Air Interdiction Is Not So Crisply Battlefield Support in Virtually All Its As Defined
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JOURNAL Spring 1990 Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Sidney J. Wise Editor Col Keith W. Geiger Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Dorothy M. McCluskie. Production Manager Steven C. Garst, Art Director and Illustrator The Airpower journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If repro duced, the Airpower journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL STRING 1990, Vol. IV, No. I AFRP 50 -2 Editorial 2 How to Get Promoted \laj Gen Dale O. Smith, USAF, Retired 4 Battlefield Air Support: A Retrospective Assessment Dr Richard P. Hallion 8 The US Air Force In Korea: Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air Power Maj Roger F. Kropf, USAF 3 0 A Kind of Deja Vu: Some Historical Perspectives on Cruise Missile Defense Capt George W. Cully, USAF 4 7 Air and Space Forces: The One Endures as the Other Emerges Harry F. Noyes III 6 2 Ricochets 3 Letters Net Assessment 7 3 Reviews of Current Literature Notams 8 7 Notices of Interest Contributors 88 EDITORIAL rations. Now we must rethink the threat. Now That We’ve Won We must not become mired in a doctrine, a strategy, or an organizational structure that World War III has been overcome by world events. The potential removal of a threat in Europe does not mean that there are no other threats in ecent events in Eastern Europe have the world. It does mean that we must con created a strange possibility: World War sider what those threats are and how we 111 may be over! For the American military can best prepare for them. We must be R open-minded as we rethink the threat—and the changes in Europe have created two challenges: how to handle the changing we must use the best minds available. Soviet threat and how to deal with other The questions that we must answer are threats in the world around us. Within numerous. They must have honest answers. these two challenges lies an important Those answers must be given without re point to remember—world peace has not gard to sacred cows or “gold w-atches.” We suddenly broken out. cannot afford to develop a horse-cavalry Our first challenge is to remember that mentality, more concerned with preserving the Warsaw Pact military threat still exists. traditional turf than preparing for the fu Walls that are torn down rapidly can be ture. We must begin by asking the most rebuilt just as rapidly. The civilian world basic questions and building from the hears the peaceful rhetoric and assumes answers. The Air Corps pioneers were con that actions will automatically follow. The sidered to be among the most innovative military cannot afford to be that optimistic. and forward-looking of military officers— The threat in Europe appears to have sig visionaries who prepared for the future nificantly diminished in recent months. without being tied to the past. We need to But we must remember that the MiGs are approach our present situation with that still ready to fly and the tanks are still same positive and open type of thinking. pointed west. Their numbers have not yet Insurgency warfare, drug interdiction, diminished. increased airlift requirements, and many While we remain vigilant, we cannot more issues face us. We cannot simply afford to hide our heads in the sand. We force our traditional thinking on these new face very real changes in the future, and we issues. The role of space, of unmanned air must prepare to deal with them. Virtually vehicles, and of joint operations must not all of us‘serving in the military today, from be looked upon as threats to the Air Force the newest airman basic to our most senior but as opportunities to do our job more general officers, have lived with the Soviet efficiently. The way we answer these ques threat our entire lives, certainly our entire tions will determine how capable our mil adult lives. It has been a fact of life for itary is to face the challenges in the years to the last 40 years that the main threat was come. war with the Soviets in Europe. We based Throughout it all. the job of the Air Force our military planning and our operational remains to fly and to fight. But we must structure around it. The concern over the prepare now for the next war, not the last next European war dominated our thinking one. As Gen Sir Archibald Wavell reminds during the Korean War. It caused us to view us, "The ideal officer should be afraid of both the Korean and Vietnam wars as aber nothing, not even a new idea." MAK 2 ricochets Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre equipment. There was a short delay, and I had spondence should be addressed to the Editor. some time to talk with him. I learned several Airpower Journal. Walker Hall. Maxwell AFB things. This “soldier” was not issued a helmet, AL 36112-5532. We r e s e r v e the right to edit the web belt, ammo pouch, canteen, or first aid material for overall length. pouch. He was not assigned a personal weapon and fired one only once a year, if at all. He knew nothing of even the most basic infantry tactics. He expected the SPs and the Army to defend AIR BASE DEFENSE PROBLEMS him. Worse than that, having lifted us and I recently read with interest an article in the Fall our equipment and being on an 8-to-5 work 1989 Airpower Journal entitled "To Protect an schedule, he decided that the job was finished Air Base" by Brig Gen Raymond E. Bell. Jr. It whether we were done or not. So he departed, caused me to reflect upon my recent experiences leaving us stuck 30 feet in the air! My impres in Panama during Operation Nimrod Dancer. I sion of most personnel I met (excluding forward deployed in May 1989 attached to Delta Com air controllers and pilots) was that they were pany. 1st Battalion. 61st Infantry (Mech.)—part technicians in uniform and not real soldiers. of the 5th Infantry Division (Mech.) at Fort Polk. My belief is that the Air Force is paying lip Louisiana. I would like to share my impressions service to base defense and is really expecting of air base defense that I gained there. the Army to take on this unglamorous mission. The Air Force is not serious about air base It is giving only paltry resources to those forces defense. Admittedly, the Air Force's primary it must have. Most Air Force personnel I met interest is in aircraft. However, it seems that if were highly intelligent, motivated, and capable some attention is not paid to base defense, there people, but when it came to base defense, we will be no aircraft to sortie. We received occa thought of them as prima donna fly-boys who sional visits from a high-ranking Air Force of were unwilling to stoop to this work and ex ficer who seemed to spend most of his time pected the lowly Army to do it for them. complaining about how our Ml 13 armored per It is obvious that the interests of the Air Force sonnel carriers were tearing up the grass. He did are and should be centered on aircraft. The not seem very interested in our defensive dispo article quite rightly stated that the air wing sitions. commander's mission is to generate as many The Security Police (SP) are impressive. I sorties as possible. The article also makes the think that the older SPs were primarily inter point that if the air base is not defended, there ested in law enforcement, and only the younger may be no aircraft to sortie. It’s apparent to me ones were interested in base defense (it's the that if the Air Force is serious about base de same way in the Army, where most military fense, it must realize that it is going to have to do police (MP) I have met really want to be police). it by itself in all but level III threat situations. An I think that the Air Force air base defense air base is a priority target for Soviet airborne, doctrine is deficient in organization, equipment, Spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units because it and command emphasis to support these im contains nuclear delivery means. Army units pressive men and women. It seemed to me while could be totally absorbed in heavy fighting. I was in Panama that the health of the grass was According to an MP officer I know, there are not more important than the security of the air base. nearly enough MPs for all the missions they Ground personnel other than SPs were unim have been assigned.