. For a complete account of Operation Strangle, see our joint doctrinal principles cannot be applied to the theater Futrell. chapter 14. in which we face our most dangerous threat—Central Eu 65. Blair. 931. Blair notes that "an all-out Eighth Army rope." (pp. 2-3) attack to the Korean waist under existing conditions 79. Charles D. Hightower, The History of the United States (stalemate in June 19511 would almost certainly incur a Air Force Airborne Forward Air Controller in World War II. prohibitive cost in American casualties. Even a limited ad the Korean War. and the Vietnam Conflict (thesis. US Army. vance (5. 10. or 20 miles) to improve the Army’s defensive Command and General Staff College. 1984). Hightower notes, posture, disrupt a possible CCF counterattack, or gain an edge "(airborne FAC] capability must be maintained within the US in the possible cease-fire arrangement would not be worth the Air Force. . . . The airborne FAC's history since 1945 has cost in American blood." made it clear that failure to train for the airborne FAC mission 66. Futrell, 704. is a mistake." (pp. 109-10) 67. Ibid., 498. 80. Ibid.. 109. "The airborne FAC must have a viable aircraft 68. Ibid., 59. in which to perform his mission." Some problems with the 69. US Air Force Korean Evaluation Group. An Evaluation OA-10 include one seat, not dedicated to the mission (it of the Effectiveness of the United States Air Force in the would also provide CAS), and it can't be flown hands off for Korean Campaign (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Library. the long periods needed by the FAC. 1951), vol. 3. chap. 2, sec. 1. January. 81. Gary T. Hawes. “Lessons Learned from Air-Land Battle 70. Hallion, 40-41. Training at the US Army National Training Center" (paper 71. Futrell. 112. presented at the Air War College symposium on Air Support 72. Blair. 652-53. of the Close-in Battle. Maxwell AFB. Ala.. 1987). 50-55. 73. Futrell. 72. 388-89. 636-37. 82. Momyer. 89-99. 74. Ibid., 635. 83. LI Col Price T. Bingham. "Fighting from the Air Base." 75. Reed, 21. Airpower Journal, Summer 1987. 34-40. 76. Futrell: 635. 84. Franklin J. Hillson, "Barrage Balloons for Low-Level Air 77. Price T. Bingham. "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdic Defense." Airpower Journal. Summer 1989. 37-40. tion in the Operational Art.” Parameters. March 1989. 16-31. 85. Reed. 10. A KIND OF DEjA VU Some Historical Perspectives on Cruise Missile Defense

future—something we do by surmising C apt Geo r ge W. C ully, USAF about what might be, based (in part) upon what has been. This process is not arcane. The truth is that we use insights derived ISTORIANS are often challenged from such analyses every day. Unfortu to justify their work, and it is at nately. we do not always employ these least arguable that many histori insights in systematic ways. And equally cal studies do not offer immediate important, we do not seek out more oppor applicationH in our daily lives. But that does tunities to turn them to our advantage.1 not make such studies useless; a well- So how can military professionals put written historical narrative can be educa history to better use? First, we must recog tional. and it may even be entertaining. For nize what history will not do. It most cer the professional military officer, however, tainly will not repeat itself; every historical some specially focused historical analyses event is unique. Nor can history be used as will produce important insights not obtain a kind of Delphic oracle: it will not answer able through any other channel. And there our questions—at least not directly. But if is no question that we need this informa we study past events carefully, using tion. That is because much of the military thoughtful analogies and apt comparisons, planning process involves predicting the then perhaps history can suggest what

47 The German V-l war a cheaply built and cost-effective man engineers designed the V-l so that it "flying bomb." The pulse-jet power plant was inexpensive, could be built of readily available materi yet ga\ e the missile a top speed close to that of piston- powered fighters. (Imperial War Museum). als. including wood and mild steel, and many of its subassemblies could be made by unskilled laborers. However, these fea questions to ask of the present. Provided tures were meant to reduce costs, not per we exercise caution, the answers will help formance. For its time, the V-l was quite us anticipate the future. fast, with a cruise speed of about 400 miles The following analysis operates with that per hour. Early V-l models had a range of approach in mind. It examines the Allies' about 150 miles; later improvements in response to German V-l flying bombs dur creased this to over 250 miles. Propulsion ing World War II, and it asks what lessons was by pulse jet, a form of ramjet with a might be learned from their experience.2 shutter-controlled intake. Its cyclic opera The answers suggest some perspectives in tion produced a characteristic sound, lead dealing with a new weapon that resembles ing British listeners to give the V-l a more the V-l in many ways but poses a far more memorable name—they called it a buzz serious danger—the long-range cruise bomb. Since pulse jets require a high min missile. *' imum airspeed to operate, most buzz bombs were launched from large, inclined catapults.h After launch, the V-l's self- An Earlier Threat contained guidance system kept the vehicle on a preset course and altitude, and a The V-l (vergeltungswaffe eins or “ven simple, propeller-driven distance log di geance weapon number one") was an air- rected the vehicle to enter a vertical dive breathing flying bomb fielded by the upon completing the measured flight time. Luftwaffe in 1944.4 Its mission was to bom Given the crudeness of the technology, it bard Allied urban areas—London, espe should not be surprising that V-ls varied in cially, but other cities as well—with a their performance. In fact, about 20 percent 1.870-pound, high-explosive warhead.1 Ger of the missiles proved defective. Still, the

48 overall result was quite acceptable. During the early stages of the assault on London, for example. V-ls had a mean impact point of about four to four and one-half miles from the center of the city.0

V-l Deployment and Operations Launcher construction began on the French coast during the summer of 1943. The first seven sites were immense con crete bunkers, but the Germans also built many smaller, simpler facilities.9 These of ten consisted only of a launching ramp and assembly shops, and the Germans requisi tioned farmhouses, barns, and outbuildings for V-l sites wherever possible. This ap proach speeded installation, reduced costs, and helped mask the sites’ locations. By December 1943 Allied photo interpreters had confirmed 88 "austere’’ V-l sites, and they suspected about 50 more.10 Con scripted laborers finished half of the pro jected 150 sites before the Allies invaded Europe on 6 June 1944, and the Luftwaffe launched its first V-l against London shortly before midnight on 12 June. The Germans soon became quite proficient, and on 22 July they launched their 5.000th missile. While most of the V-ls were ground launched, about 1,600 The Germans had expected to launch were air-launched against Britain. (USAF) 8.000 V-ls during September, but by that time all of the sites in France were cap tured. The brief lull led the Allies to con clude that the V-l no longer presented a danger. They were mistaken. The Luftwaffe simply reworked the V-l to increase its bombs against England and about 8.000 range and then built new sites in Holland. against Continental targets. A total of 2.419 The bombardment resumed in October warheads exploded in the London Central 1944 and continued through the winter, Defence Region, inflicting 92 percent of all with the target list expanded to include the English V-l casualties. London’s civilian vital Belgian supply centers of Antwerp losses included 6,184 dead and 17,981 in and Liege. Although dwindling component jured, and its military casualties came to stocks gradually reduced the frequency of about 1.200 killed or wounded.” But there the attacks, the bombardment did not cease were other effects as well. The V-l bom entirely until late April 1945. bardment forced British authorities to evac In all. the Germans produced about uate between 800.000 and 1.3 million 30.000 V-ls. They launched 10,492 flying Londoners to outlying areas, and falling

49 50 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SPRING 1990

warheads destroyed 23,000 buildings and fering views on the effectiveness of the houses.12 Missile-inflicted casualties on bombing effort. Even the best way to go the Continent—mostly in the Antwerp about it was a matter of dispute. area—totaled 14,758, although only 211 Long since weary of bombing, English V-ls hit the central port areas. Afterwards, city dwellers put their political leadership the Allies acknowledged that the V-l was a under intense pressure to stop the V-ls by tactical success. It was also a very cost- every means possible.1' The British War effective weapon: Cabinet called for direct strikes on the launch sites, even though this diverted ef From a strictly dollar point of view, the V-l forts away from other important targets. But cost the Germans less to build and to operate Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur (“Bomber”) than it cost the Allies in damage and defense. A wartime British study [concluded that] us Harris, head of the Royal Air Force (RAF) ing the German costs as unity . . . it cost the Bomber Command, and Maj Gen )immy defenders 1.46 for damage and loss of produc Doolittle, commander of the US Eighth Air tion, 1.88 for the bombing, .30 for fighter Force, disagreed. Both leaders wanted to interception, and . 16 for static defenses, for a attack the V -l’s sources of supply: the cen total ratio of 3.80:1 [in favor of the Ger tral stockpiles that fed the launchers and mans.]13 the factories that created the stockpiles. Tactical air force units continued to pound the launch sites, but Harris and Doolittle The Allied Response won the argument for putting their heavy bombers to better use. Between 2 and 9 The buzz bomb exacted a heavy price, August 1944, the Allies dropped 15.000 but it could have been much higher. Of the tons of ordnance on German support facil 8.500 or so V-ls that crossed the English ities. Losses were heavy— 1,412 airmen and Channel, the British detected 7,488 (88 197 planes—but thereafter the V-l launch percent) and destroyed 3,957 (52.8 percent rates dropped by half.18 The “heavies" con of those identified). The defense was poorly tinued their attacks afterwards but on a coordinated at first, but Prime Minister lower priority basis; by late summer, most Winston Churchill intervened personally, of the work was being done by tactical air and the Allies soon developed an effective force fighter-bombers based in France. strategy.14 This effort—code-named Opera tion Crossbow—continued the bombing of fensive that began in 1943 and reinforced it Defensive Measures with a multilayered defense network. Unlike the manned bombers in the hlitz of 1940-41, V-ls could be launched at all hours and in every kind of weather. The Offensive Measures Allies responded with a layered defense The Allies knew of the V-l through agent net and with measures intended to reduce reports, reconnaissance photos, and inter the target areas’ vulnerabilities as much as cepted radio transmissions well before it possible. One risk-reducing measure was to posed a direct threat to Britain.15 They reevacuate all nonessential civilians, par mounted massive bombing attacks against ticularly the women and children who had the hardened facilities in France while con returned to the English target areas after the struction was still under way. and they also blitz subsided in 1942. targeted each of the smaller austere sites Another measure was made possible by immediately upon discovery.15 All agreed the successes of MI5, Britain’s secret counter that bombing was the only offensive mea intelligence organization. MI5 had “turned" sure available until ground troops could virtually every German espionage agent in capture the launchers, but there were dif the British Isles by late 1939, and it manip A KIND OF D j A VLT 51

ulated German intelligence-gathering ef vectors. Thus, they ran the risk that several forts in Britain throughout the rest of the aircraft might chase one bogey, but the war. This affected the V-l campaign be method worked well overall, especially cause the Germans largely relied upon their with additional ground input for final agents to report V-l impact points.19 By interception (e.g.. radio guidance from feeding false data to German intelligence ground observers in visual contact, marker agencies through these controlled sources. gunfire, special flares [“snowflakes”], or MI5 made it appear that the V-ls were searchlights). overshooting London. The launch crews The second method, called "close con shortened their missiles' flight times to trol,” was used by fighters patrolling over correct for this "error,” consequently shift the English Channel. Radar controllers ing the mean impact point away from the vectored the pilots on intercept courses center of the city. with the incoming V-ls. The close control The defense measures took time to be method allocated fighters more efficiently come fully effective. By late lune 1944. than did running commentary, but it had however, the Allies had the outline of a several drawbacks. The V-ls crossed the workable system, and they continually narrow channel very quickly—in perhaps strengthened it during the remainder of the as little as four or five minutes—and did summer. This integrated network included not stay on radar for very much longer. This an excellent detection and control system, cut reaction time to a minimum. It also high-speed interceptors, radar-directed guns meant that the defenders had to commit a firing proximity-fuzed shells, and barrage larger number of aircraft for the same de balloons. gree of barrier coverage: they had to travel Detection. Tracking, and Force Control. further to get there, and they had to keep The defenders could usually detect incom enough fuel in reserve to make sure they ing V-ls by radar. The more difficult task got back. And there was another unforeseen was making best use of the available force difficulty imposed upon close control im (e.g., deciding whether to scramble fighters mediately after D-day: air traffic over the on warning or maintain standing patrols, channel became much heavier. This in determining which fighters should be vec creased the controllers’ identification work tored for intercept and which held in re load, thereby reducing the reaction time serve, minimizing the number of fighters still further. allocated per missile, and coordinating Interceptors. Fighter interception was fighters and antiaircraft artillery [AAA] so not particularly effective during the first that they did not interfere with each other’s few days of the campaign. The RAF Fighter efforts]. In the end. the system of raid Command’s squadrons had been trained to reporting and aircraft control developed for attack Luftwaffe bombers flying at lower V-l defense was more elaborate than the speeds and higher altitudes, and it took one that had worked so well against Ger time to devise more appropriate tactics and man bombers during the blitz of 1940-41.2,1 become proficient in their use. The prob Two methods of fighter control were em lem was difficult. Minimal warning times ployed. and the V-l’s high speed combined to make The first method, called "running com interception an unlikely proposition for all mentary," was used primarily to control but the fastest fighters. (Once a V-l crossed fighters operating over England: it required the channel, the defenders had only about two radar stations and two Royal Observer six minutes to bring it down.) The British Corps stations.21 Each station provided a initially assigned 12 fighter squadrons to controller who advised patrolling fighters the campaign, but many other units tried to of the incoming missile’s course and posi engage the speedy missiles on a catch- tion. Pilots devised their own intercept as-catch-can basis. This only confused the controllers and antiaircraft gunners alike, A less orthodox method of destroying a V-l was to fly along and many defending aircraft were damaged side (left) . . . slip a wing under the missile'swing, and then flip the device over, tumbling its gyro, causing it to crash. or shot down by mistake. Within a few days (above). (Imperial War Museum) the Allies had limited the effort to their best fighter types, and as the summer wore on, they continually assigned additional units to buzz-bomb defense. By mid-August, 21 large warhead. Buzz bombs were report Allied squadrons were committed exclu edly several times more difficult to kill than sively to V-l interception, and two more piloted aircraft at the same range, in part assisted as required. Even so, successful because they were smaller and had fewer interceptions were not easy. Radar could critical components, but also because the direct the fighters to the vicinity, but the V-l’s fuselage was a simple metal cylinder rest of the work was on visual terms. The tapered to a point at both ends. This shape buzz bomb’s small size and camouflage tended to deflect projectiles fired from a paint made it difficult to see from above in beam-end aspect. At first, pilots averaged daylight, especially in the summer haze. about 500 rounds per kill: this dropped to The pulse jet’s exhaust flame was easily 150 later in the summer ” Much more spotted at night, but it tended to appear to famous, of course, was the tactic of simply the eve as a point of light at an uncertain flying alongside and tipping the vehicle distance. Even if the sky were clear and with a wingtip. This tumbled the V-l’s moonlit, the V -l’s narrow wingspan gave gyroscopic autopilot, and the missile went few depth-perception cues for effective out of control. gunnery. Moreover, the short reaction time By every analysis, aircraft interception forced the RAF Fighter Command to main became very effective. Even though they tain standing patrols, and fatigue quickly were sometimes grounded by bad weather, became an additional factor. Many pilots the fighters accounted for 1.846 of the 3,957 seldom left their aircraft between first light missiles destroyed—almost 47 percent."'1 and dusk, although few complained of Many pilots achieved multiple kills, with boredom. RAF Squadron Leader Joseph Berry leading As the defenders became more experi the list at 61 and one-third, including seven enced, they found that the best tactic was in one day on two occasions. Sadly. Berry to approach the missile from above and was mistakenly killed by Allied antiaircraft astern in a long, shallow dive. They usually fire on 1 October 1944.J4 opened fire at about 300 yards but were Antiaircraft Artillery. AAA was the sec careful not to close to less than 150 yards ond line of defense against the V-l, ac because of the turbulence of the pidse jet’s counting for 1,878 missiles—just over 47 exhaust and the lethal radius of the V -l’s percent of those destroyed. The British be-

52 A KIND OF DEI A VU 53

gan planning AAA requirements for V-l respective altitudes at which British light defense as early as January 1944, and they and heavy guns were most effective.~r’ Fi expected to install 400 heavy and 346 light nally. to make matters worse, the initial guns south of London. Unfortunately, their plan was not well thought-out. It stationed efforts were soon found wanting for several the guns close to London and put their reasons. To begin with, the attacking mis fire-control radars below the terrain line to siles were far more numerous than the avoid an anticipated German countermea defenders expected; they had overesti sures effort. This had the double disadvan mated the bombers’ ability to knock out the tage of reducing the gunners’ tracking times launching sites. The Allies also underesti and allowing the damaged V-ls to fall mated the AAA needs of the invasion force: within the target areas. These errors were as a result, only half of the guns the plan soon corrected, but the most serious prob had demanded were actually in place at the lem remained unresolved: how to coordi start of the campaign. Further, the defense nate the fighter and AAA efforts. planners also presumed that the V-ls In the beginning of the campaign, fighters would approach London at an altitude of roamed at will, and AAA batteries were 6.000 to 8.000 feet. As chance would have required to cease fire if the fighters came it. the V-ls flew much lower—2.500 feet on within range. This allowed the fighters to average—and this zone fell between the work very effectively (as of 13 July. 883 of the 1,192 kills had been achieved by air craft), but it severely hampered the gun Aircraft could intercept and down the V-l, hut not without ners. In mid-July the British decided to difficulty. An aircraft closing within 200 yards of the missile move most of the guns to the coast and risked damage or destruction from the V-l' s jet exhaust or its establish “gun belts,” where aircraft oper explosion. (Imperial War Museum) ated at their own risk below 8,000 feet. A 54 AIRPOWEH JOURNAL SPRING 1990 large number of bed-down sites for the aries, however, such studies may be very mobile guns, called “mattresses,” were pre useful. Indeed, what else can provide us stocked with ammunition, electric power with a body of real-world experience be generators, and other necessities. This yond the limited perspective of the imme greatly increased the flexibility of the AAA diate present? defense network. The number of guns was The long-range cruise missile (CM) is a also continually increased, so that by late good candidate for historical analysis. Cer summer the AAA batteries included almost tainly, the CM represents a dramatic im 600 heavy-caliber and over 1,400 light- provement over the V-l in performance caliber weapons, including some installed capabilities, but both weapons share an on platforms built out over the Thames obvious and distinctly similar design con estuary."1’ The British installed the latest cept: they seek to achieve strategic success fire-control equipment, including centimeter- by overwhelming the enemy’s defenses band, gun-laying radar sets, and they also with relatively inexpensive, “disposable” obtained large quantities of proximity tuxes vehicles. This similarity encourages the from the United States. The net effect was a military historian to make some general major improvement in AAA lethality. On observations about CM defense problems. the nights of 27-28 August, for example, 90 of 97 V-ls were shot down, and only four hit London. CM Defense Will Be Very Expensive Barrage Balloons. As a last resort, the The defensive effort that the V-l imposed British suspended steel cables from barrage on the Allies was substantially more expen balloons in the most likely approach corri sive than the Germans’ effort to develop dors. This effort was the least effective and deploy the missile. Granted, this ex response, in that the defenders had to change ratio included unique circum maintain over 2,000 balloon stations that stances, but since then we have learned brought down only about 230 missiles. But much more about the construction of a it was a relatively inexpensive defense to defense net against air-breathing vehicles. mount, was clearly visible to the public, In the 1950s the United States and Canada and occasionally worked. This effort was created the North American Air Defense often hampered by shortages of hydrogen Command (NORAD), a fully integrated bi gas and rubber sheets, and 630 balloons national system consisting of an elaborate were lost to lightning and high winds. Still, net of radar stations extending above there is evidence that the Germans took the the Arctic Circle, a force of 65 fighter- balloons seriously: some of the downed interceptor squadrons, standing patrols of missiles had cable cutters built into their early-warning aircraft and ships watching wings. over millions of square miles, hundreds of surface-to-air missile (SAM) and AAA bat teries, and a Ground Observer Corps with What Can the V-1 Campaign 350,000 volunteer members. That effort cost over half a billion pre-1957 dollars." Suggest to Us about The CM defense network must be far more Cruise Missile Defense? capable—thus, far more costly—il it is to deter or if it is to protect us adequately This analysis began with the premise that should deterrence fail. historical studies—if carefully defined and properly limited—could help us evaluate current trends and thereby suggest future But CM Defense Is Crucial prospects. Remember that the past will not The V-l was a primitive weapon, but it predict future events. Within these bound imposed a heavy burden upon the Allies. A KIND OF DliJA VU 55

The CMs of the future will be able to do launched from covert and unconventional what the V-l program attempted but failed platforms: this would make them particu to accomplish for lack of sophisticated larly difficult to eliminate by preemptive technology: they will supplant the long- strike. They are also attractive for economic range, penetrating bomber for the purpose reasons. Specifically, they can be stock of attacking fixed targets. Moreover, their piled more cheaply than manned systems, deployment in large numbers—and their and they will force an opponent to spend inevitable adoption by third world com enormous sums on defensive, rather than batants—will present a threat that we are offensive, measures.29 Finally, the success not presently equipped to counteract. ful deployment of a ballistic missile de Consider the range of problems that CMs fense system can only encourage CM | will pose. Their small electromagnetic sig development. Why? Because a space- natures will make them difficult to detect, oriented defense network won’t eliminate and as CM guidance computers become long-range strategic bombardment as a mil more sophisticated, they will approach the itary technique. Rivals will simply look for operational flexibility of piloted aircraft. something else to replace readily detected CMs will demonstrate increasing auton and vulnerable rocket boosters and reentry omy. including the ability to loiter, to exer vehicles. Air-breathing missiles are the cise a limited degree of judgment in target most effective alternative. selection, to detect and evade enemy For all of these reasons, CMs could very forces, and perhaps even to respond to a well become the long-range strategic change of mission or recall."8 CMs can be weapon of choice by the end of the century. An efficient defense is imperative. Effective Planning Is Essential Although it may seem self-evident, the V-l experience underscores the importance of thoughtful advance planning. The Allies knew that the V-l was being developed at least 18 months before the first warheads fell on London, and their intelligence “data base” grew rapidly after the winter of 1943- 44. Nevertheless, they did not anticipate the magnitude of the threat, and as a result they substantially underestimated the re sources required to deal with it. Further, their initial response was not efficient or well coordinated, and correcting it entailed significant risk and effort. Shifting the gun batteries to the English coast, for example, disrupted the defense net for a week. It also required moving 23,000 men and 60,000 tons of equipment and supplies, and di verted trucks and fuel from the support effort for the Normandy invasion—a signif icant cost at a critical time. Tomorrow’s defenders will have even less latitude, and Side and overhead views of V-l (above) and cruise missile only an effective defense in place can hope (below). to deter a would-be aggressor. Moreover, 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

given that we cannot specifically anticipate CM threat, and doing so will require a how this threat may develop, we must sustained, major, multiservice and transna emphasize flexibility and adaptability in tional commitment if we hope to achieve our preparations. More pilots and planes success.33 Both the V-l and NORAD expe will clearly be necessary,30 but strategies riences show that such a commitment can for "doing it smarter” must lie at the heart be achieved when the stakes are high of any effective CM defense plan; high-tech enough. Subordinating the narrow interest approaches may not provide the entire is the single most difficult task. solution.31 CMs Will Be Difficult CM Defense Must Receive to “Find and Fix” Coordinated Support The Allies quickly learned that the buzz The Allies failed to successfully coordinate bomb was not easy to locate, but the CM their forces at first, thereby allowing some will pose a much greater challenge. Unlike V-ls to get through that could otherwise the immobile V-l launch sites in France have been destroyed. Their failure also con and Holland, CM carriers will be constantly tributed to the tragic loss of Allied pilots on the move, and they will encompass a and planes to "friendly” AAA fire, and this variety of forms, including aircraft, ships, in turn reduced the defenders’ ability to submarines, and trucks. This flexibility deal with incoming V-ls. Even so, the Al means that targets can be attacked from lies were fortunate. They only had to mesh many points of the compass, in flight pat the efforts of airmen and gunners who terns that will be difficult to anticipate. spoke the same language, and they already Even if we know the general direction of had a well-integrated command, control, approach, detection will still be a problem. communications, and intelligence appara Although space-based, synthetic-aperture tus. Their units were abundantly supplied radar constellations and other exotic de and well equipped, and they had long since fense systems offer great promise, these been united in an all-out wartime effort. technologies will not be fielded soon.34 Further, they had to defend only a limited Moreover, they will have to be integrated number of targets in a relatively small area with appropriate tactics at the squadron against attacks coming in predictable direc level—down where “the rubber meets the tions from known launching grounds. In ramp.” contrast. CMs could be launched simulta Even after they are detected, CMs will neously against many US and allied targets still be hard to bring down. Defending from a variety of platforms operating in aircraft have a significant speed advantage very different environments. Preparing an over CMs at present, but that will probably adequate defense will require a large and become less pronounced in the future, continuing investment at the expense of thereby limiting the number of useful tac other important needs. Shrinking man tical solutions. The greatly reduced radar power pools and the ever-rising costs of and thermal signatures of small, “stealthy" high technology will make this even more CMs will make target acquisition much difficult.32 Perhaps the net effect of these more challenging, especially for defending trends will force us to adopt a kind of triage missile seekers. The latter will always be defense, in which we have to prioritize our severely constrained by weight, antenna efforts in favor of certain locations or kinds size, power supply, and other limiting fac of targets—and abandon others to less- tors. This is not to say that the problem certain outcomes. Considerable political is insoluble. Recent studies suggest that consequence will undoubtedly attend such bundling different sensors together and in choices. Nevertheless, we must answer the terpreting their combined signals with A KIND OF DEI A VU 57

artificial-intelligence techniques could be aircraft and their lives. Even if it remains very effective. ^ only an unconscious question, the effect of this quandary might give the CM just enough advantage to escape. Technical and C\fs May Xot Be Defenseless tactical countermeasures can help, but only Finally, we should address the common a well-balanced mixture of dedication, assumption that CMs may be hard to locate judgment, and second-nature living will but. once found, are “meat on the table" for successfully overcome such a weapon. Like modern interceptors. That may not be so. all other skills, those traits can only be Allied airmen developed a healthy respect ingrained through constant training and for the buzz bomb because its exploding practice. warhead could easily bring an overeager ipilot to grief. Even at the normal kill dis tance of between 150 and 300 yards, the Conclusions !fireball often generated enough energy to damage the attacking aircraft, and a closing The V-l was a cost-effective weapon to stern chase forced the interceptor to fly begin with, but the Allies’ mistakes magni through the exploding missile's debris. A fied its impact. They failed to anticipate the CM carrying a nuclear weapon poses a scope of the threat, and they suffered an much greater threat, and vve should not agonizing period of false starts and confu assume that it will stay "safed” when fired sion before fashioning a successful re upon.i6 In fact, deliberately programming a sponse. Fortunately, time and resources CM to detonate if attacked may benefit the were on their side, and they prevailed. The aggressor in several ways. V-l took lives and destroyed property, but First, if it is attacked, the CM will prob it could not change the outcome of World ably not be able to complete the intended War II. The cruise missile poses a much primary mission. Should that occur, the greater threat than the V-l, but it too can be aggressor could logically be expected to countered if we and our allies undertake pursue a useful alternative mission—the sufficient preparations. The most serious destruction of the attacking interceptor. problem we face, however, is one of percep This tactic would be particularly attractive tion. not technique. if the size of the interceptor force were Many Americans believe that an attack limited, and it could even form the basis for upon their homeland is unthinkable—a a deliberate strategy. In such a scenario, the conclusion supported by 40 years of nu primary goal of the aggressor's first salvo clear standoff between roughly equal super would be to eliminate the defending inter powers. And we have spent our resources ceptor force, thereby turning the defender’s according to that consensus. We are willing cities into naked hostages facing a follow- to fund research for the Strategic Defense on attack. Initiative, but in the meantime we will Second, the prospect of attacking nuclear- defend only very limited portions of our weapon-carrying CMs fitted with “dead- airspace with a mere handful of fighter- man switches" would certainly encourage interceptor squadrons. We do not see a caution. Firing short-range missiles at an clear need to spend enormous sums in yet armed quarter-megaton bomb could be the another arena against an opponent who beginning of a real adventure. This possi already seems sufficiently deterred. The bility must surely put even the most deter world is changing, however, and the old. mined pilot in a difficult position.3' The familiar, stable balance of power appears to too-cautious will hesitate and risk all that be breaking up. We face new threats from failure implies, while the too-aggressive new directions—including messianic the will rush in to attack, thereby losing their ocracies that may not subscribe to the 58 AIRPOIVER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 self-restraining, "rational-man” theory of enter the international marketplace sooner deterrence. In the past, we have vigorously or later, just as medium-range ballistic mis opposed the proliferation of nuclear weap siles are beginning to enter it today. Anal ons. Today, we also oppose the diffusion of ysis also suggests that nuclear weapons sophisticated missile technologies for the may be becoming militarily irrelevant, same reason: the world is already a suffi thereby underscoring the urgency of the ciently dangerous place.38 CM problem. Multikiloton warhead yields Our desire to limit access to advanced are not necessary, provided that the deliv military hardware is understandable, but ery vehicle is extremely accurate and that the reality is that we cannot succeed indef the target is vulnerable and important—an initely. Thus far, the United States and the increasing likelihood in complex, indus Soviet Union are the only nations that have trial societies.39 fielded sophisticated, long-range CMs, and Like the Allies in 1942, we can still neither has announced any willingness to consider this problem in relatively abstract make them available to anyone else. Nor terms. For now, we deem it sufficient to has the current climate of relaxed tensions maintain only a nominal defense against air encouraged any sense of urgency in pub attack because we are unable to envision its licly addressing this issue. But is silence occurrence. But what about tomorrow? prudent? Experience suggests that CMs will When shall we begin to prepare?

Notes 1. Historians are slowly developing a literature on the Allied air superiority. In all. the Germans lost an estimated 77 systematic application of their craft to policy-making. See. carrier aircraft to Allied interceptors. Oliver Thiele. "Un- most recently. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May. Think ternehmen Rumpelkammer," FJugzeug 4. no. 1 (January- ing In Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers {New March 1988): 38-11. York: The Free Press. 1986). 7. Peter G. Cooksley. Flying Bomb: The Story of Hitler's 2. Most of the defense of England was carried out by British V-Weapons in World War II (New York: Charles Scribner's forces, but units and personnel from other nations—including Sons. 1979), chap. 2. the United States—also took part. Moreover, the campaign 8. Kenneth P. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile was directed by the integrated command structure created by (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press. 1985). 47. 50. the Grand Alliance. For that reason, the word Allied is used Another source reports that the V-l's “circular error probabil throughout to describe the effort, except where the narrative ity" was 14 miles. McFarland, 115. This relative inaccuracy describes the activities of a particular national force. did not pose a problem, however, as the primary target— 3. This essay is intended as a generic analysis. Its conclu metropolitan London—encompassed 630 square miles. sions apply equally to all air-breathing, pilotless strategic 9. Some of these structures still exist. See Phillip Henshall. systems, regardless of whether they are launched from air. sea. Hitler's Backet Sites (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1985). or land. To be sure, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 10. The unusual shape of the V-l's steam-powered catapult (INF) treaty (see New York Times. 9 December 1987. A24-26 led Allied photo interpreters to refer to these locations as "ski for text) will have a significant impact on the future develop sites." Werrell, 43. ment of cruise missiles, but they continue to be developed. 11. Werrell. 60-61. Only the LIS and the USSR have signed the treaty, and cruise 12. The effects of V-2 attacks are included in some of these missiles, per se. are not disallowed. In effect, the INF treaty statistics. The V-2 was the world's first ballistic missile. Once rewards efforts to increase CM range by merely prohibiting launched, there was no effective defense against it. The use of short-range vehicles. Adaptive efforts are already under way. the V-2. however, lies outside the scope of this essay. See See William M. Arkin, "Stealth Cruise Sneaks into Canada," lames McGovern, Crossbow and Overcast (New York: Paper Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 45, no. 4 (May 1989): 6-7; back Publications, Inc., 1964). “USA Begins Development of LRCSW," lane's Defence Weekly 13. Werrell. 61. 12, no. 4 (29 July 1989): 153. 14. Winston S. Churchill. The Second World War. vol. 6. 4. For a detailed technical description of the V-l. see Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.. 1953). Anthony Kay. Buzz Bomb. Monogram Closeup no. 4 (Boyl- 15. R. V. |ones. The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelli ston. Mass.: Monogram Aviation Publications. 1977). gence. 1939-1945 (New York: Coward. McCann & Geoghegan. 5. The Germans also considered using V-ls to deliver Inc... 1978). chemical and bacteriological payloads, but they were deterred 16. Between 1 December 1943 and 12 lune 1944. US and by fears of retaliation. See Stephen L. McFarland. "Preparing British bombers dropped 36,200 tons of ordnance on 96 sites. for What Never Came: Chemical and Biological Warfare in Allied intelligence analysts assessed 82 of the sites as de World War 11." Defense Analysis 2, no. 2 (June 1986): 107-21. stroyed, but the attackers lost 771 aircrew personnel and 154 6. About 1.600 V-ls were air-launched from Heinkel He-111 aircraft. Furthermore, they did not prevent the Germans from medium bombers, but the Luftwaffe abandoned this method in constructing alternate sites. Because the effort required 25.150 January 1945 because of fuel shortages and overwhelming sorties, other important missions, such as preinvasion A KIND OF D£jA VU 59

transport-net interdiction, had to be deferred. See W. F. they need not penetrate enemy airspace. CM carriers do not Craven and I L. Cate. eds.. The Army Air Forces in W'orld War have to perform abrupt evasive maneuvers or risk significant U, vol. 3. Europe: Argument to V-E Day. /anuary 194-1 to May combat damage. Nor do they have to include elaborate sell 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1951), chaps. 4 defense suites in their payload, particularly il they incorpo and 15. rate stealth technologies. Future CMs will further divorce 17. Churchill's War Cabinet considered every solution that themselves from their carriers thruugh increased range Other promised even the slightest chance of success, including operational factors include greatly reduced tanker require i poison gas. For example, some British scientists proposed an ments (as a function of sortie/warhead generation), fewer | incredible electromagnetic jammer: preparations for poststrike recovery and force reconstitution, and no need for constant strike-crew refresher training (be Their idea was to form a magnetic loop employing existing yond guidance data refinement). The CM's life-cycle costs are railway lines, suitably interconnected, all the way around also lower in a number of other important categories, includ London—a circumference of about 60 miles. This loop ing fewer support personnel requirements (and their associ would be energized with a hefty current to make it a giant ated basing costs), reduced operating expenses (beyond that magnetic deflector. They worked out a system which would associated with the carrier vehicle), and lower maintenance have required something like 1.000 amps D.C. . . The costs. power requirement for the system would have been on the 30. This process has already begun. See "First F-16 ADFs order of 20 to 30 megawatts, xvhich would have meant Delivered." /one's Defence Weekly 11. no. 20 (2U May 1989) dedicating quite a large (commercial) power station for this 943. purpose. The system was very seriously considered, and 31. See. for example. Maj Franklin | Mil Ison. "Barrage design work began on some of the necessary equipment. Balloons for Low-Level Air Defense." Airpoiver /ournal 3. no. Alfred Price. The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare, vol. 1 2 (Summer 1989): 27^10. (Washington. D.C.: Association of Old Crows, 1984). 241. 32. Demographic trends suggest that aircrew recruitment— 18. Werrell. 49-50. among other personnel needs—will become increasingly dif 19. J. C. Masterman. The Double-Cross System in the War of ficult in the future as the nation's birthrate continues to 1939 to 1945 (New Haven. Conn : Yale University Press. stagnate. See. for example. George C. Wilson. "Looking for 1972). chap. 12. The obituary columns of London newspapers More Than a Few Good Men and Women," Washington Post were another source of information, but British authorities National Weekly Edition 6. no. 17 (27 February-5 March recognized this leak and closed it in the summer of 1944. 1989): 32; and "US Manpower Warning As Recruitment Hits German attempts at aerial reconnaissance were generally Low." lane's Defence Weekly 11. no. 9 (4 March 1989): 341. A rendered ineffective by RAF air superiority. reevaluation of previous assumptions has already begun. 20. Cooksley. 108-13. Given recent developments in USAF policies regarding the 21. The Royal Observer Corps (ROC) added visual tracking assignment of female aircrew personnel, however, perhaps we to the overall air defense network. ROC lookout posts reported should also reconsider the role of women in air defense. If their sightings—including altitude, heading, and force they can serve aboard reconnaissance, tanker, and patrol strength—to filter centers for correlation with radar and aircraft—performing missions that will undoubtedly be op fighter inputs. They also reported other matters, such as posed bv enemy forces in wartime—then surely they can also parachuting airmen, downed aircraft, and bomb impacts. fly interceptors against pilotless vehicles over friendly terri 22. Cooksley. 102-5. tory. But the thought of female pilots in combat is not a new 23. Unfortunately, the Allies denied the benefits of dedi one. See, for example. Maj Sandra S. Bateman. "The Right cated air cover to the liberated cities on the Continent. The Stuff Has No Gender." Airpoiver /ournal 1. no. 3 (Winter British War Cabinet feared that any assets diverted to Belgium 1987-1988): 63-74. for Y-l defense would undermine morale on the home front. 33. Special problems seem to arise in coordinating naval European target areas were supported by extensive AAA and air forces, particularly in jurisdictional matters. Consider, installations, however. See Werrell. 60-61. for example, the inability of the US Army Air Forces and the 24. Werrell. 55. US Navy to agree upon an effective division of responsibility 25. The light guns lacked sufficient range. Without powered for antisubmarine warfare in 1941^2. German submarines traversing gear, the heavy guns could not be brought to bear operated at will in American coastal waters as a result. See W. fast enough to track the speedy V-ls. Werrell. 52-55. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, eds.. The Army Air Forces in World 26. For a more complete account of AAA defense during the War II. vol. 1. Plans and Early Operations. /armory 19.39 to V-l campaign, see Kenneth Werrell. Archie, Flak. AAA. and August 1942 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), SAM (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, December 514-37; Edwin P, Hoyt. U-Boats Offshore (New York: Stein 1988). 10-21. and Day, 1978). New technical departures suggest that some 27 James M. Eglin. A ir Defense in the Nuclear Age: The effort is being made to address this issue. See David A. Brown. Postwar Development of American and Soviet Strategic De "Airship Pushed for Early Warning. Mine Countermeasures fense Systems (New York: Garland Publishing. 1988): Richard Missions," Aviation Week Sr Space Technology 129. no. 23 (5 Morenus. DEW Line (New York: Rand McNally. 1957). December 1988): 65- 70. 28. The increasing sophistication of current systems sup 34. For a glimpse of what one space-based, anti-CM radar ports this projection See. for example. "Anti-Radar Missile system might look like, see William E. Burrows. Deep Black Could Loiter over Target." Air Force Times 47. no. 36 (20 April (New York: Berkley Books. 1988), 300—303. But that doesn't 1987|: 35: and Edward H. Kolcum. "Martin Pursues Develop get us from here to there: high tech is expensive. For some ment of Autonomous Cruise Missile." Aviation Week Sr Space thoughts on space-based air defense costs, see James W. Technology 130. no. 18 (1 May 1989): 85-86. Canan. "The Big Hole in NORAD," Air Force Magazine 72, no. 29. Assuming that the mission requires penetration of an 10 (October 1989): 54-59. enemy's home airspace, compare the costs of a CM to those 35. Promising results have been obtained by computer incurred by a manned system. Size alone makes the CM integration of radar, infrared, television, and possibly laser cheaper to build, and although current CMs require carrier signal returns. This use of combined, correlated imagery may vehicles, such carriers need not be especially robust. Since counteract attempts to mask various segments of a stealthy 60 AIRPOIVER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

CM's electromagnetic signature. See David Fulghum. "Stealth Prompts Campaign by C.I.A.." Nerv York Times (international ! Technology Brought into New Focus,” Air Force Times 49, no. edition). 31 March 1989. 5: Barbra Starr, "Controlling the 43 (5 |une 1989): 30. Spread of Ballistic Missiles," Jones Defence Weekly. 22 April 36. Although this analysis treats CM-carried nuclear weap 1989. 696; Barbra Starr. "USA Debates Missile Proliferation," ons as the most dangerous form ot the air-breathing threat, we Jane's Defence Weekly 12. no. 19 111 November 1989): 1007. should keep the ever-quickening pace of technological devel 39. The advent of long-range, accurate, conventionally opment in mind. Consider for example, the tantalizing oppor armed CMs is fraught with danger for several reasons. First, tunities suggested by “excited" molecular fuels, ultrahigh- consider their effect upon potential aggressors. Since 1945, density energy storage using superconductivity, and the decision makers of every political persuasion have operated prospective manufacture of antimatter in microgram quanti within a climate of near-unanimous opposition to the use of ties. These possibilities existed onlv in science-fiction maga nuclear weapons; "madness" is the common metaphor used to zines even a few years ago. The recent USAF Forecast 11 describe any initiative which favors first use. Governments technology' survey recommended that they receive serious which have these weapons at their disposal have been made attention (i.e.. significant funding) in future weapons system more circumspect by this consensus. The Teheran-Baghdad planning. This rapid acceptance reminds us that surprises are bombardments of the Iran-Iraq War, on the other hand, suggest always at hand. Moreover, the impetus for technological that no such general psychological barrier exists against progress is being continually fueled by political develop ballistic-missile-delivered, high-explosive warheads. A CM- ments. nuclear weapons may be eclipsed as a result. See, for delivered. conventional first strike—or the threat of one—is example. "INF Treaty Likely to Intensify Race in Exotic therefore likely to be thinkable in at least some quarters. Conventional Weapons.” Aviation Week & Space Technology Second, consider their effect upon potential victims. The 127, no. 24 (14 December 1987): 19-20: and Paul Mann. immediate result of a successful. CM-delivered. high- "Study Fuels Strategic Shift to Advanced Conventional Weap explosive attai k upon an industrialized nation's nuclear ons." Aviation Week & Space Technology 128, no. 4 (25 power plants, for example, would include an extended power January 1988): 135. blackout affecting thousands of square miles. The long-term 37. This tactic also raises an opportunity for strategic results could include severe, lasting economic disruptions deception. ('.Ms need not actually have this capability, so long and a broad landscape made uninhabitable for centuries. as the defenders believe that they do. The effect is the same. What political leverage accrues to the aggressor who can 38. Stephen Engelberg. “Third World Missile-Making threaten "one, two. three . . . many Chernobvls?" Basis of Issue

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61 AIR AND SPACE FORCES The One Endures as the Other Emerges

H arry F. N oyes III

T is hard to contemplate man’s future in space operations. At that point, the Air space without getting excited. Many Force will be what it is today: an atmo military people feel a sense of urgency: spheric force with only limited, ancillary What can my service do in space? How space operations. Like Army aviation, the can 1 get involved? For Air Force people, Air Force’s space presence will be limited the answer seems self-evident. The Air to activities that are essential to support its Force flies high and fast. A little higher primary earthbound functions. This con andI a little faster and—whoosh—you’re in clusion stems from two conditions that can space. It seems like a natural step. And so it be demonstrated in a fairly convincing is—so far. The Air Force is the lead service manner: (1) We will always need an atmo in space and will keep that role for a few spheric. flying Air Force. That mission will decades. prevent the Air Force from devoting itself Eventually, however, an independent US exclusively to space and simply evolving space force will emerge to handle deep- into the US space force. (2) Space and air handles its parental responsibilities wisely and generously, it will ensure a smoother, more efficient, less traumatic birth.

The Persistence of Air Power The persistence of air power follows log ically from current conditions and the gen eral lessons of military history. We can be sure that for many years to come, only a handful of powers will be capable of signif icant space operations. Space will be dom inated by the same mature alliances of industrial nations that have managed the nuclear balance reasonably well, and they will probably maintain an effective deter rent balance that renders full-blown space war unlikely. This means that the world will continue much like today’s—one in which nuclear and space power form a kind of containment structure that limits but does not eliminate conflict. Lesser na operations will differ so much that the two tions will still seek to impose their wills cannot reside in the same military house through low-intensity warfare, and the hold. They will demand different kinds of great powers will mix in this process while people, skills, and world views. avoiding open war with each other. Logic and historical experience suggest In this environment, the low visibility of that both these propositions are most likely the enemy will limit space observation, to prove true. And. if they are true, the Air while world opinion and deterrence will Force will always be deeply committed to shackle spaceborne weapons—much as nu air operations, and someone else will have clear power is rendered “powerless” in so to carry out missions in deep space. Yet many conflicts today. Thus, conventional (and this is important), that "someone" will air forces will remain vital for projection of gr.jw out of today’s Air Force, as a child national power, for low-intensity tactical grows out of its mother’s womb. The Air operations against non-space-pow'er foes, Force will remain what it is. but it will give and for peacetime functions. Although this birth to the space force and nurture it seems a pretty tame future for air power, it through its childhood. If the Air Force should not be underrated. It is, after all. 64 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 precisely what air power has been doing helpful to examine why war manifests this since World War II. odd blend of change and permanence. The In any event, the general lessons of mili reason is found in the tension between tary history strongly suggest that air power technological progress and human nature. would play a vital role even if a super War is a running battle between technolo power conflict involving full use of space gy’s propensity for rapid, radical change power did break out. Granted, air power and human nature’s obstinate refusal to would have to adapt to changed battlefield change at all. Since war is above all a conditions. Terrestrial combat against a political and psychological process, human foe with spaceborne observation/weapons nature tends to win out over technology. As would certainly be a tough chore, much users of new weaponry, people rarely show more hectic and dangerous than anything the imagination, energy, and will to maxi known before. However, one great lesson of mize its effectiveness. As the targets of new military history is mankind’s genius for weaponry, the same people muster as precisely that kind of adaptation. tounding amounts of imagination, energy, Despite drastic changes in warfare over and will to frustrate the weapons and the ages, no major weapon category, no thereby ensure their own survival. Result: branch of the armed forces, and certainly man’s stubborn survival instinct always no arena of conflict has ever been elimi limits weapons to an effectiveness far be low their theoretical potential. nated. Every prediction of obsolescence has proven false. To this day, edged weapons The usual mechanisms for tempering a and animals have a role in war. Successful new weapon’s impact include bayonet charges were mounted in World • adopting the same weapon (my ma War II. Korea, Vietnam, and the Falklands. chine cancels your machine). Animal transport proved as vital in Afghan • using passive protective measures istan as it did in the Italian mountains in (camouflage: armor: terrain, darkness, and World War II. and some of our North Atlan weather for cover and concealment), tic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies still • avoiding the weapon's effects through have mule trains. One history of the 10th tactical gambits (maneuver, surprise, etc.), Armored Division in World War II contains • dispersing one’s forces to complicate a photo of US soldiers using a log battering the enemy’s targeting and reduce the effect ram in a German town. And there are of a hit, and reports of GIs using crude catapults to throw grenades in the French hedgerows. • above all. suppressing enemy weapons The machine gun did not render the foot by engaging them with one’s own—using soldier obsolete, the tank did not doom destruction and fear to impair their crews' trencheg and barbed wire, the bomber did accuracy. not drive the battleship from the sea, the All these factors will apply to space forces submarine did not eliminate surface ves and keep land, sea. and air forces effective sels, and no “anti” weapon ever eliminated in the future—albeit under new pressures. the thing it was “anti” to. Additionally, two other nontactical fac War becomes more complex as arsenals tors often limit the effect of new weapons grow more sophisticated, and warriors seek and may especially affect space forces. the best combination for each war. Yet all First, the tremendous cost of space forces, arms find ways to adjust, albeit often in especially manned platforms, will limit modified or reduced roles. Conclusion: no their numbers for the foreseeable future. matter what happens in space, terrestrial Given the enormity of the world's size and (land, sea. and air) forces will always have population, these numerical limits will vital roles. hobble even sophisticated space forces po To convince the doubters, one may find it tential. Second, the human factor is not AIR AND SPACE FORCES 65

limited to tactical behavior. Man’s survival reconnaissance, meteorology, navigation, instinct also affects political leaders and etc.). These improvements do not change the general public and inspires changes in our enduring principles of organization, politico-military strategy. Homefolks and strategy, and tactics. They do improve the politicians will impose rules on war to execution of those principles, reducing the protect themselves. “fog and friction” of war. They confer sim The limiting factor in the "fightability” of ilar benefits on our most sophisticated ri war is not so much the effects of weapons vals. However, we feel little pain because but the human tolerance of those effects. (1) we aren't actually fighting them and When one side or both decide the stress is don’t expect to and (2) at this stage, space too high, it (or they) will act to reduce the would only make the familiar threat a little level of stress. This may mean ending the more efficient, not transform it into any fighting by surrender, limitation, or truce thing shockingly new. (either formal or tacit). Or it may mean a However, as space surveillance improves— change of strategy, such as gearing down to especially if and when earth-attack weap a lower-intensitv form of combat (e.g.. guer ons are introduced into space—we and our rilla resistance, in which high-tech forces foes will start to feel a cramp in our terres are less effective). trial (land, sea, and air) combat styles. We We may expect all these techniques to be will have to start routinely adapting our used to mitigate the impact of space oper terrestrial operations to the reality of obser ations on terrestrial conflict. We will use vation and perhaps attack from the new many of them ourselves. Much of the rest of “high ground” in space. This can be done, this article discusses how we will use them but it will be demanding and unpleasant. to preserve the efficacy of air power. The Life on the battlefield will become more bottom line is that every measure has a hectic; we will have to make decisions and countermeasure and every countermeasure take action much faster. People doing the has a counter-countermeasure. War will fighting will suffer more or less the same rarely be a high-tech walkover and will kinds of hardships and hazards as always, never stay that way for long. It will always but the intensity and frequency of unpleas be a complex pattern of struggle, risk, and antries will be higher, and they will be chance, in which victory depends on a much harder to escape from. complicated interaction of technology, The kind of chaos that used to assail numbers, leadership, training, morale, and frontline combatants sporadically and rear- strategic/tactical ideas. area forces only rarely may become a steady diet for all, if weapons are placed in space. It will become as easy for a space-power foe The Impact of to destroy a truck being loaded onto a ship Space Operations in Boston as to destroy it after its arrival in theater. Some may find this prospect un In war, challenge is the flip side of op bearably frightening. However, by smart portunity. Whoever gets on top of a techni planning and training, we can prepare for cal, tactical, or political development can this threat and operate successfully in such meet the challenge and seize the opportu an environment. nity. Whoever does this best wins.1 As space surveillance improves, achiev Today, in the infancy of space operations, ing strategic (global, long-term) surprise we are mainly reaping the benefits of being will become increasingly difficult unless a space power. Such operations increase we use methods that do not require mass the precision and reliability of our command- ing of military forces. Catching a foe off and-control infrastructure for military action guard will demand imaginative strokes that on land, sea, and air (e.g., communications, cannot be detected from space (e.g., subtle 66 AIR POWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 nonmilitary actions—political, economic, First, as mentioned, one can hide better. social, cultural, and psychological) to dis This means not only improved camouflage/ locate the enemy’s posture and plans. stealth technology, but also broader techni Small military forces whose presence or cal and tactical evolution to make forces intentions can be concealed will usually be easier to camouflage. For the Air Force, more effective than much larger forces that this means reducing reliance on highly cannot be hidden. Chemical, biological, visible bases and logistics support by using weather-control, terror, and other “invis vertical-takeoff aircraft and concealed bases. ible” weapons will appeal to belligerents Other passive technology options include lacking scruples. To preserve the option armor to shield aircraft against beam weap of large-scale action, military forces will ons and hypervelocity guns, and electronic need radically improved camouflage/stealth countermeasures to “jam” the space weap measures. Old ideas will reappear on a ons or the observation-and-computation grander scale: underground and under gear that directs them. water bases, facilities disguised as civilian Some tactical countermeasures also sug activities, and so forth. Most such measures gest themselves. One is expanded reliance will lag behind space surveillance a long on standoff attack, even at extreme ranges. time, partly due to cost. In short, strategic Instead of long approaches to the target, surprise will depend on deceiving the foe. vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft Tactical (local, short-term) surprise can would make brief hovers over their own be achieved another way—as long as space hidden and/or fortified bases. They would observation data must be relayed to earth offer the foe only fleeting targets, getting for analysis before it can be acted on. The back into their ground shelters—mission detection-analysis-decision cycle creates a accomplished—before return fire could ar significant time lag, which can be exploited rive from space or ground weapons. (While for tactical action. Instead of fooling the ground-launched standoff weapons can do satellites, one need only act so fast that the similar things, hovering aircraft offer some enemy cannot react in time. However, this target-acquisition and lock-on advantages “window" will narrow when terrestrial and can displace rapidly to new bases. commanders get direct, real-time access to Also, air-launched systems may be legal in space intelligence. This may be through cases where ground ones are banned by direct field links to unmanned satellites, as arms-control treaties. Finally, standoff mis their number and technical sophistication sions are a way to use aircraft when condi grow; or through manned space stations, tions preclude conventional employment, which will exercise intelligent initiative in just as unemployed tanks sometimes work alerting commanders. It may be decades as artillery.) Standoff action helps preserve before this becomes a major factor, but it surprise by letting us concentrate weapons will happen and will begin to hamper tac on the target without concentrating the tical surprise. aircraft that launch them. Widely dispersed Tactics will be hampered much more if aircraft could attack the same target, and and when space platforms graduate from the foe would not know it was under attack tattling to shooting." Missiles, lasers, parti until too late. cle beams, and hypervelocity guns might Another tactic is to exploit aircraft and all be fired from space against terrestrial pilot agility to evade fire. Any aircraft mak targets. “Hampering” does not mean elimi ing extended flights will need to use ground- nating. however. Besides the inherent limits hugging tactics such as those that helicop imposed on space observation/weaponry ters already use (to evade space-directed by cost and the earth’s size, terrestrial ground fire) and violent changes in speed forces can take passive and active counter and direction such as those that dogfighters measures to protect themselves. use (to frustrate the aim of spaceborne AM AND SPACE FORCES b7 gunners or dodge their fire). In short, Using aircraft (manned or unmanned) against a foe with significant space forces, under these conditions demands revolu there will be little chance for straight-and- tionizing ground as well as air mobility. level flying—not even for transport mis Aircraft and their support forces must mas sions behind the lines. Virtually all aircraft ter rapid, concealed ground movement be will have to be high-performance, high- tween hidden, unprepared bases inside agilitv machines that spend most of their buildings, forests, caves, and so forth. Avi time very close to the ground. (This will ation must become like artillery: “shoot demand quantum leaps in air traffic control and scoot.” Timing of exposed movement and tactical air control, too, of course.) will become a critical skill, with units ad justing both to the foe on the ground and to the complex orbit schedules of satellites and space stations. Despite all, terrestrial forces will continue operating and will remain decisive, since the people who make war’s all-important political deci sions reside on the earth. In the end, a private with a bayonet in your parlor is A potentially controversial countermea more persuasive than a ray gun circling sure would be to disguise air operations as many miles above. civil aviation. Despite the moral and legal Space weapons will not be omnipotent, question marks, this is a gambit we may space surveillance alone even less so. Con encounter even if we don't use it. A legal sider tanks: they are powerful beasts, yet form of disguise would be to use decoy there is still a role for infantry on the aircraft—remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) battlefield. There will always be targets that or robot-piloted vehicles designed to simu space stations cannot see, hit, or damage, late the sensor images of the real things—to due to camouflage, motion, or armor. An provide cover for the real craft in their old-fashioned airplane will be able to han midst. In many cases, the “real” planes dle some of these targets better, due to its could be dispensed with altogether, and shorter reaction time (including the short harder-to-kill, cheaper-to-lose RPVs would flight time of its weapons), closer vision, or carry out the missions. Despite RPV nim better angle of attack. No space station can bleness, losses could be high in a space shoot into a horizontal cave, for example, war. That means we will need large num but an aircraft can. Also, there’s combat bers and the cost will be high, despite their economics. With a multitude of possible relative cheapness per airframe. Nonethe targets on a major battlefield, it takes thou less, it beats risking pilots and even more sands of weapons to do the job. Since no costly manned aircraft, so w-e can expect a one can afford so many space weapons, big role for RPVs. Finally, air commanders space forces will be precious resources that may often have to use extremely small commanders reserve for special targets. forces, which are easier to hide than big Even with the most sophisticated sensors masses of aircraft. and weapons, space forces are unlikely Taken together, all these factors may sub ever to totally overcome the protection stantially reduce the significance of tradi earth targets get from terrain, vegetation, tional air superiority operations. As the sea, and atmospheric effects. Even nuclear- space threat forces aircraft to adopt ex weapon effects are attenuated by these fac tremely low profiles, there won't be many tors, and space-weapon effects will be too. accessible targets for our fighters and little Deep surface features will provide cover chance for them to survive the chase any against all except direct overhead fire, and way. caves can defeat even that. By exploiting 68 AIRPOWER fOURNAL SPRING 1990 such features, advanced air forces can sur what aviation powers started doing early in vive and fight in space-war conditions. World War I—going after their harassers Battles are outrageously complex transac with manned combat craft. tions. with niches for every conceivable If space war were preceded by a period of weapon. By learning what the niches are armed space peace, we could see the devel and how to exploit them, we can ensure opment of “watchdog" spacecraft. As per that aircraft remain powerful actors on fu manently orbiting platforms or shuttles ture battlefields, even against space pow operating in shifts, they would shadow the ers. armed platforms of potential foes to deter All of the foregoing, however, is about the firing of weapons and retaliate immedi passive countermeasures. We’ve saved the ately against any hostile action. Besides the best for last: active interference. Confeder outrageous expense of such a system, it ate cavalry leader Nathan Bedford Forrest could lead to perilous harassment tactics reputedly got a message once from a des like the “chicken” games the Soviet navy perate officer who was surrounded on all has sometimes precipitated. Nevertheless, sides by overwhelming enemy forces. What the watchdog concept might be a useful should he do? Forrest’s answer was “Fight counter to exceptionally threatening space ’em!" Simplistic as it sounds, that idea is platforms (e.g., those armed to attack stra the secret to the complexity of the battle tegic civilian targets). field—the continued value of traditional Actual space combat may take two differ weapons and methods, and warfare’s stub ent forms and will probably take both. One born refusal to succumb to one supposed is long-range exchanges of fire between wonder weapon after another. War is a permanently orbiting stations: the other in struggle of contending wills, not machin volves fighter craft using speed and maneu ery. Man’s obstinate, creative, even desper ver to attack from close ranges (for ate will always seems to find ways to relatively reasons given below, those ranges may in frustrate the wonder weapons. And the best way of all is to ’’fight ’em." fact be quite long). Fighters may be devel Even wonder weapons must be con oped that can be launched from earth to trolled bv human minds and hands, and a penetrate space for a short time. However, burst of hot steel close to those minds and the obvious limitations of such operations hands has a truly wonderful power to de dictate that true space fighters—based on grade the effectiveness of those weapons. orbiting space stations—would eventually It’s called suppression. It works against emerge for both attack and defense. Space- machine guns, antiaircraft guns, tanks, and based fighters would be essential for deep- aircraft. It will work against space plat space operations against high-orbit platforms. forms. Weapons that can shoot down Some fighters could be operated by remote through ’the atmosphere to hit targets on control or piloted by robots, but command earth can also be directed upwards, to hit ers will want the flexibility, adaptability, targets in space. In fact, the guy' on earth and initiative of human crews. has some advantages: less concern about weapon weight, lower costs (permitting more weapons), a stable firing platform, the An Independent predictable motion* and visibility/vulner- Space Force ability of orbiting targets, and the use of terrain for cover/concealment. However, if So far, it is easy to see space operations as antiaircraft experience is any indication, a natural extension of the Air Force mis the effectiveness of ground-to-space fire sion. The service already primarily respon won’t satisfy the people ducking space- sible for providing overhead cover for our to-ground fire. Soon space powers will do forces will just fly a little higher and a little AIR AND SPACE FORCES 69 faster to provide space cover as well. How or surface naval actions more than dog ever. the deeper we move into space and fights. Agility will still count, as a way to the more extensive our space operations dodge weapons or baffle the aim of weapon become, the harder this connection will be operators. However, effective combat will to maintain. Fighting in space will not revolve mainly around the sophistication simply be a case of flying higher and faster. of high-tech weapons and electronic-warfare It will be drastically different from air com equipment and skill in their use. bat on earth. As the differences become The likelihood of frequent hits in such ever clearer and more important, the need no-concealment, no-cover combat will put for an independent space force will arise. a premium on armor, antimissile defenses (guns, beams, or antimissile missiles), sys tems redundancy, and damage control. Those requirements suggest larger vessels and crews. Yet the risk of catastrophic hits also suggests a “more-and-smaller-baskets” approach—large numbers of smaller craft to complicate enemy targeting and preserve the force despite losses. Study and experi The critical differences about the space ence will reveal how to balance those con environment are twofold: (1) the sheer na flicting imperatives. kedness of the place and (2) the unlimited Add the demands of three-dimensional three-dimensional quality of space flight, navigation/maneuvering on a grand scale, much more than just "altitude plus.” We and it’s clear that deep-space combat will will not achieve a Buck Rogers performance— be a radically new experience for which air hiding behind the moon, zipping out to combat provides no particularly relevant fire, then dodging behind some asteroid preparation. If anything, naval surface com belt. For the foreseeable future, deep space bat with its relatively slow, almost pure- will offer no place to hide. There will be geometry maneuvering might be a more nothing like clouds or mountains to shelter relevant example for space fighters (albeit combat vehicles. Astronomical phenomena totally lacking the third dimension). No will be too distant or too thin to hide traditional terrestrial force is suited for this behind, though man-made objects may of mission. A new kind of warrior, with dif fer some limited hide-and-seek options in ferent training and a different kind of mil earth orbit. itary vision, is needed. This suggests that battles will be long- These people will be very much techni range affairs—cruising fights in which in cal warriors. Their survival and success tervisibility will be continuous and relative will depend on mastery of extremely so motion leisurely. Spacecraft will be in sight phisticated equipment, more than on any of each other s sensors and human eyes for thing else. Soldiers, sailors, and airmen long periods. Closure rates and changes must be as attuned to their environment as in relative position (i.e., angular changes they are to their equipment. Space war in aim point) will be slow in terms of riors, however, will be almost exclusively computer-aided reaction time, however machine-oriented people, since their envi rapid they may be in absolute terms. ronment will offer little of tactical value. The nakedness of space and deadliness Tactically, they will operate in a purely of long-range weapons will make it hard to geometrical arena. The ability to visualize close with the enemy, so true maneuvering constantly changing, almost infinitely vari combat (i.e., anything resembling a dog able angles and speeds in three dimensions fight) will be rare at best. Combat will (plus time) will be the soul of tactics. resemble long-range interceptor missions Such war may be a grim, inelegant pro 70 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SPRING 1990 cess of attrition, in which subtle differences in technical quality and skill will be mul tiplied by time into the decisive difference between winners and losers. There will be few Inchons in space, but there may be all too many Hamburger Hills. Poker may be a better metaphor for space war than chess. It is naive to think that space will be an Just as the Wright brothers had to invent exception to this rule. Space is at least as not only the airplane itself but also a new different from air as land and sea are, both kind of human being—the aviator—so will tactically and in terms of human experi deep space demand development of true ence. In addition to the tactical differences “spacemen.” We can begin now to analyze discussed above, the mechanics of motion, what kind of people these will be. People propulsion systems, controls, and life- who have flown in space can help us lay an support systems are different. The physical orderly basis for their identification and and psychological demands and sensations training. But one way or another, they will are alien. Space vehicles will demand a emerge.4 And when they do, why can't quite different set of engineering, mainte the Air Force control them? Even if they nance, supply, and in-flight expertise. aren't interchangeable with aviators, why shouldn’t they fall under the Air Force umbrella? One might as well ask why the The Emerging Challenge Air Force cannot fit under the Army um brella. All these differences will lead to chal The medium always dictates the pro- lenges against Air Force control of military foundest and most insuperable boundaries deep-space operations. The challenge will between services. What is more set in con not come from any existing service. Such crete than the distinction between land, challenges do not grow out of theory: they sea, and air? Even when operational re evolve from existing missions, hardware, quirements or history results in combining and experience. They do not come from land. sea. and air forces in one service, the people who claim they could do it better: boundaries of the medium are never really they come from people who are already overcome. There is more than a little evi doing it and want more freedom to exercise dence that Marines understand soldiers their own judgment. In other words, the and Navy pilots understand Air Force fly challenge will come from within. It will ers better than either group understands resemble the Air Force’s own struggle for sailors. It's an example one could repeat in independence from the Army. It will come all the services. from Air Force space people, who will Put a mixed bag of service people in one insist that the old-fogey airplane drivers do room, stir for a while, then sit back and not understand space operations, are crip watch professional chemistry sort them pling them with old-fashioned aviation out. The final discussion groups will be ideas, and cannot provide the leadership defined more by their media of conflict our space force needs. than the color of their uniforms. The fighter The Air Force must begin now to prepare jocks will talk to fighter jocks—Air Force, for this challenge. That does not mean Navy, and Marines (with perhaps some girding for bureaucratic battle to protect its Army helicopter pilots trying to butt in). turf. It means preparing mentally to respect Marine grunts will talk to Army grunts (and the spacemen’s views and do what is best Air Force parachutists). Seamen will swap for the nation. It means planning ahead for tales with Army engineer boat operators a smooth, orderly, friendly emergence of an and riverine-warfare veterans. independent space force at just the right AIR AND SPACE FORCES 71

stage of development, as soon as it is ready this mission). Air Force shuttle astronauts to function on its own but not before. will do in-space repairs. The Air Force will If the Air Force tried to fight the inevita also man low-orbit military space stations ble. it would fail. Eventually, the space (along with Army and Navy astronauts) force will become independent. Fighting to support terrestrial operations. The Air the inevitable would only distract from Force will also fight to defend these opera more important work and create bitterness tions, with transatmospheric fighters or in an arena where cooperation is essential space fighters based on low-orbit stations. (because the Air Force will operate under Just as the Army operates a large force of the space umbrella and because space and aircraft working closely with its primary air operations will overlap in the transat- ground mission while leaving major air mospheric regime). The lessons of the Air operations to the Air Force, so will the Air Force’s own birth should make it sensitive Force operate on the fringes of space to to the need to avoid such a struggle. support its terrestrial mission while leaving A struggle would damage air power as deep space to the independent space force. much as it would space power. The air Meanwhile, the Air Force will be adapting mission could get lost in a space- its equipment, training, and tactics to carry dominated organization. How? As space on effective air operations—down where it developed into a high-visibilitv. high-cost, really counts, on earth, the home of those “glamorous” military specialty, politics who ultimately decide the outcome of all and public opinion could force Air Force conflict: civilian society. leaders to favor the fair-haired space boys. Space war would make conflict much Air operations could be neglected, even more harrowing for civilian society. They orphaned. Better that aviation should have would find space weapons even harder to its own “independent” Air Force to look hide from than bombers in past wars. Per after it. The Air Force must be careful not to haps the threat of this no-place-to-hide become the dog that gets wagged by the kind of war will create a powerful deterrent space tail. The way to avoid that is to turn effect, rendering all-out space war as nearly the space force loose before it gets too big unthinkable as nuclear war has proven to for the doghouse. be. If so, the Air Force will be the proud This does not mean that the Air Force parent of the forces that create that peace will have no role in space. It will continue preserving effect. In any case, beneath to operate in shallow space, up to the point the space umbrella, the Air Force will con where the earth ceases to be the operational tinue to play a vital deterrent role in the point of reference. The Air Force will launch medium it has mastered so well, where it and service satellites supporting terrestrial has defended American liberty for so long: operations (though it may not monopolize the air.

Notes 1 Let me emphasize that I do not claim that every possibil 4. Keep in mind that we speak here of deep-space combat. ity described in this article is desirable policy for the United Close to the earth, a more traditional combal environment is States This is an effort to analyze historical and technical possible with Ihe earth’s surface as the continued reference forces and their likely effects, not to prescribe policy decisions point. Combat here may remain within Ihe purview of tradi on what to do about all of them. tional warriors (e.g.. the Air Force). Transatmospheric fighters 2. US policy opposes placing offensive weapons in space, can be launched from concealed earth bases, loiter in weather but we must consider what might happen if somebody did it or ground clutter, then zoom into space to fight. Space-based anyway craft may "dip” into the atmosphere to disguise their inten 3. The threat of ground fire will soon compel the orbiters to tions or exploit air’s obscuring effects, then zip back into space become less predictable by zigging and zagging in orbit. Such at unexpected points and times. Here the old-fashioned avia jinking will degrade the accuracy of their fire and thus tor will still be a suitable model, and such operations can be accomplish the purposes of the suppression. handled by Ihe Air Force as an extension of its atmospheric mission. 72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

Ricochets whatever kind, to accomplish what might be (continued from page 3) done. In using B-17s temporarily for troop oper ations and for low- and medium-level attack (73-nim gun. Sagger missile, two machine guns, with skip-bombing techniques, he was turning armor protection, and six infantrymen—all in his back on prewar Army Air Corps doctrine one vehicle), a security squadron is not intimi about the use of strategic bombardment aircraft. dating at all. The Royal Air Force regiment has Major Westenhoff makes a point about unity Scorpion light tanks, Rapier air defense mis of command of the air on the United States side siles, and so forth. 1 understand that the Air as opposed to mere coordination on the Japa Force is now considering light armored vehicles nese side. However, there was unity of com (LAV-25s). That is certainly a step in the right mand of the air on the US side before General direction. Kenney relieved Gen George Brett, yet the Japa The Air Force also needs to train its non-SP nese had done quite well. In fact, their whole ground personnel in at least minimal self- advance into Southeast Asia—including the at defense tactics. Every ground unit should be tack on the Philippines—was a coordinated, self-reliant in self-defense. The article quoted rather than a joint, operation under one theater Gen William Westmoreland as saying that commander with subordinate component com manders. It appears that while unity of air “every US military member, regardless of ser vice, must be prepared to engage the enemy in command was helpful, the key factors were combat." Those who are not capable of doing so Kenney's drive and flexibility. cannot truthfully be called soldiers. The objec |ohn F. O’Connell tion was given that it would cost money to give A lexandria, Virginia the training. What does the Air Force teach at basic training? What could be more basic? Sus tainment training should take place in units. SPACE DOCTRINE Hopefully, Air Force units would give self- defense more emphasis than they give the an I write to compliment Lt Col Alan J. Parrington nual M-16 rifle qualification. Additionally, Air on his recent article “US Space Doctrine: Time Force units should be armed on the same basis for a Change?" in the Fall 1989 issue of Air- as Army combat service support units, with power Journal. He strikes a telling blow in M-16 rifles, M-203 grenade launchers, light an pointing out the discrepancy between the active, titank weapon (LAW) rockets, and M-60 ma offensive mandate of AFM 1—1, Basic Aerospace chine guns. The Air Force has some very fine Doctrine of the United States Air Force, and the personnel, and—if properly equipped, trained, passive, reactive, defensive wording of AFM and led—they could present a formidable de 1-6, Military Space Doctrine. I have urged in fense of an air base. various addresses and papers the need for The Air Force needs to seriously think about greater concern for the active role, but I think he base d efen se if it w an ts to co n cen tra te on flying has done so more effectively than I with this aircraft. 1 hope it will give ground defenders the simple contrast between the two doctrinal man resources they need to do the job. uals. Colonel Parrington has made a good begin SSgt Scott E. Rogers. USA ning with his suggested doctrinal points, but I Fort Polk. Louisiana hope he will go further and not only add to the three major points he makes but elaborate these KENNEY AND THE AIR WAR in much greater detail. I would hope in his next try he will include the necessity for redundant Maj Charles M. Westenhoff's article (“Aggressive or alternate launch facilities. Our current avail Vision," Fall 1989) about Gen George C. Ken able facilities are too close to the sea, too vul ney's exploits as air component commander in nerable, and almost certainly pinpointed for the Southwest Pacific Area was very interesting. initial destruction by an undeclared surprise The key qualities that Kenney possessed were attack. With “peace breaking out all over" and an iconoclastic flexibility and a take-charge at the declining probability of a major war in the titude. He also had an understanding of the immediate future, thoughtful projections such meaning of air power in its truest sense. He as his become all the more important. Histori recognized that he had to use air power, of cally. our greatest failures between wars, when RICOCHETS 73

funding is cut back sharply, have been intellec- history of space development. 1 was somewhat ual failures—an absence of lively professional puzzled, however, to see no mention of Dr lebate on doctrinal issues. Robert H. Goddard’s work with liquid-fueled rockets in the 1920s. I was under the impression Maj Gen 1. B. Holley. Jr.. USAFR. Retired Durham, North Carolina that his work made major contributions to the German scientists' efforts prior to and during Wo r l d Wa r 11.

|[ found the article by Lt Col Alan Parrington CMSgt Lawrence J. Dongilli, USAF [very interesting, particularly the section on the Fairchild AFB. Washington net assessmenlt

^Defending Am erica’s Security by Frederick H. nizational treatm ent and only then to a section Hartmann and Robert L. W endzel. Elmsford. on “Threats. Responses, and Issues" in itself New York 10523: Pergamon-Brassey. 1988. teaches much to the student of defense policy. 378 pages, S38.00. A second and related strong point of the book is its uncompromising position that “how to These two professors, one from the Naval War think about defense” is the proper basis for College (Hartmann) and the other from the Air analyzing all defense issues. This point in par War College (Wendzel). have produced a treat- ticular makes the text truly useful for the mature nent of what may be called the “defense prob- student of defense policy. Both the high-level em .” They have m ade the claim that their book policymaker and the American undergraduate s for the new student of US defense policy as have a tendency to forget that we Americans well as for the professional analyst. This goal is must first determ ine w hat we want to do (and i difficult one, but— considering that they set the context in w hich w e m ust act) before we do Dut to determine “what to consider in arriving at it. If this book succeeds in teaching nothing answers’’ rather than to give "solutions"— they other than this perspective. US defense policy lave well succeeded. w ill have gained from this effort. Further, they have done an important service A third refreshing point about the text is the o the discipline by producing a text that has authors’ ability to go beyond the traditional iuch a goal. Books abound on this or that de- method of analysis involving “bureaucratic pol ense issue: what has been lacking until now is a itics." Such “conventional w isdom " approaches comprehensive text that addresses conceptual a type of fatalism in accepting policy as an issues and then builds on them in a logical outcom e of a process in w hich rationality plays manner. Every teacher of defense issues has a m inim al part. Hartmann and W endzel, w hile irobably wrestled with the problem of getting giving full weight to the bureaucratic problems lehind the current issues of the day for the in form ulating and im plem enting policy, im jurpose of conveying to the student the subtle- plicitly refuse to say that nothing can be done ies and difficulties of actually arriving at w ork about intractable problems. Although not prim a able solutions to create and implement a real US rily engaged in advocacy, they do not shrink defense policy. from realistically addressing solutions to prob In fact, this sense of logic may be am ong the lems. look's strongest points. The authors immedi- If there are any drawbacks to the text, they itely dispel the notion that one can just sit dow n must include the admittedly ambitious attempt ind begin to discuss, say. the Strategic Defense to cover the entire range of defense issues in one nitiative or the m aritim e strategy without first book. Although the authors' effort is com m end jnderstanding the actual and normative bases of able from a standpoint of com prehensiveness, (those strategies or capabilities. The logical pro one does find that the result is a text cram m ed gression from a conceptual analysis to an orga with facts and analyses. This amount of data 74 AIRPOWER fOURNAL SPRING 1990 may make it difficult for the new student to possible outcomes. This review addresses the follow the argument. four parts of the book and comments about the Finally, one substantive criticism comes to editors' views on policy implications. mind. It may be that previous applications of Part 1 provides an overview of the I/O model the "indirect approach" as a preferable direction with an excellent thumbnail sketch (6-7). A for defense policy do not receive fair treat strong aspect of the introduction is the discus ment. Specifically, Dwight D. Eisenhower is said sion of the consequences of moving toward to have used a “direct approach" (nuclear- occupationalism. But it is not clear that the link oriented), and former President Reagan's de between the presence of women in the military fense policy is criticized as trying to do too and a drift toward occupationalism is a valid much (that is. not setting priorities—a prerequi one. as discussed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 pre site of "strategy”). It is possible, however, that sents a good theory overview of social organiza both of these presidents understood quite well tional change and examines an insightful the “limits of power." Eisenhower’s doctrine delineation of differing organizational levels was to respond to aggression on American and their own unique requirements for research terms: Reagan's was to implement the concept methodology. However, it is probably dangerous of “competitive strategies." Both doctrines, it to focus solely on the process rather than the seems, are prime examples of the indirect ap outcome, as advocated here (33). Surely the proach. Perhaps the shaping of our environment bottom line has to include outcomes—both pos through this approach would be aided by recog itive and negative. Chapter 4 offers an interest nizing its past successes. ing parallel between the private-industry In sum, though, this text is exceptional in movement captured by Thomas J. Peters's In what it tries to do and what it accomplishes. It Search of Excellence and the military's move fills a real need in the field of US defense policy: toward institutionalism. Charles A. Cotton sug it tells the student how to approach the problem, gests that peace probably leads to occupation not simply what solutions are available. If a alism. This premise creates a conundrum: generation of future defense analysts (or present militaries cannot want war because it leads to ones for that matter) can learn (1) that there are institutionalism. In chapter 5 John H. Faris pro no easy solutions and (2) that they must think poses that bureaucratic rationalism is extant in about goals, environments, and limitations be today’s military (vice occupationalism) and that fore they act. then Hartmann and VVendzel are to the tensions developed from an I/O conflict can be commended. be found in all organizations. Part 2 centers on topical issues of importance Lt Col Douglas L. Erwin, USAF to the US military. Madv Wechsler Segal de US A ir Force Academy, Colorado scribes families and the military as two compet ing (and greedy) institutions, with society moving toward a new institutional form to ac The Military: More Than Just a Job? edited by commodate both. Interestingly. Segal postulates Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood. Elms- that dual-service couples may be more institu ford, New Y:ork 10523: Pergamon-Brassey, tionally inclined than couples with only one 1988. 322 pages, $30.00. service member. In chapter 7 Patricia M. Shields says that military women were/are very institu Even though interest may wax and wane tional and that only men in combat specialties about topics such as the institutional/ are more institutional. Her arguments are some occupational (I/O) thesis, current emphasis what persuasive. Next. John Sibley Butler writes places this subject squarely amidst Air Force about race relations in the military from an I O studies of officer and enlisted development. perspective. He attributes racial behaviors and Other services as well continue to examine their attitudes to differences in I/O structures. The last roots in light of I/O forces. Charles Moskos and chapter in part 2 provides insights into the Frank Wood have crafted a magnificent monu institutionalization of US Air Force Academy ment to the central theme that Western militar cadets. Thomas M. McCloy and William H. ies have drifted away from institutionalism Clover review evidence that shows cadets to toward occupationalism. Clearly, their collec have both institutional and occupational values. tion of contributing authors provides a litany of Part 3 is an amalgam of several Western- reasons for this drift, as well as some hint of oriented countries and their resident authors' NET ASSESSMENT 75

research (or thoughts) on the applicability ot the Revolutionary armies pioneered such tactical LO thesis in the militaries of these countries. innovations as screens of skirmishers, massed [Several of the reasons touted as leading to occu- column attacks, and rapid mobility over a wide bationalism include all-volunteer recruiting in- front in order to achieve local superiority at a iducements (Great Britain), affluence (France), decisive point. At its height, under Napoleon, lack of on-base housing (Australia), technologi the empire conquered by these armies stretched cal advances (Switzerland), and increases in from Portugal to the border of Russia and from number of personnel (Israel). One gets the im the Baltic to the Mediterranean. One of the pression that most of these foreign militaries are secrets of the Revolution is how it managed to struggling with modernization movements that release such powerful forces buried in the seem (in the absence of protracted conflicts) foster ingly moribund oncien regime. deinstitutionalization. At least one country But the Revolution’s military aspect is Greece), however, feels that the drift toward scarcely a subject that historians have neglected. jccupationalism is beneficial. The common de- A vast library of books deals with Napoleon and lominator here is the universality of the I/O his republican predecessors. The four volumes hesis. published by William Phipps in the 1930s prob Part 4 is a wrap-up by Moskos and Wood, with ably rank as the classic work on the revolution i strong urging for a return to institutionalism. ary armies available in English. More recently, Conditions of this return are (1) leadership by Gunther Rothenberg has written a short, lucid deed (not word only), (2) demonstration of how account of Napoleonic strategy tactics. To this he parts relate to the whole, and (3) motivation already large and growing literature Col John R. ihrough values. Both editors suggest a review of Elting, USAF, Retired, has now added a long and Dolicy implications according to the level of amply documented study of the grand armee. jrganization where those policies (i.e., recruit Elting’s Swords Around a Throne focuses, how ment and retention, military family, sex roles, ever. on military organization and daily life and organizational commitment and leadership) rather than on the battlefield. The early chapters interact. The micro-, macro-, and organization- trace the backdrop of the old royal army, de level analysis frame is quite enlightening. There scribe the reforms introduced during the chaotic |s an excellent logical tie presented between years between the fall of the Bastille and Coup of institutionalism and an effective military, but no Brumaire, and provide some colorful miniature real evidence is offered. Obviously, the inclu- portraits of Napoleon’s principal companions- fsion of evidence would have made a much more in-arms. Elting then moves on to a series of more convincing case. or less self-contained essays covering virtually every aspect of the social organism that was the Generally speaking, this book is very stim u Imperial Army. Attractively decorated with con lating if not provocative. Although it is probably temporary sketches, knowledgeable even on the targeted at a rather esoteric audience, the au subtle intricacies of uniform designs, this richly thors really succeed in tweaking anyone’s inter comprehensive book deals with such diverse est in the essence of military personnel. topics as diet and pay, bivouacs and marching Lt Col Roger W. Alford. USAF formations, the enforcement of discipline, and Randolph AFB. Texas the practical functions of drumbeats and bugle calls. Written with clarity and verve, crammed with Swords Around a Throne by John R. Elting. information that makes it a useful reference New York 10022: The Free Press, 1988. 768 work, Elting’s book will probably, neverthe pages. $35.00. less. disappoint professional historians. Based entirely on published memoirs and printed The French Revolution marks a new era in the sources. Swords Around a Throne is very much history of Western warfare no less than in the old-style social history, content to luxuriate in history of Western political ideas and institu its subject and blissfully unaware of the socio tions. The mass conscriptions that began in 1793 logical concepts and methods that might help to raised the first truly national armies of citizen- explain the world it so gustily describes. Take, soldiers. and the primitive efforts at economic for example, the myth of the Imperial Army as mobilization during the brief Jacobin dictator an instrument of social mobility (the baton in a ship were an early attempt at waging total war. knapsack thesis): Elting’s brief sketches of Na 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

poleon’s marshals—certainly a ragtag lot— enormous challenges to military planners. A suggest that the army may have been an further but less obvious issue lies in our person instrument of upward mobility, but other evi nel policies. Will, as has been suggested, the dence points in a different direction (105 cap reinstatement of the draft soon become a neces tains who served under Napoleon had once sity? outranked him), and no attempt is made to A central concern in reaching such a decision measure the phenomenon precisely. In fact, the will be the present condition and future pros issue of the relationship between the army and pects of the all volunteer force. How well has it social mobility is never even broached directly. worked, especially in attracting and retaining The role of the mass army of the Napoleonic highly qualified people and in resolving divi period as an instrument of modernization break sive social aspirations and overall military effi ing down provincial loyalties is likewise left ciency? Dr Sue Berryman attempts to answer unexamined. Elting has a large fund of anec these questions, as well as the more fundamen dotes on draft dodgers and deserters and under tal one of our traditional perception of our stands the formal administrative procedures for military rank and file. dealing with them but says nothing of the famil Particular attention is given to what are ial and community networks that made draft termed social compositional issues concerning dodging and desertion on an ever-increasing the Army’s enlisted force. These concerns are defined as "race, ethnicity, recency of immigra scale possible. Finally, to conclude a list of tion, citizenship, age, sex, family socioeconomic omissions that might have been extended fur status, or geographical origin,” as well as "edu ther, one notes that the interpenetration of civil cational attainment, verbal and mathematical and military society is ignored, although the abilities, and aptitudes." By emphasizing the same man administered both and was in the former, more empirical, set of values, Dr Berry habit of using his generals as temporary ambas man wisely concludes that a more effective sadors and of appointing disabled veterans to process may be found to influence both policy electoral colleges. makers and the general public to consider more Napoleon’s armies, at least in the early days, dispassionately the actual results and possible were interesting organizations where peasant future uses of volunteer forces. boys and footloose clerks rubbed shoulders with "W'riting this book,” declares the author, “was emigres waiting to go home and with ex- pure pleasure.” Reading the book might also terrorists, both red and white, unable to go home have been pleasurable for this reviewer had for fear the friends and relatives of those they had murdered might murder them. An archival more care been taken. Present are the usual historian with an eye for picaresque detail wed blemishes of jargon (“percents” for “per ded to an intellect attuned to underlying struc centage”), as well as an annoying dual system of references to authorities, both in the text and in tures (Richard Cobb, for example) could make of footnotes. There are also several questionable such material the pretext for a brilliant exercise sociological premises. Dr Berryman states that of historical imagination. Swords Around a “military service . . . offers opportunities that Throne is something else and something less than this. fundamentally distinguish it from domestic wel fare programs.” Such opportunities "are best Dr Laurence J. Kilbourne thought of as status transformations.'' One of Peterson AFB, Colorado these confers "legitimate careers on those from groups that hold marginal social and economic Who Serves? The Persistent Myth of the Under positions in the country” (2). class Army by Sue E. Berryman. Boulder, This distinction between military service and Colorado 80301: Westview Press, 1988, 127 social welfare may not be as sharp as Dr Berry pages. $20.00. man supposes. One can imagine that certain welfare programs, particularly those offering Our national defense strategy is presently un full- or part-time employment in conjunction der significant revision. The effect of the with education or those subsidizing child care Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, for single or welfare mothers who thus obtain the condition of our conventional forces, the upwardly mobile employment, also offer "legit feasibility of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the imate careers” as well as social and economic debt crisis, and the new administration present status transformations. NET ASSESSMENT 77

Moreover, Dr Berryman rightly demonstrates Even if Gorbachevian proclamations about that public opinion throughout this and the last defensive doctrine and reasonable sufficiency century has perceived pejoratively the social are correct, the Soviet program guarantees— composition of the Army’s enlisted ranks. Such especially in the absence of a NATO consensus a valid point could have been made more mean about missile defense against tactical ballistic ingful had the author discussed the nature and missiles' conventional, chemical, and strategic prevalence of the popular notion of the Army as nuclear capabilities— a high and persisting de a mild social reformatory. This well-known con gree of threat to the Western alliance. As Yost cept has been discussed in, for example, Morris demonstrates. Moscow has reached the stage of Janowitz and Lt Col Roger Little’s Sociology and being able to creep out of the antiballistic mis the Military Establishment, rev. ed. (1965), sile (ABM) treaty without openly breaking it by which is not cited in Dr Berryman's bibliogra virtue of its long-term increase in its defenses. phy. This program has already seriously degraded Even more dubious is the supposed "histor NATO offensive options and is forcing the ical" perspective of her work. Dr Berryman does United States into an expensive and controver not claim to be a historian, but she does state sial reorganization of its own strategic forces. that she received assistance from historians in The ongoing controversy about SDI and its the preparation and exposition of her case. Such related ambition to make nuclear weapons im work as presented is very superficial. A 24- potent and obsolete has met with great skepti year-old unpublished doctoral dissertation on cism in Europe. Specifically, France and Great “The American Enlisted Man in World War 1" is Britain alike have concluded that in the event of hardly the best single authority for the inequity conventional disarm am ent, given the Soviet of that much-studied subject, the Civil War threats on both offense and defense, they will draft. Furthermore, to discuss the nature of the have to continue upgrading and modernizing twentieth-centurv draft without any references their nuclear deterrent. Moreover, no strategic to such authorities as John Chambers. George consensus exists within NATO as yet for coun Flynn. J. Gary Clifford, and Samuel R. Spencer tering Soviet defenses or missiles. does little to create confidence in Dr Berryman's No better study exists in detailing the scope, conclusions, however ingeniously offered. comprehensiveness, and purposes or benefits One finishes the book wishing that its subject accruing to M oscow from these programs. It would have received the thoroughgoing and should also be noted that Yost fails to point out sophisticated treatment it clearly deserves. that Soviet air. missile, and space defenses are becoming mobile on land, at sea, and in the air Dr Richard E. Morse and are in nature com bined-arm s defenses. M e Maxwell AFB. Alabama ticulous and sobering by turn, this study belongs in the hands of every analyst concerned about the related issues of NATO security and BMD. These will be am ong the two m ost intractable security issues facing the Bush administration, Soviet Ballistic M issile Defense and the Western and they need to be addressed in tandem— not Alliance by David S. Yost. Cambridge, Massa chusetts 02138: Harvard University Press, separately, as they were in the Reagan adm inis 1988. 405 pages. $40.00. tration. Moreover, this book should conclusively demonstrate that while BMD defenses are As this masterful study makes clear, Soviet hardly perfect (what defense is?), they are essen ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs are tial and need to be introduced with a com p re long-standing, antedate the Strategic Defense hensive strategy and doctrine behind them to Initiative (SDI) program, and pose a major threat protect ourselves and our allies. Hopefully, as a to both US and NATO security options. The result of books like this one, we can get away comprehensive Soviet program of air, space, and from the Buck Rogers ideas about technological missile defense not only enhances the defenses submission and get back to strategy and doctrine of the USSR, even if they are not perfect, but also in our security planning against this persisting threatens the capability of our offensive weapon threat. systems and enhances the threat posed by Soviet systems in the absence of a credible Western threat. Dr Stephen Blank Maxwell AFB. Alabama 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

Beyond Military Reform: American Defense mobility shortfall. Fallows and James Webb, in a! Dilemmas by Jeffrey Record. Elmsford, New pair of articles in the April 1980 issue of the York 10523: Pergamon-Brassey. 1988, 186 Atlantic Monthly, offered many of the same pages, $17.95. arguments on the need for a draft that Record now uses. Therefore, those issues have not been ignored, but neither have they been outlined in Jeffrey Record believes that the military re as simple and readable a form as in Beyond form movement, of which he is one of the most Military Reform. prominent members, must expand “its present This book is clear, and—in some places— narrow focus on the operational level of war in Record’s essays are both novel and brilliant. For recognition that, for the United States, opera example, chapter 10—on the decision to commit tional reform must be accompanied by strategic forces to fight—is particularly good, and it raises reform" (18). The reform movement, in his view, issues about the six Weinberger principles that has neglected strategic foundations, without have not been heard before. However, the book which tactical success means little. has several major flaw's. First, it is inadequately Record outlines several basic strategic failures documented: therefore, verification of Record's that jeopardize the security of the United States, presumed facts is difficult if not impossible. For and he believes that reformers have ignored example. Record writes, "When the British war these failures for the most part. Record summa ship Sheffield was sunk by a single Argentine rizes the problem: Exocet missile, many of the same technological Not even the most operationally superb US military faith-healers who had declaimed the historical force can prevail in war if it exit of the main battle tank after the 1973 Octo is assigned objectives beyond its capacitv to ful ber War quickly declared the extinction of the fill; surface worship" (124). How'ever, he doesn't cite cannot be brought to bear at the right time and even one "faith healer.” I would like to see the place: names of just three of the "many" people who is grossly unrepresentative of the society from which it is drawn; condemned both tanks and surface warships so is trained and equipped for the wrong war; l can judge their statements myself. Also, Record reflects excessive investment in forces irrelevant includes a large list of numbers (28) and refers to to the main threat; “many observers” (53-54). but the reader win has unwarranted faith in machines over men: ders where he got this information. There are lacks allies in circumstances requiring them; only 17 footnotes in 180 pages of basic text, and ignores the presence of nuclear weapons and that number of references is simply insufficient their implications; and for the reader to determine how Record col is sent away to fight under tactically and politi cally self-defeating conditions (178). lected his facts. A second flaw is that there are numerous Record makes a very good case that the secu small errors of fact (aside from editing mistakes). rity troubles of the United States derive mainly Record's statement, "We have never been in from the failure to match strategy and resources. vaded" (120) is not true. The British burned the Strategic reform would create the conditions White House after invading during the War of that makq military operations worthwhile. How 1812. Another example: “Hanoi's conquest of ever, whereas the government may not have South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia breathed moved in the correct direction (in his view), encouraging military life into the Association of Record is wrong in his assertion that the reform Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)” (175. note). ers have ignored strategic issues. For example. Again, not true. ASEAN, an economic entity, has James Fallows, in (1981), in National Defense gotten worried enough about Hanoi to make cluded chapters on technology, the nuclear di political noises, but there has never been even a lemmas, and personnel problems—including hint of "military life" in ASEAN. the lack of a draft. Edward N. Luttwak, in The The third major flaw results from Record’s War (1984), pressed Pentagon and the Art of obvious contempt for the intellectual capacities similar arguments on the kinds of forces the of those people who disagree u'ith him. This United States should have. Sherwood S. contempt appears plainly where he writes about Cordier. in US Military Power and Rapid De the abilities of “the Pentagon" (81. 87). Appar (1983), ployment Requirements in the 1980s ently he believes that an educated person could explained in much greater detail the strategic not disagree u'ith him on, for example, tactical NET ASSESSMENT 79

joctrine or on the use of special operations Looking at NATO’s foreign policy over the past orces. 41) years, the current state of world affairs, and These flaws detract from an otherwise good, the NATO political process (with special em :oncise overview of an important topic. phasis on consultation, cooperation, and shar Record’s own Revising US Military Strategy ing burdens), he does an excellent job of 1984) covers some of the same ground in a presenting his argument. letter manner. The earlier book is preferable to According to Colonel Schmitz. NATO can no he present one. which is recommended only for longer be tied to its concept of territorial defense he general reader who needs or wants an out- of its 16 nations. Times have changed, and— ine of some major strategic issues facing the although the threat of a Soviet invasion of West Jnited States. This restriction is unfortunate ern Europe cannot be discounted—greater jecause Record has shown that he has important danger is posed to the alliance in geographic houghts on these topics, and he is capable of areas external to the NATO landmass. Soviet nuch better work. expansionism. Communist subversion, and in ternational terrorism affect the allies' needs for Maj Thomas Bradley. USAF energy and raw material and their relationships Maxwell AFB. Alabama with third world countries. Those people who would delimit NATO’s ability to act or react to extra-NATO events are being shortsighted. The alliance needs to reassess its foreign policy and Defending the NATO Alliance by Col Peter N. effect the changes necessary to make it a collec Schm itz. National Defense University Press. tive power to be reckoned with, both inside and Washington. D.C. 20402: Government Printing outside the region. The time has come for NATO Office. 1987. 178 pages. $4.50. to influence world events over the long term, As NATO approaches its fortieth year, we are rather than react to real-time events in patch- being inundated with political observations work fashion. about the alliance's viability and future. Pick up Schm itz says that NATO’s inability to develop a political journal, and you are likely to find a coordinated, com prehensive global policy has yourself reading about either a positive or neg contributed to an identity crisis. NATO must ative aspect of what has come to be known as achieve political-strategic cooperation in global NATO's “crisis.” This buzzword focuses on per policies "if it is to defend itself and preserve the ceptions of ever-increasing tension between the ideals for w hich it was designed.” To accom United States and its European allies over mili plish this objective, he implies that NATO must tary, political, and economic issues. At best, the go on the offensive. It must take the initiative, on crisis is perceived as healthy. Some consider a global basis, to counter any threat. He suggests debate fundamental to the checks and balances that m easures critical to this initiative would so necessary in an alliance of 16 sovereign include a program of technological and eco nations. At worst, it threatens a "transatlantic nomic aid, a lower-profile US role, and joint rift” and the eventual demise of NATO. Most of US-allied m ilitary presence in critical areas. The the friction is related to NATO’s operating area. net effect of this initiative w ould be to offset the The most heatedly debated issues have been the ability of the Soviets (and others) to force NATO Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat to Western Eu reaction to such events as Afghanistan, the Per rope. nuclear policy, defense expenditures. sian Gulf, and African crises. Coordinated initi Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) de atives by the allies would reduce internal NATO ployment. and East-West trade. Each relates di friction, m aking the alliance stronger. rectly to the alliance's role as guarantor of peace Although his book was published in 1987. in Western Europe. Colonel Schmitz actually wrote it between Oc Now Col Peter Schmitz, of the West German tober 1982 and July 1984. when he was a Na air force, adds a new dimension. He argues that tional Defense University international fellow. in addition to resolution of the internal issues Bv the time it was published, the material was cited by other observers, NATO's future success somewhat dated. Nonetheless, events in Libya depends on revising global strategy. He posits and the Persian Gulf and subsequent coopera that NATO's lack of a comprehensive and coor tive allied efforts support his arguments. dinated worldview strategy threatens the alli 1 found his hook thought provoking and well ance just as seriously as do internal arguments. written. Colonel Schmitz's command of English 8U AIRPOWER IOURNAL SPRING 1990 is impressive, especially so because he was able to the problem. After nearly 30 years of defense to concisely articulate a very complex issue in procurement tinkering. Fox believes we are no 178 pages. If you are looking for another dimen nearer to efficient and effective acquisition. sion to the discussion of the NATO crisis, 1 To Fox, the main reason things have gotten highly recommend his book. worse is that reformers have failed to improve how defense procurement is managed. In this Maj Gary C. Lagassey, USAF respect he agrees with a com m ent John Kenneth Headquarters Washington. D.C. USAF. Galbraith made some years ago during the height of the Reagan-led public disaffection with big government. One thing the American gov The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons ernment needs is a good school in public man Acquisition by J. Ronald Fox with James L. agement and the right incentives. YVhat ails the Field. Boston 02163: Harvard Business School government’s defense procurement business Press, 1988, 348 pages, $24.95. most is the absence of a cadre of experienced Few people doubt the questionable manner in and trained procurem ent managers. In Fox’s which the US government goes about the busi view, there can be no substitute for day-to-day ness of procuring hardware for the nation’s evaluations and negotiations between buyers defense. Recent press reports on the so-called and sellers. Parenthetically, it should be noted Department of Defense (DOD) procurement that this book is published by the Harvard scandal have only added the taint of personal Business School, w hich would surely benefit as malfeasance to the widespread feeling of pro an instructional institution for the professional skills and training of the DOD military and found dysfunction. The defense industry is run civilian acquisition force. ning for cover, fearing a new round of How does he propose to improve manage congressional reform, while the general percep ment? Basically. Fox would like to see more and tion deepens that the government acquisition better incentives for those military and civil process is out of control. service acquisition managers. This action would Critics of how the government goes about its attract a better trained and skilled cadre and defense business generally fall into five groups: would present a genuine alternative to the self-interested industrialists (eager to escape revolving-door problem. Will the cost of in overregulation), ideologues (of various persua creased incentives be offset by the savings of sions). moralists (who blame self-interested par better management? Fox’s projections of savings ticipants), technocrats, and managerialists. J. up to $40 billion per year from more efficient Ronald Fox falls into the latter group. The au management seem ridiculously optimistic and thor has held high-level civilian positions in are precisely the kinds of estimates likely to both Air Force and Army procurement, contract underline the idea that more dramatic changes ing, and logistics bureaucracies, in addition to pursuing an academic career in government- are necessary. industry relations and an entrepreneurial career At bottom. Fox’s solution comes down to two in manufacturing. He authored Arming Amer com peting visions of what a program manager ica: How (he U.S. Buys Weapons (Harvard Busi might be. In the first vision, the program m an ness School. 1974), which the current work ager is a program promoter and contract moni under review updates. tor. a role that m inim izes cost controlling and He does not bring good news. The problems smacks of military-industrial-complex collu identified in the first book still exist, he argues, sion. In the second vision, the program manager and some have gotten worse. The following are is an acquisition m anagem ent specialist whose among the major elements of the problems he principal function is the control of contractor discusses: government-industry relations con costs, in addition to managing a technically tinue to swing between collusion and adversar- excellent program. To achieve this vision re ialism: costs increases and technical shortfalls quires strengthening the autonomy of the gov are on the rise; inappropriate contractor charges ernment manager’s side, while diminishing the continue: and—most alarmingly—while costs influence of the DOD's civilian leadership, increase, output has declined, even given whose historic role has been to coddle the greater weapon system capability. Over the contractors from whose ranks they are invari years, in response to these basic conditions, ably taken. Congress has added intrusive micromanagement Since it is unlikely the contractor com m unity NET ASSESSMENT 81

would ever support such a change, vve can only that lead to incompetence and integrates it into hope for deliverance in this direction. Greater a historical perspective, seeking to discover “the management autonomy at the program-office unusual or surprising event" that dramatically level, however, might offer benefits that bolster influenced the outcome of combat. Great Mili Fox’s case. For example, in the military space- tary Disasters addresses the inadequacies of procurement field, space system acquisitions commanders by focusing on the frailty of their are structured along lines similar to large-scale physical, mental, and psychological constitu production activities, even though the small tion. Among those qualities, Regan discusses number of space units makes space acquisition overconfidence and timidity as characteristics resemble a classical research and development of incompetence. Besides psychological incon model. The result is inflated procurement costs. sistencies, commanders are afflicted by personal A more intelligent approach to administrative inadequacies such as physical incapacity, emo Istructure would allow program managers to bet- tional jealousies arising from professional ri iter fit together what business historian Alfred D. valry. and cowardice. Regan completes his Chandler refers to as strategy and structure. analysis of commanders by scrutinizing their Regardless of whether one agrees with Fox’s professional ineptitude—those tactical and op solutions, one is certain to find his work both erational blunders that contributed to military informative and insightful. It contains a detailed disasters. description of the major aspects and phases of In addition to relating the personal inability of acquisition, an explanation of major legislation, a commander to make correct battlefield deci land a good deal of history to help us understand sions. Regan devotes attention to the institu how and why procurement problems have tional incompetence associated with military (changed for the worse. bureaucracies and the relationship of unrealistic political policy to military affairs. The inability Dr |ulian J. DelGaudio Los Angeles AFB. California to overcome institutional inertia or interpret intelligence data and the unfortunate tendency to relate doctrine to technology are some of the Great Military Disasters: A Historical Survey of detrimental qualities of staff planners found in Military Incompetence by Geoffrey Regan. Great Military Disasters. Politicians falter in New York 10017: M. Evans & Company, Inc.. relating their policy decisions to the military by 1988. 320 pages. S22.50. making unrealistic demands of commanders. In the diplomatic and domestic arena, politicians The explanation of the moral element in war err by alienating natural allies, by miscalculat has gained a popular resurgence in print. Al- ing adversaries’ intentions, and by not appreci I though the human dimension has been the ating the value of propaganda. theme of many recent books, it is still, for very By citing numerous historical examples, good reasons, the least understood or predict Regan adequately documents these individual able facet of combat and the greatest influence and institutional qualities that contribute to on the "fog and friction" of warfare. In examin- military failures. Organized in two parts, Great I ing the moral and psychological elements of Military Disasters identifies characteristics of | war, the preeminent nineteenth-century mili- incompetence associated with commanders, I tary theorist Carl von Clausewitz concluded that staff planners, and politicians in part one and all aspects of war emanate from the human then demonstrates these negative attributes in condition: "Moral forces are among the most 11 minor case studies in part two. Possibly the important subjects in War. They form the spirit best two battles used to illustrate patterns of which permeates the whole being of War." Writ- incompetence are Marston Moor (1844) and San i ten from a historical perspective, Geoffrey Juan Hill (1898). Expanding its scope from the I Regan's Great Military Disasters continues the personal inadequacies of commanders in battle, I investigation into understanding the relation to military bureaucracies' reluctance to change, ship of man to warfare. and finally to national leaders’ misunderstand Regan highlights our erstwhile inability to ing of the relationship of politics to war, Great identify the types of incompetence of command Military Disasters portrays the fundamental el ers. staff planners, and politicians that resulted ement of warfare— man. in the failure of various battles and campaigns, An in-depth treatment on the calamitous con i He presents a comprehensive range of factors duct of war. Great Military Disasters concen 82 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 trates on the moral and psychological factors fiction, poetry, and movies), and offers detailed that negatively influence warfare. However, analyses of the words and actions of major Regan fails to m ention the foremost deficiency decisionmakers. Two-thirds of the book is de of commanders, staff planners, and policy voted to bom bing policy and strategy in World makers—their disregard for the importance of War II. history. Although Regan does not comment di In developing the themes that "technological rectly on this aspect, his historical perspective fanaticism” drove strategic bombing and that demonstrates the usefulness of studying history bombing with unclear strategy led to exorbitant to gain insight, temper judgment, and train the use of force, Sherry applies a “calculus of mind. Combat experience for most people is blame” (293) to major decisions, actions, and relatively scarce, but one may obtain vicarious players. He describes both what should have exposure to warfare by studying military his been done (in his opinion) and what might have tory. The institution that disregards the useful occurred had other actions been taken. Sherry covers the apocalyptic theorists of air ness of military history is m yopic. The human power well, although his concentration on stra dim ension, institutional evolution, and political tegic bom bing might lead the innocent reader to relationship to war are rooted in history. Geof assume that theorists were all of the Stanley frey Regan’s Great Military Disasters recounts Baldwin persuasion ("the bomber will always some of these intricate complications of warfare get through”). The interplay of technology, in by illuminating the negative aspects of military stitutional desires, doctrine, and policy over the blunders. It should be read by military and 20 years between the world wars illustrates the political professionals w ho make critical deci problems of prophecy very well. sions about military policy and the conduct of Sherry’s narrative of decisions, actions, and war. outcomes in World War II is studded with valu Maj Michael R. Terry, LJSAF able insights on strategy and policy. While he US A ir Force Academy. Colorado does not quote Clausewitz, it’s hard to find better examples of war’s uncertainty, its resis tant medium, and its tendency to change in

The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation nature and objectives, once begun. Ineffective efforts (such as bombing submarine pens), dis of Armageddon by Michael S. Sherry. New Haven, Connecticut 06520: Yale University persal of effort, equating amount of effort (hours Press, 1987. 435 pages, $14.95 paperback. flown or bombs dropped) with results, and in efficient operations (bombing from China) reveal The title and the cover illustration (a B-29 sobering mismatches between means and ends. escorted by 10 P-5 Is) might lead a reader to The tendency to pursue quantifiable goals, sim expect just another book exploring the contem ply because results could be reliably measured porary appetite for military history. Not so. and reported, clearly parallels the generation of Sherry has written a history of an idea—the idea purposeless sorties that crippled the Luftwaffe of strategic bombardment. in World War II. The predominant theme is that ideas, expec Sherry's most detailed argument is that strat tations, emotions, hopes, dreams, and ignorance egy in the Pacific was not properly focused on a about air power led US policymakers to use political center of gravity that could force la- excessive force thoughtlessly in World War II pan’s surrender. Ideally, strategy should have bombing campaigns. This overindulgence oc "rested finally on a view of the enemy: a con curred despite a prevalent prewar belief that air ception of the adversary’s resolve, of the condi power was so terrible that it would never be tions under which it would cease fighting, and used. Sherry believes that the history of strategic of the institutions that made decisions" (239). bombing theory provides an ominous example The Indian author S. T. Das has stated that “the for nuclear deterrence theory. objective of war . . . is the effective control Sherry traces thought on strategic bombing over the political elite of the state to enforce a from H. G. Wells’s 1908 novel The War in the Air political decision." The point—that Americans through the end of World War II. In the process, tend to have difficulty identifying political cen he employs the tools of intellectual history, ters of gravity other than the popular will—is augments the major apocalyptic air power theo significant. rists with popular views of air power (including Sherry argues that because no clear determi NET ASSESSMENT 83

nation of the political center of gravity was air power theory (or World War II. or strategy), made, a wasteful and aimless strategic bombing the author’s omissions, predispositions, and ad campaign resulted. This argument, of course, monitions would not provide a sufficiently assumes that a susceptible center of gravity was broad view of these big topics. available, that it could be identified, and that strategists would recognize the information as Maj Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF AFB, Alabama reliable. Sherry postulates that the Japanese cab Maxwell inet was the political center of gravity and that less costly measures such as interdiction of Secret Intelligence: The Inside Story of Am eri transportation might have induced surrender, at ca’s Espionage Empire by Ernest Volkman and reduced cost in lives (whether Japanese or Blaine Baggett. New York 10016: Doubleday. American or both is not clearly spelled out). One 1989. 266 pages. $19.95. should keep in mind that "a clear and accurate model of how the enemy thought and how This self-professed “brilliant popular history” destruction might compel his surrender" (239) of America’s espionage empire will probably is the Holy Grail that strategists have always result in more confusion than answers. Out- sought. w’ardly. the book seeks to take the reader into the Sherry's idea of identifying a single, minimum- dark depths of A m erica’s intelligence com m u effort strategy and his criticism of the simul nity but does so by presenting a confusing taneous pursuit of m ultiple strategies in the history and concludes with a vague warning that Pacific should be treated with caution. Because intelligence-collection capabilities can be a the lives of m en and the future of nations threat to our own constitutional rights. Surely, are involved, strategists are wise to adopt mutu this idea is nothing new! ally supporting strategies. Rigorous approaches The book begins with a vividly written sce chosen to increase the certainty of victory— as nario. giving a brief account of the A m erican opposed to chancy, dispersed, or excessive intervention during the Bolshevik revolution. efforts— appear to be proper responses to war's From this interesting starting point, the authors most basic condition: uncertainty. then present converging and confusing accounts This brings up the most serious flaw in Sher about the rudimentary pre-World War II Am eri ry s book, if taken as history. Military errors or can intelligence efforts, and the reader is unsure excesses, by their very cost in lives, should if these efforts are directed more against foreign compel examination of how decisions were targets or US citizens. From there, in increas made by individuals who were there with infor ingly broad strokes. Volkman and Baggett begin mation then on hand. Learning about decisions to recount som e historical events involving in depends on a rigor of chronology that this book telligence. loses in seeking the "calculus of blam e." With For example, they roundly condem n Pearl hindsight, it is easy for us to see factors that Harbor as an intelligence failure. Yet those who decisionmakers didn’t know they were ignorant have read W ohlstetter and Prange’s extensively of, as well as events not yet know n to these researched accounts may wonder if intelligence actors. The effectiveness of the atom ic bomb and data was sim ply not acted upon rather than even its consequences are presented as if they unavailable. The intelligence difficulties cited were known before the Trinity explosion, while are well known and add nothing to the Pearl certainty of victory is presumed early on. Heavy Harbor controversy. The critical battle of Mid reliance on postwar sources and the omission of way, which was won largely due to good intel the most objective evidence for or against ligence, is dealt with in one sentence. The "fanaticism ”— the rules of engagement— weaken authors ignore a golden opportunity to show Sherry's calculus. what good intelligence collection and analysis For the reader with some background in the can do. But it seems here, as is the case through history of air power, strategy, and the history of out the book, that they favor the sensationalist W orld W ar II. S h erry offers m u ch w o rth w h ile point of view. food for thought. For the prepared reader, his Concerning more recent events— nowhere is detailed exposition of the costs of nuclear stra Penkovsky mentioned— reconnaissance aircraft, tegic thinking provides a useful vehicle for ex satellites, and collection techniques are scarcely am ining past mistakes to avoid repeating them. even alluded to (certainly not described), and But if this book were a reader’s introduction to the Cuban m issile crisis is dealt with in but two 84 AIRPOIVER JOURNAL SPRING 1990

paragraphs. Worse, the book's chronology would any military theory. As a result, Cimbala argues make Faulkner rejoice. Chapter 11, “Desert that our nuclear doctrine rests on strategizing, One,” begins with a cursory account of the tragic w hich inspires erroneous policy decisions, rescue attempt; jumps to President Carter’s in rather than strategy. telligence policies; covers Allende’s overthrow According to the author, strategizing is nu in Chile, the Portuguese withdrawal in Angola, clear strategy divorced from strategy proper. In a the Soviet brigade in Cuba, the shah of Iran’s pseudoscientific way, it assumes precision and overthrow; and ends with Ronald Reagan com exactitude in warfare. It does not completely ing to power. None of these diverse, complex deal with the collective impact of operational, topics are covered beyond the most superficial social, and logistical factors. It further ignores level, much less in depth. the reciprocal relationship between war and Overall, the book devotes itself to intellectual policy and thus leads to a nuclear strategy that is sensationalism under the guise of providing a asocietal and ahistorical. work that will help US citizens protect their Given its utilitarian bent, Cimbala notes that constitutional rights. But in fact it provides strategizing blinds policymakers to an uncom nothing new; nor does it even shed new light on fortable truth: one can rationally conduct an familiar topics. It concludes with the observa irrational war with stupid political objectives in tion that intelligence activities need to be mind. Strategizing also obscures the distinction closely monitored—scarcely an original idea. between diplomacy based on a balance of terror and that found in a traditional balance-of-power Baggett is involved in the PBS television series system. As a result, the author argues that cur "Secret Intelligence,” and the book seems to be rent planners wrongly believe the reasoned use merely a printed version of that series. But what of nuclear forces to gain limited objectives is works on video, with interviews and footage, possible within a balance of terror. In fact, the just doesn’t work well in print. While there is opposite is true. To Cimbala, nuclear war cannot much information of interest to the popular function as an extension of politics by other audience, this book has been done before, and it means because it is uncontrollable and cannot has been done much better. If you are interested ensure victory in the traditional meaning of the in a good, popular, intelligence history with word. Clearly, strategizing and its Jominian em outstanding illustrations, try William Kennedy’s phasis on rational control and predictability is a Intelligence War. blind alley. Capt Joseph H. Murphy, USAF Another problem that afflicts our current nu US A ir Force Academy. Colorado clear strategy is scientism. According to the author, scientism is a self-defeating approxima tion of science. It is a commingling of facts, values, and biases that focus on firepower ratios Nuclear Strategizing: Deterrence and Reality by Stephen J. Cimbala. New York 10010: Praeger and other quantifiable irrelevancies. It substi Publishers. 1988, 306 pages. $45.00. tutes cost-effectiveness and payoff tables for true strategy. As a result, scientism also contributes In this intricately reasoned study, Stephen J. to mistaken assumptions. Planners fretted over Cimbala ‘offers a Clausewitzian critique of our an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) win current nuclear deterrence strategy. According dow of vulnerability in the early 1980s while a to the author, US deterrence doctrine is too shift to diversified deterrence, which included mechanistic. It may seem a rational response to new mobile missiles of various kinds, made a dangerous predicament, but the rationality the controversy irrelevant. NATO, and West behind nuclear deterrence is conditional. Secu Germany especially, subscribe to a militarily rity planners may try to account for all the untenable forward strategy and expects to com variables in a thermonuclear war. but that task is pensate for it with improved gadgetry. Policy impossible. Conditional rationality leaves out or makers seem to believe that limited nuclear improperly accounts for intangibles like in war is possible and that it ensures both escala stincts about life and death, feelings about na tion control and success at acceptable costs. tional honor, and the impact of pride and fear. It All these muddleheaded beliefs, according to tries to substitute a well-calibrated decision Cimbala. spring from scientism and its substitu making process for the recognition that the “fog tion of marginal utility theory for a strategy that and friction” of war are inescapable features of includes the human element in war. NET ASSESSMENT 85

What is the solution to these problems? Cim- found in nuclear strategizing. Yet, even though bala argues that we should adopt the right kind the author’s language suggests a personal search of rationality to act as the foundation of for the formalized control that he condem ns deterrence— the rationality of coping. In lieu of elsewhere, this work makes a powerful point strategizing and scientism, where you bend re about our nuclear strategy not being truly ratio ality to fit rigid intellectual constructs, the ratio nal. nality of coping encourages you to live with Capt Peter R. Faber, USAF conditions instead of trying to triumph over US A ir Force Academy, Colorado them. It stresses accepting limits rather than searching for options that an opponent might misconstrue as hostile. It further emphasizes avoiding military and political situations that The Shield of Faith: A C hronicle of Strategic lead to trouble. Defense from Zeppelins to Star Wars by Barry The strategy of coping thus accounts for “fric Bruce-Briggs. New York 11)020: Simon and tions.” It recognizes there is no cross-national Schuster, Inc., 1988. 464 pages, $22.95. logic of deterrence. As a result, a coping strategy focuses on avoiding hostilities rather than fixat This book is exactly what it claims to be, a ing on how to control and terminate a nuclear chronicle rather than a history. Barry Bruce- war. It acknowledges the need for reduced nu Briggs—who worked for Herman Kahn's Hud clear arsenals and changes in their character. son Institute from 1969 to 1983, followed by a Finally, a coping strategy calls for well- brief assignment at the Futures Branch in the rehearsed leaders who, rather than adhere to a Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War previously advertised course of action, shape College—has put together his recollections of their ends and means based on a real-time strategic defense issues "based almost entirely approxim ation of goals. M usclebound strate upon hanging around the courts and camps of gizing and scientism would thus yield to an the Business.” He defines the "Business" as the approach that accommodates the internal con national security apparatus made up of politi tradictions in our deterrence policy. cians, soldiers, engineers, and think-tank ana When it comes to exposing the internal con lysts. Defense is a “Good Thing,” according to tradictions of a deterrence strategy based on the author, but convincing the decisionmakers strategizing and scientism , this is a splendid to develop and implement defensive weapons book. The author shows with surgical precision has had its ups and downs. Bruce-Briggs leads !that a credible deterrence is not necessarily a the reader down a bumpy road, pointing out moral or rational one, that ballistic m issile de along the way the rise and fall of numerous fenses may underm ine stability and actually continental air defense and antibal 1 istic missile iencourage a nuclear first strike, and that ex (ABM) weapon schemes. His unsurprising con pended deterrence in NATO rests on dubious clusion is that defensive systems have generally jwar scenarios. taken second billing to offensive weapons. For On the other hand, the continuing flux sur example, during the Eisenhower administration, rounding nuclear issues may quickly date antiaircraft guns, air-to-air missiles, and Nike (portions of this book. Secretary M ikhail Gor Hercules air defense missiles could not compete bachev's concept of "reasonable sufficiency” with the Department of Defense's priority to and its potential impact on our nuclear strategy build B-52 bombers for the Strategic Air Com gets short shrift. The current scaling back of mand (SAC) and later nuclear-tipped intercon som e ballistic m issile defense programs also tinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). receives limited recognition, as does the US With the proliferation of ICBMs under Presi Navy's apparent shift away from the maritime dent Kennedy, and his decision to drop the B-70 strategy advocated by John Lehman. Finally, this bomber, attention shifted from SAC bombers to is a work that uses “technostrategic” language. Minuteman and Polaris missiles as the primary Those who have a distaste for the never-never means to win any future war. The defense as land of abstraction, where critics of nuclear sumed the role of "defending the deterrent”— bolicy use elaborate and sanitized euphemisms the strategic offensive forces. This meant lor an ugly subject, may find this book hard hardening Minuteman silos, building an invul going. Ironically, the author's use of ‘‘nuke nerable command post inside the Cheyenne ppeak involves using the very sam e language Mountain Complex, and paying lip service to a 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1990 plan for building a network of fallout shelters In terms of balance, the book focuses primar throughout the country as an “insurance policy” ily on the evolution of defense programs from to protect the general population. These passive the 1950s through the 1970s. Although the measures failed to satisfy the proponents of an reader might expect to find a lengthy coverage of active defense who lobbied for and briefly suc Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative because of ceeded in installing the nation's only ABM sys the book's title, this subject appears mainly as an tem, Safeguard. afterthought in a brief epilogue. The author is What is frustrating about this book is that in very effective in describing the personalities and spite of the author’s preference for the defense, behavior of the think-tank experts who were he provides a strong case for the offense. constantly wheeling and dealing in their quest Throughout he highlights the think-tank and for government contracts. Based on interviews, government studies that showed ABM systems experience, and knowledge obtained from were not cost-effective or were plagued with "hanging out," he presents some interesting and technical shortcomings. The problems of the humorous vignettes on the Herman Kahns of the perimeter acquisition radars, the sorting out of Hudson Institute, the Albert Wohlstetters and reentry vehicles from decoys, the difficulties of Harry Rowens of the Rand Corporation, and multiple retargeting, the extremely demanding numerous others from the Massachusetts Insti task of maintaining a high reliability for "hitting tute of Technology Research (MITRE) Corpora tion and private contractors. He also does an a bullet with a bullet,” and the enormous ex excellent job of identifying and tracing the ca pense of keeping the system operational all reers of lesser-known luminaries in government contributed to the demise of Safeguard and and the private sector who played an important prevented other systems from getting under role in building a strong case for strategic de way. What Bruce-Briggs does not adequately fense. answer is. with limited resources, why should How does one rate this book? It depends. If large investments have been made in defensive you want anecdotes and an overview of the weapons? Even when the cost of a system seems debate on offensive and defensive strategic sys to favor the defense there are inconsistencies in the discussion. While the writer points out that tems, then this will be a useful source. If you are looking beyond that for an explanation or inter “the great virtue of fallout shelters was . . . that pretation as to why those events occurred as they were cheap" (p. 119), Eisenhower was they did, you will have to look elsewhere. "flabbergasted" by the excessive cost of blast and fallout shelters presented bv his advisers (p. Dr Robert W. Duffner 130). Kirtland AFB. New Mexico notams

Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and other professional notices of a noncommercial nature should be sent to the Editor, Airpovver Journal. Walker Hall. Bldg 1400, Maxivell AFB AL 36112-5532. IVe reserve the right to edit material for length and editorial content.

Air University Review Index concerning attendance or submission of papers The Air University Press is in the process of should be addressed to Lt Col Dave Porter or Maj publishing a complete index of the Air Univer Lee Lever, USAFA/DFBL. US Air Force Acad sity Review (1947-1987). This two-volume in emy CO 80840-5701. Telephone inquiries to dex will contain an author index, a title index, AUTOVON 259-3860 or (719) 472-3860. and a cross-referenced subject index. Any Air Force or other government organization, college Space Logistics Sym posium or university library, or similar organization The Third Space Logistics Symposium will be with a need for this index can be placed on held from 30 April to 2 May 1990 in Colorado distribution. Requests for distribution and other Springs, Colorado. The topic of the conference is inquiries should be addressed to Maj M. A. "Space Logistics in Transition—The Shift from Kirtland. CADRE RI. Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB R&D and Experimental to Operational Systems." AL 36112-5532. Major Kirtland can also be con Inquiries concerning the conference should be tacted at AUTOVON 875-6629 or (205) 293- sent to Mr David P. Martin. Science Applica 6629. tions International Corporation, 2860 S. Circle Drive. Suite 2400, Colorado Springs CO 80906. Army Aviation Convention

The Army Aviation Association of Am erica will USAFA M ilitary History Sym posium hold its annual convention from 11-15 April The Air Force Academy’s Department of History 1990 in Orlando, Florida. The theme for this will host the Fourteenth Military History Sym year’s convention is "Arm y Aviation in a Chang posium at the academy from 17-19 October ing W orld.” For more information, contact 1990. This year’s topic is “Vietnam. 1964-1973: AAAA. 49 Richmondville Avenue, Westport CT An American Dilemma.” Sessions will be con 06880-2000 or call (203) 226-8184. ducted on Vietnam War scholarship, the war during the Johnson and Nixon eras, and Viet Psychology in DOD Symposium namese perspectives of the war. The symposium The Department of Behavioral Sciences and also features the Harmon Memorial Lecture. For Leadership at the US Air Force Academv will more information, contact Capt Scott Elder. De host the Twelfth Biennial Psychology in the partment of History. US Air Force Academv CO Department of Defense Symposium from 18-20 80840-5701 or call AUTOVON 259-3232 or April 1990 at the Air Force Academy. Inquiries (719) 472-3232.

87 contributors

Andrews AFB. Maryland. Formerly, he was a curator at the National Air and Space Museum. Washington. D.C., c hief historian of the Air Force Flight Test Center. Edwards AFB. Cal ifornia: and director of a special staff office for the Aeronautical Systems Division. Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio. Dr Hallion taught at the Army War College during 1987-88 as the Harold Keith lohnson Visiting Profes sor at the Military History Institute.

Capl George W. Cully (BA. Old Do Maj Gen Dale O. Smith. USAF. Re minion University: |D. University ol tired (USMA; VIA and EdD. Stanford Virginia School of Law) is chief. In University), was last assigned as a quiries Division. US Air Force Histor member of the loint Strategic Survey ical Research Center. Maxwell AFB. Council. |oint Chiefs of Staff. He was Alabama. He has been a staff histo special assistant for arms control to rian at the Air Force Operational Test the joint Chiefs of Staff from 1961 and Evaluation Center, Kirtland AFB. until 1964. General Smith retired in New Mexico; a circuit trial counsel in 1964 and has since devoted his time the US Air Force 1st Judicial Circuit: to writing and consultant work He is and an area defense counsel at Dovet the author of US Military Doctrine AFB. Delaware. (1955), The Eagle's Talons (1966). Cradle of Valor (1988). and coauthor Harrv F. Noyes III (BA. University of with Gen Curtis LeMay of America Is the South: MA. University of Hawaii) in Danger (1968). His articles have served four years of active duty in the been published in Air Force, The Air Force after his ROTC commis Retired Officer, and the Aerospace sioning in 1967. He was an informa Historian. General Smith is a gradu tion officer at Norton AFB, California, ate of Air War College. and Yokota AB. |apan. and a film researcher-scenarist at Tan Son Nhut AB. South Vietnam. Presently a civil ian public affairs specialist at Head quarters US Army Health Services Command. Fort Sam Houston. Texas, he has been editor of the joint Army- Air Force Wiesbaden Post. Wies baden Military Community. West Germany, and a reporter covering military affairs at Fort Hood. Texas, for the Killeen Daily Herald. He has written articles for a variety of publi Maj Roger F. Kropf (BA. University ol cations. California at Los Angeles: MS. Ail Force Institute ol Technology) is as^ signed to the 48th Tactical Fightet Wing. RAF Lakenheath. United King-; dom. His assignments have include* tours in F-l 1 Is at Cannon AFB. New Mexico, and RAF Lakenheath. Ha was also stationed at Space System Richard P. Hallion (PhD. University Division. Los Angeles AFB. Califor of Maryland) is executive historian. nia. Major Kropf is a graduate ol Advanced Projects Office. Headquar Squadron Officer School and A! ters Air Force Systems Command. Command and Staff College.

88 BOARD OF ADVISKRS Col Kenneth J. Alnwick. IJSAF. Retired, Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom . IJSA F, Office of Air Force History Brig Gen James L. Cole, Jr.. IJSAF. Inspector General. M ilitary A irlift Command Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr., IJSAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR. Retired. Duke University Dr Richard H. Kohn. Chief, Office of Air Force History

The Airpower Journal (ISSN 0897-0823), Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2, is published quarterly. Subscriptions are available from the Superin tendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Annual rates are $9.50 domestic and $11.90 outside the United States. The GPO stock number is 708-007-00000-5. The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts. Address them to Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-5532. Submit double-spaced, typed manuscripts in duplicate. Journal telephone listings are AUTOVON 875-5322 and commercial (205) 293-5322. Coming Next Soviet Naval Aviation Air Force War Gaming